AIR FORCE DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 3-99

SPACE DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 3-99

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE

AIR FORCE ROLE IN
JOINT ALL-DOMAIN
OPERATIONS

U.S. SPACE FORCE

19 November 2021
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The Department of the Air Force, for the first time since becoming a multi-Service
organization, presents unified operational doctrine for the entire department. This
Department of the Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-99, The Department of the Air
Force Role in Joint All-Domain Operations, is a guiding doctrinal statement of the
way ahead for both Services in the vital and growing area of joint all-domain
operations. Each Service contributes to the full range of forces and capabilities
made available to the joint force commander. Together, they provide the
incomparable ability to exploit air and space in the service of our Nation.
WILLIAM G. HOLT SHAWN N. BRATTON
Major General, USAF Brigadier General, USAF
Commander, LeMay Center for Doctrine Commander, Space Training
Development and Education and Readiness Command
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Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-99

Space Force Doctrine Publication 3-99
Department of the Air Force Role in Joint All-Domain
Operations

Table of Contents
CHAPTER 1: JOINT ALL-DOMAIN OPERATIONS ....................................................... 1
JADO PRINCIPLES..................................................................................................... 1
THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM ............................................................................. 2
DEFINITIONS .............................................................................................................. 4
CHAPTER 2: COMMAND AND CONTROL ................................................................... 5
PLANNING .................................................................................................................. 6
EXECUTION ................................................................................................................ 8
ASSESSMENT ............................................................................................................ 9
CHAPTER 3: INFORMATION ...................................................................................... 10
OPERATIONS IN THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (OIE) ............................... 10
CHAPTER 4: INTELLIGENCE ..................................................................................... 13
PLANNING ................................................................................................................ 14
CHAPTER 5: FIRES ..................................................................................................... 15
CONVERGENCE ....................................................................................................... 15
TARGETING AND FIRES INTEGRATION ................................................................ 15
CHAPTER 6: MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER ............................................................. 17
CHAPTER 7: PROTECTION ........................................................................................ 19
AGILE COMBAT EMPLOYMENT (ACE) .................................................................. 19
CHAPTER 8: SUSTAINMENT ...................................................................................... 21
MANEUVER LOGISTICS .......................................................................................... 21
APPENDIX A: DOMAINS, ENVIRONMENTS AND ELEMENTS ................................. 23
APPENDIX B: AGILE COMBAT EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS ....................... 24
APPENDIX C: DEGREES OF HUMAN AND MACHINE CONTROL ........................... 26
APPENDIX D: JOINT ALL-DOMAIN DOCTRINAL GAPS ........................................... 27
APPENDIX E: CONCEPTS TO DOCTRINE CYCLE .................................................... 29
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“The Air Force organizes, trains, and equips forces to be an air component to a
joint force commander (JFC). As part of the joint force’s air component, our
forces must be prepared to accomplish JFC objectives. The air component
commander’s administrative authorities are derived from Title 10, U.S. Code,
and exercised as the commander, Air Force
This vignette forces
box goes (COMAFFOR).
into ALL The air
component commander’s AFDPs operational authorities
on the page are delegated from the JFC
and exercised as both theimmediately
COMAFFOR, over
after theAirTOC.
Force Forces, and as the
The
functional joint force air component
vignette will be the only thing on over joint air forces
commander (JFACC),
made available for tasking.thisThus, the air component commander leads Air
page.
Force forces as the COMAFFOR and the JFC’s joint air operations as the
JFACC. This duality of authorities is expressed in the axiom: Airmen work for
Airmen and the senior Airman works for the JFC.”
--Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 1, The Air Force
Since the COMAFFOR and JFACC are nearly always the same individual,
this AFDP will use the term “air component commander” when referring
to duties or functions that could be carried out by either or both, unless
explicit use of the term “COMAFFOR” or “JFACC” is necessary for clarity.
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CHAPTER 1: JOINT ALL-DOMAIN OPERATIONS

This doctrine publication establishes a framework for air and space components
supporting joint all-domain operations (JADO). The framework combines a vision of
JADO with near-term practical approaches grounded in operational experience and
battle-tested processes for operational planning, execution, and assessment. This
publication guides the Department of the Air Force (DAF) in organizing and employing
the full range of forces and capabilities presented to a joint force commander (JFC).
Experiments, wargames, and exercises continue to refine JADO operational principles.
This publication’s role, as emerging doctrine, is depicted in Appendix E. Its desired
outcomes are:

 Describe the need for joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) structures.

 Accelerate and increase capacity to develop and exploit decision-quality information.

 Organize, train, and equip forces to converge effects in multiple domains in

operationally-relevant timeframes.

 Improve and increase the options by which the joint force can succeed while cutting
off adversary pathways for success.

The DAF’s ability to operate is challenged by anti-access and area denial threats and
the rapid proliferation of advanced technologies that restrict freedom of maneuver. The
DAF does not fight alone and joint force operations are increasingly interconnected,
interdependent, and challenged. This operating environment requires the DAF and
Department of Defense (DOD) to examine how forces will sense, plan, decide, and act
in concert across all domains to gain the freedom of action necessary for success.
Success requires the convergence of effects globally, across all domains, to
consecutively or simultaneously present an adversary with multiple dilemmas.
Synergistic employment of capabilities in different
domains enhances effectiveness and compensates for A dilemma is a situation in
vulnerabilities, creating outcomes not readily attainable which one must make a
through single-domain action. Such dilemmas, when difficult choice between
presented at an operational tempo that complicates or two or more alternatives,
negates an adversary’s response, enable the joint often equally undesirable.
force to operate inside an adversary’s decision cycle.

JADO PRINCIPLES
 Mission Command through centralized command, distributed control, and
decentralized execution through mission-type orders (MTO) when appropriate.

 Delegation of authority to lower echelons and to other component and Service

leaders as required.

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 Information sharing.

 Integrated multi-domain planning.

 Risk identification and mitigation.

 Synergistic effects.

 Flexibility and Versatility.

 Concentration.

