In-Q-Tel The Central Intelligence Agency As Venture Capitalist
In-Q-Tel The Central Intelligence Agency As Venture Capitalist
In-Q-Tel The Central Intelligence Agency As Venture Capitalist
Volume 33 | Issue 3
Spring 2013
Recommended Citation
John T. Reinert, In-Q-Tel: The Central Intelligence Agency as Venture Capitalist, 33 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 677 (2013).
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njilb/vol33/iss3/4
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
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In-Q-Tel: The Central Intelligence
Agency as Venture Capitalist
By John T. Reinert*
Abstract: The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the United States’ principal
foreign intelligence and spy organization, chartered the first government-
sponsored venture capital firm, dubbed In-Q-Tel, in February 1999. In-Q-Tel
represents the twenty-first century fusion of U.S. spy efforts with the venture
capital industry. Envisioned as a platform to expand the research and
development (R&D) efforts of the CIA into the private sector, In-Q-Tel uses
CIA-supplied funds to make strategic investments in startup companies
developing commercially focused technologies that are of interest to the CIA
and greater intelligence community. This Comment contends that, although
R&D collaboration between the public and private sectors is vital and should be
encouraged, such collaboration should not be in the form of a venture capital
firm chartered and sponsored by the CIA. The CIA is not equipped to succeed in
the notoriously perilous business of venture capital, and heightened ethical
concerns surround the making of government-sponsored equity investments in
private companies. Indeed, In-Q-Tel often invests in companies with
international operations, vicariously and unnecessarily exposing the CIA and
larger U.S. government to foreign entanglements. This Comment begins by
tracing relevant developments in the funding of U.S. spy efforts in Part II. Next,
Part III explores the venture capital industry, paying particular attention to the
interplay between venture capital and R&D. Part IV then analyzes the
relationship between the CIA and In-Q-Tel. Finally, Part V: (1) contends the
risks of In-Q-Tel currently outweigh its benefits; (2) suggests the current In-Q-
Tel model inappropriately exposes the CIA and larger U.S. government to
disputes arising from private international law; and (3) proposes alternative
courses of action by which the CIA may tap into the R&D efforts of the private
sector. Part VI concludes this Note.
* J.D., 2013, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A., 2007, Indiana University. I
thank my editors, especially Pat Disbennett and Topher Michail, for their insightful
comments and (almost) limitless patience. Special thanks also to Mike Molitor, whose
thoughtful review of an early draft helped immensely.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction .................................................................................... 678
II. Funding U.S. Spy Efforts: The Origins of In-Q-Tel ...................... 680
A. Early History: 1775–1947 ....................................................... 681
B. Formation of the CIA and In-Q-Tel: 1947–1999 .................... 684
III. Venture Capital and the U.S. Government ..................................... 688
A. Venture Capital in the United States ....................................... 689
B. Strategic Venture Capital and Recent Government Projects ... 691
IV. The Relationship between the CIA and In-Q-Tel .......................... 693
A. What Is In-Q-Tel? ................................................................... 693
B. How In-Q-Tel Works .............................................................. 696
V. Analysis .......................................................................................... 699
A. Internal Issues: Staffing and Technology Integration ............. 700
1. Staffing In-Q-Tel and QIC ................................................. 700
2. Technology Integration at the CIA .................................... 703
B. External Issues: International Security and Foreign
Entanglements ......................................................................... 704
C. Recommendations ................................................................... 707
VI. Conclusion ..................................................................................... 708
I. INTRODUCTION
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the United States’ principal
foreign intelligence and spy organization, chartered the first government-
sponsored venture capital firm, dubbed In-Q-Tel, in February 1999.1
Envisioned as a platform to expand the research and development (R&D)
efforts of the CIA into the private sector, In-Q-Tel’s mission is “to identify,
adapt, and deliver innovative technology solutions to support the missions
of the Central Intelligence Agency and broader U.S. Intelligence
Community.”2
Under the In-Q-Tel model, the CIA provides investment capital and
1
BUS. EXEC. FOR NAT’L SEC., ACCELERATING THE ACQUISITION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR INTELLIGENCE: THE REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL ON THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN-Q-TEL VENTURE 6 (C. Lawrence Meador et al. eds.,
2001), available at http://www.iqt.org/attachments/BENS%20Report.pdf [hereinafter BENS
REPORT].
2
IQT Corporate Fact Sheet, IN-Q-TEL,
http://www.iqt.org/mission/IQT%20Corporate%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 2,
2011).
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3
GEORGE TENET WITH BILL HARLOW, AT THE CENTER OF THE STORM: MY YEARS AT THE
CIA 26 (2007).
4
BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.
5
IQT Mission, IN-Q-TEL, http://www.iqt.org/about/mission.html (last visited Feb. 4,
2013).
6
As one commentator noted, In-Q-Tel:
[C]an make either an equity investment, where it receives part ownership in the
company, or a work program investment. Work programs typically provide
funding for a company to develop its technology in a way that suits [Intelligence
Community] needs. For example, if a company has developed a new
communications antenna, but the CIA needs that antenna to be 50 percent smaller,
it could make a work program investment to help fund that reduction in size.
Typically, In-Q-Tel makes both equity and work program investments.
Andrew S. Mara, Maximizing the Returns of Government Venture Capital Programs, DEF.
HORIZONS (Nat’l Def. Univ./Inst. for Nat’l Strategic Studies, D.C.), no. 71, Jan.2011, at 2,
available at http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/DH%2071.pdf.
7
Deals & Deal Makers—Memo to Techies: This Army Wants Your Energy Ideas, WALL
ST. J., May 9, 2003, at C5.
8
Id.
9
Marc Kaufman, NASA Invests in Its Future with Venture Capital Firm, WASH. POST,
Oct. 31, 2006, at A19.
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faster access to that creativity.”10 Even the U.S. Postal Service, faced with a
projected loss of $7 billion for fiscal year 2010, expressed interest in the In-
Q-Tel model.11 Commenting on the projected loss, Louis Atkins, executive
vice president of the National Association of Postal Supervisors, declared
the Postal Service “lacks the vision, resources and know-how [to] generate
additional revenue in innovative ways.”12 His solution: “The Postal Service
needs its own In-Q-Tel to achieve the same leverage that connects
technology advances to improvements in communications, including going
beyond hard-copy mail itself.”13
Although collaboration between the R&D efforts of the public and
private sectors is vital and should be encouraged, this Comment contends
that such collaboration should not be in the form of a venture capital firm
chartered and sponsored by the CIA. The CIA is not equipped to succeed in
the notoriously perilous business of venture capital, and heightened ethical
concerns surround the making of government-sponsored equity investments
in private companies. Indeed, In-Q-Tel often invests in companies with
international operations, vicariously and unnecessarily exposing the CIA
and larger U.S. government to foreign entanglements.
