The Cardinal Virtues and Plato's Moral Psychology

Author(s): David Carr

Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 151 (Apr., 1988), pp. 186-200
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 ThePhilosophical Vol.38 No. 151
Quarterly
ISSN 0031-8094$2.00

THE CARDINAL VIRTUES

AND PLATO'S MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
BY DAVIDCARR

In a longand enduringtradition ofmoralthought, fourqualitiesofmoral

character - courage,temperance, justiceand wisdom- havebeen regarded
as cardinal;in characterisingthesequalitiesas thevirtueson whichall right
conduct turns, modern catechisms of Catholic Christian doctrine1
essentially expressa traditional
Scholasticview.Moreover,itwouldappear
thatin most serious treatments of the natureof virtuefromPlato and
Aristotle throughAugustineand Aquinasdownto thosepresentdaymoral
philosopherswho have also consideredthe topic2these fourvirtueshave
been accordeda certainpivotalstatusin morallife.But despitethefactthat
thestandardliterature on virtue,ancientand modern,containsanynumber
of interestingobservationsand insightsrelating to the paramount
importance forhumanmoralconductofthesevirtues, itremainsratherless
than completelyclear in what sense the dispositionsnamed in the
traditional quartetmaybe regardedas cardinal.Whypreciselythesefour
ratherthananyotherfourqualitiesof character;whynotthreequalitiesas
in the case of the theologicalvirtues,or five,or seven?
For a start,then,I shallsuggestthatthe criteriaaccordingto whichthe
cardinality ofthesevirtuesshouldbe judgedmaybe regardedas enshrined
in the following fourtheses:
(1) thatreferenceto all of the cardinalvirtuesis requiredfora complete
accountofvirtueor excellenceof moralcharacter(i.e. thateach of the
cardinalvirtuestakenseparatelyconstitutes somethinglike a necessary
conditionof moralexcellence);
(2) that a completeor exhaustiveaccount of moral excellencemay be
providedin termsofthesefourvirtues(i.e. thatthefourcardinalvirtues
forcompletemoralexcellence);
are jointlysufficient
(3) that none of the four cardinalvirtuesare reducibleto any one or
combinationof the other three (i.e. they are not exhaustively
interdefinable even if, for example,wisdom constitutespart of the
definition of the otherthreevirtues);
l For exampleTheSaint PeterCatechism CatholicDoctrine
2 of (Liverpool,1972) p. 59.
See, forexample:P. T. Geach, The Virtues
(Cambridge,1977); P. Foot, Virtues
and Vices
(Oxford,1978); and JamesD. Wallace, Virtuesand Vices(Ithaca,1978).

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 THE CARDINALVIRTUES AND PLATO'S MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 187

(4) thatall othernon-cardinalqualitiesof characterordinarily regardedas

virtues(e.g. anyof therangeofdispositions identified as 'in a mean'by
Aristotlesuch as friendliness,modesty,generosity, self-respect and so
on) mayeitherbe definedin termsofthecardinalvirtuesor understood
to be specialcases of them.
In thispaperI shalltryto arguethata satisfactory case forthecardinality
of the fourtraditional virtuesmaybe made in termsof thesefourtheses;
but I shall attemptno historicalanalysesof the extentto whichdifferent
traditional accountsof thesevirtuesare compatiblewiththethesesbeyond
attendingto what Plato, and occasionallyAristotle,had to say on the
matter.
In factI haveelectedto discusstheproblemofthecardinality ofthefour
traditional virtuesalmostexclusively in relationto the moralphilosophy of
Plato.This is not,however,justa matterof havinga convenient peg upon
whichto hang a discussionof the virtues,forthereare good reasonsfor
choosingPlato fromamongotherpossiblephilosophersin relationto this
particulartopic.First,then,Plato's dialoguesofferthe earliestsystematic
and coherenttreatment of the natureof virtueand moralityin western
philosophicalthoughtand that treatmentis almost exclusivelyfocused
(unlikeAristotle's) uponan attempt to understand thefourcardinalvirtues.
Second, in the course of his attemptto accountforthe natureof virtue
Plato conceivedand elaboratedcertainmodelsof moralpsychology, which
have continuedto have a profoundand enduringinfluenceon all serious
subsequentthoughtaboutproblemsof ethicsand whichare also of direct
relevanceto mypresenttopic.Third, however,althoughthereare good
reasonsforthinking thatin generalAristotle'sapproachto understanding
thevirtuesas qualitiesofcharacterholdsrathermorepromisethanPlato's,
I shallsuggestthatthereare featuresofPlato'streatment ofthetopicin his
laterphilosophywhichare potentially moreilluminating thanAristotlein
relationto the presentproblem.I shall investigatethe problemof the
cardinality of the traditionalvirtues,then,by directreferenceto three
periods of Plato's thoughtabout the nature of virtue and morality
identifiable roughlywiththeProtagoras, theRepublicand theLaws.3
The firstofthesethreephasesofPlato'sthought is familiar enoughfrom
the earlierSocraticdialoguesin generalthoughit is perhapsassociated
especiallywith the Protagorasand the Gorgias.I suppose the general
perspective associatedwithit maybe fairly called the'Socratic'viewand it
is mosteasilygraspedin theidea thatvirtueis knowledge.In muchearlier
dialoguesthantheProtagoras, of course,Socratesis represented as arguing

3All collectedin: Edith Hamiltonand HuntingtonCairns (eds.), Plato: The Collected

Dialogues(Princeton,1961).

