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    TICOM Vol. 4 - Army High Command Sigint Service

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    Robert Vale
    This document provides a history of the German Army Signal Intelligence Service from 1919 to 1945 based on investigations conducted after World War II. It details the evolution of the service from a small codes and ciphers section prior to Hitler's rise to power in 1933 to a large and sophisticated organization by the end of World War II. Key developments included establishing numerous fixed intercept stations in the early 1930s, forming field signal intelligence regiments in 1939, adding mathematicians and linguists to help with cryptanalysis, and increasing focus on protecting their own cryptography. The document is organized chronologically and provides information on the organization, expansion, and responsibilities of the various components of the German Army Signal Intelligence Service over the course of World War II.

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    TICOM Vol. 4 - Army High Command Sigint Service

    Uploaded by

    Robert Vale
    727 views240 pages
    This document provides a history of the German Army Signal Intelligence Service from 1919 to 1945 based on investigations conducted after World War II. It details the evolution of the service from a small codes and ciphers section prior to Hitler's rise to power in 1933 to a large and sophisticated organization by the end of World War II. Key developments included establishing numerous fixed intercept stations in the early 1930s, forming field signal intelligence regiments in 1939, adding mathematicians and linguists to help with cryptanalysis, and increasing focus on protecting their own cryptography. The document is organized chronologically and provides information on the organization, expansion, and responsibilities of the various components of the German Army Signal Intelligence Service over the course of World War II.

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    TICOM Vol. 4 - Army High Command Sigint Service

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    This document provides a history of the German Army Signal Intelligence Service from 1919 to 1945 based on investigations conducted after World War II. It details the evolution of the service from a small codes and ciphers section prior to Hitler's rise to power in 1933 to a large and sophisticated organization by the end of World War II. Key developments included establishing numerous fixed intercept stations in the early 1930s, forming field signal intelligence regiments in 1939, adding mathematicians and linguists to help with cryptanalysis, and increasing focus on protecting their own cryptography. The document is organized chronologically and provides information on the organization, expansion, and responsibilities of the various components of the German Army Signal Intelligence Service over the course of World War II.

    Copyright:

    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
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    727 views240 pages

    TICOM Vol. 4 - Army High Command Sigint Service

    Uploaded by

    Robert Vale
    This document provides a history of the German Army Signal Intelligence Service from 1919 to 1945 based on investigations conducted after World War II. It details the evolution of the service from a small codes and ciphers section prior to Hitler's rise to power in 1933 to a large and sophisticated organization by the end of World War II. Key developments included establishing numerous fixed intercept stations in the early 1930s, forming field signal intelligence regiments in 1939, adding mathematicians and linguists to help with cryptanalysis, and increasing focus on protecting their own cryptography. The document is organized chronologically and provides information on the organization, expansion, and responsibilities of the various components of the German Army Signal Intelligence Service over the course of World War II.

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    of 240

    DOCID:

    " I

    'IUf,'
    ..
    .... , SECRET
    By A,u\horlty of \hit :
    ARMY SECURITY AGENCY
    WRshlngton,D. C.
    Commcmdinq General
    Initials ,'. -. Date


    )Ec
    -'L A,C<-'IFIEC" '-"E.. ..) 4 E r)
    _" .J;::" .J per:J
    12958 Oi rector, ef,
    =SS. B,A,\/\l date 10/23/98.
    . "
    .'
    - ,..
    .,....
    .
    ;?:
    (1)
    p.
    r-
    -"
    \
    AND BY OTHER PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATIONS
    ,AND MATERIAL, PRINCIPALLY GERMAN

    . -
    VOLUME 4--SIGNALINTELLIGENCE SERVICE
    OP'1HE ARMY HIGH COMMAND
    \
    .EUROPEAN AXIS SIGNAL UI WORLD WAR II
    AS REVEALED BY IITICOM-" INvESTIGATIONS
    . \ .'
    I..- .-
    . ".
    , .
    7 MAY.1947
    DOCID:, 3486746

    14251
    I
    ,Chaptel' II
    Chaptel' III
    Chaptel' IV
    Chaptel:' V
    VOLUME 4
    , The Signal Intelligence Service
    of the Army High COmmand'
    The History of the 'German Army Signal,
    Intelligence Service "
    Organization of Central ot the -
    German Army Intelligence Service
    . '. '
    Organization of the German Army Field Signal
    'Intelligence 'Service
    German,Army Intercept
    Operations of a Typical, Signal Intelligence
    Regiment on the Eastern Front
    Section A. Introduction
    SectionB. Functions of' the KONA Units
    Section C; Features of Russian 'Radio'
    Communications
    Section D. Direction and R$d10
    ,
    VI, Russian Cl'yptanalys1s
    Section A. Organization of' C:rypt(iD8.lyt1c.
    Ef.fort Agalnst- Russia
    B" Cryptanalytic Achievements
    'Against Russ1a,
    Section C. Lialsonvlth other Agencies
    on Russian Cryptanalysis
    \ ' I
    Ch&ptel:' VII MiscellaneouS Cryptanalysis
    Section A. Period from 1919 to
    1939
    Section B. Per:t.od .from
    1939
    to

    0
    t.
    " 8.ection C. Period from 1941 to 1945
    DOCID: 3486746

    Chapter' VIII
    Chapter' IX
    Chapter' X
    TAB A
    German Army Cryptographic. Systems
    Training of German Army S1gna1 Troops
    , .
    Liaison or the Signal Intelligence Serv1ce
    of the Army High Command v1th. other Signal
    Intelligence Agencies at H o ~ and Abroad
    Glossary
    DOCIO: 3486746

    VOLUME 4 .'
    Chapter I: of' the German ArTlI1Signal
    , , Intelligence .
    . ..," Paragraph,
    The pre-H1t1erPer1od (1919-1933) .' 1
    , The \lar IIPer1,od-(1933-19391.. '.' 2 >',,-
    ,The narl,. World II Period (1939-1941) 3
    The ln1dd1e World War II, Period (19.41-1944} 4
    Th.e'late World War Period P944-1945) 5
    . ,
    1. TheA"re-Hitler perl0-lli912-1932J-:" The pre,-
    Hitler pe:rloClof sIgnal Intel gence1n the German ArrifJ
    i8 very obscure. From the' and uncertain, evidence, .
    however, the ro11oving.organization may be suggested. '
    A COdes and Ciphers Section of" the German Def"ense
    (Re1ehsvehrministerlUm Chirrr1erabteilung), subordinated .
    to an Officer, had been maintained 1nskeleton
    rorce rronithe end or., the, rlrst Worlei The CMefs.
    vere:
    2
    ' " .. ' .."...
    Lt. Buschenhagen
    Majol',Schm1dt
    Major Fellgiebel
    Major Oschtn9.nn
    Major Boetzel
    1919-1927
    1927':"193.1
    1931,..1932:,
    .1932-1934
    1934-1939

    .,
    The head or the Codes and Ciphers Section ot the
    Gertll!ln Defense I-1inist1'7 also the M1nistry's - :',
    IntElrcept network. This' network fl"om l'923/4wbenthe
    f1ratf1xed (Feste Horchstelle, abbreviated
    Feste) Yere There 1s or at .least
    . seven 8\:lchstations operating before Six or these.
    Yere to the interception ot foreign
    mill tary traf'fic;' and' one to,:the in't.ercept1onof fore1gn
    diplomat1c traff1e. ' The s1x for m111t&ry, verelo- ,
    eated at Stuttgart,' l<lunich"r4uenster,Koen1gsberg, , L1egni tz, ,
    and,Bres1aui the one for diplOmatic
    . I96p 2,
    2 , ,
    ,. I 123 p 4,
    3 I 62 P 5; IF 181p 1
    ',4 I -as p '2
    5 1: '62P 6
    DOCID: 3486746

    , ,
    2. '\tie-World W8.Jt 19 -... In
    1933/34, t e rman Defense ln1sry set up t e more
    intercept stations: one at Hersbruck(later moved to
    Lauf"); the other two, at Strlegau and Chemnitz.6 With
    these ten lnterceptstatlons, the German'Defense Min1stry
    interoepted foreign ,Army, Air Force, and diplomatic '
    traf';rl0. The German Defense 141n1stl;Y also set up ,in 1933/4
    in &erlin its own military code and cipher :section called
    the InteroeptControl Station {Horchleitstelle, abbreviated'
    HLS).1 For th1s1tdl'ev a few tralnedcryptana1ysts from
    the Codes and Cipher Section of'the .German 'W'ar, Ministry
    (Re1c.bskriegSmini'sterlum).8 Foreign Army traffic inter-
    cepted by the German Defense i'li1nistl'7 vas sent to the '
    Intercept Control Statlon(Horchleitstelle); Air Force .
    traftle;to the Signal Intelligence Agency or the Commander-
    in-Chief of the Air Force (Chittrierste11e des .Oberbefehl-
    shabersder Luftwaffe, abbreviated Chi-Stelle'OBdL) , '
    esta,blishedin 1937.9 Diplomatic traffic vas sent ,to both
    the Codes and Ciphers Section ot the Ministry
    (cal.leda:rter 1934 'the German War Fdnlstry(Xriegsministerlum)
    and the ForelgnO:rfleeCl7Ptanalytle SeetioJi(SonderdleJist '
    des Referats Z in derPersonalabteilung des Auswaertlgen Amts,
    abbr'evlatedPers Z$) .10
    , 8. The narrow1ng ot' the mis'sian of the service
    to :Lnclude only Army tra:f:fle. In 1939.8 nevI.,. formed Signal
    Agency or, the Supreme Command' ottheArmed
    For<,ea (Oberkommando del' abbrevl ...
    ated,OKW/Chi) took 'over the interception of, all foreign ,
    the' German 'Army Signal Intelligence
    Service,&n<i tor' the Army gave it iYo ot its own
    lntl:Jrcept at Laursnd Treuenbr1etzen.
    \

    6
    185P
    }
    ., I 78 p 2
    8 The German Defense Ministry vas renamed ,the German War
    'Ministry after 1935.
    9 IF 181 p 15 .
    1
    0
    I'8S' P 2
    11 I 85 p 3
    2
    ,
    .'
    DOCID: 3486746

    b. .Theexpans1on of intercept serv1ceo' In ,1.939, the


    established tvo new branch stations tor the intereept
    ot foreign Army traffic emanating :from the east" one at
    Graz and the other at Tullin.
    12
    ,c. The establishment otf'ive Signal Intelligence ", '
    Regiments (Kotnriaandeur'der Hachriehten Auf'klaerung, abbreviated
    '"KONA") .These regiments vel'e sent into the field as COlD-
    intercept andevaluat1ontmlit.ci" attached, to Art1J7'
    Groups ,,13 ' The ,KONA vere given the numbers ,one through five.:
    , KONA 1.. 2, 3 vel'e ass1gnedto German Armi.es on the eastern
    tront: KONA 1 to the Artrry Group on the 'southern
    KONA 2 to the Army Group on the central front, and 'KON4 3
    to the ArTJf1 Group on the Northern tront. KONA 4 vas'not
    attached to any Army Group but vas subord1nated to the
    Command1im Orf1cer who controlled. the German Armies in the
    Balkans (aerehlshaber Suedost}.14, KONA 5 vas assigned to
    the Army Group on the Western .front.15
    d. The 1ntrod.uction ot mathematic1ans and linguists ..
    To eopevith the increased a11)ount of' enemy
    all level$, and the increas1ngly problems' of' so-
    lution, mathematicians and linguists were the
    AZ'my1n 19:;9 and were assigned either to the various field
    un1ts or to the Intercept Oontrpl Stat1on.
    16
    . '. '
    . e. An increased interest on the ,part olthe Army 111
    the security of"its: own systems. This' new 'interest gave
    rise to,the of' an ArmY Signal Security Agency
    designated as Group 'IV or Inspectorate 7 (lnspekt1on 1 .
    G:ruppe ' IV, abbrevlated In 7flV) .vh1,eh was' 8ubordinated to
    ,the of Ax-my Equ1pment and' Commander' qf' ,the Replacement .
    Arm7{Cl;1ef del" Heeresruestung und Be;fehlshaber ,des El'satzheeres
    . abbreviated "Chef H RUest u. BdE"}. In 7IIV vas comPosed
    l2
    r
    85'p 3
    '1;;1 18 p 4
    :14
    IF
    111 p i
    '15IF 127
    ,16
    1
    18 p 4
    3
    DOCIO: 3486746

    of mathematicians and actuaries whosefunction vas


    the' cryptographic systems 'used by the (Jerman
    ,Army6 and the print1ng and <;iistr1but10n ot .
    codes and ciphers .17 . . '. '.' . . . .. .
    The German Army signal intelligence serv1oe1n 1939
    cons1:sted or the. follov1ng parts:.'
    (1) at least 10 Intercept ststionsfQr the 1nterception
    ot foreign A'1!Tlf1 traffic Feste
    abbreviated Feste .
    (2) 1iveSignal Intelligence Regiments attached to
    Army Groups' (each called Xommandeur der' l'lachr1ehten
    "KONA
    n
    ) - .' ."
    . (3) an Stat1on'{Horchleitstelle" .or
    . _, . H.L3) for the analysis and evaluat10n of
    Arnil .'. ' . . .. ' " .
    . (4) an' Army 5I8D41 Security Agency
    or In.7fIV) tor testing and 1ssuing codes and .'
    ciphers for tl,le. Arrrry. . .
    4. . Pax-ted 141-1 44 .When,
    1n'1941, t astna sta a..t .t e ;orc e1tste e .vas foUnd
    to be inadequate toc9pe v1ththe large amo'unt .ot't;raff1c'
    'which had x-esulted from the increas1ng pressure or the .
    two centra1agencles. were'establ1shed to 1'"eplace the' .
    station; . s central cryptanalytic. agency at Berlin designated
    &sInspectorate 7 the Chief. of" Army Equipment and .
    of the Replacement Army (Chefder'Haeresruestung
    und Betehlsshaber des Ersstzheeres Inspektlon'1 GruppeVI,, .
    ab'breviated Char H Ruestu BdE/ln 1/VI or more slmpl"In 1/VI);
    . and S' central evaluat10n agency at Zossen as '.
    5tationf'orSignal IntelligenCe. {Leitstell,e del' .
    . Aurklaerung, abbrev1ated LNAl Q' . '
    In 1/VI vas ol"gan1zed by Major. M&ng ot the .German ArT1J1" .
    whose a1m vas not only to increase the cryptanalytic' start.
    oltha new agency but also to prov1de reserves 'of"cr}ptana1lsts
    .to vorkin areas 1n . In order
    sonnel eas11" Mangsubordinated In 7/VI 1n matters .'
    of personnel and administration to 'the or Army Equip-
    .. Commande.r the. H .
    " I . ".
    . ,
    .. 92p; 6
    ,18
    I7
    8J.) 5
    4
    DOCID: 3486746
    '.

    In ma,tters of polley, 'however, In7/VI was subordinated to' 'the


    Field Army. This curious form of orgaD.1zation j,s said to
    have enabled the cryptanalytic service to reeruitsurric1ent
    personnE'l vithoutseriolls interference whilemalntalnlng
    ,clOSEl operational contliet vi th fieldunits .19
    During the first fev months of ,the existence, or In 7/VI,
    Russian cryptanalysis vas included in theeryptanalytlc york
    done ,at In7/VI, and Russian ,evaluation included in " .
    the Elvaluation done by LNA.' Both these organizations, how-
    e,ver" soon felt that' the cryptanalysis and evaluation of
    Russlan tra:rr1c should be earried on close:r to the f"orward
    echelon of ,the German Field Army in East Prussia. In late
    1941" therefore, some eryptanalysts and evaluators skilled
    in Russian traffic veredetached trom In1/VI and from LNA
    and. vere sent to Loe,tzen to york.
    2
    0 These
    ts and eva!uat@1\'S beCame the nucleus of the
    which later became the' chief cryptanalytic and
    evaluation age'ney for Russian traffic" named Intercept Contx-ol
    Statlon East, (Horchleitstelle Ostiabbreviated H'LS Ost).
    ,From this point until November 1944 signal intelligence , , " .
    acti',ities were sharply into Russian signal intelligence,
    earr:Ledon by.. 1fiJS Ost, and non:"Russian signal, intelligence"
    carrled on by In 7/VI and LNA. ' "
    -In 1942, the responslbil1tytor security testing of.
    existing Ge'l"DJan Army, systems had been trsns-
    ferrl9d from In 7/IV to In 1fV.I 21. From that time, the Army
    Signal aecurity Agency,. In 7/IV, to ,
    dev(!}lopment or new systems for the and to the production,'
    prInting and d1str1butfon of cur:rent key's,andsystems.
    22
    " \
    p 5
    21 '78 p5
    21
    I
    '7Bp 6
    221 '.36 'P. 2
    , ,5
    DOClD: 3486746

    . In fall of 1943, In 7/Vlhad been transferred to


    the newly created Department or Signala of the General Army
    Office and Signal Intelligence, Department ot Signals,
    General Army Office, .Army High Command (Oberkommando des .
    Heerea/Allg.eme1nes Heeres Amt/AmtSgruyp.e Nachr1chten/Naeh- '
    richten Aufklaerung, abbreviated OKH/AHA/AgN/NA) . Minor
    changes 1n internal organization were erfected, but the
    function and operation of the agency was not changed.
    2
    3
    Although there was no, essential change in the organi-
    zat10:n or thef:1:eld un! ts of the .German A1-my Signal Intelli-
    gence, Service from 1941 to 1944, add1tional un! ts were
    placed in the' field. In 1942 the eastern KONA (I, 2" and :;,)
    were supplemented by the add1tion of KONA 6 which was formed
    to cover the German campa1gn 1ntheCaucasus.
    2
    4 This KONA
    vas not to any'ArmyGroup but directly
    under HL5 Oat. KONA 7 was established in Februarl' 1943 and
    was subordinated to the Co1D1118.ilder-in-ChiefSouth (Oberbefehl..
    Sued) who controlled Army Group C and the German forces
    in Italy.25 ..'
    . . The organization of the German Army ;Signal Intelligence '
    Service in 1944 consisted or:.' ..' .
    'I)a,central crri>tanalyt1c agency for non-Russian traffic,
    In 1/VI (latterly AgN/NA) . .'
    2) a central evaluation agency-for non-Russian traffic,
    . LNA;. .
    3) a.central cryptanalytic and evaluation agency for
    HLS,Oat;
    seven'Signal Intelligence Regiments (xONAsl;
    _. an Army Signal Seeuri ty Agency .for the distribution
    and development o.f cArmy ays tems (In 7/IV) .' ..
    .5. The Late World War II Per1o.d(1944-l94S).:-- In
    October 1944, the organ1zation of the .
    intelligence serv1ce vas completely changed the
    , amalgamation o.f the central agencies, In 7fVI (latterly
    . AgN/NA), liNA, and m..s into, one Central. cryptanalytic
    and evaluation a'geney,( the 51gnallntelligenee Agency otthe
    Army High Command,. theOberkommando Heeres/General der ,
    Nachrlchten Autklaerung, abbrev1ated OKH/GdNA). _'
    gamation vas the logical of the retreat of ,HLS Oat to-
    . gether with the German Army" from Eae5 Prussia tozossen,
    'where In 7/V.I and LNA wer,e a1tU8tedo
    2
    '2} . .
    IF 190 B p.4
    .. 24
    DF
    18 p a1-'
    25
    IF
    172 p2
    26
    IF
    P 5 ' 6
    7 \
    DOCID: 3486746,

    'J.'he Signa.l Intelligence Regiments (KONAs) were not


    greatly affected by the amalgamationot the central ,
    agencjLes into the GdNA, although the KONAs did come "under
    closer centralized control in matters of administration and
    s1gnal intell1gence policy. "27' .
    , 'I'hemaln changes in the ArmyGs s1gnal intelligence '
    tleld organization in 1944-1945 vere necessitated by the
    Allied 1nvasion.ot France in June 1944. To cope with th1s
    sit'uat1on KONA 6 vas moved from the eastern :rront to the ' '
    lJeste:rn;2A and a Senior Commander or Signal Intell1-gence:
    .{Boeherer Kommandeur del' abbreviated
    Roeh Kdr' d NA1 vas Sf)t up to coordinate and control' KONA 5.
    and 6.29 In late 19lJ.4 and early 1945, tvo addlt1onalXONAs
    vere formed in the east, KONA 8 and KONA Nord,30 but it is
    poteli'orthy that these KONAB "ere largely composed of unl,ts '
    , from other eastern Tront Signal Intelligence
    mentel" and the craBtion of these last two KONA was thue not
    -$0 a or expansion as of redeployment to areas
    Wlder st:ress.31 . .' " .
    Colonel Boe.tzel,' -of Signal Intelligence Agency
    or ,the ArmY' High Command '(OKH/GdNA) stated that KONA4 vas' '
    tranlSte1"red to the West at the end 01' the var.32' A captured
    dOCUllDent33ind1cated that KONA4 had been succeeded by a ' '
    battalion 'Naebrlchten Aufklaerurig Abtel1ung. abbrev1ate4
    NAA) 16" in February 1945 but did not mention 1ta trans:rer . -
    ,. to the West. Itls probable that the KONA disintegrated '
    and. that various parts vere sent to the dU'tex-ent fronts.
    , '. The organizatioD. ,of the German ArYII1 signal intelligence
    sex-v'ice at the end' ot the war consisted of:
    " '. .
    l)the Signa.l Intelligence Agency o1'the Arrrrr High
    Command( OXH/GdNA) a central
    evs.luation, agency 1'01' all traffic.'
    2) a Senior Commander ot,Signal Intelllgenee,(Hoeh
    Kdr dNA) With, contro-l.over theKONA stationed in
    the west and res,ponslbillty tor all signal.intell1'" ,
    geneeactlVi tieso:r the German Army in the West i '
    3) , nine Signal Intelligence Regiments (KONAs) which'
    vere attached to Al-DT1 Groups 01' CODDJiande:rs in the
    field.
    ,27 IF 123 p 5
    28 I r6Append1x, Chart I
    29 'IF 123 p 5
    30 T 1402
    31 Seebelov Chapter IV
    32 I 76 p 7
    '3:; 'T 1402
    DOCID: 3486146

    VOLUME 4
    ,
    Chapter II: Organization of CentrsJ.Agencies of the German
    Army SiGnal Intelligence Service.
    Para.graph
    Organization or Intercept) Control station
    193.3-19410 .. '., 0 6
    Organiza.tion of In , 7
    Organization of LNA ' 0 .. 0 0 o. .. .. . 8,-
    Organiza.tion of HLS Ost ' 0 0 ' 0 9
    Organization of GdNA ' , ,.' .. 10.
    6. Organization of the Intercept ControlStat1on 19}3-
    1941__ Not much is known or tEe organization ot the Inter-
    cept Control Station (Horchleitstelle, abbreviated HL&),
    belfore 1941. The existence of sections tor the cryptans1y-
    sls and evaluation
    35
    of Belgian, Polish, Russian, and Brit...
    ish be surmised from Mett1g
    D
    s account of its
    activities...... flothing specific, however,; is known from .
    TICOM:;',ources. The small sta.fr was commanded by Major Dr.
    If Tung. , .
    7. Organizf:Ltion of In 7/VI.--
    B.. Insper;torate 7/Vr(lnspektion 7/Vl', abbreviated'
    In 7/VI} in t.he autumn of 1941 was headed by NajorMang,
    andvas
    S
    div1ded into the following sections &S
    shown:
    3
    . . , . .
    Personnel Section Captain Herbrueggen
    . British Section. 0.00'" .'.0' 0.0"0 Senior Inspectors
    Z111man and L1edtke'
    French Section Senior Inspector Kuehn
    Italian Section.. 0 Captain Fiala
    2,5Evaluatlon is a free translation of the German WOI'd
    "auswertung" Which to the mea.nt' traffic
    the interpretattonof newsbroa.dcast andpla.1n,texttrans-
    missions, the interpreta.tion of radio telephone intercept,
    and the interpreta.tion of the results or successful cryptan-
    a.lysis . All thea.e things ta.ken together resulted 'in t'ully
    evalusted intelligence .
    36
    1
    1'8' P .3
    371 78 p 2
    3
    8
    IF 190/ B App .. 3 8
    ..
    ________ 1:" __
    DOCIO: 3486746

    Balk&n Sect1on...... .. Senior 8pec1al1st'B&11ovlc


    , Sect:t.on. lstLt. and.: .
    '. '.' Teclui1c1an f1etsch
    .. Russ1an sect1on '. ..: : lstI.t. Dettman
    Linguistic section. '. Techn1cian Koehler.
    Training ,Seotion senior"Inspector Kueh.J1,
    " 'Between 1941'pd 194} the tolfovln8 ch$nges Inthe -. ,
    Orga;n1zatlon' of" In 7/VI took place,:", .' " .'.. .
    a) was sent' to Loetzen, East
    ala, .
    b) 8. s80tiQn for-cryptanalysis' of' USAS7S43Dl8
    with' the entry Qf tbe 'USA into the war .' , '
    c) a.section fQr cryptanalysIs ot traffic or /agenta .' . ,
    " (foreign' aM internAl) vas added in 1942
    41
    ' .....
    d) the 1nvestlga.t1qn of the secuztlty of current Ge1'lll&D
    , /f..rT:rJy systema was transferred from In 7/VI, th,e .', .
    . former Arrity, Signal. to the'm&:tho';';
    , ' . mat1cal seotion ot In 7/VI ,,:' .' " "
    , et. an IBM tQtfother its f'ram
    . In 7/IV was :J , . , " '. .' ,.
    ,
    , b.In 7/'11 in the spring ot 194} was divided into .the
    sections :44 " .
    . 0 Major Mettlg
    " Br1tish Section .... Senior :t'nspector Z111mann
    U5ASect1on. Technioian Dr. Steinberg'
    'Balkan Seetlon ,Sen1or Speo1al18t'Bal1ovlc
    Frenoh Section.. Technician Kuehn .
    Section Corporal Aanaigo
    Mathemat1o&lSect1on Technician Dr. Pietsch
    "Lingulatic Section........ Technic1an Koehler
    Tl"aln1ng . Senior Inspector "Kuehn
    AgentsSeotlon... '. 1st Lt.Vauck
    '. Section Special1st Schenke
    , .
    '91 78 p 8
    40
    1 18 plO
    41
    1 115' P 3
    42
    1 18 p 6'
    4'I78p 6
    4411 190 B. API> 4
    9
    /'
    DOCID :,3486746

    . ,
    I
    The sectlonsof In'7/VI were housed during this period
    in .buildings near in Berlin. The head-
    qua,rters ,Tra.ining Section and' sections tor USA, French and
    Age'nts e traffic vel'e located at fllatthaekirchplatz. 4 j "45.
    the Balkan section, at Schellingstrasse 9; the
    section, on Viktoriastre.sse. Location of the Mathe,,'
    ma1iica.1 section 1s not knovn.
    lfb
    , In 'N.ovember 1943, the first large RAF ra.id on Berlin
    a. great part of the officet:s of the Army High
    COlmnd on Bendlerstrasse 1n "'hion were those
    of In7/VI. In 7/VI was thereupon moved to Jueterbog, .
    1t was until its ama.lga.ma.tion :1n November
    19441nto GdNA. '+1 ' .
    , No esti.ma.te 1s given of' the number or people employed
    i:n In 7/VI. ' .' .'
    c. . Organization of AgN/NA. When In 7/VI was re- ,
    organized as the Signal Intelligence 3ection of the Depart-
    me,nt of Signals or the General Army Office, 'of, the Army .
    Hi.gh Command, the internal organization was somewhat changed.
    The previously independent sections were organized into
    a. maln section (Hauptreferat) for mathematics, and a main
    se'ction for langua.ges,. The IBM section retained its auto....
    nomy. .
    The Section for Languages, vith the exception
    tha.t one' section vas added for Swedish tra.ffic, covered
    the same field as had by the individual 1an-
    g'llageseot1ons
    4
    Qf In 1/VI. Theorganizatlonaf 'AgN/,BA 1s
    outlined thus: .' .
    Chief 0 0 0 ;, Maj or L'scnner
    Main Section A ror Mathematics 4 1st Lt. Lueders
    Main Section B tor Languages.. Senior Speoialist
    Bal10vic .
    British Section.. Senior Inspector
    Zillmann
    . USA Section...... Technician 'Steinberg
    Frenoh Section.... Technielan Kuehn
    'Balkan Section. ...... Senior-Specialist
    Bailovic
    Sw:edish section ,Pfe. Rohden'
    , .
    45
    1'- 58 p 2
    46IF 126 pp 6-7
    47IF 126 p 6
    .48J;F 190 B App 5
    10
    DOCID: 3486746

    '\ .
    IBM
    Linguistic Section.
    Training Section..
    Seet.io,n... .:l" 'II ..... 0 . 0 ... fI 0
    '/, '
    Technician Koehler
    Senior Inspector .
    Kuehn .
    speciaiist Schehke

    B. Or anlzation of the Control Sta.tlonfor S1 al


    Intelli enos LNA .-- e organ zation t e centr
    eva.luation agency for non-Russian traffic, the Control
    Station fqrSignal Intelligence (Leitstelle der Nachrlchten
    Aufklaerung, abbreviated LNA) . .
    . According to Krause) a member .of LNA, there were sec..
    tlons foreva.luating British, USA, Italian, Balkan, Greek,
    Turkish, .Tunisian, Near Eastern; and Span1sh
    trs.fflc. Evaluation waS ,made both of .tr!U"f.lc and of the
    'Qontents of decoded messages 'p8.ssed'tothese sectione from
    In7/VI. ',rne sta.fr. '01" LNA
    slating' of about. who:were'housedln .
    , gl
    o
    . Organizatipn of' HLS oat.--:- The Intercept Control.
    Station Eaat{Horchleitatelle Ost, abbreiated HLS Ost) .
    was the oentral. cryptanalytic and evalua.tionCe?ter for' .
    Russian trafficloca.ted at Loetzen",' East: i?russia' from:' .
    . la.te 1941 to late 1944. The exact size of the. station 15
    not known.jl 'but the organization 1s outlined' as: fol1dwa:
    5
    ...
    Section 1'Zu p;ro:blem.s: .: ...'
    Sect'ion: 1.. -....:- SupplY-,itna:1n'teila;tlc:6':j;'
    . .: :: ;, . 'i i : ;;
    '. ..... : .' ,;.docume.nts and 'gehertU" '.
    research into W:ireless
    . 'procedures.
    Section 2 .Evaluation, compilation
    of'intercept, 51 .
    . report '.
    '. Section 3......... ; .......Russ Umcryptanalyt1e
    section. . ,
    Section 4 Moni tor1ng of 1liter-'
    Soviet State tra.ffic;
    Russian radio broadcasts
    and,Reuter and Tass Nevs
    Agency broadcasts.
    49IF 111 . Annexes 1 a.nd 2(.
    5
    0
    IF 12} P 4
    .,'...
    11
    DOCID: 3486746

    In."the'winter of 1942-43, 1:;he Baudot Reception Station


    was moved from Loetzen'and subOl'dinated.to HLS/
    Ost, Section 4. . . . . . . , . .
    , HLS Ost was first directed by.Col. Kettler, who later
    beoamechief" of" the Signal Intel11senceAgency of the Su- .
    pr'eme Command of the Arme.d Forces l OXW/Ch1) In tt.e summer
    of 1942.. Kettler was succeeded by Baron Col. von del' Osten..
    5acken, who remained' its chief until July 1944, when he
    was implicated in the 'plot on HitlerCs lire and committed
    5ulclde .5
    1
    , . ' . '. .
    . 10. Organiza.tion of slfna.l
    Tbe three agencies, In'7fVI,1atteriy A/NA], :aL3 Ost and .
    LNA were amalgamated in November, 1944, into the Signal
    In.tel1igence Agency of the High Command
    des Heeres GeneJ"al del' Aufklaerung".abb:rev1ated
    ,OXli!GdNA) In 7/VI (latterly AgN/NA),
    wtth some slight depletion ot personnel" became Group-IV
    of' GdNA,. which vas assigned the responsibility .tor all
    I cl'yptanalys1s on fore.ign military traffie. UJAwas trans-
    ferred as a unit tc Group II of Oxa/GdNA, except for those
    sf:tct1ons which ha.d been dealing \11th wireless and- news .
    agency.trarfic . These sections were assigned to Group I .
    at OKH!GdNA. The. various secU-ons of HLS Ost'ffere a.bsorbed
    1:nt6 the appropriate sectiqns of" OKH/GdHA as 1'ollows:
    Section Z .. into Group Z
    . Section 1 . ... into Group V
    Section 2 ... . into Group III
    Section 3 ' ,. . 1ntQGroup' IV ' .
    Section 4 ; . IntoGroup VI (ex- .
    cept the wireless.
    '.
    a.nd news agenoy.
    whichwent:to Group
    . ,I) _ . " .
    The orga.nization of' the OKH/GdNA whiCh is
    in the following pages is outlined on Chart It was,
    :tn erfeot from November 1944 to the ca.pi Approxi-
    mately 100 people were employed by the OKH/GdNA ./ .
    '51IF 123 P 4
    5
    2
    IF 123pP 5-6
    53All material concerning theorganiza.t1on 01 the GdNA 1s
    derived either from IF 123 ' PP 6-14 or 1113 . PP 5-12,
    . the account by Major Rentze, head of Group IV or the GdNA.
    12
    DOCID: 3486746

    , , ,
    , a. Headquarters unit. ,The Headquarters unit of OKHI
    GdNA conststed of the Chief, Signal Intelligence, Service "
    tCher"General de:r Nachrlchten AUfklaerung, abbreviated
    Boetzel; his Chlefof .. Star.r, Lt. Col.
    Anclra.e;t,he AdJutant, Lt. Moraveo, and theChlef', of'the'
    Understaff, Lt.,!:oebe
    o
    ," "
    The staff controlled ,the signal intelligence work of
    ,a.ll. units of the GdNA,Groups I through VI. It also, con-
    tr()lled two int6!'cept stattons, ,Feste 6 and'Feste 11.
    ha.d been subordinated to HLS Ost before being attach-
    ed', the GdNA.' They speoialised' 1n high
    t:z:taff'ic of the Red Army and NKVD.' "
    The Understaff of theOKH!GdNA supervised the1nter-
    capt coverage of', the Signal Intelligence Regiments (Kom..
    ,malldeure der Nachrichten Aufklaerung, abbreviated KONA)
    8.n<1 their sUbord1nateunits: ,directly, 1n the case of
    1,2,3,7, and 8; and! throu'gh the Senior Commander
    Intelligence (Hoeherer Kommandeur
    abbreviated Hoeh, Kdr.'d NA)for KONA 5 and 6.
    bo. Group I. Group I wa.s under the supervision of '
    It had tvo main tasks:
    1) the maintenance at. the units
    of the GdNA; , '
    2) pre,s,smonitor.ing. , ' '
    Fo:r internal communications, teleprinter :was used until
    tbe final deba.cle, when it became neoessary to resort to
    radio.. To carry out the second task of GroupI,prees '
    mo:nitoring, there weref'oursub.sectlons: them,onitoring'
    ot eastern wireless, western wireless, plain text moni-
    to:t'ing, and evaluation.' The evaluation sub-section (,4)
    w.as responsible, for c'ollatlng all information from' the
    ot:h.erthree sub-seotions and consolidating it 'into, reports.
    The collated reports were divided into separate parts.
    for political, economic, or military news. They were cir-
    culated,within the departments of the Army High Command,
    sometimes with the' classiflcat,ion SECRET
    sacheJI abbreviated GKdoS). Beoaus of the personnel short-'
    age, the;13BCLondon Service and the Reuter Agency were
    only news agencies monitored for western traffic.
    5
    4
    IF
    '123 ' , 6
    p-
    5:;IF 12} p 6
    13
    DocrD: 3486746

    c.. ,Group II. . Group II 'Which h&dcannlbalized LM


    and:, consisted of about 50 people. proclucedrad!() situation
    re'portscot'relat1ng the 1nformat1dn freoJil KOllAs 5, 6.' and
    1. Capt. Thiel, vho vas'hea.d of this group, had been with
    LNA for a long time and vassald bl Hentze to.Q8.V& been
    thoroughlr familiar with the problemS ot western evaluatlon0
    , . d . a,roup III This', group, under t1).e supervision ot
    Capt. Gorz"olla, vas responsible for the evalWJ,tion or .
    tl'ldtle andor)"Ptanalyt1c ,work emanat1ng f'rom the Russian
    .. The department was dlv1deci into the following ,
    seetlons: ,
    ,Traffic,SortlngOff1ee
    Northern Sector Evaluatlon
    Cantral Sector" Evaluat10n
    Southern Sector Ev81uation .
    Russ1an Special Police (:NXVD} EvaluatIon
    . Partisan tI-a.ttio' evaluatton
    , Swedish evaluation
    e ..Groups IV.. Gl"OUP' IV.. U1"ldsx- Major Hentze, vas
    responsible for all erypt8Jl8l ytic work done 0 It
    V'g'S one! 'tt.'le graoups of the OXH/GdNA,havlng been
    bUllt up .t'rom parts of th.1"'ee Tormer agencies" In 7/VI.' ,
    LNA and m.S Ost.. The gl'oup was d1v1dedinto separate
    . se,etions according to the origin of the material.
    , ',. Section I" headed by themathematic1an. Dr. Pietsch,
    'the Mathemat1cal Sect10n of In 7/VI.' It vas
    responsible f'or the security afOerm&n
    SUb-section la, headed by engaged in re
    on German hand sub-section lb,
    Under Dr 0 ,Pietsch hancUed l'eseareh on German /t.'1!If1'3 machine
    , '
    by Knescbke. dealt w1th the crypt-
    analYsis, and deciphering of non
    co
    Russ1an tratf'lc. There
    lITere three sub-seotions:
    2&: British and USA systems;
    2b - French. aystems; , '
    20: Balkan systems,
    5ection J.; headed' bY' Lt. De.ttmann. vas composed or
    the cryptanalytic sections of lILS, Qat. It dealtv1th
    Russian systems and had SUb-sections: '
    , '}a: Russian Special police traffic (lmVD) i
    3b:' Russian Aruq traffic; ,
    14
    DOCID: 3486746

    30: RusslanPartls8D traffic;


    3d: Rf)search on Russians:stems
    . 4\'&8 the former IBM section' of . In7/VI o.
    According to Major Bentze, this section mainly
    sta.tistical Yo:rk. Most of the vere vomen used to
    run the machineso 'The section maintained its 'own repair
    shop tor the machines. .' " -', ,
    Section 5 was the traln1ngdepartment at the 0dNA,
    where cryptographic and cryptanalytio.courses were given
    'under the direction of Kuehn,\f:ho had headed the
    '!'ra,lning Section During the 18st'months of
    t,he war, onoe flourishing section dwindled to a group
    or ro:rty student$ $very three months... '
    , f Group V0 Group 'V wa.s a mixed g:roup containing
    three sections all or vhich carried out
    ties. . ' '.. ,
    Section 10 Thissectlon b7 Inspectcw Zipper,
    :'las engaged in British,' and USA
    signs and callsigt1s. systems, and deducing units
    'therefrom0 It covered various' procedures of enemy wireless
    .l9.ndthe allocation, otwavi' lengths 0 . '.
    . Section 2 . This section under Specialist Block VAS
    ':responsible tot' the exploita.t1onof captured Russian do'cu-'
    mentsof\ signals Captured manuals ye1'& trans..
    lated and descriptions ot Russianequ.lpment examined. .
    , Section 3. This section engaged insuppl.ylng. the
    ,KONAs with necessax-y intercept equipment &no. in maintain-
    ing a workshop to service'the needs of' the OKH!GdBA,1tselto
    go Group VI group VI, located a.t Potsdam under
    Capt. Roader. was, rsQ'pon&lble ,tor ,interoepting and' eval,u- .
    ating speoial machine systema,Ruas1ansystema
    were handled by Section 1. With three sub-sect10t:ls:
    18: interception and evaluation or Inter-SOViet
    State traffic; ,
    Ib: intercepting and ,evaluation of Russian Baudot; .'
    10: intercepting and evaluation RUssian Ar!r1J:1
    ( trarflc.
    'Western teleprinter and automatic mone handled
    by Sect'1on 2. (Intercept1on was done in sub-section 2b,
    evaluation in sub-section 2a).
    " ..,.
    DOCID: 3486746
    .:

    .'
    . \
    ,\
    h. Group Z. GroupZ (WhiCh 18 not shown on' the
    was responsible forgenei-41 administrative oontrol
    of all departments wIthin the OlOi/GdNA. The YOrk vas
    <i1v1ded 1ntof'oUl' types: personnel # communications ..
    pay, and dra.wing. A central caz-d index was kept otall
    peJ'lsonnel employed in the OXB/GdNA and the personnel" .
    aectlon wa.s tor all transters, either
    I' liepartm.ental or outside -the OKH/GdNA. Th$' seotion tor
    looDlD1Un1catloZlS -registered all incoming and outgoing' cor..
    and vas rtlsponslble.tor .all courlercommun1-
    catIons between the.OKH7GdNA and ita
    For"local communioations, this section hadIt;s own runners;
    but tor long dista.nces, the 'courier" servioes ot the .
    :a1ghCommand vera Allpe:rsonnel ot OlOl/GdlfAwere
    . paid by the "pay}' .' In the draw1Dgs8ct1on.. all
    s 1tuat10n maps a.ndl'8.d10 netwOrks were reproduced. A
    certaIn amount of photostat and book-binding activity
    was' .also carried' onnel'e. . .. : .
    Because of the lack of detaile4 intormat19D oon-
    cernlngGerman signal intelligence.at the. end ot the
    it lsdUf10ult to appraise the effttct1veness of
    the f1nal reorganization of Novermbel" 1944. In large. .
    measure, s1mp11clty ot disrupted
    1n the last months. The full organization eX1sted,&8 .
    an 1ntagratedun1t only fram Bovember, 1944 to February,
    1945.' From tha.t time untU the surrender, the Oa/GdlVA .
    was almos't.cont1noualy on the move seeking. refuge in.
    southern Germany. Most of the groups. moved from Zosssn
    .. to Bad Relchenhall. eltherd1rectly 01' by way or .El'tw't o'
    Somewhere between Er.turt and Bad Reichenh&ll in the .
    Weimar. usa. the IBM section was lost. Gi-oup VI whicb
    had been located at6Potsd&m went to stuttgart and
    then to Rosenheim.5. . .
    56
    IF
    123. P
    16
    ;
    DOCID: 3486746

    4
    Chapter 11,1: Organization of the German ArmY, Field
    Signal Intelligence Service
    f.'
    Paragraph
    Organization or the typical Signal Intelligence
    . j), 11.0, .. ' .... "'., ,0 "' .... ' 0-. '.. 11
    Organization of XONAl o D.D 12
    Orga..nlzation' of KONA 2 D"""" .- : v .. D ,. D.. " 13
    ,of' KONA 3 ' 14
    tlon of KONA 4 ;, D D .. .. .. .. 15
    Organlza. tion of KONA 5 .,; ," '.. D ' 16
    4 .. ' Organization through 1944,
    1 "b.. Organizl?- tion ,afte:r '1944 , ' ," . :,': '.' j ,
    ',: , 'c .Orga nizat1on:or (component 'parts', ,',.,: ,,' ,',;'
    t10n of 6 D .. .. u q 0' ! ,,' .. ., .; 17' '.,"
    Organization of'KONA, 7 ', :; .. ,. H3' "
    Organization of K'JNA : .. " ,." p ':t9
    Or,gan1zs.tiQn otKoNA ;, ;. ;. .. ," ' ... '. ' :20
    Or.gan.:i,zatlon of' NAA 11., ..... '.. .,. .. :., .. :" 21
    Ol',ganiza:t,ion of' te LoeIqcerh , " .. ," .. ,r " ". 22
    ", ,,",11.', The 2!
    8!nee .... - 1'he'baslc, efemeiiro"t' til#!
    zatlon'or the Qerman Armys1gnal intelligenoe service was'
    , the Intelligence Nac,hri.c:t:lten,
    'Ati.fk1aer.uns,; Al-'my
    (KONA),vhieh'had'eon-
    tl"ol over all, un1ts ,in the
    , by' tneA'rmy Group. If,,: as: vas the ease with 4:and; "
    the Signal Intell1genceRegiment vas attached'to'a,'
    Cmnmander,.ot tbe, Gel'man Armies $tat1oned,1n, an :the,"
    Si.gnal Intelligence Regimen"t'''had c-ontrol of
    i
    &;1:1,
    ge,nee units within the a:res. of that commanq. ' , ' ' , , , '
    There were, oteourse, variations In the organization
    and manner of operation. or the ,various S1gn,al,' Intelligence
    Reglmentseorresponding to d1f.ferenees 'in personnel,
    alld operational responsibil1ties. ,The typical component
    6
    ' "
    ot a Signal Intelligence Regiment, however, vere: 0,
    '. / .
    60 1190 p 5
    17
    DOCID: 3486746

    . / .
    /
    One Signal Intelligence EvaluatlonCenter (Nacnrlchten
    Aufklaerung Auswertestelle, abbreviated NAAS), designed.to
    work with KONA headquarters at Army Group level; usually
    one Intercept Company (Feste Nachrlchten
    'Aufklaerungsstelle, abbreviated Feste),.des1gned to work
    at A:r'my level; usually two Long Range Signal Intelligenoe
    Companies (Nachrichten Fernaufklaerung Kompanie, abbreviated
    FAK) "designed to work. at Army level;' usually twoC.lose. .
    Signal Intelligence C'ompanies (Nachrichten Nahaut-
    klael'ting Kornpanie, abbrevlateU designed to work at
    Army Corps level; each Close Range Company usually had two
    or three Range Signal Intelligence Pla.toons (Naohrich- .
    ten Nahaufklaerungs .zue, abbrevlated NAZ), designed to work
    belo\{ the NAKbut :still at Arm.y Corps level.. .
    In 1944, the Signal Intelligence Battalion (Nachrich-
    ten Auf'klaeruIlg Abteilung" abbreviated NAA) wa.sintrodueed
    into the organization or the KONA. These battalions were
    small administrative units, which acted as coordinating un1ts
    .8t AJt'my leve1. .
    Hertzel' .. CO of. KONA 1 .. stated that the NAA
    comwlnders were generally elderly supervisors whose chief .
    duty was to make the rounds of the units forming the NAA
    o!Jinions and effecting small adjustlnents in the
    useo!' close range signal intelligence platoons. Colonel
    Boetzel" head of OKH/GdNA,,' stated- that the NAA v3f3' not
    cons:idered. an eff'ective improvement. 61
    'This chapter vill deal with each Signal Intell1genee
    Regiment separately and will give in some detail the organi-
    zation and history ot. the components of each.
    18
    'J
    : I
    DOCID: 3486746
    12. Orgariizat1on or KDNA 1.-- KONA 1 vas org8Jl1zad
    :f.n the rolioving va7. To fOtlA &adquarters vere 8ubordl-
    nated:
    62
    1 Signal Evaluation Oenter, NAA3 1
    1 stationary Intercept Feste 10.
    I Close Range Signal Intelligence Company,
    NAK Preuss .
    2 Signal Intelligence Batta11ons, NAA 3 and NAA4
    To NAA 3 subordinated: .
    1 Long Range Signal Intelligence FAK 623
    1 Close Range Signal Intelligenoe Company, NAK 953
    .(later NAK Beilold) .' .
    '. ToNM 4 were subordinated:
    . 1 Long Range' Signal Intelligence Company FAX 6rr
    ,1 Close Range Signal Intelligence Company, NAX954
    a. Headquarters Un! t. The headquartersun1ta 01: XONA:1;Jl
    wh1ch worked a t Army Group headquarters" conslsted of' the .
    . '. commandant of: the KONA, his Adjutant, a Chief" of' Operation.
    (8-3), a paymaster, a teehn1cal'inspectol", and 'truck
    d;rivers. The f'o1lov1ng statistics show the b1"eakdovn of' the
    unit.63 . . .
    Co
    Adj.
    8-3
    Officers
    1
    1
    1
    En11stedMen
    -'
    Women
    -.

    Paymaster 1
    Technical
    Inspector 1,
    Clerks
    Truck drivers -
    s-
    62
    1
    198 P 5 .
    ,63
    IF
    40p
    .
    --- - - -
    4
    19
    2,
    -
    2""
    DOCID: 3486746

    , \
    I
    b" NAAS 1. T1)e NAAS of 1, had tyomajor oper-
    at+onal subdivisions:, '8 in evaluation
    and traffic analysis, and a section
    There were also a headquarters sectlQn" a
    . qommWlication line section, and a section of drivers:"
    The personnel, totalling eight off'icers" one hwidred s1xty
    enlisted mSin, a.nd .firty enlisted women were thus divided .
    among the section: 64 .
    Section Of'.ficers Enlisted Men
    Women'
    ,
    I
    2
    .23. ..
    , .,
    -",'
    ....
    . .,
    "13 .
    !50'
    ! :' .
    1
    6
    .1


    ysls
    , . ... ' ",

    Dr!vera
    c" Festa 10 and the Long R8itge" Intercept CbmPazlies e
    The Stationary' Intercept Company, Feste 10, and ,the Long
    Intelligen(fe 'Companies" FAX 617 and FAX 623,
    ;Ylere,sim,1;Lar .in their' organization'and ope1"st;i.on.. , had
    a'lie&ClCluar'ters sec tj;ori;"'1Don1 ,an,iV;81uatloh '
    slB'et1an" .a cryptanalytic s.ection" arid a
    platoorl. ,The
    minor . 10 than
    t:ruek drivers 1nstead o:f.the tvelvearid to
    F.U617 and FAX 623 " ,\. .
    . ., ,-
    64 IF' 4q p 12
    ...

    20
    .'..
    DOCID: 3486746
    ."
    '. .
    " ',The f'ollovUJg lists show and stl-ength
    ot Feste 10" FAX 617.. and FAX 623:
    0
    5. . . ,
    '. l
    \ .
    Feste 10 f
    \.
    YJ1Ptanalr-s18 1 .
    Communication Ln. Plt
    J
    . ,Officers '. En11stedMen
    :l.... 18
    Section'
    , Headquarters-
    MelmtoringPlt.
    -
    Evaluation :
    TJruck Dr!vera ..
    .
    EJtlemyRadl0 .Station
    :Locators
    . i
    1. -.
    - .
    3'"
    FAX 617
    32,
    .
    2!?
    15 .
    \ .
    10
    8
    l
    Women'
    2
    61
    8
    2
    -' ,
    ... .
    --r-
    :J!
    . C:ryptana11S;S
    Communication Ln. PIt. -
    Truck Drivers
    -Section
    '. H:eadquarters
    . Ilion!toring,Plts. '
    Evaluation
    :-., .
    .Or:r1eers
    1
    Enlisted Men
    15
    91
    33'
    20
    23
    16
    ,-gg

    ' .
    Women
    3
    ..
    , ..
    . \
    .e'
    ' ..
    65
    IF 40 p 13
    21 .
    DOCID: 34867'46
    '.
    FAK 623
    . Section ' Officers Enlisted Men
    Headquarters '1 14
    Mon1toring PIts. 1 83
    Evaluation, 1 34
    Crypt'analysis 16
    I
    Communication P1t. 1 17
    Truck Drivers 12
    ,....
    176
    Women
    4
    -
    d.NAK \954.. TheC10se Range Signal Intelligence Com-
    NAK 954, wasd1vlded into sections comparable to
    those of Feste 10 and the intercept, companies"
    as the folloving chart indicates: 6b .
    . I
    Section Officers Enlisted Men Women
    Headquarters
    EvSLluat10n
    Radio
    CODmnunlcation Ln. PIt.
    4 toring P1ts
    1 41
    - 30
    25
    18
    112
    229
    -,
    The NAK operated by platoons" one platoon attached t9
    each Army Corps.67. The strength of a platoon vas from
    to thirty men, of Which approximately tvelve vere en-
    gaged in radio telephoneintereept, tvo in radio intercept,
    fl'i78 in direction finding" and three in eva.luation. The
    the platoon comprised clerks" drivers,
    66 ,
    IF 40 p 13 ,
    67
    1
    'l9b 1? 2
    I
    22
    DOClD: 3486746

    .-
    -
    ,
    e. NAK 953,., Up to September J 1944 NAK 953 was
    nated to HAA3 or KONA, 1; but ,at that time it was moved' to
    the west, leaving only 1ts interpreters and cr
    YD
    g
    -
    to on the eastern rront:
    b
    ,
    " f BAJt Benold. NAK Benold, named afte;r .1ts CO, was '
    compos'ed at specialists ldnds who, had been drawn
    from the signal intell1gence companies subordinate to KONA 1.
    As' a company it f'ormedpart of' NAA 3. , '
    , g. NAK NAK Preuss, taking its name did NAK
    :aenold, f'rom its CO,'was formed from fot-ces withdrawn
    ot,her units of KONA i.' This' close signal company lias,
    in contrast to the other SUbordinated directly
    to KONA Headquarters.' ' ,
    Orss.nizs. tiOD' of' ' KONA '2. -- ' tion of
    KaNA 2is not Idiown In detaIl. As tar as can' be deter:L'1l.ned
    , l'romTICOM sources, there were 'subordin&ted'to,th18 KaNA
    in 1944:
    6
    9 . ' " "
    1 Signal Intelligence Evaluation Center, ,NAA5 2
    3 Signal Intelligence Battalions, lfAA.6, 7. and 8
    1 stationary Intercept Company, Feste 7 !
    3 Range Signal Intelligence CompaDies,FAX610,
    619. 622 " '"
    3 Signal Inteltigence Co.n1es!, ,BAK 951,
    In Feb:ruary components of' KONA 2 vere spllt:
    part 01' them. remained with KONA 2, which vas from'
    Army Group North to ArTlIJ' GJ,-oup We1chse'1; part or, thelli were'
    attached to KONA Nord, wh1ch place 'of' KONA 2 with
    A.rmy Group North. Theorigtnal components vere d1v1ded
    betveenthe two KONA ,in the following vaY:,1
    0
    , '
    KONA?:
    , 2 Long Range ,S1gnal Intelligence Companies, FAX 610; 622
    1 Close Range, Signal; In,tel11gence Company, NAX 958
    1 Intercept 7
    Q8
    I
    19b pl' -
    ,69 DF -9; I Appendix,
    . '
    70 DF 9
    \

    I
    Nord:
    , '
    .'
    . I
    lLong.Range Intercept Company, FAK 619
    1 (aose Range'Signal Intel:.ligence NAZ Brutus
    2 Range' Signal Intelligence CompanY' NAK 951, 955
    1 Signal Intelligence Evaluation Center, NAAS 2 '
    This, rema1ned_ the generalorganizatlon until 28 .1945,
    'wben b:r order at General Praun, Chief" Slgrial Ott1cer,'APmed '
    'Forces (Cbet Weh1'maoht abbreviated
    'Cbet W]W) and Chiet Signal 'Otficer, Artrr1 (Chet Beeres . .
    B wesen, abbrevlated ChetHNW.) KONA
    DOI'd ,to KONA2 all 1ts units except the Close Range
    Signal Intelligence Companies', NAK 951 and 955- 71 .
    . 14. organizationot KONA f'. -- .KONA 3 vas composed, in-
    -so1"ar \9.8 ls1iiiovn, of one NAA 710),7
    2
    . one FAX, one NAXand .
    one Feste . (The FAX maY' have been Number' 611, wh1ch was . .
    trans.f,erl'ed to the west .under KONA 61n ,October 1944)73 ,
    Nothing fUl"thei,' lsknown about KONA 3, which was caught 'bt
    .the Russians in a pocket in Kurland at the end ofthewar .. 74
    , \ , ",: I . .'.
    15. ' 'ot KONA4.. --' KONA 4" vas'
    to the Command1ng OffIcer (Be.fehlshaber .
    Who controlled the OermanA:rm1e#J 1n the Balkans. 75 The ,
    respon,slb:l:11ty of. these .armies appears to have been essen,t18,1-
    1y that of and occupational force; and KONA 4, therefore,'
    added to its of intercepting long range traffic
    emanating trom' the M1ddleEast and Afr1ca that ot monitoring
    the tr'attlc' of the occupledBalkan Tli.1s circum-
    stance may account tor the.faot. that the organization ot KONA 4'"
    included no, ,mobile Long Range ' Signal COmp8I,l1es
    and oIlLly two mobileOlose Range Signal Intell1gence Platoons.
    The other units of KONA 4 vere the Signal Intelligence Evalu-
    ation Center NAAB 4,andtvo stationary Intercept Companies
    (:Fes tEl 5 and'6)7
    6
    71 DF9
    72. I Appendix
    I 1
    r
    6 Appendix
    74 I 116p 8
    '75 . IF 171 p 1
    7
    6
    IF 171

    '24
    " ,
    DOCID: 3486746

    &. HAAS 4. The code name tor NAAS 4 was the abbrevi
    ation HASSO, which stood for Horchauswertestelle Suedost, .
    Intercept Evaluation Station Southeast.IT NAAS.I+ vasdiv1ded
    into a c1'yptanalyt1csection, a direction finding section,
    a tactical evaluation section, and a final evaluation se6tion.
    78
    'The stroength of 4 vas about 80..100 men, 1ncluding
    interpreters, decoders, cryptanal'1sts, personnel, I
    d.raug:htmenjJ drivers and antchboard operators. 79.
    15l. Feste 5.. - Feste 5 .W88 the former A:rmy Fixed Inter-
    cept Station at Graz. It-had the :following sections:
    lj headquarters
    2 radio intercept seetion
    :radio operation and maintenance seetion, operating
    a radio transmitter
    4) decoding. and cryptanalyt1csect1on
    5) evaluation section tordirectlon finding.
    Pestle 5 had. a strength of" 150-170 men and operated tlf't'1
    rad10intercept sets. Its personnel' was composed ot radio
    intercept operators,. code clerks, crypt&nalyste, interpreters",
    drivers, radio operators, typists, and switchboard operatora.oQ
    . c;, Feste 6. Feste 6 vas the former Army' Fixed Inter-
    Station at Tulln. It 'had the same subordinate sections
    6S Fleste 5, vith a strength or about 130 men: 81
    headquarters
    radio intercept section .
    radio operat1ons.and'tnalntenance section, operating
    a radio transmitter; .'
    decoding and cryptanalytic section
    evaluation section for finding

    77XF 171 p 1
    78
    IF
    171 P 2
    79IF 171 p 2
    8l:F 111 p 3
    81J[F 171 1> 3
    DOCID: 348674'6
    \ '
    d. " NAZ To The ,ctose Range, Signal Intelligence Platoon,
    NAZ T, consisted of rorty-tvo men; among these vere
    Turkish. decoders who also acted as interpreters. Its
    organization was asfollows:
    82
    .
    1 platoon headquarters
    2 radio intercept station with 10 sets
    } radio operation and maintenance section
    4 direction finding platoon
    '5 decoding section Turkish only
    6 final evaluation. section for direction findfng
    eit NAZ W. The signal intelligence pla1;oon, NAZ W,
    consisted of about eighty men who specialized in monitoring
    Balkan radio . Its organization vas as
    rollovs:
    8
    3 '
    1 platoonheadquarters
    2 radio intercept station
    } radio operation and maintenance section
    4 direction platoon
    5! decoding section
    61 final'evaluation section
    'f .,Radio Control station. The Radio Contl'"ol Station
    which had been ,part or' the
    of KONA 4 was d1ssolved in 1942. 84 '
    . .
    " 16. 'Orgardzatlonof KONA
    s" Organization t'h:rough 1 44. KONA 5 was the only' .
    S1gnal Intel11gence Regiment on the. western front until. the
    establishment of KONA 7 in February 1943.. It remainedthl-ough-
    out the war preeminent on this front.. .
    '.'
    82IF 171 p 3
    . 83IF 171 p 3
    84
    IF
    171 p 3
    26
    , \
    ,
    DOCID: 34,86746
    ,e"
    , \
    I, '
    february 1944, the organization KONA 5 cons1sted
    of a Signal Intelligence Evalua't1on Center,NAAS 5, tour
    Stat1Qn8ry Feste },9, and 12; an4
    , tllO ,Signal Illtelligence Companies.. FAX 613 and .
    624.8,) " :", ,
    . February 1944" the organization ot
    KONA J5 vas changed.
    86
    The reorganizatiQn ot 5 parallels
    changes in the German order at battlevhich took place pn
    the western front in early 'Prior to this time thS
    western armies had been under the cominand,..Dt Army Group D,
    to w,h.ich KONA. 5 a ttsched as ,the Signal, Intelligence ,
    ReglDllent of _the West. In' ea.r17 1944.. .. ' Army Gl'oup D '
    vas absorbed into the Commander-tn-Chief (Oberbetehl-
    shabeil' Vest), who took bntl"ol ot tht'ee newlytormed ArDlJ'
    Groups on the western front, Army GroupsB, H, and . ,
    KONA 5.' therefore .modeled its organization so t ,1t control-
    led three Signal Intelligence Blittalions, NA,A' la, 13.. and
    14, Each b&ttallon "ss attached to a separate ,Arl'lf'l ,GJ,'".9'IJ.Pf
    NAA 12 to, JiM 13 to ArMJ" GrOl1P,:aD aM mA.4:14
    to AJrtrq Group Gco _ ", ", <
    I In regard tbe iSubo1"d1nat10n the six component', .
    _pal'tlS orXONA 5 to the tbl"ee 81gnallntel11gence Battalions,
    ther49 1s disagreement between a 'OQmb1ned Detailed
    Interrogation Centre pub11catlon8tl and a TICOM interrogation
    report. 89-90 . :.. -
    ,
    86
    IF
    127 'P 2
    871 76 Appendix -':::Jl
    .. .; ,'j. ,i :
    88
    D '
    127 .',':. .' ,- L-,;'i, "
    89
    1 1.6 ',. - , . "'-" ".
    reportdeserlblng ,the grouping of the six
    ponent parts indicate FAK624 combined with
    platoon 12. to Torril NAA and 12
    c()mbined, to ;fo;rln ,NAA 13; Feste.613 combined vi th
    rll,nge 1nterceptcompany.. , NAX 965, to Torm 14. Feste
    3 and 9 werele:ft as independent units by
    the Kommandeur , . . .
    -' 'y' :;.
    \
    \
    ...
    '".'
    r -:".
    .. ;,
    ",'.- ." '.'
    ./
    - -.
    - -
    :0
    ", ,""
    . " (::.' ;" .t. l ..
    '" ':' :-
    ,- '.' , . -.f ;: .,'. ,
    , ',; , "
    '. \ ,'.;.-,; '.'; '\ " ;'-t
    . - . " ::'; \. - .
    ..-."l....
    , :(,.'
    - If
    DOCID: 3486746

