V. Impt. Post Cold War Geopolitics

Presidential Address: Global Geopolitical Change in the Post-Cold War Era
Author(s): Saul B. Cohen

Source: Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 81, No. 4 (Dec., 1991), pp.
551-580
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of the Association of American Geographers
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2563424
Accessed: 15-08-2016 10:37 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Taylor & Francis, Ltd., Association of American Geographers are collaborating with JSTOR to
digitize, preserve and extend access to Annals of the Association of American Geographers
This content downloaded from 134.117.10.200 on Mon, 15 Aug 2016 10:37:16 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Global Geopolitical Change in the
Post-Cold War Era
Saul B. Cohen
Abstract. Evolution of the world geopolitical strengthen global interdependence through

system follows organismic developmental partnerships of interest.
principles. The system is complex. It is char- Key Words: asymmetrical state, change, devel-
acterized by a flexibly hierarchical, special- opmental theory, entropy, equilibrium, flexible hi-
ized and integrated spatial structure. Global erarchy, Gateway region, gateway state, general or-
imbalance is a function of changes among and ganismic system, geopolitical region, geostrategic
realm, orders of power, polyocracy, power seesaw,
between geostrategic realms and their geo-
Quarter-Sphere of Marginality, Shatterbelt, world
political regions. The imbalance especially re- order.
flects differences in entropic levels of major
national states, particularly first- and second-
order powers. As power becomes more dif- Ij HE world is in the throes of international
fused across the evolving world system, the upheaval and the search is on for new
system is better equipped to cope with the structures to restore global stability.
shock of change. The evolution of the system Many believe that just as the global balance has
depends upon such change. been upset by two cataclysmic episodes-the
An evolving system is reflected in the mul- disintegration of East European and Soviet
tiplication of its parts. The system becomes Communism, the dismantling of the Soviet
more integrated as these parts become more centralized state, and the end of the Cold War-
specialized. A novel example of specialization so can equilibrium be restored only by some
is the Gateway region. Eastern Europe is sudden and equally dramatic international
emerging as the Gateway that will link the event. In fact, however, the rapid change in
Maritime and Continental Geostrategic realms. Soviet-American relations has not occurred
Ultimately the Middle Eastern Shatterbelt may because of these recent events alone. Rather,
also acquire Gateway status. In addition, in the the changes are historic milestones in a con-
coming decades, nearly thirty Gateway states tinuing process that has marked the evolution
are likely to emerge. These are small exchange of our geopolitical world over the past quarter-
states with qualified sovereignty that will spin century.
off from existing national entities to help link Assuming that equilibrium-a condition of
the world system. Such gateways serve the dy- equal balance between arrays of opposing forc-
namic system as structures of accommodation. es operating at different geographical scales-
American foreign policy needs to adapt to is the desired state, then its restoration will take
current geopolitical realities. The global sys- more than one or even a series of diplomatic
tem is increasingly becoming a seamless web strokes, no matter how defining they are taken
whose salient characteristic is dynamic equi- to be. For what is now being widely heralded
librium, not rigidly imposed order. United as a sea-change in world history has not oc-
States leadership cannot impose a PAX AMER- curred because reasonable or desperate na-
ICANA on the global system. It can, however, tional leaders suddenly decided to behave dif-
further its development through a carefully ferently (Rizopoulos 1990). Rather, it happened
constructed series of policy moves that will because of a sequence of events that have
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 81(4), 1991, pp. 551-580

