IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

TWITTER, INC., )
)
Plaintiff and )
Counterclaim-Defendant, )
)
v. ) C.A. No. 2022-0613-KSJM
)
ELON R. MUSK, X HOLDINGS I, INC., )
and X HOLDINGS II, INC., )
)
Defendants and )
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs. )

DEFENDANTS AND COUNTERCLAIM-PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO

STAY PENDING CLOSING OF THE TRANSACTION

Defendants Elon R. Musk, X Holdings I Inc., and X Holdings II, Inc.

(“Defendants”), by and through their undersigned attorneys, hereby move to stay

this action and remove the October 17 trial from the Court’s calendar based on

changed circumstances that have effectively mooted this action.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. This Court ordered an expedited trial on Twitter’s sole equitable claim

for relief that Defendants “specifically perform their obligations under the merger

agreement and consummate the closing in accordance with the terms of the merger

agreement.” Defendants have agreed to do exactly that. They have stated they are

willing to close the transaction at $54.20, the Debt Financing parties are working

cooperatively to fund the close, and closing is expected on or around October 28,
2022. As a result there is no need for an expedited trial to order Defendants to do

what they are already doing and this action is now moot. “Delaware courts do not

address ‘disagreements that have no significant current impact.’” Crescent/Mach I

Partners, L.P. v. Dr Pepper Bottling Co. of Texas, 962 A.2d 205, 209 (Del. 2008).

(quoting Stroud v. Milliken Enter., Inc., 552 A.2d 476, 480 (Del.1989)).

2. Yet, Twitter will not take yes for an answer. Astonishingly, they have

insisted on proceeding with this litigation, recklessly putting the deal at risk and

gambling with their stockholders’ interests.1 Proceeding toward trial is not only an

enormous waste of party and judicial resources, it will undermine the ability of the

parties to close the transaction. Failing to stay the litigation would send a signal to

the market that—despite Defendants’ commitment to perform their obligations

under the Merger Agreement and Equity Commitment Letter—Twitter is demanding

that the Court impede the deal moving forward. Instead of allowing the parties to

turn their focus to securing the Debt Financing necessary to consummate the

transaction and preparing for a transition of the business, the parties will instead

remain distracted by completing discovery and an unnecessary trial. In effect, a trial

would keep the merger transaction in limbo for longer, casting an unnecessary cloud

of uncertainty over the company.

1
As this Court held during the Motion to Expedite hearing, each day of litigation
poses harm to the company that Defendants have agreed to acquire. Dkt. 103 at
62-63.

2
 3. Further, although Twitter resists a stay based on the theoretical

possibility of a future failure to obtain the Debt Financing, no such failure has

occurred to date. Quite to the contrary, counsel for the debt financing parties has

advised that each of their clients is prepared to honor its obligations under the Bank

Debt Commitment Letter on the terms and subject to satisfaction of the conditions

set forth therein. We have so advised Twitter, again to no avail. Not only has

Twitter’s baseless speculation been refuted by the banks themselves, any theoretical

claims Twitter could concoct based on a potential financing failure that has not

happened are unripe and unpled, making them well outside the scope of the trial set

to begin in eleven days.

4. Simply put, there are two possibilities at this stage. By far the most

likely possibility is that the debt is funded in which case the deal will close on or

around October 28. Shareholders would receive their payments far faster than would

be possible if Twitter were to proceed to trial and win, win again on appeal, and only

then first proceed toward funding and closing. This process could take months. The

other much less likely possibility is the debt is not funded and the deal does not close,

in which case any potential claims Twitter may have will have just arisen based on

brand new facts. Either way, a trial on October 17 based on the existing claims and

the existing factual record is at best an utter futility for Twitter.

