Training of Lawyers
Training of Lawyers
Training of Lawyers
Chapter XVI
MONITORING DURING
PERIODS OF ARMED
CONFLICT..........................
Key concepts
Some human rights obligations, including the duty to avoid arbitrary deprivations of life,
torture, slavery and discrimination, are not subject to derogation during periods of armed
conflict.
Human rights officers should be aware of the various levels of applicability of
international human rights and humanitarian law — and the protection they offer —
based on the level and nature of the conflict.
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions provides “fundamental principles of
humanitarian law,” which deal explicitly with non-international armed conflicts, but
which have now been recognized as constituting a minimum standard applicable in all
circumstances, including international armed conflicts.
If mandated to do so, there are several basic principles in monitoring and contacting
armed opposition groups, which a UN human rights field operation should consider:
l Avoid giving recognition to armed opposition groups;
l Be transparent in talking with the Government and opposition groups;
l Preserve its impartiality;
l Assess serious security concerns in making contacts;
l Avoid interfering with other humanitarian organizations;
l Become aware of who can speak for or influence non-State actors;
l Explain its mandate and its reasons for wishing to keep in touch;
l Engage in broadly based human rights promotion activities;
l Determine what arguments will persuade armed opposition groups;
l Be aware of inherent conflicts in monitoring and other efforts; and
l Mediate by keeping lines of communication open between the parties.
A. Introduction1
1. Frequently, international armed conflict, civil wars, and other internal conflicts
are the occasion for and consequence of State fragmentation; the erosion of civil
society; the loss of respect for both local law and international standards; the erosion of
traditional values and kinship ties caused by a breakdown of community structures; loss
of respect and effectiveness of traditional authorities and the legal structure including
the judicial system; grave humanitarian crises which cause massive suffering;
devastating deprivation of food, clean water, health services, education and economic
resources; forced dislocation of large numbers of people; restrictions on travel;
destruction of roads, bridges, markets, schools and infrastructure; the rise of sometimes
several competing armed opposition groups; pervasive human rights abuses by both
government forces and non-State entities; a general culture of violence; and the use of
violence against civilians, prisoners, human rights monitors and humanitarian staff as a
deliberate tactic of war or because they are sometimes perceived to assist one side or
another and even seen to prolong the conflict.
2. Human rights field operations may operate in country situations characterized
by different levels of conflict and violence. This chapter deals with three problems
arising in this context. First, in order to gather and assess facts HROs must be aware of
the human rights and humanitarian rules and principles which are applicable to
different kinds of armed conflict. Second, in order to work effectively and with credibility
against human rights abuses, officers must be able to gather and assess the relevant
facts. Armed conflict situations may hinder monitoring work and thus impair the
officers’ ability to respond to human rights violations during periods of armed conflict.
Third, if its mandate indicates that a human rights field operation should undertake to
monitor the activities of and make contact with armed opposition groups; such
efforts require skills and approaches which are somewhat different from monitoring
and contacting governments. This chapter suggests several basic principles for such work
with regard to armed opposition groups.
1 For a more detailed examination of this topic, see David Weissbrodt, “The Role of International Organizations in the
Implementation of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in Situations of Armed Conflict”, 21 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational
Law 313 (1988).
2 The prohibition of imprisonment on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation and the right to recognition as a
person before the law are also non-derogable rights.
7. One of the difficulties of monitoring as to human rights violations during periods of armed
conflict relates to the various categories of armed conflict. HROs do not normally collect
information about the sort of facts necessary to determine the existence or
non-existence of an armed conflict. Yet the application of humanitarian law hinges on the
characterization of the armed conflict. The human rights operation (including particularly its
legal office) must distinguish between international armed conflicts, wars of national
liberation, non-international armed conflicts under Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, non-international armed conflicts under Additional Protocol II, and
other situations. In trying to apply humanitarian law to human rights violations
occurring during the above described situations, the human rights field operation will
have to make an internal assessment about the kind of conflict going on in the
country, in order to be able to refer to the appropriate body of international law in
its monitoring and reporting functions. It is important to note, in this regard, that levels
of conflict may change as the situation evolves. It is, however, not the job of the
human rights operation to make public and final determinations about the kind
of conflict occurring in a certain country.
15. In addition, the human rights operation may want to consider whether the de jure
Government has been obliged to deploy regular military forces against the insurgents.