K Copyright 1991 by Association of American Geographers
552 Cohen
robbed both superpowers of the ability and ances with weak and unstable regimes. In the
need to continue the conflict. Challenged early same genre of geopolitical determinism was Jean
on by the emergence of other major power Kirkpatrick's 1986 pronouncement that "Cen-
centers, they then became bogged down in tral America is the most important place in the
unsuccessful regional wars, each with dire do- world for the United States today" (quoted in
mestic consequences. Even more compelling, O'Loughlin 1989, 321).
glasnost and perestroika could not ward off the Current talk about a"New World Order" im-
collapse of the Soviet economy, and Reagan- plies the possibility of an international situation
omics hastened the end of America's hegemo- that would remain stable. This is not a possi-
ny over the world economy. bility. Change is not only inevitable but a nec-
It is not surprising that international military essarl, concomitant to progress. The challenge
and political earthquakes give rise to hopes and is to manage the change, channeling it in di-
dreams of new world order. After such unex- rections that promote equilibrium within the
pected events, statespersons and politicians ea- dynamic global system that reflects the inter-
gerly embrace the goal of reordering, and action between political forces and human and
scholars busy themselves with explanatory the- physical environments.
ories. In ancient times these theories were of- Geographers today have an unparalleled op-
ten derived from religion and the supernatural. portunity to dispel geopolitical illiteracy by fo-
The modern approach seeks rational and sci- cusing on the geo of geopolitics. It is not easy
entific explanation. While historians, philoso- to convey to policymakers and the public the
phers and social scientists are widely recog- complexity of the spatial structures and rela-
nized for their contributions to international tionships that knit together the world system.
order theory, this is not the case for geogra- But if we do not address these complexities in
phers. Geography made a prominent impact the public arena, and in ways that are spatially
upon international policy in the past, but mod- theoretically grounded, we will be remiss in
ern geographical concepts have been largely carrying out our scholarly and civic responsi-
ignored by international-relations theorists. bilities.
In the U.S., older geopolitical ideas were em- The geopolitical theory in this paper applies
braced by Kennan, Acheson, Nitze, Dulles, Ei- a spatial approach to the development of sys-
senhower, Rostow, Taylor, Kissinger, Nixon, tems. The developmental perspective that is
Brzezinski and Haig (Brown 1989), and inte- utilized is dynamic. While the geo accounts for
grated into American foreign policy. Outdated the spatial dimension, the politics in geopolitics
versions of the Heartland-Rimland theory re- is the exercise of power that derives from and
mained a tool for containment strategy long seeks to control economic, social and cultural
after that strategy had proved wanting. The forces. Reference to geopolitics then subsumes
American geopoliticians grasped spatially ob- geoeconomics, a term that is gaining in cur-
solete views because of their limited under- rency, but should be no more separated from
standing of geography. For theirs was and is a politics than should politics be separated from
definition of the discipline that is static, deter- economic or social forces.
ministic, and naive. The geo in geopolitical analysis starts with
One example is Brzezinski's (1986) rigid em- spatial structure. To understand geopolitical
brace of Heartland containment. This led him systems, we must address the spatial categories
to project geopolitics as a superpower contest that geographers use as frameworks of analysis.
for "lynchpin" states-Germany, Poland, South The structure is hierarchical. At the highest lev-
Korea, the Philippines and either the combi- el are two geostrategic realms: the Maritime
nation of Pakistan and Afghanistan, or Iran. His and the Eurasian Continental. Below the realm
argument is that Soviet domination of South is the geopolitical region (Cohen 1973). Realms
Korea and the Philippines would encircle Chi- are arenas of strategic place and movement.
na, and its command of Iran, or both Afghan- Their trade orientations differ, the Maritime
istan and Pakistan, would enable it to project being open to specialized exchange, while the
its power on the Indian Ocean. Such a view is Continental is inner-oriented. Regions are
dismissive of the innate geopolitical positions shaped by contiguity and political, cultural, mil-
and strengths of China and India, and surely itary and economic interaction. They are also
underestimates the costs of superpower alli- influenced by historical movement (Fig. 1).
Mrnlim~ ~S ter Europe
/ {,/~~~~ East~~~~sia .4J~~~APAN \X & Caribbean\ ...
and the Maghreb of Heartland
Z~~~~~ g ran Tie \ (CHINAZ eld
0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
V.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C
in~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C
* Second Order Powers~~an Ocani
Regions within the Geostrategic Realms Trade-dependent Maritime Realm jCJ Independent Geopolitical Region
Subsoham 0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Regions outside the Geostrategic Realms Euraaian Continental Realm EIII Gateway Reg
0 Firat Order Powera Shatterbelt iQuarteraphere of Marginalit
Second Orer PoweraGeopolitical Regiona
Geoatrategic Realm
Figure 1. The world strategic realms and geopolitical regions in the 1990s, showing the hierarchical structure of the world's
highest level are two geostrategic realms: the Maritime, an open system based upon exchange, and the Eurasian Continental,
oriented system. South Asia is geopolitically independent, the Middle East Shatterbelt is caught between the two realms, wh
beginning to link them. Subsahara Africa and South America, the Quarter-Sphere of Marginality, are of little military and
Great Powers.
554 Cohen
The Maritime realm has a global reach. With- transnational forces that are now knitting the
in it are geopolitical regions that constitute the world together economically and socially. These
second-level geopolitical of the hierarchy, in- integrative forces can more than offset the cen-
cluding: Anglo-America and the Caribbean, trifugal forces of nationalistic Balkanization that
Maritime Europe and the Maghreb, Offshore once again are seeking to put their stamp on
Asia, South America, and Subsahara Africa. The the world map.
Eurasian Continental realm consists of two geo- Finally, the geopolitical insights derived from
political regions: the Soviet Heartland and East this analysis will be applied to a series of foreign
Asia. policy recommendations for the U.S. It is time
Most of the second-level regions are con- for Americans to sweep away the last vestiges
tained within the realms. Three, however, lie of outmoded, unidimensional spatial thinking.
outside. South Asia is an independent region. In particular, because ours is a polycratic and
The Middle East is a Shatterbelt, a zone of con- polycentric world, to continue to focus essen-
tention caught between the two realms. The tially on the Eurasian center is as geographically
third is the emerging Gateway region of Central misleading as to shift to the concept of a unified
and Eastern Europe. This is a transitional zone Pacific Rim (Ginsburg 1988).
that can facilitate contact and interchange be- Holdover thinking from the Nixon-era geo-
tween the two realms. politics that believed the Sino-Soviet schism to
The third level of the hierarchy is the national be necessary to thwart Eurasian unity is coun-
state. States are hierarchically-ordered, accord- terproductive to global peace. So are growing
ing to their power positions and functions in pressures in the U.S. to push German and Jap-
the world system. Gateway territories are a spe- anese remilitarization in order to share the bur-
cial category. Currently they are components den of policing the world. Soviet and Chinese
of the subnational, or fourth level, of the hi- fears of such remilitarization are well-ground-
erarchy. Gateways are embryonic states which ed. World balance will be more easily regained
can accelerate exchanges that will stimulate the if the U.S. and a reconstituted Soviet Union
evolution of larger nations from which the maintain their military primacy, while the su-
gateways have spun off. perpowers and other parts of the world be-
The world system is in a continuing process come increasingly interdependent with the
of development, becoming a seamless web as economies of Maritime Europe and Offshore
it moves towards greater specialization and in- Asia.
tegration. As national energies and transna- In South Asia, the U.S. should recognize In-
tional forces gain or lose momentum, the re- dia's legitimate desires to be neutral in the su-
gional frameworks- realms, regions, states, and perpower rivalry, as well as the reality of India's
subnational units-change in status and in dominant position on the subcontinent. The
boundaries. This, in effect, produces new parts- American military alliance with Pakistan that
to-whole relationships within the system which brought India and the Soviet Union more closely
require rebalancing. together was based upon the flawed logic of a
Immediately after the Second World War, China-Pakistan-U.S. counterbalance to Soviet
equilibrium was struck through the division of ambitions in Eurasia. Our choice of Pakistan as
the world into two geostrategic realms, each a partner has been as geopolitically unsound as
controlled by a superpower. A new balance was was our espousal of Somalia as a counter to
then fashioned as geopolitical regions became Ethiopia.
important subsets of the world system. This was In the Middle East, Europe's interests as an
due to the rise of additional great power cen- intrusive power are as legitimate as those of the
ters and the emergence of important region- U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Even if the superpowers
ally-based states. The map has continued to exercise their military pressures in concert, they
change as some Shatterbelts have appeared and will not be able to bring contending regional
disappeared. powers to the peace table. America should rec-
In the near future, we anticipate the new ognize that the European Community has a great
emerging geopolitical phenomena-the Gate- deal to offer the Middle East economically and
way region and Gateway states-will play sig- politically, and needs to treat the Community
nificant roles in restoring balance to the world as an equal partner in the efforts to promote
system. They will complement the efforts of regional peace and security.
Global Geopolitical Change 555
Finally, North-South relations cannot be ig- the Monsoon lands of India and China (Mac-
nored in the face of the overwhelming temp- kinder 1943). He also speculated that the con-
tation to focus on East-West ties. The "Quarter- tinental masses bordering the South Atlantic
Sphere of Marginality" (Subsahara Africa and might eventually become part of the balancing
South America) will destabilize the world process. The Mantle of Vacancies from the Sa-
through local and regional conflicts, unless hara through the Central Asia deserts that di-
greater economic and political attention is ac- vide the major communities of humankind was
corded the region. It is especially imperative another component of the balanced system.
that the U.S. redirect its foreign aid to these Mackinder forecast that this barrier region
needy lands, rather than continue to concen- might someday provide solar energy as a sub-
trate nearly all of its economic and military aid stitute for exhaustible resources.
on a handful of military allies. Another geographer also engaged at policy
Moreover, regional balance is not an alter- levels in attempts to fashion a new world order,
native to past efforts to strike a global equilib- the one envisaged by Woodrow Wilson, was
rium through a standoff among the major pow- Isaiah Bowman. "The effects of the Great War
ers. Pan-regions are neither economically are so far-reaching that we shall have hence-
adequate nor politically feasible. The world is forth a new world .. . the new era would date
now far too interdependent. Global equilibri- from the years of the First World War just as
um requires an open system, not a precarious Medieval Europe dates from the fall of Rome,
balance based exclusively upon megaregions. or the modern democratic era dates from the
Declaration of Independence" (Bowman 1922,
1, 2). Describing the war as the combination of
Past Geographic Thinking on assassination, invasion and Germanic ambitions,
World Order "colored by the desire to control the seats of
production and the channels of transportation
In the early part of this century, geographers of all those products" (1922, 8) he viewed the
made important theoretical contributions to the relations among states as an evolutionary strug-
attempts to fashion new world orders for their gle.
times. Most noteworthy was Sir Halford Mac- Bowman did not believe that the League of
kinder. In his warning to peacemakers in 1919, Nations was, in and of itself, the framework for
Mackinder described the world as a closed sys- a New World. Rather, he saw different leagues
tem. Nothing could be altered without altering emerging for functional purposes, each de-
the balancing of everything, and rule of the signed to advance cooperative plans that would
world still rested upon force, notwithstanding reduce the causes of international trouble. "The
the juridical assumptions of equality among world's people are still fundamentally unlike,
sovereign states. Mackinder called himself a and the road to success passes through a wil-
democratic idealist in advocating equality of derness of experiment" (1922, 11). No grand
opportunity for nations to achieve balanced theory, here, as was Mackinder's, but rather the
economic development. He also described prescription of an empiricist, of a practitioner
himself as a realist who feared that the League with his nose to boundaries, resources, national
of Nations would degenerate into an unbal- minorities-a world of shifting international
anced empire, as one or two of the great pow- parts that were disorganized, unstable and dan-
ers bid for predominance. As a safeguard, he gerous and required mediating international
urged smaller powers to federate among them- groups to minimize the dangers. Bowman's
selves to increase the number of significant ideas for a new world were essentially a map
players on the world scene and make it more of the world as it was, with greater attention to
difficult for hegemony to be attained by po- the sovereign needs of certain nationalities and
tential tyrants (Mackinder 1919). a need for coordinated international action. His
Mackinder remained steadfast in his com- work was, in effect, an explication of what
mitment to the concept of balance. In looking problems would be encountered by Woodrow
at the shape of the post-World War II order, Wilson's fourteenth point-the call for a gen-
he saw an eventual balance between a com- eral association of nations to guarantee the
bination of the Heartland and Midland Ocean peace of the world.
powers that could keep Germany in check, and The most direct, and infamous, geographical
556 Cohen
contributor to the concept of new world order tially free members. His notion was that this
was, of course, Karl von Haushofer, whose doc- union would constitute an unbalancing power,
trine of Geopolitik became an intellectual un- with so much preponderance that trouble-
derpinning for Nazi world conquest (Whittle- makers could not upset it (Streit 1938). Instead,
sey 1942). Balance-of-power theories drawn the world that emerged after World War II was
from Arnold Guyot (1889) were the basis for bipolar, the hegemonic struggle between the
Haushofer's Pan-Regions, and, potentially, for superpowers submerging the United Nations
a harmonious world community. On the other that had been established as successor to the
hand, Haushofer's espousal of Mackinder's League. This happened notwithstanding that
Heartland theory was seized upon by the Nazis the new world organization now included the
as the spatial key to German world conquest U.S. and had a two-tier system that embraced
and the framework for a new world order dom- a Security Council with five permanent mem-
inated from the Eurasian power center. bers and the mandate to enforce the peace that
The concept of regionality was central to the the Geneva body had lacked.
writings of these three geographical scholars.
However, differing levels of regional organi-
zation and hierarchy were absent from their Equilibrium and Change
thinking. Today's complex political and spatial
world requires more intricate analysis. Now, in this last decade of the twentieth cen-
tury, we hear the siren call for a New World
Order once again. The collapse of Commu-
The World State nism, the end of the Cold War, the allied victory
in the Persian Gulf, and the dismantling of the
In contrast, in a tradition that went back to centralized Soviet state have inspired the hopes
Immanuel Kant, there was a body of scholarship that a new order is dawning and fired the de-
that held that the physical unity of the globe bate anew about the form that the new inter-
required a single, unified political world sys- national arrangements should take. The rhet-
tem. His writings on physical geography re- oric of the aims is not novel: peace and security,
flected his philosophical outlook (May 1970). reduction of military weapons, sharing the
Kant's "Universal International State" was based wealth, justice for national groups. The mech-
on the proposition that nature had drawn peo- anism is what is at question. Can there be a
ple by wars to the most desirable parts of the truly global system in which the world acts in
world, and that a unified political mechanism concert through the United Nations? Is it now
was necessary to enforce the peace on them feasible to save the world through a PAX
(Kant 1795). AMERICANA? Or can we count upon the
The English historian H.G. Wells, whose Out- world's major power centers-the U.S., the Eu-
line of History first appeared in 1920, discount- ropean Community, Japan, the emerging re-
ed the League as not being a league of peoples, constituted and loosely federated U.S.S.R., and
but of states, dominions, and colonies. For him, China to take collective action to stabilize and
the new world promised by the League of enhance a New World Order?
Nations was the old world once again. A new Cynics scoff at the notion that the concept
world order meant a world state-"Our true of a New World is anything but the Old World
nationalism is mankind"-with a common re- cloaked in new rhetoric. They maintain that
ligion, common education, no military and pro- power, not universal law, will govern whatever
duction for general use with private enterprise system emerges and that therefore the pros-
controlled to serve humankind (Wells 1920). pects for substantive change are slim (Lapham
For Wells, the capitalist system which drove the 1991). There are grounds for such concern, but
state was not a system at all-only unplanned there is also a reason for hope. Arms control
production for private profit. talks between the superpowers are progress-
Wells's dreams of a world state came to ing. So are discussions for reducing the flow of
naught, as did pre- and post-World War II pre- arms to the Middle East. The Warsaw Pact is
scriptions for world federalism. In 1938, Clar- history, NATO is redefining its structure and
ence Streit called for a Federal Union of North mission, and the West is seeking ways of en-
Atlantic Democracies, with their South Asian abling Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to
and African colonial dependencies as poten- rebuild themselves economically and political-
ly. Moreover, regional wars in Angola, Ethiopia The balance is not only maintained by what
and Namibia are over, and the shooting has Adam Smith referred to as an "Invisible Hand,"
given way to diplomacy in Cambodia and Af- or the rational self-interest of peoples. For in
ghanistan. the absence of reason, excesses of war, eco-
Despite its sweeping military victory, Amer- nomic greed and environmental imbalances ul-
ica's political and economic dependence upon timately encounter resistance. When things go
the support of other nations to wage the Gulf too far, there is reaction, correction, regula-
War has demonstrated its basic inability to im- tion. Humankind does fear a world of disorder
pose a PAX AMERICANA on most parts of the or Manicheanism. The "rage for order" that
world. The conflict was not a unilateral action. Schutz recognized in the human mind and car-
While the U.S. took the lead militarily, it had ried over to the social world, "The World is
to hold its breath politically lest the alliance fall always given to me from the first as an orga-
apart, and to "beg" for financial support from nized one" (Schutz 1964), shapes the course of
outside states. In fact, the five major powers international politics.
need one another in ways that have no historic When new weights are introduced, they alter
precedents in modern great power relations. the content and boundaries of the system's
And the United Nations Security Council, while parts. The lines separating the parts have rag-
it may not have a clear collective interest, nev- ged edges and are permeable, within hierar-
ertheless proved its importance by serving as a chical levels and between them. Sometimes the
forum that required a consensus among its per- parts overlap, creating border zones rather than
manent members. This is a consensus that will lines.
be as important in stabilizing the global system As systems mature, their parts multiply and
as it was for waging war. draw power away from the center. In a decen-
How we treat the end of the Cold War and tralizing system, where the individual territorial
a New World Order is very much a matter of units have increasing responsibility for mar-
conceptualization and perspective. We prob- shaling their energies, the interaction among
ably should not even be discussing the topic of the components becomes self-directing. This
order, because global stability is a function of interaction may be competitive, or it may be
equilibrial processes, not order. Order is static. cooperative, but it is almost always turbulent.
It speaks to a fixed arrangement, a formal dis- For, without turbulence there is no change, and
position or array by ranks and clusters that re- without change there is no progress. G.B. Shaw
quires strong regulation and implies a sharply said "progress is impossible without change,"
defined set of niches separated by clear-cut and Carl Jung added "in all chaos there is a
boundaries. The niches fit together in an elab- cosmos, in all disorder a secret order."
orate structure which follows a blueprint de- The argument as to whether our world is in
signed by some body that operates either he- order or disorder should, then, be revolving
gemonically or consensually. Essentially, order around the question of whether or not it is
implies outside regulation. As Tennyson put it, presently in a stage of short-term disequilib-
"everything is in its proper place or function." rium that is intrinsic to the process of dynamic
Equilibrium, on the other hand, is dynamic. equilibrium, or in complete systemic collapse.
We are not using equilibrium in the physical or To answer this question, we need to look to
psychophysical sense that the natural state of the sequence of events and their trends, to gain
the organism is rest or homeostasis. Such equi- insights into the direction of the equilibrial
librium characterizes closed systems but does process. No single event, no matter how cat-
not fit human organizations. Surely a geopolit- aclysmic, is likely in and of itself to be the de-
ical system whose parts would be so arranged fining event. Some of the sequencing, inevi-
that their resultant force at every point is zero, tably, involves a dialectic in which opposites
is both theoretically and practically impossible. play against one another in maintaining a dy-
Instead, by equilibrium, we refer to the quality namic balance through change.
of balance between opposing influences and A major manifestation of such change is the
forces in an open system. Balance is regained reorientation and realignment of political ter-
after disturbance by the introduction of new ritorial units. Regrouping occurs at all levels of
weights or stimuli. the geopolitical scale-from realm, to region,
The process that enables the system to prog- to state to national subdivisions. Such regroup-
ress developmentally is dynamic equilibrium. ing is not spatially random or independent of
558 Cohen
lines provided closely to Anglo-America, albeit by