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188 DAVID CARR

againstone antagonist or anotherthatthisor thatmoralvirtueof courage,

temperanceor whateveris explicableonly in termsof the exerciseof
wisdom,but it is perhapsaboveall in theProtagoras thatwe encounterthe
mostexplicitacknowledgement of wisdomas themastervirtue,the keyto
all the others.
At thisrelativelyearlystageof Plato'smoralthought, of course,theview
thatvirtueis knowledgeor wisdomis based essentially on a simpledualistic
analysisof human nature as a functionof two qualitatively different
elements, mind or soul and body. Whereas the body as the mortal and
materialaspectof humannatureis thelocus of all thepassions,pleasures
and painswhichare thesourceof temptation to errorand wickedness,the
mindor soul is the source,at leastpotentially, of knowledgeof good and
evil,of the values and principleswhereby some sort ofmoralordermaybe
on
imposed unrulycorporeal nature. On the Socratic view,moreover,it
appears that such government of mind over body is the onlywayin which
human naturecan become good. On this view, then, it appears that
knowledgeor wisdom amountsto somethinglike both a sufficient and
necessarycondition for virtuous not
conduct; only is it the case that no man
who genuinelyknowsbettercan behaveworse,it is also thatanyconduct
which mightsuperficially appear courageous,just or temperatecannot
really be so unless it is informed by wisdom.For anythesisthatthe four
virtuesof courage,temperance, justiceand wisdomare to be regardedas
cardinal,however, analysis virtueis clearlyfatal;it certainly
this of violates
the thirdof our conditionsforcardinality thatthe virtuesshould not be
mutuallyreducibleor interdefinable, even if it does not violatethe first
conditionthatreference to all fourof thetraditional virtuesis requiredfor
a completeaccountof moralexcellence.Basically,on the Socraticview,
wisdomor knowledgeof thegood comprehends thewholeof therealmof
virtue.
In due course, however,Plato's own difficulties about this simple
Socraticaccountofmoralpsychology led to thedevelopment or elaboration
of it thatis to be foundin theRepublic.It is therethatwe encounterthe
morematurePlatonicanalysisofthesoul as consisting ofthreepartswhose
relationsto each otherdetermine thecourseofhumanmoralconduct.The
earlierSocratictreatment of human natureas a conflictor partnership
betweenmindand bodycontinuesto be acknowledgedor reflected in the
Republican distinction between the rationaland appetitiveaspects of
humanexperience,but so thatthe moralagentdoes not nevertheless act
or
incontinently irresolutely when faced with or
temptation hardship, the
additionalelementof spiritor will is introducedto performan executive
functionin the serviceof reason with respectto the disciplineof the
appetitesand passions. It is preciselyin the interestsof developingor

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 THE CARDINALVIRTUES AND PLATO'S MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 189

thewillthatPlato insistsin theRepublic

reinforcing thateducationshould
be physicalas well as academic:

... excessiveemphasison athleticsproducesa prettyuncivilised

type,whilea purelyliteraryand academictrainingleaves a man
withless backbonethanis decent.4

Althoughthe Republican model is largelyjust a complicationof the

Socraticviewthatvirtueis essentiallya functionofthewiseruleofappetite
by good judgement,it nevertheless allowsverymuchmore scope forthe
of distinctvirtues,foron thismodelrathermoreis
separateidentification
requiredfor good conduct than just knowledgeof the good; wisdom
requiresthe assistanceof the spiritor will, for example,to secure the
obedienceof appetiteto theprinciplesof rightconductthatit formulates.
Roughlyspeaking,then,temperancemaybe definedas the conditionin
whichtheappetitesare subjectedto disciplinebythewill,courageconsists
in the exercise of will for the disciplineof passion and appetitein
accordancewithprinciplesof rightreason,and wisdomis a matterof the
rightinstruction or directionof the will for the reasonablecontrolof
passionand appetite.Althoughit is true,then,thatthereis a good deal of
herebetweencourage,temperance
partialinterdefinition and wisdom,none
of the characteristicsin questionis completelyreducibleto the others;
temperanceis not exclusively definablein termsof courageand wisdom
sinceit requiresreferenceto appetite,courageis notreducibleto wisdom
and temperancesincereference to theexerciseofwillis neededto explain
how the controlof the passionsand appetitesby reason is possibleand,
above all, courage and temperanceare not simplyreducibleto wisdom
sincePlato allowsthata man of reasonor good judgementmayhave 'less
backbonethanis decent.'
In termsof the resourcesof Republicanmoral psychology, then,it
appearspossibleto givetolerably persuasiveaccountsof wisdom,courage
and temperanceas relatively distinctaspectsor expressionsofmoralvirtue
in general.Moreover,I believethatthereallyprofoundinsightbehindthe
explanation ofvirtuein termsof thispsychology lies in thewayit accounts
forthe need forseveralvirtuesratherthanjust one, by relatingdifferent
virtuesdirectly aspectsofpsychological
to different experienceor elements
in human nature;thus temperanceis to the appetitesand passions as
courageis to the spiritor will and wisdomis to reason. I shall indeed
proceed to argue that the fourtraditionalvirtuesmay be regardedas

