2009 Pronin - Introspection Illusion

C H A P T E R O N E
The Introspection Illusion

Emily Pronin
Contents
1. Introduction 2
1.1. Self and other 3
1.2. Components of the illusion 4
2. Identifying the Illusion: The Case of Bias 6
2.1. Introspective weighting 7
2.2. Self–other asymmetry 9
2.3. Behavioral disregard 10
2.4. Differential valuation 12
3. The Introspection Illusion in Social Psychology 15
3.1. Judgment and decision making 15
3.2. The self 16
3.3. Attitudes and attitude change 18
3.4. Social influence 20
3.5. Interpersonal interaction 21
3.6. Personal relationships 23
3.7. Stereotyping and prejudice 25
4. Implications for Major Theoretical Concerns 26
4.1. The perspectives of actors and observers 26
4.2. Self enhancement 31
4.3. Psychological distance 36
4.4. Free will 41
5. Roots of the Illusion 44
5.1. Development 44
5.2. Culture 45
5.3. The brain 47
5.4. Further thoughts: Projection and perspective taking 48
6. Applications 49
6.1. Conflict 49
6.2. Persistence of racism, sexism, and inequality 50
6.3. Ethical lapses 51
Department of Psychology and Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs, Princeton
University, Princeton, New Jersey, USA
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 41 # 2009 Elsevier Inc.

ISSN 0065-2601, DOI: 10.1016/S0065-2601(08)00401-2 All rights reserved.
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6.4. Introspective education 52

6.5. Pursuits of self-knowledge and social connection 53
7. Conclusion 55
Acknowledgments 55
References 55
Abstract
Introspection involves looking inward into conscious thoughts, feelings,
motives, and intentions. Modern social psychological research has raised ques-
tions about the value and reliability of information gained via introspection. This
chapter concerns people’s heavy weighting of introspective information for
making self-assessments. It also concerns a few principles associated with
that weighting—that is, that it does not extend to how people treat others’
introspections, that it can lead people to disregard information conveyed by
their own (but not others’) behavior, and that it is rooted not only in people’s
unique access to their introspections but also in the unique value they place on
them. Over-valuing of personal introspections occurs in a variety of domains,
including judgment and decision making, personal relationships, and stereo-
typing and prejudice. An understanding of it sheds light on theoretical concerns
involving the actor–observer bias, self-enhancement, temporal distance effects,
and the perception of free will. People’s unique valuing of their introspections
likely has deep roots, but this ‘‘introspection illusion’’ also causes problems.
It can foster conflict, discrimination, lapses in ethics, and barriers to self-
knowledge and social intimacy. Understanding its sources and effects may
help alleviate some of those problems.
1. Introduction
‘‘I think therefore I am.’’ In 1637, the most well-known line in the
history of modern philosophy was written. Descartes’ claim derived from a
basic intuition: If there was one thing in which he could be confident, it was
the reality of his own thoughts. Indeed, the capacity for conscious intro-
spection is fundamental to human experience and is commonly thought to
differentiate humans from other animals. Through introspection, people
constantly are aware of the various thoughts, feelings, and motives that
reside in their conscious minds.
However, important advances in cognitive and social psychology have
questioned the degree to which introspection can uncover the sources of
our judgments and actions. People, it has been shown, can form impressions
of others, pursue goals, adopt attitudes, and regulate their emotions—all
without awareness, effort, or intent (e.g., Hassin et al., 2005; Wegner &
Bargh, 1998). People’s introspective access to their conscious intentions,
emotions, prescient thoughts, and salient attitudes all can mislead them in
The Introspection Illusion 3
their efforts at self-understanding (respectively, Epley & Dunning, 2000;

Gilbert et al., 1998; Pronin et al., 2006b; Wilson et al., 1993). In short,
introspection often is not a valid and reliable method for assessing the self.
Nevertheless, people show a persistent and widespread tendency to place
heavy weight on introspection when seeking self-understanding. I refer to
this tendency as an introspection illusion. The ‘‘introspection’’ part refers to
information gained by looking inward, however briefly, to thoughts, feel-
ings, motives, intentions, and other mental contents. The ‘‘illusion’’ part
refers to some mistaken notions that people have about introspective
information and its value.
Given the sometimes weak value of introspection, why do people place so
much value on the information they obtain from it? In a classic study, college
students watched a video interview with a university instructor who had an
unfamiliar foreign accent. In one version of the video, his responses were
warm and likable; in the other, they were cold and unlikable. Students who
saw the warm and likable version later rated the instructor’s accent as more
pleasant than did those who saw the other version. However, they were
unaware that his likability influenced how they perceived his accent and even
confidently claimed that the reverse had occurred—that his accent made
them like (or dislike) him. This experiment by Nisbett and Wilson (1977a)
demonstrates something more than the unreliability of introspection.
It also suggests people’s false confidence in its reliability.
One reason for that confidence likely involves the wealth of introspec-
tive information available to people. When individuals are inundated
with information about their thoughts, feelings, and intentions, they may
naturally come to view those introspections as an authentic source of
self-knowledge (Wilson, 2002). Another important reason for people’s
confidence in their introspections likely involves the felt directness of
introspective information. William James described people’s experience of
their thoughts as having ‘‘a warmth and intimacy about them of which
[others’] are completely devoid’’ ( James, 1890, p. 314). This fact may lead
people to value their own introspections more than those of other people
because, of course, people cannot experience others’ thoughts and feelings
with the same directness, warmth, and intimacy. Even when one is
privileged enough to have access to others’ introspections, such as when
those others share their thoughts about a particular judgment, that access is
of an indirect sort. Consequently, one may value it less (e.g., ‘‘I know you
think his cold personality didn’t affect your perception of him, but I have to
weigh that against how harsh you were about his accent.’’).
1.1. Self and other

In the case of others, what individuals seem to experience more directly
than introspective information is extrospective information—that is, informa-
tion gained by looking outward to behavior rather than inward to thoughts
4 Emily Pronin
and feelings (Pronin, 2008a). People generally cannot directly perceive their
own appearance and actions, and this distinction in visual attention has been
shown to influence the attributions people make (Storms, 1973; Taylor &
Fiske, 1975). Given the confidence people place in information that arrives
at them ‘‘directly’’ (Ross & Ward, 1996), it seems that people may not only
differentially attend to introspective versus extrospective information about
themselves versus others, but they also may differentially value those sources
of information when considering themselves versus others.
In proposing such an asymmetry, this theorizing offers a new chapter to
social psychology’s unfinished story about the divergent perspectives of
actors and observers. Even unfinished, that story has earned the status of a
classic—owing in large part to a set of theoretical accounts proposed nearly
40 years ago by Jones and Nisbett (1972) and Bem (1972), with further
elaboration by Nisbett and Wilson (1977b). These sometimes seemingly
contradictory accounts differ both in the emphasis they place on introspec-
tive awareness and in the introspective material they consider. Jones and
Nisbett generally were interested in circumstances in which actors have
‘‘more, and more precise’’ introspective information about their internal
states than do observers (p. 85). In that context, they theorized about actors’
inclination to form different causal explanations from observers. Bem and
also Nisbett and Wilson were interested in circumstances in which actors
lack privileged introspective access to mental process. In that context, they
emphasized actors’ tendency to rely on the same information and to reach
the same conclusions as observers.
The current theorizing speaks to circumstances in which actors have rich
access to introspective information, such as when introspection provides
actors with convincing evidence of their good intentions. Importantly,
though, it also speaks to circumstances in which actors lack introspective
access, such as when introspection fails to reveal to actors the influence of
bias on their own judgments because that bias operates automatically and
does not leave conscious traces. In both cases, the introspection illusion
involves actors’ placing too much weight on introspection. In the former
case, actors place that weight on whatever information is present in intro-
spection (e.g., on their good intentions); in the latter case, they place it on
the absence of information in introspection (e.g., on their absence of feeling a
motive to be biased). In both cases, people view the contents of introspec-
tion as highly meaningful, but in the former that meaning is derived from
what introspection yields and in the latter from what it fails to yield.
1.2. Components of the illusion

The introspection illusion, in essence, involves people’s treatment of their
introspections as a sovereign (or, at least, uniquely valuable) source of infor-
mation about themselves. People tend not to show this heavy introspective
weighting when considering the introspections of others. Therefore, another

component of the introspection illusion involves a self–other asymmetry. Placing
so much weight on one’s introspections engenders, by necessity, a sort of
behavioral disregard whereby people give less consideration to their behavior
(but not the behavior of others). A final component of the introspection
illusion is that it does not arise purely from the fact that, in general, actors
have introspective access whereas observers do not; it also arises from actors’
and observers’ differential valuation of information derived from actors’ intro-
spections. The introspection illusion thus has four components, with the first
being most defining:
1. Introspective weighting (heavy weighting of introspections when assessing
self )
2. Self–other asymmetry (absence of above when assessing others)
3. Behavioral disregard (disregard of behavior when assessing self but not
others)
4. Differential valuation (asymmetric valuation of own versus others’
introspections)
The components of the introspection illusion derive in large part from
the nature of how people perceive themselves and others, and in particular
from the information that feels directly available to people when engaging
in the perception of self and others. Fig. 1.1 illustrates the distinction
between people’s seemingly direct experience of introspective information
Self Other
(1) (2)
(4) (3)
Information “directly”available to self Weight given Component of illusion

• Own thoughts, feelings, intentions (1) Heavy Introspective
[apprehended via introspection] (in perceiving self) Weighting
• Others’ observable behavior (4) Heavy
[apprehended via extrospection] (in perceiving others)
Information not “directly” available to self

Light Self–Other
• Others’ thoughts feelings, etc. (2) Asymmetry
(in perceiving others)
Light Behavioral
• Own observable behavior (3) Disregard
(in perceiving self)
Figure 1.1 A graphical illustration of the perceptual basis of the introspection illusion.
6 Emily Pronin
about themselves, versus their seemingly direct experience of extrospective

information about others. Illusions involve the fallibility of seemingly direct
perception. The introspection illusion derives its name from the fact that it
involves this fallibility in the case of one particular kind of perception—that
is, not perception of external phenomena (as in the typical case, such as with
optical illusions) but rather perception of internal phenomena. John Locke
(1690/1975) described introspection as an internal rather than external form
of perception, stating that ‘‘though it be not Sense, as having nothing to do
with external Objects; yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be
call’d internal sense.’’ Much as people seem to wholly trust information that
comes to them via external sensory perception, people also seem to wholly
trust information that comes to them via introspection. And, much as
external perception can deceive, so too can introspection. That deception
can involve both what is perceived and also what is not perceived (as when
the presence of bias is not perceived because it has operated automatically).
The term introspection illusion is intended to reflect not only people’s
illusory notions about introspection (notions that lead them to overweight
and overvalue their introspections) but also this basic perceptual source of
people’s overweighting and overvaluing of introspection.
This chapter first reviews evidence aimed at explicitly identifying the
introspection illusion. That evidence comes from research showing that
people’s blindness to their own bias results from their heavily weighting
introspection to detect something that occurs unconsciously. The chapter
then offers evidence that the introspection illusion gives rise to a large
number of important phenomena across major domains of social psychol-
ogy, ranging from judgment and decision making to stereotyping and
prejudice. Next described are contributions of the introspection illusion
framework to theorizing about the actor–observer bias, self-enhancement
tendency, effects of psychological distance, and belief in free will. Finally,
roots of the illusion are discussed, as are its applications to problems
concerning conflict, the persistence of racism and sexism, lapses of ethics,
and the pursuit of self-knowledge and social intimacy.
2. Identifying the Illusion: The Case of Bias

Although the rudiments of the introspection illusion are suggested by
many important findings in social psychology, the identification of it is new.
It first was identified as a mechanism underlying people’s bias blind spot, or
relative blindness to their own versus others’ bias (Pronin et al., 2004). The
most direct evidence for the illusion comes from research on that blind spot.
People tend to deny their own susceptibility to bias, even while they
readily impute (and even exaggerate) others’ susceptibility (Pronin, 2007).
This occurs for a variety of biases, such as the biasing effects of: self-interest
in forming attitudes about policy issues (Miller & Ratner, 1998), personal
affections in judging who is at fault in an interpersonal conflict (Frantz,
2006), ignoring the situation in explaining others’ behavior (Van Boven
et al., 2003b), political ideology in assessing policy issues (Robinson et al.,
1995), and irrelevant numeric anchors in making numeric estimates
(Wilson et al., 1996). The bias blind spot may at first seem like pure self-
enhancement. After all, biases are generally viewed as undesirable. How-
ever, a deeper exploration points to the underlying role of the introspection
illusion. That evidence is now reviewed, with the goal of using it to
illustrate the four components of the introspection illusion.
2.1. Introspective weighting

The first component of the introspection illusion involves giving heavy
weight to introspections in self-assessment. Heavy weighting of introspec-
tive information about intentions, motives, and wishes logically could
account for people’s bias blindness, because the operation of bias often
eludes introspective awareness (Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; Dawson et al.,
2002; Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Kahneman, 2003; Lieberman et al., 2001;
Wilson et al., 2002). In such cases, when bias is nonconscious, introspection
will mask bias and even may turn up false signs of objectivity if one has
consciously tried to be objective.
When people erroneously judge their own driving ability to be
better-than-average, or when they egocentrically take too much credit for
collaborative projects, they often show these biases without knowing it.
The introspective weighting component of the introspection illusion sug-
gests that people will show a blind spot for biases that operate noncon-
sciously and thereby elude introspective awareness. For biases that leave
signs in introspective awareness, by contrast, people should not claim
relative insusceptibility. In order to test that prediction, Pronin et al.
(2002) asked San Francisco airport travelers to rate their susceptibility to
various biases in human judgment compared with the susceptibility of
others traveling at the airport that day. The biases included things such as
taking credit for one’s successes while denying responsibility for one’s fail-
ures (self-serving bias) and making overly dispositional inferences about the
reasons for others’ outcomes in life (fundamental attribution error). Impor-
tantly, respondents also were asked about a few biases that are likely to leave
signs in conscious awareness. For example, they were asked about their
tendency in times of hardship to selectively compare themselves to those
who are worse off, which is a bias that our research suggested individuals
often have a nagging awareness of at the time they are showing it. The result
was that respondents showed a blind spot for biases that are unconscious
8 Emily Pronin
(i.e., most biases), but their blind spot disappeared in the case of biases that
leave introspective traces.
Pronin et al. (2009) tested the introspective weighting component of the
introspection illusion by experimentally manipulating actors’ introspective
cues to bias. Participants in the experiment were students at an elite-admis-
sions American university. They read about a new policy that their school
allegedly was considering to limit over-representation of students from the
northeastern United States. The policy involved deducting 20% from the
score assigned to any application from a Northeast high schooler. The
students indicated whether they supported or opposed the policy, and
how objective or biased they felt they were in evaluating the policy. They
also rated their affect. Most students (91%) opposed the policy, and that
opposition did not differ based on whether they were from the Northeast.
We expected that Northeasterners, though, would feel more biased in
evaluating the policy than would their peers because Northeasterners
would have an introspective cue of bias—that is, a negative emotional
reaction when reading about the policy. We tested this hypothesis using a
misattribution design. All participants received their study materials, includ-
ing the description of the admissions policy, on purple paper. The experi-
menter explained that this was because she ‘‘ran out’’ of plain paper while
making the photocopies. To participants in the misattribution condition,
she added that subjects had been telling her that ‘‘the color annoyed and
irritated them,’’ and she said that the paper might put the participant ‘‘in a
negative mood.’’ Thus, Northeast students in that group were offered an
alternative attribution for their internal experience of annoyance and irrita-
tion. As predicted, they did not see themselves as biased (their self-ratings
were at the neutral midpoint of the scale), and they rated their bias as lower
than did their fellow Northeasterners, F(1, 94) = 4.08, p < 0.05. Appar-
ently, they introspected to find signs of bias, but dismissed those signs as
brought forth by the color rather than the content of their survey. The
misattribution manipulation had no effect on non-Northeasterners (who
had not felt irritated and annoyed by the policy and therefore had no
such emotions to misattribute), thereby yielding a significant interaction,
F(1, 94) = 4.23, p < 0.05 (see Fig. 1.2).
When people make predictions about their future, such as about the
likelihood that they will be happy in their new job or the likelihood that
they will get cancer if they keep smoking, their predictions often are
unrealistically positive (Armor & Taylor, 1998; Helweg-Larsen &
Shepperd, 2001; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Weinstein, 1980). When making
those predictions, though, people generally feel motivated to make an
objective assessment and do not experience introspective signs of bias.
This suggests that if individuals rely on introspection to assess their bias,
they may be more likely to deny bias in judgments that they have actually
made (and for which they therefore possess introspective cues suggesting the
Perception of own bias 5 Northeast students

(irritated group)
4 Non-northeast students
(non-irritated group)
3
2
No misattribution for irritation Misattribution for irritation
Figure 1.2 Participants from the Northeast were irritated by the policy and took that
irritation as a sign of their bias. When offered an alternative attribution for that
irritation, they no longer saw themselves especially biased.
absence of bias) rather than judgments that they have only contemplated
making. Ehrlinger et al. (2005) found this result in the context of college
students making predictions about their future versus contemplating making
those predictions. The students either reported the likelihood of various
positive and negative outcomes occurring in their future, such as contract-
ing lung cancer, or having a good job, or they imagined how they might
respond if asked those questions. Consistent with the introspection illusion,
those who responded to the questions—and therefore were likely to have
introspective ‘‘evidence’’ of their objective and unbiased intentions—were
less likely to acknowledge the possibility of bias in their judgment than
were those who only contemplated completing the survey.
2.2. Self–other asymmetry

The foregoing review suggests that, when assessing their bias, people place
heavy weight on information obtained via introspection. The self–other
asymmetry component of the introspection illusion involves placing compar-
atively less weight on others’ introspections when assessing those others’ bias.
Because biases generally operate nonconsciously, and consequently tend not to
reveal themselves via introspection, that self–other asymmetry could account
for people’s tendency to see themselves as less biased than others.
Most of us have engaged in political arguments with individuals whom,
as the argument progressed, we came to view as ideologically biased to the
point that rational debate seemed impossible. We may have been amazed to
find that those individuals thought the same thing about us—that is, that we
were the ones who could not be reasoned with because of our ‘‘knee-jerk
liberalism’’ or ‘‘hard-core conservatism.’’ Consistent with this everyday
experience, experiments have shown that people are heavily influenced
by partisan ideology when evaluating policy issues, but that they generally
deny that influence, even while they see it and even exaggerate it in others
(Cohen, 2003; Robinson et al., 1995).
10 Emily Pronin
Pronin et al. (2007) explored a source of that bias blind spot in the self–
other asymmetry component of the introspection illusion. Collegiate resi-
dents of northern California were randomly assigned to be either voters or
observers of those voters in an experiment concerning political initiatives
allegedly up for vote in the state of California. The initiatives were pretested
to ensure that they had no apparent partisan bent and each one was then
randomly linked to the Democratic or Republican Party. For example, an
initiative to increase the maximum cargo size at the Port of Los Angeles was
allegedly backed by the Democrats. For each initiative, the voter partici-
pants read a description of it, then listed their thoughts about it (Cacioppo &
Petty, 1981; Taylor & Fiske, 1981), and then indicated how they would
vote on it. They also indicated their political affiliation with the Republican
or Democratic Party. Each observer participant was assigned to a voter
participant. The observers read the descriptions of each initiative; they
also saw their voter’s thoughts about it, their voter’s indication of how he
or she would vote, and their voter’s party affiliation. Both voters and
observers rated how much the voter’s positions were influenced by party
affiliation, and they then rated how they made that assessment.
Voters were heavily influenced by their political party in choosing their
positions. At the same time, the usual asymmetry in bias perception emerged
whereby voters thought that they were less influenced by their party than did
observers. More importantly in terms of the introspection illusion, voters
and observers reportedly considered different information when assessing
party influence. A self–other asymmetry emerged whereby voters claimed to
have paid more attention to their thoughts than observers claimed to have.
These self-report claims were corroborated by content analysis of the voters’
thought-listings. Those listings were coded for indications that the voter had
consciously thought about his or her political party’s position when thinking
through the initiative. The analysis revealed that voters who had consciously
thought about their party’s position were more likely to impute ideological
bias to themselves than were voters who had not had such thoughts. This
suggests that voters indeed had relied on their thought content in order to
assess their ideological bias. The content of voters’ thought listings did not
predict observers’ assessments of the voters’ ideological bias, suggesting that
the observers had not relied on that thought content.
2.3. Behavioral disregard

The introspection illusion involves actors not only placing heavy emphasis
on introspections but also consequently disregarding behavior—a trade-off
that observers are not expected to show. Consider an everyday occurrence
familiar to most teachers: A student performs poorly on a test and then
complains about the test’s unfairness or lack of validity (a complaint not
voiced by those who performed well). To an outsider, the student’s com-

plaint seems self-serving. But when asked to consider whether her judgment
might be biased, the student denies this possibility, citing flaws with the test
and the fact that she feels no motive to protect her ego. By focusing on this
internal information, the student fails to pay sufficient attention to her
behavior of criticizing the test after scoring poorly on it.
This example was the subject of an experiment by Pronin and Kugler
(2007). Test-taker participants took what they believed was a test of social
intelligence for which the experimenters sought to determine its validity.
Previously, Pronin et al. (2002) had shown that takers of this test display the
classic self-serving bias (those told they have done poorly view it as relatively
invalid, those told they have done well view it as relatively valid); they also
found that takers of this test are more likely to impute this bias to a fellow
test-taker than to themselves. Pronin and Kugler’s experiment aimed to
learn what information test-takers and observers rely on in assessing test-
takers’ bias. In their experiment, the test-takers all were told that they had
performed poorly on the test. They were then asked to think aloud about the
test’s validity (their thoughts were tape-recorded) prior to providing a
numeric assessment of that validity and evaluating whether that assessment
may have been biased by their score on the test. Observer participants each
saw a test-taker’s scored test and saw that test-taker’s assessment of the test’s
validity. Half of the observers heard the test-taker’s verbalized thoughts, in
order to allow for a test of the differential valuation component of the
introspection illusion (discussed next).
The results showed the usual bias blind spot; test-takers viewed them-
selves as less biased than did observers. Recall that all of the test takers were
assigned a low score on the test. Thus, a behavioral sign of bias involved
their rating the test as low rather than high in validity. The bias blind spot
appeared to be rooted in test-takers’ versus observers’ differential inclination
to look to this behavioral sign of bias. Observers (regardless of which type)
relied on that behavior—they imputed more bias to test-takers who were
more rather than less harsh about the test. That is, observers showed a
positive correlation between their assessment of a test-taker’s bias and that
test-taker’s negative assessment of the test. Test-takers, by contrast, tended
to ignore this behavior. Those who criticized the test after receiving a low
score saw themselves as no more biased than those who praised it after
receiving a low score (Fig. 1.3A).
The same pattern of results emerged in a study in which actors
rated themselves relative to average on various traits. Observers saw the
actors’ trait ratings (and half of them were given access to the actors’
ongoing thoughts while making those ratings). Actors showed the typical
bias of rating themselves as ‘‘better than average.’’ The bias blind spot also
emerged: Actors were less likely to see the bias in themselves than were
observers. Moreover, the bias blind spot appeared rooted in test-takers’
12 Emily Pronin
A B
7 Test-taking study 7 Better-than-average study
6 6
Perceived bias
5 5
r = .48* r = .34*
4 4 r = .09
r = .17
3 3
2 2
1 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Negativity of actor’s test evaluation Positivity of actor’s trait ratings
Actors Observers
Figure 1.3 (A, B) In two experiments (each involving a different bias), observers paid
attention to actors’ behavior when assessing those actors’ bias, whereas actors did not
significantly attend to their own behavior. *p < 0.05 (Pearson r).
versus observers’ differential inclination to look to behavior. As shown in

Fig. 1.3B, observers relied on behavioral signs of bias—they imputed more
better-than-average bias to actors who rated themselves further above
average. Actors, by contrast, showed no such correlation between how
much better-than-average bias they imputed to themselves and how far
above average they had rated themselves. Participants’ self reports also sup-
ported this finding. Observers claimed to have placed more weight on behav-
ior than did actors (indeed, an interaction effect emerged whereby observers
claimed to focus more on behavioral than introspective information and
actors claimed the reverse).
2.4. Differential valuation

Our introspections are, of course, often available to us only. And, self–other
differences in the weighting of introspective information likely can reflect
that. However, research also suggests a differential valuation component
of the introspection illusion, whereby people’s greater weighting of
their own introspections is in part due to their greater valuation of those
introspections.
Recall that the test-taking and better-than-average studies described
above included two types of observers: those provided with introspective
access and those not provided with that access. As can be seen in Fig. 1.4,
the self–other asymmetry in perceptions of bias (the ‘‘bias blind spot’’)
emerged regardless of whether observers were given introspective access
or not. The fact that observers’ evaluations of bias were unaffected by
A Test-taking study B Better-than-average study

Perceived bias
5 5
4 4
3 3
2 2
Actors Observers Observers with

introspections
Figure 1.4 (A, B). In two experiments (each involving a different bias), actors saw
themselves as less biased than did observers—regardless of whether those observers
were or were not privy to the actors’ introspections.
whether they were provided with introspective information suggests that

they did not give significant weight to that information.
One might wonder, though, whether observers’ disinclination to rely on
these introspective reports reflected their mistrust of those reports rather
than a disinterest in actors’ introspections. Not surprisingly given the
unconscious nature of bias, actors’ introspective reports generally did not
reveal conscious bias (3 of 27 actors in the test-taking study, and 1 of 32 in
the better-than-average study, showed any awareness that they might be
biased). Perhaps this led observers to suspect the genuineness of actors’
reports. In order to test that question, new groups of observers were asked
whether they viewed the reports as accurate, understandable, and genuine
accounts of what the actor was really thinking. The large majority (in both
studies) reported viewing the accounts as such, and the results persisted
when participants who provided (or observed) reports that were viewed as
suspect were excluded from analysis. Apparently, observers’ low reliance on
introspective information, and their preference for relying on behavior, did
not reflect overt skepticism about the genuineness of their access to the
actors’ introspections.
In considering these two studies, it seems participants operated as though
they had different definitions of ‘‘bias’’ depending on whom they were
considering. They seemed to view bias as an introspective phenomenon,
defined by internal motives and intentions, when judging it in themselves,
but as a behavioral phenomenon, defined by action, when judging it in
others. Pronin and Kugler (2007) explored this possibility. College students
read about various situations where bias might occur, such as: ‘‘You’re
gambling, and the roulette wheel has now landed on red four times in a
row.’’ They then indicated how they would define bias in that situation, by
14 Emily Pronin
choosing either an introspective definition (e.g., ‘‘You think that since there
has been a streak of red, black must be due to come up next.’’) or a
behavioral definition (e.g., ‘‘Although your prior bets have all been small,
you now place a rather large bet—on black.’’). Half of participants received
the wording described above. The other half instead were cued to think of
another person when reading each description (e.g., ‘‘Linda is gambling,
and the roulette wheel has now landed on red four times in a row’’). All
participants responded to the same question: ‘‘What might it mean to be
biased in that situation?’’ The result was that participants were more likely to
define bias in terms of introspection, and less likely to define it in terms of
behavior, when cued to think about themselves rather than another person.
For example, on the above roulette question, self-raters chose the intro-
spective definition over the behavioral one 68% of the time, whereas
other-raters chose it 42% of the time.
Other studies add further support for the behavioral disregard compo-
nent of the introspection illusion. For example, Pronin and Kugler (2007)
asked people how valuable it would be for a person to rely on introspection,
and on general theories of behavior, for judging the participant’s own or a
peer’s susceptibility to the self-serving bias. Participants reported that it
would be more informative for someone to try to get inside the participant’s
head in order to assess his or her bias than to look to behavior—but that it
would be more informative for someone to look to their peer’s behavior
than to try to get inside that peer’s head.
Another way to explore the possibility that people place too high a value
on their own introspections is to see what happens when people are taught
about the sometimes questionable value of introspection. An experiment by
Pronin and Kugler (2007) taught that lesson. Students came to the labora-
tory for a study that they were told concerned comprehension of scientific
information. They read a short piece (allegedly from Science) that described
classic studies illustrating the automaticity of behavior and the concomitant
shortcomings of introspection (e.g., Bargh et al., 1996; Berkowitz &
LePage, 1967; Darley & Latane, 1968; Devine, 1989; Nisbett & Wilson,
1977a). The article, titled ‘‘Unaware of Our Unawareness’’ (from Wilson
et al., 1995), described the role of unconscious cues in guiding behavior and
judgment, as well as people’s unawareness of that role and their conse-
quently inappropriate reliance on introspection. In a control condition,
students read an irrelevant scientific article. Then, in what participants
believed was a separate experiment, they assessed their susceptibility, rela-
tive to their classmates, to various judgmental biases. The result was that
students who received introspective education showed no bias blind spot,
and differed significantly from those in the control condition (who showed
that blind spot). Providing people with information about the perils of
valuing introspection seemed to have led them to overcome the bias blind
spot; this suggests that over-valuation of introspection contributed to it.
3. The Introspection Illusion in

Social Psychology
Although the basic components of the introspection illusion initially
were identified in the domain of bias perception, the utility of the illusion as
a construct rests in part on its ability to bring together a wide range of
important social psychological findings under a common theoretical
account. This section of the chapter reviews evidence of the underlying
role of the introspection illusion in various phenomena that share a source in
people’s placing heavy value on introspective information about themselves
(information based on looking to internal thoughts and feelings) even while
they place heavy value on extrospective information about others (informa-
tion based on looking to external behavior).
3.1. Judgment and decision making

People frequently have to predict their own behavior. Unfortunately, their
predictions are often wrong (e.g., Bazerman, 2006; Gilovich et al., 2002a).
Research suggests that these mispredictions can arise from people’s heavy
weighting of their own introspections (e.g., positive intentions) at the
expense of considering other information (e.g., population base-rates, past
behavior). Because people do not show this heavy valuation of others’
introspections, they sometimes can be more accurate in predicting others’
behavior than their own.
Whether trying to finish a big project or just make it on time to an
appointment, people often do not leave adequate time for the task. Buehler
et al. (1994) tested the psychological sources of this planning fallacy. College
students predicted how quickly they (or others) would complete various
work projects, such as their honors thesis. The actual time that it took the
students demonstrated that they were over-optimistic about how long it
would take them to complete the projects, whereas they were more accu-
rate in predicting others’ completion times. The reason for the students’
inaccuracy in self-prediction involved the fact that they focused on their
industrious motives and intentions when predicting their own task comple-
tion times, rather than focusing on their past behavior or the behavior of
others in similar situations. Indeed, when the students were led to put aside
their ongoing motives and intentions—that is, when they were specifically
instructed to focus on their relevant previous behavior—they made self-
assessments that were more accurate.
People’s prediction errors extend beyond the planning fallacy. Epley
and Dunning (2000) asked students to predict how much money they
and their peers would contribute to a campus charity drive. The students
16 Emily Pronin
overestimated the amount of money they would contribute, and were more
accurate in their predictions about their peers. This asymmetry arose from
their reliance on internal information—in this case, information about
positive intentions—when making predictions about their own behavior,
combined with their reliance on external information—in this case, infor-
mation about the base-rate of charitable behavior in the population—when
making predictions about others’ future behavior (see also Koehler & Poon,
2005). Another example of this asymmetry involves Kahneman and
Lovallo’s (1993) observation that entrepreneurs often are over-optimistic
about the odds of success of their own risky business endeavors, even while
onlookers make more sober (but also more realistic) predictions. The
divergence, they suggest, is due to something akin to the behavioral disre-
gard component of the introspection illusion: The entrepreneurs focus on
their energy, motives, and intentions at the expense of considering their
own past failures and those of others in similar situations, whereas onlookers
are more sensitive to that base-rate information.
Gilbert, Wilson, and their colleagues (Gilbert et al., 1998; Wilson &
Gilbert, 2000, 2003) have shown that the weight people place on their
introspections can lead them to mispredict their future thoughts and feel-
ings. In one experiment, Wilson et al. (2000b) asked college football fans to
estimate what they would be thinking about, and how they would feel, on
the days following an upcoming game. The fans, who were absorbed in
thoughts about the game when completing the survey, displayed a focalism
error. Their over-attention to their ongoing thoughts caused them to
incorrectly predict that in the days following the game they would continue
to think about it (and to feel elated or distressed, depending on whether
their team won or lost). When the fans were experimentally induced to
focus on their behavior in the days after the game (i.e., by writing about what
activities they would be doing) rather than on their current thoughts and
feelings, they no longer overestimated the degree to which they would be
thinking about the game and feeling emotional about it. This suggests that
errors in affective forecasting may be at least partially rooted in the excessive
weight that people place on introspective information when making those
forecasts (see also Buehler & McFarland, 2001; Schkade & Kahneman,
1998).
3.2. The self

People see their true selves as best captured by their ongoing feelings and
subjective experiences; they are more prone to view others as captured
through behavior or stable traits (Andersen & Ross, 1984; Johnson & Boyd,
1995; Pronin et al., 2001). This self–other asymmetry in concern with
introspective information, a key component of the introspection illusion,
helps to account for some of the unique ways in which people view the self
as opposed to other people.
For one, people’s greater focus on their own introspections leads them to
think that they have a richer inner life than do others, and one that is filled
with more intense feelings ( Johnson, 1987; McFarland & Miller, 1990).
It also leads people to assume that they are relatively ‘‘unknowable’’ via
overt observation (Pronin et al., 2001). That assumption gives rise to an
asymmetric insight illusion: People feel they know others better than others
know them. In one study, Pronin et al. (2001) asked pairs of college
roommates how well they knew their roommate, and how well their
roommate knew them, on a variety of dimensions. Both roommates in
each pair generally thought they knew their roommate better than vice
versa, which is logically impossible. Consistent with the idea that this
asymmetry arose from the roommates’ placing more weight on their own
than their roommates’ introspections, the asymmetry was amplified for
knowledge about characteristics that have a largely introspective compo-
nent (e.g., true feelings, underlying motives) as opposed to for more visibly
observable characteristics (e.g., messiness, risk-taking). The results of a
separate study by Pronin et al. (2001) further supported the introspection
illusion mechanism. Respondents were asked to complete the sentence ‘‘I
am most like myself when I. . .,’’ or they were asked to complete the same
sentence about when a friend was most like him or herself. Respondents
viewed their true selves as revealed in introspective moments involving
private thoughts and feelings 72% of the time, whereas they viewed their
friend as revealed in those moments only 28% of the time.
The flipside of people’s belief that their own introspections tell the full
story about them is their belief that others’ actions tell the full story. For
example, during a campus water shortage, students read deep into their
classmates’ showering behavior to infer how much they cared about the
campus community—even while they saw their own behavior as relatively
unrevealing (Monin & Norton, 2003). Those who showered during the
crisis inferred that others who showered cared little about the community in
comparison to themselves; those who had not showered inferred that others
who had not showered cared more in comparison to themselves. The
students apparently looked to their internal attitudes (which barely differed
between showerers and nonshowerers) in order to infer their own caring,
whereas they looked to others’ behavior for inferring that caring.
This tendency to give heavy weight to others’ behavior can help to
account for the interview illusion (Nisbett & Ross, 1980), whereby people
think they can learn a great deal from interviews when the reality is that
interviews often have little diagnostic value (e.g., Dawes, 1994; Kunda &
Nisbett, 1986). Interviewers often feel confident relying on interviewees’
behavior in order to infer more stable internal states—such as passion,
mental stability, or drive. In making such inferences, interviewers pay
18 Emily Pronin
attention not only to interviewees’ carefully composed replies but also to

their implicit or uncontrolled responses, such as nonverbal gestures, off-the-
cuff remarks, or unintended slips of the tongue. The very unintentional and
unmonitored responses that people often view as meaningless in their own
case, people often view as meaningful in the case of others (Pronin et al.,
2001). In a classic (though perhaps apocryphal) example, Sigmund Freud,
famous for his tendency to infer phallic-oriented mental life from others’
seemingly incidental behavior, once said about his own cigar smoking:
‘‘Sometimes a cigar is just a cigar.’’ Like Freud, most people tend to infer
others’ internal states from their observable behavior (Gilbert & Malone,
1995; Heider, 1958; Ichheiser, 1949; Jones & Davis, 1965; Ross, 1977),
even while they would discourage such inferences about themselves.
Finally, it is worth noting that people’s self concepts are typically
characterized not only by their emphasis on internal thoughts and feelings,
but also by their generally positive or self-enhancing nature (Krueger,
1998a; Kwan et al., 2004; Sedikides et al., 2003; Taylor & Brown, 1988).
That fact likely reflects people’s basic need to protect and affirm their sense
of self (Fiske, 2004; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Steele, 1988; Tesser, 1988).
Accumulating evidence suggests that people’s overly positive self-percep-
tions also derive from their reliance on introspection and disregard of
behavior when evaluating themselves. This idea, that the introspection
illusion can contribute to self-enhancement effects, receives full attention
in the later section on self enhancement.
3.3. Attitudes and attitude change

Perhaps the most obvious use of introspection is for determining one’s
preferences when one does not have a readily retrievable attitude in mem-
ory. If asked about one’s attitude towards Pepsi or the President, one may
have a stored evaluation that immediately pops to mind (e.g., Fazio, 1989).
If not, though, one is likely to consult one’s accessible thoughts and feelings
in order to determine a response (e.g., Schwarz, 2007). In that case,
individuals often show the usual tendency of placing too much weight on
their ongoing introspections. The result is that they can be misled in
predicting their ‘‘true’’ attitudes (i.e., those capturing their more stable
preferences), and they also can be misled in inferring what those true
attitudes derive from.
One reason why it can be a mistake for individuals to place heavy weight
on their introspections for inferring their attitudes is that people can hold
‘‘implicit attitudes’’ of which they are completely unaware (Bassili &
Brown, 2005; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Wilson et al., 2000a). Looking
inward to assess attitudes and preferences only makes sense to the extent that
they are explicit, rather than implicit. However, even when people are
concerned with their explicit attitudes, the process of introspection itself can
misguide people as to the nature of their true attitudes and preferences

(Wilson et al., 1993, 1995). When individuals introspect about their atti-
tudes (e.g., about what type of movie—comedy, drama, or action—they
like best), they focus on whichever thoughts and feelings are most accessible
at that moment. As a consequence, they overweight that information (e.g.,
if they think of a recent comedy they liked, they might infer that comedy is
their favorite). In one experiment Wilson et al. (1993) asked college
students to choose among types of posters that they could take home.
Some of those students were instructed to introspect about their choice
and the reasons for it before making that choice. Those participants were
less happy with their choice than were their peers who did not introspect
about the reasons for their preference. The former group placed too much
weight on the introspections that they generated at that moment in time,
and thus lost sight of their more enduring attitudes. In a related study,
participants who consulted their thoughts before making complex decisions
about consumer products (such as cameras or airplane tickets) were less
satisfied with their purchases than were those who took a similar amount of
time before making their decisions but did not spend that time consulting
their thoughts (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006).
These studies suggest an ironic reason why people sometimes find
themselves unhappy with their decisions about what poster to put on
their wall or what vacation destination to visit: That dissatisfaction may
result not from a failure to look inward to their attitudes and preferences,
but rather from the usual introspection illusion of looking inward too much.
In such cases, an observer oblivious to one’s introspections about one’s
difficult decisions or the reasons for one’s preferences might be better than
oneself at inferring one’s true preferences.
The introspection illusion can lead people not only to incorrectly infer
their attitudes but also to incorrectly infer the source of those attitudes. Vast
sums of money are spent on advertising, all with the hopes of persuading
people to buy new electronic gadgets, eat more fast food (and take more diet
pills), and vote for one politician over another. Yet, most people believe
that they are relatively immune to such campaigns. People show a third-
person effect whereby they view themselves as unpersuaded by the mass media
even while they view others as influenced by it (Davison, 1983; Perloff,
1993). This effect appears to be rooted in the introspection illusion. Media
appeals often exert their influence outside conscious awareness. For exam-
ple, consumers’ attitudes can be influenced by mere exposure to a product
(e.g., Fang et al., 2007) or by the carrying over of an irrelevant mood state
(e.g., Gorn et al., 1993). People, therefore, often deny their susceptibility to
media campaigns because they look inward to find evidence of it (‘‘If I were
affected by that commercial, I’d know it.’’). In the case of others, people
recognize that influence because they assess it by relying on observations of
behavior (e.g., ‘‘Hal buys whatever gadget they show on TV.’’) and
20 Emily Pronin
intuitive theories (e.g., ‘‘People will buy anything if you put a gorgeous
model next to it.’’).
The introspection illusion suggests that individuals will acknowledge
media influence on themselves in cases where introspective cues suggest
that influence. An experiment by Gunther and Thorson (1992) supported
that hypothesis. University students viewed commercials that varied in
whether they elicited a strong internal reaction (i.e., ads perceived as high
in emotional content). The researchers found that the study participants
showed the usual third-person effect—they saw themselves as less susceptible
than others to the commercials—except for ads that elicited a strong emo-
tional response. For those ads, which left behind discernible introspective
traces of their impact, people saw themselves as more influenced than others.
3.4. Social influence

Classic studies in social psychology have demonstrated the surprising degree
to which experimental subjects conform to those around them. Yet, when
we teach these studies, our students often deny that they would similarly
conform. Indeed, even the subjects in those studies often denied having
conformed: Participants in Darley and Latane’s (1968) classic bystander
intervention experiments denied that their peers had influenced their
action. Likewise, participants in Sherif’s (1937) classic autokinetic experi-
ments denied having conformed in the judgments they made. More
recently, Pronin et al. (2007) reported an ‘‘alone in a crowd of sheep effect’’
whereby people tend to deny their susceptibility to conformity and social
influence even while they readily recognize the susceptibility of those
around them. This asymmetry is rooted in the introspection illusion.
In one study by Pronin et al. (2007), college students read descriptions of
various instances of conformity and social influence. For example, they read
about the tendency for people to unconsciously mimic the physical gestures
of conversation partners, such that they might cross their legs if their
partner’s legs are crossed (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). The participants
then rated their own susceptibility to each instance, relative to that of
their peers. Not only did they show a general tendency to see themselves
as less conforming than their peers, but, consistent with the introspection
illusion, the effect was moderated by whether the particular example
they read about operated nonconsciously or left introspective cues. That
is, when conformity left introspective traces (such as when it involved
intentionally choosing one’s attire in order to ‘‘fit in’’ at a formal event or
religious ceremony), individuals did not deny their relative susceptibility to
social influence.
This effect is not limited to abstract scenarios or conformity-obsessed
teenagers. Berger and Pronin (2007) surveyed drivers of BMW cars and
found that they viewed their own luxury car purchase as less influenced by
status and conformity than that of another BMW driver whom they knew
(Ms = 2.70 vs 4.93, 7-point scale), t(27) = 4.90, p < 0.001. One might
wonder whether this asymmetry in conformity perceptions reflects social
desirability rather than the introspection illusion. Consumers might view
social influence as an undesirable reason to buy a product. Pronin, Berger,
and Molouki tested that question. College students evaluated their own
versus their classmates’ purchases of a trendy personal music player (the
‘‘iPod’’). They were led to view social influence in purchasing an iPod as
either desirable (i.e., they were told that it offers people a shared experience
which is important for being socially connected) or as undesirable (i.e., they
were told that it prevents people from thinking for themselves and being
independent). The result was that participants saw themselves as less socially
influenced in their purchase, even when they had been led (as confirmed by a
manipulation check) to view that influence as positive. The students were
unaware of the impact of social influence on their iPod ownership and, by
virtue of relying on their introspections, they denied that influence even
when they saw it as a good thing. In the case of their peers, the students
recognized that influence because they were less prone to disregard the
obvious fact that their peers had bought the same item that so many others
also owned.
3.5. Interpersonal interaction

All too often, social interactions do not go as planned, and people are left
feeling hurt, angry, or confused. Although negative outcomes such as this
are to be expected when individuals’ intentions toward each other are
exploitive or unkind, such outcomes are surprising (and disappointing)
when people’s intentions are kind and generous. In these cases, individuals’
surprise often stems from the introspection illusion—they place a great deal
of weight on what they know internally, whereas others judge them based
on what they observe externally.
For example, cooperatively minded negotiators often incorrectly assume
that their partners will view them positively. Their assumption derives from
the fact that they focus on their cooperative motives, which they assume are
transparent, whereas their partners focus on their overt actions, which are
ambiguous. The negotiators’ assumptions are distorted by an illusion of
transparency, whereby they assume that their internal motives are transparent
via external observation (Van Boven et al., 2003a; Vorauer & Claude,
1998). That assumption could derive from the introspection illusion. It
involves actors placing heavy emphasis on their assessments of their internal
states (in this case, their cooperative motives)—such heavy emphasis, in fact,
that they neglect to recognize that those internal states are not visible via
external observation. Consistent with the self–other asymmetry component
of the introspection illusion, observers instead judge actors based on overt
22 Emily Pronin
An actor is involved in an event with another person. They both assess what occurred. Domain
Examples:
• Dan has a paper due and tells Liz. They both judge how long he’ll take to write it. Judgment and decision.
• Bill buys a new luxury car that Ed also owns. They both judge Bill’s conformity. Social influence.
• Tom negotiates a contract with Sue. They both judge Tom’s cooperativeness. Interpersonal interaction.
• Lia went on a date with Ira. They both judge Lia’s romantic interest. Personal relationships.
• Jo chats with Lou, who belongs to a minority group. Both judge Jo’s friendliness. Stereotyping & prejudice.
Information used…
In actor’s In other person’s

self assessment assessment of actor
Introspective information Extrospective information Asymmetry

Examples: Examples:
• Dan plans to be focused and intense. • Dan has no topic & nothing written. Intentions vs. behavior.
• Bill analyzed the car’s pros and cons. • Bill chose the car all his friends own. Thoughts vs. behavior.
• Tom feels motivated to be agreeable. • Tom has yet to make Sue an offer. Motives vs. behavior.
• Lia is excited by Ira’s mere presence. • They share just a peck on the cheek. Feelings vs. behavior.
• Jo believes Lou’s race is unimportant. • Jo makes little eye contact with Lou. Beliefs vs. behavior.
Likely conclusion…
The actor and other person make different assessments. Effect

Examples:
• Dan estimates he will finish by tomorrow. Liz thinks he will need a few more days. Planning fallacy.
• Bill thinks he bought his car for its quality. Ed thinks he bought it to conform. Alone in crowd of sheep.
• Tom thinks he’s been clearly cooperative. Sue is skeptical about Tom’s intentions. Illusion of transparency.
• Lia sees her interest as unreciprocated. Ira concludes only he `is interested. Pluralistic ignorance.
• Jo thinks she’s been friendly and unprejudiced. Lou thinks Jo’s been unfriendly. Implicit prejudice.
Figure 1.5 The introspection illusion in perception of self and others produces impor-
tant psychological phenomena.
behavior. Figure 1.5 illustrates this instance of the introspection illusion (and
a number of other instances discussed in this section).
Information that is available via introspection often involves motives and
intentions, as it does in the case of transparency illusions. At other times, that
information can involve thoughts about one’s outward appearance as when,
for example, one is embarrassed about a bad hair day or proud of a new
outfit. Researchers have demonstrated that people show a spotlight effect in
such situations: they overestimate the noteworthiness of their actions and
appearance (Gilovich et al., 2000, 2002b). That effect may seem contradic-
tory to the introspection illusion (given the illusion, why would actors be so
focused on their behavior as to over-estimate others’ notice of it?), but it is
in fact consistent. The spotlight effect seems to occur when actors’ outward
actions and appearance are salient in their introspections (e.g., when they
feel self-conscious about wearing a silly tee-shirt; Gilovich et al., 2000).
In such cases, what actors lose sight of is that their appearance is less salient
visually than it is in their own thoughts—because visually there is no
spotlight shining on them. Spotlight effects thus differ from illusions of

transparency, in that the former involve the assumed obviousness of external
appearances and the latter the assumed obviousness of internal states, but
both seem to reflect the same underlying introspection illusion—involving
an emphatic focus on introspections at the expense of considering what is
emitted by observable behavior.
Interpersonal interactions can be compromised by people’s misestima-
tions of what information they are communicating to others. Such mis-
estimations often reflect people’s excessive focus on the thoughts and
feelings they associate with their communication (e.g., Epley et al., 2004a;
Keysar & Henly, 2002; Puccio et al., 2001). For example, when people
mean to terminate a relationship with a romantic partner, their intention to
do that can prevent them from recognizing that they may not be sending a
clear message in their communications (Puccio et al., 2001). Those who
intend to break up may fail to fully convey that intention and instead may
deliver ambiguous messages, such as avoiding the other person and making
the excuse that they have been ‘‘really busy,’’ or suggesting that perhaps it
would be good to take some time ‘‘to reevaluate things.’’ The result, Puccio
et al. found, is that those who break up tend to think they have sent a clear
message (i.e., the one that they intended to send) whereas those on the
receiving end tend to feel that they have received ‘‘mixed signals.’’ Again,
the problem involves people judging their own communications based on
what they intend to communicate whereas others are left to judge those
communications based on the behavior that can be observed.
3.6. Personal relationships

When we wish to pursue friendships with those who are acquaintances,
or when we wish to build intimacy with a romantic partner, the introspec-
tion illusion sometimes gets in the way. By placing heavy weight on our
introspectively experienced thoughts and emotions, but not on those of
others, we sometimes inadvertently put up barriers to relationship closeness.
Consider the case of two individuals embarking on a romantic relation-
ship. Both might wish to initiate a romantic moment, but each might let fear
of rejection or of potential awkwardness get in the way of making the first
move. At the same time, each might focus on the other’s inaction and view
it as a sign of disinterest (Vorauer & Ratner, 1996). In such cases, individuals
may be concerned by others’ inaction (‘‘If he liked me, he would’ve made a
move.’’), even while they focus on their own internal states (‘‘I like him, but
I fear rejection.’’). This example (shown in Fig. 1.5) is one of pluralistic
ignorance, in that it involves individuals viewing embarrassment as the cause
of their own actions even while they take others’ similar actions at face value
(Miller & McFarland, 1987; Prentice & Miller, 1996). Shelton and
Richeson (2005) found pluralistic ignorance in the context of college
24 Emily Pronin
students’ pursuit of cross-race friendships. They found that college students

would forgo trying to make friends with students of other races, even
though they wanted to be friends, because they interpreted those others’
lack of trying as indicating lack of interest. Such instances of pluralistic
ignorance suggest the operation of the introspection illusion: Individuals
judge each other based on information about overt behavior (e.g., failing to
make social overtures), while judging themselves based on introspective
information (e.g., wanting friendship but fearing rejection). That asymme-
try may be particularly pronounced in interracial interactions. Racial divides
may encourage the expectation that the other person’s internal states will
not match one’s own (even if the other’s behavior does); they also may lead
individuals to be even more introspectively focused than normal because of
their concerns about the interaction (Shelton & Richeson, 2006; Vorauer &
Kumhyr, 2001).
When people make the effort to open up to each other in order to
achieve closeness, things still can go wrong. Pronin et al. (2008a) documen-
ted such a scenario. In one study, pairs of students were asked to mutually
open up to each other about what they valued most in life, such as their
family, friends, or career. After doing that, the students generally felt that
they had genuinely opened up to their partner but that their partner had
revealed little to them. This asymmetry was rooted in the introspection
illusion: People who disclosed their values felt they had revealed a great deal
because they focused on the thoughts and feelings associated with their
disclosure (e.g., the feelings of joy that their family brings them); recipients
felt that little had been revealed because they focused on the disclosers’
behavior (e.g., a brief and prosaic disclosure) and on relevant base-rates
(e.g., family is important to most people). In a different experiment, Pronin
et al. explored that mechanism directly. Discloser participants described
different values that they held with more versus less emotional intensity
and that allegedly (i.e., according to the experimenter) were common
versus uncommon among their peers. Recipient participants were exposed
to another student’s value disclosures. Thus, the experiment employed a 2
2 2 design (Participant Role: Discloser vs Recipient Value Intensity:
High vs Low Value Uniqueness: High vs Low). The result was as the
introspection illusion would predict: A three-way interaction emerged
whereby, for disclosers, it was the emotional intensity associated with their
values that predicted how much they felt they had revealed, whereas for
recipients it was the base-rates (or uniqueness) of the values that predicted
how much they felt the discloser had revealed. People judged their own
revelations based on the introspections they associated with them, but they
judged others based on overt behavior and base-rates.
This effect is likely to compromise attempts to reach intimacy. Disclo-
sers, by virtue of their introspective focus, are likely to feel that they have
communicated a great deal, and are therefore likely to feel rejected when
others respond as though little of meaning has been exchanged. Listeners, by

virtue of their behavioral focus, also may feel rejected, as they infer that their
partner has made little effort to open up. This self–other asymmetry in
people’s perceptions of value disclosures may seem to contradict the previ-
ously mentioned illusion of asymmetric insight (whereby, in the course of
social interactions, people tend to assume that they have learned more about
others than others have learned about them; Pronin et al., 2001). In fact,
both effects involve the same source in the introspection illusion—that is, in
actors’ focus on the internal meaning, thoughts, and feelings that they
associate with their disclosures compared with observers’ focus on the
behavior emitted by actors. To the extent that actors have little depth of
feeling associated with their disclosures (as with off-the-cuff responses in a
brief chat), they are likely to view those disclosures as unrevealing; to the
extent that they associate intense feelings with those disclosures (as with
testaments to deeply-held values), they are likely to view those disclosures as
highly revealing.
3.7. Stereotyping and prejudice

Research suggests that most people possess implicit biases that, under certain
conditions, lead to stereotyping and prejudice. Modern racism often is
characterized by positive explicit attitudes combined with negative implicit
ones (‘‘aversive racism’’; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Son-Hing et al., 2005).
Because people place heavy weight on their introspections, they are likely
to conclude that they are nonprejudiced, even in cases when their behavior
appears prejudiced to others and base-rates reveal prejudice in their midst.
Experiments support this hypothesis. Dovidio et al. (2002) examined
actor–observer differences in perceptions of Whites’ race bias in friendli-
ness—that is, Whites’ tendency to act friendlier toward Whites than Blacks.
Such differential treatment can go unnoticed by actors, even when it
influences observers, because it typically is emitted via nonverbal and
unmonitored behavior (Word et al., 1974). In Dovidio et al.’s experiment,
pairs of White and Black students were asked to converse with each other in
the laboratory about the topic of dating in the current era. Prior to the
interaction, the White participants completed measures of their explicit and
implicit attitudes toward Blacks. After the conversation, both participants
rated how they and their partner behaved during the interaction. The result
was that White participants’ assessments of their friendliness toward their
interaction partner were associated with their explicit attitudes toward Blacks,
but not their implicit attitudes. This suggests, consistent with the introspec-
tion illusion, that the participants consulted their conscious introspections
(in this case, their explicit attitudes) in order to assess their bias. Also
consistent with the introspection illusion, their interaction partners’ assess-
ments were uncorrelated with those explicit attitudes and instead were
26 Emily Pronin
correlated with the White participants’ nonverbal behavior (which, notably,

flowed from implicit attitudes). See Fig. 1.5.
The idea that actors rely on their conscious introspections—even when
others judge them based on their behavior—has also been suggested by
stereotype priming experiments. Chen and Bargh (1997) subliminally
primed some of their participants with stereotypes about African Americans
as a group. This led the participants to behave in a hostile manner that, in
turn, engendered hostility from their interaction partners. Observers were
sensitive to this behavior and rated the primed participants as more hostile.
The actors themselves, by contrast, noticed their partners’ hostility but,
consistent with the behavioral disregard component of the introspection
illusion, ignored their own behavior and thereby failed to recognize their
role in engendering that hostility. In sum, both ‘‘actor’’ and ‘‘observer’’
participants behaved in a hostile manner, and both recognized the hostility
of their partner but did not recognize this behavior in themselves. The
influence of unconscious bias, whether activated by implicit priming (as in
Chen & Bargh’s experiment) or by implicit prejudice (as in Dovidio et al.’s
experiment), is not accessible via introspection. As a result, people see
antagonistic or racist behavior in others that they do not see in themselves.
The introspection illusion thereby produces an illusion of nonprejudice. In
a later discussion, this chapter addresses the implications of this fact for the
persistence of racism and sexism in society.
4. Implications for Major Theoretical Concerns

The foregoing discussion suggests that theorizing based on the intro-
spection illusion can help to account for well-known findings in domains
ranging from judgment and decision making to stereotyping and prejudice.
Another key component of a useful theoretical framework is that it pro-
duces theoretical insights. A number of those are now discussed.
4.1. The perspectives of actors and observers

The current theorizing continues the tradition in social psychology of
exploring differences, and similarities, in how people perceive themselves
and how they perceive others. That tradition has yielded a number of
influential theoretical approaches such as those of Jones and Nisbett
(1972) and Bem (1972). Those approaches sometimes seem to make con-
tradictory predictions about the information people look to, and the infer-
ences they make, when perceiving self and other. This section of the chapter
discusses the ways in which these apparent contradictions can be resolved by
taking a more nuanced look at these theories and then bringing to bear an
understanding of the introspection illusion.
4.1.1. Divergent versus similar perspectives

Perhaps the most obvious distinction among these theoretical approaches
involves whether they propose that the dominant source of information
processed by people differs when people perceive themselves versus others.
Jones and Nisbett (1972) described one potential difference—they sug-
gested that people look to dispositional factors (e.g., personality) when
considering others but situational factors when considering themselves.
More recently, Malle (2005) also proposed a divergence in actors’ versus
observers’ perspectives. As shown in Table 1.1, these theorists’ approaches
can be contrasted with those of Bem (1972) and Nisbett and Wilson
(1977b), which often are distilled to variants of the idea that people look
to the same information when considering themselves and others.
In trying to reconcile these distinct theoretical perspectives, it is impor-
tant to consider the differing conditions on which each is focused. Bem
(1972) and Nisbett and Wilson (1977b) focus on conditions in which
perceivers make inferences about attitudes or judgments that have not
been guided by conscious thought and reflection. Bem explicitly constrains
his claim of actor–observer similarity to this condition. He posits that this
similarity occurs ‘‘[only] to the extent that internal cues are weak, ambigu-
ous, or uninterpretable’’ (p. 2). Similarly, Nisbett and Wilson’s central
interest involves cases where we ‘‘tell more than we can know’’—that is,
where our judgments or attitudes are influenced by cues outside
of introspective awareness (p. 321). Under these conditions, actors are exp-
ected to look to the same information as observers because these are
conditions in which actors lack privileged or unique information.
This analysis suggests that the apparent contradictions among these
theories can in part be reconciled by the fact that they concern different
conditions. This clarification, however, does not completely settle the
question. The theories are still in some tension about how common it is
for actors to find themselves in these different conditions. Bem’s theorizing,
Table 1.1 Some theories of self and other perception
Dominant source of information

Theorist(s) For self For other
Bem Behavior Behavior
Jones and Nisbett Situation Traits
Nisbett and Wilson Theories Theories
Malle Unobservables Observables
28 Emily Pronin
inspired by a behaviorist analysis, suggests that it is common to have weak

introspective cues and therefore to look at oneself as an observer would. By
contrast, Jones and Nisbett suggest that it is common for actors to have
unique access to internal information, and to look to different information
than observers. They note that ‘‘typically, the actor has more, and more
precise, information than the observer about his own emotional states and
his intentions’’ (p. 85).
Modern research on the role of nonconscious processes in guiding
human judgment and behavior (e.g., Hassin et al., 2005) points to the
weakness and poor diagnosticity of introspective cues. However, theorizing
about the introspection illusion suggests that Jones and Nisbett were right,
nevertheless, in suggesting that people look to different information for
assessing the self versus others. The theorizing suggests that even under
conditions when internal cues are weak and nondiagnostic, people may not
look at themselves as an observer would. Instead, they may (1) fail to
recognize this problem, and therefore (2) consult whatever internal cues
are present anyway. When no such cues are present people may still look to
those cues—and, finding none, they may take that lack of evidence as
diagnostic. For example, in the case of unconscious bias (discussed earlier),
people may look for internal signs of bias and, finding none, conclude that
this means they were not biased (rather than concluding that they should
look elsewhere). Even when people make the same inferences about their
attitudes that an observer would, that process is likely to be mediated by
considering introspective experience in the case of self. Thus, participants in
the classic Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) cognitive dissonance experiment
who reported enjoying a boring task after telling someone that it was fun
may have looked inward before reporting their enjoyment (if it was not
immediately obvious to them). Upon looking inward, they likely would
have entertained the question of whether they had said it was fun because
they had been paid to say that. In the $1 condition, they would have found
no internal signs of having been tantalized, tempted, or otherwise influ-
enced by the $1 payment and therefore might have felt confident that the
task was enjoyable after all. The money, essentially, could have diverted
their attention from introspection about the true source of their behavior
(i.e., implicit pressure to go along with the experimenter).
A good deal of empirical evidence supports the notion that people look
inward to their introspections even when those introspections are weak or
absent. Studies have shown that people rely on introspections to judge
whether they have been biased even though bias operates nonconsciously
and therefore cannot leave introspective cues (Pronin & Kugler, 2007).
People also have been shown to look inward for assessing other noncon-
scious influences such as implicit social influence (Pronin et al., 2007).
Furthermore, people have been shown to look to introspective cues for
assessing things that have yet to occur, or are out of their mental control, and
therefore could not yield evidence in introspections (e.g., Pronin et al.,

2006b; Wegner et al., 2004; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). These findings, taken
together, point to the conclusion that actors rely on internal evidence for
making self-assessments (even in cases when they should not). This fact is
central to understanding the apparent contradictions between the ‘‘similar-
ity’’ versus ‘‘divergence’’ theories of actors’ versus observers’ perspectives.
As is discussed next, this conclusion also is central to yet another apparent
contradiction in theorizing about actors’ and observers’ perspectives.
4.1.2. Internal versus external explanations

Among theories that address the differing perspectives of actors and obser-
vers, Jones and Nisbett’s (1972) is the most well-known. The heuristic
version of it is that people look to internal dispositional factors when
considering others but external situational factors when considering them-
selves. At first blush, this approach seems to oppose Malle’s (2005), which
argues that people look to internal (unobservable) factors when considering
themselves and external (observable) factors when considering others.
This apparent contradiction can in part be resolved by the fact that the
theorists have in mind different types of internal versus external phenomena
(see Table 1.1). Jones and Nisbett focus on observers’ attention to internal
traits while Malle focuses on actors’ attention to internal mental states. Thus,
the two theories may not be in contradiction if it is the case that actors are
more prone than observers to look to internal states, whereas observers are
more prone than actors to look to internal traits. A study by Robins et al.
(1996) offered some support for that possibility: After engaging in a getting-
acquainted conversation, individuals made more internal trait attributions
(to personality) for their partner’s behavior than their own but tended to
make more internal state attributions (to mood) for their own behavior than
their partner’s. My students and I tested this hypothesis more directly in a
recent pair of experiments (Pronin & Contreras, 2008; Pronin & Kugler,
2008). College students drew crude models with boxes and arrows predict-
ing what they would do on an upcoming Saturday night, with the relative
importance of each predictor indicated by the size of its box. In the Pronin
and Kugler study, they were told what predictors to include (i.e., personality,
desires and intentions, situation, past behavior), and in the Pronin and Contreras
open-ended study they were told to include whatever predictors they saw
fit. To analyze the data, we calculated the total area (length height) of
each predictor box and then calculated the proportion of the total area
attributable to each predictor. In the open-ended study, we first coded each
predictor as either internal–trait (i.e., personality) or internal–state (i.e.,
thoughts, feelings, etc.), or as external.
In both studies, the predicted interaction effect emerged. People
appealed to internal traits more for others than self, and to internal states
(e.g., desires and intentions) more for self than others (see Fig. 1.6).
30 Emily Pronin
A Discrete options study B Open ended study

40% 30%
Area assigned to predictor
35% 25%
30% 20%
25% 15%
20% 10%
15% 5%
10% 0%
Mental states Fixed traits Mental states Fixed traits
Self Roommate
Figure 1.6 (A, B) Scores show percentage of total area devoted to predictor. Interac-
tion effects (self vs roommate trait vs state) were significant in the discrete options
study, F(1, 55) = 24.63, p < 0.0001, and the open-ended study, F(1, 49) = 4.87,
p = 0.03. Simple effects (self vs roommate) were significant ( p < 0.01) except for
mental state in open-ended study.
These results suggest that both actors and observers look to internal
information, but of different sorts. Consistent with the self–other asymme-
try of the introspection illusion, actors are more likely than observers to look
to information that comes to them via introspection—such as information
about desires and intentions. A remaining question concerns the nature of
actors’ and observers’ reliance on external information. This question is
particularly timely given the results of a recent meta-analysis by Malle
(2006). That meta-analysis operationalized the actor–observer bias as a
tendency to make internal attributions for others and external attributions
for self, and it found little support for the bias when operationalized in that
fashion. Theorizing about the introspection illusion suggests that this
internal–external distinction does not capture the true actor–observer dif-
ference. The introspection illusion framework suggests that actors are likely
to view their actions as a product of their internal thoughts, feelings,
motives, intentions, goals, and desires (i.e., the information that constitutes
their introspections), rather than as a direct offshoot of the external situa-
tion. Rather than viewing their actions as driven by the situation, actors are
likely to view their actions as responses to the internal thoughts, feelings,
motives, and so on that the situation brought forth for them. This analysis
suggests that actors are likely to view internal phenomena as playing a key
role in accounting for their own behavior.
This reasoning based on the introspection illusion helps bring into
harmony the apparently contradictory approaches of Jones and Nisbett
(1972) and Malle (2005, 2006). Consistent with Malle’s framework, it
proposes that actors focus more on unobservable information than do
observers (who focus more on external aspects of the actor). Consistent with
Jones and Nisbett, it proposes that this difference in focus leads actors to
appeal to influences that are mediated by their ongoing internal reactions—
most notably, the immediate impinging environment, whereas it leads
observers to appeal to influences that are mediated by the person they are
attending to—most notably, his or her personality.
Consider a classic instance of the actor–observer bias: Actors attribute
their choice of boyfriend or girlfriend to the ‘‘situation,’’ whereas their peers
attribute that choice to the actors’ ‘‘disposition’’ (Nisbett et al., 1973). An
analysis derived from the introspection illusion suggests that actors’ attribu-
tions do not literally involve their believing that the situation forced them to
date a specific person but rather that the situation generated in them certain
internal responses that guided their choice. When a person says he chose his
girlfriend because she was ‘‘pretty’’ and ‘‘nice,’’ he may really mean that he
chose her because he felt attracted to her and happy around her. It is unlikely
that this same actor would attribute his choice of girlfriend to situational
forces of the sort that elude conscious introspection. In reality, his interest
might derive from the fact that he first met her while the two waited to be in
a psychology experiment involving electric shock (but no permanent tissue
damage) that they had reached only after crossing a rickety bridge together
on a beautiful sunny day. However, he is unlikely to explain his choice as a
product of these implicit situational forces (despite their demonstrated
impact; respectively, Dutton & Aron, 1974; Schachter, 1959; Schwarz &
Clore, 1983). More generally, people are unlikely to view their behaviors as
affected by situational cues when those cues are nonconscious. Actors’
greater appreciation for the role of the situation in their own behavior, an
introspection illusion analysis suggests, likely reflects not so much the belief
that they are unwittingly buffeted about by external forces (as though they
were a stimulus–response automaton), but rather the belief, afforded by the
process of introspection, that their actions are the product of the thoughts,
feelings, and intentions that the external situation brought forth for them.
4.2. Self enhancement

The current theorizing suggests a new approach to understanding the classic
self-enhancement tendency. Typically, that tendency has been linked to a
motive to preserve self-esteem. Researchers also have pointed out various
cognitive processes that can act in concert with, or independent of, that
motive in order to elicit self-enhancing judgment and behavior (e.g.,
Dunning et al., 1989; Kunda, 1987; Miller & Ross, 1975; Pyszczynski &
Greenberg, 1987). We suggest that self-enhancement also reflects the twin
introspection illusion processes of heavily weighting introspective informa-
tion and disregarding behavior.
32 Emily Pronin
Consider a classic case of self-enhancement: People tend to rate them-

selves as ‘‘better than average’’ on a wide range of traits and abilities (e.g.,
Alicke et al., 1995; Dunning et al., 1989; Kanten & Teigen, 2008). Although
this tendency may serve to bolster the ego, studies have demonstrated a
source of it in the more cognitive mechanism of overweighting one’s own
but not others’ good intentions and lofty goals. In one study, Kruger and
Gilovich (2004) asked individual self-rater participants how much a hypo-
thetical observer would need to consider their individual intentions in order
to judge how much they possessed various positive traits, such as friendliness
or open-mindedness. Other-rater participants responded to that question
about a hypothetical observer judging someone they knew rather than
themselves. The result was that people believed their own intentions should
be given more weight than others’ intentions. This suggests that self-
enhancement in trait ratings is at least partially rooted in people’s tendency
to credit themselves but not others with positive traits to the extent that they
intend to possess those traits. More recent work suggests that it is not only
people’s introspections about their intentions that lead them to self-enhance
on traits and abilities but also their introspections about their goals and
potential. Williams and Gilovich (2008) found that people give more weight
to their sense of their own potential in self-assessment than they give to their
sense of others’ potential in assessment of others.
Can the introspection illusion account for self-enhancement apart from
the better-than-average effect? People self-enhance in a multitude of other
ways (Taylor & Brown, 1988), including: (1) making overly rosy predic-
tions about their behavior, (2) denying their susceptibility to bias, (3) over-
estimating their control over external events, and (4) holding unrealistically
positive expectations about their future outcomes. For the first three of
these four cases, prior studies suggest that the introspection illusion can
produce them. Specifically:
1. As previously discussed, people’s tendency to make overly rosy predictions
about their behavior—such as their efficiency in completing work
projects, or their generosity in helping others—has been linked to
people’s overweighting of their own (but not others’) positive intentions
and plans relative to past behavior and base-rates (Buehler et al., 1994;
Epley & Dunning, 2000).
2. As previously discussed, people’s tendency to claim that they are less
biased than others has been linked to their overweighting, and over-
valuing, of their own but not others’ lack of thoughts, motives, or
intentions to be biased—and to their underweighting of behavioral
signs of their own (but not others’) bias (Pronin & Kugler, 2007;
Pronin et al., 2007).
3. As will be discussed in the forthcoming section, people’s over-estimation
of their control over external events can derive from overweighting their
thoughts related to those events, such as when a person thinks about an

enemy’s suffering and then takes credit for it even when that causation
would otherwise seem magical (Pronin et al., 2006b).
Could the introspection illusion also account for the fourth of these self-
enhancing phenomena, that is, over-optimism? I conducted a new experi-
ment in order to test that question (Pronin, 2008b). College students
completed a short version of Weinstein’s (1980) measure of unrealistic
optimism, in which they assessed the likelihood of various positive events
(e.g., living past 80) and negative events (e.g., being fired from a job) occurring
in their future relative to the futures of their peers. Those participants served
as self-raters. After making their likelihood assessments (with response
options of 100% less likely, 80% less likely, etc., up to five times as likely;
see Weinstein), they indicated how much they believed that their intentions
and desires would determine the likelihood that each event would happen
to them, and how much they believed that the base-rate of that event’s
occurrence in their peer group would be determinative. Another group of
students served as other-raters; they assessed how likely it was that those
same events would happen to a student they knew (relative to that student’s
peers), and they indicated how much they believed that the student’s desires
and intentions, and the overall base-rate, would be determinative.
Students were expected to be more over-optimistic about their own
future than about that of another student they knew. Based on the intro-
spection illusion, that over-optimism was expected to be attributable to the
higher value participants believed should be placed on intentions and desires
in their own case versus that of a fellow student. These hypotheses were
supported. Consistent with the classic unrealistic optimism effect, the stu-
dents were significantly more over-optimistic about their own future than
about that of another student they knew (see Table 1.2). More importantly,
Table 1.2 Roots of over-optimism in an introspection illusion
Other- Self–other
Self-raters raters difference
Measure M(SD) M(SD) F(p)
Over-optimism 2.85 (1.46) 2.02 (1.77) 6.40 (0.01)
Perceived value of
Intentions/Desires 6.05 (0.95) 5.13 (0.74) 27.89 (0.0001)
Perceived value of
Base-rates 2.22 (1.34) 2.94 (1.38) 6.81 (0.01)
N = 97. Over-optimism was assessed by converting participants’ 15 response options to an ordinal scale
where 0 represented the response ‘‘equally likely’’ as other students, positive numbers represented
degrees of over-optimism, and negative numbers represented degrees of over-pessimism. Perceived
value was assessed via 7-point scale questions (1 = won’t determine at all, 7 = will strongly determine).
34 Emily Pronin
as shown in Table 1.2, people rating the likelihood of their own future
outcomes felt that intentions and desires would be better predictors than did
people rating the likelihood of others’ future outcomes. Viewing desires and
intentions as predictive was correlated with over-optimism, r(95) = 0.39,
p < 0.0001, and the Sobel test advocated by Baron and Kenny (1986)
revealed that participants’ greater over-optimism about themselves than a
peer was mediated by the greater weight that they believed should be placed
on their own desires and intentions versus those of a peer, z = 3.24,
p < 0.01. The introspection illusion also would suggest that participants’
over-optimism about their own futures would be bolstered by the low value
they believed should be placed on base-rates in their own case versus a peer’s.
Consistent with this notion, self-raters felt that base-rates would be worse
predictors of future outcomes than did other-raters; viewing base-rates as
predictive was negatively correlated with over-optimism, r(95) = 0.23,
p < 0.05, and the self–other difference in valuing base-rates tended toward
mediating the self–other difference in over-optimism, z = 1.71, p < 0.10.
4.2.1. Self denigration

