Lepanto Vs Dumapis eSCRA

6/30/23, 5:06 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 562
G.R. No. 163210. August 13, 2008.*

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY, petitioner, vs.
MORENO DUMAPIS, ELMO TUNDAGUI and FRANCIS
LIAGAO, respondents.
Labor Law; Labor Code; National Labor Relations Commission;

Administrative bodies like the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and
the rules obtaining in courts of law.—Administrative bodies like the NLRC
are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules
obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and
prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by
analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. In a number of cases, this
Court has construed Article 221 of the Labor Code as permitting the NLRC
or the LA to decide a case on the basis of position papers and other
documents submitted without necessarily resorting to technical rules of
evidence as observed in the regular courts of justice. Rules of evidence are
not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the
NLRC.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Affidavits; It is not necessary for the
affiants to appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for the
adverse party; To require otherwise would be to negate the rationale and
purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules
and to make mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence.—
In Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., 403 SCRA 699 (2003), the
Court ruled that although the affiants had not been presented to affirm the
contents of their affidavits and be cross-examined, their affidavits may be
given evidentiary value; the argument that such affidavits were hearsay was
not persuasive. Likewise, in Rase v. National Labor Relations Commission,
237 SCRA 523 (1994), this Court ruled that it was not necessary for the
affiants to appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for the
adverse party. To require otherwise would be to negate the rationale and
purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules
and to make mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
104
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company vs. Dumapis
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The admissibility of evidence should

not be confused with its probative value.—The admissibility of evidence
should not be confused with its probative value. Admissibility refers to the
question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all,
while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted
evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within
the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. The distinction is clearly
https://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000018908fa8bb4c12ba6ba000d00d40059004a/p/ARN259/?username=Guest 1/13
laid out in Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. National Labor Relations

Commission, 494 SCRA 661 (2006).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Even though technical rules of
evidence are not strictly complied with before the Labor Arbiter (LA) and
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), their decision must be
based on evidence that must, at the very least, be substantial.—While it is
true that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not
bound by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases, this
procedural rule should not be construed as a license to disregard certain
fundamental evidentiary rules. The evidence presented must at least have a
modicum of admissibility for it to have probative value. Not only must there
be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must
be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. Thus, even though technical rules of evidence are not
strictly complied with before the LA and the NLRC, their decision must be
based on evidence that must, at the very least, be substantial.
Same; Termination of Employment; Desistance; In labor cases, in
which technical rules of procedure are not to be strictly applied if the result
would be detrimental to the workingman, an affidavit of desistance gains
added importance in the absence of any evidence on record explicitly
showing that the dismissed employee committed the act which caused the
dismissal.—In labor cases, in which technical rules of procedure are not to
be strictly applied if the result would be detrimental to the workingman, an
affidavit of desistance gains added importance in the absence of any
evidence on record explicitly showing that the dismissed employee
committed the act which caused the dismissal. Accordingly, the Court
cannot turn a blind eye
105
VOL. 562, AUGUST 13, 2008 105
and disregard Madao’s recantation, as it serves to cast doubt as to the guilt

of respondent Liagao.
Same; Same; Loss of Trust and Confidence; Rule that proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required to terminate an employee on the charge of
loss of confidence, and that it is sufficient that there be some basis for such
loss of confidence, is not absolute.—While the Court agrees that the job of
the respondents, as miners, although generally described as menial, is
nevertheless of such nature as to require a substantial amount of trust and
confidence on the part of petitioner, the rule that proof beyond reasonable
doubt is not required to terminate an employee on the charge of loss of
confidence, and that it is sufficient that there be some basis for such loss of
confidence, is not absolute.
Same; Same; Same; In order that loss of trust and confidence may be
considered as a valid ground for an employee’s dismissal, it must be
substantial and not arbitrary, and must be founded on clearly established
facts sufficient to warrant the employee’s separation from work.—The right
of an employer to dismiss an employee on the ground that it has lost its trust
and confidence in him must not be exercised arbitrarily and without just
cause. In order that loss of trust and confidence may be considered as a valid
ground for an employee’s dismissal, it must be substantial and not arbitrary,
and must be founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant the
employee’s separation from work.
Same; Same; Evidence; It is a well-settled doctrine that if doubts exist
between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the
scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.—It is a well-settled
doctrine that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer
and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. It
is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his
master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation
of agreements and writing, should be resolved in the former’s favor. The
policy is to extend the doctrine to a greater number of employees who can
avail themselves of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with
the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor.
106

