Nature and essence

Neg. O. II Elec. Coop. v. Sangguniang Panlungsod – 155 SCRA 421 [1991] (nature and essence)

FACTS: In 1985, the Sanggunian Panlungsod of Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation in connection
with pending legislation related to the operations of public utilities. Invited in the hearing are the heads of
NORECO II – Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have installed inefficient power lines in
the said city. Torres and Umbac refused to appear before the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) and they alleged
that the power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to conform to
standards is lodged exclusively with the National Electrification Administration; and neither the Charter of the
City of Dumaguete nor the [old] Local Government Code (LGC – BP 337) grants the SP. The SP averred that
inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondent SP is the power to conduct investigations in
aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction.

ISSUES: Whether the Sangguinan Panlungsod possess and can exercise the contempt and subpoena power -
NO.

HELD: There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP 337) granting local
legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt.
Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the
issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious behavior would be for said
power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power.

But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the
grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions.
To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory
basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. There being no provision in the LGC explicitly
granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt,
the SP of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt.

The Ad-Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers.
Even assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue the subpoena and the order
complained of, such issuances would still be void for being ultra vires. The contempt power (and the subpoena
power) if actually possessed, may only be exercised where the subject matter of the investigation is within the
jurisdiction of the legislative body.

Requisites
Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee – 203 SCRA 767 (requisites)

FACTS: PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin Romualdez, et al for engaging in devices, schemes
and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of plaintiff and the Filipino people.

The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over personal
privilege before the Senate on the alleged "takeover of SOLOIL Inc," the FlagShip of the First Manila
Management of Companies or FMMC by Ricardo Lopa and called upon the Senate to look into the possible
violation of the law in the case with regard to RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of Public Officers [SBRC]) started its
investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the SBRC to appear before it
and testify on what they know regarding the sale of 36 corporations belonging to Benjamin Romualdez. Lopa
and Bengzon refused to testify, invoking their rights to due process, and that their testimony may unduly
prejudice the defendants and petitioners in case before the Sandiganbayan.

1
SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying and the SBRC continued its investigation of
the matter.

The petitioners filed for prohibition with a prayer for TRO and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the SBRC in
requiring their attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose.

The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for reconsideration filed by one of the defendants of the civil
case.

ISSUES: Whether the inquiry was in aid of legislation. – NO.

HELD: The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or
unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the Constitution. As provided therein, the investigation must be:
o "in aid of legislation” 
o “in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that
o "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected."
 The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to:
o the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation
or the formulation of future legislation.
o They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in
the Senate alone.
 As held in Jean L. Aznault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the
legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the
Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member.
 A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that there is no suggestion of contemplated legislation;
he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise
known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."
o In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon
Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr.
Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39
corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group. A matter that
appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. There appears to
be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.
o The issue sought to be investigated has already been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan.
The civil case was already filed in the Sandiganbayan and for the Committee to probe and inquire into the
same justiciable controversy would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that
had already earlier set in.  To allow the inquiry to continue would not only pose the possibility of conflicting
judgments between the legislative committee and a judicial tribunal.

(1) in aid of legislation

Standard v. Senate – 541 SCRA 456 [2007] (to prevent future fraudulent activities)

FACTS: Standard Charter Bank Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the courts in
Metro Manila for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799).
Enrile, in his privileged speech, urged the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, to
prevent the occurrences of a similar fraudulent in the future. The respondent Senate Committee on Banks,
Financial institutions, and Currencies, then set an initial hearing to investigate, in aid of legislation thereto. As
investigations commenced, petitioners argued that the Committee has no jurisdiction given the subject matter
2
is already in the cognizance of the courts, thus posting a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent Committee
to continue with the inquiry.

ISSUES: Whether the Committee has jurisdiction over the matter. – YES.

HELD: The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution, as initiated in the
privileged speech of Senate President Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal practices committed by a
foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities xxx", and at the conclusion of the said speech "to
immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent in
the future."

The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not
automatically bar the conduct of legislation. The exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power
of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative
investigation.

The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not be enacted into
law. Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the committees of the Senate or the
House of Representatives cannot penalize violators even there is overwhelmingly evidence of criminal
culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory or remedial legislation, respondent Committee can
only recommend measures to address or remedy whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the
investigation, although it may include in its Report a recommendation for criminal indictment of persons who
may appear liable. At best, the recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in such Report would only
be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and the courts to determine the liabilities of the
offender.

De la Paz v. Senate – 579 SCRA 521 [2009] (Euro generals)

FACTS: In October 2008, Gen. Eliseo Dela Paz, a senior officer of the PNP, headed a delegation of eight to
attend an Interpol General Assembly. Dela Paz brought with him his wife. Three days after the scheduled
Interpol assembly, Dela Paz was also to retire. After the assembly, Dela Paz was apprehended in the departure
area for he was carrying with him €105,000.00 (P6,930,000.00).

He was also carrying with him €45,000.00 (P2,970,000.00). He failed to declare in writing that he is carrying
such an amount and this is in violation of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the United
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. Dela Paz and his group was later released but the
Euros were confiscated by the Russians.