    -'., .
    Chart shows the d1stri_but1on or the six elements'
    to Tlcorl report. Feste 12 comb1ned with
    Feste :; to torm NAA 12; Feste 2 and 9 combined with
    . FAX to'torm NAA 13. There is no 1ndiqation
    FAX 624comb1ned w1th other companies when i ttorme\d
    . NAA 14. '''. " .' . ,. .
    b. AttE!l' 1944. ,. The organizat1on ot KONA 5 as outlined
    shoverema.1ned constant throughout most, of 1944. In 1&te
    1944,hovever, an attempt vas.made to centralize and to '
    strengthen the vestern t1eld organizat1on. Accord1ngl7, / ' .
    'a - sen1()l' Commander ot S1gna,l (ltoehererX9mmand-
    eur dEtr Nachr1chten Auf'lclaerurig, abbl'ev1ated Hoeh Xdr d l'IA)
    e Eltabl1shed.. This Senior Commander, Col. Kopp, was
    attached to the Commander-In-Chief \test (.Ober'b,tehl-
    u
    shaber West) and vas made responsible tora11 Lntelli-
    genceactiv1ties west. 91 The strengtheJiing ot the
    western t1e1dslgna11ntell1gence vasef'f'ected ".bY 'mov1Dg
    KONA 6 f'1wc)m the easterntront to the western :f:rontto jo1n
    KONA 5. Both KONAs veresubordinated to the Semol" Com-
    mande:ro:'KONA 5 vas assigned to ArTIf1 Group vh1ch
    trolled 'the German armies on the southern erid ot the western
    front;'and KONA 6 vas attached to .A:rrqGroup B..
    trolled the German armies on the northern end of the vestern
    tront.92 " . ,
    / \riththe move of KONA 6 to the west, the' organization'
    . of' KONA 5 vas modif1ed.' , The Signal Intelligence Battalions
    ot KONA, 5 vere reduced to tvo, BAA 12 and NAA 14. NAA
    vMcb had,been composed of two stationary Intercept Com- '
    (Feste2 and ,9) and one Long Range Signal 'Intelligence
    COmpllnJ (FAX 613), was' .,taken and. .'
    1ts Feste2, 'was 'placed upder the .
    direct supervision of' the Hoeh ,ltdr .' dNA; Feste 9 was shifted
    from Norway .toltal,., where. 1 t 'e11 ,7:; and. BAA 13
    with FAX 613 vas assigned to KONA:6. KOWt,5 'vas compensated
    f'orthe l'oss of FAX 613 by" the addition of FAX 626, 'wh1ch
    vas taken'trom one of the eastern }tONA (perhaps KONA 8)
    to the western tront.9'
    , :91
    IFI
    123 P 6
    92
    1 .76 Appendi.x
    93
    1 76; IF 127

    DOCID: 3486746

    ,
    - . .
    , ,c. Organizat10n ot component parts: The organizat1on
    o:r.KONA 51 theref'oreI in the spr1ng of' 1945 vas. as' Chart
    4-3 indicates:' one evaluation center (NAAS 5) with tvo
    batta110ns (NAA 12 and 14); subordinated to NAA .12, one
    Stationary Intercept Oompany (Feste 12), and one Long .
    Range Signal Intell1genceCompany (FAK 624); subordinated
    to NAA 14, one S1gnal Intelligence COmp&n7 (FAX 626). This
    vas the organization otKONA 5 until the capitulation.
    1) MAS 5.. MAS 5, the S1gnal Intelligence Evaluation
    Center 01' KONA 5, vas located near P8l'1s at St. Germaine-en-
    Laye. The strength of' the organization vas about 150 men,
    consisting or .inter.pz-etel*8. c:ryptanalysts, evaluators,
    switchboard operators, dl*1vers, etc. In' addit1C)n.
    some vomenauxil1ar1es available, particularly
    l!I;v1tchbo&rd
    4
    "ork. The internal organization of' BAAS 5 1s
    J3l0t known. 9 .
    2) 'Feste 12. 'Feste 12 vas the Statlon&lty Intercept
    Clompa.ny which vas8ubord1nated to BAAS 5 until early 1944,
    when it jo1ne.d with Feste 3 to f'orm NAA 12. .
    l2consisted of'a radio lnter-
    c:ept platoon, and a telephone comnnm.1cat10ns unit. When it
    lIr&8 attached to NAAS 5" Feste 12 had no cl7Ptanalyt1c 01",
    Elva1uat1on personnel since' this vOl'k was being done at BAAS 5,
    j.t 1s probable that this type of' personnel vas added. The .
    strength of' Feste 12 vas estimated at 120 men and 30 women
    iLux111ar1es.95 . I.
    3} Festa 2. to a pr1soner's account" 96 the
    ()rganizat1on of Feste 2., tne f'ormer A.rtrr7 intercept
    "lot t-.1uenster" closely approximated that ot. Feste 3. It had,
    lL :p8.diointercept platoon, a direction f'incU.ng platoon, and
    evaluation platoon consisting ot tvo sectIons: one tor
    evaluation or content of' messages (Inhaltsausvertung)
    SI,tlfi. one. for the evaluation 00 tra:rf'ic. (VerkeIlrsausvertung)

    94IF' 127 p 2
    95IF127 p 4
    96
    IF
    '
    121
    p 4
    29
    \ '
    DOCID: 3486746
    ,.'
    i,
    '0

    , Feste 2 comb1l1ed. w1th Peste 9, and FAX. 613 to


    to:f1Jl NAA 13Q "\Qlen BAA 13 was, 'broken up 1'lovember
    Feslte '2 directly to the Senior' Oommander
    ot 31gnalInte111gencein the West.
    4) Feste 3. . Fes'te 3 vas the .original ArllQ' intercept
    at Eusk1:rchen. EarlY' 1nthe war 1t had been
    ordl1n&.ted to 5. At first adm1:n1stered independentl,-,
    .in 1944 1t combined with Feete 12 to f'Ol'Dl 'BAA 1,2.' ,When
    5vasreorgan1zed 1n the, tall, of 1944. Feste 3 was
    coolb1ned ,w1th,theLongRange Signal Intell1gence COmp&nr,
    626, wh,1ch had been brought trom the, eastern front to
    . fOI'm NAA14 This organization was, valid until, 'the end
    or the .war. 97 . -.,' . . ,
    organizat1onotFeste 31a a
    officer, Lt., Hans Le,hvald,. attached to1t aacon-
    sistingot a radio reception platoonot approximatelY' 70
    tt8c:e1vers,.:and an evalUation platoon at, 25-30 _no . '!'he
    vas' down into. tor trart'1c'
    crn>tanal:tais" evaluat1on, d1:rect1on finding, and
    f1ling' section tor cartl slgns,
    8oll&litles, code names, and direction finding
    " .
    . . . 5J:: Peste 9. Fes'te 9 ,It'&S.& In'te1"()ept Comparq
    ro]:,med 1n Frankf'\11"tjMa1n spring ot 1942 and sent to
    NOJ:"w&y in July ot that. -year. 'It wa.srlt'st atationedat'
    'rl-c)ndh1em, later at Bergen, and in the ot 1944 at
    SlCl near Oslo. (Between the summer ot 1944 following
    V1Jlter, most of the personnel Vere moved to Ital,.; b,.
    Ch:Jt-ls tmas o..t 1944, there' was nothing, 1ert or the un1t'
    Norwa7.)99 .
    97:r.F 127 p ;, '.
    . \ ,
    p 2
    99:Ip 120 p 6
    30
    '.
    DOCID: 3486746
    I
    ,

    ., .
    . While in Norvay Feste 9 vas organized along the lines
    ora ,Long Range Signal Intelligence Company, with
    quart'ers platoon" an intercept platoon or' BO-120men, a "
    direct10n f'ind.1ng, a re.d1o platoon of about 20 men, and.
    an ev,aluation section ot about 30 men. The evaluation sec-
    tion ;b.ad one subsection for the evaluation of message
    conte:ntsg one for traf'f'ic,' and one for cr,ptana17s1a.100
    .... - When in Norvay. Feste 9 was. 8ubord1nated to KONA 5.
    can be surmised, however, that its connection with KONA 5
    , {tali 'always more flexible than that ot the othel' un!ts because
    \:of".lt:sgeograph1cal posj,t,1on in Norway. When NAA 13 vas
    up, Feste 5rema1ned under the supervision of' KONA 5
    until" 'it vassh1:rted to' Italy under KONA' 7 .. ",' "
    6:) FAX 624 .. ' FAK 624 vas s't Montpellier on 16
    April 1943 and attached to KONA 5.
    102
    In FebrU8.l7 1944,
    FAIt vas subordinated to NAA 14 o.f" KaNA 5, and ,1n late
    . rallc)f' that. year it combined with Feste:; to f'.ol'm th4:t
    NAA'l4.103 '"'.
    , The company was composed an,1n,tel-cept platoon
    an-sd"snced listening post, a communications platoon, and an
    evaluution platoon.. For transport, FAK 624 1s sa1dto have .
    had app:roximate1y 85 velUcles, with six special French radio
    trucks .&nd trai.1ers with direction rinding .equ1pment. The
    strength of the company ,vas apprOXimately 250 men including
    interpreters, code clerks, radio intercept
    and ninety drivers,;104
    100
    IF 120 p 6
    lOlIF 144 p 2
    102
    IF 127 p 3
    1
    0
    3
    1
    6 -
    l' .Appendix.
    104
    IF 127 p 3
    31
    DOClD: 3486746
    ,e
    --,,-

    '.
    7)' FAIt 613. FAX 61) beloliged to KONA 5, in so tar .
    is know, from' its inception. In February 1944, FAX' 613
    combined with Feste 2 and 9 to form NAA When this
    battalion was up in late 1944, FAK613vas're-
    assigned to KONA6, with which it remained until. the end
    .of the war. 105 . . . .
    Very little is' known or the orgail1zatlon' 6r FAX.613;
    according to IF 127, its organization paralleled that ot
    FAR: 624.106 . . .
    . 8) FAE: 626'.. FAX vas' established in, August 1943,
    .trained until January 1944 and formally activated at that
    time at Wlnri1za. It vas subordinated to one of the eastern
    KONA. (perhaps KONA 8.) and vas stationed in the UkraIne area.
    , In October1944,FAK626 vas sent to Landau.where it was .
    schooled1.n -western trafric $Jld re.organ1zed. .In November
    1944, it metFAK 624 at Landau; and both units were sent
    vest to KONA 5 with which they remained until the end ot
    the war .107 " . . .
    The .original strength of FAX 626 on the Russ1an front
    is. said to have' been 250-300 men orcwhom-80-l00 were inter-
    cept operators, 10-15 direction finding operators,
    lO,traffic analysts. The
    greatl,. Wlder strengtll on theve'stern
    front. 10 . . . . . '. .
    17. Organization or' KONA 6.-:.. KONA 6 vas activated
    as an, eastern KONA at Frarikfurt/Main in 19,4l and 'stationed
    IntheCrimea tp 109 vorkin the Caucasian campaign.
    110
    Arter thatcampalgn, Its 8ssignmentwas the interception
    . Of-Russlanpartisan This remained its task
    , linti1the KONA was detached in early 19!1:4 and re&sslgne<1
    to work, on the western front. 112 ..
    . 10;176
    106IF 127 p 4
    .
    10
    11 '76.p 3
    108
    1
    '7'p 4
    '109
    IF
    195
    .110DF 18.p 81
    lJ.l
    DF
    18' p 81 .
    76
    32
    '.
    DOCID: 3486746

    . ( #
    There 1s no statement in TIC014doeuments about the
    organizat1on KOWi 6 while in the east. The,.
    -organization after it was ass1gned to the vest, however,
    ls'c:lear from I 76 .Append1x. - As. ,8 western XONA,KONA 6
    . had two Signal Intell1gence NAA 9 and NAA
    ,BAA 9 'had been, brought trom the ea.st in November 1944.
    Subordinated.to 1t were the Close.Range.S1gnal Intelllfenoe
    Company, NAK 956, vhiehwas e'stablished1n October 194, .
    arid the Long Range Intelligence Compan,., PAIt 611" ,.
    vh1eh. had been bl'ought tromthe east at that time. NAA13,
    it. 'il111be 'recalled, had been g1 to !tOKA 6 01 KONA 5
    with the LongRangeS1gnal Intelligence COmp8.n1. FAIr 61.3.
    .to NAA 13we1'e.8180 FAK.610, which had been
    broUght from the east in lt6vember, ,1944; aIidl1AX 95}
    been brought from the east in October, '1944.113
    a . FAK 613. FAX' 613 vas given by KONA5 to KONA 6
    1n1ate 1944. As has been stated under the material on
    KO!IA 5, nothing 1sknovn of the orgaiUzatiorio:t FAX 61J.
    It ,probably parallel to that ot' o,ther Long Range Signal
    Intelligence ComPanies such" as FAX: 624.114 ' ..
    '. b.FAX 611. FAX '611 vas active on the eastern front
    the Russian campaign trQm June 1941. . It vas a180
    in poland, where it .vas attached to Ar1DJ' Group.
    Center.1lS In 1944, 611,v&8 moved to
    6
    the
    western .tront'andsubordiDated to !tOM 6 BAA 9.
    11
    ot the} size of FAX on the eastern
    On the western 1t vas small enough
    .in Zutphen, Holland, .near theVand,.k cburch,' and
    consisted of 30-40 radio and radio telephone, operators,
    10 decodersand o17'Ptan&11sts, and .25 evaluators.
    ll
    7
    113
    1
    ,16 Appendix
    1l4
    IF
    121 I> /4
    l15i. 55 p4 ..
    116 6 ..
    I 7 APPendix
    117
    1
    1'4p 2
    /

    33
    }4
    DOCID: 3486746

    e.
    e. FAK610. FA!: 610 va.s' activated 1n 1940 tar oper-
    at1c)ns on the eastern.front;118 SUbgrd1nated to KONA
    it "orked,at TI1s1t1n September 1940 and later settled
    (at Volkhov, it intercepted RU8s1an\tJ;-att1c. In
    1944 It vas transt'erred to the western front.
    Notbing 1s known or FAK6l0 on the v8stel-n front except
    that 1twas 8ubol'd1nated to NAA 13 or KONA 6.119
    18. Organize.tloD .or ]tOM' 7. - - KONA 1 vas established
    in FebrU817.143 as tlie S1gnal Regiment Bub-
    ord:Lnated to the. Commander-in-Chief South (Oberbetehl-
    ababer Sued) who controlled the .Germa.n Armies in Italy.
    In . the component parts ot KONA 1 vere: 120 .
    Headquarters un! t
    1 Signal Intelligence Evaluation Center. BAA 7" with
    . covername Kr1mhilde ..
    2 Stat10nary Intercept Companies, Feste 1 and ,,1th
    covernames Mon1ka and Astrid
    1 Long'Range Signal Intelligence Compa.n.y,F'AX621, w1th
    eovername .Erika
    a. NAAS 7. NAAa 7 vas organized into sections tOl"
    cryptography,. ar7Ptana1ysis, and evalU8.tion. The evaluation
    sections includedimmed1ate, tactical,
    evaluation. The strength o:f
    the evalUation center lias about 150 men, 121
    . b. Feste 1. Feste 1, the former intercept station
    . at.Stuttgart, wh1ehhad been stat10nedat Strasbou:z-g in ..
    1940; Brittany in 1941, and later that year at Montpellier,
    moved to Italy and was attached to KONA 7 in 194}.122 ..
    The main task or Feste 1, vas interception. No evaluation
    vas by the personnel who consisted/of' radio 1ntercept
    operators, and telephone operatol"s, anddirect10n
    :f1tiding operators .123 '
    62 P 3
    119
    11
    6 Appendix
    120
    IF
    172 ,
    121
    IF
    , 172 .. 2
    122IF 172p 2
    123IF 172
    DOCID: 3486746

    c. Feste 9. The origin and organization of Feste 9


    hal!! been described under KONA 5..
    d. FAIt 621. FAK 621 vas organized in 1942 from the
    fOJC"mer intercept (Hc>r.ch) company 3 (H) NA 56.
    124
    Its,
    or:lginal commander was Seebohm.. who vas captured vith'
    mOI,t of FAK 621 in the .African campaign on 10 July" 1942.
    remnants of' this eompanJ continued to work on Allied
    sYI!Stems under Oaptain H8bel until lo'1ay 194:;, whe.n the Al11es
    completed the capture ottile unit at Tunis1a.125 Nothing
    is known of'the organization or the company and intel'ro- \,
    otthe prisoners are not available for this report.
    . Organization of'KONA8.-- KONA which was tormed
    in Oc:tober !9li4 and assIgned to the Eastern f:ront.. A:rmy Group
    Sotl\th" had one Signal Intelligence Evaluation .. .NAAS 8;
    tvo Signal Intelligence Battalions, NAA 1 2';120 one .
    .Long .Range Signal Intelligence' .Company.. FAX 620; One Close .
    Range Signal Intelligence Company vh9se id.entl tJ 1s unknOWn;.
    anclone stationary Intercept Company 4 or 8). It
    is known that Feste 8 attempted In the winter of 1942-3 '
    to 1ntercept Russian radio telephone traf'fic at KoeDigsberg;
    but; it 18 not certain to VMt:eastern KONA this Peste vas
    aSI!l1gned.
    12
    1 FAX 620 had monitored wes'tern traf'tic on the
    N01"derneyIsland from August 1939 until 1t yas sent to the .
    e&Eltern .front and subordinated to KONA Nothing more
    1s 1Qlown of the un! ts
    ..'
    'IF 126p 10 See I S5p 4 f'er a list of' the seven .
    intercept eompanies(Horchkompanle) in the German ArT/f1.
    125iI 18 p 9
    126
    1
    76 Appendix
    127' .
    IF 123 p 3
    128
    I 76 1'3
    35
    DOCID: 3486746

    ') ,
    ,

    20.. Organization of.KONA Nord.-- KONA Nord was


    organ:Lzed !n Pebruary, 1945 to serve Army Group North when
    KONA which had, been attached to that group, vas trans-
    ferred to Arrify'Group We1chsel. From KONA 2, KONA Nord re-
    ,ceiveel NAAS 2, FAX' 619, NAK 951 and 955, and NAZ Brutus ..
    TlUs was valid only until 28 f.1arcll" vhen(by
    order' or General.Praun, KONA Nord w8.s.ol:'dered'to return
    to Arlny' Group Weicheel all its components except the two
    Close -Range l.t,ltelltgepce companies,NAK 951 and 955.
    These probably remained with KONA Nord until. the capitu- '
    latiOJ1.129,' ,c '
    . 11.-- NAA 11 was a field wrlt
    in Uerman Army SIgnal organization. . "
    AlthOl.1$h it was assigned to the 20th Mountain. Army, (XX Gebirg-
    J, in matters of signal intelligence it was an inde- '
    . pendent unltsubordinated directly to Ost acting in all
    respe(Jts. like a Signal Intelligence Regiment. 13
    0
    . "
    The'original core of NAA 11 was the Long Range Signal
    Intelligence Platoon designated North (Nachrichten Fernaufk-
    laerungszug Nord"abbreviated FAZ Nord) which operated in
    Finlalld after 1941.. ' On 1 March 1944, FAZ Nord was merged
    wi Close Range Signal Intelligence Conipany, NAK 961;,
    to fo]:om NAA 11. In the :raIl of 1944, after Finlandt s
    capitulation, NAA 11 retreated to Norway.13l In !t1ay 1945..
    :ltwas at Norway, it was ordered to turn over
    al1dc)cuments and papers to the 20th Army and to .
    organlze a grollp which would incorporate the experl,ence and
    . o:rthe Unlt.132 The interrqgations of this
    'which known as the. Norway partyn are published
    asI I 106. '
    l29
    DF
    ,9
    131
    '-5 p 5 .)
    131
    1 '5
    P 5 .>
    132
    I '5
    P 3 .> ,
    36
    -----------------
    DOClD: 3486746
    I
    .'
    )

    7
    \
    The major of NAA 11 vB.s1ntercepiion, although
    ,1t "!'is respons1ble for d1reot1o'n finding, evaluation, .
    cryptanalysis"and communications. Tije division of per-
    sonnel,gives an es1flmate of 'the comparative importance of
    these tunctlons,.Of, the 475 men" from 200 to'250 Were
    assigned to intercept and operated seventy-five. sets;
    men vere assigned' to direction finding, forty to
    evalu8ti()n, . twentY-five to oryptanalysis, and thir,ty to
    communications. One'hWldred men were needed,for dr1vtng,
    ,eooldng, ete.133 ,
    Feste,LoekkeJi .. -- The Feste Loelcken was the
    stationary Intercept. Compan1' IJ,ttached to the German m1i1t817
    c'ommander in'Denmark.Nothing is o:t1ts ol"gantzatlon.
    1}3
    I 55 p 8
    "
    /
    \
    37
    ,
    "
    "
    ..\
    DOClD: 3486746

    --
    ,
    VOL0ME4
    Chapter IV: . German A:nr:f intercept Operatl'ons
    , Paragraph'
    ,Intercept Operations 1923'-1933 23
    Intercept Operations 1933..1939 24
    InterceptOperatlons 1939-1944.o o
    a. Control ot Intercept coverage
    b'. AssIgnment of intercept,' . /
    Opel-ationa 1944-1945
    a. Interceptoperatlons ot'GdlIA
    b. Intercept operations in the field
    c. Disintegration ot Intercept operations
    "
    23. Intercel '23-1' -- Assignment ot
    Inte1"cepteoverage rom 92 - ,wa.s IDa .e,by tlie Code.s.
    and Ciphers Section of the Defense (Relchvehr.1
    m1nlaterlum, Chif'f"rlerabtel1ung). The division of' inter.-
    eept taaks vas establIshed on ageograph1oal basis.
    ntch monitored Italy :(lncludlng her oolontes)., Yugoslavia,
    Gl'$ece," Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania; Bungal7, Austria. and
    Czechos:J,.ovak1a. 'Stuttgart monltore,c1 Franoe (including .
    her' colo.n1es), Belgium, and Spain., moni-
    'tared England '. (lnclud1ng colonies)' and Dominions . ' ,
    1s 1nTICCM sources ot intercept :o'tUntted
    state'S :tl'a.f'f'ic betozee 1941,..With the entrJ ot the ,United
    States into ,a USA section vas torm/ad vithlnln 7 '
    VI.) The. station in Koenigsberg intercel>ted RU8sian traffic,
    , 'and tM,t at Bzeeslau monttwed Pollsh,Czechoslov8ld.8.l1 '
    (and Russian) oommun1oatlQns.The station atLlegn1tz "
    . h&dtvlce the 'personnel ot the other stat1ons,and its,
    Qover vas directed by the
    4
    Codes and Ciphe1'ls Section ot the
    'German Defense Ministry.1 0 t ' '
    - ,The personnel of eabh'lnterceptst&tlonconsistedat
    one of'f'iceze (cl)1ef'.or the station) , one radio mechanic, "
    eigbteen or tventJ enlisted men,. and six or' eight civilian
    employees used, as clerks, 'interpreters, etc. ,In 19", , "
    .;8
    DOClD: 3486746

    "

    /
    .five the personnel. Major Pe!cht-
    nel' or Air Force, Air Signal,a Reg1ment"52 (Llf '
    Regt.J52) state<! that these units 'had !io,tables9t organi-
    zation, their personnel be1ng .detached tram aignal batta-
    , 110nsand slgnalp).atoons ot tbelnfant1'7',Cavalr1., ,
    Notunt1119}2 did the, Fixed Intercept Stat1ons. ,(Fe$te .
    'Horchatelle, Peste) receive the11' 'tables or:
    ()J'Sa.nlz&t10n The quall,t7 or the, personnelot 'the' Pixed
    vas C)ert.in to, beef best' 'becauaethe ,
    8tat1ons',.rf)celved the "ct, ,the ,
    K1nlatry.l
    l
    1l1 " ' ", ' , .",:
    The mater1al 'utercepteq. <1&11,. vas 8,tudled b;r ,the ,trat..
    f'ia, a.nal181saect1'oll.-ot the 'fe.te, and the' re,U1ta were
    into &'daU,.trertlc ana17s18 repol't.,. The ,
    ,d.8c1phered','radl0 messages yere then All., ,
    " messAges'which could., nQt, 'b,. 'the stat1()ns"
    ,\o'eresent'daily to the Sect1onot ,the German '
    Defense' .M1nlatrl'; On one 000&8'1QI1, when
    : ot the 'l81"getoi"elgn power.were be1ng monitored, ,
    FeldhtD9xt' statedtha.t of the 5ub-a&ct1on'deall11g
    with the,countr., 1n: question va" sent tram the Code'S ,
    ,CiPhers: the lnterceptat&t1cn,tor'the
    durat1on, or the 2" " ' ' ',' .
    , ,. 'The t1;l'st nal millta,rl &ctlv1t1waa themon1'tor.lns '
    ot V8.1' in the midd,J.e 1920's (Felchtner'said 1930)
    deplo1Dient end operational' tact10s of' the 5j)&n1sh"
    and:.Prencb'V81"e learned lndetaU' through the decoding' of
    radjLo'm8ssages. arid the German BQ W&8 regw.ult serv1ced'
    wltb reports. In recognitlon of the tine pertoz-mance' ot
    tbeMun:tch '1nterceptstation, its chief was'
    pursue 'techn1calstudles at the expense otthestate. ' ,';
    : "Ha;j01" Feichtner made it that the'period prIor
    to 1933' vas 'onset tl'&1nlng tor the German1J1tercept'uD1ts.
    .. 24 :lnlg". ...
    Army H1gh dommana( 0 ,n 'gener, : control, ot the
    141
    IF
    "lal ,p3.
    142iF 181 p '4
    ,p S'
    '9
    , ,
    o
    DOCID: 348674,6

    Volume IV
    40
    "
    inte'l'oept organizat1"on
    144
    and the Intercept Cont1'ol St&tion
    145
    (HLS) directed intercept coverage. ' AprograIQ of expans10n
    and, improvement was instituted, with establishment 'or three
    new :FiXed1lgtercept Stations at Striegau, Hersbruck, and '
    Chemnitz. All Amy intercept sta.tions were '1mp1'oved.
    By 1934, torinstanoe, a&chhad its own bu1lding '
    the city' .limits where it vas tree ,tromelectricallnter-
    terenoe, arid ea.h was equip];)ed W'1ththe latest technioal'
    improvements. 1 7 In 19'5, the,tirst mobile Signal Intel-
    ligence Companies were activated, tor the grsaterpartrom
    Signal Corps recruits. Officers, n0J1... ortlcers,
    and privates the. Fixed Intercept 5tat1QD8 acted as
    instructors.
    1
    , .' , ", i
    At this 'time the Amy vas interoeptingallA.rmr, dip-
    lomatic" and Air Foroe traffic. The Army-traffic vas sent'
    for to the: Army cryptanalytic &ndevaluation '
    agen,oT'" "the InterceptCon,trol Station (lU.J5) at Berlln.
    Diplomatic traffic was,passed, either 'to the Codes and'Ciphers
    the German Defense Ministry or to the ,Foreign,
    ottice. Sergeant Jer1ng9t the Slgnallntel11gence . _
    Agen,cy of the Air Force High,Command (OKL/l..B Abt,350) noted
    . that dur1ng this period the Army intercepted and evaluated
    foreign Air Foreetratfie but did not give it so much atten-
    tion. asit'gavethe ground toroe traft1c.
    151
    The Air Foree
    was beooming ,inoreasingly dissatisfied '11th the ArrAy lnter-
    cept'work and ln1935 began to organize its QWn'Slg1l&1Intel-
    ligenee' For three years however (1935-19381, the '
    Air,Fproe'Dialntained olose relat1ons' with the Army. Air ,
    Force.>empJ.oyees f'8IIi,111arlzat1on training at Army
    Fixed Interoept Stations and the Air'Force rad10 interc&pt ,
    8 tat10ns,Wetterfunkenpf'angstelle
    1
    ,' (w-s were' set 'up
    aCCQ
    1
    rd1ng the Army. prototY.P8S .' 52 BJ 19'9, the break be..,
    twee'D the Signal Intelligence SeriTioe ot, the A1!lrq H1gh Com-
    mand, and that or the Air Foroe Command was complete.
    78 p, 2
    ,
    145
    s,ee Chapter II,
    146 . '
    I, SSP 3
    147IF 181 p 9
    . 148
    1F
    '181 p 10
    78 p 2
    151 85 " P 2
    15
    1
    IF ,181 p 13,
    15
    2
    IF
    181 p ,14

    DOCID: 3486746

    .'
    /

    At this time the Supreme Command of' the Forces also


    set u:p its, own intercept service for diplomat10 traffi0.
    The Army gave to the ArmedIPorces two or its 1ntercept
    statlons,Laut (formerly at Hersbruck\
    for the interception or th1s tratric.
    1
    5} From this per1o<1
    on" the Army interoeptservioe conf1neditself
    to the interception of fOl'e1gn P:r.wm.y traffic. "
    , ' The act!vities of the Arm.y interoept "service trom.
    19}3to 1939 centered around the various' crises of the ,
    : international situation. In 1934, at the time or' the 4ue-
    trianrevolt, Munich given the task ot
    ,Austr1,.an traffic including internal commun1catlons .J.5 '
    At the same time it monitored Ital1ans and
    through 1.ts.diseoverY,that,theltalians were massing tx-oops
    a t the, brought about the vithd1tawal
    of Ge:rmany front the Affair.
    l
    ,:> ,In 1935. Munich was Iloni- ,
    toring French traffio at ot'the
    Rh1neland;- an.d, as a result' of, the 1ntellige:nee derived
    troops In,vithout,fear ofreprls&l.15
    0
    '
    'From 1933 to 1936, peri'od of" 'the Abyssinian War"I' inter_-
    cept atat10Iis of theAraly !lElhCommand monItored Italian_ I
    . tr&t'fle without 57 ' Froml9,6 to 19:;9; ,Munich 1
    and 'Stuttgartmonltoref the traf'f',"c of' both.f'ac'tione in
    theSpan1sh Civil War. Durlng this period, thetlrst,
    mobile signa11ntell1gence company ,went 1nto the field
    attached to the Legion Condor. Felchtner stated'
    1nsplte,or,the OPP9sltlon, of some of'"the,regu181'Army
    'of'f"1eers ' to' a mobile organ,1zat16n' of'" this' type.' this com-
    'pe,ny quickly assumed 1tsrole as amost,tmportant inetru.,;
    mant of to ' '

    153
    1
    85 'p 3
    15
    4
    IFlai p,'6
    155IF '181 p 6
    '. '. . .,
    15
    6
    IF 18i'pp
    157IF,' 181' p7
    158
    1F
    181' p 8
    159IF 181 p 8
    41
    \
    ./
    42
    DOCID: 3486746

    0i/rations 1229-1944-- BefOre 1939,


    the Ganer . St . thad pIa,ced very 11ttle emph.a$ls
    uponlntereept in thet1eld. Nearly all 1nterceft
    been caz-ried on by the Fixed Intercept, Stat1onaFeste).
    Wlth the approach of mobile. war-t'are, however" Germ&n Army
    lntez'cept operations also became mobile.' The new emphasis
    on field interoept resulted in the establishment of SignAl
    Intelligence Regiments (KONA) whose mobile component parts
    were designed to work with or the Army from Army
    Grou;p to Jutmy Corps level. The adaptation ot the S1gnal
    Intelligence Regiments to meet the'needs of the Field
    Army 1s one of the ohief accomplishments or the Army ,51gnal
    intelligence service.' ',; . , .
    , a . ot Covera.se ....... Control
    of lr.ltercept aUr, the 'tf8,19 stemm rom the
    Intel.ligence Officers Of' the Eastern Armies Bran:eh and the
    Western Armies Bl-anchl-
    bO
    , As Jodl stated, theseotfleers
    were thorougbl!61ami11ar the general s1gnal1ntel11-
    genee' picture 0 The chain of' command is very clear dur1ng
    the l.ast yea:r or, the war. The Intelligence,off1cers o-r the
    Eastern Armies Branch and the Western Arm1$s Branch briefed
    the chief" of' the Underst&f"t ot oKH/GdNA" who had control
    ,
    In the west, the Understarr worked through the 5eniorCom..
    mander of Signal Intelligence (Hoeh Kdr dNA) whose funct10n
    it W
    6
    8S to coordinate the intercept coverage of KONAs 5 and
    6 3, With the other KONA, the cha1n ot command fl'OU1 the
    Under'stattwas direct. The Signal. Intelligence Evaluatl.on
    Centers (NAAS) of the KOBAs issued the'dlreet1ves'ror 1nter-
    cept coverage to all units subordinate to the KO:NA O' .
    In 1941-1944, previous to the estab11shment at the
    GdNA, ,the chain of' command appears to have been the f'ollov-
    1ng; non:"Russ1an interoept coverage was directed by the
    Western Armies Branch through the Control '
    Intelligence of the Army High Command (oDILIA);..L Russla.n
    1601 86 ' 2
    p,
    '
    161
    1 143 ',p
    162
    I
    F 123 p 6
    163IF 123 p'6
    16
    4
    1 196 plO
    DOCID: 3486746

    intercept by the Eastern Branch


    the Intercept Station East' ot the Army' High
    Comma,nd (OKH/BLS Ost). ", ' ,
    b.Assigpment of Assignment of interoept '
    was estabIIshed on the geogra real basis: eastern, south-
    east9!rn. western. southwestern. FrODi the begUin1ng of the
    war'eastern interception 'Was given high priorIty and KOllA
    1. 2. 3. vere assigned to coverage. In 1942 KONA
    6 andl in 1944/45 two other KONAs, 8 and Hord were tormed
    a180to1' the interception of eastern traffic .166 In add1.;.
    tion, eastern interception was oarried an by three 1ndepen-
    "dent Stationary Intercept Companies. Feste 7, 8, ,11, and one
    Longllange ,Signal Intelligence Platoon; FAZ Bord. At tel'
    1942J1 new monitoring of eastern traffic was done b1
    tl1e-,1ntercept Control Station East (BL3 Ost.) tn In con-
    trast;. SIOutheastern.western. and southwestern interception
    were covered by ODe KOltAaplece. with one central monitoring
    a.gent'J ,to%' all three' area, the Control Station tor S1gnal
    Inte:l11gence (LNA). ., - , , , .' '
    . 1. Eastern intercept. -- The mission ot all eastern
    KONA vas the1nterceptlonand evaluation of Rus81an Arm7,
    , Air lroree. and Partisan (guerrilla troops) trartle. , Their
    Intell"Cept cover,age differed only 1nrespect to the geographi-
    cal .ior1gin of' the tl'&f't1c. KODA which vas attached
    durihg the period ,1939-19" to Army Group South Ukraine,
    covered the southern part ot the Russ1an f'ront.' It moved
    in tbevlcin1t1es of Lemberg, Wlnnl;8., Poltav&, Re1chshof,
    and Novy J1cin in KONA 2.whlch W&S
    atta,ched .to Army Group Center and covered traffic on the'
    oentI-alJl\1ss1an tront,moved in the v1cinity at Warsaw
    Vltebsk, Smolensk, Minsk. and Grodno.
    169
    KOHA3,wh1eh va.s attached to Army Group Borth, <sovered
    ,1651F123 P 4
    .166
    1
    198 P 1
    167
    11 123 P 5
    116 P 8
    169
    1
    116 p8'
    , I
    DOCID: 3486746

    tr
    t
    atflcon the n01'ltheI'n part of the Rus$lan tront andln
    the Baltic states. It wa.s variously at R1ga/Dueneberg,
    psikov and where in 1945 it was ca.ught pocket
    bJ' the Russians &nd captured Intact.
    1
    70 KONA6vas tONed .
    in 1942 to the traN"le ot the campaign 1n C$.ucasus.
    1
    71 .
    While in the east the .unit vas loeated at Hostov on the
    Nc)vocherk&ssy, and Minsk.
    1
    7
    2
    Atter that campaign, it vas'
    a.slslgned to the interception ot Russian P8l'tisan' t:rattio
    aILd kept this. as its, coverage until :November 1944,
    when 1t vithdl'awn trom. the Gast and reassigned to the .
    WElstezan . .' .
    The f'our Independent 5t&tionary Intercept Companies
    aSlsigned to .work on the eastern f'ront had the follow1ng
    &EISlgnmen,ts. To FestEJ 11 vas e.sa1gned covel'age of'high-
    tIsequency: traffic on the Red kr!trr1. and the liK.VD. OriginallyJ
    tiLis Feste wa.s . located at W1nnlzs,.. latter17 at Kiev.:I74
    The other two Feste, 7 and. 8, concentrated on special Rus- .
    slan trar:r1c. Feate 7 was the Russian reception
    at Minsk. . In 1942-43 it was moved to Loetzenwhere
    became part of8eetion4 or the m.S Ost and eontinued .'
    te) intercept Russian Baudot traffic .175 Feste 8 was the
    f'c)rmerAI.-my interoept' stat10nat Koenigsberg. Af'ter1942,
    this station ooncentr&ted on Russia.n wireless telephone
    ca.lled by the Germans Russian X-traffic. Attempts
    were made to pick up this traffic by
    AJ.tmy Ordnance, Sign&]. Equ1pmentTestlng La.boratory ,', ,.' .. -
    (llra..r:renpruef"ung, abbreviated Va :Pruet" 7). The channels
    mc)nitDl'ed ran east ot K08001l; the traffic was. main].,. econo-
    mic. Fram 1942 to 1944, thlstratf'10 WAS succesBf'ully.re-
    c()rdeQ.; but attar 1944 the Russians scrambled their w1re'"
    telephone traffio, and after unsuccessful et"forts
    lILtel'Cept th1s
    6
    scr&mb1ed type had been made, the monttoring
    VELS dropped.17 _
    l'tol 116 p8
    l"llDP '18 p 81'
    11
    r2
    l 116 p 8
    173
    1
    116 p 8
    l1
    r4
    IF 123 P 12 I
    175]lP 123 P 5
    ljr6
    IF
    123 P 14
    44
    DOCIO: 3486746

    .'
    45
    The 1."ong Itange 81gnal Intelligenoe Platoon, PAZ Bord,
    operated in Finland atter 1941. The mission otth.ls unit .
    (whloli vas attached to the 20th Germsn Mountain Arrsr1) .was
    the. 1nterceptlonor Russian ArU1"3 traf"f"10 .177 . All Russian
    Army systems were handled by FAZ liord except five-figure
    , tra.ttic vhich vas sent in an unprooessed s.tateto HLS.17
    8
    Section 4.of IlLS Ost monltored:BKVD Inter-Soviet State
    . traffic
    1
    end rad10 broadcasts of" the Tass Hews Agency trom
    Moscow. 7':J. (Mention has already been made.. ChapterII,ct
    the aCQ.u1s1tion by the section ot the B&udot reception.
    station 1n1942-4J, when Feste 7 vas moved trom
    '2. ..- Southeastern intercept
    . vas the task: Of kOlA.4, whIch was. the S1gn&l Intelli-
    gence Regiment in the Ballcails durlngtbe war. '. For the task
    or interoepting tra1'tlc in this at-9s.,the component parts
    of the KONA> were located 1n 8 trateglc places: ltAA5 4, the
    Signal Intelligence Eval.uation Center, wasSmOved 1n the. sum-
    or to Beon Phaleron Athens;l Oit remained
    theI's until' Fel>ruary1944, when 1t retreated to -Be1.grade.
    181
    From Belgrade 1t to Graz whence it had departed some
    four years1aefore. Feate 5. the tormer Army intercept
    6;
    1nterceptstatlon at Tulln, vas stationed' dUring thla.. perlod
    in AthenSifrom Which it returned to Tulln in
    The Close Range S18nal Intelligenoe Platoon T v& located
    u.tKavalla on the Thraclan sea; liAZ 'W at Belgrade .It:S5
    The traf".f'1o' intercepted by J
    KONA
    4 and 1ts .component
    Jparts was d1v1ded 1ntot'Wo twes: . . .' .
    a) long range tl"attio emanat1ng trom the tiddle East
    and Urica: ,
    b) . tr'attlc ot the oocupied Balkan countries.
    Long of' the Middle East 'eman&ted from
    Turkey. tram the 'British lflnth Army. in Palestine and
    Tenth.Army in Iraq, and trom the French Armies in Syria.
    1771 55 p 5
    11
    8
    1 55 P 9
    179IF 12} p 5
    l80IF 171 p 2
    . ,181IF 171 P 2
    182IF 171 p}
    183IF171 P 3
    184IF' J..71 p:]
    , p}

    DOCID: 3486746

    , or Tl.1rkish traffic, was .carried QU from .1941-


    1944 l>artly by the BAAS 4 at Weon but chiefly
    by close Ra.nge Signal Intelligence P1atoon, NAZ Tj
    statlc)nedat Kavalla, Whose sole mtiS.lon inter-
    ceptlc)n and decoding or Turkish tz-a.ftie .1t5T Trc.ttlc from
    the Bt
    t
    1tlsh and French troops in and Syria was
    intercepted by, XAAS 4 at Neon Phalel'on..
    1
    ($ti . .,
    of the occupied covered betore
    I1l&lnlyby NAZ W, . operating trom Belgrade
    o
    This pla-
    toon clovered thetraftic of the Cl'oatlan terrorists" the
    partisans, and Tlto.
    18
    9 Festa 5 aided by covering
    Greekpart1san trattlc.
    1
    g
    o
    Feste 6 added Hungarlantrattle
    to its intercept coverage in 1943 by send1ng a plainclothes
    detail. to Slovakia, near Px-essburg, Hung&1"y to monltorthis
    tratf'lc.
    1
    91 WhenNAAS 4 vas moved to Belgrade, it con-
    centrated on the traffic of the occupied countries and
    Yugoslav, Rumanian, Bulgarian.. and Hungarian tratii
    tte .'
    3,. Western intercept.-- The traffics assigned to
    vesternintercept 8manatea tram: .
    The British Isles;,
    b) USA (including. Ieeland and American troops 1n
    the British Isles), attar the entry ot the USA
    into the war'; and
    c) Spain, p'ortugal, Brazil.
    dl) 'Miscella.neous .
    ,The cClverage 01' these trattlcs was the task or KOllA 5
    vhleh,untl1 November 1944, w&sthe only Signal Intelli-
    gence Regiment lnthe'westernarea. ' ,
    a) Traffie from 'the British Isles was considered,
    the mClst imPortant o.tthe western .traf'f'ics. lthad been
    'intensively since August 1939, when a Long Range
    Signal, Inte1.1igenee Company, FA!: 620, was sent to the '
    Atlant1c CQast near Norderney Island to monitor British

    186
    IF
    171 P 2
    187IF 171' P 3
    188IF'171 P 3
    l89IF' 171 P'
    19
    0
    IF 111 p,
    19
    1
    IP126' p 10
    19
    2
    1 14 P 2
    46 '
    DOCID: 3486746


    { .
    , Arm:r tratrlc .193AJ.though FAX 620 was. sent at
    a date to the easte;t'n a.rea',19
    4
    Br1t1sh tratf1c con-
    t1nl1ed to be monitored by the :following units of'J(OlfA 5
    troln 1939 to 1944: ' ., f '
    , 1) Long Range PAX61}.
    This unit stationed ,at St. Malo mon1toredexcly-
    s1vely 1'&d10 txiaatf1c from theB*it1sh IslS$:J.9=>
    2) Feste 2, & Stationary Intercept CpmpBnl located
    until Dovember194} at HUSUDl in Bolland, atter, "
    , that at -L11la. ' Th1s unit mon1tgl'ed excluslve17'
    traffic of' the B1'it1sh IsJ.es :J.9 ' ,
    3) Fe$te 9.:rorrmed in June 1942.. at PraD1c:rurt/Main
    and sent to Norway to monitor, Brit1sh tl'att1c.
    At tirst the unit vas stationed -at Trondhjem; ,
    ,later, at Bergen. vh82"e1t remained untU the
    spring ot 1944 when t move4 to Ski near Oslo ,_ ..... , "
    The task ot the unit was to interoept tratf"ic .
    01"1ginated 'b1 the' BJlt1tiah Ar1JrT in lortherD England.
    Scotland.. and p'&1'oes .197 " ,
    4) Feate 12, a Stationary Intercept Campany attached
    to the EvaluatlonCentel" or KOlA 5 and located
    at Louveeiennes Until J'tmuarr19Ja.4 this station
    excluslve1ytrarrle from the Brit1sh
    Isles. "
    b) Tratf'le emanating trom the United 'States and
    Iceland. and .f'rom American troops in the ar1tlah Isles vas
    monitored chiefly by Feste 3 at Eusk1rchen'and Feste,9 at
    Norway. Fsste 3 concentrated ontrarrie from the,
    USA .. ,,:? Atter the autumn or 1943 Peste 3 had a special.
    un!t- tor USA non-Morse radio, teletype traN"leJ. '
    'desjLgna.ted by the Gezamans as FF5 (Funk Fernscmaelb 5)20u
    Fr,om Feste 9 in Bergen, USA tz-arrlc rz-oin IcelaDd w&a mont-
    torEtd. This unit watched tor short wave radlotraf"f'1c ' 20),
    t"roJitl London to Washington via Ireland, but without auccess. .
    .'
    . 76p3
    194
    176 p 3
    195JJi' 127 P 5
    19
    6
    J:F127p 5
    'l97J:F 120 p 6
    198J:F 127 p 4
    199JJP 121 P 3
    20
    1,149 p 2
    201
    178 p, +0 '
    47
    48
    DOCID: 3486746

    e) The or Spa1n# Portugal II and the Brazilian


    Army in Italy was monitored fram 1939 to 1942 bi Feste 3
    at E1L1sk1r'ehen. In early 1943, however# the Long Range .
    Intelligence Company, FAIC 624,. was formed at Kont-
    pallieI'. on the southern coast otFrance tw the 1.ntel'ceptlon
    ot this In January 1944, the interception or
    Spanish.. Portuguese, and Brazilian trattle vas shared with
    FAK 624 by Feste 12.
    20
    3 ' .. _ .
    d) In addition to the three, main comDl'ltmentsot the
    western units. two other minor traffics were
    monitored: , Swedish A:i9.rr:f "traffic, and French. poliee traf'f'lc
    in Corsica. The Swedish A'1!m.y traffic was,
    ceptedby a SUbordinate unit ot Feste 9 in Bol'V&Y. This
    unit,. known 8.8 'out-station Halden (Aussenstelle Halden)
    ,vas stationed at Balden, Borvay, and vas adm1n1-
    strs.t1vepurpoaes to the Balden Poliee Battalion.. The ,
    pollce tr&ttlc trom Corosica. was monitored by FAK '
    at . " .
    4. Southwestern ...- Betore 1943. theGermsn
    appears to have liiid ne signal intelligence uilit in '
    Ital.y. In ,February ot that year, however. :KONA 7 wasestab-
    l1shed with the task of intercepting' tra.tf'lc from Italy
    and trom :North Atr1ca.
    206
    Thetrat.f1cs conslstedof &-i tish,
    Amez'iean, .rol18h,Freneh
    6
    and BrazU18Jl traf'tic in
    Italy and North Af':r1oa.
    2
    7 So far as' can be determined.
    thEn'e was no spec1f'1c division of' tasks among the various
    unlt;sot KONA 7: allunlts intercepted all A:nr1 traffio
    .frOIJ1 these countries' . ' ,., , .
    ,The m.ost southerly location ot BAAS 7. the. S1gnal
    Evaluation KONA 7,was .RoeM dl
    Pap!L# 25 laD south of Rome. , In September 1.943. it moved
    intc) the neighborhood o.fRome. estab11shing itself a.t
    Vallerano. Later it moved to Vicenza .in northern Italy.209
    1. the f"ormerArmy intercept station at Stuttgart#
    af'tEir sundry moves 1n France from 1940 to 1943 was ultimately
    in' Italy at Genzano neal' Peste 9,
    202:rF 127 p 3
    203:[li' 127 p' '
    2q4:rF' 120 p 6 '
    205IF 121 P' 3
    206IP 172.' p ;}
    207:IF 112 . P .;
    208IF 172' p 1
    209IF 172 p'l
    210IF 172 p1
    DOCID: 3486746

    ;.rhteh came to Italy from 'Iorva,. in November 1944, vas


    lo(;ated. at Breganza remained there until .
    bel ore t.he :collapse . . ...
    . The Long Range 31gnaJ. Intell1genceCattp&ny, FAX ,', ' ",
    62JL, wh1ch vas to KO:NA7, had baen originally
    deslgnatec;1 80$ the, Signal Company :3 (Horch Bacbrichten
    AU1r1clrg. \H NA 56,). 2 This unit, vhich was partlcularoly
    active in N,orth At1tlea during the ,campaigns there, vas
    captured (in part) InJuly In May 1943" the entire
    was captured at Until the time or its
    f1JW capture, this u.Iilt intercepted traf'f'lc or the 'British,
    Amarican A:trlca lind or the
    Egrptlan A1'my and Camel. Corps .
    26. Inte2'ce t service 1 44-1'94 --
    'e.... Intezace t 0 era.t ons 0" GdIfA The 'years 1944-
    saw the centra lzationo e lOJI&n Army Signal Intel-
    'ligence Service and its catastrophic dJ.ssolution in, the
    mOlrl ths prior to the cap1tulation. As part or the movement
    to centralize the service,OXH/GdNA assumed responsibility
    for the intercept and evaluation ot the .follOWing t'1Pes

    . foreign press; .
    . 2 speeial high grade machine ciphers;
    3 wireless photography. .
    . 10 Intercept and' evaluation of the foreign press W&s
    done by Section '2 of Group I, OXU/GdlIA. This section V&S '
    dI'vlded into f'oux- subsections:
    21
    5 '.
    . a) . mont toping of eastern wIreless (Bunduebervachung Ost);
    b) monitoring of western Wireless (Rundueberwachung
    west);
    cj monitoring of' clear text (Helldlenat); and .
    d) evalua.tion.
    Owing to the personnel shortage during the ,.ears ,1944-1945.
    Section 2 vas not able to cover its
    211
    IF
    144 p 2
    126 P 10
    213
    1 78 P 9
    214
    1 74 . p 2
    . 215IF 123 PP 7-8
    49
    DOCID: 3486746

    large extent. Eastern monitoring w&aconflned tor the most


    'part to the Moscow v1.reless, although in later months .
    a certain amount 01" Balkanmon1,toring was instituted tor
    Turkey and Rumania.. \{estem monitoring vas confined to
    the :aBC London Service. Bews monitoring vas con1"'1ned to
    th.e Heutel' and Tass Agencies. From these sources the evalu-
    ation center collected and collated material tor its reports.
    2. The interception and evaluation or special, high
    gr'ade machine ciphers ot RUBsia,Britain, and the USA were " '
    a.ssigned to Group VI or OKB/G<UiA Which was located atPot,sdam.'
    SeJction 1, dealing wlth Russian tzaattle, had three ..
    ' ' ' .
    llll Interoeption ot.' Inter-Soviet 5t&te,t;r'attlc,
    lb Interceptlon ot Russian Baudot traffic,
    1c Interception ot Russian Armytrattic.
    The interception of Russian Baudot tr&f"fie(called by the "
    Bliu5s1a.nsZ-traffic} vas carried on by the same personnel.
    who had manned, the Russian Baudot station a.t Minsk in 1942/43.
    ItL 194'1 the Russian Baudotstat1.on was moved to m..S -Ost
    at Loetzen, where it vas absorbed b,. Section 4 otlJLS Ost.
    ast was absorbed b1the the Baudot s ta..
    tlonbecame Section lb or the OXH/GdNA. .
    . Sectlon2 or Group VI vas employed with the tntercep-
    (2b) and the (2a) of British and American
    grade machine 18. The 1nteroept1onor this' .
    tz-att,"1c he..s been c&1'l'led on b}" Feste 3 at Eusk1l'chen until.
    the establishment of'the when the
    fcn-1nterception wa.s transferred to the
    The interception of wireless photography. called by
    tl:le Germans Y-trattlc, was oarried on by :aspee1al unit ot
    tlon' I Group VI. . unit intercepted trat1"ic' tl'om
    .e.lloverthe world but the non-Russian channels are 8$id
    nc)t to have yielded any valuable Photos inter-
    cE.pted, trom internal Russian eon-
    tl!l.ined technioal diagrams and charts. '20
    216IF 123 P 9
    2JL7IF 123 p 11
    2JL8
    IF
    , 123 P11
    2JL9IP 123 P 5
    123 p 13
    50
    DOCID: 3486746

    b. Intercept in the f1eld.-- The intercept


    service in the field during tne year of the war main-
    tained its geographical distribution: eastern. southeastern,
    southwestern. Paralleling the ehanges the war
    situs,tion. thepe vas an increasing emphasis on weste:rn
    lnte-Illcept and a copresponding deepeasing emphasis on 8outh-
    easte,pn intercept in the war situation.
    With the pressure ot the Allied invasion, western
    intercept assumed of necessity a position of greater impop-
    tance 0 It 'Will be recalled that KOIiA 6 was reassigned at ' '.'
    this time trom eastern to western intercept and that the
    weste'rn Signal Intelligence Regiments. KOBAs 5 and 6, were
    SUbOI"dine.ted to a Senior Commander of 51:gnal. Intelligence
    (HoellL Kd1' d :NA) who was responsible tOJ! all signal intel-
    ligellLce operations in the vesto
    22l
    Upon these two KOBAs
    tell the task of intercepting the traffic ot the invading
    Armlels.. , , . " " , ,
    KOBA6 monitoredtr&f"f'1c for A:I!m:1 Groups Hand B which
    were stat1oned'in the northern part of the western

    One Dlember of the L:ong Range Signal Intelligence Company.,
    FAK 626 (Haupts), states that Ihis unit 0 s 01!1g1nal mission
    wa.s Intel"cept1on of' traf't'ic or the Flpst French Army ,
    and clf the Seventh USA A:J:rrrIy Later it intercepted traffic
    of' the USA First.. Third, and Ninth .Armies.
    The decreasing emphasis on southeastem interception
    wa.s manifested by-the d1sbandm.ent KOllA 4 Tne component
    parts vere apparently reassigned to various fronts. South-
    eastern intercept and ev&luat1on vas carz-ied on by KOBA 4'8
    the newly f'ormed Signal Intelligence'Battallon.
    liAA 16. ' " "
    The situat10n on the eastern and southwestern fronts
    rematned. ror the most part, much as 'it had been In the
    previous To .the vere assigned two new
    KOllAl!l, KOUA 8 and KOn Nord; and to' KOBA 7 InItaly.

    ,
    221
    1 76 Appendices
    2221 76 Append1ces
    223
    m
    , 9
    224nF 9
    , 51
    DOCID: 3486746

    " ,
    onE. new 1ntel'Cft:,P,t vaa moved to lta11 '
    fI-()m Bonay. 22!')" ",', '
    A Gel"JD8.ll Az1DJ Report on thelntereept s1tuat1onabout
    J'alluaryI 1945 thetol1ow1l)g picture or the units and
    thoU-coverage: " ,", '
    E'B.sternF1'ont: "
    Un1ts: EOlIA Stor Arm,-'Group South ,
    KOllA 1 tor .ArrJry,Group Oenter
    KOlIA 2 tor A:1-rJr1 Group Weiehsel
    KOIIJl Bord tw A:nt7 Group' Borth
    ,K6lfA ',tor Kurland
    'NAAll fW20th l:(ounts.1n Anr1
    .
    , ,
    , 0
    52
    EngliSh, American. Pranesh; front traffic
    Allied tz-aflt1c 1'r.om western
    and Borth Atr1ca, " . '
    bands 111 upper Italy
    $en1or CQmms.nder or signal, Intelligenoe'
    ltOBA 6 for 'A:1!my H" B '" ,
    EOlIA Sfor A:q Groups Gand Ob&nhe1n
    ,. . ,." .
    English, trntia-attlc
    BritiSh tratt1CfrQmBrltisn 'Isles '
    USA traffic trOll' United states '
    French traf"t1c "
    SOUthW8Stern tront: " ' .
    ',. Unit:" , XOllA1
    Coverage:
    :
    Russlan','hont tratf10 '
    RAdio nets ,ltkVD",
    ,"" ,,",' ,':,,' , "c,c': :',', ," " ;
    'Rdu1Dg,bQJ1dS; and .'
    , Espionage Un1ts
    Sou1;heaatern f"ront: ' , ',,', ",' , ", ,
    Unit: BAA '16 tOl!' Arnrs. ,GrOl.lp E.
    . Ooverage:' " "
    Allied t1"oops andeOmmunlcation;s 'statts
    ;,'in Balkans
    .5ov1at.tzaont'traffic "
    TITQ traftic(Jugoslav1.1
    ELA8 tra.t:t1e ( Greek)
    Bulgs.rla.n trattJ.c' ', , '
    M1ha.Uovlc tI-4ffle (Jugoslav1an:)
    Western tz:.ont:
    , Un1ts:
    .225DP 9
    226nF,g
    .'
    DOCID: 3486746

    c. Dlsintegratlonof Inter.cept It may


    bl9 saf"elyassumed that the cons'tant movement 01 the German
    Armies and their Intez-ceptun!ts during the iast months
    of'the war prevented continuous orderly interception
    o:r enemy traffic. A brief resume of tlJ,e movements or the
    v.!t.rious Signal Intelligence Regiments will illustra.te the
    c,onfu$lon of these last, months. 227 KOlA 1 withdrew from
    tbe eastern front IntoCzechoslov8.kia and vas found by the
    l:nvadlng forces at NovyJieln (Neutitsche1n); KONA 2 re-
    treated from the' vicinity of. Grodno to Ortelburg in, Prussi8,
    Danzig, Holstein,'and finally the Wlsmar area; KONA , was
    caught by the Russians in a pocket a.t Kurland and captured;
    ,KODA 8 withdrew f1rst Into Rwnanla,then and
    . f1n&lly to ,Lenz. KONA 5 In the west withdrew trom Louve-
    ciennes in 1944 and went first to V1gg1ngen
    near Metz. At the beginning of September"it moved to
    krotdort near Giessen, where it stayed until from
    there 1t went' to the RhQen and finally, to Dlsch1ngell 1n, ,
    t:he DonauYoerth Of the component parts of KOlA 6
    less 1s known. One of its un1ts, FAK 611 movedlnthe
    springer 1945 trom Holla.t).d to Feste'3 moved
    from Eusk1rohen into the , '
    The southwestern unit, KONA 7 and 1ts subordinates
    retreated into northern Italy. Concerning southeastern
    intercept in the last months of the war, it is known only
    that NAA '16 remained as the only unit 1n that area.
    2
    31
    The constant sh1ttings ot the KONAs, and in tne late
    m,onths 01' the war, the disrupt1on, -of interna.l communica-
    tions between'the varIous parts otthe KONAs and between
    the KONAs and the GdNA had a etfect on the whole
    problem ot enemy intercept.
    227
    r
    116 p 8 ,
    228
    r
    113 P 2
    229I 74 P2
    230r -76 ,p 11
    ,231DF 9
    53
    DOClD: 3486746

    During the last months of the 'War I the internal inter-


    cept units of the GdNA were also The unlts of
    crroups I andd V moved wl th the othe;r2GroUPSQf the 'GdJfA to
    , Er urt an then to Bad Relchenhall., 52 The intercept un! t
    of 'Group VI which had cover1ng high machine
    , traffic a.t w&smoved to Stuttgart and from there
    to The equipment was buried in the cellar
    in, the surr.oundlng neighborhood of 8. house, the P1oneel:'-
    Kaserne:. in where. 1t vas later round by TICOM
    1nterl"ogators., ) , '

    , 23
    2
    IF
    123
    233IF 123
    23
    4
    IF 15
    p 12
    P .12
    54
    DOCID: 3486746

    VOLUME 4
    Chapter V: Operat.ions of a Typical Signal
    Intelligence Regiment on the Eastern Front
    SectionA. Introduction
    Paragraph
    Sources for thischapter o 27
    Successes of KONA l " "..... .28
    IID.portance of Traffic Analysis '. " 29
    27. Sources for .this chapter.--Thematerials describing
    Signal IntellIgence Regiment 1 (kommandeur del' Nachrichten
    Aufklaerung" abbreviated KONA) provided a rather complete
    account of that unit" and were generally more thorough than
    reports available for other "fieldsignal intelligence f"ormations;
    therefore" KONA 1 is discussed in this chapter as a typical
    Signal Intelligence Regiment., This completeness resulted from
    the availabil1ty ot a substantial portion of this un1t
    t
    s per-
    sonnelror Interrogation. The circumstances under which the
    remnants of KONA 1 were round are not without interest:
    "The full facts of the surrender of this unit
    were explained by the Commandant, Major Ernst Hertzer.
    The remnant of the regiment -- approximately 700
    officers, enlisted men and women" first contacted
    American troops on 9 May 1945 the vicinity of
    Tausing" where they were directed to a.PW enclosure
    at Stift Tapl. They had destroyed almost allot
    their papers except those that they considered most
    essential for reconstruction of records. These
    documents were kept 1n three brief cases plus one
    book. In the afternoon of the 9 May,'while rumOrS
    circulating in the PW enclosure to the effect that
    the Russians were moving !rito the area, the contents
    of' the three brief' cases were buztned. The book"
    however" remained in one of' the vehicles a minute
    search of that car failed to produce It."240
    Three hundred and fifty prisoners were screened at a town
    llear Pilsen between 23 May and 28 May All operational per- .
    were interViewed; and of these 41 were chosen for
    55
    DOCID: 3486746

    further questioning. A few reports were written near Pilsen,


    but the bulk of documents which formed the basis for later
    interrogations were written between 30 May and 2 June, at .
    Oberursel; near Frankfort-am-Main, where the unit had been
    moved. More specific information was given and further docu-
    ments written after the group was moved to Revin, in the
    Ardennes. 241 The material produced consisted of 31 reportsf42
    supported by supplementary "Annexes" giving information on
    traffic analysis, organizat1on, etc.
    . Interrogations of Prisoners of War from units other than
    KONA 1 were relied upon in this chapter to fill out the picture.
    The! outstanding of these vas the Karrenberg Party report on
    "Russian Radio,," Corporal (Unteroffizier) Karrenberg wea an
    "ex.ceedingly brilliant" man with a "phenomenal memory."
    24
    3 The
    re:port was written by him and his colleagues. All were members
    of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command
    (Ol)erkommando des General der Wachrichten Aufklaerung"
    abbreviated .
    Since the Signal Intelligence Regiments were the important
    fieldunlts of the German Army signal intelligence service, and
    1nformation on one .of these, KONA I, was available, in
    this cbapter an account will be given or the functions and
    0plE;lrat1ons of KONA 1, which may be considered typlcalof those
    of Signal Intelligence Regiments operating in the
    East. Because organ1zation has already been treated in Volume 4.,
    Chapter 11, organizational matters w111 be noted here only as
    some review of them appears necessary to a full understanding
    of the operationso
    280 Successes of KONA l.--KONA 1 operated in the southern
    sector or the Russ1an Tront trom June 1941 unt1l May inter-
    CElpting and evaluating Russ ian Army., Army Alr" ,and EKVD2ZJ.:;> in
    that traffic area. Elements ofthis unit appear :to have suc-
    ln reconstructing the detailed Orderaf Battle of the
    R\lSsian forces., and in predicting the locality and timing of
    the Russian offensives before they Captain Roman
    Roessler" Chief Evaluator of KONA 1 and Commanding Officer of
    the Int-el11gence Evaluatlon Center (Nachrichte.n
    IF 40 P 4
    2,42 I 19b
    243 IF 123 P 2
    244 I 173 p 1
    245 .
    NKVD is translated as "Peoples' Commissar1at for internal
    affairs 0 fl During the war 1t maintained frontier troops
    which performed counter espionage and bad many mi11tary
    police functions. See I 67 p 3,
    I 19b" 1
    56
    DOCID: 3486746

