Securitization theories: Big picture

theorising vs. 1:1 mapping

Rita Floyd, University of Birmingham, UK
Paper presented at ISA 2023 Annual Convention, Montréal: (Slot
Code: SC32) Innovations in Securitization Studies
Version 23.02.2023

Draft do not cite without permission. Email R.Floyd@bham. ac.uk

Prelude
For context, please note that this chapter is part of a planned edited book provisionally called The
Big Picture as an approach to the study of International Relations: Working with and beyond Barry Buzan
(Editors Rita Floyd and Laust Schouenborg). The introduction to this book argues as follows:

[….] In this volume, we wish to examine the promises and pitfalls of Barry Buzan’s unique
approach to IR theorizing, which we label big picture theorizing. The choice of Buzan will be made
clear shortly. Big picture theorizing, or BPT Buzan-style, combines the following trades:

• The subjects of analysis are large scale events/developments/concepts, not specific

or singular events, e.g., a specific war.
• It aims at simplifying and ordering hugely complex issues, and often operates at
several levels of analysis at the same time
• It does not profess allegiance to one theoretical camp, but pragmatically utilizes and
combines a diverse range of theoretical perspectives, including from other
disciplines where relevant to the area/issue of enquiry.
• It takes a long-term view, emphasizing the importance of history for our
understanding of the world today, and it is not averse to prediction.
• It is overtly apolitical, or else non-normative.

This break-down shows that big picture theorizing is not theory purported ‘to explain broad
patterns of state behavior’ (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2013: 432). It is instead a particular
way of doing research in IR and its subfields. In short, ‘big picture theorizing’ is not
theory at all, but a method, or else an approach to IR. In this volume, we seek to
interrogate this method embodied in the work of Barry Buzan [….] (Floyd and
Schouenborg, p 2).

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Abstract

This paper revisits debates on the nature of securitization from the perspective of big picture
theorising. While many differently nuanced approaches to securitization exist, most works can be
placed within either the philosophical strand or within the sociological strand. The former refers
to the original Copenhagen school’s approach, while the latter refers to work following Thierry
Balzacq (2005, 2011). According to proponents of the latter strand, the sociological approach has
become necessary because of a lack of detail given to key factors in securitization processes, most
notably perhaps context, but also the role and nature of the audience. It is true that the
philosophical strand lacks detail, certainly in comparison with the sociological strand. However, it
is also the case that the lack of detail was – following Waltz - informed by a deliberate choice for
a parsimonious theory that does not offer 1:1 mapping of each case of securitization, but rather
one that offers a broad and generic view of securitization simpliciter reminiscent of Buzan’s big
picture theorizing (Wæver, 2015). This is not surprising, after all, the Copenhagen school’s
securitization theory facilitated the analytical step of capturing theoretically the broadened security
landscape to include alongside states a myriad of other actors (as both referent objects and
securitizing actors). Nowadays, however, the sociological strand is more popular than the original
philosophical strand. This paper examines not only why this is, but also what is lost if we don’t do
securitization theory as big picture theorizing, and finally whether big picture theorizing in
securitization studies has a future?

Introduction

The Copenhagen school of security studies is famous for three things: securitization, regional
security complex theory (RSCT) and security sectors (economic, environmental, military, political
and societal/identity security). All three are testimony to the Copenhagen school’s interest in
offering a rounded, big-picture perspective of the complex reality of security in international
relations.

RSCT and sectors originate from Barry Buzan’s earlier single-authored work (1983), while
securitization is the brainchild of Ole Wæver (1995). The school’s most significant work is Security:
A new framework for analysis (hereafter SANFFA) published in 1998. In said book securitization is
developed and applied to a range of security sectors (environmental, military, economic and so
on). These analytical lenses bring order into the complex security landscape by setting out distinct
contexts in which securitization may arise. Securitization here is the social process whereby issues
are turned into security threats enabling them to be addressed by extraordinary means.