Functions of the military departments are codified in DOD Directive 5100.01, Functions
of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components. Though the directive
promotes unity of command and unity of effort within each domain, it also allows for
stovepiped operations and limited integration, planning, and synergy between activities.
This creates vulnerabilities and reduces dynamic exploitation of emergent opportunities.
Conversely, a joint all-domain approach leverages the joint force’s full capability and
permits lower-level integration in operationally-relevant timeframes.

Current decision-making processes (e.g., the joint planning process) employ linear
planning and force synchronization to execute operations. These operations lead to
continuous cycles of heightened activity followed by a period of reduced activity. Current
processes can be slow and predictable; peer competition requires processes that create
adversary dilemmas by facilitating rapid synchronization of effects. This requires
continuous and iterative, near-term tactical planning, longer-term operational planning,
and campaign refinement as conditions change. Reframing integration and
synchronization in this manner allows for sustained and dynamic combat operations.

THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM

The DAF presents forces to the JFC and synergizes and integrates capabilities into
JADO across the competition continuum. Those forces operate principally in the air,
space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). Appendix A depicts the
relationships between DOD domains and their associated elements.

The competition continuum is presented in Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, Competition

Continuum. The doctrine note describes a comprehensive and flexible spectrum of
strategic relations between the United States and other actors. The competition
continuum, rather than a world either at peace or at war, describes a world of enduring
competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation, competition below armed
conflict, and armed conflict. The joint force is never solely in cooperation (or in
competition below armed conflict or in armed conflict) but instead campaigns through a
mixture of cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict calculated

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to achieve the desired strategic objectives.1 The competition continuum describes the
environment and how the United States government applies instruments of national
power across the continuum.

Key points are:

“The reemergence of long-term
 Cooperation: Mutually beneficial strategic competition, rapid dispersion
relationships with compatible of technologies, and new concepts of
interests. warfare and competition that span the
entire spectrum of conflict require a
 Competition: Relationships with Joint Force structured to match this
incompatible interests–none seeking reality.”
to escalate to armed conflict.
National Defense Strategy of the
 Armed conflict: A situation in which United States of America, 2018
combat is the primary means to [unclassified summary]
satisfy interests.

Air and space forces support JADO across the competition continuum, as shown
through examples in the figure below.

JADO Across the Competition Continuum

Continuum region Joint all-domain operations, activities, and investments

 Improve partner nation interoperability.

 Obtain and maintain all-domain access enabling global
Cooperation reach and rapid projection of military power.
 Establish cooperative sharing agreements improving
mutual support in crisis response.

 Incorporate all-domain approaches into flexible deterrent

options.
Competition  Expose and counter malign influence.
 Maintain freedom of access and maneuver in the global
commons.

 Gain information advantage.

 Project global combat power.
 Integrate and synchronize action in, from, or through all
Armed Conflict
domains to gain and maintain theater access.
 Overmatch adversary forces at decisive points.
 Preserve combat capability to conduct future operations.

1 Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, Competition Continuum

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DEFINITIONS

Domain: A sphere of activity or influence with common and distinct characteristics in

which a force can conduct joint functions.2

Decision Advantage: The product of situational understanding, the ability to assure

and exchange information, make and communicate decisions by maintaining
advantages in all domains.

Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO): Comprised of air, land, maritime, cyberspace,

and space domains, plus the EMS. Actions by the joint force in multiple domains
integrated in planning and synchronized in execution, at speed and scale needed to
gain advantage and accomplish the mission.

Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2): The art and science of decision-
making to rapidly translate decisions into action and leverage capabilities across all
domains, with mission partners, to achieve operational and informational advantage in
both competition and conflict.

Information Advantage: A condition in the information environment, favorable to

achievement of a commander’s objectives, achieved through the application of
information capabilities and influence, that results in a comparative advantage to
support all-domain operations. This includes targeting an adversary’s ability to conduct
C2 through observing, interpreting, and acting.

Information advantage can be achieved by deliberately using information to:

 Influence relevant actors.

 Inform target audiences.

 Attack, exploit, and defend information, information networks, and systems.

 Support decision-making.

2 Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, describes the operational environment as encompassing
the physical domains of air, land, maritime, and space; the information environment, which includes the
cyberspace domain; and the EMS. It also describes the joint functions as related capabilities grouped to
help commanders integrate, synchronize, and direct operations. The joint functions are C2, information,
intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Also refer to Appendix A for a
graphical depiction.

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CHAPTER 2: COMMAND AND CONTROL

DOD strategy defines JADC2 as “the warfighting capability to sense, make sense, and
act at all levels and phases of war, across all functional areas, domains, and with
partners, to deliver information advantage at the speed of relevance.”3 The DAF’s vision
for C2 provides an alternate but complementary definition: JADC2 ─ the art and science
of decision-making to rapidly translate decisions into action and leverage capabilities
across all domains, with mission partners, to achieve operational and informational
advantage in both competition and conflict. It is the natural extension of C2 across
domains and functional components and is essential for JADO. The DAF’s vision
for JADC2 connects distributed sensors, shooters, and data across all domains, to all
forces, to enable mission command for the scaled, coordinated exercise of authority to
integrate planning and ensure the convergence of effects across a dynamic battlespace.
The convergence of effects in all domains requires:

 Robust, resilient, and distributed C2 enterprise capable of simultaneous C2 of multiple

domains.

 Unity of effort through shared understanding of commander's intent.

 A shared understanding of the operational environment.

 Integrating global and geographically-focused forces and capabilities with effective

command relationships.

 Secure, adaptable, interoperable (joint and allied partners), and integrated data
networks to provide information synthesis, distributed decision-making, and
assessment.

 Operating with agility and resilience through MTO and delegation of authority at
each echelon.

The airpower tenet, mission command, guides the C2 of joint air operations. It is
executed through centralized command, distributed control, and decentralized execution
(AFDP 1, The Air Force). Mission command empowers subordinate decision making
through MTO to provide resiliency and flexibility required for JADC2. Mission command
provides the greatest freedom of action proportional to acceptable risk. Commanders
should determine and delegate levels of control based on the operating environment.
Exceptions to the use of MTO are when authorities for operations are held at the
highest levels, such as nuclear operations.