This Comment traces relevant developments in the funding of U.S. spy
efforts in Part II. Next, Part III explores the venture capital industry, paying
particular attention to the interplay between venture capital and R&D. Part
IV then analyzes the relationship between the CIA and In-Q-Tel. Finally,
Part V: (1) argues the risks of In-Q-Tel currently outweigh the benefits; (2)
suggests the current In-Q-Tel model inappropriately exposes the CIA and
larger U.S. government to disputes arising from private international law;
and (3) proposes alternative courses of action by which the CIA may tap
into the R&D efforts of the private sector. Part VI concludes this
Comment.
10
Id.
11
Joe Davidson, Postal Service Desperate for Good Ideas, WASH. POST, June 23, 2010,
at B03.
12
Id.
13
Id.
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14
2 SECRET JOURNALS OF THE ACTS AND PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS, FROM THE FIRST
MEETING THEREOF TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE CONFEDERATION, BY THE ADOPTION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 5–6 (Thomas B. Wait 1820) [hereinafter SECRET
JOURNALS].
15
Id. at 5.
16
CHRISTOPHER ANDREW, FOR THE PRESIDENT’S EYES ONLY: SECRET INTELLIGENCE AND
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 7 (1995).
17
Denys P. Myers, Legislatures and Foreign Relations, 11 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 643, 676
(1917).
18
SECRET JOURNALS, supra note 14, at 6.
19
Robert M. Gates, Intelligence, Democracy, and Freedom, 22 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q.
231, 231 (1992).
20
See, e.g., Halperin v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 629 F.2d 144, 157 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(“The Committee exercised broad discretionary power to conduct intelligence activities
independent of the Continental Congress and to safeguard the secrecy of matters pertaining
to its agents, though Congress asserted greater direct control following the Declaration of
Independence. It is especially remarkable that the Committee was in a position to insist upon
secrecy even against Congress, which functioned both as the legislative and the executive
power at this time and exercised control over foreign affairs.”).
21
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE, OF THE
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centuries later, the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 would grant
similar deference to the CIA.22
George Washington’s contributions to the development and funding of
U.S. spy efforts did not end with the Revolutionary War. On January 8,
1790, during a speech to Congress that would be remembered as the first
State of the Union address,23 President Washington requested “a competent
fund designated for defraying the expenses incident to the conduct of our
foreign affairs.”24 On July 1, 1790, Congress responded by creating the
Contingent Fund of Foreign Intercourse, known informally as the Secret
Service Fund.25 Congress authorized the President “to draw from the
treasury of the United States . . . a sum not exceeding forty thousand dollars
annually” to finance intelligence operations.26 The Act included an annual
reporting provision, but Congress required the President to account only for
expenditures from the fund “as in his judgment may be made public.”27 On
February 9, 1793, Congress clarified the reporting provision by requiring
the President to certify expenditures from the fund. Significantly, Congress
declared “every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the
sums or sums therein expressed to have been expended.”28 Thus, while
President Washington had to certify the sums spent from the fund, he could
“conceal both the purposes and recipients of payments.”29
Although the Contingent Fund remained in use by U.S. Presidents
until the mid-twentieth century,30 the operations it funded consisted of “ad
hoc efforts.”31 This would change during World War II,32 when President
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE FIRST TO THE SECOND
SESSION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS 568 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834).
22
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, ch. 227, 68 Stat. 208 (codified as amended
at 50 U.S.C. § 403 (2006)).
23
See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 20 at 158 (describing President Washington’s address
as “the precursor to the ‘State of the Union’ message. . .”).
24
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 969–70 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
25
ANDREW, supra note 16, at 11.
26
Act of July 1, 1790, ch. 22, § 1, 1790 FIRST CONG. 128-29 (providing the means of
intercourse between the United States and foreign nations).
27
Id.
28
Act of Feb. 9, 1793, ch. 4, § 2, 1793 SECOND CONG. 299–30 (continuing “in force for a
limited time,” and amending “An act providing the means of intercourse between the United
States and foreign nations”).
29
ANDREW, supra note 16, at 11.
30
See, e.g., Halperin v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 629 F.2d 144, 158–59 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (“The contingent fund remained in continuous use by the President throughout the
nineteenth century and up to the creation of the CIA in the mid-twentieth century.”).
31
Gates, supra note 19, at 232.
32
See Edward F. Sayle, The Historical Underpinnings of the U.S. Intelligence
Community, 1 J. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 1 (1986) (discussing the
development of U.S. intelligence efforts between the Revolutionary War and World War II).
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33
Jennifer Davis Heaps, Tracking Intelligence Information: The Office of Strategic
Services, 61 AM. ARCHIVIST 287, 289 (1998).
34
A Look Back: Gen. William J. Donovan Heads Office of Strategic Services, CENT.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/gen.-
william-j.-donovan-heads-oss.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2011).
35
See William J. Donovan, A Plea for State Regulation, 159 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 76, 83 (1932) (“William J. Donovan . . . was the only man in the World War who
received every decoration in the power of the United States to give: the Congressional Medal
of Honor, the Distinguished Service Medal, and the Distinguished Service Cross.”).
36
Gates, supra note 19, at 232.
37
Id. at 233.
38
ANDREW, supra note 16, at 160.
39
Id. at 29.
40
Id.
41
Id.
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42
See, e.g., ANDREW, supra note 16, at 156–61; see also AGOSTINO VON HASSELL &
SIGRID MACRAE, ALLIANCE OF ENEMIES: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE SECRET AMERICAN AND
GERMAN COLLABORATION TO END WORLD WAR II 292–95 (2006).
43
U.S. Intelligence Held Inadequate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1947, at 6.
44
Id.
45
ANDREW, supra note 16, at 168.
46
National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, § 102(d), 61 Stat. 496, 498 (current version at
50 U.S.C. § 403-4(b) (2006)).
47
See Gates, supra note 19, at 233.