4
translated
Plato: TheRepublic, 1955) p.153, Book III,
by H. D. P. Lee (Harmondsworth,
410d.

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190 DAVID CARR

cardinalin so faras theymaybe seen to relatedirectly to relatively distinct

aspectsof humannatureor,moreprecisely, to differentrespectsin which
failurecan occurin humanmorallife.
Clearly,however,the Republicanstorywill not do as it stands.In the
firstplace, where does the virtueof justice featurein relationto this
analysisof humancharacter? In termsof the moraltheoryof theRepublic
the relationship betweenjusticeand virtueis clear enough- to all intents
and purposestheyare identical.Or, rather,the aim of the enquiryinto
moralpsychology in theRepublic is to discoverwhatjusticemeansin both
the individualand the state and for Plato understanding justice at the
personal level is simplya matterof understanding how moral virtue
operatesin theindividual;thereis individualjusticeor virtuewhenreason
dominatesappetiteand passion with the help of the will. In termsof
individualmoralvirtue,then,a man behavesjustlywhenhe conductshis
affairswisely,courageouslyand withtemperance.But, of course,in that
case justicecomprehends thewholeofindividual virtue;it is nota separate
facetof humancharacterdistinctfromcourage,temperanceand wisdom.
On the Republicanmodel,then,justiceseems,like Aristotle'snotionof
universaljustice,to be no morethana generaltermforrightconductas
such. Effectively what has happened between the Protagorasand the
Republic is simplythatjusticehas usurpedtheplace ofwisdomas thevirtue
par excellence,themastervirtuein termsof whichthe othersrequireto be
understoodand to whichtheyare in some sense subordinate.
Aboveall, however,thisleavesus withno wayof identifying anyspecific
featureofhumannatureor psychology to whichjusticemightbe said to be
relatedas, in theRepublic, wisdommaybe relatedto reason,temperance to
the appetitesand so on. But in their own of
ways, course, some of these
other identifications may also appear unsatisfactory. Even when it is
admitted thatwisdom seems to be the virtueappropriate to reason,it may
be objectedthat,since both courageand temperanceare virtuesof self-
controlrequiringsome exerciseof will over varioustemptations, there
seems no compellingreason forassociatingcourageratherthantemper-
ance withthe willas such,apartfromPlato's apparentviewthatthosein
whom the spirited element is lacking are guiltyof some sort of
spinelessnessor effeminacy ratherthan licentiousness. And again, since
both Plato and Aristotle to
appear respect conventionalwisdom bydefining
couragelargelyin termsof the controlof an emotion- fear- therewould
seem to be no overriding reason foridentifying temperanceratherthan
courage as the virtueespecially concerned with the controlof the non-
rationalpassionateside of humannatureand experience.
If Plato's observationson the natureof moralpsychology and virtuein
theRepublic had been his lastwordon thematter, thenanygeneralattempt