    Al.1Swe:rtungsstelle, Abbreviated NAAS) of the regiment, pointed


    out that even when identification ot individual formations be-
    came impossible" the KONA was still successful in picturing
    tbe overall grouping and the number of format1ons 0 He conoeded
    tloat'in the case of Russian Rifle Corps and D1visions, German
    Ilo.tell1genoe units had to rely on means other than signal
    intelligence 0 However, he emphasized that the overall pictm-e
    a:rfo:rded, by signal intelligenoe units of the "movements Of
    s'trategic reserves, of points of main efforts" ohain ot oommand"
    1lo.tent1ons to attack
    4
    " etc., were of great value to German
    Intelligence un!ts.
    2
    7 '.' .
    It should be emphasized that Roessler 9'S style was rather
    p'omJ)0us, andh1a of KONA 1 successes may have been
    overenthusiastic.
    290 Imfiortance of Traffic ADalysis on the Eastern ii'ront.--
    In. general t e,successes notedab9ve were due to traffIc.anaIysis
    rather than to cryptanalysis 0 'While there seems to have: been
    great disagreement among the persons on the
    relative merits of these two methoda,the ,evidenceindlcated
    that the results'achieved by the careful integration of all
    sources available trom traffic analysis appeared to outweigh
    those achieved throughl'eading of the Russian low grade codes
    and cipherso This situation may be accounted for by two
    principal factors. In the first place: although the Germans
    werehighlyauccessful in reading Russian low grade systems
    (as described in Volume If, Chapter VI), most or the Russian
    . grade codes employed by the army were one-time pad systems"
    and consequently defied attack by the cryptanalystso
    Secondly: . an enormous amount of inf'ormation was available
    "from tlleRussian practice in the useot ind'1cators,call..
    and the generally low though improving standard. of
    R.ussian wireless discipline 0 "2
    4
    9, ..
    Because or this relative importance or cryptanalysis and
    t.raffic analysis the emphasis in this chapter will be upon the
    throughwhlch was derived rrom a stUdy
    . Cit the ot Russia.n radlooperations. -The
    . performed by the rield units wl11" be discussed 1n another
    and only its organizational relationship to the oper-
    e.tions or the, components will be noted here.
    The functIonal relationship of the units ot a KONA is
    ;pictured on Chart Number 4-4.. Roughly, the KONA conaisted or
    s, Intelligence Evaluation center or companies
    (FAK) 8ubord1natet.o it in intelligence which
    247 I 19b pp 14-15
    248 .1 199 PP 3-4
    I 19b p 1
    57
    \
    ------
    DOCID: 3486746

    1D.tercepted enemy traffic and fed the traffic back to the


    EV'aluation center; and close range companies (NAK) J which
    intercepted enemy low level traffic, did s o ~ e analysis of
    the slmpler'systems,ll and passed the results and intercept
    into the Signal Intelligence Evaluation Center. To pick up
    enemy traffic of higher formations, there were so-called
    Long Range Signal Intelligence Companies (FAR:) and so-called
    Flxed companies, (Feste). The first intercepted pr1maril).
    trafticalready identified; the second concentrated on net-
    wQrks carrying unldentif1edtraff1c 0 Both typesot these
    llong range compan1es did analysis on thetratf'1c they inter-
    cepted" and passed the results and their traffic up to the
    S1gna,l Ineel11gence Evaluation Center (NAAS) 0

    58
    + "'".: ".M." :..'. r ~ ; ';.1.':- ~ .,.:'

    DOCID: 3486746

    Section B.
    VOLUME 4
    V
    Functions of the KONA Units
    , ..0..;..__
    ParagN.ph

    Introduction0 0 fit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30'


    Functions of the Signal Intelligence Evaluation .
    Center (NAASl. 0 0 0 0 0 ,; .. 31
    Functions ot the Station8ltY Intercept Company (Feste). 32
    Functions of the Long Range Signal Intelligence
    COD1l)8.IlY (PM) 0 0 0 : .0. 9 0 0 t! 0 0 0 0 0 0 ,. 0 , . 33
    of the Close Range Signal Intelligence .
    (NAK) 0 0 0 ,0 .. 0 ....' QI 34
    30. Introduction 0 --The purpose of the KONA was to supply
    intelligence tl"om'signal SOUl"ces to the G-2
    1
    s of the Army
    Al."D1ies, and A1!m.y Groups. A typical KONA consisted of one
    Eva.luation center and of 5 or 6 intercept and intel-
    ligence companies. Chart Number 4-4 shows thelayo\1t of such
    a Signal Intelligence Reg1nient. . .
    The chart gives the picture of a typical KONA as it
    actually operated, with its signal intelligence platoons oper-
    ating near the front 11nes, with its companies situated back
    neal' army headquartel's, and with its main reg1mental evaluation
    c,entel' in the rear at Army Group Headqual"ters .
    Close Range Signal Intelligence platoons intercepted very
    low level traffic, evaluated what they could, kept the G-2 of
    their assigned Army Corps infar med of all intelligence derived,
    a.nd passed back to an evaluation platoon at company headquarters
    all their results and presumably their intercepts.
    Long Range Signal Intelligence Companies intercepted
    level trattic; did some eval uation.. the results ot Which
    'W'ere giveIito the G-2 of their assigned Army headquarters; and
    passed back evaluation reports and intercepts to the regimental
    EvalUAt10n Centar (NAAS) . The stationary
    Intercept Companies operatea in an almost identical manner..
    llrith primary emphasis on enemy unidentif'ied traffic.
    The regimental Evaluation Center (NAAS) evaluated the
    J-eports and the intercepts from all compan1es ot the regiment
    and Passed their l'esults to G-2 of Army Group.
    More detailed funct10ns of the NAAS, ot the companies,
    l:Lnd ot: the platoons are discussed below. (The organization
    of these units has already been descr1bed1n Volume 4..
    Ohapter III)
    59
    DOCID: 3486746

    310 Functions of the Sig.{lsl 'Intell! ence Evaluation Center
    ()MAS) 0
    2
    5 -_'1' e NAAS was s ua, e e ose y Army Group -
    quarters .25
    1
    The functions of' the NAAS in,eluded Evaluation and
    Analysis
    l
    Cryptanalysis, Dissemination of Intelligence,
    t:Lnd Direction of intercept cover.
    a. Evalyation anq, Traffic Analysis included four tipes
    of ,
    (1) andcoord1nation of repor.ts
    passed up to theNAASby other elements of the
    KONA, anq the synthesis of the results.
    (2) Traffic Analysis (1nclud1ng the stUdy of Direction
    Finding re.sults) 'of identified traffic passed in to
    the NAAS by the Long Range Companies (FAK); and of
    NKVD and Russian Air traffic, passed in (presumably)
    by either the Long Range oroC10se Range Companies.
    \ '
    (4)

    Attempts to id,entify unidentified traffic passed


    in by the companies" chiefly by the Feste

    Keeping-of full files'and card indexes in which


    all data of any possible significance was recorded.
    b. Cryptanalysis in the NAAS primarily meant the
    of unknown systems, the stUdy of developments in known systems,
    and work on NKVD code. The, NAAS worked, on Russian systems up ,
    to and inclUding 4-figure systems. (The cryptanalytic opera.tions
    are discussed in Volume 4" Chapter VI.,)
    c. The NAAS was responsible for the dissemination of in-
    telligence;it passed its results to the Intelligence Officer
    of the Army Group to which the KONA' was a.ttached"and reported
    its findings to the Slgnallnte111gence Agency ot the Army High
    Command (oKH/Gdl'JA). 253 , . ,
    250 For graphic representat1onof the f'Wlctlons of the NAAS see
    Chart Number It should be emphasized that th1s
    portrays the main functlons only, and does not
    the breakdown bytab1e of orga.nization sections, which is
    given in Chapter III.
    251 I 19b P 1
    ,252 I 19b P 6
    253 I19g p 7
    60
    61
    DOCID: 3486746
    do TheNAAS had a key position in the direction.of
    intercept cover. It controlled the intercept coverage of all
    the lo'"er elements of the. KONA, following the overall coordi-
    nation exerc1sed bY' the OKH/GclliA .254
    Certain items were passed, unprocessed" thr0ush the KONA
    to the GdNA..Themain item treated thus was 5-figure (in-
    cluding NKVD) traffic" and NKVD traffic which fell outside
    of the area of the particular KONA by whose units it was
    intercepted .. 255 . . .
    32. Functions of the Stationary Intercept Company .-"
    The Stationary In ercept Companies.. estewel'e es gne
    at thc3next lower level to the NMS" that of Army. The Feste
    were interceptstatlonsj and they retained
    - . the traditional deslgnationimplying they were lIf1xedll(Feste
    Horchstel1e)" they actually'were semi-motorized early in the
    Russian campaign. Feste 10, 'the "stationaryU2cgmpany of 1
    operated for, and near to, Army Beadquartel's. ,
    Feste consisted of five functional sections, besides
    the Headquarters section.. An
    8
    1ntercept platoon (whose coverage
    was controlled by the NAAS)25 covered unkndwn traffic in the

    An evaluation section identified and reported unknown
    , Appal'ently the interception and study of unidentif"ied
    traffic were the main functions of the Feste.
    2ol
    A cryptanalytic section contributed to the interpretation
    of unknown traffic by the identification of keys, trans-
    lated plain-text messages
    3
    and did some solution.
    202
    The Feste had a Direction Finding platoon, which carried
    out the requests "of the Companies. II Communications between
    the Direction Finding sites and the Regiment were carr1edout
    by Bl Communications platoon. This platoon passed the
    of Evaluation by telegram or teleprinter to the NAAS.203
    254 DF 18 P 82
    255 I 199 p 8
    256 119g p 6
    257 See Volume 4, Chapter III
    258 DF 18 P 82
    259 These 'were also partly covered by the FAKQs
    260'1 19b P 3
    261 I 19b PP 3-4; pp 19-20
    262 I 19b P 4
    263 I 19b p 4
    DOCID: 348.6746
    ----------,-
    .' ' .
    33. Functions of the Long Range Si@al Intelligence Company
    Long Range SignaL Intelligence Companies were dlstin-
    gu ahable in .fWlctlon .from the Feste, that they were con-
    cernedto a much greater degree with identified, traffic. Like
    Feste 10 (e .g.) they were semi-m9torlzed and were designedto ..
    near Army Headquarters .204 It was plarmed that one should
    work with each army staff covering an army sector. In actuality,
    however, the operations of these companies (and likewise those
    of Feste 10) took place further and further in the rear. The
    crush of work would become heaviest just at a time when safety
    precautions demanded a withdrawal; and it was more
    to undertake the work 1n the rear echelon areas where
    it 'would be less frequently interrupted. Fak i s 617 and 623 'and
    Feste 10 ended up by operating in the immediate vicinity of the
    Evaluation Center (NAAS 1) , ' .
    In thairinterception of identified traffic, the coverage of
    the FAKu s was dil'ected, as was that, of the Feste by the cover
    control section of the Evaluation Center The traffic
    intercepted by the FAK was studied by it as fUlly as. resources
    wou.ld permit. Plain-text messages were translated, and tra.f.f1c
    of known codes decoded by specialist;3 assigned to the unit. ,A
    general section was devoted to card indexes and lists. (Raw
    . trs.ffic which defied analysis was sent to the, cryptanalytic and
    tra,,ffic analysis sections of the NAAS.)
    . 34. Functions of Close Ran e Signal Intelltgence
    tNAKf.--The C Range Company :Na uf eerung Kompan e, a: -
    rev ated NAK) presumably worked at Army CoPps level. Its main'
    responsibility was to pick up and workonlow-leve1
    3-figure, and possibly some 4-figure) traffic.
    2b
    7 It should be
    > yPi: been
    de:31gned to' work: at Army' Corps leveli in practice such So' company
    a159 sta:t;;1pned by the, rXommandeur ", Regi-
    ment (KONA) with Army as well.
    268
    In contrast to the Long Range which were designed
    to operate in full strength, the Close Range Companies
    , operated by platoon.
    209
    The operations or each company was

    264 I 199 P 6
    .. 265 I 19b p 1
    266 DF 18 p82
    261 I. 19b P 2
    268 1 19 .' 1
    g p
    269 I 199 P 6
    62
    J
    DOCID: 3486746
    ....
    divlded among four platoons: Intercept (Horchzug); Direction
    Finding {Peilzug}; Evaluation and C.ommunications
    (Sendezug) .270 .
    As in the case of ihe other units, intercept coverage was
    by the NAAS. 27 Although they were army l,Uli ts,. in at
    leant one case the NAKappal'ently covered not only enemy tl'att1c,
    but. also enemy air-ground, and air traffic as well. A normal
    of intercept called for about twenty rece1vers.
    2
    72 The
    platoon usually' had two or thl"ee intercept operators, while
    theJ:'e were general1y9.bout
    2
    twelve operators who knew Russ.1an
    to pick up the radio talk. 73 ,
    , The organization or Direction Finding Platoon was rather
    elalJorate. Normally fo-r one company the-re were about eight out-
    stations, separated from each other by 5 to 10 kilometers and
    a
    , With each platoon was a 3mall evaluation section, consisting
    of two or evaluators,27
    b
    who worked usually in sroom near
    the intercept station.
    2
    77, Presumably their results would be .
    paSf'ed to the Evaluation platoon of the company. , Only the
    simplest systems were worked on at the NAK level; most of the
    raw trafric was passed upwards to the NAAS, which studied it'
    cryptanalytically as well as for tactical intelligence derivable
    thr(Jugh. traffic analysis. Captain Roessler considered evaluation
    at NAK level a "dispersal of strength,
    1t2
    7
    ti
    but the NAK evaluation
    musit; not be brushed aside too 11ghtly, for these NAKvs did no
    evaluatloU9B.nd did pass, the results to the Corps
    Off":lcer .2"f '
    270
    1 62 P 4. The documents relied upon for the follOWing account
    to those descr1bing KONA 1 units. ,The account
    in I 62) is based upon one man's experience with Funkhorch-
    kompanie 610 and 520 NahAuflklaerungkompa.nie on the Eastern
    Front. '
    271 DF 18 P 82
    272 I 62 p 4
    273 I 19b p 2
    274 I 62 p 4
    275 I 19b p 2
    276 I 19b P 2
    I 62 p 4
    278 I 199p 2
    279 I 19b .p 2
    63
    DOClD: 3486746
    VOLUME 4
    Chapter V
    Section C. Features of Russ1an Radio Communications
    Paragraph
    Introduot1ono,. '00.00 '0.00000 ..... ".00 0 '0 0 . 35"
    Identifying Characterist1csof Russian Networks. a 36
    Some Identifying Character1stics of Russian Call Sign
    Pract1ceo 0 0 0 0 0 lit tl 0 00 0' 0 0 0 0' 0 0 0 0 0 0 37
    Some Ident1fying Characterist1c:,E1ements of Procedure 0 38
    . Some Ident1f'ying Chara_cteristics or Russian Message Text.
    ) as Tran.smlttedooo .. O.O.04!O . OOO O., O 39
    '35. Introduc.tion a - -The ,components of the KONA described in
    the precedIng sectIon were designed to provide the most effective
    overall attack upon Russian radio communications. S1nce un1dent1
    fied traffic formed the great percentage of German intercept in
    the East, the identification and interpretat10n of ,unknown traffi(
    was one or the most important fimctions of the KONA.280 , Thus it
    is pertinent here to survey briefly some of the characteristics
    facilitating German identification of Russian traffic. The
    operating data (such as networks and call signs) and the visible
    properties of the message text as transmitted formed the basic
    -SUbject matter with which all units in degrees were con-
    cerned# and provided the clues leading to identification.
    The reports available did 'not prOVide sufficient evidence
    to build a fUll picture of Russian communications. Russian nets
    were'd1scussed for the most part only in terms of types of traffi
    passed and the1r call sign practices. Details on such data
    as frequency s,ystems, t1me of communication, and so on, were
    lacking. The discussion which follows is therefore limited by
    the sources available, and concentrates upon the
    features of Russian Signal operations of value to the' German .
    signal intelligence field units
    .280 I19b p 14; I 199 p,4
    I
    64
    DOCID: 348(5746
    netwcirks or which any station might form a. part. This process of
    ident;ification was facilitated by the following characteristics
    of !il;lSSian network:
    a. Radio teleprinter (Baudot) traffic was characteristic
    of tlle communications of the Russian General Staff to the Front
    (Army Group Starfs), and of that of the Front starfs to
    the U1Assault Armies." Russian' General starr radio teleprinter
    transmissions were 2-channel" as opposed to the "modulated" .
    (i.e. prqoably multichannel) transmitters used from Front staffs
    to Assault Also, these latter links used lower 1're-
    quencies.
    281
    Automatic high-speed morse transmission was possible
    on all such higher links" but was seldom used.
    282
    (Thztee radio
    tele:printer ,links passing All' Force trarric frQm Moscow to higher ,
    Air :Force headquarters were als0 identifi
    7
    d )2ts3. . ., .
    b.' Great radio actiVity was characteristic of the ,morse
    networks of Assault Armies" because or the mobility of these
    Armies and their lack of land lines .284 . . . . ....
    c. Radio silence marked Dlvls10naland Regimental networks
    Just preceding attacks.
    d. In general" units below division used low frequencies
    (2,,200 to 3,,900
    . '
    '... 37.' Some identifying characterlsticsof Russian Call
    Practlce.--Apparently the Germans put a great deal of efrortto
    the study of RussIan cal'l signs, which were. mentioned frequently
    , throughout the reports. One reported stated that up to "July"1944
    the Russian call sign system was well, known to the Germans and .
    predictions reliable., The summer ,>ofrens1ves" bowever"
    brought a change of system."286 In spite of the seemingly general
    practice of enciphering their station call signs,28J the
    Gerlaans do appear to have had. considerable success in their study
    281 I 168 p 2; I 272 PP 5-7
    282 I 173 p 6
    283 I 173 p 11
    284 I '173 pp8-10
    285 I 15 p 4
    286 I 75' p 7
    287 I 168 pp 3-4; I 173 p 21
    .. ;
    DOCID: 3486746
    of them as characteristics aiding in trafric identification.
    The prisoner quoted above stated that by the end of hos-
    tilities the Germans had made good progress in solving the

    , Two reports indicated that mos t Army, Air Forc,e" and NKVD
    call. signs down to diVision level consisted" in their trans-
    mittedrorm, 'or three-figure calls, of which the first two
    fig\lLres Roman letters with the third either a letter or
    a ntlmber.
    2ts
    9 Regimental networks could be dlst-inguished from
    Arm"jr, Air Force, and NKVD networks" because,' although they used
    calls, these were composed entirely of letters of
    the Russian alphabet.
    2
    9
    0
    Moreover" the calls of stations on
    the regimental networks were "usually composed of thI-ee letters
    of the cover name; they were. either three consecutive letters
    or tlU'ee consonants of the cover name. 11291 " .....' .,
    One Prisoner or war stated that, provided the formations
    tooJl{ their call signs from a "Basic Book for Allotment of Call
    Signs (Hauptverteiler L it was possible to identify with con-
    siderable certainty A:y:omy or Air units as belonging on certain
    fronts .292 . '. .... . . . ..... . .
    Call signs of atew higher NKVD networks" of the network
    of ,the "Artillery Reserve of the Supreme Command,," and of the
    traffic passed on the networks of the Air Force ground stations
    were distinctive in that they used four-element One .
    pr1,soner stated that the NKVD calls were mostly pronounceab:l:'e,j/294
    and another witness went so far as to declare that the "only
    means of esta.blishing the central NKVD authority" was the stUdy
    of call sign usage .?95 The same reporter. was of the opinion '.' .
    Partisan traffic could be identified with certainty
    of .the consistent practice of using one call sign only.29
    6
    ......
    . .' . ',.' ,
    ..... . 38.0 Some characteristics of procedure.--NKVD
    traffic spotted wIth a high degree be-
    cause of' the transmittal of"NK"to separate the preamble from
    thl9 address(or text)
    J1
    2
    97 and because of the practice of .
    by. sending a series of dots and dashes instead of by keying "v'
    as in other Russls.D tra.fflc .2ge The absence in NKVD Administra-
    tive traffic'of the group separation sign "r,," common in Army.
    '". ,
    288
    1
    75 p' 7
    289 1 168pp 3-4; I 173 p 21
    290 I 173 p 21
    291 I 1731:> 11
    292 I 19b P 36 .
    293 I 173 p 11 and p 21 .
    294 I 19b p 48
    295 I 19b' p 36 .'.
    296 I 19b P 36 66
    297 I 168 p 2
    298 1 19b p47
    DOClD: 3486746
    .....
    traff1c, was a clue aiding identification.
    2
    99 The appearance
    of SMERSCH in the preamble NKVD messages
    times picked up nets which might be used by the
    Counter Espionage organization OIm .
    '. The appearance of "WZD" (air raid warning signal). in the
    f.reamble characterized Russian Air Force trarfic. The use of
    'QCO".rather than "QTC" in the preamble also was some (though,
    by no means the exclusive) indIcat;J.on that the traf.fic was '
    Air Force, , ..... . ." ....
    PaIttlsan pItocedurewas characteItized by its usesot the'
    international abbreYiations of amateur radio, such as the use
    of "CK" ror the group count. Furthermqre, most.otthe traffic
    was sentblind.30l ."
    Army traffic could to some degree be characterized by the
    absence of the features noted above.302 ;
    30. Some Identifyln CharacteItlstlcs ot RussIan Messa e
    Text as'Transm tte .-- e message ex S' cipheIt tex s trans-
    mitted by the various formations had recognizable.features.
    Gep.erally, high level traffic was sent r in S-t'igure groups while
    low level traffict'ended to' be sent in groups ot 2, 3, and 4 .
    tigu.res.' For instance, the traffic passed on the operattonal
    ., networks of, the General Staff, the Front Staffs, sid the Armies
    , tended to be predominantly 5-figure.3
    0
    3,. One ,witness 'made the
    , genera11zation that 4-figuresystems were used "from corps to
    army and :Crom army to army group. 11304 . The tra.ffic passed trom'
    Division downwards tended to be '2- or 3':'flgure .3
    0
    5. '.,
    The significance of. the characteristics bf5-figuretraffic
    in traffic identiflcatlpn was emphasized in one ot the, Iteports.
    Two ot'these'characteristics, the "blocknot" indicator and the .'
    '"Chi-number, II were ,of particular importance. , .'
    c., .According to one Witness, a "Blocknot" consis:t.,ed fifty
    shents of 5-figure random additive, 100 additive groups to a
    shent.' .. No sheet was used more, than once; thus the blocknots
    were in effect one-t1mepads. Fit'ty of theSe addit1ve Sheets,
    numbered Ito 50, were 1ssued +n a sealed envelope, whlch bore
    . a 5-figure number. '. The additive' sheets in any "pad
    ll
    were always .'
    .: ....
    .. -.
    299
    1'173 P 12
    . 300 I '1gb P 48 .
    301 119b p 36
    3
    0
    2, 119b PP 36-37
    '3
    0
    3 1''l73'PP 608
    304 1191 P 8 ' '
    305 1.173 PP 10-11
    . .'
    DOCIO: 3486746
    .'
    designated by the same 'block number. The 5f1gure group
    designating the block number was always transmitted within
    the first ten groups of the message. A further 5-f1gure group"
    usually in the first seven groups but always following the
    clock number contained" "as the' last two flgures,the number
    of the (additive) sheet (1 to 50) used. The middle figure of
    th1s group indicated the formation level, e.g. '6 might,be
    Corps 'forward to Division" 95
    9
    might be Div: to Div. "306 By"S.
    daily 'recording of all blocknot numbers, traffic enciphered
    in the same blocks could,be segregated and ident1fied as being
    transmitted by the same unit. "
    Another characteristic of this 5figure trafflc,actually
    a external
    ll
    feature, was'the serial numbering of all
    Every 5figure message was assigned a5-figure serial
    number. This was called the Chi-number by the Germans. These
    Chi-numbers began at 00001 on 1 January and ran serially
    out the year. The number ,was sent always aathe last group of
    the message;,3
    0
    7 of formations would, ,start at "
    000901. j'3
    00
    , A study of the Chi-numbers assisted materially in
    traffic 1dmlt.ificat1on., ." Generally, 'a Corps sent ten messages
    a day, an Army twenty to th1.rty, and, a "front" (roughly, Army
    Group) from sixty to one hUndred. Since each message was
    ser1ally numbered with a the progression of these
    numbers could be charted on a graph" and it was possible after
    a short time to determine the type of f9rmation sending out the
    traffIc' .from the indI:vIdual curves on this graph.3
    0
    9 The im-
    portance the Germans attributed to the Chl..;number was great;"
    in fact, one non-commissioned o1'1'ice1' who recorded the time- '
    of-orIgin as a Chi-number" was: threatened with court-martia1.
    310
    , ,The absence of blocknot and ChI-numbel's distinguished ,
    5-figure Russian Partisan traffic from 5-figure
    , NKVD messages'consisted of 4 or 5 f1gul'es was said to 'JIbe
    easily dist1ngulshedby their characteristics from Army and Air
    Force messages." Thl$ was probably due to the features of
    NXVD traffic reported as follows: '
    "The first group is a discriminant which in most
    cases remains constant for one line of traffic. The

    -..
    306 '0; 75p 12
    307 I 19b p 11
    308175pl2
    309 1 19bp11 ,,'
    310 I 199 P 3 ,.'
    311 I 19b ,p 37
    68
    '0
    DOCID: 3486746

    penultimate group contains the date and a number


    re,present1ng the number of groups in the message
    'a variable number according to the number of
    ir.Ldicator groups used 0 .Exceptions to these
    rl.:Lles are very rare. Two and three-itgure messages
    uSlUally contained technical wireless chat. f "312
    Messag-es of the :NKVD Frontier Troops were of both 4- and 5-
    figure 'tIpes, and in regimental networks 2-figure codes
    as well.j13 The 2-figure NKVD messages could usually be recog-
    nized such because of the practice, in contrast to that of
    the arlI1Y, of enciphering the same sys tem for months 0 Moreover,
    3- and 4-figure codes rarely changed in NKVD traffic; and once
    their characteristics had been ascertained, they were also fairly
    eas11y recognizable .314 "
    On the whole a good deal of ,carelessness prevailed in the
    encoding of NKVD messag"es
    1
    at least In those appearing on the
    Frontier Troop networks.3 5 Such a lack of security on the part
    of Russians facilitated the work of the KaNA 9 s,
    . Air Force traf'!'1c, which might be picked lip on search by
    the KONA units, could be distinguished from Army traffic by
    several external characteristics. For instance, meteorological
    messages usually carried an "X" or some other padding letter
    the numerals 0 Special Air FOI>ce expressions' often
    appeared in 2, 3, and 4-figure messages with an admixture of
    plain language. In plain language messages there were mentions
    of take-offs, and permission to land or to take-off 0 ' Such
    appeared frequently, and once picked up enabled the
    immediate spotting 'of the network as Air Force. IIIn general,
    very many more plain language messages passed over air
    force networks than over army networks."31b Air reconnaissance
    reports, for example, were sent mainly in the clear.3l7-
    312 1: 19b p 47
    313 I 173 :p 13 '
    314 I 167 PP 5-6
    315 1173 p 13
    316 I 173 p'll
    317 I 19b p 37
    69
    DOCID: 3486746

    "
    VOLUME 4
    Chapter V
    Bectlon D. Direction Finding and Radio "F4J.ger-Printing"
    Paragraph
    D1rec:t1on F1na,ing 0 'Cl 0 0 0 0 .0 o. 0 ."0 0" 0 Cl 6. 0 0 0 0 0 0 .. 0 40
    Radie> "Finger-'Print-ingII .' 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41
    40. D1rection finding was of the
    greatest importance In Signal Intelligence activities; and its
    increased as Russia.n and code and
    security were 1mproved.3
    1tl
    "A relatively large number
    of d:Lrect1on finding personnel was employed by the KONA,
    rive with each forward platoon, 50 (as against 84 intercept '
    operators) with Feste 10. "319, '
    The NAAS evaluation section was fed by the Direction Finding
    se<:t1l:>ns from both the FAK and the NAIL The FAKos' sent requests
    not only to the long range but to the close range direction find-
    ing isites. FAK 617, for example, sent its orders both to three
    or of,our long-range direction find sites and to about twelve close
    rangeones.j20, '
    Lon'g-'range direction"rinding sets vere located 200-350
    kilometers behind the front line. Two to three direction finding
    sets at one spot constituted a direction rinding group.3
    21
    The
    supervisor worked in the company inteI'cept rooms, and sent re-
    quests to the direction finding operators over a command trans-
    mitter. Through this means simultaneous fixes could be taken
    ',by and frequently by three sites.3
    2
    2 ,. ,
    The Close Range sets were located with the NAK platoons.
    ,,' The sets received requests not only from the Long J1ange Companie,s
    but also from the Close Range headquarters.3
    2
    3
    ..,:'" '
    : It'The distance from company headquarters to the
    nearest outstation was twenty to 'thirty
    318 I 19b p 38
    319 I 199 P -5
    .. 320 I 19b p 38
    321
    1 19b P 2
    , 322 I 173 p 34
    323 I 19b P 2
    70
    DOCID: 3486746

    kilometers. Each station was completely 'mobile, and


    moved with the' sectors of heavy fighting. Wire com-
    munication was occasiona11y available, but for the
    most part WiT /wirelessl communication was employed
    between outstations and headquarters. There was no
    corwnunication between outstations. Bearings were
    requested by and at the discretion of, the duty
    officer at the intercept station. The outstations,
    listening on a common frequency, were advised of
    active enemy frequencies by means of messages sent
    in simple substitution cipher. Bearings were then
    returned, enciphered by a daily additive. Thirty
    to, sixty seconds were required to notify all out-
    stations of bearings required.
    1t
    3
    2
    4
    While generally Long Range finding operations
    ,could fix'a station within fifteen kilometers, Close Range
    platoou direction-finding operationsc;:could narrow the possi-
    bility to two or three kilometers.
    32J
    . The results'were screened at company level, and the good
    bearings were selected, with all relevant information, and
    reported back to the NAAS, which passed final jUdgment on them.326
    41. "Radio Finger-Printing. f'j_To enable the identification
    'of raal0 statIons, a working in
    the NAAS.constructed an apparatus designed to "radio finger-
    print" the Russian transmitters through a stUdy of oscillograms.
    The was
    i1to register the incoming telegraphic trar'fic in the
    form of an image on a cathode. ray tube and analyze the
    image. Analysis consists of a number. of so that
    all details and peculiar;!. ties of the trEl.D.}lmi tter are
    comprised. The apparatus is attached to a normal inter-
    capt set. The individual of the trans-.
    mltter can be recorded graphically by means of tracings,
    or in the form of phot os tats , in a card index .'113
    2
    7 .
    Attempts to study the characteristics of particular radio
    operators, by the peculiarities of their sending habits
    l
    were
    eVidently not undertaken by KONA lin any formal manner.
    324 I 62 p 4
    325 I 19b p 38
    3
    26
    ; I 19b P 38
    327 I 19b p 39
    71
    DOClD: 3486746

    VOLUME 4
    Chapter V
    . Section Eo of Evaluation and
    9ryptanalysis in the KONA
    Paragraph.
    Evaluation in the 0 0 0 ' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 42
    Evalu,B. tion in the Fes te . 0 0 43
    .Eval'uation in the FAK ' 0 44
    Cryptana1ys is in the KONA. 0 0 0 0 0 45
    Reports resulting from Evaluation ........ 46
    42. Evaluation in the main duty of the NAAS
    to evaluate tEe enemy traffic intercepted and passed to it by the
    Long Range and 'Close Range Signal Intelligence Companies.
    Captain Roessler, Chief Evaluator of KONA 1" and Commanding
    Officer of the NAAS, observed that "there were no prescribed
    rules for evaluation, and this fact made the suceess or failure
    of the signal intelligence service a personal matter depending on
    the perspicacity and of a few specialists and persons.
    opera ting in key positions. "32tl . . .'
    Evaluation in the NAAS was concerned with "the observation
    and interpretation of. known (radi"o) nets 1" the study of un-
    'identified traffic, the results of Roesaler
    emphasized that in the case of KONA 1, "the interpretation or
    unknown traffic was ... froma long term intelligence point or view
    the evaluation problem. ..
    Comprehensive research work was necessary to systematize
    the evidence available, and the basic instruments of this system-
    atization were the Card Indexes. The Card Indexes were exhaustive'
    in detail, thorough and methodical. The Germans believed that
    the tiniest detail, t.hough utterly lacking in any apparent sig-
    nificance at the moment of interception, might form part of a .
    significant picture when scrutinized in context withslmilar
    details. Thus the mihutest phenomenon, irrespective of its
    momentary irrelevance was recorded.33
    0
    328 I 19b p 13 .
    329 I 19b p 14
    330 I 19b p 13; I 198 p 3
    72
    DOCID: 3486746

    .:
    A section in NAAS 1 kept up to date all card
    indexes.
    3j
    These will be described below.
    a. Personality Index. This index listed all officers and
    radio operator,s whose names were .derived not only rrom radio
    but from'all sources (interrogations
    l
    captured'documents
    l
    etc.)
    . All names were treated with caution because of the Russian pro-
    pensity for using cover names. There was a special fi1efor
    indexing these 0
    b. Unit Index. This file contained all information avail-
    able from all sources on all Russian units. Each card was
    designed to list the following items: unit, commanding officer,
    chief of staff
    l
    components to which the unit was subordinateI
    subordinate units comprising the unit in question
    l
    location,
    sate of first appearance
    l
    and sources of information.
    Co Blocknot Index. Both Blocknots and Chi-numbers were
    contained in the same indexo A caref'ul :recording and study of
    blocknots provided positive clues in the and the
    tracking of fo:rmations using 5-figure codes. This index was
    subdivided into two files: one, the search card index, con-
    tained.all Blocknots and Chi-numbers whether or not they we:re
    known; 'tlie other,jl the unit, card index, contained only known
    Block-and Chi-numbers. Inspector Berger observed that the two
    files'formed "The most important and surest" instrument for
    identifying Russian radio nets known to him.332 ,
    ...... ,"
    d. Key (Schluessel) Index. This index contained all solved
    keys, irrespective of the areas in which they were used. They
    were arranged according to the German designation of the Russian
    keys .,. liThe German system or key designation includes a self-
    evident description of the code plus 'an allotted number; e.g.,
    R4zc 1800: russ ische:r 4-Zahlen-Code IBoo /Russian 4-rigure
    code'1800/."333 The 2 and 3-figure keys especially were
    '331
    The information on the Card Index down to but not induding
    , sub-paragraph h, foilows very closely the detailed report
    , made by Inspector Georg Berger
    l
    in charge of documents in
    . , . KONA 1. This report is :No. 8,1 19b pp 16-18.
    332 I 19b p 16
    333 I 199 p 10
    DOClD: 3486746

    , "peculiar to def1ni te formationa," and thus certain 1nferences


    about the formation in could sometimes be made on the
    basis of the key alone.j34 ' -
    e. Call Sign Index. All call signs picked up on the
    entire Eastern front, known or unknown, were listed in this
    index, wh+ch showed not only the call sign, but also the con-
    nection in wh1chit previously might have appeared.
    335
    The
    index was fully cross-referenced and was relied upon not ,only
    for spot identification but for building new call sign blocks.336
    :r. Cover Name Index. The Russians used cover names
    abuIidcantly, not only for Wlits, but for "common military ex-
    pressionsand tactical measures as well." Some were so con-
    sistently used that all disguise was lost, and they became
    accepted "expressions. II On the who,le they presented no
    difficulty and could usually be successfully.337
    All cover names obtained were scrupulously recorded py the Index
    Section. In many cases nearly complete coverstables were re-
    constructed tor the various Russian fronts.33. , '
    , '
    g. , Coordinates Index. The map coordinates derived by
    solution of Russian map reference systems were recorded in this
    inde:;:, the coordinates being arranged both by the sys tem and by
    the unit use of the system.
    3
    39 It is significant that,
    , even though the coordinate system might not be understood, the
    method itself might be enough to important
    facilitating the tracking of a particular formation.340 .
    Direction Finding Bearings. This file cons:1.sted of a
    listing of the various bearings on each Russian radio station
    obtained through direction finding, and helped the NAAS to
    estimate the and significance of the bearings.3
    41
    i. Air Traffic Index. Russian Air Traffic was trequently
    picked up by operators assigned to search missions. In order
    to spot this intercept as Air traffic, a cataloguing of its
    334
    I 19b P 17
    335
    I 19b p 17
    ' .
    336
    I 19b P 36
    337
    I 173 p 25
    338
    :I 19b p 18
    339
    I 19b p18
    '.
    340
    I 199 P 10
    341
    I 19b P 38
    74
    DOCIO: 3486746

    ,I

    characteristics was necessarYi and to accomplish this a special
    index was set up in the NAAS. In this index were recorded not
    only the statistics derived from German Army interception of
    traffic
    l
    but also data supplied by units of the German Air
    Force (2nd and 3rd battalions of Air Signal Regiment 353,
    operating with Local Air Forces 4 and 6 respectively). The
    statistics gathered were passed on to the Long Range Signal '.
    Intelligence Companies (FAK), which were likely to pick up Air
    traffic. The companies did not have air data .1ndexes
    l
    but kept the data 1n the Army card index.342 ..
    It should be pointed out that in order to insure the most
    indexes possible, 11a1son was laterally
    between the NAAS of KONA 1 and the other regiments on the East-
    el'Il front. Full collaboration was effected also with OKH/GdNA.
    A system for exchanging current information, new interpretations
    l
    corrections I etc., operated smoothly, the data being passed by
    telegl'aph or courier depending upon the l,1rgency of the item in
    quest1on.3
    4
    3 ",.. .' '
    Below the level of the NAAS, card indexes were extensively
    used; but they were naturally less comprehensive, be1ng only as
    complete as the company cover assignment permitted.3
    44
    Of the
    card index in general
    l
    Roessler made a significant (and char-
    acteristic) observation, emphasizing that while "the card
    indexes formed the 1ndispensable material basis for evaluation,
    and of the evaluators
    , 43. 'Evaluation in a Feste.--Evaluation in the Feste was a
    matter of loentitylng and Interpreting unknown traf'f'ic, the inter
    ception of which was its particular function.346 'Some character-
    1stics of Russian communications f'acilitating identification'
    have been discussed in the preceding section. The systematiza-
    tion of this work as ca:rried on by the Feste Evaluation' Section
    showed how the identifying elements were studied at this level
    . ' The fi:rst task of the Traff1c Evaluation Section347 was to
    work up the 1nformat1on into a network diagram
    l
    which not only
    342 1 19b P 52 .
    343 119b P 16
    344 1 199 P 10
    345 1 19b p 13'
    34t;5 I 19b p 4
    347 The data Traffic Evaluation in the Feste follows closely
    ,Report No.9 1 19b pp 19-20.
    --- -- - ---
    DOCID:3486746

    represented the net structure but listed all pertinent inf'ormatioi


    ami formed the basic medium studied. The diagram contained:
    a.The net number
    ,b. The date ,
    c. Traffic workings with call signs
    d. The number and kind of messages (if any) sent
    e. The "Direction finding number" "
    f. Block numbers and Chi-numbers on any 5-figure messages
    g. Short plain text messages when available
    In the case of 5-figure traffic" this diagram was tUrned over to
    a 5-figure section" where an attempt was made to identity the
    s tion from a stUdy of the Blocknots and the Chi-numbersI which
    we:re checked against the previously indexed or charted data.
    All diagrams passed through the Traffic Analysis Section"
    where the call sign composition was scrutinized, studied in
    relation to the "Basic Book for Allotment of Call Signs"(Haupt-
    verteiler), and" if unidentified" recorded in the index. Net-
    wo:rk diagrams and messagel:Jawere checked against ,the Card Indexes
    of names and for interpretation in the light of
    the evidence accumulated there. '
    The network diagrams were passed to the Direction Finding
    Section" which determined by the location of the ,
    "fixes n whether the intercept was likely to be" for example, , ,
    Arim.y (if' in an area near the front) 'o:r Air Force; or Line of
    COitumunication traffic (1f' 1n a rear area). , " ' '
    . The diagrams went finally to the final Evaluation
    34
    9 or
    Fusion Section, wheI'e the results enter,ed on the diagram by the
    various sections were weighed and considered in the light of
    information passed to the Final Evaluation unit by the Crypt-
    analytlcsection.From here the traffic identified bl the
    Final Evaluatlon un!t was reported to the NAAS, together with' .
    the tactical derived from the messages. The findings
    guided modification of' the cover towards dropping the less im-
    portant traf'f'lc and placing more sets on the "interesting" ,
    circuits. .
    44.' Evaluation ina FAK.--The Evaluation Section in the
    FAKwas apparently organIzed like thatini"the Fes te" although
    the ,relative dearth of" evidence availace preclUded drawing
    cl'ose parallel. Presumably it differed in function f'rom the
    348
    The source did not make clear whether this function was
    performed in the Traffic Analysis Section.
    349 Endauswertung, I 199'p 3
    76
    DOCID: 3486746
    Evalua,tion section in the FAK worked on identified traffic
    a.s well.351
    A.s in the case or the Feste" the basic document of evalua-
    tion "W'as the network diagram.. prepared by the Traffic Evaluation
    sectioln. This diagram included all evidence by which the station
    in que!stion had been identified ( in the case of 5,-figure traffic,
    the Blocknots and,Ch1-numbers) and other significant'data. '
    Apparently" as in the case of the Feste
    l
    this diagram pa.sed
    through various sections devoted, to direction finding evaluation..
    traffl,c analysis, work on unidentified traffics" contents eval-
    uation352 and finally to fusion or final evaluation.353
    45. Cryptanalysis in the KO:NA.--The details of cryptanalysis
    perfor'med by the field un1ts are discussed in Chapter VI of this
    volume!. Because of the importance of cztyptanalysis in the total
    evaluation, however" it is pertinent to note here the organiza-
    tion and function of the sections carrying out this work at
    level.
    Cryptanalysis in the NUS was performed ,by a. special section
    separate from the Evaluation and Traffic Analysis sections. The
    cryptanalytic section totalled less than 60 persons. It was
    divided into subsections" the most important of which was that
    to "new developments." Other subsections were 2-figure"
    3-figure, 4-figure
    l
    NKVD" bookbreaking, and plaintext examination.
    Thee was also a small subsection devoted to
    The cryptanalytic section had the following tasks:355
    a. To collect and work on the traffic which the companies
    could not deal with (whether because of lack of material or
    preoccupation with more important systems). ','" , '
    b. To test and check doubtful solutions passed up by the
    compa.n.ies.
    c. To whether keys broken by the companies were
    the first examples of their kind; to complete them and put them
    in a handy workable form (the so-called "basic form"), and to
    a number to each key appearing in the area of the regiment.

    351 I 19b p 5
    352 The section concerned with content evaluation "/worked! on
    all readable messages, (identified) places, names and-cover-
    names and sees to the immediate forwarding of all important
    messages to the (I19b P 5)
    353 I 19b p 5
    '354 I 19b pp 10-11
    355 I 191:> P 9
    77
    DOCID: 3486746

    d. To pass back down all solved key systems to companies


    who might be concerned.
    . . The function and organization of cryptanalysis in the long
    ra.nge companies (both Feste and FAK) appears to have been much
    the same in each. On paper, cryptanalysis at company level was
    a part of the evaluation platoon, in contrast
    6
    to its independent
    pClsition as a separate section in the NAAS;35 it appears to
    have functioned in. practice independently, however, because o.f
    the special nature of its work.. The evidence indicated that'
    there may have been 15 to 20 in cryptanalytic
    wc)rk in the company evaluation platoons . ' ...
    lilt was the task of company cryptanalysis not only
    to solve systems, to recover ciphers, to decode already
    known procedures, and/or to translate all this material,
    but also to contr1bute to the 1dentif1cation and inter-
    . ;p.retatlon of trat'fics' on the basis of keys employed
    LThe cryptanalytic sectionTcooperated closely with .
    cryptanalyss of the NAAS, but was so organized and
    eqUipped that it could work on most messages itself."358
    . The cryptanalytlc group was divided into separate sections
    f\)r plaintext message translation" 2-" 3-,. and 4-figure traffic.
    (;One section for each), and a general section which kept card
    iio.dexes and lists and performed certain administrative duties.
    'These sections" besldes belng responslble for the solutlon of
    nlew systems" the recovery of additive" and the decoding of
    SQlved systems" played an important part in traffic identifi-
    cation through a study of the keys employed.359 The key indi-
    .' cc9.tors, which the Russj;.ans placed at the begiIUiing and often
    at the end of messages, were 'arranged by the desig-
    assigned by the Germans to Russian keys in
    an index file.3 0 .' .' . .
    The cryptanalysts relied heavily upon the card indexes in
    their work, .and also had at hand graphic and statistical pre-
    sentations of single letter, and trigraphic fre-.
    q'uencies" and lists of pattern words. 301
    356 I i9b p 6
    357 I 19b p 11'
    358 I 19b ppll-12
    359 1 19b pp 11-12
    360. I 19bp 41
    361 I19b P 41
    78
    DOCIO: 3486746

    They cooperated with the personnel engaged in the


    riDal evaluation section, often passing notes with the trans-
    lated messages calling the attention or the evaluators to,the
    key employed on the message or to peculiarities which might .
    have a significance when viewed in relation to the total.data.
    Moreover, the cryptanalystskept in touch with those responsible
    for intercept, to the end or gbta1ning the best copy
    . for solution or new systems.3 2 ". . ..
    46. Reports .--The findings of the, intelligence units were
    passed to the operating agencies in various reports, and the
    intelligence in them was made available by an efficient reporting
    system. captain Roessler obseI'ved that "a smoothly functioning
    report system was the chief problem discussed at almost all
    meetings to consider organization."3
    6
    3. In general, careful pro-
    vision was made both on low and high levels for efficient report-
    ing. ' The reports were passed either laterally to other field
    forma tions or upwards through signal intelligence channels to
    the higher "Hot" items were sent out in "Advance
    Reports,"3
    6
    while other Importantbut v.rgent conclusions
    were sent in the daily "Situation Reports. "305 .
    . The680mpanies weI'e required to provide highly detailed .
    reports.3 They had to exercise their own jUdgment, showing
    initiative and intelligence in selecting the items to be passed
    on. A great deal of material was never reported at all but
    simply went into the card indexes of the companies. The com- .
    panies'had to distinguish urgent from routine items, and' the.
    /NAAS frequently rebuked the forward units for a failure to send
    back in a "flash" what they had allowed,to get through only in
    a routine report .367 ......: . .... .
    The NAK maintained an evaluation platoon at Company Head-
    which correlated and interpreted the mater1als from
    the other platoons, and reported the findings laterally t,o the
    / Army Corps G-2 and upward to the NAAS .3bt3 .' . ..' .'
    The basic technical report at company level,was a "Day.
    " -
    '.'

    362 I 19b P 12
    363 I 19b p 13
    364 I 198 P 7,
    .365
    I 19b p 14
    366 1 19b P 13
    367 I 199 p 7
    368 I 19'9 P 5' I 19b 22
    , J P
    79

    DOCID: 3486746

    Report" made by the intercept operators, listing all traffic


    heard on the frequencies monitoredo There were columns for
    recording the time of the frequency upon which the
    traffic was taken" the call signs to and from, the contents .
    of the transmission" the intercept number and remarkse All
    intercept operators made similar logs" which gave a picture
    of the total traffic carI"ied on a particular link or network.
    These logs provided the company evaluation sections with
    the sUbjegt matter studied in drawing lJ,p.their Situation
    Report se 3 9 A typical Situation Report descI"ibed the deploy-
    ment and status of identified Russian units and reported any
    appearance of a new unit.37
    0
    . .
    The reports issued by the Feste and the FAK were much the
    same 0 These lndUded:37
    l
    a. Twice-daily Wetwork Reports (Netzmeldungen)
    b. Advance Reports. (Vorausmeldungen or Sofortmeldungen)
    for important tactical items
    Ct, Daily Situation Reports (Tagesmeldungen) tor a summary
    of the dayDs Advance Reports and all less important data
    These were sent to the NAAS for fUrther interpretation,,
    and items were then passed laterally
    to the Armies.3 A range company needed an of 16
    typist hours to get out its daily report for the NAASo31j
    The'Feste on the Eastern front issued in addition to the
    'reportla listed a.bove a type of report known as the nS.-figure
    offer" for circulation by OKH!GdNA to the other KOliAus. The
    purpos,e of the S.. flgure offer was to assure the maximum ex-
    ploitation of information available, and 1n effect constituted
    invitations to all KONA's to check the data in these reports
    with their own f1:1:.es. They listed all current data derivable
    from the external characteristics of messages consisting of
    S... figure gl'oups .374 , .
    The section at the NAAS for technical and tactical analysis,
    collated and combined the significant findings from all these '

    369 1'113 p 24
    370 I 19b pp 21-23
    371 I 199 P 8
    372 I 199 p'8
    373
    1 19b P 13
    314 I 199 P 8
    80
    DOCID: 3486746

    reports with the data at hand$ passed material not immediately


    exploitable to the various specialists in the for a further
    llsqueeze
    Q
    andpassed its combined report to the Ar>my Group.375
    Roessler referred: to the daily Situation Reports issued by the
    NAAS ,as a "Lagemeldung. It . ,
    Information furnished by members of In 7/VI showed tbat
    the Signal Intelligence Reports issued by the Evaluation Centers
    of some regiments were called IlFunklagemeldungen. "376 These
    consi:sted of tour component reports:
    a. Direction tinding reports (Peilmeldungen)
    lb. Radio traffic reports (Betriebsmeldungen)
    c::. Radio clear text reports (Funkmeldungen)
    d. Radio code-text reports (Verkehrsnachrichteill
    reports went beyond In 1/VI and were passed to the'
    "Army Group Commander as well as to the Army High Command and
    other echelons and commands' on a distribution list of 14
    listings "379 .
    These were the evaluated daily reports compiled on call
    signs (Rufzeichen) and radio trarfic (verstaendigungs- .
    . ve,rkehr) otenemy and neutral broadcasting stations .
    (F1lnkstellen).. . ., .
    378 These contained the decoded and translated texts of enemy
    messages.
    375 I 198 p8
    376 1F
    '
    105 p 4
    377
    379 IF l05b P 4

    81
    DOCIO: 3486746

    VOLUME 4
    Chapter VI. Russian Cryptanalysis
    Section A. Organization of -Cryptanalyti9 Etl'ort

    .
    paragraph
    Review of Central Offioe Organization 47
    Review of" Field Of.fice Organization. 48
    Assignment of tasks to the .
    Orfioea and the KONA's .;...................... 49
    47. Review of Central Ofrice.Organization.-- Prior
    to 1939, an agency known as the Intercept Control Station
    (Horrihleitstelle"abbrevlated HLB) had a section for
    handling Russian traffic; but little is known in detail
    of its achievements.385 In summarizing German aotivities
    . before the outbreak of val' with Russia, Lt. Col. Mettig ,
    (second in command of OKW/Chi) stated tha,t the Germans
    vere able during the first Russo-Finnish war to break a
    number of two-, three-, and four-figure codes.386 . In
    addi tion, a copy of 'the Russian fl ve-figure code. was
    obtained from the Finnish General Staff. (This particular
    code was used by the Hussians in the .first year of" war
    w1th Germany.387 The Intercept Control Station (HLS) was
    replaced in 1941 by two agencies, .Inspec torate 7/VI
    (I:Lbbreviated In 7!VI)(serving asa cryptanalytic unit in
    and the Control Station of Signal Intelligence
    (Leitstelle del' Nachrichten Aufklaerung, abbreviated LNA)
    in Zossen. 388 The sec tlon :for Russian cryptanalysis that .
    .hd been part of' HLS remained attached to In 7/VI during,------..
    , 'the first few months ot its existence j Russian "evaluation"
    was done at. LNA. Both organizations f'elt, however, that
    oryptanalysis and evaluation should be dOne rurther forward;
    and late 'in 1941, the Russian section ot In 7/VI . (including
    cryptanal,!sts and evaluators) was sent to Loetzen in East
    the nucleus for a third

    82
    Group IV,
    DOCID: 3486746

    .,
    central agency, the ,Intercept Control East
    iHorchle1tstelle Ost, abbrev,iated HLS O$t).From this' ,
    tlme'until November, 1944, German ArmySigntil IntelligenCE!
    aCltlv1t1es were divided into Iion-Russian{per-
    :rclrmedat In 7/VI)59
    v
    , and int,o Russian (per.formed at '
    HI.S Ost 8I}.d LNA). , " , " ,,' " ", ,,'
    , In October,1944, IILS'Ost andLNA vere 8tn!!\lgamated,
    , together with In 7/iTI, 'into t1)e Signal IntelllgenceAgency
    of the Army High Command ( des, Heeres{ General
    - de:r Nachrlchten Auf'klaerung; lJ,bbrevlated OKH/GdNA), the ,
    on,e .final central agency off the war, 391' " " , "
    For the ultimate breakdown of in detsl1 see
    Volume 4, Chapter 11.392 Inbrlet, the ' assignment or,
    RUI:Jslan cryptanalytic f\1llctlon,s vere as :follows:,
    , , ,
    Group III (under Capt. Gorzolla): evaluated traffic
    and cryptanalytie work fro,m the Russlanfront
    'r .
    (under, Major 1lertze):- did all cryptanalyt1c
    , at OKH/GdNA" '" ' ",. , " ,;
    Section 3 (under Lt. Dettmann)t:'> the former
    . . cryptans.lytlc .section ot Jil,SOst,
    and handled .
    a.. Russian NKVD tra.ffic
    b. Russian Army traffic
    c. RUBsian Parti san traffic
    d. Research on Russian Systems
    390 Discussed in Volume 4., Chapter VII
    391 The was the retreat ot
    mas .Ost to where In 7/Vl and k'1A were 19cated.
    This move was one of .operational rather
    analytic: expediency: the Russlans were advancing; HLS
    Qstwas retreating; and when the home of'fice arid the '. .
    flelderyptanalyt1c and:evaluatlon of.ficesvereall c19se
    togetber,1t was certainly more expedient to combine .
    them. The result:.GdNA.
    39
    2
    :qerived almost whollytrom IF 123 ,pp 6... 14
    , ' t
    / I
    ,

    83
    DOClD: 3486746

    Group V . Section l(lUlder Specialist Block): re-


    constructed Russian call signs'
    Section 2 (Under Specialist Block}: ex-
    ploited captured RussiRn docu-
    , ments'of signals.interest

    . .
    Group VI (under Capt. Roeder at Potsdam): "
    Section 1:. worked on high-grade machine
    ' ,
    a. Intercept andevaluat10n ot
    Inte:r-Soviet State Traffic
    b. Intercept and evaluat10n of
    Euss1anBaudot
    c . Intercept and eval'Ust1onof
    Russ,ian Army traffic
    Section 3 of Group IV in the above chart was the Russian
    cryptanalytic section:.. It may be assumed th8t HLS Ost"
    although amalgamated into GdNA". continued very much as 1t
    had in 1ts duties, and that thevork perrormed earlier by
    HLS Ost was ,in nature to the work. per.formed later
    in Section 3 of Group IV of GdNA.393. .' ,
    48. Review of F1eid Ofrice
    preparations were being ma,defor t e attack on Russia,' it
    . was :found that there was an !tacuteshortage" of cryptanalysts
    available for field were culled from
    thef:ixed intercept stations and trained for field work with
    the newly,organized S1gnal Intel11genceReg1ments (Kommandeure
    del" Nachrlchten Aurklaerungs abbreviated KONA). Five'or these
    regiments were sent into the rleld as complete low leve1 .
    intercept and evaluation 'units attached to J\.rmy Groups: tvo
    went to the westel"n front; KONAs 1, 2" 3 were assigned
    to the eastern front. These ea.sternKONAs vere supplemented'
    in 1942 by KONA 6, which was sent out to cover the German
    campa1gn in the Caucasus395, and which vas attached directly
    to HLS Ost. Low level crY"Ptanalysls and evaluation was also.
    done by KONA 8 and KONA Nord,wh1eh were made up from other
    Eastern front signal intelligene regiments, and aetivated .
    in late 1944 and early 1945.
    393Nothing is' mown rrom TICON sources of the cryptanalytic
    activities of m.S Ost befol'e its amalgamation into,'GQNA
    except a brief statement or Mett1g. tAl 78 p 8 .. -
    394
    1
    78pp4, 7
    395
    DF
    18 p 81
    84
    DOCID: 3486i146

    .....
    i
    The organization of field units for cryptanalysis has
    already been discussed in deta11.396 Since the information
    on ,Russian c.ryptanalysis used in .this chapter,. however, ,
    as much from interrogations or prisoners. engaged.
    in t:J.eld operations as from.the discussion ofcryptana11sis
    of GdNA 397, the readerls rererred for a brief review to
    the c:hart of organization otKONA 1 398 about which we know
    more than any other as it was captured-lntoto.399
    . .
    49. ASsi!nment of crqtanal1tic tasks to the. central
    of? ces and. the ONAs.-- In dIscussing the task
    or In, 7/VI, Lt. Mettlg 400 .
    . ,
    "Once the units hac1oeen'
    set up and attachE!dtothe various forvardwireless
    units it w8.sagreed to allot tq them tr,.e InV'estlga1;1dri
    offorward and Llne'ofCommunicatiori tra.:ffic which eQuId
    be solved in the :fIelcL ' In 7/VI hC;;wever,
    . r:espcmsible for all army crypt6-analyticwork and con-'
    , . c,entrated on the most difficult and unsolved procedures. II
    .' . '. . . '.' .
    or thte assignments for'HLs Ostand LNA as
    or :fo:r, varlo.\1sKONAs in the.field
    J
    there is no
    interrogations. Of (}dNA, there is only .the sta.te-
    ment IJ.f Detttn8nn and samsonov 401 to the ef'feet that' "the
    solut:lon of agent, guerl11a,an<;i Kundsehatter " ,
    ty , He:ferat3ctpf , GroupIY. If , The
    of cryptanalytic work ,to
    both field, ,can only be inferred'from'the dis"
    , cussionsorthe Prisoners of War regarding solution and
    aehie,rement. 402, ,,', '.' - .
    l ..,
    396Volume 4 Chapter' III" :',
    samson6v" riA Heport on ,Russian Decryption'
    Inthe Former ae,..ma.n Army", publIshed as DF 18. ."
    4-1, '4..
    399seEt also Volume 4, Chapter V for discussion of'the
    functions and duties of the various f'ield.units.
    ,
    400
    1 7'8' p '8 '
    401
    1 l,i6p 7 ,
    402DF_18. GdNA; all quoted 1h this (}hapter,
    . . P..!!!.:tptJ f'oza the KONAs
    DOCID: 3486746

    It is clear, in all the interrogations, that actual


    cryptanalysis was done on all levels ot field operations
    and the central offices almost interchangeably: from
    the lowest level (where it was considered merely a .'
    .fWlction ot "evaluation") up through the highest level
    (where it involved pure mathematics and the assistance ot
    IBM machinery). By inference from the interrogations, it
    can be said that, with one or two exceptions,403 all types
    of pro'blems were handled in all un! ts The tlexibili ty of
    cryptanalytic assignment was determined mainly by the
    Russia,ns
    B
    use of their own systems. Aside from machine
    traff1,c and five-figure codes (Army or NKVD), which it
    can bet assumed contained the most important operational
    communications, the Russian tactical, strategic, and lower
    level operational eommunicationswerenot carrled'inany
    set cE:lLtegory of systeins, determined by their relative' ..
    Two-, three-, four-, and even some f1va-figure
    trafflc was used by' the', Russian Air, Force, the NKVD,' and the
    Army ELt all levels: of operations'. The German Army Crypt-
    analytic ettort:, theretore, was oriented to fit the situation
    as by Russian usage. The discussion or
    analytic operations ori the part ot German Prisoners,ot War
    was invariably set f'orth in term!! of types of' encipherment
    and dlf'ficulty of solution, and took the form ot tvo-figure,
    three-figure, f'Qur-figure, five-figure, NXVD, address, '.
    Agents' solution. As Lt. Loeffler pointed out, in discussing
    company "The ot the various
    was ml:>d1t1ed to cope w1th developments on the Russia.n'
    namely, the shif'ting of" emphasis from 2-f'igure to' 3-tigure,
    and then later to CryptB.nalytioseations were
    d1yidied accord.1ng to this soheme 1n the company (FAX), the
    battalion (NAA), and the central agency ot the' KONA> (the .
    NAAS). The same soheme vas followed by Dettmann and Samsonov
    1n discussing the problem of Army cryptanalysis
    of and appears to be the underlying .'
    403 5-t'"igure codes and partisan :and agents 9. codes are to
    be discussed later in th1s chapter.
    404
    DF
    '
    18
    86
    DOCID: 3486746

    b8.e1sfor the organization of training the "Russian


    Cryptanalysis Course" given by ,Group IV ot OKH/GdNA tor
    field trainlng.
    40
    5 In this course, more attention was
    given to two-figure tablesand'three-rigure andf'our-
    f1gurecodes because of' their operational f'requency and their
    importance tor taot:Lcal and strategio intelligenoe,/ .
    In short, thevarioue oryptanalytic assignments seem to
    haVEI been determined for the most part by how the Russians,
    used their own systems (operationalal'ea and in1pOrtaIlCe)'
    and by the amoUnt 'of time and manpower the Germans needed
    to Eiffect solution. A summary of the assignments follow:
    /
    were wOl"kedon mostly by the companies
    (where, it has been po+ntedout, itwasconsldered
    ,part of' ','evaluation" )beoause .of ,the simple solution
    and the immediate need for the tactical j,ntell1gence
    involvedj but it was also hanq.1edby.the battalion
    {NUl, the centralKONAagencl (the NAAS), and'
    even by the home office' (GdNAJ:Lt'. Dettmann ,says
    ,that solving the two-figure codes 'was "merely a
    torm at crossword p.uzz1e .n406 .' . . .
    three-t;l.gurecodes were worked on in the companies, but
    were also handled by the NAA, the NAAS and HLS
    .' OSt.
    405
    I 166, complete
    406
    IF5 p 6 .
    ,81
    . , "
    "., ..
    DOCID: 3486746
    .'
    f'our-figure codes offered more difficulty in solution"
    since a large amoWlt ot'material was "absolutely
    necessary the majority of unsolved our-:fig'iire
    codes were abandoned because at an insufficient.
    number of messages
    lf40
    7; these were handled by the
    NAAS and GdNA, rather than on company level, '.
    because of the lack of' men, .ma.chinel"Y (IBM), and .
    time necessary for solutionona forvard level.
    three-figure and four-figure signal codesW'ere con...
    sidered somewhat "special" and were handled1n
    the company (FAX) by "chosen' cryptana.ll'sts, .
    sometimes b:r the, chie.fcryptanalystr
    40CS
    and'1n
    the NAAS. 409. .. . .
    f'ive-figure codes, which were generally con,sidred
    were handed by GdNA, though KONA 1
    for.a .pex-iod did five... figUre cryptanalysis' inde-
    pendently410j Dettmann. and Samsonov state that
    :five-figure traffic' wassubmitt,ed f"or the ex-
    clusive processiI18of the,@'dNA7.
    tt4l1
    agents 11 codes, whkch had always been done inthecen-.
    tral offices 12, were "the respons1bilitr,'ot
    Ref"erat 3c"
    41
    3, mainly because solution' 'depended
    on captured material. "414 They were probably ..
    given to these central offices by other than
    Army sources. ' ,
    4, Chapter VI in this Chapter

    407
    r
    191 p 8
    40S1 19b.' p .. II
    409
    1 19b p 11
    410r 19b p 43 .
    411
    DF
    18 P 83
    412
    See
    'Vo1ume
    413
    1
    116 P 7
    414
    ibid


    88
    "
    :.;/ ..
    ',:-
    DOCID: 3486746

    NKVD systems formed a special group or wireless traffic


    from the Russian and the German points of
    and cryPtanalysis of NKVD material was handled by
    the NAAS
    4l
    5, LNA4l6 and GdNA {through 4-figure.l
    (five-flgure)4l7 . .
    machine ciphers were considered on the.same level of
    solution as five-figure code and were handled
    exclusively at GdNA
    Whatever systems were solved, or could be easily solved
    and deciphered, were done as far forward and with -as few'
    men and as little time as possible. When more time, or
    manpower, or, mechanical (IBM) or theoretical help was needed,.
    the solution was removed as far to the rear as practicable
    or Because of the difficulty involved in solution
    o:f five-figure codes (Army orNKVD) and machine traffic,
    the was obviously the best agency for handling these;
    at the other extreme, the companies could almost always.
    solve and process two";'figure systems, because of their
    sImple encipherment. All systems of intermediate difficulty,
    however, were assigned not only to these units but to the .
    intermediate units, depending on state of SOlution, amount
    o:f materialnecessary, number of men required, ete Rather
    than cutting across systems and thinking in terms or ,speciric
    l,evels of operation and levels of intelligence priority, both
    the' Russians and the Germans thought in terms or types or
    e:ncipherment. In, discussing the German Army cryptanalytic
    effort of Russian systems, 'therefore, the discussion will,
    . t,ake the form of two-figure, three-.figure,four-rigure,
    five-figure, address, NKVD, etc. . .
    41
    51 96 pp, 46-47
    416
    ibid. PP'9-l0
    417DF 18 P 63
    89
    ... ..
    DOCID: 3486746

    VOLUME 4
    Chapter VI. Russian Cryptanalysis
    Section B. Cryptanalytic Achievements against .. '
    Russia.
    Paragraph
    2- .flJgllre codes It " 50
    3.. figure codes ...#- . . .. .. . . ... . 51
    4- -rlglll'"e codes ,. ".... 52
    5- rlgllre codes If.... 53
    f\.ddress oodes e' " 54
    )11seellaneou8 .. "55
    .
    c Periodic and columnar substitution
    d Coordinate systems
    e Machine ciphers
    NKVD 8;nd Agents codes............................ 56
    NKVD codes .
    . ('b) Agents 0 codes .
    50. codes.-- 2....figure codes were used by
    the Russian ,Army, Air Force and NKVD. In the Army, they
    were used by Army Groups, Armies, Corps, Divisions, and
    Regiments; and by small independent special units such
    as Combat Engineer Brigades, Notor Regiments, and Artillery
    Brigades. In the NKVD, they were used on frontier regi-
    mentsl networks and from divisional level downwards.
    Solution of 2-figure systems was done mostly on company
    level (FAX), but was also handled byNAA, the NAAS, and
    the GdNA.
    a) The PT-39. The,PT-39 (Peregovornaa Tab11ca,
    Iiterally 'conversation table n ), a 2-figure code placed in
    a square 10 x 10 and then enciphered by substitution through
    a 2-tigure, 10 x 10 Lat1n square
    422
    , can be taken as the
    "mothe:r" 2-figure code. 423
    422
    i.e. no figure was repeated in any row or column
    423
    1 191 p 1;119c p 1
    90
    \
    DOClD: 3486746


    (Actually, according to the Dettmann and samsonov
    424
    , the
    f1rst 2flgure operational system used over a long period
    by the Army andAlr Foree of the wholeSovlet Unlonwas
    a code with 100 values, re-enciphered daily
    the individual networks. In the -last months of 1939, ,
    PT-35 was l'eplaced by PT-39.. 1940-1942, it was,used
    far more than all other codes'comblned. 425 "PT-39 va8 used
    by Armles,Col'pS, and Divisions. The identifi-
    cation of the latin square used enabled'
    the Germans to establish to which ,Russian 'front or army the
    wireless stationuslng it or whether it was an
    Army or Air Force Station. Since the squares were orten
    used tor sevel'almonths, the reconstruction of' squares could
    be easily. to have been hardly necessary,
    howevel', since the rows and columns could be solved (recon-
    strueted}vitha minimum of 15 to 20 groups. The messages
    were ora technical signal or tactical nature, the latter
    more el!lpecia11y after the beginning ,or the Russian campaign
    in June, 1941. This particular code (PT-39) was used from'
    the extreme south to the extreme'north or thee&stern front,
    and,in :the back areas as far as the Caucasus, middle Asia,
    and North Persia'.426 ' ., ,','. '
    , b) The PT':"42 and PT 42N. The 39 was superseded in
    May 1942 byPT...'42.' 'There is a .flat disagreement with this
    statement, i'n the report or Dettmann and Samsonov, whoa'a,.'
    that "at thebeg1nnipg qf 1942','PT... 41 came into use as the
    successor of PT"39. "427 Dettmann, ,and Samsonov do not '
    mention PT-42at all, butthelr description or PT-4'lcorre-
    spondsto the description'given'of PT,,:42. They are very
    probably the same code and encipherment, misnamed by one
    or the, other or '. the, Prisoners of War. The PT-42 was similar
    'to PT.39 in construct1on'exeept that the distribution of
    424
    DF
    i8 P 45
    425
    1 19cp '1
    426 '
    I 19c P 1
    427
    , DF 18 p' 47
    91
    - ...-. _ ..-:

    ... ,.- ..
    .... ....

