A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL COURT’S INHERENT POWERS UNDER

THE CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE

Submitted to: Mr. Rajvendra Sarswat, Advocate, Guest Faculty.

Submitted by:

Piyush Senapati

2046

Section-B

Mid-term for CPC.

 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

At this juncture, I would like to take an opportunity to convey my heartfelt thanks and
acknowledgement to some special people, without whom this project would have remained
just an idea and would not have been completed. First of all, I would like to take this
opportunity to thank Mr. Rajvendra Sarswat, Advocate, Guest Faculty for being a guide, a
light of inspiration and a pillar of support for me. I would also like to thank my seniors for
being my mentors in helping me complete this project. I am also thankful to the IT Staff for
providing all necessary facilities to carry out this work.
 INTRODUCTION

There is no legal draughtsman in the world who can provide in a legal document answer to all
problems and solutions to every exigency. Indeed, this basic limitation of legal drafting has
been reflected in every legal arena- from ordinary contracts between individuals to the
Constitution itself and the Civil Procedure Court of 1908 (Hereinafter “CPC” or “the code”)
which regulates the functioning and process of Civil courts in India is far from being an
exception in this field. While the code is pretty comprehensive in nature, its drafters did
recognise the fact that no such code can serve as a panacea for all the procedural and
substantive issues that come up before it. Therefore, the bestowed upon the court certain
inherent powers to enable them to deal with situations and exigencies which are not
adequately dealt with by the provisions of the Code.

The term "inherent" is quite broad and implies the sense of something permanent and
inseparable from a certain entity or a permanent attribute or characteristic1. Basically it is an
essential element, anything intrinsic or essential, vested in or linked to a person or position as
a privilege right2. Every single power that might be vital to have the privilege and to repair a
wrong over the span to administer the ends of justice, comprise an inherent power of the
court- “The objective of legislators in enacting one of several procedural laws is to ensure the
ends of justice”3.

Although the concept of inherent powers bestowed by the CPC upon the courts can seem like
a very abstract concept, in the practical sense we can see these powers as manifesting in a
concrete form in those judicial powers that aid in the reduction of litigation, the avoidance of
multiple proceedings, and the rendering of complete justice between the parties. They also
encompass the extension of time, the payment of court fees, the transfer of a court's business
to another court, the end of justice, abuse of the court's process, and the alteration of
judgments, decrees, orders, and records, among other things4. It is important to remember that
the courts have vast and broad powers in the spheres mentioned above, and that these powers

1
Surjuse, S. S. (2021). EXERCISE OF INHERENT POWER BY THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA TO DO
COMPLETE JUSTICE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DIVORCE MATTERS UNDER THE HINDU
MARRIAGE ACT–A CRITICAL ANALYSIS. Ilkogretim Online, 20(1).
2
P Sirajuddin v. Government of Madras  (1970) 1 SCC 595.
3
Kylasanatha Pillay, K. P., & Sadasivan Nair, G. (1999). Inherent Powers of the High Court under Section 482
of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (Doctoral dissertation, COCHIN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY).
4
Supra note 1.
must be exercised in the absence of express court provisions to that effect, and in cases where
the express provisions are limited to a single topic, no inherent power of the court must be
exercised in respect of the said provisions. Such clauses, on the other hand, are not intended
to limit the court's inherent powers, but rather to establish a presumption that such powers
have been entrusted to the courts by the legislature to safeguard the interests of justice5

This paper will thus seek to understand and analyse the meaning and nature of the court’s
inherent powers under the CPC, the practical application of the inherent powers and inquire
into the situations wherein they are deemed applicable by the courts. Also, the situations
wherein the inherent powers cannot be exercised will be probed into and an country-wise
analysis will be undertaken regarding how inherent powers have been understood in other
common law jurisdictions besides India. Further, an attempt will be made to understand what
are the problems associated with the exercise of inherent powers and possible solutions to
the same will be stated.

Relevant statutory provisions-

The CPC provides some provisions, as to the inherent power of the court, which deals with
the exercise of powers in different situations. Such as:

1. Section 148 and Section 149 deals with grant or enlargement of time;
2. Section 150 deals with the transfer of business;
3. Section 151 protects the inherent powers of the courts; and
4. Section 152, 153, and Section 153A deal with amendments in judgments, decrees, or
orders, or separate proceedings.

For the purpose of this project, we shall be limiting our analysis to section 151 of the CPC
only which reads as follows-

Section 151.   Saving of inherent powers of Court-

5
Godwin, A., Howse, T., & Ramsay, I. (2017). The Inherent Power of Common Law Courts to Provide
Assistance in Cross‐Border Insolvencies: From Comity to Complexity. INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY REVIEW,
26(1), 5-39.
Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent
power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of
justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.
 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

For the purposes of this project, the author has referred to primary sources such as the bare
act of the CPC and the case laws which provide its interpretation. Secondary sources journal
articles and blog posts have also been probed into.

Scope/Research objectives-

 To gain a comprehensive understanding of the meaning and nature of the court’s

inherent powers under the CPC,
 To understand the practical application of the inherent powers and inquire into the
situations wherein they are deemed applicable by the courts,
 To understand the situations wherein the inherent powers cannot be exercised,
 To probe into how inherent powers have been understood in other common law
jurisdictions,
 To understand what are the problems associated with the exercise of inherent powers
and suggest possible solutions to the same.

Limitations-

 The corpus of case laws mentioned in the part which deals with situations and
conditions wherein inherent powers can be exercised are not meant to represent an
exhaustive depiction of the usage of the court’s inherent powers, they are just
illustrative examples of some of the situations wherein the court can exercise the
same.
 The case laws mentioned in the portion on inherent powers in other common law
jurisdictions do not comprehensively represent the entire jurisprudence on this issue
in those jurisdictions; they are just the leading cases and there may be divergent cases.
 This paper project will limit its analysis to Section 151 of the CPC and not probe into
sections 148, 149, 150, 152 and 153 which also reflect some inherent powers of the
court.
 THEORITICAL UNDERPINNINGS BEHIND THE CONCEPT OF
INHERENT POWERS

The concept of a court of law having inherent powers stems from the latin maxim actus
curiae neminem gravabit, or that an act of the court can prejudice no one. If the obvious
implication of this maxim is that the court cannot do any injustice through any of the powers
given to it, its natural corollary is that the court cannot allow injustice to be meted out to any
party simply on account of a gap in the express powers given to it. This is the very crux of the
rationale behind inherent powers being bestowed upon the courts.

The modern account of the inherent jurisdiction begins with Sir Jack Jacob’s seminal piece
“The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court”6. Jacob defines ‘inherent jurisdiction’ as the
“residual source of powers, which the court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just
or equitable to do so, in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to
prevent vexation or oppression, to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial
between them”7.

Jacob’s seminal piece contained more than simply a definition of the inherent jurisdiction- It
provided the historical basis for the concept and then provided several examples of why and
how a court invokes the jurisdiction8. It is through this descriptive process that the
fundamental basics of the concept were made clear – the examples Jacob used in his seminal
treatise where inherent powers were applied by the courts are not simply a random assortment
of cases. In fact, each of those examples involved several common denominators that
provides a more substantive definition of the notion of inherent jurisdiction.

