The Pattern of Administrative Reforms in the Closing Years of Dutch Rule in Indonesia

Author(s): Harry J. Benda

Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Aug., 1966), pp. 589-605
Published by: Association for Asian Studies
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The Pattern of Administrative Reforms
in the Closing Years of Dutch Rule in Indonesia

HARRY J. BENDA

T HE history of Indonesia in the last two or three decades of Dutch colonial rule
still has to be written, and it can only be written when the abundant archival
materials for this period, both in Indonesia and in the Netherlands, come to be
opened up for scholarly investigation.' Scholars who, since the Second World War,
have turned their attention to modern Indonesian history have tended to focus on
the development of Indonesian nationalism, and for understandable reasons. The
Indonesian Revolution, crowned by the attainment of Indonesian independence in
1949, rendered an understanding of the Indonesian nationalist movement in colo-
nial times imperative not only to Indonesian historians attempting to come to grips
with their country's recent past but also to an ever-increasingnumber of foreign stu-
dents. Welcome as this ongoing re-examination of Indonesian nationalism is, it, too,
must remain incomplete until documentary evidence, whether archival or (auto)-
biographical,can substantiallyenrich it.
There is, furthermore, another reason why most of these recent attempts must be
viewed with a modicum of caution: they are almost invariably cast in a teleological
frame of reference which reflects, so to speak, the ultimate victory of Indonesian
nationalism back upon its history in the colonial era. Implicitly or explicitly, this ap-
proach not only endows the nationalist movement (or movements, rather) with a
self-sustainingmomentum of virtually uninterrupted growth and strength, it also im-
plies that late colonial history revolved around the issue of nationalism.2 Both as-
sumptions, it would appear on closer scrutiny, are very likely erroneous and thus
tend to distort the historicalrecord, imperfectly as it is so far known to us.
This article will not directly address itself to either of these two problems. A re-
assessmentof Indonesian nationalism in the late colonial era, in particular,is reserved
for a subsequent essay. But the relative insignificance of nationalism as an issue in
the eyes of the colonial and home governments (not necessarily mirrored in the
often paranoid phobia with which most Europeans and Eurasians in the Indies
viewed "the native movement") deserves brief comment for our present purposes.
Harry J. Benda is Professorof History at Yale University.
1 A new series of officialdocuments is in the process of publication in the Netherlands, providing excel-
lent materials for future research. The first volume is S. L. van der Wal (ed.), Het onderwijsbeleidin
Nederlandsch-lndie 1900-1940: Een bronnenpublikatie-Education Policy in the Netherlands-Indies19oo-
1940 (with a Preface, Introduction and Survey of the Documents in English) (Groningen, I963). Atten-
tion should also be drawn to a three-volume publication of the official recommendations to both the
colonial and home governments by the famous Arabist, one-time Adviser on Native and Arabian Affairs,
and Professorof Arabic and Islamic Institutions at Leiden University, C. Snouck Hurgronje; two volumes
have so far appeared.E. Gobee and C. Adriaanse (eds.), Ambteliike adviezen van C. Snouck Hurgronje
(The Hague,1957, I959).
2 Cf. Harry J. Benda, "Decolonization in Indonesia: The Problem of Continuity and Change," Ameri-
can Historical Review, LXX (I965), 1058-73.

589

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590 HARRY J. BENDA
It is true, of course, that Dutch colonial officialdom was forced to take cognizance
of Indonesian nationalism. It is equally true that Dutch policy vis-a-vis Indonesian
nationalism rested, to a far from insignificant extent, on repression, especially so
after the Communist-led uprisings of the mid-nineteen twenties. Prominent Indone-
sian leaders, Communist and non-Communist alike, were either banished from the
colony or individually interned in various parts of the archipelago, while the greater
number of lesser spokesmen found their way into the detainment camp at Boven
Digul in New Guinea. The numbers so exiled were, however, relatively small; the
Digul internees,counting some I,300 in the mid-nineteentwenties,in I935 barely
totalled four hundred-surely a surprisingly low count in a total population exceed-
ing sixty-five millions.3

The Dutch Indies may, then, well have been a police state,4 and constant repres-
sion, petty and irksome surveillance of all manifestation-real or presumed-of anti-
government sentiment are matters of the record. Yet this was, at most, only the
harsh edge of a colonial system that could easily control what to all intents and pur-
poses was a numerically feeble opposition. Indeed, it was not the repressive rigor so
much as the studied, condescending indifference to Indonesian nationalism, the
stubborn refusal to take it seriously-in part at least because of its weakness-that
may well have inflicted the most damaging psychological wounds to the pride of the
movement's leadership.5 But this attitude, in turn, cannot have resulted primarily
from myopia so much as from the unshakable belief in Dutch superiority, from an
unperturbed certitude in the rightness-and inevitable gradualness-of the Dutch
civilizing mission in Indonesia.6 The humiliating record of even moderate petitions
haughtily refused, of increasingly insistent nationalist demands laughed out of
court by a Dutch government already forced into exile by the German invasion and
at a time when the war visibly threatened the colony, the miniscule gestures made on
the eve of the impending loss of the colony-they all surely testify to the firm Dutch
belief that Indonesian nationalism simply did not matter or warrant serious official
concern.7
If it is hard to imagine a governor-generalblithely asserting, in I936, the need for
3 These figures are taken from J. Th. Petrus Blumberger,Dc communistischebeweging in Nederlandsch-
Indie (Haarlem,2nd rev. ed., 1935), II8-I9.
4 The Batavia daily De lava Bode stated on December 8, I937, that "the Indies have become a state
living under a police regime." Quoted in G.-H. Bousquet, A French View of the Netherlands-Indies (tr.
by Philip E. Lilienthal; New York, I940), 34n.
5 For a thoughtful post-war Dutch discussion, see P. J. A. Idenburg, "Het Nederlandse antwoord op
het Indonesisch nationalisme," in H. Baudet and I. J. Brugmans (eds.), Balans van het Beleid: Terugblik
op de laatste halve eeuw van Nederlandsch-Indie(Assen, I96I), I21-51.
B Cf. the symptomatictitle, Mission Interrupted (Amsterdam, 1945), of an abbreviatedEnglish transla-
tion of a Dutch symposium on the Netherlands Indies, W. H. van Helsdingen and H. Hoogenberk (eds.),
Daar werd wat groots verricht . .. : Nederlandsch-Indiein de XXe eeuw (Amsterdam, I941). The book,
which contains many authoritativecontributionsby leading specialists,is pervaded by the spirit paraphrased
in the text. The same may be said of most of Balans van Beleid (see Note 5, above), and it is truer still
of the remarkable collection of essays included in a volume dedicated to the glory of the Binnenlands
Bestuur (Department of Interior Administration), Gedenkboek van de Vereniging van Ambtenaren bij
het Binnenlands Bestuur in Nederlands-Indie (Utrecht, I956). (Future references will read Gedenkboek).
7 The record is carefully chronicled in George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in
Indonesia (Ithaca, I952), Ch. III. For an insightful reminiscence by an Indonesian, see S. H. Tajibnapis,
"De laatste tien jaren voor de Japanschebezetting," De Brug/Diambatan, I, I (April, 1946), IO-14 and
I, 2 (May, I946), I4-I6. Cf. also J. de Kadt, Dc Indonesische tragedie: het treurspel der gemiste kansen
(Amsterdam, I949).

