BAR 2022 - Constitutional Law Part II - Alexis F. Medina - SSCR LAW

Updated as of January 30, 2022
2022 BAR REVIEW NOTES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PART II.
Selected Recent Jurisprudence 1
By Atty. Alexis F. Medina2
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The right against unreasonable searches

and seizures as a component of the right to
privacy
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a component of the

right to privacy. -- The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our
Constitution. It has many dimensions. One of its dimensions is its protection through the
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
(People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014)
As a component of the right to privacy, the fundamental right against unlawful searches
and seizures is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution. (Veridiano v. People, June 7, 2017,
G.R. No. 200370)
The meaning of “search”
There is a “search” within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition if

there is an intrusion into a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. -- The
Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated
the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted
a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic
device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have
no constitutional significance. (Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347)
In the seminal case of Katz v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
electronic surveillance of a phone conversation without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment
[constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures]. According to the U.S. Supreme
Court, what the Fourth Amendment protects are people, not places such that what a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his or her own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection in much the same way that what he or she seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. Further, Justice John
Harlan laid down in his concurring opinion the two-part test that would trigger the application of
the Fourth Amendment. First, a person exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.
Second, the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).
The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure ultimately stems from a person's right
to privacy. Hence, only when the State intrudes into a person's expectation of privacy, which
society regards as reasonable, is the Fourth Amendment triggered. Conversely, where a person
1 This collection of summaries, excerpts or capsules of selected recent jurisprudence is a work in progress, subject to continuing
revision and updating. Reproduction for purely academic purposes with due attribution to the author is permitted.
2 AB Political Science, University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman; Order of the Purple Feather (OPF), UP, College of Law;
Valedictorian, San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila, College of Law; Teaches Constitutional Law at San Sebastian College-
Recoletos, Manila, College of Law, and Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), Manila, College of Law; Taught
Constitutional Law at New Era University, College of Law; Litigation Lawyer; Partner and Head of Public Private Partnership
(PPP) Group, LIBRA LAW, https://libralaw.ph/
RECOLETOS LAW REVIEW 2022 Bar Review Notes in Constitutional Law – by Atty. Alexis F. Medina Page 1
does not have an expectation of privacy or one's expectation of privacy is not reasonable to society,
the alleged State intrusion is not a "search" within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
(Saluday v. People, April 3, 2018, G.R. No. 215305)
The reasonable expectation of privacy test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the
individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one
that society recognizes as reasonable. -- In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the
right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. This test determines
whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been
violated. In Ople v. Torres, we enunciated that "the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of
privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an
expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable."
Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individual’s
"reasonable expectation of privacy." Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of
privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances
surrounding the case.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form
of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal
process. (Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)
Examples of a “search”
Mandatory drug testing as a search. -- Drug testing effects a search within the
meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board,
G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008)
In the present case, though, petitioner was arrested for extortion; he resisted having his
urine sample taken; and finally, his urine sample was the only available evidence that was used as
basis for his conviction for the use of illegal drugs. The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s
right to privacy and right against self-incrimination. It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused
to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test.
He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still
compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those circumstances.
In the face of the constitutional guarantees [against unreasonable searches and seizures
and self-incrimination], we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the
crime or offense for which the arrest is being made. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, July
23, 2014)
Restricting and blocking access to computer data as a search and seizure. --

Sec. 19 of RA 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, provides: Restricting or Blocking
Access to Computer Data — When a computer data is prima facie found to be in violation of the
provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to such computer
data. Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and violates the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Computer data may refer to entire programs or lines
of code, including malware, as well as files that contain texts, images, audio, or video recordings.
It is indisputable that computer data, produced or created by their writers or authors may
constitute personal property. Consequently, they are protected from unreasonable searches and
seizures, whether while stored in their personal computers or in the service provider’s systems.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in one’s
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no search warrant shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge. Here, the Government, in effect, seizes
and places the computer data under its control and disposition without a warrant. The
Department of Justice order cannot substitute for judicial search warrant. (Disini v. Secretary of
Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014)
Accessing and copying contents of a computer hard drive. -- Accessing and

copying of the contents of the hard drive of a computer constitute a search. (see Pollo v.
Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)
Disclosure, interception, search, seizure, and/or examination, of computer

data. -- Note that the Supreme Court already issued the Rules of Cybercrime Warrants (A.M.
No.17-11-03-SC dated 03 July 2018) covering the procedure for the application and grant of
warrants and related orders involving the preservation, disclosure, interception, search, seizure,
and/or examination, as well as the custody, and destruction of computer data, as provided under
Republic Act No. (RA) 10175, otherwise known as the "Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012."
Use of surveillance cameras to cover places where there is reasonable

expectation of privacy. -- In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed
practically everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone. The installation of these cameras,
however, should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the
consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should
these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another’s residence or business office as it would
be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-
Wiretapping Law. (Hing v. Choachuy, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013)
The state action requirement in the application

of the constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures
The Bill of Rights does not govern relationships between individuals; it

cannot be invoked against the acts of private individuals. If the search is made at the
behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and
private purposes, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of
private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. The protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals. -- The Bill of Rights does not govern relationships between individuals; it
cannot be invoked against the acts of private individuals. If the search is made upon the request
of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality.
However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention
of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only
the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals
so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. Hence, items
seized pursuant to a reasonable search conducted by private persons are not covered by the
exclusionary rule (De la Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016, citing People v.
Marti, G.R. No. 81561, January 18, 1991)
When private individuals are considered agents of the state: Security

personnel of the Cebu Port Authority should be considered agents of the
government under the Constitution. The actions of port personnel during routine
security checks at ports have the color of a state-related function and thus they are
deemed agents of government. -- The Cebu Port Authority is clothed with authority by the
state to oversee the security of persons and vehicles within its ports. While there is a distinction
between port personnel and port police officers in this case, considering that port personnel are
not necessarily law enforcers, both should be considered agents of government under Article III
of the Constitution. The actions of port personnel during routine security checks at ports have the
color of a state-related function. Port security personnel’s functions having the color of state-
related functions and deemed agents of government. (De la Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387,
January 11, 2016)
A search by agents of persons in authority, such as barangay tanods, is

covered by the Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures. -- However, barangay tanods sought by the police authorities to effect the search
warrant act as agents of persons in authority. The Local Government Code also contains a
provision which describes the function of a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority.
Thus, the search conducted by such barangay tanods is covered by the Constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable search and seizure. (Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012)
Barangay tanods and barangay chairmen are also considered law enforcers
or agents of the government for purposes of the prohibitions in the Bill of Rights. --
Barangay tanods and barangay chairmen can be deemed law enforcement officers for purposes of
the application of the Bill of Rights. Similarly, port security personnel’s functions having the color
of state-related functions are deemed agents of government for purposes of the application of the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387,
January 11, 2016)
Bantay Bayan civilian volunteers are deemed law enforcers for purposes of
the prohibitions in the Bill of Rights. -- The acts of the Bantay Bayan - or any barangay-
based or other civilian volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups - relating to the
preservation of peace and order in their respective areas have the color of a state-related function.
As such, they should be deemed as law enforcement authorities for the purpose of applying the
Bill of Rights. Consequently, evidence obtained by them during an illegal search is inadmissible
as evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule under the Constitution. (Miguel v. People, G.R. No.
227038, July 31, 2017)
The requirement of reasonableness

for a valid search
The constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches

and seizures as it operates only against “unreasonable” searches and seizures.
Searches and seizures are as a rule unreasonable, unless authorized by a validly
issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. -- The constitutional guarantee is not a blanket
prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates only against “unreasonable” searches
and seizures. (Saluday v. People, G.R. No. 215305, April 3, 2018)
The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of
"unreasonable" searches and seizures. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18,
2011)
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
I.
Unreasonable: Searches and Seizures Without a Warrant
A search and seizure must be carried through a judicial warrant; otherwise,

such search and seizure become “unreasonable.” -- As a rule, a search and seizure
operation conducted by the authorities is reasonable only when a court issues a search warrant
after it has determined the existence of probable cause through the personal examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses presented before the court, with the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized particularly described. (People v. Sapla,
G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020)
The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through a
judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure violates the Constitution. Any
evidence resulting from it shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
-- Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the inviolability of a person's right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried
out through a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure violates the Constitution. Any
evidence resulting from it shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Manibog v.
People, March 20, 2019, G.R. No. 211214)
A search and seizure carried out without a judicial warrant becomes

"unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitution. -- Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the
strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which, such
search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision.
To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2),24 Article III of the
1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall
be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. (Sindac v. People, G.R. No.
220732, September 06, 2016; People v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 234207, June 10, 2019)
A proclamation of a state of emergency by a provincial governor, with an

order to conduct general warrantless searches and seizures, is void. Even a
declaration of martial law by the President does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution. -- Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 (Proclamation 1-09),
declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. It cited the kidnapping incident as a ground
for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A.
9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160). In the same
Proclamation, respondent Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints and
chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary
to ensure public safety. Petitioners cite the implementation of "General Search and Seizure
including arrests in the pursuit of the kidnappers and their supporters," as being violative of the
constitutional proscription on general search warrants and general seizures. Petitioners rightly
assert that this alone would be sufficient to render the proclamation void, as general searches and
seizures are proscribed, for being violative of the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. In fact,
respondent governor has arrogated unto himself powers exceeding even the martial law powers
of the President, because as the Constitution itself declares, "A state of martial law does not
suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ." (Kulayan v. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 03, 2012)
Cybercrime warrants: The disclosure, interception, search, seizure, and/or

examination, of computer data related to a cybercrime must be authorized by the
courts through the issuance of a cybercrime warrant. -- The Supreme Court already
issued the Rules of Cybercrime Warrants (A.M. No.17-11-03-SC dated 03 July 2018) covering the
procedure for the application and grant of warrants and related orders involving the preservation,
disclosure, interception, search, seizure, and/or examination, as well as the custody, and
destruction of computer data, as provided under Republic Act No. (RA) 10175, otherwise known
as the "Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012."
II.
Unreasonable: Searches and Seizures under an Invalid Warrant
A search warrant must conform strictly to the constitutional requirements

for its issuance; otherwise, it is void, and the search conducted on its authority is
likewise null and void. -- A search warrant must conform strictly to the constitutional
requirements for its issuance; otherwise, it is void. In the light of the nullity of a search warrant,
the search conducted on its authority is likewise null and void. Under the Constitution, any
evidence obtained in violation of a person’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Ogayon v. People, G.R. No. 188794,
September 2, 2015)
Requisites for a valid search warrant: 1) probable cause; 2) to be determined

personally by the judge; 3) judge must examine under oath or affirmation the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce; and 4) the warrant must
particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
-- A warrant, to be valid, must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be issued upon
"probable cause;" (2) probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) such judge
must examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; and
(4) the warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized. (People v. Gabiosa, G.R. No. 248395, January 29, 2020)
The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2)
such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in
writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. (Castillo v.
People, G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012)
Additional requirements for the validity of a warrant under the Rules of Court:
Warrant must be in connection with one specific offense and the judge must
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. -- Additionally, Rule 126, Sections 4 and
5 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provide for the requisites for the issuance of a search
warrant, to wit:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in
the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
(People v. Pastrana, G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018)
Requirement: Probable cause: Probable cause for a search warrant means the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with said offense are in the place to be searched. -- In search
warrant proceedings, probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. (People v.
Pastrana, G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018; World Wide Web Corporation v. People, G.R.
No. 161106, January 13, 2014)
There must be probable cause – the existence of such facts and circumstances which could
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense is in the place to be
searched. (People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066, August 11, 2010)
Requirement: Determination by a judge of probable cause: The judge must
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and
under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them. -- Under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant is central to the right, and its existence largely depends on the
finding of the judge conducting the examination. To substantiate a finding of probable cause, the
Rules of Court specifically require that – Rule 126, Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record.
– The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements
together with the affidavits submitted. (Ogayon v. People, G.R. No. 188794, September 2, 2015)
Duty of the judge before issuing a search warrant: The judge must conduct a
full and searching examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. -- In an application for search warrant, the mandate of the judge is for him to conduct
a full and searching examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The
searching questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses must depend on a large extent
upon the discretion of the judge. Although there is no hard-and-fast rule as to how a judge may
conduct his examination, it is axiomatic that the said examination must be probing and exhaustive
and not merely routinary, general, peripheral or perfunctory. He must make his own inquiry on
the intent and factual and legal justifications for a search warrant. (Dimal v. People, G.R. No.
216922, April 18, 2018)
There must be, in the records, particular facts and circumstances that were
considered by the judge as sufficient to make an independent evaluation of the
existence of probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant. --
Compliance with the examination requirement is shown by the depositions and the transcript. In
their absence, however, a warrant may still be upheld if there is evidence in the records that the
requisite examination was made and probable cause was based thereon. There must be, in the
records, particular facts and circumstances that were considered by the judge as sufficient to make
an independent evaluation of the existence of probable cause to justify the issuance of the search
warrant. (Ogayon v. People, G.R. No. 188794, September 2, 2015)
Extent of required examination by the judge: The judge must conduct a full
and searching examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. -
- In an application for search warrant, the mandate of the judge is for him to conduct a full and
searching examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The searching
questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses must depend on a large extent upon the
discretion of the judge. Although there is no hard-and-fast rule as to how a judge may conduct his
examination, it is axiomatic that the said examination must be probing and exhaustive and not
merely routinary, general, peripheral or perfunctory. He must make his own inquiry on the intent
and factual and legal justifications for a search warrant. (Ogayon v. People, September 2, 2015)
In the absence of records indicating that the issuing judge personally and
thoroughly examined the applicant and his witnesses, the search warrant is a nullity.
-- A judge’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is accorded great
deference by a reviewing court, so long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Apart
from the statement in the search warrant itself, we find nothing in the records of this case
indicating that the issuing judge personally and thoroughly examined the applicant and his
witnesses. The absence of depositions and transcripts of the examination was already admitted.
The records, bear no evidence from which we can infer that the requisite examination was made,
and from which the factual basis for probable cause to issue the search warrant was derived. Based
on the lack of substantial evidence that the search warrant was issued after the requisite
examination of the complainant and his witnesses was made, the Court declares Search Warrant
No. AEK 29-2003 a nullity. (Ogayon v. People, September 2, 2015)
Requirement: One specific offense: A search warrant must be issued in
relation to one specific offense. -- The Rules of Court requires that a search warrant must be
issued in relation to one specific offense. A search warrant applied for and issued in connection
with the crime of kidnapping with murder does not violate this rule because the kidnapping with
murder or homicide is one special complex crime. (Dimal v. People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18,
2018)
Reason for the one specific offense requirement in search warrants: To
ensure that the warrant is issued only on the basis of probable cause. -- One of the
constitutional requirements for the validity of a search warrant is that it must be issued based on
probable cause which, under the Rules, must be in connection with one specific offense to prevent
the issuance of a scatter-shot warrant. In search warrant proceedings, probable cause is defined
as such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched. For a judge to find probable cause to issue a warrant, there
must be competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts,
or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. The one-
specific-offense requirement reinforces the constitutional requirement that a search warrant
should issue only on the basis of probable cause. (People v. Pastrana, G.R. No. 196045, February
21, 2018)
Search warrant must be in connection with one particular offense. Otherwise,
it would be impossible for the judges to find the existence of probable cause. The
purpose is to outlaw general warrants. -- One of the constitutional requirements for the
validity of a search warrant is that it must be issued based on probable cause which, under the
Rules, must be in connection with one specific offense to prevent the issuance of a scatter-shot
warrant. In search warrant proceedings, probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances
that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched. (People v. Pastrana, G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018)
The one-specific-offense requirement reinforces the constitutional
requirement that a search warrant should issue only on the basis of probable cause.
-- The one-specific-offense requirement reinforces the constitutional requirement that a search
warrant should issue only on the basis of probable cause. Since the primary objective of applying
for a search warrant is to obtain evidence to be used in a subsequent prosecution for an offense
for which the search warrant was applied, a judge issuing a particular warrant must satisfy himself
that the evidence presented by the applicant establishes the facts and circumstances relating to
this specific offense for which the warrant is sought and issued. (People v. Pastrana, G.R. No.
196045, February 21, 2018)
The search warrant must be in connection with one specific offense: A search
warrant for violation of the Securities Regulation Code and Estafa is invalid. -- A
search warrant for "violation of R.A. No. 8799 (The Securities Regulation Code) and for estafa
(Art. 315, RPC)” violates the requirement that the warrant must be in connection with one specific
offense. Violation of the SRC is not an offense in itself for there are several punishable acts under
the said law such as manipulation of security prices, insider trading, acting as dealer or broker
without being registered with the SEC, use of unregistered exchange, use of unregistered clearing
agency, and violation of the restrictions on borrowings by members, brokers, and dealers among
others. Moreover, the violation of the SRC and estafa are offenses entirely different from each
other and neither one necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other. (People v.
Pastrana, G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018)
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community. The specific room in the house
to be searched need not be identified. – Accused-appellant insists that the items allegedly
seized from her house are inadmissible as evidence because the Search Warrant failed to
particularly describe the place to be searched because the house was a two-story building
composed of several rooms. A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation or description that points out
the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace
officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the case at bar, the address
and description of the place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific enough. There was
only one house located at the stated address, which was accused-appellant's residence, consisting
of a structure with two floors and composed of several rooms. (People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066,
August 11, 2010)
The search must be limited to the place described in the warrant: A search
and seizure conducted 20 meters away from the residence described in the search
warrant is invalid for being conducted in a place other than the one described in the
search warrant. -- A warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or description that points
out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the
peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the present case,
Search Warrant No. 570-9-1197-2420 specifically designates or describes the residence of the
petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in
a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having
been found in a place other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as
fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of
petitioner's constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. (Castillo v.
People, G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012)
Requirement: Particular description of the things to be seized: Section 2, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things
to be seized. (Dimal v. People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018)
Purpose of the requirement of particularity of description: Limit the things