48
Cent. Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, ch. 227, § 8(a), 68 Stat. 208, 212 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 403(j) (2006)).
49
Id.
50
Act of Feb. 9, 1793, ch. 4, § 2, 1 Stat. 299, 300 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3526 (2006)).
684
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51
50 U.S.C. § 403(j)(b).
52
Id.; Act of Feb. 9, 1793 § 2.
53
Halperin v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 629 F.2d 144, 160 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
54
See Rick E. Yannuzzi, In-Q-Tel: A New Partnership between the CIA and the Private
Sector, 9 DEF. INTELLIGENCE J. 25, 26 (2000).
55
See generally JEFFREY T. RICHELSON, THE WIZARDS OF LANGLEY: INSIDE THE CIA’S
DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (2001).
56
Gates, supra note 19, at 234 (“[A] handful of voices question[ed] the need for
intelligence in a post-Soviet, post-Cold War world . . . .”).
57
TENET WITH HARLOW, supra note 3, at 25–26.
58
George John Tenet, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-
for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/directors-and-deputy-
directors-of-central-intelligence/tenet.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2013). In a 2004
restructuring of the intelligence community, the position of Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) replaced the position of DCI. History of the CIA, CENT.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/history-of-the-cia/index.html (last
visited Mar. 1, 2013).
59
TENET WITH HARLOW, supra note 3, at 14.
60
Id. As Tenet recalled: “The entire intelligence community, not just CIA, lost billions
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686
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eye.69 David proposed that the CIA outsource a portion of its R&D efforts
to the private sector.70 After all, according to one former CIA official, “[a]s
an information-based agency, the CIA must be at the cutting edge of
information technology in order to maintain its competitive edge and
provide its customers with intelligence that is both timely and relevant.”71
The problem, according to the official, was “the CIA did not, and could not,
compete for IT innovation and talent with the same speed and agility that
those in the commercial marketplace, whose businesses are driven by
‘Internet time’ and profit, could.”72
After much discussion within the CIA and talks with leaders in the
private sector,73 the concept of a CIA-backed venture capital firm charged
with “harness[ing] the brilliance of young innovators in the IT industry”74
came to fruition. While the concept was new, it fit within the exceptionally
broad discretion granted to the intelligence community since 1775.75
The CIA approached Norman Augustine, the former chief executive
officer (CEO) of the aerospace and defense company Lockheed Martin, to
serve as the firm’s founder, since Augustine had “the experience and
passion necessary to start the Corporation.”76 Augustine accepted.77 In
February 1999, the CIA chartered In-Q-Tel78 as “a private, independent,
nonprofit corporation”79 incorporated in Delaware.80 The original corporate
charter described In-Q-Tel’s mission as follows: “[T]o exploit and develop
new and emerging information technologies and pursue R&D that produce
innovative solutions to the most difficult problems facing the CIA and
Intelligence Community.”81 A month later, In-Q-Tel received its first
contract from the CIA.82 Thus, concluded a former CIA official, “In-Q-Tel
was in business.”83
In-Q-Tel represents the twenty-first century fusion of U.S. spy efforts
with the venture capital industry. The broad grant of discretionary authority
69
TENET WITH HARLOW, supra note 3, at 26.
70
Id.
71
Yannuzzi, supra note 54, at 26.
72
Id. at 27.
73
Id. at 26.
74
TENET WITH HARLOW, supra note 3, at 26.
75
BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at 31.
76
Yannuzzi, supra note 54, at 26.
77
Id.
78
The initial name of the corporation was Peleus; it was soon changed to In-Q-It and
finally to In-Q-Tel. BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
79
TENET WITH HARLOW, supra note 3, at 26.
80
BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
81
Id.
82
Yannuzzi, supra note 54, at 26.
83
Id.
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84
50 U.S.C. §§ 403-4(a) (2006).
85
Id. § 403(j).
86
Examples abound of the CIA’s partnerships with the private sector, especially during
the Cold War. In 1951, for example, the CIA spent $300,000 to establish a Harvard-based
think tank charged with “research[ing] worldwide political, economic and social change . . .
in the interest of the entire intelligence community.” KAI BIRD, THE COLOR OF TRUTH:
MCGEORGE BUNDY AND WILLIAM BUNDY: BROTHERS IN ARMS 138–39 (1998).
87
See Kenneth W. Rind, The Role of Venture Capital in Corporate Development, 2
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 169, 170 (1981) (discussing the origins of the venture capital industry).
88
NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD 128–
33, 343 (2008).
89
Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Venture Capital Revolution, 15 J. ECON. PERSP.
145, 146 (2001).
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90
Id.
91
Id.; see generally David H. Hsu & Martin Kenney, Organizing Venture Capital: The
Rise and Demise of American Research & Development Corporation, 1946–1973, 14 INDUS.
& CORP. CHANGE 579–616 (2005).
92
But note that while the venture capital model “is a fairly recent phenomenon, ‘private
risk capital’ investing has existed in one form or another in every society that had significant
commercial activity.” JACK S. LEVIN & DONALD E. ROCAP, STRUCTURING VENTURE
CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY, AND ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS 1–13 (2012).
93
DOUGLAS J. CUMMING & SOFIA A. JOHAN, VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY
CONTRACTING: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3–4 (2009).
94
Typically, banks do not finance entrepreneurial projects, since the risk of default is
especially high. This often leaves the entrepreneur turning to his or her own savings account
or family and friends for the capital needed to get the project off the ground. Venture capital
funds take on these high-risk projects and provide start-up capital; in return for assuming
such high risk, these investors expect to be compensated handsomely. Id. at 10–11.
95
Id. at 4.
96
Id. at 11.
97
NAT’L VENTURE CAP. ASS’N & THOMSON REUTERS, NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL
ASSOCIATION YEARBOOK 2011, at 7 (2011), available at
http://www.slideshare.net/Rachid_Sefrioui/venture-capital-2011-nvca-yearbook-2011.