Thus in his account, In his account, Jacob summarised the fundamentals of the inherent
jurisdiction as follows9

1. The inherent jurisdiction is exercised as part of the administration of justice and in relation
to the process of litigation: it is procedural, not substantive;

2. Its distinctive and basic feature is that it exercised by way of summary process rather than
normal trial;

6
I H Jacob “The Court’s Inherent Jurisdiction” (1970) 23 CLP 23.
7
Id. at 51.
8
Marcelo Rodriguez Ferrere, Inherent Jurisdiction and Its limits 13(1) OTAGO LR 107 (2017).
9
Supra note 6 at 24-25.
3. Its nature as part of the machinery of justice means that a court can exercise it against
anyone, whether a party to proceedings at issue or not;

4. It is distinguishable from the exercise of judicial discretion; and

5. Rules of Court provide powers in addition to – not as a substitute for – the powers arising
from the inherent jurisdiction.

In addition to these basic characteristics, Jacob states that the inherent jurisdiction is
possessed only by “superior courts”, i.e. those courts without a statutory foundation 10As he
notes: “the jurisdiction which is inherent in a superior court of law is that which enables it to
fulfil itself as a court of law.11”

Since the inherent jurisdiction is derived from the very nature of a superior court, Jacob
argues that its limits are “not easy to define, and indeed appear to elude
definition.12”Nevertheless, Jacob classifies the residual powers not regulated by statute as
falling into three major categories13-

• control over process (eg punishing for contempt);

• control over persons (eg, a court’s judicial review jurisdiction); and

• control over inferior courts and tribunals (eg punishing for contempt of

those particular courts and tribunals).

Jacob concluded his survey of the history and nature of the inherent jurisdiction as follows14

“The inherent jurisdiction of the court is a virile and viable doctrine which in the very
nature of things is bound to be claimed by the superior courts of law as an indispensable
adjunct to all their other powers […] it operates as a valuable weapon in the hands of the
court to prevent any clogging or obstruction of the stream of justice”.

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that in general, the term "inherent" refers to
something having a permanent, absolute, inseparable, essential, or distinguishing property.

10
Supra note 6 at 27.
11
Supra note 6 at 27.
12
Supra note 6 at 24.

13
Supra note 6 at 39-42.
14
Supra note 6 at 50.
The Court's inherent powers are those that can be used by the court to provide complete
justice to the parties before it. The Court's duty to serve justice in every case, whether or not
provided for in this code, confers on them the vital power to do justice in the absence of a
specific or distinct provision15. This is stated to be the court's inherent power, which it retains
despite not having been bestowed. If the law is unclear or where the law can be stated
differently than the intention due to legal complexity, and if such application of law adversely
biases any party, the court's inherent power can be applied with care to offer suitable redress
and prevent such injustice16.

Thus, the ultimate theological underpinning behind the existence of such a section is that
Courts duty to do justice in all cases, whether provided for or not, carries with it the
necessary power to do justice in the absence of express provision 17. Every court is constituted
for the purpose of administering justice between the parties and, therefore must be deemed to
possess all such powers as may be necessary to do the right and to undo the wrong in the
process of administering the justice.

JUDICIAL ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S INHERENT POWERS

15
Bishal Deb, The Inherent Power of the Court: A discussion under Civil Procedure Code, ResearchGate
Publications, (2021).
16
Id.
17
Manohar Chopra Vs. Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SCP.527.
The analysis of existing jurisprudence of the question of exercise of inherent powers are
divided into two categories- A) The Conditions and Situations of the Application of a Civil
Court’s Inherent Powers and B) The limitations on the Court’s inherent powers.

A) THE APPLICATION OF A CIVIL COURT’S INHERENT POWERS

In the previous section, we have discussed in detail the meaning and nature of the Court’s
inherent powers as provided under the CPC. It is apparent that these powers were bestowed
upon the Court by the drafters for very specific purposes and situations. This section of this
paper will undertake a description of the same and seek to analyse the applicability of the
Court’s inherent powers in the various circumstances that arise in each case. The basic
principle behind the exercise of such powers is that in the cases where the C.P.C does not
have an express provision regarding any matter, the Court will exercise its inherent power to
do justice. If there are specific provision of the C.P.C dealing with the specific issue and they
expressly or by basic implication, then the inherent powers of the Court cannot be invoked as
inherent powers itself means those which are not specified in C.P.C. The section confers on
the judges to make such orders that may be necessary to make justice achievable. The Power
can be invoked to support the provisions of the code but not to override or evade other
express provisions as C.P.C. is the basic law which governs the functioning of the courts.

The inherent powers are exercised in the following situations-

1. To Advance Interests of Justice-

The first instance where inherent powers are exercised is in furtherance of justice or towards
the ends of justice: In the case of Debendranath v Satya Bala Das18, the meaning of “ends of
justice” was explained. It was held that “ends of justice” are solemn words, also there are
words that are not merely a polite expression as per juristic methodology. These phrases also
imply that justice is the goal and the conclusion of all legislation. However, this expression
18
AIR 1950 Cal 217.
does not refer to an undefined concept of justice as defined by the laws of the land and
statutes. The Court can use these inherent powers to review its order and fix errors, to issue
injunctions in instances not covered by Order 39, and to issue an ex parte order against a
party, among other things.

The case of Rash Behari Mazumdar v. Kasum Kumari Guha19 appeared to be the earliest
precedent, in which it was held that invocation of inherent powers of the Court under section
151 of CPC to make an order necessary for the ends of justice, is independent of the locus
standi of the applicant.  In order to administer justice, Courts have all necessary powers as
inherent in them. Under its inherent powers, a Court can correct its own orders.

A case to be noted at this point is M/s. Ram Chand & Sons Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. Barabanki
(U.P.) v. Kanhayalal Bhargava20, wherein the appellant contended that during the pendency
of the first suit, certain subsequent events had taken place due to which the first was not
fruitful and in law the said suit could not be kept pending and continued solely for the
purpose of continuing an interim order made in the said suit. While examining the question
the Supreme Court was to consider whether the court can take cognizance of a subsequent
event to decide whether the pending suit should be disposed or not. The question arose was
whether, a defendant could make an application under Section 151 CPC for dismissing the
pending suit on the ground that the said suit has lost its cause of action. The Court upheld the
contention, thus reflecting the application of inherent powers of the court in order to advance
the interests of justice.

2. To prevent abuse of process of the court

Section 151 of the CPC provides for the exercise of inherent powers to check the
infringement of the process of the court.  In Talla Srinivas Goud Vs. Ghanapuram
Srinivas Reddy21, it was observed that Courts have got ample power to invoke section
151  C.P.C. to prevent abuse of process of law. Abuse of a court's power that result in
unfairness to a party requires remedies because a court action shall not prejudice anyone.
When a party commits fraud against the court or another party to a procedure, the
remedies must be based on inherent power. When a Court adopts a method in
accomplishing something that it is never expected to do, it is said to be the perpetrator of
the aforementioned abuse, and there is a failure of justice. The party in question must be
19
AIR 1925 Cal 1145
20
A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1899.
21
(1) ALT 189 2022.
 compensated for the wrong done to it under the notion of actus curiae neminem gravabit
or that an act of the court shall prejudice no one. When a party to a case commits
activities, such as obtaining benefits by committing fraud on the court or a party to the
proceedings, causing a multiplicity of proceedings, and so on, that party becomes the
perpetrator of the abuse22.