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The Copenhagen school (Buzan et al, 1998 chapter 2) holds that security in international relations
operates like a performative (illocutionary) speech act, whereby saying something is doing
something. Specifically, a securitizing actor declares a referent object existentially threated by
stating a point of no return (unless we act now, it will be too late) coupled with offering a possible
way out in the form of security measures (necessity). (Collectively these steps are known by the
somewhat pompous term ‘the grammar of security’.) However, only once this speech act is
accepted by an audience is securitization complete, while it is successful (or, more accurately
significant enough to be studied) when extraordinary measures are adopted.

In 2003 securitization plays a central role in Regions & Powers which inter alia locates securitization
in different sectors in distinct RSCTs (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The reason why securitization
theory can be applied to everything (sectors) everywhere (all the world’s regions) is that the theory
is relatively parsimonious. Besides the grammar of security, the position of authority of the speaker
vis-à-vis the audience and features of the threat (e.g., past experiences of the threat) facilitate
securitization. Many scholars have found securitization theory extremely useful. With the help of
this theory scholars have examined all manner of things across a vast range of countries and levels
of analysis. In Europe securitization theory has long rivalled the traditional American security
theories to form the new mainstream. Moreover, securitization theory has been applied by scholars
from other subjects, including anthropology, law, criminology, and education. To be sure, in
securitization studies, scholars do not always work with the Copenhagen school’s parsimonious
version of securitization theory, instead many utilise the sociological approach to securitization
associated with Thierry Balzacq (2005). This richer and more detailed account of securitization
was developed with a view to offer more rigorous foundations for empirical study (Balzacq, 2011:
xiv.). Balzacq and his followers theorise in detail context, the audience, and the nature of the speech
act in securitization processes. Among security studies scholars this rival sociological approach to
securitization is now more popular than the Copenhagen school’s original framework.

The present paper is concerned with several inter-related research question. Why is the sociological
approach more popular than the older ‘philosophical’ approach? What, if anything, is lost if we
collectively don’t do Copenhagen school securitization theorizing? In brief, I argue that the main
difference between the two strands does not lie in the specifics of ontological entities recognised
but instead in the different authors’ theory of theory (that is their idea of theory, or else their view
of what theory does and is). For Wæver theory of and in International Relations is big picture
theorising. Which is, inter alia, theory that zooms out to the big vista and thus applies everywhere,
albeit scarifying on detail. For Balzacq, in turn, good theorising is the ability to capture the greatest

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amount of empirical detail. I argue that the sociological approach is more popular in part, because
of structural constraints peers place on one another by valuing theory advancement over simply
empirics. I suggest unless we (collectively) do big picture theorizing what is lost from securitization
studies is nothing less than IR, because IR’s forte is and should be, the big picture. To make these
points I will first examine the sociological account, comparing its view of theory with that
developed by Wæver for securitization. While the possibility of the retreat of IR from securitization
studies grants a prima facie case for continuous big picture theorising in this area, a third research
question now emerges. Can scholars still hope to develop big picture securitization theory, or are
they destined to ‘merely’ apply the Copenhagen school’s version to different contexts, because the
top spot is taken? I will answer this question by drawing some suggestions for how to do theory
building from examples that have done so successfully. The conclusion summarises the argument
and ends with the few observations on big picture theorising and IR more generally.

The sociological approach vs the philosophical approach1

To understand that the sociological approach of securitization theory is much more detailed than
that offered by the Copenhagen school, it is helpful to juxtapose Balzacq’s definition of
securitization with that of the Copenhagen school. Balzacq (2011:3) argues:

I define securitization as an articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic

artefacts (metaphors, policy tools, image repertoires, analogies, stereotypes, emotions,
etc.) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor, who works to prompt an
audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thoughts,
and intuitions), about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with
the securitizing actor’s reasons for choices and actions, by investing the referent
subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized
policy must be undertaken immediately to block its development.