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ronald Rex S. Recidoro and Vladimir B. Bumatay for
petitioner.
Domogan Law Office for private respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the November 7, 2003
Decision1 and April 15, 2004 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 75860.
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Corporation (petitioner), a
domestic juridical entity engaged in mining, employed Moreno
Dumapis and Elmo Tundagui as lead miners; and Francis Liagao, as
load, haul and dump (LHD) machine operator (respondents).3 All
three were assigned at the 850 level, underground, Victoria Area in
Lepanto, Mankayan, Benguet. This is a known “highgrade” area
where most of the ores mined are considered of high grade content.4
In the afternoon of September 15, 2000, at 2:00 p.m., Dwayne
Chambers (Chambers), one of its foreign consultants who was then
acting as Assistant Resident Manager of the Mine, went
underground at the 850 level to conduct a routinary inspection of the
workers and the working conditions therein. When he went to the
various stopes of the said level, he was surprised to see that nobody
was there. However,
_______________
1 Penned by Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero with the concurrence of Justices

Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Regalado E. Maambong; Rollo, pp. 9-19.
2 Id., at pp. 20-21.
3 Id., at p. 10.
4 Rollo, p. 27.
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VOL. 562, AUGUST 13, 2008 107

when he went to the 8k stope, he noticed a group of workers sitting,

sorting, and washing ores believed to be “highgrade.” Realizing that
“highgrading”5 was being committed, Chambers shouted. Upon
hearing his angry voice, the workers scampered in different
directions of the stope.6 Chambers then reported the incident to the
security investigation office.7
After investigating, Security Investigators Paul Pespes, Jr. and

Felimon Ringor (Security Investigators) executed a Joint Affidavit,
which reads as follows:
“x x x x
At about 3:40 PM of September 15, 2000, while we were at the Lepanto
Security Investigation office, we received a report that the LMD Asst.
Resident Manager, Mr. Dwayne Chambers saw and surprised several
unidentified miners at 8K Stope, 850 level committing Highgrading
activities therein;
Consequently, all miners assigned to work therein including their
supervisor and SG Ceasarion Damoslog, an element of the Mine Security
Patrol posted therein as stationary guard were called to this office for
interrogation regarding this effect;
In the course of the investigation, we eventually learned that the
highgrading event really transpired somewhere at the roadway of 8K Stope,
850 level at about 2:00 o’clock PM of September 15, 2000. That the
involved participants were all miners assigned to work at 7K Stope, 8K
Stope, 240 E, Cross Cut South level drive, all located at 850 mine level.
Likewise, the detailed stationary guard assigned thereat and some mine
supervisors were also directly involved in this activity;
_______________
5 Presidential Decree No. 581, Section 1: Any person who shall take gold-bearing ores or
rocks from a mining claim or mining camp or shall remove, collect or gather gold-bearing ores
or rocks in place or shall extract or remove the gold from such ores or rocks, or shall prepare
and treat such ores or rocks to recover or extract the gold contents thereof, without the consent
of the operator of the mining claim, shall be guilty of “highgrading” or theft of gold x x x.
6 Rollo, p. 10.
7 Id., at p. 27.
108