The introspection illusion also can account for something that seems anti-
thetic to motivational accounts of self-enhancement: People sometimes
view themselves more negatively than others view them (and than they
would view others) and sometimes take more responsibility for negative
outcomes than they should (and than others would assign them). Most of us
probably have judged our performance more harshly than others thought
was warranted, or blamed ourselves for unforeseeable accidents or failed
relationships that only a seer or a saint could have prevented. These
phenomena call into question fully motivational accounts of self-serving
tendencies. Often, they point to the role of an introspection illusion that can
elicit both self-serving and self-denigrating assessments, depending on the
circumstances.
The very same processes of introspective weighting and behavioral
disregard that elicit self-enhancement can also elicit overly negative self-
assessments—when introspective experience is negative but behavior is not.
One example of that involves shyness. Shyness can have introspective
components, such as feelings of anxiety and self-consciousness, and also
behavioral components, such as quietness and awkward body language. But,
the behavioral features are not always present (Henderson & Zimbardo,
2001; Leary & Kowalski, 1995; Melchior & Cheek, 1990). As a conse-
quence, shy people often perceive themselves more negatively, and as more
shy, than an observer would, because they focus on introspective signs of
shyness, whereas observers notice their relatively ‘‘normal’’ and unremark-
able behavior (Melchior & Cheek, 1990). This self-denigrating tendency is
not reserved for dispositionally shy people. Pronin et al. (2002) reported
evidence suggesting that people in general view themselves as more fearful
of public speaking (a concern related to shyness) than others, presumably

because they base their self-assessments on introspective signs of that fear
whereas they assess others based on those others’ behavior—and, whereas
many people experience bouts of nervousness before public speaking, many
also manage to conceal that nervousness when in front of an audience.
A pair of studies by Pronin et al. (2006b) involved a quite different
example of self-denigration. Students came to the laboratory where they
were told they would be participating in an experiment on Haitian Voodoo.
They arrived two at a time, but only one was a true participant; the other
was a confederate of the experimenter. The true participant always was
assigned the role of ‘‘witch doctor,’’ and the confederate always was
assigned the role of ‘‘victim.’’ Participants were asked to place a voodoo
hex on their victim, by sticking pins in an authentic voodoo doll. Half of
them were led to think evil thoughts about the victim prior to placing the
hex. In one study those thoughts were elicited by the victim’s obnoxious
behavior; in the other they were elicited by an experimenter’s instruction to
think ill of an apparently pleasant and nice victim. The result in both studies
was that compared to participants who were led to have more neutral
thoughts about their victim, those led to have evil thoughts reported
more responsibility for a headache the victim reported. Importantly, parti-
cipants felt responsible for their victim’s suffering not only in an experiment
in which they reported being pleasantly surprised to see their victim suffer
(because of his ill temper), but also in an experiment in which they reported
feeling negatively about that suffering (because it involved inflicting pain on
an innocent victim). Likewise, in another study reported in the same article,
television-viewing fans of the winning and the losing team in a Super Bowl
football game felt that they had influenced the outcome of the game when
they had thought intently about it—even though the outcome for the losers
was not one for which they would want to take responsibility. These studies
present a stark example of people’s over-reliance on the thoughts available
to them via introspection, and of the capacity for that over-reliance to
produce both self-elevating and self-denigrating consequences.
Even the notorious better-than-average effect sometimes reverses, and
people sometimes view their traits and abilities as worse-than-average. This
can reflect dispositional qualities, such as the mental health of the per-
ceiver—depressed people and people with low self-esteem are less prone
to hold inflated self views (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Accumulating evidence
suggests that it also can arise from the introspection illusion. Studies demon-
strating below-average effects have shown that those effects are associated with
actors’ disregard of relevant base-rate information when assessing their traits
and abilities (Chambers & Windschitl, 2004; Klar & Giladi, 1999). An
introspection illusion account would suggest that actors would disregard
that information while excessively weighting introspectively-derived infor-
mation. Consistent with that hypothesis, Kruger (1999; also Moore &
36 Emily Pronin
Small, 2007) found that people are more likely to show below-average
effects for difficult tasks (such as joke-telling) and above-average effects for
simpler tasks (such as bicycle-riding). This finding suggests not only that
people ignore base-rates when judging their abilities, but also that they
may instead rely on internal feelings—in this case, feelings of difficulty
versus ease.
4.3. Psychological distance

A rich area of recent theorizing involves effects of psychological distance on
judgment and behavior. Psychological distance can take a number of forms,
including temporal (now vs later), social (self vs other), and hypothetical
(real vs hypothetical). Perhaps the most striking finding about these different
forms of distance is that people tend to respond to them in similar ways
(Liberman et al., 2007; see also Albert, 1977). Theorizing about the intro-
spection illusion offers one possible source of these effects.
People sometimes treat their future selves similarly to how they treat
other people. This parallel between temporal and social distance occurs
when, for example, people choose to reward the present self at the expense
of the future self, much as they might reward themselves over another
person (e.g., Ainslie & Haslam, 1992). When we spend money on present
selves rather than save for future ones, or when we consign future selves to
unpleasant experiences (e.g., painful surgeries) rather than undergo them in
the present, we seem to act as though we have ‘‘multiple selves’’ and care
about some more than others (Schelling, 1984). The philosopher Derek
Parfit (1971) even has argued that people are successions of different over-
lapping selves and therefore should be treated as such.
This fact is worth contemplating in light of the introspection illusion.
Thus far, this chapter has described how people’s different treatment of
others versus the self is often rooted in their reduced weighting of others’
introspections. That raises a question: Might the same be true for people’s
different treatment of future selves versus present selves?
When considering temporally distant selves, whether at a week’s dis-
tance or a decade’s, people literally cannot introspectively access those
selves’ thoughts and feelings. Work on construal level theory describes the
uniqueness of perceiving present selves—as opposed to psychologically
distant selves—as characterized by people’s sense that they can ‘‘directly
experience’’ themselves in the present (Liberman et al., 2007, p. 353). That
uniqueness manifests itself in the concreteness of individuals’ perceptions of
present selves, versus the abstraction of their perceptions of psychologically
distant selves (Liberman et al., 2007; Trope & Liberman, 2003). The
introspection illusion framework suggests another factor that differentiates
perceptions of present selves: that is, the focus of attention on thoughts and
feelings. Indeed, consistent with an introspection illusion analysis,
experiments have linked people’s differential treatment of present selves

versus future selves to people’s unique ability to ‘‘directly’’ experience their
present selves’ thoughts, feelings, and other internal mental states. Those
experiments have been conducted primarily in the contexts of decision
making, and attribution.
4.3.1. Decision making

People’s differential decisions for present selves versus for future selves
and others can reflect their inattention to introspective information when
considering future selves and others. In one study, Pronin et al. (2008b)
confronted college students with the prospect of imbibing a murky mix of
soy sauce, ketchup, and water for the sake of a scientific experiment.
Participants were told that the more one drank the better, because the
study concerned effects of ‘‘disgust’’ on judgment. They were asked to
decide how much they would drink right then, how much they would
drink in a future experimental session (that they were obligated to attend),
or how much the subject in the lab room next-door would drink. Based on
the introspection illusion, we expected that feelings of disgust about drink-
ing the liquid would be given more weight for present selves than future
selves or others and that this would be reflected in participants’ decisions
about the quantity to be consumed. Consistent with this hypothesis, parti-
cipants chose about two tablespoons to drink in the present, whereas they
chose about half a cup for their future self to drink—the same amount they
chose for another person (Fig. 1.7A).
Pronin et al. (2008b) linked this psychological distance effect to greater
introspective reliance in the case of present selves. In the disgusting liquid
study described above, the dominant introspective experience for partici-
pants about to drink the liquid involved disgust. Those feelings of disgust
outweighed, for them, any feelings of joy brought forth by the knowledge
that they could contribute to the progress of science. Of course, there also
are times when people think about helping and find themselves more
compelled by thoughts about the joy of helping than about the suffering
and sacrifice the helping will entail. The introspection illusion would
predict that in such cases people will offer more help on behalf of present
selves than future selves or others. This prediction, notably, runs contrary to
the lay intuition that people are simply greedy in the present and more
willing to promise generosity in the future.
In order to test this hypothesis, we (Pronin et al., 2008b) conducted
another experiment. Students were approached on campus by a classmate
(a confederate of the researchers) who claimed to work for a nonprofit
organization. Her job, she said, involved sending solicitation emails on
behalf of various charities that were represented by the nonprofit organiza-
tion. Her question for participants in the self-present condition was how
many of these emails they would be willing to immediately receive (the
38 Emily Pronin
A Disgusting liquid study B Charity email study

1/2 cup
Decision (number of emails)

35
Decision (amount of liquid)
25
1/4 cup
15
1 tbsp 5
Present self Future self
Other student Future other (B only)
Figure 1.7 (A, B) In the experiment shown in the left panel, introspective experience
was focused on the disgust involved in helping (and the joy it would entail was
secondary). In the experiment on the right, introspective experience was focused on
the joy of helping (and the annoyance was secondary).
more the better, she told them, for the charities and also for her, because she
was paid based on that number). In the self-future condition, she told
subjects that the emails would not be sent for another 6 weeks. In the
other-present and other-future conditions, her question was how many of
these emails should be sent immediately (or in 6 weeks) to a fellow student.
In all conditions, participants were told that receipt of the emails constituted
a minor burden because each one had a receipt function that required
opening it before it could be deleted. As shown in Fig. 1.7B, participants
were more generous on behalf of themselves in the present than on behalf of
a future self or a peer (in the present or future). Notably, participants also
reported more positive than negative thoughts about the prospect of receiv-
ing the emails. Their dominant internal experience involved positive
thoughts about helping rather than annoyance about having a flooded
inbox, and they apparently gave that introspective experience more weight
in making a decision for themselves in the present.
4.3.2. Attribution
The tendency for people to treat future selves like others also applies to
attributions. People tend to offer dispositional explanations for their future
actions, much as Jones and Nisbett suggested that they do for others’ actions
(Nussbaum et al., 2003). People also tend to describe temporally-distant

selves in terms of dispositional traits while describing present selves as situa-
tionally variable (Moore et al., 1979; Pronin & Ross, 2006; cf. Miller &
Porter, 1980), a phenomenon that mirrors the way people describe others
versus themselves (Nisbett et al., 1973; Sande et al., 1988). For example, when
asked whether they are serious versus carefree, or introverted versus extroverted,
people tend to reply that it ‘‘depends on the situation,’’ even while they readily
pick one trait over the other to describe a friend or themselves 5 years in the
past or future (Pronin & Ross, 2006).
These temporal effects on attribution have been linked to the introspec-
tion illusion. In a series of experiments, Pronin and Ross (2006) tested that
link by inducing participants to focus on the introspections of past or future
selves. In one study, participants performed a monologue of themselves at a
family dinner at age 14. First, though, half of them were given a crash course
in method acting, which is a form of acting in which actors seek ‘‘to
discover the inner life of the man [or woman] they portray’’ (Moore,
1984, p. 8). The other half instead were given a crash course in standard
acting, which they were told involved trying to appear to an external
observer to be the character one is playing. After performing their mono-
logue, participants were asked to respond to a series of questions on behalf of
their 14-year-old self, while staying in the role of that self. These questions
asked them whether, during the remainder of their day, they would be
serious or carefree or whether it would depend on the situation, whether they would
be introverted or extroverted or whether it would depend on the situation, etc. (for 11
trait pairs). The result was that participants who had been induced to
introspectively experience the thoughts and feelings of their past self made
less observer-like, and more present-self-like, attributions. That is, they
attributed fewer traits and more situational variability to their past self
than did their peers in the standard-acting condition. This result supports
the notion that people typically give less weight to the introspections of
temporally distant selves because they do not experience those introspections
in a way that feels direct. When led to experience the introspections of a past
self in that way (via method acting), participants seemed to give those
introspections more weight.
Theorizing based on the introspection illusion would predict that
people’s perceptions of past and future selves resemble their perceptions of
others not only in terms of decreased attention to internal states but also in terms
of increased focus on outward behavior. One way to test that hypothesis is to
study the images that people form when they visualize their past and future
experiences as opposed to their present ones. Pronin and Ross (2006) asked
people who were exercising on stationary bicycles at the gym to form
images of their present selves on the exercise bicycle ‘‘right now,’’ or to
form images of their past selves on the exercise bicycle ‘‘about 1 year ago.’’
Whereas only 7% pictured their own actions in the images they formed of
40 Emily Pronin
present selves, a full 43% saw their past selves in the images that they formed.
When imagining past selves, they thus often saw themselves on the exercise
bicycle as though they were looking from the perspective of an external
observer. Other studies have shown that such observer-like images of past
selves are especially common when people literally feel as though they used
to be a ‘‘different person’’—that is, when they believe that they have
changed since being their past self (Libby & Eibach, 2002). Consistent
with the introspection illusion, observer-like images that focus on behavior
are most likely to occur for memories characterized by low recall of internal
states such as emotions, thoughts, and physical sensations (e.g., Libby &
Eibach, 2002; McIsaac & Eich, 2004; Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Pronin &
Ross, 2006).
Taken together, these findings involving attribution and decision-
making suggest that one reason for parallels between temporal and social
distance may involve similarities in how people experience events that are
socially and temporally distant (i.e., in terms of a reduced focus on intro-
spective information). This insight derives from theorizing about the intro-
spection illusion, and also helps illuminate it. It suggests that people’s
tendency to treat their introspections as a sovereign source of information
about themselves (or, at least, a uniquely important one) may be limited to
how they treat their present selves.
4.3.3. Social distance

The preceding discussion suggests that people do not treat the introspec-
tions of all their ‘‘selves’’ the same. This finding regarding temporal distance
suggests a related question about social distance: Do people treat the
introspections of all ‘‘others’’ the same? Or, do people give others’ intro-
spections different weight depending on whether those others are friends,
relatives, strangers, or enemies? Theorizing about the introspection illusion
suggests that introspections that are directly experienced will be given the
most weight. Although directly experiencing others’ introspections is
improbable, there may be occasions when people at least have the sense
that they are doing that. On such occasions, they may give heavy weight to
others’ introspections. This may occur in the context of close relationships,
in which partners sometimes feel as though they think each others’ thoughts
before the other has them, or that they know what each other is thinking
better than the other knows him or herself. It also may be more likely to
occur in the context of perceptions of similar others, because individuals
may be more likely to view similar others’ introspections as an accurate
reflection of reality.
The question of how individuals perceive the introspections of distant
versus close, and similar versus dissimilar, others has not been investigated,
but the existing research offers evidence of social distance effects that
provide some support for these hypotheses (e.g., Ames, 2004; Liberman
et al., 2007; Norton et al., 2003; Prentice, 1990; Pronin et al., 2001). That
existing work has shown that people tend to perceive and judge close others
(e.g., ingroup members, familiar others, friends) differently from distant
others (e.g., outgroup members, unfamiliar others, foes), and that those
differences often involve their perceiving close others more in the way they
perceive themselves. For example, people experience cognitive dissonance
over not only their own discordant behavior but also the discordant
behavior of ingroup others with whom they identify—but not outgroup
others (Norton et al., 2003); also, people’s representations of familiar others
resemble their self-representations in content and structure more than do
their representations of unfamiliar others (Prentice, 1990).
4.4. Free will

Modern research on the automaticity of behavior has called into question
the degree to which people have free will (Bargh, 2008; Hassin et al., 2005;
Wegner & Bargh, 1998). That research has shown the impact on people’s
preferences, judgments, and actions of influences of which they are not even
aware. The doubts cast by that research are not the only ones. From theories
of hard determinism in philosophy, to behaviorism—and, more recently,
willpower and mental control—in psychology, to brain activity in neuro-
science, arguments have come forth questioning the extent and even the
existence of free will (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; Haggard, 2005; Libet,
1985; Skinner, 1971; Soon et al., 2008; Watson, 1982; Wegner, 2002).
Nevertheless, people generally are convinced that they consciously will
their actions (Wegner, 2002), and a sense of agency is a hallmark of mental
and even physical health (Taylor & Brown, 1988; Taylor et al., 2000). The
introspection illusion offers an account for why people’s belief in their own
free will persists, and for why the debate over free will persists in spite of that
belief.
Regardless of how we view free will in the abstract, our introspections
give us the sense that we have it. We feel as though our desires and
intentions precede and influence our actions, and that we face junctures
in life where we make genuine, exciting, and even frightening, choices
about what path to take. Because actors place such heavy weight on their
desires and intentions, they are likely to view those desires and intentions as
determinative of their behavior (and thereby as reflecting free will). Because
introspections often include deliberations about various possible options for
action (‘‘Should I do X, or should I do Y?’’) and often include counterfac-
tual thoughts (‘‘I did X; maybe I should have done Y’’), giving heavy
weight to introspections is likely to induce the perception of free will.
Consistent with the introspective weighting component of the intro-
spection illusion, people generally overestimate the causal impact of their
42 Emily Pronin
desires and intentions. They show illusions of control whereby they assume
that their wishes can influence chance or near-chance events (Langer, 1975;
Matute, 1996), and they can become convinced that they have caused
seemingly magical outcomes that they have merely intended. Importantly,
from the perspective of the present theorizing, these beliefs have been
associated with actors’ unique access and attention to their internal thoughts
and wishes (Pronin et al., 2006b; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999).
At the same time that people have frequent experiences that seem to
imply their own free will, they often observe those around them and have
the sense that those others’ decisions (e.g., about what career path to pursue)
and accomplishments (e.g., in getting accepted at a top college) were
predetermined by things such as personality, upbringing, or genes. In the
case of others, people are less likely to give credit to those others’ goals
and intentions and more likely to assume that those others will simply do
as those before them have done or as they themselves have done before
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; also Buehler et al., 1994; Epley & Dunning,
2000; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). The introspection illusion framework
suggests that these contrasting experiences about the free will of the self
versus others might resolve themselves in a simple (though logically unten-
able) way: People may be more likely to believe that their decisions and
actions are guided by free will than are those of others.
In a recent series of experiments, Pronin and Kugler (2008) explored
the hypothesis of a self–other asymmetry in belief in the major tenets of free
will—that is, that one’s actions are unpredictable a priori, that there are
multiple paths one can pursue, and that personal action is influenced by
internal desires and intentions. Asymmetries were observed for each of these
beliefs. Specifically, the experiments suggested that:
(i) People view their own pasts and futures as less predictable than those of their
peers. The most classic tenet of free will involves the notion of indeter-
minism, or the a priori unpredictability of personal action. College
students rated the a priori predictability of outcomes in their own past
and future, or of those same outcomes in their roommate’s past or
future (e.g., their or their roommate’s decision to attend Princeton Univer-
sity, choice of major, ultimate career path, marital partner). For example, self-
rater participants were asked: ‘‘Think about your choice of what to
major in. How easy would it have been to predict that you would end
up choosing that major?’’ The result was that students perceived
their own past and future outcomes as less predictable a priori than
their roommate’s (Ms = 3.86 vs 4.81, on 7-point scale), F(1, 48) =
14.46, p < 0.001. This difference was significant for past and future
(ps < 0.01).
(ii) People view their own futures as having more possibilities than those of their
peers. A central tenet of the concept of free will is that people are able to
choose among options—to take one path when they ‘‘could have done
otherwise’’ (Aristotle, 350 BCE/1985; Chisholm, 1964/1982;
Descartes, 1637/1998). We examined whether people saw more pos-
sible paths in their own future than others’ future. Waiters and wait-
resses at two local restaurants were asked to indicate from a set of
options all of the possibilities that they saw as plausible with respect to
their own, and a co-worker’s, life in the next 10 years. The possibilities
were separated into categories for places one might live, jobs one
might have, and lifestyles one might lead (e.g., for places one might
live, the same house/apartment lived in right now, another house/apartment in
the same town, another state in the Northeast, the West Coast, etc.). As
shown in Fig. 1.8, the waiters and waitresses indicated more possible
paths in their own future than that of a co-worker. This held true not
only for possibilities that they reportedly saw as ‘‘desirable,’’ such as
leading a more fun lifestyle, but also for possibilities that they report-
edly saw as ‘‘undesirable,’’ such as leading a more conservative lifestyle.
(iii) People view their own outcomes as more driven by internal desires and inten-
tions. A distinct tenet of free will is that it involves the ability to
overcome the influences of situation and personality, to choose what
one wants, and to act accordingly on one’s intentions (Frankfurt, 1971;
Watson, 1982). If people view themselves more than others as pos-
sessed of free will in this sense, then they should be more likely to view
their behavior as the product of ongoing wants and intentions (rather
than, for example, fixed traits or random circumstances). In the box
model studies described earlier, college students essentially were asked
to draw regression models of their own or a peer’s future behavior.
Those who modeled their own behavior assigned more predictive
weight to ongoing intentions and desires than did those who modeled
a peer’s behavior. In Pronin and Kugler’s (2008) experiment,
4
Number of possibilities
Self
3 Co-worker
1
Home Job Lifestyle
Life domain
Figure 1.8 Restaurant servers circled the options they saw as genuine possibilities for
themselves and a co-worker during the next 10 years (seven possibilities were listed in
each life domain). For each domain, they listed more possibilities for themselves than a
co-worker; all Fs(1, 27) > 4.80, ps < 0.05.
44 Emily Pronin
participants assigned weight to four predictors (desires/intentions,

personality, external causes, past behavior). They saw desires and
intentions as the strongest predictor of their own behavior (receiving
36% of the total predictive weight, as compared to 27% for others, F[1,
54] = 13.46, p < 0.001), whereas they saw personality (fixed traits) as
the strongest predictor of their peer’s behavior (receiving 32% of the
total predictive weight, as compared to 21% for self, F [1, 54] = 24.42,
p < 0.0001).
Research in experimental philosophy has begun to take up the question
of lay beliefs in free will (e.g., Nahmias et al., 2005; Nichols, 2006). The
studies reviewed here suggest that actors’ versus observers’ asymmetric
perceptions of free will could help to account for the seemingly endless
persistence of the free will debate. Perhaps it persists because of an intro-
spection illusion. When people introspect, they are compelled by feelings of
possibilities, intentions, and choice, all providing them with the sense that
they have free will. Yet, when they look at others’ actions and outcomes,
they are compelled by the notion of determinism. That asymmetry captures
the everyday experiences people have when they feel that their own choices
are very real (and often stressful, thrilling, and heart-wrenching), while at
the same time they are surprised by others’ tormenting themselves over
choices for which their ultimate decision seems obvious from the outset.
5. Roots of the Illusion

The introspection illusion seems to be at the root of a range of
phenomena involving human behavior and judgment. But what gives rise
to the illusion itself ? Its possible foundations are now discussed from the
perspectives of development, culture, and the brain.
5.1. Development
The introspection illusion seems to have roots in human development. In
infancy, human beings have trouble separating their internal wishes from
external reality (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956). They give tremendous weight to
their own introspections, such as their private hopes and wishes, because
they are unaware that those hopes and wishes do not directly translate into
external outcomes. When an infant believes that his hope for his mother to
enter the room will make that event occur, he is in essence over-valuing the
import of his introspections.
Infants do not show a similar intuition when it comes to others’ internal
states. Indeed, they generally under-appreciate the role of others’ internal
states in guiding those others’ judgments and actions. Thus, if a toddler’s
mother approaches, he may attribute that action more to his desire than to
hers. From a developmental perspective, this lack of appreciation is due to
the infant’s lack of a well-developed ‘‘theory of mind’’—that is, a set of
beliefs about the desires, beliefs, and other mental states of other people
(Flavell, 1999; Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Saxe et al., 2004; Wellman,
1990; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Children acquire a theory of mind
through interaction and maturation—those who do not are considered
autistic (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985).
These patterns observed in infants persist to some degree straight into
adulthood (Woolley, 1997). Even then, people sometimes fail to recognize
that their thoughts do not directly translate into action (e.g., Pronin et al.,
2006b; Woolley, 1997). Most healthy adults also have ‘‘autistic’’ moments
when they forget not only that others have thoughts and feelings different
from their own, but even that others have thoughts and feelings at all. One
important difference between children and adults may involve adults’
learned habit of correcting after-the-fact for their automatic overweighting
of information from their own introspections. Epley et al. (2004b) found
some support for that hypothesis. Adult and children subjects played a game
in which they followed another person’s instructions for arranging an
assortment of objects, such as toy cars and trucks, in a grid-like pattern
(see also Keysar et al., 2000). They were made aware that the other person
had an obstructed view of the objects and thus could not see all the objects
that they could. The researchers tracked the participants’ eye movements
during the game in order to examine how well they put aside their unique
knowledge in order to follow the other person’s instructions. The result was
that the adults were quicker than the children to put aside the information
that they uniquely held. This suggests that people’s over-reliance on their
own thoughts and perspectives is automatic, and present from childhood,
though adults are more likely to overcome it.
5.2. Culture
Research in cultural psychology has shown that the cultures to which
people belong shape how they think and what they think about. From
the standpoint of the introspection illusion, it is noteworthy that although
Western and Eastern cultures can afford different causal inferences (e.g.,
Miller, 1984; Morris & Peng, 1994; Norenzayan et al., 2002), people across
these cultures seem to arrive at those inferences by introspecting. They
may arrive at different inferences nonetheless, either because their intro-
spections differ in content (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett &
Miyamoto, 2005) or because they make different assumptions about those
introspections
People in all cultures likely have the sense that information derived via
introspection is direct and immediate and therefore valid and reliable.
46 Emily Pronin
Nonetheless, all cultures may not subscribe equally to the introspection

myth—the ensuing belief that introspections provide a complete source of
information about one’s mind and self and should thus be afforded sovereign
status in self-assessment. Some research suggests that people in more collec-
tivistic cultures also may be less prone to assign sovereign status to their own
individual introspections and more prone to take into account their beliefs
about the introspections of those around them (e.g., ‘‘If I want to know
which book I will enjoy most, I should consider which one others think
I will enjoy’’; see Iyengar & Lepper, 1999). Thus, people in more collectiv-
istic cultures may be more prone to think about others’ introspections when
making self-assessments. Although both groups may heavily weight their
own introspections, people living in more interdependent cultures may also
heavily weight others’ introspections—or, at least, their assumptions about
those others’ introspections.
It also is possible that people in more collectivistic cultures focus less on
their own introspections. Eastern cultures that practice meditation, for
example, emphasize the importance of using that practice to quiet down
one’s introspective world rather than listen to it (Leary, 2004). Cohen et al.
(2007) review research indicating that people from collectivistic Eastern
cultures are more likely to take an outsider’s perspective on themselves—
that is, one that gives more consideration to external appearances and how
one looks to others than to internal thoughts and feelings. They trace this
cultural divergence to the fact that more collectivistic cultures have tighter
norms for guiding behavior and therefore require more attention to how
behavior will be perceived. Consistent with this logic, Cohen et al. suggest
that collectivistic individuals are likely to disregard introspections in favor of
an outsider perspective at times when they are at the center of attention and
sense others’ focus on them.
At least some components of the introspection illusion are likely univer-
sal, because of their evolutionary adaptiveness. For example, judging others
based on their behavior (rather than reported introspections) has clear
advantages given the evolutionary costs of being cheated (Cosmides &
Tooby, 1992). The evolutionary value of the first element of the introspec-
tion illusion—judging self primarily based on introspections—is less clear. It
is possible that this element is not adaptive, but instead arises as a byproduct
of the existence of consciousness, perhaps accentuated by cultural factors.
Alternatively, it may be that assessing oneself based largely on intentions
augments the drive to carry out conscious intentions, and thereby to
complete tasks too complex to be carried out automatically. Or, it may be
that heavy weighting of introspections when judging the self leads to a
stronger sense of self, and thereby empowers individuals to break societal
boundaries, innovate and lead, all features that have played a key role in
natural selection among human populations.
5.3. The brain

Neuroscience research has begun to shed light on the brain processes
involved in perceiving oneself and others. Some of these findings are of
indirect relevance to the introspection illusion and are worth recounting
here with the hope that they may eventually contribute to an understanding
of the neuroscientific underpinnings of the illusion.
Experiments have begun to identify brain processes that are involved
when people perceive themselves and others. Evidence from f MRI suggests
that areas of the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) activate when people
make judgments about both their own internal states (feelings and inten-
tions) and those of others (Ochsner et al., 2004; Saxe et al., 2006; Zaki &
Ochsner, in press). Also, research on mirror neurons in monkeys has shown
that these neurons fire both when the monkeys perform an action and when
they perceive another perform the same action (Iacobini & Dapretto, 2006;
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti et al., 2001). Some researchers
have suggested that humans also possess mirror neurons, based on findings
that people display similar regions of brain activity for representing motor
activity of self and other, but individual mirror neurons have not been
identified in humans (Dinstein et al., 2008).
The above findings suggest common brain processes that are uniquely
involved in the perception of self and others. The data suggest that when we
perceive others, we simulate the mental processes behind their actions. It
seems that perceivers may infer others’ thoughts and feelings by thinking
about how they themselves would think and feel were they those others
(rather than by relying on those others’ introspections).
This simulation hypothesis raises the question of how people come to
impute different mental states and processes to others than to themselves. If
people use their own minds in order to simulate others’ minds, why would
they view others’ judgments as influenced by bias when they do not see that
influence on their own judgments? An experiment by Mitchell et al. (2005)
suggests one possibility. While subjects’ neural activity was being moni-
tored, they viewed photographs of people and assessed those people’s
mental states (i.e., how ‘‘pleased’’ they were to be photographed) as well
as, for comparison, their facial symmetry. Afterwards, the subjects rated how
similar each of the individuals in the photographs were to themselves. They
showed MPFC activation consistent with what they would show in self-
perception, but only when considering targets whom they viewed as similar
to themselves (and only when considering those targets’ mental states). This
suggests that people project their mental states onto others when they view
those others as similar. That perception of similarity may be influenced by
many factors including, for example, knowledge about whether others share
one’s beliefs and perceptions (Ross & Ward, 1996). When others are seen as
dissimilar, people may use other means for inferring mental states, such as
48 Emily Pronin
group stereotypes or lay theories (e.g., Ames, 2004; Miller & Ratner, 1998).
Those alternative means are consistent with the finding that the bilateral
temporo–parietal junction is uniquely recruited when individuals reason
about others’ mental states (i.e., but not when they engage in self-
reflection), suggesting that inferences about others do not always rely on
simulation (Saxe, 2005; Saxe et al., 2006). Taken together, these varied
neuroscientific findings offer the beginning sketches for a portrait of how
individuals’ brains respond to others’ actions and infer others’ internal states.
That portrait may eventually help us to understand the neural underpin-
nings of people’s reliance on their own, but not others’ introspective
contents.
5.4. Further thoughts: Projection and perspective taking

The tendency for people to assume that others share their knowledge and
subjective perceptions is generally referred to as egocentrism (Epley et al.,
2004; Piaget & Inhelder, 1956; Pronin & Olivola, 2006; Royzman et al.,
2003). That tendency is characterized by people’s inclination to project
their own knowledge, attitudes, and preferences onto others, and to simu-
late others’ mental states by consulting their own (e.g., Epley et al., 2004a;
Kenny & DePaulo, 1993; Krueger, 1998b; Nickerson, 1999; Robbins &
Krueger, 2005; Ross et al., 1977). These mental processes produce failures
in perspective-taking in which individuals misunderstand how others per-
ceive events and stimuli.
Taken together, these egocentric processes suggest the possibility of an
introspection illusion that extends to a somewhat different place from the
one in this chapter. The one described here involves people placing
too much weight on information from introspection when making self-
assessments. Findings involving egocentrism, simulation, and projection
suggest that people also place too much weight on information from their
introspections when making assessments of others. Thus, when trying to
predict what others will like, individuals may look inward to their own
preferences and project those onto others—especially if they deem those
others to be similar to themselves. That hypothesis is supported by the
recent finding that when individuals try to take another person’s perspec-
tive, brain regions normally associated with introspection (in the ventrome-
dial PFC) show increased activation (Ames et al., 2008). This strategy is not
without merit. After all, people have much in common and it is not
unreasonable for them to assume that what they find painful will also be
painful to others, or that what they find delicious others also will find
delicious. People can be misled by this assumption, however, when it
prevents them from taking into account the role of construal processes in
producing their particular reactions of pain and deliciousness (Gilovich,
1990; Griffin & Ross, 1991; Pronin et al., 2004). In such cases, people
may show a variant of the introspection illusion—a variant whereby they

place too much weight on information about intentions, knowledge,
thoughts, and preferences that they access directly, via introspection,
when assessing the intentions, knowledge, thoughts, and preferences of
those around them.
6. Applications
The introspection illusion describes a set of basic processes involved in
people’s perception of themselves and others. The utility of identifying basic
psychological processes rests in part on how much that identification con-
tributes to our understanding of problems of real-world significance. What
follows is a brief illustrative discussion of some areas of potential application.
6.1. Conflict
Why do conflicts arise even among people with the best intentions? The
answer lies, in part, in the fact that we tend to judge ourselves based on our
motives and hopes, whereas we tend to judge others based on their
actions—or, worse yet, based on naı̈ve theories of human behavior that
place too much prominence on self-interest (e.g., Miller & Ratner, 1998).
This asymmetry is bound to produce conflict.
Consider the case of two people engaged in a negotiation. Both people
may approach it with every intention to be fair. Yet, each is likely to pay
little heed to the other’s introspectively experienced intentions (Vorauer &
Claude, 1998). Indeed, each is likely to instead impute greed as the motive
behind the other’s actions (van Boven et al., 2000). Thus, while both
individuals may feel confident and convinced of their fairness because
they internally experience signs of that motive, both may fail to consider
the other’s parallel feelings and instead focus on outward behavior and/or
assumptions about what people ‘‘in general’’ are like. That focus is likely to
lead to a cynical conclusion, particularly if both sides’ behavior involves
some posturing and self-interested advocating and if—as suggested by
research—both sides’ base-rate assumptions involve the idea that people
are competitive and selfish in negotiations (Epley et al., 2006; Kruger &
Gilovich, 1999; van Boven et al., 2000).
In a scenario such as this, individuals’ asymmetric perceptions of self
versus other are likely to produce a vicious cycle of competition and
conflict, as both parties act based on their assumptions about the other
(e.g., Kelley & Stahelski, 1970). Whenever people give themselves credit
for their good intentions but judge others based on behavior or cynical
50 Emily Pronin
theories about human nature, resentment and anger are inevitable. And,
when those on the ‘‘other side’’ accuse us of being unfair, self-interested, or
ideological, conflict is likely to worsen as we feel convinced (because of the
introspection illusion) of our freedom from those biases and angered by the
other side’s unwillingness to look at their own behavior. Indeed, studies
have shown that people’s tendency to view themselves as objective and their
adversaries as biased is a key force in transforming disagreement into all-out
conflict (Kennedy & Pronin, 2008; Pronin et al., 2004, 2006a).
6.2. Persistence of racism, sexism, and inequality

One of the sad facts of entering the new millennium is that racism and
sexism have persisted in societies that claim a moral commitment to banish-
ing them. Research on prejudice and stereotyping has provided one key
piece to this puzzle: modern sexism and racism can be shown by people
who lack conscious prejudice and even hold explicitly positive attitudes
(Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Fiske, 1998; Glick
& Fiske, 1996; Son-Hing et al., 2005). Findings involving the introspection
illusion add a second piece to the puzzle: Not only are displays of racism and
sexism often unconscious, but people may take their lack of any conscious
awareness to mean that they are not in fact racist or sexist.
Recall the results of Dovidio et al.’s (2002) experiment involving cross-
race pairs of students conversing with each other. By virtue of the White
participants’ focusing on their introspections, and their Black conversation
partners’ focusing on their White peers’ behavior, the two groups reached
very different conclusions about what had transpired in the interaction. The
White participants looked to their conscious introspections (i.e., their
explicit attitudes) and concluded that they had been friendly. The Black
participants looked to the White participants’ nonverbal behavior (which
revealed their implicit attitudes) and often concluded the opposite. It is not
difficult to imagine how those divergent conclusions could contribute
to the experience of racial inequality. Actors with implicitly prejudiced
attitudes judge themselves based on the explicit attitudes that are available
to them via introspection. Finding no prejudice in those attitudes, they
assume that their behavior is unbiased. Looking back on their interaction or
experience, they may even misremember the other person in a way that
justifies their prejudiced behavior, thus further concealing their bias (Son
Hing et al., 2008). As a result, any implicit bias that influences their behavior
goes unnoticed by them and, therefore, uncorrected.
Consider the company CEO who, because of unconscious sexist bias,
has never hired a woman for an executive position. If he is convinced—
based on his conscious motives and intentions—that he is unbiased, he is
likely to be unconcerned about his hiring record. Uhlmann and Cohen
(2005; see also Norton et al., 2004) found that participants who were
especially confident in the objectivity of their motives were also especially
likely to discriminate against women candidates for a stereotypically-male
job (police chief ). If this seems counter-intuitive, consider the aforemen-
tioned CEO. If his decisions reflect unconscious bias and he dutifully probes
his mind for possible sexism, that process is likely to make him yet more
confident in his objectivity (because it is likely to reveal nonsexist attitudes
and egalitarian motives) and, consequently, more likely to persist in his
sexist behavior. On the bright side, making people consciously aware of
their prejudices can have encouraging results: In one experiment, when
people high in unconscious prejudice were made consciously aware of
their prejudice, they behaved with even less prejudice than their low-
prejudiced peers (Son Hing et al., 2002). This finding points to the promise
of tools that can raise people’s introspective awareness of their implicit race
and gender biases. One such tool might be the IAT or Implicit Association
Test (Greenwald et al., 1998). Anecdotal evidence and research (see Nosek
et al., 2007, for a review) suggest that, while taking the test, people
sometimes can ‘‘feel’’ their prejudice, in the sense of feeling more difficulty
associating a prejudiced-against group with positive stimuli (e.g., associating
African American faces with positive images). That feeling can come as a
surprise to those who experience it, and might help them to recognize their
bias by allowing them to feel it introspectively.
6.3. Ethical lapses

News stories about rampant corruption and breakdowns of ethical behavior
seem to fall into two classes: Those involving individuals who intentionally
have engaged in dishonest or unethical practices, and those involving
individuals who seem genuinely incredulous about the possibility that
they have done anything wrong. Although individuals in the former cases
may deny their corruption for the instrumental purpose of avoiding censure
or punishment, those in the latter cases may defend their integrity out of a
genuine belief in it. The introspection illusion can help to account for these
latter cases.
On average, doctors receive six gifts annually from pharmaceutical
representatives and meet with them four times a month (Wazana, 2000).
Although this influences their drug prescription decisions, most doctors are
convinced that they are uniquely immune to this sort of influence (Dana &
Loewenstein, 2003; McKinney et al., 1990; Wazana, 2000). Why? Their
introspections likely tell them so—most doctors probably feel motivated,
above all, to provide the best care for their patients. But, when one’s office
pens and memo pads all advertise for the same cholesterol-lowering
drug, that mere exposure might instill positive feelings about the drug
52 Emily Pronin
(Zajonc, 1968); Or, those pens and notes might act as ‘‘material primes’’
causing one to act in ways consistent with their presence (Kay et al., 2004).
Because such responses are subtle and unmotivated, introspection will not
reveal them. And, those who are convinced that they personally are unaf-
fected by gifts are likely to continue accepting them. Those same individuals
who judge themselves based on internal motives and intentions are likely to
judge their colleagues based on other information, such as behavior (‘‘Ever
since Dr. Madsen went on that cruise sponsored by ABC Pharma, she can’t
stop praising their latest drug.’’), or beliefs about relevant base-rates (‘‘The
drug companies wouldn’t keep giving gifts if it didn’t influence people.’’),
or intuitive theories about human nature (‘‘It’s amazing what a person will
do for a free paper-weight.’’). They are likely to place less value on their
colleagues’ introspections and to be unmoved by their colleagues’ claims of
integrity.
Given that lapses in ethics often are not consciously intended (Bazerman &
Banaji, 2004), people’s introspective overweighting can account for their
denials of those lapses and for the consequent persistence and even escalation
of those lapses. It may help explain the behavior of high-court judges who
remain convinced of their impartiality while handing down decisions influ-
enced by political partisanship (Miles & Sunstein, 2006, 2008), or the behavior
of financial auditors who feel they can provide objective assessments of
companies’ financial practices, even while those companies are footing the
bill (Bazerman et al., 2002; Moore et al., 2006).
6.4. Introspective education

The present theorizing suggests that each of these applied problems could be
solved at least in part by removing people’s introspection illusion. In each of
these cases, individuals’ behavior is affected in a way that they themselves
would frown upon, but they fail to recognize this because of their undue
reliance on introspective information. In an experiment described earlier in
this chapter, Pronin and Kugler (2007) found evidence for a potential
antidote to that undue reliance and the problems it causes. In their experi-
ment, participants read an alleged article from Science describing the effects
of nonconscious processes on human judgment and action as well as the
concomitant perils of relying on introspection. Those who read the article,
as opposed to those in a control condition, showed no tendency to deny
their susceptibility to biases—including biases of the sort that engender
prejudice (e.g., outgroup bias) and compromise ethics (e.g., self-interest
bias).
This result is promising. Past research has suggested that people will
correct for their biases when they (1) have an accurate theory about the
effects of the bias being committed (Wegener & Petty, 1995; Wilson &
Brekke, 1994), or (2) are aware of the operation of the biasing influence
(Bargh, 1992; Wilson & Brekke, 1994). Experiments aimed at inducing bias
correction by forewarning people about biases in order to heighten aware-
ness have yielded only mixed success (e.g., Lord et al., 1984; Stapel et al.,
1998; Wegener et al., 2006; Wilson et al., 1996). Our result suggests that
forewarning will fail in situations where people understand the nature of the
bias, but do not appreciate the extent to which it operates without aware-
ness (e.g., when they know a bias induces assimilation to an irrelevant
anchor, or self-servingness, but do not recognize the extent to which that
induction is nonconscious). The promise of introspective education lies in
its suggestion that providing individuals with an understanding of the effects
of a bias might be enough—even if people cannot be made consciously
aware of its operation—if they can be made aware that they would not be
aware of that operation. If that sounds confusing, it may be worth noting
that in everyday life people sometimes seem to have an intuitive grasp of the
need to avoid unconscious bias. When teachers grade papers blindly, for
example, or when orchestras audition potential new members behind a
curtain, they perhaps do so not because they can feel the biasing effects of
race, gender, or personal affections on their evaluations, but rather because
they recognize that they would not feel the operation of those biases even if
those biases were operating.
6.5. Pursuits of self-knowledge and social connection

The commandment to ‘‘know thyself’’ is thought to have been carved into
the ancient temple at the Oracle of Delphi. Throughout recorded history,
individuals have viewed the attainment of self-knowledge as a worthy
goal—and a formidable challenge. They also have viewed that goal as best
pursued by looking inward. The counsel to pursue self-knowledge, and to
do so via introspection, reaches from Socrates’ pronouncement that ‘‘the
unexamined life is not worth living,’’ to Maslow’s (1971, p. 53) advice that
self-actualization requires one to ‘‘break through the defenses against his
own self-knowledge, to recover himself, and to get to know himself.’’
The current theorizing raises the question of whether introspection truly
is the path to self-knowledge. Studies reviewed herein show that people’s
inclination to look to introspections for self-knowledge misleads them.
When seeking knowledge of their own biases, or of their prejudices,
abilities, character traits, or potential, people may be misled by even the
most concerted and well-intentioned efforts to look inward. From where,
then, can true self-knowledge be derived? When considering those around
us rather than ourselves, the answer may seem more obvious. We may
readily recognize cases in which no amount of introspection on others’ part
will lead them to an accurate picture of themselves. We may think that those
54 Emily Pronin
others’ attempts to achieve self-knowledge would be better served by

consulting their behavior or the ways of human nature more generally.
Interestingly, and probably not coincidentally, those strategies are the ones
that we would use to increase our knowledge of them. The current
theorizing suggests that, at least sometimes, those observer-like strategies
will be superior to introspection. This leads to a somewhat ironic answer to
the question of where self-knowledge may best be found: On occasion, it
may best be found through others’ knowledge of oneself. Rather than
looking to one’s own introspections for self-knowledge, one may some-
times be better off looking to others’ perceptions of oneself. That possibility
is supported by empirical results (for a review see Dunning, 2005). For
example, close others know better than oneself how much time one spends
talking to others one-on-one (Vazire & Mehl, 2008), and people’s college
roommates know better than themselves how long their latest romantic
relationship will last (MacDonald & Ross, 1999).
The commandment at the Oracle of Delphi to ‘‘know thyself ’’ is
generally thought to have been a warning to visitors to the Oracle that
they should look inward in order to understand the meaning of the Oracle’s
prophecies. Given those prophecies’ riddle-like nature, it makes sense that
some self-reflection would have been useful for decoding their meaning and
personal relevance. However, this chapter suggests another reason why that
commandment may have been inscribed at Delphi. Notably, people would
have encountered that inscription when seeking an outsider’s knowledge
about themselves (i.e., that of the Oracle channeling the god Apollo).
Perhaps the commandment was offered at that time in order to remind
knowledge seekers of a fact they might have been ill-prepared to accept:
sometimes an external perspective can offer the true path to self-knowledge.
The present theorizing suggests that in order to attain self-knowledge,
we should at least sometimes try to see ourselves the way others see us.
Previous work has demonstrated that we are likely to often have the reverse
desire—to have others see us the way that we see ourselves (e.g., Sedikides,
1993; Swann, 1990). In pursuing intimacy and connection with others, it is
likely to be worth the effort to try to see those others how they see
themselves. Theorizing about the introspection illusion suggests that in
order to do that, we should focus on others’ introspections (their reflections
on their internal thoughts, feelings, and motives) rather than on their
behavior or on population base-rates. When we make the effort to do
that, those others are likely to feel more socially connected and close with
us. After all, people’s behavior and the ways of human nature in general may
say a great deal about who they are, but people often define themselves in
terms of their introspections. If we truly want to understand others and
connect with them, it therefore is not unreasonable that we should try
to value their introspections in a way that at least approximates how much
they do.
7. Conclusion
The tension between valuing introspections versus observable behav-
ior is a key component of the introspection illusion. In the case of self, we
resolve that tension by looking to introspections; in the case of others, we
resolve it by looking to behavior. Historically, the tension between looking
to introspection versus behavior has also characterized the field of psychol-
ogy itself. When Wundt established the first experimental psychology
laboratory in 1879, he envisioned using introspection as the primary tool
of psychological research. By the mid 1950s, B. F. Skinner was famously
advocating for the opposite approach—one that completely devalued intro-
spection and treated behavior as the only source of valuable information. To
some degree, the debate that began then continues today (Boring, 1953;
Jack & Roeptstorff, 2002).
Ultimately, however, the technique of introspectionism failed because it
could not provide an accurate and unbiased window into the workings of
the mind, and behaviorism fell because psychologists were too interested in
mental experience to ignore it. In contemporary psychology, two ground-
breaking approaches have attempted to overcome the shortcomings of each
of these methods by studying nonintrospective responses in order to pursue
the goal of understanding mental experience. These approaches are non-
conscious priming and brain neuroimaging. According to the present
review, people are likely to be more enthusiastic about these approaches
when it comes to abstract scientific efforts to understand how ‘‘the mind’’
works, rather than when it comes to specific efforts to understand how ‘‘their
mind’’ works. In their own case, people are likely to feel that efforts to
circumvent their subjective experience by taking pictures of their brains
and prodding them with subliminal stimuli are unlikely to tell the real
story of how they chose their career, why they fell in love, or even what
they will eat for dinner. For themselves alone, people are likely to feel that
introspection reigns supreme.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The writing of this chapter was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation
(BCS-0742394). I am grateful to John Darley, Thomas Gilovich, Benoit Monin, Deborah
Prentice, Rebecca Saxe, Mary Steffel, Timothy Wilson, and Mark Zanna for comments
regarding this chapter, and to Kathleen Schmidt for assistance with its preparation.
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C H A P T E R T W O
Persuasion: Insights from

the Self-Validation Hypothesis
Pablo Briñol* and Richard E. Petty†
Contents
1. Introduction 70
2. Overview of Classic and Contemporary Social Psychological
Perspectives on Persuasion 71
3. Fundamental Processes of Persuasion 72
4. The Self-Validation Hypothesis: A New Way to
Affect Attitude Change 74
5. Distinction from Other Recent Meta-Cognitive Approaches 77
6. Source Effects Through Self-Validation 79
6.1. Source credibility 79
6.2. Source similarity 81
6.3. Source majority/minority status 82
6.4. Summary of source factors 83
7. Recipient Effects Through Self-Validation 84
7.1. Bodily responses 84
7.2. Incidental emotions 87
7.3. Power 89
7.4. Self-affirmation 91
7.5. Ease of retrieval 92
7.6. Threat and mortality salience 93
8. Message Effects Through Self-Validation 95
8.1. Matching regulatory fit 95
8.2. Thought matching 96
8.3. Summary and additional message factors 97
9. Context Effects Through Self-Validation 98
10. Extending Self-Validation in Persuasion 99
10.1. Ambivalence 99
10.2. Personal relevance 101
11. Confidence Applied to Confidence: A Self-Validation Analysis 102
* Departamento de Psicologia Social, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Campus de Cantoblanco, Carretera

de Colmenar, Madrid, Spain
{
Department of Psychology, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA

69
70 Pablo Briñol and Richard E. Petty
12. Self-Validation Effects Beyond the Persuasion Context 105

12.1. Emotions 105
12.2. Priming 106
13. Multiple Roles of Confidence 107
14. Final Remarks 109
15. Summary and Conclusion 111
References 112
Abstract
This article describes the basic mechanisms underlying persuasion highlighting
the role of a recently discovered new process—called self-validation. Unlike
previous mechanisms in attitude change that focus on primary or first-order
cognition, this new process emphasizes secondary or meta-cognition. The key
notion of self-validation is that generating thoughts is not sufficient for them to
have an impact on judgment. Rather, one must also have confidence in them. We
review research revealing that this new mechanism can account for some
already established outcomes in persuasion, but by a different process than
postulated previously, as well as for some new findings. Specifically, we describe
how source (e.g., credibility), recipient (e.g., bodily responses), message (e.g.,
matching), and context (e.g., repetition) variables can influence persuasion by
affecting thought-confidence. We also describe how establishing a basic mech-
anism such as self-validation can provide a novel framework for understanding a
variety of additional phenomenon in the domain of persuasion and beyond.
1. Introduction
Persuasion has always been a major component of human activity.
Thinking about the varied situations in which persuasion occurs quickly
reveals that it is present in nearly all social interactions, ranging from
consumer and organizational settings to academia and health related con-
texts. As we will describe in this review, understanding why a particular
persuasion phenomenon is effective is essential for a number of reasons
ranging from designing interventions across diverse domains to predicting
the long-term consequences of persuasion. Accordingly, the focus of this
article is on explicating the psychological mechanisms underlying persua-
sion with particular attention to a recently discovered process by which a
plethora of variables can produce attitude change.1After providing a brief
1
Although many constructs can be targeted for change (e.g., emotions, beliefs, behaviors), we focus on
attitudes (people’s general evaluations of people, objects, and issues) because attitudes serve a key mediational
role (e.g., attitude change mediates the impact of belief change on behavior change) and have been the focus
of most persuasion research. Nevertheless, the same fundamental persuasion processes can operate regardless
of the target of change.
Self-Validation 71
overview of classic perspectives on attitude change research and outlining a

general framework that articulates the key processes of persuasion we will
(1) highlight a new mechanism of persuasion—called self-validation—that
ties together the operation of a diverse set of variables, (2) describe how a
variety of source, recipient, message, and context variables can influence
persuasion by affecting the validation of or confidence in one’s thoughts, (3)
describe how self-validation plays an important role in other phenomena
related to attitudes, and (4) outline other processes by which confidence can
influence judgment.
2. Overview of Classic and

Contemporary Social Psychological
Perspectives on Persuasion
In the typical situation in which persuasion is possible, a person or a
group of people (i.e., the recipient) receives an intervention (e.g., a persuasive
message) from another individual or group (i.e., the source) in a particular
setting (i.e., the context). Successful persuasion is said to occur when the
target of change (e.g., attitudes, beliefs) is modified in the desired direction.
Over the past 50 years, researchers have developed numerous theories of
persuasion (see Petty & Wegener, 1998). We highlight some prominent
approaches next.
One of the earliest assumptions was that effective influence required a
sequence of steps leading to absorption of the content of a message (e.g.,
exposure, attention, comprehension, learning, retention; see McGuire,
1985). According to this framework, variables affected the extent of persua-
sion by affecting learning and retention of message information. However,
the available research evidence shows that message learning can occur in the
absence of attitude change and that attitudes can change without learning
the specific information in the communication (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981;
Petty et al., 2008).
Cognitive response theory (Greenwald, 1968; Petty et al., 1981) was
developed explicitly to account for the low correlation between message
learning and persuasion observed in many studies, and for the processes
responsible for yielding to messages. In contrast to the traditional message
learning view, the cognitive response approach contended that persuasion
depended on the extent to which individuals articulate and rehearse their
own idiosyncratic thoughts to the information presented. According to this
framework, an appeal that elicits issue-relevant thoughts that are primarily
favorable toward a particular recommendation produces agreement, whereas
an appeal that elicits unfavorable thoughts toward the recommendation is
ineffective in achieving attitude change—regardless of message learning.
Although the cognitive response approach provided important insights

into the persuasion process, it focused only on those situations in which
people were active processors of the information provided to them. Indeed,
the numerous persuasion theories that have promulgated over the past
several decades have tended to focus either on persuasion that required
relatively high amounts of thinking (e.g., dissonance theory; Festinger,
1957) or relatively low amounts of thinking (e.g., classical conditioning,
Staats & Staats, 1958; self-perception theory, Bem, 1972). By the 1980s it
was clear that attitudes could be changed both when thinking was high and
when it was low. The Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion (ELM;
Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, 1986) was proposed to integrate the many persua-
sion theories by arguing that persuasion can occur when thinking is high or
low, but the processes and consequences of persuasion are different in each
situation.2 Although many specific processes of persuasion have been pro-
posed over the years (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), the ELM holds that these
processes can be organized into a finite set, and that any one variable (i.e.,
whether source, message, recipient, or context) can influence attitudes by
affecting these key processes (Petty & Wegener, 1999).
3. Fundamental Processes of Persuasion

As just one example of the multiple roles that a variable can play in
persuasion situations according to the ELM, consider how a person’s inci-
dental emotions can impact evaluative judgments. First and most simply,
when thinking is constrained to be low (e.g., due to many distractions or
low personal relevance), then emotions tend to serve as simple associative
cues and produce evaluations consistent with their valence. That is, positive
emotions should produce more positive attitudes than negative emotions
(e.g., Petty et al., 1993). When thinking is high, however, one’s emotions
serve in other roles. First, emotions can be evaluated as evidence (e.g.,
negative emotions such as sadness or fear can lead to positive evaluations of a
movie if these are the intended states; see Martin, 2000). Also, when
thinking is high, emotions can bias the ongoing thoughts (e.g., positive
consequences seem more likely when people are in a happy than sad state;
DeSteno et al., 2000). There is one more process by which emotions can
operate when thinking is high—affecting confidence in thoughts and this is
discussed in this chapter.
2
The ELM is an early example of what became an explosion of dual process and dual system theories that
distinguished relatively thoughtful (deliberative) from relatively nonthoughtful (e.g., automatic, intuitive)
determinants of judgment (see Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Petty & Briñol, 2006).
Self-Validation 73
When the likelihood of thinking is not constrained to be high or low by

other variables, then emotions can affect the extent of thinking. For exam-
ple, people might think about messages more when in a sad than happy state
because sadness signals a problem to be solved (Schwarz et al., 1991a) or
conveys a sense of uncertainty (Tiedens & Linton, 2001). If people process a
message more when in a sad than happy state, this means that they would be
more persuaded by cogent arguments when sad than happy but less per-
suaded by specious arguments.3 Various theories of emotion and social
judgment have incorporated one or more of these processes highlighted
by the ELM (e.g., see Forgas, 2001).
Notably, the ELM organizes these processes of persuasion together into
one overarching framework (see Petty et al., 2003), and holds that these
same processes can be used not only to understand the impact of incidental
emotion, but also a long list of other very different variables. For example,
source credibility has been shown to serve in the exact same multiple roles
observed for incidental emotions under the same circumstances (see Briñol &
Petty, in press, for a review).
Understanding the multiple processes by which variables can produce
persuasion is important for a number of reasons (Petty & Briñol, 2008a,b).
First, if any one variable can affect attitudes by different processes, then
different persuasion outcomes for the same variable are possible. For example,
when thinking is constrained to be low, a happy state might lead to more
persuasion than a sad state because emotion serves as a simple positive cue, but
when thinking is unconstrained, a happy state might reduce processing of the
strong arguments in a message compared to a sad state thereby reducing
persuasion.
Second, the ELM holds that the process by which an attitude is formed
or changed is consequential for the strength of the attitude (Petty &
Krosnick, 1995). Thus, even if two different processes result in the same
extent of persuasion, the consequences of this persuasion can differ. For
example, when variables such as emotion or a highly credible source
produce persuasion through low thinking processes (e.g., serving as a cue)
the attitudes formed are less persistent, resistant to change, and predictive of
behavior than when the same amount of change is produced by these
variables via high thinking processes (e.g., biasing the thoughts generated;
see Petty et al., 1995). Thus, understanding the processes by which
variables have their impact is important because it is informative about
the immediate and long-term consequences of persuasion (see Wegener
et al., 2006).
3
When mood management is a salient concern and thinking about the message will be uplifting, people will
process more when in a positive than in a negative mood (e.g., see Wegener et al., 1995).
4. The Self-Validation Hypothesis: A New Way to

Affect Attitude Change
We noted that since its inception, the ELM has described four ways in
which any variable can affect attitudes: (1) serving as a simple cue, (2) as a
piece of substantive evidence (i.e., an argument), (3) affecting the extent
of information processing by influencing motivation or ability to think, and
(4) affecting the direction of processing (i.e., introducing a bias to the
ongoing thinking). Variables serve in these four roles at different points
along the elaboration continuum (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Recently, we
have proposed and documented a fifth mechanism through which variables
can work that also appears to have considerable integrative potential. Unlike
the previous roles, which focus on primary or first-order cognition, this
new process emphasizes secondary or meta-cognition. Primary thoughts are
those that occur at a direct level of cognition and involve our initial
associations of some object with some attribute. Following a primary
thought, people can also generate other thoughts that occur at a second
level which involve reflections on the first level thoughts. Meta-cognition
refers to these second order thoughts, or our thoughts about our thoughts or
thought processes (Petty et al., 2007). In recent years, meta-cognition has
assumed a prominent role not only in the domain of social psychology ( Jost
et al., 1998), but also in memory research (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996),
clinical practice (Beck & Greenberg, 1994), and advertising (Friestad &
Wright, 1995). Indeed, meta-cognition has been touted as one of the top
100 topics in psychological research (Nelson, 1992).
One of the most essential dimensions of meta-cognitive thought consists
of the degree of confidence people place in their thoughts, ranging from
extreme certainty to extreme doubt in their validity.4 Thus, two people
might have the same thought, but one person might have considerably
greater confidence in that thought than the other, and the greater confi-
dence in the thought, the greater its impact on judgment. This idea is referred
to as the self-validation hypothesis (Petty et al., 2002). The key notion is that
generating thoughts is not sufficient for them to have an impact on judgments.
Rather, one must also have confidence in them. The self-validation hypothesis
makes a number of straightforward predictions.
First, it suggests that just as assessing attitude confidence has been very
useful in determining which attitudes guide behavior (e.g., Fazio & Zanna,
1978), so too would assessing thought confidence be useful in determining
4
People can have confidence or doubt in many aspects of their thoughts (e.g., their origin, likelihood,
desirability; see Petty, Briñol et al., 2007), but assessments of confidence have focused on the validity
dimension because of its fundamental importance in judgment (Kruglanski, 1989).
Self-Validation 75
which thoughts generated to a persuasive communication would predict

attitudes. In line with this reasoning, Petty et al. (2002) found that attitude-
thought correlations increased as measured thought confidence increased.
More specifically, we conducted an initial study in which thought confi-
dence was assessed following a persuasive message along with the tradition-
ally measured variables of thought valence and thought number. In this
study (Petty et al., 2002, Study 2) participants were asked to read a persua-
sive message about a campus issue, to think carefully about the proposal, and
to list what they thought about the proposal. Following the thought listing
task, participants reported the confidence they had in the thoughts they
listed as well as their attitudes toward the proposal. In accord with the self-
validation hypothesis, the relationship between thoughts and attitudes was
significantly greater to the extent that confidence was relatively high rather
than low. In other words, to the extent that people had confidence in their
thoughts, persuasion depended on the valence of those thoughts. On the
other hand, to the extent that people lacked confidence in their thoughts,
persuasion was less dependent on thought valence. When individuals wrote
favorable thoughts, increased confidence was associated with more persua-
sion, but when individuals wrote negative thoughts, increased confidence
was associated with reduced persuasion. This study showed that thought
confidence could play an important role in persuasion and thus understanding
the origins of thought confidence was important.
At first glance, one might think that thought confidence would stem
from some objective quality of the thoughts such as having thoughts based
on careful analysis or study. Yet, over the past several years we have shown
that thought confidence can stem from factors that are linked to validity
only in the minds of the perceivers. In one early study, for instance, we
showed that thought confidence could be misattributed from an irrelevant
source to one’s thoughts about a persuasive message and thereby affect
whether the thoughts were used or not. In this study, college students
were asked to think about past situations in which they experienced confi-
dence or doubt. They engaged in this exercise immediately following
exposure to a message containing strong or weak arguments in favor of a
new university exam policy (Petty et al., 2002, Experiment 3). Those who
articulated past instances of confidence became more certain of the validity
of their recently generated thoughts to the message compared to those who
reflected upon instances of doubt. That is, the feeling of confidence stem-
ming from the memory exercise was over generalized (or misattributed) to
the thoughts previously generated to the persuasive message. Furthermore,
this confidence led to greater persuasion when recipients’ thoughts were
largely favorable (i.e., to the strong arguments), but more confidence led to
less persuasion when recipients’ thoughts were largely unfavorable (i.e., to
the weak arguments). Thus, confidence (vs. doubt) increased the impact
of thought valence (and argument quality) on attitudes (see Fig. 2.1).
8.0
7.5
7.0
6.5
Attitudes
6.0
Negative
5.5
Positive
5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
Low High
Thought-confidence
Figure 2.1 Attitudes as a function of thought valence and confidence. Adapted from
Petty et al. (2002, Experiment 3).
This work clearly indicates that in addition to considering the number and
valence of thoughts elicited by a message, confidence in thoughts is also
consequential. Indeed, persuasion attempts can be unsuccessful not because
a message has failed to elicit many favorable thoughts, but because people
lack confidence in the thoughts they generated.
In these initial studies, the self-validation hypothesis was supported
whether thought confidence was measured or manipulated. We also used
two different kinds of measures of thought confidence—assessing confi-
dence in each individual thought or in all of one’s thoughts together.
Furthermore, we measured confidence both before and after attitude
expression in different studies. In addition, we used different ways to vary
the valence of thinking (e.g., argument quality and instructed thinking).
None of these differences changed the self-validation effects observed.
Finally, across the studies in this original series, we were able to demonstrate
that the effects of thought confidence on attitudes are not accounted for by
related constructs, such as belief likelihood or desirability (Fishbein & Ajzen,
1975).
Another contribution of our initial research has been to specify under
what circumstances evaluations of our own thoughts are more likely to
influence our judgments. Petty et al. (2002) demonstrated that the meta-
cognitive activity involved in the self-validation process is more likely to
take place when people have the motivation and ability to attend to and
interpret their own cognitive experience (e.g., participants are high in need
for cognition; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; when there is high personal rele-
vance of the persuasion topic; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). There are at least
two reasons for this. First, for validation processes to matter, people need to
have some thoughts to validate. Second, people need some motivation and
ability not only to think at the primary level of cognition but also to think
Self-Validation 77
and care about their thoughts. This fact has led to some interesting results.
For example, although individuals who are high in their need for cognition
generally rely on their thoughts more than those low in need for cognition
(for a review, see, e.g., Petty et al., in press), this effect can be eliminated if
people are made to doubt their thoughts. Consistent with this notion,
motivation or ability to think will play an important moderating role in
the self-validation effects described in this review.
Subsequent research has identified another limiting condition on the self-
validation effect. That is, self-validation effects are more likely when confidence
is salient following thought generation rather than prior to it. For example,
Tormala et al. (2007a) demonstrated that when the validating information
(source credibility) preceded the message, it biased the generation of thoughts,
consistent with past research (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994), but it affected
thought confidence when it followed the message. Thus, our findings on self-
validation argue that research on persuasion can benefit from considering the
timing of the key manipulations as placement of the independent variable (e.g.,
source credibility, experience of emotion) in the sequence of persuasion stimuli
can have an impact on the mechanism by which it operates. In line with this
notion, timing will play an essential role in many of the studies we review.
5. Distinction from Other Recent

Meta-Cognitive Approaches
Now that the self-validation approach has been described, it is impor-
tant to note that the self-validation framework shares features with some
other meta-cognitive theories in social psychology, but also has notable
differences. Most obviously, the self-validation approach agrees with other
recent theories on the importance of secondary cognition. However, pre-
vious approaches have generally examined and attempted to explain one
single source of meta-cognitive influence. For example, Kruglanski’s (1989)
lay epistemic theory (LET) has been applied to causal attributions and argues
that validation processes are affected by the number of causal explanations
generated—the more alternative explanations generated for any given
event, the less confidence a person has in any one given causal explanation.
Generating few explanations, then, leads to greater confidence.
Perhaps the most well known meta-cognitive theory in social psychology
is that of Schwarz et al. (1991b) on ease of retrieval effects. In this work, the
focus is on the ease with which primary cognitions come to mind and the key
finding is that cognitions that come to mind easily are more impactful than
those that are difficult to access. In a separate line of work, Clore and
colleagues (e.g., Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Clore et al., 2001) have focused
on emotions and have proposed that cognitions accompanied by positive
emotions are more likely to be used than cognitions accompanied by negative

emotions because of the promotive nature of positive emotions.
Interestingly, by focusing on particular variables (e.g., number of cogni-
tions, ease, emotion), these theorists have developed rather specific ratio-
nales for why and when their particular variable of interest would matter.
In contrast, and as will be evident in the studies that we review, the self-
validation framework is designed to be a general meta-cognitive approach
that can explain the effects of a wide array of variables that have been
examined separately under the rubric of different theories. We also aim to
explain the impact of variables that have not been considered to have a
meta-cognitive impact by any prior theory.
To help understand how the self-validation approach differs from other
theories focused on single variables, consider the ease of retrieval phenomena
just mentioned. Schwarz et al. (1991a) argue that when thoughts are easy to
generate (e.g., generate 2 reasons to buy a BMW), people infer (mistakenly)
that there are more reasons available then when they are difficult to generate
(e.g., generate 8 reasons). Because of this availability heuristic (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974), generating 2 reasons in favor of something can lead to more
persuasion than generating 8 reasons. Furthermore, because the ease effect is
presumed to be mediated by use of a heuristic, the ease effect is argued to be
more likely when people are not thinking very much (e.g., for a low impor-
tance topic; see Rothman & Schwarz, 1998). In contrast, the self-validation
approach assumes that easily generated thoughts have greater impact because
people infer greater validity of thoughts that are generated easily. This would be
true independent of the actual number of thoughts that are generated. Second,
the self-validation approach assumes that because a meta-cognitive inference of
validity is involved, the ease effect should be magnified under high rather than
low levels of thinking. Thus, the self-validation approach postulates a different
mediator and different moderation than classic ease of retrieval theory. In a
series of studies examining both mediation and moderation of ease of retrieval
effects we found that the ease effect was mediated by thought confidence rather
than the availability heuristic and occurred to a greater extent when thinking
was high rather than low (see Tormala et al., 2002, 2007b). It is important to
note, however, that these self-validation findings do not mean that ease cannot
affect attitudes by simple heuristic processes when thinking is low. Indeed, we
believe that ease, like other variables, can affect attitudes by different mechan-
isms in different circumstances. However, consideration of the self-validation
mechanism provides a new way in which experienced ease or fluency can affect
judgments that has not been considered previously.
It is also important to distinguish thought confidence from other theories
that aim to deal with multiple rather than single variables. In particular we
can distinguish thought confidence from thought diagnosticity (see Lynch,
2006). This is important because like thought confidence, the more diag-
nostic thoughts are perceived to be, the more they should impact judgments.
Self-Validation 79
In our studies, we hold thought diagnosticity constant for the same situation,
and vary thought-confidence. For example, a person might consider a
thought very diagnostic (i.e., when it is relevant to deciding how one feels in
the current situation), but hold that thought with low confidence (e.g., because
it came to mind with great difficulty) or high confidence (e.g., because it
came to mind very quickly). Obviously, a person might also consider a thought
to be perfectly valid (e.g., I am sure the car was yellow) but still realize
that that the thought is not diagnostic or relevant now (e.g., I am sure the
color of the car has nothing to do with how much I like it). Further distinguish-
ing thought validity from diagnosticity is that the former tends to transcend
different situations whereas the latter often changes from situation to situation
(see Petty et al., 2007, for further discussion).
In sum, the self-validation notion is that numerous variables can affect
attitude change not only by affecting the number or valence of thoughts
generated, but also by affecting thought confidence. The self-validation
hypothesis provides a completely new mechanism by which a large number
of traditionally studied variables can have an impact on attitudes in persuasion
situations. After describing some of the initial work in which the self-validation
notion was used to account for some classic persuasion variables, we examine
how self-validation can provide a novel framework for understanding a variety
of additional persuasion phenomena. Finally, we move beyond the persuasion
context to briefly describe the possible role of self-validation in other kinds
of judgments
6. Source Effects Through Self-Validation

6.1. Source credibility
One of the earliest and most well-known findings in the persuasion litera-
ture is that high credibility sources often produce more attitude change than
sources of low credibility. As we outlined earlier for emotion, this effect
could result from the several processes outlined by the ELM. That is,
depending on the message recipient’s extent of thinking, source credibility
has been found to influence persuasion by serving as a simple cue, biasing
the thoughts message recipients have, serving as a piece of evidence relevant
to the central merits of the issue, and determining the amount of thinking
that occurs (see, Petty & Wegener, 1998, for a review).
Recently, we have proposed that source credibility can also influence
persuasion by affecting the confidence people have in the thoughts they
generated to a message. This hypothesis relies on the assumption that source
credibility begins by influencing the perceived validity of the information in
a persuasive proposal. Consistent with this assumption, Kaufman et al. (1999)
found that information from a high credibility source (e.g., Washington Post)
was rated as more believable, accurate, factual, and true than the same
information originating from a low credibility source (e.g., National Enquirer).
More important, we argued that when one has already thought about
information in a proposal and then discovers that it came from a high or
low credibility source, one’s thoughts can also be validated or invalidated by
this source information. For example, if one learns that a source is high in
credibility, one might think that, because the information is presumably valid,
his or her thoughts about it can be trusted. If one learns that the source has
low credibility, however, one might think the information itself is invalid and
thus have less confidence in one’s thoughts about this information. That is, if
the credibility of the information in a message is undermined, confidence
in one’s thoughts that were based on that information are likely to be
undermined as well.
In an initial demonstration of this possibility, Briñol et al. (2004) exposed
participants to strong arguments in favor of the benefits of phosphate
detergents. Following receipt of the message, participants learned that the
source of the information was either a government consumer agency (high
credibility) or a major phosphate manufacturer (low credibility). The self-
validation reasoning is that when thoughts are generated in response to
credible information, people can be relatively confident in their thoughts,
but when people learn that their thoughts were generated to a source of low
credibility, doubt is instilled. Although participants in both high and low
credibility conditions generated equally favorable thoughts to the strong
arguments, participants exposed to the high (vs. low) credibility source
had more confidence in their thoughts, relied on them more, and were
therefore more persuaded by the proposal.
In a follow-up experiment, Tormala et al. (2006) predicted and found that
because of the self-validation role for sources, a high credibility source can
lead to either more or less persuasion than a low credibility source depending
on the nature of people’s thoughts in response to the persuasive message.
In two experiments, Tormala et al. (2006) presented recipients with either a
strong or a weak persuasive message promoting Comfrin, a new pain relief
product, and then revealed information about the source (i.e., either from a
federal agency that conducts research on medical products or from a class
report written by a 14-year-old student). When the message was strong, high
source credibility lead to more favorable attitudes than low source credibility
because of greater reliance on the positive thoughts generated. However,
when the message was weak and participants generated mostly unfavorable
thoughts, the effect of credibility was reversed. As illustrated in Fig. 2.2, for
the weak message, high source credibility produced less favorable attitudes
than did low source credibility because participants exposed to the more
credible source had more confidence in their unfavorable thoughts.
Finally, Tormala et al. (2007a) confirmed that source credibility primar-
ily affects thought confidence when the source information follows rather
Self-Validation 81
8.0
7.5
7.0
6.5
6.0
Attitudes
5.5 Weak
5.0
Strong
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
Low High
Source credibility
Figure 2.2 Attitudes as a function of argument quality and source credibility. Adapted
from Tormala et al. (2006, Experiment 1).
than precedes the persuasive message. In this research, when source infor-
mation preceded the message, it biased the generation of thoughts, consis-
tent with past research (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994). In sum, our
research on source credibility shows that the self-validation process should
be added to the other mechanisms previously identified for explaining the
impact of source credibility on attitudes.
6.2. Source similarity

Although there are some notable studies on the likeability or attractiveness
of the source (e.g., DeBono & Harnish, 1988; Petty & Cacioppo, 1983),
source factors other than credibility and status have not been extensively
studied. Nevertheless, we have collected some initial evidence for self-
validation effects of source similarity. In one illustration, Petty et al.
(2002, experiment 4) studied how having similar others agree with one’s
thoughts can increase the perceived validity of those thoughts and thereby
increase their impact on attitudes. The undergraduate participants in this
study first received a message advocating the implementation of a new
comprehensive exam policy at their university. In order to manipulate the
direction of the thoughts toward the proposal, the message they received
contained adaptations of either the strong or weak arguments on this topic
developed originally by Petty and Cacioppo (1986). After listing their
thoughts, participants were told that those thoughts were going to be
analyzed by the computer and compared with a pool of thoughts of many
other students from their own university (Ohio State University). After 10 s,
a new computer screen appeared with the ostensible outcome of this
comparison. Half of the participants were told that their thoughts had been
rejected for future research because they were very different from the rest of
the members of their group. The other half of the participants were told their
thoughts had been accepted into the pool for future research because they
were quite similar to the thoughts listed by other members of their group.
As anticipated by Festinger’s (1950) notion of consensual validation, this
experiment found that social consensus information affected persuasion by
influencing thought-confidence (see also, Goethals & Nelson, 1973; Orive,
1988a,b). People reported more confidence in their thoughts when these
thoughts were said to be shared with similar others than when they were
not. When thoughts were favorable toward the proposal, sharing thoughts
with others increased persuasion, but when thoughts were not favorable,
sharing thoughts with others reduced persuasion. Importantly, the results in
support of the self-validation hypothesis were apparent particularly for
participants high in need for cognition, who are more chronically motivated
to engage in extensive thinking. This finding is similar to the one described
above for source credibility, and also is consistent with the notion that meta-
cognitive processes tend to be more pronounced to the extent that people
have the motivation and ability to engage in considerable thinking.5
6.3. Source majority/minority status

One of the most examined source variables in the persuasion literature is
whether the persuasive proposal is said to be endorsed by a majority or a
minority of other people. Both the conformity and persuasion literatures
have accumulated considerable evidence suggesting that endorsement from
numerical majorities often exert greater influence than numerical minorities
do (e.g., Wood et al., 1994), although sometimes minorities can be more
effective (e.g., Crano & Chen, 1998; Moscovici, 1980; Mugny & Perez,
1991). Several of the mechanisms we have already mentioned have been
shown to operate for minority sources. Thus, endorsement of an issue by a
numerical minority (vs. majority) has led to resistance to attitude change by
a low-effort rejection process (minority as a negative cue) when thinking
was likely to be low, and by a more thoughtful but negatively biased
processing mechanism under high thinking conditions. When elaboration
is not constrained by other variables to be high or low, however, minorities
have been shown to influence attitude change by influencing the amount
of thinking that occurs (e.g., Baker & Petty, 1994; for a review these
mechanisms, see, Martin & Hewstone, 2008; Tormala et al., in press).
5
Although in this research, agreement with similar others increased perceived validity compared to disagree-
ment with similar others, this could be because the message was on a matter of opinion rather than fact.
Following prior work by Goethals and Nelson (1973), it could be that agreement with dissimilar others would
increase thought confidence if the message was on a topic considered to be a matter of fact rather than
opinion. Thus, agreement by similar (vs. dissimilar) others might increase or decrease perceived validity
depending on the circumstances, such as the nature of the topic being considered.
Self-Validation 83
We have recently conducted a line of research in which we proposed

that minorities can affect persuasion not only by serving as cues or affecting
the direction and the amount of thinking, but also by influencing the
confidence with which people hold their thoughts in response to the
persuasive message (Horcajo et al., 2008a). That is, we proposed that, at
least under some circumstances, such as when the source information
follows the message and thinking is high, minority influence can operate
through self-validation processes.
In one of the studies of this series, participants were presented with a
message introducing a new company. The message was composed of either
strong or weak arguments about the firm. The gist of one strong argument
in favor of the company was that workers report high satisfaction because of
the flexibility in their work schedules. In contrast, the gist of one weak
argument in favor of this firm was that they used recycled paper in one of
the departments during an entire year. After reading and thinking about this
information, participants listed their thoughts in response to the company.
Next, we manipulated source status by attributing the message to a source in
the numerical minority or majority (e.g., 18% vs 88% of their fellow
students support the company; see Baker & Petty, 1994). Consistent with
the self-validation hypothesis, we predicted and found the status of the
source (minority vs majority) influenced the confidence with which parti-
cipants held their thoughts about the company. Specifically, participants
tended to have higher thought confidence when the message was endorsed
by a majority rather than a minority. As a consequence, we observed that
the majority (versus minority) endorsement increased reliance on thoughts
and thus enhanced the argument quality effect on attitudes.
Among other things, these findings are important because in virtually all of
the prior studies manipulating minority source status and argument quality,
the manipulation of source status has preceded presentation of the persuasive
message. As explained earlier for source credibility, in this order any variable
can affect the amount of information processing that takes place as long as it is
not already constrained to be high or low by other variables. In contrast, in
the study just described, the status of the source was introduced when
processing of the message proposal was already done, and operated through
thought confidence. Thus, the effects of source status on attitude change and
the mechanisms underlying those effects vary as a function of the timing in
which the source information is introduced in the persuasion process.
6.4. Summary of source factors

