Probable Questions
Probable Questions
Probable Questions
The appellant has approached the court Under Article 136 of the Indian Constitution which refers to
Special Leave Petition. However, the respondent would contend that the petition is not maintainable
since there is no grave injustice done here.
Mekala Sivahiah V. State of Andhra Pradesh - The power under Article 136 is exercisable only when
this Court is satisfied that it is necessary to interfere in order to prevent grave or serious miscarriage of
Justice.
2) S 148
3) S. 302
4) S. 326
5) S. 149
6) S. 34
It is humbly submitted that the accused was not justified in using the right of private Defense because of
the following reasons:
A. Firstly, the accused didn't have any right of private Defense of body or property provided under
section 96-106 since neither the complainant party launched the attack on the accused so that they
need to protect their body nor the land on which they were fighting belonged accused and hence
no right to private Defense against the property.
B. Secondly, assuming they had the right to private Defense, they were not justified in using it since
they had malicious intent and were the aggressors. Per the rule of law, the aggressor can't benefit
from the right to private Defense.
C. Thirdly, the amount of force used was not justified.
D. Lastly, the present case can be included in the category of free fighting where the Defense of right
to private Defense is unavailable.
[2]. WHETHER THE ACCUSED HAS EXCEEDED THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE DEFENSE? IF YES, CAN THE
ACCUSED BE HELD LIABLE UNDER SECTION 302 OF THE IPC?
It is humbly submitted before the hon'ble Court that the accused has exceeded the right of private Defense
because of the following reasons:
1) To begin with, as mentioned earlier, they didn't have any right to private Defense, and hence no
question of excess of the right of private Defense arises.
2) Secondly, assuming there was a right of private defense available to the accused, then there was
no need to use it when the victims were retreating from the field, and hence there, the alleged
right of private Defense was exceeded.
Lastly, it was the case of free fight where the right of private Defense is immaterial, and hence the
question of exceeding the right of private Defense is immaterial too.
[3]. WERE THE APPELLANTS GUILTY UNDER SECTION 302/149 OR ONLY UNDER SECTION 302 OF
THE INDIAN PENAL CODE FOR THE MURDER OF THE SIX VICTIMS?
It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that appellants are guilty under section 302/149 of the
Indian Penal code because of the following reasons:
1) Section 149 prohibits the unlawful assembly of more than 5 people with an unlawful object which
condition is fulfilled herein since
a) the appellants were present at the scene of the crime with other four people and,
b) they had an agreement to do riots and murder of the victims.
2) Also, when one commits a crime in the unlawful assembly it is presumed that it is committed by
every one of them and hence even if presumed that the murder was not committed by the
appellants they can be prosecuted since they were part of the unlawful assembly.
3) They can be charged with murder under section 302 of the IPC since it is clear from the facts and
circumstances of the case that the appellants shot at the victims and don’t fall under any
exception provided under chapter 4 and hence they are liable under section 302 of IPC as well.
Therefore, the essentials of both crimes are made out and hence the appellants can be charged under both
sections 302 read with section 149 of the code.
Section 97: clearly mentions that the right of private defense is not an absolute right. There are several
restrictions imposed on this right.
Section 100 of the act: mentions the conditions wherein the right to private defense to the body can
extend to cause death however in these six clauses none was met out in this case:
1) There was no apprehension of death as the complainants were working on the field and this act
surely can’t cause apprehension of death.
2) There was no assault on the part of the complainants and hence no question of reasonable
apprehension of grivious hurt.
3) And the rest are clearly not made out and hence there’s no defence under section 100 of the act.
in the case of Jaipal v. state of Haryana, 2000 the SC pointed out that it was the accused party alone who
carried dangerous weapons, which clearly showed their intention to attack. The complainant party did not
carry any lethal weapons but instead suffered injuries.
Thangavel v. State representation by Inspector of Police Thevattipatti Police Station Salem, the Court
highlighted that the Right of Private Defense exists and is inherent to every person but cannot be misused
by the person claiming the right.
in the case of Gopal v. state of Rajasthan, the SC, in the backdrop of the facts identical to the present
case, held that the accused who chased the assailants running from the scene and inflict injuries did not
have the right of private Defense as reasonable apprehension cease to exist at that point of time.
in the case of the State of UP v. Ram Swaroop, it was held that the right of private Defense is a right of
Defense, not of retribution. It is available in the face of imminent peril to those who act in good faith, and
in no case can the right be conceded to a person who stages manages a situation wherein the right can be
used as a shield to justify an act of aggression.
Ishwar Singh v. State of Rajasthan it was held that the accused had to prove that he was put in a
dangerous situation wherein invoking the Right of Private Defense was necessary to get out of the said
situation.
in the case of Subramani v. State of Tamil Nadu, the Supreme Court went on to establish that the injuries
on the accused must justify the version of private Defense, and it is upon the Court to decide as per the
facts and circumstances that the accused had rightfully used him right of private Defense against the
aggressor.
In Yogendra Moraji v. State, the Court held that for a person to cause the death of the assailant as
self-defense, there should be an imminent danger, and there should be no other possible way of
getting out of the situation.
Mahanadi v. Emperor and Alingal Kunhinayan & Anr v. Emperor wherein the Courts have
observed that the acceptable degree of Defense is determined by the "reasonably proportionate
force" to deter wrongdoer. This force must be proportionate to the danger posed by the person
against whom force has been unleashed. In other words, the use of force must not be "totally
disproportionate."
K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, where the Supreme Court held that "it is not
necessary that each member of an unlawful assembly must be shown to have committed a
specific overt act which constitutes the offence charged against him." The Court further
held that "if it is shown that all the members of the assembly entertained a common object
which is prohibited by law, each of them is liable for the acts done in furtherance of that
common object."
Mahabir Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court held that "the existence of an
unlawful assembly may be inferred from the conduct of the persons alleged to be its
members, the weapons used by them, and the manner in which they moved about."
State of Haryana v. Raja Ram1, the Supreme Court held that in a case where an accused is
charged under section 149 of the IPC, it is not necessary to establish the precise role played by
each accused in the commission of the offence.
In the case of Lal Bihari v. State of U.P., the Supreme Court held that the presence of an
accused at the scene of the crime, coupled with the other circumstances of the case, may lead to
the inference that the accused was a member of an unlawful assembly.
In the case of State of U.P. v. Satish, the Supreme Court held that the common object of an
unlawful assembly need not be pre-arranged or pre-concerted. The common object may develop
at the spur of the moment. The common object may also change during the course of the
assembly.