Security Guard Ceasarion Damoslog honestly confessed his direct

participation then claimed that he was allegedly convinced by Mr. Joel
Gumatin, one of the miners assigned at Panel No.1-est-North, 8K Stope, 850
level to cooperate with them to commit Highgrading. He revealed his
companions to be all the miners assigned at 8K stope, namely, Joel
Gumatin, Brent Suyam, Maximo Madao, Elmo Tundagui and Daniel
Fegsar. He also included those who were assigned to work at 240 E, XCS,
namely: Thomas Garcia (immediate supervisor), John Kitoyan, Moreno
Dumapis, and Marolito Cativo. He enumerated also messrs. Benedict
Arocod, Samson Damian, and Dionisio Bandoc, 7K Stope, 850 level
assigned miners and shiftboss, respectively;
Mr. Pablo Daguio, the shiftboss of 240 E, XCS, 850 level also
positively confirmed the Highgrading activity. He added that actually he
came upon the group and even dispersed them when he went therein prior to
the arrival of Mr. Chambers;
Furthermore, we also learned from the confession of Mr. Maximo
Madao that its was messrs. Joel Gumatin and Brent Suyam who took their
issued rock drilling machine then drilled holes and blasted the same at the
8K Stope roadway with the assistance of Thomas Garcia, John Kitoyan,
Benedict Arocod, Samsom Damian, Daniel Fegsar and Francisco Liagao.
That SG Ceasarion Damoslog was present on the area standing and
watching the group during the incident;
That we are executing this joint affidavit to establish the foregoing facts
and to support any complaint that may be filed against respondents;
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands and affix our
signature this 28th day of September 2000, at Lepanto, Mankayan,
8
Benguet.” (Emphasis supplied)
On October 24, 2000, petitioner issued a resolution finding

respondents and their co-accused guilty of the offense of
highgrading and dismissing them from their employment.9
On November 14, 2000, respondents together with the nine other
miners, filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with the
_______________
8 Rollo, p. 177.
9 Id., at pp. 183-185.
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VOL. 562, AUGUST 13, 2008 109

Labor Arbiter (LA), docketed as NLRC Case No. 11-0607-00

against petitioner.10 On August 21, 2001, the LA dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit.
On September 22, 2001, the miners appealed the decision of the
LA to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On
August 30, 2002, the NLRC rendered a Decision, declaring the
dismissal of herein respondents as illegal, but affirming the dismissal
of the nine other complainant miners. The dispositive portion of the
NLRC Decision insofar as respondents are concerned, reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DECISION dated August 21,

2001 is hereby MODIFIED declaring the dismissal of complainants [herein
respondents] Moreno Dumapis, Elmo Tundagui and Francis Liagao illegal
and ordering respondent to pay them backwages in the total amount of four
hundred eighty thousand one hundred eighty two pesos and 63/100
(P480,182.63) and separation pay in the total amount of four hundred
seventeen thousand two hundred thirty pesos and 32/100 (P417,230.32) as
computed in the body of the decision.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.”11
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied

for lack of merit by the NLRC in its Resolution dated on November
22, 2002.12
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court with the CA assailing the aforementioned decision
and resolution of the NLRC. The CA affirmed the decision of the
NLRC13 and denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, herein petition on the following grounds:
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 210-221.

11 Rollo, p. 67.
12 Id., at p. 70.
13 Id., at pp. 9-19.
110

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE

AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION’S DECISION DATED
AUGUST 30, 2002 WHICH DECLARED AS ILLEGAL THE

DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE OF HEREIN RESPONDENTS.14
A. The Court of Appeal’s strict application of the hearsay rule
under Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to the present case is
uncalled for.
B. In cases of dismissal for breach of trust and confidence, proof
beyond doubt is not required, it being sufficient that the employer has
reasonable ground to believe that the employees are responsible for the
misconduct which renders them unworthy of the trust and confidence
demanded by their position.15
The petition is devoid of merit.

