Pentagon Papers Part V B 2a

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16.
By: NWD Date: 2011
V.B Justification of the War (11 Vols.) Internal Documents (9 Vols.) 2. The Truman Administration: (2 Vols.) a. Volume I: 1945-1949
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
V.B. 2. J USTIFICATION OF THE H.A.R v - I NTEBJJAL COlvuUTlv1ENTS -
BOOK I ...... -.".......,.
1945 -1949
TOP SECRET - Sensit.ive
V. B.2 .
J USTIE'ICATION OF TB...E liJjI.R -- INTERNAL COI'IJIvIITI1EJJTS The Trll1nan AdrD.i~istration, 1945 - 1952
E'orelwrcl
Thi s portion' of the st'udy consists of a collection of U. S. Government doc"L1ments \'Thich set forth the rationale of U. S. policy to"\.:ard Vietnam. The collection represents the internal commitment of the U. S. as expressed in classified documents circulated at the highest levels in the Government. The dOCUlnents are organized cn-"l'onologically ,;,!i thin each Presidential arunjnistration. This vol1)1rle covers the TTUlnan years , 19L~5-1952.
(')
o
Z
m Z
-t
(/')
-t
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
V.B.2. JUSTIFICATIO!.IJ OF T.HE: \':llli - - I NTERL4L COHl\lITI"lE}',:TS
The Truman Ac1r!lini st rati.on , 1945 .. 1952
Cont ents and Chronological List of Documents
1.
Extract of minutes of State \',"ar-Navy Coordinating Com mittee ( ffi'JJlTCC) h elel 13 April: Nr. Lovett states that lithe lack of e. .'lolicy /On Inclochina7 is a source of se~cious embarrassment to the military ." The Committee agreed that the State Department should take up the question of clarification of policy on Indochina. Memorandmn, R. E. Cox, SHNCC, to Mr . Bonbright - 1:Iinutes, 23 May (13 April) 19)-15....... . ................................ Secretary of State Stettinius informs AmbassadoT Caffery ( France) on the status of U.S. assistance to French resistance groups in Inclo chimL Stettinius 1576 to Caffery ( Paris), 19 April 1945......... .. . .. ......... .... ............. The U.S. r e j ects a French proposal to conclude an agreement vTi th the French Provisional Government analogous to the Franco-Allied agreement of 25 August 19LIL!. TIle U. S. r efuses to considel' diversion of resources to specifj.c military operations in Indochina. Stet.tinius letter to French Ambass0.dol' Bonnet, 20 April 1945 ....................... The State Department 1.1."'Jdertakes an i ntcr112,1 te,sk to clarify U. S. policy to;'T2.rd Indochina follm:ring PresideI.lt Roosevelt r s death, 12 April 19~5, and the m-mcc meeting, 13 April 191.~5 .A S'LllY',meTY of ho,: the ste,te DepartTllEmt o.o(:rrrJ1.ent cd this t2.sk <tEd the pertine!lt doct1.1J!ents follo\! as 11.a. through 4.e ....... .
a . Division of Euro:p ean Affe.irs (EUR) submits 2. propo:::ed. "I'Iemor8.ndLl'Tl on Inclochine. Policy" to the AsSj.stB.:"'lt SeC:Tete.r fox' for'\~a.rding to the Presi.dcilt. The m".:lY!OT8Jldnn recOlmliCno.s that the U. S, Lot op~)ose restoration of Il1dochina to Fr2..nce. If. }i'TeeL8.n l:lD,tthe-;,-s , BUR , i~ey::oreDdur:; to ';-. . -)"lllT1;. Acc ' ","'r?+- l..)eClc:v-='Ul.~1 01.. 0"V:J..vC:, 20 A -. ;1 _ / ,-) ......... C'_ -' r "-r- , . -P '.... r~. '_ 1'.:...::' l!"" __ ~:ul . )l;a.dv ~ -I).i. _ lOJrr::
2.
3.
L. l
tI
..
TOP SECRET - Sem;it:l.ve
Declassified per Exec utive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number : NND 63316 . By: NWD D ate: 2011
Tor SECRET - Sensitive
b . Division of Far Eastern Affairs ( FE) for..rards comments and suggested changes to EUR version of the Henorandum on Indochina policy. FE reco::'ill1ends additions to th e EURproposals as \vell as not opposing restoration of Il'dochina to France, provided Fre.nce gave adequate assurances on five major points chiefly concerning Indochinese independence . MemorandU!'n by Mr . Stanton, FE, to Mr . Dunn, 21 April 1945 . . ... .... :. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . c. Mr. Durln fe els that it is bett er to let the Indochina policy matter dri.ft rather than base it on the FE version of the Memorandum . Dunn message to Mr . GreY;, Under Secretary of State, 23 April 1945. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . d . Tne final compromise Memorandwn to the P"I'esident i ncludes extracts from both the FE and EUR versions, b ut does include mention that the U. S. vlOuld seek the French vi ev7s on the five points r aised by FE. Memorandurn. to the President, subj ect : American Policy "lith Respect to Indochina, unda ted, not sent...... . ........... ..... e . The draft cable, 'Thieh vIaS approved by all Divisions conc erned ,reques'ts French indication of int ent i ons on five points: .....................................
