4-. Magtoto vs. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4, Nos. L-37201-02

Magtoto vs.
Manguera
Nos. L-37201-02. March 3, 1975.*
CLEMENTE MAGTOTO, petitioner, vs. HON. MIGUEL M. MANGUERA, Judge of the Court of First Instance
(Branch II) of Occidental Mindoro, The PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, IGNACIO CALARA, JR., and LOURDES
CALARA, respondents.
No. L-37424. March 3, 1975.*
MAXIMO SIMEON, LOUIS MEDNATT, INOCENTES DE LUNA, RUBEN MIRANDA, ALFONSO BALLESTEROS,
RUDOLFO SUAREZ, MANU EL MANALO, ALBERTO GABION, and RAFAEL BRILL, petitioners, vs. HON.
ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court of Pasig, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
No. L-38929. March 3, 1975.*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE ASAALI S. ISNANI, District Ju dg e o f th e
Co urt of First In stan ce o f Zamb o anga d el Su r, Bran ch II, VICENTE LONGAKIT, and JAIME DALION,
respondents.
Constitutional law; Rights of the accused; Evidence; Confession; Rule on inadmissibility of confession
obtained without informing accused of his rights gi ven prospective effect.—A confession obtained from
a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his ri ght
(to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity
of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely , such confession is admissible in evidence
against the accused, if the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even
if presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since
no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code does not confer right to counsel.—The
argument that the second paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, which was added
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* EN BANC.
VOL. 63, MA RCH 3, 1975
Magtoto vs. Manguera
by Republic Act No. 1083 enacted in 1954, impliedly granted to a detained person the right to counsel
and to be informed of such right, is untenable. The only right granted by said paragraph to a detained
person was to be informed of the cause of his detention. But he must make a request for him to be able
to claim the right to communicate and confer with counsel at any time.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Historical facts show intent to give Constitutional guarantee of right to
counsel only prospective effect.—The history behind the new right granted to a detained person by
Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution to counsel and to be informed of said right under pain of a
confession taken in violation thereof being rendered inadmissible in evidence, clearly shows the
intention to give this constitutional guaranty not a retroactive, but a prospective, effect so as to cover
only confessions taken after the effectivity of the New Constitution.
Same; Construction and interpretation; Constitutional provisions generally have prospective effect.—
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code giving retroactive effect to penal statutes is not applicable to
the present cases: First, because of the conclusion We have arrived at that the constitutional provision
in question has a prospective and not a retrospective effect, based on the reasons We have given;
second, because the “penal laws” mentioned in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code refer to substantive
penal laws, while the constitutional provision in question is basically a procedural rule of evidence
involving the incompetency and inadmissibility of confessions and therefore cannot be included in the
term “penal laws;” and third, because constitutional provisions as a rule should be given a prospective
effect.
CASTRO, J., dissenting:
Constitutional law; Equal protection of law; Majority’s interpretation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code violates the equal protection of law clause of the Constitution.—Misreading the intendment of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the majority of my brethren are of the literal view that the “only
right granted by the said paragraph to a detained person was to be informed of the cause of his
detention,” and that a detained person “mu st make a request for him to be able to claim the right to
communicate and confer with counsel at any time.” I regard this interpretation as abhorrent because it
gravely offends against the provisions of the 1935 Constitution as well as of the 1973 Constitution that
guarantee equal protection of the laws to every person in the realm. So that in effect the majority
interpretation would give the right to counsel at a
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
custodial inquest to only the choice few who happen to know the provisions of the law and have the
courage or the temerity to invoke it in the menacing presence of peace officers, and in the same breath
deny the beneficence of those provisions to all others. The poor, the ignorant and the illiterate who do
not know the rudiments of law would be at an overriding disadvantage as against the informed few.
Same; Rights of the accused; Evidence; Confession; Guarantee of right to counsel has existed as early as
1954.—I am thus of the firm view that the second paragraph of article 125 makes it an obligation on the
part of any detaining officer to inform the perso n detained of his right to counsel before the very
inception of custodial inquest, and that this obligation was made a statutory one as early as in the year
1954. So I consider it an error to say that Section 20 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution granted, for
the first time, the right to counsel to a person under custodial interrogation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Custodial interrogation not the only means of solving a crime.—If understand
the size and shape of this implication, Justice Antonio is of the view that until our police agencies are
freed from the confining limits of their antiquated methods and ancient equipment, custodial
interrogation of detained persons, without the benefit of counsel, would “furn ish the only means of
solvi ng” crimes in this jurisdiction. The validity of this view is of course to be seriously doubted.
Conversely , does this mean that if a detained person has the assistance of counsel, custodial
interrogation would cease to be an effective means of solving the crime?
I hold no brief against custodial interrogation per se. But I do entertain mortal fear that when a
detained person is subjected, without the assistance of counsel, to custodial interrogation by peace
officers, official lawlessness could be the rule and not the exception.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Ruling that confession obtained without aid of counsel is admissible, is
merely obiter in People vs. Jose.—I do not ascribe any significance to the statement made by this Court
in People vs. Jose that an extra-judicial confession given without the assistance of counsel is not
necessarily inadmissible in evidence. This ruling, if it can be construed as a ruling, is, to my mind,
unmitigated obiter, since it was absolutely unnecessary to the Court’s affirmance of the conviction of
the accused in People vs. Jose. If one were to read critically and with discernment the entire decision in
People vs. Jose, one would inescapably see it crystal-clear that the conviction of the accused was based
entirely on the inculpating declarations in court of the offended party Maggie de la Riva. Their
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conviction was a necessary consequence not because of their confessions but inspite of them.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Conviction cannot rest upon extra-judicial confessions done.—If I understand
my jurisprudence in criminal adjective law, it would appear to me that an extra-judicial confession, of
and by itself alone, has never been regarded as a proper basis for conviction. I am not aware of any
decision of this Court which affirmed the conviction of an accused solely and exclusively on the basis of
his written confession obtained during custodial interrogation. To the contrary, my abiding impression is
that extra-judicial confessions have been adduced in criminal trials as mere corroboration of other
evidence independently establishing the guilt of the accused.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

Constitutional law; Rights of the accused; Construction and interpretation; Constitutional injunction on
inadmissibility of confession obtained without aid of counsel need no further interpretation as to its
date of effectivity.—The Constitution now expressly protects “a person under investigation for the
commission of an offense” from the ove rwhelming power of the State and from official abuse and
lawlessness and guarantees that he “shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be
informed of such right.” In order to give force and meaning to the constitutional guarantee, it flatly
outlaws the admission of any confession obtained from a person under investigation who has not been
afforded his right to silence and counsel and to be informed of such right.
The outlawing of all such confessions is plain, unqualified and without distinction whether the invalid
confession be obtained before or after the effectivity of the Constitution. The Court is called upon to
enforce the plain mandate of the Constitution outlawing the admission of such invalid confessions. Ubi
lex non distinguit nee nos distinguere debemus.
FERNAND O, J., dissenting:
Constitutional law; Rights of the accused; Construction and interpretation; Constitutional provision on
inadmissibility of confession obtained without informing the accused of his rights is categorical and
needs no interpretation.—A judge is bereft of the competence, even if he were so minded, to impress
with admissibility any confession unless the person under investigation was informed of his right to
remain silent and his right to counsel. Absent such a
showing, whatever statement or admission was obtained during such stage of custodial interrogation is
a worthless piece of paper. So the Constitution commands. It speaks in no uncertain terms from and
after January 17, 1973 when it became effective. The crucial date is not when the confession was
obtained, but when it was sought to be offered in evidence. Parenthetically , such a mode of viewing the
issue would indicate the irrelevancy of the question of prospectivity . To repeat, there is no imprecision
in the terminology of the fundamental law. It is quite emphatic in its choice of the phrase, “inadmissible
in evidence.” This then is, for me at least, one of those cases where, to paraphrase Justice Moreland, the
judicial task is definitely indicated, its first and fundamental duty being to apply the law with the
Constitution at the top rung in the hierarchy of legal nouns. Interpretation therefore comes in only after
it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without its aid.
Same; Same; Same; Assuming need for interpretation of provision enjoining inadmissibility of confession
obtained without informing the accused of his rights, still view that said provision has prospective effect
is not correct.—Assume, however, that the need for construction is unavoidable, it is my submission
that the compulsion exerted by the specific wording of the above provision, its historical background
with particular reference to the explicit adoption of the Philippines of the Miranda decision of the
United States Supreme Court and the policy to be pursued in line with the avowed objective to vitalize
further the rights of an accused, the present Constitution reflecting, to borrow from Frankfurter, a more
progressive standard of criminal justice, calls for a decision other than that reached by the Court.
ANTONIO, J., Concurring Opinion.
Constitutional law; Rights of the accused; Evidence; Confession; Previous court doctrines favor
admissibility of confession although accused had not been informed of his rights.—The constant
doctrine of this Court has alway s been in favor of the admissibility of statements obtained from a
defendant under police custodial interrogation where the same has been obtained freely and voluntarily
. We have alway s held that it will suffice for the admission of an extrajudicial confession of an accused
that it appears to have been given under conditions which accredit prima facie its admissibility, leaving
the accused at liberty to show it was not voluntarily given or was obtained by undue pressure, thus
destroy ing its weight, and that a presumption of law favors the spontaneity and voluntariness of a
statement given by the defendant in a criminal case and the burden is upon him to destroy that
presumption. We have also
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declared that an extrajudicial confession is not rendered inadmissible by reason of failure to caution the
accused that he need not talk and that if he does, what he say s will be used against him, even though
such extrajudicial confession was under oath.
x x x x x
The law enforcement officers of the government and the courts have relied upon these doctrines and
followed their commands. Hundreds, if not thousands, of cases were finally decided on the basis of such
doctrines. To assert, therefore, that Article IV, Section 20, of the New Constitution—which renders any
confession obtained in violation of said section inadmissible in evidence—is a confirmation, ratification
and promulgation of a pre-existing rule, is to indulge in a historical fallacy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Giving restrospective effect to new rule on admissibility of confession can no
longer deter official lawlessness already committed.—The purpose of requiring the presence of counsel
in police custodial investigation in Section 20, of Article IV, of the New Constitution, is to serve as an
effective deterrent to lawless police action. We cannot say that this purpose would be advanced by
making the requirement retrospective. If any misconduct had been committed by the police in
connection with the taking of statements of suspects during custodial interrogation prior to the
effectivity of the New Constitution, it will not be corrected by making this proscription retroactive.
Same; Same; Same; Same; To give retrospective effect to the new rule on admissibility of confessions
would invite unwarranted hardship on the part of the prosecutor.—It must be noted that the law
enforcement officials of the national and local governments have heretofore proceeded on the premise
that the Constitution did not require the presence of counsel to render admissible statements obtained
during police custodial interrogations. All of the courts of the land, in reliance on Our settled doctrines,
have heretofore considered as admissible confessions obtained freely and given voluntarily by the
declarant even in the absence of counsel. To insert such constitutional specific on cases already pending
in court before the ratification of the New Constitution may well undermine the administration of justice
and the integrity of the judicial process. Recognition of this fact should put us on guard in promulgating
rules that are doctrinaire. To apply this new rule retroactively would have an impact upon the
administration of criminal law so devastating as to need no elaboration.
Same; Same; Construction and interpretation; Constitutional provisions do not have retrospective effect
unless the same is clearly
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intended.—It is a fundamental rule in the construction of constitutions that constitutional provisions