to be seized to those particularly described in the search warrant in order to leave
the officers of the law with no discretion on what articles to seize. --The purpose for
this requirement is to limit the articles to be seized only to those particularly described in the
search warrant in order to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what items
they shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and seizures will be committed. (Dimal
v. People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018)
A general warrant is a search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the
person to be arrested or the property to be seized. It gives the officer executing the
warrant the discretion over which items to take, and makes the person, against
whom the warrant is issued, vulnerable to abuses. -- A general warrant is defined as "(a)
search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person to be arrested or the property to be
seized." It is one that allows the "seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another" and
gives the officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take. Such discretion is
abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is issued, vulnerable to abuses.
(Worldwide Web Corporation v. People, G.R. No. 161106, January 13, 2014)
A search warrant is not a sweeping authority for a fishing expedition to search
and seizure of any evidence. The search is limited in scope. -- A search warrant is not a
sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to confiscate
any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. Objects taken which were not specified
in the search warrant should be restored to the person from whom they were unlawfully seized.
(Dimal v. People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018)
What may be searched and seized under a search warrant: Subject of the
offense; stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or used or
intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.-- Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court, amplify the rules regarding the following places and items to be searched
under a search warrant:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of personal property: a) Subject of the offense; b) Stolen or embezzled
and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or c) Used or intended to be used as the means
of committing an offense.
(World Wide Web Corporation v. People, G.R. No. 161106, January 13, 2014)
Test of particularity of description of the things to be seized: When the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when
it is a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the warrant officer may be guided;
or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the
offense. -- A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized (1) when
the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or (2) when the
description expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided
in making the search and seizure; (3) and when the things to be described are limited to those
which bear direct relation to the offenses for which the warrant is being issued. (Dimal v. People,
G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018; Laud v. People, G.R. No. 199032, November 19, 2014)
A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of the things to
be seized when the things described are limited to those that bear a direct relation to the offense
for which the warrant is being issued. (World Wide Web Corporation v, People, G.R. No. 161106,
January 13, 2014)
Test of particularity of description: Technical precision of description is not
required, or precise and minute details. The warrant is valid when it enables the
police officers to readily identify the properties to be seized and leaves them with no
discretion regarding the articles to be seized. -- The things to be seized must be described
with particularity. Technical precision of description is not required. It is only necessary that there
be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and
seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. Indeed, the law does not
require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no
room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. A search warrant need not describe the
items to be seized in precise and minute detail. The warrant is valid when it enables the police
officers to readily identify the properties to be seized and leaves them with no discretion regarding
the articles to be seized. (World Wide Web Corporation v. People, G.R. No. 161106, January 13,
2014)
Particular description of the things to be seized: The warrant is void for lack
of particularity if the description is too all-embracing, subjecting all documents
pertaining to the transactions of respondents, whether legal or illegal, to search and
seizure.-- To be valid, a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and
the things to be seized. A search warrant for violation R.A. 8799 and (The Securities Regulation
Code) and Estafa and ordering the seizure of telephone bills showing the companies’ calls to
clients abroad; list of brokers and their personal files; incorporation papers of all these companies,
sales agreements with clients; copies of official receipts purposely for clients; fax messages from
the clients; company brochures; letterheads -- is null and void for having been issued for more
than one offense and for lack of particularity in the description of the things sought for seizure.
The terms used in this warrant were too all-embracing, thus, subjecting all documents pertaining
to the transactions of respondents, whether legal or illegal, to search and seizure. (People v.
Pastrana, G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018)
Particular description of items to be searched and seized: Items must bear
direct relation to the offenses for which the warrant is being issued. Thus, the
inclusion of a sacks of palay in the things to be seized under the warrant is invalid
because such items have no relation to the crime of kidnapping with murder. -- A
search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized (1) when the description
therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or (2) when the description
expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making
the search and seizure; (3) and when the things to be described are limited to those which bear
direct relation to the offenses for which the warrant is being issued. The purpose for this
requirement is to limit the articles to be seized only to those particularly described in the search
warrant in order to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what items they shall
seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and seizures will be committed. Only objects that
are (a) subject of the offense; (b) stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense;
or (c) those used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense, can be the proper
subject of a search warrant. Having no direct relation to the crime of kidnapping with homicide,
the 1,600 sacks of palay that were supposedly sold by the victims to the accused and found in his
warehouse, cannot be a proper subject of a search warrant. (Dimal v. People, G.R. No. 216922,
April 18, 2018)
The seizure of goods not described in the warrant does not render the whole seizure illegal,
and the seizure is illegal only as to those things which was unlawful to seize; and (2) the fact that
the officers, after making a legal search and seizure under the warrant, illegally made a search and
seizure of other property not within the warrant does not invalidate the first search and seizure.
Seizure of goods not described in the warrant does not render the whole
seizure illegal, and the seizure is illegal only as to those things unlawful to seized. --
The seizure of goods not described in the warrant does not render the whole seizure illegal, and
the seizure is illegal only as to those things which was unlawful to seize; and (2) the fact that the
officers, after making a legal search and seizure under the warrant, illegally made a search and
seizure of other property not within the warrant does not invalidate the first search and seizure.
A.
Valid Warrantless Searches

GENERAL RULE:
The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through a
judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure violates the Constitution. --
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides for the inviolability of a person's right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried
out through a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure violates the Constitution. Any
evidence resulting from it shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Manibog v.
People, G.R. No. 211214, March 20, 2019)
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of
probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the
meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and
seizures, Section 3 (2),24 Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding. (Sindac v. People, G.R. No. 220732, September 06, 2016; People v. Cristobal, G.R.
No. 234207, June 10, 2019)
EXCEPTIONS:
Valid warrantless searches
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution requires a warrant to be issued by a judge
before a search can be validly effected. The rule requiring warrants is, however, not absolute.
Jurisprudence recognizes exceptional instances when warrantless searches and seizures are
considered permissible:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view";
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
(People v. Sison, G.R. No. 238453, July 31, 2019; Manibog v. People, G.R. No. 211214,
March 20, 2019)
Reasonable warrantless searches and seizures. -- As a rule, a search and seizure
operation conducted by the authorities is reasonable only when a court issues a search warrant
after it has determined the existence of probable cause through the personal examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses presented before the court, with the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized particularly described. (People v. Sapla,
G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020)
VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCHES & SEIZURES
1. Search incident to a lawful arrest
The rule on searches incident to a lawful arrest: A person lawfully arrested

may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. --
Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure: A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without
a search warrant. (Vaporoso v. People, G.R. No. 238659, June 03, 2019)
A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may
have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
(Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; People v. Che Chun Ting, 328
SCRA 592, March 21, 2000)
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person
arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect
his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.
In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence
on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. (Valeroso v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 164815, September 3, 2009)
Purpose of search incident to a lawful arrest: Protect the arresting officer

from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed
weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. -- Searches
and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Section 13. Search incident to a lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in
the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is to
protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with
a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. It is
therefore a reasonable exercise of the State's police power to protect: (a) law enforcers from the
injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (b) evidence
from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the
integrity of the evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee. (Vaporoso v.
People, G.R. No. 238659, June 03, 2019; People v. Calantiao, G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014 )
The requirement of lawful arrest prior to the search: For a valid search
incident to a lawful arrest, the lawful arrest must precede the search; the process
cannot be reversed. -- A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a
lawful arrest before a search is made. Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search;
the process cannot be reversed. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)
There must be a valid arrest before there can be a valid search incident to a
lawful arrest. -- The determination of validity of the warrantless arrest would also determine
the validity of the warrantless search that was incident to the arrest. (Dominguez v. People, G.R.
No. 235898, March 13, 2019)
In a search incident to a lawful arrest, there must be a lawful arrest preceding

the search, the process cannot be reversed. An arrest is effected by an actual
restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to
the custody of the one making the arrest. -- There must be a valid warrantless search and
seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, which must precede the search. For this
purpose, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the
process cannot be reversed. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she
may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of
the person to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one
making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical
restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. (Homar v. People, G.R. No. 182534,
September 2, 2015)
A lawful arrest must precede the search, the process cannot be reversed: An
arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his
voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. There is no
valid search incident to a lawful arrest when the search and discovery of illegal
drugs in the possession of a person preceded the arrest. -- A search as an incident to a
lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The law requires that the search be incidental to
a lawful arrest. Therefore, a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings;
the process cannot be reversed. Here, the search preceded the arrest of Sanchez. There was no
arrest prior to the conduct of the search. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody
that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is effected by an actual
restraint of the person to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest. Even casting aside the petitioner’s version and basing the resolution of this
case on the general thrust of the prosecution evidence, no arrest was effected by the police
operatives upon the person of Sanchez before conducting the search on him. After the police
caught up with the tricycle, its driver and the passenger, Sanchez, alighted from it; the noticed
Sanchez holding a match box and requested Sanchez if he could see the contents of the match box,
to which the petitioner acceded and handed it over to him. The arrest of Sanchez was made only
after the discovery by SPO1 Amposta of the shabu inside the match box. Evidently, what happened
in this case was that a search was first undertaken and then later an arrest was effected based on
the evidence produced by the search. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)
A lawful arrest must precede the search: There is no valid search incident to
a lawful arrest when the police conducted the search after they accosted a person
for jaywalking, without any intent to arrest. -- When Tan and Tangcoy allegedly saw the
petitioner jaywalking, they did not arrest him but accosted him and pointed to him the right place
for crossing. In fact, they immediately accosted him and told him to cross at the designated area.
Tan and Tangcoy did not intend to bring the petitioner under custody or to restrain his liberty.
From Tan's testimony, the intent to arrest the petitioner only came after they allegedly confiscated
the shabu from the petitioner. The indispensability of the intent to arrest an accused in a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest was emphasized in Luz vs. People of the Philippines.
The respondent’s argument that there was a lawful search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest
for jaywalking appears to be an afterthought in order to justify a warrantless search conducted on
the person of the petitioner. (Homar v. People, G.R. No. 182534, September 2, 2015)
A lawful arrest must precede the search: There is no valid search incident to
a lawful arrest if a motorcycle driver is stopped/flagged down for a traffic violation
that is punishable by a fine and subjected to a search, as there can be no lawful
warrantless arrest for an offense punishable by a fine. -- The seized items were
confiscated from Cristobal as he was being issued a traffic violation ticket. His violations consisted
of (1) not wearing a helmet while driving a motorcycle, and (2) being unable to show the original
receipt (OR) and certificate of registration (CR) of the motorcycle he was riding. A violation of the
law requiring the use of helmets while driving a motorcycle is only punishable by fine.
Meanwhile, Cristobal's second violation - failure to furnish the OR and CR of the motorcycle - is
likewise punishable only by fine. Stated simply, the police officers involved in this case conducted
an illegal search when they frisked Cristobal on the basis of the foregoing violations. It was not,
as it could not have been a search incidental to a lawful arrest as there was no, as there could not
have been any, lawful arrest to speak of.
In the case of Luz vs. People, a case strikingly similar to the present case, a man who was
driving a motorcycle was flagged down for violating a municipal ordinance requiring drivers of
motorcycles to wear a helmet. While the police officer was issuing him a ticket, the officer noticed
that the man was uneasy and kept touching something in his jacket. When the officer ordered the
man to take the thing out of his jacket, it was discovered that it was a small tin can which contained
sachets of shabu. When the man was prosecuted for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
Court acquitted the accused as the confiscated drugs were discovered through an unlawful search,
observing that there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing
a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking
of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that person's
voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual
force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the
other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and
impression that submission is necessary. Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender,
but the confiscation of the driver's license of the latter. It also appears that, according to City
Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while
riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need
not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may
be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense. The case
of Luz squarely applies in the present case. There was similarly no lawful arrest in this case as
Cristobal's violations were only punishable by fine. There was thus no valid search incidental to a
lawful arrest. (People v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 234207, June 10, 2019)
Meaning of arrest: An arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to