18
19
22
(1)
Union .
Indochinese self-government -within a French
( 2)
( 3)
Economic and commercial non-discrimi.nation. Haiphong as a free port. Recogni tion of an Indochi na-The.i border.
( 1+ )
east
( 5) Internat i onal seccrity arrangements for SouthAsia. Unnumbered cable, 9 Hay 1945.
5.
Assistant Secretary of Har proposes " S0 far as prD.cticable" the U. S. should avoid "un...necessary or long term" conunitments of assistance t o French resistance forces in Ind ochina. MemoranduJn, R.E. Cox, mnTCC , to Hr. Bonbright , vIE, 2 liI2.y 19!'t5.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . French Foreign ill:inister :L.s inforned by Stettini1..1.s at San F-I'ancisco the;L lithe record is entirely irmocent ... of this government questioning ... French sovereignty over I m1.ochina . If Gre".,' 19)-19 to Caffery> 9 May 1945. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
26
6.
27
ii
TOP
SECJ~ET
- Sens:L t:.Lv \:~
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET -
Sc:nsit:i ,v('~
Mat the,'TS reports t o President Truman of French desires to partj,cip8.te in Far East \'rar e,nd the JCS Vi(;\l that li ttle military value \vould accrue from the French forces. Hemorandu.rri by j,iatthe. . 1E; for Tnllr!an, 16 May 19 J +5. Gr e,'; rcviel'ls for Hurley the present position of U.S. policy on "trusteeship structure" and the necessity of "voluntary" action by colonial pUllers and tha,t the extent of French participa.tioll in the \-Tar in the Pacific was to be determined by Gen MacArthmo . Grel'r 873 to Hurley (China ) 7 Ju.1e 1945 . ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' The U. S. mili te.ry reply to the French offer of pa:cticipo. tion (by tHO French di vis i ons ) in the Pacific \'rar out lines the provisions to acceptance i n pr i nciple . Essentially, the U. S. des:Lre s complete cOJ"1lT!E1.nd and control of th e French trained, equ,ipped and maintained divis i ons wi th movement fror.1 France based on the uni,ts having attained U.S. c ombat standards. Memorandum by H.S. Chiefs of Staff to Combined Ch:Lefs of Staff at ~otsdmn, 16 July 1945. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The U. S. Chiefs of Staff vievTs that l ogistics considETations prevented French and Du,tch participation i n the Pacific war are pres('nted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff fOT consideration . Memorandum by the V.S. Chiefs of Staff at Potsdam, 18 July 19h5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The British Chiefs of Staff suggest that the French divisions be " eml)loyed :i.n due course in French I ndoChina. It MemoTc.ndum by British Chiefs of Staff at Potsdam, 18 July 1945. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
27
8.
30
9.
33
'10.
.....
36
11.
........
37
12.
The V. S. Chiefs of Staff consider the Bd tish vie,', and com,prorrdse earlier U. S. posit:i.ons to 0.110'\'1 for possible use of F.rer!.ch divi2 j,ons under Bri tj sh COll'I!lB.nc1 i n B.rea.s to "be determined later . ~mOra'1dUT~ by U. S . Chiefs of Staff at Pots d2.Hl , 19 July 19Lf5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Report to the President and Prime W_nister of the agreed SUl.11l13.ry of conclus ions on the str8,tegic conc:e})t and policies forprosecli,tion of the il8.r, reached by the Combined Chj efs of Sta:Z'f at the tcrrrd,Eal conference of the Postde:.0. 11.:'2cting. Bas ic<"lly, the Chie:::~s 1 strategy focused on J-e.pan Hi th the U. S . controJling opera.tJ ons . The door vTas left ODen for French and D:'ltch i' ' . . par t lClpa~lon b asea on "']-:' ml ,l~ary conSldera t' ,lons 11 an d " s. J,Pl)lDE; " requlre r:icn t 3. Jf" S I~'l es, CC" 000/-' h' . . '" 1 :::;./ .J, 21+ July J.9'~5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
37
13.
....
39
iii
TOP SECRE'j' - SocnB i tive
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Sectio n 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63 3 16. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECHET - Scn::;itivc
14.
President Truman infol'ms Hurley ( China) thf:..t i t \'TeuS agreed at potsdam to cl.i vjcle Indochi.n.a 8,t la'll tude 16 0 no}'th for operational purposes: the south Going to Southeast Asia Conmand ( SEAC) and the north going to thc China theater. Hurley is urged to get Chjc~"nG Kai-shek ' s con.c:urrence . TrulT;an telegram to HLU'ley from Berlin, 1 August 1945. ........ .