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PATTERN OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 591
another three hundred years of colonial rule anywhere else in Southeast Asia (with
the probable exception of French Indo-China), the assertion was nonetheless widely
accepted as self-evident;8 nor can we be sure that, without the Japanese cataclysm,
Dutch colonialism would or could have been forced into far-reaching concessions,
let alone seriously challenged, by Indonesian nationalism at an early date. This, for
sure, is pure speculation, as is the related question of whether the prevalence of such
an attitude among officialsin the colony and in the metropolis may not have proved
to be the major stumbling block to a timely Dutch reorientation to the new In-
donesian reality of the immediate postwar years and, even beyond them, to the bale-
ful colonial legacy of the New Guinea (Irian Barat) dispute.9
What does concern us in this essay is that the absence of a constant preoccupation
with the issue of nationalism, justified or not as it may have been, should not be
misread as the absence of a Dutch colonial policy proper in the years under investi-
gation. Such a policy did exist and it occupied, indeed it almost preempted, most of-
ficial attention to the detriment of political questions. In later colonial times the
problem of nationalism (as of other, notably religious, manifestations of antigovern-
mental movements) had been relegated to the police, leaving the administrators to
devote their expert training and tireless energies to matters of administration. Tauto-
logical as this may sound, it points up the basic-though often neglected-fact that
colonial governments are almost without exception Beamtenstaaten, apolitical, ad-
ministrative polities par excellence. The maintenance of peace and order being the
summum bonum of what, in Frederick Lasalle's contemptuous phrase, could be
called a nightwatchman state, colonial policy is above all an instrument for the im-
plementation, not of competing social demands but of "sound administration" per
se."0 That the guardians of the Dutch colonial polity had to abide by the gen-
eral rules of capitalist exploitation is as undeniable as were their frequent endeavors
to place themselves, in good Platonic style, above the persistent economic and po-
litical demands of mammon's spokesmen in the colony no less than in the metro-
politan parliament.

The last four decades of Dutch rule in Indonesia are seemingly dominated by the
constant theme of reform. They commenced in and during the first two decades re-
mained virtually limited to Java, extending to the other islands thereafter. But con-
tinuity is more apparent than real, tending to mask a rather profound hiatus that
occurred halfway along the road. To understand this disruption it will be necessary
to see reforms in the broader perspective of twentieth century colonial history.
Though the colony had for decades been a Beamtenstaat, inroads into its pristine
existence had occurred ever since the turn of the twentieth century under the aegis
8 Governor-General B. C. de Jonge (I93I-I936), in an interview granted the North Sumatran daily
Deli Courant, said i.a. ". . . I am always being asked in connection with . . . [our] policy of autonomy:
when? Now I believe that since we have worked in the Indies for some 300 years, another 300 will have
to be added before they may perhaps be ready for some kind of autonomy." Cited in Koloniaal Tijdschrift
(The Hague), XXV (I936), 338.
9 Cf. F. J. M. Duynstee, Nieuw-Guinea als schakel tussen Nederland en Indonesie (Amsterdam, I96I).
10 A prominent Dutch journalist in colonial Indonesia accurately described the apolitical nature of the
colonial polity when he called it a ". . . structure in which the problem of power plays no part, [and] in
which the play of political forces cannot ever lead to a decisive influence on the development of the conduct
of governmental [policy]." J. H. Ritman, "Eenige aanteekeningen over politeke partijen in Indie,"
Koloniale Studien (Batavia), XXI (I937), 339.

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592 HARRY J. BENDA
of the so-called Ethical Policy first enunciated in Queen Wilhelmina's speech from
the throne in i9oi.11 This new colonial policy, with its enthusiastic emphasis on
rapid modernization of colonial, but especially indigenous, society, had brought
forth a reformist zeal all too often directed against some of the most hallowed insti-
tutions of the administrative ancien regime. Political pressures for change from an
increasingly Liberal parliament were channeled through reformist-minded colonial
ministers and their appointees, the governors-general. The epitomes of the Dutch
Beamtenstaat, the corps of the Binnenlands Bestuur (Interior Administration De-
partment, usually abbreviated as B. B.), hitherto the well-nigh all-powerful "demi-
gods" of the colonial realm,'2 were forced to yield, or worse still, saw themselves by-
passed by hosts of new officials manning the mushrooming specialized technical
and welfare agencies.13At the same time, steps were taken to endow some segments
of the population with at least the rudiments of self-governing instrumentalities.The
excitements of the First World War led to ever greater experimentation, crowned
by the establishment of a quasi-representativeassembly (the Volksraad, or People's
Council) in I9I8, and by the appointment of a Revision Commission (Herzienings-
commissie) which, two years later, produced a voluminous blueprint for an in-
creasinglyliberalized colonial relationship.
The newly emerging pattern of these administrative as well as quasi-political re-
forms had by no means become rooted and established when the colony entered
an era of more or less profound shocks. To begin with, political unrest had gained
visible momentum with the rise of the first (and indeed also the last) mass move-
ment in colonial Indonesia, the Sarekat Islam, whose legators, the fledgling In-
donesian Communist Party, fanned the by then waning waves of popular unrest into
suicidal uprisings in I926-27.'4 To the "demi-gods," it was all too obvious that the
whirlwind which outsiders had created had at long last yielded-as the B. B. had
expectantly feared-its bitter harvest.'5 These turbulent events before long brought
the Beamtenstaat back into the good graces of colons and increasingly conservative

11 For the complete text of the speech from the throne, see E. van Raalte (ed. & comp.), Troonredes,
Openingsredes,Inhuldigingsredes I814-1963 (The Hague, I964), I93-94. The relevant passage reads as
follows: "As a Christian Power, the Netherlands are duty-bound better to order the legal position of the
native Christians in the Indian Archipelago, to lend firmer support to the Christian mission, and to
permeate the entire governmental system by the realization that the Netherlands has to fulfill a moral
obligation towards the population of these areas." (p. 94).
12 "Demi-gods of the centralized regime" is how a Dutch commentator referred to the B.B. officials
as late as I936. See J. J. van Bolhuis, "Indie en de NederlandischeVolksvertegenwoordiging,"De Indische
Gids (Amsterdam), 58 (I936), 73I.
13 The problems created by the rise of the technical services are briefly discussed by W. H. van

Helsdingen, "Het centraal en regionaal bewind," in Daar werd wat groots verricht, 475-76, and Ph.
Coolhaas, "Ontstaanen groei," in Gedenkboek, 64. A far more profound change, also under the aegis of
modernization, had been legal reform, which sought to separate judicial from administrative functions.
The establishmentof a judicature constituted an important diminution of the B.B. corps' authority (see
Coolhaas, ibid., 54 and 64). For a brief discussion, see H. A. Idema, "De rechtspraak,"in Daar wbrd
wat groots verricht, 448 ff.
14 These events are carefully traced in Robert Van Niel, The Development of the Indonesian Elite (The
HagueandBandung,I960), 207-42.
15 The events of the mid-ig2o's gave rise to a flood of critical, often vindictive, literature, much of it
seeking a causal connection between the uprisings and liberal reforms. One typical example is M. W. F.
Treub's Het gist in Indie (Haarlem, I927); its author was chairman of the "Ondernemersraad,"the
plantation owners' council in the Netherlands. The most important work in this flood of criticism was
that by Dr. H. Colijn, later premier and minister of colonies, Koloniale vraagstukken van heden en
morgen (Amsterdam, I928).