be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one
making the arrest. A motorist flagged down by the police for a traffic violation is not
“arrested” if there is no intention on the part of the police to arrest him, deprive him
of his liberty, or take him into custody. There being no valid arrest, the warrantless
search that resulted from it was likewise illegal. – There was no valid arrest of petitioner.
When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for
this reason, arrested. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be
bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person
to be arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest.
Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a
formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one
of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit,
under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. Under R.A. 4136, or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not
the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter. At the time that
he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been
"under arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his
liberty, or take him into custody. There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted
from it was likewise illegal. (Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012)
If the offense is penalized by a fine only, there can be no warrantless arrest for
such an offense. -- The petitioner cannot be considered "under arrest" at the time that his
traffic citation was being made. Under City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by
petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only.
Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was
filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. Neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an
offense. This does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. When there is an
intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into
custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the
officer’s issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for
the same violation. (Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012)
Limits to a search incidental to a lawful arrest:
Limitation as to Area: Immediate Control Test: A valid arrest allows the

seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested
or within the area of his immediate control. The “area of his immediate control"
means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence. -- In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the
apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect, but
also in the permissible area within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the
seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the
area of his immediate control. The phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the
area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. (People v.
Calantiao, G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014)
Thus, a bag in the possession of the person arrested is within his immediate
control and the apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless search of
the bag. -- In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiao’s possession
and within his immediate control. He could have easily taken any weapon from the bag or
dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it. As the black bag containing the marijuana was in
Calantiao’s possession, it was within the permissible area that the apprehending officers could
validly conduct a warrantless search. (People v. Calantiao, G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014)
When is there a lawful arrest?
Valid warrantless arrests: In flagrante delicto, hot pursuit and escaped

prisoner arrests. -- Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the
instances wherein a peace officer or a private person may lawfully arrest a person even without a
warrant:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.
Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a

warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must
concur: (l) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. (People v. Comprado, G.R. No.
213225, April 4, 2018; Vaporoso v. People, G.R. No. 238659, June 03, 2019; Veridiano v. People,
G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)
On the other hand, the elements of an arrest effected in hot pursuit under paragraph (b)
of Section 5 (arrest effected in hot pursuit) are: first, an offense has just been committed; and
second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. (People v. Comprado, G.R. No.
213225, April 4, 2018; Vaporoso v. People, G.R. No. 238659, June 03, 2019; Veridiano v. People,
G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) above has
been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described
as a "hot pursuit" arrest. (Pestilos v. Generoso and People, G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014)
Under paragraph (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime while under paragraph (b),
he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed. (People v. Villareal, G.R. No. 201363,
March 18, 2013)
In flagrante delicto arrest
In flagrante delicto arrest: A peace office of a private person may, without a

warrant, arrest a person, when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. -- A settled
exception to the right guaranteed by the above-stated provision is that of an arrest made during
the commission of a crime, which does not require a previously issued warrant. Such warrantless
arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace office of a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(Miclat v. People, G.R. No. 176077, August 31, 2011; People v. Chi Chan Liu, G.R. No.
189272, January 21, 2015)
In flagrante delicto arrest requirements: (1) the person to be arrested must

execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer. -- For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in
flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer. Trying to run away when approached by a police officer, even when no crime has been
overtly committed, and without more, cannot be evidence of guilt. Flight per se is not synonymous
with guilt. (People v. Edano, G.R. No. 188133, July 7, 2014)
For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to operate, two (2) elements must concur,
namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and ( b) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. (Comerciante v. People, G.R. No.
205926, July 22, 2015)
In flagrante delicto arrest requirements: 1) Overt act indicating that the

person has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and 2) the overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer. -- Requirements for a valid in flagrante delicto arrest to justify a subsequent warrantless
search: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No.
200370, 07 June 2017)
For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2)
elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. (Miclat v. People, G.R.
No. 176077, August 31, 2011)
For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, paragraph (b)
of Section 5 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just
been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
appellant had committed it. (People v. Villareal, G.R. No. 201363, March 18, 2013)
Overt act requirement in in flagrante delicto arrest: Reliable information

alone is not enough to justify a warrantless in flagrante delicto arrest. There must
be an overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been
committed, was being committed, or is about to be committed. -- Reliable information
alone is not enough to justify a warrantless arrest. The accused must perform some overt act that
would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. (People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010)
Examples of lack of overt act requirement

for an in flagrante delicto arrest
Arrest of a jeepney passenger at a checkpoint on the basis of an informant’s

tip cannot be justified as a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, absent any overt act from
the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being
committed, or is about to be committed. A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a
warrantless arrest. -- In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an inflagrante
delicta arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime
at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in
the presence of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest,
the police officers relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient
to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that
a crime has just been committed, was being committed, or is about to be committed. The
warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified as a hot pursuit arrest if the law enforcers had no
personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating that petitioner had just committed an
offense. A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have
personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has
just committed a crime. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017)
The mere acts of leaving a residence of a known drug peddler and boarding a
tricycle are not sufficient for a valid in flagrante delicto arrest. Such acts cannot be
considered criminal. -- The evidence on record reveals that no overt physical act could be
properly attributed to Sanchez as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the police operatives that he
had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Sanchez was merely seen
by the police operatives leaving the residence of a known drug peddler, and boarding a tricycle
that proceeded towards the direction of Kawit, Cavite. Such acts cannot in any way be considered
criminal acts. In fact, even if Sanchez had exhibited unusual or strange acts, or at the very least
appeared suspicious, the same would not have been considered overt acts in order for the police
officers to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113. (Sanchez
v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)
The act of walking while reeking of liquor per se cannot be considered a

criminal act that justifies an in flagrante delicto arrest. – In this case, Reyes argues that
no valid warrantless arrest took place as she did not do anything as to rouse suspicion in the minds
of the arresting officers that she had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
crime when she was just passing by. No lawful arrest was made on Reyes. PO1 Monteras himself
admitted that Reyes passed by them without acting suspiciously or doing anything wrong, except
that she smelled of liquor. As no other overt act could be properly attributed to Reyes as to rouse
suspicion in the mind of PO1 Monteras that she had just committed, was committing, or was about
to commit a crime, the arrest is bereft of any legal basis. As case law demonstrates, the act of
walking while reeking of liquor per se cannot be considered a criminal act. (Reyes v. People, G.R.
No. 229380, June 6, 2018)
The mere act of carrying a bag while riding a bus is not an overt physical act
that could have raised suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that the
person to be arrested had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit
a crime to justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. -- No overt physical act could be properly
attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that he
had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. In the case at bar, accused-
appellant was just a passenger carrying his bag. There is nothing suspicious much less criminal in
said act. Moreover, such circumstance, by itself, could not have led the arresting officers to believe
that accused-appellant was in possession of marijuana. Here, without the tip provided by the
confidential informant, accused-appellant could not be said to have executed any overt act in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officers 'which would indicate that he was committing
the crime of illegal possession of marijuana. Neither did the arresting officers have personal
knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant had just committed an offense. (People v.
Comprado, G.R. No. 213225, April 4, 2018)
The acts per se of walking along the street and examining something in one's
hands cannot considered criminal acts to justify a warrantless arrest. -- From a meter
away, even with perfect vision, SPO1 Parchaso would not have been able to identify with
reasonable accuracy the contents of the plastic sachet. Dominguez' acts of standing on the street
and holding a plastic sachet in his hands, are not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of
criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest. In fact, SPO1
Parchaso's testimony reveals that before the arrest was made, he only saw that Dominguez was
holding a small plastic sachet. He only mentioned that the plastic contained "pinaghihinalaang
shabu" after he had already arrested Dominguez and subsequently confiscated said plastic sachet.
The Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon, even with his presumably perfect vision, would
be able to identify with reasonable accuracy, from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters and
while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible and minuscule amount of powdery
substance (0.03 gram) inside the plastic sachet allegedly held by appellant. Absent any other
circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no other overt act could be properly attributed
to appellant as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 de Leon that he (appellant) had just
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, for the acts per se of walking along
the street and examining something in one's hands cannot in any way be considered criminal acts.
The Court reached the same conclusion in the case of Comerciante v. People: On the basis
of such testimony, the Court finds it highly implausible that PO3 Calag, even assuming that he has
perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy — especially from a distance of
around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour —
miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held by
Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt act could be properly attributed to
Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Calag that the former had just committed,
was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a
companion and handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be considered criminal
acts. (Dominguez v. People, G.R. No. 235898, March 13, 2019)
Trying to run away when approached by a police officer, even when no crime
has been overtly committed, and without more, cannot be evidence of guilt. There
was no overt act that person had just committed, was actually committing, or was
attempting to commit a crime to justify a warrantless arrest. -- There was no overt act
indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be properly attributed to the appellant to rouse
suspicion in the mind of PO3 Corbe that he (appellant) had just committed, was actually
committing, or was attempting to commit a crime. As testified to by PO3 Corbe himself, the
appellant and the informant were just talking to each other; there was no exchange of money and
drugs when he approached the car. PO3 Corbe also admitted that he had no personal knowledge
on whether there was a prohibited drug and gun inside the space wagon when he approached it.
That the appellant attempted to run away when PO3 Corbe approached him is irrelevant and
cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the police officer with personal knowledge
that the appellant had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in
criminal activity. Furthermore, appellant’s act of darting away when PO3 de Leon approached
him should not be construed against him. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not
always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt. It is not a reliable indicator of guilt without
other circumstances. Thus, appellant’s attempt to run away from PO3 de Leon is susceptible of
various explanations; it could easily have meant guilt just as it could likewise signify innocence.
In other words, trying to run away when no crime has been overtly committed, and without more,
cannot be evidence of guilt. (People v. Edano, G.R. No. 188133, July 7, 2014)
Reliable information alone is not enough to justify a warrantless arrest

without an overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Thus, the warrantless arrest,
based on an informant’s tip, of a person who had just alighted from a bus and was
waiting for a tricycle ride is invalid. -- The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction is that
"reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in
addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant
had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in
any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect
and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the
information given by the informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search
would have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated.
(People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010)
Example of a valid in flagrante delicto

arrest based on overt acts
Example of existence of probable cause for a valid in flagrante delicto arrest:
The smell of marijuana emanating from a carton baggage, the irregular shape of the
baggage, flight at the sight of the uniformed police officer and leaving behind his
baggage – justify a warrantless arrest. -- There were numerous circumstances and overt
acts which show that PO1 Falolo had probable cause to effect the said warrantless arrest: (1) the
smell of marijuana emanating from the carton baggage; (2) the irregular shape of the baggage; (3)
the hardness of the baggage; (4) the assent of petitioner in the inspection of his baggage but
running away at the sight of SPO2 Suagen; and (5) leaving behind his baggage to avoid the police
officers.
Petitioner's flight at the sight of the uniformed police officer and leaving behind his
baggage are overt acts, which reinforce the finding of probable cause to conduct a warrantless
arrest against him. The flight of an accused is competent evidence to indicate his guilt; and flight,
when unexplained, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. Indeed, the
wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as lion. Based on these facts, PO1
Falolo had probable cause to believe that there was a reasonable ground of suspicion supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that
petitioner is guilty of the offense charged. Petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto of
transporting marijuana bricks by PO1 Falolo.
Consequently, when PO1 Falolo and SPO2 Suagen captured petitioner in front of the St.
Rita Parish Church, they had probable cause to arrest him and bring him and his baggage to the
police station. There, the police officers properly conducted a search of petitioner's baggage, which
is an incident to a lawful arrest. Indeed, numerous devious circumstances surround the incident,
from the time petitioner boarded the bus until he was caught after fleeing at the sight of the police
officer, that constitute as probable cause to arrest him and to conduct the warrantless search
incidental to such lawful arrest. (Macad v. People, G.R. No. 227366, August 01, 2018)3
Examples of invalid warrantless arrests/searches