In finding the dismissal of respondents illegal, the CA upheld the
NLRC in considering the Joint Affidavit of the Security
Investigators (Joint Affidavit) as hearsay and therefore inadmissible,
to wit:
“We subscribed to the conclusion of the NLRC that the Joint Affidavit of
Security Investigators Paul D. Pespes, Jr. and Felimon Ringor is hearsay and
thus, inadmissible. Their narration of factual events was not based on their
personal knowledge but on disclosures made by Chambers and Daguio.
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court defined the nature of hearsay:
Witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in these rules.”16
Arguing for the admissibility of the Joint Affidavit, petitioner

cites Article 221 of the Labor Code, as amended, which provides:
_______________
14 Id., at p. 31.
15 Rollo, p. 31.
16 Id., at p. 52.
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VOL. 562, AUGUST 13, 2008 111

“Article 221. Technical rules not binding and prior resort to amicable
settlement. In any proceeding before the Commission or any Labor
Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall
not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of the Code that the
Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively
and without regard to the technicalities of law or procedure, all in the
interest of due process. x x x” (Emphasis supplied)
We agree with the petitioner.

Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the
technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in
courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by
analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.17
In a number of cases,18 this Court has construed Article 221 of
the Labor Code as permitting the NLRC or the LA to decide a case
on the basis of position papers and other documents submitted
without necessarily resorting to technical rules of evidence as
observed in the regular courts of justice. Rules of evidence are not
strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the
NLRC.19
In Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc.20 the Court ruled

that although the affiants had not been presented to affirm the
contents of their affidavits and be cross-examined, their affidavits
may be given evidentiary value; the argument that such affidavits
were hearsay was not persuasive. Like-
_______________
17 Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., G.R. No. 153660, June 10, 2003, 403
SCRA 699, 704.
18 Robusta Agro Marine Products, Inc. v. Gorobalem, G.R. No. 80500, July 5,
1989, 175 SCRA 93; Sevillana v. I.T. Corp., 408 Phil. 570; 356 SCRA 451 (2001).
19 Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., supra note 17, at p. 703.
20 Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., id.
112

wise, in Rase v. National Labor Relations Commission,21 this Court

ruled that it was not necessary for the affiants to appear and testify
and be cross-examined by counsel for the adverse party. To require
otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the
summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to
make mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence.
Thus, the CA and the NLRC erred in ruling that the Joint
Affidavit is inadmissible for being hearsay. The Joint Affidavit of the
Security Investigators is admissible for what it is, an investigation
report.
However, the admissibility of evidence should not be confused
with its probative value. Admissibility refers to the question of
whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while
probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted
evidence proves an issue.22 Thus, a particular item of evidence may
be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial
evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.23
The distinction is clearly laid out in Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission.24 In finding that the Report
of the Chief Engineer did not constitute substantial evidence to
warrant the dismissal of Rosaroso, this Court ruled:
“According to petitioner, the foregoing Report established that

respondent was dismissed for just cause. The CA, the NLRC and the Labor
Arbiter, however, refused to give credence to the Report. They are one in
ruling that the Report cannot be given any probative value as it is
uncorroborated by other evidence and that it is merely hearsay, having
come from a source, the Chief
_______________
21 G.R. No. 110637, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 523, 534.

22 PNOC Shipping & Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 38; 297 SCRA
402 (1998).
23 PNOC Shipping & Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22, at p. 59; p.
424.
24 G.R. No. 148893, July 12, 2006, 494 SCRA 661.
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VOL. 562, AUGUST 13, 2008 113

Engineer, who did not have any personal knowledge of the events
reported therein.
xxxx
The CA upheld these findings, succinctly stating as follows:
Verily, the report of Chief Engineer Retardo is utterly bereft of probative
value. It is not verified by an oath and, therefore, lacks any guarantee of
trusthworthiness. It is furthermore, and this is crucial, not sourced from
the personal knowledge of Chief Engineer Retardo. It is rather based on
the perception of “ATTENDING SUPT. ENGINEERS CONSTANTLY
OBSERVING ALL PERSONNELS ABILITY AND ATTITUDE WITH
REGARDS TO OUR TECHNICAL CAPABILITY AND BEHAVIOURS
WITH EMPHASY [sic] ON DISCIPLINE” who “ NOTICED 3/E
ROSAROSO AS BEING SLACK AND NOT CARING OF HIS JOB AND
DUTIES x x x.” Accordingly, the report is plain hearsay. It is not backed
up by the affidavit of any of the “Supt.” Engineers who purportedly
had first-hand knowledge of private respondents supposed “lack of
discipline,” “irresponsibility” and “lack of diligence” which caused him
to lose his job. x x x
The Courts finds no reason to reverse the foregoing findings.”25
(Emphasis supplied)
While it is true that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies like