98
National Venture Capital Association, VC INDUSTRY OVERVIEW,
http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=141&Itemid=589
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Typically, the investment is held for multiple years before the exit.99 For
their highly specialized services, venture capital fund managers are
compensated with an annual management fee (generally 2% of the fund’s
committed capital) plus a performance fee called “carried interest”
(generally 20% of capital gains from the exit sales of the fund’s
investments).100 This compensation structure is known colloquially as “2
and 20.”101
The unusual taxation of the 2 and 20 structure has recently become the
subject of intense political debate.102 “The general partners [of a venture
capital fund] typically claim the 2% fee as compensation, so it’s subject to
ordinary income and payroll taxes,” notes the Wall Street Journal.103 “But
they often classify the 20% share of profits—where the big money can be—
as an investment producing a capital gain or loss.”104 The difference is
important because the highest tax rate applied to capital gains is slightly
more than half the highest rate applied to ordinary income.105
But not all venture capital firms earn huge profits. Indeed, many are
not profitable at all. The venture capital market is notoriously complex and
challenging, and success is rare.106 The National Venture Capital
Association cautions: “Approximately one-third of portfolio companies
[held by venture capital funds] fail, so those that do succeed must do so in a
big way.”107 Otherwise, the fund managers will run out of capital as
investors move to other managers. On the other hand, successful venture
capital firms and other financial intermediaries continue to attract investors.
Indeed, “[m]any recent . . . funds have capital exceeding $1 billion (and a
few exceeding $10 billion).”108 The success of these firms traces in large
part to the industry’s ability to attract the best and brightest with the
potential to obtain substantial compensation under the 2 and 20 model.109
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110
FERGUSON, supra note 88, at 6.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Yannuzzi, supra note 54, at 26.
114
“Private [venture capital] investors are intensely driven by financial motivations,
whereas [government venture capital] programs are primarily driven by strategic concerns.”
Mara, supra note 6, at 11.
115
Gilson, supra note 106, at 1068.
116
See Rind, supra note 87, at 179 (discussing venture capital as “a useful tool for
corporate development”).
117
Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to
Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 674, 675 (2000).
691
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118
Id.
119
See generally IAN MACMILLAN ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH.,
CORPORATE VENTURE CAPITAL: SEEKING INNOVATION AND STRATEGIC GROWTH (2008),
available at http://www.atp.nist.gov/eao/gcr_08_916_nist4_cvc_073108_web.pdf
(examining strategic corporate venture capital as a generator of innovation in a report
prepared for the U.S. Department of Commerce).
120
Maryann P. Feldman & Maryellen R. Kelley, Leveraging Research and Development:
Assessing the Impact of the U.S. Advanced Technology Program, 20 SMALL BUS. ECON. 153,
154 (2003).
121
Id. at 153.
122
Id. at 161.
123
Id. at 161–62.
124
See generally TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION PROGRAM, http://www.nist.gov/tip (last
visited Nov. 3, 2011).
125
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM, http://www.atp.nist.gov (last visited Nov. 3,
2011); see also America Competes Act, Pub. L. No. 110-69, § 3012, 121 Stat. 572, 593
(2007).
126
Josh Lerner, When Bureaucrats Meet Entrepreneurs: The Design of Effective “Public
Venture Capital”, 112 ECON. J. F73, F80 (2002).
127
NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, TECHNOLOGY
INNOVATION PROGRAM: TRANSFORMING AMERICA’S FUTURE THROUGH INNOVATION 1 (2009),
available at http://www.nist.gov/tip/upload/tip_2009_annual_report.pdf.
128
Id.
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A. What Is In-Q-Tel?
Shortly after In-Q-Tel opened for business, an article in the Los
Angeles Daily Journal described the partnership between the firm and the
CIA as “an out-of-the-box marriage between the federal government and
129
Id. at 2.
130
See, e.g., Feldman & Kelley, supra note 120; CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 93, at
256–57.
131
See, e.g., SCOTT SHANE, ILLUSIONS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE COSTLY MYTHS THAT
ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS AND POLICY MAKERS LIVE BY 88–90 (2008).
132
Scott Shane, Why Encouraging More People to Become Entrepreneurs Is Bad Public
Policy, 33 SMALL BUS. ECON. 141 (2009).
133
Id. at 147.
134
HOMELAND SEC. INST., VENTURE CAPITAL CONCEPT ANALYSIS 7 (2005), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA502019.
135
Id.
136
KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30533, THE QUASI GOVERNMENT:
HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS WITH BOTH GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR LEGAL
CHARACTERISTICS, at summary (2011), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30533.pdf.
693
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Silicon Valley.”137 As the writer put it, “This is a tale of James Bond meets
venture capitalist.”138 True, the CIA wanted to play up the mystique of
James Bond—the “Q” in the firm’s name, placed between “Intel”
(shorthand for “Intelligence”), refers to James Bond’s fictional inventor of
high-tech spy gear and other gadgets.139 However, characterizing In-Q-Tel
solely as a venture capital firm is somewhat inaccurate. Indeed, In-Q-Tel
has variously (and correctly) been called a “technology accelerator,”140 a
“private nonprofit venture capital company,”141 as well as “the ‘venture
capital arm’ of the CIA.”142 Reflecting its focus on R&D, In-Q-Tel refers to
itself as a “strategic investment firm.”143
But the best definition of In-Q-Tel’s business model is supplied by an
independent report prepared by Business Executives for National Security
(BENS), an organization that fosters an exchange of ideas between the
private and public sectors.144 “In-Q-Tel has been mischaracterized as a
private venture capital firm,” observes the 2001 report.145 “More
precisely . . . In-Q-Tel is an evolving blend of various business, nonprofit,
and government research and development (R&D) models. It is most
analogous to a corporate strategic venture capital entity—like those
maintained by major technology firms.”146 The BENS report notes that,
while profit is important, In-Q-Tel primarily “seeks enhanced innovation,
earlier discovery of relevant technologies, and more direct information on
market developments.”147
Regardless of the label, the important point is that In-Q-Tel, legally
independent of the CIA, makes equity investments in private-sector firms
using government-supplied funds. In the years prior to In-Q-Tel’s
formation, many observers had called for the CIA and the broader
intelligence community to do some “radical rethinking about its missions
137
Leslie A. Gordon, Venturing Out, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 13, 2000, at S10.
138
Id.
139
Id.; Neil King, Jr., With a Nod to 007, the CIA Sets Up Firm to Invest in High Tech,
WALL ST. J., April 3, 2000, at A1, available
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB954709328708352542-
search.html?KEYWORDS=Neil+King+Jr&COLLECTION=wsjie/6month.
140
BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at viii.
141
Amy Cortese, Suddenly, Uncle Sam Wants to Bankroll You, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30,
2001, at 1.