Furthermore, have the insurgents been recognized by the de jure Government as
belligerents? Has the United Nations recognized the conflict as a threat to international
peace and security?5
16. Moreover, governments are often reluctant to accept the characterization of a conflict as
non-international because they are concerned that there might be some implied
recognition of the belligerents, even though Common Article 3 and Protocol II
clearly indicate that the application of those provisions should not affect the
legal status of the parties.
17. Once the human rights operation has determined what law applies or that it will
rely upon the very basic standards in Common Article 3 and non-derogable human
rights, there remains the application of the specific provisions of human rights and
humanitarian law to the situation at hand. For example, HROs initially and later the
human rights operation may need to determine whether particular deaths occurred
during an armed conflict between combatants or were arbitrary killings, for example, of
civilians. In this regard, the HRO may wish to refer to Chapter IV-B: “Right not to be
arbitrarily deprived of life”. For ease of reference, the chart reproduced in Chapter
III: “Applicable International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: The
Framework” on the applicability of international human rights and humanitarian law
at various levels of conflict is also reproduced here on the next page.
5 For an example of how these factors have been applied to an armed conflict not of an international character in the
Philippines, see International Commission of Jurists, The Failed Promise: Human Rights in the Philippines Since the Revolution of 1986
144-47 (1991).
6 Most of these factors were identified by Stefanie Grant in the testimony she prepared for Hearing on Africa: Human Rights
Problems before two subcommittees of the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, October 31, 1979.
e. Whether the local media can report human rights matters freely
23. Press censorship ordinarily increases during wartime. At the same time the war may
attract foreign journalists. The presence of international television coverage may have a
distorting effect on the conduct of the parties and the possibility of engaging in human
rights monitoring.
8 Amnesty International, Extrajudicial Executions in El Salvador, AI Index: AMR 29/14/84, at 15 (1984). Americas Watch
apparently encountered similar difficulties in assessing evidence with regard to human rights violations in Nicaragua. Americas
Watch, Human Rights in Nicaragua 1985-1986 (1986).
9 See the problems discussed in Americas Watch, Managing the Facts, How the Administration Deals with Reports of Human Rights
Abuses in El Salvador (1985).
10 This paragraph and other portions of the present section are principally based on Iain Levine, Promoting humanitarian
principles: the southern Sudan experience (1997), reflecting the experience of UNICEF, as well as interviews with regard to the
experience of the ICRC, the UNHCR, the Friends World Committee for Consultation, and others.
whether to establish working arrangements for the purpose of delivering some forms
of humanitarian assistance in Sudan:
v the group must have independent control of territory and population;
v it must have a recognized structure;
v it must have a political agenda and objectives;
v it must have a proper humanitarian wing;
v this humanitarian wing or entity must make a clear commitment to some form of
basic humanitarian ground rules with UNICEF and the related NGO assistance
community;
v this humanitarian wing should demonstrate the capacity to manage programmes
with staff who can carry out these activities.
36. Such factors may not be necessary for delivering life-saving humanitarian
assistance as distinguished from the other kinds of humanitarian assistance and
relationships which UNICEF pursued in Sudan. Also, such factors may not be as
necessary for human rights field operations as they were for UNICEF, because the
operational needs of a humanitarian operation to deliver assistance are different from
the monitoring and follow-up activities of a human rights field operation. Indeed,
human rights field operations should be in touch with all sectors of the society, including armed
opposition groups, churches, other religious bodies, local communities groups, women’s
leaders and others to seek respect for human rights.
2. Transparency
37. A second, related, and extremely important principle would be that of transparency.
Both the Government and armed opposition groups should be aware that the human rights field
operation is having discussions with each side and that the field operation is saying pretty much the same
thing to both. Of course, the UN human rights field operation may have different
concerns as to the conduct of each side in a conflict, so that transparency does not
require that the field operation express precisely the same concerns to each side. Also,
transparency does not imply that the field operation ignore security concerns about
contacting armed opposition leaders or other responsible representatives. In seeking to
establish discussions, the field operation should be aware that they are likely to be
subjected to surveillance and take precautions for their own safety — as well as to avoid
jeopardizing the safety or betraying the whereabouts of such responsible persons.