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 THE CARDINALVIRTUES AND PLATO'S MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 191
to understandthe cardinality of the fourtraditional virtuesin termsof
some moral-psychological analysison the Republicanmodel mighthave
appeared ratherless than promising.In directrelationto this problem,
however,I think that it is possible to discern certain interesting
developments in Plato'sthoughtaboutthesemattersin his lastgreatwork,
the Laws. It is true, of course, that unlike the developmentfromthe
Protagoras to theRepublic, theviewsexpressedin theLaws, oftenregarded
as no more than a long-windedrepetitionor expansionof those of the
Republic,do notrepresent anyradicaladvanceon thethinking oftheearlier
work; but I shall suggest that we encounterat least one important
elaborationof earlierviewsand one interesting freshemphasis.
One of the difficulties of the Republicanperspectiveforthe present
problemof explaining thecardinality of thevirtues,forexample,is related
to the statusof bothcourageand temperance withrespectto the willand
the appetitive-passionate side of humannature.Since in boththeRepublic
and earlierdialoguesPlato is inclinedin his moralpsychology to a simple
cognitive-affective dichotomy whichopposes reasonand judgementquite
generally to a mixedbag of appetites,emotions,passionsand feelings, it is
notimmediately clearwhytwodistinctvirtuesof self-control, courageand
temperance,are requiredin relationto the affectivedomain of human
experience.Essentially, however,Plato providesthe answerto thisin the
Laws wherehe is at greatpains to distinguish clearlybetweentwo quite
different aspectsofhumanmoralfailurehavingtheirsourcesin affective or
non-rational responses;passion,then,is distinguished clearlyfrompleasure.
Passion, says Plato, is 'a contentiousand combativeelement which
frequently causes shipwreck by its headstrongviolence'whereaspleasure
'regularlygets its will by a combinationof seductionwith cunning
deception'.5
In the protracted discussionof thisdistinction in Book IX of theLaws,
Plato arguesthatmoralturpitude arising from the pursuitofpleasureis of
a quitedifferent and moreseriousstatusthanthesortoffailurethatresults
fromfitsof emotionand passion; to the extent,then, that two quite
different affective sourcesof moralfailureare explicitly emphasisedin the
Laws, it is to a
possible recognise significant elaboration of the earlier
Platonicmoralpsychology. In the termsof the ninthbook of the Laws,
then,thereis a definite basis on whichto relatesomeofthecardinalvirtues
to certaindefinite categoriesofpotentialvice or errorconcerning relatively
distinctareas of humanexperienceand conduct.Man requireswisdom
because he is a rationalanimalwhois nevertheless susceptibleto errorand
he
ignorance, requirestemperance because he is the kindof creaturewho
5 Plato: TheLaws, translated A. E.
by Taylorin: E. Hamiltonand H. Cairns(eds.) Plato:
The Collected
Dialogues(Princeton,1961) p. 1423, Book IX, 863b ff.

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192 DAVID CARR

is undera constanttemptation to pursuecarnalpleasuresand appetitesof

varioussortsand he requirescouragebecause thepain and dangerthathe
must face in this hard world render him prey to frequentfear and
irresolution. In the termsof the Laws, then,we may relatecourage to
passionand temperanceto pleasureas wisdomis relatedto ignorance.
But these identifications maynow be held to give rise to at least two
further problems.In the firstplace, then,whyshouldcouragebe directly
relatedto theemotionalor passionateside of humanlifeanymorethanto
thatsame sphereof the senses withwhichtemperanceis concerned?If
courage is afterall concernedwith the controlof physicalpain and
hardshipin muchthe same fashionas temperanceis concernedwiththe
governanceof tendenciesto ease and pleasure,then both virtuesare
essentiallydesignedto givetheindividualsome masteryoverthe realmof
physicalsensationratherthan that of emotionor passion. The crucial
difference betweentemperanceand courage,however,mightbe put by
sayingthatwhereastheformer is concernedessentially withchoicebetween
sensualor physicalexperiences, thelatteris not.Temperancerequiresthat
a manshouldchoosewiselyfromthepleasureswhichtempthimand reject
thosewhichare bad forhimor harmfulto others.But,althoughit is true
thata manmaytakestepsto avoidpainsand hardships, he cannotavoidall
of them;pain and difficulty will come his wayregardlessof his choice in
thematterand thecourageofthebravemanis judgedin termsofhowwell
he enduressuch hardships.
Thus thedifference betweencourageousand cowardlymen is notto be
simplymeasured in terms of any differencebetweenthe amountsor
of
qualities pain that are undergoneas the difference betweentemperate
and incontinent men may be judged by reference to the amountsor
qualitiesof pleasure that are chosen. The difference between courageand
cowardiceis measured more in terms of the emotional or attitudinal
response to the or
pains hardshipssuffered; whereas the cowardly manwill
complain,panic,despair or sink into the
self-pity, courageous man willgrit
his teethand endure.Essentially, then,courage consists in the control of a
naturalhumanpsychological to
response pain and hardship - fear- rather
than in the controlof the amountsor circumstancesof thatpain and
hardship.
A secondpossibleobjectionto viewingcourageas thevirtueconcerned
withthecontrolofthepassionsand emotions,however,is thatsurelyit can
onlybe held to be concernedwiththecontrolof theparticularemotionof
fear ratherthan with that of the passions in general. In referring to
temperance, afterall, we be
may adverting to the control of any of a range
of physicalor sensualappetites(sexual,gustatory and so on), but courage
maynot in the same waybe said to be concernedindifferently withthe

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 THE CARDINALVIRTUES AND PLATO'S MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 193