based only on informant’s tip
In People v. Aruta, a police officer was tipped off by his informant that a certain "Aling
Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the following day with a large volume of marijuana.
Acting on said tip, the police assembled a team and deployed themselves near the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) in Olongapo City. While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in
front of the PNB building where two females and a man got off. The informant then pointed to the
team members the woman, "Aling Rosa," who was then carrying a traveling bag. Thereafter, the
team approached her and introduced themselves. When asked about the contents of her bag, she
handed it to the apprehending officers. Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried
marijuana leaves.
The facts in People v. Tudtud show that in July and August, 1999, the Toril Police Station,
Davao City, received a report from a civilian asset that the neighbors of a certain Noel Tudtud
(Tudtud) were complaining that the latter was responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in
the area. Reacting to the report, the Intelligence Section conducted surveillance. For five days,
they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. On August 1,
1999, the civilian asset informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be
back later that day with a new stock of marijuana. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team of
police officers posted themselves to await Tudtud’s arrival. At 8:00 p.m., two men disembarked
from a bus and helped each other carry a carton. The police officers approached the suspects and
asked if they could see the contents of the box which yielded marijuana leaves.
In People v. Nuevas, the police officers received information that a certain male person,
more or less 5’4" in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and
usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a delivery of marijuana leaves. While
conducting stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking, they saw the accused
who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag. The police accosted the accused and informed him
that they were police officers. Upon inspection of the plastic bag carried by the accused, the bag
contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. In his bid to escape charges,
the accused disclosed where two other male persons would make a delivery of marijuana leaves.
Upon seeing the two male persons, later identified as Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, the
police approached them, introduced themselves as police officers, then inspected the bag they
were carrying. Upon inspection, the contents of the bag turned out to be marijuana leaves.
3 Note that in this case, the Supreme Court used the standard of probable cause for an in flagrante delicto arrest,
which goes against the prevailing jurisprudence that imposes probable cause as a standard for a hot pursuit arrest,
not in flagrante delicto arrest.
In all of these cases, we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely because there
was no adequate probable cause. We required the showing of some overt act indicative of the
criminal design.
As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the
police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the
time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle.
Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for
the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime.
Were it not for the information given by the informant, appellant would not have been
apprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would
not have been confiscated. (People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010)
Hot pursuit arrest
Requirements for a valid hot pursuit arrest: Immediacy and probable cause: 1)
the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the arresting officer's exercise
of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be determined from the
facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge. – Under Section 5(b), Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and jurisprudence on the matter, the following must
be present for a valid warrantless arrest: 1) the crime should have been just committed; and 2) the
arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable cause to be
determined from the facts and circumstances within his personal knowledge. The requirement of
the existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest for
purposes of compliance with the Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests. (Pestilos
v. Generoso and People, G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014)
Hot pursuit arrest: Law enforcers need not personally witness the
commission of a crime, but must have personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances indicating that the person sought to be arrested committed it. -- Law
enforcers need not personally witness the commission of a crime. However, they must have
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating that the person sought to be arrested
committed it. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, 07 June 2017)
Probable cause in hot pursuit arrest: Police present during the commission
of the offense is not required, but probable cause is required: Police presence
during the commission of the offense is not required for a hot pursuit arrest. It is
enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent and the police
officer has probable cause to believe, based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime. --
In a hot pursuit arrest, police presence at the scene while the crime was being committed is not
required. It is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent and the police
officer has probable cause to believe, based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that
the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime. Thus, if the police officers respond to
the scene of the crime in less than one hour and talked to the bloodied mauling victim who
identified his attackers in the same neighborhood, and these alleged attackers did not deny the
incident but had a different version – the police officers had personal knowledge to justify the
warrantless arrest of the alleged attackers. (Pestilos v. Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, November 10,
2014)
The arrest of a person who had presented himself before the police station to clear his
name and prove that he was not the accused -- was not valid, as he was neither committing nor
attempting to commit an offense, and the police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense
that he might have committed. (In the Matter of Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang
Salibo, v. Warden, Quezon City Jail, G.R. No. 197597, April 8, 2015)
Meaning of probable cause for a hot pursuit arrest: The existence of such facts
and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. --
The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man
to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged, or an actual
belief or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts. The standard for determining
"probable cause" is invariable for the officer arresting without a warrant, the public prosecutor,
and the judge issuing a warrant of arrest. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances that
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested or held for trial, as the case may be. (Pestilos v.
Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014)
Personal knowledge as basis for probable cause in a hot pursuit arrest:

Probable cause must be based on the arresting officer’s personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. --
The arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to
actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore
must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers
making the arrest. (Pestilos v. Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014)
While the arresting officer, the public prosecutor and the judge all determine "probable
cause," within the spheres of their respective functions, its existence is influenced heavily by the
available facts and circumstance within their possession. In short, although these officers use the
same standard of a reasonable man, they possess dissimilar quantity of facts or circumstances, as
set by the rules, upon which they must determine probable cause. Thus, under the present rules
and jurisprudence, the arresting officer should base his determination of probable cause on his
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has
committed the crime; the public prosecutor and the judge must base their determination on the
evidence submitted by the parties.
In other words, the arresting officer operates on the basis of more limited facts, evidence
or available information that he must personally gather within a limited time frame. Hence, the
inherent limitations of determining probable cause in warrantless arrests due to the urgency of
its determination in these instances. The Court held that one should not expect too much of an
ordinary policeman. He is not presumed to exercise the subtle reasoning of a judicial officer.
Oftentimes, he has no opportunity to make proper investigation but must act in haste on his own
belief to prevent the escape of the criminal. (Pestilos v. Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, November 10,
2014)
Example of lack of probable cause for a hot pursuit arrest: The police officers
proceeded to, and entered, the house of the accused based solely on the report of a
concerned citizen that a pot session was going on in said house. Thus, they had no
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them to believe that
the accused had just committed an offense. -- A review of the facts reveal that the arrest of
the accused was illegal and the subject items were confiscated as an incident thereof. According
to the testimony of the police officers, they proceeded to, and entered, the house of accused
Gonzales based solely on the report of a concerned citizen that a pot session was going on in said
house. As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge that at the time of the arrest, accused had just committed, were committing, or were
about to commit a crime, as they had no probable cause to enter the house of accused Rafael
Gonzales in order to arrest them. As to paragraph (b), the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them to believe that the accused had just
committed an offense. As admitted by the police, the tip originated from a concerned citizen who
himself had no personal knowledge of the information that was reported to the police: (People v.
Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010)
Example of lack of probable cause for a hot pursuit arrest: When police
officers chased the tricycle to arrest the accused, they had no personal knowledge
to believe that they accused bought shabu from the notorious drug dealer and
actually possessed the illegal drug when he boarded the tricycle. -- When the police
officers chased the tricycle, they had no personal knowledge to believe that Sanchez bought shabu
from the notorious drug dealer and actually possessed the illegal drug when he boarded the
tricycle. Probable cause has been held to signify a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. The police officers in this case had no
inkling whatsoever as to what Sanchez did inside the house of the known drug dealer. Besides,
nowhere in the prosecution evidence does it show that the drug dealer was conducting her
nefarious drug activities inside her house so as to warrant the police officers to draw a reasonable
suspicion that Sanchez must have gotten shabu from her and possessed the illegal drug when he
came out of the house. In other words, there was no overt manifestation on the part of Sanchez
that he had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in the criminal
activity of illegal possession of shabu. Verily, probable cause in this case was more imagined than
real. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)
Example of lack of probable cause for a hot pursuit arrest: A hearsay tip by
itself does not justify a warrantless hot pursuit arrest, because the arresting officers
had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating that the accused
had just committed a crime. – A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest.
Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person
sought to be arrested has just committed a crime." In this case, records failed to show that PO1
Monteras had any personal knowledge that a crime had been committed by Reyes, as in fact, he
even admitted that he merely relied on the two (2) teenagers' tip (that the woman bought shabu).
To interpret "personal knowledge" as to encompass unverified tips from strangers would create a
dangerous precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect
warrantless arrests, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites under Section 5 (b), Rule 113.
(Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 229380, June 06, 2018)
The requirement of immediacy in hot pursuit arrest: The determination of

probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made
immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the element
of immediacy.-- The determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or
circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply
with the element of immediacy. In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these
facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard to
ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a very
limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their
probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission
of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to become
contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other hand,
with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be
limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very
limited period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of
probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police officer
could effect a valid warrantless arrest. (Pestilos v. Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, November 10,
2014)
Requirement of immediacy in hot pursuit arrest: The rule requires that an

offense has just been committed. It connotes "immediacy in point of time." -- Rule
113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit arrest. The rule requires that an
offense has just been committed. It connotes "immediacy in point of time." That a crime was in
fact committed does not automatically bring the case under this rule. An arrest under Rule 113,
Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court entails a time element from the moment the crime is committed
up to the point of arrest. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017)
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (b), it is essential that the element of
personal knowledge must be coupled with the element of immediacy; otherwise, the arrest may
be nullified, and resultantly, the items yielded through the search incidental thereto will be
rendered inadmissible in consonance with the exclusionary rule of the 1987 Constitution. (People
v. Manago, G.R. No. 212340, August 17, 2016)
Immediacy in a hot pursuit arrest: This required time element acts as a

safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the
circumstances within a very limited time frame. -- In warrantless arrests made pursuant
to Section 5 (b), Rule 113, it is required that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just
been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
accused had committed it. Verily, under Section 5 (b), Rule 113, it is essential that the element of
personal knowledge must be coupled with the element of immediacy; otherwise, the arrest may
be nullified, and resultantly, the items yielded through the search incidental thereto will be
rendered inadmissible in consonance with the exclusionary rule of the 1987 Constitution. The
clincher in the element of "personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required element
of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time
element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived
the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would
have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an
exhaustive investigation. (Vaporoso v. People, G.R. No. 238659, June 03, 2019)
The clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the

required element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered.
This required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the
facts or perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the
police officers would have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances
obtained after an exhaustive investigation.
The reason for the element of the immediacy is this - as the time gap from the
commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered are prone to
become contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay. On the other
hand, with the element of immediacy imposed under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, the police officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be
limited to raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very
limited period of time. The same provision adds another safeguard with the requirement of
probable cause as the standard for evaluating these facts of circumstances before the police officer
could effect a valid warrantless arrest. (Pestilos v. Generoso and People, G.R. No. 182601,
November 10, 2014)
Example of existence of immediacy for a valid hot pursuit arrest: A

continuous and unbroken pursuit leading to arrest: A police officer ordered a
motorcycle-riding suspect -- who held a bag that appeared stolen from a parked
vehicle -- to stop but the suspect sped away, and immediately thereafter, the owner
of the vehicle reported to the same police officer that the suspect broke her car
window and stole her bag, prompting the police officer to chase the suspect in a
continuous and unbroken pursuit until he was arrested six hours later. -- In this case,
a judicious review of the records shows that while PO2 Torculas was cruising on his motorcycle,
he personally saw petitioners holding a lady bag which appeared to have been taken from a parked
vehicle. Suspicious of the incident, PO2 Torculas told petitioners to halt, prompting the latter to
speed away aboard their motorcycle. Immediately thereafter, the owner of the vehicle, Dombase,
approached PO2 Torculas and sought for his assistance, narrating that petitioners broke the
window of her vehicle and took her belongings. To the Court, petitioners' sudden flight upon being
flagged by a police officer, coupled with Dombase's narration of what had just transpired is
enough to provide PO2 Torculas with personal knowledge of facts indicating that a crime had just
been committed and that petitioners are the perpetrators thereof. Moreover, upon gaining such
personal knowledge, not only did PO2 Torculas chase petitioners until they entered a dark,
secluded area, he also called for back-up and conducted a "stake-out" right then and there until
they were able to arrest petitioners about six (6) hours later. These circumstances indubitably
show that the twin requisites of personal knowledge and immediacy in order to effectuate a valid
"hot pursuit" warrantless arrest are present, considering that PO2 Torculas obtained personal
knowledge that a crime had just been committed and that he did not waver in his continuous and
unbroken pursuit of petitioners until they were arrested. From the foregoing, the Court concludes
"that the police officers validly conducted a "hot pursuit" warrantless arrest on petitioners.
(Vaporoso v. People, G.R. No. 238659, June 03, 2019)
Example of lack of immediacy for a hot pursuit arrest: The arrest of a robbery
suspect at a checkpoint one day after the robbery and after investigation and
verification proceedings were already conducted by the police. -- In this case, records
reveal that at around 9:30 in the evening of March 15, 2007, PO3 Din personally witnessed a
robbery incident while he was waiting for his turn to have a haircut at Jonas Borces Beauty Parlor.
After his brief shootout with the armed robbers, the latter fled using a motorcycle and a red Toyota
Corolla. Through an investigation and verification made by the police officers headed by PO3 Din
and S/Insp. Ylanan, they were able to: (a) find out that the armed robbers were staying in
Barangay Del Rio Pit-os; and (b) trace the getaway vehicles to Manago. The next day, or on March
16, 2007, the police officers set up a checkpoint in Sitio Panagdait where, at around 9:30 in the
evening, the red Toyota Corolla being driven by Manago passed by and was intercepted by the
police officers. The police officers then ordered Manago to disembark the car, and from there,
proceeded to search the vehicle and the body of Manago, which search yielded the plastic sachet
containing shabu. Thereupon, they effected Manago's arrest.
The foregoing circumstances show that while the element of personal knowledge under
Section 5 (b) above was present - given that PO3 Din actually saw the March 15, 2007 robbery
incident and even engaged the armed robbers in a shootout - the required element of immediacy
was not met. This is because, at the time the police officers effected the warrantless arrest upon
Manago's person, investigation and verification proceedings were already conducted, which
consequently yielded sufficient information on the suspects of the March 15, 2007 robbery
incident. As the Court sees it, the information the police officers had gathered therefrom would
have been enough for them to secure the necessary warrants against the robbery suspects.
However, they opted to conduct a "hot pursuit" operation which - considering the lack of
immediacy - unfortunately failed to meet the legal requirements therefor. Thus, there being no
valid warrantless arrest under the "hot pursuit" doctrine, the CA erred in ruling that Manago was
lawfully arrested. In view of the finding that there was no lawful arrest in this case, the CA likewise
erred in ruling that the incidental search on Manago's vehicle and body was valid. In fact, the said
search was made even before he was arrested and thus, violated the cardinal rule on searches
incidental to lawful arrests that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made. (People
v. Manago, G.R. No. 212340, August 17, 2016)
Examples of valid and invalid hot pursuit arrests
Other examples of valid and invalid hot pursuit arrests. -- In Pestilos v. Generoso
and People (G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014), the Supreme Court provided the following
illustrative rulings on hot pursuit arrests pursuant to Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure --
Invalid hot pursuit arrest – Arrest of suspects 3 days after commission of the
crime. -- In Posadas v. Ombudsman, the killing of Dennis Venturina happened on December 8,
1994. It was only on December 11, 1994 that Chancellor Posadas requested the NBI's assistance.
On the basis of the supposed identification of two (2) witnesses, the NBI attempted to arrest
Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag three (3) days after the commission of the crime.
With this set of facts, it cannot be said that the officers have personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the persons sought to be arrested committed the crime. Hence, the Court
invalidated the warrantless arrest.
Invalid hot pursuit arrest – Arrest of a suspect plowing his farm field after
being identified as an NPA recruiter. -- In People v. Burgos, one Cesar Masamlok personally
and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, stating that Ruben Burgos forcibly recruited him
to become a member of the NPA, with a threat of physical harm. Upon receipt of this information,
a joint team of PC-INP units was dispatched to arrest Burgos who was then plowing the field.
Indeed, the arrest was invalid considering that the only information that the police officers had
in effecting the arrest was the information from a third person. It cannot be also said in this case
that there was certainty as regards the commission of a crime.
Invalid hot pursuit arrest – Arrest of a person one day after the commission
of the crime. -- In People v. del Rosario, the Court held that the requirement that an offense has
just been committed means that there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time
the offense was committed and the time of the arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time
between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.
The Court held that the arrest of del Rosario did not comply with these requirements
because he was arrested only a day after the commission of the crime and not immediately
thereafter. Additionally, the arresting officers were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses
to the crime. Hence, they had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested had committed the offense. They became aware of del Rosario's identity as the driver of
the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.
In People v. Cendana, the accused was arrested one (1) day after the killing of the victim
and only on the basis of information obtained from unnamed sources. The unlawful arrest was
held invalid.
Invalid hot pursuit arrest – Arrest of a person six days after the commission
of the crime. -- In Rolito Go v. CA, the arrest of the accused six (6) days after the commission of
the crime was held invalid because the crime had not just been committed. Moreover, the
"arresting" officers had no "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that the accused was the
gunman who had shot the victim. The information upon which the police acted came from
statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting; one stated that the accused was the
gunman; another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned
out to be registered in the name of the accused's wife. That information did not constitute
"personal knowledge."
Valid hot pursuit arrest – Arrest of a person 3 hours after the commission of
the crime. -- In People v. Gerente, the policemen arrested Gerente only about three (3) hours
after Gerente and his companions had killed the victim. The Court held that the policemen had
personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of facts indicating that Gerente and two
others had killed him. The warrantless arrest was held valid.
Valid hot pursuit arrest – Immediate arrest after the commission of the crime.
-- In People v. Alvario, the warrantless arrest came immediately after the arresting officers
received information from the victim of the crime. The Court held that the personal knowledge of
the arresting officers was derived from the information supplied by the victim herself who pointed
to Alvario as the man who raped her at the time of his arrest. The Court upheld the warrantless
arrest. In People v. Jayson, there was a shooting incident. The policemen who were summoned to
the scene of the crime found the victim. The informants pointed to the accused as the assailant
only moments after the shooting. The Court held that the arresting officers acted on the basis of
personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that the accused was the
assailant. Thus, the warrantless arrest was held valid.
In People v. Acol, a group held up the passengers in a jeepney and the policemen
immediately responded to the report of the crime. One of the victims saw four persons walking
towards Fort Bonifacio, one of whom was wearing his jacket. The victim pointed them to the
policemen. When the group saw the policemen coming, they ran in different directions. The Court
held that the arrest was valid.
In Cadua v. CA, there was an initial report to the police concerning a robbery. A radio
dispatch was then given to the arresting officers, who proceeded to Alden Street to verify the
authenticity of the radio message. When they reached the place, they met with the complainants
who initiated the report about the robbery. Upon the officers' invitation, the victims joined them
in conducting a search of the nearby area where the accused was spotted in the vicinity. Based on
the reported statements of the complainants, he was identified as a logical suspect in the offense
just committed. Hence, the arrest was held valid.
In Doria, the Court held that Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the
offense. In this case, P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative
of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by SP03 Ramirez to
investigate the incident. SP03 Ramirez later reported that a certain William Sia was wounded
while Judge Abelita III, who was implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the place of the
incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for Abelita III and when he found him, he informed him of the
incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested Abelita III to go with him to the police headquarters as
he had been reported to be involved in the incident. Abelita III agreed but suddenly sped up his
vehicle and proceeded to his residence where P/Supt. Doria caught him up as he was about to run
towards his house.
The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the driver's seat as
Abelita III opened the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the driver's seat. The police
officers confiscated the firearms and arrested Abelita III. The Court held that the petitioner's act
of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, were enough to
raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable
cause.
(Pestilos v. Generoso and People, G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014)
2. Search of a moving motor vehicle
A checkpoint search is a variant of a search of a moving vehicle. Checkpoints