The self-validation research reviewed in this section has shown that this new
mechanism can account for some already established persuasion outcomes
(e.g., more persuasion with high than low credibility sources), but by a
completely different process than postulated previously (i.e., a credible
source making people more confident in their thoughts and thus relying on
them more). Moreover, we have also been able to obtain findings opposite
to those typically observed (e.g., when thoughts are mostly unfavorable
there is more persuasion to low than high credible sources). Importantly,
self-validation not only relates to classic topics in the psychology of the
source of persuasion (such as credibility, similarity, and minority status), but
it has the potential to provide a useful framework for examining other more
novel phenomenon (for an extensive review of source effects on persuasion,
see, Briñol & Petty, in press). For example, self-validation can be used to
interpret the role of oneself as a source of persuasion (self-persuasion), to
examine research on the self versus other origin of thoughts, and to shed
light on diverse source matching phenomena. We briefly cover some of
these lines of research in subsequent sections of this review.
7. Recipient Effects Through Self-Validation

There are many recipient variables that are relevant for persuasion that
have been studied in the literature. In addition to emotion which we cover
in more detail below, important recipient factors include individual beha-
viors, motives, abilities, and personality (see Briñol & Petty 2005, for a
review). We review some recipient factors that have been subjected to a
self-validation analysis next.
7.1. Bodily responses

There is a growing interest in studying how people’s own behavior can
influence information processing and social judgments. Indeed, cognition
and judgment are embodied (see Smith & Semin, 2008). One of our first
self-validation studies focused on the role of people’s own bodily
responses—their head movements—on thought confidence and persuasion.
Prior research on head nodding had assumed that nodding one’s head in a
vertical (versus horizontal) manner produced more positive attitudes either
because vertical head nodding biased thinking in a favorable direction or
because head nodding served as a relatively simple affective cue (Wells &
Petty, 1980). Although these roles are certainly possible under certain
circumstances (e.g., head nodding as a simple cue when thinking is low),
the self-validation hypothesis suggested another possibility—that just as
vertical head movements from others can give us confidence in what we
are saying, our own vertical head movements could give us confidence in
what we are thinking. In a series of studies (Briñol & Petty, 2003), we found
that head movements affected the confidence people had in their thoughts,
and thereby had an impact on attitudes.
Self-Validation 85
9.0
8.5
8.0
7.5
Attitudes
7.0
Weak
6.5
Strong
6.0
5.5
5.0
4.5
4.0
Horizontal Vertical
Head movements
Figure 2.3 Attitudes as a function of argument quality and head movements. Adapted
from Briñol and Petty (2003, Experiment 1).
In one study (Briñol & Petty, 2003, Experiment 1), when people listened
through headphones to the strong arguments in an editorial advocating that
students be required to carry personal identification cards on campus, vertical
movements led to more confidence in the favorable thoughts generated and
to more favorable attitudes than when horizontal movements were made.
However, when people listened to weak arguments about the ID cards,
vertical movements led to more confidence in the unfavorable thoughts
generated and to less favorable attitudes than when horizontal movements
were made. This was the first reverse effect observed for head movements on
evaluation (see Fig. 2.3). Additional analyses indicated that the head move-
ments did not have any impact on the number or valence of thoughts listed
but did have an impact on the confidence with which people held their
thoughts. Furthermore, this thought confidence mediated the impact of head
movements on attitudes (Briñol & Petty, 2003, Experiment 3).
The initial studies on the effects of bodily responses through self-valida-
tion processes were conducted in traditional persuasion settings in which
attitudes change with respect to particular issues and objects following
presentation of a message (for a review on embodied persuasion, see,
Briñol & Petty, 2008a). It is important to note, however, that the self-
validation framework can also be applied to other attitude domains, such as
attitudes about oneself (i.e., self-esteem). That is, confidence applies to
whatever the salient or available mental contents are at the time. For
example, in one illustration of the generality of self-validation processes
(Briñol & Petty, 2003, Experiment 4), we asked participants, as part of a
presumed graphology study, to think about and write down their best or
worse qualities (thought-direction manipulation) using their dominant or
nondominant hand (overt behavior manipulation). Then, participants rated
the confidence in their thoughts and reported their self-esteem.
Because writing with the nondominant hand is very infrequent and

difficult, and whatever is written with the nondominant may appear
‘‘shaky,’’ we expected and found that using the nondominant hand
decreased the confidence with which people held the thoughts they just
listed. As a consequence, the effect of the direction of thoughts (positive/
negative) on current self-esteem was significantly less when participants
wrote their thoughts with their nondominant rather than their dominant
hand. That is, writing positive thoughts about oneself with the nondomi-
nant hand decreased self-esteem relative to writing positive thoughts with
the dominant hand, but writing negative thoughts with the nondominant
hand resulted in the reverse pattern (see Fig. 2.4).
This experiment reveals that bodily responses can influence self-evaluation
by affecting the confidence with which people hold their self-related thoughts.
In another study examining this meta-cognitive process in the domain of self-
evaluation, Briñol et al. (2009) asked participants to think about and write
down their best or worse qualities while they were sitting with their back erect
while pushing their chest out (confident posture) or slouched forward with
their back curved (doubt posture). Then, participants completed a number of
measures and reported their self-esteem. In line with the self-validation
hypothesis, it was predicted and found that the thoughts generated about the
self only affected self attitudes in the relatively high confidence posture.
Conceptually similar to the previous study, the effect of the direction of
thoughts on current self-esteem was greater when participants wrote their
thoughts in the confident rather than the doubtful body posture.6
4.0
3.5
Attitudes
Negative
Positive
3.0
2.5
Non-dominant Dominant
Hand writing
Figure 2.4 Attitudes as a function of thought-direction and hand writing. Adapted

from Briñol and Petty (2003, Experiment 4).
6
None of the bodily movements or postures we have studied (head nodding, hand writing, slumping) affected
the number or valence of thought generated. Only thought confidence was affected.
Self-Validation 87
These studies demonstrated that inducing doubt about possessing posi-

tive qualities tended to undermine self-esteem whereas inducing doubt
about possessing negative qualities tended to enhance self-esteem. Impor-
tantly, Briñol and Petty (2003; Experiment 4) showed that these changes in
self-esteem were mediated by changes in the participants’ certainty in the
self-beliefs listed. Subsequent research has replicated these effects on self-
thoughts using other validating variables, including a measure of individual
differences in chronic self-confidence (e.g., see, DeMarree et al., 2008a).
Taken together, these lines of research also suggest that meta-cognitive
confidence can be associated with anything that is currently available in
people’s minds, including not only thoughts in response to persuasive
messages and social issues, but also self-related thoughts.
7.2. Incidental emotions

One of the most fundamental and encompassing aspects of the human
condition is emotion. People often rely on their emotions, either inten-
tionally or unintentionally, to shape their judgments and decision making
regarding life satisfaction, risk assessment, and so forth (e.g., Forgas, 2001).
Thus, a recipient aspect that has been studied extensively in the attitudes
domain is the emotional state of the target of persuasion. We noted earlier
that as expected by the ELM, prior research has shown that a person’s
emotions can operate through different processes in different situations
(see Petty et al., 2003, for a review).
Research guided by the self-validation hypothesis has shown that emo-
tion can also affect thought confidence. This possibility follows directly
from the finding that emotional states can relate to confidence with happy
people being more certain and confident than sad individuals (Tiedens &
Linton, 2001). If emotion influences thought confidence, then people in a
happy state should be more reliant on their thoughts than people in a sad
state. In fact, Briñol et al. (2007a) found that when placed in a happy state
following message processing, attitudes, and behavioral intentions were
more influenced by the recipients’ valenced thoughts to the presented
arguments than when placed in a sad state following the message (see
Fig. 2.5).
In one study (Briñol et al., 2007a, Experiment 2), when participants
received a strong message advocating that students should be required to
carry personal identification cards on campus (and thoughts were thus
mostly favorable), those who were asked to recall prior situations in
which they were happy following message processing were more persuaded
than those asked to recall prior situations in which they were sad. However,
when participants received a weak message on the same topic (and thoughts
were mostly unfavorable), the effects of the emotion induction were
reversed. Furthermore, the effect of emotion on attitudes was mediated
7.0
6.5
6.0
5.5
Attitudes
Weak
5.0
Strong
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
Sad Happy
Emotion
Figure 2.5 Attitudes toward the proposal as a function of argument quality and
emotion. Adapted from Briñol et al. (2007a, Experiment 1).
by the confidence people placed in their thoughts with happy individuals

expressing more thought confidence than those who were sad. In other
studies in the series, these self-validation effects for emotion were confined
to situations when emotion followed thought generation rather than pre-
ceded it and when conditions fostered high thought (e.g., for individuals
high in need for cognition, NC).7
It is worth noting that, like much of the previous research on the influence
of affect on cognition, our studies on self-validation examined the effects of
emotions for which valence and other appraisals such as confidence were
operating simultaneously (i.e., were confounded; see, Briñol et al., 2006).
Some emotions unconfound the valence and confidence dimensions. For
example, anger is negative in valence, but is associated with confidence (see
Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Thus, it is important to know if it is the valence
appraisal of an emotion that is determining use of thoughts (e.g., I am angry
with my thoughts—implying nonuse) or the confidence appraisal. To examine
these possibilities, we conducted a series of studies in which participants were
led to feel anger or surprise after generating positive or negative thoughts
toward a persuasive proposal (Briñol & Petty, 2008b). Anger is negative in
valence whereas surprise is positive, but anger is associated with confidence
whereas surprise is associated with doubt. Consistent with most of the
research presented above, we found that the direction of primary thoughts
(positive or negative) only affected subsequent judgments when those
7
Of most importance for the multiple roles idea outlined earlier, for people low in NC, emotions had a direct
effect on attitudes unmediated by thought confidence. That is, for low NC individuals, feeling good
following the message acted as a simple cue leading to more positive attitudes when happy than sad regardless
of argument quality. As noted earlier, this is consistent with prior research suggesting that low elaboration
individuals are more likely to use their emotions as input to an affect heuristic (e.g., Petty et al., 1993).
Self-Validation 89
thoughts were accompanied by an emotion associated with relatively high

(anger) but not low (surprise) confidence.
Taken together, our research on emotion suggests that different emotions
such as happiness or anger can influence persuasion by affecting the confi-
dence with which people hold their thoughts. The research covered so far on
self-validation has focused on the validity dimension of one’s own thoughts.
That is, we have examined cognitive validation. It is important to note that the
self-validation approach also holds open the possibility of affective validation
wherein people infer that their thoughts have made them happy or sad, angry
or surprised (e.g., Petty et al., 2007). Thus, although we focus on cognitive
validation in this review, we also acknowledge that affective reactions might
also exert an impact on attitudinal processes by affective validation (i.e., a
valence effect of the emotions). For example, in a preliminary test of this idea
we manipulated whether participants felt angry or surprised following the
generation of positive or negative thoughts in response to a persuasive
proposal (Briñol et al., 2008b). To foster affective or cognitive validation,
after these two inductions we asked participants to either write about how
they felt about their emotions (affective mindset) or to write about their
thoughts and beliefs in response to the proposal (cognitive mindset). For
those induced with a cognitive mindset, we replicated previous findings and
showed self-validation effects by an emotion associated with relatively high
(anger) but not low (surprise) confidence. In support of the possibility of
affective validation, however, those induced with an affective mindset felt
better and relied more on their thoughts when forming their attitudes
following the surprise rather than then anger induction. Among other things,
this line of research on affective self-validation suggests that the same emotion
can increase or decrease thought-confidence as a function of people’s mindset
(e.g., focused on how they feel about their thoughts or focused on how valid
they think their thoughts are).
7.3. Power
Power has been recognized as a central motivating force in human relation-
ships and action, being considered as one of the most fundamental concepts
in social science (e.g., Fiske, 1993). As a consequence, scholars have long
argued for the importance of understanding the origins of power and its
influence on a variety of outcomes. In a line of research inspired by the self-
validation hypothesis, we examined the effect of recipients’ power on
attitude change. The self-validation prediction is that when induced to
feel powerful, people should be more confident in their thoughts. This
prediction is in line with prior research that suggests a link between power
and approach tendencies (e.g., Keltner et al., 2003).
In one study on power (Briñol et al., 2007c, Experiment 4), participants
were first led to generate either positive or negative thoughts about a
6.0
5.5
5.0
Attitudes
Weak
4.5
Strong
4.0
3.5
3.0
Low High
Power
Figure 2.6 Attitudes as a function of argument quality and power. Adapted from
Briñol et al. (2007, Experiment 3).
vaccination policy for students on campus. Then the participants were

instructed to recall either two incidents in their lives in which they had
power over another person (high power condition), or in which someone
else had power over them (low power condition). Relative to powerless
individuals, those induced to have power following message processing
reported greater confidence in their thoughts about the campus policy.
As a consequence, the effect of the direction of the thoughts generated on
attitudes was greater when power was high rather than low (for an illustra-
tion, see, Fig. 2.6). Furthermore, thought-confidence mediated the
observed effects of power on persuasion. As in the prior self-validation
studies, these effects were greatest under high elaboration conditions and
when power followed thought generation.
These studies not only contribute to the literature on persuasion, in which
the few studies conducted so far focused exclusively on the power of the
source rather than the recipient (e.g., Kelman, 1958), but also have important
implications for the study of power. For example, according to the self-
validation hypothesis, power is likely to produce either positive (e.g., miti-
gating conflicts) or negative (e.g., corruption) social outcomes depending on
the direction of the thoughts that power holders have in their minds. This is
important because the self-validation view argues that meta-cognitive confi-
dence can magnify the effect of any content that is currently available in
people’s minds, including not only the thoughts in response to persuasive
proposals, but also to other cognitions including active goals.
In one study examining self-validation processes in this domain,
DeMarree et al. (2008a) first asked participants to complete words related
to different constructs, such as competition (C_M_ETE) versus cooperation
(e.g., H_LP). Previous research has revealed that when these constructs are
activated, they can influence the extent to which particular goals are activated
Self-Validation 91
and people behave accordingly (e.g., Macrae & Johnston, 1998). Next,
participants were assigned to a role of high or low power, a manipulation
that, as we described above, has been successfully shown to influence the use
of thoughts in the domain of persuasion. In line with the self-validation logic,
we found primes to influence participant’s behavior during a subsequent
negotiation simulation, particularly in the situations in which participants
were assigned to a role with high (vs. low) power. That is, the more powerful
people were found to engage in more competition or cooperation, whichever
was primed. Thus, as was the case with power affecting validity of thoughts
generated in response to persuasive messages, so too does it appear to affect
the validity of socially-relevant mental content.
7.4. Self-affirmation
People are often motivated to resist changing their attitudes. Thus, there is
growing interest in studying ways to undermine resistance as a first step to
persuasion (Knowles & Linn, 2004). One means that has been promulgated
to soften a person’s resolve is to provide some self-affirmation prior to an
attacking message. Self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) holds that affirm-
ing an important aspect of the self can restore self-integrity when the self has
been threatened. When applied to persuasion, self-affirmation theorists have
argued that self-affirmation can buffer the self against the threat posed by a
counter-attitudinal persuasive message, and thus increase the likelihood that
participants will respond to the message favorably (e.g., Cohen et al., 2000).
Although the self-affirmation approach has much to offer, it says nothing
about situations in which a message does not pose a threat to the self.
We have argued that in such situations, self-affirmation can affect persuasion
by affecting thought confidence.
In a relevant study, Briñol et al. (2007b, Experiment 2) had participants
read an advertisement introducing a new cell phone containing either
strong or weak arguments. After receiving the message, individuals affirmed
either an important or unimportant aspect of their self-concepts. That is,
they were asked to write about situations in which they felt or performed in
a manner consistent with their most or least important value. In accord with
the self-validation framework, this research found greater argument quality
effects for self-affirmed than nonself-affirmed participants (see Fig. 2.7).
And, once again, in additional studies on self-affirmation, the self-validation
effects were obtained only when participants were in high elaboration
conditions and the self-affirmation followed thought generation. When
the self-affirmation manipulation preceded the persuasive message, it vali-
dated the person’s own initial point of view, and affected the extent of
thinking about the message with more affirmed individuals thinking less.
That is, when people feel confident (affirmed) prior to a message, there is
6.0
5.5
5.0
Attitudes
Weak
4.5
Strong
4.0
3.5
3.0
Control Self-affirmation
Confidence manipulation
Figure 2.7 Attitudes as a function of argument quality and self-affirmation where

affirmation follows the message. Adapted from Briñol et al. (2007, Experiment 2).
more confidence in one’s own position, and less need to process the
opinions of others than when one is feeling doubtful.
These findings on information processing are consistent with those found
by Correll et al. (2004) in a study examining the link between being affirmed
prior to a message and the subsequent processing of the message. In their
study, participants were recruited for whom the issue of a tuition increase was
counterattitdinal and was either important or unimportant to the self. Among
participants who did not attach a great deal of importance to the issue (i.e., the
message would not be very threatening), there was a trend for affirmed
participants to show less sensitivity to message quality and message position
than nonaffirmed participants. This pattern is consistent with the idea that
self-affirmation lead to decreased thought under these conditions because the
affirmation validates a person’s existing opinion.
7.5. Ease of retrieval

As noted earlier in this review, considerable attention has been paid to the
subjective sense of ease with which new information can be perceived or
generated. In their seminal research, Schwarz et al. (1991b) showed that
subjective feelings regarding information can be more important than the
content of one’s thoughts. Although the traditional interpretation of this
ease-of-retrieval effect has relied on the availability heuristic approach (i.e.,
that ease signals that many supporting arguments or thoughts are available;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), the self-validation hypothesis provides an
alternative mechanism by which ease of retrieval effects can occur—at least
under high thinking conditions. As described earlier, Tormala et al. (2002)
demonstrated that people were more confident in their thoughts when few
Self-Validation 93
rather than many were generated, and this thought confidence mediated the
effects of ease of generation on attitudes. Subsequent research has replicated
these findings using different paradigms (Tormala et al., 2007b).8 As in prior
research on self-validation effects, the impact of ease on confidence
occurred only under high thinking conditions. Again, this is notable given
that the ease of retrieval effect had largely been assumed to be a phenome-
non only of low cognitive effort based on the availability heuristic (e.g.,
Rothman & Schwarz, 1998). According to the ELM, however, ease, like
other variables, should be capable of affecting judgments by different
mechanisms in different situations.
7.6. Threat and mortality salience

Taken together, the examples in this section illustrate that self-validation
can provide a useful framework for understanding how a wide variety of
aspects related to the recipient of persuasion operate in producing attitude
change. Whether the manipulations involved head movements or ease of
retrieval or whether the cognitions were about oneself, others, or objects,
self-validation effects were apparent suggesting that people often look for
ways to validate their thoughts. Furthermore, a consideration of self-valida-
tion processes might expand our understanding of the dynamics of other
unexplored recipient variables that could influence persuasion either by
increasing or decreasing thought-confidence. As one example, consider
research on threat, and on mortality salience (MS).
Our research on self-validation has typically found that meta-cognitive
confidence exerts a magnifying effect on one’s self-related cognitions. In
contrast, doubt exerts an attenuating influence on one’s thoughts, reducing
the impact of these primary cognitions. There might be circumstances,
however, when a thought is cast in doubt, and individuals are motivated
to behave in ways that restore the sense of confidence they would like to
associate with that thought (for a review of these cases, see, Wichman &
Hermann, in press; see also, Briñol et al., in press). The idea of compen-
sating for doubt suggests that people sometimes try to correct for the
doubts they do not want to have by engaging in behaviors associated
with confidence. We argue that most of the time meta-cognitive doubt is
8
In addition to self-validation, Tormala et al. (2007) uncovered another mechanism relevant to understanding
ease of retrieval effects in the most common paradigm in which people are asked to generate a high (difficult)
or low (easy) number of cognitions in a given direction. Specifically, it was predicted and found that when it
is difficult for people to generate the specific type of cognition requested, they are more likely to spontane-
ously generate unrequested cognitions, and the presence of these opposite-direction cognitions can play a
mediating role in determining the judgments expressed.
likely to merely attenuate the use of primary cognition.9 However, when

doubt is threatening, it might lead people to want to restore confidence.
In a line of research designed to explore this idea, Horcajo et al. (2008b)
asked participants to read a persuasive proposal composed of strong or
weak arguments. After listing their thoughts toward the proposal, parti-
cipants were assigned to either write about personal experiences of doubt
(doubt induction), to complete a test of intelligence and receive false
feedback of poor performance (threat induction), or to do both of these
tasks sequentially (threatening doubt induction). Compared with partici-
pants in the normal doubt condition, participants in the other two
conditions (threat and threatening doubt) reported wanting more confi-
dence, and showed more reliance of their thoughts. These findings
suggest that the same meta-cognitive doubt can decrease or increase the
use of primary cognitions depending on the threat associated with that
doubt.
We argue that one day-to-day situation in which people are engaged in
intense threatening uncertainty occurs when thinking about one’s inevita-
ble death. In accord with this possibility, Terror Management Theory
(TMT; Greenberg et al., 1986) postulates the idea of death leading people
to counter their fear of death by creating and maintaining a cultural
worldview, which gives meaning and order to the world. Consistent with
this proposal, laboratory research has shown that reminders of death lead to
more favorable evaluations of people who personify cultural values and to
more negative evaluations of people who defy those values (e.g., see
Greenberg et al., 1997; for a review). Our self-validation approach can
shed some light on why MS leads to such polarized judgments. Specifically,
we hypothesized that one way in which MS influences attitudes is by
increasing threatening doubt (inducing the need for confidence), which,
in turn, leads to reliance on one’s own thoughts.
In order to test this novel prediction that MS-induced polarization can
occur via self-validation, Horcajo et al. (in press) exposed participants to a
printed vita of a job candidate containing either strong or weak attributes in
support of the candidate. Attribute cogency was varied in this study to lead
participants to generate mostly positive or negative thoughts toward the job
candidate. After participants read the vita and wrote their cognitive
9
There might also be conditions and processes by which doubt does not just attenuate but actually reverses the
effects of first-order cognition (cf. Briñol et al., in press). For example, if people have so much doubt about
what they have in mind, they might decide to do the opposite of their thoughts. Some studies have provided
some preliminary evidence in favor of the possibility that doubt can sometimes lead to such reverse effects
(e.g., Briñol et al., 2007a). In particular, people might be especially likely to do the opposite of their thoughts
when they doubt self-views that are represented or framed in a dichotomous manner (e.g., winner vs loser,
extrovert vs introvert, smart vs dumb) than when those self-views are seen as more continuous (e.g., success,
intelligence, age). Obviously, a large number of individual (e.g., dysfunctional use of dichotomous thinking,
Beck & Greenberg, 1994) and situational (e.g., format of response) factors might influence these constructs,
and therefore whether doubt merely attenuates or reverses primary cognition.
Self-Validation 95
responses about it, MS was experimentally manipulated. Participants were

asked to describe what they thought will happen when they die (MS
induction), or to write about being cold (control). Finally, all participants
reported their attitudes toward the candidate. In line with the self-validation
hypothesis, we found that the effect of attribute cogency on attitudes toward
the job candidate was greater under the MS than the control condition.
Thus, MS participants relied on their thoughts more than control partici-
pants in forming attitudes to judge the candidate. Importantly, we estab-
lished that the MS effects on attitudes were mediated by thought
confidence, and occurred only among participants who reported greater
elaboration. Across different manipulations of all the variables, this series of
studies revealed that MS can influence attitude change by increasing the
confidence with which people hold their own thoughts. Among other
things, these findings are important because they provide an entirely unex-
plored mechanism (self-validation) for MS effects that are relevant for
understanding persuasion.
8. Message Effects Through Self-Validation

Although there are numerous studies on aspects of a persuasive mes-
sage that can determine its effectiveness (e.g., whether it emphasizes affect
or cognition, presents many or few arguments, is complex or not), relatively
few self-validation studies have examined message effects per se. Although
we have examined some of these (e.g., message complexity can influence
persuasion by reducing thought-confidence, cf. Petty & Briñol, 2002), we
focus here on two current topics within the domain of persuasive mes-
sages—the effects of matching or tailoring the message to some characteris-
tic of the message recipient (e.g., their personality, their identity, etc.; see
Briñol & Petty, 2006; Petty et al., 2000), and the effects of a person’s
thoughts that match some aspect of the persuasive appeal.
8.1. Matching regulatory fit

One aspect of matching that has achieved considerable attention recently is
the idea that matching a message or a process to a person’s promotion or
prevention regulatory style can produce a sense of regulatory ‘‘fit’’ (Higgins,
2000). As a result, when a message is matched to the person in this way (i.e.,
eager means of achieving some end combined with a promotion focus or
vigilant means with prevention focus), the individual might come to accept
the message position simply because the message ‘‘feels right’’ (Cesario
et al., 2004) or is easier to process (e.g., Lee & Aaker, 2004). According
to the ELM, these simple fluency experiences should influence attitudes in a
simple way (e.g., as a heuristic, ‘‘if it fits it is good’’) primarily under
relatively low thinking conditions. Our interest here is that the experience
of ‘‘fit’’ from matching can also serve a self-validation role when the
likelihood of thinking is high (Tormala et al., 2002).
In one study on regulatory fit, Cesario et al. (2004) exposed participants
to a persuasive message in favor of consuming more vegetables. The
message either emphasized the accomplishment (promotion) or the safety
(prevention) features of vegetable consumption. Additionally, within each
regulatory focus condition, the message was either framed in terms of
eager means (i.e., presence and absence of gain/no-gain information) or
vigilant means (i.e., presence and absence of nonloss/loss information).
When the promotion system was activated, there was more persuasion
with eager means framing than vigilant means framing. The reverse
occurred when the prevention system was activated. This interaction pat-
tern is consistent with the self-validation framework if one assumes that
participants generated mostly favorable thoughts. In another study in which
both positive and negative thoughts were assessed, Cesario et al. (2004)
report that the valence of one’s thoughts (favorable/unfavorable) had a
greater impact on attitudes under conditions of regulatory fit than nonfit.
This pattern fits predictions from the self-validation framework if regulatory
fit enhanced thought confidence.
Future research on regulatory fit should examine whether other kinds of
message matching can also produce self-validation effects by inducing a
sense of feeling right. For example, additional research on regulatory fit has
shown that fit (vs. nonfit) can increase motivation when one has a positive
thought (e.g., ‘‘I feel like continuing’’) or decease it when the thought is
opposite (e.g., ‘‘I have done all I can,’’ Ann Vaughn et al., 2006). This
pattern also fits the self-validation framework if fit enhanced the impact of
available thoughts by increasing confidence.
8.2. Thought matching

An interesting case of matching between the persuasive appeal and the
message recipient has to do with the content of the thoughts generated by
the target of persuasion. As described earlier in this review, prior work on
self-validation has demonstrated that sources (e.g., credible and similar) can
validate people’s thoughts regardless of the content and valence of the
target’s thoughts. For example, high source credibility increased confidence
in message recipients’ thoughts in response to strong messages and also in
their counterarguments in response to weak messages (Tormala et al., 2006).
Similarly, different recipient variables (e.g., emotion, power, head nodding)
were shown to validate thoughts regardless of the content and valence of the
target’s thoughts. For example, happiness increased confidence in favorable
(positive) and unfavorable (negative) thoughts alike, and sadness reduced
confidence in both kinds of thoughts (Briñol et al., 2007a). In all these
Self-Validation 97
studies, the content of the thoughts did not matter for validation purposes
because those thoughts were not directly related to the validating variable in
that the thoughts were about some proposal (e.g., a new cell phone,
comprehensive exams) rather than the validating variable itself (e.g., about
the source of the message or one’s emotional state).
However, it might be different when the content of the thoughts relates
directly to the validating variable. For example, when a source serves as a
validating cue, it might matter if the thoughts are about the source rather
than a proposal the source is advocating. Imagine reading a message about
some unidentified person that you suspect is a woman. If you then learn that
the source is indeed a woman, your thoughts about the source would be
validated whereas if you learned that the source was a man, your thoughts
would be invalidated. In general, people are likely to have more confidence
when the content of their thoughts matches or fits the nature of the source
rather than when the content does not fit or mismatches. Thus, thought
confidence might be increased if a person high in prejudice generated
negative thoughts toward a job candidate and then learned that the candi-
date came from a stigmatized group with low performance expectations
rather than from a nonstigmatized group with positive performance expec-
tations. This suggests that sources with low (vs. high) status can affect
judgments by validating (rather than invalidating) thoughts under some
circumstances such as when the source is the object of the thoughts, and
when thoughts are stereotypical or match the nature of the source.
In one study examining this idea (Clark et al., in press), participants
received information about a student who performed either reasonably well
or poorly on an intelligence test. The good information would lead people
to have positive thoughts about the target’s intelligence whereas the poor
information would lead people to have negative thoughts about the target’s
intelligence (see Wegener et al., 2006). Following the information, partici-
pants listed their thoughts about the target and then learned that the target
was either from a low SES (socioeconomic status) household or a high SES
household. When the SES information matched the performance expecta-
tions (i.e., poor performance with low SES and high performance with high
SES), participants had more confidence in their thoughts and used them
more in making recommendations regarding the targets future education.
Importantly, the obtained findings were mediated by thought-confidence
(rather than thought content, and consistency-related measures).
8.3. Summary and additional message factors

The examples on matching described above suggest that the self-validation
approach can operate not only for totally unrelated thoughts and validating
variables, but also when the content of the thoughts (e.g., stereotypical or
nonstereotypical) directly relate to the validating variable. Other aspects of
the thoughts can also match (or mismatch) the recipient, leading to an
increase (or decrease) in confidence. For example, future research should
examine whether the position advocated in a persuasive proposal can be seen
as validating or invalidating information regarding one’s own position,
at least when highlighted after thinking about the persuasive proposal.
9. Context Effects Through Self-Validation

In the preceding sections we have described how source (e.g., credi-
bility), recipient (e.g., emotions), and message (e.g., matching) variables can
influence persuasion by affecting thought-confidence. Most of the time,
variables affect confidence in a particular direction. For example, source
credibility and positive emotions tend to signal high rather than low confi-
dence. However, the meaning and the valence of particular variables can
vary between individuals and situations. We argue that if the meaning of the
variable with respect to confidence changes, the subsequent effects could
also change (for an example of variations on the meaning of ‘‘fluency’’ see,
Briñol et al., 2006). This implies that the same variable might increase or
decrease certainty as a function of other variables, such as one’s naı̈ve
theories of the meaning of that variable. For example, consider the case of
mental repetition. Previous research has shown that repeating thoughts that
are perceived as uncontrollable might lead to nonadaptive self-related con-
sequences (by increasing rumination and uncontrollable intrusiveness),
whereas repeating thoughts that are perceived as controllable might lead
to more adaptive outcomes (by allowing strategies such as refocusing and
reframing; Segerstrom et al., 2003). These findings suggest that repetition
might increase or decrease certainty depending on various other factors such
as the specific mental construct that is rehearsed.
In addition to the specific construct rehearsed, people’s naı̈ve theories
about repetition are expected to moderate this phenomenon. For example,
a few repetitions could enhance confidence in the repeated construct, but
many repetitions might trigger doubt as continuing repetition might signal
that something is wrong with the thought. This logic is similar to the
findings observed in the literature on mere repeated exposure (e.g.,
Bornstein, 1989; Cacioppo & Petty, 1979; Zajonc, 1968) where initial
repetition leads to positive results that turn negative. In a preliminary test
of the later idea, Briñol et al. (2008) asked participants to list their positive or
negative thoughts regarding a persuasive proposal, and to report their
attitudes toward it. The number of times the thoughts were repeated
(1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11) was manipulated between subjects. As predicted, the
results revealed a curvilinear effect of repetition on confidence with confi-
dence first increasing and then decreasing with repetition. With very few
Self-Validation 99
repetitions, repetition increased confidence, and people relied on their

thoughts more when forming attitudes. However, after an early inflection
point in the curve, the thought-confidence effect reversed. Specifically,
asking participants to repeatedly write down the same thoughts reduced
the perceived confidence in the thoughts as a basis for judgment. As a
consequence of this reduction in thought-confidence following excessive
repetition, persuasion either decreased (for positive thoughts) or increased
(for negative thoughts). In line with the self-validation logic, this study
revealed that the number of repetitions moderates the relation between
repetition and confidence, therefore having opposite effects on persuasion.
10. Extending Self-Validation in Persuasion

Our review has documented that the self-validation framework pro-
vides a new process by which many previously studied variables can operate
in persuasion situations. We have focused our review on the effects of self-
validation processes in traditional persuasion settings in which attitudes
change with respect to particular issues and objects following presentation
of a message. Having demonstrated that some classic persuasion variables
such as source credibility and a recipient’s emotion can determine the extent
of influence by affecting thought confidence, we have started to examine
whether other classic phenomena in the attitude change literature can
similarly benefit from a consideration of self-validation processes. We next
describe how self-validation can provide a novel framework for understand-
ing persuasion in two essential additional domains: attitudinal ambivalence
and self-related phenomenon.
10.1. Ambivalence
Although we generally think of attitudes as being positive or negative, some
attitudes are characterized as being ambivalent in that the attitude object is
associated with both positive and negative features rather than being one-
sided or univalent (e.g., Kaplan, 1972). People typically report feeling
conflicted when they endorse both positive and negative aspects of the
same attitude object. Understanding ambivalence is important as it can
prevent people from changing undesired behaviors (e.g., smoking) into
desired ones. Ambivalence can emerge from multiple sources (e.g., Priester
& Petty, 2001; Thompson et al., 1995; see, Petty & Briñol, 2009), and has
been associated with important consequences, such as enhanced scrutiny of
the information in a persuasive message (Briñol et al., 2006; Maio et al.,
1996; Petty et al., 2006), especially when that processing holds the promise of
reducing the ambivalence (Clark et al., 2008).
In accord with the self-validation framework, DeMarree et al. (2008b)

conducted some initial studies to examine the extent to which differential
confidence in the positive or negative aspects of the attitude object contrib-
ute to the experience of ambivalence. To date, one puzzle is that consider-
ation of the positive and negative features of an attitude object allows just a
moderate prediction of the extent of subjective ambivalence (Priester &
Petty, 1996; Thompson et al., 1995). This prediction can be improved by
considering the extent to which the positive and negative aspects of an
attitude object are simultaneously accessible (Newby-Clark et al., 2002).
Furthermore, the self-validation approach suggests that prediction can be
further improved by considering the confidence people have in the positive
and negative aspects of an attitude. For example, by making people doubt
one side of their reactions, the overall sense of ambivalence can be reduced.
Conversely, by enhancing confidence in both positive and negative associa-
tions, the sense of ambivalence could be magnified. Thus, paradoxically,
selectively instilling doubt might potentially lead to enhanced overall con-
fidence, and instilling confidence in both sides would lead to more overall
doubt.
In one of the studies conducted to examine this idea, participants were
asked to generate both positive and negative thoughts regarding an attitude
object. As one might expect, this mixed pattern of thoughts produced both
objective and subjective ambivalence. After measuring how conflicted
people felt, we manipulated the confidence associated with just one side
of those mixed thoughts or both sides. Specifically, in one condition we
provided participants with false feedback leading them to believe that only
one half of their thoughts were shared and endorsed by other students,
whereas the other half was rejected. In another condition, participants
received false feedback suggesting agreement or disagreement with both
sides. As described earlier, this social consensus induction has been previ-
ously found to influence thought-confidence in a paradigm in which
participants’ thoughts were polarized in just one direction (Petty et al.,
2002, experiment 4). As expected from the self-validation logic, instilling
doubt (in one side of the thoughts), paradoxically, led to overall confidence
in the attitude, and instilling confidence (in both positive and negative
associations) was associated with more doubt in one’s overall position.
In addition to measuring confidence and ambivalence, in subsequent
studies in this series, we assessed the potential consequences for persuasion
by giving people the opportunity to receive different messages related to the
attitude object, and assessing their reactions to them. In line with the self-
validation logic outlined above, we found confidence (or doubt) associated
with just one side of the thoughts (positive or negative) reduced ambiva-
lence, and therefore undermined the need for information processing
associated with the attitude object. Conversely, confidence associated
Self-Validation 101
with both sides of the attitude object was shown to increase ambivalence,
and enhance subsequent information processing of a relevant persuasive
message.10
This line of work provides an important advance because all the work
conducted so far on self-validation has examined the effects of confidence/
doubt on all the thoughts that an individual has available at the time. Here,
however, we focus on differential confidence in part of one’s thoughts. The
present line of work also has the potential to provide an important addition
to prior work on ambivalence in suggesting a novel approach to reduce the
conflict and thus the negative consequences that sometimes follow from
ambivalence.
10.2. Personal relevance

In most of the persuasion literature, the self has been studied as a variable
relevant at the primary level of cognition. For example, when motivation
and ability to think are relatively low, merely linking an attitude object to
the self can increase liking of it, assuming that people hold themselves in
high regard (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1991; see also Greenwald et al., 2002;
Gawronski et al., 2009). If thinking is not constrained to be high or low,
however, then increasing self relevance before a persuasive message influ-
ences the amount of thinking about the message, increasing the effect of
argument quality on attitude change (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979; see also
Petty & Wegener, 1998).
However, as is the case with any variable, the self can be also relevant at
other levels of cognition, operating through a variety of processes (for a
review, see, e.g., Briñol et al., in press). Thus, when thinking is already
constrained to be high and the self relevance follows message processing, a
link to the self can serve a validation role. In one study exploring this idea,
Petty and Briñol (2008c) first asked participants to read either strong or
weak messages in favor of comprehensive exams. This manipulation led
participants to generate either positive or negative thoughts toward the
proposed policy. Importantly, those thoughts were subsequently made
more or less self-relevant by asking participants to think either about the
self-relevance or the general implications of the policy. Consistent with the
self-validation notion, the thoughts generated regarding the proposal had a
greater impact on attitudes when they were made self-relevant than when
they were not. Among other things, this research reveals that self-validation
can account for an already well-established persuasion outcome (e.g., a
greater argument quality effect under high- vs low- personal relevance),
10
This suggests that differential confidence in the two sides of an issue decreases ambivalence.
but by a different process than postulated previously (through thought

confidence vs amount of thoughts). This work also specifies the conditions
under which each process is more likely to operate. That is, self relevance
introduced before the message influences the amount of thinking (Petty &
Cacioppo, 1979), whereas self relevance induced after the message affects
thought-confidence.
In the above line of research thoughts were linked to the self by asking
participants to think about the self-relevance of the policy. There are other
ways to link thoughts to the self, and thus increase self-relevance. For
example, a self-link can be created by making the outcomes relevant to
the self (vs. others). Another approach relies on making the self (vs. others)
the origin of the thoughts. The perceived origin of the thoughts is an
important dimension of meta-cognition (Petty et al., 2007). In one of the
studies examining the perceived origin of one’s thoughts, Briñol et al.
(2008a) asked participants to generate positive or negative thoughts regard-
ing their bodies. Then, participants were led to believe that their thoughts
were originated externally (by an external source) or internally (by the self ).
Specifically, thoughts about the body were said to emerge from the partic-
ular views of their culture through socialization (external origin) or to
emerge from deep down inside of the self. Because participants had more
confidence in their thoughts in the later than in the former condition, the
direction of their thoughts generated had a greater impact on how satisfied
they felt with their bodies when the origin of the those thoughts was
perceived to be the self rather than an external source. As a result, perceiving
positive thoughts to come from the self (vs. others) made people feel better
about their body image, but produced the opposite effect for those with
negative thoughts.
In another study in this line of research, we replicated these findings for
attitudes toward fast food. Specifically, after thinking about the benefits or
costs of eating fast food, participants were led to believe that food-related
thoughts were learned from others (external source) or were innate (internal
source). As expected, the direction of the thoughts (positive or negative)
had a greater impact on the attitudes and behavioral intentions regarding
eating fast food when people perceived the self (vs. others) as the source of
the thoughts.
11. Confidence Applied to Confidence:

A Self-Validation Analysis
We have described how the thought-confidence induced by source,
message, recipient, and context variables can influence persuasion. Our
review on the effects of self-validation processes has also examined some
Self-Validation 103
cases in which these variables influenced not only thoughts in response to a

persuasive proposal, but also other kinds of cognitions such as self-related
thoughts or thoughts about other people. Thus, research on self-validation
suggests that confidence can also be applied to any primary cognition.
As mentioned earlier, the self-validation view argues that meta-cognitive
confidence can magnify the effect of any content that is currently available
in people’s minds, including not only the different kinds of thoughts
reviewed so far, but also other cognitions. That is, confidence applies to
whatever the salient or available mental contents are at the time.
Given that meta-cognitive confidence can be applied to any cognition,
an interesting case to examine would be when people have confidence (or
doubt) in their own confidence or doubt. Especially interesting would be
the case in which people doubt their own doubts. That is, doubt can be the
content of primary cognition, and therefore people can vary in the extent to
which they have confidence or doubt in the original self-doubt (i.e., second
order cognition). For example, consider a person who suffers from chronic
self-doubt which is typically conceptualized and measured as a belief about
oneself (e.g., ‘‘I am an insecure person’’; Oleson et al., 2000). If people with
chronic doubt are given a situational induction of certainty, they might
apply this sense of confidence to the chronic doubt which would further
reinforce the doubt (e.g., ‘‘I’m confident that I am an insecure person’’).
On the other hand, if people with the same chronic doubt were given a
situational induction of doubt, they might apply this doubt to the accessible
chronic doubt, which could lead to the opposite conclusion (e.g., ‘‘I’m not
confident that I am insecure; therefore, I might be a secure person’’). If these
processes occur, then a person with chronic doubt who was given a doubt
induction would feel more certainty than a person with the same chronic
doubt who was given a certainty induction. This prediction stands in stark
contrast to what would be predicted from an additive combination of
chronic and state uncertainty, in which cases of ‘‘double doubt’’ would be
associated with extreme uncertainty.
These predictions were examined in a series of studies in which doubt
was present at both the level of primary and secondary cognition. Indeed, a
traditional perspective on the accessibility of doubt holds that multiple
sources of doubt activation should lead to increased levels of uncertainty
(e.g., Bargh et al., 1986; Srull & Wyer, 1980). In contrast, we proposed and
found that under some conditions two sequential sources of doubt activa-
tion result in decreased levels of uncertainty. In one study about doubting
your own doubt (Wichman et al., 2008), participants were first primed with
doubt or certainty and then exposed to a manipulation associated with
either confidence (e.g., head nodding) or doubt (head shaking; see Briñol &
Petty, 2003). Supporting the idea that people can either trust or doubt
their own doubts, head nodding (vs. shaking) accentuated (vs. attenuated)
the impact of the initial doubt versus certainty manipulation (see Fig. 2.8).
5.0
4.5
4.0
Uncertainty
Confidence
3.5
Doubt
3.0
2.5
2.0
Horizontal Vertical
Head movement
Figure 2.8 Uncertainty as a function of head movements and initial confidence or

doubt. Adapted from Wichman et al. (2008, Experiment 2).
This meta-cognitive idea that doubt following doubt can undermine

doubt (i.e., doubt + doubt = confidence) has important implications for
persuasion. For example, in one study Wichman et al. (2008, cf. Briñol
et al., in press) manipulated the extent to which participants relied on their
own doubt as measured with the self-doubt scale (Oleson et al., 2000). To test
the processing implications of double doubt, a sample of high self-doubt
individuals was randomly assigned to either a doubt priming or neutral
priming condition. Thus, half the participants were essentially placed in a
state of single-doubt (high chronic self-doubt with the neutral prime) and half
were placed in a state of double-doubt (high chronic self-doubt with the
doubt prime). Then, participants were randomly assigned to receive strong or
weak arguments in favor of a foster care program. The gist of a strong
argument in favor of the foster program was that brothers and sisters are an
additional source of love and support for the social development of the child.
In contrast, the gist of a weak argument in favor of the foster program was that
the program recognizes that children need other children to fight with, and
brothers and sisters provide an ideal opportunity for this to occur. As noted,
considerable prior research has shown that when people are either unable or
unmotivated to process a message, the impact of the quality of the arguments
on judgment is less than when thinking is high (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).
Based on previous literature on uncertainty and message processing (e.g.,
Briñol et al., 2006; Petty et al., 2006; Tiedens & Linton, 2001; Weary &
Edwards, 1997), those in a state of single-doubt were expected to process
information more carefully and therefore to discriminate between weak and
strong persuasive arguments more so than individuals experiencing double
doubt. This is because double doubt should lead to less uncertainty. Consis-
tent with this reasoning the results revealed that conditions associated with
single doubt (e.g., high chronic self-doubt with the neutral prime) produced
Self-Validation 105
greater information processing (i.e., more argument quality effects) than

conditions associated with double-doubt (e.g., high chronic self-doubt with
the doubt prime).
This study reveals that people’s primary beliefs about themselves (low vs
high doubt) can be qualified by a situational uncertainty induction in a way
consistent with the meta-cognitive logic, and that the results of double
doubt are consequential for information processing and persuasion.
As noted, this line of research is also consistent with the idea that meta-
cognitive confidence (and doubt) can be associated with any type of
cognition, including one’s own doubts.
12. Self-Validation Effects Beyond the

Persuasion Context
The research described in this review illustrates that self-validation can
provide a useful framework for understanding how a wide variety of
cognitions can be validated (or invalidated) by a diverse set of variables.
Whether the manipulations involved source credibility, bodily responses of
the recipient, message matching, or thought repetition, and whether the
cognitions were about a persuasive proposal or had contents of a different
nature, self-validation effects were apparent suggesting that people often
look for ways to validate whatever mental contents have been activated.
People can even have confidence (or doubt) in the validity of their own
confidence (or doubt), and self-validation can explain those cases of double
doubt leading to certainty. After having described how confidence can be
applied to mental contents relevant for persuasion, next we briefly mention
how confidence applies to whatever people have in mind, including
emotions and other primed constructs.
12.1. Emotions
We have already explained how emotions can validate cognitions. We also
argue that one’s emotion-relevant thoughts can be validated or invalidated
thereby affecting a person’s emotional experience. In a test of the idea that
emotion-relevant cognitions can be validated, Rucker et al. (2008a) used an
ease of retrieval manipulation to induce a sense of confidence or doubt in
one’s thoughts. In one study, participants were asked to write about either a
few (easy) or many (difficult) happy events from the last year. When
generating happy experiences was easy, people had more confidence in
these experiences and this led to greater reports of happiness than when
generating these experiences was difficult. In another study, participants
were asked to write about happy or sad experiences with either their
dominant or nondominant hand. Writing emotional experiences with the

dominant hand should lead to greater confidence in the experiences and
greater emotional feelings than when writing with the nondominant hand
(Briñol & Petty, 2003). In accord with this assumption, writing about
emotional experiences with the dominant hand led to a larger biasing
impact of the activated emotion on subsequent judgments of the likelihood
of irrelevant emotional events than writing with the nondominant hand.
These studies revealed that emotional thoughts can be affected by meta-
cognitive confidence, thereby influencing the emotion experienced. Given
the prominent role of emotions in persuasion (for a review, see Petty et al.,
2003), understanding all the ways in which thoughts are validated by
emotions and emotional thoughts are validated (Briñol et al., 2006) seems
to be a very fruitful avenue for future research.
It is important to note that the research described above focused on how
the confidence associated with one’s thoughts affected the experience of
emotions. Other research has examined how, after people have already
experienced an emotion, confidence can affect whether the emotion is
used in subsequent judgments (e.g., Gasper & Bramesfeld, 2005). For
example, Pham (2004) found that manipulating people’s trust in their
feelings affected whether people used their emotions in subsequent judg-
ments. This finding is analogous to work on attitude-behavior consistency
whereby people trust equivalent attitudes differentially when they are held
with different degrees of confidence (e.g., Fazio & Zanna, 1978; Rucker
et al., 2008b). In our self-validation research, however, confidence did not
affect trust and use of the emotion, but rather confidence in emotion-
relevant thoughts led to different perceptions of the extent of the emotion
itself. This difference suggests that confidence can have multiple and inde-
pendent effects both on assessing one’s degree of emotion (as in the research
by Rucker et al., 2008a) and in determining whether to use one’s emotion
(as in the research by Pham and others).
12.2. Priming
One of the most intriguing areas of research in recent years has concerned
how subtle primes of various sorts (e.g., stereotypes, goals, etc.), can affect
judgments and behavior (e.g., Higgins, 1996). In one study examining self-
validation processes in this domain, DeMarree et al. (2008b) subliminally
primed participants with words related to the Black (vs. White) stereotype.
Following this induction, participants were instructed to use their heads to
follow a ball moving vertically or horizontally on the screen. Consistent
with the self-validation logic for vertical versus horizontal head movements,
we found that the direction of the prime affected participants’ felt aggression
on an implicit measure as well as their deliberative ratings of closeness to
African-Americans in the head nodding but not the head shaking condition.
Self-Validation 107
Thus, as was the case with head nodding affecting confidence in thoughts to
a persuasive message (Briñol & Petty, 2003), so too did head nodding appear
to affect the validity and use of subtly activated mental content via priming.
In another experiment of this series, participants subliminally primed
with the concept of resistance (vs. persuasion), showed more resistance to
subsequent persuasive proposals. However, this only occurred when parti-
cipants were nodding (compared with shaking) their heads immediately
following the priming induction. In still other studies on priming we
activated a goal followed by a validation manipulation (DeMarree et al.,
2008a) and in each case the behavioral effects of the goal were more evident
when the goal priming was followed by a confidence rather than a doubt
induction. As was the case with emotional thoughts, our studies on priming
provide several key advances other than extending the range of mental
contents that are subject to meta-cognitive influence. For example, this
research shed light on the study of self-regulation by testing whether the
kind of validating variables described in this review (such as nodding,
power, emotion) can be associated with either impulse (e.g., spending
more money and engaging in more risky behaviors) or control (e.g.,
spending less money and engaging in less risky behaviors) depending on
the direction of the primed goals that confident people (e.g., power holders,
people nodding) have in mind. One of the ironic implications of the self-
validation process is that highly confident people (e.g., high power indivi-
duals) might sometimes engage in less action than their low confidence
partners (e.g., low power individuals) depending on the salient mental
contents available.
13. Multiple Roles of Confidence

Before closing this review, it is important to note that although we
have focused on the validating role for confidence, like other variables,
confidence can play different roles in information processing and judgment
depending on the circumstances. As noted earlier, examining the validity of
thoughts is a form of meta-cognition, and therefore it requires high thinking
conditions (Petty et al., 2007). Indeed, research on the self-validation
hypothesis has demonstrated that this mechanism requires a level of elabo-
ration that is sufficiently high for individuals to both generate thoughts, and
to care about their validity.
Under other circumstances, however, confidence can affect judgment
by alternative mechanisms. In accord with the ELM, confidence, like any
other variable, can affect judgments not only by validating thoughts, but also
by affecting the direction and amount of thoughts, and by serving as an

argument or a simple cue.11 We briefly describe these roles next.
First, when thinking is low, confidence should serve as a simple associa-
tive cue and produce judgments consistent with its valence. Given that
confidence is often seen as something good, and doubt as something bad
(e.g., Briñol et al., 2006), confidence can operate through low effort
mechanisms, such as serving as input to a confidence heuristic. For example,
when the extent of thinking is low, a person might draw direct inferences
from confidence, such as ‘‘if I feel confident, I must like it.’’
Second, when thinking is high, confidence can serve in other roles. First,
confidence can be evaluated as evidence when it provides diagnostic infor-
mation about the merits of an object. For example, one’s own confidence
can be evaluated as evidence when deciding whether to apply for high
(vs. low) competitive jobs. Also, when thinking is high, confidence can bias
thoughts in a positive manner, again assuming that confidence is positively
valenced. If people are thinking about themselves, confidence is likely to
make the self-thoughts generated more positive than they would be in the
absence of such confidence. In such cases, confidence (relative to doubt)
would be likely to increase self-evaluations by biasing the self-thoughts that
come to mind. As a consequence of this unrealistic optimism, even when
engaged in careful and detailed thinking, confidence can lead people to
overestimate their skills and underestimate their own faults.12
When people are thinking about things other than themselves, such as a
persuasive proposal, self-confidence could sometimes result in negative
outcomes. That is, when thinking about a proposal is high, confidence
(vs. doubt) can lead people to defend their own existing attitudes more, and
as a consequence, generate more counter-arguments against the proposal or
derogate the source.
Third, when elaboration is not constrained to be high or low, confi-
dence has been shown to affect the extent of information processing, with
confident people engaging in less thought than people lacking in confidence
(e.g., Briñol et al., 2006; Petty et al., 2006; Tiedens & Linton, 2001; Weary
& Edwards, 1997). One reason for this is that when people feel confident in
their current views, there is little need to seek additional information that
might lead to change. In contrast, when people lack confidence, they are
11
Although there might be other processes relevant to understanding how confidence operates, we focus on
this particular set of processes articulated by the ELM because they have been the most fruitful way to
account for how many variables other than confidence can affect judgment (see, Petty & Briñol, 2006, for a
discussion). Thus, we consider that each of these processes can be applied to social judgment more broadly.
12
Also under high thinking conditions, if confidence was made salient and people perceived it as a possible
biasing factor, they might attempt to correct their judgments for the perceived contaminating impact of their
own confidence (Wegener & Petty, 1997).
Self-Validation 109
likely to seek out and carefully scrutinize information that might provide a
more validated opinion. Consistent with predictions, as noted earlier, when
confidence has been induced prior to message exposure, and elaboration
was not constrained to be high or low, confidence (whether stemming from
power, emotion, or other factors) affected the extent of information pro-
cessing, with confident people engaging in less thought than people lacking
in confidence (e.g., Briñol et al., 2007b,c). Also consistent with this view,
other forms of doubt (stemming from a variety of self-discrepancies, such as
explicit–implicit conflict) have been found to increase information proces-
sing (see Petty & Briñol, 2009, for a review).
In sum, the ELM has described a finite number of ways in which any
variable can affect judgment. In accord with this framework, we have
described in this section how confidence can operate by: (1) serving as a
simple cue, (2) serving as a piece of substantive evidence (i.e., an argument),
(3) affecting the direction of processing (i.e., introducing a bias to the
ongoing thinking), and (4) affecting the extent of information processing
by influencing motivation or ability to think. In this review, we focused on
a fifth mechanism through which confidence (whether stemming from
emotion, bodily movements, or credible sources) can work, self-validation,
which also appears to have considerable integrative potential.
14. Final Remarks

We have described the basic mechanisms by which confidence can
affect attitudes and persuasion, highlighting the role of a recently discovered
process, self-validation. In this final section, we describe some remaining issues
relevant to confidence and its influence on social judgments. First, although
self-validation focuses on confidence as the main meta-cognitive dimension,
it is important to note that other meta-cognitive aspects can be also explored
in relation to thoughts. For example, it is well-established that thoughts and
mental constructs that are highly accessible are more consequential in terms of
durability and subsequent impact than less accessible thoughts (e.g.,
DeMarree et al., 2007). Although accessibility and other features of thoughts
(e.g., importance) are often related to confidence, they are relatively inde-
pendent features of cognition (for a review, see, Petty et al., 2007). In this
review, we also have differentiated between confidence and other previously
studied dimensions, such as desirability, likelihood, and diagnosticity.
Second, in the present review, we have emphasized relatively transitory
situational (e.g., source credibility) and individual (e.g., body postures, ease)
factors that can influence thought confidence. In addition to these situational
determinants of thought confidence, there also are dispositional determinants
of the use of mental contents. As described, individual differences in the
operation of meta-cognitive processes such as self-validation have been iden-

tified previously (e.g., need for cognition). Furthermore, we have recently
examined chronic individual differences in the use of mental contents.
In particular, we found that attitudes were more in line with participants’
thoughts when participants were high rather than low in self-confidence.
Specifically, across several studies, DeMarree et al. (2008a) showed that
increases in self-confidence (measured as self-esteem certainty, attitude
certainty, self-attributes certainty, trait self-confidence, and judgmental
confidence) were associated with increased use of mental contents. As
self-confidence increased, participants’ attitudes became more congruent
with their thoughts. Results held across different thought inductions, and
after controlling for self-esteem and other related constructs. Furthermore, as
expected from a self-validation approach, these findings were moderated by
amount of elaboration (i.e., only occurred among individuals engaging in
effortful thought) and mediated by thought-confidence. This line of research
provides a more complete understanding of the diverse nature of the determi-
nants of thought confidence.
Finally, one might wonder whether many of the self-validation effects are
due to the manner in which a variable (e.g., source credibility, recipient power,
nodding, or positive mood) amplifies thought-confidence or how that variable
(e.g., low credibility) diminishes confidence in thoughts. Without a control
group it can be difficult to know whether the reviewed effects on thought-
confidence resulted from validation or invalidation of thoughts. We argue that
even though having a control group can allow for more precise statements,
ultimately it is not necessarily critical for our contribution. That is, although we
have found that, for example, both happy and sad emotions are each capable of
producing a difference from a neutral mood control group (Briñol et al., 2007a,
experiment 4), whether positive or negative emotions would always have
greater impact over a neutral mood group would depend on many background
factors. For example, if we used a persuasion topic for which people had high
knowledge, the default level of thought confidence should be relatively high
making the sad (low confidence) group more likely to differ from the control.
On the other hand, if knowledge of the topic was low (i.e., it was unfamiliar),
default (control) thought confidence would likely be low leading the happy
condition to show the greater difference from the control. Given that in any one
study other background factors would also come into play by affecting the
default level of confidence, reading too much into the control group in any one
study is potentially misleading if people view a control group in a particular
context to imply a bidirectional effect that will be equivalent in magnitude across
different issues, people, and situations. In the real world, the background level of
confidence would vary dramatically from situation to situation and thus whether
the ‘‘action’’ would be in the confidence or doubt condition would vary with
these real world background factors.
Self-Validation 111
15. Summary and Conclusion

In this article we have argued that although persuasion is complex, it
can be understood by breaking the processes responsible for attitude change
into a finite set as articulated by the elaboration likelihood model of
persuasion. By focusing on underlying mechanisms, we now know that
the extent and nature of a person’s thoughts to external information are
often more important than the information itself, and that the thoughts
people generate only determinate judgments to the extent that people have
confidence in them. Thus, in each of the studies reviewed, we showed that
not only does the content of what is activated matter (e.g., thoughts in
response to a persuasive proposal), but so too does the perceived sense of
confidence in one’s mental contents. Whether the validating manipulations
involve power or head nodding, or whether the primary cognitions are
about persuasive proposals, or oneself, or are emotional or rational in nature,
the self-validation logic suggests that people sometimes look for ways to
validate whatever mental contents have been activated. Together, these
studies illustrate that self-validation can provide a useful framework for
understanding how a wide variety of cognitions can influence (or not)
judgment and behavior by being validated (or invalidated) by a diverse set
of variables.
We have examined how self-validation not only relates to some classic
topics in the psychology of the source of persuasion (e.g., credibility,
similarity), the message (e.g., matching), the recipient (e.g., bodily
responses, emotions, self-affirmation, power, and ease of retrieval), and
the context of persuasion (e.g., social consensus, repetition) but also to
more recent, or relatively novel phenomenon (e.g., oneself as a source,
self vs other origin of thoughts). Furthermore, self-validation processes
have shed light on a variety of phenomenon relevant to attitude change
from a meta-cognitive perspective, such as attitudinal ambivalence and
self-relevance.
Research on self-validation has shown that this new mechanism can
account for some already established persuasion outcomes (e.g., more
persuasion with happy than sad mood, with high than low credibility
sources, when argument generation is easy rather than difficult, when
nodding rather than shaking one’s head), but by a different process than
postulated previously. Moreover, we have been also able to obtain findings
opposite to those typically observed (e.g., more persuasion when shaking
than nodding or for low than high credible sources). Thus, a consideration of
self-validation processes might expand our understanding of the dynamics of
other unexplored variables that could influence persuasion either by increasing
(e.g., visualization) or decreasing (e.g., negation) thought-confidence.
In closing, it is worth noting that research conducted on self-validation

has examined the effect of thought confidence with regard to a variety of
attitude objects, ranging from consumer products (e.g., cell phones) to
health policies (e.g., mandatory vaccinations), to social issues (e.g., foster
care programs), to the self (oneself as a job candidate). The use of a wide
variety of topics, including some that are relatively important to our parti-
cipants (e.g., a change in crucial university policies), increase the potential
applicability of the self-validation process. Furthermore, the obtained find-
ings on different dependent measures support the notion that the current
results have real-world implications.
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C H A P T E R T H R E E
Action-Based Model of Dissonance:

A Review, Integration, and Expansion
of Conceptions of Cognitive Conflict
Eddie Harmon-Jones,* David M. Amodio,†
and Cindy Harmon-Jones*
Contents
1. Overview of the Chapter 120
2. Overview of the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance 121
2.1. Experimental paradigms used to test dissonance theory 122
2.2. Alternative theoretical explanations 123
3. Action-Based Model of Dissonance: Why do Dissonance
Processes Occur? 128
4. Tests of the Action-Based Model 130
4.1. Action-orientation and spreading of alternatives 130
4.2. Neural activity underlying dissonance
and dissonance reduction 131
4.3. Increasing strength of action tendencies
and discrepancy reduction 140
5. Considering the Action-Based Model and Other Modes of
Dissonance Reduction 142
6. Individual and Cultural Differences 144
6.1. Self-esteem 145
6.2. Preference for consistency 146
6.3. Action-orientation 147
6.4. Cultural differences 147
6.5. Concerns about individual differences research 148
6.6. Creating a new individual differences measure related
to dissonance processes 149
7. Conclusion 159
Acknowledgments 160
References 160
* Department of Psychology, Texas A&M University, 4235 TAMU, College Station, Texas, USA
{
Department of Psychology, New York University, 6 Washington Place, New York, USA

119
120 Eddie Harmon-Jones et al.
Abstract
An action-based model of dissonance is presented. This model accepts the
original theory’s proposal that a sufficient cognitive inconsistency causes the
negative affective state of dissonance. It extends the original theory by proposing
why cognitive inconsistency prompts dissonance and dissonance reduction. After
reviewing past theoretical and empirical developments on cognitive dissonance
theory, we describe the action-based model and present results from behavioral
and physiological experiments that have tested predictions derived from this
model. In particular, this evidence converges with recent neuroscience evidence
in suggesting that the anterior cingulate cortex and left prefrontal cortical region
are involved in conflict detection and resolution, respectively. We end by reviewing
research on individual differences in dissonance arousal and reduction, and
present a new measure designed to assess these individual differences.
1. Overview of the Chapter

Cognitive dissonance theory, first proposed by Festinger (1957), has
generated hundreds of experiments and is considered one of the most
influential theories in psychology ( Jones, 1985). The theory and the
research it has inspired have led to an increased understanding of attitude
and behavior change processes, as well as an understanding of the relation-
ships between cognition, perception, emotion, and motivation. In this
article, we present the core ideas behind Festinger’s original theoretical
statement and discuss some notable attempts by researchers to revise and
extend the basic theory. We then describe a more recent theoretical con-
ceptualization of dissonance, referred to as an action-based model, which
provides an overarching framework for understanding dissonance processes,
and for integrating a wide range of data and previous theoretical revisions to
Festinger’s theory.
Briefly stated, the action-based model begins with the assumption that
many perceptions and cognitions serve to activate action tendencies with
little or no conscious deliberation. This assumption is consistent with several
perspectives in psychological science, such as William James’ (1890) ideo-
motor conception, Gibson’s (1966, 1979) ecological approach to perception,
and subsequent elaborations of these basic ideas (Berkowitz, 1984;
Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; Fiske, 1992; McArthur & Baron, 1983; Smith
& Semin, 2004). The action-based model goes further to suggest that when
these ‘‘cognitions’’ with action implications come into conflict, a negative
affective state is aroused, referred to as dissonance. Our model posits that
dissonance affect is aroused because conflicting action-based cognitions have
Action-Based Model of Dissonance 121
the potential to interfere with effective action. The organism is motivated to

reduce this negative affect and ultimately reduce the ‘‘cognitive inconsistency’’
in order to behave effectively. This way of conceptualizing dissonance
processes addresses many problems with past theories concerned with
dissonance. It also suggests a broad organizing framework for integrating and
understanding a wide array of other nondissonance theories and research.
2. Overview of the Theory of

Cognitive Dissonance
The original theory of cognitive dissonance predicted that when an
individual holds two or more elements of knowledge that are relevant to each
other but inconsistent with one another, a state of discomfort is created. This
unpleasant state is referred to as ‘‘dissonance.’’ According to the theory, the
magnitude of dissonance in relation to a cognition can be formulated as equal
to D/D þ C, where D is the sum of cognitions dissonant with a particular
cognition and C is the sum of cognitions consonant with that same particular
cognition, with each cognition weighted for importance (see Sakai, 1999;
Shultz & Lepper, 1999, for precise mathematical models).
According to the original theory, the unpleasant state of dissonance
motivates individuals to engage in psychological work in an effort to reduce
the inconsistency between cognitions. Festinger (1957, p. 3) wrote,
‘‘The existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, will
motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve conso-
nance.’’ So, if a dieter consumed a fattening meal, he would likely be in a
state of dissonance. Assuming that he stays committed to the diet, the theory
would predict that he will reduce dissonance by adding consonant cogni-
tions (e.g., ‘‘the diet will improve my appearance’’), subtracting dissonant
cognitions (e.g., ‘‘fattening foods are not very tasty’’), increasing the impor-
tance of consonant cognitions (e.g., ‘‘my health is the most important thing
in life’’), or decreasing the importance of dissonant cognitions (e.g., ‘‘sensory
pleasures are not very important’’).
Researchers have most often measured dissonance reduction with atti-
tude change. Attitude change in response to a state of dissonance is expected
to be in the direction of the cognition that is most resistant to change. In
laboratory tests of the theory, knowledge about recent behavior is usually
assumed to be the cognition most resistant to change. If one has recently
performed a behavior, it is usually difficult to convince oneself that the
behavior did not occur. Thus, attitudes often change to become more
consistent with a recent behavioral commitment.
2.1. Experimental paradigms used to test dissonance theory

Three experimental paradigms constitute the majority of tests of dissonance
theory. Each paradigm induces participants to experience an inconsistency
between cognitions and then gives them an opportunity to express a change in
attitudes. The change in attitudes is measured, and is presumed to reflect the
degree of dissonance reduction. In this section, we describe the basic logic
behind each of these paradigms to provide the reader with a basis for evaluating
much of the research conducted on dissonance over the past half century.
2.1.1. Free choice

After a decision between alternatives, all of the cognitions that favor the
chosen alternative are consonant with the decision, whereas all the cogni-
tions that favor the rejected alternative are dissonant. An individual’s expe-
rience of dissonance is greater when the number and importance of
dissonant cognitions is higher, and/or when the number and importance
of consonant cognitions is lower. The dissonance an individual experiences
is typically greater after choosing between alternatives that are closer in
attractiveness (as long as each alternative has several distinguishing charac-
teristics). Dissonance caused by a decision can be reduced by viewing the
chosen alternative as more attractive and/or viewing the rejected alternative
as less attractive. Brehm (1956) conducted the first free choice experiment.
In it, participants made either an easy or a difficult decision between two
alternatives (i.e., household objects such as an automatic toaster and a
fluorescent desk lamp). The difficult decision was one in which the alter-
natives were close in attractiveness, whereas the easy decision was one in
which the two alternatives were very different in their attractiveness (i.e.,
one alternative was much more attractive than the other). Participants were
asked to evaluate each of the alternatives before and after their decision to
choose one of the alternatives. After an easy decision, attitudes toward the
alternatives did not change. In contrast, after a difficult decision, attitudes
toward the alternatives changed, such that they became more negative
toward the rejected alternative (and slightly more positive toward the
chosen alternative). This method of reducing dissonance by changing
one’s attitudes toward the two choice options to be more consistent with
a decision has been referred to as ‘‘spreading of alternatives.’’
2.1.2. Induced compliance

Dissonance should also be aroused when a person acts in a way that is
contrary to his or her attitudes, because the recent behavior is inconsistent
with one’s preexisting attitude. But how can an experimenter unobtrusively
induce a research participant to perform such an act? In the first test of this
prediction, Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) had participants perform a
boring task that involved turning a series of wooden pegs. After completing
this very tedious task, participants were paid either $1 or $20 to tell ‘‘another
participant’’ that the task was interesting. Festinger and Carlsmith reasoned
that lying for a payment of $20 should not arouse much dissonance, because
$20 provides sufficient justification for the counterattitudinal behavior (i.e.,
it adds cognitions consonant with the behavior). By comparison, being paid
$1 for performing the same behavior should arouse much dissonance,
because $1 was just enough justification for the behavior (i.e., it adds
fewer consonant cognitions than $20). As expected, participants in the $1
(low-justification) condition changed their attitudes to be more positive
toward the task, whereas participants in the $20 (high-justification) condi-
tion did not change their attitudes. Thus, this paradigm was successful in
arousing dissonance and motivating dissonance-reducing attitude change.
2.1.3. Effort justification

Dissonance is aroused whenever a person engages in an unpleasant activity to
obtain some desirable outcome. From the cognition that the activity is
unpleasant, it follows that one would not engage in the activity. In other
words, the cognition that the activity is unpleasant is dissonant with engaging
in the activity. As an individual puts increasing effort into an unpleasant
activity, the dissonance he or she feels as a result of the activity should
increase. Dissonance can be reduced by changing one’s view of the outcome
to be even more desirable (a means for adding consonant cognitions).
In the first experiment designed to test these theoretical ideas, Aronson
and Mills (1959) had women undergo a severe or mild ‘‘initiation’’ to
become a member of a group. In the severe initiation condition, the
women engaged in an embarrassing activity to join the group, whereas in
the mild initiation condition, the women engaged in an activity that was not
very embarrassing to join the group. The group turned out to be rather dull
and boring. The women in the severe initiation condition evaluated the
group more favorably than the women in the mild initiation condition.
The above paradigms continue to be used fruitfully in research (e.g.,
Beauvois & Joule, 1996; Cooper, 2007; Harmon-Jones & Mills, 1999;
Olson & Stone, 2005). Other experimental paradigms have been used to
test the theory but they are used less frequently and because of space
limitations are not described here (Wicklund & Brehm, 1976).
2.2. Alternative theoretical explanations

After these and other dissonance results appeared, some theorists began to
question whether the results were due to motivational processes. These
theorists suggested that attitude change was due to cold, purely cognitive
processes such as self-perception (Bem, 1967) or to managing one’s impres-
sion to others (Tedeschi et al., 1971). However, subsequent research con-
firmed that dissonance is best characterized as a motivated process (for
reviews, Harmon-Jones, 2000a,b). For example, individuals experiencing

the state of dissonance have been found to exhibit heightened electrodermal
activity (which is associated with activation of the sympathetic nervous
system; Elkin & Leippe, 1986; Harmon-Jones et al., Simon & Nelson,
1996) and report increased negative affect (e.g., Elliot & Devine, 1994;
Harmon-Jones, 2000c; Zanna & Cooper, 1974). After cognitive discrep-
ancy is reduced (i.e., attitude change occurs), self-reported negative affect
is reduced (Elliot & Devine, 1994; Harmon-Jones, 2000c). Moreover,
research using a misattribution paradigm reveals that discrepancy reduction
is motivated by the need to reduce negative affect (Zanna & Cooper, 1974).
Thus, this research showing that negative affect occurs as a result of cognitive
dissonance and that it creates a motivation to engage in dissonance-reducing
activities strongly suggests that the dissonance process is a motivated one.
Beginning in the late 1960s, researchers began to propose motivational
explanations for dissonance effects that differed from Festinger’s originally
proposed theory. Whereas the original theory focused on a very basic incom-
patibility between cognitions, these newer theories invoked higher-order,
more complex processes. They changed the focus from inconsistency to the
individual’s self-concept and the individual’s concern with harming others.
2.2.1. Self-consistency
In self-consistency theory, Aronson (1969, 1999) proposed that dissonance
only occurs when a person acts in a way that violates his or her self-concept,
that is, when a person performs a behavior inconsistent with his or her view
of the self. Because most persons view themselves in a positive light, such
that they are competent, rational, and moral, dissonance is experienced
when a person behaves in an incompetent, irrational, or immoral way.
One of the primary predictions derived from this revision is that high self-
esteem individuals should respond with more dissonance reduction than
low self-esteem individuals, because dissonance experiments induce indivi-
duals to act in ways discrepant from a positive self-view. Studies testing this
prediction have produced mixed results: some showed that high self-esteem
individuals showed greater attitude change, some showed that low self-
esteem individuals showed greater attitude change, and some found no
differences between self-esteem groups (see Stone, 2003, for review).
Also, Beauvois and Joule (1996, 1999) obtained results that appear incom-
patible with this self-consistency revision. Therefore, the experience of
dissonance and the engagement in dissonance-reducing activities does not
appear to be limited to discrepancies involving the self-concept.
2.2.2. Self-affirmation
In his alternative to Festinger’s dissonance theory, Steele (1988) proposed
that individuals possess a motive to maintain an overall self-image of moral
and adaptive adequacy. He stated that dissonance-induced attitude change
occurs because dissonance threatens this positive self-image. Whereas

Festinger’s dissonance theory posited that individuals are motivated to
reconcile inconsistent cognitions, Steele proposed that, instead, individuals
are merely motivated to affirm the integrity of the self or maintain a
‘‘perception of global integrity, that is, of overall moral and adaptive
adequacy’’ (Steele et al., 1993, p. 885; see Sherman & Cohen, 2006, for a
recent review). In support of this idea, Steele presented experiments where,
following a dissonance induction, participants either were or were not
presented with an opportunity to affirm an important value. When partici-
pants were allowed to affirm an important value, dissonance-related attitude
change did not occur.
However, Simon et al. (1995) presented evidence supporting an alternative
explanation for Steele’s findings that was in line with the original theory of
dissonance. Festinger’s original theory proposed that the degree of dissonance
experienced depended upon the importance of the dissonant and consonant
cognitions. Simon et al. proposed that the mechanism by which self-affirma-
tion reduced dissonance was by reducing the importance of the cognitions
involved in the dissonance. They hypothesized that making an important
value salient could reduce dissonance by reducing the individual’s perception
of the importance of the dissonant act, even if the value was unrelated to the
self-concept. They conducted an experiment in which, following the induc-
tion of dissonance, participants were either given an opportunity to affirm an
important value (i.e., ‘‘a self-affirmation condition, rank issues such as politics
in term of their personal importance’’), asked to consider a value that was not
important to them personally but was of general importance (i.e., ‘‘an issue-
salient condition, rank the same issues as above but in terms of their impor-
tance in general’’), or were given no special instructions (control condition).
Participants in the control condition changed their attitudes to be more
consistent with the induced compliance behavior, as expected. Participants
in both the self-affirmation and issue salient conditions did not change their
attitudes. Writing about an important value caused participants to reduce the
importance of the behavior and attitude to the point that attitude change did
not occur. This occurred even when the values were not personally important
and thus not self-affirming. Other evidence has been presented that is difficult
to interpret in self-affirmation theory terms, such as evidence suggesting that
self-affirmations relevant to the recent dissonant act increase rather than
decrease dissonance-related attitude change (Aronson et al., 1999).
The self models of dissonance also have difficulty explaining the disso-
nance effects produced in rats (Lawrence & Festinger, 1962), as rats are
believed to lack self conceptions of morality, rationality, and competence.
Recent research has revealed that four-year-old humans and capuchin
monkeys, who also lack the complex self-concepts which would seem to
be required by self models of dissonance, show evidence of dissonance
reduction (Egan et al., 2007). Hence, although self aspects appear to
moderate dissonance processes, they are not necessary to cause dissonance