should not be given a retrospective operation, unless that is the unmistakable intention of the words
used or the obvious design of the authors. In short, the rule is prospectivity; the exception,
retrospectivity. There is no indication in the language used that Section 20 of Article IV (Bill of Rights), of
the New Constitution, is intended to operate retrospectively. On the contrary , under Section 8 of Article
XVII (Transitory provision) of the New Constitution, all cases pending in the courts of the Philippines
shall be heard, tried, and determined under the laws then in force. The law existing at the time of the
adoption of the New Constitution, as construed by this Court in People vs. Jose, considered admissible
extrajudicial statements of accused obtained during custodial interrogation, without assistance of
counsel. This decision formed part of the legal sy stem in this jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Statutory construction; Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code does not provide for i
nadmissib ility of confession obtained without aid of counsel; Interpretation is improper where the
statute is unambiguous.—It is, however, asserted that under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, any
incriminatory statements given by a person detained, in the course of a police custodial interrogation, is
inadmissible in evidence, if the same is done without the assistance of the declarant’s counsel. This
novel theory cannot be squared either with the clear wordings of the statutory provisions or with the
existing jurisprudence on the matter. While it may be conceded that Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code requires the detaining officer to inform the person detained the cause of detention and of his
right, if he so desires, to communicate and confer with his counsel, it does not necessarily follow that an
additional obligation is imposed upon said officer to allow the suspect to be assisted by his counsel
during the custodial interrogation. Neither does it provide that any incriminatory statement given by
him, even if voluntary, would be inadmissible in evidence, if the same was done without the assistance
of counsel. Such a construction finds no basis in the clear and plain wordings of t he statute. Where the
language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the Court should not indulge in speculation as to the
probable or possible qualifications which might have been in the mind of the legislature.
Same; Same; Construction and interpretation; Giving law retroactive effect is not favored if it will
hamper the administration of justice.—Where there has been justifiable reliance on Our decisions, and
those who have so relied may be substantially harmed if
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11
retroactive effect is given, where the purpose of the new rule can be adequately effectuated without
giving it retroactive operation, or where retroactive operation might greatly burden the administration
of justice, then it is Our duty to apply the new rule prospectively.
ORIGINAL PETITIONS in the Sup reme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Felipe S. Abeleda for petitioner Clemente Magtoto.
Joaquin L. Misa for petitioners Maximo Simeon, et al.
Alan L. Roxas for respondents Ignacio Calara, Jr., et al.
Organo Law Office for respondent Vicente Longakit, et al.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Vicente V. Mendoza for
respondent and petitioner People of the Philippines.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
The present cases involv e an interpretation of Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution, which
reads:
“No person sh all be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall
be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence,”
and specifically, the portion thereof which declares inadmissible a confession obtained from a person
under investigation for the commission of an offense who has not been informed of his right (to remain
silent and) to counsel.1
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1 We here limit Ourselves to a discussion of this right to counsel and to be informed of such right,
because that is the only principal issue in these cases, and that is the only new right given to an accused
by the New Constitution with respect to extrajudicial confessions. Under the Old Constitution, there was
already the provision that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself (Art. III, Section 1
(18); this right included the right to remain silent (U.S. vs. Luzon, 4 Phil. 346); and confessions obtained
through force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will were already
declared inadmissible against an accused person in a number of Our decisions to which We shall refer in
the course of this
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We hold that this specific portion of th is constitutional mandate has and should be given a prospective
and not a retrospective effect. Co nsequently, a confession obtained from a person under investigation
for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is
inadmissible in ev idence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Co nstitution on
January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence against the accused, if the same
had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after January 17,
1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the accused the
right to be so informed before that date.
Accordingly, We hereby sustain the orders of the respondent Judges in G.R. No. L-3720 1-022 and G.R.
No. L-374243 declaring admissible the confessions of the accused in said cases, and We hereby set aside
the order of the respondent Judge challenged in G.R. No. L-389294 which declared
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opinion, although they were raised into the category of a constitutional mandate under Section 20,
Article IV of the New Constitution.
2 Petitioner Magtoto was accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 394 and 395 (CFI of Occidental Mindoro) of
murd er for the death of Ignacio Calara and Eduardo Calara in two informations both dated February 23,
1973; and during the joint trial of these cases, his extrajudicial confession dated November 15, 1972
was, in the Court’s order of June 18, 1973, admitted in evidence over the objection of the defense on
the ground that it was taken while the accused was in the preventive custody of the PC without his
having been informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel.
3 The petitioners were accused of murder for the death of Pedro Langaoen in Criminal Case No. CCC-VII
87, Rizal. When arraigned on November 25, 1972, they pleaded not guilty . Their Extrajudicial
confessions, obtained without the benefit of counsel were taken on October 17, 1970, and presented
during the trial held on June 2, 1973 and admitted in the Court’s order of August 16, 1973.
4 In G.R. No. L-38929, the respondents Vicente Longakit and Jaime Dalion were both accused in Criminal
Case No. 4113 of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur for robbery with homicide. The
information is dated February 6, 1970. The extrajudicial confession of Longakit was executed on
November 7, 1968, while his additional confessi on was executed on September 1, 1970, without his
having been informed of his right to counsel; and
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inadmissible the confessions of the accused in said case, although they have not been informed of their
right to remain silent and to counsel before they gave the confessions, because they were given before
the effectivity of th e New Constitution.
The reasons for these rulings are as follows:
Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution granted, fo r the first time, to a person under investigation
for the commission of an offense, the right to counsel and to be informed of such right. And the last
sente nce thereof which, in effect, means that any confession obtained in violation of this right shall be
inadmissible in evidence, can and should be given effect only when the right already existed and had
been violated. Consequently, because the confessions of the accused in G, R. Nos. L-37201-02, 3 7424
and 38929 were taken before th e effectivity of the New Constitution in accordance with the rules then
in force, no right had been violated as to render them inadmissible in evidence although they were not
informed of “their right to remain silent and to counsel,” “and to be informed of such right,” because,
We repeat, no such right existed at the time.
The argument that the sec ond paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, which was added by
Republic Act No. 1083 enacted in 1954, which reads as follows:
“In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall he allowed,
upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel,”
impliedly granted to a detained person the right to counsel and to be informed of such right, is
untenable. The only right granted by said paragraph to a detained person was to be informed of the
cause of his detention. But he must make a request for him to be able to claim the right to communicate
and confer with counsel at any ti me.
The remark of Senator Cuen co, when Republic Act No. 1083 was being discussed in the Senate, that the
bill which became Republic Act No. 1083 provides that the detained person should be informed of his
right to counsel, was only the personal
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they were offered in evidence during the trial and rejected by the Court on June 18, 1974. In this case,
nothing was ment ioned of any extrajudicial confession of the co-accused and co-respondent Jaime
Dalion.
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opinion of Senator Cuenco. We grant that he was, as W e personally knew him to be, a learned lawyer
and senator. But his statement could reflect only his personal opinion because if Congress had wanted
Repub lic Act No. 1083 to grant a detained person a right to counsel and to be informed of such right, it
should have been so worded. Congress did not do so.
As originally worded, Senate Bill No. 50, which became Rep ub lic Act No . 108 3, p rov id ed : “In ev ery
case, th e p erson detained shall be allowed, upon his request, to have the services of an attorney or
counsel. In the period of amendment, the phrase ‘have the services of was changed to the present
wording ‘communicate and confer anytime with his.’ As the Solicitor General poin ts out in his ab le me
mo randum, apparently the purpose was to bring the provision in harmony with the provision of a comp
le mentary measure, Republic Act No. 857 (effective July 16, 1953), wh ich provides:
“SECTION 1. Any public officer who shall obstruct, prohibit, or otherwise prevent an attorney entitled to
practice in the courts of the Philippines from visiting and conferring privately with a person arrested, at
any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night, said visit and conference being requested by the
person arrested or by another acting in his behalf, shall be punished by arresto mayor.”
None of these statutes requires that police investigators inform the detained person of his “right” to
counsel. They only allow him to request to be given counsel. It is not for this Court to add a requirement
and carry on where both Congress and the President stopped.
The history behind the new right granted to a detained person by Section 20, Article IV of the New
Constitution to coun sel an d to be informed of said right under pain of a confession taken in violation
thereof being rendered inadmissible in evidence, clearly shows the intention to give this constitutional
guaranty not a retroactive, but a prospective, effect so as to cover only confessions taken after the
effectivity of the New Constitution.
To begin with, Section 29, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, provides:
“Confession.—The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged,
may be given in evidence against him.”
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And according to Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court:
“Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction.—An extrajudicial confession made by an
accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
”
Extrajudicial confessions of th e accused in a criminal case are universally recognized as admissible in