The Copenhagen school, in turn, define securitization as ‘the move that take politics beyond
established rules of the game and frames issues either as a special kind of politics or as above
politics’ (Buzan et al, 1998: 23). The two definitions are clearly describing the same thing, however,
Balzacq’s version seems intent on covering all eventualities. Moreover, Balzacq’s definition of
securitization includes within it the mechanics of the same, that is his is not so much a description

1 The term philosophical approach is Balzacq’s. Wæver rejects this label in favour of the political approach (2015). I
think that neither is a good fit and I largely refrain from their usage.

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of a thing, but he outlines the process. This is not surprising. After all, Balzacq starts from the
view that the Copenhagen school’s version is simultaneously underspecified and unclear on
method (Balzacq, 2011: 31ff).

Although, ‘studies of securitization do not necessarily fall neatly within a particular category’
(Balzacq, 2011: 3), many scholars declare allegiance to Balzacq’s or other sociological strand
scholars. This includes many of the scholars who have theorised further the role and nature of the
audience (e.g., Leonard & Kaunert, 2011; Côté, 2016; Salter, 2008) Theoretical refinements are
usually developed out of a detailed case study that sees the author locate the audience(s) in context
and from there to recommendations on how the theory must change. Somewhat simplified the
general approach for an article by second generation scholars includes the following steps:

1) identify an oversight or contradiction in the Copenhagen school’s version of securitization

theory.
2) identify literature or theoretical model external to securitization studies that can help fill
the gap.
3) test or exemplify the sought refinement on a case study
4) make recommendation for change of securitization theory.2

But why do scholars operate in this way? Why does nearly everyone in securitization studies find
it necessary to add to the theory, rather than say apply the Copenhagen school’s version and simply
state in case X, or in case Y, securitization behaves as follows…., without suggesting general
inferences for securitization theory from one case? Intriguingly, the best answer can be found in
Wæver’s writings on the sociology of the discipline. In a 1998 article published in International
Organization he pointed out that ‘You only become a star by doing theory’ (1998: 718), because
‘[the top] journals are mainly defined, structured, and to a certain extent controlled by theorists’
(ibid). In other words, if you want to get into the top journals, you cannot merely apply theory,
you need to refine it.

2 There are interesting parallels here with neorealism. Wæver in his article Waltz’s Theory of Theory (2009) argues:
‘Current debates on neorealism – mostly conducted within the family – follow recurrent patters. Critics call for further
‘specification’ of the theory. It is found to be too sparse, too elegant, too minimalistic. Almost any case study easily
shows that the theory tell us less than we want to know, and the author of the case study therefor calls for the theory
to be elaborated further’ (Wæver, 2009: 211). It is my impression that one could easily replace neorealism with ST in
this paragraph.

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The loss of IR….

Without doubt many second-generation scholars achieve greater accuracy in tracing securitization.
Moreover, – at least some of – the many ideas for addition to securitization theory make for a
better, more precise, and definitive theory. So, what is the problem? According to Wæver the
problem with Balzacq and his followers is that he/they no longer offer or build theories of
securitization, but instead micro-sociologies of the same (Wæver, 2015: 127). He argues that
Balzacq’s ‘theory’ lacks a focal theoretical point (his own is the illocutionary logic) and instead
becomes ‘an unstructured mapping of actors’ perceptions /predispositions and their exchanges
of communication’ (Wæver, 2015: 125). To understand this, consider that Wæver has a very
specific view of what theory is, which he takes from Kenneth Waltz. He explains that for Walz,
and for himself: ‘A theory […] is a model that does not in itself explain, but it forms a coherent
system in relation to which it is possible to both compare instances and formulate specific
hypotheses.’ (p.125).