To actualize JADC2, the DAF’s solution calls for a C2 construct composed of processes
and systems that compress decision making cycles and facilitate convergence of effects

3
DOD JADC2 Strategy & DOD JADC2 Posture Review, (Washington, DC:
OSD, 2020)

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across domains to enable globally integrated operations. The four key elements of this
construct are:

 Sensing Grid

 Advanced Networking

 Decision Making

 Authorities & Effects Delivery

These elements provide the capability to observe the environment, share information to
make sense of the environment, enhance decision making, and convergence effects to
overwhelm an adversary.

Effective JADC2 requires communications architectures that are distributed, robust, and
resilient in nature. Similarly, information and intelligence should be accessible and
shared at all echelons. The sensing grid harnesses information and applies automated
data processing through artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) to provide
data to warfighters. This data is transferred across domains and classification
boundaries through an integrated, resilient, self-healing advanced network. JADC2
architectures should ensure interoperability with allies, partner nations, and agencies,
enable integration into central C2 nodes, and simultaneously provide the ability to
operate independently at the tactical edge, disconnected from C2. This all-domain data
enables decision-makers to understand relationships between information from different
domains with acceleration provided
by AI and ML capabilities. Cross- “We need purple command and control. It
domain perspectives provide insight takes too long for us to do air command and
on impacts to the joint force, and control, and ground command and control, and
ways to enhance or mitigate those navy command and control, and then try to
impacts. These capabilities combine come back together and talk about what we are
to achieve decision advantage, and going to do.”
translate it into operational-
advantage, through the integrated, -- General James M. Holmes, USAF, Retired,
synchronized convergence of lethal Commander, Air Combat Command (2020)
and non-lethal effects across all
domains. Human-Machine
relationships are further discussed in Appendix C

PLANNING

JADC2 requires an appropriate level of distributed control, decentralized execution,

delegated authority, and less dependence on central planning and mission direction
than recent, low-intensity conflict operations. Decentralized execution is enabled
through the designation of conditions-based authorities, in which conditions triggering
delegation to a lower echelon are planned for and designated prior to an operation.

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Conditions-based authorities enable C2 processes to function in a contested and

degraded environment. To achieve decentralized execution, commanders must
clearly convey intent, and subordinates must be empowered to act on that intent
absent further guidance.

Early and clear communication of Conditions-based authorities are

commander’s intent and force authorities delegated to a subordinate
prioritization is critical for JADO planning, under certain pre-defined conditions.
generating joint force opportunities while This may include (but is not limited to):
creating adversary dilemmas across all
domains. Operations in contested  Degradation in communications.
environments may necessitate a greater
degree of distributed control, but also  Significant changes in the
increase the risk of unintended operational environment.
consequences if forces lack an accurate
understanding of overall mission context and evolving operational constraints and
restraints.

JADC2 requires efficient management of resources and sophisticated information

gathering, processing, and sharing across domains. JADC2 tools and methods enable
information advantage and decision superiority. Where available, analytic modeling and
simulation tools should be employed to support and enhance commander decision
making and inform strategy choices (e.g., apportionment).

To ensure convergence of effects,

the planning process for the air “It is a given in future conflicts that the joint
tasking order should expand to force will be conducting operations in a
support joint all-domain planning and contested environment. We must be prepared
execution. JADC2 will orchestrate to execute in a degraded C2 environment
this convergence through an where clearly delineated and forward-thinking
integrated tasking order (ITO) commander’s intent will be a requirement. It is
employing assigned, attached, and imperative senior leaders provide our
supporting forces, capabilities, and commanders with conditions-based authorities
effects. The ITO should incorporate delegated to the lowest capable and
and synchronize capabilities across competent level, and empower command by
components and domains to allow for negation to accept the appropriate level of
mutual support and convergence of risk, all while working toward moments of clear
forces or effects. Knowledge of joint C2.”
force capabilities, a common lexicon,
common data standards, and the -- General C.Q. Brown, Jr., USAF,
ability to communicate across Commander, Pacific Air Forces (2019)
echelons enables DAF forces to
integrate across domains.

Early all-domain planning allows forces to sustain initiative despite contested operations
and C2 degradation. Integrating planning cycles across domains may induce

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inefficiencies. However, those inefficiencies are outweighed by the increased

adaptability and force flexibility it affords. Longer planning cycles with faster adaptation
and refinement permit subordinate commanders to understand and execute intent in a
contested/denied environment. JADO planning considerations include:

 Commander intent and objectives.

 Capabilities, available for tasking, that can achieve effects necessary to meet
objectives.

 Limiting and enabling factors for effects.

 Reusability of non-kinetic capabilities for follow-on operations.

 Indirect effects and consequence management plans to include information

operations (IO), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security.

 Rules of engagement and judge advocate review.

 Flexibility to re-role assets quickly to contingency options to deliver unscheduled

effects or attack unanticipated targets. This may include missions that forces have
not been trained to conduct.

 Lead time required to access capabilities needed to deliver effects.

 Authorities required to deliver necessary effects.

 Effects timing, including start time, duration, and flexibility.

 Cross-component synchronization processes to include C2 with the air operations

center non-kinetic operations coordination cell (NKOCC).

 Integration of partners and allies.

EXECUTION
JADC2 synchronizes operations across domains to integrate kinetic and non-kinetic
actions to produce lethal and non-lethal effects. By providing a fused view of the
battlespace, JADC2 enhances the ability to monitor and adapt operations to meet
evolving operational requirements and political directives and adjust the weight of effort
at tactical and operational levels as needed. Effective JADC2 requires successful
execution or implementation of the following:

 Synchronize application of forces and capabilities.

 Define conditions for delegation of authorities.

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 Synthesize legal and policy implications of force employment.

 Commence, accelerate, delay, or terminate operations at an operational tempo

necessary to maximize advantages over an adversary.

 Leverage domain advantages and mitigate disadvantages, by actions in and through

other domains, to generate joint force opportunities and create adversary dilemmas.

 Continue tactical action through MTO.

 Integrate between combatant commands to ensure efficient and effective use of

limited forces (e.g., global integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance).

 Develop and prepare follow-up actions as needed to account for a changing

operating environment.

 Refine transition criteria to account for the full range of conditions across domains.