evidence against him, based on the presumption that no one would declare anything against himself
unless such declarations were true. Accordingly, it has been held that a confession constitutes an
evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind
would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. (U.S. vs.
Delos Santos, 24 Phil. 329, 358). The fundamental rule is that a confession, to be admissible, mu st be
voluntary. And the first rule in this connection was th at b efore th e co nfessio n cou ld b e ad mi tted in
ev id en ce, th e prosecution must first show to the satisfaction of the Court that the same was freely
and voluntarily made, as provided for in Section 4 of Act 619 of the Philippine Commissio n (U.S. vs
Pascual, August 29, 1903, 2 Phil. 458). But with the repeal of said provision of law by the Administrative
Code in 1916, the burden of proof was changed. Now, a confession is admissible in evidence without
previous proof of its voluntariness on the theory that it is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is
proved (5 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p. 264; People vs. Dorado, 30 SCRA 53, 57, citing U.S.
vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308; People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64; People v. Singh, 45 Phil. 676; People v. Pereto, 21
SCRA 1469).
And once the accused succeeds in proving that his extrajudicial confession was made involuntarily, it
stands discredited in the eyes of the law and is as a thing which never existed. It is incompetent as
evidence and must be rejected. The defense need not prove that its contents are false (U.S. vs Delos
Santos, 24 Phil. 329, 358; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 325, Nov emb er, 19 21). Th e same ru le was fo llo wed in
Peop le v s. Nishishima. “Invo luntary confessions ar e uniformly held inadmissible a s eviden ce—by
some co urts on th e g ro und th at a confession so obtained is unreliable, and by some on the ground of
humanitarian principles which abhor all forms of torture or unfairness towards the accused in criminal
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proceedings, x x x.” (57 Phil. 26, 48, 51; 1932).4* In the concurring opinion of Justice Butte, he said:
“Apart from the fact that involuntary confessions will be declared incompetent and are therefore utterly
futile, it is high time to put a stop to these (third degree) practices which are a blot on our Philippine
civilization.”
This rule was, however, changed by this Court in 1953 in the case of People vs. Delos Santos, et al., G.R.
No. L-4880, citing the rule in Moncado vs. People’s Court, et al., 80 Phil. 1, and followed in the case of
People vs. Villanueva, et al. (G.R. No. L-7472, January 31, 1956), to the effect that “a confession to be
repudiated, must not only be proved to have been obtained by force or violence or intimidation, but
also that it is false or untrue, for the law rejects the confession when by force or violence, the accused is
compelled against his will to tell a falsehood, not when by such fo rce and violence is compelled to tell
the truth.” This ruling was followed in a number of cases.5
But the ruling in Moncado vs. People’s Court, et al., 80 Phil. 1, which was the basis of the leading case of
People vs. Delos Santos, supra, was overruled in the case of Stonehill vs. Diokno (20 SCRA 383, June 19,
1963), ho lding that evidence illegally obtained is not admissible in evidence. So, We reverted to the
original rule. As stated by this Court, speaking th rough Justice Teehankee in People vs. Urro (44 SCRA
473, April 27, 1972), “involuntary or coerced confessions obtained by force or intimidation are null and
void and are abhorred by law which proscribes the use of such cruel and inhuman me thods to secure a
confession.” “A coerced confession stands discredited in the eyes of the law and is as a th ing that never
existed.” The defense need not prove that its contents are false. Thus, We
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4* “While from the purely evidentiary standpoint, a confession may he truthful even if coerced; y et it
must not be overlooked that extraction of such a confession infringes the constitutional guarantees of
due process and the inhibition against compulsory self-incrimination (Const., Art. III, sec. 1 (1 and 18))
that are among the touchtones dividing democratic from totalitarian methods, and that the violation of
these Constitution prescriptions sufficies to render the coerced confession objectionable.” (People vs.
Castro, 11 SCRA 699, 710).
5 People vs. Tiongson, G.R. No. L-6872, May 21, 1955; People vs. Dizon, G.R. No. L-8336, July 30, 1957;
People vs. Garcia, L-8289, May 29, 1957; People vs. Frias, G.R. No. L-13767, July 30, 1960.
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turned full circle and returned to the ru le origin ally established in the case of U.S. vs. Delos Santos, 24
Phil. 323 and People vs. Nishishima, 42 Phil. 26. (See also People vs. Imperio, 44 SCRA 75).
It must be noted that all these Philippine cases refer to coerced confessions, whether the coercion was
physical, mental and/or emotional.
In the meantime, the United States Supreme Court decided the following cases: Massiah vs. United
States (377 U.S. 201, 1964), Escobedo vs. Illinois (378 U.S. 478, 1964); and Miranda vs. Arizona (384 U.S.
436, 1966). In Miranda vs. Arizona, it wa s held:
“To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against
self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employ ed to protect the privilege
*[384 US 479]* and unle ss other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of
silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures
are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning
if he so desires. Opportunity to exerci se these rights must be afforded to him throughout the
interrogation. After such warning have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual
may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make statement.
But unless and until such warning and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.” (Miranda vs. Arizona, supra, p. 478)
[Italics Ours]
When invoked in this jurisdiction, howev er, the Miranda rule was rejected by this Court. In the cases of
People vs. Jose (37 SCRA 450, February 6, 1971) and People vs. Paras (56 SCRA 248, March 29, 1974), We
rejected the rule that an extrajudicial confession given without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible
in evidence. This Court in th e Jose case (as in the Paras case), held:
“The inadmissibility of his extrajudicial statements is likewise being questioned by Jose on the other
ground that he was not assisted
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by counsel during the custodial interrogations. He cites the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Massiah vs. U.S. (377 U.S. 201), Escobedo vs. Illinois (37 U.S. 478) and Miranda vs. Arizona (384
U.S. 436).”
“The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in point is Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 1, par. 17
of which provides: ‘In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall x x x enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel x x x.’ While the said provision is identical to that in the Constitution of the United
States, in this jurisdiction the term criminal prosecutions was interpreted by this Court in U.S. vs.
Beechman, 23 Phil. 258 (1912), in connection with a similar provision in the Philippine Bill of Rights
(Section 5 of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902), to mean proceedings before the trial court from
arraignment to rendition of the judgment. Implementing the said Constitutional provision, We have
provided in Section 1, Rule 115 of the Rules of Court that ‘In all criminal prosecutions the defendant
shall be entitled x x x (b) to be present and defend in person and by attorney at every state of the
proceedings, that is, from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment.’ The only instances
where an accused is entitled to counsel before arraignment, if he so requests, are during the second
stage of the preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section 11) and after the arrest (Rule 113, Section 18).
The rule in the United States need not be unquestioningly adhered to in this jurisdiction, not only
because it has no binding effect here, but also because in interpreting a provision of the Constitution the
meaning attached hereto at the time of the adoption thereof should be considered. And even there the
said rule is not yet quite settled, as can be de duc e d from the a bse nc e of unanimity in the voting by
the members of the United States Supreme Court in all the three above-cited cases. ” (People vs. Jose,
supra, at page 472).
The Constitutional Convention at the time it deliberated on Section 20, Article IV of the New
Constitution was aware of the Escobedo and Miranda rule which had been rejected in the case of Jose.
That is the reason why the Miranda-Escobedo rule was expressly included as a new right granted to a
detained person in the present prov ision of Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution.
When Delegate de Guzma n (A) submitted the draft of this Section 20, Article IV to the October 26, 1972
meeting of the 17-man committee of the Steering Council, Delegate Leviste (O) expressly made of record
that “we are adopting here the rulings of US Supreme Court in the Miranda-Escobedo cases.” And We
cannot agree with the insinuation in the dissenting opinion of Justice Castro that the Delegates did not
know of the existence
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of the second paragraph of Art. 125 of th e Revised Penal Code.
Hence, We repeat, this historical background of Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution, in Our
considered opinio n, clearly shows that the new right granted therein to a detained person to counsel
and to be informed of such right under pain of his confession being declared inadmissible in evidence,
has and should be given a prospective and not a retroactive effect. It did not exist before its
incorporation in our New Constitution, as W e held in the Jose and Paras cases, supra.
The authors of the dissenting opinio ns ignore th e historical fact that the constitutional a nd legal
guarantees as well as the legal precedents that insure that the confession be voluntary, underwent a
slow and tedious development. The constitutional guarantee in question might indeed have come late in
the progress of the law on the matter. Bu t it is only now that it had come under Section 20 of Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution. That is all that our duty and power ordain Us to proclaim; W e cannot properly
do more.
Furthermore, to give a retroactive effect to this co nstitu tio n al gu aran tee to co un sel wou ld hav e a
great unsettling effect on the administration of justice in this country. It may lead to th e acqu ittal of
guilty individuals and thus cause injustice to th e People and the offended parties in many criminal cases
where confessions were obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution and in accordance with
the rules then in force although withou t assistance of counsel. Th e Con stitu tio n al Conv en tio n co u
ld n ot h av e in tended su ch a disastrous consequence in the administration of justice. For if the cause
of justice suffers when an innocent person is convicted, it equally suffers when a guilty one is acquitted.
Even in the United States, the trend is now towards prospectivity. As noted in the me morandum of the
Solicitor General:
“x x x That survey indicates that in the early decisions rejecting retroactivity, the United States Supreme
Co urt did not require ‘pure prospectivity;’ the new constitutional requirements there were applied to all
cases still pending on direct review at the time they were announced. (See Linkletter vs. Walker, 381
U.S. 618 (1965) (on admissibility of illegally -seized evidence); Tehan vs. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966) (on
the self-incrimination rule of Griffin vs. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). But the Court began a new course
with Johnson vs. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). It departed from Linkletter and
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Tehan and came closer to “pure prospectivity” by refusing to permit cases still pending on direct review
to benefit from the new in-custody interrogation requirements of Miranda vs. Arizona. As Chief Justice
Warren observed in Jenkins vs. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213 (1969), “With Johson we began increasing
emphasis upo n the point at which law enforcement officials relied upon practices not y et prescribed.”
“More recently,” he continued, “we have selected the point of initial reliance.” That development began
with Stovall vs. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (on the line-up requirements of United States vs. Wade, 388
U. S. 218 (1967) and Gilbert vs. California, 388 U. S. 263 (1967). These new rulings were held applicable
only in the immediate cases “and all future cases which involve confrontation for identification purposes
conducted in the absence of counsel after the dates of Wade and Gilbert.” The fact that Wade and
Gilbert were thus the only beneficiaries of the new rules wa s described as an “unavoidable
consequence of the necessity that constitutional adjudications not stand as mere dictum.” In Jenkins vs.
Delaware itself, the Court held that the Miranda requirement did not apply to a re-trial after June 13,
1966—the cut-off point set for the Miranda requirement by Johnson vs. New Jersey—because Jenkin’s
original trial had begun before the cut-off point.
“Thus, the remarkable thing about this development in judgemade law is not that it is given limited
retroactive effort. That is to be expected in the case of judicial decision as distinguished from legislation.
The notable thing is that the limited retroactivity given to judge-wade law in the beginning by Linkletter
vs. Walker has been abandoned as the Supreme Court in Johnson vs. New Jersey and in Jenkins vs.
Delaware moved toward “pure prospectivity.” (pp. 26-28) (Respondents’ memorandum, Feb. 16, 1974).
The provision of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code that:
“Retroactive effect of penal laws.—Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony , who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of
this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced
and the convict is serving the same,”
is not applicable to the presen t cases: First, because of the conclu sion We have arrived at that the con
stitutional p rov isio n in q u estio n h as a pro sp ectiv e and n o t a retrosp ectiv e effect, based on the
reasons W e have given; second, because the “penal laws” mentioned in Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code refer to substantive penal laws, while the constitutional
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provision in question is basically a procedural ru le of ev id en ce involving the inco mp etency and in