Personally, I don’t think it is correct to say that Balzacq’ s theory does not have a focal point,
because here intersubjectivity is paramount (Balzacq, 2011: 3).3 Nonetheless, Wæver is quite right
to suggest that much of what Balzacq’s followers are doing is 1:1 mapping of specific cases of
securitization. Indeed, many do seem to think that theory must mirror reality as best as possible,
not that theory ought to serve as a model that ‘explains in general’ (Wæver, 2009: 205). Still, who
is so say that theory can take only one form and, for example, that it needs to have that all
important focal point to be classed as theory (cf. Dunne, Hansen, and Wight, 2013). Think that
many IR scholars within the US American mainstream would not consider the Copenhagen
school’s iteration of securitization a theory, after all it does not contain a causal relation, general
laws and/or prediction (Wæver, 2009: 207-8)). How then can we explain Wæver’s puzzling act of
gatekeeping? I hasten to suggest the following answer: for Wæver the subject matter determines
what theory is. The same was true of Waltz who argued: ‘A theory is a depiction of the organization
of a domain and the connections among its parts’ (in Wæver, 2009:206, my emphasis). The subject
matter or domain here is of course the international. And the defining element of the international
is what Rosenthal calls ‘societal multiplicity’, i.e., the fact that ‘human existence is not unitary but
multiple. [and that it is] distributed across numerous interacting societies.’ (Rosenthal, 2019: 135).
Other authors advance similar definitions, Jackson and Nexon, for example, argue that IR theory

3 Suggesting contra (Wæver, 2015: 125) Balzacq is correct that his approach is an ideal type (Balzacq, 2015:103)

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is about different actors within world politics (states, international organizations and so on) and
their multifarious interactions (cf. Jackson and Nexon, 2013: 550-51, see also Corry, 2022). All of
this means that theory is IR theory only if it can capture the international (cf. Corry, 2022), by
speaking to different contexts and situations and ideally for different actors. In a word, IR theorising
is big picture theorising. Not necessarily of the Buzanian kind, but it is theory (or better an approach
to IR) that can account for multiple actors, complex issues across time and space. And here comes
the crux of the matter, to work the same will inevitably be parsimonious.

‘Hold on a minute’ might be what readers familiar with Wæver’s many writings on the sociology
of the discipline of IR are likely thinking at this point. Thus, in those writings Wæver toggles IR
firmly to the great debates, while he also stresses the contextual relationships of IR theories with
other IR theories. ‘To understand a theory implies knowing why it was created that way. In other
words, to understand neorealism, it helps to have the IR scene of the 1970s as a setting….’ (Wæver,
2013: 318) And of course securitization theory emerges at the interface between traditional security
studies and Critical approaches (Buzan et al, 1998). While this suggests that for Wæver IR theory-
status is about intellectual legacy, this is not so. The Great Debates matter, but not so much for
designating what theory is, or better for how to approach international relations, but for separating
out International Relations as its own discipline. In evidence, consider that Wæver has worked
hard to uncover, ‘international relations scholarship around the world’ (Wæver and Tickner, 2009).
Here the same is not about theories made in the US, but about ‘a shared object of interest’ namely
international relations (ibid: 1). Moreover, only one (Waltz) of the four intellectual ancestors of
Wæver’s securitization theory is from within IR, the rest are a motley crew of ‘philosophers’ (Floyd,
2010: 9ff).

There can be no doubt that the Copenhagen school are devoted to IR and that their theory of
securitization is about and starts from a concern with international relations. The school open their
all-important theoretical framework chapter in SANFFA with the following words: ‘What quality
makes something a security issue in international relations? It is important to add the qualification
“in international relations,” because the character of security in that context is not identical to the
use of the term in everyday language’ (Buzan el, al, 1998: 21).
Moreover, Wæver adopts Waltz’s idea of theory as a picture mentally formed. Waltz
explains the emergence of the picture as starting with an idea, ‘such ideas “will be about the
organization of the subject matter” (Waltz cited in Wæver, 2009: 209 my emphasis). Put differently,
in the formation of theory, the domain informs the theory. For Balzacq and many of his followers,