3. Application for restoration:-

As was held in Nallapati Pandu Ranga Rao Vs. Vempati Venkateshwar Rao and
another23, when an application is filed for restoration of property invoking Sections
144 and 151, CPC even if the application is not maintainable under Section 144, CPC,
the restoration can be ordered under section 151, CPC.
 
4. Reopening of suit and recalling of witnesses-

In Bagai Construction v. M/s. Gupta Building Material Store24, it was held that
though power under section 151 can be exercised if ends of justice so warrant and to
prevent abuse of process of the court and Court can exercise its discretion to permit
reopening of evidence or recalling of witness for further examination/cross-
examination after evidence led by the parties, in the light of the information as shown
in the order of the trial court, namely, those documents were very well available
throughout the trial, we are of the view that even by exercise of section 151 of CPC,
the petitioner cannot be permitted. Similarly in in P. Bhaskara Rao Vs.
M.R.Wolfgang Ormeloh & Ors25, it was held that Court in excise of its inherent power
under section 151 of CPC can permit a party to recall a witness and examine/cross-
examine him.

5. Police aid under section 151 CPC :-

22
Y. Srinivasa Rao, Inherent Powers of the Civil Court Under Section 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure,1908: A Detailed Legal Study ARTICLES ON LAW (Feb 11, 2022).

23
(2) ALT 177 2015.
24
2013 (2) SCJ 754.
25
2013 (2) ALT 110.
 In Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal26, while dealing with
the power of the court to pass orders for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of
the process of the court, this Court held that the courts have inherent jurisdiction to
issue temporary order of injunction in the circumstances which are not covered under
the provisions of Order 39 of the CPC. However, it was held by this Court in the
aforesaid decision that the inherent power under section 151 of the CPC must be
exercised only in exceptional circumstances for which the Code lays down no
procedure. It is also well settled that when parties violate order of injunction or stay
order or act in violation of the said order the court can, by exercising its inherent
power, put back the parties in the same position as they stood prior to issuance of the
injunction order or give appropriate direction to the police authority to render aid to
the aggrieved parties for the due and proper implementation of the orders passed in
the suit and also order police protection for implementation of such order27.
Additionally, when in the event of utter violation of the injunction order, the party
forcibly dispossesses the other, the court can order restoration of possession to the
party wronged. In this case of Yarlagunta Bhaskar Rao28 it was further observed that
a party, who obtained temporary injunction orders, and is complaining of violation of
such orders, may file not only an execution petition under Order XXI Rule 32 CPC or
an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A of CPC seeking attachment and/or arrest
of the violator for Contempt of Court, but also an application seeking police
protection under section 151 CPC from the Civil Court. Additionally, police aid
cannot be granted to a party under Section 151 in a civil proceeding to protect his
possession of property when there is no order in his favour as to possession to
maintain as was held in J. Jagannath Reddy Vs. Smt. L. Laxmi29.

6. Power of the civil court to direct police officers to provide assistance in the
execution of orders or decrees :- 
In Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited, rep. by its Authorized Officer, Hyderabad Vs.
Station House Officer, Madhapur P.S., Hyderabad and others30, the power of the
Civil Court to direct police officers to render assistance was recognized. When parties
26
AIR 1962 SC 527.
27
Supra note 22.
28
(2) ALT 319 2014.
29
(1) ALT 461 1998.
30
(2) ALT 164 2016.
 violate orders of injunction or stay, the Court can, by exercising its inherent power,
put back the parties in the same position as they stood prior to issuance of the
injunction order or give appropriate direction to the police authorities to render aid to
the aggrieved parties for the due and proper implementation of the orders passed in
the suit, and also order police protection for implementation of such an order as was
held in Meera Chauhan v. Harsh Bishnoi31. In Rayapati Audemma v  v. Pothineni
Narasimhan32 it was held that, though an order of injunction under Order 39 CPC is
only interim in nature, it still clothes the person, who obtained the order, with certain
rights which he is entitled to enforce against the party who is bound by the order; in
such a case the aggrieved party can, himself, approach the police authorities and seek
their assistance to prevent obstruction to the enforcement of the order, or to the
exercise of the right which he derives under the order of the Court; there is no reason
why, when the same person brings to the notice of the court that enforcement of the
order is sought to be prevented or obstructed, the Civil Court should not exercise its
inherent power under section 151 CPC, and direct the police authorities to render all
aid to the aggrieved party in the implementation of the court order; the exercise of
such power is necessary to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process
of court; the Civil Court has ample jurisdiction to pass such an order under section
151 CPC; and the police are bound to obey such directions.

7. Civil Court is competent to suspend a declaratory decree even if it is inexecutable, in

exercise of inherent powers under section 151  r/w Section 94, CPC if such decree
affects the rights of third parties, as was held in Khaja Safiullah v.Mettu Baga Reddy
and ors33.
8. Civil Courts competent to grant interim maintenance under section 151 even though
there is no provision under the Act. This was held in Yellapu Satyanarayana
Petitioner vs. Yellapu Vijayalakshmi34
9. Where Section 10 of CPC is not applicable, party can file a petition in course of
proceedings pending before Court invoking Section 151 for stay of trial of

31
(7) SCJ 798 2007.
32
AIR 1971 AP 53.
33
2007 (1) ALT 33.
34
1996 (3) ALT 451.
 independent suit, as was held in Karri Satyanarayana and others vs. Pichika Veerraju
and Ors35
10. Where Order 39 does not apply, the Court has inherent power to grant injunction in
appropriate cases in exercise of inherent power under section 151 of CPC (Madduri
Padmavathi Vs. Chintala Abbai)36.
11. Restitution Court can order restitution in exercise of inherent powers under section
151 CPC in cases where they would not strictly fall within the scope of Section 144,
CPC to do justice as was observed in T. Penchalaiah v. Jaladanki Saroja v. L.Rs. and
ors37.
12. An appellate court may extend time fixed for deposit of suit costs while granting stay
of operation of suit decree, by exercising inherent power under section 151 of the
Code, 1908 as was held in P. Hari and others v. Anjuru Yellappa38.
13. As was observed in M. Satyanarayana Pedda Raju v. Katama Raju and anr39, A bona
fide mistake committed can be rectified under section 151 of Code,1908 in the
interests of justice when no prejudice is caused thereby to other side.
14. Civil Court can exercise inherent power under section 151 CPC to recall its own order
if order is obtained by a party by practising fraud on court, as was laid down in P.
Vijaya Laxmi v. Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy Dist., Hyderabad and ors40  There is no
statutory bar to correct a procedural error in exercise of inherent power under section
151 of CPC where it violated entire proceedings resulting in miscarriage of justice, as
was held in Mahalingappa and others v. Kariyanna41.