(Harmon-Jones, 2000d; Stone & Cooper, 2003). In terms of the original
theory, self-related cognitions would be expected to affect the magnitude of
dissonance, as cognitions related to the self are often important to an adult
human. In other words, the experimental results derived from the self
models are compatible with the original theory. Furthermore, the self
models are unable to explain basic dissonance motivation effects concerning
discrepancies that do not involve the self.
2.2.3. Aversive consequences

Cooper and Fazio (1984) proposed that the discomfort experienced in disso-
nance experiments was not due to an inconsistency between the individual’s
cognitions, but rather to feeling personally responsible for producing an
aversive consequence. In support of this idea, Cooper and Worchel (1970)
replicated and extended Festinger and Carlsmith’s (1959) classic experiment in
which participants were given low or high justification to claim that a boring
task was interesting. In addition to the conditions of the original experiment,
Cooper and Worchel added a condition in which, when the participant told
the confederate that the boring task was interesting, the confederate was not
convinced. Attitude change occurred only in the low-justification condition
where the confederate believed the participant. This result and others
(for review, see Cooper & Fazio, 1984) have been interpreted as indicating
that dissonance-related attitude change only occurs when individuals feel
personally responsible for producing an aversive consequence.
According to the original theory of cognitive dissonance, the production
of aversive consequences would be expected to increase the amount of
dissonance produced because an aversive consequence in itself may be an
important dissonant cognition, or it may further strengthen one’s behavioral
commitment (see Harmon-Jones, 1999). However, the original theory
would deny that an aversive consequence is necessary to produce dissonance.
In the induced-compliance experiments testing the necessity of aversive
consequences, there are a number of reasons why attitude change may have
occurred only when participants’ behavior led to aversive consequences.
The null finding that attitudes were unchanged in the no-aversive-conse-
quences conditions, like all null effects, is difficult to explain and subject to
multiple alternative explanations. One possibility is that attitude change was
produced, but the small sample sizes in these experiments may have had
insufficient power to detect the change. Another possibility is that not
enough dissonance was aroused in these experiments to produce attitude
change without the additional important cognition of an aversive conse-
quence. Finally, the dissonance in the no-aversive consequences conditions
may have been reduced by some other route besides attitude change.
To examine whether attitude change could occur in an induced com-
pliance setting in which aversive consequences were not produced, we
conducted several experiments (Harmon-Jones, 2000c; Harmon-Jones

et al., 1996). Under the guise of an experiment on memory, participants
were exposed to an attitudinal object (e.g., a boring passage they read).
Participants were assured of privacy and anonymity, and then given high or
low choice to write a counter-attitudinal statement (to manipulate justifica-
tion) about the object. They were asked to discard the statement in the trash
after writing it, so that there was no chance of the statement causing an
aversive consequence. This manipulation was based on Cooper and Fazio’s
(1984) statement that, ‘‘making a statement contrary to one’s attitude while
in solitude does not have the potential for bringing about an aversive event’’
(p. 232). In other words, the experiments were designed so that aversive
consequences were clearly absent to demonstrate that cognitive dissonance
processes could occur in such situations.
In one experiment (Harmon-Jones et al., 1996), participants were asked
to read a boring passage. They were then given high or low choice to write
that they found the boring passage interesting. Although no aversive con-
sequences were produced, persons in the high-choice condition changed
their attitudes to be more favorable toward the passage. In addition, parti-
cipants in high-choice condition evidenced more sympathetic nervous
system arousal, as measured by nonspecific skin conductance responses,
than those in the low-choice condition.
In another experiment, chocolate-loving participants wrote a statement
that they disliked a piece of chocolate they had just eaten under conditions
of low or high choice (Harmon-Jones, 2000c). Participants in the high-
choice condition changed their attitudes to report a decrease in their
enjoyment of chocolate. In addition, self-reported negative affect was
increased following dissonance-producing behavior and was reduced
following the attitude change. These experiments also demonstrate that
the experience of cognitive dissonance evokes an unpleasant state that
motivates discrepancy reduction.
The results obtained in these experiments indicate that dissonance affect
and dissonance-related attitude change can occur in situations in which a
cognitive inconsistency is present but does not involve the possibility of
aversive consequences. Because participants’ counterattitudinal statements
were produced in private and with anonymity and were discarded after they
were written, the participants did not cause an aversive consequence. In
these experiments, participants did not lose a reward, gain a punishment, tell
a lie to another person, or inflict any other kind of injury on other persons.
There was simply an abstract benefit of helping in research. The discrepancy
between the participants’ perception of a stimulus and the participants’
knowledge of what they had been induced to state about that stimulus
was sufficient to create dissonance.
These experiments supported the original conception of dissonance
theory over this revision. McGregor et al. (1999) have also discussed and
demonstrated that attitudinal ambivalence research has provided evidence

of dissonance-related negative affect in the absence of feeling personally
responsible for producing negative consequences. More specifically, they
found that the simultaneous accessibility of participants’ conflicting attitudes
(i.e., how quickly and equally quickly conflicting evaluations came to mind)
predicted the ambivalence participants felt (Newby-Clark et al., 2002).
Nevertheless, some important questions regarding the basic mechanism
underlying dissonance effects remained: Why does dissonance evoke this
negative motivational state? Why does this state motivate attitude change?
3. Action-Based Model of Dissonance: Why do

Dissonance Processes Occur?
Festinger (1957) posited no answer to the question of why dissonance
processes occur other than to state that inconsistency is motivating. Brehm
and Cohen (1962) and Beauvois and Joule (1996, 1999) pointed out that a
behavioral commitment is an important component of the dissonance pro-
cess. However, in these previous statements, these theorists did not indicate
why cognitions with implications for action motivate persons to engage in
discrepancy reductions. The action-based model of cognitive dissonance was
proposed to answer this ‘‘Why?’’ question (Harmon-Jones, 1999).
The action-based model concurs with theorizing in other areas of psychol-
ogy in proposing that perceptions and cognitions can serve as action tendencies
(Berkowitz, 1984; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; Fiske, 1992; Gibson, 1979;
James, 1890; McArthur & Baron, 1983; Smith & Semin, 2004). Indeed,
this perspective on perception/cognition is quite consistent with the situated
cognition approach of Smith and Semin (2004), which proposes, among other
things, (1) that mental representations are action oriented; (2) that cognition is
embodied in that it draws on our sensorimotor abilities, environments, brains,
and bodies; and (3) that cognition and action are the result of dynamic processes
of interactions between an agent and environment.
The action-based model further proposes that dissonance between cognitions
evokes a negative affective state because it has the potential to interfere with effective
and unconflicted action. In essence, discrepant cognitions create problems for
the individual when those cognitions have conflicting action tendencies.
Dissonance reduction, by bringing cognitions into line with behavioral
commitments, serves the function of facilitating the execution of effective
and unconflicted action (see also, Jones & Gerard, 1967).
The action-based model proposes both a proximal and a distal motivation
for the existence of dissonance processes. The proximal motive for reducing
dissonance is to reduce or eliminate the negative emotion of dissonance. The
distal motivation is the need for effective and unconflicted action. Thus,
consistent with the socially situated cognition approach (Smith & Semin,
2004), the action-based model assumes that emotion, cognition, and action
constitute adaptive regulatory processes that ultimately serve survival needs.
Past discussions of the theory of cognitive dissonance have referred to two
different constructs as ‘‘cognitive dissonance.’’ One is the inconsistency
between cognitions. The second is the unpleasant emotional/motivational
state that occurs when a person holds two contradictory cognitions. In order
to better understand the processes of dissonance, the action-based model
distinguishes between the two. We refer to inconsistency between cognitions
as ‘‘cognitive discrepancy,’’ whereas we call the unpleasant emotive state
‘‘dissonance.’’ The unpleasant emotive state of dissonance provides motivation
to change one’s attitudes or engage in other discrepancy-reduction processes.
After an individual makes a difficult decision, psychological processing
should assist with the execution of the decision. The tendency of partici-
pants in dissonance research to view the chosen alternative more favorably
and the rejected alternative more negatively after a decision may help the
individual to follow through, to effectively carry out the actions that follow
from the decision.
As an example, consider an important, effortful behavioral decision, such
as beginning an exercise program. In this situation, the ‘‘actions’’ implied by
the decision are the exercise behaviors. The benefits of exercise, from
better-fitting clothes to improved long-term health, constitute consonant
cognitions. The drawbacks of exercise, including the time commitment and
muscle soreness, constitute dissonant cognitions. Dissonance affect comes
from the conflict aroused by the dissonant cognitions, and this unpleasant
affect motivates the individual to decrease the discrepancy by bringing the
cognitions in line with the behavioral commitment. The better an individ-
ual is able to reduce the number and importance of dissonant cognitions and
increase the number and importance of consonant cognitions, the more
likely it is that he or she will faithfully perform the actions required by the
exercise program over the long-term and reap its benefits.
In contrast to models of cognitive dissonance that view dissonance
processes as irrational and maladaptive (Aronson, 1969), the action-based
model views dissonance processes as adaptive. Of course, adaptive, func-
tional psychological processes that are useful and beneficial in most circum-
stances may not be beneficial in all circumstances. Occasionally, dissonance
reduction may cause persons to maintain a prolonged commitment to a
harmful chosen course of action, when it would be better to disengage.
However, when we state that dissonance processes are adaptive, we mean
that they benefit the organism in the majority of cases.
In addition, we must distinguish between dissonance motivation and
dissonance reduction. The action-based model, like the original theory,
proposes that cognitive discrepancy produces negative affect, and that the
negative affect motivates the individual to change his or her attitudes.
However, it is possible for a person to continue to maintain conflicting

attitudes (although negative affect may persist). Furthermore, there are
some situations in which individuals do disengage from harmful chosen
courses of action, even though they may experience high levels of negative
affect in the process.
4. Tests of the Action-Based Model

4.1. Action-orientation and spreading of alternatives
According to the action-based model of dissonance, the post-decisional
state is similar to an action-oriented state (Beckmann & Irle, 1985;
Gollwitzer, 1990; Kuhl, 1984), where the individual is in a mode of
‘‘getting things done.’’ Once a decision is made, an organism should be
motivationally tuned toward enacting the decision and behaving effectively
with regard to it. An implemental or action-oriented mindset is one in
which plans are made to effectively execute behaviors associated with the
decision (Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999). We suggest that this implemental or
action-oriented state is similar to an approach motivational state. When a
person is in an action-oriented state, implementation of decisions is
enhanced (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). We suggest that these action-
oriented states and implemental states are similar to Jones and Gerard’s
(1967) concept of an unequivocal behavior orientation.
We proposed that the action-oriented state that follows decision-making
is equivalent to the state in which dissonance motivation operates and
discrepancy reduction occurs (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2002).
Thus, experimentally manipulating the degree of action-orientation experi-
enced following a decision should affect the degree of discrepancy reduction.
In one experiment, participants were asked to make either an easy decision or
a difficult decision. Participants then completed a mindset questionnaire. The
neutral mindset asked participants to list seven things they did in a typical day,
whereas the action-oriented mindset questionnaire asked participants to list
seven things they could do to perform well on the physical exercise they had
chosen. Participants then reevaluated the exercises. Participants who made a
difficult-decision in the action-oriented condition demonstrated a greater
increase in preference for the chosen over the rejected exercise (i.e., spreading
of alternatives) than participants in the other three conditions.
In a second experiment, we replicated the results of the first experiment
using a different manipulation of action-orientation (Harmon-Jones &
Harmon-Jones, 2002). In this experiment, action-orientation was induced
by asking participants to think about a project or goal that they intended to
accomplish, and to list the steps they intended to use to successfully follow
through with their decision (Gollwitzer, 1990). Two comparison condi-

tions were also included, one in which participants wrote about a neutral,
ordinary day and one in which participants wrote about an unresolved
problem, which was defined as a problem characterized by the fact that
they were not yet sure whether to take action to change things. Thus, as in
the previous experiment, participants first made a difficult decision, but this
time the decision was between two equally attractive research studies in
which they could participate. Following the decision, participants com-
pleted the action-orientation manipulation described above, and then rera-
ted their attitudes toward the research studies. Results indicated that the
participants in the action-orientation condition engaged in more spreading
of alternatives following a difficult decision than did participants in the
comparison conditions. This study provided stronger support for the
action-based model because, in this case, the action-orientation induction
was unrelated to the decision in the experiment.
Correlational evidence also suggests that action-oriented processing facil-
itates discrepancy reduction (Beckmann & Kuhl, 1984). In this study, dispo-
sitional action orientation was measured by Kuhl’s (1980, 1984) action versus
state orientation questionnaire. A sample item from the scale says, ‘‘When
I have decided to buy one item of clothing and I find several things I like:
(1) ‘‘I often waver back and forth, trying to decide which I should buy’’
(state-oriented answer); and (2) ‘‘I usually don’t think much about it and
make a quick decision’’ (action-oriented answer). Participants were indivi-
duals searching for an apartment and they were shown information about 16
apartments. Participants rated the attractiveness of the apartments before and
after choosing the apartment they preferred (i.e., before and after a tentative
decision). After the decision, individuals who were dispositionally high in
action-orientation increased the attractiveness rating of the chosen apartment
more than individuals who were dispositionally low in action-orientation.
Thus, both state and trait evidence support our contention that dissonance
reduction occurs in an action-oriented state—a state that assists in the
implementation of decisions and in effective action.
4.2. Neural activity underlying dissonance

and dissonance reduction
The action-based model of cognitive dissonance corresponds closely to
recent models of self-regulation developed in the field of cognitive neuro-
science, and it provides an important theoretical framework for placing
neural processes in the context of motivated cognition. In this section, we
describe findings from research on the neural processes associated with the
monitoring of response conflicts and the implementation of intended
behavior that are consistent with the action-based model of dissonance.
4.2.1. Dissonance arousal, conflict monitoring,

and the anterior cingulate cortex
According to the action-based model, dissonance is aroused by the activa-
tion of cognitions that interfere with goal-driven behavior. Although few
studies have directly examined the process of dissonance arousal in the
brain, much attention has been given to questions of how the brain pro-
cesses response conflicts on task such as the color-naming Stroop (1935)
task. For example, when completing the color-naming Stroop task, one’s
goal is to identify the ink color of a word stimulus, regardless of the word’s
meaning. However, the processing of word meaning is typically automatic,
and when a word’s meaning is incongruent with one’s goal to judge the
word’s color, such as when the word ‘‘red’’ is presented in blue ink, there is
conflict between the intended and the automatic response tendencies.
In studies examining neural activity during the Stroop task, anterior cingu-
late cortex activity is greater during incongruent trials than congruent trials
(Carter et al., 1998). Similar findings have been observed using other
response-conflict tasks, such as the Eriksen flanker’s task (Gerhing et al.,
1993; Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), and the Go/No-Go task (Botvinick et al.,
1999; Kiehl et al., 2001). Researchers have interpreted these findings as
evidence that the anterior cingulate cortex plays an important role in
monitoring the moment-to-moment representations of action tendencies
for potential conflicts, presumably so that other neurocognitive mechanisms
may be engaged to override the unwanted tendency and to promote an
effective goal-directed response (Botvinick et al., 2001). Thus, conflict
monitoring represents the first component of a dual-process model of
cognitive control, whereby the need for control is initially detected.
Recently, we have suggested that the anterior cingulate cortex, and its
associated role in conflict monitoring, corresponds well to the process of
dissonance arousal (Harmon-Jones, 2004). The conflict-monitoring account
is consistent with the action-based model of dissonance, because it too focuses
on conflicts between action tendencies. Amodio et al. (2004) integrated the
conflict-monitoring framework with social psychological theories of self-
regulation by examining conflict between automatic stereotyping tendencies
and participants’ goals to respond without prejudice. In this study, anterior
cingulate cortex activity was monitored using an event-related potential
measure referred to as the ‘‘error-related negativity’’ component (Gerhing
et al., 1993; van Veen & Carter, 2006). When participants—who reported
low-prejudice attitudes—accidentally made responses that reflected the appli-
cation of racial stereotypes, thus constituting a clear response conflict, the
anterior cingulate cortex was strongly activated. By comparison, anterior
cingulate cortex activity was lower on other trial types that did not elicit
conflicting actions.
In subsequent research, Amodio et al. (2008) demonstrated that height-
ened anterior cingulate cortex activity associated with racially-biased
responses was only observed for participants with strong personal
motivations to respond without prejudice. Participants without personal

motivations (i.e., high-prejudice participants) did not show enhanced ante-
rior cingulate cortex activity when their responses reflected the application
of stereotypes. Thus, when participants made responses that were dissonant
with their attitude-based intentions, anterior cingulate cortex activity was
high. Furthermore, across studies, participants with stronger anterior cingu-
late cortex activity to dissonant responses were more likely to engage in
controlled behavior (slower, more careful responding). These studies
provided initial evidence for the role of the anterior cingulate cortex, and
its associated conflict monitoring function, as a critical process underlying
dissonance arousal. Importantly, this line of research demonstrated that
high-level conflicts, the type with which dissonance theory has been most
concerned, also activate the anterior cingulate cortex, in line with lower-
level forms of conflict typically studied in the cognitive neuroscience
literature (e.g., in studies using the Stroop task).
More recently, van Veen et al. (2007) examined dissonance-related brain
activity more directly in a study that used the induced compliance paradigm.
The authors observed heightened anterior cingulate cortex activity during the
manipulation of dissonance, and participants’ degree of anterior cingulate
cortex activation was significantly associated with attitude change. The finding
that dissonance reduction was associated with increased anterior cingulate
cortex activation is consistent with the action-based model, which suggests
that discrepancy reduction results from the need for effective and unconflicted
action (distal motive). Although this interpretation of anterior cingulate cortex
activity is compatible with the original theory of dissonance, it is not clearly
compatible with other versions of dissonance, because these versions focus
primarily on high-level self-consistencies (or other nonconsistency-oriented
motivations such as aversive consequences or self-affirmation), and thus are
not directly associated with coordinating action.
Response conflict tasks used in studies of the anterior cingulate cortex
have also been found to cause increases in skin conductance, which indexes
sympathetic nervous system arousal (Hajcak et al., 2003, 2004), and mea-
sures of negative affect such as the startle eyeblink response (Hajcak & Foti,
2008). Situations that typically evoke cognitive dissonance also cause
increased skin conductance (Elkin & Leippe, 1986; Harmon-Jones et al.,
1996; Losch & Cacioppo, 1990) and negative affect (Elliot & Devine, 1994;
Harmon-Jones, 2000c; Zanna & Cooper, 1974). Taken together, these
studies suggest that the anterior cingulate cortex is involved in generating
the negative affective state of dissonance.
4.2.2. Dissonance reduction and the prefrontal cortex

The arousal of negative affect by cognitive discrepancy drives efforts to
reduce the dissonant state, either through actions or cognitive restructuring
(e.g., attitude change). The process of cognitive discrepancy reduction can
occur rapidly. Indeed, research has revealed that dissonance-related attitude

change can occur immediately after individuals commit to engage in behav-
ior and before they actually engage in the behavior (e.g., essay writing;
Rabbie et al., 1959). According to the action-based model, the process of
discrepancy-reduction engages approach-oriented motivational processes,
as the individual works to successfully implement the new commitment.
To our knowledge, only the action-based model makes the prediction that
discrepancy reduction following commitment to action involves approach
motivational processes, which the model views as part of the distal motive of
effecting unconflicted behavior.
Recent neurocognitive models of control posit that the prefrontal cortex
governs the implementation of a controlled response following the detec-
tion of conflict by the anterior cingulate cortex (Botvinick et al., 2001;
Miller & Cohen, 2001). That is, as discrepancy-related activity in the
anterior cingulate cortex rises, anterior cingulate cortex-to-prefrontal cor-
tex communication or signaling increases. The prefrontal cortex is then
believed to play a critical role in responding to the discrepancy by amplify-
ing an intended response tendency to override the unintended tendency
(Kerns et al., 2004). In relating the neurocognitive model of control to
cognitive dissonance, the action-based model suggests that whereas the
anterior cingulate cortex is associated with dissonance arousal, regions of
the prefrontal cortex are critical for dissonance reduction. The dissociation
between the neural processes related to dissonance arousal and discrepancy
reduction supports the idea that these two processes reflect the operation of
independent underlying mechanisms. However, the neurocognitive model
of control does not clearly specify which regions of the prefrontal cortex
contribute to different aspects of discrepancy reduction and action control,
and it is silent on the role of motivation in the process of control.
Converging evidence from studies using a range of methods suggest that
prefrontal cortex activity is lateralized on the basis of motivational direction,
with the left frontal region being involved in approach motivational pro-
cesses (‘‘going toward’’), and the right frontal region being involved in
inhibitory or withdrawal motivational processes (‘‘going away’’). For
instance, Robinson and colleagues (e.g., Robinson & Downhill, 1995)
have observed that damage to the left frontal lobe causes depressive symp-
toms, with stronger depressive symptoms among patients with damage closer
to the frontal pole. Given that depression relates to impaired approach-
related processes (and associated approach-related emotion), damage to
brain regions involved in approach motivation would lead to depression.
A growing body of research assessing electroencephalographic (EEG)
activity has similarly found that increased left-frontal cortical activation
relates to state and trait approach motivation (Amodio et al., 2007, 2008;
Harmon-Jones, 2003, 2004; Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1997, 1998). Source
localization of frontal asymmetry in alpha power, which comprises the
index of frontal asymmetry in EEG studies, has demonstrated that it reflects

activity in the dorsal prefrontal cortex (Pizzagalli et al., 2005). Initial studies
of the prefrontal cortex’s role in motivation examined the association
between greater left-sided frontal activity and questionnaire measures of
behavioral approach sensitivity (Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1997) and the
approach-related emotion of anger (Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1998).
Subsequent research has related greater left-sided frontal activity to the
state engagement in approach-related responses (Amodio et al., 2007;
Harmon-Jones & Sigelman, 2001) and to the accessibility of approach-
related goals (Amodio et al., 2004). In addition, several fMRI studies have
observed greater left-sided prefrontal cortex activity during the retrieval of
approach-related action words (Bunge, 2004; Petersen et al., 1988). These
findings are consistent with the idea that the left prefrontal cortex is
particularly involved in the implementation of intended action and the
formation (and restructuring) of goals to guide future action. This body of
findings is in line with the action-based model’s position that the discrep-
ancy reduction process serves to promote goal-directed behavior through
the restructuring of goal-relevant attitudes and beliefs.
It is notable that the relation between right-sided prefrontal cortex
activity and withdrawal motivation is less clear, with few EEG studies
reporting an association between right-sided frontal activity and either
state or trait assessments of withdrawal motivation. By comparison, several
recent studies suggest that the right prefrontal cortex plays a special role in
the inhibition of action (Aron et al., 2004). This evidence represents data
from fMRI studies of normal participants as well as brain lesion patients.
Given the remaining ambiguities concerning the frontal asymmetry and
withdrawal motivation, more research is currently needed to clarify the
relation between withdrawal motivation and response inhibition, both at
the conceptual and neurocognitive levels of analysis (Amodio et al., 2008).
Considered as a whole, research on left prefrontal cortex function
suggests that it is involved in approach motivational processes aimed at
resolving inconsistency (MacDonald et al., 2000; van Veen & Carter,
2006). In what follows, we describe a set of studies that have examined
the role of left prefrontal cortex activity and approach motivation as they
relate directly to the resolution of dissonance-arousing discrepancies.
The overarching prediction of the action-based model is that commitment
to a chosen course of action should lead to an enhancement in relative left
frontal cortical activity, which in turn should be associated with attitude
change in support of the chosen course of action.
Induced Compliance and Relative Left Frontal Cortical Activation In an

experiment by Harmon-Jones et al. (2008), participants were randomly
assigned to a low versus high choice condition in an induced compliance
paradigm. Immediately after starting to write the counterattitudinal essay
(regarding a tuition increase at their university), participants’ EEG activity was

recorded. After essay completion, attitudes were assessed. Participants in the
high choice condition evidenced greater relative left frontal activation than
individuals in the low choice condition (Harmon-Jones et al., 2008). More-
over, commitment to write the counter-attitudinal essay (high-choice) caused
attitudes to be more consistent with the behavior, as compared to a low-
commitment (low-choice) condition. However, in this experiment, relative
left frontal activation did not relate to attitudes, perhaps because the attitude
measure lacked the needed sensitivity (e.g., it did not tap attitude change from
precommitment, but only tapped attitudes following the commitment).
Neurofeedback of Relative Left Frontal Cortical Activity and Free Choice In

the previous experiment, when the psychological process (commitment to a
chosen course of action) was manipulated and the proposed physiological
substrate was measured (left frontal cortical activation), commitment to a
chosen course of action increased relative left frontal cortical activation
(Harmon-Jones et al., 2008). To provide stronger causal inferences regarding
the role of the left frontal cortical region in following through with the com-
mitment (discrepancy reduction), it is important to manipulate the physiology
and measure the psychological outcome. Manipulation of the mediator also
provides stronger causal evidence than simply correlating the proposed medi-
ator with the outcome (Sigall & Mills, 1998; Spencer et al., 2005). Therefore,
we conducted another experiment in which relative left frontal cortical
activation was manipulated after dissonance was aroused to test whether a
manipulated increase in relative left frontal cortical activation would increase
dissonance reduction (attitude change).
To manipulate relative left frontal cortical activity, we used neurofeedback
training of EEG. Neurofeedback presents the participant with real-time
feedback on brainwave activity. If brainwave activity over a particular cortical
region changes in the direction desired by the experiment, then the partici-
pant is given ‘‘reward’’ feedback; if brainwave activity does not change in the
desired direction, either negative feedback or no feedback is given. Rewards
can be as simple as the presentation of a tone that informs the participant that
brain activity has changed in the desired way. Neurofeedback-induced
changes result from operant conditioning, and these changes in EEG can
occur without awareness of how the brain activity changes occurred (Kamiya,
1979; Siniatchkin et al., 2000). Participants typically are not aware of how
they brought about changes in brain activity; in fact, extensive practice is
required to gain awareness of how one may intentionally cause changes in
brain activity (e.g., 8 weeks of practice, Kotchoubey et al., 2002).
In past research, neurofeedback was effective at decreasing but not
increasing relative left frontal activity after only 3 days of training. The
decrease in relative left frontal activity brought about with this brief neu-
rofeedback training caused less approach-related emotional responses (Allen
et al., 2001). Based on these past results, we predicted that a decrease left
frontal condition would be more successful at changing brain activity than
an increase left frontal condition.
Most importantly, we predicted that a decrease in relative left frontal
activity would lead to a decrease in discrepancy reduction as measured by
spreading of alternatives. To test these predictions, we used the decision
paradigm developed by Brehm (1956). First, participants were randomly
assigned to increase or decrease relative left frontal activation during 2 days
of neurofeedback training. Then, on the third day, immediately following a
difficult decision, participants received neurofeedback training in the same
direction as the previous 2 days. Finally, attitudinal spreading of alternatives
was assessed. In support of predictions, neurofeedback training caused a
reduction in relative left frontal cortical activity, which caused an elimina-
tion of the familiar spreading of alternatives effect (Harmon-Jones et al.,
2008). Together with past research showing that commitment to a chosen
course of action increases activity in the left frontal cortex (Harmon-Jones
et al., 2008), this experiment’s manipulation of relative left frontal cortical
activity, a presumed mediator of the effect of commitment on discrepancy
reduction, provides strong support for the role of relative left frontal activity
in discrepancy reduction processes.
Action-Oriented Mindset and Relative Left Frontal Cortical Activation A

follow-up experiment (Harmon-Jones et al., 2008, Experiment 2) was
designed to conceptually replicate the experiment described in the previous
section. In this experiment, we manipulated action-oriented mental proces-
sing following a difficult decision. We expected to replicate past research in
which the action-oriented mindset increased discrepancy reduction following
a decision (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2002). Secondly, we expected
the action-oriented mindset would increase relative left frontal cortical activ-
ity. Finally, we expected this increase in left frontal cortical activity would
relate to discrepancy reduction, as assessed by spreading of alternatives.
To further extend past research, we included a condition to manipulate
positive affect that was low in approach motivation (i.e., participants wrote
about a time when something happened that caused them to feel very good
about themselves but was not the result of their own actions). This was done
to distinguish between the effects of positive affect and of approach moti-
vation on spreading of alternatives. Past research suggested that action-
oriented mindsets increase positive affect (Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995), but
we do not predict that positive affect, itself, causes increased left frontal
cortical activity or an increase in spreading of alternatives.
Results from the experiment were consistent with predictions and revealed
that the action-oriented mindset increased relative left frontal cortical activity
and spreading of alternatives, as compared to a neutral condition and a positive
affect/low-approach motivation condition. See Figs. 3.1 and 3.2. These results
0.09
0.08
Relative left mid-frontal activation
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0
Neutral Positive/no-action Action-oriented
Figure 3.1 Relative left frontal activation as a function of mindset condition.
3.0
2.5
Spreading of alternatives
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
Neutral Positive/no-action Action-oriented
Figure 3.2 Spreading of alternatives as a function of mindset condition.
provide a conceptual replication of the past results by using a different oper-

ationalization of action-oriented motivational processing. Both experiments
revealed that the hypothesized increase in action-oriented processing was
manifested in increased relative left frontal cortical activity. Moreover, both
studies revealed that relative left frontal activation correlated positively with
spreading of alternatives. This correlation occurred across both conditions
within the neurofeedback experiment and within the action-oriented mindset
condition of the second experiment. We suspect that the second experiment
did not produce significant correlations within the neutral and positive-no-
action conditions because, in these conditions, participants were instructed to
think about information that was not associated with approach-motivated
post-decision processing. In contrast, participants in the action-oriented
mindset condition were instructed to think about information that should
have facilitated approach-motivated post-decision processing, according to
the action-based model and previous research.
Left prefrontal cortex activity and approach motivation following

prejudice-related discrepancy Discrepancies between one’s attitude and
behavior are often investigated in the context of intergroup relations. For
example, most White Americans today believe it is wrong to discriminate
on the basis of race. But at the same time, most White Americans show
evidence of automatically-activated tendencies to express racial stereotypes
and negative evaluations. Thus, in intergroup situations, people are often
confronted with a discrepancy between their nonprejudiced beliefs and
their implicit tendencies to express prejudice. This phenomenon clearly
represents a case of cognitive dissonance, although it is not typically
described in such terms.
To examine the roles of left-prefrontal cortex activity and approach
motivation in the context of prejudice, we preselected White American
participants who reported holding low-prejudice attitudes in an earlier
testing session (Amodio et al., 2007). Participants were told that we
would examine their neural responses as they viewed pictures of White,
Black, and Asian faces. Following this task, participants were given bogus
feedback indicating that their neural activity revealed a strong negative
emotional response toward Black faces, compared with White and Asian
faces. This feedback was highly discrepant with participants’ nonprejudiced
beliefs and, as expected, aroused strong feelings of guilt on a self-report
measure (beyond changes in other emotions), and participants were not
immediately given an opportunity to engage in behavior that might reduce
their guilt. Participants also showed a decreased in left-sided frontal cortical
activity compared with baseline levels, and the degree of this decrease was
correlated with their experience of guilt. This pattern suggested that the
initial arousal of guilt-related dissonance was associated with a reduction in
approach-motivation tendencies. Although this study was not designed to
measure changes in anterior cingulate cortex activity, the decrease in left-
sided prefrontal cortex activity is consistent with the idea that dissonance
arousal is associated with a reduction in approach motivation accompanied
by an increase in behavioral inhibition (e.g., Amodio et al., 2008).
t = 6.17
Manipulated t = 0.42 Interest in
Guilt increase
prejudiced prejudice
(vs. baseline)
feedback reduction
r = −0.45 t = 0.32
Frontal EEG Frontal EEG

asymmetry asymmetry
Figure 3.3 Summary of guilt study.
The effects of left-frontal activity and approach motivation were exam-

ined in the second part of the study. After the guilt manipulation, partici-
pants were told that the study was completed, but that in the time remaining
in the session, they could help us by judging some stimuli ostensibly to be
used in a future experiment. Here, we provided an opportunity to reduce
their discrepancy-related guilt. We told participants that we wanted their
feedback on different magazine articles that we might have participants in a
future study read. Participants read the headlines of a series of different
articles. Some headlines referred to articles associated with reducing preju-
dice (e.g., ‘‘Improving Your Interracial Interactions’’). Others were filler
headlines that were unrelated to intergroup relations (e.g. ‘‘Five Steps to a
Healthier Lifestyle’’). Participants viewed each title for 6 s while EEG was
recorded. After viewing each title, they rated their personal desire to read
the article. We found that participants who reported stronger guilty affect in
response to the bogus feedback indicating their prejudiced response—an
index of dissonance arousal—reported significantly stronger desire to read
articles related to reducing prejudice. Induction-related feelings of guilt
were unrelated to participants’ desire to read the filler articles. Furthermore,
stronger desire to read prejudice reduction articles was associated with
greater left-sided prefrontal cortex activity, consistent with the idea that
discrepancy reduction involves the engagement of approach-related action
(i.e., associated with egalitarian behavior), which involves activity of the left
prefrontal cortex (Fig. 3.3). Hence, these results supported the action-based
model of dissonance in the context of prejudice and feelings of guilt.
4.3. Increasing strength of action tendencies

and discrepancy reduction
According to the action-based model of dissonance, dissonance should be
increased as the salience of the action implications of cognitions that are
involved in a dissonant relationship are increased. Several theoretical per-
spectives on emotion consider emotions to involve action tendencies
(Brehm, 1999; Frijda, 1986). To the extent that an emotion generates an

action tendency, as the intensity of one’s current emotion is increased and is
involved in a dissonant relationship with other information, dissonance
should be increased.
Research has demonstrated that the emotion of sympathy (empathy)
increases helping behavior because it evokes altruistic motivation, that is,
motivation to relieve the distress of the person in need of help (Batson,
1991). We conducted an experiment that tested whether an inconsistency
between the emotion of sympathy and knowledge about past failures to act
in accord with the sympathy would evoke motivation to reduce this
inconsistency (Harmon-Jones et al., 2003).
In the experiment, we tested the hypothesis that after experiencing
sympathy for a target person in need of help, individuals will be more
motivated to help that person when they are reminded of times that they
failed to help similar persons. This prediction is predicated on the idea that
the aroused sympathy would be the ‘‘cognition’’ most resistant to change
and that individuals would thus work to support it if dissonance were
aroused in relation to it. Participants were informed that they would be
listening to a pilot broadcast for a local radio station and that the researchers
would like students’ reactions to the tape. Participants then listened to a
tape-recorded message that was purportedly from a person in need of help
(an adolescent with cancer). Before listening to the tape, participants were
assigned to one of two conditions: one in which they tried to imagine how
the person must feel (high empathy set) or one in which they tried to remain
objective as they listened to the tape (low empathy set). Then they listened
to the tape-recorded message. Afterward, they completed questionnaires
assessing self-reported emotional responses and evaluations of the tape-
recorded message. Participants were then asked to list times when they
failed to help other persons who were in need of help (in order to induce
dissonance) or they completed a demographic survey (control condition).
Finally, participants were given an opportunity to help by volunteering time
to assist the person with addressing letters that would request money from
possible donors or by donating money to the person’s family. The design
was a 2 (low vs high empathy)2 (reminded of times that did not help vs
not reminded) between-participants factorial. Consistent with predictions
derived from the action-based model, more helping was observed in the
high-empathy/reminder of past failures condition than in other conditions.
See Fig. 3.4.
It is important to note that this experiment is similar to other dissonance
research using a hypocrisy paradigm (Aronson, 1999; Stone et al., 1997).
However, the present experiment differs from the hypocrisy research in an
important way. In the hypocrisy experiments, the dissonance was aroused
between a public behavior (e.g., video-taped speech to be delivered to other
students about safe sex) and a reminder of past failures to practice what was
1.4
1.2
Standardized time and money donated
1.0
0.8
0.6
Neutral
0.4
Dissonance
0.2
0.0
−0.2
−0.4
−0.6
Low empathy High empathy
Figure 3.4 Amount of helping as a function of empathy and dissonance conditions.
spoken (i.e., they had not always practiced safe sex). In the current experi-
ment, dissonance was aroused between a private emotional experience that
generates an action tendency and a reminder of past failures to behave in
accord with what the emotion motivates the person to do. Thus, past
hypocrisy work only shares with the current experiment the explicit
reminder of past failures to behave in certain ways. More importantly, the
action-based model generated the hypothesis that because sympathy gen-
erates an action tendency, it can evoke dissonance. In general, we view past
work on hypocrisy as consistent with the action-based model, because
the conflicting ‘‘cognitions’’ have strong behavioral implications and the
reduction of the dissonance between these ‘‘cognitions’’ enables one to
behave effectively with regard to the cognition most resistant to change
(i.e., in past studies, the information provided in the speech).
5. Considering the Action-Based Model and

Other Modes of Dissonance Reduction
Would a change in action orientation and/or relative left frontal
cortical activity affect discrepancy reduction in other dissonance-evoking
situations? We would expect left frontal cortical activity to affect dissonance
processes when dissonance is aroused by a strong commitment to behavior,
which is what typically occurs in the induced compliance and free choice
paradigms (e.g., Beauvois & Joule, 1996; Brehm & Cohen, 1962). In such
situations, we predict that individuals are motivated to follow through with
their behavioral commitment and to change their attitudes to be consistent
with their behavior (Stone et al., 1997). However, in some induced com-
pliance situations, individuals may reduce dissonance by means other than
attitude change, perhaps because their commitment is not sufficiently strong
(Gilbert & Ebert, 2002) or because their original attitude is highly resistant
to change (Simon et al., 1995). Thus, in other dissonance paradigms, we
would predict relative left frontal activation to relate to dissonance reduc-
tion to the extent that dissonance is likely to be reduced via approach
motivational processes, such as changing one’s attitudes to be more
supportive of the recent behavioral commitment.
Changing one’s cognitions to bring them in alignment with each other is
one way of reducing the negative emotion of dissonance. This is the
method of reducing dissonance most often measured in research. However,
this is not the only way a person can deal with the emotive state of
dissonance. It is also possible to trivialize the dissonant cognitions (Simon
et al., 1995) or engage in reality-escaping behaviors such as drinking alcohol
to reduce the negative dissonance state and the motivation to engage in
discrepancy reduction (Steele et al., 1981). The action-based model would
predict that reducing dissonance by means other than attitude change would
be more likely when action was not greatly needed or when the action
implications of the cognitions were low.
It is also possible to experience dissonance and not reduce it. The negative
emotion of dissonance provides motivation to change one’s cognitions but
this motivation may not always lead to such changes. In this situation, the
cognitive discrepancy would still be present but the negative affect would
remain elevated. The action-based model predicts that if an individual
experiences dissonance but does not reduce it, the effectiveness of his or
her behavior related to the commitment would be hampered. The effective-
ness of behavior could be hampered by hindering pursuit and acquisition of
an immediate goal or it may be hampered in more diffuse ways. These and
other ways of dealing with cognitive discrepancies, and with the negative
emotion of dissonance, need to be considered in future research.
The action-based model does not make the claim that dissonance reduc-
tion always occurs in the direction of a decision. Sometimes a person makes a
decision and the evidence is overwhelming that the wrong decision has been
made. This information would arouse dissonance. When a person realizes that
he/she has made a mistake, his/her original decision is no longer the cogni-
tion most resistant to change. Consider Leon, who chose to attend one
university over another. After beginning the first semester, Leon might realize
that the university he chose is completely unsuitable for him. He will likely
not be able to reduce the dissonance associated with his decision; rather, the
negative emotion of dissonance would likely increase. At some point, as
dissonant cognitions continue to increase, he may choose to reverse his

decision and look for a different university (Festinger, 1957, reports the results
of such an experiment). Like the original theory of dissonance, the action-
based model predicts that the direction of attitude change will be in the
direction of the cognition that is most resistant to change.
6. Individual and Cultural Differences

Recent research has suggested that individual and cultural differences
may moderate dissonance processes. For instance, individuals with greater
preferences for consistency show greater attitude change after being given
high-choice in an induced compliance situation (Cialdini et al., 1995), and
individuals from Eastern cultures as compared to Western cultures show
greater dissonance-related attitude change when inter-dependence is salient
(Hoshino-Browne et al., 2005). As noted by Wicklund and Brehm (1976),
individual (or cultural) differences in dissonance-related attitude change
could emerge because of differences in the initial perception of discrepant
cognitions, the awareness of dissonance, the tolerance of dissonance, and/or
the mode of dissonance reduction. If attitude change is the only measure in a
standard dissonance experiment examining individual differences, it is
impossible to determine why a particular individual difference may be
related to a pattern of attitude change. In order to determine why a
particular individual, or cultural, difference relates to a pattern of attitude
change, it would be necessary to measure the relationship of this difference
to factors influencing dissonance.
Assuming no differences in the above variables (e.g., initial perception of
discrepancy), the action-based model suggests that these individual and
cultural differences may be associated with differences in the extent to
which unconflicted action would be important. For example, preference
for consistency may be related to tendencies toward action orientation.
In addition, individuals high in preference for consistency may prefer
consistency because of the implications inconsistency has for behavior,
and they may be more concerned about executing effective behavior.
With regard to cultural differences, cultures that value or emphasize the
group over the individual may cause one to evaluate cognitions, their
relevance to each other and to behavior, and their inconsistency according
to group standards rather than individual standards. Alternatively, these
cultures may differ in their tendencies toward individual versus group action
orientation. In the following section, we review research conducted in the
last two decades on the relationship between individual differences and
dissonance processes. We then present data on a new questionnaire designed
to measure aspects of the dissonance process.
6.1. Self-esteem
One individual difference that has received much empirical attention is self-
esteem. This is because self versions of dissonance theory predicted that
individuals who differed in self-esteem level would respond differently to
dissonance-inducing situations. For example, the self-consistency revision
proposed that persons with positive self-concepts should respond with more
dissonance when they lie or act counter to their values (behaviors that have
typically been used to evoke dissonance) because the discrepancy between
their positive self-conception and their knowledge of their behavior (e.g.,
lying to another person) is greater for them than it is for persons with
negative self-concepts who may have expected themselves to behave in
these ways. In addition, the negative consequences of a decision (the
negative aspects of the chosen and the positive aspects of the rejected),
which suggest that the person made an unwise decision, are inconsistent
with a positive self-concept. And individuals with high self-esteem should
show greater evidence of discrepancy reduction following a difficult deci-
sion. Gibbons et al. (1997) provided evidence supporting this prediction. In
their research, they found that smokers with high self-esteem who relapsed
showed lowered perceptions of health risk associated with smoking and a
greater decline in commitment to quitting smoking, whereas smokers with
low self-esteem did not. Moreover, the decline in risk perception was
related to maintenance of self-esteem for those who relapsed. These results
support predictions derived from self-consistency theory, by showing that
individuals with high self-esteem engaged in more discrepancy reduction
than individuals with low self-esteem.
More recently, Jordan et al. (2003) found support for self-consistency
theory’s predictions using an approach that separates trait self-esteem into an
explicit (more conscious) and implicit (less conscious) dimension. Based on
the ideas (1) that explicit and implicit self-esteem are independent and
(2) that individuals with high explicit but low implicit self-esteem may be
particularly defensive, they predicted that such individuals would show
greater discrepancy reduction than other individuals (i.e., low explicit/
low implicit, low explicit/high implicit, and high explicit/high implicit).
In this study, participants made a decision between two moderately positive
and similarly rated food entrées. Then, following the decision, participants
rerated the food entrées. Results revealed the predicted interaction of
explicit and implicit self-esteem on spreading of alternatives. That is, indi-
viduals high in explicit but low in implicit self-esteem showed more
spreading of alternatives than all other individuals. Thus, expansion of the
understanding of self-esteem by incorporation of two independent dimen-
sions—explicit and implicit—led to a new and refined prediction and result
concerning the effect of self-esteem on discrepancy reduction.
In direct contrast to predictions derived from self-consistency theory,

the self-affirmation model predicts that persons with high self-esteem would
be less likely than persons with low self-esteem to engage in discrepancy
reduction, because persons with high self-esteem have more positive self-
concepts and self resources with which to affirm and repair their perception
of self-integrity. According to the self-consistency model, the actions often
elicited in dissonance experiments are more discrepant from a positive than
from a negative self-concept, and thus individuals with high self-esteem
should experience more dissonance when they engage in these actions. To
test these competing predictions, Steele et al. (1993), using a free-choice
paradigm, found that reminding individuals of their self-esteem levels by
having them complete self-esteem scales prior to their decision caused
individuals with low self-esteem to be more likely than individuals with
high self-esteem to justify their decision (spread alternatives). Steele et al.
(1993) concluded that these effects were opposite to effects predicted by the
self-consistency model, but consistent with the self-affirmation model.
It is important to note that justification of the decision (i.e., change in
evaluation of the decision alternatives) did not differ between high and low
self-esteem individuals in the condition in which they were not reminded of
their level of self-esteem, suggesting that neither the self-consistency nor
self-affirmation model can adequately explain the data.
In more recent work testing his self-standards model of dissonance,
Stone (2003) has found that individuals with low self-esteem show less
attitude change following induced compliance if their personal self-stan-
dards were primed (by rating their personal ideal for themselves on traits
such as untrustworthy, precise, and ethical) immediately after the writing of
the counterattitudinal essay. When normative standards (by rating what
their peers thought they ought to be on traits such as untrustworthy, precise,
and ethical) or no particular standards were primed, participants with low
self-esteem showed the same amount of attitude change as participants with
high self-esteem. Stone (2003) suggested that ‘‘for self-consistency to oper-
ate in dissonance, something in the context must make idiosyncratic self-
knowledge accessible. Otherwise, dissonance processes are not necessarily
moderated by individual differences in the structure and content of self-
knowledge (p. 852).’’ Stone (2003) suggested that these results cast doubt on
both self-affirmation and self-consistency theories, and he proposed that
both the self-affirmation and self-consistency models are correct, but under
different conditions.
6.2. Preference for consistency

Cialdini et al. (1995) developed a measure they referred to as preference for
consistency. The questionnaire assessed self-reported agreement with 18
items such as ‘‘I prefer to be around people whose reactions I can anticipate’’
and ‘‘I typically prefer to do things the same way.’’ In one study, individuals
who scored in the lower and upper thirds of the distribution on preference
for consistency participated in an induced compliance experiment. Results
revealed that individuals high in preference for consistency engaged in more
discrepancy reduction after high as compared to low choice. In contrast,
individuals low in preference for consistency did not show a significant
difference between high and low choice conditions. It is interesting to note,
however, that the least favorable attitude occurred in the low choice/high
preference for consistency conditions, and that the low and high preference
for consistency groups’ attitudes did not appear to differ in the high choice
condition.
Subsequent studies have revealed that individuals high, as compared to
low, in preference for consistency experience greater negative affect when
their highly inconsistent cognitions (i.e., evaluations of abortion) are made
simultaneously accessible (Newby-Clark et al., 2002). In addition, higher
preference for consistency is related to feeling more offended by being stood
up by a friend for a poor reason (insufficient justification) as compared to a
good reason (sufficient justification; Nail, Correll et al., 2001).
6.3. Action-orientation
Other evidence suggests that individual differences in action-orientation
relates to discrepancy reduction (Beckmann & Kuhl, 1984). As reviewed
previously, students searching for an apartment who were dispositionally high
in action-orientation increased the attractiveness rating of their decision more
than did individuals who were dispositionally low in action-orientation.
6.4. Cultural differences

Heine and Lehman (1997) found that North Americans and East Asians
differ in their attitudinal responses to difficult decisions. Whereas North
Americans showed the typical spreading of alternatives following the diffi-
cult decision (regarding choice over popular compact disc music selections),
East Asians did not. This observed effect was not consistent with earlier
observations by Sakai and colleagues (Sakai, 1981; Sakai & Andow, 1980)
who had found dissonance-related attitude change following public but not
private induced compliance.
However, Hoshino-Browne and colleagues (Hoshino-Browne et al.,
2005) noted this discrepancy between results and suggested that the experi-
ments by Sakai and colleagues may have produced dissonance-related
attitude change because participants were concerned about the interper-
sonal consequences of their actions. That is, the participants, who were
typically motivated to be interdependent with others and avoidant of
interpersonal conflict, experienced dissonance because they had acted
inconsistently with those cultural ideals. To address these issues and others,
Hoshino-Browne and colleagues conducted four studies in which European
Canadians and Asian Canadians made difficult decisions for themselves or
for a friend. Results indicated that whereas European Canadians spread
alternatives more for self than friend decisions, Asian Canadians spread
alternatives more for friend than self decisions. These results serve as a
reminder that the importance of the cognitions was one of the factors
affecting the magnitude of dissonance in Festinger’s original theory.
Cultural values would be expected to relate to the importance of cognitions,
and thus, to the amount of dissonance these behaviors would evoke.
6.5. Concerns about individual differences research

Individual difference studies have shed new light on dissonance processes
and connected the dissonance literature with other research literatures
concerned with self processes and cultural differences. Moreover, the indi-
vidual differences studies have increased the predictive power of the theory.
Although some inconsistencies in results with individual differences
and dissonance processes have been noted, subsequent studies have been
conducted to address these inconsistencies.
Importantly, almost all studies of the relationship between individual
differences and dissonance processes measured attitudes in the free choice or
induced compliance paradigms. As noted by Wicklund and Brehm (1976),
to fully understand the role of individual differences in dissonance processes,
investigators need to be concerned with the variables (both independent
and dependent) that are involved in dissonance. If only attitudes are
measured in standard dissonance paradigms, it is difficult to know why a
particular individual difference related to a particular pattern of attitude
change results. Such designs leave open questions such as: Was dissonance
aroused at all for the group of individuals who failed to show attitude
change? Was dissonance aroused and not reduced at all or reduced via
a mechanism other than attitude change? To assist in answering these
questions, three variables need to be considered.
The first relevant variable is the initial perception of dissonant cogni-
tions. A behavior that creates dissonance for one person may cause conso-
nance for another. Consequently, when a group of individuals shows
attitude change following a free choice but another does not, this result
may be due to group differences in the initial perception of dissonant
cognitions. Experiments designed with this variable in mind can explore
the effects of such behaviors. Future research should explore ways of
manipulating and measuring the initial perception of dissonance, as most
dissonance studies simply expose individuals to one dissonance-evoking
situation and then examine the effect of individual differences on attitudes.
The second set of variables involved in the dissonance process relates to

dissonance arousal. Once the individual perceives a sufficient cognitive
discrepancy, dissonance arousal should occur. Individuals are likely to differ
in their awareness of this arousal, how long this awareness lasts, and the
tolerance of this arousal. Differences may also exist in the causal relationship
between dissonance arousal and discrepancy reduction. That is, some
individuals may need more arousal to provoke discrepancy reduction.
The third set of variables involved in the dissonance process relates to
dissonance or discrepancy reduction. Festinger (1957) predicted that disso-
nance reduction would first be aimed at cognitions that are least resistant to
change. Experimental work by Gotz-Marchand et al. (1974) supported
these predictions. Individual differences research has also supported these
predictions. For example, following induced compliance, individuals high
in public self-consciousness reduce dissonance via attitude change, presum-
ably because they are more firmly committed to their public behavior than
to their private attitudes (Scheier & Carver, 1980). In contrast, individuals
high in private self-consciousness reduce dissonance via derogation of their
behavior, presumably because they are more firmly committed to their
private attitudes than their public behavior. Other, more recent work has
suggested that the order of discrepancy-reduction mode presentation can
have effects on discrepancy reduction, such that individuals seem most likely
to use the mode presented first (Simon et al., 1995). It is possible that order
effects such as these only emerge when the cognitions are roughly equal in
resistance to change, because other research has suggested that, in general,
individuals prefer to reduce dissonance via discrepancy reduction rather
than through self-affirmation (Stone et al., 1997).
6.6. Creating a new individual differences measure related

to dissonance processes
The specification of the three critical components of the dissonance process
requires that studies concerned with individual differences measure or
manipulate these variables to fully understand how a given individual
difference relates to dissonance processes. Along the same lines, individual
difference measures may be used to separate out the various aspects of the
dissonance process. Because the first component of the dissonance pro-
cess—the initial perception of the dissonance situation—is more amenable
to manipulation than measurement, we sought to create a questionnaire
that focused on assessing individual differences in the remaining two
components: dissonance arousal and dissonance reduction.
Previous research on individual differences and their relationship to
dissonance has typically focused on existing individual differences measures
and their relationship to the dissonance reduction component (i.e., attitude
change) in laboratory studies. However, one could instead start with the
experimental paradigms used by dissonance researchers and create an indi-

vidual difference measure based on these paradigms. That is, we know that
dissonance is evoked following difficult decisions, induced compliance, and
the exertion of effort. By using these situations as a starting point for the
creation of an individual differences measure, we could benefit from insights
gained from decades of laboratory research on dissonance processes. More-
over, it would also permit an easy method of assessing individual differences
in dissonance processes, thus allowing the extension of dissonance-based
individual differences into other realms of inquiry. Finally, such a measure
could permit the testing of theoretically-derived predictions in novel ways.
The action-based model specifies that dissonance arousal be separated
conceptually and empirically from dissonance/discrepancy reduction.
Accordingly, when we created the following individual differences measure,
we generated some items that we thought would capture dissonance
arousal/affect and other items that would tap dissonance/discrepancy reduc-
tion. In addition, we created items that measured reactions in three of the
most commonly used dissonance paradigms—induced compliance, free
choice/difficult decision, and effort justification.
We believed it important to separate dissonance arousal from discrep-
ancy reduction, even though most past conceptualizations suggest a direct
relationship between arousal and reduction. However, research has consis-
tently failed to support this relationship, particularly when subjective reports
of the negative affective experience of dissonance are measured (Elliot &
Devine, 1994; Harmon-Jones, 2000c). That is, although some experiments
found a positive correlation between discrepancy-produced negative affect
and discrepancy reduction (attitude change) in the critical high-dissonance
condition (Zanna & Cooper, 1974), other studies did not find such a
correlation even though the dissonance situation created subjective negative
affect (Elliot & Devine, 1994; Harmon-Jones, 2000c; Higgins et al., 1979).
These results suggest that the subjective experience of negative affect need
not correlate directly with discrepancy reduction measures such as attitude
change. Indeed, individuals who continue to experience dissonance-related
negative affect for prolonged periods may be the very individuals who have
difficulty reducing the dissonance or engaging in discrepancy reduction.
These individuals may be unable to alter their cognitions because their
cognitions may be too resistant to change. In addition, individuals who
experience high levels of dissonance-related negative affect may be more
acutely aware of their negative affect and thus less able to reduce it through
discrepancy reduction (Pyszczynski et al., 1993).
Thus, we predicted that dissonance arousal and dissonance reduction
would be separate but correlated constructs. We also predicted that the
arousal and reduction responses within the three dissonance situations
would be inter-related.
After generating a set of appropriate items and having a large pool of

undergraduate students respond to the items, we submitted the responses to
an exploratory factor analysis. Then, on a separate sample, we conducted a
confirmatory factor analysis. The resulting items of these two studies are
shown in Table 3.1. The results of the confirmatory factor analysis revealed
a model that contained six lower-order factors (dissonance situation X
arousal/reduction) plus two higher-order factors (arousal vs reduction); see
Tables 3.2 and 3.3. The results of this analysis are displayed in Fig. 3.5. We
refer to the measure as the dissonance arousal and reduction questionnaire
(DARQ; Harmon-Jones et al., 2008). Dissonance arousal and reduction are
inversely correlated (see Fig. 3.5).
The DARQ subscales correlated with other measures with which they
would be expected to correlate (see Table 3.4 for the list of questionnaires
and their example items). For example, dissonance arousal correlated
directly with Personal Fear of Invalidity, r ¼ 0.48 (all reported correlations
are significant, p < 0.05). Dissonance arousal also correlated directly with
Response to Lack of Structure, r ¼ 0.34. These questionnaires are subscales
of the Personal Need for Structure and Personal Fear of Invalidity scales
(Thompson et al., 1989; see also, Neuberg et al., 1997), which were
designed to measure trait preferences for cognitive simplicity and structure.
The third subscale from these scales, Desire for Structure, was not correlated
with dissonance arousal, r ¼ 0.00. Dissonance reduction, on the other hand,
was directly correlated with Desire for Structure, r ¼ 0.13, and inversely
correlated with Fear of Invalidity, r ¼ 0.20. It was not correlated with
Responses to Lack of Structure, r ¼ 0.02. In addition, Preference for
Consistency (Cialdini et al., 1995) was not significantly correlated with
dissonance arousal, r ¼ 0.08, but was directly correlated with dissonance
reduction, r ¼ 0.19. These correlations help to establish the convergent
validity of the DARQ, but because the correlations are far from perfect,
they also suggest that the DARQ measures constructs different than these
measures.
In addition, from the action-based model, we derived some predictions
regarding the relationships of the DARQ with other variables. In particular,
we predicted that dissonance reduction should relate positively to variables
associated with effective behavior. To assess this, measures of depression, life
satisfaction, and well being were included. Depression was measured with
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1979), and life satisfaction
was measured with the Satisfaction With Life Scale (Diener et al., 1985).
Other dimensions of well being were measured with Ryff and colleagues’
six dimensions of psychological well-being scale (Ryff & Keyes, 1995).
These dimensions include positive evaluations of oneself and one’s past
life (Self-Acceptance), a sense of continued growth and development as a
person (Personal Growth), the belief that one’s life is purposeful and
Table 3.1 Factor analyses of dissonance arousal and reduction questionnaire

(DARQ) items
Sample 1 Sample 1 Sample 2

DARQ Item Subscale (N ¼ 428) (Revised) (N ¼ 427)
1. After I work hard Effort – 0.63 0.61 0.67

on something, I Ar.
feel down and
wonder whether it
was worth it.
on something, I Ar.
often wish I hadn’t
bothered.
3. I really dislike the Effort – 0.31 ** **
let-down feeling I Ar.
have after I finish a
big project.
4. When I work hard Effort – 0.69 0.69 0.68
on something, the Ar.
results are usually
disappointing.
on something, I Red.
really appreciate
the results of my
efforts.
6. My favorite things Effort – 0.72 0.72 0.64
are the things I’ve Red.
had to work the
hardest to get.
7. The harder I have Effort – 0.64 0.64 0.65
to work to get Red.
something, the
more I like it.
8. If something Effort – 0.07 ** **
comes easily, it’s Red.
not worth that
much to me.
9. I really enjoy Effort – 0.67 0.67 0.61
looking back on Red.
my work when
the work was
really hard.
10. If I have to work Effort – 0.75 0.74 0.68
hard to achieve Red. x
Table 3.1 (continued)

something, I will
afterwards find it
more attractive.
11. After I make a Decision 0.63 0.62 0.57
decision, I tend to – Red.
stick with it.
12. Typically, I Decision 0.64 0.65 0.69
appreciate what I – Red.
decided to do.
13. After making a Decision 0.46 0.45 0.46
decision, I’m – Red.
happy with what I
chose and I don’t
think about it
anymore.
14. I feel good once I Decision 0.68 0.69 0.58
make up my mind – Red.
about a tough
decision.
15. I often regret my Decision 0.74 0.74 0.69
decisions. – Ar.
16. After making a Decision 0.63 0.62 0.69
tough decision, I – Ar.
often wish I could
change my mind.
17. I often suffer from Decision 0.47 0.48 0.35
regret after I buy – Ar.
something
expensive.
18. It’s an awful Decision 0.38 0.39 0.52
feeling when I’ve – Ar.
made a difficult
decision and
there’s no going
back.
19. I rarely regret Decision 0.36 ** **
things after – Ar.
making a tough
decision.
20. I rarely feel guilty Induced 0.34 ** **
over mistakes I – Ar.
made.
(continued)

21. I feel really bad Induced 0.71 0.71 0.69
about myself if I – Ar.
do something
stupid.
22. After I do Induced 0.62 0.62 0.71
something foolish, – Ar.
I dislike myself.
23. Whenever I do Induced 0.74 0.74 0.61
something wrong, – Ar.
I feel like I’m not a
good person.
24. If I do something Induced 0.26 ** **
that makes me feel – Red.
guilty, I usually
can think my way
out of the guilt.
25. If I do something Induced 0.47 0.45 0.48
that seems wrong – Red.
at first, I soon
realize that there
was a good reason
for it.
26. I can think of good Induced 0.68 0.70 0.72
reasons for things – Red.
I’ve done, even
things that might
seem foolish to
someone else.
27. When I think I’ve Induced 0.50 0.50 0.30
made a mistake, I – Red.
often realize that I
did the right thing
after all.
28. There are always Induced 0.57 0.56 0.60
good explanations – Red.
for things I have
done, even things
that might at first
seem irrational.
Note. **omitted items. Ar. ¼ arousal; Red. ¼ reduction. All factor loadings estimated via maximum
likelihood confirmatory factor analysis for six-factor oblique solution.
Table 3.2 Fit indices for six-factor (lower-order) models (corresponds

to Table 3.1 loadings)
TLI
Model w2 df RMSEA (NNFI) CFI SRMR
Model 1 875.53 335 0.061 0.92 0.93 0.077
(Sample 1:
exploration
sample)
Model 1- 465.67 215 0.052 0.95 0.96 0.062
Revised
(Sample 1:
exploration
sample)
Model 383.09 215 0.043 0.97 0.97 .052
2 (Sample 2:
confirmation
sample)
Table 3.3 Fit indices for higher-order models (confirmation sample)
TLI
Model w2 df RMSEA (NNFI) CFI SRMR
Model A—one- 584.44 224 0.061 0.94 0.94 0.079
factor model
‘‘unitary
dissonance’’
Model B—two- 506.13 223 0.055 0.95 0.96 0.072
factor model
‘‘arousal and
reduction’’
Model C— 581.04 221 0.062 0.94 0.94 .078
three-factor
model ‘‘effort,
decision, and
induced
compliance’’
0.69 DARQ-1
Effort- 0.63
DARQ-2
arousal 0.67
DARQ-4
DARQ-5
0.68
0.66 DARQ-6
Effort-
0.67
reduction DARQ-7
0.62
0.68 DARQ-9
0.75 0.80
DARQ-10
Arousal DARQ-11
0.57
0.97 0.70
Decision- DARQ-12
arousal 0.45
DARQ-13
0.58
− 0.57 DARQ-14
DARQ-15
0.71
0.69 DARQ-16
1.04 Decision-
reduction 0.34
Reduction DARQ-17
0.50
DARQ-18
0.56
0.68 DARQ-21
Induced- 0.73
DARQ-22
0.73 arousal 0.60
DARQ-23
DARQ-25
0.46
0.74 DARQ-26
Induced-
reduction 0.28
DARQ-27
0.60
DARQ-28
Figure 3.5 Hierarchical two-factor model of dissonance arousal and reduction.

Table 3.4 Example items for the personality scales
Personal Fear of Invalidity (Thompson et al., 1989)

– Sometimes I become impatient over my indecisiveness.
– Sometimes I see so many options to a situation that it is really confusing.
Response to Lack of Structure (Thompson et al., 1989)
– It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect
from it.
– I hate to be with people who are unpredictable.
Desire for Structure (Thompson et al., 1989)
– I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.
– I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place.
Preference for Consistency (Cialdini et al., 1995)
– I prefer to be around people whose reactions I can anticipate.
– It is important to me that my actions are consistent with my beliefs.
Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1979)
– I do not feel sad; I feel sad; I am sad all the time, and I can’t snap out of it;
I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it. (participants select the
statement that best describes them).
– I don’t feel particularly guilty; I feel guilty a good part of the time; I feel
quite guilty most of the time; I feel guilty all of the time. (participants
select the statement that best describes them).
Satisfaction With Life Scale (Diener et al., 1985)
– In most ways my life is close to my ideal.
– The conditions of my life are excellent.
Ryff ’s Psychological Well-Being Scale (Ryff & Keyes, 1995)
Self-Acceptance
– The past had its ups and downs, but in general I wouldn’t want to
change it.
– When I compare myself with friends and acquaintances, it makes me feel
good about who I am.
Personal Growth
– I think it is important to have new experiences that challenge how you
think about the world.
– I have the sense that I have developed a lot as a person over time.
Purpose in Life
– I am an active person in carrying out the plans I set for myself.
– I enjoy making plans for the future and working to make them a reality.
Positive Relations With Others
– People would describe me as a giving person, willing to share my time
with others.
– I know that I can trust my friends and they know that they can trust me.
Environmental Mastery
– I am quite good at managing the many responsibilities of my daily life.
(continued)
– I generally do a good job of taking care of my personal finances and affairs.