Upon arrival in the Philippines, Dela Paz was issued a subpoena by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
for the investigation it was to conduct involving the Moscow incident. Instead of appearing before the senate
committee, Dela Paz averred that the said committee does not have jurisdiction of the case. Dela Paz argued
that the Committee is devoid of any jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow incident as the matter does not
involve state to state relations as provided in paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of
Procedure (Senate Rules). Later, the committee issued a warrant of arrest against Dela Paz (his wife?). Dela Paz
questioned the warrant as he claimed that the Senate Rules required the signatures of the majority of the
members of the Committee which was not obtained in this case, and the Senate Rules were not published as
required by the Constitution, and thus, cannot be used as the basis of any investigation.

ISSUES: Whether respondent committee has jurisdiction to investigate the Moscow Incident. – YES.

3
HELD: According to Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution, "Each House shall determine the
rules of its proceedings". 
 The House of Congress has a grant of full discretionary authority to the formulation, adoption
and promulgation of its own rules. The exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial
supervision and interference, except when it constitutes a denial of due process. 
 The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, asks this Court to
inquire into a matter that is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue partakes of the
nature of a political question

2. The Respondent Committee can inquire into the source and purpose of the funds discovered in Moscow
as this would involve the Philippines' non-observance to its national obligations as a State Party to
United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime. 
 Said conventions contain provisions dealing with the movement of considerable foreign currency
across borders. 

3. The Moscow incident damage the international  relations between the

Philippines and Russia. Gen. Dela Paz went to Moscow in an official capacity, as a member of the PH
delegation carrying a huge amount of "public" money. Dela Paz failed to comply with immigration and
currency laws, and thus the Russian government confiscated the money in his possession and detained
him and other members of the delegation in Moscow. 
 Paragraph 12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules provides:
“ 12) Committee on Foreign Relations. — Fifteen (15) members. All matters relating to the
relations of the Philippines with other nations generally; diplomatic and consular services; the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations; the United Nations Organization and its agencies;
multilateral organizations, all international agreements, obligations and contracts; and overseas
Filipinos.”

4. The Philippine Senate has decided that the legislative inquiry will
be jointly conducted by the respondent Committee and the Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue
Ribbon Committee).
 According to paragraph 36, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules, the Blue Ribbon Committee
may conduct investigations on all matters relating to malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance
in office by officers and employees of the government, its branches, agencies, subdivisions and
instrumentalities, and on any matter of public interest on its own initiative or brought to its
attention by any of its members.
 The Blue Ribbon Committee can investigate Gen. Dela Paz, a retired PNP general and member of
the official PNP delegation to the INTERPOL Conference in Russia, who had with him millions
which may have been sourced from public funds

Romero v. Estrada – 583 SCRA 396 [2009] (sub-judice rule)

FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order(TRO) and
preliminary injunction under Rule 65, assailing the constitutionality of the invitations and compulsory processes
issued by the Senate Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development in connection with
its investigation on the investment of Overseas Workers Welfare Administration(OWWA) funds in the Smokey
Mountain project. Pursuant to Resolution No. 537 and 543, Petitioner Reghis Romero II as owner of R-II
Builders Inc. was invited by the Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development to

4
attend a public hearing at the Senate on August 23,2006 regarding the investment of OWWA (Overseas
Workers Welfare Administration) funds in the Smokey Mountain project.

The investigation is intended to aid the Senate in the review and possible amendments to the pertinent
provisions of RA 8042,The Migrant Workers Act. Petitioner Romero in his letter-reply requested to be excused
from appearing and testifying before the Committee at its scheduled hearings of the subject matter and purpose
of Philippine Senate Resolution Nos. 537 and 543. The Committee denied his request. On the same date,
invitations were sent to the other six petitioners, then members of the Board of Directors of R-II Builders Inc.
requesting them to attend the September 4,2006 Committee hearing. The next day, Senator Jinggoy Estrada as
Chairman of the Committee issued subpoena ad testificandum to petitioner Romero II directing him to appear
and testify before the Committee relative to the aforesaid Senate resolutions. The Committee later issued
subpoenas to the Board of Directors of R-II Builders Inc.

ISSUES: Whether or not the subject matter of the Senate inquiry is sub judice. – NO.

HELD: The Supreme court held that the sub judice issue has been rendered moot and academic by the
supervening issuance of the en banc resolution of July 1, 2008 in GR No. 164527. An issue or a case becomes
moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a determination of the issue
would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the
petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Thus, there is no
more obstacle-on the ground of sub judice, assuming it is invocable to the continuation of the Committee’s
investigation challenged in this proceeding.

As stated in Arnault vs. Nazareno, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently truerecourse must be
had to others who possess it.

The court further held that when the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear
before it in connection with its investigation of its aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to its
authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec.21 of the 1987
Philippine Constitution. The court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee from requiring persons to
appear and testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure.