for so negative na
be likened to a diamond, not a pane of glass. a purpose.
Its geopolitical cleavages occur along specific Another example of change, disturbance, re-
fault lines which are drawn from an array of action, and steps towards restoration of equi-
optional boundaries provided by nature (Co- librium can be found in Lebanon. The Palestine
hen 1973). The relative strength of particular Liberation Organization's establishment of a
cores determines where and at what hierar- state-within-a-state in the South and its esca-
chical scales geopolitical repartitioning takes lation of guerrilla activities triggered Israel's
place. 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Israeli troops quickly
Boundary shifts are part of the change pro- rolled north to Beirut, overrunning the PLO
cess. An example is the western boundary of territory and breaching the "Red Line" that had
the Continental Realm. The U.S.S.R.'s relation- hitherto been respected by Israel and Syria as
ship to its western periphery has weakened being necessary to maintain the balance be-
dramatically. Central and Eastern Europe have tween them. Subsequent political events forced
split away from the realm, probably to become Israel to withdraw to its present Security Zone
a separate Gateway region. Thus, the Heartland along the Lebanese border. The "Red Line"
boundary that had been pushed westward to once again became a reality that contributes to
the Elbe in 1945, approximating the ancient the uneasy equilibrium. However, the position
boundary between Slavs and Germans as rec- of the Palestinians is now substantially weak-
ognized by the 843 Treaty of Verdun, has shift- ened. They cannot create a new state-within-
ed eastward once again. The line now extends a-state as both the new Lebanese government
from the eastern end of the Baltic to the north- and the Syrians are committed to supporting
western Black Sea. It follows the eastern edge the Lebanese army in disarming the PLO militias
of the Masurian lakes, the western end of Po- lest Israel once again be provoked, as well as in
lesia, the Bug River and the Carpathians. Es- disbanding the various Lebanese militias.
sentially, the new boundary follows the wid- In July, 1991, the Lebanese army successfully
ening of the North European Plain. removed the PLO from their bases in the South
It is noteworthy that the realm's boundary and forced them to surrender their heavy
has not been pushed back to the western bor- weapons. If PLO activities against Israel are halt-
ders of Mackinder's 1904 Pivotland, the area of ed by this action, Israel will face enormous po-
Eurasian Continental and Arctic drainage litical pressure to withdraw from its South Leb-
bounded by the Volga and White and Caspian anon Security Zone and to accept the disarming
Seas (Mackinder 1904). The Soviet Union has, of the South Lebanon Army-the militia which
however, lost political and economic, if not it has so carefully built up and supported. Thus,
military strategic hegemony over the western the recent agreement between Lebanon and
halves of the Baltic and Black Sea Basins and Syria whereby Lebanon has become a de facto
the navigable Middle and Lower Danube, which Syrian protectorate is likely to stabilize the sit-
in 1919 Mackinder had included in the Heart- uation in a variety of ways. The Syrians are, in
land for purposes of strategic thinking (Mac- effect, now responsible for containing PLO ter-
kinder 1919). rorism. By splitting their forces between Leb-
Shifts in the boundaries of geopolitical regions anon and the Golan Heights, they have become
may also take place. Offshore Asia has extended more vulnerable to Israeli attack and therefore
its reaches to include Singapore, Malaysia, and are more committed to maintaining a new bal-
Thailand, and closer links between Venezuela ance.
and Colombia could push the Anglo-American
and Caribbean geopolitical region's boundaries
southward to include Colombia. This is because Evolution of the System
Venezuelan-Colombian interaction, historical-
ly focused along Colombia's Caribbean coast Since short-term imbalance is intrinsic to dy-
and particularly in the Gulf of Venezuela, is now namic equilibrium, the overriding question
also taking on an Andean economic orienta- about the nature of the present turbulence is
tion. Moreover, Colombia's impact upon the whether it seems to be leading to a more in-
U.S. through its drug trade has linked it more tegrated world system. For the relations be-
tween Eastern and Western Europe, or be- ment in much of the Third World in the 1980s
tween the industrialized powers of the Maritime have contributed to global geopolitical shifts.
world and the various republics of the Soviet In Anglo-America and the Caribbean, U.S. ties
Union, the trend is clearly towards integration. to Central America are being redefined by the
At the regional level, this also seems to be tak- defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the
ing place in the Middle East. The Gulf War was overthrow of Noriega in Panama. These events
surely a major disturbance. Its result, however, represent, ironically for some, not an enhance-
seems likely to promote greater integration be- ment of American power in Central America,
tween Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Egypt and but rather a triumph for indigenous and re-
Syria. In general, we can hypothesize that regional forces, as evidenced by the continuing
cent changes in the world are trending from turmoil in El Salvador. The defeat of Marxist
spatial differentiation to specialized integra- totalitarianism in Ethiopia alerts us to impend-
tion. ing regional changes in the Horn of Africa. The
For the serious student of geopolitical anal- U.S.-Canada Free Trade Zone, which is likely
ysis, then, such a question as recently posed by to be extended to Mexico, and the tortuous
a political scientist-"are the great tectonic diplomatic attempts by the U.S. and Japan to
plates of geopolitics and economics upon which find a new basis for trade relations are still ad-
a post-World War 11 American foreign policy ditional signs of significant change. So are the
has been based shifting?" misses the point government of South Africa's legitimation of
(Hamilton 1989). This shift is ongoing, not new. the ANC (African National Congress) and its
As in earth processes, geopolitical plates are commitment to constitutional reform based
constantly moving. There are larger and smaller upon universal voting rights the first step in a
tremors, but the signs of change have been White/Black accommodation there, and in-
there for all who cared to see-and they did creasing pressures to bring Israel and the Pa-
not start with the end of the Cold War. lestinian Arabs and Arab confrontation states
Stalin's expulsion of Yugoslavia from the to the negotiations table.
Comintern in 1948 because of Tito's heresies, What we are witnessing is the evolution of
Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956, the the global system. The military equilibrium
Treaty of Rome in 1957 creating the European struck by superpower detente had, over a pe-
Economic Community, the Sino-Soviet break riod of four decades, been superseded by an
of 1960-61, the attempt at democratization of overarching set of equilibrial forces that in-
Czechoslovakia which prompted the Soviet included multinational corporate networks, global
vasion of 1968, the OPEC oil price rise after the capital flows, the specialization of industry,
1973 Arab-Israeli war, U.S. loss of the Vietnam technological transfer and adaptation, and the
War in 1973, Soviet withdrawal from Afghani- rejection of Moscow's brand of Communism
stan in 1988, the tearing down of the Berlin wall and one-party rule. While these forces are
and the unification of Germany in 1989 and viewed as global, in fact they also often have
1990, the collapse of East European Commu- regional clusterings. This regional impact con-
nism, America's changed status from a creditor tributes to the salience of the geopolitical re-
to debtor nation, the deterioration of the gion, as second-order powers interact with
U.S.S.R., the end of the Cold War, and Amer- other countries in their regional arenas. Smaller
ica's lead role in defeating Iraq-these are all states that have become specialized centers of
part of the process of geopolitical change. economic and political activity within the glob-
Ahead and part of the continuing change pro- al network may also have a shadow effect on
cess lie the Europe of 1992, the possible frag- the regions within which they are located.
mentation of the Union of Soviet (Sovereign) In the face of all these developments, it is
Republics, and any number of other energizing instructive that there has been no cataclysmic
events to come-the expected and the unex- collapse and global conflagration, as posited in
pected. theories of change based upon cyclical and de-
Moreover, change is not limited to the re- terministic economic interpretations of history
lationship between the North Atlantic and Eu- (Wallerstein 1983; Modelski 1987). WallerStein's
ropean Heartland centers. The emergence of economic dialectics and Modelski's long-cycle
regional powers in the 1970s and dedevelop- model based upon a hegemonic explanation of
560 Cohen
world political economic forces (O'Loughlin creasingly complex, as the concept of hierarchy
1989) do not match current realities. New major of cultures is widely challenged. Old notions
and regional powers have challenged and of Eurocentric cultural primacy are fading. The
changed the bipolar world, but they haven't success of sophisticated Offshore Asian econ-
displaced the superpowers. Rather, they have omies undermines the myth of Western cul-
become absorbed within an evolving system. tural supremacy. Also, as richness of culture,
Communism and single-party rule are disap- religion, and historic traditions are not nearly
pearing, and with considerable disturbance to as subject to the test of economic development
the system. But their demise has been attended as they once were, the world exhibits a greater
by "whimpers" rather than the "big bang." spirit of equality.
In arguing that the hegemonic decline of While forms of political colonialism (West-
American economic and therefore military ern, Russian, Chinese and Third World) persist,
power is part of the 500-year cycle of hege- and while international financial and economic
monic "overstretch," Kennedy (1987) pro- agencies and bodies have not fully eliminated
motes the concept that economic decline and classic national economic colonialism, the ero-
overextension of military commitments ulti- sion of cultural colonialism has been a signifi-
mately bring the downfall of all Great Powers. cant equalizer in the relations among states and
The thesis is that the colonial record of uneven peoples. It has substantially muted, reduced or
economic growth and technological change has altered the role of hierarchy in the structure
led to military decline in an essentially anar- of the international system.
chical world system. While, in the epilogue of While the web of hierarchy still retains rel-
his volume, Kennedy does suggest that the de- evance in an integrated system, the web is so
cline of hegemonic power need not always lead flexible, so dense and provides so many op-
to war, he nevertheless bases his thinking upon tional contacts, that models of dominance/sub-
a system that has reflected a very different kind ordinance and rigid hierarchy no longer reflect
of world-a world of dependency, not inter- the process of integration within a world that
dependency. Today's world system is funda- is evolving according to general systems prin-
mentally different from that of the past. For in ciples.
our world, the relationship between political/
military and economic power is not one-to-
one; economic hierarchy is not necessarily Geopolitical Systems as General
translated into political hierarchy. We have Organismic Systems
learned from the experience of economically
resurgent Japan and West Germany that the Treating the world as a general organismic
exercise of parallel political/military power is system provides insight into the relationships
neither necessary nor desirable for a nation to between political structures and their opera-
enjoy economic and social prosperity. Trading tional environments. These interactions pro-
states (Rosecrance 1986) are particularly cau- duce the geopolitical forces which shape the
tious about diverting their energies from the system, upset it and then lead it towards new
quest for economic growth, and military power levels of equilibrium. To understand the sys-
is no longer necessary to safeguard access to tem's evolution, it is useful to apply a devel-
resources. Continued capital flows and tech- opmental approach. Such an approach is de-
nological innovation do so. rived from theories advanced in sociology,
In addition, resources are increasingly sub- biology and psychology. The developmental
stitutable, and a modern service and high-tech- principle holds that systems evolve in predict-
nology-oriented economy relies increasingly ably structured ways, that they are open to out-
on sophisticated manpower, not raw labor. Also, side forces and that hierarchy, regulation and
international agencies are taking on functions entropy are important characteristics.
that major powers no longer wish to assume Herbert Spencer was among the first to set
through independent action, and the gap in forth a development hypothesis that drew an
international political inequality between large analogy between the physical organism and so-
and small states is narrowing in behavioral as cial organization (1860). His evolutionary ideas
well as juridical ways. came from physiology and the proposition that
Finally, hegemonic structure is becoming in- organisms change from homogeneity to het-
erogeneity. Using the organic growth analogy, ing the development of the current system. In
Spencer argued that social organizations evolve the early postwar years the two bipolar realms
from a state of indefinite, incoherent homo- controlled by the Soviet Union and the U.S.
geneity to one of relatively definite, coherent were clearly differentiated from each other.
heterogeneity (1969,21). For Spencer, state and Within each realm, however, the parts were
land meant the combination of social organi- relatively undifferentiated. This was the period
zation and physical organisms. when nations had begun to recover from the
Spencer not only recognized the mutual de- ravages of the Second World War. There was
pendence of parts, including the social role of also little hierarchy within either realm. Both
the division of labor. He wrote of the duality Stalin and Dulles believed that superpowers
of society, with two controlling organiza- could influence all parts of their respective
tions-the outer one with a centralized control geostrategic arenas, without the need for any
or governance system for defense and the pre- intermediaries.
vention of anarchy, the inner one with a de- That system quickly changed. Within the
centralized regulatory control for industry. He Maritime World, specialized regional cores like
likened these two levels, sometimes cooper- Common Market Europe and Japan arose, ini-
ating, sometimes antagonistic to one another, tially as junior partners and then as friendly
to the organic world. That world is differenti- competitors to the U.S. Europe has been the
ated between the outer part-the outer wall first to emerge as a political and economic bloc.
that is in direct contact with the environment- Within the Eurasian realm, China soon chal-
and the inner part-the digestive sac that is not. lenged the U.S.S.R. for strategic parity. These
Each organ has its own controlling system, to new power centers began to develop inde-
promote either cooperation or antagonism be- pendent ties to other states and regions.
tween the two (1969, 277). Spencer's concept The challenge to superpower monopoly
has particular pertinence to our understanding brought new forms of hierarchy into the re-
of the processes by which the Soviet Union may lations between the superpowers and their pe-
be reconstituted. ripheries. As Albania defected from Soviet su-
Combining organismic concepts from Her- zerainty, it looked to China for protection. In
bert Spencer, the sociologist, with those of the Caribbean, Cuba broke with the U.S. and
Heinz Werner (1948), the psychologist, and turned to the U.S.S.R. Then the Soviet Union
Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1966), the psycho-bi- was able to extend its influence through Cuba