admissibilit y of confessions and therefore cannot be included in the term “penal laws;”6 and third,
because constitutional prov isions as a rule should be given a prospective effect.7
Even as W e rule that the new constitutional right of a detained person to counsel and to be informed of
such right under pain of any confession given by him in violation thereof declared inadmissible in e
vidence, to be prospective, and that confessions obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution
are admissible in evidence against the accused, his fundamental right to pr ove that his confession was
involuntary still s tands. Our present ruling do es not in any way diminish any of his rights before th e
effectiv ity of the New Constitution.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGO IN G, th e p etitio n s fo r writs of certiorari in G. R. No s. L-3 7201-02 and
G.R. No. L-37424 are denied and that in G.R. No. L-38929 is granted. As a consequence, all the
confessions involv ed in said cases are hereby declared admissible in evidence. No costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Barredo , Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino , JJ., concur.
Castro, Fernando and Teehankee, JJ., dissent in their respective separate opinions.
Antonio, J., concurs in a separate opinion.

CASTRO, J., dissenting:
The burden of this dissent is my co nsidered view that the particular prov ision of Section 20 of Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution which invalid ates a confession obtained during custodial interrogation from a
detain ed person who at such interrogation was not afforded the assistance of counsel,
_______________
6 “As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes
the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from t he procedural law which provides or
regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished.” (22 C.J.S. 49; Bustos vs.
Lucero, 81 Phil. 640, 650).
7 Vide, Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2d Ed., p. 26, citing City of Shreveport vs. R.T. Cole, et al ., 129
US 36; San Antonio vs. San Antonio Public Service Co., 255 US 547; also Cooley , Constitutional
Limitation, 8th Ed., Vol. I, pp. 136, 137.
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should operate retrospectively as of June 15, 1954 when Republic Act 1083 introduced th e second
paragraph of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code recognizing the right of a detained person to counsel
in any custodial inquest. I am thus distressed by, and consequently am in sharp disagreement with, the
following doctrines expostulated in the majority opinion of Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez and in the
concurring opinion of Justice Felix Q. Anto nio:
(a) “Section 20, Article IV of the new Constitution granted, for the first time, to a person under
investigation for a commission of an offense, the right to counsel and to be informed of such right.”
(b) “In most areas, police investigators are without modern and sophisticated in struments for criminal
investigation. Many grave felonies have been unsolved because of the absence or unavailability of
witnesses. In such cases it is obvious th at the custodial interrog ation of suspects would furnish the only
means of solving the crime.”
(c) “The law existing at the time of the adoption of the new Constitution, as construed by this Court in
People vs. Jo se, considered admissible an extra-judicial state ment of the accused obtained during
custodial interrogation, without assistance of counsel. This decision forms part of the legal syste m in
this jurisdiction.”
1. The second paragraph of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
“In every case the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed
upon his request to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel.”
Misreading the intendment of this provision, the majority of my brethren are of the literal view that the
“only right granted by the said paragraph to a detained person was to be informed of the cause of his
detention,” and that a detained person “must make a request for him to be able to claim the right to
communicate and confer with counsel at any time.” I regajd this interpretation as abhorren t because it
gravely offends against the provisions of the 1935 Constitution as well as of the 1973 Co n stitu tio n th
at gu aran tee eq ual p ro tectio n o f th e laws to every person in the realm. I am persuaded that only a
handful of the more than forty million inhabitants of this country actually know the provisions of the
second paragraph
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of article 125, notwithstanding the mischievous legal fiction that everyone is conclusively presumed to
know the law. I would even venture th e opinion that at l east 95% of the Filipino people are not even
aware of the existence of this paragraph. As a matter of fact, at the hearing of Magtoto vs. Mangu era
and Simeon vs. Villaluz, it was my distinct impression that many of those in attendance thereat, lawyers
and laymen alike, became aware of the existence of the paragraph then and only then for the first time
in their lives. If many full-fledged lawyers with years upon years of practice behind th em are not aware
of the said paragraph, can we expect the great bulk of the population of the Philippines, whose
experience has been limited to occasional brushes with the uniformed “strong arm” of the law (and not
with the law itself), to know of its existence? So th at in effect th e majority interpretation would give
the right to counsel at a custodial in quest to only the choice few who happen to know the provisions of
the law and have the courage or the temerity to invoke it in the menacing presence of peace officers,
and in the same breath deny the beneficence of those provisions to all others. Th e poor, the ig norant
and the illi terate who do not know the rudiments of law would be at an overriding disadvantage as
against the informed few.
An accurate paraphrase of the majority view may be stated in the following words: “If this detained
wretch asserts his right to counsel, I will allow him to communicate and confer with a lawyer of his
choice. But if he says none because he is unlettered or uninformed, I am under no moral or legal
obligation to help him because, standing mute, he has no right to counsel” The absurdity so implicit in
these words strikes terror in me at the sa me time that it sa ddens me, for it not only denies the poor
and the unschooled the equal protection of the laws but also inflicts a horrendous indignity on the m
solely because of their poverty, ignorance or illiteracy. The cogent remark of the late Senator Mariano
Jesus Cuenco, truly a man of wisdom and experience, when Republic Act 1083 as a bill was under
discussion in the Senate, that a detained person in every custodial interrogation should, under the
proposed amendment, be informed beforehand of his right to counsel, was therefore not a mere wisp of
wind, but was indeed a warning mo st pregnant with meaning. The statement by the majority that
Cuenco’s remark reflects only his personal opinion is to o simp listic.
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Twenty centuries ago, our Lord Jesus Christ articulated the first recorded concept of social justice when
he admonished his disciples that “the poor will always be with you.” Two decades ago President Ramon
Magsaysay expressed the concept of social justice in his own phrase: “He who has less in life should
have mo re in law.” And Pr esident Ferdin and E. Marcos, expounding his own concept of a
“compassionate society,” has only one emphasis: the balancing of the scales between the affluent and
the poor. The meaning given by the majority to the second paragraph of article 125 not only comp letely
denigrates all concepts of social justice I have imbibed, for it accords the right to counsel in custodial
interrogation only to an informed few and denies it to the great masses of the nation, but also would
result in a grossly uneven and largely fortuitous application of the law.
I regard as intolerable in a civilized nation, which proclaims equal justice under law as one of its ideals,
that any ma n should be handicapped when he confronts police agencies because of the happenstance
that he is poor, underprivileged, unschooled or uninformed. The majority interpretation does violence
to th e demo cratic tradition of affording th e amplest protection to the individual—any and every
individual—against the tyranny of any governmental agency. It should be unthinkable that an innocent
man may be condemned to penal servitude or even sent to his death because he is not blessed with
familiarity with the intricacies of the law.
I am thus of the firm view that the second paragraph of article 125 makes it an obligation on the part of
any detaining Qfficer to inform the person detained of his right to counsel before th e very inception of
custodial inquest, and that this obligation was made a statutory one as early as in the year 1954. So I
consider it an erro r to say th at Section 20 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution gran ted, for the first
time, the right to counsel to a person under custodial interrogation.
Without making any reference to the minutes of any proceedings of the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
Justice Fernandez, who himself was a Delegate to th e said convention, attests that the Convention
articulated the Miranda-Escobedo doctrine of the United States Supreme Court, as a “new right”
granted to detained person, in Section 20 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He cites the submission
by Delegate de Guzman of the draft of the said Section 20 to th e October 26,
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1972 mee ting of the 17-man committee of the Steering Council of the Convention, at which ti me
“Delegate Leviste expressly made of record that ‘we are adopting here the ruling of the US Supreme
Court in the Miranda-Escobedo cases.’” This sketchy state ment is all the advertence made by Justice
Fernandez to the proceedings of the 1971 Constitutional Convention upon th e issue at bar. Considering
the curiou sly re markable paucity of the discussion made by Justice Fernandez, I am at a loss to
determine whether the delegates who had anything to do with the draft of Section 20 of Article IV knew
at all of th e ex istence of the second paragraph of article 125, or, if th ey were aware of its existence,
whether they really knew what the paragraph meant and signified vis-a-vis the Miranda-Escobedo
doctrine. I a m mo re inclined to believe that th e delegates, if indeed they were aware of the existence
of the said second paragraph, completely overlooked it, or chose to consider it as at par with th e Mir
and a-Escob edo do ctr in e an d d ecid ed to elev ate it to th e primacy of a constitutional mandate, the
better to insulate it from the passing frenzies of te mporary majorities.
2. The concurring opinion notes that “in most ar eas, police investigators are withou t modern and
sophisticated instruments for criminal in vestigation. Many grave felonies have been unsolved because
of the absen ce or unavailability of witnesses. In such cases it is obvious that the custodial interrogation
of suspects would furnish the only means of solving the crime.” That most of our police agencies are
superannuated, is undeniable. But I am amused, and also at the same time outraged, by the implication
therefrom th at “custodial interrogation of suspects,” in such an environment, “wou ld fu rn ish the only
means of solving the crime” If I understand the size and shape of this i mplic ation, Justice Antonio is of
the view that until our police agencies are freed from the confining limit s of their antiquated methods
and ancient equipment, custodial interrogation of detained persons, without the benefit of counsel,
would “furnish the only mean s of solvin g” crimes in this jurisd iction. The validity of th is view is of
course to be seriously doubted. Co nversely, does this mean that if a detained person has the assistance
of counsel, custodial interrogation would cease to be an effective means of solvin g the crime?
I hold no brief against custodial interrogation per se. But I do entertain mortal fear that when a detained
person is subjected,
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without th e assistance of counsel, to custodial interrogation by peace officers, official lawlessness could
be the rule and not the exception. Witness the in numerable cases in the annals of adjudication where
this Court has set at naught and declared inadmissible confessions obtain ed from detained persons thru
official lawlessness. It is a verity in th e life of our nation that people without influence and with out
stature in society have, mo re often th an not, been subjected to brutal and brutalizing third-degree
methods, if not actually framed, by many police agencies in this country. Instead of blinking our eyes
shut to this reality, we mu st recognize it for what it is.
I am co mpletely conscious of the need for a balancing of the interests of society with the rights and
freedoms of the individual. I have advocated the balancing-of-interests ru le in all situations which call
for an appraisal of the interplay of conflicting interests of consequential di mensions. But I reject any
proposition th at would blindly uphold the interests of society at the sacrifice of the dignity of any
human being.
3. I do not ascribe any significance to the state ment made by this Court in People vs. Jose that an extra-
judicial confession given without the assistance of counsel is not necessarily inadmissible in evidence.
This ruling, if it can be construed as a ruling, is, to my mind, unmitigated obiter, since it was absolutely
unnecessary to the Court’s affirmance of the conviction of the accused in People vs. Jose. If one were to
read critically and with discernment the entire decision in People vs. Jose, one would inescapably see it
crystal-clea r that the conviction of the accused was based entirely on the inculpating declarations in
court of the offend ed party Maggie de la Riva. Their conviction was a necessary consequence not
because of their confessions but inspite of them.
4. If I understand my jurisprudence in criminal adjective law, it would appear to me that an extra-judicial