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PATTERN OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 593
home governments alike. Slowly, the reformist tide started to recede, to receive
further blows when the world depression of the nineteen thirties sharply reduced the
surpluses that had been the fiscal cornerstone of liberal experimentation."'"Rust en
orde" (tranquillity and order), together with financial sobriety, thus became once
again the watchwords of colonial rule, as the Netherlands entered what turned out
to be its last decade in the Indian archipelago. Officialdom reinstated to its pre-
eminence confronted the task of disentangling, if not dismantling, the web of re-
forms bequeathed to it by two decades of exuberance, while constructing a new and
presumed saferedifice of its own, "counter-reformist,"design.
We should, however, beware of seeing the "demi-gods" as the real, or the only,
devils in the drama of colonial Indonesian history. Not only is their reluctance to see
the weakening if the not the presumed dismemberment of the Beamtenstaat under-
standable in terms of normal human reactions,17their criticisms of what was being
attempted in the first two decades of this century was as often as not justified or at
least justifiable. It could be argued that under their aegis the evolution of Indo-
nesian society had been artificially retarded; but it must be admitted that the pleth-
ora of reforms introduced under pressures largely generated in distant Holland
suddenly pushed that evolution ahead with little regard for Indonesian social re-
ality. In particular, the hasty introduction of Western-style institutions into Asian
communities was (and remains), at best, problematical.The virtual repetition of the
decentralization and recentralization drama thirty years later, in the context of an
independent Indonesia, would seem to lend paradoxical weight to the erstwhile
Dutch defenders of the administrativestatus quo.

The reformist tide that was to sweep over the Netherlands Indies after the turn of
the twentieth century in large part originated in fairly widespread dissatisfaction
with the Beamtenstaat, which in many quarters was by then considered an out-
dated encumbrance. Quite apart from the fact that Indonesian society itself had
started to stir and show signs of political vigor, a widening rift between administra-
tors and European colons-generic to most modern colonies-had generated pres-
sures for modernization and change. Once the dams were breached, nothing seemed
to be sacred, purely administrative reforms being implemented side by side with
potentially more far-reaching political, or quasi-political, ones;18 their constant over-
lapping and, more important, the question of the priorities to be accorded either re-
mained characteristicfeatures of the first two decades."9
Administrative reform intersected with, and was often subsumed under, the gen-
16 For a brief discussion of the impact of the depression on the Indonesian economy, see M. A. Idema,

"Impulsen tot Indie's ontwikkeling," in Daar werd wat groots verricht, 433-35. Cf. also G. Gonggrijp,
Sc/hetsener eonomische geschiedenis van IndonesieC(Haarlem, 4th impr., 1957), Ch. VIII, esp. i8o ff.
17 B. B. opposition to reforms is specifically acknowledged by van Helsdingen, loc. cit., 46i, and by
R. K. A. Bertsch, "Het Binnenlandsch Bestuur," in Daar werd wat groots verricht, 473-74. See also
R. A. A. Wiranatakoesoema,"De Regentschapsraad,"in F. W. M. Kerchman (ed.), 25 larenDecentralisatie
in Nederlandsch-Indie,1905-1930 (Semarang, n.d., ca. I930), I9I-92, and W. C. Koenders, "Het B. B.
en de Indische maatschappij,"in Gedenkboek, 284.
18 "From the beginning," wrote an astute British observer, "administrativeand political reforms have
been closely intertwined."John S. Furnivall, Netherlands India: A Study in Plural Economy (Cambridge,
I944), 264.
19A. Jansen, "Voortzetting van de bestuurshervorming,"Koloniale Studien, XX (1936), 88-Io8; re-
printed also in Koloniaal Tijdschrift, XXV (i936), 603-22. This is one of the most concise discussions
of the reforms.

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594 HARRY J. BENDA
eral label of decentralization,a word fraught with several distinct meanings. It could
imply greater "Indian" autonomy from The Hague,20 but more frequently its prime
purpose was to loosen the tight central control wielded by Batavia over life in the
archipelago; in this latter sense, decentralization came to mean first, the creation
of organs endowed with a measure of autonomy, and thus partly removed from ad-
ministrative control and, second, the development of greater independence within
the administrative system as such. This involved regional decentralization,2' but
more particularly the bestowing of greater responsibilities upon the native ad-
ministrative corps-the so-called Inlands Bestuur-recruited from among the Java-
nese aristocracy.(This corps, in fact, derived from the precolonial royal administra-
tive system, but it had gradually been converted into an hereditary, bureaucratic
adjunct to the European B. B. of which it formed the lower echelon.22)
The first of the decentralization laws was passed in I903, when the Liberal
Christian A. W. F. Idenburg was Colonial Minister. It established municipalities in
Java (inaugurated in I905), to be followed by a few others in the outer islands dur-
ing the First World War. The tasks devolved on these bodies were, however, so nar-
rowly circumscribed that contemporary opinion dubbed the half-hearted measure a
"bang wetje"-a cautious little law.23 The municipalities also provided for a limited
measure of self-government for their European and Eurasian citizens; significantly,
however, municipal councils at first exercised no jurisdiction over the urban in-
digenous populations living in city kampongs who remained under the central con-
trol of the B. B. In I9o7-8 a beginning was also made in the direction of regional
decentralization, when so-called gewesten (departments) were created, headed by
Residents who, under this new dispensation, were to enjoy somewhat greater free-
dom of action from the center; at the same time, regional councils (gewestelijke
raden) were established in these departments.

Regional decentralization, like so much else, received a major additional boost

with the Decentralization Law of I922-to take effect in I925-which inter alia re-
placed the gewesten, to begin with, by the three Provinces of West, Central and
East JavaA4Like the municipalities, the new provinces were equipped with part-
elected, part-appointedcouncils (provinciale raden), in both cases patently fashioned
after Dutch models of local self-rule, which took the place of the poorly devised
regional councils. Neither municipal nor provincial bodies were entirely free of
administrative personnel, middle-rank B. B. officials at the outset acting as mayors
20 This aspect of decentralizationis not discussed in this paper. For a brief critical evaluation, especially

also of the constitutionalrelationship reflectedin the new basic law of I925, see Furnivall, op. cit., 277-80.
21 Insofar as this also meant a measure of greater freedom of action for European civil servantsoutside

the capital, decentralization in this limited sense of the word found ready approval among them. See
Coolhaas,loc. cit., 65.
22 For an excellent discussion of the historical development of the regent's office, see B. Schrieke, "The
Native Rulers," in Indonesian Sociological Studies: Selected Writings of B. Schrieke, Part One (The
Hague/Bandung, I955), I67-221.
23 Cited in Verslag van de Commzssie tot bestudeering van staatsrechtelijkehervormingen (Batavia,
I94I-42, 2nd impr., New York, I944), I, I34. Future referencesto this important publication, the official
report on governmental reorganization published on the eve of the Japanese occupation, will be styled
Visman Report, after the Commission's chairman, Dr. F. H. Visman, a member of the Council of the
Indies.
24The decentralizationlaw can be found in Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indii, i922, Nr. 2i6; the
ordinancesestablishing the new provinces and regencies appearedin ibid., I924, Nrs. 78 and 79.