Autonomy
– I am not afraid to voice my opinions even when they are in opposition to
the opinions of most people.
– My decisions are not usually influenced by what everyone else is doing.
Carver and White’s (1994) BIS/BAS Scale
BAS—Drive
– When I want something, I usually go all-out to get it.
– I go out of my way to get things I want.
BAS—Reward Responsiveness
– When I get something I want, I feel excited and energized.
– When I’m doing well at something, I love to keep at it.
BAS—Fun-seeking
– I will often do things for no other reason than that they might be fun.
– I crave excitement and new sensations.
BIS
– I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or know somebody is angry
at me.
– I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at something.
meaningful (Purpose in Life), the possession of quality relations with others

(Positive Relations With Others), the capacity to manage effectively
one’s life and surrounding world (Environmental Mastery), and a sense of
self-determination (Autonomy).
As expected, dissonance arousal was inversely related to psychological
well-being, whereas dissonance reduction was directly related to psycho-
logical well-being. Specifically, dissonance arousal related directly with
depression (r’s > 0.40). In contrast, dissonance arousal was related inversely
with subjective well-being and all of Ryff’s dimensions (r’s > 0.35).
Dissonance reduction, on the other hand, related inversely with depression,
but directly with subjective well-being and all of Ryff’s dimensions
(r’s > 0.27). The above relationship of dissonance arousal and depression
(and subjective well-being) remained significant when controlling for
Desire for Structure, Response to Lack of Structure, Fear of Invalidity,
and Preference for Consistency. Identical results occurred for the relation-
ship of dissonance arousal and Ryff’s well-being dimensions. In addition,
the relationship of dissonance reduction and depression (and subjective
well-being) remained significant when controlling for Desire for Structure,
Response to Lack of Structure, Fear of Invalidity, and Preference for
Consistency. Identical results occurred for the relationship of dissonance
reduction and Ryff’s well-being dimensions.
Given the action-based model’s predictions regarding the relationship

between dissonance reduction and approach motivation, we predicted that
dissonance reduction would relate to trait differences in approach motiva-
tion, as measured by Carver and White’s (1994) Behavioral Activation Scale
(BAS). As expected, dissonance reduction was directly related to BAS,
r ¼ 0.41. Dissonance arousal, on the other hand, was inversely related to
BAS, r ¼ 0.15.
This recent research using the DARQ suggests that dissonance arousal
and dissonance reduction are separable but related constructs at the individ-
ual differences level of analysis. They both relate in expected ways with
existing constructs but their overlap with these existing constructs is not so
high as to suggest redundancy. Consistent with the action-based model,
dissonance reduction was directly related to distal measures of effective
behavior such as satisfaction with life, positive relationships with others,
and environmental mastery. Moreover, dissonance reduction was directly
associated with approach motivation, also in line with predictions derived
from the action-based model. Taken together, these results suggest that
use of the DARQ in future research may shed new light on cognitive
dissonance processes.
7. Conclusion
The action-based model assumes that dissonance processes operate
because they are functional, that is, most often useful for the organism.
However, the action-based model does not claim that dissonance reduction
is always functional. We think of dissonance processes as being similar to
other functional, motivated behaviors such as eating. Eating is necessary for
the survival of the organism; however, disordered eating can be harmful.
Similarly, dissonance reduction often benefits persons by assisting them in
acting on their decisions without being hampered by excess regret or
conflict. However, if a person makes a poor decision and then reduces the
dissonance associated with the decision, he/she will persist in acting on the
decision when it might be advantageous to disengage. The action-based
model proposes that dissonance reduction, while not always functional, is
functional more often than not. In the majority of cases, it is advantageous
for persons to reduce dissonance, and act effectively on their decisions.
The dissonance-reduction mechanism functions to override continued
psychological conflict that would potentially interfere with effective action.
We suggest that the action-based model provides an explanation of the
underlying, basic motivation behind dissonance processes. The action-based
model assumes that, in most cases, dissonance processes are behaviorally
adaptive. Dissonance reduction primarily functions to facilitate effective
action. The reason organisms experience discomfort when they hold

conflicting cognitions is because conflicting cognitions impede effective
action. We hope that this new way of thinking about dissonance processes
will stimulate research on dissonance theory and assist in connecting the
large body of dissonance theory evidence with other research literatures
concerned with action orientation, behavioral regulation, emotion regulation,
and the neural processes that underlie these important psychological processes.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The work in this article was supported by a National Science Foundation Grant (BCS-
9910702). We would like to thank Leonard Berkowitz and Brandon Schmeichel for their
helpful comments, and Dan Newman for help with the DARQ. Correspondence
concerning this article should be addressed to Eddie Harmon-Jones, Texas A&M University,
Department of Psychology, 4235 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843, or via the internet to
[email protected].
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C H A P T E R F O U R
Affect as a Psychological Primitive

Lisa Feldman Barrett* and Eliza Bliss-Moreau†
Contents
1. Affect in the History of Psychology 168
2. A Modern Wundtian View: Core Affect 171
3. The Neural Reference Space for Core Affect 173
4. The Affective Circumplex: A Descriptive Tool for Representing
the Nature of Core Affect 179
4.1. Deconstructing the affective circumplex 180
4.2. Anchoring the affective circumplex 182
5. Individual Differences in Core Affect 193
6. Future Directions 197
6.1. Core affect supports learning 198
6.2. Core affect as a fundamental feature of
conscious experience 202
Acknowledgments 205
References 206
Abstract
In this article, we discuss the hypothesis that affect is a fundamental, psycho-
logically irreducible property of the human mind. We begin by presenting
historical perspectives on the nature of affect. Next, we proceed with a more
contemporary discussion of core affect as a basic property of the mind that is
realized within a broadly distributed neuronal workspace. We then present the
affective circumplex, a mathematical formalization for representing core affec-
tive states, and show that this model can be used to represent individual
differences in core affective feelings that are linked to meaningful variation in
emotional experience. Finally, we conclude by suggesting that core affect has
psychological consequences that reach beyond the boundaries of emotion, to
influence learning and consciousness.
* Massachusetts General Hospital/Harvard Medical School, Psychiatric Neuroimaging Program and Martinos
Imaging Center, Department of Radiology; Department of Psychology, Boston College, Chestnut Hill,
Massachusetts, USA
{
Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, University of California, Davis, Sacramento,
California, USA

167
168 Lisa Feldman Barrett and Eliza Bliss-Moreau
‘‘. . . stimuli do something more than arouse sensation; they give rise to
processes of a different kind, to ‘‘feelings’’ in a special sense; we do not
merely take the impressions as they come, but we are affected by them, we
feel them’’
Titchener (1909, p. 226)
In English, the word ‘‘affect’’ means ‘‘to produce a change.’’ To be
affected by something is to be influenced by it. In science, and particularly
in psychology, ‘‘affect’’ refers to a special kind of influence—something’s
ability to influence your mind in a way that is linked to your body.
Historically, ‘‘affect’’ referred to a simple feeling—to be affected is to feel
something. In modern psychological usage, ‘‘affect’’ refers to the mental
counterpart of internal bodily representations associated with emotions,
actions that involve some degree of motivation, intensity, and force, or
even personality dispositions. In the science of emotion, ‘‘affect’’ is a general
term that has come to mean anything emotional. A cautious term, it allows
reference to something’s effect or someone’s internal state without specify-
ing exactly what kind of an effect or state it is. It allows researchers to talk
about emotion in a theory-neutral way.
In this review, we begin with a historical account of the concept of affect
in psychology. This sets the stage for discussing the contemporary view of
core affect as a basic, universal, and psychologically irreducible property of
the mind. We then describe the brain areas that are responsible for realizing
core affect, illustrating its central role in mental life. Next, we present the
affective circumplex as a mathematical formalization for representing core
affective states. We then describe evidence from our own laboratory
demonstrating that the circumplex can model and represent individual
variation in core affective feelings that are linked to differences in the
precision of emotional experience (termed emotional granularity). Finally,
we end by describing our most recent research on how affective variation
has important psychological consequences that reach beyond the boundaries
of emotion. We describe how core affect forms a basis for learning and
grounds consciousness for other senses like seeing.
1. Affect in the History of Psychology

Wilhem Wundt (1998b/1897), along with William James (1890),
crafted the first psychological constructionist approaches to psychology
(Gendron & Barrett, in press). Constructivist approaches are united in the
assumption that the mental phenomena people experience and name (e.g.,
‘‘thoughts,’’ ‘‘emotions,’’ ‘‘memories,’’ and ‘‘beliefs’’) are events that result
from the interplay of more basic psychological ingredients that are not
Affect as a Psychological Primitive 169
themselves specific to any single psychological phenomenon. Whereas

James focused on the importance of raw sensory processing of somatic,
visceral, vascular, and motor cues from the body as the basic building block
of the mind, Wundt focused on the mental counterpart of those internal
cues, which he called ‘‘affect.’’1
Affect, according to Wundt, is a feeling state that is a fundamental
ingredient of the human mind. People are, wrote Wundt, likely ‘‘never in
a state entirely free from feeling’’ (1897/1998b, p. 92). Wundt argued that
affect is a direct (uninterpreted), psychologically primitive (psychologically
irreducible) experience. He also argued that internally-generated sensations
were as important to mental life as externally-driven sensations, so that affect
(what he called ‘‘simple feelings’’) and sensation were two sides of the same
mental coin. Internal and external sensations ‘‘do not indicate separate
objects,’’ wrote Wundt, ‘‘but different points of view from which we start
in the consideration and scientific treatment of a unitary experience’’ (1897/
1998b, p. 2). Wundt referred to simple feelings as the ‘‘affective tone of a
sensation’’ (1987/1998b, p. 75).
Wundt described momentary affective states as having three independent
qualities—pleasantness/unpleasantness (now called hedonic valence), arous-
ing/subduing (arousal), and strain/relaxation (intensity). According to
Wundt, these properties were not ingredients that make an affective response,
because affect itself is irreducible and cannot be decomposed into more basic
parts. Instead, valence, arousal, and intensity are descriptive features of a
unified state. These three properties define the multidimensional affective
space that people inhabit, such that a person’s momentary affective state can
be described in these terms. Furthermore, Wundt believed that there was
great variety in the nature of simple feelings, so that pleasure and displeasure
did not refer to uniform states. It is ‘‘entirely untenable,’’ wrote Wundt, that
the ‘‘unpleasurableness of a toothache, of an intellectual failure, and of a tragic
experience are all regarded as identical in their affective contents’’ (p. 85).
Edward Titchener (Wundt’s student) largely agreed with Wundt, save
two modifications (Titchener, 1909). First, Titchener believed that affect had
only one property—hedonic valence—on the somewhat flawed reasoning
that pleasure and displeasure were clearly accessible to introspection. Second,
Titchener, more so than Wundt, believed that the content of feelings revealed
their process (i.e., those feelings of pleasure and displeasure reveal the process
of evaluation). This latter assumption has caused a great degree of confusion in
scientific discussions about the basic dimensions of affect, as we discuss later.
Like most ‘‘dimensional’’ approaches, Wundt and Titchener did not argue
that mental states are reduced to only affective feelings. Instead, they argued that
1
In an earlier volume of Physiological Psychology, Wundt argued that affect is an attribute of sensation. In his
1896 Outlines of Psychology, he changed his view and argued that sensations and feelings are complementary
elements (Titchener, 1908).
affect is a mental element that can become an emotion when combined with
other mental elements. This assumption inspired many similar models of
emotion during the first half of the twentieth century (e.g., Beebe-Center,
1932; Duffy, 1934; Gemelli, 1949a,b; Hunt, 1941; Ruckmick, 1936; Young,
1943) and defined a theoretical tradition that was carried forward by Schachter
and Singer (1962), Mandler (1975), Russell (2003), and Barrett (2006b).
Wundt, in particular, emphasized that emotions are not static things or entities,
but instead are ‘‘psychical compounds’’ or composites that are constituted out
of ‘‘psychical elements,’’ like affect, that are simple and irreducible in a
psychological sense (1897/1998b, p. 101). He proposed that the additional
element in emotion was ‘‘ideas,’’ which he described as ‘‘revival of previous
experiences’’ (1894/1998, p. 452).2 For our purposes, the important point is
that most theorists who are labeled as having a ‘‘dimensional’’ perspective on
emotion, including Wundt and Titchener, did not argue that affect was
sufficient to explain mental states. They only proposed that it was necessary.
Wundt and Titchener inspired several decades of debate about affect
during the first decades of the twentieth century. First, there was debate
over whether affect was more like a sensation (i.e., a sixth sense to vision,
taste, etc.) or like a mental feeling. Most writers favored the latter conclusion.
For example, Alechsieff (1907; cited in Arnold, 1960) argued that affect is not
a sensation on the grounds that it cannot be parsed and analyzed as distinct
modalities like vision, audition, and touch. Koch (1913; cited in Arnold,
1960) added that affect is not a distinct sensory modality because it is derived
from ‘‘diffuse organic sensations,’’ in effect arguing that affect can be distin-
guished from sensations that derive from the external sensory world, but not
from those sensations that derive from the internal sensory world (i.e., the
body). In modern terms, Koch’s proposal would be that affect is, essentially,
a redescription of internal sensation in personally relevant terms. In contrast,
Arnold herself argued that affect (as feeling) is completely separate from all
sensations and always occurs in reaction to them. Importantly, Arnold’s
writing forms the basis of most modern appraisal views of emotion.
2
Wundt described how affective and ideational compounds combine via a specific temporal course in a way
that strongly foreshadows the kind of stage model described by Schachter and Singer (1962) (and carried
forward in some newer constructionist views, e.g., Russell, 2003). According to Wundt, emotions begin
with an ‘‘inceptive feeling’’ that is affective in nature. The inceptive feeling is caused either by external
sensory stimulation (what Wundt called ‘‘outer emotional stimulation’’) or internal stimulation arising from
associative or apperceptive conditions (what Wundt referred to as ‘‘psychical’’) (1897/1998b, p. 171). Next,
an ‘‘ideational process’’ distinguishes different emotional feelings from one another. Although Wundt did not
provide a clear definition of what an ideational process is, his writing is at least suggestive that he is referring to
some sort of embodied conceptualization close to that proposed by Barrett (2006b). Finally, there is a
terminal feeling, which is basically a more diffuse affective state that remains after the more intense feelings
have dissipated—similar to a mood state. Interestingly, Wundt argued that the psychical compounds combine
to produce emergent emotional phenomena (in a way that is reminiscent of more recent treatments of
emotion, e.g., Barrett, 2006b; Clore & Ortony, 2008). ‘‘The attributes of psychical compounds’’ Wundt
wrote ‘‘are never limited to those of the elements that enter into them, but new attributes, peculiar to the
compounds themselves, always arise as a result of the combination of these elements’’ (1897/1998b, p. 91).
A second debate inspired by Wundt and Titchener dealt with the

question of whether affect is distinct from emotion. Most writers assumed
that the answer was yes, but for different reasons. Some argued that feelings
of pleasantness and unpleasantness are something more akin to an attitude or
an action tendency derived from the feeling of wanting to approach or
avoid an object (e.g., Carr, 1925; Hunt, 1939; Peters, 1935; Young, 1943).
These feelings could then be shaped into emotion via additional processes.
In these models, which have a largely constructionist flavor that is similar to
Wundt and Titchener, emotion is just one class of affective feeling. Arnold
(1960), on the other hand, used the word ‘‘affect’’ to refer to ‘‘feelings’’
as categorically separate from ‘‘emotions’’ which she described in more
behaviorally mechanistic terms (i.e., a tendency to move towards or away
from an object during basic emotions). For Arnold, affect is a state of mind
that occurs in response to emotion—it is unpleasant to be angry or sad or
afraid and pleasant to be excited or happy or tranquil. According to Arnold,
both sensations and emotions inspire affective feeling (that are pleasant or
unpleasant) by virtue of their influence.
Amidst these debates, the last century has seen a steady accumulating
of evidence that Wundt’s initial proposals about affect were largely correct.
In the next section, we discuss how a person’s momentary mental state
(however it is categorized) can be described as pleasant or unpleasant with
some degree of arousal. Together valence and arousal describe something
psychologically primitive—a basic or ‘‘core’’ ingredient common to all psy-
chological states. In the section following that, we describe the neuroanatomi-
cal evidence that a core affective state is, at once, tied to a person’s interoceptive
sensations from the body and exteroceptive sensations from the world.
2. A Modern Wundtian View: Core Affect

Core affect is a state of pleasure or displeasure with some degree of
arousal (Barrett, 2006b,c; Russell, 2003; Russell & Barrett, 1999).
Together, valence and arousal form a unified state, so although it is possible
to focus on one property or the other, people cannot feel pleasant or
unpleasant in a way that is isolated from their degree of arousal.3 This
kind of affect is referred to as ‘‘core’’ for a number of reasons.
Barring injury, core affect is grounded in the somatovisceral, kinesthetic,
proprioceptive, and neurochemical fluctuations that take place within
the core of body (Barrett, 2006a; Nauta, 1971). As we will see in the
3
This may be one reason why the Negative Affectivity/Positive Affectivity model of affect (Watson &
Tellegen, 1985) and other similar models are so popular. The empirical basis for this model is grounded
largely in self-reports of affective experience.
next section, core affect is realized by integrating incoming sensory infor-

mation from the external world with homeostatic and interoceptive
information from the body. The result is a mental state that can be used
to safely navigate the world by predicting reward and threat, friend and foe.
Affect is a central feature in many psychological phenomena, including
emotion (Barrett, 2006a,b; Diener, 1999; Russell, 2003), attitudes
(e.g., Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Eagly & Chaiken, 1998; Ito & Cacioppo,
2001), stereotyping and prejudice (e.g., Cacioppo & Berntson, 2001; Forgas
& Fiedler, 1996; Mackie & Hamilton, 1993; Moreno & Bodenhausen,
2001), verbal communication and negotiation strategies (e.g., Forgas, 1998,
1999a,b), judgment and decision-making (e.g., Forgas, 1995; Haidt, 2002;
Slovic et al., 2002), predicting the future (e.g., Gilbert & Ebert, 2002;
Gilbert et al., 1998), work motivation (e.g., Seo et al., 2004), psychopathology
(e.g., Davidson, 2000; Davidson et al., 2002), well-being, (e.g., Davidson,
2004), health (Gallo et al., 2005), and personality (e.g., Revelle, 1995; Watson,
2000; Yik et al., 2002). Core affect provides a common metric (or what
neuroeconomists call a ‘‘common currency’’) for comparing qualitatively
different events (Cabanac, 2002), and can serve as the basis for moral judgments
of right and wrong (Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 2001). It also serves as a basic of
language comprehension. A speaker’s tone of voice (speaking rate, tone of
voice, and intonation) as well as acoustical cues to the identity of a speaker
routinely impacts the affective state of the listener (Nygaard & Lunders 2002;
Owren & Rendell, 1997) and these cues influence lexical processing (Schirmer
& Kotz, 2003; Wurm et al., 2001). Affective tone even influences the percep-
tion of spoken words, making it easier to recognize some words and harder to
recognize others (Nygaard & Queen, 2008). In the final section of the paper,
we discuss how core affect is important in normal object perception (see Barrett
& Bar, in press). People see with feeling. We ‘‘gaze,’’ ‘‘behold,’’ ‘‘stare,’’
‘‘gape,’’ and ‘‘glare.’’ Without affect, there is visual sensation, but no sight.
Core affect also represents a basic kind of psychological meaning. The
basic acoustical properties of animal calls (and human voices) directly act on
the nervous system of the perceiving animal to change its affective state and
in so doing conveys the meaning of the sound (Owren & Rendall, 1997,
2001).4 All words (regardless of language) have an affective dimension of
meaning (Osgood et al., 1957), so that people cannot communicate without
also (often inadvertently) communicating something about their affective
state. Learning a new language fluently does not merely require making a
link between the phonological forms of words and their denotation, but a
connection to affective changes must also be forged.
4
The acoustical properties that reflect the identity of the sender (reflected in ‘‘sonants’’ and ‘‘gruffs’’) indirectly
influence the affective state of the perceiving animal based on its prior experience with the sender, whether it
is animal (Owren & Rendall, 1997) or a human speaker (Bliss-Moreau et al., manuscript under review).
Finally, as we discuss in the final section of the paper, affective changes

are ‘‘core’’ because they are crucial to the conscious experience of the world
around us (for a discussion, see Duncan & Barrett, 2007). Affective changes
are often experienced as a property of an object, in much the same way as
color (people say ‘‘The sky is blue’’ rather than ‘‘I experience the sky as
blue’’ or ‘‘Light from the sky at 500 nm is striking my retina which I
experience as blue’’). Indeed, objects in the world are said to be ‘‘positive’’
or ‘‘negative’’ by virtue of their capacity to influence a person’s core
affective state. For example, if the perception of a snake involves unpleasant,
high arousal affect, then the snake is said to be negative and arousing.
People are often aware of their core affective state, although they need
not be. The capacity to have core affective states is psychologically universal
and biologically basic, although people largely learn which sensory patterns
predict threat and reward through experience. Infants (Lewis, 2000) and
people in all cultures around the world have core affective experiences
(Mesquita, 2003). Scientists can clearly measure core affect in the face (for
reviews, see Cacioppo et al., 2000), in the voice (for reviews, see
Bachorwoski, 1999; Russell et al., 2003), and in the peripheral nervous
system (for reviews, see Bradley & Lang, 2000; Cacioppo et al., 2000). As a
consequence, core affect can be thought of as a neurophysiologic barometer
of the individual’s relationship to an environment at a given point in time,
with self-reported feelings as the barometer readings.
3. The Neural Reference Space for Core Affect

With several decades of modern neuroscience evidence to draw from,
it is now possible to see that Wundt was probably right about the relation
between affect and external sensations. Both neuroanatomical and neuro-
imaging evidence suggests that people don’t evaluate an object for its
personal significance once they already know what it is. Their affective
reaction to the external sensory array helps the brain to make external
sensations meaningful, aiding perception in a very basic way.
The distributed circuitry for core affect can be found in every mamma-
lian brain and is particularly elaborated in the human brain (Fig. 4.1). These
areas represent crucial components of a network that bind sensory stimula-
tion from inside the body to that coming from outside the body, and in so
doing each gives the other informational value. Some parts of affective
circuitry are strongly interconnected with sensory cortical areas, whereas
others are strongly interconnected with areas that direct the autonomic and
hormonal responses to regulate the homeostatic state of the body (Barrett &
Bar, in press). The strongly re-entrant nature of neural activity makes it
difficult to derive simple cause and effect relationships between the brain
and the body, or between sensory and affective processing.
Figure 4.1 The hypothesized neural reference space for core affect. Brain areas that
realize core affect include the visceromotor and sensory integration networks in the OFC
(A–C, blue, and purple, respectively), the anterior insula (D, yellow), the amygdala (D,
rose), subgenual and pregenual parts of the ACC (B, copper, tan), the hypothalamus
(B, light green), and the ventral striatum (D, dark green). Also included are the midbrain
(B, turquoise) and brainstem (B, C, dark pink). Adapted from Barrett et al. (2007). Refer
online version of the chapter for color figure.
Core affective circuitry includes brain areas that are traditionally consid-
ered to be ‘‘emotional,’’ such as the amygdala and ventral striatum. The
amygdala’s role in affective circuitry is not to code for fear, or threat, or
anything negative per se. Instead, the amygdala’s function is to direct the
various sources of attention (Holland & Gallagher, 1999) towards a source of
sensory stimulation (such as an object) when the predictive value of that
stimulation is unknown or uncertain (cf. Barrett et al., 2007). As a conse-
quence, the brain can orchestrate physiology and physical actions that allow it
to learn more about the object to better predict its value on future encounters.
The amygdala’s work is complete once an object’s value is known for that
particular context and in that particular instance. When the threat or reward-
ing value again becomes uncertain the amygdala is once again engaged (e.g.,
Barad et al., 2006; Herry et al., 2007). This interpretation is not only
consistent with the neuroscience research showing that rats freeze during
aversive classical conditioning (in our view mistakenly called ‘‘fear’’ condi-
tioning), but it is also consistent with the research showing that the amygdala
is selectively engaged by novelty (e.g., Dubois et al., 1999; Schwartz et al.,
2003; Wilson & Rolls, 1990; Wright et al., 2003, 2006, 2007, 2008) and
ambiguity (Hsu et al., 2005), and quickly habituates to stimuli as they become
familiar (Breiter et al., 1996; Wedig et al., 2005; Wright et al., 2001, 2003).5
Furthermore, amygdala lesions disrupt normal responses to novelty in pri-
mates (e.g. Prather et al., 2001). For a related view, see Whalen (1998).
The ventral striatum (and the larger mesolimbic dopamine system of which
it is a part) does not to code for reward or positivity per se, but instead gates
attention to novel, salient, or unexpected environmental events that require an
effortful (usually behavioral) response, regardless of whether they are positive
or negative (e.g., Berridge & Robinson, 1998; Horvitz, 2000, 2002; Salamone
et al., 2005, 2007; Schultz et al., 1993). Consistent with this view, both
approach and withdrawal behaviors in rats are facilitated via electrical stimula-
tion of the rostral and caudal shells of the nucleus accumbens (which is part of
the ventral striatum; Reynolds & Berridge, 2001, 2002, 2003) and approach
behaviors become dopamine independent with overtraining (Choi et al.,
2005). Dopamine neurons within the ventral striatum increase their firing
rates when surprising or unexpected appetitive events are presented
(McCullough & Salamone, 1992), but firing rates do not increase when
appetitive events are predictable (Mirenowicz & Schultz, 1994). New evi-
dence in rats demonstrates a context dependent functional remapping of cells
in the nucleus accumbens; the same cells code for reward or threat depending
on the context in which the rat is placed (Reynolds & Berridge, 2008).
Core affective circuitry also includes paralimbic portions of prefrontal
cortex that until recently have been considered ‘‘cognitive’’ (cf. Duncan &
Barrett, 2007). These areas include the lateral portions of the orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC) extending back to the agranular insula and laterally to the
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC), as well as the medial portions of the
OFC (sometimes included in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex or
vmPFC) extending back to the subgenual and pregenual portions of the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) on the medial wall. The OFC is a hetero-
modal association area that integrates sensory inputs from the external world
and from the internal body to create a multimodal representation of the
world at a particular moment in time (Mesulam, 2000). It plays a role in
representing reward and threat (e.g., Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004) as well as
in hedonic experience (Kringelbach, 2005; Wager et al., 2008).
Figure 4.1 demonstrates how the amygdala, ventral striatum, and OFC
(including the vmPFC), along with the ACC, insula, thalamus, hypothala-
mus, and autonomic control centers in the midbrain brainstem, constitute a
large-scale neural reference space that realizes neural representations of sensory
information from the world as well as its somatovisceral impact (Barbas,
2007; Ghashghaei & Barbas, 2002; Ongur et al., 2003; reviewed in Duncan
& Barrett, 2007). This description of affective circuitry is meant to be
5
In our view, freezing is not a behavioral index of fear. Freezing can be thought of as an alert, behavioral stance
that allows a creature to martial all its attentional resources to quickly learn more about stimulus whose threat
value is uncertain (e.g., a tone that is suddenly paired with a footshock).
nonspecific without sounding vague, in that a ‘‘neural reference space’’

(according to neuroscientist Gerald Edelman) refers to a neuronal work-
space that implements the brain states that correspond to mental states.
Different brain states are implemented as flexible neuronal assemblies,
so that a given neuron need not participate in every brain state within a
class (such as reward or hedonic pleasure), or even in the exact same mental
state at two different points in time. The assembly of neurons involved in
realizing the constantly changing flow of affective states shifts from moment
to moment, so that particular neurons are selective for affect but may not be
specific to affect in any way.6 Furthermore, this circuitry, although not
specific to emotion, is nicely illustrated within a meta-analysis summarizing
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission
tomography (PET) studies of emotion and affect published between 1990
and 2005 (see Fig. 4.2; Wager et al., 2008).
Although the details are continually being researched, the available
evidence suggests that this larger neutral reference space for core affect can
be subdivided into two related functional networks (for reviews, see
Barbas & Pandya, 1989; Carmichael & Price, 1996; Hurliman et al., 2005;
Ongur & Price, 2000; Ongur et al., 2003). The first functional network is a
sensory integration network. This network establishes an experience-dependent,
value-based representation of an object that includes both external sensory
features of an object along with its impact on the homeostatic state of the
body. It includes the cortical aspects of the amygdala (specifically, the baso-
lateral complex (BL)), the central and lateral portions of OFC, as well as most
of the adjacent agranular insular areas. The sensory integration network has
robust connections with unimodal association areas of many sensory mod-
alities (Barbas, 1993, 2000; Carmichael & Price, 1995; Cavada et al., 2000;
Ghashghaei & Barbas, 2002; McDonald, 1998), including the anterior insula
that represents interoceptive sensations (Craig, 2002).
The second functional network is a visceromotor network and is part of a
functional circuit that guides autonomic, endocrine, and behavioral responses
to an object. It includes the medial portions of the OFC (extending into what
6
Our starting assumption is that core affective states are realized in a broadly distributed system within the
mammalian brain. This view is inspired by constraint satisfaction logic that represents how the brain works
(Barrett et al., 2007; O’Reilly & Munakata, 2000; Spivey, 2007; Wagar & Thagard, 2004), as well as newer
evidence on population-based coding and multi voxel pattern analysis where information is contained in
spatial patterns of neuronal activity across the brain (Norman et al., 2006). In our view, different instances of
core affect (combinations of hedonic valence and arousal) correspond to different brain states (flexible,
distributed assemblies of neurons) from moment to moment, but these need not be localized in different
parts of the brain. Two specific instance of high arousal, negative affect can be realized in different neuronal
assemblies, even within the same person. A given neuron, because it receives input from many other neurons,
can participate (in a probabilistic sense) in more than one neuronal assembly at the same time. It is even the
case that single neurons can respond to different classes of information, depending on the frequency of firing
(or the context) (Basole et al., 2003; Izhikevich et al., 2003; Reynolds & Berridge, 2008), so that even
neurons are probably not specific to a single feature or content.
PCC
dmPFC
pgACC
sgACC
vmPFC
a.Ins IFG l. OFC
s.TC TC/amygdala
vmPFC
Deep nuclei of cerebellum
Thalamus
OFC
v. striatum
Nucleus
Basal forebrain accumbens
Hypothalamus
m.TC Midbrain
CB Pons
Medulla
Figure 4.2 The observed neural reference space for core affect. 165 neuroimaging studies of emotion (58 using PET and 107 using fMRI)
published from 1990 to 2005 were summarized in a multilevel meta-analysis to produce the observed neural reference space for emotion (Wager
et al., 2008). These areas include (from top left, clockwise) anterior insula (aIns), lateral OFC (lOFC), pregenual cingulate cortex (pgACC),
subgenual cingulate cortex (sgACC), ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), temporal cortex/amygdala (TC/Amygdala), thalamus, ventral
striatrum (v Striatum), nucleus accumbens, hypothalamus, midbrain, pons, medulla, OFC, and basal forebrain. Other areas shown in this figure
(e.g., inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), superior temporal cortex (sTC), dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC),
medial temporal cortex (mTC), and cerebellum (CB)) relate to other psychological processes involved with emotion perception and experience.
(See online version of the chapter for color figure).
is sometimes called the vmPFC), as well as subgenual and pregenual areas of

the ACC, with robust reciprocal connections to all limbic areas (including
many nuclei within the amygdala, and the ventral striatum), as well as to the
hypothalamus, midbrain, brainstem, and spinal cord areas that are involved in
internal-state regulation (Barbas & De Olmos, 1990; Barbas et al., 2003;
Carmichael & Price, 1995, 1996; Ghashghaei & Barbas, 2002; Ongur et al.,
1998; Price, 2007; Rempel-Clower & Barbas, 1998). These areas modulate
changes in the viscera associated with the autonomic nervous system (includ-
ing tissues and organs made of smooth muscle, such as the heart and lungs) and
neuroendocrine changes that affect the same organs by way of the chemicals
released into the bloodstream via hypothalamic regulation of the pituitary
gland. In addition, the visceromotor network (particularly the vmPFC) is
important for altering simple stimulus-reinforcer associations via extinction
(Milad et al., 2005; Phelps et al., 2004; Quirk et al., 2000) or reversal learning
(Fellows & Farah, 2003) and appears to be useful for decisions based on
intuitions and feelings rather than on explicit rules (Dunn et al., 2006; Goel
& Dolan, 2003; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005), including guesses and familiarity
based discriminations (Bechara et al., 1997, 1999; Elliott et al., 1999, 2000;
Schnider et al., 2000; Schnyer et al., 2005; Weller et al., 2007).
The circuitry within the neural reference space for core affect binds sensory
information from the external world to sensory information from the body, so
that every mental state is intrinsically infused with affective content. When
core affect is in the background of consciousness, it is perceived as a property of
the world, rather than as the person’s reaction to it. It is under these circum-
stances that scientists usually refer to affect as ‘‘unconscious.’’ We experience a
world of facts rather than feelings, and affect gives us a sense of confidence in
those facts. This is why a drink tastes delicious or is unappetizing (e.g., Berridge
& Winkielman, 2003; Winkielman et al., 2005), why we experience some
people as nice, and others as mean; and why some paintings are beautiful
whereas others are ugly. When core affect is experienced as a property of the
world it acts in stealth by directly translating into a behavior. We have another
sip of Bordeaux because it tastes so good. We avoid an acquaintance on the
street because he is mean. We stand for hours looking at the details of a
painting because it is captivating. When affect is backgrounded in conscious-
ness, we refer to ‘‘affective stimuli’’—but affect is never a property of a
stimulus—it is a feature of a person’s response to that stimulus. An object is
said to have affective value precisely because it has the capacity to influence an
individual’s core affective state. When core affect is in the foreground of
consciousness, it is experienced as a personal reaction to the world: we like
or dislike a drink, a person, or a painting. It is at these times that feelings which
can be described as pleasant or unpleasant content with some degree of arousal
can serve as information for making explicit judgments and decisions
(Clore et al., 2005; Schwarz & Clore, 1983).
Finally, we hypothesize that the validity of experience is rooted in core
affect. Core affect gives force to our attitudes and beliefs, and provides a sense
that what we know is what is right or correct. It seems plausible, then, that core
affect would contribute to confidence in our beliefs about political topics (e.g.,
global warming, abortion, etc.), our world view (e.g., belief in a just world, or
in basic moral principles), or even form the core of religious faith (e.g., a strong
affective response is how you believe in something that cannot be seen). It is
no surprise, then, that the most affectively loaded topics are the ones that
produce the most steadfast opinions, even in the face of contrary evidence.
4. The Affective Circumplex:

A Descriptive Tool for Representing
the Nature of Core Affect
A person’s momentary core affective state (whether it is a simple feeling,
part of an emotion, or part of perceiving an image or another person’s face),
realized by such complex circuitry in the anterior parts of the human brain,
can be psychologically described and represented by a single point on the two
dimensional space schematically represented in Fig. 4.3. Many readers will
recognize this structure as the affective circumplex (Barrett & Russell, 1999;
Feldman, 1995b; Russell, 1980; Russell & Barrett, 1999). The horizontal
dimension, hedonic valence, ranges from pleasant states at one end to
unpleasant states at the other. The vertical dimension, arousal, ranges from
high activity and attention at one end to low activity and sleepiness at the
other. Both dimensions are descriptively bipolar (for a discussion, see Russell
& Carroll, 1999) and largely independent from one another, meaning that
arousal is not merely the intensity of pleasure or displeasure (Kuppens et al., in
preparation). In this section, we describe how the circumplex can be used as a
research tool for studying the content of core affective states.
Negative affect Positive affect

high activation high activation
(e.g., upset, distressed) (e.g., elated, thrilled)
Activation

medium activation Valence medium activation
(e.g., miserable, displeased) (e.g., gratified, pleased)

low activation low activation
(e.g., lethargic, depressed) (e.g., serene, calm)
Figure 4.3 The affective circumplex. Hedonic valence is represented on the horizontal
axis and arousal on the vertical axis.
4.1. Deconstructing the affective circumplex

In the most general terms, a circumplex structure is a multipurpose, mathe-
matical tool for representing mental structure through the geometry of the
circle (Guttman, 1957). The mental structure can be for any group of objects,
items, or stimuli and is assessed by measuring people’s responses to them. For
example, researchers typically measure judgments of affect-related words,
perceptual judgments of faces depicting emotion, or self-reports of a person’s
own momentary feeling state. To create a circumplex, the relations between
the judged or rated stimuli are rendered in multidimensional space.
In simple terms, a circumplex, such as the circumplex model of affect, is
a circle and a set of axes. The circle depicts the similarity or relatedness
between the objects (based on people’s psychological responses to them).
The axes represent the psychological properties that quantify what is similar
and different about people’s reactions to those objects.
4.1.1. The circle

Most objects in the world are similar to one another (or different from one
another) in more than one way. For example, in the interpersonal domain,
people differ from one another based on their nurturance (how warm and
giving they are) and dominance (the extent to which they prefer to be
controlling the outcome of others vs. being controlled by them (Wiggins &
Broughton, 1991). Using the terms of psychological measurement, we
would say the interpersonal descriptions are heterogeneous—two people
cannot be compared to one another using only one property (nurturance)
because they simultaneous vary on the other (dominance) as well. If we only
compare along only one dimension, we will be making a specification error
(leaving some meaningful variance unaccounted for).
When projected into geometric space (using some kind of factor analysis
or multidimensional scaling), heterogeneous objects take on a circular shape
(Guttman, 1957). In fact, circularity is a kind of statistical test for the descrip-
tive nature of the objects in question. The term ‘‘circumplex’’ literally means
‘‘circular order of complexity’’ to indicate that the psychological objects or
events in question are simultaneously similar or different from one another on
at least two more basic psychological properties and therefore cannot be easily
ordered relative to one another in a simple linear fashion. When objects are
homogeneous, and best described by one and only one property, then a
circular structure would not appear (instead, when projected into geometric
space, would see something more like Thurstone’s simple structure).
When projected into geometric space, measurements of affect almost
always take on a circular shape (for a review, see Russell & Barrett, 1999).7
7
For ease of explication, we will refer to words, pictures, or faces as ‘‘affective objects’’ to denote their ability
to change a perceiver’s affective state; or to denote their reflection of that change, as in self-reports of emotion
experience.
A
Surprised
Aroused
Angry Interested B
Nervous Enthusiastic
Surprised Aroused
Nervous angry interested happy
Disappointed Happy satisfied
Disappointedsad
Sad Satisfied Sluggish still relaxed
Sleepy quiet
Sluggish Relaxed
Sleepy Calm
Quiet
Still
Figure 4.4 Variations in the affective circumplex. (A) depicts a prototypical affective
space insofar as emotions are distributed evenly in a circular structure, with many
smaller regions of homogeneity, where each region is psychologically distinct from
every other. (B) depicts a nonprototypical affective space with two larger regions,
where emotions within a region are highly similar. Figure is adapted from Barrett
(2004).
The fact that they arrange in a circular fashion with such regularity reveals
that affective objects (be they judgments of words, pictures of faces, or self-
report ratings of experience) are similar or different from one another in
more than one way (and therefore must be described by more than one
fundamental property). For example, both structures in Fig. 4.4 depict
circumplex structures of affect in geometric space. The similarity between
affective objects is represented solely by their position in the circle. This
similarity might be the result of two properties, or three, or even four—the
point is there is more than one.
The affective circumplex has an additional feature, over and above a
generic circular structure. The qualitative (or ordinal) similarity for two
affective objects is reflected in their proximity to one another around the
perimeter of the circle. Affective objects that are closer together are more
similar, whereas elements separated by an arc distance of 180 are maximally
dissimilar (but for an alternative view, see Plutchik, 1980). For example, as
the minimal arc distance between elements increases (e.g., ‘‘happy’’ and
‘‘enthusiastic’’), the degree of similarity decreases (i.e., the correlation
becomes smaller), suggesting that the elements are experienced as qualita-
tively different. Affective objects are separated by an arc distance of 90
(e.g., ‘‘happy’’ and ‘‘surprised’’) are completely independent. As the arc
distance increases to 180 (e.g., ‘‘happy’’ and ‘‘sad’’), the objects represent
bipolar opposites. Past 180 , the objects become increasingly similar again
until the original starting point is reached. Over and above these constraints
though, objects within space need not be equally spaced around the circle
for it to be considered a circumplex (Browne, 1992; Fabrigar et al., 1997;
see also Segura & González-Romá, 2003).
4.1.2. The axes

As conceived by Guttman (1957), the circumplex was defined solely in
terms of ordinal relationships and so, alone, does not allow a quantitative
analysis of the features or properties that psychological responses share—it
merely depicts their nonparametric relatedness in geometric space. As is true
for some (but not all) circumplexes, it is necessary to embed the affective
circle within a two dimensional Euclidean space to discover the multiple
properties that best describe how its elements are similar (or different) from
one another (see Shepard, 1978). The dimensions represent the salient
psychological attributes or features that describe the psychological responses
(Davison, 1983). In the affective domain, the specific nature of those
attributes has been an issue of great debate for the last half a century.
4.2. Anchoring the affective circumplex

Although valence and arousal are the original set of dimensions that
anchored the affective circumplex, other sets of dimensions have been
proposed (see Fig. 4.5), including positive and negative activation (e.g.,
Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Watson et al., 1999), positive and negative affect
(Cacioppo et al., 1999), approach and withdrawal (e.g., Davidson, 1992), and
tense and energetic activation (Thayer, 1989). In fact, all dimensions can be
incorporated within the same circular structure (Carroll et al., 1999; Yik
et al., 1999; Fig. 4.6). Still, there have been long debates about which
dimensions are the most scientifically useful, with arguments on all sides
(for reviews, see Cacioppo et al., 1999; Green et al., 1999; Russell &
Barrett, 1999; Watson et al., 1999). A brief discussion of these arguments
highlights some important points about the nature of affect.
4.2.1. The great bipolarity debate

One issue that has drawn a good deal of attention is whether a bipolar
valence dimension can properly describe affective states. Most typically, this
question is asked in terms of whether pleasure and displeasure are truly
bipolar opposites. Many studies (relying almost exclusively on zero-order
correlation coefficients) have demonstrated that people report feeling both
pleasant and unpleasant affective feelings ‘‘at the same time,’’ so that the
correlation between the two is nowhere near –1 (which is assumed for
bipolar opposites).
When measurement errors are properly controlled, subjective ratings of
pleasure and displeasure are strongly negatively correlated (Barrett & Russell,
1998; Green et al., 1993). But to emphasize these negative correlations is to
miss the more central point that correlations are statistically inadequate for
evaluating bipolarity. Mathematical proofs clearly show that a correlation of –1
is not the gold standard for demonstrating bipolarity (Russell & Carroll, 1999;
Russell (1980) Watson & Tellegen (1985)
Arousal Engagement
High High
Distress Excitement negative positive
affect affect
Misery Pleasure Unpleasantness Pleasantness
Depression Relaxation Low Low

positive negative
Sleep affect Disengagement affect
Larsen & Diener (1992) Thayer (1989)
High activation Tense-energy

Activated Activated
Tension Energy
unpleasant pleasant
Tense- Calm-
Unpleasant Pleasant
tiredness energy
Unactivated Unactivated Tiredness Calmness

unpleasant pleasant
Low activation Calm-tiredness
Figure 4.5 Multiple affective dimensions mapped in circumplex space. Primary (or main) dimensions are indicated in with black solid lines
and labeled with capital letters. Secondary dimensions are indicated with gray dotted lines and are labeled in lower case letters. From Barrett
and Russell (1999).
Feldman Barrett & Russell

deactivated
Boston sample 74⬚ (65⬚ / 83⬚)
Thayer
Thayer vancouver sample 77⬚ (70⬚/83⬚)
energy
Tension
56⬚ (49⬚/62⬚)
136⬚ (130⬚ / 143⬚)
Larsen & Diener
Larsen & Diener
A activated pleasant
activated unpleasant
45⬚ (39⬚/51⬚)
146⬚ (140⬚ / 152⬚)
Watson & Tellegen
Watson & Tellegen
High PA
High NA
38⬚ (31⬚/45⬚)
152⬚ (145⬚ / 160⬚)
Feldman Barrett Feldman Barrett

and Russell and Rrussell
unpleasant UP P pleasant
Boston uample 171⬚ (165⬚/178⬚) 0⬚
Vancouver sample 175⬚ (169⬚/180⬚)
Watson & tellegen

Watson & Tellegen Low NA
Low PA 321⬚ (314⬚/328⬚)
D Larsen & Diener
234⬚ (225⬚ / 243⬚)
unactivated pleasant
Larsen & Diener Thayer
Thayer 313⬚ (307⬚/319⬚)
unactivated tiredness
Calmness
unpleasant 238⬚ (231⬚/245⬚)
302⬚ (296⬚/308⬚)
234⬚ (227⬚/241⬚)
Feldman Barrett and Russell
deactivated
Boston sample 265⬚ (256⬚/247⬚)
vancouver sample 267⬚ (260⬚/273⬚)
Figure 4.6 A circumplex representation of various affective dimensions plotted accord-

ing to a CIRCUM analysis. The Russell/Barrett, Larsen/Diener, Thayer, and Watson/
Tellegen affective dimensions were measured using separate scales and there position in
circular space was estimated using a structural equation modeling program (CIRCUM)
that was specifically designed to estimate circumplexity. From Yik et al. (1999).
see also Segura & González-Romá, 2003). This is because the predicted
correlation between true bipolar opposites with error-free data, when each
is measured on an unambiguous unipolar format Likert-type scale (e.g.,
‘‘neutral’’ = 0, ‘‘happy’’ = 6), equals the unintuitive number –.467. This
value is based upon assumptions about L-shaped bivariate response distribu-
tions (Russell & Carroll, 1999). Item response theory analyses places the
correlation for bipolar opposites closer to –.392 (Segura & González-Romá,
2003). Whether the actual value is –.467 or –.392, the point is that zero-order
correlations cannot be unambiguously interpreted as supporting either bipo-
larity or bivalence (independence between pleasure and displeasure). When
correlations are more negative than –.467, it is usually the result of systematic
measurement error (for a full discussion, see Russell & Carroll, 1999). Conse-
quently, correlational techniques (and statistical methods based on those
techniques, such as factor analysis) should never be used to provide evidence
for which set of dimensions best anchors the circumplex (cf. Russell & Carroll,
1999; Schimmack, 2001; Schimmack et al., 2002), although scientists
routinely ignore this advice and continue to use them for this purpose.
Figure 4.7 The ‘‘Necker’’ cube illusion.
Furthermore, it is not clear what ‘‘at the same time’’ actually means
when a person reports feeling happy and sad at the same time. In the
timeframe required to render a self-report rating or even a button-press,
several different brain states could have occurred. This means that a single
button press even when rendered very quickly in behavioral terms, is always
a summary of a series of brain states. An equally plausible possibility, then, is
that people do not experience two distinct feelings literally at the same time,
but instead can alternate back and forth quickly between them, in much
the same way that people do when looking the Necker cube illusion
(see Fig. 4.7). In this illusion, it is possible to see two different percepts,
but it is impossible to see them both at the same time. Instead, they alternate
in quick succession. When asked how many configurations you see when
you look at Fig. 4.7, you might say two (providing a summary of what you
just saw), but you do not actually ‘‘see’’ them simultaneously. The same
situation could be happening with affective states.8
Some scientists have criticized the valence/arousal model of affect on more
causal grounds. Like Titchener, many scientists continue to believe that the
descriptive structure of affect should be isomorphic with its causal structure, so
that the best affective dimensions are those that are most causally plausible (i.e.,
the dimensions should reflect the processes that cause affective states). Accord-
ingly, it has been claimed that certain dimensions (e.g., positive and negative
affect) are more biologically basic, and therefore should be the preferred
anchors of affective space (Ashby et al., 1999; Cacioppo et al., 1997, 1999;
8
Alternatively (and much more speculatively), it might even be possible for a person to be in both a positive
and a negative state at the same time (in a probabilistic sense). Spivey (2007) argues that the human brain is
rarely in a discrete state, and can be described by a fuzzy logic that allows many different states at once (each
with some probability of reaching consciousness or causing action). When a certain threshold is crossed (or
the probability of a given state is sufficiently high), the brain is said to be ‘‘in’’ that state, resulting in an
experience (e.g., ‘‘having an positive affective experience’’ or ‘‘having a negative affective experience’’) or a
behavior (e.g., approaching or avoiding an object). Because the brain can configure itself into several different
states in the time it takes to generate one motor response (to indicate a response choice, for e.g.), it is possible
that positive and negative affective states, which bear no subjective resemblance to one another, are realized
in neuronal assemblies that involve many of the same brain areas. Something (like attention) must bias
processing to allow a motor output and/or consciousness of one or the other.
Reich et al., 2003). So far, however, the sorts of arguments that have been
offered in this regard are problematic, for two reasons.
First, description and explanation usually occur at two different levels of
analysis. In the end, a description of psychological content will rarely ever
shed light on the processes that caused it, in much the same way that the
experience of the sun rising and setting is not evidence that the sun actually
revolves around the earth (cf. Barrett, in press).
Second, many of the specific biological arguments that have been offered
to support other sets of dimensions do not hold up under closer scrutiny.
Most notable is the claim that positive and negative affective states are
realized in anatomically different parts of the brain. Sometimes it is claimed
that the amygdala is the locus of negative affect, whereas the ventral striatum
is the locus of positive affect. As discussed already, neither claim is true. The
amygdala is engaged in humans when viewing faces depicting positive
expressions (Canli et al., 2002; Mather et al., 2004; Yang et al., 2002) as
well as pleasant images (Garavan et al., 2001; Mather et al., 2004); animals
with amygdala lesions show impaired stimulus-reward learning (Baxter &
Murray, 2001; Baxter et al., 1999, 2000) and are less likely to self-administer
rewarding drugs (Robledo & Koob, 1993). And work from Kent Berridge’s
lab (e.g., Reynolds & Berridge, 2001, 2002) has clearly shown that neurons
in the ventral striatum also code for negativity.
Nor do positive and negative affect consistently show hemispheric
specificity. The left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex may somehow support
pleasant moods, reactions to pleasant stimuli (e.g., pleasant film clips), and
approach behaviors, whereas the right supports unpleasant moods, reac-
tions to unpleasant stimuli (e.g., unpleasant film clips), and withdrawal
behaviors (for reviews see Davidson, 1992, 1993, 2004), but this laterality
does not extend to other parts of the prefrontal cortex. For example, our
own recent meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies of affect and emotion
found exactly the opposite lateralization for pleasant and unpleasant affec-
tive experiences (particularly in the orbital sector of prefrontal cortex)
with positive affective experiences corresponding relatively greater activa-
tion on the right and negative experience to relatively greater activation
on the left (Wager et al., 2008; see Fig. 4.8). A meta-analysis by
Kringebach and Rolls (2004) localized positive affect medially and nega-
tive affect laterally within the OFC of both hemispheres (with no differ-
ences in lateralization).
It is sometimes claimed that positive and negative affective states rely on
different neurotransmitter systems (dopamine and serotonin, respectively),
but this, too, is debatable. Dopamine is not a reward transmitter (for
reviews, see Salamone et al., 2005). Increases in dopamine are observed in
rats occur during aversive events, such as tail pinches (Bertolucci-D’Angio
et al., 1990), foot shocks (Sorg & Kalivas, 1991; Young et al., 1993), and
cold ice baths (Keller et al., 1983). Similarly, serotonin is not a distress
OFC vmPFC pgACC
OFC vaINS
vaINS
vStr
Amy
vGP NAC/BF
VTA
ArdACC aINS
ThaI
vmPFC Hy PAG/SC
vmPFC
Figure 4.8 Brain areas consistently activated for positive (yellow) and negative (blue) affective experiences. OFC = orbitofrontal cortex;
vaINS = ventral anterior insula; Amy = amygdala; vStr = ventral striatum; vGP = ventral globus pallidus; pgACC = pregenual anterior
cingulated cortex; rdACC = rostral dorsal anterior cingulate cortex; vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal cortex; Hy = hypothalamus; Thal =
thalamus; PAG/SC = periaquaductal gray/superior colliculus; aINS = anterior insular. From Wager et al. (2008). (See online version of the
chapter for color figure).
neurotransmitter and has been linked to changes in positive affect as well

(Barge-Schaapveld et al., 1995; Dichter et al., 2005; Zald & Depue, 2001).
Both dopamine and serotonin are what has been called ‘‘neuromodulators’’ in
the sense that they originate in the brainstem’s ascending arousal system and
tune the firing rates of many different neuronal groups throughout the cortex.
Dopamine from both the substantia nigra and ventral tegmental area mark the
salience of an event and are important to regulating access to voluntary motor
outputs during motivated, effortful behavior; serotonin from the rostral raphe
nucleus reduces distractibility and gates the processing of motivationally
relevant sensory cues (Mesulam, 2000; Parvizi & Damasio, 2001).
Based on our read of the evidence, valence and arousal are best thought
of as the descriptive features of core affect that bear no resemblance to or
inform about how affect is caused. Simply put, content does not necessarily
tell us anything about process. This means that the structure of felt
experience will not correspond to the brain processes that produced those
experiences in a one-to-one fashion. It also means that brain structure will
not necessarily inform us about which psychological dimensions are best
suited to anchor the affective circumplex. Nonetheless, as we demonstrate
later in this paper, descriptions can be scientifically useful.
4.2.2. Replicability across affective domains

Wundt’s original properties of hedonic valence and arousal are most
replicable across different domains of psychological response (Barrett &
Russell, 1999; Russell & Barrett, 1999), and therefore seem to be the best
dimensions to anchor the affective circumplex as a descriptive tool. In this
section, we briefly review the evidence that judgments of emotion-related
language, judgments of facial behaviors, and subjective ratings of emotional
episodes, such as anger, sadness, and fear, as well as nonemotional affective
states (like fatigue, sleepiness, and placidity) can all be minimally character-
ized as a combination of hedonic valence and arousal. Other dimensions,
such as positive and negative activation, have been identified only for the
self-reports of experience, and not for judgments of words or faces.
4.2.3. Judgments of faces

Judgments of emotion in other people’s faces configure as a circumplex that
is described by valence and arousal properties. Woodworth (1938) described
classification judgments of ‘‘facial expressions of emotion’’ (i.e., emotion
caricatures) as well as ‘‘judgment errors’’ (i.e., failures to give the consensual
response) using valence and arousal dimensions. Schlosberg (1952) found
something similar as well, describing a circular mapping of affect defined first
by two dimensions (pleasantness–unpleasantness, attention–rejection), fol-
lowing which he added an intensity dimension (sleep-tension) to produce a
cone-like structure (Schlosberg, 1954). Circumplex structures have been
identified in perceptions of facial depictions of emotion (e.g., Abelson &
Sermat, 1962; Cliff & Young, 1968; Dittman, 1972; Fillenbaum &
Rapoport, 1971; Green & Cliff, 1975; Russell et al., 1989; Schlosberg,
1952, 1954; Shepard, 1962a,b), both in adults and in children (Russell &
Bullock, 1985; Russell & Ridgeway, 1983). Very young children only seem
to make distinctions between facial depictions of pleasant and unpleasant,
however (Widen & Russell, 2003).9 Furthermore, event-related potential
(ERP) studies general confirm that hedonic valence (and perhaps arousal) is
coded early during face perception (as early as 80 ms, but typically between
120 and 180 ms after stimulus onset depending on whether the face is
presented fovially or parafoveally; for reviews, see Eimer & Holmes, 2007;
Palermo & Rhodes, 2007; Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007). Recent neuro-
imaging evidence also supports the idea that valence is a basic aspect of face
perception (e.g., Engell et al., 2007; Todorov, 2008).10
4.2.4. Judgments of words

Multidimensional scaling analyses of similarity judgments (estimates of
relatedness) of emotion-related words routinely yield valence and arousal
dimensions. Here, valence and arousal represent the basic, semantic proper-
ties contained in cognitive maps of emotion language (Barrett & Fossum,
2001; see Fig. 4.9). Circumplex structures anchored by valence and arousal
dimensions have been reliably derived from similarity ratings for different
sets of affect terms (Barrett, 2004; Block, 1957; Bush, 1973; Feldman,
1995a; Russell, 1980; also, see Fig. 4.10) indexing emotion language in
many different cultures (Russell, 1991). These findings are consistent with
the semantic differential work by Osgood et al. (1957) who demonstrated
that there are three major components of meaning in natural language
(evaluation, activity, and potency).
9
Contrary to popular belief, studies do not conclusively demonstrate that infants distinguish between discrete
emotion categories. Infants categorize as distinct faces with different perceptual features (e.g., closed versus
toothy smiles) even when they belong to the same emotion category (Bornstein & Arterberry, 2003) and no
studies can rule out the alternative explanation that infants are categorizing faces based on the valence,
intensity, or novelty (especially in the case of fear) of the facial configurations. For example, infants look
longer at fear (or anger or sad) caricatures following habituation to happy caricatures, but this may reflect their
ability to distinguish between faces of different valence (e.g., Flom & Bahrick, 2007). Similarly, infants look
longer at a sad face following habituation to angry faces (or vice versa), but infants may be categorizing the
faces in terms of arousal (e.g., de Rosnay et al., 2004, Experiment 3). Many studies find that infants tend to
show biased attention for fear caricatures (e.g., Flom, & Bahrick, 2007), but this is likely driven by the fact
that infants rarely see people making these facial configurations.
10
Although affect is a basic aspect of face perception, it is most likely a learned aspect. For example, in a recent
case study, an individual recovering from blindness (following a corneal transplant) could not tell the
difference between happiness and sadness in faces that were unfamiliar to him. This problem persisted for
several years after he was able to receive visual stimulation in early visual brain areas.
A B C
7 2 2
Excited Excited Excited
6 Aroused Alert Lively Lively
Lively Aroused
Nervous Alert 1 Aroused Cheerful 1 Cheerful
Cheerful Nervous
Nervous Alert
5 Fearful
Pleased Pleased
Fearful Pleased Fearful
4 Disappointed 0 0
Relaxed
Unhappy Disappointed
3 Relaxed
Relaxed Unhappy Calm
Bored Idle −1 Unhappy −1
Still Calm Calm Disappoined Still
2 Bored Idle Still Idle
Dull Dull Dull
Bored
1 −2 −2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 −2 −1 0 1 2 −2 −1 0 1 2
Figure 4.9 Cognitive maps of affective space. The circumplex structure of affect derived from direct semantic ratings, similarity judgments,
and conditional probability judgments of emotion words. Based on data from Barrett and Fossum (2001).
2 2
Nervous Surprised
Aroused Aroused Enthusiastic
Afraid
Elated
1 Peppy 1 Anxious Cheerful
Surprised
Enthusiastic
Happy
Disappointed Happy Nervous
0 0
Sad
Relaxed
Quiet Blue
Satisfied Quiet
−1 Sluggish −1 Sad
Still Still Calm
Relaxed Sluggish
Sleepy Calm Dull
−2 −2
−2 −1 0 1 2 −2 −1 0 1 2
2 2
Astonished Aroused Fearful Active

Excited Stimulated
Anxious Annoyed
Elated 1 Excited
1 Peppy
Annoyed Unhappy
Cheerful
Pleased Gloomy
0 0
Unhappy Pleased
Glad
Content Tired
Blue
−1 −1 Bored Content
Bored Idle Serene
Tired Idle At ease
Tranquil Inactive
−2 −2
−2 −1 0 1 2 −2 −1 0 1 2
Figure 4.10 Affective circumplex structures estimated from multidimensional scalings

of similarity judgments using different sets of emotion adjectives (Barrett, unpublished
data).
4.2.5. Self-report ratings of experience

Ratings of subjective ratings of emotion experience also configure into a
circumplex described by valence and arousal. Self-reports of emotion expe-
rience taken from a group of individuals at one point in time configure into
a circumplex shape anchored by valence and arousal dimensions (Feldman,
1995b; Russell, 1980; Yik et al., 1999; for a review, see Barrett & Russell,
1998; Russell & Barrett, 1999) (see Fig. 4.11). So do idiographic reports that
are taken over time and modeled separately for each person (Barrett, 1998,
2004; Feldman, 1995a; Fig. 4.12; see next section for a more detailed
description). People are also able to give an explicit account of core affective
feelings using a variety of self-rating scales (Barrett & Russell, 1998;
1.0
Afraid Aroused Enthusiastic

0.5 Nervous
Disappointed Peppy
Surprised
Satisfied
Sad
0.0
Happy
Sluggish Still
Sleepy Quiet Calm

−0.5 Relaxed
−1.0
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Figure 4.11 Cross-sectional ratings of emotional experience modeled as a circumplex.

Factor loading plot for ratings of emotional experience taken using 16 adjectives.
Valence is represented as the horizontal axis and arousal as the vertical axis. Taken
from Feldman (1995b).
A B
1 1
0.5 0.5
0 0
−0.5 −0.5
−1 −1
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1 −1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
Figure 4.12 Idiographic variation in circumplex structure. Examples of idiographic

affective circumplexes derived from momentary ratings of emotional experience for
two participants. The participant depicted in (A) has a relatively prototypical circum-
plex with many small regions of homogeneity which reflects high emotional granular-
ity. The participant in (B) has a flatter, more elliptically shaped circumplex which
reflects low emotional granularity. Figure reprinted from Feldman (1995b).
Bradley & Lang, 1994; Carroll et al., 1999; Frijda et al., 1989; Kitayama
et al., 2000; Lang et al., 1993; Roseman et al., 1996; Russell et al., 1989;
Scherer, 1997; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985, 1987; Yik et al., 1999).
All humans, it seems, can tell the difference between a pleasant affective
state and an unpleasant affective state. Many, but not all, people also
characterize their affective states as high or low in activation. In these
studies, valence and arousal dimensions did not reflect the artificial influence
of language (for evidence, see Barrett, 2004, 2006b) nor social desirability
(Barrett, 1996). Instead, valence and arousal represented the content of
experience. In the next section, we discuss how the affective circumplex
can be used to model individual differences in the phenomenological
experience of valence and arousal.
5. Individual Differences in Core Affect

For about a decade, our lab used a range of experience-sampling
procedures to observe how people reported their emotion experiences
(using simple English words for emotion) in the course of everyday life
over several weeks. Primarily with the use the palm-top computers, we
observed hundreds of people reporting their experiences over many occa-
sions. We then treated those reports as verbal behaviors and constructed an
affective circumplex structure for each person. We observed significant
variation in affective structure across people, and with the use of some
novel multivariate techniques (outlined first in Feldman, 1995a), revealed
individual differences in core affective experience that was linked to broader
differences in the granularity of emotional life.
Within the affective structure for a given person, a local region of homogeneity
formed when reports of two experiences are relatively close over time (e.g.,
‘‘happy’’ and ‘‘satisfied’’). Very high correlations reflected the fact that
experiences were descriptively similar and are phenomenologically indistin-
guishable. People whose verbal behaviors produced a prototypical circum-
plex with a uniform, circular structure show many small regions of
homogeneity across the circle. This means that they had many precise
domains of experience that were descriptively distinct from one another
(like that depicted in Fig. 4.4A; for an example of actual data, see
Fig. 4.12A). These individuals were said to be high in emotional granularity
because they used different adjectives to represent distinct kinds of experience
(e.g., anger and sadness are phenomenologically distinct).
People who produced a structure that is flatter and more elliptical in
shape show a small number of broad regions of homogeneity and corre-
spondingly fewer domains of distinct experience (e.g., see Figs. 4.4B and
4.12B). These individuals were lower in emotional granularity, because
even though they were using the same set of adjectives to report their
experience (as were those higher in emotional granularity), they used
these terms to represent only a few general feeling states. For example,
they might use words like ‘‘angry,’’ ‘‘sad,’’ and ‘‘afraid’’ to mean ‘‘unpleas-
ant,’’ and words like ‘‘excited,’’ ‘‘happy,’’ and ‘‘calm’’ to mean pleasant. Less
frequently, we observed people who use arousal words interchangeably,
so that ‘‘excited’’ and ‘‘nervous’’ are experienced as phenomenologically
similar, as are ‘‘tired’’ and ‘‘calm.’’
Individual variation in emotional granularity (represented by the shape
of the circle) could be quantified in terms of the emphasis that an individual
placed on the hedonic and arousal properties of core affect when reporting
his or her experience. Estimating the emphasis (or focus) on valence was
accomplished by computing the proportion of variance in the verbal reports
of emotion experience due to the valence-based meaning of the words (for
a step by step description of the process, see Barrett, 2004; Feldman, 1995a).
The emphasis (or focus) on arousal was estimated by computing the pro-
portion of variance in the verbal reports due to the arousal-based meaning of
the words. In this procedure, then, the emphasis on core affective properties
was measured directly from behavior (as opposed to asking people to report
how much they focus or emphasize each feature).
The more that valence-based meaning of the words accounts for vari-
ance in the reports of actual experience, the more an individual emphasizes
or focuses on valence during the reporting process. Valence focus (VF)
represents the amount of information about pleasure or displeasure
contained in verbal reports of emotional experience. It does not represent
the tendency to report pleasant states, or unpleasant states, but rather reflects
the extent to which hedonic valence is an important descriptive property of
core affective responding in that individual. Individuals high in VF empha-
size pleasure and displeasure in the content of their verbal reports more than
do those lower in VF, often at the expense of other properties of affect, like
arousal (Barrett, 2004).
Similarly, arousal focus (AF) represents the amount of information about
felt activation or deactivation contained in those verbal reports. It does not
represent the tendency to report high arousal states, or low arousal states,
but rather it reflects the extent to which arousal is an important descriptive
property of core affective responding in that individual.
Individuals high in emotional granularity, with perfectly circular affec-
tive structures, experienced core affective states that were equally hedonic
and arousal-based (VF = AF). In Fig. 4.13, VF is plotted against AF for
almost 700 participants who have participated in our experience-samplings
studies. Respondents who fell around the diagonal displayed circular affec-
tive structures. Individuals lower in emotional granularity, with elliptical
structures experience core affective states that were relatively more hedonic
(VF > AF) fell below the diagonal. These individuals had difficulty
1.0
0.8
Arousal focus
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Valence focus
Figure 4.13 Scatterplot of variation in valence focus and arousal focus. Valence focus
plotted against arousal focus for 700 subjects who completed experience sampling
experiments in our laboratory over a 10-year period. Caricatured circumplex structures
are plotted on the extremes of the axes. Participants who fall along the diagonal line
(where VF = AF) are high in emotional granularity and have a prototypical circumplex
structure. Participants who fall above the diagonal like (AF > VF) and below the
diagonal line (VF > AF) are less granular and have more elliptical shaped circumplex
structures.
distinguishing between negative states that differed in arousal (such as anger
and sadness); the same was true for positive states. Those whose affective
states were relatively more arousal-based (AF > VF) fell above the diagonal,
and had difficulty distinguishing between high arousal states that differed in
hedonic valence (such as nervousness and excitement); the same was true for
low arousal states.
Individual differences in both VF and AF relate to other psychological
phenomena in a way that establishes their construct validity. For example,
people who are more valence focused are also more perceptual sensitive to
hedonic information in the face of another person (Barrett & Niedenthal,
2004). Using a Morph Movies task, participants were presented with a series
of movies in which actors began with neutral facial expressions and gradually,
over the course of one hundred frames, began to express happiness, sadness,
or anger. Participants advanced each movie using a cursor at the bottom of the
screen and were instructed to stop the cursor at the point at which they first
detected any feeling on the actor’s face. Heightened levels of VF predicted
earlier detection of the appearance of affective expressions, suggesting that
people high in VF have enhanced perceptual sensitivity to valenced informa-
tion in the environment. People high in VF also described themselves as being
more sensitive to hedonic cues, as indexed by reports on a variety of traditional
personality measures (e.g., neuroticism and extraversion) (Barrett, 2006c).
Increased sensitivity to hedonically evocative cues has real-world impor-
tance for the lives of people high in VF. People high in VF experience a life
as a rollercoaster ride filled with drama. They experience a world that is
saturated with hedonic value because their threshold for detecting and
responding to such cues is comparatively lower than people who are low
in VF. We verified this hypothesis in another series of experience sampling
studies where we examined the extent to which VF was linked to self-
esteem lability. In two event-related experience-sampling studies, partici-
pants reported on their social interactions over either a week or two-week
period. During each sampling moment, participants reported on their
emotional experiences (using the methodology from previous studies and
therefore allowing for the computation of VF), their self-esteem at the
moment of sampling, and the valenced information in the social interaction
(e.g., the amount of positive or negative emotion expressed by the interac-
tion partner(s)). Lability in self-esteem was measured behaviorally in hierar-
chical linear modeling analyses, as the magnitude of the self-esteem change
when faced with positive and negative cues during social interactions.
As predicted, individuals who were more valence focused also demonstrated
more self-esteem lability—their self-regard was like a ping-pong ball,
bouncing around from interaction to interaction (Pietromonaco &
Barrett, manuscript under review). People high in VF are not simply
perceiving more hedonic information in their environments—they are
using that information to shape and change their sense of self.
AF, on the other hand, is related to an enhanced sensitivity to one’s own
physical state (Barrett et al., 2004). Participants completed a modified
Whitehead heartbeat detection task (Whitehead & Drescher, 1980) during
which they were asked to judge whether a series of tones were either in sync
or not in sync with their heartbeats. These data were then subjected to a
signal detection analysis yielding an index of interoceptive sensitivity.
In two studies, people who were higher in AF showed enhanced sensitivity
to their own heartbeats. These finding indicated that people who have more
awareness of the internal sensory cues coming from their body also experi-
ence more variation in the arousal-based property of core affect. They
clearly showed that people can, at times, detect specific information in
their bodies, and this sensitivity is, in some way, related to the experience
of emotion.
Furthermore, the AF-interoception link helps to clarify the relation

between interoceptive sensitivity and emotional experience. Most studies
have examined the link between heartbeat detection and explicit ratings of
the intensity of emotion experience, with inconsistent results (Critchley
et al., 2004; Ferguson & Katkin, 1996; Hantas et al., 1982; Wiens et al.,
2000). In most studies, respondents rated their experience on a Likert-type
scale using a set of adjectives, and those ratings were summed to derive an
index of experienced emotion. It is possible; however, that interoceptive
sensitivity is better conceptualized as relating to the perception of arousal as
a property of experience, rather than to the intensity of experience per se.
The feelings of activation and deactivation arising from interoceptive cues
may be too impoverished to reliably influence direct, consciously available
explicit ratings of emotion. Instead, these background interoceptive cues
may manifest in a focus on activation-based aspects of emotional states in a
more indirect or nonexplicit way. Presumably, individuals who are more
interoceptively sensitive would be more likely to perceive feelings of
arousal, and would communicate those feelings in self-report process over
time, even if such differences are not apparent in the intensity of explicit
reports.
Moreover, the relation between AF and interoceptive sensitivity not
only provided validity for the link between interoceptive sensitivity and
experienced emotion, but they also provided much needed incremental
validity for self-reports of emotional experience more generally. By demon-
strating that AF was related to interoceptive sensitivity, we were able
to demonstrate that information implicitly contained in self-report ratings
(i.e., the extent to which people focus on a property of their experience
when reporting it) was associated with a behavioral variable (heartbeat
sensitivity). This is a different sort of validity than showing that the levels
of self-reported emotional experience (e.g., participants’ ratings of anger,
pleasure, etc.) correlate with behavioral or psychophysiological measure-
ments. In addition, many of the studies that provide validity evidence for
self-reports of emotional experience examine concurrent relationships
between self-reports and validity variables. In contrast, we demonstrated
that AF was linked to interoceptive sensitivity when the measurements of
each were separated by several weeks time.
6. Future Directions
Taken together, both psychological and neuroscience evidence sup-
ports the conclusion that core affect is a basic psychological ingredient in
emotion. Studies examining the circumplex structure of affect demonstrate
that core affect is a multiproperty phenomenon, and the structure is robust
enough to accommodate many different ways of describing affect. Further-

more, the structure is able to represent meaningful individual differences in
affective focus and link them to patterns of variation in emotional
experience.
More recently, our lab has focused its attention on the hypothesis that
core affect is a basic psychological ingredient of mental life more generally.
The neuroanatomical studies mapping affective circuitry strongly suggest
that core affect plays a formative role in other psychological phenomena that
fall outside the traditional boundaries of emotion. In the past several years,
we have been investigating role of core affect in two such processes:
learning and vision.
6.1. Core affect supports learning

To survive, a person must know to avoid threat and danger and approach
reward and nourishment. A person must be able to navigate through the
world using affective reactions as a guide. Such navigational skills are critical
not only in the physical world (e.g., knowing to avoid a poisonous snake in
the desert), but also for survival in the social world (e.g., knowing to avoid a
person who has not proven trustworthy in the past). Very few objects and
situations (and even fewer people) have the innate or intrinsic power to
perturb another person’s core affect. Instead, humans (like all living crea-
tures) must learn what to approach and what to avoid, what to desire and
what to ignore. Core affect supports this kind of learning, which we call
affective learning.
Affective learning occurs when a stimulus that does not have the capacity
to perturb core affect (what colloquially would be called a ‘‘neutral’’ stimulus)
acquires that capacity on future occasions. Stimuli acquire affective value by
being paired with other stimuli that change in a person’s core affective state.
When the two stimuli are paired across a number of experiences, the neutral
stimulus begins to itself elicit changes in core affect. In this way, a neutral
stimulus is said to have acquired affective value. Examples of associative
affective learning include Pavlovian or classical conditioning (i.e., where
neutral stimuli are paired with stimuli that cause robust sympathetic nervous
system (SNS) reactions; for reviews, see, Delgado et al., 2006; Domjan, 2005;
Pearce & Bouton, 2001) and evaluative conditioning (i.e., where neutral
stimuli are paired with stimuli that are explicitly evaluated to be liked (or
good) or disliked (or bad); for reviews, see De Houwer et al., 2001; Field,
2005). SNS activity is broadly implicated in affective responding (Cacioppo
et al., 2000) and changes in people’s SNS responses to a stimulus are taken as
an indication that it has the capacity to perturb core affect.
In associative learning studies, affective learning is usually demonstrated
by pairing human faces (e.g., Hermans et al., 2002) and pictures of
geometric shapes (e.g., LaBar et al., 2004; Lipp et al., 2003) with stimuli
that have the capacity to perturb core affect, like high pitched and loud
noises (e.g., Büchel et al., 1999; LaBar & Phelps, 2005) and electric shocks
(e.g., Grillon, 2002; LaBar et al., 1998). So, for example, a neutral blue
square acquires affective value by being paired repeatedly with an aversive
(i.e., negative and arousing) electric shock. As it increasing comes to predict
the presence of the shock, the blue square elicits the same affective response
(typically indexed by SNS activation measured as electrodermal activity
(EDA) on the surface of their fingertips). The larger the affective change,
(presumably) the easier (and perhaps more robust) the affective learning.
An on-going line of work in our laboratory is investigating how indi-
vidual differences in affective reactivity support individual variation in
affective learning. In an associative learning experiment (Bliss-Moreau
et al., manuscript under review), participants were presented with two
neutral faces. One picture (the CS+) was consistently paired with a shock
(the US) during an acquisition phase of learning, and the other picture was
never paired with a shock (the CS–). When participants were shocked (i.e.,
presented with the US), they generated large sympatric nervous system
responses measured as the magnitude of their EDA response. Over time
and many pairings, participants began to respond with heightened EDA to
the CS + face (paired with the shock) than to the CS – face (never paired
with shock), and this response to the CS + face occurred even when the US
was not presented (see Fig. 4.14A). With this pattern of findings, we
demonstrated, like many other studies before us, that a neutral face acquired
affective value and was able to change a person’s affective state based on
prior instances where it was paired with a stimulus that easily did so. Most
importantly, we found that individual differences in affective reactivity
predicted the magnitude of learning in this experiment. Individuals who
demonstrated a perceptual sensitivity to affective value (assessed using the
Morph Movies task that was related to VF in a prior experiment; Barrett &
Niedenthal, 2004) also demonstrated enhanced affective learning. Specifi-
cally, as perceptual sensitivity increased, so too did the magnitude of the
EDA response to the CS+. This learning effect was further enhanced for
individuals who described themselves as high on neuroticism (itself an index
of sensitivity to negative value) (see Fig. 4.14B). These findings provide
some of the first results to show that individual differences in core affective
reactivity are related to variation in negative affective learning.
Individual differences in core affective responding also predicted better
rule-based affective learning (Bliss-Moreau et al., 2008). Rule-based affec-
tive learning occurs when the value of an object is communicated explicitly
through symbolic means (e.g., telling someone that another person is
threatening) rather than the object being paired in time or space with
something of known affective value (as is the case for associative affective
learning; for a discussion of rule-based vs. associative processing, see
Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). We developed a rule-based
A
0.8 Face paired with
aversive stimulus
0.6 Face never paired
Mean EDA (minus baseline, uS)
with aversive
stimulus
0.4
0.2
−0.2
−0.4
−0.6
B 0.2
High
0.15
Magnitude of acquistion
Mean
0.1
0.05
Low
0
−15 −10 −5 0 5 10 15
−0.05
−0.1
Perceptual sensitivity (grand mean centered)
Figure 4.14 Variation in affective learning. Sympathetic nervous system response

(as indexed by EDA) to face stimuli that were either consistently or were never paired
with an aversive electric shock during an associative affective learning paradigm (A).
The stimulus that was paired with a shock (CS+) acquired affective value as indicated
by a significantly higher EDA response as compared with the EDA response to the
stimulus that was never paired with shock (CS–). Individual differences in the acquisi-
tion of affective value were related to variation in affective reactivity (B). The relation-
ship between perceptual sensitivity to affective value and the magnitude of affective
learning is presented at three levels of neuroticism. From Bliss-Moreau et al.
(manuscript under review).
affective learning paradigm using a modified spontaneous trait inference

paradigm (e.g., Todorov & Uleman, 2002, 2003). Participants were asked
to learn about the behavior of a series of target people. Participants were
shown a series of 60 face target pictures, each of which was paired with a
sentence describing a behavior during the learning phase of an experiment.
1
0.9
% positive information learned 0.8
0.7
0.6
correctly
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
50 70 90 110 130 150 170
Extraversion
Figure 4.15 Individual differences in rule-based affective learning. Positive affective

learning via rule-based means is predicted by participants’ sensitivity to positive infor-
mation and propensity to experience positive affect (as indexed by self-reported extra-
version). Adapted from Bliss-Moreau et al. (2008, Study 3).
The behaviors were either positive (e.g., ‘‘celebrated a friend’s birthday’’),

negative (e.g., ‘‘hit a small child’’), or neutral (i.e., ‘‘asked the cab driver for
directions’’) in affective tone. Participants were instructed to imagine the
targets performing the behaviors described by the sentences. In a following
test phase, participants made explicit judgments of the faces (presented
without the sentences) as positive, negative, or neutral. More often than
chance, participants categorized the faces according to the affective value of
the sentence with which it had been paired during the prior learning phase.
In addition, affectively positive learning was enhanced for people who
described themselves as particularly reactive to positive affective value
(as measured by extraversion). As self-reported levels of extraversion
increased, so too did people’s propensity to categorize faces which had
been paired with positive sentences as being positive (see Fig. 4.15).
Taken together, these findings suggest that both associative and rule-
based affective learning are enhanced for people whose core affective states
are often and easily perturbed. These findings have real-world implications
for understanding how people come to have such different mental lives.
As we noted earlier, people who are those high in VF surf a tumultuous sea
of agony and ecstasy, and are easily moved or perturbed by changes in their
surroundings. They often react to things that others find devoid of
emotional meaning. Others (who are lower in VF) float in a sea of relative
tranquility. They live their lives relatively undisturbed and they are
generally less affected by the vicissitudes of life. They often do not react
to things that others find compelling or evocative, thereby missing events of

potential import or significance. What begin as simple temperamental
differences in affective reactivity may develop into these very different
emotional lives (manifesting in different degrees of VF) because differences
in reactivity support differential degrees of affective learning. In what might
be considered a classic positive feedback loop, affective learning may pro-
ceed more robustly for a person who is more reactive to begin with.
The person’s world will become more populated with affectively evocative
stimuli (because great numbers of previously neutral stimuli will presumably
acquire value), so that the processing of those affective stimuli will serve to
maintain shifts in core affect, which in turn promote enhanced affective
learning. And so on. Thus, a person who experiences great reactivity in his
or her core affect state sets the stage for that reactivity to be maintained
through new affective learning throughout the lifespan
6.2. Core affect as a fundamental feature of

conscious experience
Neuroanatomical evidence strongly suggests that core affect provides a
source of attention in the human brain (where attention is defined as
anything that increases or decreases the firing of a neuron). This implies
that core affect has an important role to play in normal perceptual function-
ing, including consciousness. When sensory information from the world
sufficiently influences a person’s internal bodily state, the processing of that
information is prioritized so that the resulting object is more easily seen
(reviewed in Barrett & Bar, in press; Vuilleumier & Driver, 2007) and
remembered (reviewed in Kensinger & Schacter, 2008). Put another way,
‘‘feeling’’ and ‘‘seeing’’ (or ‘‘hearing’’ or ‘‘smelling’’ and so on) may not be
all that independent of one another.
Core affect has the capacity to influence sensory processing throughout
the brain via a number of direct and indirect routes. Parts of the neural
reference space for core affect (such as the amygdala and lateral OFC)
project directly to all sensory cortices and so can directly influence sensory
processing. For example, the basal nucleus of the amygdala projects directly
to all portions of the visual ventral stream, serving to modulate neural
activity from the association cortex all the way back to the primary visual
cortex (or V1) (for a review, see Duncan & Barrett, 2007). The sensory
integration network in the central and lateral OFC projects to the visual
association areas in the inferior temporal lobe (part of the ‘‘what’’ or ventral
visual stream for object recognition) and the visceromotor network in the
medial OFC projects to the visual association areas in the inferior parietal
lobe (part of the ‘‘where’’ or dorsal visual stream for spatial localization and
action preparation) (for a review, see Barrett & Bar, in press). The circuitry
that realizes core affect also project indirectly to sensory neurons via three
different routes. The amygdala, the visceromotor network of the OFC