the NLRC are not bound by the technical rules of procedure in the
adjudication of cases, this procedural rule should not be construed as
a license to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules. The
evidence presented must at least have a modicum of admissibility
for it to have probative value.26 Not only must there be some
evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must
be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla.27
It means
_______________
25 Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, id., at p.

666.
26 Uichico v. National Labor Relations Commission, 339 Phil. 242, 251; 273
SCRA 35, 44-45 (1997).
27 Labor v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 110388, September
14, 1995, 248 SCRA 183, 200.
114

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.28 Thus, even though technical
rules of evidence are not strictly complied with before the LA and
the NLRC, their decision must be based on evidence that must, at
the very least, be substantial.29
Pursuant to the aforementioned doctrines, we now look into the
probative weight of the Joint Affidavit.
An examination of the Joint Affidavit reveals that the facts
alleged therein by the Security Investigators are not of their own
personal knowledge. They simply referred to the facts allegedly
relayed to them by Chambers, Damoslog, Daguio, and Madao. Thus,
there is a need to individually scrutinize the statements and
testimonies of the four sources of the Joint Affidavit in order to
determine the latter’s probative weight.
The Joint Affidavit states that, “Mr. Dwayne Chambers saw and
surprised several unidentified miners x x x.”30 Chambers simply
narrated to the Security Investigators what he saw but did not
indicate herein respondents.
Also stated in the Joint Affidavit is the alleged confession of

Damoslog wherein he named respondents Tundagui and Dumapis as
his companions in the act of highgrading .31
Records show that Damoslog submitted two sworn statements. In
his first statement,32 Damoslog claimed that he was unaware of the
act of highgrading, and denied any involvement therein. However, in
his second statement,33 Damoslog claimed to have personally
witnessed the act of highgrading and named the miners involved to
wit:
_______________
28 Gelmart Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Leogardo, Jr., G.R. No. 70544, November 5,
1987, 155 SCRA 403.
29 Ang Tibay v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
30 Rollo, p. 177 (emphasis supplied).
31 Id.
32 Id., at pp. 142-143.
33 Rollo, pp. 144-147.
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VOL. 562, AUGUST 13, 2008 115

07. Ques Could you narrate briefly how it transpired then?

Ans On the first hour of this specific dated and shift at about 0800hrs, while we
were at the 8K stope, 850 level, Mr. Joel Gumatin approached me that he could
not procure some needed amount of money and if possible we will commit
highgrading for that effect to settle his problem. That because I pity him, I just
answered that if they could manage to do it then they could do it.
08. Ques Who was the companion of Mr. Gumatin when he approached you?
Ans He was alone.
09. Ques Did Gumatin specifically informed [sic] you his problem?
Ans I did not asked him honestly but he only insisted that he needed an amount
of money badly as I earlier said.
10. Ques So just after telling his purpose did he started [sic] the highgrading
activity?
Ans No, the highgrading scheme started at past 1300 Hrs.
11. Ques How did it started [sic]?
Ans They started after they all finished their respective drilling assignment.
That while I was near the panel 2-West located at the inner portion of 8K Stope, I
observed the LHD unit coming from the roadway near the 8K Eating station
which was previously parked thereat proceeded to the roadway of panel 1-West
then started cleaning and scraping said roadway. That after cleaning he parked it
at the inner portion of the roadway. Then afterwhich one among the miner who
was not assigned therein and I failed to identify his name shove two shovels on
the roadway recently cleaned by the LHD then handed it to us with another man
whom I don’t know his name but could recognize and identify him if I will meet
him again then we washed the same in the inner
116