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 BACKGROUND

5. Given Twitter’s recalcitrance, Defendants have no choice but to submit

a proposed Stipulation and Order, effective upon entry by the Court, that would bind

them to take all actions necessary, proper or advisable to consummate the Debt

Financing and perform the Merger Agreement and Equity Commitment Letter upon

their terms and conditions. We ask the Court to enter that Order to put an end to this

dispute and facilitate the prompt closing of this transaction.

6. Twitter filed this lawsuit on July 12, 2022, seeking specific

performance of Defendants’ obligations under the Merger Agreement and requesting

that Defendants be enjoined from further breaches, ordered to work toward

satisfying the Merger Agreement’s closing conditions, and ordered to close upon

satisfaction of those conditions. Compl. ¶ 11.

7. Twitter alleged that it is entitled to specific performance under Section

9.9(b) of the Merger Agreement, assuming the following conditions are met: (i) all

of the conditions set forth in Section 7.1 and Section 7.2 have or will be satisfied at

the closing; (ii) the debt financing has been funded or will be funded at the closing

if the equity financing is funded; and (iii) the company has confirmed that the

closing will occur. Id. at ¶ 153 (emphasis added).

8. Twitter further alleged that “[a]ll of the conditions set forth in Sections

7.1 and 7.2 have been satisfied or waived, or are expected to be satisfied or waived

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at the closing, and the closing will occur if the debt and equity financing are funded,

which funding is solely within the control of defendants.” Id. at ¶ 154 (emphasis

added).

9. In its prayer for relief, Twitter requested the Court enter judgment and

relief against Defendants as follows: “(A) [g]ranting all relief requested in this

complaint to the extent permitted under the merger agreement; (B) [o]rdering

Defendants to specifically perform their obligations under the merger agreement and

consummate the closing in accordance with the terms of the merger agreement; and

(C) [g]ranting such injunctive relief as is necessary to enforce the decree of specific

performance.” Id. at 61.

10. On July 19, 2022, although acknowledging that the committed Debt

Financing was not set to expire until April 2023, the Court granted expedition,

reasoning that “the longer the merger transaction remains in limbo, the larger the

cloud of uncertainty cast over the company, and the greater the risk of irreparable

harm to the sellers and to the target itself.” Dkt. 103 at 62-63.

11. Defendants filed their answer and counterclaims on July 29, 2022.

12. On October 3, 2022, Defendants’ counsel delivered a letter to Twitter

stating “that the Musk Parties intend to proceed to closing of the transaction

contemplated by the April 25, 2022 Merger Agreement, on the terms and subject to

the conditions set forth therein and pending receipt of the proceeds of the debt

5
financing contemplated thereby, provided that the Delaware Chancery Court enter

an immediate stay of the action, Twitter vs. Musk, et al. (C.A. No. 202-0613-KSJM)

(the “Action”) and adjourn the trial and all other proceedings related thereto pending

such closing or further order of the Court.” Dkt. 698, Ex. A at 1. Defendants also

filed this correspondence with the SEC.

13. On October 4, 2022, Twitter responded to Defendants’ letter, noting

that “[t]he intention of the Company is to close the transaction at $54.20 per share.”

A STAY OF TRIAL IS WARRANTED

14. This Court has the power to stay proceedings based on “efficiency or

simple common sense.” Paolino v. Mace Sec. Int’l, Inc., 985 A.2d 392, 397 (Del.

Ch. 2009). A stay is appropriate “to conserve limited judicial resources and to avoid

rendering a legally binding decision that could result in premature and possibly

unsound lawmaking.” In re Straight Path Commc’ns Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig.,

2017 WL 5565264, at *3 (Del. Ch. Nov. 20, 2017) (quotation omitted). “[A] stay

may be granted if it will substantially simplify the proceeding and the moving party

can clearly show that hardship or inequity will be avoided.” Harbor Ins. Co. v.

Newmount Min. Corp., 564 A.2d 352, 356 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989).

15. At the threshold, this Court should stay the action and remove the trial

from the calendar because no live dispute exists to be litigated. Accordingly, a stay

makes “common sense.” Paolino, 985 A.2d at 397.