(including what is sometimes called the medial OFC or vmPFC), and the
ventral striatum project to the ascending arousal systems the brainstem and
basal forebrain (for a review, see Edelman & Tononi, 2000; Mesulam, 2000;
Semba, 2000) that have diffuse, unidirectional afferent projections through-
out the cortical mantle, acting as a ‘‘leaky garden hose’’ (Edelman, 2004,
p. 25) to control the level of neuronal firing throughout the brain. (In fact,
affective circuitry offers the only path by which sensory information from the
outside world reaches the brainstem and basal forebrain; Mesulam, 2000).
The amygdala and OFC (as well as the brainstem and forebrain nuclei) also
project to certain thalamic nuclei that regulate the transmission of sensory
information to the cortex and are partly responsible for forming and selecting
the groups of neurons that fire in synchrony (called neuronal assemblies) to
form conscious percepts (the things people are aware of seeing) (Zikopoulos
& Barbas, 2007; for a review, see Duncan & Barrett, 2007). Finally, the lateral
portions of OFC project to lateral prefrontal cortex (which is the source of
what scientists term a ‘‘top-down’’ or ‘‘goal-directed’’ or ‘‘endogenous’’
source of attention). In these ways, areas involved with establishing a core
affective state can indirectly constrain ongoing processing throughout the rest
of the cortex and help to select the information that reaches conscious
awareness by directing the formation and maintenance of the neuronal
assemblies that underlie conscious experience.
Indeed, evidence shows that sensory areas show enhanced neural
activity during perceptual states having a strong core affective component.
Affectively potent, as compared to neutral, stimuli generate robust
responses in the visual cortex (e.g., Lane et al., 1999; Lang et al., 1998;
Moll et al., 2002; Morris et al., 1998; Taylor et al., 2000). Activity in the
visual cortex was also enhanced for stimuli that recently acquired affective
value by being paired with an electric shock as compared to perceptually
similar stimuli that never were paired with shock (e.g., for functional
neuroimagining evidence using fMRI see Damaraju et al., manuscript
under review Pamalaand & Pessoa, 2008; for ERP evidence see
Stolarova et al., 2006).
Our own meta-analytic investigation of fMRI and PET studies of
emotion confirmed that V1 is consistently activated in response to affec-
tively potent as compared with neutral stimuli (Kober et al., 2008; Wager
et al., 2008; see Fig. 4.2). Activity in the visual cortex also appears to be
further enhanced when affective stimuli are particularly arousing. When we
assessed activation in the visual cortex in studies of negative core affect
(using negative pictures, sounds, words, facial expressions, etc.), there was
greater neural activity in studies using stimuli that generated core affective
states that were high in arousal as compared to lower in arousal (e.g.,
perception of fear faces vs. neutral faces; experiences of anxiety vs. neutral
affect) (Bliss-Moreau et al., 2008).
The pattern of projections from the neural reference space for core affect
to visual cortex suggests the intriguing hypothesis that what people literally
see in the world around them may in part be determined by their core
affective state. In our lab, we are in the process of investigating three specific
hypotheses with respect to core affect and vision.
First, we hypothesize that core affect may play a role in basic object
perception, even when objects are not affectively evocative per se. As we
noted already, the OFC has strong reciprocal projections to both the dorsal
‘‘where’’ and ventral ‘‘what’’ visual streams involved in object perception.
Furthermore, when briefly presented objects are successfully recognized,
there is more neural activity in OFC as compared to when objects go
unrecognized (Bar et al., 2001, 2006). One hypothesis is that OFC provides
top-down modulation of basic visual processing necessary for determining
both what and where objects are (Barrett & Bar, in press). Feeling some-
thing affective about sensory stimulation may make it more likely that you
will see an object in the first place.
Second, we are investigating the hypothesis that an individual’s
momentary core affective state helps to select the contents of conscious-
ness, so that what you feel literally influences what you see. There is
evidence, for example, that the affective content of a visual image can
resolve a phenomenon called ‘‘binocular rivalry.’’ Binocular rivalry occurs
when two incompatible images are presented to both eyes that cannot be
merged into a coherent three dimensional image. Instead of perceiving a
mixture of the two images, people experience one image at a time,
oscillating back and forth into visual awareness every few seconds.
By measuring which percept is seen first, and for how long, it is possible
to assess which percepts are selected for subjective awareness. A handful of
studies have shown that images with affective meaning tend to be repre-
sented in conscious awareness more often than rival images with more
neutral content. Valenced scenes have greater perceptual dominance over
neutral scenes (Alpers & Pauli, 2006), as do facial depictions of emotion
when compared to neutral faces (Alpers & Gerdes, 2007). Stimuli that
have recently acquired affective value by being paired with an aversive
electric shock in an associative learning paradigm also dominate subjective
visual awareness compared to neutral stimuli (Alpers et al., 2005). In our
lab, we are currently exploring how changing the core affective state of
the perceiver more directly influences subjective visual awareness for
objects (such as faces). In our lab, we now have preliminary evidence
that affectively-potent objects are selected over neutral objects more often
when the perceiver is in a salient affective state.
Third, we are investigating whether individual differences in core affect
enhance or diminish blindsight. Blindsight occurs when perceptually blind
people (i.e., people who report not being able to see) are able to detect
visual stimuli without having any conscious or qualitative awareness that
they can do so (Weiskrantz, 1986). Blindsight can be induced in the lab with
the brief presentation of an object (e.g., 16 or 33 ms) followed by a
backward mask (to prevent the re-entrant feedback processing that is
necessary for subjective awareness). Although objects not consciously seen
under these conditions, people can still respond to them behaviorally in
such a way as to indicate that the objects are being detected at better than
chance levels. We hypothesize that a strong core affective state may enhance
experimentally-induced blindsight, so that intense core affective feelings
may allow people to better detect and act on certain objects or blind them to
others, before the sensory information is shaped into a fully formed percept
that reaches full subjective awareness.
Although our research on the affect and vision is in its infancy, it will
have two important implications if successful. First, this research explores
the possibility that there is normal variability in the extent to which the
world appears affectively infused, so that the environment may literally look
different to different people depending on how they feel. This would
translate into different base rates for affective (and potentially emotional)
events even when the physical surroundings are held constant. It is highly
possible that this variation instantiates individual differences in personality
dimensions that are broadly related to mental and physical illness (e.g.,
neuroticism and introversion). Some people may be affectively wired to
see certain types of information better.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, this research will inform an
ongoing debate over the distinctiveness between affect and cognition,
suggesting that the distinction may not be an ontological distinction that
is respected by the brain (cf. Duncan & Barrett, 2007). The most far-
reaching implication of this work is that ‘‘thinking’’ (e.g., sensing and
categorizing or deliberating on an object) might not be a fundamentally
different sort of psychological activity than ‘‘affecting’’ (i.e., constructing a
state to represent how the object affects you).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Deep and heartfelt thanks to Jim Russell for his wise council and collaborative input into
much of the work reported in this paper. Thanks also to Rainer Reisenzein for pointing
out the Titchener reference which details Wundt’s changing views on affect. Preparation
of this manuscript was supported by the National Institutes of Health Director’s Pioneer
Award (DP1OD003312), a National Institute of Mental Health’s Independent Scientist
Research Award (K02 MH001981), grants from the National Institute of Aging
(AG030311) and the National Science Foundation (BCS 0721260; BCS 0527440), and a
contract with the Army Research Institute (W91WAW), as well as by a James McKeen
Cattell Award and a Sabbatical Fellowship from the American Philosophical Society to Lisa
Feldman Barrett.
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C H A P T E R F I V E
Human Mimicry
Tanya L. Chartrand* and Rick van Baaren†
Contents
1. Introduction 221
2. Types of Mimicry 222
2.1. Facial mimicry 223
2.2. Emotional mimicry 223
2.3. Verbal mimicry 225
2.4. Behavioral mimicry 225
3. The Impact of Mimicry 227
3.1. Impact on the mimicry dyad: Bringing and keeping
people together 228
4. The Link between Mimicry, Liking, and Rapport 228
4.1. Correlational evidence 228
4.2. Being mimicked leads to liking and rapport 230
4.3. Mimicking others leads to liking and rapport 231
4.4. Rapport and liking lead to more mimicry 232
5. Mimicry as a Nonconscious Tool to Affiliate and Disaffiliate 233
5.1. Increases with goal to affiliate 233
5.2. Decreases when people don’t want to affiliate 237
6. Mimicry, Empathy, and Understanding Others 239
7. Mimicry and Similarity 240
7.1. Attitudes converge 240
7.2. Mimicry of similar others 240
7.3. Mimicry of stereotyping others 241
8. Prosociality Toward Mimicker 241
9. Persuasion 242
9.1. Evidence against mimicry impacting persuasion 243
9.2. Evidence for mimicry impacting persuasion 243
9.3. Prosocial impact beyond the mimicry dyad 244
10. Mimicking Others Makes People More Prosocial 245
11. Being Mimicked Makes People More Prosocial 245
12. Prosociality Leads to More Mimicry 246
* The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
{
Behavioral Science Institute, Raboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands

ISSN 0065-2601, DOI: 10.1016/S0065-2601(08)00405-X All rights reserved.
219
220 Tanya L. Chartrand and Rick van Baaren
13. Self-Construal Mediates the Mimicry-Prosociality Link 246

13.1. The impact of mimicry on the individual 248
14. Preferences for Products 248
15. Self-Esteem 249
16. Self-Regulation 249
16.1. Mimicry as schema-driven 250
17. Cognitive Style 252
18. Stereotype Conformity 252
19. Mood 253
20. Creativity 254
21. Evaluations of Experiences 255
22. Theories of Mimicry 255
22.1. Mimicry as communication tool 256
22.2. Ideomotor action 257
22.3. Perception-behavior link 259
23. Neuropsychological Evidence for Perception-Action:
Mirror Neurons 259
24. Are We Born to Mimic? 260
25. Mirror System and Empathy 263
26. Motivation and the Mirror System 265
References 266
Abstract
Human mimicry is ubiquitous, and often occurs without the awareness of the
person mimicking or the person being mimicked. First, we briefly describe some
of the major types of nonconscious mimicry—verbal, facial, emotional, and
behavioral—and review the evidence for their automaticity. Next, we argue for
the broad impact of mimicry and summarize the literature documenting its
influence on the mimicry dyad and beyond. This review highlights the modera-
tors of mimicry as well, including the social, motivational, and emotional con-
ditions that foster or inhibit automatic mimicry. We interpret these findings in
light of current theories of mimicry. First, we evaluate the evidence for and
against mimicry as a communication tool. Second, we review neuropsychologi-
cal research that sheds light on the question of how we mimic. What is the
cognitive architecture that enables us to do what we perceive others do?
We discuss a proposed system, the perception-behavior link, and the neurologi-
cal evidence (i.e., the mirror system) supporting it. We will then review the debate
on whether mimicry is innate and inevitable. We propose that the architecture
enabling mimicry is innate, but that the behavioral mimicry response may actu-
ally be (partly) a product of learning or associations. Finally, we speculate on
what the behavioral data on mimicry may imply for the evolution of mimicry.
Mimicry 221
1. Introduction
How many times have you caught a friend, colleague, or acquaintance
mimicking someone else? Mimicry is everywhere—we all do it, and do it
frequently. Even a casual glance at people interacting at an office, restaurant,
bar, park, or at home will reveal many manifestations of our proclivity to
mimic others. We fall into a British accent while talking with our friend
from London on the phone; we cross our legs when our new boss crosses
hers; we wince when we see someone at a doctor’s office in pain. We aren’t
trying to imitate the other person, and we aren’t aware of mimicking them.
Likewise, the friend, boss, and stranger at the doctor’s office don’t notice it
either. The facility and tendency of humans to mimic each other has long
been of interest to philosophers, psychologists, authors of popular press
books, and laypeople alike. But what does the research say about mimicry
and its ubiquity, impact, function, and underlying cognitive and neural
mechanisms?
The answer is, quite a lot. Humans are intensely social animals and
research suggests mimicry is a critical part of human social interactions. It
is intimately tied to relationships, liking, and empathy, functioning both as a
signal of rapport and as a tool to generate rapport. Its use can occur entirely
outside of awareness and yet it can also be used consciously and deliberately.
It has important consequences both within and beyond the mimicry dyad.
Indeed, it appears to be such a critical part of social functioning that the
brain may have even evolved specific capabilities to facilitate its use.
Human mimicry has been the focus of research in disciplines ranging
from communication, neuroscience, and social, developmental, clinical, and
consumer psychology. Although the questions asked, the methodologies,
and the level of analysis vary across the disciplines, a consensus is emerging.
Automatic, nonconscious mimicry exists in many forms and its strength and
frequency are determined by a variety of social, cognitive, affective, and
motivational factors. Moreover, mimicry has important consequences,
impacting the mimicry dyad as well as the individuals involved.
An important distinction to make is between conscious imitation and
nonconscious mimicry. The conscious imitation of others is critical to
learning and to navigating our social environment (Bandura, 1962). How-
ever, the focus of the current paper is on mimicry, which occurs without
the mimicker’s or mimickee’s awareness. The current paper unfolds in the
following way. First, we briefly describe some of the major types of
nonconscious mimicry—verbal, facial, emotional, and behavioral—and
review the evidence for their automaticity. Next, we argue for the broad
impact of mimicry and summarize the literature documenting its influence
on the mimicry dyad and beyond. This review highlights the moderators of
mimicry as well, including the social, motivational, and emotional condi-

tions that foster or inhibit automatic mimicry. Who is most likely to mimic
and who is most likely to be mimicked?
In the face of this critical mass of research into the ubiquity and impact of
mimicry, one goal of our review is to contextualize it all into a broad theory
of mimicry. Thus, after reviewing the impact of mimicry, we will interpret
these findings in light of theories on mimicry. First, we evaluate the
evidence for and against mimicry as a communication tool. Is the function
of mimicry to signal to others that we understand and empathize with them?
Do we mimic because we want to signal this rapport? Second, we review
neuropsychological research that sheds light on the question of how we
mimic. What is the cognitive architecture that enables us to do what we
perceive others do? Despite the ubiquity and intuitive appeal of mimicry, it
is remarkably difficult to explain how perceiving someone else perform a
movement can lead us to automatically reproduce that movement. In fact, it
requires a specific cognitive and neural system. We discuss a proposed
system, the perception-behavior link, and the neurological evidence (i.e.,
the mirror system) supporting it.
We will then review the debate on whether mimicry is innate and
inevitable. Does the automaticity of mimicry imply that we are born with
hardware enabling us to imitate from the minute we are born? Or is
mimicry something that needs to be trained and practiced, shaping the
way mimicry is eventually manifested? We propose that the architecture
enabling mimicry is innate, but that the behavioral mimicry response may
actually be (partly) a product of learning or associations. Finally, we specu-
late on what the behavioral data on mimicry may imply for the evolution of
mimicry. We conclude that mimicry is pervasive and has important con-
sequences, and hope that the next time the reader picks up a British accent
after talking to a friend in London, he or she will have better insight into
how and why this occurred.
2. Types of Mimicry
Mimicry is manifested in various ways, and often the mimicker neither
intends to mimic nor is consciously aware of doing so. What is mimicked?
For one, individuals mimic the facial expressions of others. This can lead to
emotional contagion, or ‘‘catching’’ the emotions and moods of others.
Verbal mimicry occurs when people match the speech characteristics and
patterns of their interaction partners. Finally, behavioral mimicry involves
taking on the postures, mannerisms, gestures, and motor movements of
other people. We briefly review the empirical support for each type of
mimicry, including evidence for its automaticity.
Mimicry 223
2.1. Facial mimicry

One of the most recognizable forms of human mimicry is the tendency to
mimic the facial expressions of others. O’Toole and Dubin (1968) found that
when infants open their mouths to feed, mothers tend to open their mouths in
response. Chartrand and Bargh (1999) examined facial mimicry in laboratory
experiments and found that individuals interacting with a smiling confederate
smiled more than those interacting with a confederate who did not smile. In a
provocative study, Zajonc et al. (1987) found that married couples have more
facial similarity over time, and one could argue that this similarity results from
the couples frequently mimicking each other’s facial expressions.
Does facial mimicry occur automatically? Suggestive evidence comes from
the developmental literature showing that neonates (one-month old) stick out
their tongues when observing others doing the same (Meltzoff & Moore,
1977). Infants have also been found to mimic the facial expressions of emotion
(Termine & Izard, 1988). The work of Dimberg et al. (2000) provides more
direct evidence for the automaticity of facial mimicry (see also Dimberg, 1982;
Vaughan & Lanzetta, 1980). In their research, three groups of participants
were exposed to faces that were happy, sad, or neutral. The faces appeared for
30 ms, followed by a neutral face for 5 s. The subliminal presentation along
with the long backward mask (i.e., the neutral face) prevented participants
from consciously perceiving the happy or sad faces. During the viewing of the
facial stimuli, the spontaneous facial electromyographic activity for participants
was recorded. Based on the authors’ previous findings that activity in certain
facial muscles can be automatically evoked by exposure to angry and happy
faces (Dimberg & Thunberg, 1998), the authors specifically focused on the
activity of the corrugator supercilii muscle, which knits the eyebrows during
frowns, and the zygomatic major muscle, which elevates the lips during smiles.
Dimberg et al. (2000) argued that if different emotional responses can be
automatically elicited, then subliminal, unconscious exposure to happy or
sad faces should differentially activate these particular muscles. Although
participants showed no awareness of having consciously seen the happy or
sad faces, their facial emotional response patterns showed that the zygomatic
major muscle activity was highest when exposed to happy faces, and that
corrugator supercilii muscle activity was highest in response to sad faces (see
also Lundqvist & Dimberg, 1995). Thus, facial mimicry in this work occurred
automatically as a result of being unconsciously (subliminally) exposed to
emotional faces (see also Achaibou et al., 2008).
2.2. Emotional mimicry

Given that facial expressions of emotions elicit emotional experiences (Laird &
Bresler, 1992; Strack et al., 1988), it is perhaps not surprising that facial
mimicry facilitates emotional mimicry—the contagion of emotions displayed
by others (Hatfield et al., 1994, in press). Supporting this, Lundquist and

Dimberg (1995) found that the facial mimicry of subliminally presented facial
stimuli is accompanied by congruent emotional experiences (see also McIntosh,
2006). Laird et al. (1994) found that mimicry mediates the effects of viewing
others’ emotions on the observer’s own emotional state (but see Gump & Kulik,
1997). Interestingly, the mimicry of facial expressions may be more likely to lead
to the corresponding affective state for some emotions than others. Hess and
Blairy (2001) found that although facial mimicry occurred for many different
emotions, emotional contagion only occurred for happiness and sadness, but
not for more specific emotions such as anger and disgust.
Neumann and Strack (2000) found that the audition of affectively
laden vocal intonations elicited a congruent mood state in the listener.
Specifically, they had participants listen to a cassette of a target person
reciting an affectively neutral speech in either a slightly happy or a slightly
sad voice. Participants who heard the slightly happy voice reported being in
a better mood than those who heard the slightly sad voice. In a follow-up
study, participants who repeated back the content of the speech they heard
mimicked the affective tone of the speaker’s voice. This suggested that
participants adopted a mood state that was congruent with the mood
implied by the speaker’s voice.
Ramanathan and McGill (2008) found further evidence for emotional
contagion in an experimental study of mimicry and consumption. Partici-
pants watched a movie clip with another person who they could either see
or not see. When they could see the other person (but not when they could
not see the other person), their own emotional expressions could be pre-
dicted by the prior expression of the other person. However, this was only
true if the participant had looked at the other person and thus observed the
expression. The contagion effect in this study lasted about 2–3 s as measured
by the participants’ facial expressions.
Perhaps not surprisingly, emotional mimicry is moderated by such basic
factors and liking and expressiveness. For instance, people tend to catch the
emotions of those they like more than those they don’t like (Howard &
Gengler, 2001). Interestingly, level of expressiveness also appears to mod-
erate the extent of emotional contagion (Friedman & Riggio, 1981; Sullins,
1991). For instance, Friedman and Riggio (1981) found that participants
who were highly expressive transmitted their moods to other participants
more easily, especially to those who were less expressive. This occurred
even when the group of participants were sitting together silently, preclud-
ing any verbal communication. Thus ‘‘expressiveness’’ can be communi-
cated nonverbally, leading to the higher rates of mood transmission among
highly expressive individuals. This individual-difference effect of expres-
siveness is further moderated by the type of mood that is being displayed
(Sullins, 1991). Specifically, when the mood being displayed is happy, both
high and low-expressive participants pass their mood on to others. But
Mimicry 225
when the mood is negative, the highly expressive participants transmit their
mood to others more than do low-expressive participants.
2.3. Verbal mimicry

Humans engage in verbal mimicry from a very early age. In fact, neonates as
young as two to four days old have been found to cry in response to another
infant’s crying (Simner, 1971). Interestingly, infants do not mimic synthetic
cries, which suggest that newborns can actually discriminate between real
and artificial cries. Research with adult participants has found that speech
patterns also converge over time. Specifically, people adopt each others’
accents, speech rate, utterance duration, and latency to speak (Cappella &
Planalp, 1981; Giles & Coupland, 1991; Giles & Powesland, 1975; Gregory
et al., 1997; Matarazzo & Wiens, 1972; Webb, 1969). Controlled experi-
ments have also found that speakers mimic their conversation partners’
syntax (i.e., they structure their sentences the same way) across multiple
sentences (Bock, 1986).
Much of this verbal mimicry occurs automatically, without the intention
or awareness of the people involved. In research supporting this, Levelt and
Kelter (1982) found that people use the same words and clauses that their
interaction partners use during conversations (see also Niederhoffer &
Pennebaker, 2002). Importantly, they had a condition in which partici-
pants’ cognitive resources were taxed, and found that mimicry occurred
even when participants were under cognitive load. This suggests that
imitation of the words and clauses used by interaction partners occurs
automatically and nonconsciously.
2.4. Behavioral mimicry

Behavioral mimicry refers to the adoption of the mannerisms, posture,
gestures, and motor movements of one’s interaction partner. Some of the
first research into behavioral mimicry was conducted by Scheflen (1964).
He believed that the postures and body positioning occurring between
psychotherapists and their clients could provide insights into the dynamics
between them. To test this possibility, he videotaped 18 therapists conduct-
ing psychotherapy sessions in order to analyze the behavioral patterns being
used to communicate during these sessions. He argued that ‘‘postural
congruence’’—mimicry—indicated similarity in the views or roles held
by the therapists and their clients.
Bernieri and colleagues (Bernieri, 1988; Bernieri et al., 1988) have tested
behavioral mimicry in controlled laboratory settings. In one study, they
examined whether naı̈ve judges rated ‘‘real’’ interactions as more synchro-
nous than interactions that never actually took place. Several mother–child
interactions were videotaped, always with the child on the left of the screen
and the mother on the right part of the screen. The researchers then created
different versions of the videotapes, some in which mothers were paired
with their own children and some in which mothers were paired with other
children. Upon watching these videos, participants rated how physically in
sync the pairs were. Mothers were judged to be more in sync with their own
children than they were with other children.
Bavelas and colleagues examined the behavioral mimicry that occurs
when an observer and target face each other (Bavelas et al., 1988). The
question they addressed was whether the observer’s motions mirror the
direction of a target (mirror mimicry) or whether the observer’s motion is
the same as the target if the observer was rotated into the target’s position
(rotational mimicry). The target leaned to the right or the left, and the
researchers found in several studies that participants displayed mirror
mimicry, not rotational mimicry (see also LaFrance & Broadbent, 1976).
In a series of studies focusing on the mimicry of mannerisms, Chartrand
and Bargh (1999) found that mimicry occurs automatically in dyadic inter-
actions. Participants engaged in a photo description task with a confederate
(ostensibly another participant) they did not know. The confederate either
moved her foot or touched her face throughout the session. Then the
participant did the same task with a second confederate, who engaged in
the mannerism that the first confederate did not. Hidden videocameras that
were focused on the participants were used to record these sessions, and
coders blind to the experimental condition and hypotheses later watched
these recordings and rated the amount of face touching and foot moving that
the participant engaged in. Results provided evidence for what the authors
coined ‘‘the chameleon effect’’: participants changed their own mannerisms
to blend in with those in their current environment. That is, they moved
their foot more when with the foot-mover than the face-toucher, and they
touched their face more when with the face-toucher than the foot-mover.
Participants reported no awareness of either the confederates’ mannerisms or
their own mimicry of those mannerisms, providing additional evidence that
behavioral mimicry can be an automatic and nonconscious process.
Thus, there is substantial evidence for facial, emotional, verbal, and
behavioral mimicry. We mimic virtually everything that we can observe
another person do, and even ‘‘catch’’ their affective states as well. Impor-
tantly, these types of mimicry can all occur outside of conscious awareness
and intent. Studies documenting the existence of mimicry in various
domains were an important first step in understanding the breadth of the
phenomenon. We now know that mimicry is pervasive in virtually all social
interactions. Are there any consequences of this mimicry? Given its ubiq-
uity, it is important to uncover any downstream effects of the presence or
absence of mimicry. It is to these consequences that we now turn.
Mimicry 227
3. The Impact of Mimicry

The previous section reviewed the types of mimicry and the evidence for
their automaticity. The fact that we mimic others so much may make for
fascinating cocktail conversation, but is it any more than that? Recent research
suggests that, in fact, mimicry affects us in important ways. Figure 1.1 presents
an overview of the model. Perhaps not surprisingly, the presence of mimicry
has an effect on the dyad (i.e., the mimicker and the mimickee), leading to
more rapport, empathy, and liking between them. It ‘‘binds and bonds’’
people together, serving as a social glue (Chartrand et al., 2005; Lakin et al.,
2003). But mimicry does much more. For one, it affects people’s general social
orientation (beyond the other person in the mimicry dyad) such that they feel
closer to others and are more likely to help them (van Baaren et al., 2004a).
Perhaps most surprisingly, mimicry has effects on the individuals who are
mimicked—consequences that one might not guess to arise from a nonverbal
behavior displayed during a social interaction. For instance, being mimicked
can make a person procrastinate more, increase a person’s self-esteem, reduce a
person’s willpower to resist eating junk food, make a person like a snack they
normally wouldn’t, make a woman do worse at a math task, and lead to more
creativity. In this section, we review the evidence for the impact of mimicry
on the dyad and the individuals involved.
Cognitive, affective, motivational,

contextual, and individual
difference moderators
Prosociality within a mimcry dyad
General prosocial orientation
Mimcry
Affective, cognitive, and behavioral

influence on the individual
Figure 1.1 The moderators and consequences of human mimicry.

3.1. Impact on the mimicry dyad: Bringing and keeping

people together
We first discuss the impact that mimicry has on the person mimicking and
the person being mimicked. The members of the ‘‘mimicry dyad’’ are
influenced in various ways by the presence or absence of mimicry during
an interaction. In short, mimicry encourages affiliation between interaction
partners and gives rise to a prosocial orientation. We review this evidence
and make the following conclusions: (1) there is a link between mimicry on
the one hand and liking and rapport on the other. Mimicry leads to rapport
and vice versa; (2) when individuals want to affiliate with others they
nonconsciously engage in more mimicry of them, and when they want to
disaffiliate they automatically engage in less mimicry, suggesting that mim-
icry is used as an unconscious tool to create rapport; (3) mimicry can lead to
empathy, which facilitates understanding the emotions felt and displayed by
others; (4) mimicry leads to a merging of the minds—to more similar
attitudes and shared viewpoints; (5) mimicry leads to more prosocial (i.e.,
helping) behavior toward the mimicker; (6) individuals are more persuaded
by people who mimic them than by people who do not.
4. The Link between Mimicry, Liking,

and Rapport
The earliest research on the impact of mimicry focused on the rela-
tionship between ‘‘behavior matching’’ or ‘‘posture sharing’’ and liking,
rapport, and empathy. Interest began over 40 years ago regarding the
correlation between mimicry and rapport, and experimental evidence has
accrued more recently for causality in both directions.
4.1. Correlational evidence

In the fields of clinical and counseling psychology, researchers have long
been interested in the nonverbal communication transpiring between the
therapist and client. As discussed previously, some early research on mim-
icry was conducted in such settings, testing the impact of mimicry on the
therapy relationship (Charney, 1966; Dabbs, 1969; Scheflen, 1964). In one
notable study, Charney (1966) observed psychotherapy sessions and found
that the postures of therapist and client converged over time such that the
postures were more similar at the end of a session than they were at the
beginning (see Johnston et al., 2008, for similar findings on the time course
Mimicry 229
of mimicry). Importantly, this convergence in posture was significantly

correlated with an increase in rapport between the therapist and client
(see also Maurer & Tindall, 1983). This was some of the earliest evidence
that mimicry was related to rapport.
Other early research went beyond the psychotherapy setting to study the
relationship between mimicry and rapport. LaFrance and Broadbent (1976)
postulated that nonverbal behavioral mimicry would be a good index of
group rapport. In a study testing this, they analyzed the similarity between
the body and arm positions of teachers and their students in college seminar
classrooms and found that students reported greater rapport in classrooms
where such mimicry was more frequent. Tickle-Degnen and Rosenthal
(1990) conducted a meta-analysis on rapport and found that three distinct
facets—mutual attention, positivity, and coordination—are correlated with
specific nonverbal behaviors. The coordination element in particular was
strongly linked to mimicry.
Is the correlation between rapport and mimicry observable by outsiders?
An interesting experiment by Grahe and Bernieri (1999) suggests the answer
is yes. The researchers conducted an experiment in which they asked
participants to judge rapport in dyadic interactions, based on different
types of information. Participants were given access to the details of the
dyadic interactions based on (1) a transcript of the interaction, (2) audio
playback of the interaction, (3) video playback, (4) video playback with a
transcript, or (5) video and audio playback. Counterintuitively, the
researchers found that participants who were only given the video playback
only—which provided only nonverbal behavioral information—were in
fact the most accurate in judging the amount of rapport in the interaction.
In contrast, those given verbal information (either the transcript of the
interaction or the audio playback) were less accurate in judging the rapport,
which speaks to the importance of nonverbal cues, including mimicry or
‘‘synchronized’’ behaviors, for this type of judgment.
Thus, shared motor movements and rapport are positively correlated,
and this is felt among the people in the interaction as well as noticed by
outsiders. But how do postures or mannerisms come to be shared? If there is
convergence in these bodily movements, it must be due to mimicry, either
on the part of one interaction partner or both partners. The mimicry may or
may not be consciously engaged in, but one or both of the interactants is
taking on the posture, mannerisms, and movements of the other(s). Given
the link between mimicry and rapport, what is the causal direction? There
are two possibilities. One is that existing rapport between interactants leads
to more mimicry. That is, people who like each other mimic each other
more, often without realizing it. Perhaps the less intuitive possibility is that
mimicry (both mimicking others and being mimicked by others) leads to
more rapport. There is now evidence for both causal directions.
4.2. Being mimicked leads to liking and rapport

In a study testing the latter causal direction, Chartrand and Bargh (1999) had
participants engage with another ‘‘participant’’ (actually a confederate) on a
photo description task. Importantly, the participant and confederate were
strangers in this study, so there was no preexisting rapport between them.
The confederate either subtly mimicked the posture and mannerisms of the
participant throughout the interaction or did not. The participants were
then asked how smoothly the interaction with the ‘‘other participant’’ went,
and how much they liked the person. Results indicated that they had
smoother interactions and liked the other person more when that other
person mimicked them than when they did not. No participant reported
noticing being mimicked (or not) or sharing postures and mannerisms
(or lack thereof ). Maurer and Tindall (1983) found that adolescents who
were mimicked by a school counselor thought that counselor was more
empathic then did those who were not mimicked by the counselor. Inter-
estingly, Hove and Risen (2008) have recently found similar effects for
interpersonal synchrony. Specifically, they found that when one person
synchronizes his or her movements in time with another, that other person
feels more affiliation with the synchronizer.
Thus, mimicry (and synchrony) leads to more liking and rapport, even
between strangers who presumably don’t want to become friends. This has
clear implications for one’s interactions in casual social settings, but can it
also impact important interactions that affect one’s career? In a fascinating
field experiment conducted at the headquarters of a Fortune 500 company,
Sanchez-Burks et al. (in press) had Anglo and Latino managers interact with
a confederate in a business interview (in which the participants were the
interviewees). The confederate (interviewer) either did or did not mimic
the mannerisms, gestures, and posture of the participants during the inter-
view. The researchers were interested in the interview performance of
the participants as a function of their ethnicity and whether they were
mimicked or not. To assess interview performance, they measured
question–answer response latency—the time passed between the end of an
interviewer question and the start of an interviewee’s vocal response. They
also had human resource experts code the interviewee’s performance along
seven dimensions (body language, impact, verbal communication skills,
motivation, assertiveness, interpersonal skills, and overall impression). Par-
ticipants were also asked to provide an overall evaluation of their own
performance during the interview. As expected, mimicry affected the
participants’ experiences during the interview and their actual interview
performance. Participants who were mimicked by the confederate inter-
viewer thought they interviewed better, and they in fact did along the
objective measures collected. Interestingly, these effects were moderated
by cultural group membership, such that the effect of mimicry on interview
Mimicry 231
performance was stronger for Latinos than for Anglos. The researchers
argued that Latinos have higher levels of relational attunement, and as a
result, are more sensitive to the presence of nonverbal cues such as mimicry.
4.2.1. Boundary conditions

Likowski et al. (2008) examined the boundary conditions of the positive
consequences of being mimicked. Specifically, they found that being mim-
icked by a member of an outgroup makes an individual like the outgroup
member less, not more. Thus, outgroup members who mimic are less liked
than outgroup members who do not mimic. In a second study, they
examined walking synchrony. A synchronized ingroup member was liked
more than a nonsynchronized ingroup member, but the opposite was found
for outgroup members (a synchronized outgroup member was liked less
than a nonsynchronized outgroup member). Interestingly, the authors also
found that the effect extends to liking of the ingroup or outgroup as a
whole; being mimicked by an ingroup member leads to more liking of the
ingroup, whereas being mimicked by an outgroup member leads to less
liking of the outgroup.
4.3. Mimicking others leads to liking and rapport

Stel et al. (2008) found it is not just the recipient of the mimicry who
benefits from it—so too does the mimicker. The researchers were interested
in the relationship between mimicking others and (1) affective empathy
toward them (operationalized as emotional contagion, or catching the
emotions of others), (2) cognitive empathy toward them (defined as taking
the perspective of others and understanding them), and (3) bonding with
them (feeling greater similarity to and liking of others). Participants were
either instructed to mimic or not mimic the facial expressions of a target,
or they were given no instructions either way. Greater mimicry of the target
was associated with more affective and cognitive empathy for and more
bonding with the confederate. However, this effect was driven by the no
mimicry instructions. That is, those who were told to not mimic the target
(thereby disrupting the automatic, natural mimicry that normally occurs)
had less empathy toward the target and felt less bonded with them, com-
pared both to participants who were told to mimic and to participants who
were given no instructions. Another study found that both affective and
cognitive empathy mediated the effect of mimicking on greater bonding,
and that increased bonding led to an increase in subsequent mimicry.
Thus, mimickers become more empathic toward the person they are
mimicking. Are these prosocial feelings communicated somehow (nonver-
bally) toward the mimickee? In a study by Stel et al. (2008), participants
were mimicked or not during a mock interview. Participants who were
mimicked felt more empathized with and understood than participants who
were not mimicked. Interestingly, the mimicked participants in turn

became more empathic to the mimicker. These results suggest that mimicry
serves an important social function by communicating empathy and under-
standing to the mimickee. Indeed, when mimicry is not present, interaction
partners feel not only less understood, but less emotionally attuned to one
another as well (Stel et al., 2008).
4.3.1. Boundary conditions

Thus, there is evidence that mimicking others leads to more liking for the
mimickee. However, there are boundary conditions to this effect. Stel et al.
(2008) found that if a person is already disliked, then intentionally mimick-
ing that person does not lessen the disliking. Participants were instructed
to either mimic or not mimic another person who was either likable or
not likable. When participants intentionally mimicked a likable person,
then liking for that person was improved. But when they mimicked an
unlikable person, the intentional mimicry did not improve liking for that
person. Whether this holds during natural (unmanipulated) mimicry
remains to be seen.
4.4. Rapport and liking lead to more mimicry

Thus, mimicry leads to liking and rapport. But what about the reverse causal
direction: does rapport and liking lead to more mimicry? McIntosh (2006)
looked at preexisting and manipulated liking and found that for both, liking
led to more mimicry. Likowski et al. (2008) found that individuals engaged
in facial mimicry of happy and sad faces of people they were manipulated to
like (via written reports), but they found less mimicry and even incongruent
facial muscular reactions to happy and sad faces of people they were
manipulated to not like. Stel et al. (2008) have also explored the relationship
between mimicry and liking. In a first study where participants’ a priori
liking for a target was manipulated and their mimicry of that person was
then measured, they found that when a target is disliked, facial mimicry is
attenuated. In another study, mimicry towards targets who were or were
not members of a negatively stereotyped group was measured. Participants
saw a video with a Moroccan and a Dutch person talking, one after another.
They found that the more negative the participant’s implicit attitude was
toward Moroccans (on a Moroccan/Dutch IAT), the less the Moroccan was
mimicked compared to the Dutch confederate. However, explicit attitudes
toward Moroccans did not predict mimicry toward the Moroccan confed-
erate compared to the Dutch. Thus, in the presence of a reason to dislike a
target, automatic mimicry is reduced.
Mimicry 233
5. Mimicry as a Nonconscious Tool to Affiliate

and Disaffiliate
What if there is no a priori liking or disliking of an interaction partner,
but there is a goal to affiliate with that person? Given the link between
mimicry and rapport, it might be predicted that with no existing rapport,
there should be less mimicry. On the other hand, it would be adaptive if
individuals were to mimic more when they want to create rapport with
another person, because the research shows that it would be an effective
strategy. Given that mimicry usually occurs outside conscious awareness,
this would imply that people would be ‘‘using’’ mimicry nonconsciously to
create rapport when desired. It would be a weapon in people’s noncon-
scious arsenals, a tool in their repertoire used to get others to like them.
And given that mimicry leads to liking and rapport, it would mean that
mimicry is functional and adaptive in creating bonds between people. We
next survey the evidence supporting the notion that an affiliation goal
increases nonconscious mimicry.
5.1. Increases with goal to affiliate

5.1.1. Direct goal to affiliate
Lakin and Chartrand (2003) found that participants with an affiliation goal
mimicked more. This held regardless of whether the goal was consciously
held after getting explicit instructions to get along with another person, or
nonconsciously held after being subliminally primed with affiliation-related
words such as affiliate, friend, team, partner, and like. Notably, the person
the participants mimicked was not physically present in the room with
them, but rather was on a videotape. The participants believed the person
they were watching, who they would be interacting with on a later task, was
seated in a room next door, but it was actually a recorded segment shown
via a VCR in a control room. Thus, even when there was no possibility of
‘‘communicating’’ anything to the person they hoped to get along with
later, and she couldn’t receive the mimicry ‘‘signal’’ and respond in kind,
they still mimicked her. This speaks to the automatic and nonconscious
nature of mimicry. Participants also reported no awareness of mimicking the
woman on the videotape.
In another study, Lakin and Chartrand (2003) tested whether the affilia-
tion-driven increase in mimicry actually works to build rapport and liking.
Participants either had a nonconscious affiliation goal (activated through a
subliminal priming procedure) or not prior to completing an on-line task
that simulated a chat-room with another person, who was presumably in an
adjoining room. Participants were told to ask the other person a series of
scripted questions about university life, and the other person responded to
these questions. The responses were actually programmed and there was no
other participant. The responses were written to be either short and cold in
nature, or longer, warmer, and friendlier in tone. This set the participant up
to either succeed at the goal to affiliate or to fail at it. Next, another
‘‘participant’’ entered the room (actually a confederate), and the participants
were told this was a new person (not the one in the chat room). They asked
the confederate similar questions about student life and the extent to which
they mimicked the confederate’s mannerisms during the interaction was
assessed.
Participants who had failed earlier at the goal to affiliate with the cold,
unfriendly on-line confederate (and who therefore still had an unmet
affiliation goal) mimicked the confederate more than those who had suc-
ceeded at their earlier goal to affiliate (i.e., who had their goal satiated by the
friendly, warm on-line partner). Importantly, the confederates (blind to
condition and hypotheses) who interacted with the participants who had
failed at the earlier nonconscious goal reported liking the participants more
and thinking the interaction went more smoothly, compared to those who
interacted with the participants who no longer had an active goal to affiliate.
The Lakin and Chartrand (2003) studies suggest that mimicry is a
nonconscious strategy that people use to affiliate with others. It is a part of
our behavioral repertoire that we invoke when needed to get others to like
us. Moreover, the strategy of mimicry, albeit unconscious, works. People
do like us more when we (nonconsciously) mimic them. In conjunction
with the Chartrand and Bargh (1999) study, this suggests that mimicry
serves an important function—it creates smoother, more harmonious inter-
actions and leads people to like each other more. This speaks to the
adaptive, functional nature of nonconscious mimicry: it is in service of the
individual, and helps to build relationships.
Of course, people are not often subliminally primed with an affiliation
goal in their daily lives. Nor are they always told explicitly to get along with
another person. More frequently, it is features of the social environment
that activate an affiliation goal in people. The presence of these features or
affiliative cues should then lead individuals to mimic more. What are such
naturalistic triggers of affiliation motivation, and do individuals mimic more
in these situations? It is to this evidence that we now turn.
5.1.2. Feeling different from others

One social cue that triggers a goal to affiliate is feeling too different from
other people. Brewer’s (1991) optimal distinctiveness theory suggests that
people try to strike a balance between a desire for distinctiveness (i.e.,
feeling unique and different from others) and a desire for assimilation or
belonging (i.e., feeling similar to others). When people feel too distinct or
Mimicry 235
too similar, they are motivated to regain the balance. Thus, they have a need
to assimilate activated in situations where they feel unusual or different. In a
study applying the principles of this theory to mimicry behavior, Uldall
et al. (2008) had participants complete a supposed ‘‘personality test.’’ They
were given (bogus) feedback on the test that indicated they had a ‘‘person-
ality type’’ that was either very similar to most others at their undergrad
institution or one that was extremely unusual at their university. Participants
then interacted with another student (actually a confederate), and those who
had earlier been told they were very different from others at their school
engaged in more mimicry of the confederate than those who had been told
they were similar to others at their school. This suggests that people mimic
more when they are feeling too different from in-group members. Mimicry
is a way that people (nonconsciously) regain their ‘‘optimal’’ balance
(Brewer, 1991) by affiliating with others in an effort to belong.
5.1.3. Social exclusion

The Uldall et al. study shows the importance of the need to belong in
triggering mimicry behavior. In fact, some have argued that the need to
belong is one of the most important, universally shared aspects of the human
race (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Leary & Baumeister, 2000). Research on
social exclusion and rejection suggests that being ostracized or rejected is
devastating (Leary, 2001). Given that ostracism can have powerful social,
psychological, and behavioral consequences (including aggression and vio-
lence toward others), Lakin et al. (2008) set out to see if mimicry was an
efficient, low-risk way to regain one’s status within an ingroup upon being
rejected by them. That is, they tested whether social exclusion increases
mimicry, and if so, of whom? Participants engaged in ‘‘Cyberball,’’ an on-
line ball-tossing game (Williams et al., 2000) in which they tossed the ball
back and forth with three other on-line participants. In reality the ball
tossing of the three others was controlled by the computers and was
programmed to either exclude the participant from the tossing after several
turns, or to include the participant. Following Cyberball, the participants
were told they would engage in a photo description task with a new
participant (actually a confederate) unrelated to the game. Results indicated
that participants who had been excluded unwittingly mimicked the con-
federate more than participants who had been included, suggesting that
mimicry is a nonconscious way of affiliating after a rejection experience (for
a conceptual replication with children, see Over, in preparation).
Do people immediately mimic the first person they can after a rejection
experience, or are they more selective about who they mimic? It would be
more adaptive if individuals mimicked a person that would help them regain
their status within the group that excluded them, particularly if that group is
an important ingroup. However, the mimicry that occurs in these situations
is an automatic, unconscious process, and as such, some would argue that it
should be a simple, automatic response—turned on or off—that doesn’t

vary as a function of the nuances of a particular situation, including the type
of person who excluded the person. However, Lakin et al. (2008) argued
that unconscious processes can be ‘‘smart’’ and functional, and as such,
nonconscious mimicry may help individuals to affiliate specifically with
the appropriate (excluding) group.
Female participants were either excluded in the Cyberball game by
fellow ingroup members (females) or by outgroup members (males). They
then interacted with a ‘‘new’’ participant (confederate) who was either male
or female. Participants who were excluded by an ingroup mimicked more,
but only when the confederate was an ingroup member. That is, the
participants who were excluded by female Cyberball teammates (ingroup
exclusion) mimicked the female confederate (ingroup mimicry) more than
the male confederate (outgroup mimicry), and more than participants
mimicked after being excluded by male Cyberball teammates (outgroup
exclusion). Importantly, this increase in mimicry was successful: the inter-
action partner for the photo description task reported that interactions with
excluded participants were smoother than those with included participants.
This research provides further evidence that mimicry is a weapon in
people’s arsenals used to affiliate with others, even though they are unaware
they have or use it. Moreover, unconscious mimicry is not an on/off switch
that is automatically turned on after exclusion and used indiscriminantly;
rather, it is selective and functional in helping people to restore status within
important ingroups.
5.1.4. Self-monitoring moderates response to affiliative cues

High self-monitors have been called ‘‘social chameleons’’ because of their
tendency to modulate their behavior as a function of their current social
environment. Does this modulation of behavior include more mimicry
upon being exposed to ‘‘affiliation cues’’ in the environment? Across two
studies, Cheng and Chartrand (2003) found that social contexts that
included affiliative cues triggered more unconscious mimicry among high
self-monitors, but low self-monitors engaged in relatively less mimicry
regardless of the social context. In one study, they had participants interact
with a confederate whom they believed to be either a peer (fellow under-
grad) or nonpeer (high school student or graduate student). High self-
monitors interacting with a ‘‘peer’’ mimicked more than those interacting
with a ‘‘nonpeer,’’ and more than low self-monitors interacting with either
a peer or nonpeer. In a second study, the researchers found that compared to
low self-monitors, high self-monitors responded more to social cues indi-
cating that another person is more powerful than they by engaging in more
mimicry. Participants were randomly assigned to be a ‘‘worker’’ or ‘‘leader’’
in a task with a confederate (who was assigned the opposite role). High self-
monitors assigned the worker role mimicked the confederate (the leader)
Mimicry 237
more than those assigned the leader role, and more than low self-monitors
assigned either role. Thus, high self-monitors engaged in more mimicry
than low self-monitors, supporting their nickname of ‘‘social chameleons’’
(see also Estow et al., 2007). More importantly, compared to low self-
monitors, high self-monitors pick up more on the affiliative cues in the
environment and respond by increasing their nonconscious mimicry.
5.2. Decreases when people don’t want to affiliate

Thus, there is substantial evidence that nonconscious mimicry increases
when a member of a dyad has a goal to affiliate. The goal to affiliate can
be triggered by various environmental features, but regardless of how it is
activated, it leads to the same increase in mimicry. What if a dyad member
does not want to affiliate or even wants to disaffiliate with someone? When
one is interacting with a member of an outgroup, or someone with a stigma,
or someone dislikeable, does that person still engage in mimicry, or is it
automatically reduced? Evidence suggests the latter, and it is to this research
that we now turn.
5.2.1. Stigmatized others

Johnston (2002) provided the first evidence that people mimic less when
they do not want to affiliate with someone. Participants observed the ice
cream eating behavior of confederates who either had a social stigma (e.g.,
obesity, a facial scar) or not. Participants mimicked the ice cream consump-
tion of the confederate, unless the confederate was stigmatized. If the
confederate had a stigma, participants presumably did not want to affiliate
with or be like her, and as a result they mimicked her less.
5.2.2. Outgroup membership

Another condition in which people don’t want to affiliate is when inter-
acting with outgroup members. Yabar et al. (2006) investigated the influ-
ence of group membership on nonconscious behavioral mimicry. The
authors argued that if mimicry is associated with the establishment of social
harmony and acts as a ‘‘social glue’’ that binds and bonds people together
(Lakin et al., 2003), then greater mimicry should occur of ingroup members
than outgroup members. Non-Christian female participants viewed video-
tapes of two female targets describing photos to them. One of the targets
wore a large crucifix and a fluorescent wrist bracelet with the words ‘‘Got
God’’ on it, identifying her as an outgroup member (i.e., a Christian). Both
targets touched and rubbed their face during the photo description, and a
hidden videocamera recorded the extent to which participants touched
their own face. Results revealed that there was greater mimicry of the
face touching behavior of the ingroup member (non-Christian) than the
outgroup member (Christian). These results are consistent with participants
not having a goal to affiliate (or having a goal to not affiliate) with a member
of an outgroup. Heider and Skowronski (2008) have found a similar finding
with ethnic groups. African-American and Caucasian participants interacted
with two confederates one after the other, one African-American and one
Caucasian. They found more mimicry of ethnic ingroup members than ethnic
outgroup members. Similarly, Bourgeois and Hess (2008) found more facial
mimicry of ingroup members than outgroup members. Interestingly, they
found that expressions of happiness were always mimicked, but negative
emotions were only mimicked when shown by an ingroup member.
In a second study, Yabar et al. (2006) found an association between the
strength of liking for a target group and mimicry of a member of that target
group. Implicit liking for the target group (again Christians) was assessed
using an Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998), and
explicit liking for the target group was assessed with an affective thermom-
eter scale (Kinder et al., 1982). The authors found that the extent to which a
person likes Christians in general predicted the extent to which the partici-
pant mimicked the Christian confederate. The degree of mimicry of the
Christian confederate could be predicted from both the explicit and implicit
liking measures of the outgroup. Interestingly (and unexpectedly), the
authors also found that the effect of implicit liking on mimicry was in the
opposite direction as the effect of explicit liking on mimicry. Specifically,
explicit liking of the target group predicted less mimicry, whereas greater
implicit liking predicted more mimicry. This suggests that noting any
discrepancy between explicit and implicit liking for an outgroup and
understanding the nature of that discrepancy is important in predicting a
person’s mimicry of members of that outgroup.
5.2.3. Relationship shielding

Another situation in which one may want to avoid affiliating with another
person is in the context of romantic relationships. Karremans and
Verwijmeren (2008) tested whether people who are involved in a romantic
relationship nonconsciously mimic an attractive opposite-sex other to a lesser
extent than people not involved in a relationship. They based this hypothesis
on the emerging evidence that nonconscious mimicry can vary as a function
of one’s current goals. In a provocative study, the authors had participants
who were and who were not involved in a romantic relationship interact with
an attractive opposite-sex other. The amount of mimicry displayed by the
participants during the interaction was observed. Results revealed that parti-
cipants who were in a relationship mimicked the attractive opposite-sex other
less than those not involved. The researchers argued that mimicry may serve a
subtle relationship shielding function. Supporting this, they found that
involved participants mimicked the attractive alternative less to the extent
that they were more close to their current partner and more satisfied with
their current relationship. The authors also found that the effect of relationship
Mimicry 239
status on level of mimicry displayed toward an opposite-sex other is mediated

by perceived attractiveness of the opposite-sex other. Thus, being in a
romantic relationship (especially a good one) leads to thinking an attractive
opposite-sex other is less attractive, in turn leading to less mimicry.
6. Mimicry, Empathy, and Understanding Others

Thus, mimicry brings people together by fostering liking and making
attitudes more similar. Stel and van Knippenberg (2008) found that mimicry
plays yet another important function within the dyad: understanding
the emotions felt and displayed by our interaction partners. How do we
understand the emotions of others? The researchers argue that in addition
to the traditional, relatively long categorization process, there may be a
shorter mimicry-based empathic process. They draw on embodied cognition
theory (Barsalou et al., 2003; Niedenthal, 2007), which suggests that
mimicry contributes to the recognition of affect experienced by others.
Specifically, by mimicking another’s emotional expression, one experiences
the corresponding emotions him- or herself (i.e., experiences empathy),
which in turn facilitates instantaneous emotion recognition. Participants in a
series of studies were asked to indicate quickly and accurately whether briefly
displayed facial emotions were positive or negative. The emotions were
shown on a computer screen for a short (but not subliminal) amount of
time—67 ms. While doing this task, half of the participants had facial
constraints that prevented them from engaging in natural mimicry. Results
revealed that when participants were constrained and could not mimic, the
speed of their recognition of affective valence was slowed down for female
participants, but not male participants (but see Blairy et al., 1999). The authors
argue that this is because women are more facially expressive than men, and
due to this enhanced expressiveness, facial feedback is more important in
emotion-related processing for women than for men. Thus, constraining the
natural facial mimicry of women impairs speed of emotion recognition
more so than for men. The study suggests that mimicry plays an important
role in understanding the emotions of others, (see Knoblich & Sebanz, 2006)
an argument to which we will return later.
Given the relationship between empathy and understanding others, it is
perhaps not surprising that individual differences in empathy modulate the
amount of mimicry that occurs in an interaction. Chartrand and Bargh
(1999) found that those high in the likelihood to take the perspective of
others (argued to be a cognitive form of empathy, Davis, 1984) mimic more
than those not as likely to take the perspective of others. In a study by
Sonnby-Borgstrom et al. (2003; see also Sonnby-Borgstrom, 2008), parti-
cipants high in emotional empathy mimicked the facial expressions of others
at short exposure times, demonstrating an automatic component in the

process of emotional empathy.
7. Mimicry and Similarity

That mimicry is related to liking, empathy, and rapport suggests that it
serves to bring people together emotionally. Does it also bring people
together psychologically? One indicator of this would be if people become
more similar in attitudes and opinions when they are mimicked. Perhaps
mimicry is related to similarity more generally, with bidirectional causality.
It is to this evidence that we now turn.
7.1. Attitudes converge

Ramanathan and McGill (2008) examined whether mimicry and emotional
contagion can lead people’s evaluations of an experience to converge
with the evaluations of those with whom they are sharing the experience.
They found that joint consumption and the mimicry that happened during
this consumption led to coherence in moment-to-moment evaluations.
In one study, participants watched a videoclip on a computer monitor in
one of three ways: either alone in the room, seated next to a person they
could not see (mere presence), or seated next to a person they could see (full
presence). The participants provided continuous ratings with a joystick of
their enjoyment of the video program. The researchers found that the
evaluations of the movie clip converged more in the full presence condition
than in either the mere presence or control (alone) condition. Thus, the
moment-to-moment judgments of the program differed for those who could
observe (and therefore mimic) the expressions of another person compared
to those who could not. A second study found direct evidence for facial
mimicry and emotional contagion as drivers of this evaluative convergence.
7.2. Mimicry of similar others

Van Swol and Drury (2008b) have also explored the other causal direction
of the mimicry-attitude link. Do people mimic others more if those others
have similar opinions to their own? They hypothesized yes, echoing earlier
theorizing by Scheflen (1964) and LaFrance (1982), who posited that
mimicry might be a consequence of shared viewpoints. Specifically, Van
Swol and Drury (2008b) tested whether shared opinions moderates the
tendency to mimic. Participants read about two vacation destinations and
chose which one they preferred. Next, they discussed their choice with two
confederates posing as fellow participants. One of these confederates agreed
with the participants’ choice on vacation destination, and the other
Mimicry 241
disagreed with the choice. Results indicated that the participants engaged in
more mimicry of the confederate who expressed agreement with them,
relative to the confederate who expressed disagreement.
7.3. Mimicry of stereotyping others

What if similarities and shared beliefs are made more salient—does that too
lead to more mimicry? One interesting implication is that people might
mimic others more if their similarity with them is made salient. One form of
similarity is shared knowledge, including stereotypes. It has been argued that
stereotypes enable interactants to achieve and maintain common ground
(Clark & Kashima, 2007). Given the link between mimicry and similarity,
perhaps we mimic another person more if that person indicates shared
knowledge, including stereotypes. Castelli et al. (2008) tested this notion
and found that participants mimic others who are stereotyping more than
others who aren’t stereotyping. Participants interacted with a confederate
who either provided a stereotype-consistent description about the elderly or
a stereotype-inconsistent description. Results revealed that nonconscious
mimicry was more likely when the confederate used stereotypic information
than stereotype-inconsistent information.
8. Prosociality Toward Mimicker

The fact that being mimicked engenders liking and smoother interac-
tions led researchers to hypothesize that mimicry may also engender other
prosocial emotions and prosocial behavior toward the mimicker. Trust is a
type of prosocial emotion and Maddux et al. (2008) hypothesized that in
light of the relationship between mimicry and prosociality, mimicry should
lead to more trust as well. They studied the power of mimicry in a negotia-
tion context. Specifically, they were interested in the effects that mimicry
might have on negotiation agreements at the bargaining table. Participants
were MBA students at a top business school who were enrolled in a
negotiations class. Participants were paired with one other student ‘‘oppo-
nent,’’ and in half of the cases, one student was unobtrusively told to subtly
mimic the behaviors of the opponent. The task of the pair was to carry out a
job employment negotiation. The dependent variables were the individual
gain from the negotiation (i.e., the extent to which individually preferred
options were selected) and the joint gain from the negotiation (i.e., the
extent to which mutually preferred options were selected). Results indi-
cated that mimicry had no effect on individual gains, but did impact joint
gains. Specifically, when mimicry occurred during a negotiation, there was
a higher joint gain compared to interactions in which no student was told
to mimic the other. In addition, the more participants mimicked their

opponents, the higher the resulting joint gain.
A second study by Maddux et al. (2008) replicated the first study, but with
a task that made it particularly difficult to come to a mutually preferred
agreement. MBA students interacted in dyads in which either one person
had been instructed to mimic the opponent, or neither had been instructed
to mimic. In this study too, mimicry increased the likelihood that a dyad
would come to an agreement, and the more the participants actually mim-
icked the opponents, the more likely they were to come to an agreement. In
addition, this study found that the effect of mimicry on the agreement
reached was mediated by overall dyad trust. That is, mimicry engendered
greater trust between the interactants, which in turn facilitated deal making.
Thus, mimicry leads to not only liking and smoother interactions, but to
more prosocial emotions toward the mimicker. But what about prosocial
behavior? van Baaren et al. (2003a) conducted a study looking at tips given
to waitresses in a restaurant. Waitresses were instructed to either recite back
verbatim a customer’s order, or to paraphrase that order (indicating an
understanding of the order without verbal mimicry). Tips given to the
waitresses were used as the measure of prosociality. Results indicated that
the waitresses received more substantial tips from customers whom they
mimicked than from customers whom they did not mimic. Mimicry led to
more prosocial behavior.
In a study examining helping behavior, participants were either mim-
icked or not by an experimenter (van Baaren et al., 2004a). The experi-
menter then ‘‘accidentally’’ dropped a bunch of pens, and the amount of
pens picked up was the unobtrusive measure of helping behavior. Partici-
pants who were mimicked picked up more pens for the experimenter than
those who were not mimicked. Thus, individuals are more willing to help
someone after being mimicked by that person than after not being mim-
icked. This effect was recently replicated with very young children
(Carpenter et al., 2008). Eighteen-month olds were mimicked or not by
an experimenter and subsequently observed the experimenter ‘‘acciden-
tally’’ drop pens on the floor. The results revealed that mimicked children
helped the experimenter pick up more pens that nonmimicked children.
9. Persuasion
That mimicry has prosocial consequences has been of interest to
researchers interested in persuasion. As reviewed earlier, mimicry leads to
a convergence in attitudes and opinions. Moreover, previous research has
found that individuals are more persuaded by others whom they like, trust,
and to whom they feel similar (Cialdini, 2001). Because mimicry fosters
Mimicry 243
these feelings (Bavelas et al., 1986; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Maddux et al.,
2008), it may lead to more success during explicit persuasion atttempts,
a hypothesis that has been tested recently.
9.1. Evidence against mimicry impacting persuasion

In work by Van Swol (2003), mimicry increased the perception of persua-
siveness, but did not increase actual persuasion. Participants were asked to
play the role of a manager of a pharmaceutical company and make a decision
on which of three cholesterol-lowering drugs to market. All three drugs had
been shown in pilot testing to be equally viable. Participants believed they
would be asked to defend their choice in a discussion with two other people
(actually research confederates). During the discussions, both confederates
disagreed with the participant’s choice and endorsed one of the other drugs
instead. Importantly, one of the confederates mimicked the participants
during the interaction and the other did not. Participants later rated the
mimicking confederate as more confident and more persuasive than the
nonmimicking confederate. Interestingly, however, the participants were
not more persuaded by the mimicking confederate; that is, they were not
more likely to adopt the mimicker’s opinion than the nonmimicking
confederate’s opinion (see Van Swol & Drury, 2008a, for a similar finding).
9.2. Evidence for mimicry impacting persuasion

However, there is other research that has found differences in actual
persuasion as a function of being mimicked or not. Bailenson and Yee
(2005) used virtual reality technology to program digital avatars to either
mimic the head movements of participants or to play back the head move-
ments from a different participant. While the participants were wearing the
virtual environment mask, the avatar delivered a persuasive appeal advocat-
ing a campus security policy that would require students to carry their
student identification cards at all times. Avatars that mimicked participants
were later rated as more persuasive and were evaluated more favorably on a
series of trait measures. In contrast with the work by van Swol, however,
avatars that mimicked actually persuaded more as well. That is, mimicked
participants agreed more with the avatar’s persuasive message than did
nonmimicked participants. This is particularly noteworthy given that the
interaction was not between two humans, but rather between human and
avatar. Social influence still occurred as a result of mimicry.
Other evidence that persuasion is facilitated by mimicry comes from
studies finding that being mimicked can influence the product preferences
of consumers. Tanner et al. (2008) conducted two studies in which a
‘‘facilitator’’ told participants about a new snack product that was soon
to be launched. The facilitator either mimicked the participants during
the interaction or did not. After learning about the product and answering
some questions about the product category, participants were asked to taste
the product and rate how much they liked it, whether they planned to
purchase it themselves, and whether they would recommend it to friends.
An index of favorability toward the product was computed from the
responses to these questions in conjunction with the amount of the product
they consumed (measured after they left).
The first study revealed that participants who had been mimicked by the
facilitator had more favorable attitudes toward the product than those who
had not been mimicked, although none of the participants attributed their
attitude to the facilitator’s behavior. In a second study, the facilitator told
half of the participants that he was invested in the success of the product,
and the other half that he was not invested. Intuition might suggest that the
effect of mimicry should be attenuated if the facilitator is invested, because
consumers may have their ‘‘guards up’’ in sales situations where they
believe the person telling them about the product is biased or motivated
to persuade. However, the authors made the opposite prediction: that the
prosocial orientation induced by mimicry would lead participants to help
the facilitator who was invested more than the facilitator who was unin-
vested. The researchers found that when the facilitator did not have a stake
in the outcome, participants were more persuaded when he mimicked
them than when he did not. Counterintuitively, this effect was even
stronger when the facilitator was invested in the outcome. Thus, the
prosocial orientation engendered by mimicry manifested itself as a greater
tendency to like what was being presented. When the facilitator needed
‘‘help,’’ mimicked participants liked the product more (in effect helping
him) than nonmimicked participants.
9.3. Prosocial impact beyond the mimicry dyad

Mimicry clearly affects the dyad, making the interactions smoother and the
interaction partners like, trust, and help each other more. That mimicry
influences the emotions and behaviors displayed during an interaction is
important because it is a process usually engaged in nonconsciously, and the
effects it has therefore occur outside of the awareness (and intent) of the
interaction partners.
However, researchers have recently proposed that being mimicked may
lead to a change in one’s social orientation. That is, mimicry may cause
people to become more prosocial in general, not just toward the person
whom they are mimicking or who is mimicking them, but to others as well.
It is less intuitive that the effects of mimicry would go beyond the mimicry
dyad. How would that manifest, and by what mechanisms would that
occur? We next review the evidence for the impact of mimicry beyond
the mimicry interaction.
Mimicry 245
10. Mimicking Others Makes People

More Prosocial
Stel et al. (2008) have found evidence that mimicking others makes
individuals more prosocial. Participants either mimicked the facial expressions
of a person shown on a video or not. They were then asked to donate money to
a charity, which was either related to the person on the video or unrelated.
Participants who were instructed to mimic (and who then in fact mimicked
more) donated more to the charity (either related or unrelated) than those who
did not mimic. A follow-up study found that affective empathy (defined as
emotional contagion)—but not cognitive empathy—mediated the relation-
ship between mimicking others and prosocial behavior. That is, mimicking the
facial expressions of another led to picking up that person’s emotions, which in
turn led to helping others more. Because the mediator was found to be
emotional contagion, this research suggests that the prosocial effects of mim-
icking others might be limited to (or stronger during) facial mimicry, which
more readily leads to emotional contagion.
11. Being Mimicked Makes People

More Prosocial
Thus, mimicking others makes individuals more prosocial, but what
about being mimicked by others? There is even more evidence for this link.
In a study testing whether the prosocial feelings engendered by mimicry
would extend beyond the dyad, Ashton-James et al. (2007) found that
participants who were mimicked on an earlier task reported on a question-
naire that they felt closer to others in general, compared to those participants
who were not mimicked during the earlier task. In a second study, an
implicit measure of feeling close to others was used—seating distance.
Participants were either mimicked or not, and then asked to take a seat in
a hallway where several chairs had been placed side by side. Several items
were placed on one of the end chairs such that it looked like another
participant was sitting there (but had stepped away). The implicit measure
of feeling close to an unknown other was how close to the ‘‘occupied’’ chair
the participant sat. The researchers found that participants who had earlier
been mimicked sat closer to the occupied seat than participants who had
not been mimicked. This suggests that mimicked participants were feeling
closer to others, and again supports the notion that the prosocial orientation
engendered by mimicry goes beyond the mimicry interaction. People who
are mimicked feel more prosocial towards others more generally.
Do mimicked individuals also behave in a more prosocial manner outside
the dyad? Van Baaren et al. (2004a) found evidence for this in a study in
which an experimenter either mimicked participants or not, and then

participants were brought to another room where a second experimenter
‘‘dropped’’ a bunch of pens. Participants who had been mimicked by the
first experimenter helped the second experimenter (who did not mimic
them) pick up more pens than those who had not been mimicked by the
first experimenter. Thus, they became more helpful in general after being
mimicked: they helped the first person they encountered who needed help,
even when it was outside the mimicry dyad. In a follow-up study, van
Baaren et al. (2004a) found that mimicked participants also donated more
generously to a charity than nonmimicked participants. Thus, mimicry not
only led to more helping of a person they encounter physically, but led to a
prosocial, helping orientation that extended to groups of unknown others.
12. Prosociality Leads to More Mimicry

Thus, mimicry leads to more prosociality. Is the reverse also true? In a
study by Leighton et al. (2008), the reverse causal direction was explored:
whether prosociality leads to more mimicry. Participants were primed in a
scrambled sentence task with prosocial, antisocial, or neutral words, and
then their ability to mimic was measured using a stimulus-response com-
patibility procedure that required them to perform a movement (e.g.,
opening hand) while looking at a (open) or incompatible (closed) hand
movement. Results indicated that those who were primed with prosocial
words were better at mimicking than those primed with neutral words, who
in turn were better at mimicking than those primed with antisocial words.
These findings confirm the bidirectionality of the relationship between
prosociality and mimicry.
Interestingly, this measure of mimicry provides more evidence for the
automaticity of imitation. Whereas most mimicry studies assume automa-
ticity on the basis of absence of awareness of the mimicry, this study used a
reaction time measure in which facilitated or inhibited responses constitute
evidence for the automaticty.
13. Self-Construal Mediates the

Mimicry-Prosociality Link
What leads individuals who are mimicked to have a more prosocial
orientation that extends beyond the mimicry environment? It has recently
been suggested that it may be due to a fundamental shift in how people
perceive themselves in relation to others. That is, Ashton-James et al. (2007)
have suggested that the relationship between mimicry and prosociality is
mediated by self-construal. The argument is that being mimicked causes
Mimicry 247
people to adopt an interdependent self-construal, which in turn leads to

more prosocial feelings and behaviors. The first part of the prediction—that
mimicry should lead to changes in self-construal—was derived from work
by van Baaren et al. (2003b). These researchers had found that individuals
with an interdependent self-construal—due either to priming or to chronic
differences resulting from being from an Eastern culture—mimicked a
confederate more than those with an independent self-construal.
Ashton-James et al. also found evidence for the reverse causal direction:
that being mimicked leads individuals to have more interdependent self-
construals. Moreover, this change in self-construal or way of viewing the self
vis-à-vis other people led to more helping behavior. Participants were either
mimicked or not by an experimenter in an initial interaction. They then
completed the Twenty Statements Test (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954), which
measures working self-concept by asking respondents to provide 20 different
answers to the question, ‘‘Who am I?’’ These responses are later coded as
either independent (e.g., personal attributes or traits) or interdependent (e.g.,
social roles, relationships). Next, participants were asked if they would be
willing to fill out an extra survey for a researcher who could not pay them.
The results supported self-construal as the mechanism by which mimicry
leads individuals to adopt a more prosocial orientation towards others,
including those outside the mimicry dyad. Specifically, participants who
had been mimicked described themselves in a more interdependent manner
and were also more likely to help the researcher complete the extra survey
without pay. Importantly, interdependence was shown to mediate the
relationship between the mimicry manipulation and volunteering.
These findings represent an important step toward understanding why
mimicry leads to prosocial feelings and behaviors: there is a fundamental
shift in the way people see themselves in relation to others after being
mimicked. The other side of this same coin means that not being imitated
decreases self-other overlap. A recent functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) study by Van Baaren et al. (2008) observed just that. Participants in an
fMRI scanner were instructed (block-design) to either think about a happy or
sad recent experience. Within these blocks, subjects briefly saw pictures of sad
and happy facial expressions. Their own facial expressions were therefore
either congruent with the expression they viewed or incongruent. The data
revealed that incongruent facial expressions, compared to congruent ones, led
to more activation in the anterior cingulate cortex and the right temporal
junction. This pattern of activation suggests a conflict/unexpected response
(anterior cingulate cortex, ACC) and an increase in self-other distance, or
allocentric and egocentric space (right temporo-parietal junction, rTPJ).
Thus, being mimicked and mimicking others appear to make people
more prosocial, not just to the other person in the mimicry dyad, but to
others more generally as well. When people are mimicked by others, they
take on a more interdependent self-construal, which in turn makes them
have a more prosocial orientation toward people in general.
13.1. The impact of mimicry on the individual

Thus mimicry impacts individuals in a prosocial way, both within and
beyond the mimicry dyad. It brings people together psychologically and
emotionally. It may or may not be surprising that the prosocial effects of
mimicry linger—as a function of changing the way one sees oneself vis-à-vis
others—to impact the way one feels and behaves toward other people. But
it would certainly be surprising to many if mimicry had individual-level
effects on the interaction partners that went beyond prosociality. It might be
counterintuitive to suggest a nonverbal behavior like mimicry could affect
things like the attitudes a person holds, how much self-control she is able to
exert in a given situation, her cognitive processing style, or how well she
does on a math test. And yet there is evidence for all of these effects.
We now review research that pushes the boundaries of mimicry impact
beyond the prosocial to the individuals’ cognitions, attitudes, and behaviors
after the mimicry and social interaction is over. From this evidence we assert
the following: (1) mimicking others affects the attitudes consumers hold about
products; (2) not being mimicked can reduce self-esteem, which in turn can
affect the way people perceive their relationships; (3) when individuals are
mimicked more or less than implicitly expected, they have fewer regulatory
resources to expend on subsequent tasks requiring self-control; (4) mimicry
leads to a more field-dependent cognitive processing style; (5) mimicry leads
people to behave in a way that confirms gender and racial stereotypes; (6) mood
influences mimicry and vice-versa; and (7) being mimicked facilitates conver-
gent creativity, whereas not being mimicked facilitates divergent creativity.
14. Preferences for Products

Research described earlier found that when consumers are mimicked,
they feel more prosocial toward the mimicker, which can be manifested in
more positivity toward products presented by that person. Tanner et al.
(2008) have argued that there is another path by which mimicry can affect
people’s preferences for products. This route does not involve prosociality,
and thus is described here as an individual-level consequence of mimicry.
In this route, people mimic the consumption behaviors of others, and this in
turn affects their own preferences for the products consumed.
In support of this idea, Tanner et al. (2008) had participants observe a
confederate on a videotape. This confederate was eating exclusively from one
of two snack bowls in front of him (one with goldfish crackers and one with
animal crackers) while engaging in an unrelated task. While watching the
confederate, some participants had bowls in front of them with the same two
snacks available to eat, and others did not. The type and amount of snack
eaten by the participant was measured, followed by a survey asking about
Mimicry 249
their snack preferences. Participants mimicked the snacking behavior of the

confederate; if they had the snacks in front of them, then they consumed the
same snack that the confederate consumed. Importantly, this went on to
influence their attitudes. They reported more favorable attitudes toward the
snack the confederate consumed, and mimicry mediated the effect of what
the confederate ate on their own preferences. Participants who observed the
confederate but were not able to consume the snacks themselves were not
affected by the confederates’ consumption behavior, suggesting that the
results were due to mimicry and not to merely observing what the confed-
erates ate. Importantly, participants did not recognize the role their own
consumption mimicry played in their preferences.
15. Self-Esteem
Another consequence of mimicry on the individual is that it affects
self-esteem. Recent work by Kouzakova et al. (2008) examined what not
being mimicked does to self-esteem and subsequent attempts to reconnect
to others. In one of their studies, participants were asked how happy they
were in a relationship with a significant other. Then they were either
mimicked or not by a confederate. After this manipulation, they completed
a self-esteem IAT, once again received a relationship satisfaction question-
naire, and then carried out a second measurement of the self-esteem IAT.
The results showed that nonmimicked participants had lower implicit self-
esteem compared to mimicked ones. More importantly, however, nonmi-
micked participants rated their relationship with an important significant
other more satisfactory compared to the baseline measure taken before the
mimicry manipulation. In the mimicry condition, there was no such
increase. Furthermore, the increase in relationship satisfaction demonstrated
by nonmimicked participants mediated the subsequent repair in self-esteem;
after an initial drop in self-esteem, evaluating their significant relationship
more favorably allowed participants to restore their self-esteem.
16. Self-Regulation
Most research thus far has focused on the positive consequences of
mimicry, and with good reason. There is strong evidence to suggest that it
leads to liking, empathy, helping, and smooth interactions. What if mimicry
is poorly coordinated—does it have negative consequences? Can the pres-
ence of mimicry itself lead to negative outcomes? These were some of
the questions addressed by Dalton et al. (2008), who examined the self-
regulatory consequences of mimicry. The researchers drew on previous
work finding that poorly coordinated social interactions burden one’s
self-regulatory resources (Finkel & Campbell, 2001; see Finkel et al., 2006),
leading to worse self-control, more resource depletion, and less ability to
regulate one’s actions. Are there basic self-regulatory consequences of well-
coordinated or poorly coordinated behavioral mimicry? The authors pro-
posed that poorly coordinated mimicry can disrupt the nonconscious social
coordination processes that normally occur automatically, which in turn
increases the effort required by a social interaction. Participants in a series of
studies engaged in a two-task paradigm. First, they interacted with a confed-
erate who either mimicked or not their mannerisms, gestures, and other
motor movements. Next, participants were brought to a room on their own
in which they completed a self-regulatory task that required self-control.
These self-regulatory tasks measured things ranging from fine motor skills to
consumption of junk food to procrastinating on a math task. Results found
that mimicry or a lack thereof during the first task affected participants’
performance on the second task such that they did better if they had been
mimicked than if they had not. For instance, mimicked participants ate less
junk food, displayed better fine motor control, and procrastinated less than
those participants who were not mimicked. Another study found the effect
was driven by no mimicry. That is, no mimicry depletes regulatory
resources, rather than mimicry replenishing regulatory resources.
16.1. Mimicry as schema-driven

So is a lack of mimicry in itself depleting? Dalton et al. (2008) argued no,
that a lack of mimicry isn’t necessarily depleting, but rather depends on what
is consistent with the expectations for a given type of social interaction.
Specifically, they reasoned that mimicry is an automatic schema-driven
process, and as such, if it is poorly coordinated, or exists when unexpected
or not part of the active schema driving the interaction, then self-regulation
should suffer. Thus, mimicry or a lack of mimicry can be depleting,
depending on whether it is consistent or not with one’s expectations for
the current interaction.
16.1.1. Cross-race Interactions

One type of interaction that may often be characterized by a lack of mimicry
is cross-race interactions. Research suggests that nonverbal behaviors differ
between same-race and cross-race interactions, and that although the pres-
ence of mimicry might be schema-consistent during same-race interactions,
a lack of mimicry would be consistent with the nonverbal behaviors
characterizing cross-race interactions (less smiling and eye-contact, etc.).
Accordingly, Dalton et al. (2008) predicted that a lack of mimicry would be
depleting during same-race interactions, but the presence of mimicry should
be schema inconsistent, and therefore depleting, during cross-race interac-
tions. To test this hypothesis, participants were mimicked or not by a
Mimicry 251
confederate of the same race or different race. They then completed a Stroop
interference task to assess regulatory depletion. Results confirmed that inter-
actions with no mimicry impaired self-regulation of people in same
race interactions but interactions with mimicry impaired self-regulation of
people in cross-race interactions. Interestingly, although mimicry depleted
participants in cross-race interactions, the other, prosocial consequences of
mimicry held up: participants still reported enjoying the mimicry interac-
tions more (in spite of their reduction in self-regulatory resources).
This latter finding, being imitated by an outgroup member leads to more
liking, seems to contradict the previously mentioned studies by Likowski
et al. (2008) where mimicry by an outgroup member decreased liking. It is
important to note that both the study by Dalton et al. (2008) and Likowski
et al. (2008) did not measure a priori liking towards the outgroup. This was
addressed in a recent study by Wigboldus et al. (2008) which showed that
the consequences of being imitated by an outgroup member are moderated
by implicit prejudice. The head movements of white Dutch participants
were mimicked or not by an avatar in an immersive virtual environment.
For half the participants, the avatar was Dutch looking, for the others he was
Moroccan looking. The results showed that for low-prejudiced people, the
‘‘normal’’ effect of being mimicked occurred: a mimicking avatar was
evaluated more positively than a nonmimicking avatar. Importantly, this
effect was reversed for high-prejudiced participants who were mimicked by
an avatar with typical Moroccan features; they evaluated the mimicking
avatar less favorably compared to the nonmimicking one.
16.1.2. Power discrepancies

Interactions between individuals with different amounts of power may
also be guided by mimicry schemas. Those individuals with relatively
more power are mimicked more than those with relatively little power
(Cheng & Chartrand, 2003). Thus, an individual interacting with a more
powerful other may not (nonconsciously) expect to be mimicked, whereas
an individual interacting with a less powerful other may expect to be
mimicked. This was tested in a study similar to the cross-race/same-race
study described earlier. Participants were told that in a task that followed,
they were going to be a leader (worker), interacting with another ‘‘partici-
pant’’ (actually a confederate) who was going to be the worker (leader).
Again, performance on a Stroop interference task was used as the measure of
regulatory resources. Results confirmed that ‘‘workers’’ did better on
the Stroop task if they were not mimicked than if they were mimicked.
In contrast, ‘‘leaders’’ did better if they were mimicked than if they were not
mimicked. Again, this suggests that it is not a lack of mimicry per se that
drains one’s regulatory resources; it is the violation of what is implicitly
expected during an interaction. During interactions that are normally
characterized by a lack of mimicry, being mimicked has a depleting effect

and reduces one’s self-control.
The studies linking mimicry to self-regulation emphasize that mimicry
goes beyond affecting the prosociality of the individuals involved in the
interaction. Mimicry also has a nonsocial impact on the mimicked indivi-
duals. Not only does mimicry facilitate positive social interactions, but it
also can save much needed cognitive resources when that mimicry is well-
coordinated and matches one’s mimicry schema for that type of interaction.
It also highlights the important point that mimicry is not always a ‘‘good’’
thing, leading to desired outcomes. There are conditions under which the
presence of mimicry can have a negative impact on the individuals involved.
17. Cognitive Style

Another individual-level consequence of mimicry is the cognitive
processing style with which individuals perceive and understand their cur-
rent environment. van Baaren et al. (2004b) noted the link between mimicry
and greater environmental attunement, and tested whether this link might
extend to processing style as well. Because field-dependent processing is
characterized by a greater attunement to and reliance on contextual details,
the authors hypothesized that mimicry should be linked to this type of
processing (as opposed to field-independent processing, which is character-
ized by not taking the environment or context into account as much). The
researchers indeed found a correlation between field dependent processing
and a greater tendency to mimic a target person’s behavior. Moreover, in a
study in which participants were mimicked or not by a confederate in a
previous interaction, they became more context-dependent in their proces-
sing style if they were mimicked than if they were not. The researchers also
found evidence for the reverse causal direction: participants who were
induced to use a context-dependent processing style mimicked a target’s
person’s behaviors more than those who were induced into using a context-
independent processing style. These studies provide further evidence that
mimicry is enhanced by factors that are associated with greater attunement to
one’s context or current environment.
18. Stereotype Conformity

The research discussed above suggests that mimicry leads to a greater
reliance on the environment. Specifically, mimicry is associated with a variety
of indicators of increased sensitivity to and reliance on social cues. Individuals
who are mimicked perceive the environment in a more field-dependent
Mimicry 253
fashion, have a more interdependent self-construal, and are higher in perspec-

tive taking and affiliation motivation, suggesting a reliance on others and a
willingness to comply with their behavioral expectations. Thus, by enhancing
field dependence, interdependence, perspective taking, and affiliation
motives, mimicry has been shown to increase sensitivity to the social environ-
ment and reliance on social cues. In turn, each of these specific indicators of
social responsiveness has been found to lead to greater stereotype conformity
(see Leander et al., 2008, for a review). Thus, the increased reliance on social
cues engendered by mimicry may lead individuals who are mimicked to
conform more to shared social stereotypes. As a result, Leander et al. (2008)
hypothesized that people who are mimicked by others subsequently behave in
stereotypic ways.
The results of three studies supported these predictions. In a first study,
participants interacted with a confederate who either mimicked their nonver-
bal behaviors or not, and then completed a math task. Consistent with social
stereotypes about math performance, mimicry by a confederate worsened
women’s math performance (but not men’s). In a second study, participants
were male Asian-American, female Asian-American, male Caucasian-Ameri-
can, and female Caucasian-American. Although men are stereotypically
thought to be better at math than women, there is also a stereotype that
Asian-Americans are better at math than Caucasian-Americans. Participants
were mimicked or not in a first task by a confederate and then completed a
math task. Mimicry boosted the math performance of the Asian-American
men, but not of Asian-American women, or of Caucasian-American men or
women. In a third study, the researchers found that the female performance
decrement engendered by mimicry is stronger for those women who believe
in the existence of the traditional gender role stereotype. These results suggest
that the increased sensitivity to the environment shown in previous research
to be activated by mimicry can be manifested in conformity to shared gender
and racial stereotypes. These findings (in conjunction with the ones on
regulatory resource depletion) are the first to demonstrate a potential negative
consequence of mimicry.
19. Mood
As reviewed above, one’s mental state influences mimicry and vice
versa. But what about one’s emotional state? Given that a positive mood
leads people to rely more on automatic processes, whereas a negative mood
leads people to rely on more deliberate forms of action, van Baaren et al.
(2006) proposed that people in a good mood should mimic others more
than people in a bad mood. Participants in one of their studies were put in a
positive or negative mood via a funny or sad videoclip. They were then told
that they would be listening to two short pieces of music in the next part of
the study. They again were directed to the television screen, where they
watched an experimenter start the first piece of music. In actuality, the ‘‘live
feed’’ was a prerecorded video. The experimenter remained on the screen
while the music played. A new, second experimenter was then depicted on
the screen during the playing of the next piece of music. In one of the video
segments (order counterbalanced), the experimenter was playing with a
pen, and a hidden videocamera recorded participants’ own pen-playing
behavior while watching the two video segments. Results indicated that
participants in a positive mood played with their pens more when watching
the pen-playing experimenter than the non-pen-playing experimenter.
In contrast, participants in a negative mood did not play with their pens
more when they viewed the pen-playing experimenter. That is, participants
in a good mood mimicked, but those in a bad mood did not.
20. Creativity
There are two types of creativity: convergent creativity (‘‘connecting
the dots’’) and divergent creativity (‘‘thinking outside the box’’). Both are
important skills that people use in their daily lives, with some problems or
tasks requiring one type of creativity and other problems or tasks requiring
the other type. Because mimicry brings people together and leads to a
convergence in attitudes, Ashton-James and Chartrand (2008) hypothesized
that mimicry would facilitate convergent creativity, whereas a lack of
mimicry would facilitate divergent creativity.
A first study used a pattern recognition task as a measure of convergent
thinking. Participants who were mimicked had a higher number of correct
completions for the pattern recognition items than those who were not
mimicked. In a second study, participants were mimicked or not by an
experimenter, then asked to complete the ‘‘unusual uses task,’’ which
requires them to list as many different uses for a brick as possible. Ratings
of ‘‘unusualness’’ were used as a measure of divergent thinking. As expected,
participants who were not mimicked came up with more unusual uses for a
brick than participants who were mimicked. Thus, being mimicked makes
one better at convergent thinking but worse at divergent thinking.
What mediates this effect? Positive mood has been linked to convergent
creativity and negative mood to divergent creativity. Yet previous research
has not found influences of mimicry on mood (van Baaren et al., 2004a).
However, this previous research used self-report measures of mood, and
perhaps mimicry, as a nonconscious process that stays ‘‘below the radar,’’
affects implicit mood but not explicit mood. That is, a sensitive implicit
measure might pick up on mood effects that more explicit measures do not.
Ashton-James and Chartrand (2008) tested whether implicit mood mediates
Mimicry 255
the effects of mimicry on creative thinking. Using a different measure of

convergent thinking—the Remote Associates Task (RAT)—they again
found that those who were mimicked performed better on this task than
those who were not.
Importantly, this study also found evidence for their proposed mecha-
nism: positive affect. Participants filled out an implicit affect measure by
completing a number of word stems that could be completed in a positive or
negative way. Those who were mimicked had more positive implicit affect
than those who were not mimicked, and this mediated the impact of
mimicry on convergent thinking.
21. Evaluations of Experiences

In the study by Ramanathan and McGill (2008) described earlier,
participants who saw a movie with another person converged in their
moment-to-moment evaluations of the movie if they could see each
other, compared to if their view of the other person was blocked. Interest-
ingly, this coherence in evaluations led to more positive retrospective
evaluations of the experience. People who were able to mimic another
and converge in their moment-to-moment evaluations of the program with
that person ended up liking the program more as a result.
Thus, mimicry has impact that goes well beyond prosociality: being
mimicked (or not being mimicked) influences one’s willpower or self-
regulatory resources, moods, academic performance, cognitive processing
style, creativity, consumer preferences and evaluations, and attitudes. This is
a broad array of cognitive, affective, motivational, and attitudinal effects,
and for them all to be impacted by the nonverbal behavior displayed during
an interaction is quite remarkable.
22. Theories of Mimicry

Now that we have reviewed the empirical data on the moderators and
consequences of mimicry, the next step is to evaluate what this means for
theories of why we mimic. Ultimately, a good theory of mimicry should be
able to explain the social function, the cognitive mechanisms involved, and
the neural underpinnings. In our view, there is not yet one single theory
capable of accomplishing this. However, several proposed theories are
capable of explaining various aspects of mimicry. We will start with the
evidence for mimicry as a communication tool and the function it serves in
making our interaction partners know that we understand and empathize
with them. Then, we will turn to the view of mimicry as an automatic
product of the direct coupling between cognition, perception and action.