(
44
15
l'lj .lliarn J. Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS ), reports on the French a tti tude to\':c,rd the Indochina Provisional Govermnent to the Secretary of State . A French committee I'Tas to negotiate ivi th Annamite l eaders on terms favorable to Indochina; the French ,-rere to act as advisors to the Indochina Provi sional Government vrith the ~pov!er to sign treaties for France. Annc'.lnite leaders, h01'Tever, expressed the desire to have status as an American protectorate, excluding both French and Chinese occupation . Threats of violence over a French reoccupa,tion were ma,de . Hemoran- dum by Donov8,n for Secrete,ry of State, 22 August 19L ........ f5 Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of Stcl,te, reasserts U.S. policy tm{8..:rd French control of Indochina to the Charge i n Ch:LnG, ( Robertson ). The U.S. neither opposed nor assisted re-establjshment of French control in IndocbillB" Rohertson\{as told. The U.S. '\rillingness " to see French control is based on the future outcome of French claims of popular SU1'1)ort . Acheson 1622 to Robertson, 5 October 19L f5. ................................. Caffery ( Paris ) i nforms Secretary of State of the Franco --Brit.ish agreem(';nt on Indochina Hhich recognizes the Fren.ch Civil Administration as sole authori ty in Indochina south of the 16t.h pa,ra11el. Caffery 6006 to SecI'ctary of State, 12 October 19h5. . .......... ...... CaffeTY reports that de Gaulle rejected announc i ng a far-reaching, progrc[;sive policy designed to give Indoch:Lnese greater authorj.ty, representB,tion, and resJlonsibilH.y in gOVelTment under the pretext of the state of disorder ,rhi.ch prevaiIed i n Indochina. De Gaulle felt that " no such policy could be ir_plemented pending restoration of French authority ." Caffcl'y 6857 to Secretary of State, 28 November 1945.
45
16.
49
17.
49
18.
50
19.
Ha;~the\Ts
request;:; dil'ection from Acheson on. tra:1sf'er of Lend-Lease vc}1.Lcles fl'c!:;1 the: Br:itj~h to tlJe French in ILdo:::hin::". M.:h::scn re})l:Le~> that P:rcsiclE-.n.t TrUL S.i:l thonght the U. S. should 8,g:cCE. to the tr""rDfer. Ache:scm- Matthe\-ls n.ote;:;} 18 January 1946. ............................. iv
52
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECEET .. S8nsitiv(:
20.
Secretary of St.ate Byrnes requests infol"TLation on condi tions in Indochina a,ld especially on the status of French-Viet Hinh negotie.tions. Byrnes 53 to Bangkok, 28 January 19 L . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. f6 Gen Ga llagher , OSS , reveals that, i n his vie", of Indoch ina, "one or hro modern French divj.sions could defeat th e Annamese " and that after de Gaulle ' s Octob er pronoll...ncement of colonie.l policy, the Annamese (Ho Chi Minh) refused to negotiate ,d.th the French and became hostile . "Ro himself \rill not deal "Tith th e French ... and yTill be b ehind any c ontinuing Anne,mese movement. " The Vj.et Minh administration ,,ras young and inexper i enced but "the demand for i ndependence is vridespread and even in the villages the peasants refer to the example of the Phj.lippilles . .. hOirever, the Viet Hinh should not b e labeled full-fledged doctrinaire CO:rlmunist." Memorandum of Conversation b y R.L. Sharp, SEA. Affa,jrs , 30 J almary 19l16. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Landon reports t hat d ' Argenl ieu Ho Chi l'linh negotiations have been proceeding e,nd may be completed in tvo or three ireeks, and that only temporary and loca l Franco-Chinese B.greenents have been renlJzed. J.J8.ndon ( Saj gon) 0927 to Byrw;:s, 5 February 1946. . . . . . . . . . . . Caffery j ni'orms Byrnes that the present French government '\-!ill try t o f ollo'lv a conc:i.liat.ory and mod erat e policy hl Indochina and ,d,ll b e more p ro gressive in its outlook than de G8,ulle. " Caffery 595 to Byrnes, 6 February 19)-+6 ............... .. . . ..... . . . . . ' I,andon states that : "It see;ns c ertain that Al1-.:.n.a.mese plan despera,te resista,nce to French. Ho Chi. Minh sta,ted t hat he considering petitioning all United Natjons to media.te Annamese indc'oendence and 'orevent extensive bloodshed. 11 Landon ( H~no.L) 2 to BY;'nes , 16 F ebruary 1946 ........ . .... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. I.,o,ndon r efers to hiO letters to President Truman frOJ~l Ho Chi Hinh v7hj eh reque.st the U2A as un n'.elnber to support Aunamese i ndepencJ.ence according to the e:mrr:ple of th e Phj li~op:i.nc;8. J?,Ddon SU!~JL8,rizes tile points in Ho Chi ]vIjr1h ' [; petitLonto the Un5.tec1 Eations 'dhjch includes a rev:i e~-r of .F rench conqlJests , Ho ' s governmenta.l e.cci);;lp.li.shrtl<::nts, a~ld reque2ts for intervention by the Big Fou.r. J.x-,nc1on (H3,noi ) to Secretary of St~:.te, undated ( received 27 February 1945) .. .. . .. .... . .............
53
21.
53
22.
58
23.
59
24 .
59
25 .
61
TOP SRCRET-SCllsitive
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 20 11
1' 0P SECRET - Sensitive
26 .
The Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister , Dr . \lIang, indicates that Chinese troops would be l-7i thdra,Y!l from Indochina by 1 5 April and t hat. he had urged a It bloodless " Franco-Viet M1nh agreement viith them . HallB; cuggests j oint Chinesf'-American mediation of Frcnch-Indoch:i.nese prob lem and refers to th e lat.e President Roosevel t l s i nterest i n d ependent peoples. Smyth (Chungking ) 39l~ to Byrnes, 28 February 19~-6. ..... . . ........................ Reed r ep0r ts signing of th e 6 March agreement Ivhereby " Vietna..rn becomes a free state wi thin th e I ndochina federa ti.on and will have ovm army, direct olm int ernal affairs, and fi nance ... Annamites are f rank.ly pleased ... French military o ccupatjon proceeding smoothly . II Reed ( Saigon ) 20 to Secretary of State, 7 March 19~ 6 . ...... . . ............ Saigon informs State that Chinese are putting ob s ta cl es in th e French path and Viet MiYlh .Lncidents around Saigon are i ncreas i ng . Reed 33 t o State , lL~ March 191 :6. ............ . ...... ....... . . . . . . . . . . Viet Minh extremists assassinate a member of the Co ch in China Council, French se i ze Hanoi TreaslJ.ry, and 'ronkin i nc idents j eopardi ze p ca~ceful oll.t-come of events . Reed erO to State, 1 April 1946. ... .. ... .......... .... . .... .............. ..... The U,S. informs France that the Combined Chiefs of Staff do not object t o relief of Chinese troops by French forces i n I ndochina, and that on the r epatriation of Japanese, the French milit,qrv commander should coordinate vrHh Gen l;a::i\rthL1T ( since the Chinese and Byi ti sh Here totally relieved of OCCU"j)9,tj on and r epatriation duties in Indochina)": Byrnes I note to Bonnet, 12 April J.9~6. .. ................. ..........
0 I Sull:i.van (Hanoi) 1ndicat.es that most i mportant i rnmediate qnef'tion i n the ncgotiat:Lons opening at Dalat appears to be st.atus of Cochin China. 0 1 Sulli van 2 to Byrnes, 18 LprH 19!6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
'I:h(~ U.S . indicates that Eo Chi. Ninh has reCluestcd U. S., U. K. and other recogni.tions as a free state Hithin French Unicn . Byrnes to Consu.!.oJ Off:Lccrs, 18 Apl'il 191~6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
62
27 .
63
28 .
63
29.
6~
30 .
64
31.
65
32.
66
vi
TOP SECReT - Sensi.tive
33
Ho Chi MiIL.'1 calls for Co(:hin- China, to join Vietnam, French to cease entering Cochj.l1-Cbina, and for I"rench to live up to agreements . French are pessimistic over Dalat conh~rences . II over-all picture is not a hapl'Y one ... " l\eed 122 to BYl'ncs / 27 Ap""'il 19LJ6 .. . . . . ... . . . U. S . revieHs the situation at Dala.~ conference from the vic\vpoint of French and Vietnamese as pessimistic ( in light of recent conflicts, outbreaks of fj.ghting, and conflicting viel'Ts on Cochin-China status) and feels that French will possibJy attempt a coup \-Then ChineGe vri.thdra'ol. Acheson to Consular Offj.cel's, 1 May 1946 . .... .. ........ . ... . . . ... . .... . .... .. . . ... . . . . . .. . Acheson reports that the French are confi.dent of success in negotia.tions itTi th Vietnam, but they feel the Vletnaln c1elegaUon is controlled by betterorganized cOlnmunists, even though only half the delegation is communist . AchesolJ. to Consular Officers, 13 Hay 1946 . . . . ............. . ........... . .. . . . ... . Ho Chi Hinh is reported as believing satisfactory agreement can be reached vTi.th the French. Acheson to Consular Officers, 14 May 1946 . . .. . ... . .......... . ...... . U,S . expresses concern over continued presence of Chinese troops jn Tonkin and that everyt.hing possible should be done to speed evacuation. .Acheson to Gen George C. Marshall ( Nanking), 15 nay 1946 . . ......... . French propose federal organization for Vietnam ( under High Commissioner who exercises French Union pOi"Ters ) ,'lith a legislative e.['sembly of ten melT,bers each from Tonkin, Anr.:9L'1, Coch:i.nChina, laos, Cambodia~ and ten French members . Byrnes to Na.pking, 20 M2~y 19Lf6 . . . . .................. . ... . . . . U.S. raises Consulate Saigon to Consulate General, effective 20 He.y 19~6. Byrnes 2L~27 to Ce.ffel'Y, 20 Nay 191 .... . .............. . .... . .... . .. . . . .......... . .. . +6
in~ortant political parties in Vietnam : V:i ct Ihnh (i'Those :Lost acU_ve me:::bers are for~:.-:E:r Indochinese Co:n:i"1l.nist F'l.rty YIlclLbers), Dong l. Hnh Ho:)_ (DJ.,11I) Cll1d Vietll.2.m Q,uoc Dan D2.ng ( VI~~DD), Hh:ich seem to have support of" the Chinese . CathoJ.ies e,ppe2.l' to support no si.l1[::lc ~os.l'ty, but "as a group i-Till not remain Ion.; absent from poli tics . 11 0 1 Sul~_:L ;,e.n 20 to Byrnes fo!' Gc1Cre.l ~"" .,1_ , 1 00 I at (.) l1'....... ~')!la--L __ , '-.I '1-k,,{ ....l..;; -'-'- ~ " " " " " .. " ~ " " " " " .. " " " " " " " " " " " " " ~.!'.....