    ,

    --- -----
    DOCID: 3486746

    -values in the basic square was made random, and v8.l'iants


    tor values (as many as four for common letters such as
    0, la, 1, a) were introduced. The enciphering method was
    the same as tor PT-39; b:ut because of the random nature
    ot 'value assignment in the basic squa.re, the solution ot
    a row (or column) ot the enciphering square now required
    abaut 30 groups./ PT-42 was restricted in use to Army
    Armies, or Oorps. For divisions and regiments, PT-42K was
    used. It W&S smaller, with a square 7 x 10 instead ot
    10 ;x 10, but its construction was the same as As in
    the- case at PT-42, enciphermant .vas rows, but
    the:S6 were 1'are1y derived trom a Latin square. Itvas
    used; almost exclusively trom division, rorwards and remained'
    1n torce tn some cases until 1944.
    42tl
    lt produoed much
    tac'tical intol'Dlation. --
    0) The PT-43. The PT-42 and PT-42N were superseded
    (no date given) by PT-43, which was the last general
    2-t:lgure code used and which remained 1n force U,P to -the
    cap:ltulation or the Germans. Unlike the basic square in
    and PT-42:N, it contained nO"letters. \ PT-4"
    -tor addresses by the A1r Force and
    the PWO (A. A. Defense). -
    d) In addition to PT-39, PT-42, PT-42N, and PT-4"
    small- independent special units, suah as Combat Engineer
    Bl'igadesJ) Motor Regiments and Artillery B:toigades" had their
    own home-made 2-f'igure codes which were otten in use tor -
    oo1;r short periods and which, besides the letters of the-
    a.lpha.bet and numbers, contained expressions
    appJl'opr1ate to the uni t concerned. ;) -
    428
    1
    19c
    .PP 1, 2
    429
    1 19c p 2
    43
    0
    :
    r
    19c p 2
    DOCID: 34-86746

    It is cl,ear f'rom all the interrogations that 2-figure


    codes were not always in use, but were being constantly
    :read. Prisoners of War of NAAll said that the last known
    PT table vas PT=43, but that they could.not reconstruct it.
    4
    31
    But their statement is only contradictory one among
    many others according to which solution was not only. easy
    but current. Capt. Noletzko, (of' Ln. Reg. 353)
    mainly of air systems (ground/ground, etc .) said,
    for example, that 2-figure codes were used only by forward
    11;roops and were almost 100% he admitted that
    tnuch assistance vas gained throy.gh security breaches on the
    part of Russian operators, but that 2-figure traffic
    \ras never very difficult to read. For Lt. Dettmann,
    solVing the PT codes was tlmerely a form of crossword puzzles 0 "4:Y
    Gerlich stated that one or two men vere sufficient atNAAS 1
    t;o' cope vi th current decipherment of 2..flgure messages,
    espec;ially as the greater part of themvere already being
    solved :In 'the companies,. but addedthat solution was made'
    easier vhenplain text was lnterspersed.
    4
    35 .
    The Prisoners of War of KONA 1 stated categorically that
    t.he Rllssians practically ceased using 2-flgurecodes after
    1.943.4-36 But other evidence would indicate that the Russians
    cont1nued to use them up to the cessation of hostilities, .
    although only f'or forward troops. Capt. Schmidt stated
    that the and NKVD used 2-f'lgure codes up to e.Q..d of
    host1l1ties
    4
    37; but Gerlich said, nln the last stages 2-
    figure only occurred where the units were engaged
    4,31
    1
    ' 106 p 2
    4:3
    2
    1
    75 p 10
    '4:33
    1
    75 p 4
    43
    4
    IF
    5 P 6
    435
    1
    191 pp'2, ), 4
    4:
    36
    1
    190 p 1
    I 55 p 11
    93
    o
    ;."--.. ,
    ... -'.. ;
    .' " ..
    .. t.. t"
    . . .,:." .
    -4.:..<i
    DOCID: 3486746

    in fighting: Thus it is to be expected that they are


    still being used in the Red Army even if they are not
    appear-ing at the rnoment. "438 ' ' ,
    51. 3-figurecodes7- codes vere USed by the
    Army" the NKVD. ,They vere used first
    (194l
    a
    .42) mainly by the Air Force; later, more widely by
    the Army. Every Army Group, Army, Corps, Dlvlsion,Brlgade,
    Regiment and Battallon had its own 3-flgure code. The
    3-flg1..1re codes were, replaced by 3-f1gureSlgnal Codes in
    1943 vere used by al,l units from Army dovnwards. In
    the they were used by the Black Sea Fleet and from
    division .
    , So,lution or 3...:rigure codes.waiS carried on mostly in the
    compan,ies(FAK),but since the3-:figure codes offered more
    difficulty tosolutlon than the 2-figure COdes, they were
    also bandIed by the the NAA8, and HLS Ost.
    Three-figure codes were first noticed 1n February, 1941.
    They w'ere used, increasingly fromlilay, 1941 and the beginning
    of the Russian campaign. From then tintil the second half
    of' 1942, the Air Force were the greatest users of this code
    and each Al:rPivision had its,own cipher. In 1942, the
    :rirst Army unit (the 48th Army then in the Caucasus) started
    . a three-figure" syllabic code.
    By the time 'of' Stalingradpractically erigaged
    in the battle had its own 3-figure cipher."439A1though
    they speak of speci:ric 3-:rlgure codes under various clrcum-
    stances, 'Dettmann and Samsonov do not discuss any 3-figure
    codes as suchj it can only be assumed that they considered
    the type of'book and encipherment so similar to the 2-figure
    PT series that they did not warrant discussion as a special
    type. ' .
    Li,ke the 2-:Cigure system, the 3-figure system' consisted
    of a c'ode-book, and an enciphering table or some sort. The
    first :3-f'lgure codes were simple iIl>"form, and were ,made up
    of sev,eral pages (at mostlO) which containedqommoll words
    arranged Originally-the letters of' the
    438
    I 191 p 4; see also DF1,8, .p 47
    439
    I 19c p 2,
    '94
    DOCID: 3486746

    alphabet were placed at the end or the book (arranged al-


    pltlabetlcally, or l"9i<rq:ap), but were soon after-
    put into the book in their alphabetic position. Arter
    some months, this totalalphabeticltyvas replaced by a
    arrangement (alphabet1clty maIntained.
    olllywi thin letters); and numbers were scattered at random
    through the book.
    4
    40 The book could have 1,000 g,roups,
    . but 1st. Lt. Schuber.t stated that the average "as300-800
    1
    .. ''In general small scope, but "441 If the
    code vere'smaller than 1,000 groups, alternativ?s vereg1ven
    either to pages or rirstriguresor the The methods
    of encIpherIng were extremelyvl1riedin detai1.s, butalws.ys
    involved encipherment 'or a sIngle :figure sepal'atel,.. 443 .
    The substItutions could be constructed wIthout any recognizable
    sJrstemor they could be made up a LatIn square; the square
    'lasted about a month, although 1nthe .Air it
    sClmet1mes lasted longer. 444 Schubert stated that JI Towards
    the end, there appeared quite . isolated 4 to 7rfiguresub .
    stiitution systems-- presumably systems of. the tie
    spect1ve cypher departments. I imagIne th:1:j1,:tpbe,soas
    they appeared. very seldom. n445 - .... .
    The . only specl.f'ie3-figure code to in T1CWM .
    is vhat the Germans called R3ZC (Russ1an,3-zahlen l1igureJ,
    CClde) metlt1onedbyCorporal A.Faure -ofNAA 11, the "Norway
    pa,rty.. "44-6 code 'w1thlO pages of 100 positions
    each, lO.xlO, alphabetically arranged. Only the. hundreds
    and tens .f'igures of' each group wel"e enciphered\>} In general,
    either the3-f1gure code book. itself or the method of en-
    ciphermentwere so varied that Prisoners .of.. Warvere able to
    characteristics, ,no specif1cexamples.
    44 ... ...
    . 1 1ge pp2, 3
    441
    1
    26 P 2
    442
    1
    19c'p 3
    44'3 /'
    'I 19c; P 3; I 26p 2.
    19c p 3
    p 3
    446
    1
    55 p12
    95
    96
    DOCIO: 3486746

    The 3-r1gure code.. 1t 1s clear rrom all interrogations,


    was used mainly bY' the Army, but also by the Air Forces.
    Aecording to P8.1'ty', onreg1mental networks
    and for less 1mportant messages on the level of assault
    armies, malnly the 3-:rlgureeode(wltha 2...tigure
    square encipherment) W88 used.,447 . But the Prlsoners ot War
    of KONA I stated that every Army Group, Army,. Corps,
    Dj.v1slon,Brigade, Regiment, and,Batta11on. had its own .
    3figure code 1t used to commun1cate withlts, sub- ..
    ox'dinate units. 44ts . .. . . ... . .
    .. It 1s curious to note that a g90d deal of plaintextyas
    inserted in the3-figure enciphered code
    GerliCh pointed out the B;dvantagesof plain-text 1nsertion:
    "TheT, otten gave WOl'dS4nd names not contained in the cQde
    '450; and continued, systems were always ...
    solved when suft1e1ent.mater1al one enc1phermerit was .
    ava11abie.
    1I4
    51 This would, appear to. be the general v1ew- ..
    point, since Capt. Holetz1(o sta:ted that }..rigure'traf:flc
    was ortiy slightly more secure than 2-:flgure and
    was 80% readable. 452 . In this case, Holetzko was talking
    partie,uJ,arly or 3-:rlgure codes as used bY' the Russian Air
    :forces (grotind!ground);. It is knoVIlthat AlrForce .eod.es
    lIere otten current rorliluch longer periodS than those of'
    the ArmY, sometimes lasting a yearj
    4
    53 and would thus. arrord
    more opportunity to :find depths and setup over18ps . AriDy.
    3-tigure eodes vere nearly. always b1goper-
    ation and were with few exceptions never current for.nJore ...
    than a month ortwo,sometlmes .f9r only a week;45
    4
    so1ut101'1
    was thereby made more dl:f.ficult . Nevertheless, Lt,; .starke .
    with 3.:rlgure trarfic in a stated that,
    g1ven 4epth of'traf'.f1c; all codes were readable;455 an4 .
    441
    1
    173 pp. 10,
    448
    1
    .
    190
    p 4. .
    449
    1.26 p 2
    451 191 1
    . ,.p
    451
    1
    191 p 7 .
    452
    1
    75 P 10' ..
    453
    1 ige. p. 4; DF 18 P 5
    45
    4
    1 190 p 4; DF 18 p 5
    455
    1
    75 p 6 .
    DOClD: 3486746

    Lt. Col. Mett1g said flatly that from the spr1Ilg of.1943
    to 2-figure and was regularly de-
    coded.
    4
    :>6 It can be assumed that 3-:.figuretraf'f'1c vas
    being read currently enough and constantly enough, to
    provide a great amount of tactical intelligence.
    The operational 3-figure codes were discontinued in
    1943 and vere supersedec:l by 3-figureSig:rial Cqdes
    4
    57'
    which veredifferent only they contained no letters,
    but only words or pm-saesof' tacticslimportanoe, and were
    not alphabetic but had under
    headings SUC!! as "attack " "derense", "enemv movements,"
    "designatlonor un1ts
    tl
    , f,rigUl'es or
    connect1ons" 10 etc. Each meaning had two or three 3.;..f'igure
    groups allotted to it. As. in the case or thef'ormer 3.
    r1gure in the book 1tselt vas
    sent in clear. 458 Every un1tf'rom ArmydoWilVal'd had its .
    own signal code for use lflthsubol'dinateunits.. There 1s '.
    no evidence tb&tsolutionof these }-figure 81gnalCodes
    vas. more d1fficult than solution ot.the3-flg\U"8 codes;. '
    nor 1s there any record of success either in totality or
    currenC'1Oi' decipher_nt. Lt. Loetf'ler of'" Feste 10 d1d,
    however" state that they were considered "special procedures""
    and "verestudied in the section by specially
    chosen for the most part also bY' the chief'
    cryptanalyst .. "459 The solution time varied according to .
    456
    178
    p 8
    Samsonov spoke of 3-tigure and 4-f1gure
    . "signal codes" described by members of KONA; but. there-
    are discrepancies between the two descriptions" and
    again it is impossible to determine where the mistake
    lies" T:tle discussion as given by KONA 1 members seeu .
    generally more reliable
    . 45
    8
    1
    19c p '4
    4591 19b, report 6, p 11
    , .
    97
    :", I,""", ":
    J>
    ".' ,
    .......
    DOCID: 3486746

    se1curity, amount of material for overlapping, etc. ;snd


    ve can. only assume that the Signal Codes were read as
    consistently and as fully as the and
    codes they superseded. .
    52 ... 4-flgl;l1':e.codes.--4-flgure codes were used by the
    Air Foree,and NiVD. They were used in the: ArT!f1 as
    General Army-Codes (called Genera:lCommaIidel's oeodes) ,
    anli on lower operational levels by mobile formations
    as Tank and Mechanized Oorps, Tank Armies, and Tank Admin!-
    stJt'ation Supply Units. In NKVD, they were used on
    Ra:Llw8.y and Transport Nets. .
    was handled partly bythecompanies(FAK}
    (There was a 4-:figure section, aswellasa2-f'igure and a
    3-jrigure section, in the organlzatlonof a typical company
    cryptanalytic setup460, but in all probability mostly by
    NAAS. and GdNA.) . ..
    1st Lt. Schul:'iert (of' GdNA) s1iated that" "The Russian
    ArlDy ke;rs are 3- or 4-figUl'8 systems. basis is the
    satne. "401 . Actually, the construction of' It--:flgure codes
    wa!;J in prlnciplethe same as in the case of 3-f'lgure codes,
    ex(,ept that the basic book had a possible 10,,000 groups
    innteadof' 1,,000.
    462
    Schubert stated that there vere in
    the perhaps only six or seven pages
    46
    3" each with a
    blockofconsecutlve numbers; but the description given by
    members
    D
    of KONA 1 indicates books of from 5 to 100
    pages. The latter seems more l1kely.464 In any ease"
    number of pages could vary from 5 to 100 . (the Air Force
    Cocles usually had about 10,000 groups and the ArrrryS,OOO .
    or less)" and eaoh page could have variant page designation.
    46
    5
    \
    DOCID: 348
    0
    6746

    ..": .
    The actual construction or pages varied in 4-figure code-
    books as much as it did in the 3-figure code books, in
    respect to alphabeticity and sequence of numbers, etc
    But the methods ot enciphering the last tvo digits vere
    still more varied than those used in 3-tigure systems:
    Subfltitution by row, digraph substitution (in comparison
    to substitution in the case ot 3..tigure
    codets); combinations of these tyo, abbreviated figures in
    the Bubstitution, and others .. 46(j 0 in his dis-
    cussion or the "Russian Cryptanalysis course '4 given for
    field training mentioned that "a 3-f1gure or -figure code ""
    can also be reciphered on an adder. For this purpose a
    text; chosen at random ls enciphered (llkewisebythe code)
    and the code text added to or subtracted ofrom (non-:carrylng) ."467
    But there is no other indication in interrogations that
    method was met in actual practice. The general method
    seems to have been variant pagedesignatlons tor the book
    (2 f'igures), and encipherment of "the last 2 ""
    varj.ous means, including 2-figure Latin squares.
    46t
    ,S
    o From 1941, the Air Force began to use 4-figure codes
    in different forms but often of the simplest construction.
    In t;he middle of 1943 many mobile formations, Tank and "
    Corps, Tank Armies, and Tank Administration and
    Supply units also started using 4-figlire codes. They were
    alsea used by Rallway and Transport Nets. 469 0
    Dettma.nn and Samsonov Gd.lIIA) described the "first
    general army and air force' code (4-rlgure with roughly
    4,600 groups, enciphered with diaphic SUbstitution), and 0
    its successors "mac 5" to "OICK 8 (General CommandersO Codes)
    that; rapidly replaced one from 1939-41. OKK 5 was
    capt;ured in the Russo-Finnish war; and OXIC 6, 7, and 8 were
    captured in the Russo-German war.. But Dettmann and Samsonov
    . "
    466
    I 19c p 5
    467J: 166 P 7, 8
    468
    I 173 PP 10, 11
    469
    1
    : 1ge pp 5, 6
    0" 99
    I
    .;. :
    DOClD: 3486746
    -.
    insisted th8t" "All these systems were" however" recovered
    by before their capture and com-
    pletely and currently readable. "470 Lt. Loeffler (of Feste
    10) stated that Ita general 8.1'my 4..figure cipher ,vas last
    observed in use in North Persialn the winter 1941-42. It
    had 50 pages, each designated by tvo alternative blgrams
    and 100 lines to each page .. "471 There is no other Indication
    in the that four-figure codes were no longer,
    or less frequently In 1944, however, four-
    figure Signal Codes (of the same form as the 3...figure Signal
    Codes) made their appearance in the Army, especially with the
    army groups,,473 and probabl,. superseded in great if'
    not wholly; the 4-figure codes just discussed...
    . Generally .speaking', 4-figure codes were changed less
    frequently than other codes474; but even. then, the ehlulge.
    came too'f'requent1yto jUdgef'rom GerlichDs statement that
    " a frequent change. of' encipherment would have made
    decipherment impossib1e."475 Certainly the 4.;.figure codes
    gave GermanC',r,.ptanalysts a certain amount of trouble; .'
    actually, a large amount of' material vas "absolutely necessar,.,
    and themajorlty of unsolved 4-figure codeS Yere abandoned
    because of' an'lnsuf'f'iclent number of messages. "476
    470
    DF 18, P 55
    411
    1
    19cp 5
    , .'
    Lt. Loeff'ler 'said anI,. that a f'our-rigure code was used
    by the VI Guards Mech.Corps (1st Ukraine Front) from January
    1945 to the end of hostilities. It vas captured in January,
    19
    4
    5. . " ,
    473
    1
    pp5, 6
    47
    4
    1
    '19cp 8
    475
    1
    191 P 8
    476
    1
    191,p 8
    100
    ..... .-
    ..b-;:
    ... ";-'
    ...:' .... -_...:..... -eo;,
    DOCID: 3486746

    Oaptain Holetzko (speaking mainly about 4-figlire air
    forcn (ground/ground), said that they were "only 60%
    readn.ble".lJ.77 And Corporal Heudorf (of NAA 8)' admitted
    that later 4-figure traffic on occasion provided some
    difficulty, but on the other hand an
    Unit in March and April, 1945, whose 4-flgure messages were
    read currently. 478 . .
    In the interrogations of KONA 1 members, the following
    . 4...flgure codes were listed as solved:479 .
    4...r1gure code of VI Guards Mech. Corps (1st Ukranlan
    Front) from January, 1945 to end of hostilities
    4r1gure code of 152 Independent Tank Br1gade(60th
    Arrrry, 1st Front) .
    4-flgure Signal Code of VI Guards Tank Corps (1st
    Ukrania.n Front) .
    4-figure code of Tank Supply and Administration
    Authorities ot 1st Front
    4-figurecode of 76th Regional Air Base (Russian 76 RAB)
    4-figure code of Supply Units of 13th Army (1st
    Ukranian Front) .'
    4-.flgure code of 3rd Guards Tank Army'.
    1st. Lt. Schubert, of GdNA, said simply, "We broke Army
    three-and four-figure re-enciphered books. These were en-
    ciphered on a conversion table. Early in the war we
    o.fthis tl'affic, but at the end only 40 to 50%.4tiO
    477
    175
    P 10
    478:
    r
    75 :p 8
    4
    79
    1 19c PP 6-8
    480
    I 15 p 1
    / 101
    :"._0
    DOCID: 3486746
    -.

    53. 5-figure codes .... - 5-tigure codes were used by the


    ArmJrI Air Force, and NKVD. In the Army, they were used by
    the NKO (Defense Council), Army Groups, Armies, Corps,
    Div:tslons .and Brigades. In the Air Force, they were used
    by Air Armies, Air Corps; Air Divisions, Regional Air Bases,
    Antt-Aircratt Defense, Anti-Aircraft Corps, ahdAnti-Aircratt
    Dlv::l.slons. TIley contained strategic, tactIcal, personnel
    and supply matters, and political reports and directives.
    With the exception of a short period in 1943, when KONA 1
    did independent cryptanalysis, solution of the
    5-t'j,gure codes vas handled exclusively by GdNA.
    In discussing the achievements of In 7/VI (predecessor
    of'GdNkJ,Lt. Col. Mettig said very glibly. "The breaking
    of' the Russlan recypheredcode vas the most ..
    outs,tanding cryptanalytic achievement of In 7/VI. The. .'
    Russian 5-figure was broken chiefly by .
    And elsewhere, when rating relative importance of
    cryptanalytic achievements contributing to total intelligence.
    he 'W'as "most impressed by the continuous breaking of the
    Russian 5figure code. despite the difficulties that were
    experienced after the Spring of 1943."482 As the inter-
    roga,tor 'Oointed out in reference to this last statement of .
    Mettig;llEven in this case, however. there exists the danger
    that, PW is laying more stress on organizational measures
    carr'led. out facilitate thebreakilig ot the code than.
    on actual cryptographic achievement. ttlj.83 It might be .
    mentioned inpasslng that Dr. Otto Buggisch(of' OKH/chi and
    . OlGijChi)' evaluated follows: "Only a fev :rundamental
    ides.s about. cryptanalys1s."484
    481"
    I 111, p 2
    482
    . I 128p 2
    48
    3
    1
    128p2
    484
    1
    i76p 6
    102
    DOCID: 3486746
    -.

    Oertainly the evidence from other Prisoner of War


    interrogations pointed conclusively and without a doubt
    to an almost completerailure on the part of German crypt-
    a ~ l l y s t s to make any real progress with the solution of the
    5-figure codeG In the interrogations of members of' KONA 11
    Corporal Althans (of the NAA8) clearly stated that success-
    ful cryptanalysis of the 5-figure code was possible only if
    1) there were a number of messages, at least three,
    which had had the same additive applied; or
    2) the 5-flgure code had been captured.
    48
    5
    Dettmann and samsonov486 talked at great length about
    the 5-figure codes used by the Russians. According to them,
    codes "OIl-A," "023.-A," "045-A", "o62-A", and "091-A",
    used successively from the beginning of the RUBso-German
    war to the capitulation, did prove difficult for pure. crypt-
    analytic solution; but they continued, "It is interesting
    tOt point out that during the course of the war all the newly
    appearing versions or the "cipher-coden were captured through
    fortunate circumstances, and always so soon that the origi-
    nals were almost always in the hands of the cryptanalyst at
    t l ~ instant or their being put into use by the Russians."487 .
    O j ~ course, this "continuous capture" was an aid in solution,
    wldersuch circumstances because or the one-time pad enclpher-
    mE9nt. (See beloY for discussion or the enclpherment itself')
    As they said, the "individual" tables "offer almost complete
    security against breaking. "488
    485
    I 19b, report 25 P 43
    486
    DF
    18 p 59
    487
    DF
    l8p 59
    488
    DF
    18 l' 61
    103
    .., .....
    DOCID: 3486746

    In the reports of personnel from NAA 11, Capt. Schmidt


    stated that "with regard to Russian traffic, the Abteilung
    fl3attaliori! did everything up to and including 4-f1gureo
    5-figurethey considered insoluble and forwarded to
    GdNA. "489
    Corporal Karrenberg, (of GdNA) discussing 5-letter and
    5-figure codes used for opera;tional orders, "These
    were the so-called Blocknot codes, which were only used
    once and were theretoreunbreakable."490 Elsewhere, in
    hlsdescription of the "Russian Cryptanalysis course given
    at GdNA he stated flatly:
    "5-figure and 5-letter messages were not touched at
    all. In general very little work was done on .
    decipherment of 5-groupmessages, although these con-
    tained the most important operational reports. They
    were only used to identify units and were only read
    if code books happened -to have been captured. 491
    In 1943, KONAi a period did 5-figure cryptanalysis
    independently of GdNA.492 But the general practice was for
    all. units to send 5-figure traf:fic directly to GdNA f'or
    possible And as Karrenberg pointed out,
    "even at the HQ of GdNA little attention was' give,n to
    5-figure messages and very little enthusiasm displayed in
    working on it. Only the preambles were used to identify
    units, from Blocknots and indicator groups.49
    4
    48
    .. 9
    1
    55, PP 9 and 11
    491 173 P 6
    4911 166 P 78; see also I 75 p 10
    49
    2
    1 19breport 2S;p 43
    I 19b report 5 PP 9, 10
    49
    4
    1
    166 p 79
    104
    . .. ".
    .:
    t, .
    DOCID: 3486746
    -.

    Finally, Lt. Schubert, when questioned on possible success


    on t1ve-figure codes, replied: "In the Finnish campaign .
    the book was captured the Russians used the one-time pads I
    over again. Because of this we had considerable SUccess.
    the Russians used the pads correc-tlyJ and only very
    few messages were read, these through re-encodements."Zl-95 .
    Thi:3 small measure of success was obviously due to the ful-
    fnlment of the two conditions set forth by Corporal Althans
    for successful cryptanalysis.
    4
    96
    Actually, the Finns had captured and turned over to the
    Gerlmans a Russian 5""'f1gure book wh4.ch was used continually
    until the Russian-Finnish war. An additiona.l copy had been
    captured by the Germans. And though the Russians introduced
    a newS-figure code on 1 April, 1942, the change-over vas
    taulty and it vas possible to establish 2,000 groups of the
    new code within a week.
    4
    97 But it is clear that atter this
    time, there was practically no success in 5-tigure code so-
    lut1on, though the Germans were able to establish the nature
    of the book and the type ot encipherment:
    The 5-figure code books contained about 25,000 out
    of the possible 100,000 groups, the pages being numbered
    000999 with a hundred lines on each page. The Germans
    never b1"oke a book and any examples they had were cap-
    tures.
    4
    98 .
    Alphabetic at first, the 5-figure codebooks later became
    pax-tially alphabetic; they contained letters, words, phrases,
    2-f1gure.numbers, types of units, specific units of the Red
    army, tull stops and commas on every page, all designations
    ot types ot tanks, ammunition, etc.
    49'-
    )1 15 p 1
    49(
    )see above, p 28; I 19b report 25 p 43
    497
    1 78 p 8
    498
    1
    19c p 8
    105
    ,.-
    DOCID: 3486746

    . !Jlhe encipherment was effected by appl:ying additives taken


    from enciphering pads known as BLOCKNOTS (& variable number of
    sheets on which 50-100 5-f'igure groups appear":J/5). Each pad
    had a. 5-figure number, and each sheet had a 2-tlgure number
    runn1.ng consecutively. There were five different types of
    Blocknots:
    1) I - (individual): 50 pages, additive read off in
    one direction only
    Z - (circular) - 30 pages, additive read off in
    as (?) either direction
    Notblock (emergency)
    5. Blocknot used for passing on traffic 499
    The cUstributlon of Blocknots was carried out centrally from
    MOSCQ'W to Army Groups to Armies The Army was responsible 1"01'
    their' distribution throughout the lower Occasionally
    the B,ame Bloclmot was distributed to tvo un! ts on different
    parts, of the front; and here the second coneli tion ror succesB.ful
    cryptanalytic success' established by Corporal Althans vas f1.11-
    depth was esta'blished. "It seems that depths o'K up
    to 8 were established at the begirml.n.g o.f the Huss1.ar.l. Ca.mpa.ign
    but t,ha1; no 5-f"igure was broken af'ter M8.y 1943. 11500
    5,4. Address Codes.-- Address Codes (2-figure, 3-figure,
    and lj'-.f1gure J were used by the Army for Army Groups, Armies,
    and Independent Corps. They were used more Widely by the Air
    Force a.nd the Anti-Aircraft'Defense. .
    Solution of address codes was considered somevhat "special,,"
    to jUdge from the statements in KaNA 1 interroga.tions describing
    crypt,analytic operations or the various uni ts :
    In the FAK: 15 to 20 people were adequate for compa:py
    cryptanalysis. Special procedures". such,as
    Signal Codes (3-rigure and 4-figure) and'
    word codes and address codes (3-f1gure),
    were studied by 'chosen cryptanalIsts, some-
    times by the chier '
    ,499 .
    I 190 p 9
    5
    00
    1 19c p 10
    501
    , I 19b report 6 p 11
    106
    DOCID: 3486746

    In the NAAS: Section 4 /iiev development.i7 did the real


    cryptanalysis: it normally .concentrated on
    difficult systems which the compan1es had
    neither time nor manpower to deal with
    adequately. It consisted mainly of mathe-
    maticians and worked on, inter alia, addresses
    (2-F, 3-F, 4-F)5
    02
    ----
    Although mention was made in the KONA 1 interrogations of
    2-figm-e address materia.l, nothing was recorded 1n the interro-
    gationa on this SUbject except one in the final
    interrogation of NAA 11 personnel:
    "Bigrams and Trlgrams in Addresses
    Blome knew of the two used separately, but
    r'scs11 any case of' the two 1n conjunction.
    that this might a.ccompany he had
    ;i ,Z code mixed into 2Z traffic. "503
    could not
    He suggested
    seen" namely
    There was no record of extent or success of solution
    to 2-f'igure address codes. Likewise there Va.::l no
    descl.'iption of' 4-f'igure addJ:>ess codes nor any statement regardi.f'..g
    the or success of solution.
    Schubert of GdNA stated that towards the close of hostili-
    ties" the Russians were using a 3-.figure code fOl" addresses.
    "In code the clear position remained unchanged for periods,
    but ciphers were changed daily. These ciphers vere in some
    way to the call signs. tl504 The only description ot
    3-f'igure address codes was given in the KONA 1 reports.5
    0
    5

    502
    I 196 p 11
    5
    0
    3
    1
    106 p 2
    504
    1
    60 p 2
    505 ...
    I 19c--
    It
    Annexe
    "
    on Russian Codes and Ciphers"
    '.
    DOClD: 3486746
    "
    Three-figure address codes were used in connection with
    5-figure niessagesj506 their construction was similar to that
    of the PT-39 or PT-42 cOdes
    1
    5
    0
    7 but they contained onlt figures,
    unit designations, authorit es, and words such as "for or
    ttfrom. It A code of this type was first used at the beginning
    of 1944508 on the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian and thelst Russian
    fronts for communications between ArTIrJ Groups a.nd their re-
    spective Armies, and Independent Corps. In the summer of 1944,
    Armies began to use similar codes with their subordinate units;
    and lattel'ly the use of such codes increased still further.
    According to the members of KONA 1, the solution ot these codes
    given a fair amount of material, was generally easy.5
    0
    9 But
    members of NAA 11 s tated the follOWing: .
    "A,,,idresses to Dersonal names rather- than titles 'Were
    eommol1 in. all Russian and this suggested the use
    of initials. The vagueness. of thls answer surp:v1sea, interro-
    gator who asked ir the addresses" being enc1.pr"ered on the
    PT table) were not read currently" The answer W89 th.g,t
    unless the same ad":'lres5 'Was used frequently and 80me outside
    hint 'Was given they ",ere usually una.ble to .read. the address.'
    They supposed it used values which had special local mea.nings
    added to the table. "510
    5
    06
    r 173 p 8
    5
    0
    7"PT 42 vas superseded by PT 43 It contained no let.ters
    and vas used or addresses, particularly by the Air Force
    'anCiPWO eAA Def'ense.") I 190 p 2
    508
    Dettmann and SSmsonov gave1943 in DF 18 P 5
    5
    0
    9
    1
    1ge p 4
    5
    1
    1 106 P 2
    / 108
    "
    signal mattersJ..
    vere
    Gerlich (of GdNA..
    DOCID: 3486746


    55. Miscel1aneous.-- Most or the statements given here
    a,re ,t.'lken from the Interrogations of members of KONA 1. It fs
    not the complete story, as the Prisoners of War themselves were
    , a,ware':
    "In the above paper examples are given only or those
    ciphers whose basic construction was established. There
    were" many types of cipher which were only partially broken
    and whose basic form could not be established, these are
    not mentioned The number of Russian ciphers of all
    sorts that were broken was about 3,000."5
    11
    a) Four-letter codes. Tvo forms of four-letter code
    f'irat appeared In practice ,traffic between ArDf'3' Groups and Armies
    B,nd Independent Corps of the 1st Ukraine Front tn November" 1944:
    1) Revolving stencil: sheet of paper ruled off into
    8 x 8 squares; a sheet with 16 holes superimposed
    and revolved at 900 turns aro\mdthe central point;
    all 64 squares were filled; the text va.s enciphered
    horizontally in 1, 2" 3, 4 positions; the cipher
    text was read off horizontally.
    2) Transposition: a keyword gave the key; the text
    was wr1tten in vertically according to the key"
    and upwards or downwards according to instructions;
    the cipher text was read off horizontally.
    The contents were usually about tactical
    t;hrough "recently .694i7 un1ts and posi tions
    , On the subject of transposition systems,
    IV" Section 3) said only this:
    "These were comparatively rarely used by the Russians.".
    I do not know whether such transposition systems were solved
    B,t Sigint. Stn. 1, however, I know that transposition mes- '
    sages were being read that "stencils", etc. were used; how-
    ever, I think they were solved at General of S1g. Int
    V
    s."513
    5
    111
    1 19c l' 11 (
    512
    1 19c p 10
    ,
    5
    1
    3
    1
    191 p 10
    ,/ .
    !
    !
    DOCID: 3486746

    b) Word-Code 0 From the. middle of 1944 a word code was used


    in the area. of die 2nd Ukran1an Front. The book consisted of
    2 halves each designated by a word such as SEVER ZAPAD /literally,
    North wes9; clear groups vere in 2 columns; each half' of the codi
    Gonte,1ned a number of columns with cover vords. The vords
    1dentir1ed vere only used by the Army and contained strategic
    and tactical reports and the names of units. They were small
    in size and contained only essential groups.5
    14
    Schubert added
    that. they we:re called TARNTAFELN.515 There was no statement
    regarding extent of solution.
    , e) Periodic and Columnar Substitutions. Corporal Ka.l'renberg _
    stated, In discussIng tne "RussIan Cryptanalysis COUl'se,"
    rarely appear 1n Russian c1pher systemsoo Periodic and columnar
    su'blat1tut10ns concluded the sections on subst1tut10n systems 1n
    the course. Not so much time was spent on them as they &1"e
    rarel encountered in practice. "516
    d) Coordinate systems. "These vere very varied. Armies
    made up their own systems and arbitrary reference po1ntsand
    gri.ds. were used. "517
    e) Mach1n"e The handling or teleprinter traffic
    hllEI been mentioned earlier 1n this chapter in desoription of
    duties. It was processed exclusively at GdNA. 'Lt. Schubert
    stilted that teleprinter traffic vas,vorked on in the machine
    &roup vg; he thought that messages in depth had been
    read, but was uncertain whether the machine had been recovered.
    Be himself never worked on machines, but knew that the Russians
    had a machine in use already at the beginning of the war, but not
    on military traf'fico51S
    51.4
    1
    190 pp 10, 11
    515
    1
    15 p 9
    5
    16
    1 166 pp 54, 62
    5171 19c p 11 also DF lS pp72... 75 for details
    5lS
    1
    15 pp S-9
    (110.
    DOCID: 3486746

    Corporal Ka.rrenberg(of GdNA) spoke of uBandwurm," and


    defined it a.s Russian Baudot letter "strip.. " not to be confused
    with Russian 5-letter tratfic also carried on Baudot lines., The
    Germans did not capture any of the apparatus used, but felt that
    it consisted ot 2 parts: 1) a Baudot teleprinter and 2) a cipher
    attachment consisting ot 5 small wheels driven by one large
    wheel.519 Depths were frequent, but the Germans did not seem
    to have any attempt to reconstruct the wheel patterns.. The
    system used by the Army and Air Force and to a lesser extent by
    NKVD.520
    Dr. Otto Buggisch (of OKH/Ch1) went irito somewhat more
    historical detail and stated that:
    1) In 1943 (He heard), Goering's Research BU1'eau Forschung-
    samt, abbreviated FA) had claimed some success on a Russian tele-
    type ,achine and had recreated the action.5
    2
    l
    2J Late in 1943 and early in 1944, OKH itself began to
    interoept non-morse, 5-impulse traf.fic (called "Hughes
    rJ
    by
    Buggisch). The Mathematics section of In 7!VI (see Vol. V,
    Cha.pter II, on organization) worked on it; at t.he end of. 1943..
    the:r'e vas a "Komprom1ss," and a depth or 8 messages wi t,h the
    same' setting was crested. The section was able to recover
    1400 letters of pure key, and to determine that the traffic was
    der-l,ved from a 5-figure code. The Germans pos tulated a machine
    llke' the German T 43, but was not able to prove any theories they
    had.
    3) Hollerith machinery was devised to locate depths, but in
    three or four more depthsvere found and vere of
    no long-termed value. .
    4) The traffic (Buggisch thought, since he left the section
    in J'une) slumped off in 1944, and LNA took steps to improve . .
    recei ption.5
    22
    519]: 30 p 2
    5
    20
    1: 30 p 2
    -521,
    1 176 p 6; I 64 p 2
    5
    22
    3: 64 p 2
    111
    ,"
    .--
    DOCID: 3486746

    "Buggisch one fact which had surprised him, that they


    bad never had information about of these machines (he .
    a:ssumed that the one the FA broke was not the same because of' .
    the difference ot cycles) trom PW or agent sources."523
    The number of links, accord1ng to Corporal Karrenberg,
    vllried to the number of armies, with a maximum ot 8.
    One end of link was Moscow, the other mobile. After 1944, no
    work was done on the traffic except on the spot. No vital clues
    to the system were given away by the Russians, though their
    precautions were not considered good.5
    24
    ,
    56. NKVD and Agents' Codes. NKVD Codes were simple mono-
    alphabetic substItution, 2-figure, 3-figure, 4-figure, 5-tigure,
    and 5-1etter types. They were used without any apparent reason
    OJ'll two large networks: 1) the networks ot the NKVD Central
    Authorities' (the networks were subdivided into those of Security
    Troops, Frontier Troops, and Railway and Convoy Troops); 2) the
    networks of NKVD Formation (communication between units attached
    to Army Front statts). 4-tigure and 5-figure codes were used
    on the tront lines: there was a 4-rigure code, tor example, used
    by the mili tary police, and a general code used on Start'-
    Regiment-Battalion links. .
    Solution of NKVD codes vas handled by the NAAS and GdNA.
    "The tratf"ic or the NKVD formed a special group of' Russian wire-
    le:ss traftic. The distinct10n applied equally to the manner
    of conducting and to the message themselves. "525 The
    GeJrman Army cryptana1ysts reflected this Russian "d1stinction
    l1
    in their own attacks 'on NKVD systems, allocating the work--
    agu1n as 1n regular army and air rorce trarflcs--to levels of
    determined b ditf'1cultof solution. L.t. Ed. lioellner
    (of a A stae' t tra fic vas a ways covered, but
    only by Long Range 5igint Evaluation and cryptanalysis
    wel'e done by NAAS. "520 On this same sUbject, Lt. Loeftler (of
    Feste 10) stated that "all NKVD signals originating in the reg1-
    mentes 8.l'ea were worked on in the NAAS, others were sent on to
    LNA. "527 But in neither case was there specified what type of
    NKVD traf'fic was worked on, and what type vas to higher
    ecbelons. Apparently, the distinction to that
    in the case of' actual army traffic. All,
    5
    2
    3
    1
    64 pp 2,3
    5
    24
    1 153 P 7
    5
    2
    51 19b, report 28, p 47
    5
    26
    I 19b,report 27 p 46
    521
    I 19b,report,6, PP 9, 10
    -r- _
    DOCID: 3486746

    operational codes (up through 4-r1gure, e.e) could be handled


    by NAA5. The five-figure codes Were not dealt with by the
    KONA, but handled by 40 to 50 men in LNA at zossen528 where
    Lt. Loeffler "thought that a good deal of success was obtained
    in the case 'of the Far Eastern traff1c." Dettmann and S&msonov
    substantiated this poiht, in their diSCUS8ion ot the German
    army cryptanalytic etfort:529
    "All the five-place message material from the Army or
    the Airtoree, as well as the NKVD messages" was sub-
    mitted tor the exclusive ot the General
    of Communications Intelligence" BJrjJjjj]
    They also gave tull descriptions of NKVD (There
    vas no discrepancy between the facts in their report and the
    facts given by Lt. Loeffler.) The details or description were
    scat'tered throughout the report according to types ot encipher-
    ment '. They mentioned the following:
    a)
    b)
    Mono-alphabetic substitut10n systems common to all
    NKVD organizations
    Conversion 8ystems and additivi7
    1936: 4-f'lgure code: 2500 values; used in
    district
    by 1939: three 4-tigure conversion systems;
    codebooks of' up to 5,000 values; enciphered
    d1graphic substitution or conversion
    tables
    1939: first general NKVD 4-tigure code; 10,000
    book positions enciphered f'irst by single
    digit substitution,,- later, by additive
    '. . -.'

    5
    28
    1 19c P 12
    5
    2
    9
    DF
    18 p 83
    53
    0
    DF
    18 pp 62-71

    -------- ---
    DOCID: 3486746

    Networks of the Central Authority, subdivided into


    al Central Authority of the Security Troops
    b Central Authority of the Frontier Troops
    c Central Authority of the Security Troops
    (Divisions and Brigades of' the Back AreSii
    d) Central Authority of the Railway Troops
    Networks of Formation, consisting of communications
    between commanders of the security troops at
    front Staffs and their regiments and between the
    latter and their batta1ions.533
    2)
    At time of capitulation: three 4-figure systems:
    (ZERNO, NEVA, VlZA, see infra) used respectively
    by
    lj NKVD troops
    2 NKVD border defense troops
    3 NKVD security troops 531
    (200 messages were read daily in all three)
    last of larger systems: ' S-figure railway code:
    2500 groups; digraphic substitution
    encipherment few 3-figure smaller codes (read
    currently) letter transposition codes: never
    found in NKVD traffic number series:
    1940:4-f'igure; single letter conversion encipherment
    (1941 - 1942 ): 4-figure; enci"{'hered by text
    key (letters equalling numbers)
    1942:4-figure enciphered by military techn.ica1 manual
    (used by Interior troops) until end of 1944:
    general enclpherment combining single digit
    conversion and Gama Tables (no description of
    these 1s given)
    Private Huchting (of Feste 10)532, speaking ,primarily from
    a traffic analysis point of view, gave the breakdown of NKVD
    hets:
    1)
    53
    1
    cf report, I 26
    53
    2
    1 19b report 28, p '47
    533
    1
    19b p 48
    ... "-
    DOCIO: 3486746

    '.
    A close watch was kept on the networks of la, because they
    carried communications between the central NKVD authority
    in Moscow and the commanders of -Security troops working
    with the Army groups, the directing staffs North and South,
    and the "less interesting independent Company Headquarters
    S:tgnals regiments." The messages were not readable.534
    passed on formation networks, however, werelffor the
    m()st part readable."535 In addition to the monitoring of
    . Central Authority NKVD--Front HQ. NXVD and Front Staffs .
    (Frontier Regiments) traffic, close watch was kept on traffic
    from regiments to battalions, because "most of the messages
    could be read. They me:ltioned army units by name, etc .. "536
    (,rTrafflc of rear NKVD troops and of Signals regiments were
    of no interest, and were not covered by KONA lA"537 _
    - Schubert (of G<iNA) stated, "After 'my studies Lvinter
    of 19417, I was posted a cryptanalytic course at OKH. Since
    I have-functioned as a cryptanalyst. I worked on Russian Army
    till March, 1943. Then KONA 6 was given the commitment of
    covering Russian partisans, and I worked on that till September
    of that year., After that KONA 6 was dissolved I went
    to GdNAand took over all Eastern Cryptanalysis L3 branches:
    Army, NKVD, and partisang. "538 Lt. Schubert was fami,liar
    with the same codes mentIoned in Private Huchting's net break-
    down (la, Ib, Id): Security Troops', Frontier Troops,
    and Railway and Convoy Troops' codes, butment10ned also "one
    OJ" two ciphers of' NKGB the 4th section of" NKVD,u539 con-
    cerned with measures against enemy agents and own active
    E!sp10nage .

    .) I 19b" report 28 p 47
    535I 19b p 48
    53619b" report 21 p 46
    537
    1
    19b p 46
    53
    8
    I
    26 p 1
    539
    1
    26 p 3
    115
    ,J
    .. ..... ' ........,
    DOCID: 3486746
    e.
    .._ Lt. Schubert spoke of two 5-igure codes: the SMERSCH
    19perations of Russian agenti] organization code (with an .
    individual sUbtractor); and the Railways Troops Code (actually
    a. code, enciphered by substitution tables, the 5th
    digit representing the quadrant on the page in which the
    g:rC)UP appeared). 5ltO But he was much mo:re .familiar with 4-
    figure NKVD Codes, which were apparently much more exploitable
    th!l.n the 5-:rigure codes.
    The Security Troops Codes were of tvo types. One was
    used forward of regiment, when a. regiment vas used in approx1-
    an Army Group sec
    4
    tor( "it is ac1pher, therefore, used
    fOl-ward of Army Group")5 1 This particular code ran for a
    eOllopQl"atively long period; "the last one which was still valid
    in the middle of February when 1 left OKa, had already been
    rUIlning 1 1/2 years .. " This code was alphabetical and contained
    lCO pages, 25 or 50 groups per page; it was enciphered, by means
    of an enciphered indicator Which prOVided for page and position
    substitution, the result of which was again enciphered by a
    substitution table. substitution tables were also valid
    foz' a longer time and varied with the network.S42 The additives
    on the page did not change, only the substitution table.
    The second type, a code used reapwards ot regiment, vas
    enc:1phered by a figure subtractor originally taken f'rom tables
    (up to Sept. 1944)'. The same tables could appear on difterent
    networks, and since the subtractor vas used very frequently,
    tt1 t; was not uncommon for 20 messages to have the same sub-
    t1'8ctor.
    tt
    543 In OctOber, 1945, 2 subtractors vere used, taken
    from different tables; and the indicators for the 2nd subtractor
    were enciphered with the first one.544 In spite of the potentl,l
    difficulties involved in this method of encipherment., the system
    vas solved by February 15, 1945, though mainly because ot bad
    Russian usage of the system.
    ,
    5
    40
    1 26 p 4 ; see also DF 18 p 67
    541
    1 26 p 3
    5
    42
    1 26 P 3
    5
    4
    3!, 26 p 3
    5
    44
    1
    26'p 4
    ll6.
    DOCID: . 3486746

    The Frontier Code was exactly like the Security


    Troops Code rearwards of regiment, with a different basic
    book, at least in traffic out of Len1ngrad.5
    4
    5 (Lt. Sohubert
    made a statement on the Railways and Convoy Troops Code
    quoted.' abO'/e).
    , The tour-figure NKVD codes exploited by KONA 1 were
    used b,y front line 'W1its (regiments and ba.ttalions) mainly
    employ'ed as Military Police. 1933-42, R4zC4 /Russian,
    4-flgure, Code 4/ was in use. It consisted of a 100 page
    alphabetlc book each with a htmdred lines. Reciphe:r va.s oarried
    out means of 31 bigram tables. It was broken by the Germans
    in 19ljO. "546 "Only one code book (known to the Germans
    R4ZC 1800 and to the Russians as KODOWAA TABL1CA "ZERNO
    lV
    ) was
    used by the NKVD from October 1943 Wltil the end of 1944.
    It was: used from Battalion upwards to Front HQ' s 0 "547
    The n4Z1800 code (which was captured in the summer ot
    1944)5
    48
    was described by :four dif:ferent people: Corporal
    Thom9.f:1 of NAAS 1 (as report no. 29, I 19b); Karl Exter, of
    NAA 11(1 55); Lt. Loeffler 0t Feste 10 (as Annex I to I
    and the at NAA It would seem to be the most
    if not. the only 4-f'igure code solved and readable.
    f1RZ 1800 vas the general code of NKVD introduced in Februa:ry,
    1944t,a8 successor to RZ The White Sea Code550, broken
    by NAJl 11, was an older code used trom 1943 to the
    fall or 1944. Then the White Sea Command adopted the RZ 1800
    5
    4
    5
    r
    p 4..
    5
    46
    1 19c p 13
    5
    4
    71 19c P 12
    5
    48
    1 106 p 5
    5
    4
    9
    1
    166 P 5 '
    550The White Sea Code was tackled by NAA 11 from April to
    July 1944, and about 60% of the traffic was solved, almost
    entirely on higher links. . There was a different "key" :for .
    each KONA, and by them to their subordinate units, in all 6.
    Solution was only relative, never basic. I 166 p 6
    117
    ---- - ------
    DOCID: 3486746

    itself It was used on the highest levels, Stafr to


    Regiment and Regiment to Battalion. No addition was ever
    used with 1 t ~ The code was still used in September 1944
    and possibly in April 1945.
    tl
    551 Although there were slight
    discrepancies in the accounts, it can be established that.
    'this particular code was a.lphabetic, and had 50 pages" each
    consisting of 50 lines-- a total 6f 2500 groups. The encipher-
    ment was carried out by 1) a "chiff'rant" and 2) d1graphic
    substitution tables. The "chif':frant" consisted of figures
    0,,,9,, in l's.ndom order printed at the top of the page, (8 differ-
    ent order 1'01' each page): one figure in this "ch1:ff'J:lant,U
    de te:rmined by the 3rd f1gure of the indicator group, vas added
    to the numbers of the lines on the page before they were en-
    ciphered by the digraphic tables.
    Ten sets of 2 digraphic tables (each 10 x 10), the sets
    numbered 0-9, were used to encipher the 2 halves of the 4-flgure
    group; the set number for enciphering the line was the 2nd
    digit of the indicator group; the set number for the page, the
    fourth. A series of substitution tables was current for a
    period of from 2 to 6 months.552 The first digit of the in-
    41cator group vas a dummy, and the indicator group itself v a ~
    inserted 1n clear 1n one of the first ten groups of the
    messagee553
    ~ .
    551
    1
    106 p 5
    5 5 ~ ? I 190 P 12
    5t::',
    . :-Y. I 1ge l?i
    P ....
    118:
    ..
    I
    ,
    .'
    \
    DOCID: 3486746

    Though the emphasis was put by the Prisoners of war on


    4-figure NKVD codes, it should be pointed out that a great
    variety of encipherments were worked on, though not all
    read. Karrenberg (of GdNA) gave the following- breakdown ot
    nets and types of codes used:
    Administration networks: usually sent 5-tlgure messages
    and, less often" 4-tigure and 5-1etter messages.
    Frontier networks: used 4-and 5-figure codes: on
    regimental networks" also 2-flgure systems.
    Black Sea Fleet: used 3-tigure and 5-f'igure codes
    networks from divisional level downward: used
    2-figure and 3-tigure, plain and figure
    messages with plain .
    COl'poral Exter (ot NAA 11) stated555 that he worked on 2-flgure
    NKVD ("used up to end of hostilities "); and on .4-figure codes
    of the NKVD type by him as Rz4Cl8oo and codebooks
    enciphered with an additive. "In this latter type, they had
    hacl considerable success vith traffic of an NKVD net on the
    White Sea Front, controlled .from the NKVD HQ at Archangel"
    but that was with a captured basic book and instructions ror
    system..They could not cope with 5-figure; that was
    sent on to Berlin. "556
    In general" elements seemed to be constant in all
    codes: contrary:to regular Army usage, NKVD messages vere
    enl::iphered on the same system for many months557 i NKVD codes
    we:re always arranged alphabetlcally55
    B
    ; and all NK\TD messages,
    whether 5-1etter or 4-tlgure or 5-figure, had the date in the
    penultimate group.S59 .
    554
    I 173 pp 13-14
    555
    1
    55 P 11
    55
    6
    1
    55 P 11
    557
    1
    167 P 5; I 26 p 4
    55
    8
    1
    167 P 6
    5C:;9
    I 173 P 35; I 19c p 13
    119
    .) ... '.
    DOCID: 3486746

    b) Agents f Codes . Aents' Codes included codes used


    by !lgents, guerillas, and Klmdschafter. u560 All types of
    systems were used, from substitutions, double transpositions,
    gr11les, and subtractors to one-time pads (tape). Solution
    was always done centrally in Berlin. .
    "The solution of agent, guerilla, and IlKlll1dschafter
    ll
    tratf1c was the responsibility of" Referat 3c jJ)r Group IV,
    GdNJISolution depended mainly on captured material to
    aCCI:>mplish solution. Some agent traffic was one..ftime tape
    and therefoI'e unbreakable. By and large the Gruppe d1d not
    much value on agent tzoaffie and neglected it. "561
    It should be pointed out that Russian agent systems
    not handled exclusively by OKH/GdNA/IV/3c, who really
    were processing the traffic from the viewpoint of military
    operations (colll1termeasuresagainst the partisans, for example).
    The agent systems vere also handled by:
    1) The Radio Defense Corps, (Oberkommando del' Wehrmacht,
    Wehrmacht Nachrichtenverbindungen, abbreviated
    (Amtsgruppe OJS:W/AgWNV/FU III) who were responsible for
    locating, eliminating, or neutralizing all enemy
    radio activltie.s.5
    62
    Prelim1nary reading,
    especially when the eode was or the system
    recognized, was done by WNV!FU/III.5
    6
    J F,qI' mozoe
    difficult cryptanalysis, traffic was tuzoned oyer to
    OKW/Chi, and worked on in the Referat VAUCKo5b4
    "Dr Vauck and his section used to be wi th OICW/Chi
    but were transferred to They continued
    to be controlled by OKW/Chi and passed their results
    to them. Vauck was then posted to OKH."565
    560Defined by Dettmarm and Samsonov 8S all agent dropped tOl" a
    single specific mission, e.g., blOWing up a bridge; a
    Kundschafter was more "localized" whereas the agent was
    mobile. I 116 p 7
    561
    1
    116 P 7
    562
    IF
    176, foreword
    176 p 13
    564See also I 115 p 2
    5
    6
    51 21, p 4; cf. also! 115 p 7, pazo 37-40 and D 60 p 16
    120'
    l'
    2)
    DOCID: 3486746

    Some agents' traffic was picked up independently of


    oxw/WNV/Fu (III) by the regular police (Ordnungs-
    polizai, abbreviated ORPO) who sent their traffic
    to Kurt Sauerbier of Goerlng
    6
    s Research Bureau
    (Forschungsamt, abbreviated FA), Hauptabteilung IV,
    Referat 9cj5?6 this vas, an entirely independent,
    personal relationship between the ORPO and Sa.uerbier.567
    Sauerbier's superior in the FA, Specialist Wenzel',
    an .expert in Agents v Systems, was sent from the
    FA by WNV/FU/III to assist Lt. Schubert of OKH/GdNA,
    in January, 1944568 on Polish Resistance Movement
    Traffic. '
    There was, consequently, a certain duplication of effort
    and a certain amount of confusion as a result of this arrange-
    ment.569 There were also conflicting opinions on the successes
    achieved. Schubert reported that "Russian agents
    8
    systems were
    tried by Vauck, who said they could not be solved. Later,
    he s,aid that they were digit substitutions and P/L enciphered
    with a one-time runri.ing key derived from a book."570 But, in
    another report, he stated that he could not remember enough
    about agents' codes to give details which Were in many eases not
    known. In the middle of 1944, for example, the Russians had,
    he thought, about 3000 agents spread over all areas, and it was
    impo:9sible to pick out one system and say that it was used in
    one 0 Moreover, he pointed out that he himself' had 'Worked
    only on Partisan and Kundschafter traffic and knev of' other
    only indirectly. Nevertheless, 'in his .first interro-
    gati()n, he stated that Agentts codes were of two types:
    1. Double transpositions and grilles
    2. Subtractors.
    5
    6
    6See the whole report of the homework of Sauerbier, I 164
    162
    5
    6
    8
    1
    26 P 7
    5
    69
    n 60, pp 19-20
    571 21 p 4
    121
    DOCIO: 3486746

    , I A
    "nouble transposition was only used by partisans and not
    by spies. n The a"stem was completely unbreakable.57l He
    went into more detail about substitution sYstems.57
    2
    They
    consist of three elements:
    code
    were
    1. The ba.sic c1pher(code}1 1.e." the substitution
    of the plain text by a substitution system
    2. The encipherment by .figure subtractol"
    3. The enc1pherment of the -indicators
    The basic cipher: certain lipks, a or 4-figure
    vas used; in general, however" simple substitution systems
    employed. 573
    The subtractor: these were of three different kinds:
    8. They Were printed on teleprinter rolls (the most
    frequently used and called "Blocknot rulon" by the
    Russians); the rolls had numbers which
    were given in clear as indicators in Partisan
    traffic, not in Spy-traffic '
    b. They were taken from tables. There were 4 basic
    systems: a simple enciphering with a table ot
    100-300 groups, used especially inNKGB Leningrad
    traffic (solved); 100 enciphering pages, used es-
    pecially in NKGB Leningradtrafflc (solved);,a
    double encipherment (table of 30 lines, each line,
    10 groups) (solved); a special very complicated
    mixing procedure (not solved)
    c. They were built up rrom an indicator: simple .addltlon
    in columns, simple cross addition, addition in
    column with a key phrase, cross addition with a
    key phrase, substituted cross addition, subtractor
    boxes.
    571
    126 pp 3, 5
    57
    2
    In the ,appendix to I 26, written as a single report on
    code-systems of the Russian Partisans and Spies (from which
    report the material given below is taken .
    I
    573por details, see I 26 P 8
    122
    a.
    b.
    c.
    d.
    DOCID: 3486746

    The indicator: indicators based on a roll, were always


    inserted inpiain. Apart from a very few exceptions, there
    were two indicators. The encipherment could be
    broklen under the following condl tions :
    when both indicators were enciphered in the same
    systems
    when messages on the same key
    when consisted of 5 different figures
    whenln.dicator was known by virtue of the
    circumstances. 574
    Lt. Schubert. also mentloned575 a third type of encipher-
    ment, by occasional,...si1nple substitution systems,; but he gave
    no cietai1s on thetypes of substitutions or methods of solJ,ltlon.
    In conclusion, the interrogator said:
    The a'bove gives the most important cipher used by
    Russian Partisans and spies, as far as they are known
    _from breaks, captured documents and POW statements.
    Systems used in the Balkans are not included by they
    are or a similar type. After the middle of 1944, WIT
    traffic of the partisans and spies dropped heaVily,
    as they were constantly being overtaken by the advance
    of the Red
    574 .'
    r 26 p 13 NOtEf: on p 5 of the original interrogation,
    Schubert said of subtractor systems: .
    "One could talk a whole day describing these methods.
    There was in eXistence a report of over 50 typed pages ""-.
    There was r<;tre1y enough depth to break these tables."
    57'5
    I 26 appendix
    5'7'6
    r
    26' P 14 .
    123
    DOCID: 3486746

    VOLUME 4
    Chapter VI
    Section C. Liaison with other Agencies on Russian
    G:r>yptanalysis
    Psr'agraph
    LiHison with the Intelligence Agency of the
    8.;u
    p
    reme Comrne.nd of the -Armed Forces. " "\". .. 57
    Liatson with the Signal Intell:Lgence Agency of the .
    Aj.r Force H5.gh Command. " . 58
    Liaison with the S:Lgnal Intelligence Agency of the '.
    Navy l-ligh Cofnmand 0 U IJ ... .- l-' .. _ _ .. ,. .11'> .. "" 9 " 0 D " 0- 59
    Liaison 'i-lith Goeringit; Resear'ch Bureau ...........,.. 60
    ....- .. with the Fore:Lgn O:f'fice Cryptanalytic Section..... 61
    Li.!11 son wi th the Japane se" ........... " __62-
    LiB,i 80:0 vi th the FiD.l1S III .... a ,8 Q 0 f> 0 ... " " 0 .. 0 0 63
    51. Liaison vith the Signal Intelligence Agency of the
    Supreme Command of tne The liaison between--
    the SIgnal Intelligence Agency' of" the Army High Comma.nd
    (OKHjGciNA) and OKW}Chi vas close because of" the joint deriva-
    tion of both o:ffice 5 from the Codes B.nd Ciphers Section of
    the Defense Mln1.stry, and because or the joint and simulta.neous
    control of and OKE signal activities in the person of" the
    Chef fl1IW and Chef WNV (Chef des lIeol'esnachrichtenverbindungs-
    vesans and Chef" des
    A certain of jealousy .existed on the top levels
    signal operations" and tlli8,ison between specialists
    was discol.lraged. Nevertheless, there were specific cases
    of" specialist fIlter-service cooperation on Russian cryptanalysis.
    581
    r
    30 p 10
    124
    l.,
    . . ."
    DOCID: 3486746

    (
    The Russian of In 7/vI, under Lt. Dettmann (and,
    for ,3. time under Professor NO'\ropaschenny) 't'rhich was d.e_tached
    to the Chief.5' Army Signals Commtin.ication Agency ( Chef" de's,
    HeerI8snachrichtenV'erbindul'l.gwesen, abbreviated Chef' RNW/(HLS,
    in Loetzen.9 had had conslderabll:-} In:Ltlal success on a Russian
    5-figure code until the spring of 1942. In 1942L'Probably--.
    April 1, when the Russians introduced a new 5-f1gure cody
    OKW/Chi sent a special Russia.n "pa.rty ll to lfi.IS/Ost to col:- .
    labo:rate with the OKH cryptanalysts there in the solution of
    a Russian 5-figure code . Professor Novopaschenny, head of
    that 'OKW/Cra.i party, retU!'l1ed to Berlin in 1943; but the
    cryptanalysts who had gone with h1m were absorbed into HLS/Ost
    and :remai.ned there. During 1942-43.f Lt. Dettmann (of m.,S/Ost)
    was also passing conslders,ble Russian 5-1etter traffic to
    OKW/Chi in Berlin or solution.582 .
    In February the language department or the Radl0
    Defense Corps ( Oberkommando d.er Wehrroaeht, rlehrmachtnachrichten-
    . verb:1ndung, FunkueberwachlUlg, abbreviated OKW/WNV/FU) headed
    by Fenner, began collaboration on with OKH/ln7/VI.
    By the end or Ma:r'ch, In 7/VI had given to Fenner's section a.ll
    traffic intercepted since 1941. Solution was begun,
    and "the results achieved by Fenner were passed on to In 7/VI.
    later, liaison on this particular problem disintegrated,
    howe'lTer" since In 7IVI vas uncooperative about turning traffic
    over to Fenner.
    Ther'e were no other examples in TICOM sources or
    by OKW/Chi with on Russian cryptanalysis.
    It 1:3 known only that OKW/Chl regularly used the IBM machinery
    of OKFl in their cryptanalytic york.5
    8
    3
    \
    582
    I 116 :9,2
    5
    8
    3
    I 96 p 13; I 67 p 2
    ],.25
    ..
    DOCID: 3486746

    58. !'1-!h th;e Sigd':;.a)"-l11tell1gence Aaenoy of the


    A1]:' For'ce jQ.gh -- Relations between the Signal rnte"Tli-
    genee of the Air Force High Command (Oberkommando
    de]" Luftwaffe Generalnachrichten.. f'ueID:'el:' Abteilung III,
    abbre,,1ated On/Gen Nafu!III) and OKH/GdNA were on the whole
    good. On a very high level, reports' and information were
    exchanged, and periodic meetings were held to discuss tech-
    niques and experience.584 On anoperat1onal level, the 3rd
    Battalion of Air Signals Regiment 353 (Luftnachrlchten Regi-
    ment 353, abbreviated LW Regt 353) (on the southern sector
    of the Russian front,) collaborated with KONAs land 8 of the
    Artny Liaison 9fficers were exchanged and evaluation closely
    coord:i.nated.585 The German Air Force Signal In"telligence
    often helped fill i.n the gaps through their work on
    . air al"m1es when the Soviet land army observed radio silence.586
    It should be pointed out in review that the Signal In.telligence
    Regiment,s OCONAs} OIl the Eastel"'U :Cront intercepted and solved
    . a great. deal or Russian Air Force Traff'ic as well as Army and
    NKVD traffic; and Prisoners War discussed the
    WOJ:'k on Air FOI'oe systems not as a. special task but as pa.rt
    of general "aI'my" assignment. Oooperation on cryptanalytic
    problems 'Y11aS good after 1943; and it can be assumed tha.t the
    liaison on tra:rfic analysis and evaluation was close and
    cOl1stant.
    59. Liaison with the Intelligence Agency or the
    Na'LTY HiM.. Cfommand. ---rn 1ts reatl'ons with agencies,
    31gnannte!ligence Ag<sncy of the Navy High Co111tl1&nd
    (Oberkornmando del' Mer1ne, Seekriegs1eitung IV, III, abbreviated
    ORlI1/SKI, IVIII!) maintained a trad1tional aloo.fness. There
    Wl3 no statement in_ TICOM sources of' specific coope:ration with.