Furthermore, we discuss the neurological evidence for this perception-
behavior link. We present a conceptualization of mimicry as driven by
hard-wired neural architecture with flexible manifestations. Finally, despite
the inherent difficulty of answering the question of why we mimic, we will
briefly address the possible evolutionary reasons for this ubiquitous tendency.
22.1. Mimicry as communication tool

Nonverbal behavior has long been thought to serve a communicative
function (e.g., Scheflen, 1964). For instance, Kraut and Johnston (1979)
found that people were more likely to smile in response to happy situations
when there was another person around than when alone, which suggested
that the smile served a communicative function. As a nonverbal behavior,
mimicry has also been thought of as a communication tool. This theory
suggests that mimicry communicates understanding and togetherness and as
a result, creates an empathic bond between interaction partners that leads to
positive social outcomes (Bavelas et al., 1988; Bernieri, 1988; Condon &
Ogston, 1966; Condon & Sander, 1974; LaFrance, 1979, 1982).
Bavelas et al. (1986) tested whether mimicry is an inherently social
phenomenon and whether it is received as a nonverbal message conveying
similarity or togetherness. In a first study, participants watched two experi-
menters moving a television into the lab room in which they were sitting.
One of the experimenters appeared to have an injured finger (was wearing a
finger splint). The television then was rigged to appear to crush the splinted
finger as the experiments moved it in front of the participants. In one
condition, the injured experimenter looked at the participant while being
hurt by the TV, and in the other condition, he hunched forward while
being injured so that the participant could only see his profile. Results
revealed that participants who witnessed the experimenter wince often
winced themselves in response, and the size of the winces reflected how
well they could view the wince on the experimenter’s face. The authors
concluded that mimicry is an interpersonal response—it occurred to a
greater degree if the interactants could see it occurring. But is mimicry a
tool of communication? The authors tried to show in another study that the
facial expressions displayed were somehow meaningful to others. Raters
were given videotaped excerpts of participants watching the staged injuries,
and the judges were asked to rate the facial expressions of the participants on
several dimensions. The naı̈ve judges only saw the participants (not the
experimenter), so that they did not know what condition the participants
were in. The facial expressions of participants who saw the face of the
injured experimenter were judged to be more caring, knowing, and
appropriate than those who only saw the experimenter’s facial profile.
Mimicry 257
The researchers concluded that mimicry functions to communicate an

observer’s vicarious response to an interaction partner.
The results discussed previously by Stel et al. (2008)—that mimicry does
in fact communicate liking and understanding to the person being mim-
icked—further support the notion of mimicry as a communication tool.
However, there are also studies that find mimicry among individuals who
are alone and watching a videotape (Bavelas et al., 1986; Hsee et al., 1990;
Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Van Baaren et al., 2007). Why does mimicry
occur under these circumstances? The key to reconciling this apparent
discrepancy may lie in whether the behavior being mimicked is related to
feelings or emotions. When it comes to emotional contagion, there may be a
strong communicative reason behind our tendency to imitate. In fact, the
communication function may be limited to instances when emotions are
involved. In the videotape studies, the mimicry was not emotional in nature.
Thus, although mimicry may result in increased empathy, liking, rapport and
prosociality, it also occurs in situations where there is no human present
(e.g., looking at a photograph or TV-screen). There needs to be an addi-
tional, more fundamental reason for mimicking that goes beyond a solely
strategic communicative one.
Chartrand and Bargh (1999) argued that nonconscious mimicry is a
passive and automatic response. They based this argument on the results
of funnel debriefings at the end of the experiments that were designed to
probe for awareness of the mimicry. Participants indicated no awareness that
they mimicked their interaction partners. Moreover, mimicry occurred in
their studies under minimal conditions, among strangers with no goal to
affiliate with each other. Thus, they concluded that mimicry must not
depend on the presence of a communication or affiliation goal during the
interaction. They suggested that a ‘‘perception–behavior link’’ might be the
mechanism driving mimicry, at least under these ‘‘minimal conditions.’’
That is, mimicry may be an automatic result of how our brains are wired.
They argued that due to a strong link between perception and action,
observing a behavior increases the chances of overtly or covertly copying
it. In the next section, first we discuss the link between thinking about an
action and actually performing it, whereafter we will shift from thinking to
perceiving an action and its effects on our own behavior.
22.2. Ideomotor action

Carpenter (1874) and James (1890) were the first to argue for a link between
thinking and doing. This principle of ideomotor action occurs when the
mere act of thinking about engaging in a behavior increases the likelihood
of actually engaging in that behavior. The regions of the brain that become
active on thinking about an action are the same regions that become active
when we engage in that action ourselves.
There is evidence from fMRI and Positron Emission Tomography (PET)

that support the principle of ideomotor action. Jeannerod and colleagues
(Decety et al., 1991; Jeannerod, 1994, 1997) found that mentally simulating
activities such as weightlifting and running activate the same premotor
cortex neurons in humans as performing these activities. Paus et al. (1993)
similarly found that thinking about words or gestures activates the same brain
regions as saying these words or performing these gestures do.
Recently an additional paper on the ideo-motor link has looked at how
automatic mental simulation of someone else performing an action influences
our own actions. Sebanz et al. (2003) used the Simon Task, a spatial
compatibility task (Craft & Simon, 1970; Simon, 1990), to test whether
perception of others activates a cognitive representation for that action in
the self. Participants looking at a computer screen saw a finger wearing
either a red or green ring. They were told to ignore the direction in which
the finger was pointing and instead simply indicate its color. Some responses
were compatible (in which the finger was pointing toward the correct
button), incompatible (finger was pointing towards the incorrect button),
or neutral (in which the finger was pointing forward). For those participants
who completed this task alone, the results uncovered a spatial compatibility
effect, such that responses were faster on compatible trials than incompatible
trials. Another group of participants responded either to only the red rings
or only the green rings (a go/no-go version of the Simon Task), and again
completed it either individually (e.g., responding only to red and ignoring
green) or with a partner (if responding to red and ignoring green, the
partner would respond to green and ignore red).
Sebanz et al. (2003) found that whether the task was performed either
individually or next to a partner had an influence on the pattern of perfor-
mance. Participants doing the task individually had fast response times for all
types of trials. But when the task was done with a partner, response items
were faster on compatible trials than incompatible trials. Their performance
suggested a spatial compatibility effect, just like the first group of participants
who completed the task alone. Spatial compatibility effects usually would
not occur in this condition because participants only need to respond to one
stimulus. The authors argued that participants working with a partner
mentally represented their partner’s action in the same way they represented
their own, and because the representations involved with perceiving the
actions of the partner are the same that would become active when per-
ceiving and planning one’s own actions, participants performed as though
they were responding to both the red and green rings.
Note that this is not yet direct evidence for a automatic link between
observing someone else perform an action and our own action because the
studies examined mentally simulating and thinking about, not perceiving,
another person’s behavior. However, there is evidence for a perception-
behavior link as well. But first we turn to theoretical accounts of such a link.
Mimicry 259
22.3. Perception-behavior link

There are several cognitive theories explaining the existence of a percep-
tion-behavior link (for a review see Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001). For
example, the common-coding hypothesis (Prinz, 1990, 1997) is a shared
representational system for perception and behavior that extends the prin-
ciple of ideomotor action to perception of events and actions, and to
mimicry. The representations of action automatically lead to actual behavior
after a certain threshold level of activation is reached. Brass et al. (2001), for
example, demonstrated in a reaction time paradigm that observing someone
perform a certain finger movement facilitates one’s own execution of that
same finger movement while also interfering with one’s own execution of a
different finger movement.
Another, somewhat different conceptualization of the perception-
behavior link involves schemas (Barresi & Moore, 1996). Whereas the
common coding account posits shared systems in the brain, the schema
account is based on basic rules of cognition. Schemas that are activated
when a person engages in an action overlap semantically with the schemas
that are activated when a person perceives the actions of others. As a result
of these overlapping representations, the two types of schemas are often
active at the same time. Thus, perception leads to action, and action also
leads to perception—that is, to interpreting a behavior in a certain way
(Berkowitz, 1984; Carver et al., 1983; Mussweiler, 2003).
Barresi and Moore (1996) argue that schemas impose structure on
different sources of information, and as a result, first- and third-person
information cannot be confused, nor can imagined and actually perceived
information be confused. Thus, when a person perceives her own behavior,
the same system is involved in perception and action, but when she
perceives another person’s behavior, different systems are involved in per-
ception and action. This implies two things, both of which have received
support. First, people should be (and are) better at recognizing themselves
than others (Beardsworth & Buckner, 1981; Knoblich & Prinz, 2001;
Repp, 1987). Second, people should be (and are) better able to predict
the future effects of their own behaviors than the effects of other people’s
behaviors (Knoblich & Flach, 2001).
23. Neuropsychological Evidence for

Perception-Action: Mirror Neurons
The discovery of ‘‘mirror neurons’’ in macaque monkeys and a similar
mirror system in humans has provided empirical support for an intimate link
between perceiving an action and performing the same action (Iacoboni
et al., 1999; Koski et al., 2002; Metzinger & Gallese, 2003; Rizzolatti et al.,
2001; for a review see Hurley & Chater, 2005). Mirror neurons are neurons
that fire both upon perceiving another engage in an action, and upon oneself
engaging in the action. There is evidence with nonhuman subjects that
supports the existence of these neurons (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti &
Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Rumiati & Bekkering, 2003).
For instance, there are clusters of neurons in the brains of macaque monkeys
that are activated both when watching a person grabbing a peanut, and when
grabbing a peanut themselves (Gallese et al., 1996). These neurons seem not
to differentiate between actions performed by others and actions performed
oneself.
In humans, functionally similar effects have been observed (Grossman
et al., 2000; Ruby & Decety, 2001). Fadiga et al. (1995) found that perceiving
a target grasp an object and grasping the object oneself results in similar
muscular responses (see also Musseler & Hommel, 1997a,b). Furthermore,
perceiving hand movements activates the same cortical region as performing
those hand movements oneself (Iacoboni et al., 1999). Moreover, perception
of a certain behavior automatically activates our own motor representation of
that action (Decety & Chaminade, 2005; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Rizzolatti
et al., 2001). In addition, mirror phenomena involving disgust (Wicker et al.,
2003), pain (Morrison et al., 2004) and auditory stimuli (Keysers et al., 2003)
have been reported. The human mirror system is thought to consist of
bilateral premotor and inferior parietal cortices, where mirror activity has
been observed. Thus, a substantial part of the human brain is active both when
observing and when executing an action.
24. Are We Born to Mimic?

It is tempting to interpret the discovery of the mirror neuron system as
a complete answer to the question of how we mimic. Does the presence of a
mirror system in the human brain imply that we are born to imitate and that
mirroring is the only automatic behavioral response to perceived action?
That is, do mirror neurons lead inevitably to imitation?
One of the strongest pieces of evidence in favor of the innateness of
imitation comes from the work by Meltzoff and Moore (1977a,b), which
showed that very young infants, even one infant of only 42 min, showed
facial imitation. This would exclude a learning explanation of imitation and
strongly suggest we are born imitating. However, more recent analyses of all
the evidence in favor of neonatal imitation (Anisfield, 1996) came to the
conclusion that the evidence actually is very thin and reliable effects have
been obtained only for tongue protrusion. However, further research failed
to find imitation of tongue protrusion in infants, and Jones (2006) described
Mimicry 261
how other stimuli (visual and auditory) increased the tongue protrusion
response in very young infants, suggesting that tongue protrusion may not
be an effect of imitation per se, but a response to a broader range of stimuli.
In sum, the evidence for innateness of imitation is weak at the moment.
The second debate centers around the question of whether mirror
neurons always trigger ‘‘mirror’’ responses. It is tempting to get overly
excited by the discovery of mirror neurons and take them to explain our
seeming default tendency to mimic. However, recent compelling evidence
suggests that there is nothing innately ‘‘mirror’’ about the mirror system.
In several papers, the flexibility of the mirror system is illustrated. Catmur
and colleagues (Catmur et al., 2007, 2008), for example, illustrated that one
can change or even reverse the response in the mirror system through
training. For example, they trained participants to either respond to hand
movements with hand movements and foot movements with foot move-
ments (compatible condition) or to respond to foot-movements with hand
movements and vice versa (incompatible training). First, their results
showed that the facilitation effect normally observed in compatible situa-
tions is actually reversed in the incompatible training condition; that is,
participants after training were faster to respond with a foot movement
upon observing a hand movement and vice versa.
Further, fMRI imaging data showed that the action observation prop-
erties in the mirror system were actually reversed. Whereas the mirror
system showed greater response to hand observations in the compatible
condition, these same areas responded more to foot observations in the
incompatible condition. Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) data on
compatible and incompatible hand opening/hand closing perception-
action couplings showed conceptually similar results on a muscular level.
More evidence for the idea that the mirror system is involved in comple-
mentary actions, and not just mirroring actions, comes from a recent study
by Newman-Norlund et al. (2007). The authors showed that activity in the
mirror system was actually greater during preparation of complementary
action (e.g., grabbing a cup by the handle when it is handed to you by
the cup itself) than imitative action.
Another line of research providing evidence against a rigid view of
imitation comes from social psychological studies related to Interpersonal
Circumplex Theory and complementary behavior in situations of hierar-
chy or power (e.g., Wiggins, 1982). Tiedens and Fragale (2003), for
example, observed that in behaviors that signal dominance or submissive-
ness (e.g., expanding the body or constricting it), which they call power
moves, people actually automatically and without awareness respond in a
complementary, not imitative, way. Dominant behavior primes submissive
behavior and vice versa.
In sum, it may actually not be mimicry or mirroring that is innate, but
the architecture that produces it (the mirror system). But this same system,
under different conditions or in a different context, can also lead to com-

plementary or other behaviors. It then depends on what motor response is
associated with what perceptual input. In most cases and in typical human
development, those associations will be mirror-like; however, that does not
mean that mirroring is the only automatic behavioral response.
Two fairly recent theories in cognitive and neuropsychology are in line
with a view of mimicry as not necessarily innate or inevitable: Heyes’
Associative Sequence Learning theory on sensorimotor associations (e.g.,
Heyes & Bird, 2007) and Keysers and Perrett’s Hebbian Perspective on the
mirror system (Keysers & Perrett, 2004). The gist of these theories is that the
mirror system acquires its mirroring properties from learned associations
between perceptions and associated actions. Neurons that wire together fire
together. When a certain motor behavior is continuously (baby waving
hand) and consistently associated with a certain perception (seeing hand
wave or seeing mama waving), these representations will be strongly linked
together and will become capable of mutual activation. This would also
explain how humans can sometimes automatically show complementary
behavior instead of imitative behavior. If we learn through experience that
the best response to a dominant posture is adopting a submissive posture
ourselves (and in this way stay out of trouble or worse), these sensory-motor
couplings may become capable of mutual activation. The findings on the
relation between implicit associations and moderation and consequences of
mimicry (e.g., Stel et al., 2008; Wigboldus et al., 2008) would be in line
with our flexible view on mimicry.
Another finding that fits with an associative account of mimicry is that
most of the imitation occurring in mother–child interactions consists of the
mother imitating the child. This may actually be part of an important
associative learning experience in the baby. Whereas for hand and foot
behaviors, there is visual feedback of the action, for facial expressions and
movements, there isn’t. Being mimicked by parents may thus provide
important visual feedback. Through time and experience, these visual
consequences become associated with the movements that produced
them. As Hebbian learning dictates: neurons that fire together, wire
together. So in time, the facial expression of the mother (or father) will
lead to the production of the same movement or expression in the baby.
In sum, mirror neurons, or the mirror system, seem to ‘‘embody’’ the
hypothesized perception-action link. However, more research is needed
to understand what exact role this system plays in the mimicry domain. In
addition, the social psychological studies on the moderators and conse-
quences described in this paper await further investigation. Even if mirror
neurons mediate mimicry, it still is unclear how mindsets such as self-
construal, cognitive style, mood and prosociality can moderate this activity.
Furthermore, it is unspecified how the prosocial and individual-level
consequences of mimicry are represented on a neural level.
Mimicry 263
Despite these questions, recent research already has made considerable

progress in trying to tie together subjective feelings and perception–action.
For example, the relation between perception–action and empathy has been
investigated thoroughly in recent years (for reviews see, Decety & Jackson,
2004; Preston & De Waal, 2002). The results suggest that the perception of
emotions partly activates the same neural mechanisms that generate those
emotions.
25. Mirror System and Empathy

Researchers have examined the neural mechanisms involved in empa-
thy ( Jackson et al., 2005). In an MRI study, participants were shown photos
of people with their hands and feet in either painful or nonpainful situations.
After being given either a ‘‘self’’ or ‘‘other’’ perspective, they were asked to
rate how painful the photos were from these perspectives. Interestingly,
there were many similarities in the neural networks involved in processing
pain from a ‘‘self’’ perspective and from an ‘‘other’’ perspective. Decety and
others have argued on the basis of this and other research that the neural
architecture involved with the pairing of perception and action plays a
meaningful role in the experience of empathy (Decety & Jackson, 2004;
Goldman, 2005; Meltzoff & Decety, 2003; Preston & de Waal, 2002). But
Jackson et al. (2005) noted that there were also some important differences
in the neural networks involved in processing pain from a self versus other
perspective. The researchers concluded that empathic responding is not the
same as self-responding. That is, we don’t literally ‘‘feel the pain of others’’;
we understand the predicament of others and feel some of their pain but we
are able to behave to them and not with them.
Research on contagious yawning (Provine, 1986) also sheds light on this
link between empathy and mimicry. Researchers have long argued that the
mimicry of yawns is a sign of empathy (Lehmann, 1979), and it was
described as a primitive manifestation of the capacity to empathize with
other people. Recent neuropsychological research has accumulated that
finally supports this theoretical link between yawning contagion and empa-
thy. Platek et al. (2003) found that vulnerability to yawning contagion was
positively correlated with various indicators of empathy, such as perfor-
mance on theory of mind tasks and a self-face recognition task. Platek et al.
(2003) argued that unconscious empathy leads to contagious yawning, and
unconscious mental simulation by mirror neurons might mediate this effect.
Platek et al. (2005) provided fMRI data on the neural substrates of yawn
mimicry. When a person sees someone else yawn, the brain areas involved
in self-processing are activated, and as a result, the authors concluded that
contagious yawning is part of the neural network involved in empathy.
Further evidence for a role of mimicry in empathy comes from work on

perspective taking. Perspective taking ability is the cognitive form of empa-
thy (Davis, 1984), and there is evidence for a relation between this and
mimicry as well. As mentioned earlier, Chartrand and Bargh (1999) found
that individual differences in perspective taking moderated the extent of
mimicry such that high perspective takers mimicked more than low per-
spective takers. In another study testing the relation between perspective
taking and mimicry, Wallbott (1991) found that when people try to under-
stand the emotions of others, they spontaneously mimic the facial expres-
sions that they see. Importantly, the more they mimic, the more accurate
they are at understanding which emotional expression is being conveyed.
Other researchers have explored the neural substrates involved in imita-
tion and perspective taking in fMRI studies ( Jackson et al., 2006). Partici-
pants were told to watch a video clip of a person performing a simple hand
or foot action. Some clips depicted the actions from the first person and
some from the third person perspective. Participants were also instructed to
either passively observe the videos or to mimic the actions performed in
them. Results revealed that motor production systems were activated both
when actions were observed and when they were imitated. However, there
was more activation in the motor production system from the first person
than the third person perspective. Samson et al. (2005) found that lesions to
the regions involved in third person perspective impair the ability to take
the perspective of others. This suggests a common biological system that
links these various social responses.
The work of other researchers suggests that mimicry is crucial for
perspective taking to happen (Adolphs et al., 2000). In a study investigating
the ability of participants to categorize the facial expressions of others,
Adolphs et al. (2000) found that individuals with a lesion in the somatosen-
sory cortex performed worse on this task. They couldn’t judge the emo-
tional expression of others, presumably because their lesions precluded
mimicry from occurring, which in turn precluded somatosensory feedback
that is necessary in understanding the emotions expressions of others. Thus,
mimicry appears to mediate the relation between neural substrates and social
responses.
In sum, the arguments that mimicry and perspective taking are supported
by the same underlying neural circuits have garnered considerable support.
Importantly, there is also evidence that mimicry might mediate this link
between the neural and the social responses. At a minimum, there appears
to be interdependence in the social responses of mimicry and perspective
taking. Thus, mimicry appears to be associated with empathy, and empathy
and mimicry are rooted in the brain architecture implicated in the
perception-behavior link. In addition, the relation seems to be bidirectional;
mimicry influences empathy and empathy influences mimicry.
Mimicry 265
26. Motivation and the Mirror System

Another striking aspect of the many social psychological experiments
on mimicry is that mimicry is influenced by mind-sets, or general mental
states, such as self-construal, cognitive style, mood, and prosociality. For a
mirror neuron account of mimicry, this would imply that mirror neuron
activity should be modulated by motivational or other mindsets.
In a recent fMRI study, Cheng et al. (2007) obtained evidence for a
motivational effect on activity in the mirror system. In this case, one of the
strongest motivational states—hunger—was used. Half the participants
arrived at the lab hungry for a two-session scanning experiment. In both
sessions, which were identical, participants watched video clips of people
grasping objects or grasping food. Between the two sessions, the hungry
participants were given a meal, so the first session (hungry) could be
contrasted against the second session (satiated). The participants who already
arrived at the lab in a nonhungry state functioned as a control group for
potential session effects. First, the results revealed that hungry participants,
upon watching food-related items, showed more activity in drive and
motivation related areas, such as parahippocampal gyrus, amygdala, and
orbitofrontal cortex. More importantly, when participants were hungry
and when they were observing a target grasping food, they showed
increased activity in the mirror system.
It will be a great challenge in future research to understand how our
brains detect unobtrusive mimicry, and how that subsequently leads to an
interdependent self-construal, a more prosocial orientation, being more
persuaded, and so on. Despite all these questions, the evidence for a direct
link between perception and action (whether mirror or complementary) is
overwhelming and the mimicry described in this paper is most likely a result
of this intimate link. Although we may now have a better understanding of
how we mimic, the more difficult question to answer is why we mimic.
An evolutionary account of mimicry has been proposed previously
(Chartrand et al., 2005; Lakin et al., 2003). Central to this account is that
mimicry serves important social functions and can be conceptualized as a
‘‘social glue.’’ Mimicry is both a result and facilitator of positive social
interactions, which may be of vital importance in human life. Human
society can be characterized by a heavy reliance on connectedness and
affiliation and humans have a strong need to belong (Baumeister & Leary,
1995). Given that mimicry is an ideal (low-cost, low-effort) means to
regulate this need to belong, there may be evolutionary pressure in humans
to use it effectively. An additional finding in social psychological studies that
attest to the evolutionary benefit of mimicry (discussed earlier) is that
mimicry is sensitive to ingroup–outgroup distinctions. We mimic
outgroups less or not at all and do not feel more connected after being
mimicked by an outgroup member about whom we hold negative views.
Mimicry helps in regulating our interactions with our friends and foes.
What should we conclude about human mimicry? That it is pervasive,
certainly, and that it often occurs automatically, without the awareness or
intent of the mimicker and without being noticed by the mimickee. Our
cognitive and neural architecture certainly facilitates automatic mimicry,
although this architecture does not inevitably lead to a mirroring response.
The impact of mimicry is broad and deep. Not only does it foster prosoci-
ality by bringing the members of the mimicry dyad closer together cogni-
tively, affectively, and behaviorally; it changes the way one perceives oneself
in relation to others, thereby inducing a general prosocial orientation that
goes beyond the mimicry dyad. Most strikingly, mimicry has effects on the
individuals involved that are not related to prosociality. The way a person
thinks, self-regulates, feels, and behaves in a given moment in time is
influenced by the presence or absence of mimicry in preceding social
interactions. Given its impact, it is important to continue exploring the
manifestations, antecedants, moderators, mechanisms, and consequences of
human mimicry.
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C H A P T E R S I X
Ostracism: A Temporal
Need-Threat Model
Kipling D. Williams
Contents
1. Introduction 276
1.1. Overview 279
2. Ostracism is Detected Quickly and Crudely 279
2.1. Detecting ostracism requires only the slightest
representation of ostracism 280
2.2. Over-detection of ostracism is likely 285
2.3. Ostracism signals pain 286
3. Ostracism Threatens Four Fundamental Needs, Reduces Positive
Affect, and Increases Negative Affect 288
3.1. Experimental evidence for ostracism-induced need threat 290
4. Reflection and Recovery: Recovering from Need Threat Directs
Need Fortifying Thoughts and Actions 293
4.1. Speed of recovery 293
4.2. Need fortification 296
4.3. The inclusionary cluster: Belonging and
self-esteem fortification 297
4.4. Social servility 298
4.5. Power and provocation cluster: Control and
existence fortification 299
5. Resignation: Long-Term Effects of Persistent Ostracism 302
6. Future Research: Groups, Communication, and Assistance 306
6.1. What can be done to help targets of ostracism?
A call for research 307
7. Summary 308
Acknowledgments 308
References 309
Department of Psychological Sciences, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, USA

275
276 Kipling D. Williams
Abstract
The phenomenon of ostracism has received considerable empirical attention in
the last 15 years, in part because of a revitalized interest in the importance of
belonging for human social behavior. I present a temporal model that describes
and predicts processes and responses at three stages of reactions to ostracism:
(a) reflexive, (b) reflective, and (c) resignation. The reflexive pain response
triggers threats to four fundamental needs and directs the individual’s attention
to reflect on the meaning and importance of the ostracism episode, leading to
coping responses that serve to fortify the threatened need(s). Persistent expo-
sure to ostracism over time depletes the resources necessary to motivate the
individual to fortify threatened needs, thus leading eventually to resignation,
alienation, helplessness, and depression. I conclude with a call for more
research, especially on the effects of ostracism on groups, and on possible
buffering mechanisms that reduce the long-term negative consequences of
ostracism.
1. Introduction
I’m not afraid of death but I am afraid of dying. Pain can be alleviated by
morphine but the pain of social ostracism cannot be taken away.
Derek Jarman, British Film Director (b. 1942)
Ostracism—excluding and ignoring by individuals or groups—appears
to occur among all social animals (e.g., lions, buffalo, primates, even bees),
and across history in humans, either in primitive tribal groups or modern
sophisticated societies. People are ostracized formally within their religions,
societies, and institutions (Williams, 2001, 2007a). Individuals are ostracized
in close interpersonal friendships and relationships, in the common dyadic
tactic called the silent treatment (Sommer et al., 2001; Williams et al., 1998;
Zadro et al., 2008a). Despite its prevalence, ostracism is a phenomenon few
social psychologists examined before the 1990s. In 1986, Gruter and Masters
edited a special issue of Ethology and Sociobiology that stemmed from a
conference that included ‘‘biologists, lawyers, and social scientists for the
purpose of taking a fresh and realistic look at the subject of ostracism’’ (1986,
p. iii). In that issue, the editors and authors argued that ostracism evolved as
an adaptive behavior that served to strengthen and protect the group from
burdensome members. They reported its prevalence among social animals
including humans, and documented behavioral, physiological, and neuro-
logical correlates of ostracism in a variety of social species. Interestingly, no
experimental social psychologists participated in the conference.
Ostracism: A Temporal Need-Threat Model 277
Ostracism was regarded as both vitally important and intriguing to many

writers. Ralph Ellison wrote in his novel, Invisible Man (1952), of his protago-
nist’s exploitation of being invisible as a function of the Black man’s ostracism
in a white culture. Franz Kafka’s sketch entitled, Gemeinschaft, immersed us in
the absurd predicament of five men excluding a sixth for no apparent reason
(even to themselves) other than he was not one of the five (reprinted in
Rehbinder, 1986). Joel Chandler Harris (1948) as Uncle Remus, wrote of
the frustration, then aggression, resulting from Brer Rabbit’s encounter with
the Tar Baby, who of course (because he was made of tar), made no response to
Brer Rabbit’s friendly initiations or his subsequently more urgent entreaties.
John Steinbeck (1945/1987) wrote, in Cannery Row,
Socially, Mack and the boys were beyond the pale. Sam Malloy didn’t speak
to them as they went by the boiler. They drew into themselves and no one
could foresee how they would come out of the cloud. For there are two
possible reactions to social ostracism – either a man emerges determined to
be better, purer, and kindlier or he goes bad, challenges the world and does
even worse things. This last is by far the commonest reaction to stigma.
(pp. 250–251).
Indeed, as early as 1890, William James wrote, when defining the
social self,
A man’s Social Self is the recognition which he gets from his mates. We are
not only gregarious animals, liking to be in sight of our fellows, but we have
an innate propensity to get ourselves noticed, and noticed favorably, by our
kind. No more fiendish punishment could be devised, were such a thing
physically possible, than that one should be turned loose in society and
remain absolutely unnoticed by all the members thereof. If no one turned
round when we entered, answered when we spoke, or minded what we
did, but if every person we met ‘‘cut us dead,’’ and acted as if we were
nonexisting things, a kind of rage and impotent despair would ere long well
up in us, from which the cruelest bodily tortures would be a relief; for these
would make us feel that, however bad might be our plight, we had not
sunk to such a depth as to be unworthy of attention at all.
( James, 1890, p. 293–294).
It is not that social psychologists felt that ostracism, or the potential of
ostracism, was unimportant to their understanding of human social behav-
ior. Indeed, reading between the lines of many classic theories and studies in
social psychology, it is relatively easy to spot the omnipresence of the fear of
ostracism. Schachter (1951) documented that during group discussions,
opinion deviates were first subjected to a barrage of persuasive attempts,
and if unmoved, were condemned to expulsion from the group. Why do
we conform if not to prevent rejection and exclusion by others? Why do we
comply with requests that we would not ordinarily consider on our own?
Why do we obey others even when asked to engage in behaviors that go
against our own values? What keeps us from responding to an emergency?

What motivates us to change our attitudes when subjected to persuasive
attempts by others? Certainly other factors beyond the fear of ostracism
contribute to and intensify these effects, but it appears to be at the very core
of many of these effects. Sherif (1966), as though directed by Ellison’s
observation, understood an implication of ostracism (i.e., being invisible)
when he chose to dress as a custodian during the Robber’s Cave experiment.
By doing so, he knew that the children would regard him, because of his role
status, as unworthy of attention and would not censor themselves in his
presence, allowing him to observe directly what they were doing and saying.
Social psychologists understood, at least implicitly, that the fear of ostracism
was a social glue that motivated individuals to be responsive to social norms.
There were also a few isolated (yet, quite clever) studies published in
social psychology on rejection and being ignored, although these studies
seemed to have had negligible influence on the field. These include ground-
breaking studies by Craighead et al. (1979), Dittes (1959), Fenigstein
(1979), Jackson and Saltzstein (1957), Geller et al. (1974), and Snoek
(1962). The findings of these studies illustrated that being ignored or
rejected was an unpleasant experience that caused the ostracized individual
to dislike the ostracizers. Snoek in particular provided some initial evidence
that ostracized individuals might be motivated to seek out assurance from
others and that they might, through attributional work, reduce the conse-
quential impact of ostracism. I could add to this list my lone attempt in the
1980s to examine the impact of ostracism on the desire to be alone, remain
in the same group, or join a new group (Predmore & Williams, 1986). All of
these studies represented interesting beginnings with no follow through.
Zeitgeist for ostracism, social exclusion, and rejection. It was not until the mid-
1990s that a consensus of interest on ostracism and related topics (e.g.,
rejection, exclusion) began. Not coincidentally, this was the same time that
the very influential article, The Need to Belong, was published by Baumeister
and Leary (1995). In this article, the authors spoke persuasively that belonging
was a need; that without a connection with at least a few important others,
individuals suffered physically and psychologically. Combined with Leary and
his colleagues’ work on sociometer theory that redefined self-esteem as a
mechanism by which one assessed one’s inclusionary status (Leary et al., 1995;
and later, Leary et al., 1998), there emerged a Zeitgeist for research on
ostracism. Today, social psychology no longer ignores ignoring or excludes
exclusion. Already, there are several books (Leary, 2001; Williams, 2001;
Williams et al., 2005), an Annual Review article (Williams, 2007a), a soon-to-
be-published meta-analysis on the topic (Gerber & Wheeler, in press) and
theoretical extensions to other domains (e.g., discrimination, stigmatization)
derived from work on social exclusion (Kerr & Levine, 2008; Smart Richman
& Leary, 2009). Additionally, new theory and research on social pain is directly
derived from research on ostracism and related concepts (Chen et al., 2008;
Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004, 2005; MacDonald & Jensen-Campbell, in

press; MacDonald & Leary, 2005).
1.1. Overview
In this chapter, I will put forth a new temporal model of ostracism’s effects on
individuals, and review the pertinent empirical literature as it relates to the
model. This model is based on a model I put forth in 1997 (Williams, 1997),
but has undergone significant change that is responsive to subsequent studies
and data. As the comparative literature suggested, there appears to be strong
converging evidence that the act of ostracism is an evolutionarily adaptive
group behavior. For animals lower on the phylogenetic scale, a hard-wired
response to ostracize burdensome, dangerous, unpredictable members of the
group ensures the groups strength and survival. The impact on the ostracized
animal, unfortunately, was certain death. Left without means for reciproca-
tion of comfort, security, food, shelter, and protection, that individual was
easy prey for predators. Thus, tendencies to ostracize burdensome members
were selected for, making this strategy common across all social animals.
Detection of ostracism co-evolved in individuals to facilitate avoidance
of likely death. As such, ostracism and its detection are embedded in our
social fabric and permeate our perceptions, feelings, thoughts, and beha-
viors. I propose a model of ostracism that incorporates ostracism detection, a
reflexive pain signal, threatened fundamental needs, reflexive coping
responses that serve to fortify the threatened need(s), and cognitive, affec-
tive, and behavioral responses. I will also use qualitative data based on
interviews and anecdotes to speak to the long-term effects of ostracism on
the individual, arguing that the capacity to cope and fortify needs diminishes
over time, leaving the perpetually ostracized individual resigned, helpless,
alienated, and depressed. I will summarize the research from my and others’
laboratories that provide support or counter-evidence to the model, and
will then discuss gaps in the research that still need to be addressed.
2. Ostracism is Detected Quickly and Crudely

As can be seen from a depiction of my new model (modified from
Williams, 1997) of ostracism in Fig. 6.1, the first step in the ostracism
process is that the individual detects ostracism. I use the term detect to
distance it from some elaborate cognitive process. Based on an evolutionary
perspective, I believe that early detection of ostracism is adaptive; it allows
the individual to either correct his or her behavior or to search for alterna-
tive groups before the isolating and harmful effects of ostracism take over.
First, to detect quickly we would expect to see experimental evidence in
Reflective stage Resignation stage

Minimal signal Reflexive stage
Attend, appraise and Depleted resources;
Detection of Pain attribute: inability to fortify needs
ostracism • Motives • Alienation
• Meaning • Depression
• Relevance • Helplessness
• Unworthiness
Negative affect
• Sadness
• Anger Need fortification If
ostracism
→↑Belonging/self-esteem
episodes
• Attempts to become
Need-threat: persists
more socially
• Belonging over
attractive
• Self esteem extended
• Attend to social cues
• Control time
• Compliance,
• Meaningful
conformity, less
existence/need to
discriminating of
be recognized as
others social value,
existing
servile
→↑Control/recognition
• Gain attention
• Provoke
• Control others
• Retaliate
• Lash out
Figure 6.1 New model of ostracism.
which individuals are quick to detect the most rudimentary forms of

ostracism. Second, over-detection of ostracism is likely. That is, there
ought to be an over-detection bias, perceiving ostracism when it is not
actually occurring, because the cost of a false alarm is lower than the cost of a
miss. This is consistent with error management theory (Haselton & Buss,
2000; Haselton & Nettle, 2006), which argues that evolutionarily adaptive
responses often are geared toward biased detection that least threatens the
survival of the individual. Thus, we should be able to document that the
detection (and associated pain, as I will discuss next) is rapid and occurs even
when, logically and rationally, it should not. Finally, this quick and crude
assumption, if not done deliberatively and thoughtfully, should be some-
thing that signals the individual in such a way that will direct his or her
attention to the possible ostracism episode for further analysis and consider-
ation. This signal, I (and others) argue, is pain. The pain, detected at least in
the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), serves to focus and direct the
individual’s attention to the source and meaning of the ostracism, so that the
individual can determine if the ostracism is potentially threatening and
important. Thus, the pain triggers attention and subsequent appraisal.
2.1. Detecting ostracism requires only the slightest

representation of ostracism
There are many paradigms to study ostracism, rejection, and exclusion.
These include some very blatant manipulations such as those used
by Gaertner et al.. (2008), Twenge et al. (2001, 2003), and Leary and
colleagues (2006; Nezlek et al., 1997). Gaertner and Iuzinni use a group
situation in which one participant is called out in a loud and vicious manner
by the others in the group (all confederates) as someone they do not want to
have in their group. Twenge, Baumeister, and colleagues give participants a
battery of personality tests accompanied by accurate feedback of their level
of extraversion, along with bogus feedback that, in the case of exclusion,
informs participant that they will be alone without any solid relationships by
the time they reach the age of 25. Leary informs participants, after they
engaged in a brief get-acquainted session with other members of a newly
formed group, that no one else wanted to work with them in the
subsequent task. All of these paradigms are interesting and useful in the
understanding of how people cope with rejection and exclusion, but they
offer little information for ostracism detection. What is needed to examine
ostracism detection are paradigms that are subtle, distal, and ambiguous. If
such manipulations have similar effects to the more blatant ones, we can
conclude that detection is quick, if not crude.
Sitting in a waiting room with two other ostensible participants, a ball
toss game emerges. The group is minimal. They do not know each other
and have no group task assigned to them. They do not converse. Their only
connection is an implied consensus to toss a ball between them. After the
actual participants receive the ball a few times, they never get it again. The
other two continue to play, looking only at each other. Note there is no
explicit rejection, no explicit declaration of not liking or not wanting to
include the participant. Things are a bit ambiguous, but what is not
ambiguous is that no matter what, the participant is not thrown the ball
any more. This paradigm, used by Williams and Sommer (1997; also
Warburton et al., 2006; Williams et al., 2002) and depicted in Fig. 6.2,
results in strong detection (effect size between 1.0 and 2.0) of being ignored
and excluded, along with negative affect and perceptions of need threat (to
be discussed in Sect. 3). The same pattern can be observed in conversation
paradigms (from unpublished honors theses, reported in Williams, 2001;
Zadro et al., 2004; see Fig. 6.2) in which, for no apparent reason (or with a
Figure 6.2 Ball toss paradigm (left) and Train Ride conversation paradigm (right).
reason), during a group discussion two of the participants suddenly begin

talking only to each other and do not make any eye or verbal contact with
the participant. Ostracism is detected strongly, and without regard to
whether or not the participant is in agreement or disagreement with the
others, or if the others begin talking about something completely off-topic.
Likewise, strong detection emerges in chat room paradigms, regardless of
topic or level of agreement with the others (Williams et al., 2002), and in
cell phone texting (also known as SMS), when the interaction of the two
others is not seen nor heard, nor does it matter if the participant is an in- or
outgroup member of the other two texters. Thus, from these paradigms, we
can conclude that declarations of rejection and expulsion are not necessary
to detect ostracism. Further, it is not necessary to see or hear directly active
inclusion taking place among the others in the group. Finally, attributions
that ought to assist the detection of ostracism (like disagreeing with the
others, being in an outgroup) have no impact on the detection.
All of the preceding paradigms do involve verbal or nonverbal interac-
tions with others. What if we were to begin stripping away these opportu-
nities? Are they necessary for the detection of ostracism? Apparently not.
Along with Chris Cheung and Wilma Choi, I developed Cyberball
(Williams et al., 2000; Williams & Jarvis, 2006), a virtual ball toss paradigm
in which participants, alone with their computers, are led to believe they are
playing an incidental game of virtual ball toss as a means to exercise their
mental visualization abilities. They are told quite explicitly that the game
itself is not important, but rather, they are to use the game to engage their
visualizations: what do the others look like, where are they? What is the
temperature and weather, if outdoors? What does the geography look like?
And on and on. They have not met the others, nor do they expect to meet
them. They see animated icons on a screen, depicting the ball tosses (see
Fig. 6.3).
In this paradigm, exclusion and ignoring are more distal than in face-to-
face paradigms, or in paradigms that permit verbal or nonverbal interaction.
Perhaps most importantly, participants are protected from the others by
being in a room, alone with the computer. Nevertheless, this paradigm
Figure 6.3 A depiction of 3-person Cyberball (participant is represented by the hand

figure at the bottom).
yields effect sizes for detection, need threat, and mood impairment similar to
that found in the face-to-face ball-tossing paradigm (effect sizes typically
above 1.0). Despite believing that the game is irrelevant except to exercise
their mental visualization abilities, being left out of a ball toss game
represented by animated icons is detected easily and is quite upsetting.
To push the envelope further, Zadro et al. (2004) led half their partici-
pants to believe they were playing with other humans, whereas the other
half were simply told they were playing with computer generated characters
and that there were no others involved in the game. Regardless of whether
they were led to believe they were playing with humans or a computer,
their detection of ostracism was just as strong, their needs were just as
threatened, and their moods just as bad.
Similar detection of being excluded and ignored occurs when partici-
pants are led to believe that receiving the ball costs them money (so, being
ostracized yields the participant more cash to take with them from the
experiment; van Beest & Williams, 2006) or when the virtual players are
tossing around a bomb rather than a ball (van Beest, et al., 2008).
One interesting aspect of this research is that even when eye-contact is not
possible, (as in chat rooms, cell phone texting, and Cyberball), the manipula-
tions still evoke strong detection of being ignored. Early research by Williams
et al. (1998) indicated that the most prominent behavior that signaled ostra-
cism and the silent treatment was lack of eye contact. Apparently, perception
of ignoring is more than simply not being looked at or spoken to.
Tracking people’s feelings, a proxy for detection, across time in Cyber-
ball allows us to see how quickly ostracism is detected. Participants are
trained to dial their feelings second-by-second by being exposed to various
mood-inducing photographs. Once trained so they can dial while engaging
in another task (in this case, Cyberball), participants show that within 20 s of
not receiving the ball, their mood begins to drop precipitously (see Fig. 6.4).
8
7
6
5
Included
4
Ostracized
3
2
1
0
1 21 41 61 81 101 121 141
Time (S)
Figure 6.4 The feelings dial (left) and the speed of detecting ostracism in the
Cyberball paradigm (right).
Figure 6.5 Graphic depiction of ‘‘minimal world,’’ sufficient to cause detection of

ostracism if participants are encouraged to generate a story describing what they see.
More recently, and as yet unpublished, Alvin Law and I have minimized
the ball-tossing paradigm further in search for the minimal conditions
necessary to detect ostracism. In one paradigm, we simply tell participants
to watch a computer monitor that will show some animation, and when the
sphere increases in size, they are to press the ‘‘a’’ key or the ‘‘l’’ key (with no
further instructions as to what those keys mean). What they see, depicted in
Fig. 6.5, is two square shapes side by side, and a sphere that moves between
them or that moves to the center and increases in size. When asked to
watch, press keys when necessary, and develop a story that can describe
what they are seeing, they report being excluded and ignored, along with
negative consequences to needs and mood. The stories that are generated
almost always include other people or other animals. Of note is that if
participants are not encouraged to generate a story, they report no exclusion
or ignoring. Thus, it appears that the stimuli alone are not sufficient to
engender feelings of ostracism, but rather it is necessary for individuals to
have some general representation that involve others having agency.
Finally, a new paradigm just developed by Jim Wirth and colleagues
involves having a participant look at a computer screen (Wirth et al., 2008).
They see a human face in which the eyes change direction from looking
forward, to looking to the right or left (depicted in Fig. 6.6). Asked to
imagine having a conversation with this person, detection of being excluded
and ignored directly maps onto the proportion of time the eyes look
forward; the more the eyes look away, the more the participant detects
(and feels the effects of ) ostracism.
The net result of these more subtle paradigms is an accumulation of
converging evidence that ostracism in minimal forms is detected strongly
and quickly. At least within 20 s of its onset in a minimized version of real-
world ostracism, individuals detect its presence and respond negatively.
Figure 6.6 Eye-gaze paradigm.
2.2. Over-detection of ostracism is likely

As Haselton and Buss argue, evolutionarily adaptive responses often involve
an error bias that is self-serving. In the case of detecting ostracism, it would
be less harmful to detect ostracism when it was not occurring (a false alarm)
than to not detect ostracism when it was occurring (a miss). Missing the cues
for ostracism, for many social animals, would mean a certain death. For
humans, it means expulsion from individuals and groups who are potentially
important and nurturing, leading to psychological and physical impairment
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). As I have already alluded, individuals are quick
to detect ostracism even in its most minimal forms. As shown in several of
the studies mentioned, rational or logical characteristics of the ostracism
episode do not appear to moderate the detection (or pain, as discussed
below) of ostracism. This implies that factors that ought to indicate the
experience is not a meaningful episode of ostracism are ignored or not
processed, leading to false alarm errors. Thus, individuals detect and are
negatively affected by ostracism by computers (Zadro et al., 2004), ostracism
by outgroup members as much as ingroup members—even when those
outgroup members are despised members of the KKK (Gonsalkorale &
Williams, 2007), not getting the ball when it actually improves one’s
monetary situation (van Beest & Williams, 2006), and not being thrown a
virtual bomb that can detonate at any time (akin to not being asked to join
in on a game of Russian Roulette!).
Another study showed that even when individuals were told in advance
that the other players could not yet throw them the ball because the
participant’s computer was not yet hooked up to the network, they never-
theless showed signs of detection and displeasure (Eisenberger et al., 2003).
Recently, we found that simply watching another person who was ostra-
cized in a game of Cyberball was enough to trigger detection and negative
self-feelings in the participant (Bagg, 2008; see also Coyne et al., 2008).
Finally, whereas a great deal of previous research documents that sharing the
impact with co-targets is sufficient to reduce or diffuse the impact (Latané,
1981), recent work indicates that sharing the ostracism with another co-
player does not reduce the negative impact of ostracism (Schefske, 2008).
As a whole, these studies indicate that factors that ordinarily (and
logically) ought to reduce the negative impact of aversive situations are
apparently overlooked or underprocessed when it comes to ostracism. If we
can generalize this to real-world events, this would suggest an over-detec-
tion and over-reaction to events that appear to be ostracism, but are not. Of
course, this error management pattern is adaptive in that, as stated earlier, it
is better to detect first, and ask questions later. The effort needed to engage
in attributional work that can ultimately assist in discounting an apparent
ostracism episode is negligible compared to the effort needed to cope with
unanticipated ostracism and its negative consequences.
2.3. Ostracism signals pain

The final argument for the initial reflexive response to ostracism is that,
from an evolutionary standpoint, something that threatens survival ought to
send a strong signal such that the individual can attend to the episode that
precipitated the signal and respond. Pain can trigger an immediate response.
It can serve to orient the individual’s attention to the ostracism episode for
further appraisal. The appraisal can tell the individual whether the episode is
meaningful or not, and if so, whether other mitigating factors should be
taken into account so that proper action, and not an over-reaction, can
occur.
Measures of pain by self-reports. We have assessed pain in various ways,
mostly using self-report measures that indicate distress, threatened funda-
mental needs, and worsened moods. These latter constructs are discussed
more fully in Sect. 3. More recently, we have provided a pain slide to
participants to indicate the level of pain they are currently experiencing, or
we give them a question that more directly asks how much pain they are
feeling. Although only one study has been published using the pain slide as it
pertained to past and current feelings when recalling betrayal (Chen et al.,
2008), a subset of those betrayals that were independently assessed as
episodes of ostracism indicated high levels of pain associated with these
ostracism events (as reported feeling during the event, and again, while
recalling it). Our findings regarding the pain slide as currently used indicate
a high correlation between the pain slide and the other distress indicators,
supporting our view that these self-reports are a reasonable proxy for pain
assessment.
Detect first—ask questions later. Using these self-report measures of pain,
we find that there are strong (again, effect sizes often over 1.0) painful
responses reported during the experience of ostracism, as manipulated by
Cyberball, ball-tossing, conversations, chat rooms, and cell phone texting.
We find no systematic differences between paradigms. It should be noted
that we typically ask participants to report on their experience during the

social interaction. It is this retrospective index of distress or pain that proves
to be exceptionally impervious to other situational factors and to individual
differences. If ostracism is so threatening that an ostracism-detection system
evolved that worked quickly and relatively automatically, then it makes
sense that the alarm should go off with clarity and strength, regardless of
outside factors and dispositional characteristics of the individual. Consistent
with the ‘‘detect first—ask questions later’’ system, the pain gets the atten-
tion of the individual so that further reflection and appraisal can take place.
Measures of activation of the dACC as a proxy for pain. Using the Cyberball
paradigm in a within-S design while participants lay prone in an MRI
chamber, Eisenberger et al. (2003) assessed pain through specific brain
region activation using f MRI technology. They also used retrospective
self-report measures of distress. When participants first arrived, they were
told they would be engaging in a mental visualization task and their brains
would be monitored to see what happened during visualizations. The task
was Cyberball and was presented with the usual instructions. There were
several stages during the experiment, including baseline, inclusion, exclu-
sion because the computer was not yet hooked up with the other players’
computers, and ostracism. Following the f MRI monitoring, the partici-
pants filled out a questionnaire asking them about their experience and
feelings during the Cyberball game. The dACC is a region of the brain that
serves many functions, and is activated for many reasons. It experiences
activation for surprise, expectation violation, and pain detection. In the
exclusion because of equipment condition, they were expecting to be
excluded, whereas in the ostracism condition they were not expecting
exclusion. Nevertheless, significant dACC activation was observed for
both episodes of Cyberball ostracism. This suggests that the activation was
not simply because of expectation violation, but might also be the result of
pain detection. Our post-experimental questionnaire supported the pain
explanation: self-reported distress correlated 0.88 with dACC activation.
This study was replicated in a nonscientific media broadcast by the BBC
with only a few participants. The results further corroborate the self-report
assessments and provide support for the argument that ostracism, even in a
minimal situation and whether or not it is expected, is detected immediately
as pain.
A recent study by Zhong and Leonardelli (2008) demonstrates that
participants assigned to the ostracism condition in Cyberball feel, relative
to their inclusion counterparts, cold. They are even more likely to request
something warm to ingest. Although not pain, feeling cold is another
unpleasant embodiment of pain, thus lending further support to this
hypothesis.
A final piece of evidence comes from work by Jacqueline Nadel and
colleagues (2007) on the use of ‘‘still face’’ with autistic children. These
autistic children, who ordinarily give no eye contact with the adult and no
signs of affection, are temporarily at least transformed into being responsive,
affectionate, and attention-seeking simply by being in the presence of an
adult adopting a ‘‘still face.’’ The still face approximates a mannequin-like
expression that is completely unresponsive to the child. How does this
support a pain explanation. Years ago, Ivar Lovaas used a cattle-prod on
autistic children who were engaged in self- or other-harmful behaviors.
Quite unexpectedly, the shocked child became attentive and affectionate,
much like Nadel’s children. It appears as though the appearance of ostracism
in the form of still face produces similar effects to the pain of a shock.
In addition to signaling pain, I argue that ostracism has a deeper psycho-
logical impact on individuals. A shock of pain, without any further damage,
is unlikely to do much more than encourage the individual to avoid the
shocking object. But, much more happens to an individual’s psychological
equilibrium after ostracism.
3. Ostracism Threatens Four Fundamental

Needs, Reduces Positive Affect,
and Increases Negative Affect
According to the model, ostracism is an interpersonally aversive
behavior unique in that, compared to physical or verbal altercations, it can
threaten four fundamental needs: the need to belong (Adler, 1930/1970;
Baumeister & Leary, 1995), the need to maintain a reasonably high self-
esteem (Steele, 1988; Tesser, 1988), the need to perceive control over one’s
social environment (Burger, 1992; Peterson et al., 1993; Seligman, 1975),
and the need to feel recognized for existing and being worthy of attention
(Greenberg et al., 1986, 1990, 1992). The term need as applied to these four
constructs can be debated; are they needs or motives? As Baumeister and
Leary cogently argue (1995) a need, if thwarted, is directly linked to harmful
physical and psychological outcomes. There appears to be enough evidence
in the literature that not maintaining satisfactory levels of any of these four
constructs results in psychological harm. Regarding physical well-being,
belonging (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) and control (Langer & Rodin, 1976;
Seligman, 1975) are associated with health problems and even mortality,
and because self-esteem and lack of meaning are associated with depression,
and depression is linked with physical illness (Allen & Badcock, 2003;
Myoshi, 2001), it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that each of
these four constructs are needs.
Perhaps a more contentious issue is whether or not these four needs are
independent constructs. At this point in time, the evidence is murky and
contentious. Advocates of each need tend to view the other constructs as
being subsumed by theirs (e.g., see Leary et al., 1995, on how self-esteem is
subsumed by belonging; or Greenberg et al., 1992, on how self-esteem
is merely a buffer to instantiate meaningful existence). It is neither my
intention nor aim to settle this matter, as it seems to me that there is
adequate evidence that all four need constructs exist logically and psycho-
logically (including their measurement). It seems reasonable to conclude
that they overlap to some degree but are conceptually separable. So, feeling
a loss of belonging can lower self-esteem, which can lower a sense of
meaningfulness and feelings of efficacy. This sentence can probably be
rewritten changing the order of each of these four needs and make sense.
Rather than arguing which need holds supreme, I will present my reasons
why ostracism can affect each.
Why belonging? Being ostracized by others is a signal of a divorce
between self and others. One no longer is connected to the group or to
the other individual. The ostracized individual is not attended to, looked at,
or considered. By its very definition, the individual is excluded. There is
substantial agreement that ostracism (rejection, social exclusion) thwarts
belonging (Twenge, Baumeister, Leary, Gaertner, Pickett, Gardner, to
name a few).
Why self-esteem? Ostracism involves silence. Its employment, unless done
formally by nations or institutions, is usually abrupt and comes with no
explanation. This leaves the ostracized individual to generate reasons for
their treatment. When left to ruminate, ostracized individuals may conjure
up many possible explanations why others are ignoring and excluding them.
When considering self-attributions for ostracism, thoughts of self-blame,
inappropriate behavior, meanness, selfishness, etc. will be considered. Com-
pare this to a verbal argument in which the cause of disagreement is
articulated. There is no need to generate more reasons than the one
given. Because the reason is often withheld, targets of ostracism are forced
to consider a laundry list of bad things they have done or said. Surveying this
list, I argue, will drive self-esteem down further than having to consider
only one (or a few) accusations.
Why control? Unlike a verbal or physical disagreement, the ostracized
individual lacks any ability to engage the source of the ostracism. Ostracism
is unilateral; one cannot argue, discuss, or reason with the ostracizers
because they do not respond. In a verbal argument the accosted individual
can direct the flow of the argument to some extent, changing arguments,
making accusations of the other, escalate or deflate the anger. In a physical
altercation the individual can duck, run, or hit back. But there is no
efficacious response to ostracism. The individual might as well argue with
a brick wall.
Why meaningful existence/need for recognition? Being ostracized, it has been
argued (Case & Williams, 2004) is a metaphor for death. Others have
suggested death is a metaphor for ostracism (A. Aron, personal
communication, 2006). Either way, being ignored and excluded is like

being invisible, like not existing, like being dead. In many tribes that use
ostracism, the term translates to social death. James, in his quote, referred to
it as ‘‘cutting them dead.’’ In this sense, ostracism ought to be a mortality
cue, a palpable reminder of what life would be like if they were dead. Verbal
and physical arguments do not have this existential threat quality. The
individual is real, is being argued with or hit; these are reminders of
existence, not nonexistence.
Ostracism reduces positive affect and increases negative affect. Being subjected
to ostracism is a negative experience, so it is not surprising that it should be
distressing affectively in addition to threatening fundamental needs. As most
reactions to pain, negative affect should increase, including anxiety, sadness,
and anger, and positive affect should decrease. These effects are routinely
found in most ostracism, social exclusion, and rejection paradigms (see
Williams, 2007a, for a review). There is some controversy, however, and
it is worthy to note that for some studies, affect is not altered. It appears as
though studies that employ paradigms that leave the participant without any
cognitive or behavioral recourse for re-inclusion (like the life-alone para-
digm), affective numbness seems to occur more often than negative affect
(Twenge et al., 2003). In many of our and others’ studies, emotional
assessment is not sufficiently thorough, so it remains to be seen whether
other emotions are activated during or after ostracism. Researchers should
consider assessing fear, anxiety, shame, guilt, and others.
3.1. Experimental evidence for ostracism-induced need threat

Self-report measures. We have used self-report measures aimed at assessing
manipulation checks of belonging and being ignored, need satisfaction (the
inverse of which is interpreted as need threat) levels for belonging, self-
esteem, control, and meaningful existence, and negative affect in the form
of sadness and anger. The current scale in use is shown in Table 6.1. This is a
theory-derived measured aimed at assessing perceptions of inclusion and
being ignored, levels of satisfaction in the needs, and mood. It is not a
validated diagnostic scale. Our analyses indicate that there is high corre-
spondence between the items within each need, four factors that fit nicely
with the four needs, but we also see a moderate correlation between all four
need satisfaction scales. Often, when not testing a specific need’s impact on
subsequent measures, we create a need satisfaction index, combining all four
needs. When measured, almost all studies in our lab or others’ labs show
significant reductions in satisfaction to the four needs (Williams, 2007a,b).
Thus, in face-to-face ball tossing (Williams & Sommer, 1997), Internet chat
rooms (Williams et al., 2002), SMS cell phone texting (Smith & Williams,
2004), role play paradigms (Zadro et al., 2005), event-contingent diary studies
(Nezlek et al., 2004), out-of-the-loop paradigms ( Jones et al., in press);
Table 6.1 Assessment of manipulations, need satisfaction, and mood

following ostracism
For each question, please circle the

number to the right that best
represents the feelings you were Not
experiencing during the game at all Extremely
Belonging
I felt ‘‘disconnected’’ (R) 1 2 3 4 5
I felt rejected (R) 1 2 3 4 5
I felt like an outsider (R) 1 2 3 4 5
I felt I belonged to the group 1 2 3 4 5
I felt the other players interacted 1 2 3 4 5
with me a lot
Self-esteem
I felt good about myself 1 2 3 4 5
My self-esteem was high 1 2 3 4 5
I felt liked 1 2 3 4 5
I felt insecure (R) 1 2 3 4 5
I felt satisfied 1 2 3 4 5
Meaningful existence
I felt invisible (R) 1 2 3 4 5
I felt meaningless (R) 1 2 3 4 5
I felt nonexistent (R) 1 2 3 4 5
I felt Important 1 2 3 4 5
I felt useful 1 2 3 4 5
Control
I felt powerful 1 2 3 4 5
I felt I had control over the 1 2 3 4 5
course of the game
I felt I had the ability to 1 2 3 4 5
significantly alter events
I felt I was unable to Influence 1 2 3 4 5
the action of others (R)
I felt the other players decided 1 2 3 4 5
everything (R)
Mood
Good 1 2 3 4 5
Bad 1 2 3 4 5
Friendly 1 2 3 4 5
Unfriendly 1 2 3 4 5
Angry 1 2 3 4 5
Pleasant 1 2 3 4 5
Happy 1 2 3 4 5
Sad 1 2 3 4 5
(continued)
For each question, please circle the

number to the right that best
represents the feelings you were Not
experiencing during the game at all Extremely
Manipulation check
For the next three questions,
please circle the number to
the right (or fill in the blank)
that best represents the thoughts
you had during the game
I was ignored 1 2 3 4 5
I was excluded 1 2 3 4 5
Assuming that the ball should be —%
thrown to each person equally
(33% if three people; 25% if
four people), what percentage
of the throws did you receive?
and Cyberball paradigms (Carter-Sowell et al., 2008; Eisenberger et al., 2003;

Lakin et al., 2008; Williams et al, 2000; Zadro et al., 2004), there is ample
evidence that ostracism, compared to inclusion, results in less belonging, lower
self-esteem, less control, and a sense of meaninglessness and invisibility.
Further support for a threat to meaningful existence has been demon-
strated in a recent study that found that ostracized participants reported
lower scores on a life is meaningful scale. This is noteworthy in that the scale
requests of participants their world views of life’s meaning, not their current
feeling. Anecdotally, we have observed several participants in the ball-
tossing experiments pinching themselves while being ostracized, an indica-
tion that they are testing for their existence.
Our effect sizes for our measures of reflexive need threat (the inverse of
need satisfaction) are routinely large; between 1.0 and 2.0. At one point, we
figured it took three participants per cell (that is, three ostracized and three
included) to obtain for these measures a p value less than 0.05. The effects
extend beyond college students. Cyberball has been used to examine the
impact of ostracism on children (Zadro et al., 2008b), adolescence
(Sebastian et al., 2008) and a representative sample of male and female
African American and European American adults in the US from age 18–
82 (Goodwin et al., 2007). For every population tested, a 2–3 min episode
of ostracism reliably threatens needs and increases negative affect.
Converging evidence for need-threat is also provided by studies that,
either by inference or tested mediation, show outcomes that are predicted
by a need-threat assumption. That is, when a need is initially thwarted,
organisms will engage in mental or behavioral activities that serve to fortify

the needs. If, for example, control is deprived, then individuals will react
against that control deprivation and attempt to regain control (Pittman &
D’Agostino, 1989; Pittman & Pittman, 1980; Wortman & Brehm, 1975).
Thus, in Sect. 4, I will lay out the assumptions behind the reflective stage
and review the research that pertains to need fortification. In the following
sections, I consider the effects of long-term or persistent ostracism. Using
the control deprivation example again, research has determined that if
control fortification fails, over time, helplessness will result, in which
organisms show resignation, even if control is achievable (Seligman, 1975;
Wortman & Brehm, 1975).
4. Reflection and Recovery: Recovering

from Need Threat Directs Need
Fortifying Thoughts and Actions
Once individuals detect ostracism, feel the pain, negative affect, and
threatened needs, what then? Because their attention is directed to the
ostracism experience, they are in a position to assess, appraise, and attribute
the meaning and importance of the ostracism episode. According to the
need-fortification hypothesis, they will feel, think, and behave in ways that
will reestablish optimal levels of the need or needs that were most saliently
threatened. It is in this stage that attributions, based upon situational context
and individual differences, are hypothesized to play an important role in the
speed of psychological recovery and behavioral options used for coping
with threatened needs.
Let us first examine evidence on speed of recovery from a brief ostracism
episode.
4.1. Speed of recovery

Without distraction. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Jim Wirth, Eric
Wesselmann, and I have developed an online feeling measure to assess the
onset, slope, and recovery of negative affect from ostracism. Participants dial
their level of negative or positive affect, and we record their dial setting
automatically every second. With no instruction or intervening task, but
with the Cyberball task completed, participants continue to dial their affect
over time. Using this as one gauge of recovery, we find that without
debriefing or distraction, participants began to recover within a few sec-
onds, and recovered to the level of inclusion within a minute. This is not
surprising. First, Cyberball is an admittedly mild form of ostracism; the
participant has never met, nor intends to meet the other players, and they
are engaged in a minimal form of computer mediated interaction. Second,

these participants have nothing to do but monitor their feelings following
their Cyberball experience, so they are able to cognitively and affectively
cope with what just happened unabated by distracting tasks. Other evidence
suggests longer recovery rates for participants when other tasks intercede.
With distraction. Zadro et al. (2006) had participants (half in the normal
range and half high in social anxiety) play Cyberball and fill out immediately
after the need satisfaction and mood measures. The participants were then
given several tasks to work on for the next 45 min. At the end of that time
they were once again asked to answer about their current need satisfaction
and mood. The authors found that both low and high social anxiety
participants experienced distress as indicated by the measure asking them
how they felt during the game (the immediate or reflexive stage). After the
45-min work period, those in the normal range of social anxiety had
recovered completely to the levels of participants who were in the inclusion
condition. Those who were high in social anxiety, however, were only
half-way to full recovery.
Recovery moderated by individual differences. Oaten et al. (2008) conducted a
similar study with normal to high social anxiety participants, but examined
their abilities to self-regulate following inclusion or ostracism. In the first
study, self-regulation involved not being tempted by eating too much non-
nutritious food; in the second study, self-regulation was measured by
willingness to drink a foul-tasting, but supposedly nutritious drink. In
both studies, they found that the individual differences in social anxiety
had no impact on initial levels of self-regulation, and that following ostra-
cism, all participants were less able to self-regulate than had they been
included. Forty-five minutes later, however, only those who were high in
social anxiety continued to show problems with self-regulation. Another
study found individual differences in subsequent retaliative responses to
rejection, finding that participants scoring higher in rejection sensitivity
were more likely to allocated hot sauce to the perpetrator of rejection
(Ayduk et al., 2007).
Recovery moderated by situational context. Gonsalkorale and Williams
(2007) examined whether ostracism by despised others would be less aver-
sive, or perhaps even positively valenced event. After all, should not we
want to be excluded and ignored by people we hate? In their study, we
convinced Australian students that they were participating in a cross-
national study that involved other individuals from diverse groups. This
allowed a convincing cover story that resulted in participants believing that
they were playing Cyberball with individuals who shared their own political
leanings, had political leanings of the opposing party, or who represented
the upstart KKK of Australia. Pretesting indicated that participants liked best
others who shared their political leanings, were unfavorable to those espous-
ing the opposing party, but absolutely despised members of the KKK of
Australia. They then played Cyberball with two other individuals who were
from one of these three groups (Labour, Liberal, or KKK). Relying only on
immediate measures of distress, we found that, regardless of the group
membership of the other players, ostracism was strongly and similarly
distressing, indicating once again the unwillingness or inability of indivi-
duals to incorporate contextual information in their immediate responses to
ostracism.
But what if we had given participants some time to recover, to get
beyond the initial pain, negative affect, and need threat? In a follow-up to
this research, Gonsalkorale et al. (2008) replicated the basic aspects of the
study with African American students at Howard University. Immediate
responses to ostracism, despite the fact that African Americans are the targets
of hate by the KKK, still reacted no more negatively to ostracism by the
KKK as they did to ostracism by Republicans or Democrats. More impor-
tantly, we assessed their negative affect and need threat a second time after
the passage of several minutes. Here, we see recovery moderated by the
situational context. Recovery was more complete for those ostracized by
the KKK than by the opposition party (e.g., Republicans), and being
ostracized by the opposition party allowed fuller recover than being ostra-
cized by members of their own party (e.g., Democrats). These results
suggest that, whereas immediate responses are not moderated by context,
recovery and coping processes take context into account.
There are many situational contexts that can potentially speed or hinder
the recovery process. In addition to the KKK studies, group membership of
the ostracizers has been examined in other experiments (Goodwin et al.,
2007; Wirth & Williams, in press), which show recovery is quicker and
fuller when ostracized by outgroup members.
Other situational factors that inform perceived motives should similarly
affect whether the individual can dismiss the ostracism episodes, or worry
about them. In my original model (Williams, 1997), I suggested that an
ostracism episode could be attributed to several motives, each carrying more
weight. Often, individuals consider a brief instance as ostracism (‘‘he didn’t
say ‘hi’ back!’’) when they find out that the other person had not heard
(‘‘oh, he’s listening to his iPod’’). Thus, mistaken episodes of ostracism ought
to cause only temporary distress until the mistake is discovered. Often, norms
of society dictate civil ostracism, as when elevator riders are not attended to
by other riders. Although elevator riders were briefly offput (as measured by
mood as soon as they stepped off the elevator) by another rider not
acknowledging their existence with the typical eye gaze and nod, it is likely
they recovered quickly (Zuckerman et al., 1983). Sometimes, people
engage in ostracism to avoid aversive consequences themselves. We may
not speak to someone because we anticipate their wrath; we may ostracize
because if we do not, we risk being ostracized ourselves. This occurs with
employees at corporations when a whistle-blower returns to work;
best friends of the whistle-blower will join the other and defensively ostracize
for fear that the other employees will freeze them out, too (Faulkner, 1998).
In many instances, of course, ostracism is perceived (and intended) as
punitive, and this should be more difficult to slough off as being unimpor-
tant or inconsequential. Finally, a rather pernicious form of ostracism,
oblivious ostracism, occurs when an individual (or group) is simply unworthy
of attention. They are so low on the pecking order that they are not seen
nor heard by others. This occurs in caste systems as well as in everyday
instances where status and power are particularly salient. When individuals
attribute ostracism to this motive, not only do the feel the sting of ostracism,
but also needs of existence and recognition ought to be so threatened that
recovery may take the longest. More research is needed to determine the
recovery rate as a function of the attributed ostracism motive.
Hence, social anxiety, an individual difference that filters and selectively
attends to socially ambiguous or aversive events, and situational context in
the form of the social identity of the ostracizers, both play a role in recovery
from ostracism. Presumably, those high in social anxiety could not easily
discount the ostracism episode as meaningless, and instead, probably rumi-
nated about why they were ostracized and what they may have done to
bring on such treatment. And, those finding themselves ostracized by a
despised outgroup could more easily discount and recover from the pain
and distress. Those ostracized by ingroup members continued to be
distressed.
The role of distraction and rumination. Swim and Williams (2008) tested
more directly the role of rumination on recovery from ostracism. Partici-
pants played Cyberball and were either included or ostracized. Following
reporting their need satisfaction levels and mood, half the participants were
instructed to watch and write about four change blindness slides, an
engaging and distracting task that prevents rumination. The other half of
the participants were encouraged to ruminate, to write down their thoughts
about what they were thinking ‘‘right now.’’ As expected, the content of
the online writing was infused with thoughts about the Cyberball experi-
ence, particularly for those who were ostracized. They then reported their
levels of need satisfaction and mood again. Those who were prevented from
ruminating had recovered from the aversive experience of ostracism,
whereas those who were encouraged to ruminate remained in psychological
distress.
4.2. Need fortification