ASSESSMENT
JADC2 assessment provides answers to these questions:

JADC2 Assessment Considerations

Category Examples of key questions
 What effects were late due to authorities’ delegation delays?
 What effects were not able to be accomplished due to a lack
Are we doing the
of authorities?
right things?
 What opportunities advanced the JFC’s objectives through
all-domain synchronization?

 Were the right communication channels in place between

domains to enable convergence?
Are we doing  Were effects sequenced between domains as planned?
things right?  Was the desired operations tempo achieved?
 Were contingency plans developed and executed and able to
maintain mission timelines?

 How was the measure of the effectiveness of the integrated

portions of the campaign accomplished?
Are we measuring  What, if any, indicators were used from one domain to make
the right things? assessments in others?
 Are the means to collect relevant metrics within operationally
relevant timeframes available?

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CHAPTER 3: INFORMATION

Within JADO, the DAF uses information as a central element of operational-level

planning, execution, and assessment. It does so by providing component commanders
and the joint force with the capability to leverage informational power to achieve
operational and strategic effects in concert with other elements of airpower. When
designing air operations, the DAF uses information to craft plans and courses of action
that ensure convergence of effects on target audiences. Information warfare capabilities
and considerations of effects in the information environment are integrated throughout
the targeting process early and not thought of simply as an adjunct to operations.

OPERATIONS IN THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (OIE)

OIE are an integral element of JADO. They are characterized by the sequencing of
actions using information to affect behavior by: informing audiences; influencing
relevant actors; and affecting information, information networks, and information
systems. OIE are designed, planned, and synchronized to complement and reinforce
operational effects from other domains. Sequencing should be accounted for in the
initial operational planning phases and executed in concert with other domain
operations. Failure to do so will limit JADO from achieving the desired effects on
adversary actors and systems.

All actions, to include written or spoken words and displayed or related images, have
informational aspects capable of communicating a message or intent. Shaping and
leveraging those messages to influence target audiences, is an integral component of
operations and planning to support JFC objectives.

Information warfare is the employment of military capabilities in and through the

information environment to deliberately affect adversary human and system
behavior and preserve friendly freedom of action during cooperation,
competition, and conflict. Information warfare has the capability to create multiple
dilemmas for the adversary.

Effective joint force application of timely and relevant information is vital to attain
enduring strategic advantage across the competition continuum. Deliberate, long-term
IO campaigns shape perceptions and behaviors by capitalizing on the cumulative and
reinforcing effects of multiple coordinated operations, activities, and investments (OAI).
Component commanders, in coordination with the joint force, achieve JFC outcomes
through nested activities integrating informational and military power. The JFC’s
operational approach shapes the information environment to gain, maintain, and protect
information advantage in support of decision superiority.

The table “OIE for Information Advantage” shows representative OIE activities, across
the competition continuum that can be used to create and leverage information
advantage. Information advantage is created by:

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 Bolstering domestic and international understanding, trust, and support with timely,
accurate, contextualized, and purposeful communication related to both component
and joint force activities.

 Distracting an enemy’s ability to observe, orient, decide, and act effectively.

 Eroding an adversary’s confidence in their capabilities, strategies, and relationships

relative to that of the joint force.

OIE for Information Advantage

Representative activities Outcome
 Develop and demonstrate enhanced information Increased
sharing, cooperative agreements and activities. understanding, trust,
 Provide public attribution of joint force activities to and support with
secure legitimacy. domestic and
 Build domestic and international audience international audiences
resilience against disinformation and propaganda. in the purpose of and
 Synchronize messaging with allies and partners. approach to component
 Highlight foreign military sales. and joint force activities

 Counter disinformation and propaganda.

 Expose and counter malign influence.
 Mislead adversary decision-makers on joint force Erosion of adversary
dispositions, capabilities, and vulnerabilities confidence in their
causing diversion of cognitive and physical capabilities, strategies, and
resources towards unproductive ends. relationships
 Conduct selective demonstrations of unique joint
force capabilities.

 Create operational surprise by deceiving enemy

decision-makers on joint force dispositions,
Diminished enemy ability
capabilities, intentions, and actions.
to observe, orient,
 Deny enemy freedom of action in cyberspace
decide, and act
and the EMS while ensuring it for the joint force.
effectively
 Provide transparent response to accidents or
inadvertent events.

Campaigns are executed through a series of OAIs, spanning day-to-day operations

(cooperation) through crisis response (conflict). Individual OAIs are designed and
selected for their ability to advance JFC objectives by shaping the information
environment. By integrating informational power (IP) and physical power (PP), OAIs are
reinforced and their value maximized through appropriate timing, tempo, scope, and
purpose. Such integration maximizes an OAI’s ability to create an advantage for the
joint force. The figure below, “Integration of Informational Power and Physical Power”,

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illustrates the potential linkages between PP and IP actions from a temporal perspective
– before, during, and after employment of physical military power. Before a PP action,
IP can be used in an enabling capacity:

 To create physical conditions for success.

 To impose costs by drawing or diverting an actor’s attention from the true purpose
and nature of joint force actions (e.g., MILDEC).

 To shape relevant actor expectations through overt and covert messaging.

Integration of Informational Power and Physical Power

While they can be effective when applied separately, IP and PP work best together in a
variety of ways. When PP is employed, IP can act concurrently, or in advance, to
support or enhance the effort. Likewise, following PP employment, IP can reinforce
impressions and interpretations of what occurred and condition expectations for what
may happen next. Alternatively, PP action may be employed for informational purposes;
i.e. to demonstrate the will behind a comprehensive set of OIE.

Such combined actions require both integration and synchronization--integration in

planning is predicated on an accurate understanding of the operational environment and
requires an effective combination of informational and physical effects to drive the target
audience behavior. Synchronization in execution converges those effects with the right
timing, tempo, scope, and intensity.

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CHAPTER 4: INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations are executed in, from,
and through all domains across the competition continuum. All-domain intelligence
capabilities enable globally-integrated ISR forces to quickly collect, analyze, process,
and disseminate relevant information to operational forces, and refine foundational
intelligence to inform mission planning and improve joint intelligence preparation of the
operational environment (JIPOE). Intelligence collected during cooperative or
competitive activities will be leveraged during armed conflict, providing commanders a
comprehensive understanding of adversary attitudes, activities, forces, and other
considerations that inform decision-making.