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PATTERN OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 595
pro tem of municipalities and occupying important positions on the provincial coun-
cils. Unquestionably, though, municipalities, with their predominant European rep-
resentation, soon came to exercise a measure of true self-government that rendered
them increasingly efficient, self-reliant and impervious to administrative tutelage.
It was not so in the provincial assemblies that had been arbitrarily carved out in
accordance with broad territorial divisions devoid of intrinsic cohesion, and com-
posed of a multi-racial membership; there, officialdom, for lack of a viable con-
stituency, continued to play a more important role.25Nonetheless, the accommoda-
tion of officialdom to the quasi-democratic atmosphere and practices of conciliar
bodies was always fraught with difficulties, for the membership (including inferior
administrativeofficers) could and did exercise the right to speak to the "demi-gods"
as equals.26This, of course, did not suffice to breathe real life into the provincial
councils which might conceivably have withered on the vine but for their function-
ing as electoralcolleges for the Volksraad at Batavia. In that central advisory tribunal,
inaugurated amidst the exaggerated hopes engendered by the report of the Revision
Commission of I9I8, political decentralization had, as it were, found its supreme
expression; and it was there, too, that the winds-and at the outset even the storms
-of political life blew most forcefully, the more so since the liberally-minded gov-
ernment had at the outset appointed representativesfrom some of the most volatile
groupings to this body.27 The municipal and provincial councils-like the regency
councils presently to be discussed-were, indeed, instituted to provide, ex post facto,
a proper scaffolding for the hastily created Volksraad; they came to serve as elec-
toral colleges for the Batavia assembly. But the history of the Volksraad belongs
more properly to the political history of colonial Indonesia than to an analysis of
administrativereforms.

We may now turn to the decentralization reforms aimed at the native administra-
tive structure in Java. Where provinces were artificial creations derived from Dutch
models, the units of indigenous authority, the so-called Regencies (regentschappen),
being by and large based on administrative subdivisions of precolonial Java, at least
enjoyed a measure of traditional, organic sanction in the eyes of the population.28For
sure, the roots of that sanction lay in an autocratic past which, Dutch lipservice
notwithstanding, had long since yielded to the eroding influences of direct colonial
rule.29The twentieth century Regent might still enjoy some of the ascriptive pres-
tige inherent in the delegation of royal charisma; but over the decades he had not
only been turned into an adjunct of an intrinsically Western bureaucraticapparatus
-i.a. exemplified by the paradox that hereditary succession, though formally intro-
duced and recognized by the Dutch, had almost become the exception rather than
the rule-but the actual functions of his offlce had irresistibly passed into the hands
25 For a detailed account of regional representation,
see H. J. Levelt, "Samenstelling van de raden
der autonome ressorten," in 25 laren Decentralisatie, 24-39. A summary of the situation in later years
can be found in Visman Report, I, I38 ff.
26 See Coolhaas,loc. cit., 66-68; Bertsch,loc. cit.,
473-74, and Koenders, loc. cit., 284.
27 For a brief discussion, see Furnivall, op. cit.,
275-77. An important collection of essays on the
Volksraad appeared in Koloniale Studien, XXII (1938); that periodical devoted an entire issue (#3) to
the chamber which was then celebrating its twentieth anniversary.A convenient survey of the Volksraad
can be found in Visman Report,I, Ch. 4, Part i.
28 Cf. van Helsdingen, loc. cit., 466.
29 See Note 22, above.

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596 HARRY J. BENDA
of his officially-styled"Elder Brother," the Dutch Assistant Resident. In fact, it was
the lowest Dutch official, the Controleur, who had over the decades become the
true "head" of the regency.30By the turn of the century, little was left of the hal-
lowed principle of having "like rule over like"; at best, the Regent reigned while
his Dutch superior ruled. The waning of native authority in Java was graphically
paralleled by the decline of indirect rule in the Outer Islands, where centralization
reduced the number of the so-called self-governing areas (zelfbesturende land-
schappen) from 340 to 273 between I9I4 and I930. In part this reduction was due to
the merger of petty principalities, but in the main it resulted from their outright
abolition and absorption into directly-ruledterritories.3'
Attempts to "do something" about the indigenous governmental elite in Java
antedated the sweeping provisions of the Decentralization Law of I922. In the early
years of the Ethical era, the staunch but almost lone advocate of an associa-
tionist colonial policy, Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, loudly advocated the rapid
Westernization of this elite through Dutch higher education.32Radical as Snouck's
advice was, once adopted it would have obviated the increasingly hollow dualism
dear to Dutch administrative theory; at long last the Regent might have escaped
from his anomolous position in an administrative practice that had, in fact, no
proper place for cherished anachronisms. In the end, however, this would have
meant the "Indonesianization" of the B. B. itself, as Snouck had quite clearly en-
visaged and argued for.33 This, surely, was too much to ask and expect. Instead,
the government decided to tinker. Between I9I2 and I9I8, an experimental policy,
known under the promising name of ontvoogding (literally, "de-tutelization"), was
introduced. A few Regents, presumably selected on the basis of their educational
record and proven loyalty, were thus de-tutelized, others to follow suit later. But
in the words of a careful Dutch student, ontvoodging "did not constitute a thought-
out and complete system, but merely a faulty expression of a vague and general aim-
ing at increased independence of the native administrative corps."34One of the first
and most prominent beneficiariesof de-tutelization in fact in later years asserted that
it had not affected his position at all.35If anything, the half-hearted attempt at par-
tial devolution had led to a blurring of the lines of responsibility between B. B. and
Indands Bestuur, and hence to confusion and even to incidental friction.
But where ontvoogding constituted an internal administrative reform, that
envisaged under the Decentralization Law went beyond the administrative to the
quasi-political realm. From being a mere territorial unit, the Regency was now to
grow into an organic cell of limited self-government undergirding the new struc-
ture capped by the Volksraad. Ontvoogding, for all its nebulousness, had been a
cautious, experimental attempt, theoretically at least depending on proven merit. Not
30 Bertsch, 10c. cit., 474.
31 Van Helsdingen, loc. cit., 468-69. On the areas under indirect rule see also Rupert Emerson,
Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule (New York, 1937), Ch. IX, and J. C. C. Haar, De zelf-
bestuurspolitiek van de Korte Verklaringslandschappen in Nederlandsch-Indii (Utrecht, 1939), Ch. IX.
32 C. Snouck Hurgronje, "De inlandsche bestuursambtenaren, vooral op Java," in Verspreide geschriften
van C. Snouck Hurgronje (Bonn and Leipzig, 1924), Vol. IV #2, 147-68. See also Ambtelijke Adviezen
van C. Snouck Hurgronje, I, 538-74, for several incisive comments.
83 See Harry J. Benda, "Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy
in Indonesia," The lournal of Modern History, XXX (1958), 338-47.
34 J. M. Pieters, De zoogenaamde ontvoogding van het Inlandsch Bestuur (Wegeningen, 1932), 13 1-32.
B5Herinneringen van Pangeran Aria Achmad Djajadiningrat (Amsterdam and Batavia, 1936), IOO.