..!..
66
34 .
35
36 .
68
37
68
38.
39
40 . U.S. notes three
" " " .. " " " " "
v:U
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number : NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP S'ECREl' - Sensitive
41.
Ho Chi 1-1inh h<::'8 constantly given impression that Ithe "ould pay great attention to any suggestions !: made by the U.S. OrSullivan (Hanoi ) to Byrnes, 5 June 1946 ... . .....................................
. .......
71
42.
U. S. Consul in H"lnoj. vieYls VietnaY,1 strene;th in Coch:in-China as " diminishing, " that Ho i-rent to Paris fcr this reason, B.nd at the same tine, to seek support from French Left \'li.ng. 0 I Sulli van to Byrnes, 5 June 19,46................... ................ Caffery reports Franco-VietllE'<olf' conference at Fontainebleau is off to a bad start, as Vietnamese delegati.on protE:sted assumption of the chairm.anship by head of the French delegation , protested creation of Cochin-China as an i ndependent state, and accused French of violating 6 March agreement . Ho Chi l1irlh held conversations \'lith A16crians on similarity of their problems. Caffery 3323 to Byrnes, 7 J uly 19~6.,.
. ..
71
43.
...........
73
1~4.
Vi etnam br eaks off negotiations at Fontainebleau on th e grounds that France violated 1,~arch 6 accord by convoking a nOH Dala t conferen.ce. Caffrey 3801 to Byrnes , 2 August 1946...... .............
....
74
45.
u. S.
vie\'Ts recent moves by the French as de signed t o r ega.in a large measure of control over I ndochina in "violation of the s-pirit of the 6 Harch convention lt and that \(j.dcspread hostili tics may result from Vi etnarucse resj.stance to these encroachments . Memorandun by Moffat ( SEA) for Vincent ( FEA) , 9 August 1946 ......................
75
L~6.
viedS results of Dalat conference a 13 a reasona.ble be.sis for t he fui...v.re, but far short of l arger d~gree of independence desired by Viet.nc:.m, and it i s difLi.cult lito for<.'see B.ny f,reB.t degree success .. . so long as Cochin China stays apart fro~n Vietnam ... fl Reed 342 to Brynes, 17 August J 9L!6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
u. S.
78
47.
u.s.
expresses concern over "French colonial t endency p.~ctlre U. S . as aggressiv2 and irr,peri.e.li si...ic fl f.nd indi cB,i...es closeness of th is um'li tting Fren:::h colonial vie'.', to Commu.nis t P20rty line . Clayton (Acting SecSta.te) 240 to Sedgon, l} Septer::bey- 19 L ........ .. ... .. .. , . .. ........ , .. .. :6
78
......... .
vi ii
TOP SEC?KC -
Scn~;itive
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number : NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
48 .
U. S. loo};;:s at int elliGence repol't s linking USSR to Ho Chi Minh and requests i nformation on relative strength and outsj_de contacts of Vietnam conmmnists . Clayton 2L~1 to Saigon, 9 September 191.r6 .. .
0 0 0
79
~9 .
Caffery reports on visit of Ho Chi l'Iinh j ust prior t o s i gning modus vivendi ; Ho decla:ces he is EOt. a cormnunist. Caffery 6131 to By-.cnes , 11 September 1 9~6 ... .... ..
0 0 0 0
00.
79
50 .
i s informed by French of i ncreased cormmmist activities in French Indochina , chiefly Chinese Communist entrench.ment in Saigon and Haiphong . Agencies outside of Indochina arc. supplying propaganda. Reed 37~' to Byrnes , 17 September 191 . 16 Caffel'y- reports signing of modus vivendi and that Ho Chi Minh obtained satisfaction on many points, but French ,wuld have likmto include d.ennition of VietnaJn relations to Indochinese federation and French Union. Caffery 4671 to Byrnes, 17 September 19J.-l-6 e ..
0 II 0 0 0 .. . .. .. 0 .. . III ...
(I
u. S.
.0
80
51.
..
..
............
..
..
..
..
..
.....
(I
.....
..
80
52 .
Saigon Vi.civS " 8.Jl1icable " meeting of Ho Chi Minh and High Connnissioner in light of belief that "French Communi sts deRire soft-pedal communist trends in Vietnam for political reasons " prior to elections. Reed L lll to Byrnes, 19 October 19L . .. f6
0
82
53 .
Ho Chi. Minh :i.nf01T!lS the U.S. that effectiveness of modus vivendi depends on Yrance , fj.ghting i; ould not stop'-unless French applied the agreement , and that c ochin-China "must be united to Vietnam. " o I Sullivan 96 to Byrnes, 25 Octo bel' 19)+6 . . .
0
82
5) +.
Contact betl,Tccn Vietnam a,nd ChineSe;! Cormnunists is apparent, but the presence of Chicoms as advisors i n the provinces is d:Lffi(;u~t to verify. Reports of Chicoms in Haiphong a:ce legarcled Fith suspicion. OISulHvan 101 to Byrnes, 1 Kovembe:c 19l i6 . c
0
o. c o .
83
55.
Caffel'Y reports Fr ench concern oyer Ilpositiv-e I)roof ll of direct cont<~ct bet\,een gosco-v~ 8.Y:d. Eo Cbi li].:i..llh. Caffery 5857 to Byrne2, 29 November 1946 ...... 0...