    126 14 I
    P
    5
    8
    5
    r
    J-:SO
    15 p
    5
    86
    IF
    186 .(
    126
    --
    DOCID: 3486746

    OKH/GdNA on Russian cryptanalysis. Lt. Schubert (of OKH/GdNA),


    who attempted to establish some sort of liaison with the Navy,
    stated simply:
    "I endea.vored to achieve cooperation between the Army
    and, the Navy. This task was actually no concern of mine.
    A naval officer was detached for six weeks who looked at
    all Army systems originating in the West and the East and
    I went to him to attempt some settlement. I tried to
    achieve collaboration, but later events upset things.
    There are practically no points of contact between Army
    and Navy--as regards the Russians ."587
    with GoeringVs Bure8u.-- Crypt-
    analysts of' the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High
    Command (OKH/GdNA) were not too well informed on the organl-
    zatton or operations of the cryptanalytic unit of Goering's,
    Bureau (Forschungsamt, abbreviated FA). Lia.ison
    did exist, however, between the two organizations, and took
    the form of actual division of tasks, sharing of personnel
    l
    and cooperation on IBM developments.5
    88
    Dr. Buggisch stated
    that (he had heard in 1943) the FA was able to break and
    read Russian teletype traffic,589 t.hough he did not know
    knml may details. On another occa\sion, however, he stated
    that there must have been at least a modicum of
    'iiaison,59
    0
    "The FA had analysed a Russian cipher teleprinter
    system in 1943 and recognized that it must have been based
    on 13. machine having certain similari.tles with the German SZ 40.
    Arter a short time the Russians altered the system. The FA
    then communicated its to my .unlt and was given as a
    kind of recompense a report on the solution of a Germa.n cipher
    teleprinter. This was one of the very rare cases where FA and
    In 7/VI exchanged results.".
    5
    8
    7
    I
    26 p 2
    588It should be pointed out that Col. Mettig objected to liaison
    wi th the FA, however J because of the "ss" taint, and .that
    Dr. of GdNA considered liaison with the FA "bad
    anyway I 64 p 2
    5
    8
    9ro1' details see above J Volume 4, Chapter VI" section on
    machine ciphers
    59
    0
    I
    176 p 6
    12.7
    !
    ._......--::-.
    DOCID: 3486746

    . \
    The liaison between OKH!OdNA and the FA has already
    been. disoussed in this chapter!J with 2'efel"ence to the vis!t
    of Specialist Wenzel of the Ii'A to OKIi/GdllA to help Lt.
    Schubert on Polish Resistance Movement traffic.
    With regard to cooperation on IBM developments, there
    vas no statement about specific Russian cryptanalytic
    problems in TICOM interrogations. I It is known that the
    Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command took
    the lead in the development and a,pplicatlon of' IBM machinery
    to cryptana.lysis, hove'lTer, and their machLnery was made
    available to other agencies. Tr8nov the Signal Intelli-
    gence Agency of the: Navy High Con..qnand, (OKM!SKL IV/III) stated:
    "About March 1942 we paid a vlsit,l? inconjunctlon
    with the GAF and the FAJI to the OKH Holler1thZiBI!7
    in Berlin "591 -
    Since there was no evidence in TICOM sources of
    application of IBM machines to specir1c Russian cryptanalytic
    problems" ltcan only be assumed that such liaison existed.
    61. Liaison ..ill.1Lthe Fore!gn O:rfice Cr:mtanalzt1c Sectidn. -,-
    Ther'e was no statement in TreON interrogations about any
    liaison between andPers Z Son Russian ,cryptanalyslso
    '62. Liaison with the When asked about liaison
    with the Japanese on problems, Dr. Buggisch
    said, he lldld not knov about Oh1{--but had never heard of any--
    and as for OIal he was sure that there had never been any Japs
    around in the f"lesh or any liaison he knew of.
    n
    S92 Actually,
    it seems, there vas a certain amount of alleged liaison with
    591
    1
    146 p 17
    59
    2
    1: 64 p 3
    128
    ./
    . oJ.
    DOCID: 3486746

    , !
    JSpSI15 as andSamsonov pointed out, "the
    Russian Raferat had been vlsitedat Loetzen in 1942 by two
    Jspanese were given a polite
    :reception but shmln very l1ttle of a.nything.. and no so-
    lut1c:m wO!'k: their tour lasted only three to :rour hours.
    The said they had sol'lred the HUBsian on 6 a.nd
    mac '7, otherllfise no Russian 5-figuro 594 ,For all
    1ntelrlts and purposes, there i1803 liaison only on paper ..
    certl3.inly no collaboI'Btion on solution teohniques or ex-
    cha.nge of information.
    63. Liaison with the Finns.-- Quite the contrary was
    true in the case of' 1181sOir"vitI-i Finland. 'iLialson on all
    cryptana.lytic mlJ.tters \-18S excellent. "595 The Germans, to
    begi:n wi th
    Jl
    had a very r.L1gh opinion of Finnish cryptanalysts :596
    Finnish cr:rpt pe:r'sonnel were considered outstanding :
    and the excha.nge \?as a. g:r;aeat bene!"1 t -to NAA 11. "597 '
    The, ma.in Finnish unit vas RTK, "Radio Telegraf Kompe.nie."
    It was o-r ba-l;talion strengthJ) with one motorized compan;r and a.
    fixed Qnit of about 200 men, located at Sortavala. RTK had
    about 70 cry-ptanalytie men, mostly offilsors.l' headed by
    or the Reserve., Erkki Pale. It also had evaluation
    The Finns worked largely on Army trarf1c and had
    no separa.te unit f'OI" Air Force Signal Intelligence operations.
    593]: 116 p 9
    5941: 116 p 9
    595
    1
    106 p 3
    596]: 116 P 10
    597JC 106 p 3
    598J[ 116 p 10
    129

    DOCID: 3486746

    ,
    "'-
    ) .
    Lt. Dettmann visited Finland in 1942 and exchanged
    technical letters that time on. But the first German
    liaison ofr1cer with the Finns was Captain Marquardt
    head of Group I, GdNA, not a. crypta.nalyst); he was succeeded.
    by 1st Lt. Riemersohmidt, 'who was stationed directly at RTE
    (the Air Force Liaison 1st Lt. VaB.tz, was stationed
    at HQvs in Ml1tkeli), and had a direct radio link to
    NAA 11.. In I'eturn, the Fi1'll1s had a liaison o.ff'icer at
    LoetzEln from 1942, 1st Mje-Koja (also not a cryptanalyst),
    who was succ.eeded by 1st J..t. Ohn; in addition, small Finnish
    partj.es visited NM 11 from time to time.599
    Results were exchanged between the Finns and NAA 11
    every tWQ or three days, and NAA 11 varied its cryptanalytic
    priorities to give full attention to any special. links required
    by Finns; in retUl'n, information and solution from LNA
    to So:l:,tavala vere sent to NAA 11: "On one occasion (the
    captuJt"ed HZ 1800) this 'tfas' raster than the direct transmission
    from LNA to NAAll.600 The Finns solved 3-figure and4-figure
    codes extensively, w1th emphasis on NKVD material. They had
    no success with 5-figure traffic and "never any
    copies of those codes as far as Schmidt knew. "bOl This 1s,
    of course, not true: see the section on 5-f'igure solution
    (Volume IV, VI) ror an account of' Finnish capture
    and deli very and German explo1tation or the Russian Sf1gure
    codebook.602 The Germans sometimes used Finnish equipment
    and vice versa, but they "gave the Finns much advice no
    physical help."6
    0
    3 And. Capt. Sehmidt statedthat,jP 11
    never 'got straight intelligence the Finns or vice
    This was of the general German-Finnish
    standing that Lapland was a Oerman area for ope:rat1ons With
    South F:!.nland allotted to the Finns. "604
    It should be out, in passing" that there vas no
    in TI00M interrogations about any liafson whatsoeveJ.-
    with Hu-o..gary and Italy, Germano S othel' allies.
    599
    1 116 P 10; I 106 P 3; I 21 p 2
    )
    50
    1'106 P 3
    -
    601
    1 106 p 3
    602
    115 p 1
    60'
    3
    1 106 p 3
    1.30
    ..
    .\
    DocrD: 3486746
    '.

    . ,
    VOLlJIvlE 4
    Chapter 'V.I. Russian Cryptanalysis
    section D. Successes and FailUres
    Paragraph
    "
    Successes and failures '.....'.. '" 64
    , .
    64. Successes and failures.-- In their criticism
    the def-ectsof' the struoture of the G,erman Army Signal.
    Intelligence Agency (oKH/GdNA) from the viewpoint of crypt-
    Lt. Dettmann and Sgt. Sa.msonov made five polnta:
    608
    1 ) the' administre. bo'chof the central office and
    of the subdivisions, had no, '01' at most a. very small
    SPeCialized knowledge regarding the fields of work
    Their vas mostly to hinder and not to for-
    the vork.' .
    2) Because the riAAS worked closely with Army Group
    commands; the NAAS and its technical direction
    tended to correspond more closely to the desires
    of Army HQ's rather than to their own central
    . .
    The division of cryptanalysts between the central
    of'flce and the NAAS had as a res,til t that1n add1tlon
    to an en<>rmous amount of "paper .warfare " , work of'
    cryptanalysis and exploitation was carried on with
    almost complete dupl1catlon.
    . ... .
    '.
    . ,
    608 .' .
    DF t8part III
    131
    -' . ":".- ":.
    "
    .. \
    - ,
    DOCID: 3486746

    4) , The multiplication of effort derived also ?rom the


    ambition in individual
    stations, due to - u'competl tion. t'I -
    5) The most serious interference viththe actual
    both in the central ofice and in all its branches
    r
    however, was doubtless -brou.ght about by the purely
    milita.ry "manipulation" of' th.is set-up, involving
    treatment acoording to' rank, not skill arcompetence;.
    military exercises, field maneuvers, and the like. '
    . . '. .
    Tbey wel'e, of course,. not concerned "w.1th specific .details
    of the oryptanalytic but rather the overall organi-
    zational and administrative difficulties involved. The contents
    of their report and of' the reports of othel" Prisoners of WSl'
    on thetechrdcal aspects of hovever.;be11ed any
    long-range s,erious ef.feots on the actual f'u.l1ct1oning of' the
    specific cryptanalytlc unitsJ) either in the centra.l office -
    or in field. The only major failure' of' the German .A.rmy
    -vis-a.-vis the Russian systems was the f'a11ure tQ solve and .
    l'eAd cur:r.ent11 the 5=f':tg'tU'e codes. Maj 0 ,Dr. Rudolf" Hentze
    (hea.d of Group IV of Gdl'lA) spoke of' the. I-1.CeO!!1P.liShments of
    :DettmanIJ!. a.nd 3a.msonow in Re.f'era,t 3b: .nLTh.ey:) had good success,
    ,especially 011 the NIVA vh1ch d1.4 not change for a period
    ,oftvo years and there.fore could 00 read almost entirely
    to the' end of 194).j.. 1'h1s was a. 5-figure code encIphered
    A new NIVA cane in at the end of 1944 and 500
    or this had been recovered by the end of.' the war.
    11
    6og 'Al-
    though he remar,ked in that Referat I or Group IV also
    "worked on 4- and 5-f'igure enciphered code-sand had.partial
    success 'Working depths, f1610 he was speaking there of only
    one specific code. And, in spite of Lt. Col. Nett-ig Q s two glib
    statements on the "continuous breaking" of' 5-:figurecodes;611
    609
    1
    '113' p 6
    611 113 P 5
    611
    I 128 p 2; I 111 p 2
    132
    ............
    DOCID: 3486746

    a nd in spi te of' De t tmann and Samsonov 0 s boas t thet they 8.1ways


    captured the books and could read (although-vith dirficulty),
    1t seems -apparent,_ jQ.dglngfrom t:he total sum of reports tram
    other PI'isoners of Warjl th,at the 5-r-igui'e' code '11188 not :read
    currently and even if the book had been captured, the
    encipherment by almost exclusively one-time pads rendered l
    e.ctual solution impossible. .
    . On the 9perational level outside or GdNA), it
    was generally agreed by all Prisoners of War that there. vas no
    tro,uble in reading 2-figure and traffic of all sorts,
    and. only a. relativ'if9 difficulty in the ca.se of 4-figure traffic.
    solution of the 2-figure and 3f'igtn:e eodeswas simple
    enough to be carri'ed out c.n compa.ny level; and what was not
    f"ir:r.tished there (either because of lack of time or rack of
    was completed on the level of the NAAS which did
    solution up to and including 4-f'igure material. A certain
    amclunt -or difficulty was encountered in address material in
    agEmts.u codes, but not enough to destroy Gontinui ty or' to im-
    pede the derivation of enough intelligence or a tactical, nature
    fOl' cl.. 'tl:'rent use.
    In the case of NKVD codes, Dettmann smd Samsonov claimed '
    t f"rom cryptanalys:l.s they veI'e able to determine the organi-
    zation$ and gene1"'B.l signif'icance of Nl\."VD as a
    RUl3sian organization; and ve!"e able to establish 191 ther direct
    or indirect knowledge ox'" diapos! tlons and changes in dis-
    positions$ enemy for deployment or attackS
    9
    preparations
    for major operations, ammunition
    3
    10$5e5, reinforcements,
    health and morale of troops, conditions rearwards of lines,
    general traffi.c 81tuation, p:i:>odu,ctlon capacl ty of factories,
    pa:rtisan movements" and finally, information on the Polish
    Resistance Movement o 612 ' -
    1s certainl,- an impressive amount or information to
    have been derived solely from crypta.nalysis, as is the cnart
    mad.e up by Dettmann and Samsonov detailing actual codes
    read.613 By comparison to other interrogations; there seems
    to be a large amount of boasting in their report, giving a
    'clear impression that all the intormatlons was not strictly
    true as' given, at least for cryptanalysis on central,office level.
    612
    DF 18 pp 16.... 33
    613
    DF
    l8p 15
    133
    "'l _ ...
    -l,. -.
    '?
    .I .
    134
    DOCIO: 3.486746

    ,.

    If one can assume a t:ruth:t'ul expos! tic!l in those eases where


    their with the statement of other Prisoners
    "of hovever
    6
    the amount of achievement on
    the part of GdNA (and of' HLS Oat) and 'Jf the small units on
    lower .levels of' operation and solution is still
    It must be remembered that oth,e!' eleroenta tha.n pure crypt-
    analysl;3 entered the pictUl"B and played a: large part
    in the productlon of total intelllgence:
    great amount or Traffic Direction
    analysis carried on in the Easternrront
    area.
    bl4
    Statements or Prisoner's of War indicated
    "that, although 5-:t'1gure t1"s.r.f:l.c was
    produced, never-the1essJ! a great amount of' 1ntelligence
    from" characteristics, blocknotseries
    numbers (for disposition of units using series
    'etc. 615 ' .
    2} Thegenel::"al1y"lov, but, improving calibre of Rus-
    sian coupled with bad Russian
    . As Starke stated in one plece,
    t1a l though 2-i'lgure trat'f'ic vS..s never dii'tl- "
    cult to l-ead, much a:salata-nee was gained f'rom
    security breach3s on the part of
    There seattered tlu'toughout the" .
    interrogations to conversations opera-
    which provided much real- information on move-
    mel'Ats of all kinds . Besides, as Dettmann and
    Samsonov pointed out in the re1"erence excluslvely .' .
    to l\JKVD, but by extension to ther systems, n the
    feet alone that NKVD ciphers continued to be used
    orten more than two years at a time must indi-
    cate that the Russians did notbelieve it possible
    the enemy vas reading thetr-arrlc."617 .
    614see "Chapter V, Vol. V for deteils
    615 .
    .. e.g., I 19b l'epor-t 5 P 14
    "/616r 75 p4
    6
    1
    7DF 18 p 71
    "','1
    .'
    ,.. -..
    DOCID: 3486746

    "
    3) Flnal1;Y-!f the apparently large amount or capture
    of both codebooks and tables. The or
    this type of compromise in solution cannot be-
    over estimated. -
    In spite of these oons1der:ations,j) it 1s still true that
    the German Army read a amount of material purely
    eryptanalytically which, though only rarely ot high level
    operational importance, produced a steady flow of tactical
    intelligence. As an which mayor
    may not be typical" Corporal (Uf"f'z) Althans (or NUSl)
    drew up the Tollowing the monthly
    for the 1944
    j
    of and
    so1.ved:018 . '.' .
    surveyor Successes lJ:l Cryptanalysis
    ITytte of .Message , Intercepted De'alt ",1th % Remarks.
    2-f'1gure 140 125 I go
    3-f'igure 6;000
    I 2,600
    43
    4-f'1.gu:re 5,000 1,900 38
    mi,ted 2,250
    86t;
    37
    Totaf
    -
    15";5
    00
    =Clegree
    T3r500
    41
    text 6,000 6p OOO 100
    l .Cryptanalytic

    . .5
    00 " 500 100
    L"120000'
    Succe.ss
    jGNlnd total 20.000
    -
    ....
    Plus
    ...
    l5-figure and
    ,
    (not stUdied
    JiKVD 5-f1gure 8,000 at KONA 1)
    lNKVD , 2,000 only partial
    studied at
    i
    KONA 1
    total 30.000 I

    .
    .. ..... .. -
    =
    618
    1
    19b report.25 P 44

    1}
    DOCID: 3486746

    Det'ttn&1Ul and Sam"'onov listed the i'ollowing as systems


    worked en" and solved:
    6
    19
    Army and "Air Force:
    Operation systems (carrying text concerning oper-
    ations and traffic technique),
    PT-4l: there was a large volume or
    messages in the PT ayst,ems.ll 'Thich were superseded
    by n amal1 codes'11 in
    Signsl Oodes: these were used in the second halT
    of the )TS.I' and were 3 an.d 4-f'1gure codes" ca.lled
    CYB or n.f'1"'ont n codes .iJ.'hey vel"S pA.rt1.all;,y sOlved,
    but completely vorked out onJ.y in the rarest cases
    Address these were used by any un1t in the
    r1fl"ont 11 commands; 1nterpl"et.ations "fElloe hard to make,
    because or the Russian use of oO"lte2"names" a.nd it
    was difficult to solve the enc1pherments
    these inoluded codes
    JI
    oode
    tables Rl7Ld extended suloi;lti'tutions'. Among those '
    mentioned
    " The Air Foroe General Code (1934-37), carrying
    on takeoffs, etc.
    TheBAK=38, the last Air Force system
    used to the end or 1939
    The Army lmd' Air Force nGeneral Cormnanders P
    Code g" OKK-S to OKK-8 (2939-41), and OTSKK-7
    flOene:ral Central COlnm@,nder'J 1 Code Of ) $ used in
    real" areB.S
    All "contrersion" systems we:re cons1dered CYB, or
    "front" systems
    5) TraIlspoa:l.. tions : pure t:!"!:,nspoai tlons 'Were used in
    the Army and Air Force only for practice
    6) Nunilier codes by the Germans
    these were 5-figure aodes for 'relaying radio reports
    of operational or tactical content, direction of
    troops (on the networks). Speclf'1cally
    mentioned Oll-A code values in 390,
    023-A., 045-A,9 062-A
    s
    091-A (23,000 code values
    in 430 pages), which was used until the capitulation
    DOCID: 3486746

    .NKVD
    1)
    2)
    4)
    All these books 't-lere captured; but the. enelpherment
    by Blookn.ots (one-time pads) made solution practically
    impossible: ther-e vas almost complete security in
    these systerns.
    620
    Operational s7stems: these were used by individual
    units until 1939, when a general operational system
    (mono-alphabetic no desoription vas ,
    ven) vas int:rooduced .
    vConvers1on systems": a 4-flgure oode "as used in
    the Kasakhastan ares.; three 4-rigure codes were 1n
    use by 1939; three 4-f1gure codes were in use at
    the time of capitulation: VIZA; a 5-
    figure railway oode was also in use
    these vere not used by
    NKVD, with the exception oT one code (used
    in the Arctic Ocean district and on the Finnish-
    Russian border) which was by a trans-
    position: it was read currently in part
    Ntwber series: . fFom 1940 on, a 4-f1gure code vas
    enciphered by various methods, monographic letter
    substitution, sliding number and Block-
    nots. These were read currently up to the end ot
    the war.

    Agent.s e and Partisans v Systems:' these were transpositions


    (single and grilles, and keyword substi-
    tutions. (Though there was no statement of crypt-
    analytic apparently great
    vas encountered in solution$ and not much success
    wa.s achieved)
    620
    DF
    18 p 61
    137
    j
    .
    --
    DOCID: 3486746

    Dettmann and Samsonov coneluded their discussion vith


    a chart of German cryptana1ytic achievements on Russian
    systems. 621 The details of which are to be round' on chart
    #1-2 (results of European axis'cryptanalytic ach1evements)Q22
    I
    621
    DF
    18 P 75
    622It should be pointed out 'once again that though Dettmann
    a.nd Samsonov' gave a comprehensive plctu:re or German
    achie,vements, they veI'e not to be trus ted in every
    . detail. Throughout this ohapter it has bean shown that
    composite picture of Germa.n achievements in Russian
    cryptanalysis as derived from thelnterrogations or
    othel- Prisoners of' War, 1n many caS'as did not agree With
    Dettnmnn and S a m s o n o v ~ but would seem to contain more
    truth. '
    1.
    il,8
    .0
    - - _.- _._._---
    DOClD: 3486746

    VOLUME 4
    Cha,tJter VII'. Miscellaneous CrY,1Jtanalysis
    A. ieriod from to
    J:'aragra.J:1h
    German Army 65
    German Army Q 00' 0 0 66!
    French Systems 00' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6'1
    Be,lgian Sys tems 0 0 0 0 o 0 0 60
    Dutch Systems .
    Sys ....... .; ',' ...... Tv
    Brt tish Jys tems . 0 < r ; 71
    of .the period., 0 .; 72
    05. German Army . .
    Before 1938, there was no Army HiGh consequently
    no German Army Signal Intelligence The
    codes-cij,luer sect.ion of the'German Defense Which
    had been maintained iIi Skeleton. since the end of world
    1 handled the crY,1JtanalyticwQrk,on foreign Army systems
    and any security work done. on Gerl1lanArmy systems. 'I'here
    is no record of the work done by this section. '.'
    66. German Arm Cr tic -- In
    l5/.53 the neWly estab is11a Army High Cornman 'U er omrnando
    des Heeres, ab:breviated "0KH
    II
    ) set 'u,t.> .its own central agency
    to hanqle '. the Armytraffio of foreign countries. This
    central agency known as the Control Station .
    (Horchleitstelle) was staffed by a rev trained cryptanalysts
    who had been dra.wn by the Arm: froIp the Cipher Section of
    , the German Defense AlthOUgh little lsknown
    a.bout the oI'ganizatlon of the Intercept
    Feichtner of the German Pir Force states that it was
    diVided into geographical sections, each sectlondeallng .
    1"'9
    . /
    ,
    . - - - - .- - - - - - -------_._------ - - - -
    DOCID: 3486746

    with an individual country.631 We know that befo.re


    there' were sections' foz' the tre-fflc of Belguim, Holland..
    SWitzerland, Englund
    9
    End Russia. '
    f
    67. lYletotig star.ed tl:J,.at
    'durIng the years, l';jj7 ,.continuous and
    were obta,:Lned by the Interce,iJt Control. Station,
    a/:Sa.:l.ns t Frencl1 Arm:{ systems .6,32 In tl1.e crises of and
    the Germans ,read the syst;8ms used:- by the French on
    the >1.reless net which radiate.d from .Pa.ris to the static
    French rorma.-tiOrl3 within France./,;>lJ;hese ,systems, de3ignated
    by the Germans 13 F jU and F llIJ0.JJ were described , .'
    Dr. Otto one of the leading
    as French Army systems based on a four-figure code. ;;
    In one case,p the encipherment was by means of a periodic
    additive; in the other it 'Was' an ordinary transposition..
    the transposition key being obtained from a keyword which
    i tselt va,s taken from the code . Sol-ution, said Buggisch,
    was by methods generally known 1n cryptanalytic
    .'
    68. The complete order
    of Battle of ne Be_gran Army vas known to the Germans
    in least partly through the reading or Belgian
    sysltems .. J' Huettenha1n, one or the leading cryvtanalysts
    of the Signal Intelligence of the Supreme Con:l1rJ.llnd
    of the Armed Forces (OKW/Ch1j., described the Belgian Army
    as a 3-flgure co.deused with substitution tables
    in such a way tha.t- the. first figure of, 88.ch group remained
    unchanged and the second and third were each enciphered
    indiVidually with tYi-les 063.&Ubstltutions that could be
    varied with each massage. '/
    63JL
    IF 181 p 4
    632r
    78 p
    3

    58 p:t; 2, 6
    634r
    176
    .P
    2
    63
    1
    --
    176 2 J1
    P
    636
    1 78 p
    3

    6.5'71
    31
    .tJ
    6
    140
    .
    DOCID: 3486746

    , : ..
    - - - - - - - ~ ~ ~ - - - - - -
    DOCID: 3486746

    I'
    ,
    ,
    VOLUME 4'
    Chapter VII. Miscellaneous Cryptanalysis
    Section B. Period from 1939...
    Paragra1-ih
    German Army Cryptanalytic Eff'ort 1939-15J41 .. 13 . I
    SummaJ:'y of the ... l941 ieriod........ 74
    \ "
    German Army CrlRtanalyti,c Effort 1939-1s;:41-...
    In early' Yea.rs of the war, the cryptanalytic' staff of
    the'Illtercept C0ntrol Station (Horchleitstelle) was unable
    to CO,f:le with the added burden of the wartime, traffic. The
    BI1tt::lh section of the. Intercept.Control Sta.tton :was un-
    able to solve the French se.ction was
    forced.to call upon the Signal Intelligence Agency of the
    Supreme Command Armed Forces (Oberkonunando der wehrmacht
    Chif:r:rier Stelle, abbrevi8.tedj)KW!Chi) to aid in the solu-
    tion of French Army systems;o5
    1
    and there were not enough
    to_furnish .the forward units with adequate
    staffs. 5 ' . '
    . 'The failure of the British sec'tioD of the Intercept
    Control Station (Horchleitstelle)to .achieve a.ny success.
    with ]31&lt,1s11 systems contint,led. In 1940 the six people
    comprising the section 'were moved to BB,d Godesberg
    no success was achieved despite an abundance of material
    with which to work.
    6
    53 Dr. Buggisch, who inJ.Sl42 looked
    over the :riles of the British section regarding 'Work on
    the British high grade IJ:Iachine, Typex, characterized the .
    . work-of Inspector worked in the winter 9f
    4
    '
    on the,British "big machine" as complete nonsense.
    0
    5 He
    stated tha.t described an ima.gina.ry i'ne.chine'which.
    had n.othing Whatever todowlth Typex. No cryptanalytic
    success was recorded in this period. In Apr.11 1940,

    6S0i 18
    651'D,6d
    652
    178
    653
    178
    65
    4
    1
    66
    p 4
    p 4
    p 4
    p 4
    i
    p2
    142
    . ! ...' ".
    :: \:); ...
    , .
    DOCID: 3486746

    , ,
    the British section received a copy_ of' the British War
    Office' Code Norway. A second copy, VA.S ob-
    tained,at Dunkirk. with this
    after' possi-ble, the Brltish continued to use this
    sys te:m untiil1943. c50 '
    The 'failure of the cryptanalysts of the Intercept
    Contr'ol Station to solve independently. the FreIl.ch Army
    syste'm succeeding theP 110 wa.s another indication of
    theil.' inadequacy. In early autumn the French re--. ",
    the peace-time' ],i' a.nd F 110, with a
    new 'oiar-gime system w.hose name is not known from
    sources. :if", The Army e:ryptanalys ts found themselves unable
    to cope with the situation and called the cryptanalysts of
    the Signal Intelligence Agency of the fl.rmed Forces, (OKw!
    Chi) to their aid., Hue t tenhain,l> one, of the cryptanalys ts
    of OKwjChi, was sent to the Army InterceptStation'at
    to aid 1n the solution; Among his
    vere two memoranda describing the work he, did' there.
    In the Huettenha1n reported that the task was
    accCimp11shed,; with the aid of his own colleagues of OKW/
    Chi by October, (1939), so that all the September material
    could be read retrospectively. The system continued to
    be worked on successfUlly throU@1 Octoberj and 1n November,
    Dr,. Huettenhafh returned to hi,s own agency, the system
    solved. It maybe noted that the hend of the Army station
    requested Huettenhain to convey the thanks of the Army to
    the Signal Intelligence of the eCommand of
    the Armed Forces {oKW/Chi} for the assistance given to ,the
    Arm;y
    1
    s qryptnnalytic section and remarked that in his op1n..
    ion such a large cryptanalyt1c,task could ,not be done by
    the Army High ,Command either then orin the near fubure .. '
    The system was decoded by the Intercept Control Sta-
    tion the German offensive of the spring
    of 1940. At this time the French began tq,use systems in
    the: forvard echelons which of the Horch-
    leitstellewere unable to Mettig remarked that

    6551 51
    ,656I
    60
    65
    8
    D 60'
    78
    11 2
    P 6
    p 4
    pp 4-5
    .v 4
    - - - -
    143
    .. .

    DOCIO: 3486746

    tfle Army cryptanalystsboth of' the i'orward and of


    the Intercept Control Station (Horchleitstelle) :finally
    concegBrated on t'fO machine systems, the 0-36 and the B-
    211.0 Neither was solved
    J
    however
    J
    until after the
    cessation of hostilities '\lith France. According to Mettlg,
    - the final solution of these two machines rated lower tha.n
    th13.t or the it was not timely and
    wa,a, done only with the aid of c$ptured rnaterial 0
    6
    (51
    . In the winter of 1939, the dearth 'of field cryptanalysts
    became nplJarent to the German p..rmy. When the Signal Intel-
    ligence Regiments (KONAs) were preparing to move into the '
    field" the Army found that were. no trained Cl'ypt- " ,
    analys.ts to s'end with them. ' . Col. Randewig, the commander
    of ,all intercept, units 1n the west, was able to procure a.
    number of' cryptanalysts from intercept units, around Berlin ,
    and :ri11ed out that number with mathematici!!.n!3e.nd'linguists.
    As a result, when the GeI'Inan ofrensive 1940, .
    the Signal a or
    cryptanalytic personnel; but moZ'.e were needed to cope with
    the fie1.d problems.' ,. ,
    74 ! Summa.ry Of the 1939-1941 Period-- Although, the
    cryptanalytIc achievements afthe Sta-
    tion (Horchleitstel1e) during the years 1939-1941 were '
    Ininor, their success in intercepting traffic and decoding
    solVable known systems was of great aid,' to the German
    Army. lJIett,ig stated that all messages 01'l the French system
    which succeeded the FllO were re2.dfrom late 1939 until
    the spring of 1940 when the system changd; and that these
    'messages', deslJi te their helped to ,
    fill in the tactical .picture.
    6b
    ;> FDr example, 'the stl'ength
    of units being set up on the training ground at Mourmelon .
    was estimated by sta.tistics or water bottles and blankets.
    It was possible to deduce facts about the shortage or armor-
    piercing ammunition with the French infantry units.' S1mi- '
    'larly the conversion or the Second and Third French, Cavalry
    Divisions to Armored Divisions in the areanorthea.stof '
    , 78 'p 4
    661
    1
    128 P 2
    662
    1
    78 p 4
    6631 "78 P 3

    144
    DocrD: 3486746
    '.

    , '
    Paris was ascertained in December 1939.
    664
    By the end of'
    1939, the complete Order of Battle o f t h ~ French Army
    was'a.vailable to the German Army from the reading of ' French
    traffic. 'The capture of' a copy of the British Wa.r Office
    Code in Norway in 1940 (and of another copy at' Dunkirk
    in June of tha.t year) af'f'orded the British s.ect10nits
    first successes and furnished a constant and important
    source of information from that time until 1943" when tbe
    Br1t1sh discontinued useo! the code. .'
    In this period the Germans realized the inadequacy
    of't.heir personnel and effort" and' ' s ~ t about correcting
    them. '
    ' .
    .'......
    . '"
    ;. ''';''
    DOCID: 3486746

    VII.
    . Sec tlon C. .Period from to
    faragraph
    German Army 'CrY,tJtanalytic Effort ... 7'.)
    western and southwestern Cryptanalysis
    . ..... o. D.' 0.0., 0 0 0 76
    work on British .. ; ........ 17
    Worl<: on USA rfraffic o. 0 0 7ti
    on French Trarrlc .... '.n 'r':J'
    Work on Swiss, Spanish, .Portuguese and.
    :Brazilian Traf'.fi.c 0 0 bv
    Work on I tal,ianTI'affic .'........ 01
    'yj ark on 0wedish' Traff 1,c .. ........ 0 82
    on Traff'1:c .. o .
    worle on Greek Trafflc .... u
    Vi ork on Hungarian Traffic 65
    Worle on R,umanianTraffic ..1Sl44........... 0 0 0
    Worleon 'Yugoslav Traffic ... 87
    W,ork on Turkish Traffic 1941-1Y44 ..... 0 ee
    ark on Bulgarian Traffic . 89
    Work on Traffic ..............
    Work on Czech Agents' Traffic ..... .....
    w ork on Yugoslav Agents 0 Traffic .....: 0
    Wor:k on Agents 0 Traffic in Soutl::lern France .
    . ,and Spa. in 0 _. 'CI 0 j
    Work on Russian Agents' Traffic ..... 94
    work on ?o11sh Resistance Movement Traffic . 95
    work on German TraitorG' Tr8.ff1c ......
    Linguistic Research l;i41-1944 . Y7:
    Mathematical Research ...........
    Cry'ptanalytlc\{ork of Subsection !IF It ..
    Use of IBM in Cryptanalysis ..J.OO
    Army Cryptanalytic $tfort 1945...........
    75. tansl tie Effort 1 41-1944--
    Thel experiences 0 owe that cons . era e expansion
    in the German Army cryptanalytic effort 'Was desirable. As
    a :r:'es'ul t, in t.he spring ot. Major Nang of the German
    146
    DOCID: 3486746

    Army, was ordered to establi.sh a new German Army cryptana-


    and evaluation agency to replace the old Intercept
    ContI'ol Station.
    b
    70 The new agency was established as
    Group VI Inspectora.te of 7 (Inspecktion 7 Gruppe VI,'
    bI'ElViated In 7/VI). Its aim; was to increase the cryptana-
    lytic effort in the central office and to train cryptana-
    lytic reserves for field work.671 A large number of
    'mathematicians and linguists were introduced into the
    oI'ganizatlon and the number of countries covered greatly
    increased; detachments were sent from In 7/VI to key areas
    (the Russian section'was dispatched to Loetzen to form
    the nucleus of the (later) Intercept Control Station
    East (HorchleitstelleOst); and cryptanalysts trained in
    Bl':ltish traffic were sent to Rommel's headquarters in
    No:rth Africa to the evaluation center of Signal Intelli-
    gence Regiment 4- (KONA 4) in Athens, to KONA 5 in Paris,
    and. to F'este 9 (Feste Horchstelle) in Bergen, Norway.
    , The cryptanalytic work of In 7/VI is described in
    the follOWing pages according to geographical div-isions:
    western and southwestern cryptanalysis; southesstern crypt-
    analysis; eastern cryptanalysis. Following these.para- ,
    graphs the work of the ,Agents' Section, of'the Research
    . Section Linguistic and Mathematical, and of the IBM Section
    wl11be discussed.
    Western and southwestern 1941-1944--
    Western ana southwestern cryptanalysis was ndIed at In
    7/VI by the British section With outposts in North Africa,
    Athens, Paris, and Bergen... Norway; by the section;
    French, section with subsections for Swiss .. Spanish..
    Portuguese, and Brazilian trarfic; and by the Italian sec-
    tj.on. 'The .field un! ts . Which handled western and southwestern
    tttaf.fic were the western field units, KONAs 5 and 7. Swedish
    A'J'my trar1"ic was handled by a special unit of Feste 9 in
    Norway.
    77. Work on British 1941-1944-- During the years
    1941-1943, the main success or the British section was the
    or the British War Office Code two copies
    ot which had been captured in early 1940.
    67
    After the
    capture of these documents, the British section under '1n-
    was successful in reading messages from
    6'
    70
    1 78 p 5
    6'
    71
    1 78 p 5
    6'7
    2
    I
    51 p 2
    148
    DOCIO: 3486746

    '.
    )
    North Africa:dur1ni:;thespring encoded, with \iOO
    and supereneiphered'with additives.o'l'; British trnfrie in
    woe wns read oonstantly throughout Marohor that
    year
    l
    a considerable volume of mes3ages was, read during the
    British Cyrenaic offensive of the British under
    Wavell; The organ1zation,:of the base services and 'the Ordet'
    of Battle of the Army were During the late
    " SWllmer: of 19.41, ilommel fa counter-atta.ck took place lea.ding
    to the siege, of Tobruk. Tha besiege9. fortress ,was'solely
    dependent on for its signal to the '
    Eignth Army and and as it used theWOCwitn'an en-
    olpherlngte.ble almost exclusively its tratflc,wasread
    by the Germans. The British section of In7!VI followed
    accurately the British Eighth Army's relief attempts in
    November ly41 vhich led to the cutt1ngorf of Rommel between
    'Tobruk, 'Bir Omar and-Sollum and" eventually, Rommel's famous
    break-out to theW-est at Sidi Rezegh. . '
    ,As a; result of the success ,'With the \iCC in Berlin,
    a specialdetaohment of eight vas sent to
    the evaluat10ncenter of KONA 4 at Athens to solve traffic
    at point and tbereby reduce the 'time wasted 1n sending
    the traffio baok to Berlin. Unfortunately for the Germans,
    about 'the time the party started, (themlddle of December .'
    '1941) certa.in diffic'ul ties vere encountered 1n', the solution
    of" the War Office Code whic,hprevented the of,
    woe for the following eight, or nine months. '( Dur1ng, '
    this period the Bri tlsh section suffered a furtPer blow,
    through the 1n July 1942 of the greater of
    the Long Ra.nge Signa.l Intelligence Oompany,',FAK 621, which
    had peen opera.ting in North Af'rica, under Seebohm. Although
    the remnants of, the- \.1Ilit to operate under a '
    Captain Habel,lnformation gained from the captured part
    ,o( the unit gave eVi,.dence to the British that their code
    being read and from that time on the British section
    had no success vlththe code.
    b7
    5 Herzfeld said that after
    his return to Barl'in in october 1942" there WA.S a little
    trarric but tbat its too small for success-
    ful exploftat1on.
    o
    7
    o
    From December 1942 to'March1943, the
    British used enciphered, indicators; and in
    1943 changed to one-time pads tor enciphering tables.o
    1
    -(
    , ,
    6731 51 pp
    67
    4
    1 51 p 17
    675
    1 1l3p 4;1 78 p 9
    676r 51' p 20
    677r p, 20'
    DOCID: 3486746

    The British section had, no success with these innova.tions


    although "({orked for a year attempting to break into
    the new system. ,', " ,
    , From 1942 to the end of' the war" the only success
    a.tt,ained was with British low..level traffic" particularly
    Slildex.. ' Slidex was designated by Germa-ns as English',
    Cadle (EnsllscheCode abbreviated '''Ee'') by a. number
    to denote the of the, basic system. Slidex was
    'used by the British and later by the American andCanadle.n
    Arm:y in front line units and in air support networks (ten.
    The variations of the EO system mentioned 1n 6'
    TICiQM sources are: EC 5, 12, 23, 24" 25, 30/3" and 30/20. 79
    EO,5 lsdescribed by Graupe of In 7NI a.s a system in
    the code values are order in -
    the columns 'of a. rectangle 25 x 25.-, The code 'groups are
    rep:ttesented in the cipher text by the digraphic coordinates
    and sent in 5 letter groups. - .Intercepted Slldex was prin-
    cipi9.11y in the United Kingdom during the.
    pe,riod and was, solved by the Britishseetion
    of In7!Vr which then forwarded the materialt:tothe training
    section of In 7/VI .for instruction ,
    In EC :1.2, the successor or EO 5., the code group or
    two derived 1'1'.051 the coordinates wasenciphez,oed
    by four figures and sent in 5 figUre 'groups. ' -
    The,tra.ffic in this c()de appeared, in North Africa in
    and was of tactical valu.,ror: in that area. "
    It ,,,assolved at In 7/VI and, wa.s decoded -easily in most of;: '
    the' field units 'of KONA 5 and 7
    678:rF 107 11 7
    619:rF 120 p,3
    ,680:rF 107' P :5
    681;[F 120 p)
    682:rF 107 P 3
    683:rF 120 P 3
    DOCID: 3486-746
    .'
    EO 23, 24, 25 were developments or the bas1c EO series.
    The systems are not described in detail in TIOOl4 SOUJ:9ces.
    The' tra:rr1e orlginated mainly from the United Kingdom a.nd )
    was used from November 1943 Until the time of the invasion
    in June 1944. in these ,systems was intercepted
    by Festle 9 in Norway and units of KONA 5 in France. The
    evaluation of KONA 5 at St. Germain 1s said to have
    succeeded in reconstructing all the cards used in systems
    23 and 24. Festa 9 succeeded in this only once atter two
    da18 t work, and then vith the help ot a message at 190
    digraph,s. System 25' was recognized but seldom intercepted,. 684
    , EO 30/3 was a variation or the EO series intended to '
    be used, specifioally for the Invasion and thereatter.685
    It h&d,however, been used by alr liaiSOn links in the Un! ted
    Kingdoml d1U'1ng Mal' 1944, and had already been reconstructed
    by Fest,e 9 by the time the invasion occurred on 6 June" 1944.
    The r6c,onstruet10n of, this code allowed the Germans at once
    to disc:over the order ot battle ot the invading armies at
    Corps, level. The evaluation center ot KONA Sa.t St. Germain
    took the work ot intercept1.ng and decoding this tl'aff'ic
    during the summer and ;fall- ot 1944; at whieh time the system
    vaScUlTently and solved by units of KONA 5 and later
    those e.f KONA 6 w1th the aid ot captured tables. Traffic in
    this system 1s sa1d to have bQen solved 80 quickly that 1t could
    be handled like plain text.
    686
    , E(' 30/20 was a variation of the EO system reconstructed
    bY' KONA 71n Italy. Traffic was originated by supply un1ts
    of the Br1tish Eighth Al"tD)" and wa.s currently solved until
    the encl of SeptemberJ 1944 when the trafric vas replaced by a
    four-figure type which vas not broken.68T
    After D-day, S11dex vas also used by the American
    Army.68B 'When the' Germans found that the American MP units
    were u::sing' 8lldex to report all Army un1ts which passed their
    control points, the deciphering of' 81idex vas given high
    pr1orl"ty.689 Graupe stated' that S11dex messages were also
    particul8l"ly valuable tor identifying bombing and
    ,/

    684
    IF
    144 p 2
    685IF P 3
    686
    1
    109 P 38
    6
    8
    7
    IF
    :120 P 3
    688
    1
    113 p 3
    689
    1
    80 p 3
    DOClD: 3486746,

    ".0
    artillery objectives'.69
    0
    The time estimated for the solu-
    tion of Slidex was one to three hours if the basic cards
    vere at hand, five to six hours it they were not, Sixty
    five percent of the work to have been done with the
    cards available. ' , ' ,
    Not muehmaterial concerning other British low-grade
    systems solved can ,be found 1n TICOM souroes. Hentze of
    1{Ol'lA 5 said that Maplay was worked on throughout
    but tIutt the volume was low and the Germans found this
    system harder to'bI'eak than 511dex. Theywere'successfUl
    ,only wi.th a. great deal ot,traffic or with a re-encodement'
    from Slldex which provided the original break.
    b
    92
    Codex vas solved by the Germans largely with the help of
    a captured specimen Which had been 1n the the
    Germans since the days of the Leros It vas ,
    read by Festa 9 in 1944-45, When that unit was in Italy.
    A. Tiger..code (so-called f.rom its ,use during the "Tiger"
    pre-iov.asion exercises 1n EnJ.;tland) was solved by the Germans
    a.tter a halt year ot work.6YJI: ,Solution was made possible
    by a long report in a British paper giving the namesot
    units, officersJetc. Another ,British system, the 9999'J '
    whichwaa used during the pre-invasion period,vas solved;'
    by the Germansj but it va.s never used 'operationally. 59?
    KONA 5 is sp,id to have had cons1derablesuccess vith the
    Tiger Code and to have, achieved solution qn the
    6
    fQurth
    orfitth day:a.ftexalts' regular monthly changes. 90 Mat1n,
    another 'British Army system, ,was never Hentze
    sa.ys the Germans' arrived at' the decision that Matin
    'was a small but he does not say whether reseagch
    on this carried OIl at In 7/VI or 1n KONA 5.':J7
    l07,p 8
    691
    r
    80 p}
    69
    2
    1 11,5 p 4
    6Y3IF 120 p 4
    694
    1 16 p 13
    695
    1'113 p 4
    69
    6
    r 113 P 4
    697I 113_ iJ 4
    151
    DOCID: 3486746

    The outstanding.fai1ure of the British aectionof'


    .In 7/'11; andof.ln 7/VI in general,. was the failure to
    the British tbig machine', Typex. Mettig stated
    that had the Germans 01"- In 7/VI had been able
    it would have been their outstanding achievement .
    At a previous interrogation, Mettig had stated that Typex
    was ]C'ead in 1942 in North Africa. and that success continued ..
    until the autumn of 1942 from which time In 1/VI had no .
    more success with the This fact,. with eome
    some information f'rom Ul tre. ... to the effect. that
    FAK 621 in North Africa had been reading Typex at the time
    of fts capture in North Africa in July and November 1942,
    about a thorRugh investigation of this SUbject by
    the interrogators. '(UU The story 1n brief was tha.t 1n June
    1943 one of the prisoners of Bode claimed that. he had
    work,ed on Brt tish machine methods f'rom 1937 to .1940 and
    tha.t messages could not be .decoded byFAK 621 .. 1n
    Nortn Africa vere sent to In 1/V1 at Berlin. Two
    prisoners from FAK 621, Haunhoi-st and Possel., stated that
    high grade traffic was handled by aVarrant Off1cer
    wagner, and this man had at his disposal one or more
    British Typex machines captured at Tobruk. They described
    the :machineas resembling a German Enigma mach1newith a .
    special. type of adjusta.ble keyboard. They said a1so that
    certain documents were used -in the solution of the settiIJgs,
    either captured British cipher documents ol"ms.ehine settings
    c:oIIlpiled by In 7/VI at Berlin from three or four ye8.l"s of .
    traffic. No further informa.tion was ga.ined concerning .
    this incident during the war since other orficers refused
    to give information a.nd Warrant Officer wa.s never
    identUied. This 1943 eVidence was contradioted by the .
    statements made atter thewar-by,hlghly placed german .
    crypta:n:B.lysts. Drs. Huettenhain and Fricke. ot the Slgn&1,
    1ntelllgenceServlce of the Armed Forces ( and
    Mettig, empha.tically denied baving solved or heard of a
    solution of had never seen a Typexmach1ne
    698
    1
    128 p2
    699
    148 P 3
    700
    r

    152
    DOCID: 3486746

    with although all admitted that a Typex machine


    without rotor,s had been captured at Dunkirk. The TICOM
    interrogators of Dr. Huettenhain and Fricke reported:
    f'Should it turn out tha.t some of the experts
    ilamed above D-. e. Mettis] were in possession of a
    cwmplete Typex and have achieved"1 sucoesses,
    both these fOW'slHuettenhain and Fricke
    J
    7
    3uld lose
    their last faith in their fellov beings. If ..
    Mettig, moreover, sta.ted categorically that a suocess of
    this nature would have been mentioned in the list of Ger-
    man cl"yptogra.t>hic successes "Thlch was drawn up for him
    yrior his visit to Supreme Headquarters Expedl-
    tionar'y:Foroes vlith the liaison of the SUllreme
    Comm9D.d of'the Armed Forces (OleW)"! Mettig's f.ormer -state..
    ment that Typex was rend in 1942 in North Africa and that
    success continued until the autumn of (tram Which time.
    In 7/VI had no more success with the ha.ve
    been a misstatementror Slidex.At least, the
    . torsasswned that Huettenhain, Fricke, and Mettig in their
    last interrogation w:ere speaking the 'truth.,. .
    A:L it is almost certain the.t In 7/VI never
    solved Typex; a great deal ertortwas expended on the '
    from 1940 to 1943. In January 1942 the files '
    of the 'Work on Typex done up to tha.t time at In 7/VI were
    turned over to Buggisch who round work dating back to 1940,7
    0
    3
    , when Inspector Breede of the British section had attempted
    s61"e the system. Breede recognized the trarf'io as
    machinEt traf:rio but described a purely imaginary machine
    which Buggisch says had no. relation
    comp).et;e nonsense 0 In 1941 some mathematical studles',
    were me.de on Typex; and in January 1942, Buggisch made a
    study 01" the system, from which he made the
    oonclus, ions : '
    'a. the system was similar to that of the Enlg1DliL,
    tlccordlqg to single letter frequency counts '
    based on 10,,000 cipher letters' '
    b. certain relationships between two
    frequently existeq
    p 6
    P 7
    p 2

    701r 161 .
    702
    1 161
    703
    1 66
    153
    DOClD: 3486746
    ,
    ' .
    ',' .
    " .' ....
    ,'i!

    " .' r,rhSI'e. is no. eV:ldence that Buggisch .prOGee(ied further


    thanthis. in his .. ... th&t. a Typex
    m2:chirie w-l.thout rotors lruis oaptur-ed during the French, .
    campaign" nea,rQunkirk andthatsomedocUtneil,tstllken ,f.rQm .
    a.n English' 300'0;1'1 ty officet' pointedou.,t .'
    in the strict regulation rotors of. the: Typex ma,chlne . .
    should be turned at rc.ndomafter.a
    There s'eemsto nokno'W'le.a:ge of now)nanyrotors:.
    the Typex machine had; B\lggisch rememb,ered having
    Iead.. thf:1,t there t"ienty","f'ive .7
    0
    5 . He a:);s9. stat,l.(}..that
    cas,uB,l CO!lside:rt3.tion was given t,Q, o;r' one might
    be a.ble to tackle the lif'.onekllsw the
    pfthe ",heelsL SinGe no.":pne:at.t.n.7/Y'l kn,e,.,
    ',the't.;i1"ing of t.'le'wneel.s, or- niany\r11(;}$l's there
    'were" thequestlon was of IiC;> '.
    whole. matter was' evtd.ently abat.idbned.sc;mietilJie
    in 194) .... ' .' .' .. , ..' '. .' .:. '. . '., .... .'. . '.
    ". Mentions.hol.ildalsobenVJ;da, of tb,e .
    4 of' e.'!lis'. fitom .. the
    Force W'hichgavevaluable information c.or.ic'e:MiittgJlt>it,ish "
    trclopmovements 111 theMlddleEast. An interceljted(and "
    decoded) ruessagef':l,"om in..,"
    . dicateq. Which units or the Nipth Army belngmoved to .
    Egypt to counter Rommel:.' s t1"..;reat to Alexandria. ',E:ven When
    . this code \m.s changei.inJUlY $01uti9P; ..
    reguj;.ar.ly aftel' afe1;T nou!"s l Ob" .' . " '. ' ..
    In' may atatetl1attheBr1.;tish section'
    intell1genoe.Goncernihg the movements of
    the. solution. and. Q.eooding 'Qf, '.
    us
    C9de .. Durir,;g the' ec..x>ly par-t:of the
    trion: of> the enclpherlt.ig table/? t1sn
    ." tf!.t!depossible .. ctirrentdeCQd1ng Jrhi,eh. fUr,l!" ...
    . .' of: du:ring:thelt;ite:J;".
    . ' mairi' sou:t'ce. Wl'th,TJTPe:t.no, .
    .' \i,as' att?-ineo.p .' and all "at, wa,ra .Eiban-
    . darted e" y. .
    "';J .... ,'
    7
    Ci
    5I 6:(:' p3 .
    .
    .\
    DOCID: 3486746

    7B. Work on USA tra:ftic 1941-1944-- USA sectlon


    of' Iil '7/VI was created with the ent17 ot the United States
    into war in early December 1941.707 The section, made
    up of' personnel who had been drafted from the mathematical
    section of" In 7/VI, was placed under the leadership ot
    Steinberg, a/leading mathematician. Initial attempts at
    breaking USA traf"fic vere fraught with difticu1ties. .
    ot the size of the USAvi!'eless network and the use
    ot -trequencies b'3' USA operators, considerable
    troubl4!) vas experienced in identifying the various links
    and so:Pting the di.fferent systems. Atter a few weeks,
    hoveve:t:-, order vas' established through the l-ead1ng ot
    call slgns.and the sorting bJ' discriminants.70B .
    Tloe f"il"st major success of the USA vas in" the
    summer ot 1942 when the M-94 vas solved.7 The Germans
    the M-94 variously as URSAL, CDAF, strip, and
    ACr2! UR5AL vas a name given to the 8J'stem f"Z-01D the 1'act
    that t:raftic 1"l'om the USA veather stations in Greenland
    , which l11sed URSAL
    7
    !8 an indica.tor prOVided the fizaat breaks .
    into the system. CDAF was tOWld in the traffic emanating
    from the Caribbean Defense Area.711 "Strip" and "ACr2"
    (Amezaillcan1scher .Caesar 2) stem from the fact that this system
    was loJrlg thought to be a strip system.7
    12
    The solutionot
    the M-94 vas achieved b:rSteinberg and mathematicians
    of the USA section, who &resaid to "have written a tventy-
    rive report on their 'Work. After the solution had
    been al,hieved cl'nrt&.na1J'tica11y, a USA manual (FM 11-5)
    a complete description of the M-94 vas found in a
    Berlin 11br&r1.7l3
    C'L11'rent solution ot the M-94 from 1942 to 1943 vas
    done" bCjth at In 7/VI and at the 'Signal Intelligence Evalua-
    tion C.,nter of KONA 5 at St. Germain. The york consisted
    of finding the dally key. A set of". 25 charts (synoptiC
    tables) corresponding to the 25 dIscs or the machine vas
    constructed, apparently similar to the nsynoptic tables".
    used b=r A.merican cryptanalysts. The daily' key was found
    bJ' assuming a beginning, and using the charts to discover
    possible disc arrangements. Later IBM was used to eliminate

    7
    0
    71 p "10
    7
    0
    8
    1
    78 p 10
    709
    1 l:L3. P 3
    711 p 2
    711I Ji'107 p 4
    1 P 2.
    1
    1
    3
    1
    1Jt2 p' 2
    1;5.5..
    \\
    DOCIO: 3486746

    "impossible" charts. Graupe of NAAS 5 stated that it usuall.,.


    took two days to recover the order of the discs and that only
    :fifty groups were required for the system to be broken.714
    This solution time exceptionally long, as American se-
    curity studies have shown. Solution of the M-94 usually takes
    only a rew hours. Estimates on the amount or material solved '
    range fr.,m 7(Y/J to 90%. .' , '
    ,. The M-g4 vas succeeded in 1943b.,. the M-209, which was
    first solved by the Germans the autumn of 1943.7
    1
    5 and con-
    tinued to be solved with somesuocessthrougbout the remain-
    ing years of the var. Solution was achieved in In 7/VI by Stein-
    berg and Luzlus, who were aided by the knowledge that the US
    government had bought the Hagelin machine which had once been
    offered to the German government.7
    16
    At f1rst only relat1ve
    settings could be reeovered,7l7 but later the section refined
    its technique of recovering absolute settings so, that not onl.,.
    , paired messa.ges but in a large number or cases a whole day' 8
    traffic be read. Thetecbn1queof achieving true
    was passed on by In 7/VI,' to the Navy and the Luftwaffe. 718 .-
    , ' Work on an operational level vas carried on jointl,. by ,
    the USA section otIn 7/VI and IfAAS 5 at St. Germain., Early in
    1944, HAAS 5 bad been. SUPPlied with a group of cryptanalysts'
    skilled in work on the 14-209; and this sm,al1 p:oup' headed by
    Engelhardt competed with the section at In ,7{VI in the Quick
    solution ot'M-209 traffic.719 It ,is estimated that
    at all M-209 messages intercepted vere read by establishing the
    true. se-ttlngs ot the Wheels, and that about half of these' settings,
    vere es'tablished at In 7/VI, half' at NAAS 5.7
    2
    0 To lnsurespeedy
    7
    14
    IF 107 4; I 113 p 3
    7
    1
    5
    IF
    107 P 5
    716 ,
    I 80 p3
    7
    1
    71 113, P 3; I 142 P 3
    7
    1
    B
    I
    144 p 2
    7
    1
    9
    1
    142 P 2
    7
    20
    IF 153 p 1
    156
    DOCID: 3486746

    solutiCln a.l.1 units subordinated to KONA 5 were ordered to tele-


    print NAAS 5 all messages on the smae setting fl' with indi-
    cators diftering only in the first two 1etters.
    12
    In addi-
    tion, ,copies or all intercepts were ,sent to In 7/VI as vellas
    to NAAS 5. in an ettort to obtain all possible solutlons.722
    Under most favorable circumstances two days were needed
    to solve and two,more days to reconstruct the absolute
    settins;s. There, were times, however, when captured lists ot
    keys 01" settings made possible a quick solution of" the traffic.
    During the campaigns ot and Italy, messages ot great
    value decoded using captured booklets containing
    14-209 s,ettings J At the time of the invasion Qf--Normano,y',
    ,the 14-2:09 keys otthe 82nd andlOlst Airborne Divisions which
    covered. the critical days of June 6, 7, 8, 9, lOt 11 were
    capture'd and all traffic on those days, was read. 25 '
    Th.e Germans ot In 7/VI knew of the axis tence of a big
    American machine' which was designated the AM 1 (Amer1kanische
    1); but it is qUite clear that In 7/VI never solved
    this ma,chlne and had no idea about its construction;r?b . Hentze
    ot KONA 5 says that unit succeeded in getting a
    model ot the machine.
    1
    7 Keller's remark that the American
    machine cipher was tackled in Berlin with approximately ::$
    success and that the conclusion that it worth the
    trouble is without dOUbt utter nonsense:( .
    The Germans were suocessful with American codes. One code
    , ot no value, a United States Army Administrative
    Code, designated by the Germans as AC 1 (Amerikanischer Code 1)
    had been captured 19'9, and photostatic copies ot the
    1
    code had 'been distributed to all field cryptanalytic units. 29
    721
    1 113 pp 11-12
    7
    22
    IF 107 p 6
    7
    2
    3IF 107 p 6
    , 1
    24
    IF 107 P 5,; IF 153 p 1
    1
    2
    5IF 1.53 P 1
    726
    m
    1,53 P 2
    , 7
    2
    7
    1
    p 4
    7
    2
    8
    1
    74 P 3
    p 2; IF 105 p 5
    \ .1
    157
    I
    ". ,
    /
    - -
    DOCID: 3486746

    /
    The code was a-5 Gode with 60,000 groups, each page con-
    taining groups. Feste ::9, while it 'Was in NorwaY', inter-
    cepted and read traffic passed in this code from the summer
    of 1942 to the autumn of 1943.
    7
    )k Although no traffic of stra-
    tegic 'value was passed, the intelligence vas valuable enough
    so that when AC 1 was succeeded,by a simplified version designated
    , as TELlrlA (USA: 9 took pains to the code
    with tJle help cf AC 1.T
    9, aided to some extent 1n more difficult solution
    by the USA sectlon of In 7/VI, also bro1ke the, simple -codes
    used by,US Army units stationed in Iceland and 'the Caribbean.
    These lrere designated as Div1s:',,:>n Field Code' (DFC) followed
    by a numbe:r indicating the variation of the system. The V8.I'ia.-
    tions TICOM sources vere: DFC 15, 16, 11, 21,
    25, and 29. '
    a., DFC 15: a 4 letter code, two-part, with variants
    and nulls. The sY'stem was used by the US
    Army in Iceland during the autumn 'of 1942
    and was solved in January 1943 by Feste -9
    in by assuming clear routine mes'sa.ges
    with a basis ot encoded text such'as Daily
    Shipping' Report, Weather Forecast etc. ...
    b. DFC 16: a 4 letter code enciphered by means of daily
    changing letta!" conversion tables. The system
    was used by stations inside Iceland and on the -
    Iceland-Washington link fQr ona month only,
    ,probably November 1942. DFC 16 was solved
    in January 1943 by In 7/VI. ,The solution
    was given to Feste 9 which thereafter succeeded
    in reading 80,% ot the traffiC intercepted.
    c. DFC 17: similar to DFe 16 but with dif'ferent code
    equivalents tor certain clear letters, words,
    abbreviations etc. The system was used in
    Icela.nd and trom USAAF links in Centra.l
    America and in the Caribbean Area in February
    and March, of 1943. With the aid ot a captured
    DFC 16 code, Feste 9 broke and rea.d nearly
    '100% ot DFC 11 traffic .