3. Preserving impartiality
38. Third, the concerns of the human rights field operation may be different with
regard to the Government and armed opposition groups, but the human rights field
operation should be perceived by each to be impartial. Sometimes this principle is
characterized as neutrality. While it is correct that the human rights field operation
should not be seen by any party as preferring their side or the other side, the field
operation should always make clear that it is committed to the impartial protection of
human rights in all circumstances. It should insist that all sides at least comply with the
“fundamental general principles of humanitarian law” enunciated in Common Article 3
and the minimum standards of non-derogable rights. The UN human rights field
operation should reserve the right to express concerns about the conduct of each side
without being accused of breaching neutrality. Hence, the term impartiality is preferable
to neutrality, although both ideas focus on similar objectives.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
UNICEF has found that offering human rights education together with humanitarian
assistance may provide a sufficient incentive in southern Sudan. Others have found that
it is necessary to separate programmes for the provision of humanitarian assistance or
for the development/reinforcement of the administration of justice from
monitoring/reporting activities or from mediation efforts.
11. Mediating
48. Eleventh, as will be discussed in Chapter XXI: “Conciliation and Mediation
in the Field”, there may be occasions in which the human rights field operation is
asked by both sides of a dispute to provide a means of communication. This role is
often fulfilled in UN operations by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
and if the field operation is requested to mediate between an armed opposition group
and the Government, consultation at the highest levels of the field operation and other
UN structures may be required. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General
may perceive mediation and other activities of the human rights field operation as
distracting and possibly interfering with the achievement of an overall settlement.
While the human rights field operation may properly assert its obligation to continue
monitoring human rights, it may need to defer to the judgement of the Special
Representative or similar high-level officials with regard to requests for
mediation and conciliation involving armed opposition groups. Nonetheless, if
such mediation and/or conciliation activities are authorized or occur, many of the
principles suggested above and the ideas in Chapter XXI: “Conciliation and
Mediation in the Field” may be useful.
49. In such a mediation as to important differences between the Government and
the opposition group, it may be less likely that the field operation could usefully make
suggestions for resolving the dispute. But the field operation would perform a very useful
function if it can keep the lines of communication open between the parties and provide each side with a
way of understanding the other and getting a sense of their human dimension. In armed conflicts the
opponents often lose sight of the humanity of their opposition. Usually both sides have
families and parallel aspirations. Mediation can communicate those similarities and
possibly bring the parties to resolve the differences which gave rise to the armed
conflict and the resulting human suffering.
50. The above tentative principles do not close this very difficult subject, but may
provide the basis for further experience and insight.
[NB. The example which follows is the agreement signed between the SPLM/A and OLS. Although signed separately,
the content of the agreements with other movements was, to all intents and purposes, the same.]
This agreement is intended to lay out the basic principles upon which Operation Lifeline Sudan
(OLS) works and to lay out the rules and regulations resulting from such principles. It seeks to define
the minimum acceptable standards of conduct for the activities of OLS agencies and Sudan Relief and
Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), as the official counterpart in areas controlled by the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).
We, the undersigned, enter into this agreement in a spirit of good faith and mutual cooperation in
order to improve the delivery of humanitarian assistance to and protection of civilians in need.
In signing this agreement, we express our support for the following international humanitarian
conventions and their principles, namely:
i. Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989
ii. Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the 1977 Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions
ii. The passage of humanitarian assistance to populations in need should not be denied even
if this requires that aid passes through an area controlled by one party in order to reach the
needy in another area, provided that such passage is not used for military advantage.
iii. Relief assistance is provided solely on the basis of need; those providing assistance do not
affiliate themselves to any side in the ongoing conflict.
iv. The only constraints on responding to humanitarian need should be those of resources
and practicality.
3. All humanitarian assistance provided is for the use of identified civilian beneficiaries. Priority
must at all time be given to women and children and other vulnerable groups such as the elderly,
disabled and displaced people.
4. Those carrying out relief activities under the auspices of OLS must be accountable to the
beneficiaries and their representative structures in [the] first place, and to those who fund the
activities. This places the following obligations on the various parties:
i. those rendering humanitarian aid have a duty to ensure its appropriate end use. This
includes a right to monitor and participate in the distribution of humanitarian aid on the
ground in partnership with SRRA.
ii. local authorities, through the SRRA, must ensure that aid is distributed fairly to civilian
beneficiaries. Diversion of aid from intended beneficiaries is regarded as a breach of
humanitarian principles.
iii. decision-making on the selection of beneficiaries and the monitoring of the use of inputs
and resources must be, and be seen to be, transparent and responsive to broad-based
decision-making at the level of affected communities. Local authorities and relief agencies
should involve local representatives of communities in the processes of targeting and
monitoring of aid. Where possible, this should be done through the Joint Relief and
Rehabilitation Committees which include elected community representatives.