142
Terence O’Hara, In-Q-Tel, CIA’s Venture Arm, Invests in Secrets, WASH. POST, Aug.
15, 2005, at D01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/08/14/AR2005081401108.html.
143
IQT Corporate Fact Sheet, supra note 2.
144
About BENS, BUS. EXEC. FOR NAT’L SEC., http://www.bens.org/page.aspx?pid=406
(last visited Jan. 23, 2013).
145
BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at viii.
146
Id. at viii–ix.
147
Id.
694
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148
Carver, supra note 67, at 156.
149
TENET WITH HARLOW, supra note 3, at 26.
150
Id.
151
Yannuzzi, supra note 54, at 28.
152
TENET WITH HARLOW, supra note 3, at 26.
153
David Ignatius, The CIA as Venture Capitalist, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1999, at A29,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPcap/1999-09/29/071r-092999-
idx.html.
154
Gordon, supra note 137, at S10.
155
Ignatius, supra note 153, at A29.
156
Gordon, supra note 137, at S10.
157
Id.
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158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
KOSAR, supra note 136.
162
Josh Lerner et al., In-Q-Tel, in VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE EQUITY: A CASEBOOK
483, 489 (3d ed. 2005).
163
IQT History, IN-Q-TEL, http://www.iqt.org/about-iqt/history.html (last visited Nov. 2,
2011).
164
Lerner et al., supra note 162, at 483.
165
Recently, In-Q-Tel received additional funding from other government agencies,
including: the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA); the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA); and the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology
Directorate (DHSS&T). Intelligence Community Partners, IN-Q-TEL,
http://www.iqt.org/about-iqt/ic-partners.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2011).
696
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investment purposes of about $37 million166 as part of the CIA’s budget for
the Directorate of Science and Technology.167 While this may seem an odd
use of taxpayer dollars, it fits within the broad discretionary authority
afforded to intelligence operations since 1775.168
An office within the CIA, called the In-Q-Tel Interface Center (QIC),
serves as the link between the CIA and In-Q-Tel.169 QIC communicates
unclassified problem sets to In-Q-Tel,170 for which In-Q-Tel is then charged
with combing the private sector for potential fits with the technologies
being developed by promising start-ups. Typically, In-Q-Tel makes twelve
to fifteen investments per year.171 When In-Q-Tel finds a company that
seems poised to deliver, it will usually invest between $500,000 and $3
million, with about 15-20% of that figure going toward an equity position in
the company and the remaining sum covering licensing agreements and
contracts to develop the company’s technology to fit the specific needs of
the CIA.172
Like other venture capital firms, In-Q-Tel typically assumes an
advisory position on a portfolio company’s board of directors.173 From this
vantage point, In-Q-Tel acts as a general advisor to the company. The
perceived benefit of being an investor in the company rather than simply a
customer is that, if any changes are made to the company or its product(s),
In-Q-Tel will promptly find out. As one of In-Q-Tel’s senior directors put
166
O’Hara, supra note 142. Since O’Hara’s article revealed In-Q-Tel’s annual
investment funding figure, no further information has been released; the current funding
figure dedicated to investments may be more or less than $37 million per year. As Forbes
noted, “[t]he operation’s budget is classified.” Kashmir Hill, Startups Backed by the CIA,
FORBES (Nov. 22, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/11/19/in-q-tel-cia-venture-
fund-business-washington-cia.html?boxes=Homepagechannels.
167
Lerner et al., supra note 162, at 495.
168
In-Q-Tel’s outside counsel, Jeffrey H. Smith of Arnold & Porter LLP, remarked that
“one of the major legal questions was: could the government give appropriated money to a
company knowing this company would then invest it in start-up companies? We got over
that hurdle, although there were skeptics for some time.” Id. at 489; see also Jeffrey H.
Smith, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP,
http://www.arnoldporter.com/professionals.cfm?action=view&id=109 (last visited Feb. 15,
2012).
169
Lerner et al., supra note 162, at 493–95.
170
BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
171
TIM SHORROCK, SPIES FOR HIRE: THE SECRET WORLD OF INTELLIGENCE OUTSOURCING
147 (2008).
172
O’Hara, supra note 142 (reporting that “In-Q-Tel spends $500,000 to $2 million on a
company with technology of interest to the CIA. But only 15 percent of that is in form of an
equity investment.”); SHORROCK, supra note 171, at 147 (quoting an In-Q-Tel vice president
stating the firm’s investments “tend to be in the $1 million to $3 million range” with some
80% of that figure funding “specific technology advancement work driven by identified
Intelligence Community needs” and the remaining sum covering an equity investment).
173
BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at 60; Lerner et al., supra note 162, at 495.
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it in 2004, “When you are [only] a customer, you are often the last to know
anything is going wrong with the company.”174
Ostensibly not-for-profit, any returns In-Q-Tel generates from its
portfolio companies flow back to In-Q-Tel.175 Although In-Q-Tel does not
regularly disclose the financial performance of its portfolio,176 Gilman
Louie stated in late 2005 that the firm had managed a cumulative rate of
return of 26% up to that period.177 When In-Q-Tel realizes a profit from the
exit of a portfolio company, the board of directors may then re-allocate the
funds to new projects.178 As for compensation, between 20 to 40% of an In-
Q-Tel employee’s salary is put into a mandatory fund; for every three
dollars In-Q-Tel invests, one dollar from the employee fund is also
invested.179 Overall, In-Q-Tel managers are compensated differently than
managers of traditional venture capital funds (which use the 2 and 20
structure described earlier in Part III.A), but they still have a direct stake in
the companies in which In-Q-Tel invests.
In terms of In-Q-Tel’s potential investments, a senior director
explained:
We are out there combing the woods, working with entrepreneurs all
over the United States, and for that matter, even worldwide. We get
business plans in, and we continually evaluate new technologies in a
variety of different areas, of which knowledge management tools are
one, and other technology areas tangential to knowledge
management.180
174
Hugh McKellar, Inside In-Q-Tel: Exclusive Interview, KMWORLD (July 1, 2004),
http://www.kmworld.com/Articles/News/News-Analysis/Inside-In-Q-Tel-exclusive-
interview-9563.aspx.
175
Lerner et al., supra note 162, at 490.