per se are not invalid. They are allowed in exceptional circumstances to protect the
lives of individuals and ensure their safety or where the government's survival is in
danger. -- A checkpoint search is a variant of a search of a moving vehicle. Checkpoints per se
are not invalid. They are allowed in exceptional circumstances to protect the lives of individuals
and ensure their safety. They are also sanctioned in cases where the government's survival is in
danger. Considering that routine checkpoints intrude "on [a] motorist's right to 'free passage'" to
a certain extent, they must be "conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists." The extent of
routine inspections must be limited to a visual search. Routine inspections do not give law
enforcers carte blanche to perform warrantless searches. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370,
June 7, 2017)
Visual Search v. Extensive Search
Visual search of a vehicle at a checkpoint is valid, if limited to a visual search.

For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body
search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine
checks is not violative of the right against unreasonable searches. -- Considering that
routine checkpoints intrude "on [a] motorist's right to 'free passage'" to a certain extent, they must
be "conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists." The extent of routine inspections must be
limited to a visual search. Routine inspections do not give law enforcers carte blanche to perform
warrantless searches. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017)
For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search,
and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be
regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable searches. Thus, a search where
an "officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein" is not unreasonable. (Veridiano
v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017)
Examples of valid visual searches: (1) where the officer merely draws aside
the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (2) simply
looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; (4)
where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (5) where the
inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection. -- Routine
inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. The
search which is normally permissible in this instance is limited to the following instances: (1)
where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public
fair grounds; (2) simply looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's
doors; (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (5) where the
inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (6) where the
routine check is conducted in a fixed area. (Macad v. People, G.R. No. 227366, August 1, 2018)
In order for the search of vehicles in a checkpoint to be non-violative of an individual's

right against unreasonable searches, the search must be limited to the following: (a) where the
officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds; (b) where the officer simply looks into a vehicle; (c) where the officer flashes a light
therein without opening the car's doors; (d) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical
or body search; (e) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual
inspection; and (f) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area. (People v. Sapla, G.R.
No. 244045, June 16, 2020)
Extensive checkpoint searches: Valid when probable cause is present. --

Extensive checkpoint searches are valid when law enforcers have probable cause to believe that
the vehicle's passengers committed a crime or when the vehicle contains instruments of an
offense. Moreover, law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped
information. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017)
An extensive search of a moving vehicle is only permissible when there is probable cause.
When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has
been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable
cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to
a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. (Macad v. People, G.R. No. 227366, August 1, 2018)
A more extensive and intrusive search that goes beyond a mere visual search
of the vehicle necessitates probable cause. -- Routine inspections do not give the
authorities carte blanche discretion to conduct intrusive warrantless searches in the absence of
probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, as opposed to a
mere routine inspection, "such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the
officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the
search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to
be searched." A more extensive and intrusive search that goes beyond a mere visual search of the
vehicle necessitates probable cause on the part of the apprehending officers. (People v. Sapla,
G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020)
For a warrantless search of a moving vehicle to be valid, probable cause remains

imperative. Law enforcers do not enjoy unbridled discretion to conduct searches. The mere
mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited discretion to
conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior of the territory and
in the absence of probable cause. Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable cause
to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case. (People v. Sison,
G.R. No. 238453, July 31, 2019)
An extensive search may be conducted on a vehicle at a checkpoint when law

enforcers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle's passengers committed a
crime or when the vehicle contains instruments of an offense -- An extensive search
may be conducted on a vehicle at a checkpoint when law enforcers have probable cause to believe
that the vehicle's passengers committed a crime or when the vehicle contains instruments of an
offense. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017)
Thus, routinary and indiscriminate searches of moving vehicles are allowed if they are
limited to a visual search. This holds especially true when the object of the search is a public
vehicle where individuals have a reasonably reduced expectation of privacy. On the other hand,
extensive searches are permissible only when they are founded upon probable cause. Any
evidence obtained will be subject to the exclusionary principle under the Constitution. (Veridiano
v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 07, 2017)
Examples of the existence of probable cause for an extensive search of a

moving vehicle: -- This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial
warrant an extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from
a package the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics Command ("Narcom") of
the Philippine National Police ("PNP") had received a confidential report from informers that a
sizeable volume of marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was
conducted; (3) Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada,
Mountain Province, had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents
confronted the accused Caucasian, because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to
present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do so; (4) Narcom agents
had received confidential information that a woman having the same physical appearance as that
of the accused would be transporting marijuana; (5) the accused who were riding a jeepney were
stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said
accused would transport a large quantity of marijuana; and (6) where the moving vehicle was
stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep
penetration agent or spy - one who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate
to which the accused belonged - that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country.
(Macad v. People, G.R. No. 227366, August 1, 2018)
Examples of lack of probable cause

for an extensive search of a motor vehicle
Law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped

information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient
to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will
arouse suspicion. -- That the object of a warrantless search is allegedly inside a moving vehicle
does not justify an extensive search absent probable cause. Moreover, law enforcers cannot act
solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how
reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other
circumstance that will arouse suspicion. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017)
Lack of probable cause: An extensive search of a passenger of a jeepney --

based only on a tip from a concerned citizen and absent any peculiar activity from
that passenger that may either arouse their suspicion -- is invalid for lack of
probable cause. -- A concerned citizen called a certain P03 Esteves, police radio operator of
the Nagcarlan Police Station, informing him that a certain alias "Baho," who was later identified
as Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs. Chief of Police June Urquia
instructed POI Cabello and P02 Vergara to set up a checkpoint at Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan,
Laguna. At around 10:00 a.m., the police chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney
coming from San Pablo, Laguna. They flagged down the jeepney and asked the passengers to
disembark. The police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for possible
concealed weapons and to remove the contents of their pockets. The police officers recovered from
Veridiano "a tea bag containing what appeared to be marijuana." Veridiano was arrested and
brought to the police station. The extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded the
allowable limits of warrantless searches. They had no probable cause to believe that the accused
violated any law except for the tip they received. They did not observe any peculiar activity from
the accused that may either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover, the search was
flawed at its inception. The checkpoint was set up to target the arrest of the accused. The
warrantless search conducted by the police officers is invalid. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No.
200370, June 7, 2017)
Warrantless searches of moving vehicles based on tipped information can be

valid if there are other circumstances that justify a warrantless search. -- Although
this Court has upheld warrantless searches of moving vehicles based on tipped information, there
have been other circumstances that justified warrantless searches conducted by the authorities.
In People v. Breis, apart from the tipped information they received, the law enforcement
agents observed suspicious behavior on the part of the accused that gave them reasonable ground
to believe that a crime was being committed. The accused attempted to alight from the bus after
the law enforcers introduced themselves and inquired about the ownership of a box which the
accused had in their possession. In their attempt to leave the bus, one (1) of the accused physically
pushed a law enforcer out of the way. Immediately alighting from a bus that had just left the
terminal and leaving one's belongings behind is unusual conduct.
In People v. Mariacos, a police officer received information that a bag containing illegal
drugs was about to be transported on a passenger jeepney. The bag was marked with "O.K." On
the basis of the tip, a police officer conducted surveillance operations on board a jeepney. Upon
seeing the bag described to him, he peeked inside and smelled the distinct odor of marijuana
emanating from the bag. The tipped information and the police officer's personal observations
gave rise to probable cause that rendered the warrantless search valid.
The police officers in People v. Ayangao and People v. Libnao likewise received tipped
information regarding the transport of illegal drugs. In Libnao, the police officers had probable
cause to arrest the accused based on their three (3)-month long surveillance operation in the area
where the accused was arrested. On the other hand, in Ayangao, the police officers noticed
marijuana leaves protruding through a hole in one (1) of the sacks carried by the accused.
(Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017)
Search of moving vehicle principle applies to fishing vessels and boats --

Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws
have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. It is
rooted on the recognition that a vessel and an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought and secured. The
same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching fishery laws.
(Hizon v. CA, 265 SCRA 517, 13 December 1996)
3. Search in connection with violation of customs laws
Requirements for a valid warrantless customs search: (1) the persons

conducting the search were exercising police authority under customs law; (2) the
search was for the enforcement of customs law; and (3) the place searched is not a
dwelling place or house. -- To be a valid customs search, the requirements are: (1) the
person/s conducting the search was/were exercising police authority under customs law; (2) the
search was for the enforcement of customs law; and (3) the place searched is not a dwelling place
or house. Here, the facts reveal that the search was part of routine port security measures. The
search was not conducted by persons authorized under customs law. It was also not motivated by
the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code or other customs laws. Although customs searches
usually occur within ports or terminals, it is important that the search must be for the enforcement
of customs laws. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016)
4. Seizure of evidence in plain view (“Plain View Doctrine”)
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to
be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and maybe
introduced in evidence. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)
Under the plain view doctrine, during the conduct of the search, objects falling in plain
view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are subject to seizure even
without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. (Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 216922,
April 18, 2018)
Plain view doctrine requirements: a) prior justification for intrusion; b)
inadvertent discovery; and c) contraband is immediately apparent. -- The plain view
doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search
of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view
a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an
initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the
course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent. (Dominguez
v. People, G.R. No. 235898, March 13, 2019)
For the "plain view doctrine" to apply, it is required that the following requisites are
present: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence
in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. (Castillo v.
People, G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018)
Plain view doctrine requirements: 1) prior justification for an intrusion; 2) discovery is
inadvertent; and 3) object is immediately apparent. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589,
November 19, 2014)
The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. (People v. Doria,
G.R. No. 125299, January 22, 1999)
Example of a valid plain view search and seizure. -- Contraband lying outside of a
suspect’s house and exposed to the sight of police officers serving a search warrant can be seized
under the plain view doctrine. (Crescencio v People, G.R. No. 205015, November 19, 2014)
The requirement of valid intrusion under plain view doctrine: Law enforcers
must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which they
can particularly view the area. -- The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial
intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course
of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. (Dominguez v. People, G.R. No. 235898, March 13, 2019)
Example of invalid seizure due to lack of valid intrusion: Without a search

warrant, the police officers intentionally peeped first through the window of the
house before they saw and ascertained the activities of accused inside the room. The
objects were not validly seized in plain view. -- The police proceeded to, and entered, the
house of accused Gonzales based solely on the report of a concerned citizen that a pot session was
going on in said house. The objects were not seized in plain view. First, there was no valid
intrusion. The accused-appellants were illegally arrested. Second, the evidence, i.e., the tea bags
later on found to contain marijuana, was not inadvertently discovered. The police officers
intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw and ascertained the activities of
accused-appellants inside the room. The apprehending officers should have conducted first a
surveillance considering that the identities and address of the suspected culprits were already
ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause
for arresting accused-appellants, they should have secured a search warrant prior to effecting a
valid arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was likewise
illegal. (People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010)
Example of evidence not immediately apparent: There can be no valid plain