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearign in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Art. VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution)

(2) in accordance with duly published rules of procedure

Garcillano v. House, GR No. 170338, December 23, 2008 (publication of rules on inquiry)

FACTS: Petitioners in G.R. No. 179275 seek to disallow the Senate to continue with the conduct of the
questioned legislative inquiry on the issue of “Hello Garci” tapes containing the wiretapped communication of
then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, without duly
published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.

5
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation
only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the
term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of
these rules when they first opened their session. Respondents justify their non-observance of the
constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and,
despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the
Senates internet web page, invoking R.A. No. 8792.

ISSUES: Whether there was proper publication of the rules as allow the Senate to proceed with its legislative
inquiry. – NO.

HELD: There was no proper publication of the rules to allow the Senate to proceed with its legislative inquiry.

Article VI Section 21 provides that the “Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure”.
This means that publication is imperative to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Article 2 of the Civil
Code complements this by stating that “publication” must be done “either in the Official Gazette, or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines”. The respondents’ invocation of RA 8792 cannot be
considered as it simply recognizes electronic data as admissible as evidence but it does not entail that the
internet is an accepted medium to satisfy the requisite of publication of laws and rules.

The set of procedural rules remaining unchanged since 1995 is not an excuse to defy Constitutional mandates
as the publication requisite is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. The law does not
provide a distinction on whether or not the rules have undergone amendments, it simply states that for the
Senate to conduct an inquiry, it must be done so in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
Court ruled that a valid exception would be if the rules contained a clause that provided for its continuing effect
beyond the Senate that adopted it until the latter decides to amend or repeal.

Hence, the Court ruled that the legislative inquiry by the Senate into the tapes cannot proceed due to the
absence of published procedural rules.

(3) respect for the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
Neri v. Senate – 564 SCRA 152 [2008] (executive privilege)

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a
contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for
the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion
Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.

The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de
Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push
the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.

Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing
wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe
him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed
President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.

However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer,
invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
6
 (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.

He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita
be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until
such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUES: Whether the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?

HELD: The communications are covered by executive privilege. The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive
officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including,
among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.),
does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power
textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations.
Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these
powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:

1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential

power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational
proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by
a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important
evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the
President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process” and, that “the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s
Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on
matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a
“quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement
with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the
communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test,
petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is
no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
7
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege violates the
constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.50 We might
have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself
available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only
that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception
only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.

Power to Punish a Person Under Investigation

Arnault v. Nazareno – 87 PHIL. 25 [1950] (subject of inquiry)

FACTS: In October 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, bought two
estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for P4.5M and P0.5M respectively, or for an aggregate amount of
P5M. Of this sum, P1.5M was paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, supposedly as payment for his
interest in the two aforementioned estates. Jean L. Arnaut, Burt's representative in the Philippines, collected
the sum of P1.5M in the form of checks. From this amount, he encashed P400,000, which he eventually gave to
an undisclosed person as per Burt's instructions.

It turned out, however, that these transactions were dubious in nature. For one, both estates were already
owned by the Philippine Government, so there was no need to repurchase them for P5M. Second, Burt's
interest in both estates amounted to only P20,000, which he wasn't even entitled to because of his failure to
pay off his previous loans.

A Senate investigation was thereafter held to determine how the Philippine Government was duped and who
ultimately benefited from the assailed transaction. One of the issues pursued was to whom did Arnault give the
cash amounting to P400,000. Arnault's refusal to provide the name of the person, initially because he couldn't
remember it and later for fear of self-incrimination, led to his being cited for contempt. He was thereafter held
in prison, and was to be freed only after saying the name of the person he gave the P400,000 to.

Subsequently, Arnault filed this instant petition for habeas corpus in an apparent bid to be freed from
imprisonment.

ISSUES: Whether the Senate had the power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the
person. – YES.

HELD: Even if the committee already rendered its report and recommendations, it may still continue its
investigation because there is nothing to prevent Congress from doing so, approving other measures it may
deem necessary after completing the investigation. Congress may hold him in contempt because Arnault
refused to answer questions and comply with the investigation, which involved public interest.

Re: Senate’s authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond 24 hours
 No time limit
o To deny this will deny the Senate an appropriate means for the performance of its legislative
function
8
 o We assume the Senate will not abuse this power

Re: Constitutional right against self-incrimination

 Arnault said the transactions were legal and no laws were violated, but he still refused to disclose the
name of the person
 His testimony is obviously false, which may warrant punishment
 The Court found no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might
incriminate him
 There is no conflict of authorities
o Meaning, there is no conflict between his right and his obligation as a citizen to give frank,
sincere, and truthful testimony’

Justice Tuason - Dissenting Opinion

My objection is that the Senate having started within the bounds of its authority, has, in entire good faith,
overstepped those bounds and trespassed on a territory reserved to other branches of the government, when
it imprisoned a witness for contumacy on a point that is unimportant, useless, impertinent and irrelevant, let
alone moot.

It is true that the committee continues to sit during the recess of Congress, but it is obvious from all the
circumstances that the sole and real object of the extension of the committee's sittings is to receive the
witness' answer in the event he capitulates. I am unable to see any new phase of the deal which the Senate
could legitimately wish to know, and the respondents and this Court have not pointed out any. That the
committee has not sat and nothing has been done so far except to wait for Arnault's answer is a convincing
manifestation of the above conclusion.