ologist, provides the foundations for a spatially- to Jamaica, Guyana and especially Nicaragua.
structured geopolitical theory. It is a theory that Also, in the 1970s, a number of regionally-
is holistic, is concerned with order and process important states began to emerge. This gave
of interconnecting parts, and applies at all lev- added substance to the regional structure.
els of the political territorial hierarchy, from the These states imposed a hierarchy of their own
subnational to the national to the supranation- within their respective regions. India became
al. dominant in South Asia, defeating Pakistan in
To adapt the developmental principle geo- war and casting its stamp upon Bangladesh and
politically, we hypothesize a system that pro- Sri Lanka, as well as Nepal and Bhutan. Nigeria,
gresses spatially in stages. The earliest is undif- not the U.S., has led the way to a resolution of
ferentiated. Here none of the territorial parts the Liberian conflict, although the U.S. had been
are interconnected, and their functions are Liberia's traditional patron. Vietnam, with help
identical. The next stage is differentiation, whenfrom the Soviet Union, drove the Khmer Rouge
parts have distinguishable characteristics, but from power and, for more than a decade,
are still isolated. The highest stage is special- achieved dominance in Indochina. China, which
ization and hierarchical integration. Exchange to date has failed to impose it suzerainty over
of the specialized and complementary outputs Vietnam, championed the Khmer Rouge, but
of the different territorial parts leads to an in- could not prevent Vietnam's occupation of
tegration of the system. The hierarchical struc- Cambodia.
ture directs the flow of these outputs. While hierarchy remains a major structural
World War II and the end of colonialism paved element of the world system, it does not follow
the way for new world geopolitical arrange- the rigid rank order in either power or distance
ments. It is thus a logical starting point for trac- terms as it does in the natural world. Rather,
562 Cohen
the hierarchy is flexible. States can exert influ- and regions. Some power changes are the re-
ence over others without always having to de- sult of domestic developments, either in po-
fer to those in the rank above them. Thus, Al- litical organization, economic structures or so-
bania broke away from Tito's control to reach cial patterns. Others can be attributed to
directly to the U.S.S.R. before splitting with the external national and transnational forces. Three
U.S.S.R. and turning to China. Mexico and Ven- orders of national power, the first or major, the
ezuela defied the U.S. to try to shape an in- second or regional, and the third subregional,
dependent Central American policy. affect the balance of the global system, but even
There is flexibility in hierarchy both because lesser-order states are change agents influenc-
of the maturation of individual states, and being regional and global patterns, witness An-
cause power relations are no longer a function gola, Afghanistan and Ethiopia.
of sheer distance. Air, sea and telecommuni- In ranking states and regions, standard na-
cations allow ties to develop between states tional power measurements, e.g., land area, soil,
that are relatively far apart. Flexibility is further water and mineral resources, transportation and
enhanced by the impact upon individual states communication networks, population num-
of transnational corporations and international bers, educational quality, and military arsenals
social and political organizations. These flows are useful. However, they do not paint the full
often circumvent the international "pecking picture, and can often be misleading, witness
order." New York financial services deal di- Argentina and Saudi Arabia. A nation's long-
rectly with Hong Kong, they need not go term strength is very much a function of its
through Tokyo. Similarly, joint research activ- cohesiveness, its ideological vigor, its national
ities are conducted between state agencies will, its self-image, its goals and strategy for
within the U.S. and those of the Russian Fed- wielding international influence, and its capac-
erated Republic, bypassing the federal research ity for renewal (Cohen 1982).
bodies of both countries. Entropy level is indicative of where a state or
This increasingly complex and open world region fits in the various orders of power, and
system can be described as a "polyocracy." The is also a useful measure of balance in rela-
system has overlapping spheres of influence, tionships between geopolitical units. Defined,
varying degrees of hegemony and hierarchy, in physical systems, as the availability of energy
national components and transnational influ- to do work, entropy is always on the increase
ences, interdependencies and pockets of self- as energy becomes exhausted. Thus a system's
containment. It is all the more complex because ability to work constantly declines. If the world
its parts are at different stages of development. were to consist of closed geopolitical units, then
The Continental Realm is seeking to catch up surely each unit would ultimately collapse. We
with the Maritime by opening itself to market would then have to agree with Cloud (1988,
forces and, with the probably temporary ex- 232): "Borrowed biological energy degrades to
ception of China, political pluralism. Geopolit- unusable forms ... the energy dies. Entropy
ical regions, too, vary in attributes depending gets us in the end."
on their particular settings. Regional states play Only hermetically-sealed systems, however,
differing roles according to their spatial and behave according to this law of inevitability.
economic interactions with major powers and This is not the case for person-environment
neighbors. systems. Geopolitical entities whose leadership
What helps to link the system is the drive of seeks to close them off from outside forces do
the less mature parts to rise to the level already suffer from the exhaustion of their human and
achieved by the more mature sectors. The bal- natural resources and sink to high levels of en-
ance of relationships across and within the tropy; ultimately, however, human needs and
nested regional frameworks can be analyzed in strivings pry open the system, for geopolitical
terms of entropic, regulatory, and hierarchical entities are inherently open. They become re-
conditions. This provides some guidelines to charged through a form of energy transport
help determine levels of development. that introduces peoples, goods, and ideas as
high free energy. In particularly favored open
Entropy and Orders of Power systems, there may be so much energy trans-
port that the level is negative. Thus, while the
A key element in the dynamism of the system Soviet Union or Albania have experienced dra-
lies in shifts in power among different states matic increases in entropy levels as a result of
America \\ Am \'tx \(.00XartieEast
South ~~~~~~Subsahara
Europe Asia
America Africa
V Very
Entropy Balance _ENTROPY * Highll
Entropy Imbalance <I~ LEVELS (O' Mediumll
Military Balance _ - *D
Military Imbalance U Lowll
Figure 2. Geopolitical reach and balance. Global equilibrium is partly a function of the reach and balance of
its geopolitical regions to one another. These regions have different levels of entropy and military capacity.
Equilibrium is enhanced when regions with strong military but high-to-medium entropy levels (Heartland, East
Asia) are matched against modest military but low-entropy regions (Maritime Europe, Offshore Asia). Equilibrium
is upset when a strong military, rapidly increasing entropy-level region is matched against a strong military, low-
entropy region (Anglo-America).
their decades-long attempt to close their sys- and the Maghreb, Offshore Asia; (2) medium
tems, Singapore, in contrast, has negative en- entropy: Heartland, Eastern Europe, Middle East;
tropy. (3) high entropy: East Asia, South Asia; (4) very
Criteria that can be used to measure entropy high entropy: Subsahara Africa, South America
include: savings rates; agricultural yields; man- (Fig. 2).
ufacturing productivity; debt repayment; per- In effect, a state or region's reach, or extent
centage of R&D exports; numbers of patents, of influence beyond its borders, is a function
scientists and engineers, and foreign scientific of the combination of its level of entropy and
exchange; and reduction of fuel-energy inten- its military-strategic strength. The reach can be
sity requirements. In general, based upon the measured by external trade, capital flow, dip-
criteria that have been enumerated, regions fall lomatic relations, immigration and transit links,
into four categories: (1) low entropy: Anglo- and overseas military bases. Using these mea-
America and the Caribbean, Maritime Europe sures (The Economist World Atlas and Almanac
564 Cohen
1989; Kidron and Segal 1987), the U.S. reaches base, but they lack the population, military and
out throughout its own region, and also quite general economic capacities of second-order
strongly to five others: Maritime Europe, Off- rivals. Saudi Arabia, Libya, Taiwan, North Korea,
shore Asia, South America, Subsahara Africa, Malaysia, Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and Hungary
and the Middle East. On the other hand, a neg- retain such status. Lesser order states like Sudan
ative flow in capital accounts, chronic budget or Ecuador have impact only on their nearest
deficits and trade imbalance is indicative of an neighbors, while fifth-order states like Nepal
increase in entropic level. In terms of equilibrial have only marginal external involvements.
relations, America is in balance with Europe and Membership in the various orders is fluid.
Offshore Asia and is in overbalance with South China is now only marginally a first-order pow-
America, Subsahara Africa, and the Middle East. er. Unless it matures through opening the sys-
The European Community dominates its re- tem and finds genuine accommodation with
gion and has substantial geopolitical reach to a restructured and revitalized Soviet Union, it
Anglo-America, the Middle East, Subsahara Af- may slip to second-order status, on a level with
rica, South America, Offshore Asia, and Eastern India. A decade ago, twenty-seven nations could
Europe. Its entropic level is low, and it is fully be measured as potential second-order powers
capable of transporting surplus energy to East- (Cohen 1982). Of these, Yugoslavia, Saudi Ara-
ern Europe and the Soviet Union. Europe is in bia, Morocco, Zaire and now Cuba have fallen
balance with Anglo-America and Offshore Asia from the ranking or never really had attained
and in overbalance with its other regions of it. The German Democratic Republic has dis-
major contact. appeared from the map altogether. On the
Offshore Asia, spearheaded by Japan and its other hand, South Korea and Thailand have re-
successfully industrializing neighbors, reaches cently achieved regional power ranking. Third-
to Anglo-America, the Middle East, Europe, order status is also ephemeral. Tunisia, Tanza-
South Asia, and East Asia. With its very low level nia, Ghana, and Costa Rica have enjoyed and
of entropy, it is also in a position to project then lost such ranking with the waning of their
substantial reach to the Heartland. The region ideological influence.
is in balance with Anglo-America and Europe, The combined inputs of major powers and
and overbalanced with the rest of its contact second- and third-order states give regionalism
area. geopolitical substance. A state which may be
The Heartland is at a medium entropic level described as "asymmetrical" plays a special role
which is rising rapidly in the light of its recent in the regional personality. It promotes tur-
economic stagnation and the collapse of the bulence by challenging the norms of hege-
centralized Soviet political system. Its reach is monic regional structures and injecting un-
to East Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Eu- welcomed energy into the system. Sometimes
rope, and it is in balance with all of these regions. this produces dialectic response that brings
China, dominant in East Asia, extends its reach change in those norms (Cohen 1984). Revolu-
to the Heartland, South Asia, and to Offshore tionary Cuba, democratic Israel, Titoist Yugo-
Asia. It is in balance with the Heartland, but slavia, the market-oriented Ivory Coast of the
underbalanced with Offshore Asia. 1970s, radical Libya, and fundamentalist Iran are
Regional or second-order powers are cores examples of asymmetrical states that have pro-
for their regions. They have nodal character- found impact upon their respective regions. So
istics in terms of trade and transportation, and were Sandinista Nicaragua and a Romania that
military influence, and they aspire to regional insisted upon conducting a foreign policy in-
or subregional hegemony. Limited extrare- dependent of the Soviet Union, and so is iso-
gional economic or political ties are also char- lationist Myanmar.
acteristic of such powers. Finally, while often Ultimately some of the initiatives of the asym-
overshadowed by a great power, second-order metrical state are grudgingly adopted by its
states try to avoid satellite status, sometimes by neighbors. Kuwait may soon play such a role
playing off one major power against the other. within the Arab Gulf states, if forces there suc-
Third-order states influence regional events ceed in overthrowing the Emir or in converting
in special ways. They compete with neighbor- the regime to a constitutional monarchy. Other
ing regional powers on ideological and political future regional "mavericks" could be a revo-
grounds, or in having a specialized resource lutionary Philippines or Peru, an anti-European
Morocco, should the King be overthrown by its maritime counterpart. Its people have deep
fundamentalist forces, or a post-Mobuto Zaire ties to the land. Whatever happens to the So-
that shakes off its ties to the West. viet Union, whether it loses such republics as
the Baltics, Moldavia, Georgia and Armenia, or
Geostrategic Realms and Regions remains intact, there will be a Russia and some
allied or subordinate republics to occupy the
The geostrategic realm is the highest regional Eurasian Heartland. It will remain a large, well-
level of the global system. Despite the pro- endowed, and technologically advanced pow-
found changes that have taken place in the er, capable of influencing events in much of
world in recent years, the basic framework of the rest of the world.
two geostrategic realms remains-the Trade- China, too, belongs to this realm. It is not
Dependent Maritime World and the Eurasian part of the Maritime World as portrayed by
Continental World. Of the world's five major Mackinder and Spykman in their times, and
power centers, only one is now both a military Richard Nixon in his. The vast majority of Chi-
and an economic colossus: the U.S. Two are nese live off the land, not from sea trade. Even
great military forces, but relatively weak eco- with China's recent spurt in commerce, it only
nomically: the U.S.S.R. and China. Two are accounts for 1.5 percent of the world's imports
dominant economic forces without equally and exports. It is the mountain that holds a
strong military capacities: Japan and the Euro- spiritual, mystical attraction for the Chinese,
pean Community. Because Japan and Maritime not the sea. And it is the common border that
Europe lack vast strategic space and are vul- strategically links the U.S.S.R. and China. They
nerable to the military pressures of their near cannot turn their backs on one another; they
Chinese or Soviet neighbors, the strategic al- have to find a modus vivendi. Even though po-
liance with the U.S. remains their strongest se- litical change in the Soviet Union is in sharp
curity card. However NATO may change, the contrast to China's quashing of political de-
American partnership with its trade-depen- mocracy stirrings, the Chinese resistance to
dent, maritime realm allies is mutually needed. change must inevitably give way, especially as
The deteriorating economic and political its openings to a market economy continue.
fortunes of the Soviet Union may lead some to When both continental powers no longer are
ask whether the concept of a Eurasian geostra- trapped by competing versions of Marxist ide-
tegic realm still has validity. Those who have ology and enjoy more open systems, they are
heralded the triumph of liberal democracy over likely to find more in common, including the