    -73
    0
    IF
    I 120 .P 4
    73
    1
    IF
    p4
    73
    2
    IF
    120 :P 5
    .,33rF p 4.i IF 144 pI> 3-5
    158
    DOCID: 3486746

    d. DFC 18:
    e. DFC 21:
    t. DFC 25:
    g. DFC 28:
    h. DFC 29:
    Similar to DFC 17, and this system was cur-
    rent in April, May; and June of 1943 witn a
    decline in the volume of in Iceland.
    It was by Feste 9 with the aid of
    experience gathered in the solution of DFC 17.,
    Similar to DFC 17 and 18, this system was
    current in July 1943 . It, was broken and read
    by Feste 9w1th the aid of routine admini-
    strative messages.
    Current only in the Caribbean Sea Area from
    August to November 1943, this system was.
    intercepted by Feste 3 a.t Euskirchen but '.
    the traffic was handed over to Feste 9 for
    solution. The system was read only in part
    because the letters and figures which pre-
    sumably meant types and makes of aircraft
    made book reconstruction very difficult and
    the intelligence was not of interest to the
    Army.
    A training code used in the south of England,
    from December 1943 to March 1944, was inter- \
    cepted by Feste9. A noticeable rise in the
    standard of encoding occurred in comparison
    with the messages from,Iceland.
    Traffic in this code was of no intelligence
    interest.
    a copy of this book was captured in the autumn
    of 1943 but it was never used.
    Melntion should also be made of the success of the USA
    section of In 7/VI With the Air Transport Code used for a.ir
    cargo and ijassenger transport circuits to Africa and South
    Americs;.73 This code, consisting of two-fi&ure elements
    from 00-99, was successfully decoded by In 7{VI from May 1942.
    until Elarly 194,3 when it was given to the German Air Force.
    P 2

    159
    DOCID: 3486746

    The work of In 7/VI, USA section, appears to have been


    SUCCElssful. in low'-t,re.de ciphers and in some medium gra.de elphe:rs
    such as 1\1-94 andM-209. Mattis rated the solution of the 14-209
    as th.e' outstanding achievement ot this and one of the
    best of In 7/VI. It. is clear also from ref'el'snces concerning
    the wOl'k on made by members or other ageneies5llch
    as Tranow,chief crypta.nalyst of the Na.vy, Voegele, chief
    cryptanalyst of the German Air Force, that the USA section of
    In 7/vI evolved the best techniques of solving the M-209 and
    other German' Signal Intelligence ftgenc1es 1n the work,
    on this system.
    '79. Work on French traffic 1
    t
    41-1944-- French traffic from
    1941-:L944 was of two main types" V chy French and Free French.
    Vichy French traffic Which was under -the direct control of the
    French Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden vas monitored by the
    1renCJ:'l sectl on or In 7/VI. 735 By agreement with the Vichy
    government, the Frenc", were to the Germans of their
    code andciphar procedures, but wary watch vas kept on their
    traffic. on Free Feench traffic which emanated during
    this period from Free French troops in Syria and in North,
    WestJ! and Equatort"aJ. At'rlca was ca.rried on by In 7/VI and, the
    Signal Intelli.sence Evaluation Center ofKONA 4 at Athens where
    the was easily intercepted.
    J:n So ll,st- compiled by ,J'Uehn
    R
    head of the French section
    of' In 7/VI, of the Free French sys tems' w'orked on by In 7/VI
    a.nd NMS following systems are ment":,oned as being used
    1n Syl
    t
    ia:7,.). . "
    }-letter system: code table w:1.th key
    change. system appeared from about 19ij.2 to the
    middle of 1944 1n Syria. but was not atter
    this. Content is described as moderate to good.
    'b. a'variant or the above code which passed technical
    details of wireless traffio.
    c:. police systems which appeared, according to Kuehn,
    rarely: either 2/F substitut10n tables or simple
    transpositions.
    735
    17
    8 P 9
    1}6
    I
    160 p 6
    160
    DOCID: 3486746

    d. a. 4/F code w1th daily key change. ,Appea.red in'1944


    in the Syrian coastal network. Content described
    ship movements1n the coastal
    From other sources may be added the de Gaul11st systems,
    two which are named: Con.tro1.Bedou1n and Service Pol! t1que. 737
    The _rork on French systems used in Syria. wa.s summarized by
    and Loeckher, tvo members of KONA4: tlAll Syrian traf-
    tic .ras and a. complete picture obtained of tp,e French armed
    f'orce.s It"(-'ts ..
    .. 'Among the Free French systems from North Africa wh1ch .
    were solved and read by In ilvI and KONA 4, Kuehn'listed:'739
    8. 5 lettermessages;from a diagonal transposition system,
    with monthly, later semi-monthly changes, used in West
    Africa trom 194} to 1945. It was later discovered .
    from a captured document that this system had been
    used in World war I, and vas resurrected eVidently
    tor use tn West Africa.
    b. TTSF code. A 4 latter code reciphered by letter
    substitution into 4 letter cipher texto The,first
    group ot the message 1s a.lways TT8P i the last group
    the indicator. The code was used in North Africa
    from 1944-1945 tor routine messages. . .
    c. 5 letter messages from a diagonal transpos+tion used:
    in Equatoria.l Africa in 1943-1944. .. _
    d. 5 figure messages from a 4 figure hatted
    nB.ted ATM 43. Kuehn of In 1/VI notes tha. t ATM 43
    derived its name trom the fact that it vas possible
    to .use the vocabulary of the pre-war FrenCh Code#
    the ATM, in the reconstruction ot this code.
    e. -' tiBure messages from 'a 4 figure code with subtractor_
    This system was used 1n North Africa in 1944 for trans-
    port work.
    A 5 jrlgure de Gaulle code was used in North# West# and Equa-
    tor1/u Africa, and later 1n France, which had not been solved
    by the end ot the waIt desp1te efforts made by. In 7/VI since

    737
    1 74
    73
    8
    i 170
    739
    1
    i60
    p 2
    p 2
    p 6
    DOCID: 348f5746

    '740
    1941/2. Bugg1sch stated that 1n1941/2 he worked on th1s
    code w:l th Kunze, one ot the chief' cryptanBJ.Ysts of the Fore1gn
    Ottice.'7
    41
    Despite these ottoz'te:< no success was' attained
    until Icampromise revealed that the code was transposed w1th
    dally Ichanglng key. lio further headway appears to have been
    made w:1th this system. .
    The French section of In 7/Vl, it w111 be recalled, had
    solved the 036 and th.eB-211 atter the,II'l'ench campaign 1n
    '1940 . When, therefore, the de Gaul1ist troops'in NOrth Africa
    and Carsica began to use the 0-36 maohine tor their traffic,
    the French section already had a solution and it waseaslly
    solve4 ly4}. Even when a new indicator system based on
    numbers was 1n early 1944, a high pe1"'oc,ntage of. the
    traff1c continued to, be solved through the use of cribs and.
    stat1stics. system itself'. was broken in the
    autumn of 19443 2- .
    At the end of his paper on the French systems by
    the French sectlon of In 7/VI and :KONA 4" Kuehn made it clear,
    that the French section vas greatly aided by certain funda-
    merital weaknesses in French Which led to easy
    solut1.ons of
    4
    Ulost of their systems. These weaknesses, he de-
    scribed &s:1 :>
    e.. "the extraordinary.conservatism of the. French regard-
    ing the construction ot their code systems or re-
    ciphering methods. Systems wh1chmust have peen used
    in the first World 'War were, for instancej used in a
    slightly mod1f'led fo:rm up to 1945 in West Africa" ,
    Recipl1;ering methods are regularly of two types:
    e1ther subtcact.ion with tinite subtractors trans-
    position with keywords taken from the code."
    'b. "the. habitual'use. by the French of -stereotyped message
    beginnings and endings which facilitates breaking
    into the systems. It . '

    741 J.60 p 7
    7
    4
    1
    1
    58 p 6
    '742
    1
    92 p 3
    7
    4
    }I JL60 P 22
    162
    ,I
    DOClD: 3486746

    c. "the idiosyncrasy or of .communicating


    . cipher matters or key changes by ra.dio. For instance,
    through the dia.gonal system in West Africa. In 7/VI
    was able on several occasions to break the key foxa ,
    C 36 machine a.nd once a key' change for the'ATM 4:;
    code was announoed."
    With these veaknasses,it,was possible tor the French section
    to reada.ll or most of Fxaee French traffic during the years
    1941-1944. Their previous wfth the 0"36 and B-211
    provided them with solutions to this machine tl'atfic as it was,
    used by de Gaulle. 'No high grade traffic appears to 'have been
    passed by the French during this period. .
    . 80. Work on Swiss; Spanish, Brazilian 'trat.fic--
    From 1941;,,19)):4, tlie Jrenchsect10n of 1'i77V1had sUbsectIons
    tOl' Swiss', Spanish, Portuguese, and Brazilian traf1'ic. . As ,
    Kuehn however, the volume of tra.:f:rlc was always extremely
    small and, unimportant.7
    44
    ' .
    Bugglsch, one of the chief cryptanalysts of In 7/VI,
    worked with Kunze ot the. the cf the
    Swiss Enigma. (the ]'.n1gma) j" although they worked
    out a theoretical solution or the machine, the theorY' was never
    applied at In 1/VI traffic because the volume did not
    warra.nt the effort. Moxaeover, easy solution of the traffiC
    was ',precluded by the :fact that the Swiss did the1r
    7
    ijlfll Wiring
    of the Enigma. Wheels and changed these :frequently0 "I
    Monitoring ot Spanish, Portuguese, and traffic
    va.s coordinated by the section of In 7/VI 7 and wa.s
    carried out by various .field signal intelligence units: from
    1939-1942, by Feste 3; from to 1944, byFAK 624, and from
    160p 3
    7
    4
    5
    1
    58 p 5 r,
    7
    4
    6:= p 3
    747
    184 P 3
    7.
    48
    1 78 p 10
    163
    DOCID: 3486746

    '.
    1-944 b:;V FAIt 624 and Festa 12. 'l'he amount of' tl'af'f'1c :read in
    theseun,1ts was eVidently small enough to be handled sat1s.f'ac-
    torily by the pe:rsonnel stated'that
    Spanish military transpositions and also a Spanish digit system
    wi th v,a.r1ants vel'S read. Of seven BI'azilian systems known,
    :five Wl31'S read. Most of the systems vera used between Brazil
    and thle United States and tiel'e signed by C1udQda.749
    8:1. Work on Italian traffic 1941-19.44-- From the beginning
    of the war, ,the security or ItaTIan systems vas 8 matter of \
    constalClt concern to the Ge:rmans 0 An Italian section under
    CaptalJrl Dz-.Fiala vas set up in In 7/VI to check the secU1'1t7
    ot Italian traf'.f1c., particularly :from Italy to Borth Afr1ca.
    The Germans teared that troop movements of the German Ar.rar7
    to Nor11:;h Uric,s vere being betrayed b7 the insecurlt,. or the
    "Ital1s1] systems. 750
    early as Dr. Fiala paid a visl t to Rome to notit7
    the It'i11ans or the weaknesses ot thei!' s1'Btems and tOl'equest
    J 'gresteJ:" security.751 The v1sItj/ ma.de little impression
    on, the'Ital1ans who remained conf'1dent oT their own 87stems.752
    .An attempt to Improve ItalIan security as vallas to demonstrate
    the ot IBM machiner}" -rar cl'yptanalysis pl'obab17 lay behind
    the invitation in 1942 for an Italian c:ryptana1yst to
    visit 1;he IBM section or In 7/VI.753. Captain one or the
    c1'7PtazlSlysts ot the Italian vas sent but his report did
    not -in any changes in Italian cr7Ptograph7. Capte.1n Big1 Us
    next vj:Bit to Berlin met only v1th coldness on the part ot In
    7/VI. BY' late 1942" the genersl 1mpJ;"8.ssion among the GeltlD8J1s
    vas tMbt the Italians vere incapable of improving their own
    systemsl, even with Germans monitoring them,155 and the ltali
    fAn
    6
    'sectloIJL In 7/VI vas disbanded in 1942 by of Hi t1er.
    7
    4
    9IP 1.07 P 3
    151 p 11 ,
    751
    1 78 p 11
    752IP 1.524; IF 1519
    753
    1
    78; p 11
    75
    4
    IF
    , 1517
    755
    1 78 p,ll
    756
    1
    100 p 2
    164
    DOCID: 3486746

    " .
    In June 1943; however, with Ita.lyDs defection (from German
    view'point), to the 'Work on Italian traffic 'Was again
    star'ted at In 7/VI 0 'P-he section in lSl43 consisted only of
    the section head, Manaigo, and a small number of assistants.
    Herz,feld, who was transf"erred to. the, section in JUly"g,we an
    accclunt ot the ,,ork. of this section until November 1943 when'
    it w'as affJ,an dissolved.. this time by Major Lechner .. head of
    In 7'/VI.' The dectslon to disband the section the second
    timel was justified by the fact that atter the fall of Leros,
    no Ilore Italian 'Wizaeless messa.ges could be intercepted and
    therle was no traffic with Which to continue work. The I,Jermans
    that the Allies had prohibited .further Italian wireless
    tra.r.Lsmissions.
    During its brief existence from July to November 1943,
    the Italian section worked on two codes, the Ellade 'and
    were being used by Italians in that per104. Great
    help in the solution of these codes was given by' an Italian
    enc1.phering table which had been captured by SOUl German
    Off-i.cers in Athens 'under dramatic circumstances ..'59 With the
    aid- ot this and other captured cipher material from northern
    Ital.y" two codes, Ellade and Piave" were identified and their
    reci.phering tables reconstructed. Later the ?iave code with
    enci.pheriQg table and ma.:q messages were captured. from northern
    ItaJ.y. Traffic was read on the Piave code. The Ellade code
    was partly reconstructed when the section was d1ssolved from
    1ac14: of current tl'af'fic.
    757]: 100 . .p 2
    758
    1100
    pp 2-4
    the news ot Mussol1ni' S' arreat and the Italian armistice
    .'lirasreceived at the headqua.rters ot KONA 4 in Athens I two
    (Jerman officers drove to' the headquarters of the Italians in
    (ldos Amerikls, Athens, walked into the Italian code ofrice,
    smd began to collect the mater1allying on .the tables and to
    l)ack it into a. case in f"ront of the beWildered Italians.
    J:n the midst of this, .a number ot Italianof'f"icers came in
    !Lnd began shouting rather excitedly. After some controversy"
    .tihe Germans thought i tpl'eferable to disappear qU1etlysince
    . tihe attitude of the 'Italians became too threatening. The,.
    did, carl'y with them what they had collected trom
    tiha tables and sent it to the Ital1an section in Bezalln
    165
    DOCID: 3486746
    f
    ./ '

    , lfe know that the end of the war, KONA 1in Italy wa.s
    orderl3d to the traffic of Italian bands ,ln Italy,'
    but hl)W much traffic vas read or of \That the traffic consisted
    is known.
    B2. Work on Swedish traffic 1941-1944-- Work on Swedish
    AX'-my trom 1941 to 1944 'washandled by a special detach-
    ment c)f Feste 9 called Out Station (Aussenstelle Halden)
    from fact ,tha.t 1s located in Halden. For adminlstra6bve - , '
    purpo:,es the station attached--to the Halden Police;', 'Th'e
    best account of the systems worked on is found in a report by
    cryptanalyst who had formerly worked on the,se
    systeI!ls. ' According to Bartel the .following Swedish Army
    syster:lls 'to1ere worked on: '
    lI.. SM 1, SRA 5: a r$volv1ng ,grille system. Numerous
    cases of compromises oocurred and the system was
    tinuously z-ead. First bz-okEm the spring or summer
    of 1943.
    b. HGA grille: a moz-e ditf'1cu1t aya tem not z-ead by' NAA 11
    or Feste 9 in NOl'way. W'ol'ked on by the German Foreign
    Off1ee but without success.
    SC 2: read in Ma.y 1943. A simple field code like 51idex.
    c10 SC}:read in April 1943. Simple
    l
    partly alphabetical
    l
    3-letter .field code without reolphering.
    u. SC 4: read in June, 194} 0 3-letter alphabetical code
    without rec1pher.
    The f'trst Swedish cipher machine (SchwedischeMasch1ne llabbre-
    vlatecl SM 1), was worked on in Norway in 1944 and was identified '
    as a Hagelin l1ke the 14-2090
    102
    ,Messages were read at Halden
    with ()rib, by errors in the cryptograrhYI or by haVing two' messages
    in same key,. The second machine SM ,2) was thought to be a
    Hagelin' machine. TwQ copies of the tr'arfic on
    were JilJB.de lone tor In 1/VI, one tor the station a.t Halden. '(
    FriedJ:a1ch, a membez- of the station at Halden, thinks t.J1at some
    SM 2 tiratf1c was read. The intelligence gained from t1le break-
    ing traffic of 8M 1 and the simple field codes allowed the Gel"
    mans 1;0 build up a complete tactioal picture .or the Swedish' Arrrr.f
    761 p 9
    761
    IF
    120 p 5
    ,
    762
    1 l42 , P 4
    763IF 149 P 2
    "764
    IF
    149 P 2
    DOCIO: 3486746

    .
    /
    . ".
    during the late yeB,;ra war-&-, bu.t ne1th@r ' the' :r$;d,e
    , grilJ.:e
    i
    HGA, p.orthelarge 3't:Ted1sh maohine was, s'QlvetLT ::>'", ,
    "\ ' ". I
    . . '.
    , ,e;3.' on., ..
    ct>1Jj}ta.nalY8\ls 'vas 'b.andIed at In llVI'by ,tht::Ba:tkan '"
    leadership in the tle:idbY,KONA4. ",'
    KO.lIJA >4, had 'been stationed inr the Balkan areaduring:the eliitire
    ',' 'and-in, addition"to 1. ts :ta.s,k,of1nterr,;,i ,
    f:rom anl. it ".
    had'l:.!een gi'Wen the task of. mo.ni t orlng the ,traff1.c., of' t,haoc'Cu.pied
    'in the, BalkanaI"ea. The sys... ,'
    te.nwwere by In'1/VI and KO]!A4
    RQmania Yugoslav1aRA1.Qa.nis,6 Tu;rkey', an(i 'Bulgaria. \f('hx-it '
    done 01t1, the t!'a.ff'io of each of cqulltrias ..
    " all
    $)"stems comes fr,om !i I'apor'ton
    system;,}l,by Dl".' Ott'o lta.r+Ul:nk lel'wh9 uas a
    a,no 4 fx"om, the of 194). to May
    1945. f !u6 \', ,,' ",,". , ". ' ,
    -: ,;,' ,Alccordlng to Dr. Wiw{:leI>;,' wo:rk on O,x>eek ata.Xtted
    tn 1941, whIS' X! J,{O}\!A 4 'W"8.S
    tam broken & Gl"eek Ai!" Force, system OrB- ,
    's ingle 'transposition sent ln3-1etter gI"QUps. " PI" 0, \(i1i'.Udsl" '
    , ','stated ,ttiAt &'l,ll, m,e.Slsages 'f:Jere by" the uoseQf, stare-a'"
    typed hegmn:i.n.gs. A1thO'!.ith the messageS\18WS of'ins1gnlfieant "
    v'q.lue:;, 'a.' continuous check on of.fl\}erpersonalities:l,deliwax-ies
    of eoncer:r!11'lg ail"llelds ccntl'"ibutedto
    , I-tlTho't1'].edge or Greek '
    4 tioIl'keo, at thistiJrisaJ.soon G:I.'Oeek ,>.AP.my and. ,
    but lil thout S1 un the eonquesto,f qreece
    At 't1hlCh '
    used 'J;g;P(;l Greeks du.riXlg the attack '
    .. .
    765
    1 p 9
    166
    1
    10
    761
    1
    110 P 2
    (
    . ',-,.'
    DOCID: 3486746

    ,
    The only other Greek system mentioned as having been
    attacked in 1941 vas a 5-lettercode with a cyclic recipher-
    me:nt which Buggisch says he worked on a.t In 71VI. 7sg1utlons
    becoming rapid when the Greek campaign ended. 6
    Atter KONA 4 moved ltsEvs.luation Center to Athens in
    Ma'Y' 1941, no more work was done by KONA 4 on Greek systems
    until, the withdrawal ot NAAS 4 trom Athens 1n the autumn of
    1943. At this time Greek Partisan traffic began to be inter-
    cepted. In the of 1944J KONA 4 gave Winkler the task
    9f forming a small Greek unit to handle trarrlc of the Greek
    Peop1e'sArmy of Liberation ("ELA5"). The unit consisted ot
    's1'x: persons, chief among whom were a cryptanalyst
    who worked on and solved a double transposition system of
    , EL,AS While Winkler concentrated on translating the traffic
    al:ready readable. 'rhe. worl,c became more important and the
    unit, now increased to persons, was attached to a
    Close Range Signal Intelligence Platoon, NAZG, newly formed
    in Salonika oover wireless and l1ne traffic of ths Greek
    Pa:rtisans.
    Winkler stated that in the beginning the Greeks sent \
    in two figure substitution with alternative
    groups. As feR messages were sent on the same substitu-
    tion, it took several days to break and read tl).ese substitu-
    tions. ELAS soon went over exclusively to letter traffic
    based on dOUble transpos1tion,wh1ch Strobl successfully solved
    1a:l'gely through the aid given by the carelessness of the Greek
    cr:yptographers.
    Winkler estimated of the traffic tackled by
    NA:Z G was solved. From these messages, the unit W$.S able to
    build up an almost complete picture ot the organization and .
    cOlrnposition of the Greek PeopleQs Aitmof Liberation (ELAS)
    anld the Na.tional, Liberty Front <"EAM
    lt
    } It also compiled lists
    of leading Greek personalities and officers and informed the
    German political and military authorities about many
    pl;anned military and political actions, acts of aabotage,
    ambushes,dynamitings, etc. In addition, the messages provided
    about the exact location of airfields in
    76;8I 58 p 6
    769
    1
    170- p 5
    168'
    DOClD: 3486746

    J '
    , the Greek about the position; strength, and activity
    'of the Allied military missions and various British commando
    , troops, a.bout Greek internal and inter-a.llied crises and
    about the British tactics tor tne occupation of Greece, etc.710
    on Greek systems ceased on lS"October 1944 when NAZ G was
    transferred to evo. 771, ' ,
    85. Work on HU!!Sarian trat.fic 1941.1244-- The Hungarians
    used the commel'cle:I mOdel oY the !SIgma, and had the rotors
    tor the machine made by the German firm of Konskl and Krueger.
    This f'u-m usually turned over the records of rotor to
    th'e Armed Forces Radio Communications. B1'anc.b (Ag WWpu) which '
    in turn gavethern to In 7/VI o HOW8ver$ Hungarians connected
    .
    W;l. tb the .ffi'm took the rotors at night and changed the wirings
    enough. to make the tirmfs tneorrectoTf2 Ko effort
    appears to have been made on the part ot the Gerro9.!l8 to recover
    the wirings 01' to prevent, the aabotage. It is difficult to ..sup-
    pose that 'the Gel'Dla.llS could have been. so easUy duped had they
    :W1shed_ to press the matter. EVidently, they did not consi4er
    the tI"a.ff1e causing embarrassment to-the Hungarians . '
    , 'W1th the onset or however, the Germans grew more
    eaut10us
    t
    gartieularly with the ot German troops' through
    7) During the spring and sWDIIler or 1941, 'the rad10
    traffic or tneHungar1an Railway Administration was monitored
    from the Fixed Intercept Station at Tulin. 'rlle code being used
    at that t1Iae by the railways was, a turning grille (Raster Code)
    w1th permanent squares which could be -turned in tour different "
    positions, and reversed to give tour additional positions. The,
    code xaa solved b1 Doering ot the mathematical section or IiJ'
    7/VI;n After the check on the 1"811vay, authorltlea had proved
    that they were dependable, 1nterceptlonvRs stopped,-
    175

    770
    1
    :L70 p 6
    7711 170 P.7
    712
    1
    84 p 3
    77}IF .126 p 10
    774
    1 58 p,7
    77S
    IP
    126 p 10
    ",
    169
    DOCID: 3486746

    Watch onoHunga.rian'trafflc was dropped from 1941 t.Q 1943


    bee.9.use of the high' priority given to Russian traffic .T16
    In 1943.t however J interest aga.in developed a.nd a was
    sen't trom Feste 6 (the former Fixed Intercept Station at
    near Pressburg" Hungary to monitor Hungaria.n
    l' Some tenseness 1n the relations of Germany and
    Hunga.ry may be reflected by the fact that all members 01' the
    detail wore civilian clothing. At time also" In 7/VI '
    . begl!Ul to resume its work on Hungarian ,traffic. Count Estarhazy
    of' 'tlle' sect_ion began work on a Hungarian code and turning ,
    grille;'f Teuchtler and Saper are said to ha.ve wOI'ked on Hun.. .
    gar:Lan messages encipheFed with it two figure substt tution key. 779
    Work. on Hungarian tx-artie was done by the Balkan section
    of :In 7/VI only when the Army thought it necessary to check
    up the Hungarian allies, but the attempts which ware made
    ,werl:! apparently successfw.o ,The solution 1n 1941 by\ Doering of
    the Hungarlan grille, vhLi.e not of great strategic or ta,aSOcal
    . ::3charaoter1zed by Buggisch a.s 'brU11ant v .O(
    Work on traffio little is
    knenln of tne work of the jl:tlkan, section on Rumanian tratf'ic
    frOlll 1941-1944. ACCOI'ding, to Mettig.t the monitoring of' Rumanian
    because of high priority given to RU5-
    S1aJl trattico In 1941, however" monitoring appears to have
    resumed. Kotachs" and Boscheinen of In 7/VI state tha.t Rumanian
    traffic wa.s completely monitored a.t that time, and that the
    Balkan section was reading a trauspos1:t10n system Which was "
    dec()ded with comparative ease.-
    10c
    Other references to Rumania.n
    are. found 1n Herzfeld0 s brief sta.tement that Schmidt,
    Kar)., 'and Wagner of: the BaJ.kan section were WOrkinK...u a Ruma.nian
    diplomatic code consisting of 5 or 6 :figure groups;"( ':J and in
    776)( 78' p 11
    777
    JCF
    126 p 10
    77
    8
    J( 100 p 4
    779
    1100 p 5
    780JC 58 p 7
    781J: 78 p 11
    182J:F 126 p 4
    783J: '100 p 5
    170
    DOCID: 3486746

    Keller's that 4
    D
    sEvaluatlon while at,
    Belgra.d,e September to December 1944 worked on Rumanian
    messages .
    Work on Xu oslav traffic WIth the 1nsis-
    tence of e erman government t at Yugos avis. align itself
    with Nazi policy in the'springor and the consequent wave
    of ,Yugoslav national resistance, the Balkan section of In 1/VI
    and KONA 4 undertook the heavy burden of monitoring the various
    types of Yugoslav traffic. '
    These types were:
    . a.. the traffic of the friendly Regula.r Army .'
    (Domobranl) and the Secret Police of that Army (Ustash1),
    military units of the puppet government established by
    the Germans 1n 1941; .
    b. the traffic of the Chetn1ks under General M1haUovltah
    Who were resisting German aggression;
    Co. the traffic of the Yugosla.v pa.rtisans under Marshal
    Tito;
    d. the traffic of the Croatian Resistance Movement led
    by Dr. Matchek.
    \ihen the German government established the puppet govern-
    ment l::Jf Croatia in 1941, the Croats were given the commercia?85
    model of the Enigma for use by their Army and Secret Pollee.
    The t:rafflc of these units was read by the Balkan section cur-
    rently Without any delay. According to Buggisch, the solution
    ot this traffic was'not an outstanding oryptanalytic achievement
    the following reasons:
    a. the machine used was the K model with three wheels
    and no stecker; ,
    .b. the 'Wheels o-r the machine were wired for, the Croat's
    by the firm of Konski and Krueger which habitually
    ga.ve the wirings to' Armed Forces Radio Communi-
    cations, Which in turn gave them to In 1/VI;
    c. A single key was used throughout the ent1reCroat '
    'Army and area." and this consisted of a list of 100
    settings per month;
    d. the ringstellung of the Wheels remained at AM;
    e. the wheel order 1,2,3 was always used.
    184
    1
    ' 74' p 2
    785}; p 2
    171
    DOCID: 34136746

    Just; to make sure, howevsI'" adds Buggisch" "the Germans paid .


    for oneot the first keys used, and'vlth this decoded traffic
    werl:table toestabllsh s tlSlJ!eotypes and solve almost 100% ot the
    from the Although Buggisch did not recall
    the contents in detail" he stated that there were some interest-
    ing passages about actions againstTlto. He also stated that
    the Germans had considered equipling the Croats with the plug-
    boa:rd Enigma" but that they decided aga.inst this since they'
    believed theco
    7a
    pt Croats would continue aellthe keys to
    British ageq.ts. " In that ca.se" the Germans would have to pay
    tor the keys used by the Croats instead of. solving them as they
    could
    t
    '1I1th the "
    . Rentze of 'In 7/VI states that the Balkan section was suc-,
    eassi'ul with.a .double trans
    P
    o
    7
    s
    a
    Sion used by the Croats but nothing
    more is known of this system. " ,"
    Herzfeld states that the Damobrani and Ustashi a tive
    figure code base.d on a former Yugoslav military code;' Evidence
    is' la.ckinga.bout the actual results obtained but it is probable
    ths,t the system was solved since the former Yugoslav code was
    ," knclwn. '
    Solution of the systems or General Mihailovitch'and Marshall
    Tltio was diVided betveena unlt at KONA 4, in Belgra.de and the
    BaJ.kan section of In 7/VI. The breaking of easy guerilla tech-
    niques, particularly the solution of daily rec1pherlngs, was
    on at Belgrade by a special detachIl1ent which had served
    in 1941 under Wollny as an evaluation center tor Section III '
    Arlll1ed Forces Radio Communications Branch (Amtsgruppe Wehrmacht-
    nachr1chten Verbindungen, Funkvesen Gru eIII aDbre..,
    vlate A WHY u III or FuIII With the assumption ythe
    0 wor aga.inst the enemies Tito and M1hailovitch, the
    detachment came under Army control and w&sattached to KOlA 4
    wh:Lch had. its Evaluation Center at that time in
    786
    1
    92 p 2
    78'71, 92 p :;
    188
    1
    ll}p 5
    .-7
    8
    9
    1
    100 P 4
    791 115 P 8
    172
    DOCID: 3486746

    The solution of the more di.fficult systems was carried on at


    In 1/VI by the Balkan section under the 1mmedie.te supervision
    or a tormer employee oftha Austr'.an cryptanalytic
    bureau and specialist in Slavic traffic. Ba110vlc is named
    throughout TICOM as the speoialist. in the systems ot .
    Tito a.nd he was not interrogated
    . ' ,
    Herzfeld, a member of the Balkan section o.f In 7/VI trom
    1941 to the capitulation, ha.s written in tvo reports, I 52 and
    169, a full discussion of the Yugoslav systems on by
    section. .The traffic ot Mihal10vitch was double trans-
    position vita fixed key and key These were regu-
    larly, it somewhat slOWlyo sol\Ted' a.t In 7/VI 'W1ththe aid or ,
    atereotlped phrases, frequency charts, a.nd other well. known crypt-
    analytic methods 0 Herzfeld states it took one to three days
    to break a single message ..
    . .'The ;;. ot Tito were far more varied, most ot them of
    Russia.n orig1n.-r
    9
    -, In I Herzteld listaamong the Tito sys-
    tems broken at In 7/VI: . .
    8.. a simple letter or two figure substitution system'
    used torenclpherlng messages sent by brigades and
    partisan units to T1to divisions'in 1944j
    a simple substitution key with short rec1phering set
    used below division Javel in 1944;
    c. simple two figure substitution key with nulls and .
    short recipherlng set usedbelov division tnnortbern
    and western Yugoslavia and Bosnia in 1944, possibly
    in Serbia and Macedonia;
    d. 'multi-columna.r substitution key used tor traffic between
    divisions and br:,gades in Slovenia
    j
    western Croatia"
    western Bosnia in 1944; '.. .
    e. an Albania.n substitution key used by Tito
    partisans ot Albanian nationality;
    f. variable substitution key With short reclphering set"
    the main cipher above division until June 1944.
    791IF 126 ' Appendix 2; I 51 p 5;
    IF, 120
    P 8
    79
    2
    1
    52
    P 2
    793
    I
    52
    p 5


    DOCIO: 3486746

    The system which succeeded the variable substitution key with


    . short reciphering set was .called Tito
    9
    s "Novo Sifra." It was
    used after June 1944 above division level and was not broken
    by In 7/VI. Herzfeld claims that it could have been broken
    sufficient traff10 and close scrutiny
    . In the autumn of 1944, 'Work on T1to traffic was
    Bes14es the unit stationed in Belgrade under the Eva1ua-
    t10:11 Center ot KONA 4 was lD.Qved trom Athens to Belgra.de
    .' beg,an work on Tito ciphersJ9
    4
    . The. Close Range Signal Intelll-
    gencePlatoon" NAZ 0, "Which had been working on Greek Partisan
    . traffic was, moved from Saloniki .to Sarajevo to cover Yugo-
    sla.v traffic. 7'1<;) .. .
    The only reference to the work of the Balkan section of
    In7/VI on Croa.tian Resistance Movement systems 18 the note
    by Kotschy and Boscheinen that this tra.ffi:c was decoded JDS,1nlJl'96
    by KONA 4 and wa.s rechecked by the Balkan section of In 7/VI.1
    In general, it may beaa1d that the work on Yugosla.v
    systems was successful. The systems or Tito and M1ha11ovitch
    ,formed the most important part or the 'Work of the Balkan
    section and received. the personal attention of the head of
    the section, .
    . 88. Work on Turk1sh traffic Both the inter-
    cept and tlie decMing of Turkish tr fic was handled largely
    bysLgnal units subordinate to KONA 4. The Close Range Signal
    Int.elligence Platoon, NAZ "T", which vas stationed a.t Graz"
    VOlt-ked only on TU1'kish traffic .197 At first it had inter-
    cepted Turkish Navy and Merchant Ma.r1J1e traff"lc as vell as
    Army and Police but certain disagreements arose with
    the German Navy over the of the Navy and Marine
    tratftc and this vas abandoned .'{5'tl .
    794
    1170
    P 7
    795
    1 170 P 7
    . 796
    IF
    126 P 4
    79TIF 171 p4
    798
    IF
    126 'P'9
    \" .
    DOCID: 3486746

    , The police traffic of Turkey is described as :799


    a. simple transposition used by the poliee departments
    o'!-'-'Ankara" Edirne, Istanbul, Izmir for police matters
    only;
    b. two letter or figure code used for polf.ce counter-
    intelligence with pol1ceagents;' '
    c. two or three letter code used for agent traffic.
    The Turkish Army Codes vere mainly transposition codes with a
    key 'World
    O
    sent in five letter groups preceded by a four figure
    number.
    50
    'All of these systems were decoded by NAZ T, and
    were to 1n7/VI simply for the.purpos,e of checking all )
    work.
    One special Turk1sh code is mentioned as having been read
    by the Germans either of In 7/VI or NAZT -- the special 'code
    used the President of Turkey while sailing on the State
    the Savarona. This code was used 1n .1943' for/radio
    toe President vas Ion the yacht, and not there-
    arter.
    Sc)met1me in 1942/43, In 7/VI received from the Resea.rch
    Burea.u of Goering (the Forschungsamt"abbreviated "FA' the mis-
    sion OJr solving Turkish diplomatic traffic. This the
    section did under the supervision of Bailovic, and the
    decoded tra.f'fic was sent to the Research Bureau. Kotschy and
    Bosche1.nen state that the traffic was used, by attaches
    for th
    ,
    s1r reports from Russia.'" and ItalyJ and that
    it was read continually by In,7FoJ'I. J We know from other'
    sources that this proved to be a very valuable source
    of information concerning Russia. Mettig remembers a .number
    of reyorts from the winter of 1943-44 on tIle military
    and the preparations fDr an offensive. Despite-
    many'warnings f'rom British sources that the traffic was being
    read, Turkey railed to change the system, and the reading uf
    traf'fic remained a constant source of' informa-
    tion., '
    -.
    799IF 126 pp 12-13
    " 800
    IF
    .126
    801IF 126 P 9.
    802
    lF
    126
    ,
    80
    3IF126 .P '!i
    804,,- p '14
    1. ;::\6
    ."
    80
    5
    1
    96 p 14
    DOCIO: 3486746

    I
    -.:;.
    .,..;,

    . . 89. Work on Bulfisr1an traf't1c There was .


    very little v9rk done on traftic'of during the
    va.!'. Accol'd1ng to Kotschy and Bosehelnen the trat't1c of the
    Bulgarian military attache.s vas Herzfeld
    . that. Thiele ot the Balkanasec.tion worked ona cipher
    but no details are known. 07 .
    . , gO. Work on Agents' traffic' lt4.!-19!t4-- The Agents t
    section of 'In7lVIwas establisnedn . Before that time',
    tbe activities of this section which consisted ot radio secUl'-
    ty inside Germany snd moni toringot illegal transm1ss10ns
    had been c3.1"r1ed on b:y Section III of the Al-med FOl'ces Radio
    .. Communica tion Branch lAmtsgruppe Wehrmacbt Nachr1chten Vel'b1n-
    dungen" Fu.o1cTlesen Gruppe III, abbreviated "AgWNV!Fu III" or
    .",Fu 111").808 In 1942" however" it was seemed necessary to
    deciphering section specializing in agents' c1phers.
    Fu III wanted 1 t set up vi thin i tselS" . but the 8upl'eme Command
    of the Armed Forces and the Al'my High Command opposed the es-
    tablishmentof agency. Asa of
    ,their oppoal tion" it was agreed to set up a section fOIi agents Q
    traffic wi thin Sn exlstingcryptanalytic organization. .IIi 7/VI
    was chosen because the Armed Forces could not spare the .
    personne.l. The Agents t section vas thus attached to In 7/VI
    although it appears to have ma1ntained the close l'elat1on with
    Pu III, itself'neal'aEu, III and moving with it in
    November 1943 to Jueterbog. 9 .
    The most complete account of the york ot the Agents
    i
    sec'tion" commonly called the Vauck section trom- its chief
    cr71ptanalyat.. First Lt. Dr. vauck.. is found in a CaDle report
    b7Mett1g (5. I. R. 1726) later re-publiShed as I 115. Mettig
    gives great credit to the work of Dr. vaucksaying that this
    section achieved good results because ot Vauck'a leadership
    and his cryptanalytic successes. The seetion'W'&s
    not large" consisting of 'twenty people in the main seotion,
    ten at outposts in Brussels and other cities, and
    eight lent to the Polish section ot the Signal Intelligence
    Agency- of' the Supreme Command"A2'med Forces (OXWjOhi) Recog-
    nized traffic was decoded in the o'l1tstations; the rest was sent
    to Berlin. traffic, moreover" vas sent to Berlin in .
    duplioate.
    806
    IF
    126 p4
    807
    1.100 p5
    808
    r
    115 P 2 .
    809
    1
    115'p3
    810
    r
    111 P'5
    .
    176
    DOCID: 3486746

    The ,cryptanalytic methods employed 'by the Vauck section


    differed tram novmal methods ofafflut!on because of the pecu-
    nature of Agents systems.. Some of' the achievements
    of 1:ihe Vauck section a.re outlined in the following pages.
    91, Work on Czech Agents' Tratric-- The Vauck section
    worlced i tra::t'.f'ic of the Czechoslovak Resistance
    MOV4:lment . - M.ettig believed tha.t the breaking in 1942/43'
    of tva links running to England made possible the arrest of
    Britilsh agents in .Czechoslovakia. The greatest success was
    achieved by intercepting the wireless communications of the
    Czel::h Resistanoe lvlovement in London. Thlswas the only case.
    in which Mettlg is certa.in that 'it was possible the Vauck
    sec'tion to break. into an agent network by purely cryptanalytic
    'mes](ls, a.nd this was la.rgely through brea.ches of security on
    the part or the Czech chief. Atter the 'system ha.d been hrtken,
    the book for enciphering wa.s .round a.nd the key recovered. In
    September 1942, tea were about to go over toa new
    system but were foo:.lshenough to name in the old system the
    book to be used tor enciphering in the new systemo
    of :messages solved on this link were nearly always concerned
    with reports on the political situation and activities of' the
    Czech Resistance Movement, and were so important that for a
    long time the WiT traffic was allo,"red to continue unhindered 0
    92. Work on Yugoslav Agents' trafic-= Work on Yugosiav
    Agents
    B
    traffic was carrfea on by-a detachment in Belgrade
    under Lt. Wollny. This deta.chID.ent ha.d beeh under Group III of _
    the Armed Forces Radio OommunicationBranch (Fu III) but was ;'
    att,ached in 1942 to KONA 4 because all .fighting against
    such as Mihailovitch and Tito wa.s directed by
    the Army. The work of -this group has already been described
    under the. Balkan section'S work on Yugoslav traffic, where it
    prcfperly belongs since the tra.ffic which wa.s not solved in
    the! detachment was sent to the Balkan section ot. In 7/VI for
    sol.ution. .
    93 Work on Ments a traffic in Southern FranCiA and Spain--
    Agents' trSl'1'1c in southern France and Spain emana.ted largely'
    f'rom.USA, British and Spanish Republican ,a.gents who were in
    811'1 116 PP
    . 1,15 p 8 :
    lis,- pp 8-9
    177
    t.
    DOCIO: 3486746
    .'
    ,"
    - , "
    \
    radio oontact with stations in Spa.in. To cope with this traf-
    fic, a camouflaged branch stat10nwas Bet up
    ,the intercepted passed to section. , Accordina
    to Mettig, the the traffic were very good.although
    no ar"eknoYn4! '
    94 Q Work on Russian ents
    D
    traffic-- Mett1g knew of three
    1IJ'!.,portant ussan Agents network: the Red 3
    11
    '(Rote 2), the ",
    Schulze-Boysen' net operating 1n Ber11n in 1942, and two links
    running, from Brusse:s. last named links' were, as far as.: ,-
    kne"f, not solved. " ", ,
    . The story 'of' the 'Work on the uRed 3" net 1s most 0
    In addition to account, we have two written
    , 'by Fenner',th,e chief of the S1gnaJ. Intelligence"
    Agency of the Armed Forces. Fenner reported tnat on '23
    February 1943 his agency was asked by Yauck1asection to col1a-
    boratein work on certa1n messages 01' Russ1an agents on'the
    "..Red 3
    11
    net,. By'the end of March, the Vauck sectlonhad fur-"
    nlshed Fenner "s Novopashni, Trappe, 'and Schm1dt,"
    ,with all the traffic in that system since September 194180
    that a staPt, was made on solution. '. Fundamental :findings, vere
    communicated to In 7/VI which enabled that organization tp
    break ' into the system roughly at the t1meas did Fenneris '
    group. Atter the in1tial brea.k in. it was agreed tnat In 7/VI '
    should cont1nue'to work on the system, and stated that
    f'rcJin' t1l1s help, the, Vauck, that the system,
    waZ5 based on a bool: text 0 ,,"( In tqe autumn of, 1944, 'Vauck 1s
    to have, ,told Mett1gthat the exact 'sen!i1ng position of
    th:ls net had been determined in Sy1 'A raid was
    planned Qut to be as Sw1ssauthorit1es had fore-
    stalled the Germans. The station. according to 818
    evacuated and destroyedbef'ore the Germans,could te.ke action.
    .'
    ,814
    r
    115 P 7
    , 115 ' P 7
    ,816
    D
    6q 'pp 16-20
    817
    1' 115 p B.
    818
    1
    115 P 10
    "
    178
    "
    , ,
    DOCID: 3486746

    ..
    I
    The ot the second Russian net, Schulze-Boysen
    net operat1ng 1"rom Berlin in 1942, is equally dramatic.
    8l
    g ,
    'This net received its name from Lt. Dr. Schulze-Boysen
    whose house was center of a Communist inspired espionage
    operating on a large scale. When the first inroad I
    into this traffic vas made'b)" the Vauck section, Dl'. Lenz,
    one of the members of the Vaucksection.l mentioned the name
    Schulze-Boysen to another member at the Vauck section named
    Haymann who rrequented the Schulze-Boysen house. Baymann
    Mrs. Schulze-Boysen. Subsequent17, both Haymann and
    Dr. LeIizwel'"e arrested, and Hayms.nn condenp1ed to death. Lenz
    was released and transferred to an out-station in Paris, since
    all that could be proved against him vas that he mentioned ,the
    name Schulze-Boysen to Baymann.' With the aid of knowledge
    .obtained from decoded traffic; the Gestapo made arrests 'ot
    from seventy-nine to eighty' people of whom seventy were con.;.,
    demned to death. The case was kept strictly secret because
    some or the wereemployed
    a
    in.var10us war 'agencies arid
    betraying secrets-to Russia. 20 .' .
    95. Work on Polish. Resistance Movement trs.:ffic--The most
    notable results Inthe Agents
    n
    sectIon were aohieved in the in-
    terceptlon and solution of the systems 'used by the Polish Re-
    sistance MovemeDt
    i
    particularly during the Polish uprising in .
    Warsaw in 1944.
    tl2
    From information passed on this system, the
    dispositions of the Pollshllberation as well as friotion '
    between them and the Russians could be estab.llshed. It vas possi-
    ble, moreover', to solve all wireless traf'fic which the Polish
    go,vernment InLondon carried: on with; its organizations in Pola:q.d.
    In order to pl'eserve s('lcrecyand to insure quicker delivery of
    the decodes . eight members of the Va.uck vere transferred
    in. the autumn or 194} to the Polish section o:f the Sign.alIntelli-,
    genee Ageney ot the Supreme Command, Armed Forces (OID/jObi,) .
    81
    9
    1
    115 P 10
    82'0' .
    See Volume 4, Chapter VI
    82:1
    1
    115 P 9
    179
    DOCID: 3486746

    for work there. The clear text was pUblished by the


    Forces in their bulletins a.nd was giveI;\ extremely restricted
    distributiono . To complete radio intercept coverage, ,
    the Armed FOI"ces Agency'COKW/Chi} ordered its sta.tion at Laut
    also tolntercept the traffic. First Lt. a cryptanalyst
    of GdNA" wrote a brief' account of the systems used by thePol1sh
    National Resistance Movementln which he that systems
    006, 11"(, 118, and 181 were broken and that others vere worked
    on. MOI:Jt of' them vere simple two figure substitutlons used
    without an indioator, with some variations in development and
    the use of basic keys or key phrases. 822 , '-
    96. Work on' German Traitors' Traf'fic-- Mettig stated
    that he once saw 8: report conceri'iIng a German who transmitted
    by wireless to England details of a nevljT constructed signals
    shelter> in Berlin 'urgently request1M,that it be bombed. No
    or these systems are known.
    91. Linguistic Research 1941-1944-- Linguistic research
    du:rlng the years 1941-191&4 was carried on, at In 7/VI by a
    section designated as the Research
    forsch1llD.gsref"erat). Mattig listed this section as one of the
    sections of In 7/VI in 1942 and named Koehler as its
    head.
    tl
    24, Koehler remained head of this group throughout the
    va1"# and in November 1944 section vas transferred With
    from GdNA to the Signal Intell1genoeAgencY otthe
    Supreme Command or the Armed Forces (OKW/Chi).
    62
    5 Mettig
    cla1me!d that 1t was contemplated that the members otthe
    11ngu1.stic research section ll'0uld' advise the cI'yptanalysts
    on language problems and direct all matteI'S of' the Armed Forces
    concs2
    a
    n1ng foreign languages. Although the plans were never
    realized, the nature of the WOI'k or the section can be inferred
    trom t;.hese pla.ns.,

    822
    1
    :26 14-15
    8
    2
    3
    1
    115 P 10
    - 824
    1
    78 p 6
    82
    51 96 p 15
    180
    DOCID: 34867.46
    .' ,

    ..
    . \
    98. Mathematical Research 1941-l944-- The Mathematical
    Res,earah Section was headed by Dr. PietsCh, who, according
    to iMattlg, ,collected in this section the best available
    ma.thematica1 bra1ns.826 The york of the section vas tlfo-
    to1,d:' .', '
    &. the investigation of all upsolved traffic trom
    the various sections of In 7/VI so long as it
    wa.s necessary to ach1evean lnrpad by pUl'e1y a.na-
    lytical means; ,
    b. the investigation 'or the security or current Ger-
    man Army systems.
    To these purposes .. three subsections were' found
    n,.ec19ssary: , ' ,
    Q.. a subsection designated "F" 1'OI" the German word
    for resear'ch, Fprschungo 'J'his subsection was
    headed b1 von Denf'fer and handled research.on
    :foreign systems.
    82
    7 .
    b. a. subsection designated "7"0 This subsection
    was hea.ded by First l,t 0 Lueders and dealt wi th the
    secu:ri ty of German Army hand systems. .
    c. a subsection designated "13". This 8ubsec'tion
    vas headed by Dr. Doering and dealt vith the '
    securi ty of German Army machine sys tems
    work of 1941-1944--
    Sub:section "F t e mathematical sect10nappears to have
    done some excellent work in the solution of the more simple
    'machine systems used' by :foreign countries. The following
    eX8ll11Ples of' solution may be c1ted: ,
    8. The discoverY' of' theoretical methods of' solving
    traffic in ,the Russian "K-37" ( a B-211 t:rne cipher
    machine) atter capture of' a model in 1941 B28 ,
    826:
    r
    78 p 6
    827:
    r
    78 p 6
    828:
    r
    58p 5; I 176 p3
    , 181
    b.
    d.
    c.
    ,
    DOCID: 3486746
    '.

    Development of' a technique tor conver,ting the 1'81a-


    tive settings, recovered to, wheels ot Converter M-20g
    on days when such solution was possible through reading
    or some ot the traffic, into absolute sett1ngsJ thus
    making it PQsslble to read all the trarflc sent on
    , those days. tl29, , ,
    The discovery in 19430t theoretlcalmethods ot salving
    messa.ges sent in the French B-211 cipher machine.
    tl
    30
    The of' de Gaulle traf.fic enciphered by the
    /
    The solution in 1944 of Hagelin, the Be 38,
    by Marquardt and Hi1burg. :J ,
    Doering's solution in 1941 of the Hungariangr111e should
    be cO,unted as one of the achievements of this seetion. As has
    been pointed out, the section had no success whatever with the
    large cipher machines such as the British Typex, the USA SIGABA,
    and large Swedish Hagelin. Hentzeof' Gd...'"fA states that the mathe-
    matical section worked on Russian 4 and 5 figure enciphered
    code with partial success.S33 .' .
    The outstanding man of this section vere named by Bugglsch '
    83 Hilburg, Rinow, and Wuenoche.
    Subsections "7
    tr
    and "13" of the mathematical section were
    con,carned With security studies o:fGerman Army hand and machine
    cipher systemso They vill be treated in 'Chapter VIII, which
    dea.ls wi thGerman A:rtrf1 systems.
    , 100.' Use of IBM fn Cryptanal;rsis! 1941-1944-- The IBM
    section of In 7/VI derived from toe IBM section set up in
    1939/40 by the German 'Security Agency (In 7/IV), at the suggestion
    82
    9
    1
    58 p 6;' I' 113 P 6
    831 160 P 6 '
    831
    1 160 p 6; I, 58 P 5. The 0-36 had been solved previously
    in 1940 with the aid of the Signal Intelligence Agency of
    the Supreme Command Armed Florees OKWlObi. '
    83
    2
    1 176 p 3; I 160 p 6; I 58 p 5
    833'1 113 pp 5-6
    DOClD: 3486746

    of the mathematicians and former'actuaries of this section.


    834
    It was natural that in 1942, when the study of the security
    of German systems vas transferred from In 7/IV to In
    the use qf" IBM machinery for security studies vas transferred
    to In7!VI and quickly adapted for cryptanalytic work: on foreign
    The machinery used by In 7/VI was mostly of .German
    make, a. number of captured French IBM machines were
    included. 35 The section, headed by Schenke, consisted 1n 1943
    of t.Qirt;y or forty key and twenty to thirty
    soldier mechan1cs.
    8
    we have no exact evidence as 'to the number
    or types of machines used although Hentzestates that in'1944
    .there vere 30 key. punchers and 2 tabulators. t5J7 The special
    contribution ot In 7/VI to IBM work was the of the
    machines to various tasks by special wirings. In 1943, a
    special workshop for the development of wirings vas

    the early stages of .the.Russian campaign, it vas comparatively
    simple to establish depths in these messages without the use
    of IBM, but by 1943 IBM. machinery was indispensable for locating
    'depths. " . .
    Buggisch declared that no tasks were undertaken by the IBM
    section which could have been done by 100 people. He maintained'
    that lack of IBM machinery theanalysta of the Signal
    Intelligence Service ot the Armed Forces (oKW/Ghi) to the develop-
    ment of new and better types of analytic devices while In 7/VI
    remained content with inferior adaptations' 'of IBM machinery.
    The Army's general attitude concerning IBMmachlnery 1s hinted a.t
    in Bugglsch
    U
    s statement that the Enigma be'solved
    by a large enough array of IBM but it never oc-
    curred to him, eVidently, that such would be contemplated by
    the
    834
    r 67 p 2
    835
    1 78 p 6
    836
    1
    6"r p 2
    831
    1
    113
    838 6
    2 .' I 7
    P
    8}91 '67
    .P
    2
    840
    58 6

    I p
    ... ,-
    /
    8411' 92
    p
    5
    ,
    48
    7
    ,
    .I.
    DOCID: 3486746
    shoul,d be noted that the IBM sec.tion of In 7/VI was .
    at toward the hampered by the fact that their machines
    weI"e outworn, outmoded and irreplaceable. The factories which
    11a.d producing pa.rts were bombed out and, as the machines
    W'or6011t,, their 'Work became inaccurate.. In some instances,
    work machine was a.ba.ndoned An example of this is c1ted
    by in his 4iscussion of the attempt in 1944/5. by the.
    Signal Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces to provide units
    'below JregimentaJ. 'level with signal ta.bles. The values were to
    be set up by the IBM section of GdNA (formerly of In 1/VI) but
    it trwlsplred that the IBM machines had been in the
    last Y4;,ara and were not functioning properly. . As a result
    the tr:1.grams "Tere not being reciprocally enc1pheredand other
    methods of: producing them were developed. In early 1945, the
    IBM se,etion of' GdNA was of'feredto Signal Intelligence Agency
    of Sup:reme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW/C1l.i), but Mettig
    stat;es that. the mat;terelCS-s never clinched because of the confusion
    at the end of the war. . .
    101. 1945=- With the
    establishment oltha in late all operational crypt-
    analysis was carried on by sections 2" 3, and 4 of Group IV
    of the GdNAG Section 2, hea.ded by Knesehks, dealt with the
    deciphering of western European traffic andprobab11 also with
    Hunga.rian, a.nd Italian ciphers. There were three
    .
    2a. headed by Dr. Werner Schulz, dealt with British,
    USA.1a.nd 8w;edlsh systemsJj . .
    .2b.. headed by O/Insp Otto Kuehn, hanCQ.ed French systems
    2c. headed by Y;neschke" processed Balka.n aystems.
    >'

    842
    1
    96
    8
    4
    3
    1
    96
    844
    1
    1.60
    P 12
    p 13
    p 2
    . 184
    --
    DOCID: 3486746

    Sect10n 'Was headed and dealt lt1th systems,


    with subsect10ns.: . 5
    3a for Russian NKVD Police) traffic,
    3b ror Russian Juomy tra.tfic,
    3c for Russian Partisan traffic,
    3d for research on Rusa1ansystema 1n general. , .
    Sect10n was devoted princ1pallyto statistical .IBM work.
    TheJ:-e .1s no record of any new or d1ttJ.cult systems being
    solved late 1944. The main effort of the GdNA wa.s
    apparently directed to the decipher1ng ,ot systems already
    solved and to the simple necessity ottind1ng a place to oper-
    ate . Fr()mFebruary 1945 unt11the capitulation, Group IV of
    the GdNA was constantly on the move seeking refuge in the south
    trom the Allied advance.