176
“In-Q-Tel is a rather secretive group.” Kashmir Hill, How the C.I.A. Perfects its
Social Media Monitoring Technologies, FORBES (Nov. 24, 2010, 10:22 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2010/11/24/how-the-c-i-a-perfects-its-social-media-
monitoring-technologies/.
177
Jay Solomon, Investing in Intelligence, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2005, at A4, available
at http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB112649119163137691-
v3hOitqG_UmQt3vvwFp_B3wWrc4_20060912.html?mod=tff_main_tff_top.
178
Sarah Lacy, Meet the CIA’s Venture Capitalist, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (May 9, 2005),
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-05-09/meet-the-cias-venture-capitalist.
179
Id.
180
McKellar, supra note 174.
181
Hill, supra note 166; Alumni Portfolio Companies, IN-Q-TEL,
http://www.iqt.org/portfolio/alumni.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).
698
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33:677 (2013)
activities, since 1999 the firm has invested in companies with operations
throughout North America, Europe, and Asia.182
George Tenet, under whose direction In-Q-Tel came to life, reflected
in 2007 that “[t]he In-Q-Tel alliance has put the [CIA] back at the leading
edge of technology, a frontier we never should have retreated from in the
first place.”183 Whether or not this assertion is true, another question
altogether is whether an independent venture capital firm is the best vehicle
to accomplish such a mission.
V. ANALYSIS
The current In-Q-Tel model has been touted as a success. In March
2012, for example, David Petraeus, then Director of the CIA, declared that
“our partnership with In-Q-Tel is essential to helping identify and deliver
groundbreaking technologies with mission-critical applications to the CIA
and to our partner agencies.”184 According to Petraeus, the private sector’s
“ability to rapidly prototype new products and get them to market—
especially our market—is a skill that government simply cannot match.”185
But might the potential risks of In-Q-Tel be greater than the benefits?
The 2001 BENS report concludes the opposite: “In-Q-Tel’s potential
advantage to the CIA outweighs the risk.”186 Yet, this study was performed
with relatively minimal data—In-Q-Tel had existed for only two years at
the time. The study seems to endorse In-Q-Tel more as a novel experiment
than a true success. The study advises: “Except for required audits and
oversight, In-Q-Tel should be allowed to complete its initial business cycle
without additional reviews. A full business case assessment should be
required at the end of the charter agreement [in] July 2004.”187 But the CIA
extended In-Q-Tel’s initial five-year charter without the recommended
study, and since 2001 no independent study or panel has fully assessed In-
Q-Tel’s successes or reevaluated its potential risks.188 “In-Q-Tel remains an
182
See, e.g., Press Release, In-Q-Tel, Asankya Launches Company at Demo Conference
(Jan. 28, 2008), http://www.iqt.org/press/2008/Asankya_01-28-08.html; Press Release, In-Q-
Tel, In-Q-Tel Signs Strategic Agreement with Endeca to Bring Power of Guided Navigation
to Government Agencies (Oct. 7, 2009), https://iqt.org/press/2003/Endeca_10-07-03.html.
183
TENET WITH HARLOW, supra note 3, at 26.
184
David H. Petraeus, Director, Cent. Intelligence Agency,, Remarks by Director David
H. Petraeus at In-Q-Tel CEO Summit (Mar. 1, 2012), available at
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2012-speeches-testimony/in-q-
tel-summit-remarks.html.
185
Id.
186
BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at v.
187
Id. at vi.
188
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 seemed to garner support for In-Q-Tel;
perhaps the War on Terror has caused Congress to leave In-Q-Tel alone for the time being.
See Cortese, supra note 141, at BU1; Lerner et al., supra note 162, at 490.
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experiment,” reported the Washington Post in 2005, “that even its most
ardent backers say has yet to prove its full potential.”189 A follow-up study,
similar to the BENS report, would help add some objectivity to the
discussion. Indeed, “little is publicly known about In-Q-Tel, or about how
the CIA defines ‘success’.”190 A recent article in the Virginia Law Review
concluded: “Given the scarcity of publicly available information, it is
difficult to say anything definitive as to whether the enterprise is truly
effective, let alone more effective than were it housed entirely within the
spy agency.”191
This Part proceeds by examining various issues associated with the
effectiveness of the current In-Q-Tel model. It then suggests an alternative
model by which the CIA may maintain or increase the effectiveness of In-
Q-Tel while reducing potential risks.
189
O’Hara, supra note 142.
190
Jon D. Michaels, The (Willingly) Fettered Executive: Presidential Spinoffs in National
Security Domains and Beyond, 97 VA. L. REV. 801, 816 (2011).
191
Id. at 817.
192
Gordon, supra note 137, at S11.
193
Kambiz Foroohar, CIA Venture Fund Focuses on Spy Gadgets ‘Q’ Adores,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 25, 2007, 1:44 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=arSqdOLQVK9g.
194
Id.
195
IN-Q-TEL FORM 990 FOR 2010, available at
http://990s.foundationcenter.org/990_pdf_archive/522/522149962/522149962_201103_990.
pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). “The compensation system is approved by the board or a
committee of independent directors who are not employees of, or independent contractors to,
[In-Q-Tel] and who do not have a conflict of interest with respect to anyone covered by these
[compensation] policies.” Id. at 33. The committee “ensures that [In-Q-Tel’s] compensation
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but significantly less than many leading venture capital firms. The most
recently available public filings show that, for 2010, In-Q-Tel’s CEO
earned total compensation (including bonuses) of $965,023.197 The firm’s
managing partner earned slightly less: $870,094.198 Compensation dropped
considerably, however, for In-Q-Tel’s chief financial officer, who earned
$473,447.199 On the other hand, a “typical managing partner” at a
successful venture capital firm in Silicon Valley might command between
$1 million to $5 million annually before receiving a bonus, according to a
veteran of that market.200 Notably, while In-Q-Tel employees are
compensated in part with equity holdings in the firm’s portfolio
companies,201 In-Q-Tel’s equity investments are relatively small.202 Thus,
In-Q-Tel employees stand to earn less in the aggregate from a successful
IPO or sale of a portfolio company than do employees of other venture
capital firms.203
With this in mind, why would an ideal candidate choose to join In-Q-
Tel as opposed to a leading venture capital firm? Perhaps the candidate
might have the opportunity to participate at a higher level earlier at In-Q-
Tel, or perhaps the candidate would prefer In-Q-Tel out of a sense of
national service. Certainly, individuals capable of commanding extremely
high compensation in the private sector have opted instead for government
service. One prominent example is Robert S. McNamara, who left his job
as president of Ford Motor Company to serve as Secretary of Defense under
program and other employee benefits are comparable to the high-tech and other appropriate
markets.” Id. at 34. Finally, the committee “determines, with input from the CIA, an overall
annual company ‘performance score’ that reflects the extent and manner in which [In-Q-Tel]
has been successful in pursuing its mission.” Id.
