Jurisprudence on Misconduct Mitigating Circumstances

1. Civil Service Commission vs Belagan GR No. 132164, 19 October 2004

Two (2) separate complaints filed respectively by Magdalena Gapuz, founder/directress of the
"Mother and Child Learning Center," and Ligaya Annawi, a public school teacher at Fort Del Pilar
Elementary School, against respondent Dr. Allyson Belagan, Superintendent of the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), from Baguio City. Magdalena charged respondent with
sexual indignities and harassment in the course of her application for permit to operate a pre-
school, while Ligaya accused him of sexual harassment and various malfeasances.

DECS Secretary rendered a Joint Decision finding respondent guilty of four (4) counts of sexual
"indignities or harassments" committed against Ligaya; and two (2) counts of "sexual advances or
indignities" against Magdalena. Upon appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), promulgated
resolution affirming the Decision of the DECS Secretary in the case filed by Magdalena but
dismissing the complaint of Ligaya. The CSC ruled that respondent’s transgression against
Magdalena constitutes grave misconduct.

Supreme Court ruling:

Petitioner prays that we sustain its ruling penalizing respondent for grave misconduct and not
merely for disgraceful or immoral conduct which is punishable by suspension for six (6) months
and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense. Misconduct means intentional
wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a
government official. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to
or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public
officer. In grave misconduct as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be
manifest. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the act of an official or
fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some
benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. This is
apparently present in respondent’s case as it concerns not only a stolen kiss but also a demand
for a "date," an unlawful consideration for the issuance of a permit to operate a pre-school.
Respondent’s act clearly constitutes grave misconduct, punishable by dismissal.

We are, however, not inclined to impose the penalty of dismissal from the service.
Respondent has served the government for a period of 37 years, during which, he made a
steady ascent from an Elementary Grade School Teacher to Schools Division
Superintendent. In devoting the best years of his life to the education department, he
received numerous awards. This is the first time he is being administratively charged. He
is in the edge of retirement. In fact, he had filed his application for retirement when
Magdalena filed her complaint. Section 16, Rule XIV, of the Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 provides:

"SEC. 16. In the determination of penalties to be imposed, mitigating and aggravating

circumstances may be considered. x x x."

The mitigating circumstances are enumerated in Section 53, Rule IV, of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which reads in part:
 "SEC. 53. Extenuating, Mitigating, Aggravating, or Alternative Circumstances. – In the
determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating, aggravating and alternative
circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense shall be considered.

The following circumstances shall be appreciated:

xxx     xxx

j. length of service

xxx     xxx

l. and other analogous cases."

Conformably with our ruling in a similar case of sexual harassment, and respondent’s

length of service, unblemished record in the past and numerous awards, the penalty of
suspension from office without pay for one (1) year is in order.

While we will not condone the wrongdoing of public officers and employees, however,
neither will we negate any move to recognize and remunerate their lengthy service in the
government.

2. Civil Service Commission vs Juliana Ledesma GR No. 154521, 20 September 2005

Ledesma is a Clerk III at the Records Section of the Bureau of Immigration ("Bureau"). She has
been with the Bureau for more than 32 years. Rank-and-file employees of the Bureau elected
Ledesma to chair their union, Buklod ng mga Kawani ng CID  ("Buklod"), for three consecutive
terms.

In 1999, Tsai I Hau, also known as Steve Tsai, and his sister, Tsai Ching Yi executed complaint-
affidavits before the prosecuting officer of the Bureau against Ledesma. The Tsai siblings are
Taiwanese nationals who were studying in the country at the time. Steve Tsai attested that he
went to the Bureau to seek Ledesma’s assistance in securing Emigrant Certificate Clearances
("ECCs") for him and Ching Tsai. He gave their passports and ₱3,000 to Ledesma. Steve Tsai
claimed that Ledesma has helped him obtain ECCs for the previous three years. He usually paid
₱1,500 for each ECC. He knew that out of the amount Ledesma kept ₱200 to ₱300 as a "service
charge”. Steve Tsai received their ECCs but not their passports, with the result that the
complainants were not able to leave the country for their planned vacation.

The CSC dismissed Ledesma’s appeal. The CSC pointed out that while Ledesma admitted
receiving ₱3,000 from Steve Tsai, there was no proof that she later gave the money to a travel
agent. The CSC also ruled that Ledesma was guilty of concealment or dishonesty when she did
not explain to Steve Tsai that he was paying more than the required fees.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals took cognizance of Ledesma’s three decades of previously
unblemished service and the circumstances of the case into account, the appellate court held that
there was insufficient proof that Ledesma acted with corrupt intention or willful intent to violate the
law or established rules.