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 16. “[T]he law requires that a dispute not be moot and that it be ripe for

adjudication to avoid wasting judicial resources on academic

disputes.” Crescent/Mach I Partners, 962 A.2d at 208–09. “If a claim is moot or

not ripe, the Court cannot assert subject matter jurisdiction over it.” Feldman v. AS

Roma SPV GP, LLC, 2021 WL 3087042, at *10 (Del. Ch. July 22, 2021); Multi-

Fineline Electronix, Inc. v. WBL Corp. Ltd., 2007 WL 431050, at *8 (Del. Ch. Feb.

2, 2007) (finding claims moot explaining that, “a court generally will not grant relief

if the substance of a dispute disappears due to the occurrence of certain events

following the filing of an action.”) (citation omitted).

17. First, Defendants’ agreement to move forward to closing in accordance

with the Merger Agreement will moot the relief Twitter seeks, justifying entry of a

stay. See Supernus Pharms., Inc. v. Reich Consulting Grp., Inc., 2021 WL 5046713,

at *3-4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2021) (holding that Securityholder Representative’s

counterclaim for specific performance under Merger Agreement was moot because

acquirer had since performed); Osborne v. City of Wilmington, 2009 WL 608536, at

*1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 2009) (staying action “in the interest of judicial economy”

when Senate bill “will moot some or all of the issues in this litigation”).

18. Defendants have proffered a stipulation that they are prepared to

consummate the transaction under the Merger Agreement upon receipt of the

proceeds of the Debt Financing. They are complying with their obligations under

7
Section 6.10. The Debt Financing parties have indicated that they are prepared to

honor their commitments and are working in good faith with Defendants on this

transaction and a closing is anticipated by approximately October 28. Thus, this

action is, or imminently will become, moot.

19. Second, any potential new relief Twitter might seek in the event the

debt is not funded is not ripe, is not pled in the existing complaint, and cannot

possibly be tried in eleven days.

20. A ripe dispute is “‘one where litigation sooner or later appears to be

unavoidable,’ and ‘one in which the material facts are static.’ This ‘common sense’

approach requires the court to decide whether the interests of those who seek relief

outweigh the interests of the court and of justice ‘in postponing review until the

question arises in some more concrete and final form.’” Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902

A.2d 737, 740 (Del. Ch. 2006) (quoting Stroud 552 A.2d at 480).

21. Any claims grounded in baseless speculation that the Debt Financing

may not successfully fund are not ripe for judicial determination. See Stroud, 552

A.2d at 480 (“Whenever a court examines a matter where facts are not fully

developed, it runs the risk not only of granting an incorrect judgment, but also of

taking an inappropriate or premature step in the development of the law.”). Further,

unable to allege that the Debt Financing will not occur, Twitter can assert no

cognizable harm. See Matter of Scottish Re (U.S.), Inc., 274 A.3d 1019, 1025, 1045

8
(Del. Ch. 2022) (explaining party lacks standing absent “a legally cognizable injury”

that is “(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or

hypothetical”).

22. Under analogous circumstances, the court in Hexion v. Spec. Chems.,

Inc. v. Oak-Bark Corp., 965 A.2d 715 (Del. Ch. 2008), deemed a similar issue unripe.

In Hexion, a party sought a declaration that, in the event the merger closed, the

combined entity would be insolvent. Id. at 757. The court declined to reach the

issue because insolvency was relevant only to the obligation of the lending banks to

ultimately fund the transaction, and thus unripe because the banks providing debt

financing had not yet determined whether to fund the debt. Id. at 758. The court

recognized that a “ripe dispute is therefore one not only where litigation ‘sooner or

later appears to be unavoidable,’ but in which ‘the material facts are static.’” Id. at

fn. 115 (quoting Stroud, 552 A.2d at 481).