0....
83
56.
u. S.
ConsuJ. viei','S Ho Chi M;nh I S contacts yUh FTEnce as designecL to facilitat9 2.Eolic2,tion of r.:i.:,,:e~:ist pTil'!ciplcs -v:hsn, anel j'r, a CO!f!T:lU::'1 :1.st COVel'}l:.i:::'Ylt is estab:LisheJ. in Fr,mce. HUTtner, :F'renc:n concern
ix
TOP SECR:S'C' - Sens it:!. ve
T01) SECRE:'.L' - Sensitive
of Ho ' s communist contacts at this tir2.e is peculi.al' when they are forcing collaborati.on or :preparing a puppet government; this ploy is a possible diversion from French policy in Indochina. O ' Sullivan 131 to Byrnes, 3 December 1946 .... , .... . . , .... . ............... , . . .
8):
57.
Acheson i nstructs Hoffat 0::1 Ho Chi, Minh ' s communist r ecord and offers gnidelines of U.S. poJicy in discus s ion \ii th Ho. Essentially, the U.S. is concerned over Tonkin events , the American people ha'","e welcomed Indochinese attainments but violence i mperils this sym:pathy, and U,S, i s informing Fl'C'mce similarly. The U. S. is not makj.ng forrJal intervention at thjs time. Acheson 305 to Saigon, 5 December 19)+6, . . . . . . . . . . . . . U.S. feels France would engage in full scale military oper8,tions in Vietnam only if forced, since they r ealize it is no l onger possible to maintain a closed do or . HOI-Tev' r , Cocb.in-China politico,l question must b e s ettled and French cannot resolve it ~ i thout a fi ght . The Cochin -Chinese -prefer Tonkin to France. Reed L i72 to Byrnes, 6 DeceL1ber 191i6. ' , , .. , ....... . , . .. , . . . . SecretEtry Byrnes reyiel'TS be,sic French-Vietnamese cl.iff:i.cu1ties for Missions at London, ltlOSCO'iT, and Nanking . Essentially , the d1fficulties revolve around deep nationalist senUment and o:pposition to the French, guided by a fe,! communist tr8,incd l eaders in the govern.ment \,lith apparent contacts with Moscow and Yenan. Hm-revel', I: French influence i s important not only as an antidote to Soviet influence, b ut to protcct Vietnam and SEA from future Chinese imperialism." Three basJc troubles are mutual c1istru.st , French i rresolut i on of the t erm I I free state, " and Vietnamese intra.ns igence, Byrnes messa.ge t o certain Iviissions, 17 December 1 946 . ,. . ..... . . ............................................ Byrnes revie'ds recent Fi'ench Jloli tical 0.1'1 sis and i nfluence of Indochina policy as an impoTt2,nt factor. Outbleak of hosti1itLc8 in Haeoj seen a8 serious and not likely to be:' resolved by l,:outet and d ' Argenlieu. Byrnes neBsage to Moscou, Nan~~lng and Saigon, 20 DecC'mbe:c 19 L ..... , ........................ , j6 Vincent infor'::lS AC'J:leson tha.t '..ri th jnadeq'Ete forces and c~J \rj.ded public opinion, the rrench he,vo. tried to 8,0cc.i'Ilplish in Indu::hir'.a ,rr-".3:L a strvng, Ul1:i. ted Brite,in found umr:isc to atter,!:qt j n DUTILe;.. . In sho:c-L, "guer:ciJ 12, ;'i'').Lf'are Ifl.r:.,y- cont'inv" inciefild, tely . " The
85
58.
87
59.
88
60.
90
61.
TOP SSCRET - SeDsitiv e
TOP SECRET - Sensi.tive
French should be infonned of U.S. concern, especially since the conflict may come before the UN or other pOKers may int ervene . Ivjemorall' .. c....L OJ' .L !.;.~l l.t l J C ;; r d_DIn "- V' Y1C"")"- Inor' Acheso'l, 2-:::> D"'c C.J,l.1)"'' 1 0 1.'6
.,
91
62 .
U. S. advances reasons \iD.y the Vietn:::mese attacked the French on 19 December: ( a) orders from 110 s COl-,' to upset Soutllea,st Asia, or to incr ease Communist Party strength in France as a result of a quick settlement if the CP sl1o"L"lld tal<;.e pm12r from Blmn; and ( b) hope for similar J'avanese-Dutch settlement resu~ting from fighting \:11 ile negotiating. 0 1 Sullivan 15 l f to Byrnes, 23 December 1946................... impresses concern ovel' Tonkin events on the French, but expresses no offer to mediate. U.S. is concerned that the UN might become involved. By-.cnes 6586 to Caffery, 21[ Decembel' 19J.[6..................... U.S. takes the position to oppose Chinese proposals for i ntervention in Indochi.na . Acheson 8317 to Gallman (ill\:) , 27 DecembeT 191.f6 .....
0
92
63.
u. S.
93
6J.1.
95
65.