B) LIMITATIONS’S ON THE COURT’S INHERENT POWERS

35
(1) ALT 177 1996.
36
(2) ALT 477 1994.
37
(6) ALT 411 2006.
38
(5) ALT 125 2010.
39
(6) ALT 93 2009.
40
(4) ALT 767 2009.
41
(4) ALT 564 2009. 
The analysis undertaken above might paint a picture of the court’s inherent powers under
section 151 of the CPC to be all-expansive in nature. However, the court cannot employ this
provision to do anything and everything it desires and there are clearly demarcated
constraints on the court’s inherent powers.

They are described as below-

1. Inherent powers can be exercised only in the absence of express provisions in the
code.

The first major limitation on the court’s power as per this section is that such powers
are exercised only when the CPC lacks any express provision laying down rules for
the matter at hand. This was held in the case of Janakiraman Vs. P.M.Neelakanta
Iyer42. It was further reiterated in K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy43 that if the CPC
contains provisions dealing with a particular topic or aspect, and such provisions
either expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the power of the
court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to that matter, the inherent
power cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code or in
a manner inconsistent with such provisions. Therefore, it is firmly established that the
court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code, where the
remedy or procedure is provided in the Code.

2. Further, the inherent powers cannot be exercised in conflict with what has been
expressly provided in the code.

Another major limitation of such powers is that they cannot contradict or transgress
the rights and remedies that have been provided for in other provisions of the CPC.
This was held in Jai Jai Ram Manohar Vs. National Building Material Supply44 and
further reiterated in K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy45 wherein the court
unequivocally declared that a court has no power to do that which is prohibited by law
or the Code, by purported exercise of its inherent powers. This further reinforces the
42
AIR 1962 SC P.632.
43
11 SCC 275 (2011).
44
AIR 1969 SC P.1267.
45
11 SCC 275 (2011).
 notion that the inherent powers conferred on the court were meant by the drafters to
only be complementary to all the other powers conferred by the court. Thus, section
151 is not meant to be an overriding provision and it does not take precedence over
other provisions of the CPC.

3. The inherent powers can be exercised only in exceptional cases.

It was held in Ram Karan Das Vs. Bhagwandas46 that the exercise of inherent powers
must be an exceptional matter. This is reinforced by the ruling that were under
Section 151 will have to be used with circumspection and care, only where it is
absolutely necessary, when there is no provision in the Code governing the matter,
when the bona fides of the applicant cannot be doubted, when such exercise is to meet
the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of court and that this provision
must not be used as a carte blanche for any relief that a party demands 47.

4. While exercising the powers, the court has to follow the procedure prescribed by the
legislature48 and thus the court in furtherance of the powers granted to it under this
section cannot go against the intention of the legislature.
5. In the exercise of its powers under this section, the court cannot exercise jurisdiction
not vested in them by law49.
6. Further, the court in furtherance of these powers is expected to abide by the principles
of Res Judicata i.e., not to open the issues which have already been decided finally50.
7. Through the exercise of it’s inherent powers, the court cannot take away the
substantive rights of the parties51.

While the restrictions on the inherent powers of the court enumerated above are general
guidelines to be kept in mind while exercising the same, the courts have also enumerated very

46
 AIR 1965 SC P.1144.
47
11 SCC 275 (2011).
48
Mohanlal Chopra Vs. Seth Hiralal AIR 1963 SCP.527.
49
State of W.B. Vs. Indira Devi 3 SCC 559 (1977).

50
Union of India Vs. Ram Charan, AIR 1964 SCP 218.

51
Mohanlal Chopra Vs. Seth Hiralal, AIR 1963 SCP 527.
specific instances where there is a bar on the exercise of inherent jurisdiction of the court.
They are as follows-

i) The court cannot direct an arbitrator to make an award afresh through the use of
its inherent powers52.

ii) Through the exercise of its inherent powers, the court cannot restrain a party from
taking proceedings in a court of law53

iii) The court cannot also using these powers set aside an order which was right at the
time of its issuance54.

iv) The court cannot exercise its inherent powers to grant interim relief which
properly ought to be granted only by the decree after determination of the points
in controversy.

v) The court cannot exercise its inherent powers to compel parties to submit to
medical examination or blood test.

vi) The court cannot exercise its inherent powers to appoint a commissioner to seize
account-books in the possession of the plaintiff.

vii) The court cannot exercise its inherent powers to consider or review an order.

viii) The court cannot exercise its inherent powers to set aside an ex parte decree.

ix) The court cannot exercise its inherent powers to strike a defence.

x) The court cannot exercise its inherent powers to restore suit dismissed for default
for non-payment of court-fee under Rule 11(d) of Order 7.

52
Rikhalidas Vs. Bullabhidas, AIR 1962 SC P 554
53
Mohanlal Chopra Vs. Seth Hiralal, aIR 1963 SCP 527.
54
A.C.Estates Vs.Serajuddin, aIR 1960 SC P 939.
 xi) The court cannot exercise its inherent powers to refund court-fee on a review
application when the review is granted on a ground other than mistake of law fact;
etc. .

xii) The court cannot exercise its inherent powers for the transfer of suits.

xiii) The court cannot exercise its inherent powers to order stay of proceedings under
the 1996 Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

xiv) The court cannot exercise its inherent powers to order payment of future interest
after the decree's effective date.

xv) The court cannot exercise its inherent powers to hear an appeal from an order that
is not appealable.

xvi) The court cannot exercise its inherent powers to modify its decision after it has
been signed.

xvii) Similarly there is no authority to change the decree to grant greater statutory
advantages.

xviii) The courts cannot set aside ex parte decree under its inherent powers.

xix) The Court has no inherent power to entertain an application for correcting a final
decree.

xx) where fraud committed is upon a party and not upon court, same is not a case
where section 151 of CPC could be invoked as was laid down in Ram Prakash
Agarwal and another Vs. Gopi Krishan (Dead through L.Rs.) and others.

xxi) Court has no inherent power to direct defendant-tenant to deposit future rents in a
suit filed for arrears of rent, held in Mohd. Younus v. Barad Lingusa55

55 55
(5) ALT 523 (2005).
All the above mentioned limitations on the courts power’s reveal that the principles and
practices relating to the levy of costs in administrative law matters can’t be imported
precisely in connection with the civil prosecution governed by the code. Thus, provisions of
the inherent power of the courts can’t be conjured to do indirectly what is not permitted to be
done directly.

It is important to note that this notion of there being restraints on the court’s inherent powers
as well as the provision not being one that gives over-expansive power to the courts is not
new. In fact, one of the oldest judgements clarifying the scope of the of the court’s inherent
powers recognised that under these powers, the courts are not getting any powers that they
did not originally possess56. Therefore, the legislative intent as well as judicial interpretation
both unequivocally convey that the court’s inherent powers are not some panacea or
superpower with the courts to be employed in each and every situation for any purpose- there
are restrictions on their usage and scope which have to be complied with. It was held in
Mahindra Manilal v Sushindra Mahindra57 that the inherent powers of the Court maybe
easily recognised as residuary and comprehensive in nature. Although the same can be
exercised ex debito justitae only in absence of express provisions in the CPC, limitations on
the inherent powers exist not because the CPC regulates them, but because it is considered
that the methods of the legislature are guided by the goals of justice.