Sabio v. Gordon – 504 SCRA 704 [2006] (contempt and detention)

FACTS: On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455 directing an
inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT
Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of
Directors.

Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting
him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined
the invitation because of prior commitment.

At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG’s unhampered performance
of its task. Gordon’s Subpoena Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to
be cited in contempt.

Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time invoked Section 4(b)
of EO No. 1: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.”

ISSUES: Whether Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members
or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding. – NO.

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HELD: Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and
the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral
of investigatory power to the committees and it means that the mechanism which the Houses can take in order
to effectively perform its investigative functions are also available to the committees.

It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The
Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled
that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court
reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation,
is a proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.”

Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21.
Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress’ power of inquiry. This cannot be
countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress’ power
of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as
proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends “to government agencies created by Congress and
officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this
class.

A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it creates
or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates the
Constitution or its basic principles.

Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is inconsistent with the
constitutional provisions on the Congress’ power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle of public
accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of access to public
information (Art. III, Sec. 7).

Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of
any constitutional basis.

Balag v. Senate, GR No. 234608, July 3, 2018 (limitation on detention)

FACTS: Case is related to the death of Horacio Castillo III a first-year law student in UST due to a hazing
conducted by Aegis Juris fraternity (AJ Fraternity). Balag is a member of the fraternity and is the alleged
president. He was invited for a senate inquiry in aid of legislation for the pending bills relating to the
amendment of RA8049 or the Anti-Hazing Law. He was asked if he was the president of the fraternity and who
ordered the hospitalization of Horacio in Chinese General Hospital instead of UST hospital. He repeatedly
invoked his right against self-incrimination and evaded the questions of Senators Grace Poe, Lacson, and
Villanueva. He was cited in contempt and placed in sergeant-at-arms custody and was detained under Senate
Custody, but was released on Dec. 12 2017.

ISSUES: Whether the Senate acted in abuse of its discretion in the legislative inquiry and citing petitioner in
contempt. – NO.

HELD: The case is moot and academic due to petitioner being released on Dec. 12 2017 by a court order.

Moot and Academic

 Capable of repetition and important issue to rule on period where the Senate can hold someone in
contempt

10
Legislative Inquiry
 Valid exercise of power of congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 
 Senate bills 27, 199,223, 1161, 1591 were all pending in the Senate and the issue is related to the
Amendment of RA8049 or the Anti-Hazing Law.

Period of Detention due to Contempt

 US Jurisprudence
 Max of 12 months
 Valid to aid Congress in its constitutional legislative functions (In Re Chapman)
 Limited to session of Congress (Jurney v MacCracken)
 PH Jurisprudence
 Lopez Case, HOR cannot cite a person in contempt when HOR adjourns its session.
 Contempt-rooted in self-preservation of Congress. NOT a punishment, if punishment is the goal
file for criminal case.
 Arnault Case, theoretically Senate can detain a person cited in contempt indefinitely since it is a
continuing body, unlike HOR that ends after the last session of the said chamber.
 Neri Case, Senate is a continuing body, but according to its own rules of procedure it is only
OPTIONAL for the next Senate to continue the pending matters and it has to be taken up as if
presented the first time. 
Court ruled that the Senate has to have a definite period of detainment for persons cited in contempt according
to Sec. 26 Art. 6 1987 Constitution which provides that the rights of those who will appear shall be respected.

Court ruled that there are two ways to end the detainment,
1. Committee is required to submit to the Senate the report of the inquiry after 15 days. Legislative inquiry
will end, so does the basis for detention.
2. Expiration of 1 Congress, shall also end the legislative inquiry, so the basis for detention ends.
Two ways to extend: 
1. File a case under Art. 150 of RPC (definite period of imprisonment) for disobedience of summons of the
National Assembly.
2. Enact a law to increase definite period of imprisonment for those who will disobey them in inquires
done in aid of legislation.

Sec. 22. Congress and Heads of Departments

SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or
upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such
House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of
the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive session.

Senate v. Ermita – 488 SCRA 1 [2006] (supra., Sec. 21)

FACTS: This case is about the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National
Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.

The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials for
them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to
Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to “afford said

11
officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better
enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation.” Senate refused the request.

On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated that
“all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita
communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting since
the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani,
among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court marshal for such attendance.

ISSUES: Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.

HELD: To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed the two different functions
of the Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and the power to conduct inquiry during
question hour.

Question Hour: The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the
1987 Constitution, which reads:

“The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the
request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on
any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate
or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance.
Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the
security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance
shall be conducted in executive session.”

The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it
had issued, the department heads’ appearance is merely requested.

The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the appearance of department heads
during question hour as it explicitly referred to Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

In aid of Legislation: The Legislature’s power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized in
Article 6, section21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or
affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.”

The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change. And where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information, recourse
must be had to others who do possess it.