confession, of and by itself alone, has never been regarded as a proper basis for conviction. I am not
aware of any decision of this Court which affirmed the conviction of an accused solely and exclusively on
the basis of his written confession obtained during custodial interrog ation. To the contrary, my abiding
impression is that extra-judicial confessions have been adduced in criminal trials as me re corroboration
of other evidence independently establishin g the guilt of the accused. Courts have generally been
reluctant to convict on the strength of
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extra-judicial confessions alone. This is quite understandable. Judges generally recognize human frailties
and know the realities o f life, an d on e o f th ese realities is that many police agencies have been prone,
as a most facile way out of their inadequacies, to extract confessions by force from detained persons
during custod ial interrogation. This is why in the process of adjudication in criminal cases, courts have
invariably required presentation of evidence of guilt other th an and independent of the extra-judicial
confession of the accused.
I cannot comprehend the apprehension of some of my brethren that a retrospective application of the
particular provision of Section 20 of Artic le IV of th e 1973 Constitution relating to the inadmissibility of
a confession obtained from a detained person during custodial interrogation without th e assistance of
counsel, would, in the language of the majority opinion, “have a great unsettling effect in the admi
nistration of justice in this country,” and, in the phrase of the concurring opinion, “have an impact upon
the administration of criminal law so devastating as to need no elaboration.” Giving due allowance for th
e hyperbolic and rather extravagant expressions used, I say that the Court need not entertain such fears,
which indeed are mo re fancied than real. If an d when called upon to review any cr iminal conviction
since June 15, 1954, th e Court need me rely e x amine the record for independent credible evidence,
other than the extra-judicial confession of the accused, proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed,
the Court has always regarded extra-judicial confessions as merely and essentially corroborative in
nature, never as primary or exclusive inculpating proof. Perhaps, my brethren ma y not begrudge this
paraphrase of Justice W illiam Douglas as a conclusion to this dissent: the rights of none are safe unless
the rights of all arq protected; even if we should sense no danger to our own rights because we belong
to a group that is informed, important and respected, we mu st always recognize that an y code of fair
play is also a code for the less fortunate.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent from the valedictory main opinion of Mr. Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez
ruling that confessions obtained during custodial interrogation from a
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detained person without the assistance of counsel before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitu tion on
January 17, 19731 are admissible in evidence against the accused at his trial although he had not been
duly informed of his right to remain silent and to co un sel. Su ch ru ling , to my min d , is in v io lation o f
th e p lain and unqualified mandate of the Constitution that such confessions are invalid and
inadmissible in ev id en ce.
Section 20 of the Bill of Rights (Article IV) of the 1973 Constitution explicitly provides (as against its one-
sentence counterpart provision in the 1935 Constitution2) that
“SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed
of su ch right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence.”
The main opinion concedes that “a confession obtained from a person under investig atio n fo r the
commission of an offense who has not been informed of his right (to silence) and to counsel, is
inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of th e New Constitution on
January 17, 1973.”3
I fail to see, however, any valid basis for distinguishing such invalid confessions obtained before the
effectivity of the New Constitution from those obtained afterwards and th e main opinion’s ruling that
conversely such confessions obtained before are to be held admissible in evidence against the accused.
_______________
1 January 17, 1973 is considered as the effective date of the 1973 Constitution under Presidential Proc.
No. 1102 of the same date. The writer subscribes to the view that the 1973 Constitution was considered
in force and effect upon the finality on April 17, 1973 of the Court’s decision in Javellana vs. Exec.
Secretary, 50 SCRA 30, wherein a split Court dismissed the petitions questioning the validity of the
proclamation. Cf. Writer’s separate opinion in Aquino, Jr. vs. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 309 (Sept. 17, 1974).
2 Section 18 of the Bill of Rights (Art. III) of the 1935 Constitution simply provided that “No person shall
be compelled to be a witness against himself.”
3 At page 2, main opinion; emphasis supplied.
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1. The Constitution now ex pressly protects “a person under investigation for the commission of an
offense” from the overwhelming power of the State and from official abuse and lawlessness and
guarantees th at he “shall have th e right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such
right.” In order to give force and meaning to the constitutional guarantee, it flatly outlaws the admission
of any confession obtained from a person under investigation who has not been afforded his right to
silence and counsel and to be informed of such right. There is no room for interpretation and the plain
mandate of the Constitu tion expressly adopting the exclusionary rule as the only practical means of
enforcing the co nstitu tio n al in jun ctio n ag ain st su ch con fession s ob tain ed in violation of one’s
constitutional rights by outlawing their admission and thereby removing the incentive on the part of
state and police officers to disregard such rights (in the same manner that the exclusionary rule bars
admission of illegally seized evidence4) should be strictly enforced . What the plain language of the Cons
titution says is beyond the power of th e courts to change or modify.
2. The outlawing of all su ch confessions is plain, unqualified and without distinction whether the invalid
confession be obtained before or after the effectivity of the Co nstitution. The Court is called upon to
enforce the plain mandate of the Co n stitu tion ou tlawing th e ad missio n o f su ch inv alid confessions.
Ubi lex non distinguit nee nos distinguere debemus.
3. Stated otherwise, th e Constitution has now given full substance and meaning to the fundamental
right recognized by all civilized states that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself
by placing confessions obtained without counsel in the same category as coerced confessions (whether
the coercion be physical, mental or emotional5) and they are therefore deemed nu ll and void and
expressly declared to be inadmissible in evidence. Such confessions obtained without counsel stand
discredited and outlawed by mandate of the Constitution.
ACCORDINGLY, and in line with the views herein