controlof fear,angeror cheerfulness. Despite the obviousforceof this

objection,however,Aristotle'sdoctrineof the mean mightbe helpfully
invokedhereto remindus thatcowardicein theformofexcessiveresponse
to fearmaynotbe the onlyrecognisabledefectof characterin relationto
courage. For Aristotle,then, there is a consideration,again possibly
reflectedin conventional wisdom,whichtakesthe formof censuringthat
sortof foolhardy exuberancewhichcauses some to rushin whereangels
mightfearto tread.The sortof rashnessthatis here contrasted withtrue
courage,moreover,appearsto be interestingly ambiguousbetweenanger
on theone handand a kindofmanicover-confidence on theother.Thus a
man mightrushheadlonginto dangereitherbecause he was blindedby
rage or because a stateof high euphoriarenderedhim obliviousof the
hazardsahead. In thatcase, couragedefinedas the reasonablecontrolof
passion or emotion,then,would be quite appropriately identifiedas the
mastervirtuewithrespectto thecontrolofa widerangeofemotionalstates
in additionto fear.
In anyevent,evenif,rathermoreconventionally, we identify something
likeeven-temperedness as thevirtuewithrespectto thecontrolofexcessin
anger, it is clear that even-temperis much closer to courage than
temperancein thekindof self-control it requires.For just as couragewill
oftenbe requiredof a man who is beset by fearin painfulor dangerous
circumstances, so also thecontroloftempermaybe requiredofone whois
drivento rageby some injuryor slight;in neithercase is it a matterof the
men in questionchoosingwhetherto be hurt,endangeredor slighted,but
rathermoreof decidinghow theywillrespondemotionally to thepain or
injury.So at theveryleastwe maysaythatgood temperand thecontrolof
excessivezeal are virtuesof the typeof courage;couragewell represents
thattypeof virtuecruciallyconcernedwiththe controlof passion and
emotionratherthan the disciplineof sensual pleasure, even if it is
stretching a point to claim to be able to reduce all cases of emotional
controlto courage.
So far,then,threeof the traditional virtues- courage,temperanceand
wisdom-may be regardedas cardinalin so far as each one of them
safeguardstheindividualagainstvice or errorwithrespectto one of three
clearly not unconnectedbut neverthelessimportantly distinguishable
aspectsof humannatureand experience.It is because of the essentially
differentconcernsof thesevirtuesthatit is notpossibleto explainanyone
of themin termsoftheothers.Withrespectto theso-callednon-cognitive
or affectiveside of humanexperience,forexample,the man of complete
virtuecannotsimplyget along withjust one formof self-control, either
courage or temperance,because the sorts of temptations aroused by
sensualpleasureare of a categoriallydifferentnaturefromthosecaused by

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194 DAVID CARR

passion and emotion.Thus a man who is naturally moderateand easily

of
capable controlling his sensual appetites in non-stressful
circumstances
may nevertheless be prone to emotional disintegration in stressful
conditions;he mayexhibitnaturalsobriety butlackcourage.But,similarly,
a courageousor emotionally stable man may all the same be unable to
resistthe snaresof pleasure,of theharmfulor unlawfulindulgenceof his
appetitesforsex and drink.Furthermore, of course,a man endowedwith
certainnaturalcapacitiesof courageor temperancemaynevertheless be
liableto errordue to some defectofwisdom;throughinvoluntary or wilful
ignorancehe mayapplyhis courageand temperance to theachievement of
wickedends.
But what,then,of the fourthso-called cardinalvirtueof justice?If
courage,temperanceand wisdomare the virtuesrespectively of passion,
pleasureand reason,whatimportant featureofhumannatureor experience
remainsto be thebusinessof justiceto safeguard? Surelyifa manis wise,
courageousand temperate he has all thatis neededforvirtueand justiceat
thepersonallevel.At anyrate,thiswouldappearto be substantially Plato's
conclusionin the Republicwhere it would seem that justice is done
whereverand whenevera man is able to choose his pleasurestemperately
and facehardshipsresolutely in thelightofsoundrationalprinciples.Once
again,however,I thinkthatan important clue to recognising thatwisdom
togetherwiththe twokindsof self-control are not sufficient
forcomplete
virtueis to be discoveredin a crucialpassage of the Laws where the
Athenianobserves:

But of all faultsof the soul the gravestis one whichis inbornin
mostmen,one whichall excusein themselves and none therefore
attemptsto avoid- thatconveyedin the maximthat'everyoneis
naturally his own friend'and thatit is onlyrightand properthat
he shouldbe so, whereasin truth,thissameviolentattachment to
selfis theconstantsourceof all mannerof misdeedsin everyone
of us ... a manwho meansto be greatmustcare neitherforself
norforitsbelongings, butforjustice,whetherexhibited in his own
conductor ratherin thatof another.6

Now I do not,of course,wantto suggestof anything Plato saysin this

a radicalbreakor changeofpositionbetweenthe
passagethatit represents
and theLaws in thesensethatthemoralpsychology
Republic oftheRepublic
exhibitsa very definitemodificationof that of the earlier Socratic
in the Republicand
dialogues;thereare, afterall, verymanyobservations

6Ibid.p. 1318,BookV,731d-732a.