view seizure if at the time of the warrantless seizure, it was not readily apparent to
the police that the very small plastic sachet contained anything, much less shabu. –
In the case at hand, while it can be said that the presence of the police officers was legitimate as
they were patrolling the area and that discovery of the plastic sachet was inadvertent, it should be
emphasized that, as to the third requisite, it was clearly not apparent that such plastic sachet is an
evidence of a crime, a contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. To recall, when SPO1 Parchaso
saw Dominguez, he only saw that Dominguez was holding a very small plastic sachet. A very small
plastic sachet is not readily apparent as evidence incriminating Dominguez, such that it can be
seized without a warrant. A very small plastic sachet can contain just about anything. It could even
be just that — a very small plastic sachet — and nothing more. Thus, the circumstances of this case
do not justify a seizure based on the plain view doctrine. The sachet of shabu seized from him
during the warrantless search is inadmissible in evidence against him. There being no warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest or seizure of evidence in plain view, the shabu purportedly
seized from Dominguez is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the
poisonous tree. (Dominguez v. People, G.R. No. 235898, March 13, 2019)
Immediately apparent test: Items not inherently unlawful cannot be seized
under the plain view doctrine. -- The "immediately apparent" test only requires that there is
a probable cause to associate the property with a criminal activity. The plain view doctrine cannot
justify seizure of items the possession thereof is not inherently unlawful. Thus, the following items
not described in the warrant but also seized are inadmissible: (a) 3 torn cloths; (b) black bag pack;
(c) a piece of gold-plated earing; (d) a suspected human hair; (e) a piece of embroidered cloth; (f)
3 burned tire wires; (g) empty plastic of muriatic acid; and (h) white t-shirt. (Castillo v. People,
G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018)
The requirement of “inadvertence”: The plain view doctrine is applied where
a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. –The "plain view" doctrine is usually
applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. What the "plain view" cases have in common
is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of
which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. (People v.
Calantiao, G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014; Dominguez v. People, G.R. No. 235898, March 13,
2019)
The "plain view" doctrine cannot apply if the officers are actually "searching"
for evidence against the accused. The discovery was not inadvertent. -- The "plain
view" doctrine cannot apply if the officers are actually "searching" for evidence against the accused.
It could not be gainsaid that the discovery was inadvertent when the police officers already knew
that there could be marijuana plants in the area. (People v. Acosta, G.R. No. 238865, January 28,
2019)
Example of invalid seizure because the evidence was not inadvertently
discovered: When the police went to arrest the accused on a complaint for mauling
and proceeded to seize the marijuana plants near his home, after obtaining prior
knowledge that he had planted marijuana near his home. The discovery is not
inadvertent when the police officers already knew that there could be contraband
in the area. -- At around seven (7) o'clock in the morning Alfredo Salucana (Salucana) went to
the Gingoog City Police Station to report a mauling incident where Acosta purportedly hit him
with a piece of wood. He also reported that Acosta was illegally planting marijuana, prompting
the police to proceed to Acosta's home. Thereat, Salucana positively identified Acosta who was
then walking on the trail leading towards his house. The police officers then rushed towards
Acosta and arrested him before he entered his home. After the arrest, the police found thirteen
(13) hills of suspected marijuana plants planted just outside Acosta's home, and around a meter
away from where he was arrested. Upon seeing the marijuana, the police immediately called
barangay officials to witness the uprooting of the suspected marijuana plants. Thereafter, they
brought Acosta and the uprooted marijuana plants to the police station for the marking and
inventory of the seized items. In defense, Acosta argued that the seized marijuana plants are
inadmissible in evidence as the "plain view" doctrine is not applicable. Acosta argued that the
discovery was not inadvertent because it was Salucana who pointed out the marijuana plants to
the police. In this case, the accused argues that the second requisite (for a valid seizure under the
plain view doctrine) is absent since the discovery of the police officers of the marijuana plants was
not inadvertent as it was prompted by Salucana. After a careful review of the records, this Court
is inclined to agree. The testimonies of police officers collectively paint the picture that the police
officers proceeded with the arrest of Acosta for the mauling incident armed with prior knowledge
that he was also illegally planting marijuana. It is also clear that Salucana apprised the police
officers of the illegal planting and cultivation of the marijuana plants when he reported the
mauling incident. Thus, when the police officers proceeded to Acosta's abode, they were already
alerted to the fact that there could possibly be marijuana plants in the area. This belies the
argument that the discovery of the plants was inadvertent. The "plain view" doctrine cannot apply
if the officers are actually "searching" for evidence against the accused. It could not be gainsaid
that the discovery was inadvertent when the police officers already knew that there could be
marijuana plants in the area. Thus, the second requisite for the "plain view" doctrine is absent.
Considering that the "plain view" doctrine is inapplicable to the present case, the seized marijuana
plants are inadmissible in evidence against Acosta for being fruits of the poisonous tree. (People
v. Acosta, G.R. No. 238865, January 28, 2019)
Example of invalid seizure because of lack of all the require elements for a
valid plain view seizure: Contraband inside a match box being held by a person
unlawfully arrested. -- First, there was no valid intrusion. Sanchez was illegally arrested.
Second, subject shabu was not inadvertently discovered, and third, it was not plainly exposed to
sight. Here, the subject shabu was allegedly inside a match box being then held by Sanchez and
was not readily apparent or transparent to the police officers. In fact, SPO1 Amposta had to
demand from Sanchez the possession of the match box in order for him to open it and examine
its content. The shabu was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant
is in violation of the law and the Constitution. In the light of the foregoing, there being no lawful
warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure, the shabu purportedly seized from Sanchez
is inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. (Sanchez v. People,
G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)
5. Consented search - When a person himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures
The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a

personal right which may be waived. -- The constitutional immunity against unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. (Acosta v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 211559,
October 15, 2019)
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be
waived expressly or impliedly. (People v. Cubcubin, G.R. No. 136267, July 10, 2001)
The consent must be voluntary, unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given,

uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. -- The consent must be voluntary in order to
validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and
intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Hence, consent to a search is not
to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. (Acosta v. Ochoa, G.R.
No. 211559, October 15, 2019)
Consent must be given voluntarily, intelligently and without duress. -- The
constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right, which
may be waived. However, to be valid, the consent must be voluntary such that it is unequivocal,
specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. If a police officer,
without coercion or intimidation, asks for permission to open a bag and the bag owner says, “yes,
just open it,” there is consent to the search of the contents of the bag. (Saluday v. People, G.R.
No. 215305, April 3, 2018)
Requisites for a valid waiver; presumption is against waiver. -- In case of

consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is
fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) the person
involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the
said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. (People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233,
February 22, 2007)
Failure to object cannot be presumed as a waiver. -- Neither can it be presumed

that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be searched simply because
he failed to object. (People v. Burgos, G.R. No. L-68955, September 4, 1986)
Lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver. --
Lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of one’s constitutional
right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure. (People v. Compacion, G.R.
No. 124442, July 20, 2001)
Silence or lack of resistance is not necessarily consent to a search but mere
implied acquiescence, which amounts to no consent at all. -- Silence or lack of resistance
can hardly be considered as consent to the warrantless search. Although the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures may be surrendered through a valid waiver, the prosecution
must prove that the waiver was executed with clear and convincing evidence. Mere passive
conformity or silence to the warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence, which amounts
to no consent at all. The police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional
right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers
are not to be presumed. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017)
A mere failure on the part of the accused to object to a search cannot be

construed as a waiver. A peaceful submission to a search is not consent but is merely
a demonstration or regard for the supremacy of the law. -- A waiver by implication
cannot be presumed. There must be persuasive evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the
right. A mere failure on the part of the accused to object to a search cannot be construed as a
waiver of this privilege. (People v. Cubcubin, G.R. No. 136267, July 10, 2001)
An implied acquiescence to the search may be mere passive conformity given

under intimidating or coercive circumstances, and cannot be considered consent. -
- There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not
object when the police asked him to open his bags. Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken
as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have
been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and
is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Cogaed’s
silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive environment brought
about by the police officer’s excessive intrusion into his private space. The prosecution and the
police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is
knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.
(People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014)
The State has the burden of proving that the consent as freely and voluntarily
given. -- It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the
necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given. (Acosta v. Ochoa,
G.R. No. 211559, October 15, 2019)
Silence or lack of resistance is not necessarily consent to a warrantless search

but mere implied acquiescence given under intimidating or coercive circumstances.
-- Silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as consent to the warrantless search.
Although the right against unreasonable searches and seizures may be surrendered through a
valid waiver, the prosecution must prove that the waiver was executed with clear and convincing
evidence. Mere passive conformity or silence to the warrantless search is only an implied
acquiescence, which amounts to no consent at all. The police carry the burden of showing that the
waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion.
In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7,
2017)
The police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one
which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be
presumed. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017)
6. Stop and frisk search (“Terry search”)
Meaning of a “stop and frisk” search: The act of a police officer to stop a
citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. –
A stop-and-frisk was defined as the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon. (Manalili v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113447, October
9, 1997 citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 [1968])
A "stop and frisk" search is defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the
street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No.
200370, June 7, 2017; Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014; People v. Binad
Sy Chua, G.R. Nos. 136066-67, February 4, 2003)
When a “stop and frisk” search is permissible: Where a police officer

observes unusual conduct, which leads him to reasonably conclude that criminal
activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed
and dangerous. -- Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably
to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where, in the course of investigating
this behavior, he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person
from whom they were taken. (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 [1968]; eventually cited by the Supreme
Court in Manalili v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113447, October 9, 1997; Malacat v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 123595 December 12, 1997; People v. Binad Sy Chua, G.R. Nos. 136066-67,
February 4, 2003, and subsequent cases)
Why a stop-and-frisk search is allowed: The interest of effective crime

prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person for purposes
of investigating possible criminal behavior, even though there is insufficient
probable cause to make an actual arrest. What justifies the limited search is the
more immediate interest of the police officer assuring himself that the person he is
dealing with is not armed with a weapon that can unexpectedly be used against him.
-- The interest of effective crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a
person, in appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest. In admitting
in evidence two guns seized during the stop-and-frisk, what justified the limited search was the
more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with
whom he was dealing was not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against him. (Manalili v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113447 October 9, 1997, citing Terry v. Ohio)
Scope of stop-and-frisk is limited to search of outer clothing for weapons. -- A

“stop and frisk” search is limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons. (People v. Binad
Sy Chua, 396 SCRA 657, 04 February 2003; Malacat v. People, 283 SCRA 159, 12 December 1997)
It is a limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover

weapons which might be used to assault him. (People v. Binad Sy Chua, 396 SCRA 657, 04
February 2003; Malacat v. People, 283 SCRA 159, 12 December 1997)
The allowable scope of a "stop and frisk" search is limited to a "protective search of outer
clothing for weapons." (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017)
Requirement in stop-and-frisk search: Not probable cause, but genuine

reason that criminal activity may be afoot and that the person may be armed and
dangerous. -- Probable cause is not required but a genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous. (People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014)
The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with his
experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has
weapons concealed about him. (Sanchez v. People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)
Mere suspicion is not enough for a “stop-and-frisk”; there must be “genuine
reason” to believe that the person has a concealed weapon. -- Mere suspicion or a hunch
will not validate a “stop-and-frisk”. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him. (People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014, People v.
Binad Sy Chua, February 4, 2003; Malacat v. People, December 12, 1997)
Stop-and-frisk procedure for the police: Stop a citizen on the street,

interrogate him, and pat him for weapons or contraband. -- A stop-and-frisk is the act
of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or
contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries,
approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check
the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending police officer must
have a genuine reason, in accordance with his experience and the surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons concealed about him. (Sanchez v.
People, G.R. No. 204589, November 19, 2014)
"Stop and frisk" searches should be allowed only in the specific and limited
instances: (1) it should be allowed only on the basis of the police officer's reasonable
suspicion, in light of his or her experience, that criminal activity may be afoot and
that the persons with whom he/she is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous; (2) the search must only be a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing; and (3) conducted for the purpose of discovering weapons which might be
used to assault him/her or other persons in the area. -- The "stop and frisk" doctrine was
developed in jurisprudence, and searches of such nature were allowed because of the recognition
that law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. These
"stop and frisk" searches are exceptions to the general rule that warrants are necessary for the
State to conduct a search and, consequently, intrude on a person's privacy. This doctrine of "stop
and frisk" "should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution (People v. Cristobal, G.R. No. 234207, June 10, 2019)
"Stop and frisk" searches should thus be allowed only in the specific and limited instances
contemplated in Terry: (1) it should be allowed only on the basis of the police officer's reasonable
suspicion, in light of his or her experience, that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons
with whom he/she is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous; (2) the search must only be
a carefully limited search of the outer clothing; and (3) conducted for the purpose of discovering
weapons which might be used to assault him/her or other persons in the area. (People v. Cristobal,
G.R. No. 234207, June 10, 2019)
Genuine reason for a “stop and frisk”: The combination of the police asset's
tip and the arresting officers' observation of a gun-shaped object under person's
shirt already suffices as a genuine reason for the arresting officers to conduct a stop
and frisk search. -- In direct contrast with warrantless searches incidental to a lawful arrest,
stop and frisk searches are conducted to deter crime. People v. Cogaed underscored that they are
necessary for law enforcement, though never at the expense of violating a citizen's right to privacy:
"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law
enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission
of offenses. For a valid stop and frisk search, the arresting officer must have had personal
knowledge of facts, which would engender a reasonable degree of suspicion of an illicit
act. Cogaed emphasized that anything less than the arresting officer's personal observation of a
suspicious circumstance as basis for the search is an infringement of the "basic right to security
of one's person and effects." Malacat instructed that for a stop and frisk search to be valid, mere
suspicion is not enough; there should be a genuine reason, as determined by the police officer, to
warrant a belief that the person searched was carrying a weapon. In short, the totality of
circumstances should result in a genuine reason to justify a stop and frisk search. Accordingly, to
sustain the validity of a stop and frisk search, the arresting officer should have personally observed
two (2) or more suspicious circumstances, the totality of which would then create a reasonable
inference of criminal activity to compel the arresting officer to investigate further. Here, while the
Court of Appeals correctly ruled that a reasonable search was conducted on petitioner, the facts
on record do not point to a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. Rather, what
transpired was a stop and frisk search. Chief Inspector Beniat received information that petitioner,
whom he knew as a kagawad and security aide of Mayor Gamboa, was carrying a gun outside the
Municipal Tourism Office during an election gun ban. With a few other police officers, he went
there and spotted petitioner right in front of the building with a suspicious-looking bulge
protruding under his shirt, around his waist. The police officer deduced this to be a firearm based
on the object's size and contour. The tip on petitioner, coupled with the police officers' visual
confirmation that petitioner had a gun-shaped object tucked in his waistband, led to a reasonable
suspicion that he was carrying a gun during an election gun ban. However, a reasonable suspicion
is not synonymous with the personal knowledge required under Section 5(a) and (b) to effect a
valid warrantless arrest. The combination of the police asset's tip and the arresting officers'
observation of a gun-shaped object under petitioner's shirt already suffices as a genuine reason
for the arresting officers to conduct a stop and frisk search on petitioner. (Manibog v. People, G.R.
No. 211214, March 20, 2019)
A “stop and frisk” becomes unlawful the moment the police officers continue
with the search on a person’s body even after that finding this person has no weapon.
-- The RTC, in its Decision, ruled that the search was valid because it was a "stop and frisk"
situation, justified by the police officers' suspicion over Cristobal as the latter supposedly tried to
flee as he was being issued a traffic violation ticket. Even if this version of events were true, i.e.,
that Cristobal tried to run away while he was being issued a ticket for his traffic violation, the same
did not justify the intensive search conducted on him. By the prosecution's own narration of the
facts - in other words, by their own admission - after Cristobal was successfully apprehended after
he ran away, "PO2 Ramos searched the accused for any deadly weapon but he found none." Even
if the Court accepts wholesale the police officers' version of the facts, the search that led to the
supposed discovery of the seized items had nevertheless become unlawful the moment they
continued with the search despite finding no weapon on Cristobal's body. The police officers' act
of proceeding to search Cristobal's body, despite their own admission that they were unable to
find any weapon on him, constitutes an invalid and unconstitutional search. (People v. Cristobal,
G.R. No. 234207, June 10, 2019)
7. Search arising from exigent and emergency circumstances
In People v. De Gracia (233 SCRA 716, [1994]), there were intelligence reports that the
building was being used as headquarters by the military rebels during a coup d’etat. A
surveillance team was fired at by a group of armed men coming out of the building and the
occupants of said building refused to open the door despite repeated requests. There were large
quantities of explosives and ammunitions inside the building. Nearby courts were closed and
general chaos and disorder prevailed. The existing circumstances sufficiently showed that a crime
was being committed. In short, there was probable cause to effect a warrantless search of the
building. 4
B.
Reasonable Administrative Searches
Administrative search doctrine: When the search is not based on suspicion