According to the need-fortification hypothesis, ostracized individuals (com-
pared to those who were included), should feel, think, and act in ways that
will fortify the most saliently threatened need(s). For example, if belonging
is highly threatened, ostracized individuals should have a higher desire for
belonging, should have thoughts and perceptions of social connections, and

should behave in ways that elevate their chances for belonging. The same
can be said for self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence.
Inclusionary need cluster: Belonging and self-esteem. To the extent that self-
esteem can be understood as a sociometer of social inclusion (Leary et al.,
1995), the constructs of belonging and self-esteem become intertwined.
Thus, in this section, and because ostracism and rejection research has not
yet disentangled self-esteem from belonging, I suggest that thoughts, feel-
ings, perceptions, and behaviors aimed at fortifying belonging also elevate
self-esteem. Belonging and self-esteem, then, become an inclusionary need
cluster, such that fortification serves the purpose of increasing the likelihood
that the individual feels connected, or can become connected to others.
Power and provocation need cluster: Control and existence. In a similar vein, it
is operationally difficult to separate desires to exert control from desires to
be noticed and thought worthy of attention. An act of exerting control or
being especially provocative fortifies both needs. Thus, I will review
research evidence for these two needs as they represent a singular cluster
of power and provocation. When these needs rise to the top of individuals’
priorities, they may be less concerned for being liked and fitting in than they
are in dominating others and forcing others to recognize their existence.
Thus, we may be more likely to expect antisocial and aggressive acts.
4.3. The inclusionary cluster: Belonging and

self-esteem fortification
Several studies in ours’ and others’ labs have provided converging evidence
that following ostracism (or rejection), individuals behave in ways to rees-
tablish their inclusionary status. That is, they do things to either remind
themselves of their social connections, or that will improve their chances of
belonging. Thus, we would expect to see evidence of increased social
attentiveness that would aid the individual in discerning cues that could
enable social connectivity. Further, there ought to be evidence that, if given
an opportunity, ostracized individuals should do things that would make
them fit in and be more attractive to others. Ostracized individuals should
therefore try harder to fit in and be liked, even to the point of becoming
socially servile and susceptible to social influence.
Social attentiveness. According to research by Gardner, Pickett, and col-
leagues, and similar to Leary et al.’s sociometer theory, humans possess a
social monitoring system that signals when the individual’s inclusionary
status is at risk. Once signaled, the social monitoring system motivates the
individual to monitor and attend cues that others emit to enhance inclusion
possibilities (and to avoid rejection possibilities). The first step in this process
is to be hypersensitive and attentive to social information. Consistent with
this hypothesis, individuals who scored higher in the need to belong, or in
loneliness, were more likely to show improvements on memory for social

information (Gardner et al., 2000). Those higher in belonging also have
been shown to be more sensitive to nonverbal cues (Pickett et al., 2004).
More recent research suggests a bias in favor of social attention to
potentially accepting individuals. For instance, participants who were
asked to recall an instance when they were rejected were better able to
discriminate accurately between nongenuine (or deceptive) smiles and
genuine (Duchenne) smiles (Bernstein et al., 2008). In a related study,
ostracism improved individuals’ ability to detect between-category varia-
bility (i.e., between sad and happy) in relevant social stimuli at the expense
of within-category variability (i.e., variations within happy) (Sacco et al.,
2008). Similarly, excluded participants were fast at spotting smiling faces in a
crowd, fixed their attention more on smiling faces in an eye tracking task,
and persisted longer in attending to smiling faces (DeWall et al., in press).
4.4. Social servility

Social servility refers to an individual’s proclivity to be overly concerned
with fitting in and being liked to the point of being especially malleable and
obsequious.
Nonconscious mimicry. Increasing one’s attraction to others can be done
consciously and nonconsciouly. One nonconscious behavior is to increase
one’s mimicry of another. In a very clever set of studies, participants were
ostracized or included (via Cyberball) and then met with another person (a
confederate who displayed various behavioral mannerisms) for an interview.
Ostracized participants were more likely to mimic these mannerisms, espe-
cially when the other person was an ingroup member (Lakin et al., 2008).
Working harder for the team. Typically, people engage in social loafing
when they are working on a collective task in which their individual
contributions are pooled (Karau & Williams, 1993). After being ostracized
(compared to included) in the waiting room ball toss game, female partici-
pants (but not males) were more likely to do the opposite: to work harder
when working collectively than when working individually on an idea
generation task. Presumably, female participants were more concerned to
do well and improve their inclusionary status when combining their efforts
with those who ostracized them, than were females who were individually
accountable for their efforts (Williams & Sommer, 1997). This finding was
replicated recently, although the authors argued that social status rather than
gender alone may account for the sex differences (Bozin & Yoder, 2008).
Compliance. Another way to be liked is to be more compliant, to agree to
costly and possibly unwanted requests. Following a game of Cyberball in
which they were either included or ostracized, participants were led to a
waiting room for an ostensible second phase of the experiment. Waiting in
the room was a participant (actually, a confederate) who had just arrived and
had not participated in the Cyberball game. When the experimenter left the
waiting room, the confederate told the participant that she was a Purdue
band member and was collecting pledges for a fund raiser. Using either a
direct request, the foot-in-the-door tactic or the door-in-the-face tactic,
the confederate requested a pledge from the participant. Regardless of tactic
used, ostracized participants were more likely to make a pledge, and pledged
more money than included participants (Carter-Sowell et al., 2008).
Behavioral extraversion. Will ostracized individuals be more outgoing,
more open to possible relationships, and actively search for others with
whom to connect or groups to join? In one study, following Cyberball
inclusion or ostracism, participants were asked to evaluate a randomly
drawn videotape of a new student organization. Regardless of whether
the new student group espoused laudable goals such as improving resume
writing and interviewing skills for students looking for employment, or
more questionable goals of using the mind to bend spoons and walk through
walls, ostracized participants liked the group spokesman and his group better
(Wheaton, 2001). When asked to evaluate potential dates, ostracized males
reported a greater desire to affiliate romantically and platonically than
included males. Moreover, ostracized males also reported consistently
enhanced perceptions of their own desirability (both platonic and roman-
tic). Ostracized females, however, did not report an elevated desire to
affiliate platonically or romantically when compared to included females,
nor did they view themselves to be any more desirable. This pattern of
results is consistent with evolutionary explanations of differential mate
selection pressures between the sexes (Winton et al., 2008). In another set
of six studies, participants were threatened with social exclusion expressed
greater interest in making friends, to work with others, to form more
positive impressions, and to reward new interaction partners. These effects
were not observed if the others were the perpetrators of the exclusion
(Maner et al., 2007).
4.5. Power and provocation cluster: Control and

existence fortification
Several studies provide evidence for control fortification. In two studies
reported by Lawson Williams and Williams (1998) and Williams (2005). In
Study 1, male students at the University of Toledo (OH) were either
ostracized or included in the waiting room with the face-to-face ball-tossing
game, and were led to believe the other two individuals were either
strangers to each other or friends with each other (in either case, the
participants did not know the confederates). Based on pretesting that
indicates people feel less in control when in the presence of two people
who are friends with each other, it was hypothesized that those ostracized
by a friendship-pair would feel the strongest control threat. Following the
ball tossing, a fourth participant (also a confederate) showed up and the

participant was paired with this newcomer in a ‘‘facial communication’’
study. Participants were asked to guess on several trials the color of the
playing card at which the newcomer was looking. Participants were told
they could request that the newcomer look left, look right, or look straight
ahead as often as they wished to help them make the guess. The more
requests of the newcomer to shift his face were our measure of exerting
control. Consistent with our prediction, it was only the participants who
were ostracized by the friendship-pair who exerted significantly more (in
fact, twice as much) control over a newly arriving naive participant. In
Study 2 with Australian female students, waiting participants played the
emergent face-to-face ball toss game with two strangers or two females who
were friends with each other. They were then given Burger’s (1992) desire
to control scale. The same pattern of results emerged; only those participants
who were ostracized by friendship-pairs reported a higher desire for control.
Control fortification and aggression. Further support for control fortification
was found by Warburton et al. (2006) who examined aggression following
ostracism. As Tedeschi (2001) argues, aggression is a behavior that reestab-
lishes power and control. Under the guise of an experiment examining cross-
modality perception, participants first found themselves in the waiting room
and playing the face-to-face toss game. Half were included and half were
ostracized. Once the ‘‘actual experiment’’ began, they were told they had to
listen to 10 noise blasts of a highly irritating sound. Half were told they could
control the onset of each noise blast (control restoration) whereas the other
half were subjected to an unpredictable sequence of the noise blasts (control
deprivation). In the next phase of the experiment, with a rigged drawing, they
were assigned the task of doling out a portion of food for the ostensible food
perception phase of the study (rather than being assigned the role of taster).
They could give as little or as much of the food as they wished to a naive
participant, who had to eat the entire amount, and whose food preferences
had been assessed. All participants found out the food (again, determined by a
rigged drawing) was hot sauce, and that the naive participant strongly disliked
hot sauce. Thus, control fortification was assessed by the amount of hot sauce
the participant allocated. Hot sauce allocation is used by aggression researchers;
the more hot sauce allocated, the more aggressive the act (Lieberman et al.,
1999). The results of this study support the control (via aggression) fortification
hypothesis. Only the ostracized control-deprived participants showed signifi-
cantly higher levels of aggression, allocating nearly five times as much hot
sauce as did participants in the other three conditions.
Other studies have examined factors that moderate the ostracism/rejec-
tion ! aggression link. One study found that when a highly entitative
group socially rejects individuals and the individuals have an opportunity to
retaliate, they are more likely to do so than if the group is less entitative
(Gaertner et al., 2008). These results are consistent with the Williams and
Lawson Williams study mentioned earlier when individuals were ostracized

by friendship-pairs; one feels less control when rejected by a tight-knit group
than a mere collection of individuals. Another study found that induced
anger, but not sadness, led to greater aggression following ostracism. Addi-
tionally, when anger was manipulated by unfair ostracism (in Cyberball),
participants were more aggressive than if the ostracism was perceived as more
fair (Chow et al., 2008). If schemas of fairness are violated, it may be that the
predictive and explanatory control offered by such schemas are undermined,
leading to a desire to control through aggression.
Life-alone and blind-sided rejection paradigms increase aggression. Research
that uses control-threatening exclusion paradigms also supports the ostra-
cism ! control ! aggression link. Twenge and her colleagues (Twenge
et al., 2001, 2007) have used two exclusion paradigms that, by themselves,
increase the likelihood of aggression. Compared to the ostracism paradigms
used in our lab, these paradigms seem to be especially highly threatening to
control. In the life-alone paradigm, participants are led to believe that their
personality test scores indicate that by the time they reach the age of 25, they
will no longer be able to maintain close relationships, and will live out their
lives alone. Clearly, if believed, participants in these studies are left little
recourse to do or imagine ways in which they could reestablish social
connections. Because their future aloneness is inevitable, any control they
have to establish close social connections has been stripped away. Thus,
aggression and the control it provides becomes the behavior of choice.
Another paradigm that yields aggressive reactions is the get-acquainted
paradigm (Nezlek et al., 1997; Twenge et al., 2001). In this paradigm,
participants meet together in groups and are told to get acquainted. They
are given some topics (e.g., favorite movies, home towns) to talk about, and
they enjoy a friendly group discussion. They are then separated into indi-
vidual cubicles, asked who of the group they would like to work with and
then experimenter takes the information to form groups. When the experi-
menter returns, participants hear that either everyone or no one wants to
work with them. When given the rejection information, participants were
more likely to be aggressive toward members of the group or naive others.
At first, this direct rejection ! aggression finding was puzzling. In thinking
about the phenomenology of the participants in this paradigm, however, we
guessed that they were generally finding themselves in a positive and
friendly group interaction. So, to hear that no one likes you should be
quite an unexpected jolt. Their sociometers, their gauges of inclusionary
status, must have been giving them hopeful feedback, and yet they are
blindsided by the unanimous rejection. We think they felt let down by
their sociometers; their gauges of inclusionary status were either unreliable
or broken. This realization, we reasoned, threatens explanatory and predic-
tive control (Skinner, 1996). An excessive loss of control is not as obvious in
this paradigm, so we conducted an experiment in which we replicated the
conditions of these other studies, with a twist. Participants had their discus-
sion among a group of confederate students. The confederates were trained
to be attentive, responsive, and friendly, or uninterested and dismissing
when the participant spoke. Thus, half were led to expect rejection whereas
the others expected acceptance. This manipulation was crossed with the
feedback that all or none of the group members wanted to work with them.
Participants were then taken to a new experimental room and asked to take
part in a food taste test (similar to the hot sauce paradigm described earlier).
Aggression was significantly higher when rejected participants were blind-
sided by the group vote than when they were led to expect rejection
(Wesselmann et al., 2007). Thus, it appears that control deprivation plays
a crucial role in the ostracism ! aggression sequence.
As yet, no studies have specifically set out to test whether ostracized
individuals are more likely to attempt to fortify self-esteem or meaningful
existence. Anecdotally, one of the five participants in a week-long role play
study (i.e., the scarlet letter), expressed no concern for being liked when
subjected to hours of ostracism by his peers, but felt jubilant when his
repeated attempts to catch their attention met with success.
Gerber and Wheeler (in press) conducted a meta-analysis of the ostra-
cism, exclusion, and rejection literature and focused on evaluating the
evidence for behavioral indicators of need threat. They found strongest
support for behavioral indicators of threats to belonging and control, with
little or no direct support for behavioral indicators of threats to self-esteem
or meaningful existence/need for recognition.
Clearly, experimental evidence is needed to test these hypotheses, but
real-world events like school shootings and shooting sprees seem to com-
bine a feeling of being ostracized or marginalized from peers or society, with
a motivation to be noticed and remembered, and if not respected or feared
(Leary et al., 2003). As Dennis Lynn Rader, the BTK (bind, torture, and
kill) Killer from Wichita, Kansas wrote, ‘‘how many do I have to kill before
I get some national attention?’’ (Chu, 2005).
5. Resignation: Long-Term Effects of

Persistent Ostracism
Some individuals are ostracized for long periods of time, by the same
individual or group, or by any number of different sources. The closest we
can get to this stage, empirically, might be examining the life-alone para-
digm that Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall and colleagues use (Baumeister &
DeWall, 2005; Baumeister et al., 2002, 2006; Twenge et al., 2001; 2003,
2007). Within a short laboratory session, participants are convinced that
they will lead a life alone; that by the age of 25, they will no longer have
successful relationships, and that if they ever marry, their marriages will not
last. To the extent that participants believe this prognosis, they are, in a
sense, experiencing an anticipated long-term period of social ostracism and
disconnection from others. How do these participants respond that speaks
to these long-term effects?
The first striking difference between the results of these studies and those
using more temporary methods of ostracism (e.g., ball-tossing, Cyberball,
group rejection) is that negative affect appears to be missing. Participants
become affectively numbed, or as Baumeister and Twenge describe it,
cognitively deconstructed (Baumeister et al., 2006). Baumeister, in his
analysis of people attempting suicide, finds a similar pattern of cognitive
deconstruction prior to the suicide attempt (Baumeister, 1990). In essence,
if emotions are for action, affective numbness is a signal of passivity, of
giving up, of psychological paralysis. Thus, these studies provide some
evidence for, rather than fighting or fortifying, helplessness and submission.
The second pattern these researchers find is a lack of self-regulation
(Baumeister et al., 2006) following the life-alone feedback. To the extent that
need fortification can be viewed as a form of self-regulation, a costly yet
functional goal, then we could regard this temporary long-term response of
impaired self-regulation as another form of unwillingness to try, to work, to
fortify.
Other than these empirical investigations using the life-alone feedback,
research on the long-term effects of ostracism are, at this point, mostly based
on qualitative research, interviews, letters, and anecdotes. As such, these
accounts provide a rich collection of examples and insights that can speak to,
if not test, the third stage of the temporal model of ostracism.
Lisa Zadro, as part of her dissertation, interviewed over 50 individuals
who had experienced long-term ostracism (Zadro, 2004). These individuals
responded to newspaper and magazine ads asking those with experiences
with long-term ostracism or the silent treatment to come to our laboratory
for an hour interview. About two-thirds of the individuals were subjected
to long-term ostracism whereas the other third had subjected others to
long-term ostracism.
The third stage of the temporal model, called resignation, suggests that
the resources necessary for fortifying threatened needs become, over time,
depleted. Like reactance turns to learned helplessness (Wortman & Brehm,
1975), belonging fortification should turn to detachment and alienation,
self-esteem maintenance should turn to depression, and attempts to prove
worthy of attention should turn to passivity and a sense of worthlesness.
How does persistent ostracism affect individuals, who despite early
attempts at fortifying their needs, are subjected to weeks, months, and
years of being invisible to those in their lives? Quotes from our letter writers
and interviewees seem to support the resignation hypothesis.
I just sort of go into a little shell and I don’t want to talk in case I’m not
there . . . I feel as if I’m a ghost.
One young woman had a history of verbal abuse followed by several
months of silence from her father. She had sought counseling for depres-
sion, and was especially distraught over the realization that the pattern of
ostracism would never stop.
I’m 40 years old and my father hasn’t talked to me for the last 6 months.
Recently, he was in hospital and I was told he might die. I decided I had to
go see him, even if he wasn’t talking to me. I walked up to him and held his
hand and said ‘‘Oh Daddy, please don’t leave me.’’ He looked at me, his
eyes welled up with tears, then turned his head away from me. He still
wouldn’t talk to me . . . his death would be the final silence.
An elderly woman’s husband did not look at her, talk to her, eat with
her for the last 40 years of his life (he passed away before we interviewed
the wife). When asked why she did not leave her husband, she said she
did not think anyone would want her and at least she had a roof over
her head.
In many instances, targets of long-term ostracism revealed suicidal
ideation or actual suicide attempts. One woman recalled,
In high school, the other students thought me weird and never spoke to
me. I tell you in all honesty that at one stage they refused to speak to me for
153 days, not one word at all . . . That was a very low point for me in my life
and on the 153rd day, I swallowed 29 Valium pills . . .
Almost all of those interviewed who had been subjected to long-term
ostracism mentioned, without prompting, that they would have preferred
physical abuse over ostracism (recall the William James’ quote earlier
suggesting that even torture would be preferred to being cut dead). As
one woman said,
. . . My second husband, who was an alcoholic used to physically abuse me,
but the bruises and scars healed very quickly and I believe that [the silent
treatment] is far more damaging than a black eye . . .
When we finally asked our interviewees why they would have preferred
physical abuse we heard two answers. First, they said that then they would at
least know that their spouse knew they existed. The second reason dealt
with the deaf ear victims of long-term ostracism face when trying to relate
their problems to others. A middle-aged woman said, ‘‘I can take bruises to
the police, but I can’t show them the bruises of silence.’’
A letter from a father who found himself ostracizing his son for several
months is enlightening, not only in terms of what the ostracism did to his
son, but why and how people choose to ostracize, and why it may become a
long-term process.
Not so long ago, I had a row with my son, which was terminated by his use
of extremely violent and foul language at me. I was so shocked and
outraged by this incident that I instinctively, that is without any thought
about what should be my appropriate response, instigated a regimen of
ostracism toward him. I did not speak to him, I did not acknowledge
anything he said to me, or anyone else, in fact I acted as if he were not
even present. I did not set a place for him at the table nor did I provide for
him in any meals that I prepared for the family.
As I said, I slipped into this, although for me novel, paradigm without any
premeditation and, hence, without any difficulty and maintained it com-
fortably as if it were the natural way of family relationships. I was able to
perpetuate it easily and without any discomfort for myself.
After two weeks, I woke up one morning with a blinding flash of insight:
‘‘What are you doing to your relationship with your son?’’ In that short period
my son had already become intimidated by this treatment – he did exactly what
his mother said at all times and whenever he spoke it was in a quiet whisper.
I am ashamed to say that I was sort of pleased with the effect of my ostracism
but, as I say, one day I suddenly realised that it was making him weak and
submissive and that it was eroding the future quality of our relationship.
To terminate the ostracism, however, was an extremely difficult process.
I could only begin with grudging, monosyllabic responses to his indirect
overtures. I was only able to expand on these responses with the passing of
time and it is only now, about six weeks since the ostracism ceased that our
relationship appears to be getting back to pre-row normality. The pain and
stress from a period of ostracism clearly impact on the principals for far
longer than the actual period of ostracism.
On your radio program last week, the case was mentioned of a husband who
ostracised his wife for 40 years. I suspect that, in that particular case, the longer
the ostracism persisted, the harder it became to stop such that there came a
point when, no matter how much that husband wanted to speak to his wife, it
was just too difficult to do. This is what I felt after just two weeks of ostracism of
my son – that if it had lasted much longer I might have not have been able to
stop and that not only would our relationship have been destroyed but also my
son himself might have been permanently emotionally and physiologically
disfigured. Further, as also suggested on the radio program, it may even have
led to illness and perhaps, ultimately, to his premature death.
So the point of this letter is just to say that ostracism can be like a whirlpool,
or quicksand, if you, the user, don’t extract yourself from it as soon as
possible, it is likely to become impossible to terminate regardless of the
emergence of any subsequent will to do so.
The use of ostracism against one’s immediate family might be an instinctive
reaction but its effects may be horrific. I have been deeply shocked by the
effect of its use in my family and will ensue that it never happens again.
I hope that this anecdote will help to add weight to any thesis that you may
be developing such that some good may come from that harrowing expe-
rience. [reprinted with permission]
Not only does long-term ostracism debilitate psychological resilience,
but once started, appears to be difficult for perpetrators to stop.
More research needs to be done on the effects of long-term ostracism.
There are many sectors of society who experience ostracism on a daily,
weekly, monthly, and yearly basis. These include the mentally ill, physically
challenged, homeless, and to a lesser degree, anyone who is not fulfilling the
role that is expected of them, like middle-aged single individuals among
their married friends (DePaulo & Morris, 2005; Williams & Nida, 2005) or
married students among their single student friends (Carter-Sowell, 2008).
What can be done to ameliorate the helplessness and depression that slowly
replaces the fight to fortify threatened needs? Often, groups of individuals
feel ostracized by the majority. How do groups, in comparison to indivi-
duals, respond to ostracism? Both of these issues are discussed briefly in the
final section that points to our gaps in the understanding of ostracism.
6. Future Research: Groups, Communication,

and Assistance
Small and large groups, clans, gangs, organizations, and countries are
often ‘‘not recognized’’ by society or the rest of the world. It is unfortu-
nately too easy to think of instances of disenfranchised groups who resort to
provocative actions and violence to gain attention and fear, if not respect,
from the world around them. Yet, our understanding of the effects of
ostracized groups is negligible compared to our knowledge of the ostracized
individual.
How do groups, compared to individuals, respond to ostracism?
Does sharing the ostracism experience with others in one’s group diffuse
the aversive impact of the ostracism? Because individuals in ostracized
groups already have a sense of belonging in their group, are they more
likely to turn to provocation and violence than are individuals who are
ostracized? These are questions that deserve our attention, and we are just
beginning to examine them.
According to Latané (1981), bearing the negative impact of outside
sources should be diffused or lessened when one shares the impact with
others who are co-targets of the same aversive behavior. Like individuals
who diffuse responsibility for helping (Latané & Darley, 1970) or for
working (Latané et al., 1979), should ostracized individuals feel less pain
and less need threat when they share the ostracism with others? Using the
train ride paradigm (Zadro et al., 2005), we recently manipulated whether

two sources ostracize one target or two sources ostracize two targets.
Behaviorally, we see evidence that when a target of ostracism has a co-
target, they turn to that co-target and seem to form a bond by talking and
commiserating with each other. They also report less distress. Yet, two
experiments using Cyberball, in which we examine individuals or pairs
playing the virtual ball toss game with other individuals or pairs, suggest no
immediate diffusion of negative affect or need threat (Carter-Sowell et al.,
2007; Schefske et al., 2008). Instead, we observe the same levels of aversive
impact and negative affect immediately, but some evidence suggesting faster
and better coping in the reflective stages.
The discontinuity effect (Insko, Schopler et al., 1990) describes the
findings in group-to-group negotiation and cooperation/competition
research that groups are more competitive and aggressive to other groups
than individuals are to individuals. We see some evidence of this in our
group-to-group ostracism studies, in that groups tend to be more aggressive
in their responses to other groups, than are individuals to other individuals.
Taken together, these preliminary results suggest that individuals in
groups are not protected from the initial pain of ostracism, but can find
comfort and engage in retaliative responses more than lone targets of
ostracism. The implication for real-world groups is both optimistic and
frightening. Ostracized group members can comfort each other and speed
up the coping process, but they might also turn to provocation and violence
more easily and quickly than their individual counterparts.
6.1. What can be done to help targets of ostracism?

A call for research
A second domain of research that requires exploration is what can be done
to buffer or ease the pain that ostracism inflicts. Given the results of the
research to date, we have much more evidence that ostracism hurts than we
have evidence for reducing its distressing impact.
The research from the reflexive stage suggests little or nothing can be
done to eliminate the initial prick of pain that ostracism elicits. Perhaps this
is good, because if we numbed ourselves to this pain, we may not become
aware of situations in which our inclusionary status is at risk. Recovery from
the pain of these occasional ostracism episodes is relatively quick and,
judging from the behavioral evidence for fortification, effective. The real
problem exists for those who are making the transition from short to long-
term ostracism. Those who endure perpetual ostracism appear to lose their
ability or motivation to fortify their threatened needs, and become despon-
dent, alienated, and experience feelings of worthlessness. If any stage of
response to ostracism deserves our attention, it should be to help individuals
maintain their motivation and effort to resist helplessness.
Individuals who are unable to make the effort to seek connections with
real people can even find relief by making parasocial attachments to pets,
photographs of friends, and even favorite TV characters (Gardner, Pickett, &
Knowles, 2005). Some even suggest that acetaminophen can, over several
days, reduce the psychological hurt of ostracism (DeWall et al., 2008).
Maybe support groups comprised of ostracized individuals could be formed
to provide members with bolstered senses of belonging, self-esteem,
control, and meaningful existence.
One goal of this chapter is to call for theory-driven applied research
aimed at aiding the plight of ostracized individuals and groups before they
pass into a stage of resignation and depression.
7. Summary
Ostracism is a behavior employed by all social animals. Its use
strengthens and protects the ostracizers while sending a quick signal to the
target that demands attention and possible behavior change. The ostracized
individual feels a palpable threat not only in the feeling of pain, but also at
four fundamental needs: belonging, self-esteem, control, and meaningful
existence/recognition by others. Upon reflection, if the ostracism is con-
sidered meaningful and important, it leads the individual to feel, think, and
behave in ways that fortify or restrengthen the threatened needs. If belong-
ing and self-esteem are most saliently threatened, then individuals will
fortify by increasing their inclusionary status. They will be more open to
others, pay more attention to others, conform and comply, generally
becoming servile and friendly. If, however, control and meaningful exis-
tence/recognition by others is most saliently threatened, the individual will
forsake positive impressions by others and will provoke and exert control,
even aggressive control, toward others. Finally, if individuals endure ostra-
cism over weeks, months, or years, their resources needed to cope by
fortifying their threatened needs will become depleted, and they will
enter a stage of resignation, alienation, helplessness, and depression. Future
research should examine the impact of ostracism on small and large
groups, as well as examine strategies that can prevent the entrance into the
resignation stage.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under
Grant No. 0519209. I would like to thank Kari Slater for her valuable comments on an
earlier draft.
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CONTENTS OF OTHER VOLUMES
Volume 1 From Acts to Dispositions: The Attribution

Process in Person Perception
Cultural Influences upon Cognitive Processes Edward E. Jones and Keith E. Davis
Harry C. Triendis Inequality in Social Exchange
The Interaction of Cognitive and J. Stacy Adams
Physiological Determinants of Emotional The Concept of Aggressive Drive: Some
State Additional Considerations
Stanley Schachter Leonard Berkowitz
Experimental Studies of Coalirion Formation Author Index—Subject Index
William A. Gamson
Communication Networks
Volume 3
Marvin E. Shaw
A Contingency Model of Leadership
Mathematical Models in Social Psychology
Effectiveness
Robert P. Abelson
Fred E. Fiedler
The Experimental Analysis of Social
Inducing Resistance to Persuasion: Some
Performance
Contemporary Approaches
Michael Argyle and Adam Kendon
William J. McGuire
A Structural Balance Approach to the
Social Motivation, Dependency, and
Analysis of Communication Effects
Susceptibility to Social Influence
N. T. Feather
Richard H. Walters and Ross D. Purke
Effects of Fear Arousal on Attitude Change:
Sociability and Social Organization in
Recent Developments in Theory and
Monkeys and Apes
Experimental Research
William A. Mason
Irving L. Janis
Author Index—Subject Index
Communication Processes and the Properties
of Language
Volume 2 Serge Moscovici
The Congruity Principle Revisited: Studies in
Vicarious Processes: A Case of No-Trial the Reduction, Induction, and
Learning Generalization of Persuasion
Albert Bandura Percy H. Tannenbaum
Selective Exposure Author Index—Subject Index
Jonathan L. Freedman and David O. Sears
Group Problem Solving
L. Richard Hoffman Volume 4
Situational Factors in Conformity
Vernon L. Allen The Theory of Cognitive Dissonance:
Social Power A Current Perspective
John Schopler Elliot Aronson
321
322 CONTENTS OF OTHER VOLUMES
Attitudes and Attraction Social Influence, Conformity Bias, and the

Donn Byrne Study of Active Minorities
Sociolinguistics Serge Moscovici and Claude Faucheux
Susan M. Ervin-Tripp A Critical Analysis of Research Utilizing the
Recognition of Emotion Prisoner’s Dilemma Paradigm for the Study
Nico H. Frijda of Bargaining
Studies of Status Congruence Charlan Nemeth
Edward E. Sampson Structural Representations of Implicit
Exploratory Investigations of Empathy Personality Theory
Ezra Stotland Seymour Rosenberg and Andrea Sedlak
The Personal Reference Scale: An Approach Author Index—Subject Index
to Social Judgment
Harry S. Upshaw Volume 7
Author Index—Subject Index
Cognitive Algebra: Integration Theory
Volume 5 Applied to Social Attribution
Norman A. Anderson
Media Violence and Aggressive Behavior: On Conflicts and Bargaining
A Review of Experimental Research Erika Apfelbaum
Richard E. Goranson Physical Attractiveness
Studies in Leader Legitimacy, Influence, Ellen Bersheid and Elaine Walster
and Innovation Compliance, Justification, and Cognitive
Edwin P. Hollander and James W. Julian Change
Experimental Studies of Negro-White Harold B. Gerard, Edward S. Connolley, and
Relationships Roland A. Wilhelmy
Irwin Katz Processes in Delay of Gratification
Findings and Theory in the Study of Fear Walter Mischel
Communications Helping a Distressed Person: Social,
Howard Leventhal Personality, and Stimulus Determinants
Perceived Freedom Ervin Staub
Ivan D. Steiner Author Index—Subject Index
Experimental Studies of Families
Nancy E. Waxler and Elliot G. Mishler Volume 8
Why Do Groups Make Riskier Decisions
than Individuals? Social Support for Nonconformity
Kenneth L. Dion, Robert S. Baron, and Vernon L. Allen
Norman Miller Group Tasks, Group Interaction Process, and
Author Index—Subject Index Group Performance Effectiveness: A
Review and Proposed Integration
Volume 6 J. Richard Hackman and Charles G. Morris
The Human Subject in the Psychology
Self-Perception Theory Experiment: Fact and Artifact
Daryl J. Bem Arie W. Kruglanski
Social Norms, Feelings, and Other Factors Emotional Arousal in the Facilitation of
Affecting Helping and Altruism Aggression Through Communication
Leonard Berkowitz Percy H. Tannenbaum and Dolf Zillman
The Power of Liking: Consequence of Inter- The Reluctance to Transmit Bad News
personal Attitudes Derived from a Libera- Abraham Tesser and Sidney Rosen
lized View of Secondary Reinforcement Objective Self-Awareness
Albert J. Lott and Bernice E. Lott Robert A. Wicklund
CONTENTS OF OTHER VOLUMES 323
Responses to Uncontrollable Outcomes: The Intuitive Psychologist and His

An Integration of Reactance Theory and Shortcomings: Distortions in the
the Learned Helplessness Model Attribution Process
Camille B. Wortman and Jack W. Brehm Less Ross
Subject Index Normative Influences on Altruism
Shalom H. Schwartz
A Discussion of the Domain and Methods of
Volume 9
Social Psychology: Two Papers by Ron
Harre and Barry R. Schlenker
New Directions in Equity Research
Leonard Berkowitz
Elaine Walster, Ellen Berscheid, and
The Ethogenic Approach: Theory and
G. William Walster
Practice
Equity Theory Revisited: Comments and
R. Harre
Annotated Bibliography
On the Ethogenic Approach: Etiquette and
J. Stacy Adams and Sara Freedman
Revolution
The Distribution of Rewards and Resources
Barry R. Schlenker
in Groups and Organizations
Automatisms and Autonomies: In Reply
Gerald S. Leventhal
to Professor Schlenker
Deserving and the Emergence of Forms
R. Harre
of Justice
Subject Index
Melvin J. Lerner, Dale T. Miller, and
John G. Holmes Volume 11
Equity and the Law: The Effect of a
Harmdoer’s ‘‘Suffering in the Act’’ on The Persistence of Experimentally Induced
Liking and Assigned Punishment Attitude Change
William Austin, Elaine Walster, and Thomas D. Cook and Brian F. Flay
Mary Kristine Utne The Contingency Model and the Dynamics of
Incremental Exchange Theory: A Formal the Leadership Process
Model for Progression in Dyadic Social Fred E. Fiedler
Interaction An Attributional Theory of Choice
L. Lowell Huesmann and George Levinger Andy Kukla
Commentary Group-Induced Polarization of Attitudes and
George C. Homans Behavior
Subject Index Helmut Lamm and David G. Myers
Crowding: Determinants and Effects
Janet E. Stockdale
Volume 10
Salience: Attention, and Attribution: Top of
the Head Phenomena
The Catharsis of Aggression: An Evaluation
Shelley E. Taylor and Susan T. Fiske
of a Hypothesis
Self-Generated Attitude Change
Russell G. Geen and Michael B. Quanty
Abraham Tesser
Mere Exposure
Subject Index
Albert A. Harrison
Moral Internalization: Current Theory and Volume 12
Research
Martin L. Hoffman Part I. Studies in Social Cognition
Some Effects of Violent and Nonviolent
Movies on the Behavior of Juvenile Prototypes in Person Perception
Delinquents Nancy Cantor and Walter Mischel
Ross D. Parke, Leonard Berkowitz, A Cognitive-Attributional Analysis
Jacques P. Leyens, Stephen G. West, of Stereotyping
and Richard Sebastian David L. Hamilton
Self-Monitoring Processes Cognitive, Social, and Personality Processes

Mark Snyder in the Physiological Detection of
Deception
Part II. Social Influences and Social
William M. Waid and Martin T. Orne
Interaction
Dialectic Conceptions in Social Psychology:
Architectural Mediation of Residential An Application to Social Penetration and
Density and Control: Crowding and the Privacy Regulation
Regulation of Social Contact Irwin Altman, Anne Vinsel, and
Andrew Baum and Stuart Valins Barbara B. Brown
A Cultural Ecology of Social Behavior Direct Experience and Attitude–Behavior
J. W. Berry Consistency
Experiments on Deviance with Special Russell H. Fazio and Mark P. Zanna
Reference to Dishonesty Predictability and Human Stress: Toward a
David P. Farrington Clarification of Evidence and Theory
From the Early Window to the Late Night Suzanne M. Miller
Show: International Trends in the Study of Perceptual and Judgmental Processes in Social
Television’s Impact on Children and Adults Contexts
John P. Murray and Susan Kippax Arnold Upmeyer
Effects of Prosocial Television and Film Jury Trials: Psychology and Law
Material on the Behavior of Viewers Charlan Jeanne Nemeth
J. Phillipe Rushton Index
Subject Index
Volume 15
Volume 13
Balance, Agreement, and Positivity in the
People’s Analyses of the Causes of Ability- Cognition of Small Social Structures
Linked Performances Walter H. Crockett
John M. Darley and George R. Goethals Episode Cognition: Internal Representations
The Empirical Exploration of Intrinsic of Interaction Routines
Motivational Processes Joseph P. Forgas
Edward I. Deci and Richard M. Ryan The Effects of Aggressive-Pornographic Mass
Attribution of Responsibility: From Man the Media Stimuli
Scientist to Man as Lawyer Neil M. Malamuth and Ed Donnerstein
Frank D. Fincham and Joseph M. Jaspars Socialization in Small Groups: Temporal
Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Emotion Changes in Individual–Group Relations
Howard Leventhal Richard L. Moreland and John M. Levine
Toward a Theory of Conversion Behavior Translating Actions into Attitudes: An
Serge Moscovici Identity-Analytic Approach to the
The Role of Information Retrieval and Explanation of Social Conduct
Conditional Inference Processes in Belief Barry R. Schlenker
Formation and Change Aversive Conditions as Stimuli to Aggression
Robert S. Wyer, Jr. and Jon Hartwick Leonard Berkowitz
Index Index
Volume 14 Volume 16
Verbal and Nonverbal Communication of A Contextualist Theory of Knowledge: Its

Deception Implications for Innovation and Reform in
Miron Zuckerman, Bella M. DePaulo, and Psychological Research
Robert Rosenthal William J. McGuire
Social Cognition: Some Historical and When Belief Creates Reality

Theoretical Perspectives Mark Snyder
Janet Landman and Melvin Manis Index
Paradigmatic Behaviorism: Unified Theory
for Social-Personality Psychology
Volume 19
Arthur W. Staats
SocialPsychologyfromthe Standpointofa
Distraction–Conflict Theory: Progress and
StructuralSymbolicInteractionism:Toward
Problems
anInterdisciplinarySocial Psychology
Robert S. Baron
Sheldon Stryker
Recent Research on Selective Exposure to
Toward an Interdisciplinary Social
Information
Psychology
Dieter Frey
Carl W. Backman
The Role of Threat to Self-Esteem and
Index
Perceived Control in Recipient Reaction to
Help: Theory Development and Empirical
Volume 17 Validation
Arie Nadler and Jeffrey D. Fisher
Mental Representations of Self The Elaboration Likelihood Model of
John F. Kihlstrom and Nancy Cantor Persuasion
Theory of the Self: Impasse and Evolution Richard E. Petty and John T. Cacioppo
Kenneth J. Gergen Natural Experiments on the Effects of Mass
A Perceptual-Motor Theory of Emotion Media Violence on Fatal Aggression:
Howard Leventhal Strengths and Weaknesses of a New
Equity and Social Change in Human Approach
Relationships David P. Phillips
Charles G. McClintock, Roderick M. Paradigms and Groups
Kramer, and Linda J. Keil Ivan D. Steiner
A New Look at Dissonance Theory Social Categorization: Implications for
Joel Cooper and Russell H. Fazio Creation and Reduction of
Cognitive Theories of Persuasion Intergroup Bias
Alice H. Eagly and Shelly Chaiken David A. Wilder
Helping Behavior and Altruism: An Empirical Index
and Conceptual Overview
John F. Dovidio Volume 20
Index
Attitudes, Traits, and Actions: Dispositional
Volume 18 Prediction of Behavior in Personality and
Social Psychology
A Typological Approach to Marital Icek Ajzen
Interaction: Recent Theory and Research Prosocial Motivation: Is It Ever Truly
Mary Anne Fitzpatrick Altruistic?
Groups in Exotic Environments C. Daniel Batson
Albert A. Harrison and Mary M. Connors Dimensions of Group Process: Amount and
Balance Theory, the Jordan Paradigm, and Structure of Vocal Interaction
the Wiest Tetrahedon James M. Dabbs, Jr. and R. Barry Ruback
Chester A. Insko The Dynamics of Opinion Formation
The Social Relations Model Harold B. Gerard and Ruben Orive
David A. Kenny and Lawrence La Voie Positive Affect, Cognitive Processes, and
Coalition Bargaining Social Behavior
S. S. Komorita Alice M. Isen
Between Hope and Fear: The Psychology of Self-Discrepancy Theory: What Patterns of
Risk Self-Beliefs Cause People to Suffer?
Lola L. Lopes E. Tory Higgins
Toward an Integration of Cognitive and Minding Matters: The Consequences of
Motivational Perspectives on Social Infer- Mindlessness-Mindfulness
ence: A Biased Hypothesis-Testing Model Ellen J. Langer
Tom Pyszczynski and Jeff Greenberg The Tradeoffs of Social Control and
Index Innovation in Groups and Organizations
Charlan Jeanne Nemeth and Barry M. Staw
Confession, Inhibition, and Disease
Volume 21
James W. Pennebaker
A Sociocognitive Model of Attitude Structure
Introduction
and Function
Leonard Berkowitz
Anthony R. Pratkanis and
Part I. The Self as Known
Anthony G. Greenwald
Narrative and the Self as Relationship
Introspection, Attitude Change, and
Kenneth J. Gergen and Mary M. Gergen
Attitude–Behavior Consistency: The
Self and Others: Studies in Social Personality
Disruptive Effects of Explaining Why We
and Autobiography
Feel the Way We Do
Seymour Rosenberg
Timothy D. Wilson, Dana S. Dunn,
Content and Process in the Experience of Self
Dolores Kraft, and Douglas J. Lisle
William J. McGuire and Claire V. McGuire
Index
Information Processing and the Study of the
Self
Volume 23
John F. Kihlstrom, Nancy Cantor,
Jeanne Sumi Albright, Beverly R. Chew,
A Continuum of Impression Formation,
Stanley B. Klein, and Paula M. Niedenthal
from Category-Based to Individuating
Part II. Self-Motives Processes: Influences of Information and
Motivation on Attention and
Toward a Self-Evaluation Maintenance
Interpretation
Model of Social Behavior
Susan T. Fiske and Steven L. Neuberg
Abraham Tesser
Multiple Processes by Which Attitudes Guide
The Self: A Dialectical Approach
Behavior: The MODE Model as an
Carl W. Backman
Integrative Framework
The Psychology of Self-Affirmation:
Russell H. Fazio
Sustaining the Integrity of the Self
PEAT: An Integrative Model of Attribution
Claude M. Steele
Processes
A Model of Behavioral Self-Regulation:
John W. Medcof
Translating Intention into Action
Reading People’s Minds: A Transformation
Michael F. Scheier and Charles S. Carver
Rule Model for Predicting Others’
Index
Thoughts and Feelings
Rachel Karniol
Volume 22 Self-Attention and Behavior: A Review and
Theoretical Update
On the Construction of the Anger Experience: Frederick X. Gibbons
Aversive Events and Negative Priming in Counterfactual Thinking and Social
the Formation of Feelings Perception: Thinking about What Might
Leonard Berkowitz and Karen Heimer Have Been
Social Psychophysiology: A New Look Dale T. Miller, William Turnbull, and
John T. Cacioppo, Richard E. Petty, and Cathy McFarland
Louis G. Tassinary Index
Volume 24 The Impact of Accountability on Judgment

and Choice: Toward a Social Contingency
The Role of Self-Interest in Social and Model
Political Attitudes Philip E. Tetlock
David O. Sears and Carolyn L. Funk Index
A Terror Management Theory of Social
Behavior: The Psychological Functions Volume 26
of Self-Esteem and Cultural Worldviews
Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, and Attitudes Toward High Achievers and
Tom Pyszczynski Reactions to Their Fall: Theory and
Mood and Persuasion: Affective States Research Concerning Tall Poppies
Influence the Processing of Persuasive N. T. Feather
Communications Evolutionary Social Psychology: From Sexual
Norbert Schwarz, Herbert Bless, and Selection to Social Cognition
Gerd Bohner Douglas T. Kenrick
A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Judgment in a Social Context: Biases,
A Theoretical Refinement and Short-comings, and the Logic of
Reevaluation of the Role of Norms in Conversation
Human Behavior Norbert Schwarz
Robert B. Cialdini, Carl A. Kallgren, and A Phase Model of Transitions: Cognitive and
Raymond R. Reno Motivational Consequences
The Effects of Interaction Goals on Person Diane N. Ruble
Perception Multiple-Audience Problems,
James L. Hilton and John M. Darley Tactical Communication, and Social
Studying Social Interaction with the Interaction: A Relational-Regulation
Rochester Interaction Record Perspective
Harry T. Reis and Ladd Wheeler John H. Fleming
Subjective Construal, Social Inference, and From Social Inequality to Personal
Human Misunderstanding Entitlement: The Role of Social
Dale W. Griffin and Lee Ross Comparisons, Legitimacy Appraisals, and
Index Group Membership
Brenda Major
Volume 25 Mental Representations of Social Groups:
Advances in Understanding Stereotypes
Universals in the Content and Structure of and Stereotyping
Values: Theoretical Advances and Charles Stangor and James E. Lange
Empirical Tests in 20 Countries Index
Shalom H. Schwartz
Motivational Foundations of Behavioral Volume 27
Confirmation
Mark Snyder Inferences of Responsibility and Social
A Relational Model of Authority in Groups Motivation
Tom R. Tyler and E. Allan Lind Bernard Weiner
You Can’t Always Think What You Want: Information Processing in Social Contexts:
Problems in the Suppression of Unwanted Implications for Social Memory and
Thoughts Judgment
Daniel M. Wegner Robert S. Wyer, Jr. and
Affect in Social Judgments and Decisions: Deborah H. Gruenfeld
A Multiprocess Model The Interactive Roles of Stability and
Joseph Paul Forgas Level of Self-Esteem: Research
The Social Psychology of Stanley Milgram and Theory
Thomas Blass Michael H. Kernis and Stephanie B. Waschull
Gender Differences in Perceiving Internal Terror Management Theory of Self-Esteem

State: Toward a His-and-Hers Model of and Cultural Worldviews: Empirical
Perceptual Cue Use Assessments and Conceptual Refinements
Tomi-Ann Roberts and James W. Pennebaker Jeff Greenberg, Sheldon Solomon, and
On the Role of Encoding Processes in Tom Pyszczynski
Stereotype Maintenance The Flexible Correction Model: The Role
William von Hippel, Denise Sekaquaptewa, of Naı̈ve Theories of Bias in Bias
and Patrick Vargas Correction
Psychological Barriers to Dispute Resolution Duane T. Wegener and Richard E. Petty
Lee Ross and Andrew Ward Self-Evaluation: To Thine Own Self Be Good,
Index to Thine Own Self Be Sure, to Thine Own
Self Be True, and to Thine Own Self Be
Better
Volume 28
Constantine Sedikides and Michael J. Strube
Toward a Hierarchical Model of Intrinsic and
The Biopsychosocial Model of Arousal
Extrinsic Motivation
Regulation
Robert J. Vallerand
Jim Blascovich and Joe Tomaka
Outcome Biases in Social Perception:
Volume 30
Implications for Dispositional Inference,
Attitude Change, Stereotyping, and Social
Promotion and Prevention: Regulatory
Behavior
Focus as a Motivational Principle
Scott T. Allison, Diane M. Mackie, and
E. Tory Higgins
David M. Messick
The Other ‘‘Authoritarian Personality’’
Principles of Judging Valence: What Makes
Bob Altemeyer
Events Positive or Negative?
Person Preception Comes of Age: The
C. Miguel Brendl and E. Tory Higgins
Salience and Significance of Age in Social
Pluralistic Ignorance and the Perpetuation of
Adjustments
Social Norms by Unwitting Actors
Joann M. Montepare and Leslie
Deborah A. Prentice and Dale T. Miller
A. Zebrowitz
People as Flexible Interpreters: Evidence
On the Perception of Social Consensus
and Issues from Spontaneous Trait
Joachim Krueger
Inference
Prejudice and Stereotyping in Everyday
James S. Uleman, Leonard S. Newman, and
Communication
Gordon B. Moskowitz
Janet B. Ruscher
Social Perception, Social Stereotypes, and
Situated Optimism: Specific Outcome
Teacher Expectations: Accuracy and the
Expectancies and Self-Regulation
Quest for the Powerful Self-Fulfilling
David A. Armor and Shelley E. Taylor
Prophecy
Lee Jussim Jacquelynne Eccles, and
Volume 31
Stephanie Madon
Nonverbal Behavior and Nonverbal
Affect and Information Processing
Communication: What do Conversational
Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Gerald L. Clore, and
Hand Gestures Tell Us?
Linda M. Isbell
Robert M. Krauss, Yihsiu Chen, and
Linguistic Intergroup Bias:
Purnima Chawla
Stereotype Perpetuation through
Index
Language
Anne Maass
Volume 29 Relationships from the Past in the
Present: Significant-Other
Counterfactual Thinking: The Intersection of Representations and Transference
Affect and Function in Interpersonal Life
Neal J. Roese and James M. Olson Serena Chen and Susan M. Anderson
The Puzzle of Continuing Group Inequality: G. Daniel Lassiter, Andrew L. Geers,

Piecing Together Psychological, Social, Patrick J. Munhall, Ian M. Handley, and
and Cultural Forces in Social Melissa J. Beers
Dominance Theory Effort Determination of Cardiovascular
Felicia Pratto Response: An Integrative Analysis
Attitude Representation Theory with Applications in Social
Charles G. Lord and Mark R. Lepper Psychology
Discontinuity Theory: Cognitive and Social Rex A. Wright and Leslie D. Kirby
Searches for Rationality and Normality— Index
May Lead to Madness
Philip G. Zimbardo Volume 34
Volume 32 Uncertainty Management by Means of

Fairness Judgments
The Nature and Function of Self-Esteem: Kees van den Bos and E. Allan Lind
Sociometer Theory Cognition in Persuasion: An Analysis of
Mark R. Leary and Roy F. Baumeister Information Processing in Response to
Temperature and Aggression Persuasive Communications
Craig A. Anderson, Kathryn B. Anderson, Dolores Albarracin
Nancy Dorr, Kristina M. DeNeve, and Narrative-Based Representations of Social
Mindy Flanagan Knowledge: Their Construction and Use
The Importance of Being Selective: Weighing in Comprehension, Memory, and
the Role of Attribute Importance in Judgment
Attitudinal Judgment Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Rashmi Adaval and
Joop van der Pligt, Nanne K. de Vries, Stanley J. Colcombe
Antony S. R. Manstead, and Frank Reflexion and Reflection: A Social Cognitive
van Harreveld Neuroscience Approach to Attributional
Toward a History of Social Behavior: Inference
Judgmental Accuracy from Thin Slices of Matthew D. Lieberman, Ruth Gaunt, Daniel
the Behavioral Stream T. Gilbert, and Yaacov Trope
Nalini Amabady, Frank J. Bernieri, and Antecedents and Consequences of
Jennifer A. Richeson Attributions to Discrimination: Theoretical
Attractiveness, Attraction, and Sexual and Empirical Advances
Selection: Evolutionary Perspectives on the Brenda Major, Wendy J. Quinton, and
Form and Function of Physical Shannon K. McCoy
Attractiveness A Theory of Goal Systems
Dianne S. Berry Arie W. Kruglanski, James Y. Shah,
Index Ayelet Fishbach, Ron Friedman,
Woo Young Chun, and
Volume 33 David Sleeth-Keppler
Contending with Group Image: The
The Perception–Behavior Expressway: Psychology of Stereotype and Social
Automatic Effects of Social Perception on Identity Threat
Social Behavior Claude M. Steele, Steven J. Spencer, and
Ap Dijksterhuis and John A. Bargh Joshua Aronson
A Dual-Process Cognitive-Motivational Index
Theory of Ideology and Prejudice
John Duckitt Volume 35
Ambivalent Sexism
Peter Glick and Susan T. Fiske Social Identity and Leadership Processes
Videotaped Confessions: Is Guilt in the Eye of in Groups
the Camera? Michael A. Hogg and Daan van Knippenberg
The Attachment Behavioral System in Over Thirty Years Later: A Contemporary

Adulthood: Activation, Psychodynamics, Look at Symbolic Racism
and Interpersonal Processes David O. Sears and P. J. Henry
Mario Mikulincer and Phillip R. Shaver Managing Group Behavior: The Interplay
Stereotypes and Behavioral Confirmation: Between Procedural Justice, Sense of Self,
From Interpersonal to and Cooperation
Intergroup Perspectives David De Cremer and Tom R. Tyler
Olivier Klein and Mark Snyder So Right it’s Wrong: Groupthink and the
Motivational Bases of Information Ubiquitous Nature of Polarized Group
Processing and Strategy in Conflict Decision Making
and Negotiation Robert S. Baron
Carsten K. W. De Dreu and An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Contact
Peter J. Carnevale Rupert Brown and Miles Hewstone
Regulatory Mode: Locomotion and Says Who?: Epistemic Authority Effects in
Assessment as Distinct Orientations Social Judgment
E. Tory Higgins, Arie W. Kruglanski, Arie W. Kruglanski, Amiram Raviv,
and Antonio Pierro Daniel Bar-Tal, Alona Raviv,
Affective Forecasting Keren Sharvit, Shmuel Ellis, Ruth Bar,
Timothy D. Wilson and Antonio Pierro, and Lucia Mannetti
Daniel T. Gilbert Index
Index
Volume 36 Volume 38
Aversive Racism Exploring the Latent Structure of

John F. Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaertner Strength-Related Attitude Attributes
Socially Situated Cognition: Cognition in its Penny S. Visser, George Y. Bizer,
Social Context and Jon A. Krosnick
Eliot R. Smith and Gün R. Semin Implementation Intentions and Goal
Social Axioms: A Model for Social Beliefs in Achievement: A Meta-Analysis of Effects
Multicultural Perspective and Processes
Kwok Leung and Michael Harris Bond Peter M. Gollwitzer and Paschal Sheeran
Violent Video Games: Specific Effects of Interracial Interactions: A Relational
Violent Content on Aggressive Thoughts Approach
and Behavior J. Nicole Shelton and Jennifer A. Richeson
Craig A. Anderson, Nicholas L. Carnagey, The Psychology of Self-Defense:
Mindy Flanagan, Arlin J. Benjamin, Jr., Self-Affirmation Theory
Janie Eubanks, and Jeffery C. Valentine David K. Sherman and Geoffrey L. Cohen
Survival and Change in Judgments: A Model Intergroup Beliefs: Investigations from
of Activation and Comparison the Social Side
Dolores Albarracı́n, Harry M. Wallace, and Charles Stangor and Scott P. Leary
Laura R. Glasman A Multicomponent Conceptualization of
The Implicit Volition Model: On the Authenticity: Theory and Research
Preconscious Regulation of Temporarily Michael H. Kernis and Brian M. Goldman
Adopted Goals Index
Gordon B. Moskowitz, Peizhong Li, and
Elizabeth R. Kirk Volume 39
Index
Culture and the Structure of Personal
Volume 37 Experience: Insider and Outsider
Phenomenologies of the Self and Social
Accuracy in Social Perception: Criticisms, World
Controversies, Criteria, Components, and Dov Cohen, Etsuko Hoshino-Browne, and
Cognitive Processes Angela K.-y. Leung
Lee Jussim
Uncertainty–Identity Theory Volume 40

Michael A. Hogg
Metacognitive Experiences and the Intricacies The Commitment-Insurance System:
of Setting People Straight: Implications for Self-Esteem and the Regulation
Debiasing and Public Information of Connection in Close
Campaigns Relationships
Norbert Schwarz, Lawrence J. Sanna, Ian Sandra L. Murray and John G. Holmes
Skurnik, and Carolyn Yoon Warmth and Competence as Universal
Multiple Social Categorization Dimensions of Social Perception:
Richard J. Crisp and Miles Hewstone The Stereotype Content Model and
On the Parameters of Human Judgment the BIAS Map
Arie W. Kruglanski, Antonio Pierro, Amy J. C. Cuddy, Susan T. Fiske,
Lucia Mannetti, Hans-Peter Erb, and and Peter Glick
Woo Young Chun A Reciprocal Influence Model of Social
Panglossian Ideology in the Service of Power: Emerging Principles and
System Justification: How Complementary Lines of Inquiry
Stereotypes Help Us to Rationalize Dacher Keltner, Gerben A. Van Kleef, Serena
Inequality Chen, and Michael W. Kraus
Aaron C. Kay, John T. Jost, Anesu N. Psychological Aspects of Retributive Justice
Mandisodza, Steven J. Sherman, Kevin M. Carlsmith and John M. Darley
John V. Petrocelli, and Amy L. Johnson Majority Versus Minority Influence,
Feeling the Anguish of Others: A Theory of Message Processing and Attitude Change:
Vicarious Dissonance The Source-Context-Elaboration Model
Joel Cooper and Michael A. Hogg Robin Martin and Miles Hewstone
Index Index
CONTRIBUTORS
David M. Amodio (119)

Department of Psychology, New York University, 6 Washington Place,
New York, USA
Rick van Baaren (219)
Behavioral Science Institute, Raboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen,
The Netherlands
Lisa Feldman Barrett (167)
Massachusetts General Hospital/Harvard Medical School, Psychiatric Neuroimaging
Program and Martinos Imaging Center, Department of Radiology; Department of
Psychology, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts, USA
Eliza Bliss-Moreau (167)
Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, University of California, Davis,
Sacramento, California, USA
Pablo Briñol (69)
Departamento de Psicologia Social, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Campus de
Cantoblanco, Carretera de Colmenar, Madrid, Spain
Tanya L. Chartrand (219)
The Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
Cindy Harmon-Jones (119)
Department of Psychology, Texas A&M University, 4235 TAMU, College
Station, Texas, USA
Eddie Harmon-Jones (119)
Department of Psychology, Texas A&M University, 4235 TAMU, College
Station, Texas, USA
Richard E. Petty (69)
Department of Psychology, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA
Emily Pronin (1)
Department of Psychology and Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International
Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, USA
Kipling D. Williams (275)
Department of Psychological Sciences, Purdue University, West Lafayette,
Indiana, USA
ix
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09 10 11 12 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Index
A induced-compliance experiments,
122–123, 126
Affective circumplex effort justification, 123
axes, 182 Cognitive response theory, 71–72
bipolarity debate Cognitive style, mimicry, 252
bipolar valence dimension, 182 Comprehensive exam policy, 81
CIRCUM analysis, 184 Confidence applications, self-validation
Likert-type scale, 184 chronic self-doubt, 103
meta-analysis, 186 emotions, 105–106
multiple affective dimension, 183 information process, 108–109
Necker cube illusion, 185 meta-cognitive idea, 104–105
neuromodulators, 188 primes, 106–107
circle validating thoughts, 107–108
circular order of complexity, 180 Conflict monitoring, dual-process model, 132
qualitative similarity, 181 Construal level theory, 36–37
variations, 181 Convergent creativity, 254
judgement of emotion, 188–189 Cultural psychology, 45–46
judgement of words, 189
mathematical tool, 180
replicability, 188 D
self-report of emotion experience, 191 Dissonance. See also Cognitive dissonance theory
Asymmetric insight illusion, 16–17 action-oriented mindset, 137–139
Attitude changes, 18–20 cognitive discrepancy reduction, 133–134
Attitudinal ambivalence action-based model
measuring confidence, 100–101 action-oriented mindset, 130
positive and negative features, 99–100 anterior cingulate cortex activity, 132–133
Attribution, 38–40 conflict monitoring, 132
decision-making, 130
B discrepancy reduction, 131
Base-rate assumptions, 49 emotion of sympathy, 141
Behavioral activation scale (BAS), 158–159 guilt study, 140
Behavioral disregard, 10–12 hypocrisy paradigm, 141–142
Behavioral judgment, 15–16 intergroup situations, 139
Behavioral mimicry, 225–226 neural processes, 131
reducing dissonance methods, 143
C self-reported emotional responses, 141
Stroop and Eriksen flanker’s task, 132
Cognitive dissonance theory decision paradigm, 137
alternative theoretical explanations, 123–124 electroencephalographic activity, 134
aversive consequences, 126–128 fMRI studies, 135
behavioral commitment, 128 individual and cultural difference
moral and adaptive adequacy, 125 action-orientation, 147
negative affective state, 128 attitude change, 144, 147–148
proximal and distal motivation, 128–129 confirmatory factor analysis, 151
self-affirmation, 124–126 critical components, 149
self-consistency, 124 DARQ subscales, 151–154
attitude change, 121 discrepancy reduction, 149
experimental paradigms dissonance arousal, 158
free choice, 122 personality scales, 157–158
315
316 Index
Dissonance (cont.) preference for consistency, 146–147

preference for consistency, 146–147 self-esteem, 145–146
self-affirmation model, 146 six-factor models, 155
self-consistency theory predictions, 145 two-factor models, 156
self-esteem, 145–146 variables, 148
six-factor models, 155 Induced-compliance experiments, 126
two-factor model, 156 Interpersonal interactions
variables, 148–149 spotlight effect, 22–23
induced compliance paradigm, 135–136 transparency illusion, 21–22
left frontal cortical activity Interview illusion, 17–18
action-oriented mindset, 137–139 Introspection illusions
counterattitudinal essay, 135–136 applications
mediator manipulation, 136 conflict, 49–50
neurofeedback training, 136–137 ethical lapses, 51–52
prefrontal cortex, 134 introspective education, 52–53
Divergent creativity, 254 racism and sexism, 50–51
Divergent vs. similar perspectives self-knowledge and social connection,
dispositional factors, 27–28 53–54
nonconscious processes, 28–29 behavioral disregard, 10–12
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), bias blind spot, 6–7
287–288 components, 4–6
cultural psychology, 45–46
E definition, 3
differential valuation, 12–14
Egocentrism, 48–49 egocentrism, 48–49
Elaboration likelihood model (ELM) extrospective vs. introspective information,
of persuasion 3–4
incidental emotions, 73 human development, 44–45
persuasion theories, 72 introspective weighting
Electroencephalographic (EEG) activity, 134 fundamental attribution error, 7–8
Emotional mimicry, 223–225 misattribution condition, 8–9
Ethical behavior, 51–52 medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) activation,
47–48
F self–other asymmetry, 9–10
social psychology
Facial mimicry, 223
attitude change, 18–20
Follow-up experiment, 80–81
interpersonal interaction, 21–23
Free will
interview illusion, 17–18
automaticity of behavior, 41–42
judgment and decision making, 15–16
self-symmetry hypothesis, 42–44
personal relationships, 23–25
social influence, 20–21
H stereotyping and prejudice, 25–26
Human mimicry. See Mimicry theoretical concerns
actors and observers perspectives, 26–27
I attribution, 38–40
decision making, 37–38
Incidental emotions divergent vs. similar perspectives, 27–29
behavioral intentions, 87–88 free will, 41–44
confidence appraisal, 88–89 internal vs. external explanations, 29–31
Individual and cultural differences, dissonance psychological distance, 36–37
action-orientation, 147 self-denigration, 34–36
confirmatory factor analysis, 151 self-enhancement, 31–34
critical components, 149–150 social distance, 40–41
cultural differences, 147–148 Introspective education, 52–53
DARQ subscales, 151–154 Introspective weighting
discrepancy reduction, 149 fundamental attribution error, 7–8
personality scales, 157–158 misattribution condition, 8–9
Index 317
L products and people’s preferences, 248–249

prosocial behavior, 241–242, 245–246
Lay epistemic theory (LET), 77 self-construal
Low-effort rejection process, 82–83 individuals in, 248
reverse causal direction, 247
M self-esteem, 249
Matching regulatory fit, 95–96 self-regulation
Material primes, 52 coordination processes, 249–250
Medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) activation, cross-race interactions, 250–252
47–48 power discrepancies, 251–252
Mental repetition, 98 and similarity
Message effects, self-validation attitudes converge, 240
matching regulatory fit, 95–96 stereotypes, 241
matching thought, 96–97 stereotype conformity, 252–253
summary and additional factors, 97–98 theories
Meta-cognitive approaches communication tool, 256–257
primary cognitions, 77–78 ideomotor action, 257–258
retrieval theory, 78–79 perception-behavior link, 259
Mimicry verbal mimicry, 225
behavioral mimicry, 225–226 Mirror neurons, 259–261
cognitive and neuropsychological theories, 262 Mortality salience (MS)
cognitive style, 252 description, 93
complementary action, 261 induced polarization, 94–95
creativity, 254–255
emotional mimicry, 223–225 N
empathy, 239–240 Nonconscious process, 28–29
evaluations of, 255 Nonconscious tool, mimicry
facial mimicry, 223 affiliation goal, 233–234
functional magnetic resonance imaging distinctiveness, 234–235
(fMRI), 247, 258, 263 outgroup membership, 237–238
impact of relationship shielding, 238–239
mimicry dyad, 228 social chameleons and affiliation cues, 236–237
moderators and consequences, 227 social exclusion, 235–236
liking and rapport social stigma, 237
boundary conditions, 231, 232
correlational evidence, 228–229 O
recipient of, 231
reverse causal direction, 232 Ostracism
and synchrony, 230 definition, 276
mirror neurons, 259–261 detection
mirror system and empathy Ball toss and Train Ride conversation
perspective taking ability, 264 paradigm, 281
yawning contagion, 263 Cyberball paradigm, 282–283
mood, 253–254 eye-gaze paradigm, 284–285
motivation and mirror system, 265–266 feelings dial and speed, 283
nonconscious tool minimal world, graphic depiction, 284
affiliation goal, 233–234 model, 279–280
distinctiveness, 234–235 over-detection, 285–286
outgroup membership, 237–238 groups, communication, and assistance,
relationship shielding, 238–239 306–308
social chameleons and affiliation cues, long-term effects, 303–304
236–237 pain signaling
social exclusion, 235–236 dACC activation measurement, 287–288
social stigma, 237 self-reports, 286
persuasion still face, 287–288
evidence, 243–244 power and provocation cluster
product preferences, 244 control fortification and aggression,
prosocial impact, 244 300–301
318 Index
Ostracism (cont.) CIRCUM analysis, 184

life-alone and blind-sided rejection descriptive tool, 188
paradigms, 301–302 emotional granularity, 193–194
reflection and recovery idiographic affective circumplexes, 192
distraction, 293–294 interoceptive sensitivity, 197
inclusionary cluster, 297–298 judgments of emotion, 188–189
individual differences, 294 judgments of words, 189
need-fortification hypothesis, 296–297 Likert-type scale, 184
rumination and distraction role, 296 local region of homogeneity, 193
situational context, 294–296 mathematical tool, 180
resignation, 302–306 meta-analysis, 186
social psychology, 277–278 Morph Movies task, 195
social self, 277 multidimensional scaling, 191
social servility multiple affective dimensions, 183
behavioral extraversion, 299 Necker cube illusion, 185
compliance, 298–299 neuromodulators, 188
nonconscious mimicry, 298 positive and negative affective states, 186
temporal model, 279 replicability, 188
threatened needs self-reports of emotion experience,
contentious issue, 288–289 191, 193
control, 289 valence and arousal focus, 194–196
positive and negative affects, 290 variations, 181
recognition, 289–290 Whitehead heartbeat detection task, 196
self-esteem, 289 basic building block, 169
self-report measures, 290–293 conscious experience
Over-optimism, 33–34 binocular rivalry, 204
Blindsight, 205
P sensory processing, 202
visual cortex activity, 203
Personal relationships. See Pluralistic ignorance constructivist approaches, 168–169
Personal relevance, 101–102 dimensional perspective, 170
Persuasion feelings vs. emotions, 171
attitudinal ambivalence fundamental ingredient, 169
measuring confidence, 100–101 learning and vision, 198
positive and negative features, 99–100 mental counterpart, 168
fundamental processes, 72–73 modern Wundtian view
mimicry common metric, 172
evidence, 243–244 core, 171
product preferences, 244 neurophysiologic barometer, 173
prosocial impact, 244 sensory information, 172
personal relevance, 101–102 neural reference space
psychological mechanisms, 70–71 affective circumplex, 179
social psychological perspectives, 71–72 affective stimuli, 178
Planning fallacy, 15 amygdala and ventral striatum, 174
Pluralistic ignorance, 23–24 circuitry parts, 173
Power and provocation cluster, ostracism dopamine neurons, 175
control fortification and aggression, 300–301 functional magnetic resonance imaging,
life-alone and blind-sided rejection paradigms, 176
301–302 orbitofrontal cortex, 175
Prosocial behavior, mimicry, 241–242, positron emission tomography, 176
245–246 prefrontal cortex, 175
Psychological primitive sensory integration network, 176
affective circumplex visceromotor network, 176, 178
axes, 182 psychological ingredient, 197
bipolar valence dimension, 182 supports learning
brain areas, 187 affective learning, 198
circle, 180–181 rule-based affective learning, 199–200
circular order of complexity, 180 sympathetic nervous system, 198
Index 319
R ease of retrieval, 92–93

incidental emotions, 87–89
Racism, 50–51 power, 89–91
Recipient effects, self-validation self-affirmation, 91–92
bodily responses threat and mortality, 93–95
hand writing, 86 source effects
head movements, 84–85 credibility, 79–81
self-esteem, 87 factors summary, 83–84
ease of retrieval, 92–93 majority/minority status, 82–83
incidental emotions similarity, 81–82
behavioral intentions, 87–88 thought confidence, 75–76
confidence appraisal, 88–89 Sexism. See Racism
power Social chameleons, 236–237
attitude change, 89–90 Social influence, 20–21
social outcomes, 90–91 Social servility, ostracism
self-affirmation, 91–92 behavioral extraversion, 299
threat and mortality compliance, 298–299
magnifying effect, 93–94 nonconscious mimicry, 298
MS-induced polarization, 94–95 Spotlight effect, 22–23
Stereotyping and prejudice, 25–26
S
Self-affirmation, 91–92 T
Self-construal and mimicry Terror management theory (TMT), 94
individuals in, 248 Theoretical implications, introspection
reverse causal direction, 247 illusion
Self-denigration actors and observers perspectives, 26–27
dispositional qualities, 35–36 attribution, 38–40
shyness and confederate, 34–35 decision making, 37–38
Self-enhancement divergent vs. similar perspectives
behavioral predictions, 32–33 dispositional factors, 27–28
cognitive mechanism, 31–32 nonconscious process, 28–29
Self-esteem, action-based model free will
self-affirmation model, 146 automaticity of behavior, 41–42
self-consistency theory’s predictions, 145 self-symmetry hypothesis, 42–44
Self-knowledge pursuits, 53–54 internal vs. external explanations
Self–other asymmetry, 9–10 actor–observer bias, 30–31
Self-regulation, mimicry trait attributions, 29
coordination processes, 249–250 psychological distance, 36–37
cross-race interactions, 250–252 self-denigration
power discrepancies, 251–252 dispositional qualities, 35–36
Self-validation hypothesis shyness and confederate, 34–35
confidence applications self-enhancement
chronic self-doubt, 103 behavioral predictions, 32–33
meta-cognitive idea, 104–105 cognitive mechanism, 31–32
context effects, 98–99 over-optimism, 33–34
extending in persuasion social distance, 40–41
ambivalence, 99–101 Threats
personal relevance, 101–102 belonging, 289
key manipulations, 77 contentious issue, 288–289
mental contents, 109 positive affect and negative affect, 290
message effects recognition, 289–290
matching regulatory fit, 95–96 self-esteem and control, 289
matching thought, 96–97 self-report measures, 290–293
summary and additional factors, 97–98 Transparency illusion, 21–22
meta-cognitive thought, 74
neutral mood group, 110 V
recipient effects
bodily responses, 84–87 Verbal mimicry, 225
320 Index
W dopamine neutrons, 175

neurophysiologic barometer, 173
Wundtian core affect view prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortex,
amygdala and ventral striatum, 174 175
circuitry, 173 sensory integration and visceromotor
common metric, 172 network, 176
definition, 171

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C H A P T E R O N E

The Introspection Illusion

Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 41 # 2009 Elsevier Inc.

6.4. Introspective education 52

their efforts at self-understanding (respectively, Epley & Dunning, 2000;

1.1. Self and other

1.2. Components of the illusion

weighting when considering the introspections of others. Therefore, another

Information “directly”available to self Weight given Component of illusion

Information not “directly” available to self

about themselves, versus their seemingly direct experience of extrospective

2. Identifying the Illusion: The Case of Bias

2.1. Introspective weighting

Perception of own bias 5 Northeast students

2.2. Self–other asymmetry

2.3. Behavioral disregard

voiced by those who performed well). To an outsider, the student’s com-

versus observers’ differential inclination to look to behavior. As shown in

2.4. Differential valuation

A Test-taking study B Better-than-average study

Actors Observers Observers with

whether they were provided with introspective information suggests that

3. The Introspection Illusion in

3.1. Judgment and decision making

3.2. The self

attention not only to interviewees’ carefully composed replies but also to

3.3. Attitudes and attitude change

misguide people as to the nature of their true attitudes and preferences

3.4. Social influence

3.5. Interpersonal interaction

In actor’s In other person’s

Introspective information Extrospective information Asymmetry

The actor and other person make different assessments. Effect

spotlight shining on them. Spotlight effects thus differ from illusions of

3.6. Personal relationships

students’ pursuit of cross-race friendships. They found that college students

others respond as though little of meaning has been exchanged. Listeners, by

3.7. Stereotyping and prejudice

correlated with the White participants’ nonverbal behavior (which, notably,

4. Implications for Major Theoretical Concerns

4.1. The perspectives of actors and observers

4.1.1. Divergent versus similar perspectives

Table 1.1 Some theories of self and other perception

Dominant source of information

inspired by a behaviorist analysis, suggests that it is common to have weak

therefore could not yield evidence in introspections (e.g., Pronin et al.,

4.1.2. Internal versus external explanations

A Discrete options study B Open ended study

4.2. Self enhancement

Consider a classic case of self-enhancement: People tend to rate them-

thoughts related to those events, such as when a person thinks about an

Table 1.2 Roots of over-optimism in an introspection illusion

4.2.1. Self denigration

of public speaking (a concern related to shyness) than others, presumably

4.3. Psychological distance

experiments have linked people’s differential treatment of present selves

4.3.1. Decision making

A Disgusting liquid study B Charity email study

Decision (number of emails)