23. This Court should likewise not make a ruling regarding debt issues that

are “not now properly framed by the terms of the merger agreement and the status

of the transaction.” Id.

24. In any event, the Merger Agreement does not permit an order of

specific performance causing Musk to fund the equity commitment or close the

transaction until the debt component of the merger consideration is funded. Section

9.9(b) of the Merger Agreement provides “Notwithstanding anything herein to the

9
contrary . . . the Company shall be entitled to specific performance or other equitable

remedy to enforce Parent and Acquisition Sub’s obligations to cause [Musk] to fund

the Equity Financing, or to enforce [Musk’s] obligation to fund the Equity Financing

directly, and to consummate the Closing if and for so long as . . . (ii) the Debt

Financing (or, as applicable, the Alternative Financing) has been funded or will be

funded at the Closing if the Equity Financing is funded at the Closing.” (emphasis

added).

25. If the Debt Financing does not fund, Twitter may not obtain an order of

specific performance under Section 9.9(b) causing Musk to fund the equity or close

the transaction. The Merger Agreement, which Twitter is seeking to enforce at trial,

unambiguously prohibits any court-ordered closing based on specific performance

absent funding of the debt.2 The absence of any basis for specific performance in

that scenario knocks the props out from under the original application for expedited

proceedings, warranting adjournment of the October 17 trial date. And, of course,

2
If Defendants refuse to close because the debt has not funded, Twitter could only
pursue a claim for breach against X Holdings I, Inc. The remedy for such breach
is that Twitter may terminate the Merger Agreement and seek a Parent
Termination Fee of $1 billion under Section 8.3(b). The Merger Agreement
expressly caps the amount under Section 8.3(c) even in the case of “knowing and
intentional breach.” Consistent with that cap, Musk signed a Limited Guarantee
of the Parent Termination Fee in the amount of $1 billion, which itself has an
express cap at that amount as well as a non-recourse provision. Ex. A.

10
if the debt does fund, as Defendants fully expect, then the transaction will close,

entirely mooting the need for specific performance.

26. Further, requiring Defendants to litigate moot or unripe disputes would

be a waste of the parties’ and the court’s resources. See In re Straight Path, 2017

WL 5565264, at *3. Accordingly, interests of judicial economy favor a stay.

27. A stay likewise is warranted because failing to issue a stay would lead

to an inequitable result.

28. Proceeding with trial will interfere with ongoing efforts to consummate

the transaction. Defendants are working diligently, cooperatively, and in good faith

with the financing banks to prepare for the closing. That funding, however, will take

time because the parties are working through the complex process of arranging $12.5

billion dollars of debt financing, including drafting required documentation,

arranging security interests for a portion of the debt financing, and finalizing funding

mechanics. Understandably, that cannot happen before the October 17 trial.3

29. This litigation will not expedite the financing, rather it will impede

Defendants’ and their counsel’s ability to work toward financing. 4 Rather than

3
Counsel for the financing banks have estimated they will need until October 28
to fund the loans.
4
While Twitter may assert that the Debt Financing is not a closing condition per
se, it is nevertheless a requirement for closing because X Holdings I, Inc. is a
holding company with de minimis assets entirely reliant on the debt and equity
financing to fund the transaction. Musk’s obligation to fund his equity
(cont’d)

11
focusing on coordinating with the banks to finalize financing, Defendants will

instead be forced to complete discovery and proceed to trial on claims that no longer

require disposition.

30. Finally, Twitter cannot show any prejudice from a brief stay of this

action to allow the parties to focus on closing. In the event a closing does not occur,

the litigation can promptly resume based on the then existing facts and whatever

issues remain at the time.

commitment portion was and remains expressly conditioned on receipt of the

debt financing. Musk is not a party to Sections 2 and 3 of the Merger Agreement,
which govern the obligation to close and make payments to stockholders at
$54.20 per share. Instead, X Holdings I, Inc.’s obligations to make such
payments are supported by (i) an Equity Commitment Letter (“ECL”) provided
by Musk in the amount of $27.25 billion and (ii) a Bank Debt Commitment Letter
in the amount of $12.5 billion. The ECL itself is expressly conditioned on
“substantially contemporaneous receipt by Parent or Acquisition sub of the
cash proceeds of the Debt Financing contemplated by the Debt Commitment
Letters in accordance with the terms and conditions of such Debt Commitment
Letters or any Alternative Financing.” Ex. B § 1(iii).