    DOCIO: 3486746
    --.
    VOLUME 4
    VIII. German Systems
    ...
    ;': ..
    '..'.'
    .. "
    Paragraph
    Germe,n Army Cryptographic Systems .. o. 0 0 0 0 o 0 102
    Prepa,ratlon and dis tributioll of keys. 0 0 0 0 a : 0 0 0 103
    German Army Security Studles.o o.ooo o 104
    Att1tudEt of' Field Army toward Security StudlEH3. 0.- 0 ., o. 105
    , cryptofraPhic systems.--The German Army
    used three maIn types of cryp ographic machines in its cODDIiun1-
    . cations down thr0ush the Enigma, the teleprinter -
    cipher attachment (IlSchluesselzusatze," abbreviated "sz"L and
    .the cipher teleprinter ("Schluesseli'ernschreibmaechine, It ab-
    .bre\d,ated "SFM"). . _ ..' .; . :
    . The type En1gnia vas introduced in 1925.
    850
    It was replaced in 1939 by the plugboard . .
    Theflrst teleprinter oipher attachment" the SZ-40 "original
    model," was introduced into the Army probably in 1940
    852
    although
    Dr. Huettenha1n of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme
    . ,Command Armed Forces (oKWlchi) said that the Army had been ex-
    . per1mg
    u
    ting with this type of cryptographic apparatus as early as
    . 1931.::>j . It was replaced by the, 8Z-40 ilregular model," and this
    was succeeded by the 3z-42a. and the developed by Dr.
    Liebknecht of the Army' Ordnance Development and Testing Group
    Signal Branch (wa Pruet 7) and by Inspector Menzer. and Dr. Huetten-
    hain of' the Signal Intell1genceAgency of the Supreme Command
    FOFces (OKW/Ch1).
    ti
    5
    4
    The 8Z-42c was a1ao developed and
    test sets bUilt, ,but the apparatus was eVidently not
    The first cipher teleprinter" ;the T-52a,9was introduced
    in 1939; improved models were called the SFM T-52bj c, d, -and e.
    By the end of the war only m04ele T-52 c" d" and e were in use.,
    A cipher teleprlAter designated the SFM was
    introduced in 1943. . .
    850 I 31 p 11
    851 I 78.p 7 _
    852 I 31 p 14
    853, I 31 P 7.
    854 1'57 PP 5-6; I 45 p 19
    855 I 31 p 13 . '. . .'
    DOCID: 3486746
    The German Army used hand ciphers below division. After
    World War and before 1942, some of the hand systems or the
    Army" a.s listed by Dr. Huettenhain ot the S1gnal Intellige.tlce
    Agency of the Supreme Command Armed (OKW!Ch1) were:
    tl
    56
    80 A monoalphabet1c type substitution using a keyword,
    mixed alphabet in a 5 oX 5 square.
    b. A "comb-transposition,iC IJKammwurfel") .
    Co A "book key"
    . \'.
    , .
    " .'
    d. A double transposition (DOPPEL WUERFEL, abbz-evlated
    "4-8-40
    11
    ). This system was used until 1926 or 1927.
    e. The "Single Playt'air" (KASTE-SCHLUESSEL.Il abbreviated
    "Ts-42II )
    f. The IUDouble Playfa1r" (DOPPEL-KASTE-SCHLUESSEL, abbre...
    v1ated"NS-42").
    In' 1942, subsection 1 of the Mathemat1cal Section of In 7/Vr
    declared that hand systems currently used by the German Army
    were lnl3ecure.
    ti
    57 Since the Field Army h&d no reserve hand
    systems;, In 7/VI Qrdered to cooperate withIn 1!IV, in pro-
    duc1ngJlew The follow1nghand systems were evolved,
    and used by the German Army from 1942-1945: '. '. .
    a o' Three letter field' codes ("Signaltafeln") with or
    without tables ("Schluesseltafeln").859
    , . ". . .
    b. Single transposition using grille ("Rasterschluessel
    44" II ususllycalled "Ras tel' 11) ts60 .' ..' .
    \ . .
    c. Double transposition <"Rasterersatzverfahren")
    UnCleI' fiel:d conditions many makeshift systems were employed, _
    such as monoalphabet1c SUbstitution, transposition consisting
    only ofrevers1ng the order of the letters of the plain text,
    and whatever the particular ra.d1ooperators might adopt by agree-
    . ment .amo1ng themselves 0 .
    856 131 p 17
    857 I '20 P 3
    858 I 18 p 13
    859 I 20 P 3
    860'1 20 P 3
    DOCID: 3486746

    For weather reporting,!) the Army used two types of systems


    until 1945g
    a o The "Barbara Code
    31
    ("Barbaraschluessel") consisting of
    figmrecards for encoding artillery meteorological reports for
    Army and' anti-aircraft units. . , ' " .
    b. Weather substitution tables" ror enciphering meteor- .
    olog:lc111reports in the Reich Weather Service
    Lt. Colo Mattig stated that the Barbara Code was replaced
    in 1945 by the "Bas tel' ne61 , " . . ,
    . , 103. Preparation and' distribution OfCrystogaPhic keys .--
    The historyoi' the preparation" 'pr1ri'ting, and, Is rioutlon of '
    cryptographic keys by the German Army was outlined by F:rlcke,
    a member of In 11rv and latterly of Signal Intelligence
    of the Armed Forces (OKW1Chi) .802 According to Fr.lcke,
    the leeys for thf' Army were produced at the begi..nningof the war
    on In 7!IV8 sown p:resa. The number of . personnel required was "
    small (about twenty people in all), since only enigma, weather
    and book keys (Heftschluessel) were printed. .
    . . With the introduction of the SZ 40/42 and other crypto-
    grapllic systems which required keys, the amount of work
    in the preparation, printing, and distribution of keys became
    too great fo:r In 1/rv alone" In 1942,thereto:re, the production
    of table manuscripts was transferred to the IBM section of .
    I:,:. 7/VI, and theprintlng to. the Reich press in Berlin; In 7/rv
    was c:ontined to reading proof and dlstributlng the finished
    product.
    . At the time of the bombing attacks on Berl!n in November 194309,
    thel>rinting press and all key rna terial of Ii:. '. '7/1V were des troyed .
    The key producing section of In 7/rv was then moved trom Berlin
    into emergency quarters prepared some weeks before in the Army
    SigIU3l1 Sphool (Heeres Nachrichten Schule) at Halle/SaaleoDuring
    this private printing f1rms were increasingly drawn on
    for the of keysj first, because the Reich printing
    pressl could not meet the requirements; and sacondly,becQuse .
    deceI:Lt:ralizat10n was increasingly necessary to avoid bombingo
    About; twenty firms in the central German area were given contracts
    for the printing of keys. 'The high number was largely attrib-
    . utabl.e to the introduction in 1944 of the Stencil System 44 .
    , . (Rasterachluessel 44). . . . " ,
    .'.
    :861 I 96 p 12
    862 1: 36'
    ! 'J(8B
    -- -----, --
    DOCIO: 348674'6

    In May 1944, the key producing section of In 7/IV was


    transferred to the Hindenburg barracks at Dresden, where Major
    Dr. Metzger,assumed direction. This remained the situation
    until 1 November 1944 when all tasks of producing" printing"
    and distributing of keys for the Army were transferred from "
    In 7/IV to Section IlIa of the Signal Intelligence Agency of
    the Forces (oKW/chi/llla). This section was established
    at Dresden in the headquarters which the key preparation section
    of In1/IV had occupied; In March 1945, Section IlIa was trans-
    ferred from Dresden to the Army Signal School at Halle/saale
    , because of the approach of the Russians 0 Work was never begun,
    and on 12 April, keys and material for producing them
    were loaded on trucks to be sent to southern Germany. Keys left
    at by the Germans at the approach of the
    United states Army.
    8b
    3 ' ,:' " '
    , 104. German Army SecU1'ity Studieso--Before 1939, the Army
    High Command had no securIty organIzatIon of its own. Questions
    of security concerning Army systems were referred to the Codas
    and Ciphers Sect10n of the German Defense Min1stry. Huettenha1n
    stated that he and Menzer, 8S members of the Codes and
    Sec,tlon, did a securi ty study on the SZ 40 model"),
    and found that it could be solved 1n two days. Th1s led to
    its improved form.
    " , ,In 1939" the Army High Command established its own Signal
    Security Agency (In 1tIV), which functioned as such unt11 19420
    the per10d of its activity, the Signal Security Agency
    (In 7/IV) examined the plugboard from the point of
    view security, ,and made security stud1es on tva ather crypto-
    graphs proposed for Army usage" the M40 and SG 4l.
    tl66
    The
    security stUdy the plugboard Enigma was occasioned by a sus-
    piciolo. roused during the Poli3h campaign in 1939 that the Poles
    were :reading Enigma. tratfic.
    tsb
    7 Pietsch" Steinberg.. and BobIn
    (mathematicians of In 7/IV) made secui-itystudies on the machine,
    863 I 36 p 3 '
    864 1 31 p 17
    ,
    86
    5 I 92 P 2 '
    866 I 58 p 5.' Buggish actually' said "C-41" but doubless meant
    "SG-41 .. II Both the M-40 and SG-41 are described from a '
    cryptographic:viewpoint in Volume 2 of this paper.
    867 I T8p 7
    189
    .,
    DOCID :.3486746

    ,
    -e
    \ .
    the results of which apparently set to rest any doubtsapout .its
    . security" The Army continued to use the system 'W1thout ehange
    .until Fricke (another mathematician of In 7/IV)8Q8 indicated'
    that the Al'myUsmanner of using indicators led to an eas
    x
    6
    ' so:+utlon"
    At his recommendation" the indicator system was changed"ts 9 .
    '. The two machines proposed for Army use, the and $0-41.1"
    had been invented by Menzer;. a ofthe Intelligence
    Agency of the Armed Forces {OKW/Chi). SeclUtlty stud1eson the
    M=40 were by Dr. Doering and Dr. Bugg1sch, mat'hemat-1clans
    of In Qr. Bugglsch stated that the studies proved the .
    device to be moderately'secure,p but tMt it was never used be-
    cause it was aabulkyas the plugboard rnlgma but could not
    print letters "ts71 With regard to the SG-41, thestudies made
    by In 7!rv showed it to be superiQr to the M-40"but
    stated: '"The Armybemmad and hawed and nevel' did adopt it. "tl72
    lnlg42, the responsibility for making $ecurity stUdies of
    German, Army systems,pB.nd most of the personnel or In 7/rv who'
    had worked testing, were :trans-
    ferred. from In 7!IV to the Mathematical Section of In 7/VI. '
    Pietsc;h" Steinberg, von Denffer, Hilburg, and Luzius were named
    among those transferred"ts73 . ,
    'l'he'Mathematical Section of' In 1/VI assigned, security' studies
    to two, subsections :"7" and "13 .. " Subsection "7" undertook the
    work 0
    1
    1:'1 hand systems; subsection "13" "on German machine .
    systenls "814,, 'rhe f'irstst'Ud1es of: subsection "7
    11
    on German hand'
    systems currently used 'German
    Army, lirere solvable. As a result" In,7/VI wa.s, ordered to, col-' .
    labora;te withIn 7/IV in the development of new systems for the
    Army ..
    ti
    75 In 7/VI would have preferred to establish .
    this slection within itself, where the preparation of systems
    would be done in close ,cooperation with cryptanalytic
    this. }:IOint ,of .v1evwas not recosn1zedby the Army and In 7/VI was
    Ordel'Eldt,o sendmathematlclans back to6In7/IV. The
    sent Fricke" Jesse;' and Kehren.
    8
    7 From that time on,p ,sub-
    , . sectlcln "7" con.f.1ned it'self to the study of hand systems handed
    to it by the Field Army. Mettlg not'ad that the amateur systems
    with 'which the sectlondealt were very b,ad and betokened gz-eat
    ignors.nce 0!l the
    8
    P:rt or the Field Army. in regard to code and
    ciphez'security" V7 .
    . Subsection "13,," which was responsible for the secu:rlty of
    868 I .i
    92P
    ,5
    869
    192 P 5; I 20 P 2
    870 158 p 5
    I 871 r 92 p 2
    872 I 58 p 5
    873 I 92p 6
    874 I 92 p 6
    875' r 78 p.i3
    876 'I' 78'p- 3
    ,
    DOCID: 3486746

    . Gerlnan Army cryptographic machine systems, concentrated on


    security studies of the SFM T-52 teleprinters. SFMT-52a, b,
    and c were tested by Dr. Doeing 1n the summer of 1942 and were
    sho,m to be easily solvable.
    7tl
    By the autumn of 1942, it was.
    clear to the mathematicians of this subsection that SFM T-52c
    could not be made secure 0 Despite the warnings from the security
    unit, the Field Army continued to use SFM T-52c. vere
    particularly sure of it because they thought the land lines on
    wh1c:h SFM T-52c messages passed could not be tapped by the
    eneDlty' Not until a. cella.r equipped to tap land lines. was found
    in F'aris in late 1942 did the Army consent to the improvement
    of the machine.879 This improvement, the T-52d, vas ready in
    ear1:y 1943 and was shown by Drc Doering to be probably insecure.
    " From, his experiments theT-52d evolved the T-52e.. which
    , was ,oons1dered s eeure 0
    8
    ' , ,
    Some of the plugboard Enigma. wa.s carried on
    by subsection "13 although no definite conclusion was reached
    , concerning its security 0 In 1943-44, definite proof was ob-
    tained from two Polish officers in a prison camp at Hamburg
    that the Poles had read the plugboard both before and
    for flome time a.fter the Polish This proof 001'-
    roboI'ated the suspicions aroused at the time of the campaign
    in 1940 . Two Army cryptanalysts .. Pietsch and Doering, were sent
    to interrogate the Poles. Although the interrogations were said
    to have drawn a blank" it became evident that Polish crypt-
    analysts at Wicher had solved rnigma had, gone to France
    after the Polish campa1gn and, bad continued their work there.
    Solution vas said to have stopped sometime later. The mathema-
    tic1a:o.s of subsection "13" belleved that solution had ceased
    when 'the Field Army followed Frickeus indicator recommendations.
    The g<meral result was that subsection "13" did not press the
    mat tep' of Enigma secur1ty ; ; , , "" ' ' ".. ..
    " Subsection "13 fI ,had also:'been assisting in the design of '.. '.
    ClpherDevlce 39 (3chluesselgeraet, 39), an improved En1gma which
    was intended to employ a plugboardj changeable turnover rotors,
    Wheels, and additional Hagelin-type drive'
    wheels 0 2 Bugg1sch stated these machines werehls specialty.
    They were under construction at the Techn1scheund Norm41zeit
    firm at Frankfurt,am Main at the time of the
    878 I .58 p 2
    879 I '78 p 11
    880 I '78 p12
    881 I 92 P 5
    882 I 58 p 6,
    883 I 20 P 4
    ;1.9.1.
    , I
    " '. .' .- ",
    DOCID: 3486746

    The esponslbl1ity for the. security of German Army CFYpto-


    graphio systemsl"emained with subsections "7" and
    tl
    13
    t1
    until
    November 1944# when it was turned over to the SIgnal Intelligence
    Agency of' the Armed Forces (OXW/Chi) o The Al"Dly then retained
    only the responsibility for seeing that approved
    by OKW/Chi were properly used in the f'leldo .
    105. Attitude of the Field Army toward Security StudIes.--
    The Field Army ma1ntamed an unoooperative attItude tovard
    security studies made by the ,Mathematical Seotion of In 7/VI.
    Whenever the Field Army was asked to ehange a system, there
    was a storm of protest. All changes in methods were supposed
    to be the stafr of the Army Communicat1ons Branch
    (Heeres NachrIehten Verbindungsabte11ung, abbreviated HNV), and
    the nieture of the results depended upon whether the o:fficer at
    . staff headquarters happened to know anything about cryptanalysis o.
    Frickle said he usually dId not.BBS onlywit.h the greatest dif-
    fioulty was the Field Army persuaded toohs.nge its methods.
    One of the speoific ways 1n which. the Field Army consciously
    hampeJr-ed progress in security studies was to refuse to fu1'n1sh
    In 7!1'{! act1JB,l traffio. Fr1ckesaid that In 7/VI never kn'ew how
    the F:Leld Army actually' used the systems which 1t approvedo When
    In asked for traffic for its stud1es$ it was gIven specially
    messages suoh as: "We are standing in Berlin Ud see
    the Pc)11sh infantry ooming down the Frankfurt Allee. "880 However,
    the Field Army made a brief attempt in 1941 to provide the
    analyfsts with actual traffic. For th1$ purposes. Signal Intel11-
    gence Regiment ot the Replacement Army (Naehr1ehten Aufklaerung
    Abteilung/Chefder Heeresruestung und Befehlshaber des Ersatz
    Heeres, abbrevia.ted NAA!Che.f H Ruest u BdE)was :formed. While
    two cc)mpa.n1es of this unit. were to aot as administrative units
    for personnel ot.In 7/VI, the third company was an interoept
    which worked in the field collecting material for the
    analysts. (Due to personnel shortage, however, this unit was
    dis8ol.ved1n February 1942" arid. no subsequent .attempt wa.s
    by the German Field Army to procure actual traffic tor In
    As deSCribed in Paragraph 104, it was diffioult to persuade
    the Army to acoept as valid the s eeu!'ity s tud1es made by
    884 D 68 pp 3-4
    885 I 20 P 3
    886 120 p 3
    887 I 20 P 3
    o
    DOCID: 3486746
    -.

    the c:ryptanalysts of In 1/VI. For instance, not until an entire
    cellar with excellent equ1pment;ror tap):t.ng land lines used by
    the wa.s raided in Paris in early 1943" was the A'r]nY High
    COlllWLnd tbat the security study made "lly In 1/VI had
    been valid. . . . .' .
    The att1tude of,the F1eld Army could be traced largely to
    the :lgnorance on all levels of matters pertaining to codes and
    security. Frlcke
    n
    s remark that the. staff off1cer at the
    HNV 1"ho controlled coda and cipher methods usually knew nothing
    cryptanalysis has already been mentioned. Mattig stated
    that the suggested. systems banded to In 7/VI for be-
    tray4ed the lamentable ignorance' ot the Field Army. Signal
    tables set up by the troops revealed serious oryptographic errors,
    such as the failure to change keywords for long periods.
    8
    9
    0
    In
    an attempt to correct this 19norance, In7!vr gave lectures at
    the Army Signal School at Halle and issued instruct10ns on code
    and I:)ipher secur1ty. The s1tuatlon,ll however, was never sat1s-
    Buggischaptlyoalled it tragic-comic: When In 7/VI
    detelt:ted an insecurity, it was not able to achieve effective
    remedies; if In 7/V1 wanted to install newdev!ces, it had even
    more dlrticultles
    d
    . The Army "hemmed and hawed" and never got
    " around to act1ng.
    o
    9l .
    888 I 78 p 11
    889 I 78
    890 196
    891 I 58 P 5
    \\
    ....
    DOCID: 3486746
    .' ..
    .
    VOLUME 4
    Chapter IX 0 Training of German Army Signal Troops
    Paragraph
    Training of Signal Recruits o. o.o o. o oo
    Training of Signal Technicians 0 0 0 00 . 0 o'
    Training Qf Specialists 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
    Training 'of Signal Officers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
    Training of Army Cryptana1ystso ... o o.oo oo o
    Evaluation of Signal Trainingo o.oooo o
    ',114
    115
    116
    117
    118 .
    119
    114. Tra1n1ngof Signal Recruits.--The Signal Intelligence
    Replacement a.nd Training BattalIon lNachl'ichten AUfklaerungs
    Ersatz und Ausblldun&.Abtellung, abbreviated NAEUAA), which v.as
    located at Frankfurt/Main
    6
    was responsible for the training of
    German Army Signal recruits. It had control over Signal Intel-
    ligence Replac:ement and Training Companies in each Service
    Command (Wehl'krels) where basic training and some training in
    signal matters given to the In time of peace,
    basic training. lasted for one year, signal training being taken
    up after the first three months. During the war, the time of
    basic training' was shortened in order to place more troops more .
    qUickl:y in the field. Recruits were trained in direction finding,
    teletype ope:ratlon, and6Simple field codes, and were then sent
    out into field No special courses were conducted in
    the Replacement and Training Companies.
    . . ' .. . . '. ,. .' . . . ,
    ..' . 115. Training of SifjialTeChniCians. - -Mos t of the signal
    technicians were traIned specialIst schools of various sorts.
    School,s for carrier frequency, switchboard operators, repairmen"
    . etc., 'were established by the Army and Division and Corps Signal
    Battalions and at Army Signal Depots .e97 Instructors were .
    mainly non-commissioned orficers who had had experience in the
    field.
    116. Training of Specialistso--The Signal Interpreter Re-
    placement and Tra1n1hg BattalIon (Nachrichten Dolmetscher Ersatz
    ".'.' .
    '.
    895
    896
    897
    IF 250 p 2
    IF 250 P 3
    IF 250 p 3
    19.4 "
    --- --- ---
    !
    DOCID: 3486746
    t,
    und Abteilung, abbreviated NDEUAA) was located at ' '
    Halle/Saale.
    ts9CS
    This battalion was responsible for thetra1ning
    of signal interpreters who were to be employed in signa;l inter-
    oept 'Wlltsfor radio and wireless monitoring. The battalion was
    divided into three companies: oompany one tor Romanoe, company
    two flor Slavio, and company three for Germanio languages. For
    matte:rs of administration the battallonwas divided into the
    . follo'iiing five platoons: CS99, ' , , '" : ','
    1) oadre platoon (stammzuf) comprising cadre personnel,
    and instructors in mIl tary and intelligenoe technical
    matters.
    instructor platoon (Lehrzug) comprising teachers and '
    members of the instructor group.
    3) platoon (Ausbl1dungszug) oomprising the students
    who were under instructions in some language.
    4) alert platoon (Marschzug) comprising men who have passed' ,
    their final examination and who are expecting to be sent
    into action.
    - ' ,
    ,,) p,ool (AuffanrorpOralSChart) newcomers
    ,waiting for heIr entrance examination., '
    . .. .
    A rough estimate of the personnel shows that in 1944 there were
    , , about 350 to 400 men attending the various language classes.'
    ,After the courses whioh lasted six weeks, the men were given a
    'final,examination. Accordlngto the results of this examination..
    " they were a.sslgnedto one of the three follOWing categories:
    8
    9
    0
    .:q" '.....
    S Speakers (Spracbmlttler}.'These were people who spoke
    well and were aEIe to make themselves understood, but .
    , who did not master the la.nguage in speaking and writing .
    correctly.
    U Translators (Uebersetzer) . These were people who ..
    mastered the foreIgn language in writing, but were
    only fair in speaking.
    D Interpreters (Dolmetscher). These were people who
    spoke and wrote the foreIgn language correctly and
    fluently and whose general education was up to a
    , corresponding standard.
    I'
    898 IF 105 p 5
    899 p 3
    900 IF p 5
    195
    --.
    DOCID: 3486746
    Employmtcmt was assigned according to the category to which each
    person 1io1as assigned.
    FOJr persons of category flS,p II a. special COurse in monitoring
    Allied radio communications was organized at Leipzig for English
    speaking personnel only. The course consisted of three weeks
    D
    daily ulstruction in the following subjects:9
    0
    l
    .. '.'
    ...
    1.
    1 USA and British organization of signal units
    2 USA and British radio sets used at all
    3 USA and British radio call signs
    4 USA and British authorized abbreviations
    5 USA and British message forms
    6 USA and British fixed station and net operational methods
    7 USA and British Army terminology
    Each of the SUbjects was taught fbI' one hour a day and had a brief
    examination. In most cases", the lectures wel'e conducted in
    English to facilitate practice in this language.
    117. Tralnlns of Signal Offlcerso--TheArmy
    at Halle (Heeres NacfirIcfitenSchuls.ll abbreviated HNS), conducted
    the course for officer candidates of the Signal Oorps.9
    02
    Em- .
    :phasis here was in the first months evenly divided between tech-
    nical and military SUbjects. 'The officer candidates were
    selected by their commanders in the field after having proved
    themselves in combat or in outstanding work in their specialty.
    All enlisted men were eligible, although the racial origin evi-
    dently played some part in the selection. One prisoner, for
    instance, states that he was not allowed to become an officer
    . candidate because of a Jewish grandmother.9
    0
    3 .. .
    After their the men were given a four weeks course
    1n tact1j;:}S" Army regulations .. customs,jl technicai subjects, etc 0
    Those who passed this preliminary course were sent- to the Armed
    Forces Signal Troop School (Fuehrungs Nachrichtentruppen Schule,jl
    abbreviated they were trained for three months in
    Signal Corps work.9
    0
    lf. From there they 'Were sent into the field
    for a probation period as leaders of platoons. - During this
    perlod of training, Colonel Grube states" many of the candidates
    lost thelr lives. A final three months at the Signal School at
    -Halle brc)ught with graduatlon the rank of Lieutenant. Failure
    901 IF 131 P 4 .,
    902 IF 205 P 5
    903 IF 12'7 p 1
    904 IF 250 p 6
    196
    DOCID: 3486746
    118. Traipiiif: of German Army Crxptanalysts. --Not-hing is -
    kno\rn of the of German Army cryptanalysts perore 1939.
    Mettig states that when the Signal Intelligence Regiments'(KONA)6
    moved 1nto the field in 1939, no cryptanalysts were available.9
    0
    Radewig, the commander at that time of all intercept
    stations in the west, however, was able to procure a number of
    czayptanalysts from the Fixed Intercept Stations (Festa) around
    Berlin"ano, to this force he, added a few mathematicians and '
    linguists.
    90
    1 As a result, when the German offensive began in
    Apr!,l 1940, the KONAos had a moderate supply of cryptanalytic l
    personnel. The early years of the war" however, showed that
    many more cryptanalysts were needed. Provision to train these
    cryptanalysts was made by establishing a Training Section in
    In 7/VI under the leadership of Kuehn but Mettig stated that the
    work of the section was not .fully exploited until 1942.908 The
    section was located at Matthaikirchplatz-4 in Berlin until
    November 1943, when it was moved with the rest of the Agency to
    Jueterbog because of Allied bombings.' In November 1944 the ,
    Training Section 7 of IN 7/VI became Section 5 of Group'IV of
    the GdNA.9
    0
    9 Accozading to Graupe, the school consisted of about
    twenty officers with one gundred and twenty men, and abouttw'elve
    women as stenographers .91 ,," .", ,
    . The course which lasted 10-12 weeks911 1s outlined in some
    , detail 1n IF 122 PP 3-8. Dur4.ng the morning and for two or three
    atte:rnoons a week, cryptography was studied f'rom a' syllabus. ,
    This syllabus included a brief history of cryptography, a general
    picture of the methods of encipherment, details of various means
    or and decipherment. the remaining arter-
    noonl3, the students eVidently specialized in whatever fie1dto
    ,wh1ch they were to be assigned. One prisoner of war, Gerd Coeler,
    stat49s that during the afternoons he studied English mflitary
    and abbreViations, studied the history and organization
    of the British Empire and the geography of England.9
    12
    Karren{"
    berg913 outlines the course given for those who werespecia11z1ng "
    " .'

    905 IF 250 p 6
    906 IF 78 P 4
    907 78 p 4
    908 I 78 p 7
    909 IF 123 p 9
    910 IF 127 P 2
    IF 123 P 9
    912 IF 12-2 P 2
    913 1: 166
    ...
    197 "
    , ,
    ,'
    , .
    DOCID: 3486746

    '.
    ';' ,'0:
    .
    .;' '
    '.
    ,: :.-
    in Russian cryptanalysis. Participants were selected from the
    persoonel of the Signal Interpreter Replacement and Tra1n1ng
    Battalio.n who knew Russian. After the most capable InterpI'eters
    had been selected they were given a course in Russian crypto- '
    graphy which included all types of Russian systems. 'For practice
    in this course actual Russian military texts were used
    4
    by which
    the men ware gradually accustomed to field problems .91 '"
    119. Evaluation of Signal Tra1ning.--The training of crypt-
    analysts by the Army appears to have been eminent11 successful.
    Tlu>.ough the classes of' the Training Section at In 7/VI passed
    most of the men who later became outstanding in the field of
    cryptanalysis either in the KONAs or in the central agencies.
    Major head of cryptanalysis at Paris (KONA 5) and later
    of IV of GdNAj 1st Lt. Vauck, head of the Agents D section
    of In 77'r.,rI; 1st Lt. Lueders, head of one of the subsections of
    the section of In 1/Vli and 1st Lt. SchUbert, haad'015
    of at HLS Ost, were all graduated fI'om this
    The training of signal troops in the field, however, appears
    to have l>een less successful. Attention 1s continuously drawn
    throughout the TICOM publications to the acute shortage in the
    Field AI'my of personnel who were well trained in signal intel-
    ligence operations. This was partiCUlarly true in the late years
    ot the wa.r when cours es became more sketchy. The central agencies
    recognizEldth1s wealmess and attempted to remedy it bypublish1ng
    field manuals on security and having lectures given at the Signal
    School at Halle by members of In 7/VI. Despite these efforts,
    howeveI', the Field Army remained, accoI'ding to Fricke, pitifully
    ignorant of the principles of security. Ignorance undoubtedly
    lay .at the bottom of the non-cooperative' attitude of the Field
    Aztmy in regard to the adoption of systems considered moI'e secure
    than those in use by the Army. Conditions were aggravated at
    the of the war by the necessity foI' sending all able-bodied
    men into the front line and by the general confusion of' the Army .
    Very little could be carried on by the Field AI'my during
    the late Inonths since their schools weI'e taken over by operating
    agencies. The Army Signal School at Hs,lle, foI' example" had been
    used by In 1/rv since November 1943 for the preparation of Army
    keysj and afteI' March 1945 it housed aconslderable section of "
    the Signal Intelligence Agency of the ,Armed Forces, including
    service and male and female civilians.. It may be
    safely stated that after 1944 little if any signal training
    was on by the Army.
    914 See VCllume 4, Chapter VI foI' details of this course
    915 I 78p 8
    DOCID: 3486746
    -e'
    VOLUME 4

    . ,
    paragraph
    Liaislon with OKW"/Chi .. a o.a a a 106
    LiaisQn with the Navy ... a 0 0 0 107
    Liaisl:>n with the Air Force a........ .a a a 108
    Liaisl:>n w1ththe Foreign Office 0 0 0 0 " 0 109
    Liaison with Goering 0 s Research Bureau ... 0 a. . 110
    LiaiscJn with Finland . a 0 111
    L1a1sc::ln with Italy 0 Q .0 III 0 coO" 0 0 0 ,004) .. 0 00000' ,0 toO a 0 0 112
    Liaison of the Signal Intelligence Service of the Army
    witll related Signal Intelligence Services a 113
    . 106. Liaison with OKW/Chi.--The relations of the Signal
    Intelligence. Agency ot the Army High Command (OKH/GdNA and its
    with the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme
    Command or the Armed Forces (Oberkommand.o der Wehrmacht Chiffr1er
    abbreviated OKW/Chi) were conditioned bya number of
    important racts.
    l:l.The office of the Chief Signal Officer" Armed Forces
    (Chef der Wehrmacht Nachrichtenverbindungen" abbreviated Chef.'
    WNY) Chief Signal. Officer Army (Chef des Heeres Nachrlch-,
    tenvvJ:-blndungS1-1eSenS" abbreviated Chef HNW) were held jointly
    from August 1939 to the capitulation. The close relationship'
    wh1ch evolved from this combined office is outlined by a German
    officer who was aide de camp to General Chef WNV and HNW
    from aeptember 1944 until the capitulation.
    92u
    As Chef WNV",
    GeneNtl Praun (and his predecessors) was directly subordinated
    to General JodI of the Armed Forces Operations Staff' (Wehrmacht
    Fuehrungsstab" abbreviated WFST) and was responsible for all s1g-
    nal operations and policy from an inter-service point of .vlewa
    As Chef HNW; General Praun was responsible for signal operations
    , and pCllicy within the Field Army" and in thiscapacity wa's sub-
    ordinsLte to General Guderian" Chief of General Staff. 921
    920 IF' 108 , '
    921 IIi' 108 p 2
    199
    DOCID: 3486746


    b. The Signal Intelligence Service of the Army (GdNA and
    its predecessors) and the Signal Intelligence Service of the Armed
    Forces (OKW/Chi) stemmed from a common orlg1ri, the Codes and
    C1phers Section of the German Defense Ministry. The Army High'
    Command had set up its .fir.stSlgnal IntelllgenceAgencyI the
    Control Stlltioll (Horchleltstelle), in 1933, by drawing
    a few trained cryptarialysts from the Codes and Ciphers Section
    of the German Defense Signal Agency
    of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces was thed1rect de...
    sceJldant of the Oodes and C1phers Sectional' the Del'ense Ministry
    and acquired its new name in 1939.922 .
    The close inter-relationships of these three organizations
    1s Itef1ected 1n the relationtlhips among the officers who con-
    trolled them. Colonel who ended the war as chief of
    the GdNA, had been from 1934 to 1939 head of the Codes and Ciphers
    Section of the Defense Ministry.9
    2
    3 General Fe11g1ebel, who had
    heen, hefid of the Codes and ClphersSectlon of the Defense Ministry
    from 1931-1932 held the office of Chief Signal Orricer Army (Chef
    liNW) and Chief Signal Officer Armed Forces (Chet WNF) from 1939
    until 20 July 0019nel Kettler who ended the war as head
    of the Slgna1Intel11eence Agency of the Supreme Command of the
    A.rmed Forces (OKW/Chi J had been head of HLS OS t .925 Lt" Colo
    Mettis, second 1n command of the OKW/Chi
    A
    had been head of OKHI
    In'7/VI from November 1941 to June
    Close collaboratlonof OKW/Chi and the Signal Intelligence
    of the Army High Command (OKH/GdNA and its predecessors)
    can be traced in a number of recordedlnstances from 1939 to the
    capitulation. In 1939, Huettenhain, chief cryptanalyst of OKW/Chi,
    was sent by that organization to'the Intercept Station of the Army
    at Frankfurt/Main to collaborate with the Army on the solution or
    a new Frenc!\ Army system.9
    2
    7 The most cordial relationship between
    the organlzations
    S
    1s manifest in his memoranda on hls Visit to
    Frank.furt!Main:9
    2
    . . . . .
    "When I was saying goodbye to the m111tarYhead of
    the evaluation section of Army Group C at the termination'
    of my attachment in FRANKFURT-ON-l>1aln" the head of the
    evaluation section expressed his regtet to me that he
    could riot yet present me with some sign of outward
    922 See Supra Chapter I
    923 I 123 p 4
    924 I l23p 4
    925 IF 123 P 3
    926 I 78 p 2
    9
    2
    7. .Supra, Chapter
    928 D 60. pp 4-5
    DOCID: 3486746
    for work successfully carried out in FRANKFURT-
    OIl-MAIN. To that I replied that success attained was not
    due to the effort of an individual but was 'the result of'
    and common effort and that if outward recog-
    nition should reward this work, Herrn TRAPPE (Chi OKW), I
    SCHMIDT (Chi OXW) and' Professor Dr. Foppl (Chi OKW)should
    llkewise remembered. The head ,of the project thereupon
    tCJld me that these gentlemen would be similarly dist1nguished.
    "In the course of the conversation, I said that ,for
    Ul:J ,the finest recognition was the knowledge that important
    intelligence" Which as a basis for the t"urther
    cQnduct of the war" had been sent to G.H.Q,. , The head of
    the projectreplled that he qUlteunderstood this attitude
    he would like to make military departments appreciate
    our work at the full value for up to now, they have shown
    1:1ttle understanding of the difficulties of such work.
    " "At the same time" the head of the project requested
    m,e to convey his thanks to the Chiffrler Section OlGi for
    the assistance given to the military declPher:Lng section
    andreniarked that in his opinion such a large decyphering
    t,ask could not be done by OKH either now or 1n the near
    future. "
    -'

    , ,
    ..
    , I.n 1942, the Si6fiSl Intelligence Agency of' the Supreme Command
    of the Al"med Forces (OKW!Chi') sent a special Russian "party" to
    HLS Ost to collaborate with .cryptanalysts there in the solution of
    a Russian 5-figure code. Prof. Dr. 'Novopaschenny, head of that
    party returned to Berlin in the autumn of 1943, but his crypt-
    analysts were absorbed into the unit at HLS Ost.929 ,
    , , OKW!Chi also collaborated with the Agents
    U
    section or OKH!
    , In 7/VI in the solution of Russian agent traffic. The memoranda
    , of Fenner, chief lingUist of OKW/Chi, give a detailed picture of
    the nature of this collaboration. 930 ".' ,
    On 23 February 1943, FennerUs department was asked by Section
    III of' the Armed Forces Radio Def'ense Corps (Fu III) to collab-
    , orate with the Agents
    D
    section of ORR/In 7/VI in work on certain
    , Russia,n agents f traffic., By the end of March, OKH/In'V!VI had "
    furnis,hed FeIUler's section with all tra.ffic in that system inter-
    cepted. since September 1941 so that a start was made on solution.'
    , , FundaD:lental findings were communicated to In 7/VI which enabled
    its Agents
    D
    section to break into the system I'oughly at the same.
    929 IF; 123 3 ,.
    930 D 60 pp 16ft
    201
    !1tJo
    DOCID: 3486746

    time as c.1d group. After the initial break-in" howevel';


    it was agreed that In 7/VI should cont1nue the work on this syst;em
    while. the' Intelligence Agency of the, Armed started
    'work on another system. From then relation.s 's.omewhat .
    strained. because of the non-cooperative attitude of the AgantsO
    section' or In 7/VI in :furnishing traff'lc to Fenner s f;ection The
    basic cooperation of the two departments; ho:wever, 1s
    . .' One of the most striking instances o.f cooperation between
    the ,Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command the Armed
    Forces (OKW/Chi) and the Signal Intelligence Agency of. the Army ,
    High Carom,and (OKH!GdNA and its predecessors) is in the ' .
    'work or the two agencies on Polish Rasista.nce"M()vement Systems .931 .
    Dur1Iig th.e Yea.rs 1943/44, the Agents 0 sect"ion of AgN/"NA was a,ble
    to intercept and solve the systems used by the Poles in their .
    traffic with the Polish government in London.. From this traffic
    the disposition of the Polish liberation troops as well as the
    frIct10nbetween them and the Russians could be establIshed. The
    traffic was cons1dered so important that eight members of the
    Agents' seetloD were transferred in the autumn of 1943 to the
    Po11sh.sectionof the Signal Intelligence ,Agency of the Armed .
    Forcea (OKW/Chi) to work on the' systems. there. The o'lear text
    was published by the Signal Intel11gence Agency of the Armed .
    Forces in bulletins wIth extremely restricted
    Signal Intelligence Agency o..f, the Armed. Forces also cooperated. ,by
    intercepting this traffic at their own station at Lauf in order
    to be certain that it was completely covered. Speed in solving
    the traff'icwas obtained by having the messa.ges sent to the IBM
    sect10n o:f AgN/NA for, sorting. The work on Po11sh traffic thus
    .appears tlO have been as much a joint project as is possible for
    two Separl!Lte agencies to attempt.
    I..ong before the time of offtcial IIChl ... conferences"held by
    Lt. Gener<!ll Gimmler .. Chief' of the Armed Forces Cormnunications
    Branch (Cbef' Amtsgru.ppe, WebrmachtnaChr.1chten Verbindungen,p
    breviated Chef AgWNV) .. the Army and the Armed Forces .. Signal In-
    telligence Servlcesworked together on aecurlty studies of German
    cryptographic machines and issued joint resolutions concerning
    their lnVl9st1gat10ns. Among the papers of Dr. Huettenhaln of.
    OKW/Chl aJre. memoranda descJ:>ibing this cooperation.932 As early as
    Decembel' 1942" In 7/V!, OXW/CHI and We Pruet 7 proposed issuing a
    statement" concerning improvements for the secret teletypewri:ter ma-
    ch1neSFM. ':I:'-52c to be submitted to the Itbig executive committee'. '933
    :It is not mown specifically what 1s meant by the "big
    executive' committee.. " it 'is :possible that it niay have been composed
    931 I 115 p 9
    D 59
    933 D 59p 6
    DOCID: 3486746
    --.
    ; )
    ,.
    '.;
    of'otf:Lclals of these 'same organizations. Throughout
    General Th1ele
    9
    who held thepos1tlon or Chler of the iArmy Com-
    . Branch' (Chet Amtsgruppe Heeres Nachr1chtenver-
    abbreviated Chef AgBNW) called conferences
    repres,entatives ot the various services concerning matters ot
    security'. B.uggisch; one of' the mathematicians Qf In 7
    at
    4
    which Drs. stein and Hassenjaeger of
    were The m1nutesof one of these
    (qated 13 December 1943) have beenpublished.
    935
    It should be. .
    'no.ted that the conference 1s said to hive been called at the
    suggestion of' In 7/rv, ani was held 1D.the ottice ot that un1t
    at Mattha1klrchplatz 4, Berlin. Those who took part were Major
    Kempe,head or In 1/IV.II Specialist Luehrs, Dr. F1'1cke, and .
    . Dr. mathematic1a.ns at:, In 7!IV; Dr. Pietsch and Dr 0
    ot AgN,/NAj representatives of 'WaPruet1; andDroHuettenbAin" .'
    Dr. Steln,and 1st mathematicians of OKW!Ch1. .
    lrom thisev1dence, it is clear tllat the called
    by Ltc> General G1mmler 111 1944 were only' a formal exteriorization
    of an already existing relationshipo This is the reason that ,
    Buggisch of AgN; NA and Huette.D..ba1n of' oKlJ/Chi were able to m1n1- /
    m1ze. the effort's or Lt" General G1mmler o9S
    0
    Both obse'rve that
    the co,nf'erences d1dnot .fost.er a closer relat10nshipamong' the
    servio,es' "'t- the cooperation ot Army ,and Armed Forces; had been of
    ,-the cl.osest natUl'e for/many years, but the ,collaboration Wit,
    servicas was riot improved. . '. . . -
    'At the formal ItChi:-conferences" and at the official Army-
    Air-Ne.val conferences of 1944, the Armed f'orces could always
    dependlupon the f'ull cooperat10n of' the Army o' The completeness . (
    . of th:1.s cooperation is illustrated by the fact that when '01CW/Chi
    ,was ol'dered to take over the of all security studies
    within the Amsd Forces, the Army compiled bytransteX'r1ng to .
    OKW/Chi all personnel of In 1/IV and of the security-sections of
    the MeLthematical Section of' 'NA 0 . .' .
    J:n the .field 'Of machinery used for cryptanalytic andsecurlty
    the Armed Forces and the Army appear to have'
    each other tully concerning their developments although
    no of machinery was made.. As early as 1939/40" the math-
    and former actuaries. who had been drawn into In/1IV
    suggented the use of IBM machinery for statistical This
    ledt() an extenSive use of the machinery for security studies.
    When f!ecurlty studies Were transferred't"l'om In7!IV to In 7!VI .
    in IBM was by In 7/VI for bothsecil1'lty
    934 I 58p 3
    935 D 59 p 16
    93
    6
    1 92 p 4; 1 84 p 2
    .,-." ........ ''''.
    .
    . i
    \ ..
    .' .
    - --- - - /-
    DOCIO: 3486746
    -e
    studies and cryptanalyt1c It is not known whether the
    ,Signal ,!ntelllgenceAgency of thlSt Armed Forces had its own IBM
    machines separate of the Army or not 0937 Mett1g and
    Bugglachboth state that 1t had no mach1ne17J but depended
    upon the IBM'machines of the Signal Intelligence Agenctof
    Army. The ,prepaz-atlon of for the use pfthE!, ,
    Army was doneB for instance, by the IBM machines of the GdNA at,
    the request of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Armed
    IIi early 1945, the IBM section of/GdNA was offered to the Signal
    Intelliigence Agency of the ,Armed -Forces (OKW/Chi) the transrer
    93
    ' 9
    was never carried out, however, because ot the turn or events. '
    , - The relation of Signal Intel11genceAgency or the Supreme
    of the Forces COKW/chi) and, of theGdNA and its pre-
    -' decessors mat oe summarized as one of complete cooperation. AI.-
    thOugh the cryptanalytic problems of the twoorgan1zatlons were "
    quite d1etinctJ) those of OKW!Chl dealing with diplomatic systems,
    of GdNA with Army -systems, whenever joint problems were deaL,_ '
    with by the two agencies therew8s complete accord.
    " .. 107. b,1a1son with the Navy 0 -'*Tha Signal Intelli'gence Agency,
    of the Navy (t5'berkommando des SeekrlegsJ:e1tuns, abbre-
    OKM14 sn III) appeared to have little liaison with, the "
    3ignallntalllgence Agency of the Army (GdNAand 1ts
    Tranow
    1
    the chief cryptanalyst of the, Signal Intelligence Agency
    of' stated -that the Navy cooperated with the Army until
    e8.1'1y 1944, but" that ,the attempt at, was
    , given up since no results of value were ,
    'The crollaboratlon,where it eXisted, or the Signal.. ,J.:,nteI11- .
    gence Agency of the Navy High Command with GdNA and its pre-
    decessors dea.lt with: ' the USA machine M-209, and
    'fBN o9ltl In both instances-, it 50 happened that the
    Navy received more frQ.m.the Army than it, gave.
    ", ,'a. . Collaboration betveen oKM/4 SKI., III and In 7/Vi'began
    :Ll'l 1943 when In 1/VI passed over to the Signal Intel11gence" ,
    Agencies, or the Navy and the Air the technique of recover-
    ing true settings, from relative settings in bl.. 20g ',solution.
    Thereafter, according to Lt. Muentz ofOKM/4 SKL III there was
    considerable liaison between the tl;t'ee aeI'v1ces 1n regard to
    M-2Q9 and they all technl.ques .91+2 Schulze. anothsl'"

    "
    937 I 96 p 13; I 67 p 2 ,
    938 I 96 p 11
    939 t 96 P 13'
    940 I 93 p 3
    941 D,21p2
    942 I 144 p 2'
    DOCID:348"6746
    .'
    cryptanalyst in OKM/4 SKL stated that 1n his investigations
    of the M.. 209 he met -Dl'o of .In 1/vI and that they had a
    detailed conversation of the methods used by the German Armyj
    Navyj) -and Air Force ,for solut10n of this these
    conversations he C9ncluded that the Navy was superior in the
    mattel' breaking into a message; the Army, in reconstructing
    tne internal sett1ngo . This was mainly because' the Army 'had more
    matel"lal t,o work on, and could depend upon having a few messages
    in depth ,every daYJlwhel'easthe Navy never got tratf1cw1th 1den.:.
    tical settings. Schulze persuaded the Army to give. the Navy some
    M-209 depth with wh1ch he could carry out
    in SKL III to exped1te the solut1oft .
    'b-o . In regard to collaboration on iBM Tranow,\ '
    :readily admitted that the Army f1JietconceiveQthe idea of using
    IBM machinery for cryptanalysis 0';) In March 1942, the Navy, ,
    .Aip Force.. and Goering
    9
    s Bureau (FA) visited the IBM :
    section of In 7/Vlin, Berlino r'Onthia Occ8.s:1.o.n," said Trano,w#
    "I to the conclusion that there 'Were enormous
    1n the IBM system for our 'Work also oII Trano'W immediately set'
    about to get some machinery tor Intelligence Agency,
    of the Na:vyI but found it dlftlcult to obtain IBM machines at
    that ,tl'me. From, March to Mayor June 1942" the Signal Intel-
    ligenc'e of the Navy' se,nt work to the Armaments
    Economic ,Section whlchwas using IBM machinery for sta-
    tistical pu:rposes. This Economic agreed to dpthe 'Work
    on condition that Tranow fUrn1sh his own staftw Hereasain,
    Tranow, h8.d trouble,. since the S:!.gnal Intelligence Agency of, ,the
    Navy had very favIBM specia11sts in the He was forced'
    to approach the Army and Air Force to obtain personnel in ex-
    <::hangefor naval of II equal value," ,as he i8 careful.to
    point out 0 By'.Ms.y' 1942, Tranow says,,' the Navy was able to Cal"t>y
    out :Lts' According to Mettig#noveverj in June 1942,
    In 7!VI undertoo'k a cQns1derable volume of IBM work for the Signal
    . Intelligence Agency of the NaVY o9
    4
    7 It seems-reasonable to sup-
    pose that this is tl,"Ue, and that' Tranow conveniently "forgot"
    this favor on the part of the Army. In September. 1944" according
    to a Navy the 'Signal Intelligence Agency of the Davy
    was l::!t111 t1 eollabo.rat1ng",with the Army on IBM procedureo ','
    943 I ,147p 22
    9
    44
    I 14t.pp 22-23
    9
    4
    5'1 l46'p 17 .
    146 p ;1.7
    947; i 78' p 12
    DOCID: 3486746
    As a matter of general policy, the .Signal Intelligence Agency
    of the Navy High Command d1sapPl:oved or indiscriminate exchange '
    a.mongthe services" Lt .. Muent2;;:3tated that 'the, head ,of his ,section
    Frankel disapproved of !3IlY contact with other services" and main-,
    tamed contact only with the ArTIlY' on M-209' solution.. Lt" Schubert
    of GdNA complained that be perSonalg{aCOuld not bring'about closer
    relations the agencieso. .'
    "I endeavoured to achieve cooperation between the
    . Al.'DIY and Navyo This task 'was actually no concern of
    ndLne. A naval officer was detached f'or six weeks who
    looked at all Army syst.ems orig1D.$.ting in the west and
    I went to him to attempt some settlement" . I
    tlt'led to achieve collaboration but lata:r events upset
    things. There 8I'e pra.ctically no points of contact be-
    t1ieen the AJ:amy and Navy. Ii .
    lOa. Liaison with the Air Force .. - -Before' the German Air
    Force IBstablfsheao its .own signal Intelligence Agency ( OKL/LN .
    Abt 350p formerly Chi-stelle OBdL)1n 1937 the Army inter-
    cept statlons(Feste) intercepted foreign Ail' Force t:raff1c and
    ,\' - worked on it a.t the .Intercept Control S.tatlon (Ho;rchleitstelle).
    According to Major Fiechtner.of the German Air however;
    the Army did not give air traffic so much attention as it did
    ground force traffic and the Air Force became increasingly dis-
    sa.tisfied with the Armyo's wOl'"ko In 1935, the Air Force began
    the formation of its own signal intelligence service
    l

    for years close relations with the Army were maintained.
    Air FClrce employees underwent fam.iliarization training at Al"D1y.
    Fixed Intercept,Stationsand the Air. Foz'ceDs first intercept .
    staticlns were set up ac.cordingto 'Army prototypes. By 1939, the
    dependlance of the Signal Inte111gence Agency of Air Force
    '. High C:ommand( OKL/LN Abt 350 forme:rly Chi-stelle O!ldL} on the
    . Signa.J. Intelligence Agency of
    4
    the Army High Command (GdNA and
    . its pI'edecessors) was ended.9 9 '.
    . Imrlng the succeeding period (1939-1945) relations ot the
    Air Force and Army were paI't1cularly good 1n field operat1ons.
    This .'raa by such means as unification of Army and Air
    Force signal regulatlons
    l
    a :regular exchange of liaison
    ,workulg personnel, reports
    l
    raw and crypt-
    , analytic methods.' A;few outstanding \examples of Army-Al:r FOI'ce
    collaboJ:'ation have been selected f:rommultitudinous instances on
    every battle front. .
    -e.
    I 26 ; 2 .
    949 IF 181 pp 14-15
    206
    DOCID: 3486746

    We !mow from the minutes' of aChi-conference held in October


    1944 that the Army and Air Force attempted to coordinate their
    signal According to the notes of the minutes pre- .
    served among the papers of Huettenhain,ll Lt. General Glmm1er." Chef'
    AgWNV" stated that one special diff'iculty in signal communica-
    tions was the fact tb&t the diverse parts of the Armed Forces
    used d1ffe:rent wire1essand cipher phraseology. In response to
    this" Lt. Gol. Schulze of the German Air Force stated:that by
    means of assimilation of Army and Air Force regula-
    tions, the d1fficulti'es arising in those services from different
    wireless and cipher phraseology would soon be overcome.950 This
    'attitude of cooperation between Army and Air Force 1s typical and
    extended to all echelons.
    A regular exchange of. liaison ofr1cers between Army and Air
    Force field units was maintained both on the eastern and western
    fronts. In the west, from 1942 an Air Force liaison otficer had
    been stationed with NAAS 5 at St. Germain0951 Ma.jor Bentze, CO
    of KONA 51 sta.ted that the two units worked closely together and
    Hentze With unit there" its complement"
    and its we,rko . ..' . . .' .
    One of the chief duties of the Army liaison at an
    Air Force signal intelligence post was to keep the ground situation
    map up to date from Air Force reports.953 Among other duties, ..
    the Air FClrce liaison officer at an Army signal!t.1nte1ligence post
    passed requests to the Air Force for support 0
    95
    ,.. '.
    Fl:!.:tendly liaison between commanders and men of units of the
    Air Force. AI(my wh:J.ch were closely assoc.1ated 1n the field mus t
    not be overlooked as a sow'ce of contact 0 Col. Muegge and .
    Colo Rosenkrantz fDrM an excellent example of this type 'of relation-
    ship.WhEm Col. Muegge was commander of' the Signal Intelligence
    Regiment (KONA 4) in Rosenkrantz, an old friend of
    his was c:ommander of the Air "Force Signal' Intelligence Unit
    stationed When Col. Muegge was moved in 1943 to Italy as
    commander of Signal Intelligence Regiment 7 (KONA 7), Col., .
    Rosenkrantz happened to be commander of the Air Force signal
    telligence in Italy and the friendly relationships of their units
    continued .955 .. '. ...' .. . .' '.' ,', .'. '.,
    Much of the interchange of men and equipment between field
    units of the Air Force and Army was caused by the fact that the
    Army had "very few long distance direction-finding sets, and
    950 D 57 :p 14
    951 IF 180 P 24
    952 I 113 'p 8 .
    953 I 130 p 10
    954 I 107 p 3
    955 I 18 pp 4-6
    207
    --,_._----
    DOCID: 3.486746
    depended upon equipment and reports from the Air Force to com-
    pensate for this deficiency. MajorOeljeschlaeger of the Air
    Force stated that the Army Signal Intelligen<Se'Regiments will-
    ingly detached direction-finding parties to reinforce the Air
    Force effOrt and that the Air Forge was always open to receive
    Army direction-finding raquests.
    9
    ....
    O
    . Muegge told interrogators
    that as of KONA 7 in borrowed two Air Force
    Direction Finding sets with long and short wave receptive powers
    t'rom Ro,senkrantz as unit and !forgot! to give them back.957 NAA-Il
    in Finltind relied on the excellent Direction Finding reports or
    the Air Force and stated that these reports were furnished
    directl:, to NAA-ll whenever theY were requested .95ts .
    Intelligence reports of all sorts were exchanged at every
    level o:f field intelligence ..' Army Group Headquarters received
    from the local Air Force whioh 'served its area oopies of the Air
    Forceas daily situation report and fortnightly summarYo959 These
    fortnightly'summaries were sent by the Army Group Headquarters to
    JodI whq stated that they were well illustrated with sketches and
    plans.9
    0
    0 Among the lower reports, and ex- .
    P?rienoes of value were constantly interchanged between units of
    the KONJi and the correlative air signal intelligence units. Re-
    ports :fl:'om the Air Force were 01' particular importance in the
    '" . identiflcation of enemy concentrations. lvl8,jor 'Oeljesohlaeger of
    '}; . the Gerlllan Air Force stated that the Air Force was alwa.ys quicker
    Off the mark than the Army mobile ground forces. The enemy could
    sneak up against German positions by imposlngradio but
    long berol'e this the Air Force would have advised the Army com-
    mands of signiricant moves of Air Force ground units.9
    6
    J..
    An interchange of traffic and methods or solution was also
    '"'"0> constantly maintained between the two services. NeWly estab-
    lished Air Force trafric was handed over Air Force units when
    it was i.nterceptedby the and from 1943 on an inter-
    change-Oif cryptanalytic methods on both western and eastern fronts
    was normal. On the western front, traffic and methods of solution
    for USA traffic M-94,M-209 TELWA9
    6
    3 were exchanged between
    NAAS 5 and western Air Force intelligence After
    . ' ....
    956 I 41 p '3
    957 I 18 P 4 <.
    958 I .
    106 p 4 '
    959 I 130 p 11 , .
    960 I 143'p6
    961 I 41 p3
    962 I 130 p 15
    963 I 11:2 pp 4-6
    208
    DOCID: 3486746

    \ .
    Section B of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Air Force .
    High Command (OKL/LN Abt 350) moved to paris following the in-
    vasion, messages encoded in Sl1dex were decoded at Paris by
    Section B, of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Commander
    1n Chief of the.Air Force, and by NAAS 5 at st. Germain and were
    exchanged daily in the t'orm of written On the south-
    eastern t'ront there was also an exchange of cryptanalytic pro-
    cedure. Muegge of KONA 4 contacted the deciphering unit of the
    Air Force unit in Athens for aid in the solution of RAF four-
    1'igure tra1'fic. Al though neither unit had any sueces s collabora-
    tionwas maintalned.965 On the eastern f"ront common problems of
    the Air Force units and Army Intelligence Regiments were
    worked on together.
    9
    Collaboration of LN 353 and
    KaNA 1 and 8 is specifically mentioned.9
    6
    7 . '
    The most striking instance of field collaboration is shown
    at time of the Dieppe raid. The Air Force intercept company
    which was responsible for monitoring landing traffic had good
    line l:Jonnections with German fighter defense and Army 1'orces
    .responsible for defense against landing operations. The Air
    Force unit maintained continuous contact with the Army units
    involved and exploited their findings for immediate by
    Air and Army. The Army signal intelligence headquarters passed
    on intelligence "to the higher headquarters, thus maintaining
    an effective diVision of labor with outstanding results. The
    . work flt Dieppr was publicised in the German newspapers and
    GoerlIlg praised it in a speech.96e ... . . .
    In summary, the Army and Air Force maintained in their field
    relations the close working relationship with an exchange of per-
    sonneJ., equipment" reports, traffic and cryptanalytic methods.
    Relations between the central agencies are less well known, but
    appeal' 'to have been adeq,uate for all that was necessary. Opera-
    tive on both fronts, such as USA M-94, M-209, Slidex,
    and Russian systems, were worked on jointly by Army and Air Force
    units in the areas where the systems were used and methods of
    soluti,on exchanged.
    l09. Liaison '11th Foreign Office.--Relations of' the Signal
    Intelligence Agency of tEe Army High Command (GdNA and its pre-
    decessors) and the cryptanalytic section of' the Foreign Office
    (Pel's ZS) were not close. This is tp be expected both from the ,
    nature of their separate commitments (the GdNA dealing exclusively
    .:
    964 I 112 p 9
    .965 IF 190 P 7 ..
    966 I 26 p 2 ...
    9.
    67
    1130 p 15
    968 I 109 p 5 ':
    209
    DOCIO: 3486746
    with Army systems, the Foreign Office with diplomatic) and from
    the well-known unwillingness of :the Foreign Ort"ice to share any
    informs. tion , , "
    Buggisch,a mathematician of In 7/VI said that he worked at
    one time on the Swiss model of the Kunae, one of the
    cryptanalystBof,the Office, and on '$ 5-flgure de Gaulle
    code in 1941 and' 1942 'Ful'ther than this there is to our
    knowledge, no record of any between the two agencies.
    Jo'dl, Chief of, Operations of the Armed stated that he did
    not receive the products of the Foreign Office bureau which went
    , directly to the Foreign Minister, Von Ribbentrop. He me", from
    milit.arylectures tbat the Foreign Of'f'icehad broken some politi-
    cal traffic, but his knowledge was not dlrect.97
    0
    , '
    110. Liaison Research Bureau. Liaison be-
    tween the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command
    " (the GdNA and its predecessors) and GoeringOs Research Bureau
    (FA) was characterized in general by narrowness of approach and
    mutual animosity of feeling. This was true, apparently, at every
    level. JodI, Chief of Ope:i....ations o.f ,the Armed Forces, told in-
    that he knew little about the Research Bureau:
    .........
    '.. ,
    t' ..'.
    '";it vasa large office and efficiently'organized, but
    Goering I S special affair. "971 , , ,',' , ,',,' ,
    Items of 'special interest f'rom the Research Bureau were passed to
    JodI f'roin special folder and Jodlreturned them after
    perusal. - He hims,eIf received nothing directly from the Research
    Bureau. Likewise, ,Goering stated that ;he'nevel' received copies
    of Army decodes as such, and had no opinion of the ability of
    the "Army bureau. "972 , ,
    _ Between the GdNA and the Research Bureau, liaison was ap-
    parently poor. Bugglsch of In 7/VI stated that this was because
    Mettig, head of In 7!VI from 1941 to 1943, was opposed to the
    Storm Trooper taint of the Research Bureau.973 Sauerb1er, a,
    lesser light in the Research Bureau, claimed that the narrowness
    -of' the heads of the Research Bureau affected'relations
    of' that organization with other bureaus inclUding the GdNA.97
    4
    - l1aison was carried on by the Goertngvs Research

    '
    - ,
    /
    969 I 58 PP 5-6
    970 I 1!4-3 p 5
    971 I 143 p 5
    , 912 I 143 p 16
    973 164 " ._
    974 I 162 P 4
    210

    ". .: .:: .. .
    DOClD: 3486746
    .-.
    Bureau was done by a single representative and never involved any
    exchange of visIts of operational personnel. Klautsche.. who was
    liaisonof.flcer .for the Research Bureau after 1943, maintaIned an
    office at the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Armed Forces (OKW!
    .Chi) and passed on material to the Navy" Air Force" and Army.975 .
    Besides actual contact with GdNA, Klautsche is said to have passed
    on intelligence material to the Arm
    I
    6
    General Staff.. Western Armies
    Branch.. and Eastern Arm1es Branch.9{ .. .
    The lack of contact between personnel of the Research Bureau
    and theGdNA is very apparent from interrogations. Fricke" a
    promin.ent mathematician of In 7/VIwhO was later transferred to
    OKW/Cl1.i, stated that he had never seen any personnel from the
    Research Bureay until the war was over and they turned up in
    prisoncamps.9.,7 Sauerbier of the Research Bureau said he did
    not know a single person in another cryptanalytic bureau.
    978
    . There are a few o.f cooperation between the Research
    Bureau and the In 7/VI .. but Buggisch.. an Army cryptanalyst .. , in- .
    siats that these were very rare.979 One o.f the outstanding" .
    instances of erfect1ve collaborat1on occurred when the Research
    Bureau was baving dI.fficulty with a Turkish diplomatic code. The
    .'. problem o.f solution and reading was turned over to In 7/VI. .
    Traffic was intercepted by KONA 4 in and relayed to the' . '
    Balkan of In 7/VI where it was broken and read untIl the
    ca
    p
    1tu1
    9aa
    on. '. t'o the Resear.ch
    Bureau. , .. .... .... ... ',' .... .. . .
    .... Buggisch stated that there was an exchange of results be-
    tween the Research Bureau and In 7/VI in connection with some
    work of the Research Bureau on a Russian secret teleprinter in
    1943. The Research Bureau had analyzed the machine and recog-
    nized t;ha t it must resemble the German SZ 40. When the Russians
    altered their system; the Research Bureau communicated there-
    sults of its investigations to the Mathematical Section of In 7/VI
    and was, given in regurn a report on the solution or a German secret
    teleprinter. No more details of the incident are mown.. but
    Buggiscp emphasizes fact that this exchange of results was a
    very rare '
    976 I"54'p 4
    977 I 20p 8
    978 1'162 p 4"
    979 I 176 p 6 .
    . 980 IF126p 8
    981 I 176 p6
    .: ...
    ... \'
    211
    , .
    DOCID: 3486746
    ,
    -.
    Collaboration between the Research Bureau and the Agents
    O
    section of In 7/VI is hinted in the statement that Wenzel$ a
    civil employee of the Research Bureau" was sent from the Re-
    search Bureau by the Radio Defense Corps (FU to the GdNA
    to work on Polish Resistance Movement Systems.
    9
    Nothing
    more is known concerning the incident trom T1COMsources.
    Evidence indicates that under pressure, GoeringOs Re-
    search Bureau resorted to the GdNA and its predecessors tor
    help in, intercept solution.. and editing of difficult traffic..
    but that 1n general the Research Bureau held itself aloof and
    '
    I ,
    111. Lia.ison with Flnland-- Liaison with Finland wa.s
    a.lways close, both at HLS Ost, and 1n the ea.stern field units.
    Formal lia1son at HLB Ost was maintained by a Finnish liaison
    officer' stationed there. This ofricer in 1942 was a Lt.
    and he was succeeded by 1st Lt. 000. Army traffic of RUSSia,
    Poland, Rumania, and Sweden wa.s exchanged. The General
    Staff 1.s said to have handed vel' to the Germans a copy of the
    Russian.'5-figure codes Which was used by the Russians 1n the
    first "3"ear of the war with Gemnany .. 984 The Germans had a high
    opinion. of Finnish cryptanalysis. Dettman of PoLS Ost stated
    that he! had visited Finland in 1942 and ha.d technical
    letters, ever since that time with the
    Lie,laon in the' field is known
    9S
    g some detail from the reports
    of BAA-,ll when it was 1n Finland. '. NAA-ll kept B. signal tntel ...
    ligence
    i
    liaison officer stationed With the main F'inn1,sh signal
    intell1.gence unit at Sortavala. This liaison officer, whose
    name we,s Riemerschmidt, had a direct radio link to NAA-ll. '
    the Germans ot NAA-llnever went to 50rtavala
    small FJinnish parties did visit NAA-ll from time to "(
    between NAA-ll and the Finns can be divided into
    several types:98SraffiC 1ia1son$ cryptographic liaison and tech-
    nical 1,iaison.' '
    , In the f1eld of traff,ic liaison, "NAA"'ll is said to have
    varied its cryptographic priorities to"give full attention to
    any spelcial links requested by the Finns through Riemerschmidt.
    NAA-ll also aided, the Finns in traffic analysis, in which the
    I
    -.
    982
    1 26 p 7
    9
    8
    3I 2], p?
    984
    r
    7H
    985
    1'13.6 p 10
    986
    1
    I 106
    987I 106 p 4
    9
    8
    ?r 106 PP 3-4
    , ,
    I I
    212
    DOCID: 3486746
    -e-
    Finns 'were admittedly weak. NAA-llta systematic w01"k and its
    ability to grasp intelligence from the analysis of small amounts
    of tra.rric was of great benefit to the Finns. D/F operations
    were coordinated very closely bet'\reen the Finns and NAA-ll. Here,
    on thEl other ha.nd, NAA-ll relied hea.vily on the Finns who had
    D/F with long range. According to Riemerschmldt, a. liaison
    observer was by the Germans with the Finnish stations
    a.t Mikleeli, Ylene, Kemi, and Rovanieme for the specific purposes
    of observing long range D/F.. . '
    In the cryptanalytio field, NAA-ll neither gave nor received
    straight intelligence from the Finns but cryptanalytic procedures
    were exchanged. The Finns gave .the Germans some very valuable
    information on Russia.n 3- and 4-f1gura ciphers which had
    succeeded lnreadingo It is amusing to note in connection that
    Riemerschmldt passed to NAA-ll some information and solution of
    traffic 1n the Russian HZ 1800 code which haa had at
    Sortavala from HLS Ost and this reached NAA-ll faster than did
    the direction transmission from HLS Ost to NAA-ll.
    Teehnical 11aison vas also handled by Riemerscbmidt and
    this proved far more helpful to the Finnish radio telegraph
    company than to NAA-ll. Finnish equipment was mostly of German
    make, with some British- and a few American receivers. The Germans
    gave the F1nns a great deal of advice concerning the operation
    of the machines and. on one occasion they put their own apparatus
    and men at the disposal of the, 'Finua for an opera.tion in a key
    sector during a Russian .
    112. Liaison with Liaison between Germany and Italy
    was negllg1blebecause of theerman lack ot confidence in the
    Italians. TheI'e could be no exchange of information, or lntel-
    lig.3nce 'When the Gerlllans were so apprehensive or the ItaJ.in cipher
    department that they thought it not competent enough to institute
    in cipher procedures even if the Italians desired to do so.
    This lack or confidence on the part of the Germans was based
    on long experience with Italia.n codes and ciphers. -As early a.s
    1941, Captain Dr. Fiala, hea.d of the Italian section of,In 7/VI,

    time because they teared that movements ot German troops around
    North Africa were being betrayed to the British by messages of
    the Italian wireless. Fialavs visit, however, does not seem
    to'have impressed the Ita.lians who were confident of their
    989
    1 106 p 3
    .99
    1
    78 p 11
    DOCID: 3486746

    own systems, and the Germans tried another scheme.