Communism and the collapse of the unitary recognition that mutual strategic vulnerability
governmental structure are premature in dis- is better served than conflict.
missing the U.S.S.R. from its perch as a con- South Asia belongs to neither geostrategic
trolling state in an arena of the world that has realm. It has separate geopolitical regional sta-
impact upon much of the rest. A revived, albeit tus. In their early history, especially from its
smaller and loosely confederated union that is Indus Valley beginnings in 3,000 B.C. to Roman
ideologically compatible with its East European times, the Indians were seafaring peoples and
neighbors will remain in a position to dominate colonizers. Since then they have been conti-
its geostrategic realm-that vast spatial arena nentally oriented, becoming a source for spe-
large enough to affect the areas within its stra- cial raw materials and a market for imported
tegic military reach. It is characterized by a dis- goods during the British rule. As an indepen-
tinct set of interrelationships expressed in terms dent geopolitical region dominated by India,
of patterns of circulation, economic orienta- South Asia remains rural-based and continen-
tion, and historic, cultural, and political tal. This does not minimize the growing im-
traditions. Place, movement, and perspective portance to the region of overseas trade, ship-
combine to shape a geostrategic realm. ping, and modern-day immigration. However,
Realms are defined by "Continentality" and the basic orientation is inward (India's mer-
"Maritimity." These are terms that not only de- chandise trade is only one-third that of Chi-
scribe lands and climates: they also describe na's)-a condition which explains the limited
outlooks. The Eurasian Continental World is impact of extraregional contacts upon the ge-
more isolated, more inwardly-oriented, and opolitical objectives of the various states of
more heavily endowed with raw materials than South Asia.
566 Cohen
If trade interactions were the only criterion economic exchange, migration of Slavs, and
for defining geopolitical regions, then South military force.
America and Subsahara Africa surely would not
qualify as separate geopolitical regions. The
trade links of their individual states are with The Quarter-Sphere of
other parts of the Maritime realm, especially Marginality
the U.S. and Europe. Moreover, the subregions
of both South America and Africa are clearer While we speak of a world system, we are
political, military, and economic arenas than are mindful that it does not really span the entire
their larger regions. globe. Perhaps it never will. Parts of the world
In rationalizing the geopolitical unity of the are outside the modern economic system and
continent, one can argue that the weight of do not benefit from the exchange that is so
eastern South America is overwhelming. More- important to the developmental process.
over, Chile's strategic interrelationships with Much of Subsahara Africa and South America
Argentina, the vulnerability of the Central An- south of the Orinoco lies outside the world
dean countries' trans-montane rainforests and economic system. The trade of these two
savannas to Brazil, and Colombia's ties with regions is only 3 percent of world exchange.
Venezuela inhibit western South America from With the exception of pockets of modernity,
gaining independent geopolitical status on a in such countries as Brazil, Argentina and Chile,
par with the east. and in South Africa, these regions are relatively
Subsahara Africa's subdivisions, Southern Af- untouched by the capital flows, technology
rica, Western and Central Africa, and East Africa transfer, and specialization of industry that
are arenas of far more intense political, cultural characterizes the Developed Market Econo-
and military interaction than is the region as a mies (70 percent of world trade), Continental
whole. When the two strongest regional pow- Eurasia (10 percent), and South Asia (8 percent).
ers, Nigeria and South Africa, sort out their in- The continents centering around the South At-
ternal problems, they may, indeed, carve out lantic and their bordering oceans represent the
two distinct geopolitical regions, with the quarter of the world's land and ocean areas
smaller, weaker central and eastern subdivi- which can be referred to as the "Quarter-
sions being included within them. This would Sphere of Marginality."
create two geopolitical regions-the South and While dominated by the U.S. and European
East Lands of the Indian and South Atlantic, and Community power centers, the Quarter-Sphere
the West and Central Lands of the Mid-Atlan- is marginal in a strategic sense. Naval and air
tic. For the present, Subsahara Africa still re- strike forces, long-range air weapons and sat-
flects much of its colonial heritage. The former ellite surveillance capabilities have minimized
French and former British subunits retain a the significance to the Maritime World of
strong group identity, but not of sufficient po- Southern Continental land bases. Moreover,
litical-military importance to give them geo- pipelines and Suez now account for as much
political uniqueness. oil movement as the shipping routes around
On the other hand, intraregional trade is a the Cape of Good Hope. The Panama Canal
major factor in linking Anglo-America and the takes most of the Pacific shipping trade not
Caribbean, Maritime Europe and the Maghreb oriented to the U.S. West Coast.
and Offshore Asia. Tourism, immigration, and Economically, the Quarter-Sphere suffers
petroleum flow characterize Anglo-America, from chronic over-production of commercial
and immigration and language bind the Ma- crops and minerals, competition from other
ghreb to Maritime Europe. parts of the world, substitutes, and changing
Japan's situation as the dominant economic consumer tastes. The postindustrial regions no
and political power in Offshore Asia is unique longer regard the two southern Continents as
because of its reluctance to exercise military the potential storehouses of the world.
pressures. This is the reverse of South Asia, As a result of these changes, panregionalism
where India freely applies military options, or has become an outdated concept (O'Loughlin
in East Asia, where China has been militarily and van der Wusten 1990). Even though it is
involved in both Korea and Indo-China. The pursuing a massive debt reduction program,
Russian Heartland organizes its region through the U.S. seems unlikely to promote large new
capital flows, business developments, or aid that other parts of the world are also charac-
programs to South America, nor is Europe apt terized by high degrees of conflict and atom-
to do more than it is already doing in Subsahara ization. It is true that wars, revolts, and coups
Africa, given its involvement with the lands to are chronic in the Caribbean, South America
its east. and South Asia. The distinguishing feature of
The burdens of high debt, low international the Shatterbelt, however, is that it presents an
trade levels, overpopulation, low life expectan- equal playing field to two or more competing
cy, and low caloric consumptions will continue powers operating from different geostrategic
to plague the two southern continents, unless realms.
the Quarter-Sphere receives much more de- Thus South Asia is not a Shatterbelt. India's
velopment aid. But it will not receive substan- dominance in a divided South Asia is not se-
tially new help unless there is a sea-change in riously threatened by the U.S., the U.S.S.R., or
the attitudes of the wealthy of world. This means China. Moreover, the Caribbean is under
letting strategic and economic disinterest give America's military strategic and tactical sway,
way to humanitarian considerations, and con- and the Soviet penetration of Cuba did not
cerns that local conflicts or the acquisition of threaten U.S. military control of the region. Had
mass weapons would affect global stability. this been the case, the U.S. would have mount-
ed massive invasion and overthrown Castro,
rather than launch the comic-opera Bay of Pigs
adventure. Just as the defections of Yugoslavia
Shatterbelts and Albania did not undermine Soviet military
primacy in East and Central Europe, so have
The concept of the Shatterbelt has long been Cuba and Nicaragua not put America's control
of interest to geographers who also have used of the Caribbean at risk.
the terms "Crush Zone" or "Shatter Zone." Shatterbelt areas and their boundaries are
Mahan, Fairgrieve, and Hartshorne contributed fluid. During the 1970s and 80s, Subsahara Af-
pioneering studies of such regions. Mahan rica also became a Shatterbelt. The Soviet Union
(1900) referred to the instability of the zone used its Cuban surrogate as well as its Eastern
between the 300 and 400 parallels in Asia as be- European satellites to provide military and
ing caught between Britain and Russia. Fair- technical support to Ethiopia, Angola, Namibia,
grieve (1915) referred to a Crush Zone of small and Mozambique. Its adjoining Middle Eastern
buffer states between the seapowers of the Eur- bases were important jumping-off points for
asian Heartland, from Northern and Eastern Eu- Africa. The U.S.S.R. also made political inroads
rope to the Balkans, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, into Guinea, Mali, Congo, and Tanzania. With
Siam, and Korea. During the second World War, the retreat of the U.S.S.R. and its allies from
Hartshorne (1944) analyzed the Shatter Zone of Africa, the region has shifted back to the Mar-
Eastern Europe from the Baltic to the Adriatic, itime Realm (Fig. 3).
advocating a post-World War II Federation. Another major change in the geopolitical map
The operational definition for Shatterbelts is that Southeast Asia has also lost its Shatter-
used here is: strategically-oriented regions belt status. Its insular and southern peninsular
which are politically fragmented areas of com- portions have become economically and po-
petition between the Maritime and Continen- litically part of Offshore Asia and the Maritime
tal Realms. By the end of the 1940s, two such World. Malaysia and Thailand now enjoy con-
atomized regions had emerged-the Middle siderable industrial development, their econ-
East and Southeast Asia. They were not geo- .omies linked to those of Japan and the U.S. This
graphically coincident with previous Shatter has followed Singapore's remarkable growth as
Zones because the global locus of geostrategic part of the Maritime realm, and the realign-
competition had shifted. The former East and ment of Indonesia with the West and its Off-
Central Europe Shatterbelt had fallen within shore Asian neighbors.
the Soviet strategic orbit, and the Maritime and Meanwhile, with the rapid withdrawal of So-
Continental Worlds became divided by a sharp viet support from Southeast Asia, Vietnam and
boundary in Korea. Indochina as a whole are soon likely to fall with-
In discussions of the typology of the Shat- in the East Asian sphere. Vietnam will have to
terbelt, it has been pointed out by Kelly (1986) find some accommodation with China. What
568 Cohen
will be left of the region is an isolated and im- mon American and European approach, how-
poverished Myanmar, with almost no foreign ever, the Middle East is likely to become part
trade or other contacts. When the military re- of the Maritime World.
gime is eventually overthrown, and the country Besides outside intrusions, the Middle East is
opens itself to the world, it will probably be- now a Shatterbelt because it is highly frag-
come reoriented to South Asia. mented internally. The region contains six re-
Presently, then, the only remaining Shatter- gional powers: Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria and
belt is the Middle East. It, too, is in transition. Turkey. They in turn cast their shadows over
It is tilting towards the Maritime Realm, as the smaller states or separate groups within those
Soviet Union has suddenly ceased to be a major states. The alliances among these states and their
economic and military supplier, at least for the subordinates are fluid. Striking a balance among
time being. The U.S.S.R. remains sensitive to its the six is complicated. The U.S. and others can
1400-mile border with Turkey and Iran and the help in the quest for regional stability, partic-
Muslim peoples on both sides of its borders, ularly by pressing for elimination of weapons
but its era of broad regional penetration, with of mass destruction, reduction of conventional
bases in the Red and Arabian Seas, and the arms, and commitments to act against new re-
Eastern Mediterranean, seems over. gional aggressors, but outside powers cannot
When the Soviet Union and the U.S. were guarantee against continued turbulence. The
equal competitors, there was some measure of challenge is to contain regional tensions and to
regional equilibrium. The two stabilizers fueled minimize their impacts since it is not likely that
local conflict, but limited its escalation and they can soon been eliminated.
stopped it when they felt they might become The Gulf War demonstrated the high degree
directly dragged in. Even during the Iran-Iraq of interaction that characterizes the region. Ev-
war, when both superpowers could not whole- ery Middle Eastern state and some of the major
heartedly support either of the contestants, ethnic and religious groups became directly or
there were attempts to keep a military balance. indirectly involved in the conflict. Interpene-
Now the region is in disequilibrium, with the trating seas, the Mediterranean, Red, and Ara-
U.S. temporarily the single dominant external bian, and the Turkish and Iranian land bases
power. played militarily significant roles. Moreover, oil
In the post-Gulf War world, however, Europe pipeline networks, intraregional migration and
is likely to exert more influence on the Middle capital flows, and water, all emerged as factors
Eastern scene, and to emerge as the second that shape the regional personality. These are
major intrusive power. Its influence on Iraq, in addition to the overlays of Arabism and Islam.
Iran and Turkey is likely to be greater than that A concluding note about Shatterbelts has to
of the U.S. The lead taken by Britain and the do with the process of entropy. The very in-
European Community in proposing a "safe ha- trusive forces that contribute to the creation
ven" for Kurds in Northern Iraq is a case in of Shatterbelts can also contribute to their
point. So was the German effort to provide peaceful development. Southeast Asia was
food and supplies to the Kurds in Iran. In both drawn into Offshore Asia because there was so
instances, the U.S. was pressured to respond much energy transport from the latter to the
by supporting and adopting these initiatives. former. Thus, what only a decade ago was a
With these two as the major intrusive powers Shatterbelt in high entropy, is now contribut-
and the Soviet Union playing a secondary role, ing substantially to the larger low-entropy re-
a new balance can be developed. Indeed, the gion. The Middle East could, under peaceful
Soviet Union may play a stabilizing role be- circumstances, benefit considerably from en-
tween Europe and America, in pursuing its own ergy exchange with Maritime Europe and lower
agenda. Shift of the "power see-saw" should its entropy level. Eastern Europe, which has ex-
be less frequent and rapid than they have been perienced rapid increase in entropy, is about
in the past (Fig. 4). The region will remain a to benefit from substantial energy transport
Shatterbelt if the U.S. and the European Com- from Maritime Europe. Rapid lowering of East
munity fail to forge a common agenda. Such Europe's entropy level is the best guarantee of
dissension might encourage the U.S.S.R. to its not becoming the Shatterbelt that it once
reenter the arena more vigorously. With a com- was.
Maritime Europe t Hearlan
\X~~~~~~~~~~~~~s~SVE s ariI
C~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Regions within the Geostrategic Realms Geopolitical Regions -First Order Powe
Regions outside the Geostrategic Realms Geostrategic Realms____
Figure 3. Major geopolitical regional changes from end of World War IIto present. Subsaharan Africa became a Shatterbelt in
the Maritime Realm. The post-World War II Southeast Asian Shatterbelt has disappeared. East Europe has split off from the Hea
linking the realms.
--- .-o - - _ . _ _ . .. ... . ...
570 Cohen
1950 - 1970's ME
ISRAEL IRAN TURKE i IRAQ EGYPT SYRIA
U.S. U.S.S.R.
1980'ss
ISRAEL EGYPT TURKEY IRAN IRAQ SYRIA
U.S. U.S.S.R.
1990 - 1991
_~~~~~I URKEY
U.S.
EGYPT SYRIA ISRAEL TURKEY IRAQ IRAN