The Court of Appeals found Ledesma guilty of simple misconduct only, thus:
 Considering that petitioner Ledesma served the government for more than thirty (30) years
with an untarnished record of service and evidence show[s] that petitioner had not
previously or persistently committed acts inimical to government service, the act
committed by petitioner may be classified as simple misconduct. Thus, the penalty
commensurate thereof would be six (6) months suspension without pay.

Supreme Court ruling:

In administrative proceedings, the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence

the allegations in his or her complaint. Obviously, the credibility of the complainant should be
considered in judging whether the standard of evidence was met or not. Although less than
preponderant, substantial evidence is not just any scrap or scintilla of evidence. Substantial
evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to justify a conclusion. The standard was not met in this case. Taken as a whole, the
circumstances surrounding this case and the execution of the complaint-affidavits against
Ledesma would raise doubts in a reasonable mind.

Given the questionable nature of the complainants’ affidavits, we are left with Ledesma’s
admission that she received ₱3,000 from complainants. There is no dispute that ₱2,560 was the
required fee for two ECCs in 1999. This amount was actually paid to the Bureau, and Steve Tsai
and Ching Tsai received their ECCs. Only ₱460 is unaccounted. Ledesma’s admission, however,
does not prove by itself corruption or the other elements particular to grave misconduct. Ledesma
admitted to receiving the money only so she could pass it to someone else and not for her own
benefit. In the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, Ledesma’s explanation is
plausible. Moreover, to warrant dismissal, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important,
weighty, momentous and not trifling. That is not the case here.

We stress that the law does not tolerate misconduct by a civil servant. Public service is a public
trust, and whoever breaks that trust is subject to sanction. Dismissal and forfeiture of benefits,
however, are not penalties imposed for all infractions, particularly when it is a first offense. There
must be substantial evidence that grave misconduct or some other grave offense meriting
dismissal under the law was committed.

Further, this is Ledesma’s first offense in more than three decades of otherwise untarnished
public service. Under the circumstances, we agree with the Court of Appeals that suspension for
six months is an adequate penalty.

3. Moreno vs CA GR No. 238566, 20 February 2019

The Ombudsman's Field Investigation Office charged Moreno with Gross Neglect of Duty and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. The charge was later amended to include
Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty. The complaint stemmed from Moreno's act of signing
Disbursement Vouchers (DVs) pertaining to the foreign travel cash advances of the PRA
Chairman, Jose Antonio Leviste (Leviste), for the year 2003. In the relevant DVs, Moreno certified
that Leviste's previous cash advances had been liquidated or accounted for, when in fact the
contrary was true. This, in effect, allowed Leviste to secure subsequent advances without first
settling his prior outstanding obligations, in violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, or
the Government Auditing Code.Essentially, the charge against Moreno was that his recurrent
false certification of DVs caused the loss of P151,358.42 in public funds, which to this day
remains unaccounted for.
Moreno, in his counter-affidavit, admitted that he, in fact, signed the above-cited DVs, but averred
that he did so unwillingly due to pressure from PRA top management.

Supreme Court Ruling:

Grave misconduct, with which Moreno stands charged, is define as wrongful, improper, or
unlawful conduct committed in connection with the performance of official functions, motivated by
a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose, and coupled with the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule. It is an odious offense
that has always been and will continue to be anathema in the civil service. As such, pursuant to
Rule IV, Section 52 (A) No. 3 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(Uniform Rules), the offense carries with it the ultimate penalty of dismissal even for the first
infraction. This breathes life into the constitutional principle that public office is a public trust,
guaranteeing that the concept is not a mere toothless iteration, and ultimately ensuring that only
those who can live up to the most exacting standards are worthy of being part of the civil service.

Nevertheless, jurisprudence is replete with cases in which the Court, after due consideration of all
the prevalent conditions, refused to arbitrarily impose the extreme penalty. In these cases, the
facts were evaluated in light of Section 53 of the Uniform Rules, which allows the disciplining
authority to mitigate or aggravate the erring public officer's liability depending on the
attendant circumstances. 

A finding of grave misconduct should not straightjacket the Court. While there is no doubt that
misfeasance and malfeasance in office are not to be countenanced, each case must be decided
with due consideration of all the attendant circumstances. In other words, compassion will
be extended in favor of the deserving, but those who are not must meet the full force of
the law. Equitable justice, after all, demands that erring public officers, regardless of rank and
stature, be meted out penalties commensurate to the offenses they commit.

In this case, there is no doubt that the irregularities committed by Moreno amounted to grave
misconduct. By repeatedly and falsely certifying the subject DVs as liquidated, he effectively
attempted to unlawfully conceal Leviste's unliquidated cash advances. This clearly meets the
jurisprudential definition of misconduct-that is, "an intentional wrongdoing or a deliberate violation
of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government official.