5. OLS is based on the complete transparency of all its activities. This means that local authorities
have the right to expect that OLS agencies provide full information regarding the resources to be
provided. In return, it is expected that local authorities will report honestly and fairly in all their
dealings with OLS with respect to needs identified, populations in need, use of resources, etc.
6. All humanitarian actions should be tailored to local circumstances and aim to enhance, not
supplant, locally available resources and mechanisms. Strengthening local capacity to prevent
future crises and emergencies and to promote greater involvement of Sudanese institutions and
individuals in all humanitarian actions is an integral part of OLS’s humanitarian mandate.
7. The fundamental human right of all persons to live in safety and dignity must be affirmed and
supported through appropriate measures of protection as well as relief. All those involved in
OLS must respect and uphold international humanitarian law and fundamental human rights.
8. Bona fide staff members of OLS agencies and others living, working or travelling in Sudan under
the auspices of OLS have the right to go about their business freely and without restraint
provided that they adhere to these Ground Rules and to local laws and customs. In all their
dealings, relief workers and local authorities must demonstrate mutual respect.
B. Mutual Obligations
1. All externally supported programmes and projects in SPLM/A-controlled areas, must be
approved by the SRRA (both locally and at SRRA heads office) prior to their implementation.
NGOs or UN agencies are responsible for ensuring that such approval is obtained in writing.
Project implementation should be based upon a letter of understanding between the agency,
SRRA and OLS which defines roles, responsibilities and commitments of all sides plus
procedures for resolving differences and grievances.
2. All UN/NGO workers are expected to act in accordance with the humanitarian principles
previously defined: provision of aid according to need; neutrality, impartiality, accountability and
transparency. This includes non-involvement in political/military activity. NGOs and UN
agencies must not act or divulge information in a manner that will jeopardize the security of the
area.
3. All UN/NGO workers must show respect for cultural sensitivities and for local laws and
customs. Relief agencies must ensure that their staff are familiar with these laws and customs.
4. UN agencies and NGOs shall strive to offer the highest possible standards of service to their
beneficiaries. This means that all agencies commit themselves to recruiting only those staff
judged to have adequate technical and personal skills and experience required for their work.
5. UN agencies and NGOs must ensure that all their staff living, working or visiting Sudan are
bearers of valid entry passes from the respective political authorities.
6. The SRRA must commit itself to the humanitarian principles defined above and not allow itself
to be motivated by political, military or strategic interests. It should seek to provide an efficient
and effective coordinated information and planning service for relief and rehabilitation activities.
7. The SPLM/A recognises and respects the humanitarian and impartial nature of UN agencies and
those NGOs who have signed a letter of understanding with UNICEF/OLS and SRRA.
8. The SRRA should facilitate the flow of relief goods and services and provide accurate and timely
information regarding the needs and the situation of civilians in their areas.
9. Local authorities assume full responsibility, through the SRRA for the safety and protection of
relief workers in areas under their control. This responsibility includes:
i. providing an immediate alert to relief workers in potentially insecure areas;
ii. facilitation of safe relocation when necessary;
iii. protection from any form of threat, harassment or hostility from any source;
Relief staff or agencies are not expected to pay for such protection either of themselves or of
their property.
10. UN/NGO compounds should be respected as property of these institutions. Those living in
these compounds have the right to privacy and compounds should only be entered with the
permission of their residents. No military or political activity should take place in these
compounds and no personnel bearing arms may enter them except when the safety of their
residents is threatened.
D. Employment of Staff
1. All UN agencies and NGO have the right to hire their own staff as direct employees. These
agencies should be encouraged to employ appropriately qualified and experienced Sudanese as
part of a capacity building strategy.
2. In the cases of Sudanese staff seconded to an NGO supported project (e.g. health staff),
appointments and dismissals are made by the local authority in consultation with the agency
which is expected to support payment of that worker’s incentives. The number of workers to be
supported must be agreed jointly. An NGO or a UN agency may ask the local authorities to
withdraw seconded staff considered incompetent, dishonest or otherwise unsuitable for their
jobs.
3. Local authorities should ensure that the Sudanese staff of UN/NGOs and, especially, those staff
who receive special training programmes to upgrade and improve their skills are exempted,
whenever possible, from military or other service so that they can contribute to the welfare of the
civilian population.