But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry,
which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege”. This is the power of the government to withhold
information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. This is recognized only to certain types of
information of a sensitive character. When Congress exercise its power of inquiry, the only way for department
heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact
that they are department heads. Only one official may be exempted from this power — the President.

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Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) should secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. In view
thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure to be present, such invocation must be
construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has
determined that the requested information is privileged.

The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or
that the matter on which these officials are being requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized
grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the lack of consent
from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing. The letter assumes that the invited official
possesses information that is covered by the executive privilege. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why
the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the
President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so.

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not
asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes
E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent.

When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by
executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of
the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide the President or the Executive
Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If,
after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege,
Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to
avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.

Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void. Section 1(a) are
however valid.

Sec. 23. Declaration of the Existence of a State of War

SECTION 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting
separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out
a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease
upon the next adjournment thereof.

Delegation of Emergency Powers

SANLAKAS v. Executive Secretary–421 SCRA 656 [2004] (in relation to State of Rebellion)

FACTS: On July 27, 2003, some 300 junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City. Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the
soldiers demanded, among other things, the resignation of President Gloria Arroyo, Secretary of Defense
Angelo Reyes, and PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane.

In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the day Proclamation No. 427 ("Declaring
a State of Rebellion") and General Order No. 4 ("Directing the AFP and the PNP to Suppress the Rebellion"),
both declaring “a state of rebellion” and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.

By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended. After hours-long negotiations, the
soldiers agreed to return to barracks. The President, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state

13
of rebellion and did so only on August 1, 2003, through Proclamation No. 435 ("Declaring that the State of
Rebellion Has Ceased to Exist").

Subsequently, several petitions have been filed challenging the constitutionality of the President Arroyo's
declaration of state of rebellion. These were:

• G.R. No. 159085 (Sanlakas and PM v. Executive Secretary, et al.) - Party-list organizations Sanlakas and
Partido ng Manggagawa (PM), contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not require the
declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces. They further submit that, because of the
cessation of the Oakwood occupation, thereexists no sufficient factual basis for the proclamation by the
President of a state of rebellion for an indefinite period.

• G.R. No. 159103 (SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al.) - Officers/members of the Social
Justice Society (SJS), “Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law professors and bar reviewers" claim that Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution does not authorize the declaration of a state of rebellion. They contend that the
declaration is a “constitutional anomaly” that “confuses, confounds and misleads” because “[o]verzealous public
officers, acting pursuant to such proclamation or general order, are liable to violate the constitutional right of
private citizens.” Petitioners also submit that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement
under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48
hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be
construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President.

• G.R. No. 159185 (Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo) -
petitioners brought suit as citizens and as Members of the House of Representatives whose rights, powers and
functions were allegedly affected by the declaration of a state of rebellion. Petitioners do not challenge the
power of the President to call out the Armed Forces. They argue, however, that the declaration of a state of
rebellion is a “superfluity,” and is actually an exercise of emergency powers.Such exercise, it is contended,
amounts to a usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.

• G.R. No. 159196 (Pimentel v. Romulo, et al.) - Senator Pimentel assails the subject presidential issuances as
“an unwarranted, illegal and abusive exercise of a martial law power that has no basis under the Constitution.”
In the main, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion “opens the door to the unconstitutional
implementation of warrantless arrests” for the crime of rebellion.

ISSUES: Whether the proclamation constitutes a usurpation of power of congress in relation to Sec. 23, Article
VI [GR 159185: Rep. Suplico Case] – NO.

HELD: The declaration cannot constitute as an usurpation of power of congress as pursuant to Sec. 23, Article
VI. The president, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a
wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested
on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers as
contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.

David v. Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006 (in relation to Sec. 18, Art. 7)

FACTS: On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers
vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The
President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or
14
 suppress. . .rebellion. . . and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power]
and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP and PNP
"to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
terrorism and lawless violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that:

(1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress;

(2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and
(3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.

They alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives
pursuant to PP 1017.

During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and
contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining
the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor
General.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5 are constitutional. – Qualified.

2. Whether the declaration of a state of national emergency by the President was an exercise of her emergency
powers. – NO.

HELD:

I. First Provision (Calling-out Power) — CONSTITUTIONAL (FOR SEC. 18)

 Discretionary power solely vested in the President’s wisdom — however, still subject to judicial review
as to whether it was exercised with grave abuse of discretion
 Article VII, Section 18 provides the sequence of graduated powers, from most to least benign: (1) to call
out the armed forces, (2) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, (3) to declare martial law
 The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power: “… whenever it becomes necessary”
 The circumstances of this case necessitated the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence (there was no actual declaration of Marital Law, contrary to the
allegations of the petitioners) 
 It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the President’s authority to declare a
"state of rebellion" and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. 
 GMA’s declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act of declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, which is a declaration allowed under Section 4 Book II of the revised Admin Code. 