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 THE CARDINALVIRTUES AND PLATO'S MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 195
earlierworkswhich are consistentwithviewingself-centredness as the
fundamental sourceof vice and injustice.At the same time,the emphasis
here on attachment to selfas thegravestfaultof the soul is strikingin a
dialoguethatelsewheretakes greatpains to identify precise distinctions
betweenparticularmoral faultsby referenceto passion, pleasure and
ignorance.It is quite possible,of course,thatPlato means no morehere
thanthatself-loveis to be identified as the rootor sourceof all the other
moral faultsand thathe is merelyendorsingthe Republicanview that
justiceat thepersonallevelis justa function oftheexerciseofcourageand
temperancein accordancewithwisdom.I shallnot speculate,then,about
whatPlato'sviewof thematteractuallywas in theLaws; insteadI shallgo
my own wayby arguingthathis identification of self-loveas the gravest
faultof the soul does anywayprovidea clue to recognising a fourthsource
of humanerrorthatrelatesdirectly to thecardinalvirtueof justiceas does
passionto courage,pleasureto temperanceand ignoranceto wisdom.
As a place to begin, one mightobserve that there appears to be
something ratherincompleteor unsatisfactory abouttheviewof individual
justiceor virtueas largelya functionof the wise controlof passion and
appetitethatis characteristicoftheRepublic and earlierworksofPlato.The
difficultywith it is that it would appear to construethe life of virtue
preciselyas a personalor individualmatter;theremayappear,then,to be
somethingpeculiarlyself-regarding or self-focusedabout this view of
virtue.It is true,ofcourse,thata personwhoseconductregularly exhibited
qualitiesof wisdom,courageand temperance wouldgenerally be regarded
as an admirableman.Moreover,as someonegivento intelligent reflection
upon questionsof individualand social policy he would probablybe
disposed to respectthe standardconventionsof public justice and to
behavewitha highdegreeof consideration forthe rightsand interestsof
otherpeople.But all ofthis,ofcourse,is quiteconsistent witha fairlyself-
interested and manipulative attitudeto others;withunderstanding thatthe
keepingof promisesand covenantsis simplyjustthemosteffective wayof
establishing a good reputationand therebythe cooperationof othersin
enterprises fromwhichone mayexpectto benefit.
But thewisdomof self-interest bywhichsuch an individuallivedwould
be hardlydistinguishable fromthemereclevernessthatAristotle contrasted
in the Ethicswiththe truewisdomof virtue.7Arguably,then,the main
troublewiththe moralpsychology of theRepublicand earlierdialoguesis
thatdespitemuchexaltedtalkof care of the soul via properattention to
considerationsof truthand justice, the account of justice suggested,
especiallyin the formof virtueor justiceat the personallevel,is often
7 Aristotle:TheNicomacheanEthics,translated
by Sir David Ross (London, 1925) BookVI,
Section12, pp. 154-6, 1144a, 24 ff.

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 196 DAVID CARR

consistent withattitudesof a ratherself-seeking, opportunist or prudential

nature.I do notthink,however,thatthisis theresultof anymereaccident
or thecommission ofsomesimplemistakeaboutthenatureofmorallifeon
thepartof a moralphilosopherof Plato'sgenius.I suspectit is ratherthat
the sort of representatives of naked and unashamedopportunism that
Socrates has to encounterin the Republic, the Gorgiasand otherearlier
dialoguesare men forwhommoralappealsof a morethanself-interested,
prudentialor utilitariancharacterwill cut no ice. Throughthe arguments
ofSocrates,then,Platoseeksto showthemthatitis morein theirinterests,
theyhavemoreto gain,fromobserving thestandardconventions ofpublic
justicethanfrompursuingtheirown obviouslymorepersonaland private
selfishdesires and appetites.In the Laws, however,the Athenianis
discoveredin much more morallycongenialand enlightenedcompany
altogether. On earlierPlatonicperspectives, then,the salvationof the soul
oftenappearsto be something achievablebytheselfin theinterests of the
self; in theLaws, however,it seems thatthe lifeof virtueand justicethat
conducesto thecompletehealthofthesoul requiresa certaindefinite self-
transcendence.
In thatcase, to whataspectof humannatureand experienceis justice
relatedas a cardinalvirtue,as wisdomis relatedto reason,temperanceto
pleasure and courage to passion? If we succumb to a common
"psychologising" tendency to lookforsomementalor "inner"dimensionof
humanexperienceto set alongsidereason,emotionand passionwe might
perhapsbe inclinedto identify theelusiveelementas a formofdesire.The
gravestfaultofthesoul indicatedbyPlatoin theLaws appearsto be a kind
of self-obsession, pride or vanitywherebythe will is directedinwardly
towardsthe satisfaction or assertionof the ego. The fundamental problem
oftheunjustmanis thathe sees everything fromhis ownpointofview,his
needs and interests are alwaysaccordedpriority overthoseofothersand in
the finalanalysishis energiesare invariably directed,howeversubtlyor
unobviously, towards the achievement of his own desiresand ambitions.
This does notbyanymeansrenderhima slaveofthepassionsin thesense
of the akraticor incontinent man; on thecontrary, his relentlesspursuitof
honour,fameand wealthmay well require iron disciplineof passionsand
sensualpleasures.Nor,ofcourse, does this make himappearin theeyesof
theworldunwise;on thecontrary, his wisdom is verymuchthewisdomof
theworld.But itwouldappearthat thiswisdom of self-loveis no morethe
genuinewisdomof virtuethan the self-controlof his ambitionis the true
self-disciplineof virtue.
But again,althoughthemanofenlightened self-interestmayalso appear
to be the mostsociableand cooperativeof men,his cooperationdoes not
seem to be thatof genuinevirtuewhichshouldmoreproperly be inspired