_______________
4 Cf. Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967).
5 People vs. Bagasala, 39 SCRA 236 (1971); People vs. Urro, 44 SCRA 473 (1972).
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expressed, I j oin Justices Castro and Fernando (who have ex ten siv ely ex pou nd ed o n th e h istory an
d ration ale of th e ru le) in voting for the unqualified application of the exclusionary rule to confessions
obtain ed without counsel before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution but only thereafter sought to
be ad mi tted in ev idence against the accused and for the rejection of the confessions in the cases at
bar.
FERNANDO, J., dissenting:
It is the difficulty, rather mark ed in my case, of reconciling the policy of the Constitution regarding the
admi ssibility of confessions obtained during custodial interrogation, as set forth in language forthright
and categorical, that precludes my yielding conformity to the conclusion reached by my brethren.
Regretfully, with recognition and awareness of the plausibility from its basic approach that ch aracterizes
the lucid and exhaustive opinion of Justice Fernandez, I must dissent. My starting point is the
recognition of the power of the Con stitu tion al Co nv en tion to imp o se con d ition s th at mu st b e
fulfilled before a duty is c ast on a court to allow a c onfession to form part of the records of the case
and that such power was in fact exercised. So I read the last sen tence of the provision in question: “Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.”1 The words cannot be
any clearer. A judge is bereft of the competence, even if he were so minded, to i mpress with ad
missibilit y any confession unless the person under investigation was informed of his right to remain
silent and his right to counsel.2 Absent such a showing,
_______________
1 Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution reads: “No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of su ch right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation
of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.”
2 It is admitted in the opinion of Justice Fernandez that the right to remain silent has always been an
aspect, one of great significance, in the guarantee against self-incrimination. This is not unexpected for
as counsel in the leading case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals, L-29169, August 19, 1968, 24 SCRA 663, he
argued most persuasively for its being deferred to and respected. Moreover, then and now again in his
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31
whatever statement or admission was obtained during such stage of custodial interrogation is a
worthless piece of paper. So the Constitution commands. It speaks in no uncertain terms from and after
January 17, 1973 when it became effective. The crucial date is not when the confession was obtained,
but when it was sought to be offered in ev id ence. Parenthetically, such a mode of viewing the issue
would indicate the irrelevancy of the question of prospectivity. To rep eat, there is no imprecision in the
terminology of the fundamental law. It is quite emphatic in its choice of the phrase, “inadmissible in
evidence.” This then is, for me at least, one of those cases where, to paraphrase Justice Moreland, the
judicial task is definitely indicated, its first and fundamental duty being to apply the law with the
Constitution at the top rung in the hierarchy of legal norms. Interpretation therefore comes in only after
it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without its aid.3
Assume, however, that the need for construction is unavoidable, it is my submission that the
compulsion exerted by the specific wording of the above provision, its historical background with
particular reference to th e explicit adoption of the Philippines of th e Miranda decision4 of the United
States Supreme Court and the policy to be pursued in line with the avowed objective to vitalize further
the rights of an accused, the present Constitution reflecting, to borrow from Frankfurter, a mo re
progressive standard of criminal justice, calls for a decision other than that reached by the Court. Hence
this dissent.
1. The authoritative force inherent in the specific language e mployed by the Constitu tion is a fund
amental rule of construction. As was expressed in J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration:5 “W e do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that
the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.
They are to be given ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which opinion, he
could trace its origin to United States v. Luzon, 4 Phil. 343, a 1905 decision.
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3 Cf. Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico, 24 Phil. 504, 513 (1913).
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).
5 L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413.

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case the significance thus attached to them prevails. * * * What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on
the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus there are cases where the need
for construction is reduced to a minimu m.”6 I am of the belief th at this is one of the m. The provision ,
to my mind, leaves no doubt as to what is intended. Its meaning is crystal-clear. I fail to discern any a
mbiguity. What it prohibits then cannot be countenanced. Its categorical wording should control. No
confession contrary to its tenor is admissible after January 17, 1973. That conclusion I find inescapable.
2. Even if there were less certitude in its wording, the conclusion, to my mind, would not be any
different. So it must be, if we pay heed to history, one of the extrinsic aids to constitutional construction.
This is to acknowledge, in the terminology of Cardozo, the force of tradition.7 It is to defer to what has
been aptly terme d by Holmes “the felt necessities of the time.”8 To recall Justice Tuason, the state of
affairs existing when th e Constitution was framed as reflected in the operative principles of law is not to
be ignored.9 It supplies the needed illu mination when things are shroud ed in mist. Such is not the case
at all, as was made clear in the preceding paragraph. Even if it were so, the trend of authoritative
decisions of recent date is unmistakable. Confessions are carefully scrutinized and if, in the language of
People v. Bagasala,10 suffering in any wise from “coercion whether physical, me ntal, or emotional” are
impressed “with inadmissibility.”11 The opinion continues: “W hat is essential for its validity is that it
proceeds from the free will of the person confessing.”12 It is not just a happy coincidence that Bagasala
was promulgated on May 31, 1971, one day before the Constituti onal Convention met. In March of
1972, while it was in session, this Court in a unanimous opinion by Justice Makasiar in People v.
Imperio13 rejected confessions
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6 Ibid, 422-423.
7 Cf. Cardozo, The Nature of Judicial Process, 127-132 (1921).
8 Holmes, The Common Law 1 (1881).
9 Cf. De los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 (1950).
10 L-26182, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 236.
11 Ibid, 242.
12 Ibid.
13 L-26194, March 29, 1972, 44 SCRA 75.
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on a showing of circums tances neutralizing their “voluntary character.”14 The next month, in People v.
Urro,15 cited in the opinion of the Court, Justice Teehankee as ponente stressed: “A coerced confession
‘stands discredited in the eyes of the law and is as a thing that never existed.’ ”16 Further: “In any case,
the mo st painstaking scrutiny mu st be resorted to by the trial courts in weighing evid ence relating to
alleged voluntary confessions of the accused and the courts should be slow to accept such confessions
unless they are corroborated by other testimony.”17 Nothing is clearer therefore than that during the
period this provision was under consideration by the Convention, the juridical atmosphere was
permeated by healthy skepticis m, at times downright distru st, when ever confessions were relied upon
by the prosecution, there being an insistence, as was but proper, that they should be unmarred by any
taint of impair ment of will. So it has been from the later sixties.18
To complete the picture, j u st shortly before th e parties in Magtoto and Simeon, were heard in oral
argument, in the closing days of November, 1973, in People v. Saligan,19 Justice Castro could speak thus
for a unanimous Court: “It is worthy of note that the trial fiscal was in th e correct frame of mind when
he recognized the importance of demonstrating the culpability of th e defendant by evidence, apart
from the latte r’s plea of guilty. Unfortunately, however, the fiscal did not follow through. His offer of
the ex trajudicial confession of the defendant as evidence of th e latter’s guilt and th e trial court’s
admission thereof do not afford us comfort in the discharge of our task. For, having rejected the judicial
confession of guilt of the defendant (his plea of guilty) on the ground that the
________________
14 Ibid, 85.
15 L-28405, April 27, 1972, 44 SCRA 473.
16 Ibid, 484. Citing United States v. De los Santos, 24 Phil. 329 (1913).
17 Ibid.
18 Cf. People v. Manobo, L-19798, Sept. 20, 1966, 18 SC RA 30; People v. Chaw, L-19590, April 25, 1968,
23 SCRA 127; Chavez v. Court of Appeals, L-29169, Aug. 19, 1968, 24 SCRA 663; People v. Alto, L-18661,
Nov. 29, 1968, 26 SCRA 342; Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, L-25018, May 26, 1969, 28 SCRA
344; People v. Gande, L-28163, Jan. 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 347.
19 L-35792, November 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 190.