II. Second Provision (“Take Care” Power) — UNCONSTITUTIONAL

 This is based on Section 17, Article VII: The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed
 It was argued that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it allowed President Arroyo the authority to
enact laws and decrees in violation of Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution, which vests the
power to enact laws in Congress. 
15
  They assail the clause "to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction." 
 The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President
Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081).
 The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the
authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’  Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature.  Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that ‘the legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’  To
be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’s
exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take care” of the
carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
 **Can PGMA enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military? She can only
order the military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless
violence.
Third Provision (Power to Take Over) — CONSTITUTIONAL

 2. The questioned provision provides that during the state of national emergency under PP 1017, PGMA
can call the military not only to enforce obedience "to all the laws and to all decrees and act pursuant to
the provision of Section 17, Article XII which reads:
 Congressmen-Petitioners claim that President Arroyo’s inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP
1017 is an encroachment on the legislature’s emergency powers.
 If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to
declare a "state of national emergency" pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant
it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have
provided so. 
 Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a
"state of national emergency." The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare
the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment.

 The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise
of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from
Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:
1. There must be a war or other emergency.
2. The delegation must be for a limited period only.
3. The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
4. The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
 Section 17 states that the "the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed
by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest," 
 This section refers to Congress, not the President. 
 The President may only order the temporary take over of businesses when Congress delegates
such power


IV. General Order No. 5 --- CONSTITUTIONAL

 Said General Ordert provided a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e.,
“whatever necessary and appropriate to prevent or suppress lawless violence” — however, it is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it punished “acts of terrorism,” which term had not yet been legally
defined and made punishable by Congress.

Ampatuan v. Hon. DILG Sec. Puno, GR No. 190259, June 7, 2011 (in relation to Sec. 18, Art. 7)

16
FACTS: On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo issued
Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under
a state of emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake such measures as may be allowed by
the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence” in the named places.
Three days later, she also issued AO 273 “transferring” supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the
President to the DILG. She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which amended the former AO (the term “transfer”
used in AO 273 was amended to “delegate”, referring to the supervision of the ARMM by the DILG).

ISSUES: Wheter President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and PNP
to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindano, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.

HELD: The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency
in the three places mentioned. She did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to
exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in
such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President.

The President's call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested
in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The Court may inquire into the factual bases for the
President's exercise of this power but it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter.

The petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the President's exercise of the "calling out" power had no factual
basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of emergency, it
follows that the takeover of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.

The OSG was able to highlight the military strength and firearm capacity of the Ampatuan and Mangudadatu
clans as well as the rebel armed groups. The President called out the armed forces to control the proliferation of
loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened the peace and security in the
affected places.

Lagman v. Hon. Medialdea, GR No. 231658, July 4, 2017 and MR, February 6, 2018 (Martial law in Mindanao)

FACTS: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring Martial Law in the
whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus therein. On May 25,
the president submitted a written report to Congress on the factual basis of the Martial Law declaration (as
required by the Constitution). The main basis of the declaration was the attack of the Maute terrorist group in
Marawi City. According to the report, the Maute group is an affiliate of ISIS which is aiming to establish an
Islamic caliphate in Marawi City (and might spread its control in all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the
ongoing rebellion and lawless violence that has plagued Mindanao for decades.

ISSUES: Whether there is a sufficient factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of writ of habeas corpus. – YES.

HELD: In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers
only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration. The
determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts and information
mentioned in the Report and Proclamation. The Court held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No.
216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President only has to ascertain
if there is probable cause for a declaration of Martial Law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on the internet, with
17
neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof. As the Court has
consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus without any probative
value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. The alleged false
and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along with these alleged false data is an
arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion exists.

Sec. 24. Origin of Money Bills, Private Bills and Bills Local Application
SECTION 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments.

Bills of Local Application – Origin

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance – 235 SCRA 630 [1994] (revenue bill; consolidation)

FACTS: that seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by
amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and challenging the
constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives but is a mere
consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did not pass three readings on separate days on the
Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.

Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments.

Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on
separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the
vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

ISSUES: Whether RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution. – NO.

HELD: The phrase “originate exclusively” refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is sufficient
that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo extensive changes in the
Senate.

SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the requirement not only of
printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.

Appropriation of Public Revenue for Public Purpose

Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works – 110 PHIL. 331 [1960-1961] (incidental advantage)

FACTS: On August 31, 1954, Wenceslao Pascual Filed an action for declaratory relief against respondents
based on RA 920 which would appropriate Php 85,000 for the construction of feeder roads in Pasig City. Said
feeder roads however were private property owned by one of the respondents, Zulueta at the time the law was
passed and afterwards tried to execute a donation in favor of the municipality of Pasig in order to comply with
18
the law. Pascual contended that the appropriation was void ab initio and that it would benefit Zulueta as an
individual.

ISSUES: Whether Public funds could be appropriated for a private purpose. – NO.

HELD: The court held that regarding the legal feasibility of appropriating public funds for a private purpose has
been settled in case law that:
 Legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but a public purpose 
o The character of the direct object of the expenditure determined its validity for justifying a tax,
not the magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage
of the community, thus public welfare, will be benefited by their promotion
o Incidental advantage to the public or state which emerges from promotion of private interests
and the prosperity of business or private enterprises, does not justify their aid by use of public
money
 Corpus Juris Secundum states the rule that:
o Taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only
o Money raised by taxation cannot be used for the advantage of private individuals
o Reason:
 The right of legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax
 The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether
the statue is designed to promote the public interests, as opposed to the furtherance of
an advantage of an individual, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally
serve the public
 These views are a necessary corollary to our democratic system of government.