THE FUTURE ? NM
SP~~~iRES YEMEN JORDAN U.~~~~~~~~~~~~~S.S.R. JRA

INFLUENCE SAUDI ARABIA U.S. Europe
BBad SaJ 1991
Figure 4. Equilibrium and the Middle East seesaw. From the 1950s to the 1980s, a static and tenuous form of
equilibrium existed in the Middle East Shatterbelt because the two superpowers were in balance. Local and
regional disturbances occurred as regional powers shifted their superpower alliances. In 1991, the region was
thrown into imbalance as Iraq was defeated and the U.S. became the dominant intrusive power.
Gateway Regions The most promising geopolitical mechanism

now for restoring the balance between the two
The world is currently in disequilibrium be- realms is the emergence of Central and Eastern
cause of the substantial differences in entropic Europe as a Gateway region (Fig. 5). Such a re-
levels between its two geostrategic realms. The gion could facilitate the transfer of new ener-
Soviet and Chinese cores of Continental Eurasia gies into the faltering Soviet core. Extending
have medium levels of entropy that are rapidly on the west from the Oder-Neisse Rivers and
increasing. They have brought their human and the Harz and Bohemian Mountains to the
natural resource bases close to exhaustion as Northern Adriatic Sea, and the east to the bor-
they closed their systems to outside social, po- ders of the U.S.S.R., the European Gateway will
litical, market and technological energies that be fully open to economic forces from the east
could have promoted innovation and renewal. and west. Its national politics and economic
In contrast, the cores of the Maritime World structures are adopting the West European
and many other parts of the Developed Market models, but it will have to find a military pos-
Economies, particularly the Newly Industrial- ture that does not challenge Soviet security
ized Countries (NICs) of South Korea, Taiwan, goals. With the exception of Greece, this re-
Hong Kong, and Singapore, or Australia or gion is composed of that middle tier of states
Mexico, are at low levels of entropy. Equilib- between Germany and Russia whose indepen-
rium between the two realms will be restored dence and stability Mackinder (1919) felt to be
only when their entropic levels are closer to crucial to Eurasian and world stability.
equal. While demilitarization is not a viable option
MaritimeEur
G t+2 ;ias a~ope reland Ha ln d \
\~~~~~~~ Mu v Hog 'Kong/I D

Vascon a aialo ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ &OcAnia o America
Azores~~~~~~~~~ East Asia~~~~~~~~~es Australiaxic

\I / U /
a British Colu-mbia Offsh
Gateway states - by mid-21 st century @ Geopolitical Regions

Gateway states - by early 21 st century 0 Geostrategic Realms
Figure 5. Prospective Gateway States, conceived as specialized exchange sovereignties which will be politicall
the states in which they are now located but militarily subordinate to them. As centers of economic and te
in the integrating world sy
572 Cohen
for the region, a form of "Finlandization" is a East and Central Europe might not revert to a
reasonable substitute for the breakup of the Shatterbelt rather than become the Gateway
Warsaw Pact. This may occur through bilateral region that has been posited. This is doubtful.
arrangements which guarantee that East Euro- The European Community and the Soviet Union
pean defense forces will oppose any attempts would find competition over the region to be
by Western armies to use their territories as counterproductive. Maritime Europe's con-
jumping-off points against the Soviet Union, cerns are Soviet military power. The U.S.S.R.
while at the same time provide for liaison be- needs West European economic help. These
tween them and NATO (or West European concerns and needs balance one another. They
Union). are best addressed through cooperation, not
The promise of the Gateway region is that it through the competition that makes for Shat-
will facilitate the transfer of economic inno- terbelts.
vation from West to East, and, ultimately, the A gateway region has "hinges"-key states
reverse. As Eastern European countries and for- which take the lead as economic and social
mer East Germany make their painful transi- mediators in opening up the region in both
tions to a market economy having abandoned directions. The eastern part of Germany can be
Comecon, they should be able to exploit their such a hinge. So, potentially, can Slovenia for
low cost, fairly well-educated labor pool and exchange between Maritime Europe and the
raw material base and play a special role in serv- Balkans, and the Baltic states for Northern and
ing as partners with Western transnational en- Northwest Europe and the Heartland.
terprises in developing joint agreements with Another Gateway region that may emerge,
the Soviet Union. Moreover, their experiences although it is presently geopolitically linked to
in balancing opportunities for economic growth Anglo-America, is the Caribbean and Central
with pressures to maintain some of the eco- America. It is and will remain within the se-
nomic egalitarianism enjoyed during the past curity orbit of the U.S., a condition never re-
four decades should be of benefit to the U.S.S.R. alistically in doubt even when the U.S.S.R. had
In the future, joint Soviet-East European com- footholds in Cuba and Nicaragua. The immi-
panies may also focus on the Western market. nent disappearance of the Soviet presence in
The region has the potential for developing the region gives greater scope for such regional
as a major source of high quality manufacturers powers as Mexico and Venezuela to extend
for its own and the Soviet market, as it benefits their influence. The U.S., on the other hand,
from Western capital, equipment, credits, and with less reason to focus on military issues, can
managerial and technical know-how. This sure- commit more of its resources to regional de-
ly is of interest to the U.S.S.R., which has had velopment.
to accept high-priced, shoddy goods from its What makes this Gateway especially impor-
Communist satellites (as well as vice versa) in tant to the U.S. is its role as a source of immi-
return for raw materials. Improved, modern- grants. With a native demographic slowdown
ized agriculture in such countries as Poland, and the growing difficulties of enlisting its poorly
Czechoslovakia, and East Germany can find ex- educated, drug-ridden underclass into the la-
port markets in the U.S.S.R. once their own bor force, the U.S. draws upon the pool of labor
consumer demands are met. from the lands to its south. In addition, Mexico
While the basis for trade within the former represents a major focus for "off-shore" Amer-
Soviet bloc will no longer be regulated by force ican manufacturing, and the Caribbean basin as
and ideological considerations, the trading a whole has the potential for attracting Japa-
framework should remain strong. Soviet raw nese capital as manufacturing points of entry
materials such as oil and gas remain crucial to to the American market.
the trade exchange. With its technological ca- Finally, the Caribbean's continued growth as
pacities and Western capital, the U.S.S.R. may Anglo-America's winter tourist focus is bright,
also be able to develop to the point where it in the face of the demands of aging, wealthier
exports quality manufactures-e.g., automo- populations in the north. Of more dubious val-
biles and computers, in exchange for Eastern ue as a gateway is the role of the region now
Europe's textiles or machine tools. in the drug trade. Among the "hinge" states in
The question might be raised as to whether the region are Colombia, a link to the Andean
Table 1. Prospective Gateway States
By early 21st century By mid-21st century
Catalonia Madeira Islands Alaska