For one, Moreno's participation in the act complained of equivalent to that of a mere accessory.
To be sure, it was never shown Moreno derived any financial gain from the false certification of
said DVs. Verily, this lends credence to his defense that the PRA upper management compelled
him to conform to the practice of certifying DVs as liquidated, regardless of whether Leviste still
had outstanding obligations with the government. Since Moreno knew that what he was doing
was highly irregular, the Court is hard-pressed to believe that his acts were free from external
influence. After all, what reasonable person would deliberately put his or her career at risk without
anything to gain in return?

Second, Moreno's track record reveals that he is an exemplar of public service. Notably, his
meritorious tenure at the PRA earned him a scholarship funded by the Japan International
Cooperation Agency. For this reason, he was sent to Japan from 2010 to 2012 to take up
advanced studies on retirement and aging, thus allowing him to further contribute to improvement
of the PRA's services. In addition, his sterling performance is evinced by the fact that he was
promoted twice; first, from Accountant III to Division Chief and, second, from Division Chief to
Department Manager. Taken together, these show beyond doubt that he is an invaluable asset
to the PRA and to the civil service as a whole.
 Third, Moreno admitted his culpability and cooperated in the administrative investigation. As
shown by the counter-affidavit he filed before the Ombudsman, he never denied certifying the
subject DVs, averring instead that he did so pursuant to the orders of his superiors. Considering
that this was his defense from the beginning, it can be gleaned that he never intended to conceal
anything from the investigating authority. His admission, clearly not an afterthought in light of the
circumstances under which it was made, saved the government precious resources and
displayed the good faith that is typically deserving of the Court's sympathy.

Finally, Moreno, to this date, has nearly two decades of admirable public service to his name.
As mentioned earlier, since the PRA hired him in 2001, he was promoted twice and admitted to a
foreign scholarship program. Additionally, this is his first administrative offense. His long and
unblemished service record must necessarily be appreciated in his favor.

Taking all of the above into account, the Court finds that Moreno should be meted out a penalty of
suspension for two (2) months without pay. However, Moreno is warned that he will no longer
merit any sympathy if he is again found guilty of a similar charge.

All told, equitable and humanitarian considerations dictate that the Ombudsman and the
CA committed a reversible error in ordering Moreno's dismissal from the service. As
elaborately put in Duque III, the Court, in resolving administrative cases, must strike a
balance between public accountability, the noble spirit behind the punishment meted out
to an erring civil servant, and social justice, the principle that allows for the attenuation of
said punishment based on the factual milieu of a given case. Here, Moreno, through the
surrounding circumstances, has merited the Court's sympathy, therefore, justifying the mitigation
of his liability. It must, however, be emphasized that this decision should not be construed as
indiscriminate condonation of official transgression. Public officers, so long as our Constitution
prevails, will remain to be accountable to the People, and the Court, as a bastion of democracy,
will not hesitate to put to the proverbial sword those who betray the trust of the public they are
meant to serve.

4. The United States vs Arthur Fitzgerald, GR No. 1179, 18 August 1903 (Intoxication as Mitigating
Circumstance)

The crime of homicide, defined and punished by article 404 of the Penal Code was charged
against defendant Arthur Fitzgerald after an argument with the victim Charles Marsh, the accused
fired the victim with the revolver causing the death of the latter. The facts were fully proven by the
testimony of several eyewitnesses and of several other witnesses who learned the facts and who
saw the body of the deceased. The judge found the accused guilty and condemned him to
sixteen years of reclusion temporal in Bilibid prison, Manila.

Supreme Court Ruling:

Notwithstanding the denial and exculpatory allegations of the accused, his guilt as principal by
direct participation of the violent death of Charles Marsh is unquestionable, for this fact is proven
in the record by the testimony of several witnesses who saw that occurred, and even heard the
threatening words uttered by the accused. The record does not contain sufficient evidence to
indicate that the accused was a habitual drunkard. On the contrary, several witnesses
affirmed that he was not in the habit of getting drunk, and therefore, apart from the legal
presumption in his favor, we are of the opinion that we should consider in his behalf the
mitigating circumstance No. 6 of article 9 of the Code, there being no evidence that the
vice of drunkenness was habitual with the accused.

The law does not consider drunkenness as a complete defense, but merely as a mitigating
circumstance, because one under the influence of liquor cannot be regarded as entirely
bereft of sense and reason. Considering the concurrence of one mitigating circumstance only,
without any aggravating circumstance to offset its effects, the court ruled the judgment appealed
should be reversed.