In JADO, intelligence must develop, maintain, and share an awareness of the

operational environment that spans geographic, functional, domain, classification, and
organizational boundaries. The scope of awareness should include intelligence on
ongoing operations, adversary forces, indications and warnings (I&W), target
information, and account for military, political, and environmental considerations. JADO
intelligence operations require a foundational understanding that encompasses
battlespace awareness, but also expands to include an understanding of the complex,
interrelated nature of events across areas of responsibility; how they affect campaign
plans, and the effect (positive or negative) they may have on the commander’s ability to
project force. Awareness is challenged by the need to fuse information of varying quality
and classification from multiple sources, over multiple networks, and across multiple
intelligence organizations.

JADO requires the combination of DAF and other Service ISR platforms and capabilities
for a global interoperable intelligence sensing architecture. This architecture produces
massive volumes of data to meet JADO intelligence needs. Processes and technologies
should be continually designed to incorporate legacy and future capabilities.

The ability to sense the operating

environment across domains relies JADO relies on the ability to fuse
predominately on expensive, high-tech, intelligence data sets together in
purpose-built systems. However, JADO ways that are nimble, work
requires a broad array of collection together, and present solutions
platforms, capabilities, and methods. JADO that work on the tactical edge.
relies on the ability to fuse intelligence data
together in ways that are nimble, that work together, and present solutions that work on
the tactical edge.

All-source intelligence is leveraged across the joint and interagency enterprise, but
much of the synthesis is done manually. JADO requires intelligence to be automatically
synthesized and shared at the lowest classification level possible. The need to conduct
cross-domain, cross-source synthesis significantly increases demand for fusion capacity
and capability.

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Current intelligence processes do not adequately integrate all-domain sensing activities

for JADO. Sensing must be a continuous effort to feed multiple decision loops. Cross-
cueing and fusing collection activities among domains results in improved JIPOE.

PLANNING
To support JADO planning and execution, intelligence timeliness should be integrated
and synchronized with all-domain operations. Increased intelligence requirements
necessitate synchronization of traditional and nontraditional intelligence capability. To
keep pace with the emerging environment, ISR must also leverage nontraditional
sources of intelligence to complement traditional ISR activities. Further, ISR collection
platforms produce intelligence at varying speeds. For example, space based imagery
can often be accessed quickly, whereas human intelligence collection must be
developed over time. Production speeds vary according to a collection platforms’ ability
to maneuver or position, its persistence, flexibility, and the speed at which data can be
processed, exploited, and disseminated. Such variances should be accounted for to
ensure successful integration and synchronization.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS:

 Cross-cueing collection activities between domains.

 Correlating information from multiple sensors, sources, and domains.

 Integrating open-source reporting into a comprehensive picture of the operational

environment.

 Evaluating potential strategic impacts of tactical actions.

 Evaluating how impacts in one domain affect actions in other domains.

 Incorporating global battlespace information from one domain to mitigate knowledge

gaps in another.

 Leveraging joint, inter-Service, interagency, multinational, and commercial partner

situational awareness capabilities and data sources.

 Incorporating all-domain considerations into intelligence gain or loss assessments.

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CHAPTER 5: FIRES

The JADO vision for fires is to

achieve convergence across “There are no boundaries on this
domains—the synchronization battlefield...there are no hiding places…there
and integration of kinetic and are no sanctuaries on this battlefield… So how
non-kinetic capabilities to do you win? I think you win by operating at a
create lethal and nonlethal tempo that they can’t keep up with, and by
effects, the results of which putting them on the horns on multiple
being greater than the sum of dilemmas… We need to create enough options
their efforts alone. Air, space, for our warfighting commanders that the enemy
cyberspace, land, maritime and doesn’t know where we are going to come from
EMS targeting cycles are next.”
synchronized and integrated at
the JFC level. Integration and -- General James M. Holmes, USAF, Retired,
synchronization of targeting Commander, Air Combat Command (2020)
and planning cycles based on
the JFC’s objectives is required
to execute effective all-domain operations. To maintain tempo, staffs at each echelon
need flexibility to observe and orient on new opportunities and quickly decide, target,
and execute across all domains.

CONVERGENCE

In JADO, effects are massed through the synchronized application of kinetic and non-
kinetic capabilities. Massing effects requires alignment of disparate planning timelines
and resource availability to ensure forces and capabilities are brought to bear at the
proper time and place to create desired effects. Each participating force element must
understand: the overall scheme of maneuver; its role within it; interdependent support
relationships; and the coordinating method to ensure desired effects convergence.

Traditional methods for achieving mass necessitate generation of large force quantities
in close proximity to create overwhelming effects against a target. Alternatively, the
prevalence of precision-guided munitions, augmented by non-kinetic capabilities,
enables fires to be massed with smaller numbers and/or dispersed forces. Reducing
and dispersing the footprint of forces deployed forward presents adversary challenges
and increases friendly freedom of maneuver to achieve desired effects. Additionally,
nontraditional fires can be used to mass effects. An example would be, mobility
platforms employing precision munitions from standoff ranges. Non-kinetic fires through
space, cyberspace, the EMS, or other means provide additional mechanisms for
creating effects.

TARGETING AND FIRES INTEGRATION

Targeting supports the process of linking desired effects to actions and tasks at the
component level (JP 3-0). For successful cross-domain effects, synchronization is

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necessary. Typically,
synchronization occurs at
the JFC level during a joint
targeting coordination Special Operations
board, as planning
capabilities are presented
by each component. In
JADO, synchronization
planning must occur at
echelons below the JFC to
provide resiliency and
speed in execution.

The current targeting

process includes
apportionment, but with
JADO, the entire joint force
requires an apportionment-
like process to ensure Planning Time
convergence. Using the
JFC joint force apportionment decision, and through collaboration, component
commanders allocate forces, synchronize effects, and ensure the weight of effort meets
JFC intent. An ITO is the mechanism to frame fires synchronization in the targeting
process.

CROSS DOMAIN KILLCHAIN EXAMPLE

During a recent operation, an enemy combatant was tracked by following his

digital footprint. Using multi-domain intelligence sources, the individual was
geolocated in an area that precluded a kinetic strike. As a result, ground forces
were employed to disable critical communications infrastructure, forcing the
combatant to move. Intelligence from multiple domains confirmed his new
location, a window of opportunity was found, and the enemy agent was
eliminated without collateral damage.