Cyprus (unified) Mount Lebanon Azores
East Nicaragua Pashtunistan British Columbia
Eritrea Puerto Rico Hawaii
Estonia Punjab Northern Ireland
Gaza/West Bank Quebec Northern Mexico
Hong Kong/Shenzhen Slovenia Soviet Far East
Kashmir Tamil Eelam West Australia
Latvia Vascongadas (Basque)
Lithuania
countries, and Venezuela as an oil exporter to world's geostrategic realms and its geopolitical
the U.S. An independent Puerto Rico can be- regions, or within an integrating Europe, Gate-
come a hinge gateway. way states are optimally situated for specialized
manufacturing, trade, tourism and financial ser-
vice functions, thus stimulating global econom-
Gateway States ic, social and political interaction. With inde-
pendence, they will accelerate the trend of
The characteristics of Gateway states will varythese borders from zones of conflict to zones
in detail but not in their overall context. Polit- of accommodation (Fig. 5 and Table 1).
ically and culturally they are distinct historic The emergence of such states can facilitate
culture hearths, with separate languages, often the creation of boundaries of accommodation
separate religions or national churches, higher as foreseen by Lionel Lyde (1926) more than six
degrees of education, and favorable access by decades ago. Since World War 11 and until re-
sea or land to external areas. cently, the boundary between the world's two
Economically Gateways tend to be more great geostrategic realms has been the world's
highly developed than the core areas of their most unstable conflict zone (from Greece to
host states, for they are often endowed with the Koreas, to the Chinese-India borderland,
strong entrepreneurial and trading traditions. to Vietnam and Afghanistan). Now, however,
When they are sources of migration because of war along this border zone has largely abated.
overpopulation, they acquire links to groups Moreover, the level of conflict along geopo-
overseas that can provide capital flows and litical regional borders has in recent years not
technological know-how. been higher than the world norm. This is in
Small in area and population, and frequently contrast to the world's Shatterbelt regions
lying athwart key access routes, Gateways are which have experienced the highest intensity
often of military value to their host states, whose and frequency of war.
security needs require defense guarantees The addition of substantial numbers of new
should the Gateways acquire political indepen- Gateway states to the international system is in
dence. While they may possess a highly spe- keeping with developmental theory, because
cialized natural or human resource which pro- these will be economically-specialized states
vides an export base, they lack self-sufficiency which will help to link the system as a whole
and depend upon the host state for raw ma- and its various parts. Far from the traditional
terials and a substantial market base. The mod- territorial unitary or federated states, whose
els for such states have existed historically in goals included self-sufficiency and defense ca-
Sheba, Tyre and Nabataea; in the Hanseatic pacities, such states will be mini-trading states
League and Lombard city-states; in Venice; and with qualified sovereignty. They will represent
in Trieste and Zanzibar. Andorra, Monaco, Fin- no military threat to their larger neighbors.
land, Bahrain, and Malta are modern-day ver- Describing Gateway states as contributors to
sions. So were Lebanon and Cyprus before they a more peaceful and stable system does not
were dismembered. imply that a few Gateways, such as Eritrea, Gaza/
Located mainly along the border of the West Bank or Tamil Eelam, will not have
574 Cohen
emerged except through bloody military con- values, with independent currencies linked to
flict. But by and large, the decision to establish the European one and the power to control
them will be mutually desired by the involved immigration and customs, could take off eco-
parties and will not, as was the case for many nomically and become a major focus for West-
independent states emerging out of decolo- ern capital and trade interested in the Soviet
nization, mean complete secession and un- market. They need Soviet energy, raw mate-
qualified sovereignty. The conflict that will at- rials, and a Common Market with the U.S.S.R.
tend the emergence of most Gateways will be for their economies. At the same time, they
minimal-limited by the asymmetry in strength can be gateways to the West which can facilitate
of the opposing parties. Soviet perestroika and its turn to a market
As the world system becomes more devel- economy.
oped, it will require that certain portions of Estonia has all the necessary ingredients for
existing states achieve flexibility in their inter- becoming a Gateway state, a state which has
actions with their previous hosts. The ideal ad- gained independent sovereignty although with
vanced general system has countless numbers certain residual and as yet undefined economic
of parts or hinges that can connect with each ties to the Soviet Union. It is quite clear that
other without having to move through rigidly Estonia could never have achieved sovereignty
controlled, hierarchical pathways. The impor- by force of arms. But political independence,
tance of having a more flexible international as well as cultural freedom for the Estonians
system within which states are linked globally, and their ability to control immigration and thus
regionally, and sectorially, is that it can cope preserve indigenous ethnic control, is a price
more easily with shocks, as blockage points are that the Russians proved willing to pay.
by-passed and the system feeds on a multiplic- Such willingness is based on Soviet self-in-
ity of nodes. In microelectronic circuitry, or terest-the prospect of a positive impact on
chips, gates permit currents to pass through the Soviet economy that a Baltic state can set
arrays of transistors. Transistors are made faster through its economic flexibility and innovation
by making them smaller, giving the current less as a bridge between East and West; an exchange
distance to travel. This applies to the potential base for Westerners seeking to open up the
of gateway states to make the world system Soviet market. This is the context within which
more responsive. the U.S.S.R. had already decided to give Estonia
Much has been written about the Baltic States free rein over its economy, including the hand-
and their drives for independence. The out- ing over of state-owned (Soviet) factories to
come of the recent turbulent "negotiations" Estonia. An Estonian state that can preserve the
(as perceived by the Lithuanians) or "discus- 60-percent ethnic mix, including its Lutheran
sions" (as termed by Soviet leadership), cul- traditions; have currency that can be freely
minated by the collapse of the Soviet central traded with a West European common curren-
government, has been international recogni- cy should it emerge; and can organize itself as
tion of the Baltic Republics. Their emergence an economic free zone will be as helpful to the
as Gateway states is thus imminent. Most likely, U.S.S.R. as to Estonia itself.
the U.S.S.R. will insist upon full military control There are limits to how far the U.S.S.R. can
of Klaipeda (Memel), a major ice-free military go in responding to separatist movements. The
port with links to the Kalinigrad R.S.F.S.R. oblast
Ukraine and Kazakhstan are parts which, if lost,
which, with Lithuanian independence, would would dismember the whole. This is not the
become a Russian territorial enclave. Klaipeda's case for the Baltic republics whose future se-
rail and road contacts with Kaliningrad and with curity depends upon coexistence with Mos-
Byelorussia and Moscow would have to be se- cow. The outcome may produce a political
cured through transit rights. Elsewhere in the model with applicability in many parts of the
Baltic, the U.S.S.R. would want political and world, including Slovenia's breaking from Yu-
goslavia, or Western Australia from Australia,
cultural rights guarantees for the relatively large
Slavic populations in Latvia (41 percent) and Es- or Shenzhen from China to join Hong Kong.
tonia (33 percent); this is only a minor problem As with the Baltic Republics, Slovenia could
in Lithuania where Slavs are 11 percent of the gain qualified independence without dismem-
populace. bering Yugoslavia. Indeed Slovenia seems to
The Baltic States, free in their own religious have won its relatively bloodless battle with the
Serbs. The absence of Serbian and indeed sub- goods destined to its respective region. Alter-
stantial numbers of other minorities, save Ger- natively, customs revenues could be shared. In
man-speaking, in Slovenia makes its indepen- defense matters, Slovenia could be guarded by
dence more feasible. This demographic picture an all-Slovenian army operating under the um-
is in sharp contrast to that of Croatia. There, brella of a federal army with a coordinated
the large Serbian minority of 600,000 is a ma- planning and command structure. In times of
jority or near-majority in Slavonia in eastern emergency, Slovenian authorities could invite
Croatia bordering Bosnia and Vojvodina, and other components of the federal force to enter
also in parts of the southeast and south-center the Republic. Conscription or recruiting would
in the Krajina along the Bosnian boundary. The be a Slovenian prerogative. A Slovenia that
Serbs insist that there can be no independence emerged in such a form would be a prototyp-
for Croatia unless its Serbian regions are per- ical Gateway state. Such a solution would pro-
mitted to join Serbia. Croatian opposition to tect Yugoslavia's security needs, continue to
such territorial dismemberment has already re- provide markets for raw materials from the
sulted in heavy fighting that would surely turn Confederation to Slovenia, and facilitate in-
into all-out war rather than the kind of low- dustrial development and innovation that could
level skirmishing that has taken place in Slo- be diffused to the southern republics.
venia. Gateways may also be found among islands
Joining Europe is no mere slogan for the Slo- that have such limited defense and political for-
venes. Central European culturally, historically eign policy concerns that they can remain un-
and geographically, in contrast to their east- der the military umbrella of the countries to
ward-oriented sister Yugoslavian Republics, and which they now belong. They can evolve as
speaking a South Slavic language that uses Ro- microstates because they have the ability to
man characters, Catholic Slovenes are more specialize in financial services, capital flows, and
economically advanced than the Christian Or- tourism. Sometimes they are ideal places for
thodox Serbs. There are traditional links to Aus- assembling manufactured parts into finished
tria, Italy and Hungary on which to promote products. Some of the Gateway states, es-
development. For eight centuries located with- pecially overpopulated islands, will have access
in the southern border of the Austro-Hungar- to the capital and technical know-how of emigre
ian Empire, and prospering in their alpine val- populations who left crowded, agriculturally-
ley and forested region well served with impoverished, island bases but retain emotional
superhighways and modern housing, the Slo- familial ties.
venes have the business and manufacturing skills The Madeira Islands, several hundred miles
to benefit from freedom to interact with Eu- removed from the coast of Portugal, are a po-
rope on their own terms. Establishment of Yu- tential Gateway. Madeira is presently an auton-
goslavia's first stock market in Ljublijana is a omous region within Portugal. It has home rule
reflection of Slovene entrepreneurship. over its regional budget and tourist develop-
When Slovenia declared its independence ment. However, its dreams of developing as an
on 25 June 1991, limited fighting soon broke offshore banking center and free trade zone
out between the Yugoslav army and Slovenia have long been delayed by central government
militia. On July 7, a tenuous cease-fire accord bureaucracy in Lisbon. As a base for companies
was arranged through the mediation of the Eu- seeking to export to the European economic
ropean Community. Agreement to seek a community after 1992, the Madeira free zone
peaceful solution could lead to a very loosely
could be quite attractive.
confederated Yugoslav structure, in which Slo-
The Madeiras need Portugal for the entry
venia is guaranteed control over its own finan-
that is provided into the European Community.
cial affairs, a separate currency and monetary
And Madeira has no incentive to take on de-
system, and independent status in international
bodies (such as is held by the Ukraine and Bye- fense burdens. But an arrangement that pro-
lorussia in the United Nations). vides it with the independence to take eco-
The dispute over control of customs posts nomic advantage of its Atlantic basin location
along the Italian, Austrian and Hungarian bor- for exports to Europe, the U.S., and North Af-
ders could be resolved by joint Slovene-Fed- rica could free Portugal from what is now an
eration customs teams, each responsible for economic burden and create in the Madeiras
576 Cohen
a model for the development of Europe's poor- they can help stabilize the system because of
er regions. their raison d'etre as links in an increasingly
Quebec is also a Gateway candidate. With such interdependent world. Uniquely suited to fur-
status it could focus on exploiting its advantages thering peace, such novel states can help fash-
in human and raw materials to be a successful ion what Peter Taylor (1991) has referred to as
partner in the emerging North American Free a people-centered world map. Such a map is
Trade Zone. So could a new Northern Mexico not an alternative to the state-centered map,
state, building upon the economic vitality of its but rather one which contains a substantial
Maquiladoras zone cities. Other examples are number of territorial units whose goals are es-
Alaska and Hawaii. Alaska, which has very small sentially devoted to the interests of peoples,
independence party, could make its own de- not states, and which binds together states and
cisions on how to exploit petroleum and where regions.
to ship it, or on generating trade with the Soviet Individuals and groups live in various cate-
Far East. Hawaii could link the economies of gories of multiple worlds. The individual op-
Japan and the U.S. without being impeded by erates in the worlds of family, work, recreation,
American law. school, friends and neighbors, religious com-
The European Community presents Gateway munities and the like. Social groups or clans
state opportunities for European peoples that also live in multiple worlds. These worlds over-
have sought independence-in particular the lap in time and in space. When they are ex-
Basques, Catalans and Walloons (although Wal- perienced totally independently at the individ-
loonia may already have attained its desired sta- ual level, the person becomes disfunctional.
tus in Belgium's advanced confederal struc- When they are handled in integrated fashion,
ture). These smaller groups could survive the individual enjoys harmony.
economically in a Europe without meaningful The same holds true for our geopolitical lives.
national political boundaries. The detachment We live in a world system, a geopolitical region,
of such ethnic or religious minorities from the a national state, a province or subnational state
mother country would create no security prob- and a locality (urban or rural). While each of
lems in a Europe with a unified defense posture. these territorially-framed units has separate
Moreover, many of the economic advantages functions, the trend is towards greater over-
the mother country enjoys from having these lapping. Yeltsin seeks to conduct foreign policy
subregions within their economic borders could on behalf of the Russian Republic, and at times
well be lost as the European community enters in overt competition with the policies of Gor-
into the new era of "pooled sovereignty" in bachev; governors of various American states
1992-the culmination of a series of steps that and even mayors of big cities sign economic
combined both federalist and functionalist ap- and cultural agreements with foreign national
proaches (Wise 1991). Conversely, the burden states which have political overtones that in-
for their support could be shared. fringe on Department of State prerogatives. As
The listing of prospective Gateway states in the world becomes more complex, this overlap
Table I does not represent the only new states will increase and so will the contradictions. Tay-
which are likely to be added to the current state lor (1989) points out that the enhancement of
system. Independence forces in colonial or trust the world system, far from diminishing the im-
territories such as the Polisaro of Western Sa- portance of local forces, will culminate in the
hara or the Kanakks of New Caledonia, or eth- mobilization of peoples in regions.
nic minorities within existing states seeking their Local forces and political power are often at
national freedom, like the Armenians, the Mol- odds with dominant national ideologies, as well
davians, the Kurds, or the Croatians will rein- as with the restraints imposed by the world
force the trend of national state proliferation. system. Reconciling these differences within
This proliferation has been cause for conflict national states and within geopolitical regions
and upheaval in much of the world since the is the most severe challenge that a highly de-
end of the Second World War, as tribal and veloped and integrated system must face. Gate-
ethnic scores have been settled in the context way states and regions have very special roles
of decolonization, and will continue to be so. to play in reconciling these territorially-based
The distinct contribution of Gateways is that differences.
Conclusion-Policy Implications from some geopolitical concepts and issues that