Sec. 25. Rules on Appropriation

SECTION 25.

(1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation
of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the
budget shall be prescribed by law.

(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited
in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.

(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for
approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.

(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported
by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding
revenue proposed therein.

(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment
any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations.

(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public purposes to
be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
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 (7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general appropriations bill
for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed
reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the
Congress.

Limits on Power to Appropriate

Prohibition of increase
Prohibition on “riders” in appropriation bills
Garcia v. Mata – 65 SCRA 517 [1975] (par. 2)

FACTS: Petitioner was a reserve o7cer on active duty with the Armed Forces of the Philippines, until he was
reverted to inactive status on November 15, 1960, pursuant to Republic Act. No. 2334, providing that reserve
o7cers with at least two years of active duty shall be reverted to inactive status within three years from the
approval of the act. When his request for reinstatement failed, petitioner =led a petition for mandamus to
compel respondents to reinstate him, readjust his rank, and to pay all the emoluments and allowances due him.
He argued that his reversion was in violation of the Special Provision for the Armed Forces of the Philippines
under Par, 11, Republic Act No. 1600 (Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 1956-1957), which prohibits the
reversion of reserve o7cers on active duty with at least 10 years of accumulated active commissioned service.
On the other hand, respondents contended that the aforesaid special provision contained in the Appropriation
Act is unconstitutional because it has no relevance to any appropriation item contained therein. The trial court
sustained respondents and dismissed the petition.

ISSUES: Whether Paragraph 11 is a “rider” in the General Appropriations Act of FY 1956-57. – YES.

HELD: The title of an act is not an index to the body thereof. Thus, it is su7cient compliance with the
constitutional requirement that the title expresses a general subject and all the provisions of the statute are
germane to the general subject. The constitutional provision is intended to preclude the insertion of riders in
legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill, and is a new and completely
unrelated provision attached to the bill.

Where the subject of an act, as expressed in its title, is restricted to "appropriating funds for the operation of
the government," any provision contained in the body of the act that is fairly included in said restricted subject
or any matter properly connected therewith is valid and operative. But, if a provision in the body of such act is
not fairly included in this restricted subject, like a provision relating to the policy matters of calling to active
duty and reversion to inactive duty of reserve o7cers of the armed forces, such provision is inoperative and of
no effect. Such a provision, being unconstitutional, confers no right and affords no protection. In legal
contemplation it is as though it has never been passed.

Par 11 is thus invalid. Par 11 relied on refers to the fundamental governmental policy of the calling to active
duty and the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP. It was a non-appropriation item inserted
in an appropriation measure in violation of the Constitutional inhibition against “riders” to the GAA [now in Art
VI, sec 25(2)].

Farinas v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 147387, Dec. 10, 2003 (liberal construction)

FACTS: SEC. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official,
whether national or local, running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity,
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except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy.

Petitioners alleged that Section 14 of RA 9006 entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly,
Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Elections Practices, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1) of the Article VI of the
Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be in expressed in its title.

The inclusion of Sec 14 repealing Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in RA 9006 constitutes a proscribed
rider. The Sec 14 of RA 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election
propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices. Sec 67 of the OEC imposes a limitation of officials
who run for office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso
facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Sec 67 of the OEC is thus not
embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of RA 9006.

ISSUES: Whether Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider. – NO.

HELD: The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are comprehensive enough to
include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the
said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its
content. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Code and the Section 14 of the RA 9006 does not
violate "one subject-one title rule." This Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in
the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by
providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.

Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to
apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into
law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. In this
case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Code as the
same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners
as members of the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting
their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of
the Omnibus Election Code

Special Purpose Fund

Belgica v. Ochoa, GR No. 208566, 19 November 2013 (PDAF)

FACTS: The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that
JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects"
using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five
(5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the
lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies,
and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.

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Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several
petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional

G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently

G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the
annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the
2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse
of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents

UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order
be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from
releasing such funds to Members of Congress

ISSUES: Whether the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional. – YES.

HELD: It is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own corresponding purpose for such a
component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid
appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice
considered as one purpose in which case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the
exercise of the President's item veto power.

 A special purpose fund and discretionary funds would equally square with the constitutional mechanism
of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence.

Section 25 (4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special appropriations bill shall specify the
purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National
Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein."

In the final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the
inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. It has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations,
non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated the
principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by
giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they
themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power ; insofar as it
has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted
the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto items ;
insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of
budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has
equally impaired public accountability ; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to
intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise
subverted genuine local autonomy ; and again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to
appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well

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as other public funds under the broad classification of "priority infrastructure development projects," it has once
more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.