Though this vignette offers a specific example, similar scenarios have played out
many times over the last two decades. The example displayed here relates the
effects of integration on a single operation. Through JADO, a JFC is enabled to
scale this type of integration to support major operations and campaigns.

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CHAPTER 6: MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER

Movement and maneuver enables deliberate and opportunistic convergence, and

preserves freedom of action, by positioning forces and capabilities to create multiple
unexpected vectors of attack against an adversary. JADO movement and maneuver
synchronizes and aligns actions from multiple domains in a complimentary and
reinforcing manner to create exploitable advantages (physical, temporal, or
psychological) over an adversary.

All-domain maneuver increases available options for the joint force to succeed while
cutting off adversary paths to success. However, for success, commanders should
anticipate the difficulties created by degraded or denied C2 environments and should
seek to achieve convergence by enabling units to operate on commander’s intent
through MTO. Opportunistic (or reactive) convergence emerges from changes in the
operational environment that can be exploited to advance joint force objectives. Building
schemes of maneuver that enable opportunistic convergence should be considered
across domains at all echelons.

Movement and maneuver planning for JADO requires integrated planning teams and
shared information across the joint force to coordinate actions within and across
domains. The movement and maneuver of forces depends on the JFC’s scheme of
maneuver and intent. The JFC’s movement and maneuver concepts should be outlined
in the operations plan and further refined in an ITO. Execution of the JFC’s movement
and maneuver plans requires a JADC2 structure capable of converging effects to create
multiple adversary dilemmas and support friendly freedom of action. Each force element
should have a clear understanding of its role, and be aware of the sequencing
mechanisms used to converge actions within and across domains to create and
preserve positions of advantage.

Maneuver exists in all domains. In JADO, maneuver in one domain should complement,
and be complemented by, maneuver within other domains. Maneuver in the air, land,
and maritime domains is well established. However, an understanding of maneuver in
the EMS, space, and cyberspace is equally important for JADO.

 Maneuver in the EMS supports JADO by providing resiliency against adversary

degradation and denial attempts. The ability to use frequency agility to evade or
overcome interference (e.g., an EMS jammer) increases adversary dilemmas and
allows for resilient, friendly force command, control, and communication.

 Maneuver in space supports JADO through deployment, repositioning, reorienting, or

reprioritizing the tasking of space forces. These actions support asset optimization,
protection from environmental hazards, passive defense, and positioning of active
defensive or offensive measures. Space maneuver creates multiple dilemmas for an
adversary by supporting follow-on space actions, as well as follow-on actions in other
domains.

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 AFDP 3-99 / SDP 3-99

 Maneuver in cyberspace supports JADO without establishing a physical presence. It

includes accessing adversary networks to support follow-on offensive and defensive
actions in cyberspace, enabling convergence of effects in the EMS and other domains,
and protecting friendly networks. These cyberspace actions create multiple dilemmas
for an adversary.

CROSS DOMAIN CONVERGENCE

During an operation in Africa, an Air Force aircraft conducted overhead ISR,

providing real-time intelligence to the ground force commander. Live video of the
operation and voice communication transmitted via satellite to allied
headquarters, allowed commanders to enact conditions-based, delegated
authorities as the situation on the ground changed.

While over the target area, the aircraft's sensors detected a threat to the assault
force. After confirming indications with intelligence, the aircrew advised the
ground team that their interpreter was acting as a double-agent and had
compromised the operation.

This example demonstrates JADO’s agility to converge capabilities and assets

and provide intelligence, fires, and protection across land, air, space, and the
EMS. JADO enables scaling of this type of operation to support major operations
and campaigns.

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CHAPTER 7: PROTECTION

Threats to friendly forces and operations can emerge from any domain. The varied
nature of threats dictate proactive and responsive protection operations synchronized
across domains to facilitate a holistic defensive approach. Protection in JADO is
focused on protecting each domain and mitigating vulnerabilities using forces and
capabilities from multiple domains. Just as convergence synchronizes all-domain action
against adversary forces and capabilities, protection planning and execution mitigates
joint force threats originating from any domain.

Integrating effects planning and synchronization, sharing information, and all-domain

risk identification and mitigation are critical enablers of JADO protection. Further, by
employing MTOs with conditions based authorities that empower subordinate decision
making, JADO enables the necessary agility, flexibility, and force responsiveness to
minimize vulnerabilities across all domains in anticipation of, and in response to,
adversary action. I&W, a process that relies heavily on information and intelligence,
must evolve to provide the clarity needed to determine the intent behind adversary
attacks. Just as all-domain warfare uses complementary attacks in multiple domains,
JADO protection requires convergence of protection capabilities to protect forces and
respond in all domains.

AGILE COMBAT EMPLOYMENT ACE is an operational concept

(ACE) that leverages networks of well-
established and austere air
ACE is the Air Force’s concept to provide a bases, multi-capable Airmen,
proactive and reactive operational scheme of pre-positioned equipment, and
maneuver executed within operationally airlift to rapidly deploy, disperse
relevant threat timelines to increase and maneuver combat capability.
survivability while generating combat power.
ACE operations generate rapid and resilient combat airpower throughout an operational
area in response to potential adversary anti-access and area denial efforts. ACE
enhances survivability and the ability to seize the initiative, deliver lethal force with
operational unpredictability, and
succeed across the competition
continuum. ACE employs multi- “When they deploy, they deploy with their own
capable Airmen practicing sleeping bag, their own shelter half, and a stove.
mission command through And they’re not waiting for anybody to build the
delegation of authorities, a tent city for them… they are coming ready to
distributed joint C2 structure fight.”
reliant on MTO, a network of
resilient airbases and austere -- General James M. Holmes, USAF, Retired,
operating locations, and an Commander, Air Combat Command (2020)
adaptive logistics system.

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 AFDP 3-99 / SDP 3-99

ACE’s use of dispersal and maneuver operations increases survivability of friendly

capabilities, decreasing time and distance problems faced in large theaters, allowing
forces to attack and defend quickly. To fully realize JADO protection, the use of
nontraditional facilities and capabilities is necessary; see Appendix B for ACE
considerations.