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manner of his arraignment does not exclude the possibility of improvidence in its en try, we can do no
less with regard to his extrajudicial confession, the same not having been properly identified nor shown
to have been freely and voluntarily executed.”20
Thus is the indispen sability of proof of the voluntariness of a confession underscored in a decision
rendered after the effectivity of the Co nstitution. To rep eat, even if th e applicable provision were not
free from doubt as to its literal command, history, I would think, supplies the answer. It sustains the plea
for inadmissibility.
3. Reference to the epochal American Supreme Court decision in Miranda v. Arizona21 is not a miss. The
issue therein raised concerned th e ad missibi lity of statements from an individual under police custody,
considering that under such a time and under the stress of such conditions, he would be hard put not to
admit incriminatory matters. The American Supreme Court, through Chief Ju stice W arren, held th at
such state ments made during th e period of custod ial interrogation to be admissible require a clear,
intelligent waiver of constitutional rights, the susp ect being warned prior to questioning that he has a
right to remain silent, that any utterance may be used against him, and that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or ap pointed. The Miranda doctrine as set forth in Chief Justice
Warren’s
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20 Ibid, 195-196.
21 384 US 436 (1966). Even before Miranda, the trend appears to be towards a much more exacting
scrutiny of the voluntariness of confessions. Cf. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 US 278 (1936); Chambers v.
Florida, 309 US 227 (1940); Lisenba v. California, 314 US 219 (1941); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 US 143
(1944); Malinski v. New York, 324 US 401 (1945); Lee v. Mississippi, 332 US 742 (1948); Williams v.
United States, 341 US 97 (1 951); Rochin v. California, 342 US 165 (1952); Ley ra v. Denno, 347 US 556
(1954); Pennsy lvania v. Claudy, 350 US 116 (1956) ; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 US 560 (1958); Blackburn v.
Alabama, 361 US 199 (1960); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 US 534 (1961); Reck v. Pate, 367 US 433 (1961);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961); Gallegas v. Colorado, 370 US 49 (1962); Shotwell Manufacturing Co.
v. United States, 371 US 341 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 US 391 (1963); Ly numn v. Illinois, 372 US 528
(1963); Brady v. Mary land, 373 US 83 (1963); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 US 1 (1964); Jackson v. Denno, 378
US 368 (1964); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 US 478 (1964).
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opinion, is to this effect: “Our hold in g will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages wh ich
follow but briefly stated it is this: the prosecution may use state ments, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendan t unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial
interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural
safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of
their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are
required. Prior to any questioning, the person mu st be warned th at he has a right to remain silent, that
any state ment he does make ma y be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of those
rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in
any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking
there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does
not wish to be interrogated, the police ma y not question him. The mere fact that he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right
to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter
consents to be questioned.”22 The delegates to the Constitutional Convention, many of them lawyers,
were familiar with this ruling announced in 1966. Concerned as they were with vitalizing the right
against self-incrimination, they advisedly used words that render unmistakable th e adoption of the
Miranda doctrine. It would be then, in my opinion, to betray lack of fidelity to the objective thus
revealed if any other interpretation were accorded th is provision th an that of conformity to its express
terms. No juridical difficulty is posed by this Co urt’s holding in People v. Jose, 23 decided in 1971, that
_______________
22 Ibid, 444-445. There were dissents from Justices Clark, Harlan, White and Stewart.
23 L-28232, February 6, 1971, 37 SCRA 450.
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rej ected the applicability of th e Miranda doctrine. Precisely it must have been partly the dissatisfaction
by the Constitutional Co nv en tio n with th e do ctrin e an nou n ced th at led to its inclusion with its exp
ress prohibition against the admission of confessions so tainted , without any qualification as to when it
was obtained. All that it means then is that henceforth People v. Jose and the latter case of People v.
Paras 24 are bereft of an y persuasive force. This is so not because of a change of judicial attitude but
because of the ex press language of the present Constitution.25
4. Now as to the question of policy. It is submitted, with respect, that the interpretation adopted by the
Court affords less than hospitable scope to a cate gorical command of the present Constitution without,
to my way of thinking, deriving support from any overriding consideration from the standpoint of an
efficient administration of justice. W ould it not amount th en to frustratin g th e ev id en t en d and aim
o f su ch constitutional safeguard? For it does appear that th e Convention, in manifesting its will, had
negated an y assumption that criminal prosecution would thereby be needlessly hampered. The me
morandum of Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Vicente Mendoza,
commendable for its thoroughness, cites an
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24 L-23111, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 248.
25 Again there can be no dispute as to the competence of the Constitutional Convention setting aside
and discarding rulings of this Court which failed to meet its approval. To cite one conspicuous instance,
it was held by this Court in a March, 1972 decision, Martinez v. Morfe, L-34022, reported in 44 SCR A 22,
that the parliamentary privilege of freedom from arrest under the 1935 Constitution did not cover
criminal prosecutions. This, inspite of the brilliant advocacy of counsel for the Constitutional Convention,
then Delegate, now Justice, Estanislao Fernandez. What happened next? The Convention, under his
leadership, decided to amend the provision so that now it reads: “A Member of the National Assembly
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six y ears imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
during his attendance at its sessions, and in going to and returning from the same; but the National
Assembly shall surrender the Member involved to the custody of the law within twenty -four hours after
its adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure
to do so. * * *” Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution.
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American lea ding decision, McNabb v. United States.26 It does not lend support to their plea, wh ich
merited the approval of my brethren. It is a blade that cuts both ways. W itness these words in the
opinion of Justice Frankfurter: “Legislation such as this, requiring that the police must with reasonable
promptness show legal cause for detaining arrested persons, constitutes an important safeguard—no t
only in assuring protection for the innocent but also in securing conviction of the guilty by me thods th
at commend themselves to a progressive and self-confident society. For this procedural requirement
checks resort to those reprehensible practices known as the ‘third degree’ which, though universally
rejected as indefensible, still find their way in to use. It aims to avoid all the evil implications of secret
interrogation of persons accused of crime. It reflects not a sentimental but a sturdy view of law
enforcement. It outlaws easy but self-defeating ways in which brutality is substituted for brains as an
instrument of crime detection.”27
So I would view the matter and thus reach a conclusion different from that of the Cour t. This is not to
discount the possibility th at it ma y be a little mo re difficult to obtain convictions. Such a misgiving
informs the prevailing opinion. It seems to me , again with due respect, that a reaction of that ; sort,
while not groundless, ma y have an element that goes beyond the bounds of permissible exaggeration.
Even if, as I would have it, the confessions in question are deeme d inadmissible in accordance with the
specific wording of the provision under scrutiny, it does no t follow that the efforts of the prosecution
are effectively stymied. It would be, to my way of thinking, an undeserved reflection on that arm of the
government if the only way it could prove guilt is to rely on confessions, especially so when, as is quite
apparent from the early sixties, the trend in judicial decisions has been as is quite proper to scrutinize
them with care to erase an y lu rking doubt or suspicion as to their having been obtained by coercion,
either physical or psychological. Only thus may be truthfully sai d that there is full resp ect for th e
constitutional ma ndate th at no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.28
_______________
26 318 US 332 (1943).
27 Ibid, 343-344.
28 It is to the credit of the opinion of Justice Fernandez that he
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5. It is by virtue of the above considerations that I am compelled to differ. Certainly this is not to imply
lack of awareness of the merits of the op inio n of the Court. It is only that for me the countervailing
considerations are much more persuasive. There is the apprehension that to postpone the effectivity of
the provision in question by a construction that looks for me aning outside its borders may at least
during such time devitalize its essence. Under the circumstances then, I could not be as one with my
brethren. It is not unusual that the vote of a Justice reflects his deeply-held convictions. Much more so
in c onstitutional law where it can truly be said that it may not be a matter of right or wrong but of
means and ends. As was so succinctly and aptly put by Justice Malcolm: “Mos t constitutional issues are
determined by the court’s approach to them.”29 I a m the first to admi t the n that viewed from the
inarticulate major premis e, which, as pointed out by Justice Holmes, is often decisive, of what in
Packer’s terminology is the Crime Control Mo del in the administration of criminal statutes that I discern
in the opinion of the Court, the conclusion reached is both logical and inevitable. I a m unable however
to overcome what undoubtedly for some may be a predilection for what in his value system lies at the
other end of the spectrum, the Due Process Model, that for me conduces mo st to an effective
maintenan ce of the cluster of the
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cited the concurrence of Justice Butte in People v. Nishisima, 57 Phil. 26 (1932), with its excoriation of
involuntary confessions which should be “declared incompetent and are therefore utterly futile * * *.”
At 51. It is understandable why therein reference was made to what for some scholars is an aberration
in Philippine decisional law, People v. De los Santos, 93 Phil. 83 (1953), with its seeming approval of the
employ ment of force or violence as long as it is utilized to obtain the truth. At any rate, as admitted by
the ponente, there has been a repudiation of such a doctrine which should never have been even
announced in the first place contrary as it is to the mandate that no person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself. It can then be looked upon as a derelict in the sea of the law. To vary the figure
of speech and to borrow from Justice Street in Bachrach Motors Co. v. Summers, 42 Phil. 3 (1921), even
its mere mention could amount to “rattling the bones of an antiquated skeleton from which all
semblance of animate life has long since departed.” At 9.
29 Manila Trading and Supply Company v. Reyes, 62 Phil. 461, 471 (1935).
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constitutional rights of an accused person. In the eloquent language of Justice Black: “No higher duty, no
more solemn responsibility, rests upon this Court, than that of translating into living law and ma
intaining this con stitutional shield deliberately planned and inscribed for the benefit of every human
being subject to our Constitution—of whatever race, creed or persuasion.”30 So it will be in due time,
even with this decision. Soon, hopefully, the lo wer courts will no lo nger be confronted with con
fessions obtained before the effectivity of the Constitution but offered in evidence thereafter. So with
more reason, I am led to conclude, if eventually it has to be thus, why not now?
CONCURRING OPINION
ANTONIO , J.:
The constant doctrine of this Court has always been in favor of the admis sibility of state ments obtained
fro m a defendant under police custodial interrogation where the same has been obtained freely and
voluntarily.1 W e have always held th at it will suffice for th e admis sion of an ex traj ud icial co nfessio n
of an accused that it appears to have been given under conditions which accredit prima facie its
admissibility, leaving the accused at liberty to show it was not voluntarily given or was obtained by
undue pressure, thus destroying its weight,2 and that a presumption of law favors the spontaneity and
voluntariness of a statement given by the defendant in a criminal case and the burden is upon him to
destroy that presumption.3 W e have also declared that an extraj udicial confession is not rendered
inadmissible by reason of failure to caution th e accused that he need not talk and that if he does, what
he says will be used against him, even though such extrajudicial confession was under oath.4
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30 Chambers v. Florida, 309 US 227, 241 (1940).
1 U.S. v. Castillo, 2 Phil., 17; U. S. v. Lio Team, 23 Phil., 64; U.S. v. Ching Po, 23 Phil., 578; U.S. v. Corrales,
28 Phil., 362; People v. Hernane, 75 Phil., 554.
2 U.S. v. Zara, 42 Phil., 308.
3 People v. Garcia, L-8298, May 29, 1957.
4 U.S. v. Agatea, 40 Phil., 596; People v. Hernane, supra.
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The concept of involuntariness seems to be used by the courts as a shorthand to refer to practices which
are repugnant to civilized standards of decency or which, under the circumstances, are thought to apply
a degree of pressure to an individual which unfairly impairs his capacity to make a rational choice. We
explained in People v. Carillo 5 that “the conviction of an accused on a voluntary extraj udicial statement
in no way violates th e constitutional guaran tee against self-incrimination. W h at the above inhibition
seeks to protect is compulsory disclosure of incrimin ating facts. While there could be some possible
objections to the admissibility of a confession on grounds of its untrustworthin ess, such confession is
never excluded as evidence on account of an y supp osed violation of the constitutional immu n ity of th
e party from self-incrimination, x x x The use of voluntary confession is a u n iv ersal, time-hon ored
practice g r oun d ed on co mmo n law an d expressly sanctioned by statutes.” In People v. Jose,6 a
unanimous Court rejected the contention that a confession obtained during custodial interrogation
without the assistance of counsel is inad mi ssible, notwithstand ing the argument based on Messiah v.
U.S. (377 U.S. 201), Escobedo v. Illinois (378 U.S. 478), and Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436) that the
presence of counsel in an in-custody police interrog ation is an adequate protective device to make the
process of interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege against self-incrimination. This Court
declared that the right of the accused to counsel under Article III, Section 7, paragraph (17) of the
Constitution refers to proceedings before the trial court from arraignment to rendition of the judgment,
and that the only instances where an accused is en titled to counsel before arraignment, if he so
requests, are during the second stage of the preliminary investig ation. Thus, W e rejected the
applicability of the principles enunciated in Messiah, Escobedo and Miranda on the ground that “the
rule in the United States need not be unquestionably adhered to in this jurisdiction, not only because it
has no binding effect here, but also because in interpreting a provision of the Constitution, the meaning
attached thereto at the time of the ad option thereof should be considered.
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5 77 Phil., 572.
6 37 SCRA 450.
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The law enforcement officers of the government and the courts have relied up on these doctrines and
followed their commands. Hundreds, if not thousands, of cases were finally decided on the basis of such
doctrines. To assert, therefore, that Article IV, Section 20, of the New Constitution—which renders an y
confession obtained in violation of said section inadmissible in evidence—is a confirmation, ratification
and promulgation of a pre-existing rule, is to indulge in a historical fallacy.
II
The purpose of requiring the presence of counsel in police custodial investigation in Section 20, of
Article IV, of the New Constitution, is to serve as an effective deterrent to lawless police action. W e
canno t say th at th is purpose would be advanced by making the requirement retrospective. If any
misconduct had been committed by the police in connection with the taking of state men ts of suspects
du ring custodial interrogation prior to the effectivity of the New Constitution, it will not be corrected by
making this proscription retroactive.
III
There are interests in th e administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial process to consider.
To make the proscription in Article IV, Section 2 0, of th e New Con stitu tio n retrosp ectiv e wou ld
certain ly i mpair the effective prosecution of cases and tax to the utmo st the administration of justice.
Custodial interrogation has lo ng been recognized as an essential tool in effective law enforcement. The
detection and solution of crime is a difficult and arduous task requiring determination and persistence
on the part of all responsible officers charged with the duty of law enforcement. The line between
proper and permissible police conduct and me thods that are offensive to due process is, at best, a
difficult one to draw. It must be noted that in most areas, police investigators are without modern and
sophisticated instruments for criminal investigation. Many grave felonies have been unsolved because of
the absence or unavailability of witnesses. In such cases, it is obviou s th at th e custodial in terrogation
of suspects would furnish the only means of solv ing the crime. It mu st be noted
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42
also that the law enforcement officials of the national and local governments have heretofore
proceeded on the premise that the Constitution did not require the presence of counsel to render
admissible statements obtained during police custodial interrogations. All of the courts of the land, in
reliance on Our settled doctrines, have heretofore considered as admissible confessions obtained freely
and given voluntarily by the d eclar an t ev en in th e ab sen ce o f co un sel. To in ser t su ch
constitutional specific on cases already pending in court before the ratification of the New Constitution
may well undermine the administration of justice and th e integrity of the judicial process. Recognition
of this fact shou ld put us on guard in promulgating rules that are doctrinaire. To apply this new rule
retroactively would have an impact upon the administration of criminal law so devastating as to need no
elaboration. Exclusion of this kind of evidence in a retrospective manner would increase the burden on
th e administration of justice, would overturn conviction s based on fair relian ce upon existing
doctrines, and would undercut efforts to restore civil order. The trial of cases already terminated, where
the main ev idence consists of ex trajudicial state ments of accused obtained during police custodial
interrogation, would have to be re-opened. It would be idle to expect under such circumstances that the
police could still produce evidence other th an those submitted, in order that the prosecution of the
case could be maintained.
IV
It is a funda mental rule in th e construction of constitutions th at co n stitutio n al p rov isio n s sh ou ld