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 PATTERN OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 597
so the new decentralizationwhich, supersedinga barely-commenced and selective
de-tutelization,decreedall Regents fit to assume an entirely new role overnight.
GreaterfreedomfromEuropeancontrolwas spelledout in the reversalof the relative
positionsof AssistantResidentand Regent-the formernow officiallybecomingthe
Regent's"YoungerBrother"-andin the increasein numberof Residencies.36 Even
more important,the lowest rung in the Europeanhierarchy,the Controleur,was
abolished,thus breakingthe chain of territorialDutch controlat the village level.3"
Potentiallyfreedfromthe pressuresof Dutch paternalism,the Regentsimultaneously
had to crossthe thresholdfrom ascriptiveauthoritarianism to quasi-democracy: be-
tween I920 and I926, the Regent,without ceasingto act as titularautocraticnative
head,had, in addition,to learnto becomefirstservantof a largelyelectiveassembly,
the regencycouncil (regentschapsraad). But as presidentof the council, he was
primusinterpares,open to criticismfrom subordinatesand commoners,duty-bound
to carryout the majoritydecisionsof his fellow councillors.Many of the council
memberswere,moreover,doubtlessbetterversedin the intricaciesof parliamentary
disputationthan were the regentswho, for the greaterpart, had been reared-and
left-in relativeisolationfrommodernity.
In actuality,the councilsprovedfar less revolutionarythan Europeanand native
officialshad feared.38Staggeredelectionsbasedon an extremelylimited franchise,39
combinedwith appointivemembers,resultedin relativelymoderateassembliesin
which lower officialdompredominated.This trend was furtheredby the fact that
from the earlynineteentwentieson the majorityof the most radicalIndonesianna-
tionalists,having chosenthe path of "non-cooperation," boycottedthe representative
institutionsborn of decentralization.40 But regardlessof whether the winds of
changeblew less hard in fact than they might have threatenedto do on paper,the
regentsalmost instinctivelyturned to the EuropeanB. B. for guidance and pro-
tection of their prestigeand position in a world suddenlyrenderedinexplicably
threatening;appointivemembershipin the prestigiousVolksraadwas, for the same
reasons,eagerly embracedas a counterweightto the loss of local authority.41

Clearly,decadesof bureaucraticcentralismcould not suddenlybe undoneby re-

36 Koenders,loc. cit., 284.

37 Bertsch, 10c. cit., 474.
38 Writing in the early 1940'S van Helsdingen (loc. cit., 567) observed that "although there has been
no lack of prophets of doom, for the time being at least they have not been proved right [since] the
Councilsdo not, in fact, exert a dominant influence."
39 Out of a total Indonesian population of over io million in West Java, I.8 million were eligible to
vote for a total of 23,776 electors in i8 regencies; the equivalent figures for Central Java, with over ioz/,
million native inhabitants, were 1.97 million and 25,154, resp.; for East Java with over 14 million, 2.5
million and 32,384, resp. Visman Report, I, 145.
40 In the Bandung regency council, so its head reported in 1930, eighteen out of 23 elected members
were governmentofficials.R. A. A. Wiranatakoesoema,"De Regentschapsraad,"in 25 JarenDecentralisatie,
I90. He accounts for this state of affairs by stressing the force of tradition. Bousquet, op. cit., 69, briefly
alludes to a possible rigging of elections in favor of officials. But Wiranatakoesoemaalso specifically
mentions that the radical nationalists of Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia and Partai Nasional Indonesia
boycotted the Council while the "cooperating"Pasundan and Budi Utomo had most of their members in
the city of Bandung which was not a constituency for the regency council. This essay contains some very
interesting details on the problems besetting the regent's position vis-'a-visthe council members.
41See Koesoemo Oetoyo, "De Volksraad en de inheemsche samenleving," Koloniale Studiien, XXII
(1938), 336, and P. A. A. Djajadiningrat,"Herinneringenaan de geboorte en aan de eerste jaren van den
Volksraad,"ibid., 365.

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598 HARRY J. BENDA
forming good will alone. Political decentralization at the regency level virtually
nullified administrative decentralization, the major result being increased uncer-
tainty and a further blurring of the lines, but also, especially at the level of the
village, loss of administrative efficiency. The sin of commission merely compounded
decades' old sins of omission. The regents, left to atrophy as the remnants of a no
longer viable past, and never given a clear opportunity to grow into properly-edu-
cated, viable segments of a modern administrative apparatus, were not so much the
beneficiaries as the victims of the sudden deluge of reforms. Before long, diehard
conservatives42no less than progressive liberals43came to regard decentralization as a
brutal fiasco, particularly when the traumatic events of the mid-nineteen twenties
revealed serious lacunae in the chain of administrative responsibility. Although the
waves of unrest had certainly not been instigated or abetted by disloyal native civil
servants, their very occurrence showed that the European Beamtenstaat had lost-
or had been reformed into losing-its grip on an increasingly perturbed and vol-
atile colonial society. In Java, it was clear, the Inlands Bestuur had floundered in
uncertainty44while in West Sumatra, the corps, partly recruited in Java, but in any
case often divorced from the traditional adat-chiefs, had proved too far removed from
indigenous life and strife.45The onset of the depression, the worst economic dis-
aster ever to hit colonial Indonesia, finally buried the Ethical era in Dutch colonial
policy, or at least served as the rationalization to call a halt-barely allowed to creep
into official pronouncements-to the reforming trend of the past two decades.46
What happened was not a sudden, visible reversal of administrative and political
reforms, even though conservative voices in the Netherlands went as far as advo-
cating the abolition of the Volksraad.47Indeed, the plans devised in the early twenties
continued to be implemented in subsequent years, and especially those for Java did
not overtly deviate from the original pattern. But within this seeming continuity, if
not behind its institutional faiade, changes of far-reaching importance were taking
place, accompanied by a marked change of emphasis, whose sum total came pretty
close to restoring the Beamtenstaat to much of its erstwhile preeminence.
The most apparent turning point came in 193I, by which time the basic pattern
42 See Note I5, above. "The political wisdom of most Netherlanders [in the colony] may be briefly
summed up in one sentence: Enough has already been 'spoiled' by all sorts of 'reform'; for God's sake,
put an end to it and keep your hands off!" Ritman, op. cit., 354. See also Koenders,loc. cit., 269.
43 Professor Cornelis van Vollenhoven, the leading proponent of "ethical" colonial policies at Leiden
University, called the reforms in Java a "deplorable fiasco." Cited in D. W. N. de Boer, "Herstel van
inheemsch bestel de kern der bestuurshervormingin de Buitengewesten," Koloniaal Tiidschrift, XXV
(1936), I5I.
44See the findings of the commission set up to inquire into the causes of the Communist-led revolt
in West Java-the so-called Bantam Report-translated in Harry J. Benda and Ruth T. McVey (eds.),
The CommunistUprisingsof 1926-27 in Indonesia:Key Documents, esp. 34 and 56-57.
45 For a detailed analysis of the administrativeproblems highlighted by the insurrection on the West
Coast of Sumatra,see Rapport van de commissie van onderzoek ingesteld bij het Gouvernementsbesluitvan
13 Februari 1927, No. ia (Weltevreden, I928), Vol. III, Part I. For a highly critical comment on the
report and especially on administrative reforms in the area, see P. de Roo de la Faille, Het Sumatra's
Westkust Rapport en de Adat (The Hague, i928); the author was a former B. B. officer and ex-member
of the Council of the Indies.
46 See Visman Report, I, I37. Fear that financial considerations would impair decentralization was
expressed by the Adviser on Decentralization in I930. A. B. Cohen-Stuart,"25 jaren Decentralisatie,"in
25 Jaren Decentralisatie,23.
47 Colijn, op. cit., 88-93. Actually "Colijn ... when he became minister again . . . never even alluded
to the ideas he had professed in his book." B. H. M. Vlekke, Nusantara: A History of the East India,t
Archipelago (Cambridge,Mass., I943), 345.