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in turn, there is not that link to IR. Many seem to want to explain the intricate detail and to that
end borrow theoretical concepts from anthropology, area studies and sociology. These academic
disciplines are quite different from IR in so far as their subject matter is not the global or the
international, instead it is the local and the specific. It seems to me therefore that, if scholars turn
away from Copenhagen school securitization theorising, what is lost is not – as Wæver’ claims -
theory per se instead what is lost is securitization theory for and of I/international R/relations.
More dramatically still, if we hand over securitization theory (this now mainstream of security
studies in Europe) to other disciplines we risk losing a significant part of IR. Of course, one can
object here is that IR is what scholars make of it (Dunne, et al, 2013: 417) and therefore that theory
informs what IR is. That is true, but theory does not change the domain of international relations.
So, what is lost is discipline specific theorising, and with something we as IR scholars can export
to other disciplines.

To appreciate why this is a problem, let’s consider the value of the discipline of IR. What, if
anything, do we do better than people in other disciplines? Here we come full-circle as the answer
is - I think - theorising about international relations. Thus, uniquely IR is about states and other
actors and how they relate and interact with one another. As any student of IR will know, however,
the actions and omissions of one actor cannot be treated in isolation. IR makes those connections,
regionally and globally and as such it can paint the big picture perspective of what states and other
actors do, and why they do it. The Copenhagen school’s securitization theory is a perfect example
of this. In a paper on security in the Artic, for example, Waver shows that securitization theory
enables one to view the Artic as a ‘security constellation’ that encompasses societal security of
different indigenous groups threatened by climate change, but also military security, a fear of a
rush to the Artic, a past of nuclear proliferation, while climate security has drawn in a multitude of
actors, raised the profile of Innuit group globally, but also threatens military escalation between
US-Russia over territorial delineations and so forth (Wæver, 2017).

The story of the Arctic security constellation shows the value of securitization as big picture
theorising. Rather than examining in minute detail who does what in any given securitization,
tracking multiple audiences etc, we can see that the ‘different securitizations are interlocking and
form a dynamic, structuration-like context for further securitizations’ (Wæver, 2017: 125). I do not
wish to suggest that this work is more valuable or better than those done by Balzacq et al, only

8
that it is different and that it is valuable. In other words, there is a prima facie case for big picture
theorizing on securitization a la Copenhagen school.

What future for big picture theorizing?

I have argued above that one reason why the sociological approach to securitization is so popular
is that it enables scholars to contribute to theory building and that - following Wæver (1998)–
theory-building is highly important for scholars’ careers. This leaves the Copenhagen school’s
version of securitization theory on the backfoot. Thus, how many scholars does it take to compile
the theoretical building blocks of securitization as big picture theorising? Indeed, we can
reasonably ask whether there is still room for others to develop big picture theory of securitization,
or does the Copenhagen school occupy that space so completely, that others can ‘merely’ apply
the school’s theory? Certainly, the example above ‘only’ applies the existing theory to the Arctic.

According to Wæver at least theory building won’t be easy. He argues: ‘If you want something else
[i.e., something not already contained in the theory] to do your explaining, you have to come up
with a new theory (or show carefully how this can be inserted into [the existing theory] without
making it less coherent and effective’ (Wæver: 2009, 212). To be sure by effective Wæver precisely
does not mean ‘empirical exactitude’ (Waver, 2015: 125), but a theory’s ability to speak to and help
explain a complex reality. The key word here is complex. Both Waltz and Wæver recognise that
international relations is vast and diverse (i.e., complex) their theories aim to capture some basic
workings that can speak to many cases and outline some general tendencies. They hold that the
moment one adds empirical matter, one’s theory no longer has that reach. Hence Waltz’s view that
‘you actually explain less by including more’ (Waltz cited in Wæver, 2009: 212). A statement that
might as well have been uttered by Wæver.