and when special needs beyond law enforcement make the warrant and probable
cause requirement impracticable: The Constitution permits the warrantless search
of "closely regulated" businesses; "special needs" cases such as schools,
employment, and probation; and "checkpoint" searches such as airport screenings
under the administrative search doctrine. Because administrative searches
primarily ensure public safety instead of detecting criminal wrongdoing, they do not
require individual suspicion. Where the risk to public safety is substantial and real,
blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as "reasonable." – US
courts have permitted exceptions to the Fourth Amendment when "special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement
impracticable" such as work-related searches of government employees' desks and offices,
warrantless searches conducted by school officials of a student's property, government
investigators conducting searches pursuant to a regulatory scheme when the searches meet
"reasonable legislative or administrative standards," and a State's operation of a probation system.
The Fourth Amendment permits the warrantless search of "closely regulated" businesses; "special
needs" cases such as schools, employment, and probation; and "checkpoint" searches such as
airport screenings under the administrative search doctrine.
Searches and seizures are ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized

suspicion of wrongdoing. However, because administrative searches primarily ensure public
safety instead of detecting criminal wrongdoing, they do not require individual suspicion. Where
the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the
risk may rank as "reasonable." In particular, airport searches have received judicial sanction
essentially because of the magnitude and pervasiveness of the danger to the public safety and the
overriding concern has been the threat of death or serious bodily injury to members of the public
4 also cited in People v. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626, April 3, 1998
posed by the introduction of inherently lethal weapons or bombs. (People v. O'Cochlain, G.R. No.
229071, December 10, 2018)
Searches conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of

an administrative purpose, rather than as part of a criminal investigation to secure
evidence of crime, may be permissible though not supported by probable cause
directed to a particular place or person to be searched. -- Searches conducted as part of
a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, rather than as part of a
criminal investigation to secure evidence of crime, may be permissible under the Fourth
Amendment though not supported by a showing of probable cause directed to a particular place
or person to be searched. Screening searches of airline passengers are conducted as part of a
general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, namely, to prevent the
carrying of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent hijackings (People v.
O'Cochlain, G.R. No. 229071, December 10, 2018)
1. Reasonable: Routine security search or

screening procedure of departing
passengers at airports
A warrantless search of departing passengers pursuant to airport security

procedure is reasonable given its minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline
travel. -- Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy,
which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in
airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has
come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft
routinely pass-through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are
routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious
objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question
that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed,
travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their
airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are
found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that
ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to
routine airport procedures. (People v. Johnston, G.R. No. 138881, December 18, 2000, 348 SCRA
526; People v. Canton, G.R. No. 148825, 27 December 2002; People v. Suzuki, G.R. No. 120670,
October 23, 2003; People v. O'Cochlain, G.R. No. 229071, December 10, 2018)
Airport screening search is a constitutionally reasonable administrative

search. -- Airport screening search is a constitutionally reasonable administrative search. The
search and seizure of an illegal drug during a routine airport inspection made pursuant to the
aviation security procedures has been sustained by this Court in a number of cases. Thus, while
the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed by Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
a routine security check being conducted in air and sea ports has been a recognized exception.
(People v. O'Cochlain, G.R. No. 229071, December 10, 2018)
Searches and seizures are ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized

suspicion of wrongdoing. However, because administrative searches primarily ensure public
safety instead of detecting criminal wrongdoing, they do not require individual suspicion. Where
the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the
risk may rank as "reasonable." In particular, airport searches have received judicial sanction
essentially because of the magnitude and pervasiveness of the danger to the public safety and the
overriding concern has been the threat of death or serious bodily injury to members of the public
posed by the introduction of inherently lethal weapons or bombs. (People v. O'Cochlain, G.R. No.
229071, December 10, 2018)
Airport security searches are lawful administrative searches because (1)

these searches constitute relatively limited intrusions geared toward finding
particular items (weapons, explosives, and incendiary devices) that pose grave
danger to airplanes and air travelers; (2) the scrutiny of carry-on luggage is no more
intrusive than is necessary to ensure air travel safety); (3) airline passengers have
advance notice that their carry-on luggage will be subjected to these security
measures; (4) all passengers are subject to the same screening procedures; and (5)
passengers are aware that they can avoid the screening process altogether by
electing not to board the plane. -- Although the US Supreme Court has not specifically held
that airport screening searches are constitutionally reasonable administrative searches, it has
suggested that they qualify as such. Airport security searches can be deemed lawful administrative
searches because (1) these searches constitute relatively limited intrusions geared toward finding
particular items (weapons, explosives, and incendiary devices) that pose grave danger to airplanes
and air travelers; (2) the scrutiny of carry-on luggage is no more intrusive (in both its scope and
intensity) than is necessary to achieve the legitimate aims of the screening process (that is, to
ensure air travel safety); (3) airline passengers have advance notice that their carry-on luggage
will be subjected to these security measures, thus giving passengers the opportunity to place their
personal effects in checked luggage; (4) all passengers are subject to the same screening
procedures; and (5) passengers are aware that they can avoid the screening process altogether by
electing not to board the plane. Moreover, abuse is unlikely because of its public nature. (People
v. O'Cochlain, G.R. No. 229071, December 10, 2018)
Routine security searches of passengers attempting to board on aircraft are

reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests
involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Thus,
illegal drugs discovered on a departing passenger during routine airport frisk
pursuant to airport security procedures may be validly seized. -- When an initial frisk
led to At around 7:30 p.m., at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area, when NAIA airport security
frisked accused-appellant Leila Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United States, she
felt something hard on the latter’s abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she
needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation. Not satisfied with the
explanation, the security personnel took accused-appellant to the rest room. The airport security
personnel then asked her to bring out the thing under her girdle. Accused-appellant brought out
three plastic packs, which contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The
methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was
acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures. Passengers attempting to board an
aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage
are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious
objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question
that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. The packs
of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless
search, they are admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant herein. Corollarily, her
subsequent arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the
discovery and recovery of shabu in her person in flagrante delicto. (People v. Johnston, G.R. No.
138881, December 18, 2000)
Airport screening procedure cannot be turned into general search for

evidence of crime: As a permissible administrative search, the scope of airport
routine check is not limitless. Screening searches of airline passengers are
conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme to prevent hijackings. The search
cannot be transformed from a limited check for weapons and explosives into a
general search for evidence of crime. -- As a permissible administrative search, the scope
of airport routine check is not limitless. Airport screening procedures are conducted for two
primary reasons: first, to prevent passengers from carrying weapons or explosives onto the
aircraft; and second, to deter passengers from even attempting to do so. Searches conducted as
part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, rather than as
part of a criminal investigation to secure evidence of crime, may be permissible under the Fourth
Amendment though not supported by a showing of probable cause directed to a particular place
or person to be searched. Screening searches of airline passengers are conducted as part of a
general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, namely, to prevent the
carrying of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and thereby to prevent hijackings. The essential
purpose of the scheme is not to detect weapons or explosives or to apprehend those who carry
them, but to deter persons carrying such material from seeking to board at all. Of course, routine
airport screening searches will lead to discovery of contraband and apprehension of law violators.
This practical consequence does not alter the essentially administrative nature of the screening
process, however, or render the searches unconstitutional.
The constitutional bounds of an airport administrative search require that the individual
screener's actions be no more intrusive than necessary to determine the existence or absence of
explosives that could result in harm to the passengers and aircraft. The search cannot also serve
unrelated law enforcement purposes as it effectively transforms a limited check for weapons and
explosives into a general search for evidence of crime, substantially eroding the privacy rights of
passengers who travel through the system. As in other exceptions to the search warrant
requirement, the screening program must not turn into a vehicle for warrantless searches for
evidence of crime. It is improper that the search be tainted by "general law enforcement
objectives" such as uncovering contraband unrelated to that purpose or evidence of unrelated
crimes or evidencing general criminal activity or a desire to detect "evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing." The US Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of keeping
criminal investigatory motives from coloring administrative searches. (People v. O'Cochlain, G.R.
No. 229071, December 10, 2018)
Once a search is conducted for a criminal investigatory purpose, an airport

search can no longer be justified under an administrative search rationale. Where
an action is taken that is simply unrelated to the administrative goal of screening
luggage and passengers for weapons or explosives, the action exceeds the scope of
the permissible search, and the evidence obtained during such a search should be
excluded. -- An airport search remains a valid administrative search only so long as the scope of
the administrative search exception is not exceeded; "once a search is conducted for a criminal
investigatory purpose, it can no longer be justified under an administrative search rationale."
Where an action is taken that cannot serve the administrative purpose, either because the threat
necessitating the administrative search has been dismissed or because the action is simply
unrelated to the administrative goal, the action clearly exceeds the scope of the permissible search.
To the extent that airport administrative searches are used for purposes other than screening
luggage and passengers for weapons or explosives, they fall outside the rationale by which they
have been approved as an exception to the warrant requirement, and the evidence obtained during
such a search should be excluded. (People v. O'Cochlain, G.R. No. 229071, December 10, 2018)
An airport security search is considered as reasonable if: (1) the search is no

more extensive or intensive than necessary, in light of current technology, to satisfy
the administrative need that justifies it, that is to detect the presence of weapons or
explosives; (2) the search is confined in good faith to that purpose; and (3) a
potential passenger may avoid the search by choosing not to fly. -- To be
constitutionally permissible, warrantless and suspicionless airport screening searches must meet
the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness. An administrative screening search must be
as limited in its intrusiveness as is consistent with satisfaction of the administrative need that
justifies it. Specifically, the Court must balance an individual's right to be free of intrusion with
"society's interest in safe air travel." An airport security search is considered as reasonable if: (1)
the search is no more extensive or intensive than necessary, in light of current technology, to
satisfy the administrative need that justifies it, that is to detect the presence of weapons or
explosives; (2) the search is confined in good faith to that purpose; and (3) a potential passenger
may avoid the search by choosing not to fly. (People v. O'Cochlain, G.R. No. 229071, December
10, 2018)
If a potential passenger chooses to avoid a search, he must elect not to fly

before placing his baggage on the x-ray machine's conveyor belt. The right to
abandon air travel must be exercised prior to commencing the screening
procedures. -- US courts are of the view that the constitutionality of a screening search does not
depend on the passenger's consent once he enters the secured area of an airport. The requirement
in Davis of allowing passengers to avoid the search by electing not to fly does not extend to one
who has already submitted his luggage for an x-ray scan. If a potential passenger chooses to avoid
a search, he must elect not to fly before placing his baggage on the x-ray machine's conveyor belt.
The right to abandon air travel must be exercised prior to commencing the screening procedures.
Any other rule would allow potential hijackers to leave whenever detection seemed imminent and
permit them to try again another day. (People v. O'Cochlain, G.R. No. 229071, December 10, 2018)
The Office of Transportation Security under DOTr is mandated to ensure civil

aviation security and enforce the Anti-Hijacking Law. It is in the context of air
safety-related justifications, therefore, that routine airport security searches and
seizures are considered as permissible under Section 2, A1iicle III of the
Constitution. -- Similar to the mission of the Transportation Security Administration of the US
Department of Homeland Security, the Office of Transportation Security under the Department
of Transportation and its predecessors has been primarily mandated to ensure civil aviation
security. To be precise, the OTS is tasked to implement Annex 17 of the ICAO Convention on
aviation security which seeks to safeguard civil aviation and its facilities against acts of unlawful
interference. Among others, the OTS has to enforce R.A. No. 6235 or the Anti-Hijacking Law. It
provides that an airline passenger and his hand-carried luggage are subject to search for, and
seizure of, prohibited materials or substances and that it is unlawful for any person, natural or
juridical, to ship, load or carry in any passenger aircraft, operating as a public utility within the
Philippines, any explosive, flammable, corrosive or poisonous substance or material. It is in the
context of air safety-related justifications, therefore, that routine airport security searches and
seizures are considered as permissible. (People v. O'Cochlain, G.R. No. 229071, December 10,
2018)
Airport search is reasonable when limited in scope to the object of the Anti-
Hijacking program. A search on the person of the passenger or on his personal
belongings in a deliberate and conscious effort to discover an illegal drug is not
authorized under the exception to the warrant and probable cause requirement.
Thus, illegal drugs discovered after a pat down search by airport security personnel
at the final security checkpoint based only on reliable information, and not during
the initial security check in the course of the routine airport screening – are
inadmissible as evidence, the search being unreasonable. -- What was seized from
Eanna were two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves, not dangerous elements or devices that
may be used to commit hijacking or terrorism. More importantly, the illegal drugs were
discovered only during the final security checkpoint, after a pat down search was conducted by
SSO Suguitan, who did not act based on personal knowledge but merely relied on an information
given by CSI Tamayo that Eanna was possibly in possession of marijuana. In marked contrast, the
illegal drugs confiscated from the accused in Johnson and the subsequent cases of People v.
Canton, People v. Suzuki, Sales v. People, and People v. Cadidia, where incidentally uncovered
during the initial security check, in the course of the routine airport screening, after the
defendants were frisked and/or the alarm of the metal detector was triggered.
Airport search is reasonable when limited in scope to the object of the Anti-Hijacking
program, not the war on illegal drugs. Unlike a routine search where a prohibited drug was found
by chance, a search on the person of the passenger or on his personal belongings in a deliberate
and conscious effort to discover an illegal drug is not authorized under the exception to the
warrant and probable cause requirement. The Court is not empowered to suspend constitutional
guarantees so that the government may more effectively wage a "war on drugs." If that war is to
be fought, those who fight it must respect the rights of individuals, whether or not those
individuals are suspected of having committed a crime. (People v. O'Cochlain, G.R. No. 229071,
December 10, 2018)
2. Reasonable: Warrantless search by the