no t b e g iv en a retrospective operation, unless that is the unmistakable intention of the words used or
the obvious design of the authors.7 In sho rt, th e ru le is p ro spectiv ity; th e ex cep tio n,
retrospectivity.
There is no indication in the language used that Section 20 of Article IV (Bill of Rights), of th e New Con
stitu tio n, is in tend ed to operate retrospectively. Note th e plain language of the provision, which
reads:
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7 See Black on Interpretation of Laws, Hornbook Series, Sec. 12, p. 26; 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec.
40, pp. 80-81; Drennen v. Bennett, 322 S.W. 2d 585.
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VOL. 63, MA RCH 3, 1975
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“No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall
be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence.”
Section 8 of Article XVII (Transitory Provisions), of the New Constitution, however, provides as follows:
“All courts existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue and exercise their
jurisdiction, until otherwise provided by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all cases pending
in said cou rts shall be he ard, tried, and determined under the laws then in force. The provisions of the
existing Rules of Court not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative unless amended,
modified, or repealed by the Supreme Court or the National Assembly .” ((italics supplied.)
The law existing at the time of the adoption of the New Constitution, as construed by this Court in
People v. Jose,8 considered admissible e xtraj udicial state ments of accused obtained during custodial
interrogation, without assistance of counsel. This decision formed part of the leg al syste m in this
jurisdiction.9
Considered as an expression of public policy, Section 8 of Article XVII, to my min d, lays down the
guidelines to be observed by the courts in the trial and determination of cases pending at the time of
the ratification of the New Constitution. Indeed, this was necessary in view of the considerations
heretofore adverted to and to avoid confusion in the resolution of such cases, considering that there are
new rules enunciated in the New Constitution, one of which is th e evidentiary exclusionary rule in
Section 20 of Article IV. To my view, with respect to those cases still pending as of January 17, 1973 (the
date the New Constitution was ratified), the admissibility of the extrajudicial state ments of th e accused
no twithstanding its adjective character, should be decided in accordance with the provisions of the
1935 Constitution as construed in the existing jurisprudence.
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8 Supra.
9 Article 8, Civil Code .
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44
The foregoing construction of Section 20 of Article IV in relation to Section 8 of Article XVII, is not only in
accord with the settled rules of statutory construction, but is an interpretation which is in accordance
with the clear provisions, spirit and intent of the Constitution.
It is, however, asserted that under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, any incriminatory statements
given by a person detained, in the course of a police custodial interrogation, is inadmissible in evidence,
if the same is done without the assistance of the declarant’s counsel. This novel theory cannot be
squared either with the clear wordings of the statutory provision or with the existing jurisprudence on
the matter. While it may be conceded that Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code requires the detaining
officer to in form the person detained th e cause of his detention and of his right, if he so desires, to
communicate and confer with his counsel, it does not necessarily follow that an additional obligation is
imposed upon said officer to allow the susp ect to be assisted by his counsel during the custodial in
terrogation. Neither does it provide that any incriminatory statement given by him, even if voluntary,
would be inadmissible in evidence, if the same was done without the assistance of counsel. Such a
construction finds no basis in the clear and plain wordings of the statute. Where the language of the
statute is plain and unambiguous, the Court should not indulge in speculation as to the probable or
possible qualifications which might have been in the mind of the legislature.
VI
The final authority of this Cour t rests upon public respect for Its decisions. That public respect is based
upon an image which represents this Court as declaring legal principles with an authority and certainty
that the people ma y place upon it their bona fide reliance and reasonable expectations. To hold now
that public officers, who have acted in justifiable reliance on Our aforecited doctrines, have tr
ansgressed th e Constitution, would certainly not strengthen public respect on the authority of Our
judgments.
45
VOL. 63, MA RCH 3, 1975
45
Where th ere has been justifiable reliance on Our decisions, and those who have so relied may b e
substantially harmed if retroactive effect is given, where the purpose of the new rule can be adequately
effectuated without giving it retroactive operation, or where retroactive operation might greatly burden
the administration of justice, then it is Our duty to apply the new rule prospectively.
The factual and textual bases for a contrary rule, are at best, less than compelling. Relevant is th e
Court’s duty to assess the consequences of Its action. More than the human dignity of the accused in
these cases is involved. There is the compelling realization th at substantial interests of society may be
prejudiced by a retrospective application of the new exclusionary rule. Thus, the values reflected
transcend the individual interests of the herein accused, and involve the general security of society. The
unusual force of the countervailing considerations strengthens my co nclusion in favor of prospective
application. To the ex ten t consisten t with this opinion, I, therefore, concur in the opinion of Justice
Fernandez.
Barredo and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Petitions far certiorari in G.R No s. L-37201-02 and G. R. No. L-37424 denied and that in G.R. No. L-38929
granted.
Notes.—Voluntariness of Confessions. In the absence of credible proof that the accused executed their
confessions because they were maltr eated by the police, maltreatment is belied by the certification of
the justice of the peace before whom they were made, and the retraction of said confessions is to no
avail. People vs. Tuazon, 6 SCRA 249.
That the confessions of the accused were explained to them before they affixed their signatures thereto;
that said confessions contain details that the police could not have possibly supplied or invented, and
that the declarants tried to blame one another for the k illing, all the circumstances lead to the
conclusion that the co nfessions were freely made. People vs. Tiongson, 6 SCRA 431.
The finding of the lower court that Exhibits “A” and “B” contain the true and correct version of the
incidents that led to the death of the victim is affirmed, considering that the statements contained in
both corroborate each other and are
46
46
Consolidated Terminals, Inc. vs. Artex Dev. Co., Inc.
natural and probable and there being no evid ence presented to show that said confessions were
obtained as a result of intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency, nor that the investigating
officer could have been motivated to concoct the facts narrated in said affidavits. People vs. Pagulayan,
8 SCRA 619. Magtoto vs. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4, Nos. L-37201-02, No. L-37424, No. L-38929 March 3,
1975

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Magtoto vs.

Nos. L-37201-02. March 3, 1975.*

No. L-37424. March 3, 1975.*

No. L-38929. March 3, 1975.*

VOL. 63, MA RCH 3, 1975

Magtoto vs. Manguera

CASTRO, J., dissenting:

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Magtoto vs. Manguera

VOL. 63, MA RCH 3, 1975

Magtoto vs. Manguera

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

FERNAND O, J., dissenting:

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Magtoto vs. Manguera

ANTONIO, J., Concurring Opinion.

VOL. 63, MA RCH 3, 1975

Magtoto vs. Manguera

x x x x x

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Magtoto vs. Manguera

intended.—It is a fundamental rule in the construction of constitutions that constitutional provisions

VOL. 63, MA RCH 3, 1975

Magtoto vs. Manguera

ORIGINAL PETITIONS in the Sup reme Court. Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Felipe S. Abeleda for petitioner Clemente Magtoto.

Joaquin L. Misa for petitioners Maximo Simeon, et al.

Alan L. Roxas for respondents Ignacio Calara, Jr., et al.

Organo Law Office for respondent Vicente Longakit, et al.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Magtoto vs. Manguera

VOL. 63, MA RCH 3, 1975

Magtoto vs. Manguera

The reasons for these rulings are as follows:

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Magtoto vs. Manguera

VOL. 63, MA RCH 3, 1975

Magtoto vs. Manguera

And according to Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court:

Extrajudicial confessions of th e accused in a criminal case are universally recognized as admissible in

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Magtoto vs. Manguera

VOL. 63, MA RCH 3, 1975

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Magtoto vs. Manguera

VOL. 63, MA RCH 3, 1975

Magtoto vs. Manguera

of the second paragraph of Art. 125 of th e Revised Penal Code.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Magtoto vs. Manguera

The provision of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code that:

VOL. 63, MA RCH 3, 1975

Magtoto vs. Manguera

provision in question is basically a procedural ru le of ev id en ce involving the inco mp etency and in

Antonio, J., concurs in a separate opinion.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Magtoto vs. Manguera

VOL. 63, MA RCH 3, 1975

Magtoto vs. Manguera