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PATTERN OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 599
of decentralization in Javahad been completed.The Volksraadhad been given co-
legislativepowersin I927, and a slight Indonesianmajoritytwo yearslater,and the
establishmentof the three Provinces(West, Centraland East Java), togetherwith
the creationof the regenciesas "autonomous" units, was finally completedin Jan-
uary,I930.48Yet it is quite obviousthat by that time reactionagainstthe patternof
I922 had reachedits apex, Europeanadministrativeofficers-the "demi-gods"-hav-
ing to all intentsand purposessucceededin urging a pause for stocktakingand re-
orientation,if not for re-entrenchment.49 Mostindicativeof theirascendancywas the
least publicizedchangeat the very center of the decentralizationapparatus.Origi-
nally,the DecentralizationBureauhad been attachedto the Governor-General's cab-
inet at Buitenzorg(Bogor), thus functioningcloseto the colony'spoliticalexecutive,
and, by implication,to the Ministryof Colonies;in the late nineteentwentiesit was
transferredto the Departmentof InteriorAdministrationat Batavia(Djakarta)and
thus becamean adjunctof the BinnenlandsBestuuritself; a GovernmentCommis-
sioner, a B. B. official,was henceforthentrustedwith the implementationof de-
Decentralizationhad thus been removedfrom politicalinterference
centralization.50
in the Netherlandsand"domesticated" in the citadelof theBeamtenstaat.

In 1931, recentralizationcommencedunder the innocuousbannerof "allocation

of tasks" (taakverdeeling),actuallya ratherfar-reachingredistributionof admin-
especiallywith regardto the InlandsBestuur.5
istrativefunctionsand responsibilities,
However limited and even problematicalthe Regents'position may have become
as a resultof ontvoogdingand, especially,of the later reforms,it had affectedthat
of their Europeancolleagues,especiallythe AssistantResidents.52 At the same time,
the new system-barelyoperativeas it was in the mid-nineteentwenties-had mani-
festlymalfunctionedin times of politicalcrisis,thus demonstrating,or so it was al-
leged, the dangersof breakingthe clearlines of Europeanresponsibilityfor native
affairs.53To repairthe damage,the numberof Residencieswas broughtback to the
original seventeen,and within these larger units the Controleur,abolishedso re-
cently, was again given significantsupervisoryresponsibilities,though he was not
de iure restoredto the territorialcontrolof the lowest, village,units.54Again, while
officiallythe AssistantResidentremainedthe Regent's"YoungerBrother,"his posi-
tion was considerablystrengthened,especiallyby giving him a fixedand in fact dom-
inantpositionin the RegencyCounciland its steeringbody,the Collegeof Commis-
sioners (College van Gecomitteerden),which performedits day-to-dayduties in
betweenthe annual sessionsof the parentbody. A similarstrengtheningof official

48 The Province of West Java with its regencies came into existence on January i, I926, East Java on
January I, I929, Central Java following suit on January I, I930. See Cohen-Stuart,loc. cit., 2I.
49 The initiative of the European B. B. is specificallyacknowledged by Koenders, loc. Cit., 285.
50 Cohen-Stuart, loc. cit., 23.
51 See Bertsch, loc. cit., 467 ff.
52 See Koenders,loc. cit., 284. The assistantresident had no formal place in the administrativestructure
of the regency (Bertsch, 10c. cit., 489). In the I920's, the governor-generalconvened regents' conferences
from which assistant residents were excluded. D. H. Burger, "Het Binnenlands Bestuur op Java en
Madoera,"in Gedenkboek,93.
53 The causal connection between the political events of the mid-ig2o's and "recentralization"is
specificallyalluded to by Koenders, loc. cit., 257-58. Apprehension concerning the new trend as a result
of political extremismwas expressedby Cohen-Stuart(loc. cit., 22-23) in 1930.
54 See Coolhaas, loc. cit., 67 and Koenders, loc. cit., 285.

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600 HARRY J. BENDA
guidance took place at the provincial level, where political controversy tended to be
louder than in the more muted, official-dominatedRegency Councils.55
The new trend became more conspicuous still when administrative reforms
were finally introduced into the Outer Islands. These were originally planned to go
into effect in I932, but their implementation was postponed on account of the depres-
sion which, so the government announced, necessitated fiscal stringency. Yet it seems
likely that, quite paradoxically,budgetary considerations before long turned into one
prime reason for their subsequent speedy enactment and for the additional changes
effected within the already established structure in Java.56The problem of fiscal re-
sponsibilities had been left undecided in the early reforms, and the theme of the fi-
nancial burdens connected with the construction of corporate and conciliar bodies
had never been muted. With the onset of the depression, it came to loom ever larger,
but before long the government apparently felt that the new organs could now be
invested with fiscal responsibilities for their expenditures, thus easing the strain on
the exchequer and reducing the sizeable subsidies hitherto paid from the center.57
The emphasis was, then, to shift from autonomous rights to duties of subordinate
organs under stricter European supervision in the regions. As a contemporary com-
mentator put it, "Auto-activity, autonomous accountability, and autonomous defray-
ing of expenditures-this, briefly, is the government's intention."58By the beginning
of I939, the new budgetary arrangement-the so-called landstreebegrotingen or re-
gional budgets-was carriedbeyond Javato the Outer Islands.59
Decentralization plans for the Outer Islands were taken up again in I934, a new
Commissioner being appointed in the following year, and in 1936 decentralization
in the Outer Islands (applying, be it noted, only to areas under direct Dutch ad-
ministration, but not to those ruled by native potentates) found its way into the
statute books.60 It provided for the creation of three "governments" (gouverne-
menten) of Sumatra, Borneo and the Greater East, the latter comprising Celebes as
well as the Lesser Sundas and the Moluccas. But these new entities were purely
creatures of administrative efficiency, the "governors"being senior European B. B.
officials (unlike the governor-generalwho was a Crown appointee). While in terms
of administrative devolution the new "governments" could justifiably be termed a
further step in decentralization, the slender political underpinning envisaged for
them stood in marked contrast to the pOSt-Ig22 reforms. For where administrative
decentralization in Java had gone hand-in-hand with the birth of quasi-autonomous
bodies coterminous with the new territorial subdivisions, the governments in the
Outer Islands were to function as vast administrative realms in which individual
ethnic groupings were to be progressively, but only very gradually, endowed with
a measure of self-determination under strict control from the three island centers.

The colonial government's own plan-obviously inspired by the "demi-gods"-

55 Cohen-Stuart,loc. cit., 23.

56 This is specificallystated in Visman Report, I, I37.
57 See the analysisand statisticsin ibid., I, I5I-56.
58 Jansen, op. cit., 88. For a criticism of this budgetary optimism, see E. J. Burger, "Het zelfbekos-
tigingsbeginsel in de Buitengewestenbestuurshervorming," Koloniaal Tiidschrift, XXVIII (I939), 296-99.
59 See F. van Maurik, "De verdere doorvoering der Bestuurshervormingin de Buitengewesten,"ibid.,
282-95.
60 Staatsbladvan Nederlandsch-IndieI936, #68.