Transfer of Funds
Demetria v. Alba – 148 SCRA 208 [1987] (par. 5; direct violation)

FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget Reform
Decree of 1977)—as concerned citizens, members of the National Assembly, parties with general interest
common to all people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers—on the primary grounds that Section 44 infringes
upon the fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of public moneys, amounting to undue delegation of
legislative powers and allowing the President to override the safeguards prescribed for approving
appropriations.

The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of the petitioners and held that
one branch of the government cannot be enjoined by another, coordinate branch in its performance of duties
within its sphere of responsibility. It also alleged that the petition has become moot and academic after the
abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution (which was where
the provision under consideration was enacted in pursuant thereof), which states that “No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President…may by law be authorized to augment any
item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.”

ISSUES: Whether Section 44 of PD No. 1177 is unconstitutional. – YES.

HELD: Par. 1 of Sec 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said Section 16 (5) of
the 1973 Phil. Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department
to another office or agency of the Executive Department to any program or activity included in the General
Appropriations Act without regard as to whether the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item. It
does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue
delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.

Par 1 of Sec 44 puts all these safeguards into naught. Such constitutional infirmities render the provision in
question null and void.

Liga v. COMELEC – 232 SCRA 219 [1994] (par. 5; unused funds)

FACTS: Consolidation of two petitions: G.R. Nos. 114809 & 114896

Petitioner Liga Ng Mga Barangay, represented by Alex David, filed a petition for prohibition, with prayer for a
temporary restraining order. They question the “threatened illegal transfer, disbursement, and use of public
funds in a manner contrary to the Constitution and the law” in relation to the upcoming Barangay Elections.
Under the General Appropriations Act of 1994, Php 137,878,000.00 was appropriated by Congress specifically
for the 1994 Barangay Elections. Petitioners alleged that the respondents are about to re-allocate several
government funds coming from the executive and legislative branches of government.

ISSUES: Whether there is an illegal re-allocation of funds specifically for the upcoming 1994 Barangay
Elections. – NO.

HELD:

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Plan of the COMELEC
 It intends to fund the upcoming Barangay Elections from the Php 137,878,000 appropriated by
Congress and from its own savings through unused funds which was originally intended for the conduct
and supervision of elections and other political exercises such as the Senatorial Elections and the
COMELEC’s Modernization Program (Php 500,000,000). 

Article VI Section 25 (5)

 “... the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.”

General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1994

 Section 17
 “... the Heads of Constitutional Commissions under Article IX of the Constitution, the
Ombudsman and the Commission on Human Rights are hereby authorized to augment any item
in this Act for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.”
 Section 19
 “Meaning of Savings and Augmentation. Savings refer to portions of balances of any
programmed appropriation free of any obligation or encumbrance still available after the
satisfactory completion or unavoidable discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or
purpose for which the appropriation is authorized, or arising from unpaid compensation and
related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay.”

This allows the COMELEC to make use of its own funds, in this case, its unused funds, to further fund the
upcoming Barangay Elections. 

Sanchez v. COA – 552 SCRA 471 (par. 5; DILG; augmentation)

FACTS: In 1991, Congress passed Republic Act No. 7180 (R.A. 7180) otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act of 1992. This law provided an appropriation for the DILG under Title XIII and set aside the
amount of P75,000,000.00 for the DILG's Capability Building Program. On 11 November 1991, Atty. Hiram C.
Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), Project Director of the Ad Hoc Task Force for Inter-Agency Coordination to
Implement Local Autonomy, informed then Deputy Executive Secretary Dionisio de la Serna of the proposal to
constitute and implement a "shamrock" type task force to implement local autonomy institutionalized under the
Local Government Code of 1991. The proposal was accepted by the Deputy Executive Secretary and attested
by then DILG Secretary Cesar N. Sarino, one of the petitioners herein, who consequently issued a memorandum
for the transfer and remittance to the Office of the President of the sum of P300,000.00 for the operational
expenses of the task force. An additional cash advance of P300,000.00 was requested. Upon post-audit
conducted by Department auditor Iluminada M.V. Fabroa, however, the amounts were disallowed.

ISSUES: Whether the two essential requisites in order that a transfer of appropriation may be allowed are
present in this case.

HELD: Contrary to another submission in this case, the President, Chief Justice, Senate President, and the
heads of constitutional commissions need not first prove and declare the existence of savings before
transferring funds, the Court in Philconsa v. Enriquez, supra, categorically declared that the Senate President
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall approve the realignment (of
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savings). However, "[B]efore giving their stamp of approval, these two officials will have to see to it that: (1) The
funds to be realigned or transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures from which the same are
to be taken; and (2) The transfer or realignment is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditure to
which said transfer or realignment is to be made.”

The absence of any item to be augmented starkly projects the illegality of the diversion of the funds and the
profligate spending thereof.

With the foregoing considerations, it is clear that no valid transfer of the Fund to the Office of the President
could have occurred in this case as there was neither allegation nor proof that the amount transferred was
savings or that the transfer was for the purpose of augmenting the item to which the transfer was made.

Further, we find that the use of the transferred funds was not in accordance with the purposes laid down by the
Special Provisions of R.A. 7180.

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