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 THE CARDINALVIRTUES AND PLATO'S MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 197

by somethinglike genuinealtruisticor other-regarding attitudesthanby

some wilyformof self-interest. Thus the rootsof justiceas a virtueor
qualityof moral characterare reallyto be located in the natureof an
individual'sattitudesor dispositionstowardsothers.That is why,rather
thantrying to identifyjusticeas thevirtueconcernedwithsome actualor
hypothetical elementof individualpsychologylike desire or will, it is
probablynearerthe markto regardit as thepre-eminent virtueof human
social life. Perhaps, then, the ultimatetrouble with earlier Platonic
accountsof virtueor justiceat the individuallevelis thattheyinclinetoo
muchtowardsdefining it in termsthatare rathertoo exclusively personal
withoutdue regardforthe respectsin whichindividualhumanpsychology
is to a large extentshaped by humansocial nature.It seems almosttoo
obviousto be worthsaying,however,thatthe characterof a man as a
genuinemoralbeingmayonlybe reallyproperly understood in termsofthe
qualityof his relationswithotherpeople; onlywhena man's attitudes have
come to expresssomethinglike a genuineconcernand regardforothers
ratherthanjust a conditionof self-interest can he be reallycreditedwith
something like a genuineinitiationintohumanmorallife.
It is foressentiallythisreason,I think,thatjusticeas a qualityof moral
character, cannotbe fullyunderstoodin termsof something like a general
endorsementof some systemof rules or principlesof distribution and
rectification, and it is preciselybecause Aristotleattemptsto characterise
particular justicein thesetermsin theNicomachean Ethicsthathe runsinto
difficulties about the natureof justiceas an excellenceof characterand
failsto accommodateit easilyto the doctrineof the mean.8In particular,
Aristotle encounters problemsofrelatingjusticeto thecontrolof a specific
emotionor feelingas courage is related to the controlof fear and
temperanceto the controlof appetite.In fact,however,we are able to see
fromthe Laws thatPlato does relateinjusticegenerallyto a stateof the
soul, thatof self-love;by implication, then,we maysafelyassumethathe
would be inclinedto contrastthe self-lovethatleads to graveinjustices
withanothersortof love thatconducesto justicein so faras it is directed
beyondthe self. True justice,in that case, is secured onlywhen men
acquirethecapacityto taketheneeds and interests ofothersto theirhearts
insteadofmerelyregarding thesatisfaction
of theneeds of othersas a way
of feathering theirownnests.Justiceas a moralvirtueis indeedconcerned
withtheexpressionof a stateofthesoul,then,and we mightcall thatstate
charityor love; but the state in question is not merelya feelingor
emotionalexperiencelikefearor lust.Whethera manis capableofgenuine
love for others or is simplyconsumed with love for himselfis not

8Ibid.BookV,Section5, p. 121,1133b,29 ff.

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198 DAVID CARR

susceptibleof discernment throughsome simpleact of introspection but

onlyby referenceto the qualityof his conductin interpersonal dealings
withothers.
Genuine moralvirtue,then,is incompletely specifiedin termsof only
wisdom,temperanceand courage;the fourthtraditional virtueof justice
cannotbe accountedforin termsof the government of the passionsand
appetitesby will in accordancewithprinciplesof rightreason,since this
state of affairsis compatiblewith an enlightenedself-interest which
exhibitslittlegenuineconcernor regardforthe welfareand interestsof
others.In short,justicedoes representa fourthcardinalvirtuealongside
the others,a virtuethe concernof whichis to safeguardthe soul against
certainerrorsor vices of egoism,pride and vanitythat are potentially
deeplycorruptive of a man'smoralrelationswithotherpeople. Injusticeor
vice may occur,then,when a man of basic good will or benevolenceis
carriedawayby passionto 'shipwreckby its headstrong violence';but the
greatestoffenceagainstjusticeand virtue,the greatestcorruption of the
soul, occurs whereverand whenevera man is wise, resoluteand self-
controlled,but with no furtherthoughtthan for his own ends. In its
diagnosisof the gravestfaultof the soul,then,thepassage fromtheLaws
about attachment to self verymuch anticipatesthe famousteachingof
Corinthians I thatthehighestqualitiesofwisdomand couragemayproveto
be morallyworthlessif a man lacks charityor love.
So it would appearthatjusticeis one of the fourcornerstones of moral
virtueand thatit is not thereforereducibleto the otherthreecardinal
virtuesof courage,temperanceand wisdom.On the otherhand,however,
thesevirtuesare not reducibleto justice,since an unselfishman of basic
goodwilltowardsothersmaynone theless errfroma defectofwisdomor
self-control. Otherparticular qualitiesofcharacterordinarily calledvirtues,
moreover,may be of
regarded particularexpressions justice,just as
as
and
sobriety chastity can be viewedas specialcases of temperance. In fact,
mostof the essentially social, or
altruistic other-regardingvirtues such as
consideration, charity, tolerance,generosity, benevolenceand so on would
seemto fiteasilyenoughintothiscategory. I havearguedelsewhere9 thatit
does notappearto be a featureofsuchvirtuesthattheyare concernedwith
disciplineor self-control in quite the same way as those virtuesakin to
courage and temperance,althoughit is likelythatmostof the particular
non-cardinalvirtuessuch as chastity, generosityand good-temperedness
are non-cardinal in thesense thattheyexhibitlogicalfeaturesor requireto
be understoodin termsof one or moreof the cardinalvirtues.
We may be required,for example,to explain chastityin termsof