Reed, in discussing vJith "l"lhom Moutet can deal, offers creation of new govenlment ulldeT Bao Da:i. and/or Tam. Reed 499 to Byrnes, 30 December 19~6 ...... The U.S. apprO"ves the Con s 1.1.l in Hanoi to act on humanitarian grounds to save lives, but cautions not to become involved in any situation v.rhl.ch could b e interpreted as mediating basic political issues without express authorization . Byrnes 25 to 0 r Sullivan, 31 December 191 +6.
0 0 0
o o.
95
66.
96
67 .
The U. S. re9.sserts the non-involvement pOlicy of appr-oving sales of miJitary aTms and arm.aments to France except in cases i'Jhich relate Indochina hostili t.ies. Byrnes 75 to Paris, 8 January 19L [7.
00'
.0.
97
68.
U. S. expres se s ,su-l)port 2.nd full recognit ion of' F:rcU1ce r .s pos:L tion; ho'::eve:c, the U. S. cannot ove:tlool:: dangeY"o~.l8 ou.tmoded colon:Lal French methods. On the otheY" hand, the U.S. dO(,8 not desire that France be re}Jlacec1 by Kremlin cor'mu~lism as eviclene:ed by Ho Cl1i 1 il111 C011[lectio~1f:; i Th.8 U. 8,. (loes not l'avOT U"n iDterv(~ntion, 'but "frc.Dt.ly 'Ke have no solution of the
e
xi
TOP SECIUi:r - Sensitive
problem to suggest ." George C. Marshall, Secret3.ry of State, ):31 to Parie;, 3 February 1947... ..... . ..... . ..... 69 . The U. S. is concerned t.hat the Hest.ern democrc,tic systen is on th'2 defensive tn emco':'ging nattons and Southern Asia is in a critical phase . The key to the U. S. position is an aiTaren-::ss that in respect to the position of "\{estern democrcytic pm;ers in Southern Asia, t.he United. States if) jn the same boat as the French, British and the Dutch . "I'le cannot conceive setbacks to the long range interests of France ,.'hich ,'70ulc1 not also be setbacks of our O\'ln . 1f The lJ . S . is ready to be heJ_pfll1 ir1 any 'my, hal-rever, non-intervention is still the U.S. policy. l-~::.),rshall 1737 to Pa.ris, 13 tlay 19l~7. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. The stat.e Departm2nt is cO:"lcernec1 that a rumored, dry sc..8.son French offensive VTou.ld howe repercussions in a Congress ,rhich Hill be called on for extensive ftnancial aid to W.stern Europe in light of France's ecol1om:ic, financi8.1, and food position. Marsllall 31~33 to Paris, 11 September 19}~,(. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
M. Bollaert, French High CommL3sioner in Indochina,
98
100
70.
103
71.
delivers publicly the m.ost impol tant declc"rat.ton of Frencb policy since before hostilities broke out . The French ask for a Vietnamese llrepreseatattve government" to 8.ccept French terms, and exclude dea.ling -vdth lIo Chi 1-1inh except as a last resort, alld then only for his sl1.rrender . 'Ihe U. S. sees this policy resLJ~ting fror:'l a strengthen.ed France ( and a proportional unwillingness to nake concessions) as a "retres,t" from the March 6 accords. 0' 8ulli van letter to Marshall, 12 SepteLlber 191~7....... .... 72. Thc French deny any l)larmed dry se3.S0n m"li tal'Y offensive. Caffery 3715 to ].1a1sha11, 12 September 191f7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. France cons5c1ers Bo11aert ' s poli.cy speech as a st(:p foniard or. t ..,o -poilcts: forr'!al abe.nc1oU11ent of Jndoc~ina fe~Eration idea, and acceptance of the princir1e of union of' the Un.'ee KYs viLt11C~ . t a l'efcre~ch. Ccd'fery 3753 to l1e,rS!18.11; J);. SeptCIl'ber 191 ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. +7 TIlC: CtJrlesC vie',; Ji'rcllc:h policy 8.S ltl.'lking the position of U.S. ard China difficult a!~ do not see a Sl..lC ce r: s f'J.l ;~ov ~~=rljli1f:.rl ~., "li t.'h_()~l-C }:8.rti c::Lr:::..ti OIl 0: Eo Clli. Liil'1.. 'rhe "ChilE:S';: 1.)(;(;)1(.11 liOllJ.cl Lot rv'
ge.rd e. B2...o [:3.1
T;!OT.:.:1..rc~!,: - fe."':'lo1:aLl~/.
104
111
73.
112
711.
!J.l10'J<S:.1
his
xii
TOP r;ECPEl' - Sensiti.ve
TOP S'ECRET - SeY'.sitivc
personality and ability are impressive, Eo Chi Hinh i s regarded 8.S a commUl:ist, and his regime on ChiLa t oS south borckr does not 8.Jlpear of critical ilYiportallce . Stuart ( H2xlking ) 2096 to 1.1 ar8ha11, 18 October 19~ 7 . . . . . . . . .
11}+
75.
b ec8~use
IndJa hesi te.tes to submit Indochina question to t he UN France could veto and the GOI is not convinceCl that Vietnm:l LRo Chi. IvJjn.!il exercises 0..<::. facto authority or represents maj ority vie'lvpoint. jn Indochina. Marshall telegram to Consular Officers, 29 LTanuary 19 L . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
116
76 .