The issue of coherence is different. The fact is that the Copenhagen school’s version of
securitization theory is in part considerably incoherent. Indeed, Wæver has delivered several ex
post facto justifications of why things are the way they are, including as part of the here much cited
paper ‘The theory act: Responsibility and exactitude as seen from securitization’ (2015). It seems
to me, however, that many second-generation scholars (above all Balzacq) that have made the
theory more coherent (notably by following through the logic of audience acceptance), have done

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so at the price of making it less effective (only in the sense just discussed). But this is not inevitably
so. Consider the following examples as cases in point.

First is, what Philippe Bourbeau calls ‘the logic of routine’ (2014). Original securitization theory
holds that successful securitization involves the use of extraordinary measures to address a threat.
Whereby extraordinary is a deviation from ‘what passed as normal until the exception was installed’
(Wæver, 2020: 6). Multiple scholars (including Bigo, 2000; Huysmans, 2011; Trombetta, 2008;
Corry 2012; Salter 2011, Floyd, 2016b) have observed, however, that policy change following
rhetorical securitization (speech act + audience acceptance) does not always result in exceptional
measures, sometimes the threat is addressed using routine measures. It seems to me that the logic
of routine can be inserted into the original theory because it does not challenge the illocutionary
logic of securitization. So doing, makes the theory more effective (in the Wæverian sense) because
it enables recognition of a more complex reality than the original version. Moreover, it makes the
theory more coherent, as it sits more comfortably with the Copenhagen school’s view that security
is constructivist all the way down, a claim that is denied if scholars set the threshold for what
counts as a securitizing response (Ciută, 2009).

A second example is threat articulation via visuals. The Copenhagen school rendition of
securitization in SANFFA has been criticised for focusing on speech only thus ignoring visual
depictions of threats and silences. Some analysts have suggested threat images can play significant
roles in the securitizing move (Hansen, 2011). Provided – as in Hansen’s case - that the imagine
comes in conjunction with relevant words, this too can be slotted into the existing theory. Wæver
clearly accepts this insertion. In 2015 he argues that securitization theory has moved ‘beyond a
focus on discourses and rhetoric (which it originally shared with a general trend towards
‘constructivism’ and ‘language’ within the new security studies) to a theory of political co-
production between multiple actors of social states […]’ (Wæver, 2015: 123). As in the previous
example the theory becomes more effective as a result, especially as the significance of digital
images on social media increases.

Third is the ethics of securitization. Here I mean not any given specific version of just
securitization theory, but simply the view that securitization can be morally permissible or
impermissible (Floyd, 2016a). This is in line with the original framework because although Wæver
and Buzan have an ethical commitment to desecuritization4, they acknowledge that

4 Because desecuritization is a political process decided by actors not analysts, the Copenhagen school’s version of
securitization theory still ticks the non-normative box specified above when listing Buzan’s approach (cf. Taureck,
2006 on the difference between securitization theory and securitization studies)

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desecuritization is better all other things being equal. In recent years, however, Wæver’s view on the
value of desecuritization has become more nuanced still. This is for two reasons. First, regarding
climate change, for example, Wæver is increasingly wondering whether securitization now is
morally preferable to the inevitable and much worse securitization (later in time) thus pre-empted
(Wæver, 2019). Second, because he now accepts that desecuritization does not necessarily lead to
normal politics (i.e., politicisation), but riskification or technification (Wæver, 2017:127),
desecuritization’s moral value is debatable. Inclusion of a more nuanced view regarding the ethics
of securitization renders the original framework more effective, again because the world requires
greater complexity than one solution fits all cases.