ANALYSIS OF INHERENT POWERS OF CIVIL COURTS IN OTHER

JURISDICTIONS.

This section will explore the concept of inherent jurisdiction or inherent powers as it is
practiced in common law systems, because it is a concept firmly rooted in the common law.
Whilst the concept of inherent powers or jurisdiction is not exclusive to common law

56
Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed AIR 1945 PC 18.
57
(3) SCJ 811 (DB) 2013.
systems, and is not unknown in civil law systems, it is clear that the concept of a substantive
jurisdiction that does not derive from statute is very much a common law creature58. Any
inherent jurisdiction in civil law systems appears to be limited to purely procedural aspects
only; whereas there is a myriad of substantive powers under the inherent jurisdiction in
common law systems, civil law systems tend to require statutory authority for such powers59.
Similarly, at an international level, the concept of an inherent jurisdiction exercised by
international courts and tribunals remains novel and controversial60 . Within common law
systems, there are a range of varying approaches to the inherent jurisdiction. This section of
the project seeks to provide examples with a view to contrasting these approaches well as
contrast them with the Indian approach.

The four systems examined below – England, Canada, Singapore and New Zealand – each
have different governmental and constitutional arrangements, but share a common thread that
the concept of inherent powers of civil courts remains a well-practised doctrine.

ENGLAND

Inherent jurisdiction is the fount of a “whole armoury” of powers in English courts,

sometimes “significant” and “extraordinary”, including: “the power to deny a litigant a full
hearing; to make orders without listening to the party affected; to decline to hear an advocate;
to exclude a party or the public from the courtroom; to arrest or to grant bail; to order a party
to speak or to keep silent; to require parties to surrender their property before judgment or to
submit to a search and seizure.61” Two examples are worth discussing in particular, to show
how England’s usage of the concept has changed in modern times. The first decision, Anton
Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd62 established the jurisdiction to grant an ex parte
order to a party to enter, search and remove property from the premises of its opponent in
civil litigation, when it is likely that the opponent was going to destroy integral evidence. The
Court of Appeal admitted that that there was little precedent – statutory or common law – to
warrant such an order, but that it was necessary so as to do justice between the parties, and
therefore justified through the invocation of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction.

58
Supra note 8 at 115.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Supra note 8 at 116.
62
Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] Ch 55 (CA).
A contemporary analogue to the 1970s’ Anton Piller order is the “closed material procedure”,
as recently ruled upon by the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Al Rawi v The Security
Service63. A closed material procedure is where, in the public interest, the Court permits one
party to comply with its evidential disclosure requirements by only supplying the information
to the Court and to “special advocates” – counsel cleared by government officials to examine
the withheld evidence and represent the opposing party’s interests – but not to the opposing
party itself64. Such a procedure was permitted in certain criminal contexts through statutory
authority, for example in proceedings under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and the
Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, in order to prevent the disclosure of sensitive information that
could undermine national security65. However, the procedure was not statutorily mandated in
civil contexts. Thus, when the plaintiffs in Al Rawi sued the United Kingdom government for
their complicity in their detention and ill-treatment at various locations including
Guantanamo Bay, the government had to rely on the court’s inherent jurisdiction to engage
the closed material procedure. Whilst the Queen’s Bench accepted that it had the inherent
jurisdiction to establish a closed material procedure in the civil context, this was overruled by
both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. While overruling, it was held that that a
court cannot exercise its inherent jurisdiction in contravention of legislation or rules of court.
It was also held that the basic rule is that subject to certain established and limited exceptions
the court cannot exercise its power to regulate its own procedures in such a way as will deny
parties their fundamental common law right to participate in the proceedings in accordance
with the common law principles of natural justice and open justice and that the right to be
confronted by one’s accusers is such a fundamental element of the common law right to a fair
trial that the court cannot abrogate it in the exercise of its inherent power.

The contrast between Anton Piller and Al Rawi is thus striking. Both involved potential
engagement of the inherent jurisdiction to secure justice overall at the cost of the liberties of
one party. Whereas Anton Piller decided to engage the inherent jurisdiction, however, Al
Rawi declined – forcing legislative action to provide the Court with a statutory jurisdiction,
showing that there are clear limits to the concept.

CANADA

63
Al Rawi v The Security Service [2011] UKSC 34.
64
Id.
65
Supra note 8 at 117.
As early as 1886, the Supreme Court of Canada had adopted the conception of the inherent
jurisdiction, holding in Re Sproule that “every superior court [...] has incident to its
jurisdiction an inherent right to inquire into and judge the regularity or abuse of its
process66 .Courts have since explicitly accepted Jacob’s definition, with the Supreme Court as
recently as 2011 in R v Caron 67 accepting Jacob’s summary on the scope of concept: “the
inherent jurisdiction of the court may be invoked in an apparently inexhaustible variety of
circumstances and may be exercised in different ways.” Guidance on that exercise was
expressed in great elaboration in the case of Ocean v Economical Mutual Insurance Co68. In
Ocean, the issue was whether it a court had jurisdiction to order a mental assessment of a lay-
litigant to determine whether she could represent herself at trial, i.e. when mental capacity
was not an issue to be determined on the merits of the case. The Court of Appeal observed in
that case that: “none of the theories put forward to explain the basis for inherent jurisdiction
attempt to determine its limits. Indeed, in this jurisdiction the courts have generally addressed
what is not a proper exercise of the court’s inherent jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis”. The
Court of Appeal analysed the exercise as69-

• Superior courts’ inherent jurisdiction originally narrowly applied to issues involving

contempt of court or abuses of the court’s process. Even in this narrow ambit, a court should
exercise it sparingly;

• It was subsequently was expanded to cover variation of trusts, safeguarding of children, the
provision of remedies and situations where statutory provisions do not so provide,
supervision, protection and assistance to inferior tribunals (including arbitrations) and filling
of gaps in statutes;

• It is primarily a procedural concept and courts should not invoke it to make changes in
substantive law;

• Any invocation requires an exercise of judicial discretion; and discretion must always be
exercised judicially;

and • A judge does not have an unfettered right to do what is thought to be fair as between
the parties. A court’s resort to its inherent jurisdiction must be employed within a framework
of principles relevant to the matters in issue.

66
Re Sproule (1886) 12 SCR 140.
67
R v Charon [2011] 1 SCR 78.
68
Ocean v Economical Mutual Insurance Co (2009) 281 NSR (2d) 201 (NSCA).
69
Id.
This case is notable for the circumspection which the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal displayed
regarding the inherent jurisdiction’s theoretically unlimited scope: in the event, the Court
held that an inherent power to order a mental assessment did exist, but since “the court’s
inherent jurisdiction is an extraordinary power and should not be used save in the clearest of
cases”, the Court held that it was not appropriate to exercise it in this instance.