government agency of the office computer of its
own employee in connection with an investigation
of work-related misconduct
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures equally applies to a

government workplace. Individuals do not lose this merely because they work for
the government instead of a private employer. -- The Fourth Amendment (right against
unreasonable searches and seizures) equally applies to a government workplace. Individuals do
not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a
private employer. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011, citing
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 1987)
Test to determine the validity of an employer’s intrusion into an employee’s

privacy: 1) whether an employee has a legitimate expectation of privacy; and 2)
whether the employer’s intrusion for non-investigatory, work-related purposes, as
well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, is reasonable. -- Because some
government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of
privacy is reasonable", a court must consider "the operational realities of the workplace" in order
to determine whether an employee’s Fourth Amendment rights are implicated; and next, where
an employee has a legitimate privacy expectation, an employer’s intrusion on that expectation "for
noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct,
should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances." In the case of
searches conducted by a public employer, we must balance the invasion of the employees’
legitimate expectations of privacy against the government’s need for supervision, control, and the
efficient operation of the workplace. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18,
2011, citing O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 1987)
Probable cause is not required for a public employer to conduct a legitimate,

work-related non-investigatory intrusions as well as investigations of work-related
misconduct. Such intrusion should be judged by the standard of reasonableness.
Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the
intrusion must be reasonable. -- The "special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement make the…probable-cause requirement impracticable," for legitimate, work-related
non-investigatory intrusions as well as investigations of work-related misconduct. A standard of
reasonableness will neither unduly burden the efforts of government employers to ensure the
efficient and proper operation of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the
privacy of public employees. We hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions on the
constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for non-investigatory,
work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged
by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this reasonableness
standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable. (Pollo v.
Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011, citing O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,
1987)
Test for determining the reasonableness of an employer’s intrusion into an

employee’s right to privacy: 1) whether the action was justified at its inception; and
2) whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference. A search of an employee’s office by
a supervisor will be "justified at its inception" when there are reasonable grounds
for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of
work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a non-investigatory
work-related purpose. -- Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold
inquiry: first, one must consider whether the action was justified at its inception; second, one
must determine whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. Ordinarily, a search of an
employee’s office by a supervisor will be "justified at its inception" when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-
related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose
such as to retrieve a needed file. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011,
citing O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 1987)
Example of an employee who failed to prove that he had an actual subjective

expectation of privacy in is government office or government-issued computer:
Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not
share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other
employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any
means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files. On the
contrary, he submits that he normally would have visitors in his office, whom he
even allowed to use his computer. -- Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which
contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which
he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees
or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other
employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the public
assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office like friends,
associates and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his computer which to him
seemed a trivial request. Under this scenario, it can hardly be deduced that petitioner had such
expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable. (Pollo v. Constantino-David,
G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)
A government employee’s subjective expectation of privacy can be negated by

a government policy regulating the use of office computers. -- Moreover, even assuming
arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof of the aforementioned factual circumstances, that
petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he claims, such is
negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of office computers. Office Memorandum No.
10, S. 2002 "Computer Use Policy (CUP)" puts employees on notice that they have no expectation
of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that the CSC
may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human means. This
implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were
used only for such legitimate business purposes. In one case, the US Court of Appeals Eighth
Circuit held that a state university employee has not shown that he had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his computer files where the university’s computer policy, the computer user is
informed not to expect privacy if the university has a legitimate reason to conduct a search. The
user is specifically told that computer files, including e-mail, can be searched when the university
is responding to a discovery request in the course of litigation. Petitioner employee thus cannot
claim a violation of Fourth Amendment rights when university officials conducted a warrantless
search of his computer for work-related materials. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881,
October 18, 2011)
Example of a reasonable search of a government employee’s computer files:

A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception
when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that
the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. -- As to the second point of inquiry
on the reasonableness of the search conducted on petitioner’s computer, we answer in the
affirmative.
The search of petitioner’s computer files was conducted in connection with investigation
of work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to
Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of a division was
supposedly "lawyering" for individuals with pending cases in the CSC. A search by a government
employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.
Thus, in the 2004 case decided by the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit, it was held that where
a government agency’s computer use policy prohibited electronic messages with pornographic
content and in addition expressly provided that employees do not have any personal privacy rights
regarding their use of the agency information systems and technology, the government employee
had no legitimate expectation of privacy as to the use and contents of his office computer, and
therefore evidence found during warrantless search of the computer was admissible in
prosecution for child pornography.
The search conducted on petitioner’s computer was justified at its inception and scope.
The Commission pursued the search in its capacity as a government employer and that it was
undertaken in connection with an investigation involving a work-related misconduct, one of the
circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. the Commission effected the warrantless
search in an open and transparent manner. Officials and some employees of the regional office,
who happened to be in the vicinity, were on hand to observe the process until its completion. In
addition, the respondent himself was duly notified, through text messaging, of the search and the
concomitant retrieval of files from his computer. It was a reasonable exercise of the managerial
prerogative of the Commission as an employer aimed at ensuring its operational effectiveness and
efficiency by going after the work-related misfeasance of its employees. Consequently, the
evidence derived from the questioned search are deemed admissible. (Pollo v. Constantino-David,
G.R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011)
3. Reasonable: Mandatory, random and suspicion-

less drug-testing for secondary and tertiary level
students to stamp out drug abuse
The provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless

drug testing of students are constitutional. It is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with
reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll
is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements. --The
drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level
students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless
arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard the wellbeing of the
citizenry, particularly the youth. The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as
those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily
treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug user
consent to undergo rehabilitation.
(1) Schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students;
(2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody
and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have
a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their students and may adopt such measures as
may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose
conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
The provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to
require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations
and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable requirements. (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870,
November 3, 2008)
4. Reasonable: Mandatory, random and suspicion-

less drug-testing for employees in the private and
public sector, to stamp out drug abuse
Reasonableness of an administrative search is judged by the balancing of the

intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some
compelling state interest. Given that the drug testing policy for employees--and
students for that matter under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search the
probable - cause standard is not required or even practicable. -- In context, the right to
privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion
into one's private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary
sensibilities. The right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the
state's exercise of police power.
"Reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion.
And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of
the government - mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion
of some compelling state interest. In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of
probable cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug - testing policy for
employees--and students for that matter--under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search
needing "swift and informal disciplinary procedures," the probable - cause standard is not
required or even practicable. (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870,
November 3, 2008)
Reduced expectation of privacy in the workplace: The employees' privacy

interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's work
policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management
and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain
discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated
office environment is, in fine, reduced. -- The mandatory but random drug test prescribed
by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable. The
first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon
which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis
of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement.
The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's
work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the
bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in
the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced;
and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld. (Social Justice Society v.
Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008)
Reasonableness of the intrusion of a mandatory, random, suspicionless drug-

testing for employees under RA 9165: The scope of the search or intrusion is
narrowly drawn or narrowly focused. -- Is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set
forth, or, is the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"? The
poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing
rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards
preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a
humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the
law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really
singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance
anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself
prescribes what is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be
subjected to "random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations for
purposes of reducing the risk in the work place." For another, the random drug testing shall be
undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the employee's privacy and
dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two
testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as
possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact
that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access - controlled laboratories
monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to
ensure an accurate chain of custody. Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to
report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All
told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by
proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively
minimal.
To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial
enough to override the individual's privacy interest under the premises. The Court holds that the
chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem. (Social Justice Society v.
Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008)
Summary: why mandatory, random suspicionless drug testing under RA 9165

is valid: Taking into account the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well
- defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of
the random testing, the challenged drug test requirement is reasonable and,
constitutional. --Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of
privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search,
and the well - defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the
random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context
of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also
labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other
laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And
if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it
should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be
accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.
The search is reasonable, and thus constitutional. (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs
Board, G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008)
5. Reasonable: Routine baggage inspections at

domestic seaports by port authorities
Searches pursuant to domestic port security measures are not unreasonable per se. The
security measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin to routine security
procedures in airports. The reason behind it is that there is a reasonable reduced expectation of
privacy when coming into airports or ports of travel. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387,
January 11, 2016)
X-ray machine scanning and actual inspection upon showing of probable cause that a crime
is being or has been committed are part of reasonable security regulations to safeguard the
passengers passing through ports or terminals. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387, January
11, 2016)
6. Reasonable: Non-intrusive public bus searches

for public safety
The State can impose non-intrusive security measures and filter those going
in a public bus. The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of
others may be put at risk. -- A bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a shopping mall are all private
property accessible to the public. The State, much like the owner, can impose non-intrusive
security measures and filter those going in. A person's expectation of privacy is diminished
whenever he or she enters private premises that arc accessible to the public. Thus, a bus inspection
at a military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search. (Saluday v. People, G.R. No. 215305,
April 3, 2018)
Guidelines for reasonable public bus searches:
Prior to entry, passengers and their bags and luggages can be subjected to a routine
inspection akin to airport and seaport security protocol. Metal detectors and x-ray scanning
machines can be installed at bus terminals. Passengers can also be frisked. In lieu of electronic
scanners, passengers can be required instead to open their bags and luggages for inspection, in
the passenger's presence. Should the passenger object, he or she can validly be refused entry into
the terminal.
While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security personnel
of the bus owner in the following three instances. First, upon receipt of information that a
passenger carries contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the passenger is aboard can be
stopped en route to allow for an inspection of the person and his or her effects. This is no different
from an airplane that is forced to land upon receipt of information about the contraband or illegal
articles carried by a passenger onboard. Second, whenever a bus picks passenger en route, the
prospective passenger can be frisked and his or her bag or luggage be subjected to the same
routine inspection by government agents or private security personnel as though the person
boarded the bus at the terminal. This is because unlike an airplane, a bus is able to stop and pick
passengers along the way, making it possible for these passengers to evade the routine search at
the bus terminal. Third, a bus can be flagged down at designated military or police checkpoints
where State agents can board the vehicle for a routine inspection of the passengers and their bags
or luggage.
In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at the bus
terminal and the search of the bus while in transit must also satisfy the following conditions to
qualify as a valid reasonable search. First, as to the manner of the search, it must be the
least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or persons being searched, minimizing,
if not altogether eradicating, any cause for public embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule. Second,
neither can the search result from any discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling,
stereotyping and other similar motives. In all instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable
identities, persons with disabilities, children and other similar groups should be protected. Third,
as to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring public safety. Fourth, as to
the evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced that precautionary
measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused.
The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be put at
risk. Given the present circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice that public transport buses
and their terminals, just like passenger ships and seaports, are in that category.
Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly accepts passengers
at the terminal and along its route is likewise covered by these guidelines. Hence, whenever
compliant with these guidelines, a routine inspection at the terminal or of the vehicle itself while
in transit constitutes a reasonable search. Otherwise, the intrusion becomes unreasonable,
thereby triggering the constitutional guarantee under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
To emphasize, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars. Neither are they
applicable to moving vehicles dedicated for private or personal use, as in the case of taxis, which
are hired by only one or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can no longer be flagged down
by any other person unti1 the passengers on board alight from the vehicle. (Saluday v. People,
G.R. No. 215305, April 3, 2018)
Effect of unlawful search and seizure: Evidence obtained is inadmissible for

any purpose in any proceeding. -- Any evidence obtained in violation of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. This
exclusionary rule instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. (People
v. Comprado, G.R. No. 213225, April 4, 2018)

BAR 2022 - Constitutional Law Part II - Alexis F. Medina - SSCR LAW

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Updated as of January 30, 2022

2022 BAR REVIEW NOTES IN

Selected Recent Jurisprudence 1

By Atty. Alexis F. Medina2

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

The right against unreasonable searches

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a component of the

The meaning of “search”

There is a “search” within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition if

Restricting and blocking access to computer data as a search and seizure. --

Accessing and copying contents of a computer hard drive. -- Accessing and

Disclosure, interception, search, seizure, and/or examination, of computer

Use of surveillance cameras to cover places where there is reasonable

The state action requirement in the application

The Bill of Rights does not govern relationships between individuals; it

When private individuals are considered agents of the state: Security

A search by agents of persons in authority, such as barangay tanods, is

The requirement of reasonableness

The constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches

Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

A search and seizure must be carried through a judicial warrant; otherwise,

A search and seizure carried out without a judicial warrant becomes

A proclamation of a state of emergency by a provincial governor, with an

Cybercrime warrants: The disclosure, interception, search, seizure, and/or

A search warrant must conform strictly to the constitutional requirements

Requisites for a valid search warrant: 1) probable cause; 2) to be determined

(People v. Pastrana, G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018)

Purpose of the requirement of particularity of description: Limit the things

Valid Warrantless Searches

VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCHES & SEIZURES

1. Search incident to a lawful arrest

The rule on searches incident to a lawful arrest: A person lawfully arrested

Purpose of search incident to a lawful arrest: Protect the arresting officer

In a search incident to a lawful arrest, there must be a lawful arrest preceding

Meaning of arrest: An arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to

Limits to a search incidental to a lawful arrest:

Limitation as to Area: Immediate Control Test: A valid arrest allows the

When is there a lawful arrest?

Valid warrantless arrests: In flagrante delicto, hot pursuit and escaped

Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a

In flagrante delicto arrest

In flagrante delicto arrest: A peace office of a private person may, without a

In flagrante delicto arrest requirements: (1) the person to be arrested must

In flagrante delicto arrest requirements: 1) Overt act indicating that the

Overt act requirement in in flagrante delicto arrest: Reliable information

Examples of lack of overt act requirement

Arrest of a jeepney passenger at a checkpoint on the basis of an informant’s

The act of walking while reeking of liquor per se cannot be considered a

Reliable information alone is not enough to justify a warrantless arrest

Example of a valid in flagrante delicto

Examples of invalid warrantless arrests/searches

Hot pursuit arrest

Personal knowledge as basis for probable cause in a hot pursuit arrest:

The requirement of immediacy in hot pursuit arrest: The determination of

Requirement of immediacy in hot pursuit arrest: The rule requires that an

Immediacy in a hot pursuit arrest: This required time element acts as a

The clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the

Example of existence of immediacy for a valid hot pursuit arrest: A

Examples of valid and invalid hot pursuit arrests

2. Search of a moving motor vehicle