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 CONCLUSION

The trial should be adjourned proceedings stayed pending funding of the Debt

Financing and closing of the transaction, and the Court should enter the proposed

stipulation and order.

/s/ Edward B. Micheletti

OF COUNSEL: Edward B. Micheletti (ID No. 3794)
Lauren N. Rosenello (ID No. 5581)
Alex Spiro SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE,
Andrew J. Rossman MEAGHER & FLOM LLP
Christopher D. Kercher 920 North King Street, 7th Floor
Silpa Maruri P.O. Box 636
SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, Wilmington, Delaware 19899-0636
MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (302) 651-3000
51 Madison Avenue, 22nd Floor
New York, New York 10010 Attorneys for Defendants
and Counterclaim-Plaintiffs
Elon R. Musk, X Holdings I, Inc.,
and X Holdings II, Inc.

Words: 2,873
DATED: October 6, 2022

13
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Edward B. Micheletti, hereby certify that on October 6, 2022, a copy of

Defendants and Counterclaim-Plaintiffs’ Motion to Stay Pending Closing of the

Transaction with Exhibits A-B and [Proposed] Order was served electronically via

File & ServeXpress upon the following counsel of record:

Peter J. Walsh, Jr. (ID No. 2437) David J. Margules (ID No. 2254)
Kevin R. Shannon (ID No. 3137) Elizabeth A. Sloan (ID No. 5045)
Christopher N. Kelly (ID No. 5717) Elizabeth S. Fenton (ID No. 5563)
Mathew A. Golden (ID No. 6035) Jessica C. Watt (ID No. 5932)
Callan R. Jackson (ID No. 6292) Brittany M Giusini (ID No. 6034)
Justin T. Hymes (ID No. 6671) BALLARD SPAHR LLP
POTTER ANDERSON 919 North Market Street, 11th Floor
& CORROON LLP Wilmington, Delaware 19801
1313 North Market Street (302) 252-4465
Hercules Plaza, 6th Floor
Wilmington, Delaware 19801 Attorneys for Plaintiff and
(302) 984-6000 Counterclaim Defendant Twitter, Inc.

Attorneys for Plaintiff and

Counterclaim Defendant Twitter, Inc.

Brad D. Sorrels (ID No. 5233) Jacob R. Kirkham (ID No. 5768)
Daniyal M. Iqbal (ID No. 6167) KOBRE & KIM LLP
Leah E. León (ID No. 6536) 600 North King Street, Suite 501
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH Wilmington, Delaware 19801
& ROSATI, P.C. (302) 518-6460
222 Delaware Avenue, Suite 800
Wilmington, Delaware 19801 Attorneys for Plaintiff and
(302) 304-7600 Counterclaim Defendant Twitter, Inc.

Attorneys for Plaintiff and

Counterclaim Defendant Twitter, Inc.
Robert A. Weber (ID No. 4013)
Joseph B. Cicero (ID No. 4388)
Elliott Covert (ID No. 6540)
CHIPMAN BROWN CICERO
& COLE, LLP
Hercules Plaza
1313 North Market Street, Suite 5400
Wilmington, Delaware 19801
(302) 295-0191

Attorneys for Defendants and

Counterclaim-Plaintiffs
Elon R. Musk, X Holdings I, Inc.,
and X Holdings II, Inc.

/s/ Edward B. Micheletti

Edward B. Micheletti (ID No. 3794)