SINGAPORE

The first case to be noted is UMCI Ltd v Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Co (Singapore) Pte
Ltd and Others70 the Court was asked to consider whether the court’s inherent jurisdiction
extended “to making orders against persons who are not parties to this action, requiring them
to furnish handwriting samples.” UMCI made an insurance claim against Tokio. Tokio
attempted to resist the claim on the basis that UMCI fraudulently doctored cargo checklists so
as to indicate damage had occurred in transit. To prove the fraud and establish its defence,
Tokio required samples from the cargo handlers, a non-party to the proceedings, who were
unwilling to voluntarily supply such samples. The Court held that it had the jurisdiction to
make an order for discovery under the rules of court71. In the alternative, however, the Court
went on to consider whether it could invoke its inherent jurisdiction to grant the order. It
noted that the rules of court acknowledging the existence of inherent powers did not give the
Court unlimited powers, and instead the touchstone for the exercise of inherent jurisdiction
was “necessity”, viz. whatever needed to be done to secure justice between the parties and
avoid abuses of the court’s processes.72Necessity, however, was to be ascertained after
looking at all the circumstances of the case, and not only with regards to the existing statutory
guidance, an acceptance of the following statement of principle-“The inherent jurisdiction of
the High Court to make interlocutory orders for the purpose of promoting a fair and
satisfactory trial is available to assist the Plaintiff in a case like this. The Court should not,
in my judgment, be thwarted by the inherent laggardness of the rule-book […] from making
use of new methods of adducing evidence for the court if such evidence is otherwise
admissible”73.

70
UMCI Ltd v Tokio Marine and Fire Insurance Co (Singapore) Pte Ltd and Others [2006] SGHC 142.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
Thus whilst the Court acknowledged that its inherent jurisdiction was constrained by explicit
and contrary statutory provisions, it acknowledged that absent a conflict, the jurisdiction was
not so constrained and indeed, where necessary, should extend beyond statutory guidance. In
the event, the Court held this was not such a case where necessity required the exercise of its
inherent jurisdiction.

The second significant case is Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 301 v Lee Tat
Development Pte Ltd74. The question involved was whether the Court of Appeal (Singapore’s
highest court) has the inherent jurisdiction to reopen and set aside an earlier decision which it
made and reconstitute itself to rehear the matters dealt with in that decision. The applicants
alleged that a decision of the Court of Appeal had breached natural justice and in such a
situation, the Court had an inherent jurisdiction to reopen that decision in order to correct the
injustice. The argument relied upon the decision in R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary
Magistrate and Others, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2)75 where the Court had used its
inherent jurisdiction to vacate and rehear an earlier decision tainted by apparent bias. The
court below had held that cases like Pinochet were distinguishable on the basis that the House
of Lords was operating in a statutory vacuum, whereas the Court of Appeal in Singapore was
a statutory creature. Rejecting the argument that an inherent jurisdiction to reopen existed,
that court stated the following- “Inherent power” should not be used as though it were the
joker in a pack of cards, possessed of no specific designation and used only when one [does]
not have the specific card required. The same might be said of “doing justice” because one
man’s justice can be another man’s injustice. Inherent power does not mean unlimited
power, and if a substantive power to reopen a case on the merits is to be given, it must come
expressly from the legislature”76.

Whilst the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s decision overall, it held that
theoretically, it had the inherent jurisdiction to reopen and rehear an issue which it decided in
breach of natural justice and to set aside the whole or part of its earlier decision founded on
that issue.

NEW ZEALAND

74
Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 301 v Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd [2010] SGCA 39.
75
R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) [2000] 1
AC 119.
76
Supra note 74.
The Inherent jurisdiction of the High Court was examined by the Supreme Court of New
Zealand in Mafart v Television New Zealand Ltd77, and described by Elias CJ as-

“Except to the extent modified by statute and rules, the Court continues to have inherent
jurisdiction and powers to determine its own procedure. The inherent jurisdiction is not
ousted by the adoption of rules, but is regulated by the rules, so far as they extend. To the
extent that the rules do not cover a situation, the inherent jurisdiction supplies the
deficiency”.

With this framework in mind, the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court in Siemer v Solicitor-
General78 provided a much more comprehensive analysis of a particular exercise of inherent
jurisdiction, i.e. the suppression of publication of its judgments. The High Court made
important pre-trial rulings in a high profile case in 2010. The rulings were accompanied by
orders prohibiting their publication or commentary about them. Mr Siemer published two
articles on his website about the rulings and provided links to the rulings themselves. The
Solicitor-General successfully applied to the Court that it should hold Mr Siemer in contempt,
and the Court imposed a penalty of six weeks’ imprisonment. Mr Siemer appealed to the
Court of Appeal against the decision on the grounds that, inter alia, the High Court never had
the jurisdiction to make the suppression orders in the first instance. The basis of Mr Siemer’s
argument was the precedent of Attorney-General v Taylor79 establishing the inherent
jurisdiction to make such suppression orders was wrongly decided. The Attorney General
case dealt with similar circumstances, and affirmed that the High Court could exercise its
inherent jurisdiction to permanently suppress the names of witnesses in a trial open to the
public if doing so was in the interests of justice80.Such a power was available to the Court
because it was necessary to enable it to act effectively. The Court of Appeal held that it may
even exercise such a jurisdiction in respect of matters regulated by statute or by rule of court,
so long as it can do so without contravening any statutory provision.

77
Mafart v Television New Zealand Ltd [2006] 3 NZLR 18 (SCNZ).
78
Siemer v Solicitor-General [2012] 3 NZLR 43 (NZCA).
79
[1975] 2 NZLR 138 (SC).
80
Supra note 8 at 128.
 SELF ANALYSIS- FLAWS WITH INHERENT POWERS UNDER THE CPC AND
SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS

Section 151 of the CPC is an integral statutory provision that equips the court to ensure
justice and fairness. It is based on the legal maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit and
stipulates that the court may act in a way which prevents the abuse of the process of court or
to meet the ends of justice.
 It is common knowledge that with respect to any provision, one of the courts foremost
concerns are to act against perversion of court procedure such that there is no miscarriage of
justice. The court calls upon these inherent powers to effectuate this obligation. However,
these powers are discretionary and are to be observed only if they meet the ambiguous
standards of courts’ “justice”.

Common Issues with Section 151

Pragmatically, in the current legal scenario, Section 151 is used by litigants as though it were
the joker in a pack of cards, possessing of no specific purpose and used only when one did
not have the specific card required. It is used as a tool of lost resort by parties when they are
unable to make their case under specified provisions and serves only to delay justice and
pester innocent litigants i.e., ensures compounding of litigation and results in a wastage of
courts’ resources and time.

The following cases demonstrate the usage of section 151 by the parties for their own
purposes-

In UoI v. Ram Charan81  it was used to surpass a limitation,

In Velayudhan Nair v. Kerala  Kshemam Yunik Kuries82, it was used as a substitute for

appeal, revision and review.

In Manoharlal v. Seth Hiralal83 it was employed when there was no scope of getting a relief.

Further, the absence of a regulated schema is the major flaw of this provision, as a narrow
interpretation would be considered as unjust and a wide one could lead to judicial overreach.
This leaves the court with the impossible task of balancing between the two alternatives.