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CHAPTER 8: SUSTAINMENT

In JADO, sustainment must ensure the continued ability to project power and maintain
initiative in contested environments. Historically, units have assumed a certain level of
continuous infrastructure and support. Such assumptions about immediacy of logistics
support and available operating location infrastructure are likely to be unreliable when
facing a peer adversary. Sustainment actions in foreseeable conflict with a peer nation
are more complex and put legacy logistics and sustainment supply hubs and distribution
routes at risk. These complexities are exacerbated by degradations in C2 that
complicate requests for support, the status of forces, and combat assessment.

Forces conducting JADO may

operate with less intensive
sustainment processes and fewer “Sustainment is more than a warfighting
resources. JADO forward positions function; it is the advantage necessary to
require simple, modular, and win, and it must be integrated at all
maintainable systems, necessitating echelons, rather than merely deconflicted.”
a shift away from: static -- MG Rodney Fogg, USA,
infrastructure; centrally controlled BG Michelle Letcher, USA,
(hub-and-spoke) logistics; highly & COL Kenneth Letcher, USA,
specialized maintenance equipment Sustainment: The Advantage that “Wins” in
and materials; and large contractor Contested Environments
and support footprints. By increasing
modularity, JADO sustainment
reduces reaction time and sustains worldwide warfighting capability. Robust, multi-
--
modal distribution systems facilitate greater sustainment options for joint forces. Lower
echelon units should see and share sustainment and logistical information to enable
integrated planning and enhance risk identification and mitigation. Joint and Service
component logistics enterprises and supporting industrial bases must be more
responsive to increased needs and be able to operate with limited or degraded
communications.

MANEUVER LOGISTICS

JADO highlights the importance of logistical movement through contested environments

and critically links maneuver, protection, and sustainment functions, often to a degree in
which they are indistinguishable. The adaptive nature of JADO maneuver logistics
enables sustainment from range with minimal dependence on large, fixed infrastructure,
and can support sustainment in contested areas through disaggregated supply
infrastructure. To generate adaptive capability independent of centralized logistics,
effectiveness should be prioritized over efficiency. JADO’s distributed operations require
redundancy in supply distribution and deliberately-planned logistics chain slack.
Enhancing partnerships with host nation forces and establishing contingency contracts
with local suppliers allows distributed forces to sustain personnel and operations.

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 AFDP 3-99 / SDP 3-99

Logistics under attack is expected in a contested environment, complicating delivery

of just-in-time logistics. Redundant logistics systems are necessary to ensure the
delivery of critical assets. Availability of commercial logistics infrastructure (e.g., contract
airlift and sealift) cannot be assumed. Nontraditional logistics will be required to counter
adversary anti-access and area denial capabilities.

Limited duration self-sustainment is necessary to enable certain functions during

periods of logistics denial or degradation. Limited duration self-sustainment includes
periods of increased risk, decreased connectivity, and limited capacity.

Dispersed sustainment is an ACE-supporting logistical concept. Prepositioned caches

of materiel in dispersed locations increase adversary targeting complexity and provide
additional friendly survivability and resiliency. This tradeoff favors survivability over ease
of access, and increases the logistical burden of the operating location. Three
requirements to sustain and project the force during multi-domain operations are:

 Resilient and integrated sustainment mission C2

 Assured joint power projection.

 Ability to sustain in a distributed environment.

“Joint logistics must integrate our combined capabilities …to shoot, move,
communicate, and win… with the expectation that the force is contested
throughout the process, and is equally challenged with time, speed, and distance.”

-- MG Rodney Fogg, USA,

BG Michelle Letcher, USA,
& COL Kenneth Letcher, USA,
Sustainment: The Advantage that “Wins” in Contested Environments

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APPENDIX A: DOMAINS, ENVIRONMENTS AND ELEMENTS

The diagram below depicts three different environments in which air forces operate
(physical, information, and human). Each of these environments are addressed by
various functions in warfare. Each environment contains elements that are
simultaneously diverse in character and highly interconnected.

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 AFDP 3-99 / SDP 3-99

APPENDIX B: AGILE COMBAT EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

 Component commanders should operate on JFC intent and communicate with

subordinate commands through MTO, when appropriate.

 The coordination of ISR and air refueling assets in a degraded communications

environment is difficult, and might require alternative organizational structures akin to
the composite wing structure mentioned in The Composite Wing: Back to the Future!.

 DAF leaders should have a clear understanding of commander’s intent, including the
operation as described in the air operations directive, the joint air operations plan, and
follow-on MTO.

 Operations will require greater risk acceptance at each level of command. To maintain
momentum, conditions may necessitate higher risk activities like integrated combat
turns, specialized fueling operations, or wet wing defueling. Other examples include
operations inside an adversary’s integrated air defense system, limited defenses at
landing sites, and short notice dispersal operations.

 To complicate adversary targeting, resilient basing plans consist of main operating

bases with significant passive and active defenses, a network of forward operating
sites used for dispersal and short term operations, and a series of additional landing
sites used for refueling and reloading.

 Operations will require increased theater access within and across partner nations,
complicating the area air defense, combat support, and airspace control plans.

 Multi-capable Airmen and Guardians, with multiple qualifications or skill sets, trained
to operate as cross-functional teams, enable continued operations while maintaining
a smaller footprint at forward operating sites.

 Reliance on sustainment and reachback from the continental US will be challenging

and may not be responsive enough to meet operational needs. Organic and theater
sustainment options should include pre-positioned materiel caches.

 Because of advances in adversary anti-access and area denial capabilities, the ability
to avoid, defend against, withstand, and/or recover from airfield attacks are key
components of ACE.

 Traditional force protection plans and strategies focused on main operating bases are
insufficient to meet the needs of short-term, austere, or dispersed operations. JIPOE
activities precede operational ACE execution to identify ground-based, foreign
intelligence, and criminal threats at potential forward operating sites and refueling
points, providing planners and leaders with information to make basing and risk
mitigation decisions. JIPOE also provides insight into enemy kinetic and non-kinetic
capabilities and threats to proposed ACE operating locations.