area of panel 2-West which is adjacent. That after washing and sorting the same,
we placed it atop of an spread cartoon [sic] sheet. That while we were busy
washing and sorting, Mr. Gumatin also was fixing and spreading the airhose for
rockdrilling machine. That few moments thereafter, I heard the running engine of
the drilling machine but I can not identify the operator as my line of view was
obstructed by the curbed angle of the panel where we are washing the ores. That
afterwhich I heard somebody that they are now going to blast the drilled holes but
we remained in our place continuing washing the stones. That after the blast Mr.
Garcia and one other companion whom I failed to identify due to foggy
condition caused by the explosive blasting then handed us the additional newly
unearth ores for washing. That while were still busy washing, Gumatin
approached us then told us that he will collect what was already washed and
sorted and start to process the same. That Gumatin took the items then started to
pound the ores atop of an LHD unit parked near the entrance of panel 2-East
which was not used during the shift. That after that, I stood up then subsequently
proceeded to panel 2-West then observed messrs. Maximo Madao, Benedict
Arocod, Brent Suyam, Daniel Fegsar, Thomas Garcia, Mariolito Cativo,
John Kitoyna and Samson Damian who acted as the look out at the junction of
240 E, XCS and 8K Stope. The enumerated miners except Damian were in
squatting position in scattered adjacent places busy sorting ores. Moments later
Shift boss Dionisio Bandoc arrived then went to the place of Gumatin then told
us that he will get a portion of the already proceeded ores for the operator to
handcarry so that he will not need to come to 8K Stope, 850 level then after
taking some of the loot he proceeded out simultaneously uttering that he will
check the look out at the outer area
117
VOL. 562, AUGUST 13, 2008 117

of the mainline posted away from the 7K Stope.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, Damoslog does not name respondents Dumapis and

Tundagui as among the miners involved in the act of highgrading;
neither does he mention respondent Liagao.
The Joint Affidavit also states that Daguio positively confirmed
the act of highgrading. However, in his sworn statement,35 Daguio
claims that he did not recognize nor did he identify any of the
miners, to wit:
11. Ques In your own honest observation, what could be the estimate [sic] number
of this group of miners doing highgrading activities?
Ans I don’t know but obviously they were several as manifested by their
number of cap lamplights. I also speculated that some of them were hidden at the
curved inner access of the roadway enroute to the inner area.
12. Ques Did you recognize nor [sic] identify any of them?
Ans Honestly, no.36 (Emphasis supplied)
Lastly, the Joint Affidavit also points to the confession of Madao

wherein he particularly named respondent Liagao as one of the
miners involved in the act of highgrading.
Madao submitted two sworn statements. In his first sworn
statement37 dated September 16, 2000, Madao claimed his
innocence. He did not incriminate any of the respondents. However,
in his second sworn statement38 dated September 20, 2000, Madao
claimed to have knowledge of the act of
_______________
34 Rollo, pp. 144-145.

35 Id., at pp. 140-141.
36 Id., at p. 141.
37 Rollo, pp. 132-133.
38 Id., at p. 134.
118

highgrading and specifically named respondent Liagao as one of the

miners involved, to wit:
09. Ques Do I understand that Mr. Suyam has companions and had drilled first the
flooring of that roadway before blasting it?
Ans Yes, that is true I saw Suyam and Gumatin transferred [sic] their assigned
drilling machine at the said roadway and drilled the area with the company of
Garcia, Kitoyan, Arocod, Damian, Fegsar and Liagao.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, the second sworn statement of Madao is not

sufficient to find Liagao guilty of highgrading. In a Joint Affidavit40
which he executed with respondent Tundagui, Madao made the
following declarations:
“When I, MAXIMO MADAO reported for work on September 16, 2000,