Key concepts
The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights does not require a Government
immediately to feed, clothe and house its residents, but it does require the Government to
take steps towards the full realization of those rights, to avoid measures which would
diminish those rights, and to forbid discrimination with regard to those rights.
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has also begun to define
“minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of each of, at the very least,
minimum essential levels of each of the rights” (emphasis added). A State party that is
unable to fulfil this obligation must “demonstrate that every effort has been made to use
all resources at its disposition in an effort to satisfy as a matter of priority those
minimum obligations”.
Field operations have generally given a lower priority to monitoring economic, social and
cultural rights, but forced evictions and employment discrimination are most likely to
require monitoring because they go to the core of the ethnic violence and other grave
violations often facing human rights operations.
A. Introduction
1. Human rights field operations are occasionally given a broad mandate to
promote and protect all human rights. Indeed, the High Commissioner for Human
Rights has principal responsibility for UN activities to implement all human rights,
including “[p]romoting and protecting the effective enjoyment by all of all civil,
cultural, economic, political and social rights.” 1
1 High Commissioner for the Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, G.A. res. 48/141, 48 UN GAOR (No. 49) at
411, UN Doc. A/48/49 (1993).
2. Despite the High Commissioner’s broad mandate and the significance of all
human rights, several human rights field operations with a similarly broad mandate
have given a higher priority to promoting economic, social and cultural rights than
to monitoring those rights. There are several economic rights, such as the right to be
free from forced eviction, which have received greater attention in monitoring. This chapter
provides a basic introduction to economic, social and cultural rights and then discusses
some of the issues which arise with regard to the priority given to monitoring those
rights. (See also Chapter IV-I: “Right to property” and Chapter IV-J: “Right to
housing and other economic, social and cultural rights”.)
2 G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 UNT.S. 3. The International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.
3 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3, The nature of States parties obligations (Art. 2,
para.1 of the Covenant) (Fifth session, 1990), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, UN Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 45 (1994).
4 Id.
party that is unable to fulfil this obligation must “demonstrate that every effort has
been made to use all resources at its disposition in an effort to satisfy as a matter
of priority those minimum obligations”.
12. Chapter IV-J: “Right to housing and other economic, social and cultural
rights” provides a sample of the Committee’s approach in its General Comments, for
example, as to the right to adequate housing.
C. An approach to monitoring
economic, social and cultural
rights in field operations
15. Human rights field operations have given a lower priority to monitoring
economic, social and cultural rights principally because they: (1) have been faced with
political killings, disappearances, torture, widespread detention, and other issues which
seemed to require more immediate attention; (2) have considered economic rights to be
susceptible of only long-term resolution while some of the more serious violations of
the rights of personal integrity were capable of more prompt action; and (3) have been
quite concerned about the magnitude of economic problems and the difficulties of
knowing where to begin improving the economic situation of very poor people or of
resolving a myriad of complicated property disputes.
5 G.A. res. 41/128, 41 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 186, UN Doc. A/41/53 (1986).
6 UN Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (Part I), World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14-25 June 1993 at 20 (1993).
4. Test cases
22. There are several economic rights problems which may be of particular concern to a human
rights field operation. Two relatively visible and unfortunately quite common problems are
discrimination in employment and forced evictions. In dealing with those
violations, human rights field operations might use a test case approach rather than
becoming overwhelmed with the sheer magnitude of the problems. The field operation
should identify particular cases which are (1) very visible, (2) very clear with regard to the facts
and rights at stake, and (3) apparently susceptible of successful intervention.
23. For example, a lead worker in a factory is dismissed because he belongs to an ethnic minority.
The dismissal has received a great deal of publicity in the community and is perceived to
be a leading example of ethnic cleansing. No other plausible explanation exists for the
dismissal. The factory is run by individuals closely associated with the ruling powers
within the Government, and with whom the field operation has previously had good
contacts. Or there exist reasonably reliable legal recourse for the dismissal which can be
invoked. If the human rights field operation can help to reinstate this individual, it will
have a very significant demonstration effect with regard to other cases or in preventing
further dismissals on ethnic grounds. That is, once the HROs have a visible success
regarding this particular discriminatory dismissal, the manager of the factory and the
authorities should get the message. Also, other workers will insist that their rights be
protected, putting additional pressure on the manager of the factory or the authorities.