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 AFDP 3-99 / SDP 3-99

 Plans should be established for providing just-in-time force protection and intelligence
support. To do so, DAF intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement entities
should leverage existing access to, and relationships within, planned and potential
ACE basing locations. In locations with no current presence, DAF personnel initiate
and develop new relationships with individuals and organizations capable of providing
necessary information and support.

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 AFDP 3-99 / SDP 3-99

APPENDIX C: DEGREES OF HUMAN AND MACHINE CONTROL

HUMAN MACHINE TEAMING

To achieve rapid adaptation necessary for all-domain
operations, improved human-machine teaming is
required. Machine-to-machine communication and
predictive modeling will be critical to moving away from
imprecise procedural controls outlined in current
airspace control doctrine; such advanced human-
machine teaming capabilities are in development.
Employing these systems effectively requires a
framework for understanding their employment.
Commanders should understand and balance the
benefits and risks of human-machine relationships.
Human-machine teaming may aid all forms of military
decision making. However, commanders and operators
should exercise appropriate levels of human judgment,
especially for decisions regarding the use of force.4 To
build appropriate levels of understanding, trust, and
skepticism with their machines, Airmen need to train as
part of human-machine teams. Examples of human-
machine teaming terms are:
 Human Controlled System: A drill (machine
requires direct control or performs only as directed).
 Machine-On-the-Loop: Aircraft fly-by-wire systems
(machine performs some processes to simplify
operation).
 Machine-In-the-Loop: Automotive driver assist Degrees of Human and
technologies (machine aids, assists, or provides Machine Control
inputs to human-controlled processes)
 Human-In-the-Loop: Power plant control system (machine seeks input for critical
decisions).
 Human-On-the-Loop: Self-driving cars (machine can run autonomously, but can be
overridden).
 Human-Out-of-the-Loop: Swarm drones (machine runs without human
intervention).

4 DoD Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapons Systems

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APPENDIX D: JOINT ALL-DOMAIN DOCTRINAL GAPS

DAF JADO doctrine establishes a framework for air components supporting JADO. It
guides the organization and employment of forces and capabilities presented to the
JFC. This section examines two doctrinal gaps that experiments, wargames, and
exercises will explore to refine JADO principles.

SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
Regardless of Service, domain expertise, or affiliation, joint commanders should
leverage information, forces, and capabilities from all domains. Planners at all
levels should consider all domains from the beginning of the planning process.
Commanders must be empowered to coordinate dynamic all-domain re-tasking
throughout execution.

JADO requires the reexamination of supported and supporting relationships.

Current doctrine envisions support relationships as a relatively static form of procedural
control along lines of operation. A supporting commander has the authority to decide
how and with what forces to meet multiple supported commanders' operational
requirements, but does not have the authority to reprioritize the supporting effort, either
within or between the supported lines of operations. Each supported commander sets
the priorities within their lines of operation and effort, but cannot change priorities
between these lines. Priorities for support between two or more supported commanders
are set by the establishing authority, the common superior commander over both
subordinate commanders (JP-1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States).
This binary supported and supporting construct works well when operations are
conducted in one primary domain supported by another. However, in complex scenarios
involving multiple interdependencies along multiple lines of effort in multiple domains,
traditional supported and supporting relationships are inadequate to affect rapid
reprioritization among efforts. Assets, like aerial tankers or satellite constellations,
may be requested simultaneously with each commander citing their supported
relationship. Currently this situation would require the asset allocation decision of the
establishing authority, a time consuming process.
JADO requires a more agile support relationship and a greater ability to rapidly task and
re-task forces to meet specific, time-critical scenarios with less procedural delay. To
meet operational requirements of multiple supported commanders while achieving the
establishing authority’s intent, the supporting commander needs authority to shift the
priority of supported forces as the operational situation changes. Since recourse to the
establishing authority may not be feasible in time-sensitive operations, supported
commanders also need the authority to coordinate laterally to reprioritize efforts as the
operational situation changes. This requires a more agile, positive control-based system
that rapidly reprioritizes and reflows support to multiple commanders. Commanders at
all levels must have the information and authority to adapt to rapidly changing contexts.

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 AFDP 3-99 / SDP 3-99

JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL AT ALL ECHELONS

Transition to joint C2 at all echelons represents a significant change in DOD
organizational structure. JADO’s speed and adaptability requires a degree of
connectivity and mission assurance at the global or theater-level. However, threats to
communications also require units to have a local capability to sense, collaborate, plan,
and execute all-domain joint responses within their available local networks; to include
coordination with local multinational partners.

So long as commanders require support from other geographically-dispersed

commands, forces, and capabilities, there will always be a need for resilient theater-
level communications to support global integration and dynamic force employment.
However, relying exclusively on theater-level integration of domain-oriented assets,
without local ability for all-domain integration and backup C2, presents a
communications chokepoint and a targeting opportunity for an adversary. Local C2
capabilities should enable geographically co-located forces to build all-domain options
in accordance with higher headquarters guidance, including the capability to sustain
operations during times of intermittent communications.

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 AFDP 3-99 / SDP 3-99

APPENDIX E: CONCEPTS TO DOCTRINE CYCLE

Traditional doctrine codifies extant best practices. This AFDP focuses on both near-term
emerging doctrine and doctrine being tested and matured in real time. Modeling and
simulation, experimentation, wargaming, and tabletop exercises are essential to the
concepts shown in the figure below. Users, groups, members, and/or aspects of all
domains and environments will use these tools throughout the cycle.

DEVELOPMENT

Emerging Doctrine
Future Operating
Drives “force development” in
Concepts the 2-7 year time frame. Still
Drives “force design” across not proven, but is a concept
the entire DOTMLPF* in the for doctrine development and
7-15 year timeframe. (e.g. is designed to drive
Virtual Flag, Air Force operational and tactical
Futures Game) doctrine. (e.g. Agile Flag,
Chennault Series)

FEEDBACK MATURATION
AND VALIDATION
Changes in:
-The Enemy Doctrine
-Technology Focuses on near-term force
employment (0-3 years) and
describes the employment of
capabilities and
organizations. (e.g. Red
Flag, Blue Flag)

Concepts to Doctrine Cycle

29