I am being required to appear at the security investigation office. After
quitting time I went to the security office and was surprised to learn that my
name is among those listed persons who were seen by Mr. Chambers
committing acts of highgrading on September 15, 2000. However, when I
quit work on September 20, 2000 I was again called through telephone to
appear at the security office. Investigator Felimon Ringor told me that I will
give another statement and convinced to tell me all the names of the persons
assigned thereat with the promise that I will report for work. With my
limited education having not finished grade 1, I was made to give my
statement on questions and answers which are self-incriminating and
knowingly mentioned names of persons who are innocent. Worst, when I
got my copy and the contents were fully explained to me by our legal
counsel I was surprised that it was duly notarized when in fact and in truth
after I gave my statement I did not appear before Atty. Nina Fe Lazaga-
Raffols for swearing. With this circumstances, I hereby RETRACT my
statement dated September 20, 2000 for being self incriminatory
unassisted by my counsel or union representative and
_______________
39 Id.
40 Id., at pp. 136-138.
119
VOL. 562, AUGUST 13, 2008 119

hereby ADAPTS [sic] and RETAINS my sworn statement dated September

16, 2000.”41 (Emphasis supplied)
In labor cases, in which technical rules of procedure are not to be

strictly applied if the result would be detrimental to the workingman,
an affidavit of desistance gains added importance in the absence of
any evidence on record explicitly showing that the dismissed
employee committed the act which caused the dismissal.42
Accordingly, the Court cannot turn a blind eye and disregard
Madao’s recantation, as it serves to cast doubt as to the guilt of
respondent Liagao.
Based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the Joint
Affidavit, being sourced from Chambers, Damoslog, Daguio and
Madao, has no probative value to support evidence to warrant the
dismissal of the respondents. Chambers and Daguio did not identify
the miners involved in the act of highgrading. In addition,
Damoslog’s first and second sworn statements did not implicate
respondents, and Madao recanted his statement implicating
respondent Liagao. As earlier discussed, the sworn statements and
joint affidavits of the sources do not corroborate but actually cast
doubt as to the veracity of the statements in the Joint Affidavit.
The second ground is not plausible.

While the Court agrees that the job of the respondents, as miners,
although generally described as menial, is nevertheless of such
nature as to require a substantial amount of trust and confidence on
the part of petitioner,43 the rule that proof beyond reasonable doubt
is not required to terminate an employee on the charge of loss of
confidence, and that it is suffi-
_______________
41 Id., at p. 137.
42 Oania v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 97162-64, June 1,
1995, 244 SCRA 668.
43 Mina v. National Labor Relations Commission, 316 Phil. 286; 246 SCRA 229
(1995).
120

cient that there be some basis for such loss of confidence, is not
absolute.44
The right of an employer to dismiss an employee on the ground
that it has lost its trust and confidence in him must not be exercised
arbitrarily and without just cause.45 In order that loss of trust and
confidence may be considered as a valid ground for an employee’s
dismissal, it must be substantial and not arbitrary, and must be
founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant the
employee’s separation from work.46
In the present case, the Court reiterates that the evidence is not
substantial to hold respondents guilty of highgrading so as to
warrant the dismissal of respondents.
Moreover, it is a well-settled doctrine that if doubts exist between
the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales
of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. It is a time-honored
rule that in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts
reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of
agreements and writing, should be resolved in the former’s favor.
The policy is to extend the doctrine to a greater number of
employees who can avail themselves of the benefits under the law,
which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give
maximum aid and protection to labor.47
_______________
44 Labor v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 27, at p. 199.