    99l
    In 1.942,
    the Italians were invited to visit the IBM section of In to
    observe the use of' these machines f'or cryptanalytic and security
    work. Captain Big1, a cryptana.lyst of the Italian army, was
    sent by the Italians ror this purpose.99
    2
    Upon his return to
    Italy, the Italians did set up an IBM section of their own, but
    it did not !'unction eff'iciently and the Germans despaired of im-
    proving Italian cipher or cryptanalytic methods.993 In late 1942,
    the Italla:n section of In 7!VIwh1ch had monitored Italian traffic
    was dissolved by order of Hitler",,994
    " After ItalyOs defection to the Allies, the Italian section
    of In 7/VI was from June 1943 until November 1943 when it
    was again During this brief period, however, no
    relations with Italy were maintained.
    113. Liaison with Japan.--Accordlng to all evidence, there
    was very little lIaison between the Army and Japan. In 1943,
    two Japanese officers visited the HLS Ost at,Loetzen for about
    half' a day. According to Dettman 7 HLS Ost they were given a
    polite reception but shown very little of anythtngand were given
    no hints as to the Germans had reached on Russian.
    traffic. The Japanese stated that they had solved the Russian
    . OKE: 6 and OKK 7 but just what help if ahy, they gave the Germans
    .. on thes'e systems 1s not mentioned Buggisch emphatically .
    stated that he had never seen any Japanese around "in the flesh"
    and that h.e knew of no liais.on with Japan. 997 "...
    At the end of the war" the Germans had decided to send a .
    cryptolog1,c mission to Japan by submarine. Included among the
    officers 'W'ere Ma"jor Opitz", a German intercept officer, Schubert,
    of"HLS Ost, and Morgenroth, a Navy cryptanalyst. How little the
    miss10n kn.ew of Japanese Signal Intelligence agencies is shown
    by the fa.c:t that they did not know whom they were to contact when.
    they got there but were to ask the German Counter Intelligence " ""
    in Japan f'or further instructicm .9ge The last minute plan could
    not he carTied out beca.use of the precipitate end of the war.9
    99
    '.: ."
    ".
    991 IF 1524; IF 1519
    992 I 78 :p 11"
    993 I 78 p 11 ..
    994 I 100 p 2
    995 I 100 p 2
    996 I 116 p 9
    997 I 64 ;p. 3 .
    998 IF P 12
    999 I 48 3
    DOCIO: 3486746
    Only one instance is remarked on in TICOM interrogations
    of exchange between the Japanese and.Germanso This occurred,
    according to Barthel;1n cormectionw1th an Army-field cipher
    by the _Japanese. Nothing more is known of the
    .1000-IF 120 P 7
    --.- :
    . . " ..
    ". ".. "
    , ," ' .....
    "'. ,.
    .. ,
    . .-: .
    . ".':
    '.7'
    .,
    . -
    ...
    -. " .. " .
    . "':.
    215
    '. ::.-.
    ..
    ..... '
    DOCID: 3486746
    ",""' ....
    VOLUME 4
    TAB A

    AgN!NA {illntsgruppe Nachrichten!Nachrichten AUfklaerung).--Depart-
    ment of Signals, Signal Intelligence. Name of cryptanalytic
    agency for non-Russian traffic 1943-1944 (successor to
    In 7/VI).
    AHA (Allg,emeines Heeres Amt.--General Army
    Air Signals Reglment.--Luftnachrichten Regiment (LN Regt).
    Allgemeines Heeres Amt (AHA).--General Army Office.
    Althans, . , Corporal. Attached toNAAS 1. r
    See Amtmann.
    Amtmann (AMTM).--Specialist. '
    Amtsgruppe Naehrichten/Nachrlchten Autk1aerung (AgN!NA).--Depart-
    roent of Signals, Signal Intelligence.
    Andrae,__ , Lt. Col. Chief of Staff of Boetzel, Chief of
    Slgn"B:r"Intelligence Agency of Army High Command (OKH!GdNA).
    Armed FOI'ces Signal Troop School. --Fuehrungs Nachrichtentruppe
    Schula (FNS). . . .
    Army Communication BI'a.nch. -"Heeres Nachrlchten Verb-.Ludungs-
    . (HNV) .
    Army High Comma.nd. --Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH).
    Army Ordna.nce, Development and Testing Group, signals Branch.--
    Watx"enpruefuM (Wa Pruet)
    Army Signal School.--Heeres Nachrichten Schule (1m3).
    Army Signal Security Agency (1940-1942)O'--Inspectorate 7/IV
    7/IV, abbreviated- In 7/IV)O'
    Arntz, ,1st Lieutenant. Aide-de-Oamp to Praun. Chef WHY
    and Chef HNW.
    Bai1ovic, Rudolf. Superior Governmental Councillor; former
    employee of Austrian Oryptanalytic Bureau; head of Balkan
    Sectlonot in 7/VI; Specialist of Yugoslav systems of T1to
    and. Mihailovic.
    BANDWURM. Ter.m used by the Germans to designate Russian Baudot
    let;ter "strip". .
    Barthel, Thomas. of KONA 7. "
    BAUDOT. A 32-charactar alphabet used in transmitting plain or ,"'
    enciphered teleprinter messages (corresponds to 26-1etter
    alphabet for hand-keying).
    BefehlS}laber Suedost.--Commanding Offic&r South-east.
    216
    .....
    DocrD: 3486746
    ' ..
    Benold, ,1st Lieutenant. Commanding Orficer of Close
    Range Signal Company (NAK Benold).
    Berger, Georg, Inspector. In charge of documents in KONA 1.
    Block, , Specialist. Head of Section 2, Group V, GdNA.
    BLOCKNOT. Russian term, used by Germans to'designate a one-
    time pad.
    Boetzel, , Colonel. Chief of-Signal Intelligence Agency of
    Army High Command (OKH!GdNA) 1944-1945. Had been Chief of
    Code lIDd Cipher Section of German War Ministry
    Boscheinen, Heinz, Non-Commissioned Officer. Turkish Interpreter;
    , Member of Bailovic's section at In 7/VI and also worked in
    Evaluation.
    Breede,' , Inspector (?). Member of British section of In
    . 1941 and worked on Typex,
    Buggisch, otto, Dr. Cryptanalyst of In 7/VI.
    Buschenhagen, , Lieutenant. Chief of Code and Cipher Section
    of German Defense Ministry 1919-1927.
    Chef del' Heeresruestung und Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres.--
    , of Army Equipment and Commander of the Replacement
    Army (Chef H Ruest u BdE). .
    .Chef del' Wehrmacht Nachrichten Verbindungen (Chef/WNV).--Chief
    . Signal Officer, Armed .
    Chef des Heeres Nachrichtenverbindungswesens (Chef/HNW).--Chief
    Signal Officer, Army. ' I
    Chef/GdNA (Chef/General del' Nachrichten Aufklaerung).--Chief,
    Signal Intelligence Service. .
    Chef/General del' Nachrichten Aufklaerung (Chef/GdNA).--Chief,
    Signal Intel11ge:uce Service. , .
    Chef/HNW (Chef del' Heeres Nachrlchtenverbindungswensens.--Chief
    . Signal Officer, Army.
    Chef H Ruest u. BdE (Chef der,Heeresruestung und Befehlshaber
    des Ersatzheeres.--Chief of Army Equipment and Commander
    of the Replacement ArmY. .
    Chef/WNV (Chef del' Wehrmacht Nachrlchten
    Signal Officer, Armed Forces.
    Chief of Army and Commander of the Replacement Army.--
    (Chef del' Heeresruestung und Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres
    (Chef H Ruest u. BdE). . '
    Chief, Signal Intelligence 8ervice.--Chef/General der.Nachrlchten
    , ; AUflclaerung (Chef/GdNA). .
    Chief Signal,Officer, Armed, Forces.--Chef del' Nach-
    , rlchten Verbindungen (Chefjwmr).
    Chlef Signal Officer, Army.--Chef del' HeeresNachrlchten-
    verbindungswesens (Chef/HNW). .
    and Cipher Sec-
    tion/German Defense Ministry..,
    211
    ,.
    DOClD:' 3486746
    \,

    '
    " ! .
    , , .
    .;"
    ,
    ,; \
    \
    ; .
    Chtf'f':rier Stelle des Oberbefehlshabers del' 1.urtvaf'fe
    StelleOBdL).--Signal Intelligence Agency of the Commander
    'j.n Obier of the Air Force. ' . .
    Chi-Stelle OBdL Stelle des Oberbefehlshabers del'
    Luftvafte)--SignslIntell1gence Agency or the Gommander 1n
    , . Chief Force. "
    Ra,nge Signal Intell1ltence Company. ":-Nachl'ichten Nah-
    , autklserung Kompanie (1VAX) . , '
    ClOSEt Range Signal Intelligence Platoon. Nah-
    . s.ufkla.erw...gszUg (NAZ l 0.' ,
    Code and Cipher Section/German Defense
    '
    Cbmb1nedStafts Detailed Interrogation Center.--CSDIC.
    Commander in Ghiet' 'Southo--Oberbefeh1shaber Sued.
    Commander in' Chief \olest.-:"Oberbereh,lsha.ber Westo
    'Commanding Offioer South-easto--Bef'ehlshaber Suedost. ,
    , Control of Signal Intel11gence--Le1tstelle Naeh-
    1':( chte:.'l A".lfklaerung (IdfA). Central evaluating agency ot
    Army H1gh Command 1942-1944. .
    Cryptanalytic Section/ot the 'German Foreign Oft1ce .. --Sonder>-
    , . dienst de} Ref"erats Z in ,del'
    , " tise:.rt1gan Amte.s Z S).. ' '
    'CSDICo Stai"t's Detailed 'Center.
    p-60. ,Miscellaneous a file orRR Dr. Huettenha1n
    . of OKW'lChl. \ A TICOM publication.', , ,
    Penfter,von. Mathemat1cian1n In 7/IV and In 7/VI. ,
    Dettmann,. Alex, '1st Head of cryptanalysis a.t BLS
    o.st; later head of section 3, Group IV of GdNA. specialty:
    . . Russian systems. . , ,
    DP'-lH. "Russian De9ryption in the Former German Army" by Dett-
    mann. and samsonow. See T-805. .' ,
    Doerlng, , Dt-. Mathematicianwith'In 1/VI"laterGdNAo
    Speciarty: Machine cipher, mathematical t-esearen.
    Paul" Count W'achtme1ster. Member' of' Balkan secti,on'
    " ,'of In 7/VI. ..' .
    ,.Extel"" Karl. Atttiched to NM-ll. . ' .
    FA. (Forschl,U'lgsamt) .--Goering8 s Research Bureau.
    FAX (Nachrichten .Fernautklaerung Kompan1e).--Long,Range Signal
    , '. Intelligenoe Company. '. ".'
    FAZ(Nachrichten ,Fernauf'klaerungszug). --Long Ran,ge Signal In-,
    . telligenee Platoon. . ..
    Fe1ehtner, Fe'rdinand, Major.Conuna.nding Officer'of" LN Regt 352
    Air Force). ,
    Fe11g1ebe1, J> Chie.fot Code 'and Cipher Section of '
    ,German.Deense Min1stry 1931-1932; Chier Signal
    Army High Command and of Supreme Command ot. Armed Poitces .
    1942-1944; Killed in July 1944 after attempt on Bitle:r
    8
    s '
    life. " .
    2:1,8
    DOCID: 13486746

    Feste. 1923-1939: Abbreviation for Feste Horchste11e (Fixed


    Int,ercept Station); 1939-1945: Abbreviation for Feste
    Nachrichten Au.fklaerungsstelle (Stationary Intercept com-
    pany). .
    Feste Horchstelle(Feste).--Fixed Intercept Station.
    Feste Nachr1chten Aufklaerungsstelle (Feste).--Stationary In-
    tercept Compan. .
    FF (Funkfernachreib).--USA non-morse radio teletype.
    Fiala.,,: , Captain. Head of Italian Section of In 7/VI during
    1941-1942.
    Fixed In,tercept Station. --Feste Horchste11e (Feste).
    FN8 (Fuehrungs Nachrichtentruppen Schule).--Armed Forces Signal
    Troop
    Forschun.gsamt (FA) .... -Goering' s Research
    Fricke, Walter, Dr. Mathematician and cryptanalyst: In 7/VI
    194,1-1942; posted to In 7/rv in 1942; transferred in 1944
    to OKW!Chi lIb. Specialty:' Production of codes and ciphers,
    _ security studies of Army systems.
    Fuehrungs Nachrichtentruppe Schule (FNS).--Armed Forces Signal
    Trc10p School. .-"
    Funkfer.IlLschrelb (FF). --USA non-morse radio teletype.
    Gehe1me Kommandosache (GKdoS).--8ecret .
    General Army Offlce.--Allgemeines Heeres Amt(AHA).
    Generalder Nachrichten AUfklaerung. Intelli-
    gellce Agency.
    GeL*lich
    J
    , Wilhelm, Dr. Attached to NAAS 1 (of KONA 1). Spe- '
    Russian systems.
    German Ministry.--Reichswehrm1n1sterium.
    German Ministry. --Relchskriegsm1nisterlum.
    Glmmler JI , Ma.jor General. Chief' Armed Forces Communicat1ons.'
    GKdoS. See Geheime Kommandosache. '
    Goer1nglls Research Bureau.-"'Forschungsamt (FA).
    Gorzolln., ".Captain. Hea.d of Group III, Signal Intelligence
    of the Army High Command (OKH/GdNA).
    Graul, Arno. Member 01: NAAS of KONA 1. Invented radio "t1nger-
    prlnter."
    Graupe" , Corporal. Member of In 7/Vl and later
    meinber of FAK 624" NAAS 5 of KONA 5. Deserted in August

    Habel, , Captain0 Successor to Seebohm as commanding officer
    . .. o?' FAX: 621 in North Africa. Captured February 1943. .
    HASSO (Horchauswertestelle --Intercept Evaluation '
    Stl!i.tion Southeast. . ;
    Hauptre:rerat. --Main Section.' .
    Heeres JNachrichten Verb1Jldungsabteilung (HNV). --Army Communi-
    cation Branch.
    Heeres :Nachrlchten Schule (lms) .--Army Signal School.
    219
    DOCID: 3486746
    \
    .,.
    ,
    \
    Heim8Im, WilhelmI' Corporal. Specialty: Russian procedure,
    cla1l signs, and f'requencle s.
    RentzEt" Rudolf, Major Dr,. Bead of Group IV, 8ignal Intelligence
    Agency of' the Army High Command (OKH/GdNA).
    Herbrue$gen, , Captain. Hea.d of Personnel Section of" In
    '"{ /VI in 10941. . .
    HertzEir, Ernst, Major. Commanding Officer of KONA 1.
    Hertzi)eld, Heintz Wolfgang, Corporal. Member of Gruppe IV,
    CJdNA; formerly member of Italia.n, Balkan sections
    Jen 7/VI.
    , Corporal. Member of NAA 8 ..
    -, Corporal. Member of lvlathematlcal Section ot
    Jen 7fVI. .' .
    HL5 (Horchleitstelle).--Intercept Control Station. Central
    . c:ryptana.lytic and evaluating agency 1933-1941. '
    m,S Of!t (Horchlei tstelle Ost). --Intercept Control Station East.
    FINS (Heeres Nachrichten Schule).--Army Signal School.
    HNV (Heeres Nachrichten Vel"hindungsabte11ung). --Al'my Commun1-
    (:8tions Branch.
    Boeh Kdr d riA (Boeherar Kommandeur del' NachrichtenAuf"klaerung).--
    Commander o:f Signal Intelligence.
    RoeheJ:oer Kommandeur. del" Nacbrichten Aufkla.erung (Hoeh Kdr dNA).--
    Commander of Signal Intelligence 0
    Hoeppue;r, , Lt. Col. Commanding ofticer of' KONA 8 in 1944.
    , C8ptain. Member of' IaN Regt 353. .
    Suedost (HASSO).--Intercept Evaluation
    station Southeast. .
    H01"ch: e1tstel1e (BLS). --Intercept Control Sta. tion.' Central
    and evaluating agency 1933-1941. .
    H01"chleltste11e Ost (HLS Ost).--Intercept Control Station East.
    --Intercept platoon.
    Huet tE:ulhain, Erich, Dr. Crypta.nalyst of Signal Intelllsence
    Agency of' Supreme Command of Armed FOl"ces (OKW/Chi). .
    Huchtjlng, Leonhard, pre. Attached to Festa 10. .
    1-2. "Interl"ogation of Dr. Huettenha1n and Dr. Fricke at Flens-
    hurg, 21 May 1945." A TICOM publicat10n.
    1-3. "Uebersicht del" Russischen Chi Ver:fahren (Nov. 1940-
    IdSy 1945)." A TICOM publication.
    1-7. "Statement of' Major McIntosh on Uftz. Graul." A TICOM
    publication.
    1-15. "Illterrogat1on of Oblt. Schubert." A TICOM publication.
    1-17.' "Extracts of SHAEF Interrogations ot Maj. Gen. Bone::r,
    Golonel Grube, Lt. Col. Mettig, and Major Ro,tt1er." A
    publication.
    1-18. "Interrogations of Oberst Muegge, O.C. of' NA 4 and NA 7
    ()f' German Ar1Il7 S1gint Service." A TICON publication.
    220

    DOCID: 3486746
    1-19 A-G. "Report on Interrogation of KONA 1 at Revin,France
    June 1945." A TICOM publication.
    1-20. "Interrogation of' Sonderf'uehrer Dr. Fricke of' OKW/Chi
    , (Formerly of OKH/Chi)." A TICOM publication. '
    1-21. "preliminary Interrogation of Oberst Kettler, RR Dr.
    Huettenhain, Sdf. Dr. Fricke and ObIt. Schubert
    15 June 1945." A TICOM publication.
    1-23. "Interrogation of Major Ernst Hertzer, German Army Sig-
    nals Intelligence Service (KONA l).ti A TICOM publication.
    1-26,. "Iilterrogation of ObIt. Schubert (OKH/Chef' HNW'/Gen.d.NA)
    on Hussian Militsryand Agents' Systems." A TICOMpublica-
    tiOl1.
    I-30" IIHeport On Interrogation of' Uffz. Karrenbe:r.g at
    on 7th July at 1100 a.m."A TICOM publication.
    1-33.. !1'Report on Traffic Analysis of' BAUDOT Trarfic by Capt.
    Jscic Msgilavy, A. U.S. 8;nd D.H. Uzie11i, SIXTA. If A T1COM
    publication.
    1-36.. ",Translation of Paper 'Written by Reg. Rat. Dr. Huetten-
    hain and Sonderf'uehrer Dr. Fricke of OKW/Chi, Sections
    A.III a!1d B.V." A TICOM,publication.
    1-45.. "OKW/Chi Cryptanalytic Research on En1gma" Hagelin and
    Cipher Teleprinter Machines." ATICOM publlcativu. '
    ,1-46., "Preliminary Report on Interrogation of Dro Otto Buggisch
    , (<;>f OKH/Gen.d.NA) and Dr. Werner Liebknecht (employed by
    , OKH and OKW as tester of cryptographic equipment) 23 June
    1945." A TICOM publication.
    1-48. "Report on Special InteI'rogation of Drs. Huettenhain and
    Fricke, Oberst Mettig" and Lt. MOI'genroth earried out on
    29th July 1945." , A TICOM publication. '
    "Interrogation Report ,on Uffz. Herzfeld, Heintz Woltgang$
    and Translation of a Paper he Wrote on the British War
    "Office ,Code." A TICOM publication.
    I-52. "papers Written by Ufrz.' Herzfeld on Mihailovic and Tito
    Ciphers." A TIOOM publica.tion.
    I-55. "Interrogation of Se,ven Members of NAA 11." A TICOM
    publication.
    I-58. "Interrogation of Dr. Otto .Buggisch of OleW/Chi." A
    'TICOM publication.'
    I-59. "Interrogation of Uffz. Arno G:rati1 at Revin." A TICON
    publication. '
    1-60. "Further Interrogation of bblt. Schubert of OKH/Chef
    HNW'/Gen.d.NA." A TICOM publication.
    1...62. ,"Field Interrogation of Paul Ratz of the German Army
    Intelligence (1933-1945)." A TICON publication.
    1-66. Paper by Dr. otto Buggisch of OKH/In 7/VI and OKW/Chi
    on TYPEX." Pi TICOM publica.tion.
    I-67. "Paper by Dr. Otto Bugglsch of OKH/ln 7/VI and OKW/Chi
    Ion Cryptanalytic Machines. itA. TI90M publication.
    221
    DOCID: 3486746
    e
    .';':'

    -e-
    I
    'f
    "d0nso1idated Report Based on Two Interrogations of
    Oberst Randewig, of Hoeh. Wehrmachts Nafue z.b.V 700,
    ., carried at C.S.D.I.C. on a.pprox. 1 Aug. andlO Aug.
    :1' 1945." A i.rICOM publica.tion. _ _
    1-69. "summary of Cipher Information on Jugoslav Traffic Pro-
    vided by Urfz. 'Herzfeld (Appendices to TICOM/I-52). It A
    TrCOM publication.
    1-72. "First Part or the Report by Wm. Buggisch on S.G. 41."
    AT1COM publication.
    1-73. "Translated Vers10n of Homework done by Wm. Buggisch."
    A TICOM
    1-74. "'Interrogation REPort on Obgefr. Keller, formerly
    Ausvertestelle 4 and Nachrichten Auf'klaerungskompa.nie 611."
    A TICOM publication.
    1-15. "Interrogation Reports on German Field S1gint Personnel
    , carried out at Buf'f'er - Ltn. August Schroeder, Ltn. Starke"
    Obegef'r.Heudorf, and Hptm. 'Holetzko. "A TICOM publication.
    1-76. Reports on Lehwald, Haupts, Klett and
    , Also 1-76 Supplement (Diagrams). A TICOM
    publication. .
    1-78. "1nter.rogation of Oberstlt. Mettig on the History and
    Achievements of OXH/AHA/ln 7/VI. "A TICOM publication.
    I-Bo. "P.O.W., Interrogation Report - Obgefr. Clement Schuck
    , Insp. VII/6 (OKH)." A TICOIIl1 pub11ce:t10n.
    1-134. "Further Interrozation of R.R. Dr. Huettenhain and Sdf.
    , Dr.' Fricke of OKWjOhi ." A TICOM publication.
    1-136. "Interrogation of Oberstlt. Mettig of OKH and OX:W/Chi
    on the higher direction of cryptanalytic work."
    A TICOM--publication.-
    1-92. "Final Interrogation of the Wachtmeister Otto Buggisch
    , (mal/In 7/VI and OKW/Chi)." A TICOM publication.
    1-96. "Interrogation of' Oberstlt. Mettig on the Organisation
    and Activities of OX:W/Chi." A TICOM publication.
    1-98. "Interrogation of Oberst Randewig on German Deception
    Plans." ,A TICOM publication.
    1-99. "Interrogation Report of Hptm. Herbert Roeder (Head of /
    Gruppe VI, Gen.d.NA, OKH, 1944-45)." A TICOM publication.
    1-:,100. "Report by Uffz. Herzfeld of NAAST 5 (Gen. d. NA) on
    the Work of the Italian Referat of' In 7/VI." A T1COM
    publication.
    "Final Interrogation-Report on the Norway Party (NAA 11).
    A TICOM publication. ,
    1-111. "Further Interrogation of Oberstlt. Mettig of OleW/Chi
    on 14th September 1945." A TICOM publication.
    1-113. "Interrogation of' Major Dr. Rudolf Hentze, Head of .
    Gruppe IV (Crypta.nalysis) General del' NachrichtenaufklaerUIl!!j
    A TICON publication. '
    222
    DOClD: 3486746
    .'
    1-115. "Further Interrogation of: Oberstlt. Mettlg of OKW/Chi .
    , on the German W1reless Secur1ty SerVice (Funldlberwaehung). tI
    A TICOM Publication. .
    ',1-116. "Report of Interrogation ot Ltn. 'Alex De'ttmann and
    . Oberwachtmeister sarg1us 5amsono\T of OKH (Gen. dNA) at
    ,. Obelt'ursel" Germany, during AUglJst 1945. If A TICON . '
    . pUblica.tion.. ,
    1-118. "Joint Reports by Reg. Rat. Dr. Huettenha1n and 5dt.
    Dr. Fricke, written at C'.S.D.I.C. on or about 28th '
    A\lgUst 1945. It A TIeOK publ1cation.
    1-122. '''Interrogation'Report onObergefre1ter lIariss. (On/Gen
    . d. ][A)." A TleON pub11cation.' .
    1-125. '''Interrogation'Report on Anton Stock of Olrn/Gen. do NAo It
    A TICoM publicat1on. ,
    1-127 .u'1nterrogationof Oberstlt .. Mett1g of OKW/Chi. h A
    TICON publication. ,.. ' .. . . .
    1-128. Aohievements of In 7/VI and OKW/Chi.
    n
    .. A TICOM publication. . ' , ' ,
    1-136. by Reg1erungsratDr. and 5dt.
    .. ,(Z) Dr. Fricke 'on B.21l.
    11
    A publication.'
    I-137. "Final Report written by(Waehtme1ster Otto Bugg1sch
    .' ,of OKH/Chi and OKW/Ch1." A T1COM publioation. . ,
    1':'142. "p/W BarthelisAecount o'GeFman Work on British; .
    American, Svedish, and French Machine Ciphers.
    1I
    A
    publication..,',,
    ,1-143. "Report on the Interrogation'ofF1ve Leading Germans
    'at Nuremberg on 27th September 1945." A T1CON publication.
    1-149. "Report by Uf"fz. Ka.rrenberg and Colleagues on Allied
    . Cypher Ma.chines. II A T1COM pUblica.tion.
    1-153.' "Second Interrogation of Uffzo Karrenberg of OKH,on
    the Baudot-Scrambler Machine (uaandlrurmU) n A TICON
    publicatiOD. ..
    1.-154. "1n'terrogatlon ot UfI"z. Rudolph Schneider of In7/VI.
    ll
    ... ' . A TICOM publication.. .
    1-156. "Report-of" Preliminary i.nterrogation of Wilhelm Ger11eh,
    AlC 1900, carried out by 3rd u.s. Army, 28thSaptember
    19450, r; A TIeON publica.tion.
    1-151. fOChart of' Communioations Within a Russian Army Dra.wn
    ,up by Ufrz 0 KarI'enberg." A T:ICOM publication.
    ,1-160. "Homevork by Kuehn of Gen. d. BAoD
    General Organisation and Work of French Referat." A
    publication. .
    ,1-161. nFurther Statements on Typexby Fricke,
    , and Mettig. It, A TICOM '
    ,
    ,I
    "
    , I
    DOCID: 340--86746

    \ .
    . '"
    ,

    .1-164. "Homework by Kurt S&uerb1er of RLM/Forschungsamt on
    Russian Agents' Trarr1c." A TICOM publication.
    1-166. "Report by Uftz. Ks.rrenberg on Russian Cryptographic
    Course. " A T1aOK publication.
    1-167. "Repc;>rt by the Karrenberg Party on the NKVD." A TICOM
    pub1ica't1on. . I,..
    1-168. . "Report by the Karrenberg party on Miscellaneous
    WIT." A TICOM publication.
    1-169. . "Report by Uftz. Karrenberg on the. Bandvurm." A'.rICOM
    publication.
    1-110. "Report on French and Greek Systems by Obervachtmeister
    . Dr. Otto Karl Winkler of OKH/FNAST 4." A TIGOM publication.
    1-11'1. "Report on Work on Russian Systems by Wachtmeister.Ber-
    gel' of FNA8T 6." A T1COM publication.
    1-113. "Report by the Xarrenberg Party on Russian WIT." A
    T1COM publication.
    1-175. "Report by Alfred Pokorn oT OKH/Chi on M.209." A TICOK
    publication. .
    1':'17'6. "Homevorkby W'achtmeister Dr. Otto Buggisch or oltH/Clli
    . . and OKW/Chi." A TICOM publication.
    1-17'8. "Homework.by Hptm. Boedigheimer of IVjNachro Regiment
    506." A TI00M publication.
    1-17'9. tlHomew'ork by Obwm. Riel, ot Stoerbefehlsstelle Balkan."
    A T1COM publication.
    I-laO. "Homework by Uf:fz. Keller of In 7/VI and WNV/Chi." A
    TICOM publication; .
    1-191. "Homevol'k ot Dr. Wilhelm Gerlich on Russian Systems."
    A TICOM publication.
    IF-S. "Notes on Field Various German Army and
    Air Force Signal Intelligence Personnel on 18/20 May 19450"
    From TICOM. . r
    IF-lS. "Final Report of' TICOM Team 1 on the Exploitation of
    Xacutbeuren and the Berchtesgaden area." From TICOMo
    IF-40. "Final Report ot TICOM Team 2.! From TIOOM.
    IF-10S.Tvo reports. First: Interrogation report on POW
    Heinz Boscheinen Walter Kotschy. 8econd; Summary
    interrogat10n report. Fl'om Headquarters, 3rd us Army,' SIS.
    1F-107. "Interrogation or POW Werner KoBo Graupe regard.1ng
    German Cryptographic and Solution ot Allied
    Codes."
    IF-108. "Interrogation or ObIt Arntz." CSDIC (UoKo) SIR 1606.
    IF-l109. "Report on Information Obtained trom Oblt Arntz;o
    CSDrC (UoKo) 8IR 1646. .
    IF-llS. "Interrogation Report on Willy Grube." 6824 DIO (MIS)
    M.l18S. '
    IP-117. "Interrogation Report on Willy Grube." 6824 DIe (MIS)
    .... . M. 1190. .
    IF..r]f:20-" j
    224
    DOCID: 3486746

    IF-120 "First detailed Interrogation Report on Thomas Barthel."


    " CSDIC/CMF/Y 40. ' ,
    IF-122 IIThird Detailed Interrogation Report on Gerd. Coeler.
    1f
    CS])IC/CMF/Y 38, 31 May 1945. '
    IF-123 "Consolidated Report on Information obtained from the
    Erdmann, 'Grubler, Hempel, Klirrenbezs, Schmitz,
    5Uf5@wk. C5DIO (U. I.) SIR 1717.
    IF-126 II Interrogation Report on Schwal'tze and Gl'aupe. II
    OS1)IC (U. K.) SIR 1335. '
    IF-127 "Interrogation Report on Schwartze and Graupe.
    1I
    , csnIC (U.K.) SIR 1374.
    IF-l}O "Copy of MIS Dossier on Fe11giebel.
    1I
    From Captured
    Ar.my Official Dossier now in MIS Files, Pentagon.
    IF-l3l, "Detailed Interrogation Report--Notes on SigIl8.1 In-
    telligence (Monitol'ing)." 6824 DIC (MIS,) M. 1080 18
    'MaI'ch 1945
    IF-l62 "Report on Preliminary Evaluation of/German Equipment
    fOI' interception of Russian Multichanne teletype circuits."
    IF-171 ,"Report on Further Information obta ed from Uffz.
    Kotschy and Uffz. Boscheinen both from esti1ngsart Abt.
    1518, deserted Diffenbach. II OSDle (UK) IR 1346. '
    IF-172 II Report 'on Further Information obta d from U.1'fz.
    Kotschy and Urfz. Boscheinen both Festu:, 'S art Abt 1518"
    at Diffe'nbach Nov. 1944. II C IC {UK) SIR
    1341 20 Dec. 1944.
    IF-176 Seabourne Report, Vol.' III. IlOperation and Techniques
    of the Radio Defense Corps, German Wehrmacht. II
    IF-lS1 Seabourne Report, Vol. VI. 11 Origins of the Luftwaffe
    - SIS and History of Its Operations in the west." ,
    IF-l90 liThe Organization and Histort of the, CryPtographic
    Service Within the German Army. I CSI;>IC (UK) SIR 1704
    8 July 1945. "
    IF-202 "Report on Information Obtained frpm PW Uffz Boscheinen,
    both or Fest Art Abt 1518, deserted at 22
    Nov. 44. , OSDle (UK) SIR 1326.
    In 7/IV (Inspektion 7/IV, Inspectora.te &/IV). Army Signal
    Security Agency 1940-1942; Army Agency for production of
    systems 1942-1944.
    Inspekti\:>n 7/IV, Inspectorate 7/IV (In 7/IV). Army S1gnal
    , 5ecur1ty Agency 1940-1942; Army Agency for Production of
    , C1ptiers 1942-1944.
    InspectoJrate 7/IV, Inspektion 7/IV (In 7/IV). Army Signal
    Security Agency 1940-1942; Army Agency for Production of
    ror Army 1942-44. '
    DOCID: 3486746
    . --
    In 7JrI (Inspektion 7/VI, Oentral crypt- .
    agency ot the German Amy High Command 1941-1942.
    Oentral cryptanalytic agency ot the German Army High Com-
    Inand for non-Russian traffic 1942-1943. .
    Inspe]{tion 7/VI, Inspectorate '{/VI (In 7/VI). Centr!\l crypt-
    agency of the Army High Command 1941-1942.
    Gentral cryptana.lytic agency of the Army High Command
    for non-Russian traffic 1942-1943.
    7!VI,Inspektion 7/VI (In 7/VI). Central crypt-
    analytic agency of the Army High Command 1941-1942. Cen-
    cryptanalytic agency of the Army High Command for
    non-Russian traffic 1942-1943.
    Inter(,ept Control Station. --Horchleitstelle (m..S).. Central
    cryptanalytic and evaluating agency of the
    Gommand ,
    Intercept Control station East.--Horchle1tstelle Ost (ELS Ost).
    Evaluation Station Southeast. --Horchauswertestel1e
    Huedost (HASSO). .
    Jering, Karl, Tech. Sgt. Attached to Chi-Stelle / OBdL.
    Jodl, Alfred, General. Chief of Armed Forces Operatlons Staff,
    OXW.
    Karrellberg, , Corporal. Attached OlOi/Gd!iA. Crypto-
    grapher.on enciphered Baudot Traffic.
    Ket t1Elr, , Col. of HLS Ost 1942; Chief of Signal
    Intelligence Agency of Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
    (OIDf/Chi) 1942-1945. . .
    Knesc:tlke, . Head, section 2, GrOll IV( Signal Iritelligence
    Army High Command (OKH/GdNAJ
    Koebe, , Lt. Chlef of Understaff
    f
    Intelligence
    of the A7!1JJ'y High Command \ OXH/GdNA) .
    Koehler, , Technician. Head of sect10n 1941-1945.
    KOm.maI1ldeur dar Naehrichten Autklaerung (KONA). --Signal Intelli-
    . Regiment. . .
    KONA der Nachrlchten Intell1-
    . genee Regiment. .
    Kopp" , Col. Senior Commander of Signal Intelligence
    . late 1944. Attached to C in C West.
    Kotschy" Welter.. Commissioned Officer. Hungarian Interpre-
    t,er. Worked in Italian section ofAf'rika Eorps. Trained
    1n "encoding and decoding" at In . .
    Kuehn, , Senior Inspectoro . Head of. tra1ni.ng. section of. '
    . . In 77f!I1941-1945 (laterhead of section 5, Group IV GdNA).
    . . .. "..' . ..
    226
    DOCID: 34867'46
    "
    Kuehne, Hans Wolfgang, Technician. Head of French section
    In 7/VI from 1941 to Feb. 194.5.
    LeChner
    4
    ' Major. Chief In 7/VI 1943; Commander KONA 6
    19 5. .
    Lenz .W,a.ldemar, Doctor O/Funker. Member of French section
    In 7/VI; later in Pa.ris. Involved in Schulze-Boysen
    Case.
    Leitstelle del' Nachrichten Aufklaerung (LNA).--Control Station
    of Signal Intelligence. Central evaluating of
    Army High Command 1942-1944. '
    Liebknecht, , Cryptanalyst in OKW/Ch1 .
    ... 4OlInsp., Head of English section of In 7/VI
    '.. until 19 3. Specialty: British codes.
    LNA. (Leitstelle del' Nachrichten Station
    of Signal Intelligence. Oentral evaluating agency of
    Army High Command 1942-1944.
    LN Regt. (Luttnachrichten Signals Regiment.
    Loeffler, Lt. Harry. Attached to Stationary Intercept Oom-
    pany 10 (Feste 10)
    Long Re.nge &ignal Intelligence Oompany. --(Nac'hr1chten Fernaufk-
    laerung Kompanle (FAK).
    Long Range Signal Intelligence Platoon.--(Nachrichten Fernaufk-
    laerungszuB (FAZ). .
    Lueders, ,1st Lt. Head of Mathematical section, sub-sect-
    ion'7 of.In 1/VI. . \ .
    Luftnachrichten Regiment (LN Regiment).--Air Signals Regiment.
    Luzius, , Doctor Corporal. Mathematician in USA
    In 17VI Specialty: M-209.
    Main Section.--Hauptreferat.
    Mana,igo, "Corporal. Head of Ita.lian section 1943" In 7/VI.
    Nang, "Major. Organized In 7/VI in 1942; Chief In 7/VI
    1941-1942.'
    Marquardt" ., Captain. Commanding Orficer NAAS 4. Head of
    Gr'oup 14, Sub Section la, or Signal Intelligence Agency
    of' Army High Command.
    Ma.rtin!., "General. Chief' Signal Officer of the Air Force.
    Menzer, . Member of OXW/Ch1.
    Mattig, , Lt. Colonel. Signal 1933;
    In. 1/VI from November 1941 to June 1943; Second in command
    of: OKW/Chi from December 1943 to April 1945.
    Mje-Koja." ,'1st Lt. Finnish liaison officer at Loetzen
    (EtLS OSTf
    Moravec:" . ." Lt. Adjutant to Chief of Signal !nte11f-
    , Agenc.yot Army Command ,GdNA).. .'
    ..
    "
    227
    DOCID: 3486746
    ".'
    ,,-
    NAA (Naohriohten Aufklaerung Abteilung).--Signal Intelligence
    Battalion.
    NAA/Chef H Ruest B d E (Naohr1chten AUfklaerung Chef
    der Heeresl"Uestung u
    1
    Befehlshaberdea Ersatzheeres) .-- -
    Signal Intelllgence Regiment of the'Replacement Army.
    HAAS (Nachrichten Aufklaerung Auswertestelle).-- S1gnal Intel11-
    ge;n.ce Evaluation Center. /
    Nach1'lchten Autklaerung Abtellung (BAA). -- SIgnal Intelligence
    Battallon. '
    Hachrlchten Aufklaerung Abtel1ung/Chef der Heeresruestung u
    1
    '
    , Be:t'ehlshaberde$'Ersatzheeres (NAA/Chef H Ruest B d E) .-- ,
    Regiment ot the Replacement Army.
    Nachrlchten Aufklaerurig Auswertestelle (HAAS).--8Ignal Intel11-
    geJ1Ce Evaluation Center.
    Nachr1chten Aufklaarungs,Ersatz und Ausbildungs Abtel1ung
    (NJ\EuAA).-- Signal Intelligence Replacement and Training
    Battallon. ' '
    Nachrlchten Dolmetscher Ersatz und Ausblldungs Abte1.lung
    (m)EuAA).--51gnal Interpreter Replacement and Tra1ning
    Bat,tallon.
    Nachrlchten Fernautklaerung Kompanle (FAF). -- Long Range
    Slgnal Intelligence Company.
    Nachrichten Fernauf'klael'Ullgszug (FAZ). --Long Range Signal
    Intelligence Platoon. '
    Nachrichten NeJ1aufklaerung Kompanie (NAK}.--Close, Range
    Signal Intelligence Compan7., ,
    Nachr1chten Nahaufklaerungszug (NAZ)_--Close Range Slgnal
    'Intelligenoe Platoon.
    N;AEuAA (Nachrlchten Aufklaerungs Ersatz und Ausblldungs
    --Signal Intelligenoe Repla.oement and Training
    Battalion.
    NAK Nallaufklaerung Kompanie). --Close Range Signal
    Intelligence Company., .
    NAZ, (Nachrichten Nahaufklaerungszug).--Close Range
    . Intelligence Platoon. .
    NDEi,iAA tNachr1chten Dolmetscher Ersatz und Ausblldungs Ab-
    tej.lung) --Signal Interpreter Replaoement and Training
    Battal10n.
    NKVD (liarodn1 Kommissar1at Vnutr1n1kh Del) .--Peoples I jCom-
    for Internal Affairs.
    -:' r; ."
    228
    DOCID: 3486746
    ,prof. Member of Signal Intelligence Agency
    of' Supreme Command of Armed Forces (OXW/Chi) and of In 7/VI.
    Oberbef'ehl-shaber Sued.--Commander in Chief South.
    Oberbefehlshaber West.--Commander in Chief West.
    Oberkommando der Luftwatte/GeneralNschrlchten Fuehrer/Abteilung
    III (OKL/Gen Na Fue/III).--8ignal Intelligence Service of '
    the Air Force High Command.
    Oberkommando des Heeres/Allgemeines Heeres AmtjAmtsgruppe
    Nachrichten!Nachrichten Atifklaerung (OKH/AHA/AgN/NA). -- "
    Signal Intelligence Department of Signals, General Army
    Office, Army H1gh Command.
    Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH).--Army High Command.
    Oberkommando des Heeres/General der Nachrichten Aufklaerung
    (OKH/GdNA).--Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High
    Command.
    Oberkommando de;t
    o
    :',Marine/Seekriegsleltung/III (ORM/Sa IV/III) .--
    Signal IntelligenceA&ency of the Navy High Command.
    Oberkommando der Wehrmacht/Chltfrierabteilung (OKW/Chi).--
    Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the
    Armed Forces.
    Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Wehrmacht Nachrichten Verbindungs
    Funkdberwachung (OXW/WNV/FU).-- Radio Defense Corps
    Oeljeschlaeger, Franz, Major. Chief ot Group II, Division III
    of the Chief Signal Office. ' ,
    ORN, , 1st Lt. Finnish liaison officer at Loetzen (HLS ost).
    OKH TODeFkommando des Heeres).--Army H1&h Command.
    O'Ji/AliA/AgN/NA {Oberkommando des Heeres/Allgemeines Heeres
    Amt/Amtsgruppe Nachrichten/Nachrichten Aufklaerung).--
    Signal Intelligence Department of Signals, General Arrrry
    Ottice, Army High Command.
    OKH/GdN,A (Oberkommando des Heeres. General der Nachrichten
    Intelligence Agency of the Army
    High Command. . . ,
    OKL/Gen, Na Fue/III {Oberkommando der LuftWaffe/General rrach-
    richten Fuehrer/Abteilung 111).-- Signal 'Intelligence
    Service ot the Air Force High Command.
    OEM/SKL, IV/III (Oberkommando daFJMarlne/Seekr.iegsleitung/
    IV/III).--81gnal Intelligence Agency of the Navy High
    Command. . .
    OKW/Chi (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht/Chiftrier Abte11ung).--
    . Signal Intelligence Agency ot the Supreme Command of
    th.e Anned Forces. .
    DOCID: 3486746
    ...... -.'
    -
    (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Wehrmacht Nachrlchten
    Verblndungen FurtkHberwachung)--Rad10 Defense Corps of
    the A.rmed Forces High Command.
    ORPO Police
    Ordnungspol1zei (ORPO).--Regular Police
    Oschmann, , Major. Chief of Code and Cipher Section of
    Qerman Defense Ministry 1932-1934. . .
    osten-Sacken, von der, Baron Col. Head of HLS Ost 1942-1944-.
    Implicated in on Hitler's life 20 July 1944 and com-
    mitted suicide.
    Pale" Erkk:l, Captain in Reserve. Chief' of Finnish Crypt.
    Outfit at
    Peilzug, Direction Finding Platoon.
    Peoples'-Comm1ssar1at f'or Internal Af'fairs.--NKVD
    Pers ZS (Sorderdienst des Referats Z in der Personal Abtellung
    des Auswaert1gen Amtes).--Cryptanalytic-Sect1on of' the
    . Foreign Oftice. .
    Pietsch, Baurat Dr. Sonderf'uehrer, Head of Mathematical
    In 7/VI (later Section 1 of Group IV, GdNA).
    Praun, , General. ChiefSlgnal Officer, ATmed Forces, Chief
    Signa! Officer Army 1944-1945 (Chef WNV Chef HNW).
    Preuss, ,1st Lieutenant. Commanding Officer of' Close Range
    Signa:rCompany (NAK preuss)
    Radio Control Station.--Rundfunkueberwachungsste1le.
    Radio Dete.nse Corps of the Armed Forces High Command, .. {OKW/WNV/
    FU).--Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Wehrmacht Nachrichten
    Ver.l1indungs Funldlberwachung. I
    Radio Intercept Station.--Wetterfunkempfangsstelle, (W-Ste1le).
    Randewlg, , Col. Commander ot Western Intercept Stations
    1939-C.0. of' Hoeh. Wehrmachts Naf'ue z.b. V 700.
    Referat, . Section . .
    Reichs Kr1egsm1nisterlum. Ministry (term used during 1935-
    1938, later changed into dberkommand0 der Wehrmachtl
    Defense Ministry. #
    Rhino'W, , Corporal. Member of Mathematical Sect10n of
    InYVI.
    R1emerschmldt, ,1st Lt. .German Army liaison otf'1ce;'rat.
    RTK (:F1nnlsh Crypt. Outf'it). .
    Roeder, Herbert, Captain. Head of Gruppe VI,' Gen.d.NA, )JKH,
    .
    .Roes s lEn" , Cap,t. Chief' Evaluator with KONA 1, Commanding Offic8_t'
    of NAAS 1.
    Rohdan, __, prc'. Head of section of AsN/NA 1943.
    2}O
    DOCID: 3486746
    Control StatIon.
    Samsonow',Sergius, Master Sergeant. Head of Seotion 3a of
    Gro1up IV. Speoialty: Russian Seoret Police Systems
    (NKWD)
    Sauerbie1r, Kurt. Member of FA. Worked on Russian Agents'
    Code.
    Sohenkel. Speoialist. Head of IBM seotion of In 7/VI 1942-
    19l/f5.
    Sohmidt, , Captain. Commanding Officer of NAA 11, head
    of 'Norway Party' , .
    Sohmidt" , Major. Head of Code and Cipher Section or
    . Defense 1927-1931.
    Sohubert;, , J.:st Lt. Expert on Russian and Polish Army
    and Agents' Codes and Ciphers.
    Seotion., --Referat.
    Seeb9limJ, Commander of FAK 621 in North Afrioa until
    oapture July 1942. .
    SeemuelJLer, , Lt. Col. C.O. of KONA 4 Feb. 44.
    Sendezug, Commun1oation Platoon.
    Senior Commander of Signal Intelligenoe.--Hoeherer Kommandeur
    del" liaohrlohten Auf'klaerung (Hoeh Kdr dNA). .
    Slgna.l jLntelllgenoe, Department ot SIgnals, General Army
    Army High Command. --Oberkommando des Heeres/ .
    Allgemeines Heeres Nachriohten/ Nachrichten
    . Aufklaerung (OKB./AlIA/AgN/NA).
    Signal :cntelllgenoe Agenoy of the Army High Command.--Ober-
    . kOlams.ndo des Haeres/General der Naohriohten AUfklaerung
    OKH/GdNA)
    Signal :Lntel11gence Agenoy ot the Commander in Chief of the
    Ai;r Force. --Chittrierstelle des Oberbefehlshabers der
    abbreviated (Chi-stelle, OBdL).
    Signal Intelligenoe Agencyot the Navy High Command.--Ober-
    kOlmnando der Marine/Seekriegsleitung IV/III (OKM/SKL/
    . IV/III).. .
    Signal :tntelligence Agency ot'the Supreme Command of the
    Forces.--Oberkommando der Wehrmaoht/Ch1tfrier
    Abte11ung (OKW/Chl).
    Signal .Intelligence Battalion.--Naohriohten Aufklaerung
    AbteI1ung (NAA).
    SIgnal Intelligence Evaluation Center.--Nachr1chten Autk-
    , . laerung' Ausvertestelle (NAAS). '
    8ignallntelligence Res1ment.--Kommandeur der Nachrichten
    Aufklaerung (KONA)
    231
    "
    DOClD: 3486746
    - Signal Intelligence Regiment of, the Replacement Army. --Nach-
    richten Aufklaerung Abteilung/ Chef der Heeresruestuns u.
    Ersatzheeres, (NAA/Chef H Ruest B d E). '
    Signal Intelligence Replacement and Training Battalion.--
    Nachrichten Aufklaerungs Ersatz und Ausbildungs Abteilung
    (NAE AA)
    Signal Intelligence Service of the Air Force High Command.--
    der LUftwaffe/ General Nachrichten Fuehrer/
    Abte:1lung III (-OKL/Gen Iia Fue/III). '
    Signal Interpreter Replacement and Training Battalion.--Nach-
    rich-ten Dolmetacher Ersatz und Ausbildungs Abteilung
    (NDE II AA). / ,
    des Referats Z in der Personalabteilung des
    Auswaertigen Amtes (Pers ZS}.--Cryptana1ytlc section of
    the Foreign Office. -
    Specialist, See Amtmann (AMTM). '
    Starke, ; Lt. Attached to NAK on the Eastern front.
    State police.--Ordnungspolizei(ORPO). ' '
    Stationary Intercept Company.--Feste Auf'klaerungs-
    stelle (Feste).. I
    Steinberg, Dr. Technician. Mathematic section of In 7/VI;
    later section 1 of Group IV, GdNAj' Worked on USA eys tems --
    M 94 and M 209. ", ./
    '[-805 l'Russian Decryption in the Former German Army", by
    Det tmann and Samsonow. See: DF-18 _ -
    Thomas, , Ptc. Attached to NAAS 1.
    USA non:niorse radio teletype. --Funkfernschreib (FF).
    Vaatz, ,1st Lt. German Air Force Liaison officer with
    " Fl.rm:lsh Hq r s at Nikkeli.
    Vauck, _,1st Lt. Head of Agents Section In 7/Vi 1942-1945.
    Warfen--prlie:fung (Wa pruef). --Army Ordnance, Signal Equipment
    Test:Lng Laboratory. .
    WaPruer (Warren Pruetung). Army Ordnance, Development and
    Testing Group, Signal Branch. " '-
    Wehrmacht Nachrichten Verb1ndungen/F'unkueberwachunb (WNV/FU).--
    Radio Defense Corps. -_
    Wenzel, , Specialist. Forschungsamt (FA).
    WetterfUDkempfangsstelle
    (Weather] .'. .
    W-Stelle (Wetterf"unkempf"angsstelle).-- Radio Intercept Station.
    Winkler.. Oscar, Corporal .. Member of KONA 4.
    232

    I IIII1IIIII1IIII111111111111111111111111111111111111111IIII1IIIII1IIII111111111111111111111111111111111111111IIII1IIIII1IIII111111111111111111111111111111111111111IIIII1111111111111111111111111
    DOCID: 3486746
    INTELLIGENCE

    .v
    '" .
    ---= GERMAN" ARMY ::SIGNAL
    CHAIN OF
    SERVICE
    COMMAND
    IN THE WEST
    SPRING 1944
    COMMANDER IN CHIEF
    WEST
    COB, WEST]
    SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
    REGIMENT 5
    [KONA 5]
    I
    I
    I 1
    TWELFTH BATTALION
    [A BT. 12]
    THIRTEENTH
    [ABT
    BATTALION
    13]
    FOURTEENTH BATTALION
    [ABT 14]
    STATIONARY
    INTERCEPT
    COMPANY 12
    [FESTE 12]
    I
    STATIONARY
    INTERCEPT,
    COM PANY 3
    [FESTE
    I
    STATIONARY
    INTERCEPT
    COMPANY 2
    [FESTE 2]
    I
    STATIONARY
    INTERCEPT
    COMPANY 9
    [FESTE 9]
    I
    LONG RANGE
    IsIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
    . COMPANY 613
    [FAK 613]
    I
    LONG RANGE
    SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
    COMPANY 624
    [FAK 624]
    I
    I
    *
    WEST THE "IN SERVICE
    COMMAND
    1945
    OF
    JANUARY
    'SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
    CHAIN
    ARMY GERMAN
    COMMANDER IN CHIEF
    WEST
    LOB. WESTl
    I
    ARMY iGROUP
    G
    [H. GI: G)
    SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
    SECTION
    [HOEH. K. d. NA]
    'ARMY GROUP
    B
    [H. Gr. B]
    I
    LEGEND
    SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
    5
    [KONA 5]
    SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
    REGIMENT 6
    [KONA 6]
    ABT.
    FAK
    - ABTEILUNG
    - FERNAUFKLAERUNGSKOMPANIE
    I
    FESTE - FESTE HORCHSTELLE
    HOEH. K.d. NA. - HOEHERER KOMMANDEUR DER NAGHRICHTEN-
    AUFKLAERUNG
    TWELFTH BATTALION
    ABT 12
    FOURTEENTH BATTALJON
    ABT 14
    I
    BATTALION
    ABT 9
    NINTH
    I
    CLOSE RANGE LONG RANGE
    ISIGNAL INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE
    COMPANY 956 COMPANY 611
    [NAK 956] [FAK 611J
    I
    LONG RANGE
    SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
    COMPANY 610
    [FAK 610]
    I
    LONG RANGE
    IsIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
    COMPANY 613
    [FAK 613]
    THIRTEENTH BATTALION
    ABT 13
    I
    CLOSE RANGE
    IsIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
    COMPANY 953
    [NAK 953]
    STATIONARY
    INTERCEPT
    COMPIINY 2
    [FESTE 2]
    I
    LONG RANGE
    SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
    COMPANY 626
    [FAK 626]
    I
    STATIONARY
    INTERCEPT
    COMPANY 3
    [FESTE 3]
    1
    LONG RANGE
    SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
    COMPIINY 624
    [FAK 624]
    I
    STATIONARY
    INTERCEPT
    COMPANY 12
    [FESTE 12]
    OTHER IF ANY, NOT KNOWN
    - OBERBEFEHLSHABER
    - KOMMANDEUR DER NACHRICHTENAUFKLAERUNG
    - NAHAUFKLAERUNGSI<lJMPANIE
    - HEERESGRUPPE
    *
    OB.
    H. Gr.
    NAK
    KONA
    '.1"'
    ,
    '""\1 '
    DOCID: 3486746
    GERMAN ARMY SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
    OPERATIONS CHART
    11111. , ""1111"1111"1111"1111"1111"1111"1111"1111"1111"1111"1111"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
    REGIMENT
    (BASED ON
    G2 OF ARMY CORPS --
    LpW LEVa TRAFFIC
    CLOSE RANGE SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
    PLATOON
    I (2 OR 3 PER COMPANY)
    R/T INTERGEPT wIT INTERCEPT
    I,
    i2 OPERATORS 3 OPERATORS
    OIFTION FINDING EVALUATION
    :5 OPERIlfOR5 3 PERSONS
    - .1. --- -- _./ J
    ,
    :
    v
    KONA 1")

    I I
    IDENTIFIED HIGH LEVEL TRAFFIC UNIDENTIFIED HIGH LEVEL TRAFFIC
    !
    "
    !
    CLOSE RANGE (MOBILE) SIGNAL
    COMPANY
    LONG RANGE (MOBILE) SIGNAL
    INTELLIGENCE COMPANY
    (2 PER REGIMENT)
    STATIONARY INTERCEPT COMPANY
    ( 1 PER REGIMENT)
    G2 OF ARMY
    (2 PER REGIMENT)
    INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION
    1 10 PERSONS (ESTIMATED)
    i
    JT\-
    ,
    DIRECTION FINDING
    50 OPERATORS
    CRYPTANALYSIS
    16 PERSONS
    INTE RCEPT :
    80 OPERATORS
    EVALU,llJION
    30 PERSONS
    r---
    I
    INTERCEPT
    60 OPERATORS
    EVALUATION
    30 PERSONS
    DIRECTION FINDING
    50 OPERATORS
    CRYPTANALYSIS
    16 f'ERS(XIIS
    SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION CENTER
    CRYPTANALYSIS
    (1 PER REGIMENT)
    TRAFFIC ANALYSIS
    --
    G2 OF ARMY GROUP-
    -
    60 PERSONS
    E V A L U A T ION::
    70 PERSONS (ESTIMATE9)
    80 PERSONS
    I
    l-
    :/:: _ _ = : . ..... /
    TOTAL PERSONNEL lIncludinq 560 Overheadl - 1330
    JI
    T
    LEGEND
    WIRELESS INTERCEPTION
    FLOW OF RAW TRAFFIC
    FLOW OF INTELLIGENCE
    ENEMY TRANSMITTER
    CHART NO.
    DOCID: 3486746
    top SEeR Et
    (OKH/G. d. NA.)
    --
    SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OF ARMY HIGH COMMAND
    I I
    FROM
    I
    OCTOBER 1944 - MAY 1945
    HEADQUARTERS I
    OBERST BOETZEL
    OBERSTLT. ANDRAE
    I I I
    I
    I
    GROUP JZ:
    MISCELLANEOUS
    GROUP r
    INTERNAL
    COMMUNICATIONS
    PRESS
    MONITORING
    AArrM. BODENMJLLER
    GROUP II
    WESTERN FRONT
    EVALUATION
    HPTM. THIEL
    GROUP m
    RUSSIAN FRONT
    EVALUATION
    HPTM. GORZOLLA
    GROUP Ill:
    CRYPTANALYSIS
    MAJ. HENTZE AMTM. BLOCK
    GROUP 11I
    SPECIAL
    INTERCEPT
    HPTM. ROEDER
    ,
    FIXED INTERCEPT
    STATION 6
    (RUSSIAN FRONT)
    FIXED INTERCEPT
    STATION 11
    (RUSSIAN FRONT)
    RESEARCH
    REG. BAURAT =REGIERUNGSBAURAT
    ,....
    1
    AMTM.
    G.d.NA.
    HPTM.
    LT.
    MAJ.
    OKH
    UFFZ.
    ABBREVIATIONS
    =AMTMANfo!
    =GENERAL DER NACHRICHTENAUFKLARUNG
    =HAUPTMANN
    =LEUTNANT
    =MAJOR
    = OBERKOMMANDO DES HEERES
    =UNTEROFFIZIER
    SECTION 3
    RUSSIAN
    CIPHERS
    DET TMANN
    I.
    SECr,ION 3.
    SPECIAL
    POLICE TRAFFIC
    (NKVD)
    SECTioN 3b
    RUSSIAN
    I
    ARMY TRAFFIC
    SECTiON 3c
    f---- RUSSIAN
    FllRTISAN TRAFFIC
    SECTION 3d
    RUSSIAN:

    ,
    SECTION 1
    -
    SECTION 1.
    RESEARCH ON
    HAND CIPHERS I---
    RE G. BAURAT
    MARQUARDT
    I---
    SECTION lb
    RESEARCH ON
    MACHINES I---
    REG. BAURAT
    PIETSCH
    SECTION 2
    WESTERN
    CIPHERS
    SUBSECTIONS
    UNKNOWN
    SECTION 4
    STATISTICAL
    (I.B.M.)
    SECTION 5
    CRYPT
    COURSES
    SECTION 1
    - WIT PROCEDURE
    RESEARCH
    SECTION 2
    I-- EVALUATION OF
    RUSSI AN DOCUMENTS
    OF SIGNAL INTEREST
    SECTION 3
    L-- INTERCEPT
    EQUIPMENT
    !SUPPLY AND SERVICE).
    SECTION 1
    _ RUSSIAN
    BAUDO:!
    SECTION 10'
    . INTERCEPTI AND
    EVALUATION OF
    INTER - SOVIET
    TRAFFic
    SECTION lb
    BAUDOT CI PHER
    RESEARCH -
    UFFZ. KARRENBERG
    SECTION lc
    INTERCEPT AND
    EVALUATION OF
    RED ARMY
    TRAFFIC
    SECTION 2 i
    '-- WESTERN TELEI!'RINTER
    AND
    AUTOMATIC MORSE
    SECTION 2.
    EVALUA110N I---
    SECTION
    INTEROEPT I---
    ESTIMATED PERSONNEL (includlnq intercept) - 700

    CHART NO. 11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111IIIIIIII1IIII11111111111111111111111111111111111111111IIIIIIII1IIII11111111111111111111111111111111111111111IIIIIIII1IIII1111111111
    DOCID: 3486746
    r
    I
    I
    lOP SECRI::i

    .1.W'
    GERMAN ARMY SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
    CHAIN OF COMMAND
    JANUARY 1945
    ARMY HIGH COMMAND

    [OKH]
    I
    SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
    AGENCY
    (G. d. NA.]
    I I
    COMMANDER IN CHIEF
    WEST
    [DB. WEST l
    I
    I--
    COMMANDER IN CRIEF
    . SOUTH ..
    (ITALY)
    [ OB. SUED] .
    COMMANDER IN CHIEF
    SOUTHEAST
    (B ALKANS)
    [OB SUEDOSTl
    SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
    SECTION
    [HOEH. K. d NA.l
    I 1
    '.
    I. SIGNAL
    REGIMENT 4 ***
    [KONA 4]
    --L-
    SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
    REGIMENT 3
    [KONA 3]
    ARMY GROUP GOURLAND
    (RUSSIAN FRONT)
    [H.Gr. Kurland]
    l'
    ARMY GROUP NORTH
    (RUSSIAN FRONT)
    [ H. Gr. Nord]
    SI(ONAL INTELLIGENCE ]
    REGIMENT 2
    [KONA 2]
    ARMY GROUP CENTER
    ( RUSSIAN FRONT)
    [ H. Gr. Mitte ]
    SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
    REGIMENT 1
    [KONA 1]
    SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
    REGIMENT 8
    [KONA 8]
    ARMY GROUP SOUTH
    (RUSSIAN FRONT)
    [ H. Gr. Sued]
    SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
    REGIMENT 7
    [KONA 7] :
    1
    ARMY GROUP B
    (WESTERN FRONT)
    [ H. Gr. B ]
    SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
    REGIMENT 6
    [KONA 6] JJ
    I
    SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
    REGIMENT 5
    r KONA 5]
    ARMY GROUP G
    (WESTERN FRONT)
    rHo Gr. G]
    THIRD BATTALION
    [ABT. 3]
    CLOSE RANGE I
    SICNAL
    COMPANY I
    [NAK rREUS5]
    CLOSE RANGE 1
    INTO L1CEN'E I
    954
    [NAK 9541
    -' - -
    FOURTH [
    [ABT. 4] J
    I
    E
    LONG RANGE I
    SIGNI\L
    COMPANY 617
    [FAK 617]
    If CLOSE RA NGE
    :ISIGNAL INTELLIGENCf

    8ENOL[)
    [NAK BEMlLDl
    1
    I

    LONG RANGE
    SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE
    COMPANY 623 I
    [ FAK 623 J
    [
    r CLOSEl-RANGEi
    !SIGNAL INTELLIGENCEj
    I COMPANY 953 ** I
    I I
    I [NAK 953J I
    L_----_-- __J
    ---_..
    SIGNAL


    EVALUATION
    CENTER
    [ NI\4S1
    'STATIONARY
    INTERCEPT
    ,COMPANY 10
    [ FESTE 101
    '\
    LEGEND
    ABTEILUNG
    FERNAUFKLARUNGSKOMPANIE
    FESTE HORCHSTELLE
    GENERAL DER NACHRICHTENAUFKLARUNG
    HEERESGRUPPE
    HOEHERER KOMMANDEUR DER NACHRICHTENAUFKLIIRUNG
    KOMMANDEUR DER NACHRICHTENAUFKLARUNG
    NACHRICHTENAUFKLARUNGSAUSWERTESTELLE
    NAHAUFKlARUNGSKOMPANIE
    OBERBEFEHLSHABER
    OBERKOMMANDO DES HEERES
    SIMILAR TO KONA 1
    CLOSE RANGE SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE COMPANY 953 SENT
    TO WESTERN FRONT, RUSSIAN SPECIALISTS RETAINED
    TO FORM NAK BENOLD AND NAK PREUSS
    LOCATED AS SHOWN THROUGH FALL 1944
    ***
    ABT.
    FAK
    FESTE
    G.d.NA.,
    H. Gr.
    HOEH. K. d. NAc
    KONA
    NAAS
    NAK
    OB.
    OKH
    *
    **
    GRAND TOTAL PERSONNEL ESTI MATED AT 12,000
    CHART NO.
    //
    DOCID: 3486746
    (WehrmachtNachriehten Verbindungswesen Funkueber-
    vach\mg III).--Rad10 Defense Corps.
    WollnYJl Ot)lt. Commanding Offioer of Feste 6; formerly Commanding
    Off"1c:er of NAZ Wor KONA 4.
    Zil1mann, i Senior Inspector. Head of British section ot
    In 7j"VI 1941.
    Z1pper, __, Inspector . Head of section 1, Group V GdNA.
    . f
    233

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