have been covered in this paper:
(1) The U.S. should unequivocally renounce
The world is still in its early stages of spe- the Nixon-era strategy that viewed the Sino-
cialization and hierarchical integration. The two Soviet split as an important instrument for world
geostrategic realms are sorting out the rela- equilibrium. Drawing Soviet military energies
tionships of their respective internal power away from Europe is taking place because of
centers. Neither the U.S.S.R. nor China has yet the end of the Cold War, not because of the
to achieve the national focus which will enable U.S.S.R.'s perception of an increased Chinese
the Russian Heartland and East Asia to build a threat. The Soviet Union (especially the Rus-
new chapter in Sino-Soviet relations from the sian Heartland) and China belong to one geo-
ashes of their schism. In addition, they are strategic realm. We should do what we can to
opening their national systems economically promote the conversion of the Sino-Soviet bar-
and, increasingly, politically. Meanwhile, the rier boundary to one of accommodation and
U.S., the European Community and Japan have decrease the instability between the two pow-
still to agree upon an allocation of global re- ers. U.S. and Japanese coordination at the eco-
sponsibilities in which America's specialized nomic and military levels can help. The two
military capacities are tempered by its econom- countries should also adopt the collateral ob-
ic parity with the other two. jective of easing tensions between Vietnam and
At the geopolitical level, the different regions China.
are at different stages of development. Their (2) The U.S. has assumed the mantle of world
power and influence cannot be comparatively military leadership. Germany and Japan are the
measured by the same criteria. They have var- cores of the Maritime realm's two other key
ied attributes depending on their particular geopolitical regions. We should not press these
settings, including the locational presence or most important geostrategic partners to share
absence of major powers. Regional states play in the military burden, because they would
differing roles within their regions, depending surely be perceived as threats by the U.S.S.R.
on their particular qualities and thus spatial and and China, leading to system destabilization.
political-economic interactions with major We need to reduce our military arsenals to lev-
powers and neighboring states. What helps to els that we can maintain through our own ef-
link the system is the drive of the less mature forts and without involving Germany and Japan.
parts to rise to levels already achieved by the Such reductions will lower the global strategic
more mature sectors. arms race and bring greater peace dividends to
Development means greater strength and all concerned. American nuclear and high-
self-confidence for the individual parts. The technology "overkill" has diverted our re-
world system since World War 11 has been heg- sources from pressing domestic social and en-
emonic, characterized by attempts to regulate vironmental problems. It has also fueled the
from the top. A more advanced system is one world arms trade that Pentagon suppliers de-
whose parts are more open, more capable of pend upon to reduce unit costs.
drawing in new energies, and more likely to (3) The U.S. should accelerate its withdrawal
find balance through self-regulation, either as from many overseas bases. Air and sea tech-
the result of failure to achieve goals through nology make it possible to exercise power with-
war and competition or through cooperation. in the Maritime Realm without having to rely
If we are to go beyond the obvious in stating on a multitude of fixed land points. In general,
that this is a geopolitically complex and dynam- land army overseas bases are unnecessary, as
ic system, we must grapple with the policy im- are nuclear weapons. Impoverished countries,
plications of the framework that has been elab- whose people view us as colonial occupiers and/
orated. "Objective" analyses cannot escape the or are ruled by unstable regimes, are unsuitable
experience and national biases of their authors. partners. We should retain air and sea bases
Mine is an analysis which reflects an American only where we are broadly welcomed as stra-
point of view. Its prescriptions are directed to tegic partners, e.g., in Britain, Spain, Germany,
American policy-making. Iceland, Italy, Turkey, Israel and Australia. Pri-
Here, then, are the conclusions to be drawn ority should also be maintained in Diego Garcia,
578 Cohen
Puerto Rico, Guam, Panama, the Azores, and misguided. Slovenia and Croatia are not the
Singapore. Politically vulnerable are bases in same. Slovenian independence can facilitate
South Korea, Thailand, Guantanamo, the Phil- Yugoslavia's economic development. Croatian
ippines, Greece, Morocco, and, if established, independence has brought civil war and chaos.
the Persian Gulf. We should leave them. In fact, and under pressure from several Eu-
(4) In geopolitically independent South Asia, ropean countries, the Bush administration did
the U.S. should recognize the primacy of India begin to back off from its commitment to an
as the core of the region. India's concerns over undivided Yugoslavia during the Slovenian cri-
our military alliance with Pakistan are legiti- sis of the summer of 1991. Freedom is not only
mate. This alliance drove India into the arms of the right of territorially-distinct people like the
the U.S.S.R. We should abandon this military Baits that were involuntarily forced into na-
agreement and also recognize the dangers to tional unions. It is also the prerogative of a na-
world stability inherent in Pakistan's nuclear tion that has found an historical union to be
arms program. The U.S. should, however, dip- repressive. The Baltic states seek emancipation;
lomatically encourage Pakistan's support of a Slovenia wants a divorce. Diplomatic nuances
free Kashmir, perhaps in consonance with the aside, both desires are equally valid.
U.S.S.R. A cooperative effort between America (7) Although the Quarter-Sphere of Margin-
and the Soviet Union to facilitate Kashmir's ality is strategically irrelevant, it must not be
emergence as a Gateway state could lead to ignored economically by the Maritime Realm.
greater regional stability than the current pol- Humanitarianism and practical considerations
icies whereby each superpower arms its ally. require a reallocation of American aid towards
(5) The Middle East Shatterbelt could shift the South Atlantic lands and away from the
to the Maritime World. However, this will not present handful of military allies-six of which
happen if America seeks to impose a PAX receive 90 percent of our foreign aid. Without
AMERICANA on the region. Maritime Europe development, the Quarter-Sphere will expe-
must be treated as a full military and political rience ever-increasing levels of conflict, thus
partner in all U.S. efforts to achieve security in defeating efforts to stabilize the world system
the Gulf, to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, in its entirety.
and to restore peace in Lebanon. If there is a (8) The emergence of regional trading blocs-
compelling strategic reason for relocating the in Western Europe, in North America, in South
Forward Headquarters of the U.S. Central America, and in the Pacific Rim-could prove
Command to Bahrain and placing a brigade in serious challenges to the world's open system.
Saudi Arabia, there is even more compelling a They might promote protectionism, inefficien-
reason to make this an allied effort. With two cies, and monopoly competition within the
cooperating balancers and respect for Soviet blocs. Extending these blocs along full panre-
concerns, the swing of the regional seesaw gional lines would not improve matters, even
would be moderated substantially. if it were politically feasible. Global equilibrium
Moreover, the Soviet Union should be in- requires an open global system.
volved in trilateral peace efforts. Resumption
We geographers have much to learn and
of American military arms sales to allied Middle
much to contribute to the field of geopolitical
Eastern regional powers or their subordinate
analysis. We have a strong tradition of past
states will only undermine regional stability and
scholarly efforts in the field, and are building
encourage other outside powers to join in a on this tradition to make novel and fresh im-
renewed arms race. Since 1983, about 60 per-
pacts on the science of the relations among
cent of world arms trade has gone to the Mid-
states, peoples and organizations. The richness
dle East. Continuation of these transfers is an
of geopolitical topics and approaches in the
invitation to future disasters such as the Gulf
current literature and at recent annual meet-
War and the various Arab-Israeli conflicts.
(6) In our foreign aid priorities, we should ings of the Association and at numerous inter-
give special attention to Gateway regions and national seminars leads to the conclusion that
states. These are areas with great promise for we are experiencing a major resurgence in per-
integrating and stabilizing the global system. haps the oldest of geography's subfields-po-
The initially rigid American policy in support litical geography. This is timely and important
of the unity of the Yugoslav Confederation was for the geographic discipline in its entirety.
Postscript Bowman, Isaiah. 1922. The new world. Yonkers-on-

Hudson, NY: World Book Co.
This article went to press at the peak of revolu- Brown, Seyom. 1989. Inherited geopolitics and
tionary change in the Soviet Union. The failed Com- emergent global realities. In America's global in-
munist coup d'etat on August 19-21, 1991 spelled an
terests, ed. Edward K. Hamilton, pp. 166-97. New
end to the Communist Party's economic and admin-
York: W. W. Norton & Co.
istrative structure and led to the collapse of central
government and the crumbling of the Union. Sev- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1986. Game plan. Boston:
enty-one years of Communist rule have now been Atlantic Monthly Press.
wiped away in a bloodless revolution. Cloud, Preston. 1988. Oasis in space. New York: W.
The final outcome of the struggle to forge a new W. Norton & Co.
flexible and multifunctional national union that will Cohen, Saul B. 1973. Geography and politics in a
provide an umbrella for those republics that opt for world divided, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford Uni-
confederation, federation, associate membership or versity Press.
an economic union, is by no means clear. But if the
1982. A new map of geopolitical equilib-
unity of Heartland is to be maintained, it will be
rium: A development approach. Political Geog-
through a "bottom up" rather than "top down" ap-
proach to governance. Collective military security, raphy Quarterly 1(3):223-42.
economic exchange, international foreign policy 1984. Asymmetrical states and global geo-
commitments and control of the nuclear arsenal are political equilibrium. SAIS Review 4(2):193-212.
functions the republics are most likely to delegate to Fairgrieve, James. 1915. Geography and world pow-
a new federal center. As long as Russia, the Ukraine, er. London: University of London Press.
Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan can agree to some form Ginsberg, Norton. 1988. Geography and the Pacific
on confederalism, the long-term prospects for the century. Asian Geographer 7:1-11.
Heartland's revival are favorable.
Guyot, Arnold. 1989. The Earth and man, trans. C.
Meanwhile the Baltic States have received recog-
C. Felton. New York: Charles Scribner's.
nition from Europe and the U.S. and applied for UN
membership. Moreover, leading forces in the Soviet Hamilton, Edward K. 1989. Introduction and over-
Union and especially Russia have dropped their op- view. In America's global interests, pp. 166-97.
position to Baltic independence. On the other hand, New York: W. W. Norton & Co.
the need for these breakaway states to secure their Hartshorne, Richard. 1944. The United States and
economic exchange base with the Soviet republics "the Shatter zone" in Europe. In Compass of the
as well as the Union's concerns with access to Kali- world, ed. H. Weigert and V. Stefannson, pp.
ningrad and the sea, are bringing heavy pressure on 203-14. New York: Macmillan Co.
both sides to develop mechanisms for gateway status.
Kant, Immanuel. 1795. Perpetual peace, trans. Lewis
Similar exchange-state structures are being dis-
Beck. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957.
cussed for Slovenia and Eritrea. Impending indepen-
dence for these two territories brings to the forefront Kelly, Philip. 1986. Escalation of regional conflict:
the need for Serbia and Slovenia to maintain eco- Testing the shatterbelt concept. Political Geog-
nomic trade and financial channels, and for Ethiopia raphy Quarterly 5(2):161-80.
to be guaranteed access to Eritrean Red Sea ports. Kennedy, Paul. 1987. The rise and fall of the great
In recent weeks, Western euphoria over the tri- powers. New York: Random House.
umph of democracy in the Soviet Union has been Lapham, Lewis. 1991. Brave new world. Harpers
quickly tempered by the spectre of political atom- March:12-16.
ization in the Heartland and elsewhere-fears over
Lyde, Lionel. 1926. The continent of Europe. Lon-
the consequences of local wars and unrest, and loss
don: Macmillan Co.
of central control of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the
intensity of the Revolutionary process has brought Mackinder, Halford 1. 1904. The geographical piv-
war to Yugoslavia and the threat of war within some ot of history. Geographical Journal 23:421-44.
of the Heartland's republics. But the prospects are 1919. Democratic ideals and reality. New York:
that such strife will be geographically limited, and Henry Holt.
that international and regional efforts will be able to 1943. The round world and the winning of
mediate the controversies. the peace. Foreign Affairs 21:595-605.
Political systems that unravel so quickly are indeed Mahan, Alfred T. 1900. The problem of Asia and
cause for concern. The basis for this unraveling, the
its effect upon international policies. Boston: Lit-
popular urge and will for democratic and human
tle, Brown & Co.
rights, also offers the hope that novel, more respon-
sive systems are in process of being forged that will May, J. A. 1970. Kant's concept of geography and
speedily contribute to a new, more stable, and peace- its relation to recent geographical thought. Toron-
ful map of the world. to: Department of Geography, University of To-
ronto Press.
References
Modelski, G. 1987. Long cycles in world politics.
Bertalanffy, Ludwig von. 1966. Organismic psy- Seattle: University of Washington Press.
chology and systems theory. Barre, MA: Clark Uni-O'Loughlin, John. 1989. World power competi-
versity Press. tion in local conflicts. In A world in crisis?, 2nd
580 Cohen
ed., ed. R. J. Johnston and P. J. Taylor, pp. 289- Taylor, Peter. 1991. Tribulations of transition. Pre-
332. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. sented at the Annual Meeting of the Association
, and van der Wusten, Herman. 1990. Po- of American Geographers, Miami.
litical geography of panregions. Geographical Re- * 1989. The world-systems project. In A world
view 80:1-19. in crisis?, 2nd ed., ed. R. J. Johnston and P. J.
Rizopoulos, Nicholas, ed. 1990. Sea-changes: Taylor, pp. 333-54. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
American foreign policy in a world transformed. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1983. Historical capitalism.
New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press. London: Verso.
Rosecrance, Richard. 1986. The rise of the trading Wells, H. G. 1920. Outline of history. New York:
state. New York: Basic Books. Garden City Publishers.
Schutz, Alfred. 1964. Collected papers 2. Studies in Werner, Heinz. 1948. Comparative psychology of
social theory, ed. Arvid Brodersen. Reprinted mental development, rev. ed. New York: Inter-
1976. The Hague: Martin Nijhoff. national University Press.
Spencer, Herbert. 1860. The social organism. In Wise, Mark. 1991. War, peace and the European
The man versus the state, ed. Donald Macrae, pp. community. In The political geography of conflict
195-233. Reprinted 1969. Baltimore: Penguin. and peace, ed. Nurit Kliot and Stanley Waterman,
Streit, Clarence. 1938. Union now. New York: pp. 110-25. London: Belhaven Press.
Harper & Brothers.

V. Impt. Post Cold War Geopolitics

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

V. Impt. Post Cold War Geopolitics

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

V. Impt. Post Cold War Geopolitics

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Presidential Address: Global Geopolitical Change in the Post-Cold War Era

Author(s): Saul B. Cohen

Abstract. Evolution of the world geopolitical strengthen global interdependence through

Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 81(4), 1991, pp. 551-580

Z~~~~~ g ran Tie \ (CHINAZ eld

* Second Order Powers~~an Ocani

lines provided closely to Anglo-America, albeit by

America \\ Am \'tx \(.00XartieEast

EGYPT SYRIA ISRAEL TURKEY IRAQ IRAN

SP~iRES YEMEN JORDAN U.~~~~~~~~~~~S.S.R. JRA

Gateway Regions The most promising geopolitical mechanism

\~~~~~~~ Mu v Hog 'Kong/I D

Azores~ East Asia~es Australiaxic

Gateway states - by mid-21 st century @ Geopolitical Regions

Table 1. Prospective Gateway States

By early 21st century By mid-21st century

Catalonia Madeira Islands Alaska

Conclusion-Policy Implications from some geopolitical concepts and issues that

Postscript Bowman, Isaiah. 1922. The new world. Yonkers-on-

You might also like