45 Supra note 27, id.
46 See Pilipinas Bank v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 101372,
November 13, 1992, 215 SCRA 750; China City Restaurant Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 97196, January 22, 1993, 217 SCRA 443; Marcelo v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 310 Phil. 891; 240 SCRA 782 (1995).
47 Nicario v. National Labor Relations Commission, 356 Phil. 936; 295 SCRA
619 (1998).
121
VOL. 562, AUGUST 13, 2008 121

Lastly, respondents’ prayer in their Comment48 and

Memorandum,49 that the CA Decision be modified by ordering their
reinstatement to their former positions without loss of seniority

rights and with payment of full backwages from their alleged
dismissal up to date of reinstatement, deserves scant consideration.
Respondents are estopped from claiming their right to reinstatement.
Records show that respondents along with their co-accused, filed an
appeal with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75457 questioning
the decision of the NLRC. The said appeal was denied by the CA.
The case was then elevated to this Court through a petition for
review, entitled Thomas Garcia v. Court of Appeals, docketed as
G.R. No. 162554. However, the same was denied with finality for
having been filed out of time.50 In effect, it serves to estop the
respondents from praying for their reinstatement in the present case.
Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, which is also
known as “preclusion of issues” or “collateral estoppel,” issues
actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised
in any future case between the same parties involving a different
cause of action.51 Applied to the present case, the “former suit”
refers to CA-G.R. SP No. 75457 wherein the CA ordered separation
pay instead of reinstatement and G.R. No. 162554 wherein this
Court denied the petition for review filed by respondents together
with other dismissed workers. The “future case” is the present case
in which the petitioner is Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company
assailing the validity of the CA Decision declaring the dismissal of
respondents to be illegal. Reinstatement was not an issue raised by
herein petitioner. Respondents cannot now be allowed to raise the
same in the petition filed by petitioner,
_______________
48 Rollo, p. 291.
49 Id., at p. 391.
50 Rollo, pp. 309-340, 341-342, 343, 344-345, 346-347.
51 Tan v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 675, 681; 363 SCRA 444, 450 (2001).
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6/30/23, 5:06 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 562

G.R. No. 163210. August 13, 2008.*

Labor Law; Labor Code; National Labor Relations Commission;

104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company vs. Dumapis

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The admissibility of evidence should

laid out in Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. National Labor Relations

VOL. 562, AUGUST 13, 2008 105

Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company vs. Dumapis

and disregard Madao’s recantation, as it serves to cast doubt as to the guilt

106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under

1 Penned by Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero with the concurrence of Justices

VOL. 562, AUGUST 13, 2008 107

when he went to the 8k stope, he noticed a group of workers sitting,

After investigating, Security Investigators Paul Pespes, Jr. and

108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Security Guard Ceasarion Damoslog honestly confessed his direct

On October 24, 2000, petitioner issued a resolution finding

VOL. 562, AUGUST 13, 2008 109

Labor Arbiter (LA), docketed as NLRC Case No. 11-0607-00

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DECISION dated August 21,

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied

10 Id., at pp. 210-221.

110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE

AUGUST 30, 2002 WHICH DECLARED AS ILLEGAL THE

The petition is devoid of merit.

Arguing for the admissibility of the Joint Affidavit, petitioner

VOL. 562, AUGUST 13, 2008 111

We agree with the petitioner.

In Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc.20 the Court ruled

112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

wise, in Rase v. National Labor Relations Commission,21 this Court

“According to petitioner, the foregoing Report established that

21 G.R. No. 110637, October 7, 1994, 237 SCRA 523, 534.

VOL. 562, AUGUST 13, 2008 113

While it is true that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies like

25 Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, id., at p.

114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

Also stated in the Joint Affidavit is the alleged confession of

VOL. 562, AUGUST 13, 2008 115

07. Ques Could you narrate briefly how it transpired then?

116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 562, AUGUST 13, 2008 117

of the mainline posted away from the 7K Stope.34 (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, Damoslog does not name respondents Dumapis and

Lastly, the Joint Affidavit also points to the confession of Madao

34 Rollo, pp. 144-145.

118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

highgrading and specifically named respondent Liagao as one of the

Nonetheless, the second sworn statement of Madao is not

“When I, MAXIMO MADAO reported for work on September 16, 2000,

VOL. 562, AUGUST 13, 2008 119

hereby ADAPTS [sic] and RETAINS my sworn statement dated September

In labor cases, in which technical rules of procedure are not to be

The second ground is not plausible.