What if anything, do these three examples teach us about how to do securitization theory as big
picture theorising? In the first instance they show that if scholars are interested, then theory
development of the original variant is possible through extension and/or embellishment. The latter
raises a question, don’t the many scholars working to define, for example, the audience not also
simply work to embellish the theory? Yes, but still there is a difference. Unlike in the cases of the
logic of routine and visuals, many studies on the audience disturb the original model of the theory’s
core as illocution. Wæver explains that second-generation scholars’ work on the audience
undermine Austin’s original view that ‘speech really can be action’ (2015:123) to a mere ‘sender-
receiver model of communication’ (Wæver, 2017: 130). In other words, it is possible and – I would
say – necessary to amend the original theory to be able to track empirical developments as
accurately as possible, all the while retaining the theory’s focal idea. The easiest way to retain the
focal idea while developing the original theory further is not to embellish existing concepts but to
add a new dimension. Besides the ethics of securitization, Sterling and Webber’s (2019) work on
collective securitization comes to mind here.

Conclusion

Given the overall trend of the literature on securitization, it is reasonable to hold that the
sociological approach will continue to have the upper hand. Some people might even think that
second-generation scholarship has successfully outlived it’s intellectual ‘parents’, indeed that the
Copenhagen school’s variant of the theory is dead. The paper underlines not only why the original
variant lives on, but also why it should live on. To this end it was concerned with three interrelated
research questions, why is the sociological approach to securitization more popular than the
original philosophical approach? Second, what is lost if securitization studies relinquish the
Copenhagen school’s approach? And third, is there still space for big picture theorising, and if so,
how? I have argued that the sociological approach is more popular because it allows the budding

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theorist more room to leave a potentially career defining mark on the discipline. However, I have
also argued that the theory thus developed is not necessarily an IR theory. The domain of IR is
the international, and many second-generation securitization scholars do not have a sufficiently
general international outlook rendering the resulting theories ‘theories of securitization’, but not IR
theories of securitization. It follows that if scholars working on securitization wish to leave a mark
in or on IR, they are better off working with the Copenhagen school’s big picture approach.

All this also shows that the question of which approach i.e., the philosophical or the sociological
one is better is unhelpful. The two types of theory are so different that they defy simplistic
comparison. The question of which is better is ultimately determined by what one seeks to do.

The finding that IR per se is about the big picture is apposite beyond assessing the value of original
securitization theory. Time and again IR scholars engage in navel-gazing exercises questioning IR’s
value, past and future (for an overview see Kristensen, 2016). Part of the reason for this perpetual
crisis of confidence is that IR frequently imports from other disciplines but fails to export its own
ideas. Neither has it produced public intellectuals (Dunne et al, 2013: 419). Excessive importing
from other disciplines has left IR fragmented, seemingly lacking a core. This research shows that
IR, with a focus on the big picture, does have a core that it is worthwhile preserving. What is more
this core is not shaken by the orientation of theory, i.e., whether theory is explanatory, critical,
constitutive, or normative (Dunne et al. 2013: 419) because within all of these big picture theorising
is possible. I suggest that if we collectively invest in big picture theorising, we might be more easily
able to export to other disciplines. In evidence, consider that the Copenhagen school’s
securitization theory is one of the few IR theories or concepts that has taken hold in other
disciplines including in: education (Gearon, 2015, Dwyer, 2018), law (de Londras, 2022;
Ghezelbash, Moreno-Lax and Klein & Opeskin, 2018), criminology (Crawford & Hutchinson,
2015; Lub 2017) and anthropology (Maguire and Zurawski, 2014).

Bibliography

• Balzacq, T. (2005). The three faces of securitization: Political agency, audience and
context. European journal of international relations, 11(2), 171-201.

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• Balzacq, T. (2011). A theory of securitization: origins, core assumptions, and variants.
In Securitization Theory (pp. 1-30). Routledge.
• Balzacq, T. (2011). Enquires into methods In Securitization Theory (pp. 31-53). Routledge.
• Balzacq, T. (2015). The ‘Essence’of securitization: Theory, ideal type, and a sociological
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