Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
 
SECOND DIVISION
 
 
RODEL LUZ y ONG, G. R. No. 197788
Petitioner,  
   
  Present:
   
  CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - BRION,
  PEREZ,
  SERENO, and
  REYES, JJ.
   
   
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:
[1]
 
Respondent. February 29, 2012
x--------------------------------------------------x
 
DECISION

SERENO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside
the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February
2011[2]and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.

Statement of the Facts and of the Case

 The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the
version of the prosecution, are as follows:

PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of

the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on
March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning, he saw the accused, who
was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road,
Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag
down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all
motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he
invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he
flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he
and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of
municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting
something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take
out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside
it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his
jacket which was a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3)
inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1)
Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it;
that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and
something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the
contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic
sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained
suspected shabu.[3]
 

Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of

Not guilty to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was
terminated on 24 September 2003, after which, trial ensued.

During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic

chemist testified for the prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified for
himself and raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion.

In its 19 February 2009 Decision,[4] the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal

possession of dangerous drugs[5] committed on 10 March 2003. It found the
prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a
traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which led to the discovery on
his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The RTC also found
his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and unsubstantiated.
The dispositive portion of its Decision held:
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL
LUZ y ONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and (1)
day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).

The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine

Drug Enforcement Agency for its proper disposition and destruction in
accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.[6]
 

Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision.

On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12 October
2011, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the Petition. On 4
January 2012, the latter filed its Comment dated 3 January 2012.

Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:

(i)                 THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT

SHABU IS INVALID.

(ii)               THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE

PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF THE POLICE OFFICER
CANNOT BE RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.

(iii)             THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE

ALLEGED SUBJECT SPECIMEN HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.

(iv)             THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT

PROVEN BEYOND THE REASONABLE DOUBT (sic).[7]
 
Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no
lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was
erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation
of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had
never consented to the search conducted upon him.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC held
thus:

It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in this
case by Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for violation of City Ordinance No.
98-012, an ordinance requiring the use of crash helmet by motorcycle drivers and
riders thereon in the City of Naga and prescribing penalties for violation
thereof. The accused himself admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the
time when he was flagged down by the said police officers, albeit he had a helmet
in his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the part of the apprehending
officers to flag down and arrest the accused because the latter was actually
committing a crime in their presence, that is, a violation of City Ordinance No.
98-012. In other words, the accused, being caught in flagrante delicto violating
the said Ordinance, he could therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the
apprehending officers. x x x.[8]
 

We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons
alleged. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review
and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed
judgment, or even reverse the trial courts decision based on grounds other than
those that the parties raised as errors.[9]

First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for
committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason,
arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be
bound to answer for the commission of an offense.[10] It is effected by an actual
restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the
custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force,
manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of
arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the
parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.[11]

Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but
the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter:
 SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law enforcement and
peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in
apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued
pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any
provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a
receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the
driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours
from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt
shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to
settle his case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will be a ground
for the suspension and/or revocation of his license.
 

Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual[12] provides the

following procedure for flagging down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in
Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept and will not apply in hot pursuit
operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following, when applicable: x
xx

m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket

(TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged,
unnecessary conversation or argument with the driver or any of the
vehicles occupants;
 
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket,
petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest. There was no intention on
the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into
custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was
at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found
by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they went to the
police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down almost in front of that
place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there.
There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.

In Berkemer v. McCarty,[13] the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court

discussed at length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained
pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation. The
Court held that, such questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor
can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the
expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is
conducted. It ruled as follows:

It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly

curtails the freedom of action of the driver and the passengers, if any, of the
detained vehicle. Under the law of most States, it is a crime either to ignore a
policemans signal to stop ones car or, once having stopped, to drive away without
permission. x x x

However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the

Miranda opinion emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine announced in
Miranda requires that it be enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations
in which the concerns that powered the decision are implicated. Thus, we must
decide whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person pressures that
sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to
require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.

Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person
questioned will be induced to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely,
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at 467. First, detention of a motorist pursuant
to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief. The vast majority of
roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A motorists expectations, when he
sees a policemans light flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a
short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his
license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he
most likely will be allowed to continue on his way. In this respect, questioning
incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse
interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is
aware that questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators the
answers they seek. See id., at 451.

Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not

such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure,
the aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge
that the officer has some discretion in deciding whether to issue a citation, in
combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions. But
other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most
importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x

In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a

so-called Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal
arrest. x x x The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort
explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject
to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic
stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops
are not in custody for the purposes of Miranda.
 x x x x x x x x x

We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not
come to pass. It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become
applicable as soon as a suspects freedom of action is curtailed to a degree
associated with formal arrest. California v. Beheler, 463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983)
(per curiam). If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop
thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him in custody for practical
purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by
Miranda. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam).
(Emphasis supplied.)
 
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only
subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not
at that moment placed under custody (such that he should have been apprised of
his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as
the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here
be considered under arrest at the time that his traffic citation was being made.

