Francisco vs. House Representatives – G.R. No.

160261, November 10, 2003

G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003

Topic: Interpretation/Construction of the Constitution

Facts:

 On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."

 On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T.
Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August
5, 2003.

 The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"
but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.

 Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after
the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary
General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella
(Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative
inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.

 Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of
the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year.

 Respondents Speaker Jose de Venecia, et al., and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution
has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review. It is the position of respondents Speaker
De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question,
issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.

Issue:

Whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.

Ruling:

Yes. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different
branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary
consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable."

The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks
the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void
if violative of the Constitution.

This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature. This is the background of
paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming
that such matters constitute a political question.

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, the Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself
which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed. We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of
course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express
the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails.

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance
with the intent of its framers. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the
light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to
ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that
purpose.

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. It is a well-established rule in
constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but
that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great
purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the
whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two
can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render
every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. While it is permissible in
this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of
the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of
the Constitution when the meaning is clear.

Debates in the constitutional convention “are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the
reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our
fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face.” The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the
people adopting it than in the framers’ understanding thereof.