While Indian courts so far have adopted a conservative approach, the wide range of powers to
do as one sees fit with Section 151 places them above the other state organs and gives them
the power to make, rather than follow laws.

Issue I- the categorisation of section 151 as Substantive or Procedural Provision.

81
AIR 1964 SC 215.
82
AIR 1988 Ker 223.
83
1962 AIR 527.
 Substantive law is defined as “that part of law which creates, defines, and regulates rights
and duties of parties, as opposed to adjective, procedural, or remedial law84”. It bestows rights
on a person whereas procedural law determines the mode in which he should move the court.
This distinction between substantive and procedural law is often blurred and is interwoven
together, because the law often gives rise to a right or duty to parties and vice versa. This
often creates ambiguities and inconsistencies in the interpretation of various provisions.
Accordingly, with respect to Section 151, the Supreme Court, in the case of K.K. Velusamy v.
N. Palaanisamy85 held that Section 151 is not a substantive provision. The rationale of the
court was that it is not a substantive provision as it does not confer any power or jurisdiction
on courts and merely recognizes the discretionary power of every court for rendering justice
in accordance with law.

However, the interpretation of the court to exclude the substantive provision is incorrect
insofar as the practical application of section 151 is concerned. When the court holds that the
provisions are reasonably necessary in order for justice to be done in a case or to prevent any
abuse of the process of the court, it can be logically inferred that, that may extend to making
substantive orders. Further, in practice, the cases pertaining to Section 151 cover a far greater
variance which signals the courts’ inherent power beyond the narrow ‘procedural’ power.
This is indicated in the judgment given in the case of Padam Sen v. State of UP86 where the
court had stated that “the inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers
specifically conferred on the Court by the Code”. Thus case highly implies substantive nature
of the provision and that substantive consequences that follow from the provision.
Additionally, in the case of Mul Raj v. Bura Mal87 the court stated that when it is empowered
to make an order, it has inherent jurisdiction to see that the order is carried into effect- this
again it alludes to the existence of substantive consequences that can impose liabilities/take
away certain rights.

Thus, there is ambiguity regarding whether section 151 of the CPC qualifies as a substantive
provision or not.

84
Prof (Dr) Mukund Sarda, Inherent Powers of a Civil Court: A Study SSRN PUBLICATIONS (April 2, 2016)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2758064
85
11 SCC 275 (2011).
86
1961 1 SCR 884.
87
(1931) I.L.R. 12 Lah. 602.
Issue II- The Lack of a strict metric/guidelines to evaluate cases falling under Section
151 and the problems emanating from such absence.

Section 151 as it stands today does not lay out a template for the courts which can indicate its
contours and limitations. It merely lays down a rough yardstick of the power of the court. 
This becomes especially problematic as it affects substantive rights as seen above. Further,
while Section 151 is useful for being flexible, flexibility can also lead to uncertainty since the
section being employed for flexibility would lead to the assumption that a uniform spectrum
of “need”, “justice” and “abuse of process” runs without distinction and without variation.
This is not a correct frame of operation since the courts’ inherent powers and the way it is
used admits three possible scenarios- its inherent jurisdiction to hear matters in the first place
(for instance to entertain the application of third parties), its inherent powers to affect
substantive rights (as indicated in the case of KK Modi v. KN Modi88 when principles of res
judicata– a substantive provision were applied to cases not falling under Section 11 of CPC
and the court gave itself more powers than is envisioned under Section 11) and; its powers to
affect procedural rights. Additionally, the provision also invites the risk of duplicity. This was
observed in the case of Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate v. The Commissioner of IT89
where the court had passed an ex parte order and recalled and altered it at a subsequent time
under Section 151 itself and not under the specific provision provided for i.e., Order 9 Rule
13 of CPC. This creates a dichotomy and uncertainty which has the potential to disadvantage
the litigants.

Additional Concerns

It is evident that, in the absence of expansive legislative guidance , the exercise of inherent
power is largely a question of fact dependent upon the discretion and wisdom of the court.
Due to this reason the jurisprudence for Section 151 is very uncertain and can potentially
become problematic if it is not mitigated/limited. Courts have started departing from a careful
application of the provision. This is indicated by the aforementioned cases of Padam Sen v.
State of UP and Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate v. The Commissioner of I.T. where
the courts are overreaching their inherent powers and using it even when express provisions

88
1998 AIR SC 1297.

89
AIR 1977 SC 1348.
addressing the problem exist. This is a grave situation as Section 151 is often criticised on the
grounds that it can be exercised only in the absence of express provisions of the code, cannot
be exercised in conflict with what has expressly been given in the code or set aside an order
which was right at the time of its issuance etc.  These limitations instead of being construed
as a positive that protects the essence of the provision are being negatively connoted, which is
a dangerous trend for it can lead to exercise of arbitrary powers by the court in contravention
of express legislative provisions.

Possible Solutions

In the absence of a regulatory authority that has been expressly granted by the constitution to
the courts with regards to section 151 should ideally reside with the legislature. While it is
undisputed that the CPC is not exhaustive and there will always be cases which are not
enclosed by the express provisions of the code and which the legislature cannot foresee, it is
an imperative to create certain indicative tests that might clarify some of the ambiguity
regarding the provision and it is ideally the legislature that must step up to this task. Even
though the legislature cannot envisage every situation where Section 151 will be applicable,
but it can certainly envisage the degree of need for which it should be employed. It can give
directives to the following effect:

1) The provision of Section 151 can distinguish between the controls that the court
should exert.
It can be determined if Section 151 should be implemented for –
(a) control over process;
(b) control over power or
(c) control over the powers of inferior courts and tribunals.
After this determination, the structure of the provision should also be established. For
instance- the provision can be split up into further subsections to provide for control
over process and control over courts individually. Another way of classifying and
directing these powers can also be according to the functions they play i.e. (a)
ensuring convenience and fairness in legal proceedings; (b) preventing steps being
taken that would render judicial proceedings inefficacious.

(2) The concept of need-based approach can be refined and it can be clarified whether
Section 151 is to be used to further a ‘specific need’ or a ‘general need’ i.e., if it is to be used
for specifically aggrieved individuals for unique situations or in public interest i.e., to cater
for provisions absent in CPC, which can affect the society.

(3) A directive list can be given and the terminology of the provision can be limited.
Accordingly, the word strictly can be added to limit the powers of the court to read- Nothing
in this code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the court to
make such orders as may be strictly necessary for the ends of the justice or to prevent abuse
of the process of the court. Such a metric may help prevent the problem of excessive judicial
activism and avoid cases such as Padam Sen. It shall render the power of delving into
substantial law to be used only in exigencies, and give the court, reason to pause and reflect
on its approach, which is absent so far. 

CONCLUSION

The furtherance of justice in all circumstances is a sacred task that every court of law in the
world has been endowed with. While a legislator aims to be as comprehensive as possible
while drafting a legal document, it is not humanely possible to provide for every exigency,
every circumstance and every externality. Even if the law in question is made completely
exhaustive, there can be situations of ambiguity where the recourse to be taken is unclear or
strictly following the letter of the law might actually lead to grave injustice for the party
concerned.