196
See generally Pay & Leave, U.S. OFF. OF PERSONNEL MGMT: PAY & LEAVE,
http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2012).
197
IN-Q-TEL FORM 990 FOR 2010, supra note 195, at 7.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Evelyn M. Rusli, In Flip-Flops and Jeans, An Unconventional Venture Capitalist,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 6, 2011, 8:36 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/06/in-flip-flops-and-jeans-the-unconventional-venture-
capitalist/.
201
See supra text accompanying note 179.
202
As one In-Q-Tel associate noted: “[T]he size of our equity investments tends to be
very small.” Lerner et al., supra note 162, at 495.
203
As discussed, In-Q-Tel’s fund has historically been less than $50 million. See supra
note 166 and accompanying text. Compare this to the funds managed by Andreessen
Horowitz, a venture capital firm also focused on Silicon Valley. See Evelyn M. Rusli,
Andreessen More Than Doubles His Firm’s Assets, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan. 31, 2012,
2:06 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/andreessen-more-than-doubles-his-
firms-assets/ (“Set up in 2009 by Mr. Andreessen and his longtime friend Ben Horowitz,
Andreessen Horowitz has raised a total of $2.7 billion in the last three years.”).
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204
McNamara discussed Kennedy’s recruiting of him in a 2003 documentary: “I was the
first president . . . in the history of the company . . . other than a member of the Ford family.
And after five weeks, I quit.” THE FOG OF WAR: ELEVEN LESSONS FROM THE LIFE OF ROBERT
S. MCNAMARA (Sony Pictures Classics 2003). Commenting on the economics of his
decision, McNamara said:
My total net worth at the time was on the order of $800,000, but I had huge
unfulfilled stock options worth millions. And I was one of the highest paid
executives in the world, and the future was of course brilliant. . . [My wife and I]
called our children in. Their life would be totally changed. The salary of a cabinet
secretary then was $25,000 a year.
Id. When Kennedy introduced McNamara in a televised press conference, he declared: “Mr.
McNamara leaves the presidency of the Ford Company at great personal sacrifice.” Id.
205
They almost certainly did not sign up with In-Q-Tel in order to make a lot of money,
since “In-Q-Tel’s primary goal was never financial independence, or even to make money.”
Steve Henn, In-Q-Tel: The CIA’s Tax-Funded Player In Silicon Valley, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(July 16, 2012, 9:43 AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2012/07/16/156839153/in-q-tel-the-cias-tax-
funded-player-in-silicon-valley (quoting Jeff Smith, former General Counsel to the CIA).
206
Rebecca Buckman, Alsop, Louie Plan Venture Fund for Early-Stage Development,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2006, at C4.
207
Erica Davis, CIA Venture Group In-Q-Tel Names Intel Executive Its CEO, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 29, 2006, at B9.
208
Id.
209
Management Team: Christopher Darby, IN-Q-TEL,
http://www.iqt.org/about/management.html#darby (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
210
BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at 41–44. Employee compensation at In-Q-Tel derives
from three components: (1) base salary; (2) annual cash bonus; and (3) an employee
investment program. Id. at 41. Base salaries are determined by averaging the salaries of
comparable positions in the following four industries: high technology, nonprofit,
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33:677 (2013)
capital firms,211 may reduce the overall talent In-Q-Tel is able to acquire.
As Louie himself put it, “The most important thing [for In-Q-Tel] is the
technology return. Of secondary importance is the financial return.”212
Even if financial return were the most important thing for In-Q-Tel, the firm
would not be able to compete on the same footing as many other venture
capital firms. Often, the funds managed by leading venture capital firms
exceed $100 million of committed capital,213 and many exceed $1 billion.214
In-Q-Tel, on the other hand, operates with far less capital. Investment
opportunities and aggregate returns are therefore restrained, possibly
reducing the interest levels of potential employees.
government contractors, and venture capital. Id. Cash bonuses, which are based largely on
individual performance, are calculated as a percentage of base salaries. Id. The investment
program allows In-Q-Tel employees to benefit directly from the IPO or sale of a portfolio
company. Id. at 44.
211
See CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 93, at 129–61 (discussing various compensation
structures among venture capital firms).
212
Nicholas Johnston, Intelliseek Gains $1.4 Million From CIA-Backed Firm, WASH.
POST, June 25, 2001, at E05.
213
CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 93, at 4.
214
LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 92, at 1–15.
215
BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at v.
216
Concerns about the proper functioning of QIC have existed since the formation of In-
Q-Tel. “In 1999, Congress believed that In-Q-Tel’s biggest obstacle would not be to find or
invest in technologies, but to transfer In-Q-Tel’s technology to [CIA] users.” Lerner et al.,
supra note 162, at 493.
217
See BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at 23 (“Individuals interviewed by the [BENS] Panel
expressed concerns about the structure of QIC and its personnel experience set. Some
suggested that QIC be staffed with employees having a strong IT background, while others
recommended QIC be staffed with those having significant Agency experience and capable
of speaking for their organizational sponsors. The Panel concluded that QIC needs an
appropriate mix of both.”).
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218
Id. at 21–25.
219
Id. at 23.
220
King, supra note 139, at A1.
221
TENET WITH HARLOW, supra note 3, at 19.
222
Id.
223
Id. at 17.
224
Yannuzzi, supra note 54, at 27.
225
See Jack M. Beard, Law and War in the Virtual Era, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 409, 413–25
704
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In-Q-Tel, on the other hand, takes the CIA beyond public international
law. In-Q-Tel’s investments in private-sector firms expose In-Q-Tel, and
vicariously the CIA, to issues arising from contract disputes, patent rights,
and securities laws.226 Indeed, in a 2005 article, BusinessWeek noted In-Q-
Tel “is always walking a fine line between the public and private sector.”227
For example, in 2006 In-Q-Tel invested in a data management firm whose
operations included Chicago, Toronto, London, and Sydney.228 Canadian
hospitals used the firm’s software to track patients’ medical records.