9 See my:'Two Kinds ofVirtue',Proceedings

oftheAristotelian LXXXIV (1984-5).
Society,

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 THE CARDINALVIRTUES AND PLATO'S MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 199

elementsofwisdom,temperance and justice0land I am inclinedanyway to

Aristotle's viewthatreferenceto wisdommustenterintothe definition of
anyvirtueincludingthe othercardinalones. But it does not seem to be
anythinglike an essential characteristic of charityor generosity,for
example,thatthe charitableor generousman should be engagedin the
controlor suppressionof uncharitableor ungenerousfeelings.On the
contrary, it is reasonableto arguethatsomeonewho acts charitably whilst
suppressing uncharitablefeelingspreciselylackscharity;he lacksprecisely
thatqualityof soul or moralcharacterwhichis opposed to prideor self-
love and necessaryforthetrueexpressionof anygenuinevirtueofthetype
of justice.
It is preciselybyviewingcharity as a particular case or expressionof the
cardinalvirtueof justiceand by understanding injusticeaccordingto our
interpretation of the Laws as essentiallyrootedin self-lovethatwe can
come to see whythisis so, since the liberationfromattachment to self,
whichis indispensableto a sincereconcernforothersand, hence,a true
regardfortheirrights,needs and interests, requiresa completechangeof
heartratherthanmerelythecontrolor suppressionof selfishfeelings.The
altruismor other-regard thatshould be presentin a givenexpressionof
charity or generosity cannotcoexistwithselfishsentiments in thesameway
as suppressedfearmayyetbe partof a genuineexpressionof courageor
suppressedsexualimpulseofchastity; altruismdoes notsuppressself-love,
it supplants it.
In thisrespectjusticeclearlyresembleswisdommore thancourageor
temperance; forsurelywisdomaimsat a beliefin whatis rightand trueand
someonewho undergoesconversionfroma stateof ignoranceto a stateof
wisdomhas not just accomplishedthe controlor suppressionof his false
beliefs.Wisdom,then,is a functionof knowledge,of actuallybelieving
whatis true;it is not a matterof professing to believewhatis truewhilst
concealing from othersone's real beliefs what is false. Perhaps the
in
largestpart of the of
difficulty understanding wisdomand justiceas moral
virtuesthathas troubledphilosophersdownto presenttimesfollowsfrom
being'held captiveby a picture'of moralvirtuesas essentially concerned
withthe controlof unrulypassions and appetites.11 Doubtless much of
Plato'sworkhas contributed to theestablishment of thispicture;butifthe
argumentsof thispaper are tolerablysound,it is also truethatthereare
elementsof Plato's latermoralpsychology thatmaycontainthe potential
forliberationfromthispicture.
It wouldappear,then,thatthefourtraditional virtuesofwisdom,justice,
o0See
my:'Chastityand Adultery',
American Philosophical 23 (1986).
Quarterly,
l For whatappearsto be an explicitself-control
viewofvirtuesee: G. H. vonWright,The
VarietiesofGoodness(London, 1963) Ch. VII.

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200 DAVID CARR

courageand temperance maybe defendedas cardinalin termsof the four

thesesstatedearlierin thispaper.Theyare cardinalin so faras theydo not
appearto be mutually to each ofthemis indispensable
reducible,reference
fora fullaccountofmoralvirtueand theyrepresent thefourmaintypesof
virtueofwhichall otherparticular non-cardinalvirtuesmaybe considered
tokens (althoughany particularvirtuemay, as Plato mighthave said,
partakeof the formsof one or moreof the fourmaintypes;chastity, for
example,maybe somesortofmixture withrespectto sexuallifeofwisdom,
justiceand temperance).Finally,thereare just fourcardinalvirtues,no
moreor less,becausebetweenthemtheywouldappearto safeguardhuman
naturein all of the areas in whichmoralfailureor errormay occur in
human affairs;harmfulor excessive indulgencein sensual pleasure,
misconductundertheinfluenceof emotionor passion,unjusttreatment of
othersthroughself-loveor prideand carelessor foolishconductfollowing
fromignoranceor a defectof wisdom.

MorayHouse College,
Edinburgh

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