24. Such efforts by human rights field operations with regard to discrimination
cases may be particularly sensible in circumstances in which there are several
international agencies in the field with potentially or partially overlapping mandates.
For example, in some countries there may be ICRC delegates working on issues relating
to prison conditions; UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL) officers working on police conduct
and the fairness of the administration of justice; UNHCR representatives working with
refugees and the return of refugees or displaced persons; UNICEF working to protect
children; Médecins sans Frontières, Save the Children, OXFAM and other voluntary
agencies helping with the immediate needs for food, clothing, housing and medical care
for elements of the population at risk. In such a context the human rights field operation
must consider how to avoid duplicating the work of other agencies and the Government itself. The
human rights field operation may be uniquely situated to handle major cases of
discrimination regarding employment or forced evictions. Alternatively, the operation
may be able to work with the Government and the legal system to develop procedures
or improve the effectiveness of existing institutions for resolving claims of
discrimination, land rights disputes, forced evictions, and other potentially serious
issues which have broad implications for the protection of economic and other rights.
27. Yet another argument is that economic, social and cultural rights are collective, while civil and
political rights are exclusively individual. Again, that distinction is rather simplistic. For
example, articles relating to freedom of association, freedom of religion, the rights of
minorities, and other provisions in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protect
collective rights. The right to be free from economic discrimination or to attend
primary school may be claimed by individuals on the basis of the Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
28. Moreover, it is said that economic, social and cultural rights are non-justiciable,
while civil and political rights are justiciable. This issue is discussed above in Chapter
IV-E-15: “Role of the courts in protecting economic and social rights”.
Key concepts
Many of the monitoring principles and approaches set forth in this Manual have their
origins in previous efforts of the United Nations and other international organizations
to guide fact-finders. This chapter reviews the historical origins of such efforts and thus
places the Manual in its historical context.
Efforts to codify rules for fact-finding can be traced back to 1907 (with the Hague
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes). Within the United Nations, general
rules are contained in the 1974 Model Rules of fact-finding procedure for UN bodies, in
the 1992 Declaration on Fact-Finding by the UN in the Field of the Maintenance of
International Peace and Security, and in a number of more recent guidelines for the
operation of UN human rights field operations.
Several human rights field operations have received mandates similar to the United
Nations Observer Mission for El Salvador (ONUSAL):
“The Mission’s mandate shall include the following powers:
a. To verify the observance of human rights in El Salvador;
b. To receive communications from any individual, group of individuals or
body in El Salvador, containing reports of human rights violations;
c. To visit any place or establishment freely and without prior notice;
d. To hold its meetings freely anywhere in the national territory;
e. To interview freely and privately any individual, group of individuals or
members of bodies or institutions;
f. To collect by any means it deems appropriate such information as it
considers relevant.”
While such a procedural mandate appears to be quite comprehensive and adequate, the
challenge facing most human rights operations has been actually employing these
techniques in practice when faced with opposition from local authorities who are unaware
of the mandate and covert resistance from national authorities who wish to test the
resolve of the UN human rights field operation.
A. Introduction
1. Many of the monitoring principles and approaches set forth in this Manual have
their origins in previous efforts of the United Nations and other international
organizations to guide fact-finders. This chapter reviews the historical origins of such
efforts and thus places this Manual in its historical context.
C. Non-United Nations
monitoring standards
8. In addition, regional organizations have implemented monitoring
standards to govern the fact-finding process. The Inter-American Commission has
one of the best developed and respected procedures for on-site fact-finding. It has
sponsored numerous on-site observations in conjunction with the investigation of
human rights in Member States. (See Edmundo Vargas, “Visits on the Spot: The
Experience of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights”, in International
Law and Fact-Finding in the Field of Human Rights 137-150 (Bertie Ramcharan ed.
1982).)
9. Many intergovernmental organizations have formulated their own fact-finding
procedures. In addition, the International Law Association met in Belgrade during
1980 and adopted by consensus a set of rules ostensibly designed for use by both
intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations, but actually
more applicable to intergovernmental fact-finding efforts (The Belgrade Minimum
Rules of Procedure for International Human Rights Fact-finding Visits”, 75 Am. J. Int’l
L. 163 (1981)).
10. Several authors have written about fact-finding procedures. For a more detailed
examination of monitoring standards relevant to fact-finding investigations, see the
references contained in the bibliography to this Manual.