It is to deal with such circumstances that courts have been endowed with inherent powers
under the CPC. These powers enable the courts to react spontaneously to new developments
that take place in the case and unforeseen circumstances wherein the code is silent. Indeed,
such a provision saves the courts from a situation of conundrum wherein apparent injustice is
being meted out but the court remains helpless due to lack of express statutory powers
bestowed upon it.

We have also seen that the notion of inherent powers is not a concept that is unique to the
Indian civil courts. In fact, the doctrine is rooted in common law and has gained widespread
judicial acceptance and statutory codification in nearly all common law jurisdictions.

The courts, especially in the Indian context have been creative in the application of this
principle to cope up with new and interesting developments that come up during a trial which
were not anticipated by the original drafters. Not only this, the courts have also creatively
construed their inherent powers to facilitate speedy disposal of cases and also reduce the
administrative burden.

While this provision definitely has a great number of applications, it must be kept in mind
that it was not meant to be panacea or a one-stop-fix for all the difficulties in procedural
issues that a court is faced with. If the answer to the problem lies in the CPC, then there is no
need to have recourse to such a provision.

However, there are instances wherein such a provision can become problematic- it is often
used by litigants as a dilatory tactic, courts sometimes tend to blur the applicability of this
provision as a substantive one rather than the purely procedural provision that the legislature
intended it to be. Further, the lack of any strict metric or guidelines for the evaluation of cases
under this section may lead to inconsistent decisions and thus injustice being meted out.

However, these problems are not grave enough for us to suggest a major change or the total
withdrawal of this provision. What is needed are concerted efforts by the legislature and the
judiciary to resolve the anomalies and ambiguities in this section. All in all, section 151 of the
CPC and the inherent powers of the courts it enshrines continues to be an extremely
important provision of the document which imbibes adaptability and relevancy into the entire
code.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cases

Al Rawi v The Security Service [2011] UKSC 34..................................................................22

Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] Ch 55 (CA).....................................21
Debendranath v Satya Bala Das AIR 1950 Cal 217................................................................10
Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed AIR 1945 PC 18................................................................20
J. Jagannath Reddy Vs. Smt. L. Laxmi (1) ALT 461 1998......................................................13
Jai Jai Ram Manohar Vs. National Building Material Supply AIR 1969 SC P.1267.............16
Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate v. The Commissioner of IT AIR 1977 SC 1348.......30
Janakiraman Vs. P.M.Neelakanta Iyer AIR 1962 SC P.632...................................................16
K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palaanisamy 11 SCC 275 (2011)...........................................................29
Karri Satyanarayana and others vs. Pichika Veerraju and Ors(1) ALT 177 1996 ...............15
Khaja Safiullah v.Mettu Baga Reddy and ors 2007 (1) ALT 33.............................................14
Kotak Mahindra Bank Limited, rep. by its Authorized Officer, Hyderabad Vs. Station House
Officer, Madhapur P.S., Hyderabad and others (2) ALT 164 2016....................................14
M/s. Ram Chand & Sons Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. Barabanki (U.P.) v. Kanhayalal Bhargava...11
Madduri Padmavathi Vs. Chintala Abbai (2) ALT 477 1994.................................................15
Mafart v Television New Zealand Ltd [2006] 3 NZLR 18 (SCNZ)........................................26
Mahalingappa and others v. Kariyanna (4) ALT 564 2009....................................................15
Mahindra Manilal v Sushindra Mahindra (3) SCJ 811 (DB) 2013........................................20
Management Corporation Strata Title Plan No 301 v Lee Tat Development Pte Ltd [2010]
SGCA 39..............................................................................................................................25
Manohar Chopra Vs. Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SCP.527.............................................................9
Meera Chauhan v. Harsh Bishnoi (7) SCJ 798 2007...............................................................14
Mohd. Younus v. Barad Lingusa (5) ALT 523 (2005).............................................................20
Nallapati Pandu Ranga Rao Vs. Vempati Venkateshwar Rao and another (2) ALT 177 2015
..............................................................................................................................................12
Ocean v Economical Mutual Insurance Co (2009) 281 NSR (2d) 201 (NSCA).....................23
P Sirajuddin v. Government of Madras  (1970) 1 SCC 595......................................................3
P. Bhaskara Rao Vs. M.R.Wolfgang Ormeloh & Ors 2013 (2) ALT 110...............................12
Padam Sen v. State of UP 1961 1 SCR 884.............................................................................29
R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte
(No 2) [2000] 1 AC 119.......................................................................................................25
R v Charon [2011] 1 SCR 78...................................................................................................23
Ram Karan Das Vs. Bhagwandas AIR 1965 SC P.1144.........................................................17
Ram Prakash Agarwal and another Vs. Gopi Krishan (Dead through L.Rs.) and others.......19
Rash Behari Mazumdar v. Kasum Kumari Guha AIR 1925 Cal 1145 ..................................11
Re Sproule (1886) 12 SCR 140................................................................................................23
Siemer v Solicitor-General [2012] 3 NZLR 43 (NZCA).........................................................26
T. Penchalaiah v. Jaladanki Saroja v. L.Rs. and ors (6) ALT 411 2006.................................15
Talla Srinivas Goud Vs. Ghanapuram Srinivas Reddy (1) ALT 189 2022.............................11
UMCI Ltd v Tokio Marine and Fire Insurance Co (Singapore) Pte Ltd and Others [2006]
SGHC 142............................................................................................................................24
UoI v. Ram Charan AIR 1964 SCP 218.................................................................................28
Velayudhan Nair v. Kerala  Kshemam Yunik Kuries AIR 1988 Ker 223...............................28
Vijaya Laxmi v. Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy Dist., Hyderabad and ors (4) ALT 767 2009
..............................................................................................................................................15
Yellapu Satyanarayana Petitioner vs. Yellapu Vijayalakshmi 1996 (3) ALT 451..................14

Journals

Bishal Deb, The Inherent Power of the Court: A discussion under Civil Procedure Code,
ResearchGate Publications, (2021)........................................................................................9
Godwin, A., Howse, T., & Ramsay, I. (2017). The Inherent Power of Common Law Courts to
Provide Assistance in Cross‐Border Insolvencies: From Comity to Complexity.
INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY REVIEW, 26(1), 5-39..............................................................4
I H Jacob “The Court’s Inherent Jurisdiction” (1970) 23 CLP 23.............................................7
Marcelo Rodriguez Ferrere, Inherent Jurisdiction and Its limits 13(1) OTAGO LR 107 (2017).
................................................................................................................................................7
Surjuse, S. S. (2021). EXERCISE OF INHERENT POWER BY THE SUPREME COURT
OF INDIA TO DO COMPLETE JUSTICE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
DIVORCE MATTERS UNDER THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT–A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS. Ilkogretim Online, 20(1)...................................................................................3

Dissertation

Kylasanatha Pillay, K. P., & Sadasivan Nair, G. (1999). Inherent Powers of the High Court
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (Doctoral dissertation,
COCHIN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY..........................................3