Prompted by concern the CIA may somehow have obtained access to these
records, the provincial government in Ontario investigated the In-Q-Tel
investment.229 “Canadians can rest easy,” remarked the Washington Post at
the conclusion of the investigation, “[t]he CIA is not using its venture
capital arm to snoop into the medical records of our northern neighbors.”230
Future exchanges may not end so amicably. What would happen, for
instance, if the company were to have been supplying records-tracking
software to clients in China? It is unclear that disputes or investigations
would be contained with In-Q-Tel alone. Notably, while In-Q-Tel is
chartered as a corporation independent from the government, QIC occupies
an observer role on the In-Q-Tel board of directors231 and thereby exerts
control over the firm. Indeed, before investing in a target company, In-Q-
Tel “considers [QIC’s] insight.”232 Further, In-Q-Tel’s primary client and
source of funds is the CIA.233 It is thus entirely possible that the CIA and
larger U.S. federal government would be approached by concerned foreign
governments or private-sector companies with respect to investment
decisions made by In-Q-Tel. This could cause serious foreign relations
issues with nations that may have good reason to believe the CIA is using
(2009).
226
See generally CUMMING & JOHAN, supra note 93, at 51–57, 464–65 (discussing
general issues associated with resolving contract disputes among venture capital firms and
entrepreneurs in an international context).
227
Lacy, supra note 178.
228
Press Release, Globe Newswire, Initiate Systems’ Software Ranked EMPI Category
Leader by KLAS Enterprises, LLC (Dec. 29, 2008), http://globenewswire.com/news-
release/2008/12/29/390285/156904/en/Initiate-Systems-Software-Ranked-EMPI-Category-
Leader-by-KLAS-Enterprises-LLC.html (discussing the geographical operations of Initiate
Systems). Initiate Systems, Inc. was later acquired by IBM in 2010. Press Release, Int’l
Bus. Mach. Corp., IBM To Acquire Initiate Systems (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www-
03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/29305.wss.
229
Griff Witte, Canadians’ Medical Records Still Safe from the CIA, WASH. POST, Sept.
4, 2006, at D02.
230
Id.
231
BENS REPORT, supra note 1, at 40.
232
Id.
233
The CIA is not the only supplier of funds. See supra note 165 (discussing
governmental agencies outside the CIA that supply In-Q-Tel with funds).
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234
Lee Tae-hee, Questions Raised over Kim Jeong-hun’s Loyalty Due to Background of
Close Involvement with US Interests, HANKYOREH (Feb. 20, 2013, 4:20 PM),
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/ENGISSUE/105/574747.html.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Yannuzzi, supra note 54, at 35.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (3d ed. 2007).
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C. Recommendations
Structuring venture capital activity within the private sector is
challenging enough; it becomes a different matter altogether when the
government is involved. A 2002 article by Harvard professor Josh Lerner
asked whether government involvement with venture capital may ever be
successful. His somewhat optimistic conclusion: “Certainly, this possibility
is not implausible.”242 On the other hand, Stanford professor Ronald Gilson
concluded such collaboration is ultimately fruitless. “The U.S. venture
capital market developed organically,” argued Gilson, “largely without
government assistance and certainly without government design.”243 At the
very least, another independent report on In-Q-Tel’s activities would help
shed light on some of the issues addressed above. As discussed, the follow-
up report recommended by BENS in 2001 was never made.
Beyond a follow-up report, the CIA should restructure the In-Q-Tel
model to limit its exposure to private sector disputes. Gilman Louie
correctly surmised that “[i]f we want a CIA that performs better, we’ll need
to take more risks—and give our government the freedom to fail.”244 But
the potential for CIA involvement in major disputes arising from In-Q-Tel’s
investments is a failure that should be deemed an unnecessary risk.
As an alternative to the current model, In-Q-Tel should discontinue
making equity investments245 and instead use its funds solely to cover
licensing agreements and to pay for contracts to develop technology to fit
the specific needs of the CIA. Such activity covers the majority of what In-
Q-Tel already does, and cutting out the equity investments would
drastically reduce the CIA’s exposure to private-sector disputes. While it
may be true that “the best software around is more likely to be developed in
Silicon Valley than in the Pentagon,”246 such a modified arrangement would
retain the CIA-Silicon Valley relationship but with a reduced level of risk.
Further, In-Q-Tel’s equity investing—the riskiest component of the
current model—is also the firm’s least effective service to portfolio
companies. A recent survey of thirty-four of In-Q-Tel’s portfolio
companies revealed that “[o]nly roughly a third of surveyed In-Q-Tel
companies indicated that the equity investment was highly or extremely
242
Lerner, supra note 126, at F78.
243
Gilson, supra note 106, at 1070.
244
Ignatius, supra note 153, at A29.
245
In-Q-Tel generally invests $1 in portfolio companies for every $9 invested by the
other partnering venture capital firms. Petraeus, supra note 184.
246
Hill, supra note 176.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The CIA should be congratulated for spearheading a bold and
innovative new approach to its mission, but In-Q-Tel has much to prove
before it may be deemed a success. While collaboration between the R&D
efforts of the public and private sectors is indeed vital and should be
encouraged, the risks of In-Q-Tel’s government-sponsored equity
investments in private companies outweigh the benefits. Gilman Louie got
it right when he said “[t]he CIA and the rest of the government need to
catch the entrepreneurial, risk-taking spirit that’s driving the Silicon Valley
technology revolution.”250 It is not clear, however, such a spirit should be
embodied in a government-sponsored venture capital firm.251 Accordingly,
247
Mara, supra note 6, at 6.
248
Id.
249
Lerner, supra note 126, at F80.
250
Ignatius, supra note 153, at A29.
251
According to the analysis of respected professor and industry commentator Ronald
Gilson, such collaboration is ultimately fruitless: “The U.S. venture capital market developed
organically, largely without government assistance and certainly without government
design.” Gilson, supra note 106, at 1070. Another article identifies the differing incentives:
“A valid concern often raised when discussing government venture capital programs . . . is
whether the government should be involved in such a highly competitive, private sector
activity. Private [venture capital] investors are intensely driven by financial motivations,
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whereas [government venture capital] programs are primarily driven by strategic concerns.”
Mara, supra note 6, at 11.
709