It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated
by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is
penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be
issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine
only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made
for such an offense.

This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation.
Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the
motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to
have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the officers issuance (or intent to
issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same
violation.

Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed
arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting
the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not
complied with.

This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty
of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must
show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they
might make could be used against them.[14] It may also be noted that in this case,
these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police officers
only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also
be given to a person apprehended due to a traffic violation:

The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that

the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the
inherently compelling pressures generated by the custodial setting itself, which
work to undermine the individuals will to resist, and as much as possible to free
courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the
fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes are
implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of
misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies.

If it were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested when he was flagged
down for a traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there would
have been no need for him to be arrested for a second timeafter the police officers
allegedly discovered the drugsas he was already in their custody.

Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from
it was likewise illegal.

The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a
warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in plain
view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v)
customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk search; and (vii) exigent and emergency
circumstances.[15] None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a search
incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.

It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently

discovered, was not in plain view. It was actually concealed inside a metal
container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not immediately
apparent.[16]
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be
lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence.[17] It must be
voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must
be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction of
PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent
consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was merely told to take out the
contents of his pocket.[18]

Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to

be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this
determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the
environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether
the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant
objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of
the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendants
belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has
the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent
was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given.[19] In this case, all that was
alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the morning,
accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against
a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.

Neither does the search qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While the rule
normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct,
which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk
is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons.[20]

In Knowles v. Iowa,[21] the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer
stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of
arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct a full
search of the car. The Court therein held that there was no justification for a full-
blown search when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers
may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to alight from
the car or doing a patdown:
 In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the search
incident to arrest exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him
into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x x But
neither of these underlying rationales for the search incident to arrest exception is
sufficient to justify the search in the present case.

We have recognized that the first rationaleofficer safetyis both legitimate

and weighty, x x x The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation,
however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In Robinson, we
stated that a custodial arrest involves danger to an officer because of the extended
exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him
to the police station. 414 U. S., at 234-235. We recognized that [t]he danger to the
police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress,
and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest. Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine
traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and is more
analogous to a so-called Terry stop . . . than to a formal arrest. Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291,
296 (1973) (Where there is no formal arrest . . . a person might well be less hostile
to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy
incriminating evidence).

This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the
case of a routine traffic stop. It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110;
Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while the concern for officer safety in this
context may justify the minimal additional intrusion of ordering a driver and
passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often considerably
greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search. Even without the search
authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to search for
weapons and protect themselves from danger. For example, they may order out of
a vehicle both the driver, Mimms, supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson,
supra, at 414; perform a patdown of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable
suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1
(1968); conduct a Terry patdown of the passenger compartment of a vehicle upon
reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate
control of a weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even
conduct a full search of the passenger compartment, including any containers
therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460
(1981).

Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident to
arrestthe need to discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for
speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense
had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found
either on the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed
to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an
illegal warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility
of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.[22]

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
[23]
 Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. While the power to search and seize may at times be
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented
without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no
statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government.[24]

The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible.[25] The
drugs are the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of
the accused.[26]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the
judgment of conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the Regional Trial Court,
5th Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087,
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is
hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from detention, unless his
continued confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.

SO ORDERED.
 
 
 
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
 
 
 
WE CONCUR:
 

 
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

 
 

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
 
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

 
ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

 
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
 

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 

[1]
 The Petition was originally captioned as Rodel Luz y Ong v. Hon. Court of Appeals, Hon. Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Naga City. However, under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the petition
must state the full name of the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without
impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario and concurred in by Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and
Samuel H. Gaerlan.
[3]
 Rollo, p. 91.
[4]
 Docketed as Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0087; rollo, pp. 90-102.
[5]
 See Section 11, Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
[6]
 Rollo, p. 101.
[7]
 Rollo, p. 23.
[8]
 Id. at 96.
[9]
 People v. Saludes, 452 Phil. 719, 728 (2003).
[10]
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 113, Sec. 1.
[11]
 People v. Milado, 462 Phil. 411 (2003).
[12]
 PNPM-DO-DS-3-1 dated March 2010.
[13]
 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
[14]
 Morales v. Enrile, 206 Phil. 466 (1983).
[15]
 People v. Bolasa, 378 Phil. 1073, 1078-1079 (1999).
[16]
 See People v. Macalaba, 443 Phil. 565 (2003).
[17]
 Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 263 (2002).
[18]
 RTC Decision, rollo, p. 91.
[19]
 Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 263 (2002).
[20]
 People v. Sy Chua, 444 Phil. 757 (2003).
[21]
 525 U.S. 113 (1998).
[22]
 People v. Lapitaje, 445 Phil. 729 (2003).
[23]
 1987 CONST., Art. III, Sec. 2.
[24]
 Valdez v. People, G.R. No. 170180, 23 November 2007, 538 SCRA 611.
[25]
 People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010.
[26]
 Id.