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PAJTERN OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 601
actually called for administrative reform pure and simple, and it was only outside
pressures that forced it to make room for slender political concessions. The original
bill, providing only for the setting up of the new governments on January I, I937,
was proclaimed by the governor general, only to be vetoed by the Dutch parliament
which insisted on the simultaneous creation of at least some quasi-autonomous
ethnic communities.61As a result, Government Commissioners were despatched to
prepare the new governments and it was only in mid-I938 that these came into
being, together with two autonomous communities, in the Minangkabau and in
Bandjar.62A virtually unanimous Volksraad thereupon forced the government to
adopt an additional, and potentially more far-reaching, measure, viz. the creation of
provincial councils to be attached to each of the three "decentralized" units.63
Where parliamentarypressure had in a sense forced the government to speed up its
announced plans, Volksraad action had gone further in compelling it to deviate
from its blueprint: in the light of earlier experiences in Java, so the government had
argued, provincial councils would be premature and in view of ethnic heterogeneity
problematical; nor could their creation be justified since almost half of the areas in
the Outer Islands would, as indirectly-ruled territories, automatically be excluded
from their purview.64As it was, however, the provincial councils never saw the light
of day. They were to be convened by July I, I940, but by the time the German oc-
cupation of the Netherlands had shifted attention-and budgetary considerations-
to defense, and the government felt justified in shelving their creation indefinitely.
Looked at closely, the new pattern of administrative reform in the Outer Islands
reveals an almost complete break with the trend of the past quarter century in that
it recreateda virtually full-fledged Beamtenstaat under the undisputed hegemony of
the European B. B. When decentralization had begun, its main effort was the more
or less rapid modernization-in fact even Westernization-of Indonesia. The official
elucidation accompanying the administrative reform bill had i. a. stated that "the
remnants of the earlier times which stand in the way of development would have to
be removed. More specifically, an end would have to be made .. . to the continued
existence of adat [customary, ethnic] communities."65The creation of the quasi-
autonomous territorial subdivisions in Java, patterned on Dutch models, had clearly
corresponded to this intention, as had the development of territorial administration
in parts of the Outer Islands and, for that matter, the radical diminution of "self-
governingterritories"
sinceI9I4.
The new reforms were unmistakably moving in the opposite direction, the plan
being to build henceforth from the bottom up rather than from the top down.66
The principle of systematic territorial decentralization was implicitly abandoned in
favor of a new form of indirect rule in which the ethnic group, styled the groeps-
61 See Jansen, op. cit., I07-08. For an angry reaction to the Dutch parliament's intervention, see Ch.
Kies, "De Bestuurshervormingin de Buitengewesten,"De Indische Gids, 58 (0936), 879-82.
62 For details on their composition, see "Kroniek," Koloniaal Tiidschrift, XXVIII (I939), 82-84. The
Volksraaddebate on these group communities is briefly reported in ibid., XXVI (i937), 33I-32. Another
such communitywas to be createdfor Tapanuli, but the plan was not carriedout.
63 Jansen, op. cit., I02-03. The vote was 45 for, 5 against (with io votes unaccounted for).
64 See "Kroniek,"Koloniaal Tiidschrift, XXVII (I938), 505-o6.
65 Cited Cohen-Stuart,loc. cit., 20.
66 This was the interpretationof the perceptive American scholar, Amry Vandenbosch, The Dutch
East Indies: Its Government, Problems and Politics (University of California Press: Berkeley and Los
Angeles, 3rd. ed., I944), I39.

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602 HARRY J. BENDA
gemeenschap (group community) in the bill of I936, was to become the main ad-
ministrative unit, and also-in the original plan-the only quasi-autonomous cor-
porate cell within the three overarching island governments. Instead of creating new
entities for training in modern self-government, these were the most basic old
units now clad in a spuriously new garb. And where the original reforms had sought
to circumscribe officialdom's authority through conciliar bodies, the new reforms
envisaged it as unhampered by such interference, a "brooding omnipresence" con-
trolling, rather than guided by, traditional polities.67 In clear divergence from the
pattern in Java, where Regency Councils were at least nominally headed by natives,
the groepsgemeenschapcouncils were presided over by Dutch Residents.

One of the most obvious victims in this reordering of colonial governance were
the Western-trained Indonesian civil servants outside the ranks of the hereditary
hierarchy in Java. Territorial administration in the Outer Islands had drawn on
such native personnel, and even increasingly so in the early years of the depression
when budgetary stringency dictated a reduction in the recruitment of the far more
expensive European candidates. But the slender hopes for even the most gradual
Indonesianization of the European Binnenlands Bestuur that these developments
may have engendered soon proved out of place in the new order of things. As the
government's spokesman in the Volksraad bluntly declared, in this new order the
Dutch-trained native official was doomed to disappear altogether, ceding his place
to the traditional adat-head. Since ethnicity and not territorialityformed the basis of
the "new look," the government, so he added, no longer wished to inject "alien"
Indonesians, notably Javanese, into the structure of Outer Island administration.08
That that structurewas to be, and remain, Dutch became equally clear when an In-
donesian Volksraad-member in I938 requested that the higher B. B. ranks be
opened up to qualified natives, only to be told that it was essential to reserve these
posts to a leadership "which, according to tradition and origin, can guarantee that
these lands will continue to be governed in accordance with Dutch principles."69In
conformity with these views, recruitment of European personnel was brought back
to its pre-depressionlevel. It is hardly an accident that it was a prominent Western-
educated Indonesian B. B. officer who in I936 launched the ill-fated petition in the
Volksraad which called upon the metropolitan government to place the future
evolution of colonial development on the agenda of an Imperial conference.70Only
such an appeal, bypassing as it were an Indies' government firmly attached to and
allied with the European B. B., might have held out promise for a stemming of the
tide.
That modernization had ceased to be the operational motto of the post-I93I
era was well demonstratedby the new respect paid to the age-old Dutch principle of
67 Jansen, op. cit., 96-97. The same author bluntly described the new reforms as "a welcome recon-

stitution of the erstwhile central position of the B. B." (ibid., iOI). See also J. J. Schrieke, "Indie en
dominion-status,"Koloniale Studien, XX (I936), 39.
68 "If we fully understand . . . the essence of ontvoogding, then the native administrativecorps can
only find a place within that policy in the measure that it must gradually see its tasks transferredto the
traditional [adat] heads of the people." Cited in H. van der Wal, "De ontvoogding in den Volksraad,"
Koloniaal Tiidschrift,XXVII (I938), 698. Cf. also de Boer, op. cit., I56.
69 Van der Wal, 699-700.
70 For a recent discussion, see Jan M. Pluvier, "The Soetardjo Petition," journal of the Historical

Society, (University of Malaya,Kuala Lumpur) II (I963/64), 5I-65.

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PATTERN OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 603
indirect rule. No longer were "self-governing"territories to be considered objection-
ably "feudal" anachronisms destined for progressive extinction. A halt was called to
the earlier policy of abolition and/or merger, and from the mid-nineteen thirties
on certain formerly self-governing areas, mainly in Celebes and Bali, were even
reconstituted.71Not surprisingly, a contemporary Dutch observer stated that the
zelfbesturen might, in the new view, be regarded as "free forms of decentralization."72
A further approximation between the two kinds of "indirect rule" occurred with
the constitution of a small, purely advisory body in the Surakarta domain of the
Susuhunan, the most venerable of the four Javanese principalities in the former
realm of Mataram.

There can, then, be little doubt that on the eve of the Second World War the
foundations of a reinvigorated Beamtenstaat, a colonial polity proper, had been
firmly reestablishedin the Netherlands Indies.73Obviously, the clock had not been
entirely turned back-witness the vigorous though limited role of the Volksraad
in the closing years of Dutch rule-nor can it be denied that under the new dis-
pensation the door had been left ajar for the slow evolution of colonial life. But it is
equally undeniable that that evolution was henceforth to be charted far more cau-
tiously and under far stricter central guidance. If in I9I8 autonomy had appeared to
many in the colony to be just around the corner, two decades later it had receded
into a barely perceivable future-three hundred years being the guarded guess which
the governor-general permitted himself in I936.74 Doubtless the early reforms had
been hastily if not over-optimistically conceived, and the hopes for the rapid West-
ernization of an as yet slowly and quite unevenly evolving Indonesian society were
perhaps bound to run aground. Nor can we deny the fact that the nascent In-
donesian political leadership ignored the proffered hand. Whether inspired by rev-
olutionary dreams or influenced by the fairly successful "non-cooperation"policies
of their British Indian counterparts, most of them for long eschewed work within
the institutional framework prepared by the colonial government.75When at long
last some groupings decided to abandon this hopeless stance of spiteful opposition
after 1936, the moment for true cooperation had long since passed. By then the new
pattern had become firmly enough established to permit the government-let alone
the colons-to ignore belated nationalist willingness to seek devolution and auton-
omy along constitutional paths.
Granting all this, and granting even that the new direction, with its emphasis on
carefully guided evolution of the diverse ethnic adat communities-especially in the

71 Visman Report, I, 130.

72 Van Helsdingen, loc. cit., 469.
73 The Adviser for Decentralization acutely observed in 1930 that, in response to the early extremism
of the national movement, the European community had turned to the safeguarding of its own political
and economic interests. The resultant clash had brought the government to the fore as the sole "balance-
creating and regulating force." Cohen-Stuart,Ioc. Cit., 20, He continued by commenting on the "accen-
tuated [tendency] to strengthen the guiding power of the administrativeauthorities." (ibid., 23). See also
Note io, above.
74 See Note 8, above.
75 This interpretationis stressed by Koenders, loc. cit., 257-58: ". . . [A]fter I927, the ethical policy
primarily lost its cause since the overwhelming majority of Indonesian politicians turned against the
Netherlanders.... The aim for rapid constitutional reforms of the ethically-minded Netherlanders had
run aground."

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 604 HARRY J. BENDA
islandsbeyondJava,wheremany of them still remainedmore or less intact-was by
no meansdevoidof intrinsicmerit,76it is hardto escapethe conclusionthat not only
the immediatebut very likely also the long-rangebeneficiariesof the post-I93I
"settlement"would have been the Dutch, and more especiallyDutch officialdom,
ratherthan the Indonesians.The reluctantexperimentin liberalizingthe colonial
polityhad, it would seem,been abandonedtoo quicklyif not too eagerly,its failures
judgedmore harshlythan the brevityof the experimentmay have warranted.Hav-
ing weatheredthe politicalstormsof the I920'S, the Beamtenstaatwas surelyin no
mortaldanger;if its doorshad to remainresolutelyclosedto radicalbut powerless
politico'sbent on destroyingthe colonialrelationship,did it have to be shut to the
Western-trained Indonesian,especiallythe official?77 Was there any justificationfor
leaving the regentsof Java,after decadesof confusionand reform,without proper,
modern trainingthat might have transformedthem in time into a truly efficient
corps?78And, whateverits viability,could the Outer Islandadat group community,
left in ethnic isolationunder Europeancontrol,ever be expectedto grow into an
adequatetraining ground for the skills of modern governance?Why, then, the
governmentalreluctanceto provideat least a regionalor provincialmeeting place
for theirrepresentatives?
Be that as it may, the Beamtenstaathad triumphedin a NetherlandsIndies that
was far more Netherlandsthan were India and Burma Britishor the Philippines
Americanwhen the soldiersof the Rising Sun at one strokedestroyedthe handi-
work of Europeancolonialismin SoutheastAsia. Not so much destroyedas in-
terrupted,perhaps.It briefly revived during the still-bornattempt to fashion a
quasi-federalIndonesiaunder Dutch aegis patentlyharkingback to the patternof
"centralizedindirectrule"developedsince I93I .7 Indeedit may even have survived
the severanceof all ties betweenmotherlandand colony,80bequeathingto the In-
76 The reorientation of colonial policy in part at least paralleled legal reforms inspired by Professor
C. van Vollenhoven at Leiden and his followers. They opposed the Westernizationof Indonesia on Dutch
models and urged, instead, that modernization be based upon the reality of viable native adat institutions
and practices. Though van Vollenhoven was politically a liberal, it seems likely that his emphasis on the
adat community provided a welcome underpinning for the administrativereforms in the Outer Islands of
the 1930's. I have suggested this hypothesis in my The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam
under the Japanese Occupation,1942-1945 (The Hague and Bandung, 1958), 66-68. In his foreword to
the book (ibid., ix), Professor W. F. Wertheim has recorded his reservationsconcerning this hypothesis.
See also Van Niel, op. cit., 243-51, for a similar interpretation.The legal problems were authoritatively
discussed in two articles-separated by over a decade- by B. ter Haar: "Een keerpunt in de adatrecht-
politiek: Toekomstbeschouwingen,"Koloniale Studien, XII (I928), 245-80, and "Halverwege de nieuwe
ibid., XXIII(I939),
adatrechtspraak," II3-4I.
77 "The government," some Indonesian spokesmen pleaded before the Visman Commission, "should
place more confidence in the Indonesian intellectuals. Even granting that the choice may be limited, the
government should take some risks and see things going less well according to Dutch standards.What
might be lost in quality would be gained in appreciationand confidence." Visman Report, II, 23.
78 A plea to admit regents to the Batavia Law School, thus equipping them at long last with a proper,
modern education, can be found in two articles by H. G. Heyting: "Positie en opleiding van regenten,"
De Indische Gids, 6o (1938), 509-I6, and "Herbewapening van regenten, moreel en sociaal," ibid., 6i
(1939), 403-07. Some regents and other native administrativepersonnel were trained in a separateinstitute,
the Bestuursschool, founded in 1914 and subsequently re-named Bestuursacademie;closed during the
depression, the "academy" was reopened in I938 with only fifteen candidates. See "Kroniek," Koloniaal
Tijdschrtft, XXVIII (1939), 85-87. Providing native officialswith a thorough Western education had been
Snouck Hurgronje'soft-repeateddemand; see Note 32, above.
79 See Kahin, op. cit., 351-90, passim. See also A. Arthur Schiller, The Formation of Federal Indonesia,
1945-1949 (The Hague and Bandung, 1955).
80 It could even be argued that the precolonial Javanese polity already was a highly developed patri-

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PATTERN OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 605
donesian Republic an administrative structure that has proved resilient enough to
reemerge-not, for sure, without important modifications-from political explosions
that dwarfed the timid first stirrings of three decades ago.81

monial Beamtenstaatin its own right, which was further developed by the meticulously bureaucraticregime
of the Netherlands Indies, reaching an old-new, Dutch-Javanesesynthesis in independent Indonesia. This
kind of continuity refers to style of governance rather than to structuralsimilarities. See W. F. Wertheim,
East-WestParallels:SociologicalApproachesto Modern Asia (The Hague, I964), Io6 ff.
81 The many-faceted administrative and political problems of decentralization and recentralization in
the history of the Indonesian Republic can be studied in J. D. Legge, Central Authority and Regional
Autonomy in Indonesia, 1950-I960 (Ithaca, 1961) and Gerald Maryanov,Decentralizationin Indonesia as
a Political Problem (Ithaca, 1958).

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