A Ho Chi IHnh lieutenant i s reported going to India ,d th a -peUtion for UN intervention . Marshall 21 to S[~igon , 3 February 19~8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
117
77 .
Hanoi Consul SUllllY!8.rizes recent events centering on Baa Daj signing Bai d t Along conference accords . Bao Dai' ,d.thdrexs commj.tment and \Vill stay in France until called for as It emperor . It Rend8.11 (Hanoi) 31 to 1>1ars118,11, 19 February 1948.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. French Government authorizes Bo.llaert t o approve formaU on of a provisional Vietnamese e;oven .ment headed by General Xuan. Caffery 2567 to Marshall , 12 May 19 L . . . . . . . . . . . . .. f8. XUFm govern.rnE:nt arouses very little enthusiasm . Bao Dai is vraiting for favora.bJe signs to return. Stuart 971 to Marshall ; 29 Nay 1948 ...... ... .. ... . ....... . .......... ,... . French indicatE.. dubious chances of succc:ss for Xuan Government. Caffer'y 3063 t.o It.arshal1, 9 June 1948....... .. Chi.nese desire U. S. vicus on Eo Chi IHn1'.l I S cOIl12!ll..mist .. connections as an i ndicator of U,S. att:i.tudes and ulti mate policy viE-a-vis the Viet Minh . Stuart ( l'Janking ) 1116 to Marshall, 22 June 19~8 . . . . .. .. .. .. ................ ,
U.S. -posit.ion on EQ Chi Hinh is that. he is a cO;~!I:1.unis1, v: ith a 'del1 - knmm rc,cord j n the CominteTll, but no evi dence of a direct link to Easeo.,, . llar.:<h:c.ll 97)+ to He,nk in8 , 2 July 191;8 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
118
'78 .
120
79.
1 21
80.
123
81.
1 25
82 .
1 27
83 .
U. S. lJelicves thc.t given present \:orlc1 poli ticc...l E~nd economic conditioDs, French carm.ct 'pc)ssibly 8.:::2,3S suffi.cient. strcrz-ch fOT "" >:l.l..:U.1,~.:C'y salll.ticn to I~lo:Joc.:h:inJ.. Hp.r ;;[.,1,]. .l 2}T66 1,0 P8~:C j s, 3 J\;J y 19 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 18.
130
xUi
TOP Sr:C?.:GJ' - ScY!sjt:i.vc ----_._._----------
TOP SECRET -
Se~sitive
84.
Caffer y sue;gests that the U.S . inforn the French that they are faced with alternatives of approving Viet i ndeT'endence, union of three. KYS or losing Indochina. Caffery 3621 to Marshall , 9 J uly 191 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . !8
13 L~
U.S. approves Ca. ffel'Y ' s suggest.ed action ( tel 3621) and 'Toul.d publicly D. pprove of French actions on CochinChina status as a forvrard looking 's tep t oward settle ment i n Indochina . Marshev1l2637 to Paris , 14 July 1948 ....................................................... 135 86. U. S. f eels that France i s evadir~g th e i ssue of altering the French Colony ste.t.us of Cochin:-Chi na 1i7hich, i n effect , nullifie s the Baie d 1 Along agreement. . Marshall 2891 to Pari s , 29 July 1948 .. .. .......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The French Assembly must face the i ssue of changing Cochin-Ch i na status and approve Baie d ' A10ng agreements, if the little progress in Indochina j.s not t o be nullified, is th e vi evl of th e French Ninistry of Overseas Territories . Caffery It034 to Marshall , 5 August 1948 . .. ... 88. U.S. s eeks to determine , i n the absence of firm cormnitments, h o\/ Prance can di spel Vietnamese distrust of French, split off adherents of Eo , or r educe hostiliti es. Marshall 136 to Sa. igon, 27 August 191 ............ .. +8 U. S . b elieves "nothing should be left undone 'w hich '\orill strengthen truly nationaljst groups " in the steadil y deteriorevt i ng I ndoc11:Ln2" situation . Marshall 3368 to Saigon, 30 August 19)18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90. The U.S . publicly recognizes ma jor strategem of C01.1mW1ists in Southeast Asia is to champion the cause of l ocalnationaljsm. Lovett 149 to Saigon, 22 S8ptenber 1948. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . ... . .. U.S. -policy statement on Indochjna cites four l ong -t ern objectives i n Indocbina: (1) eliminate cOlT!.l1unist influence, ( 2) foster associ<?.tlon of the people with \-Testern pOHers, particule. rly France , ( 3) r aise the standard of living, ('..nd (4) to prevent l.u~due Chjnese penetration . The ir:~ediate obj ect i ve is to satisfactorily resolve the FrC:Lch-Viei..nexJ.0se ir::pa,ssc. Dep9.rtment of State Policy Stater.1ent on Indochina, 27 September 19 1;8. ..........
l~oscOYT "prcs])ects are ex ce11ent that Ho eh i liir'.ll idll e-JcL'tu8.l1y for'ce the \Titl~c':r<c\'7al of the Frcl'cL evnd set UI) tbe first ' N'C;"li Derr.r)crat i.C Republic ' in SC\1th(~3 ;"t Asj 2.. 11 Abbot (f::2,)gon ) desp~tch Eo. 195 to SecState, 5 No'rbnber 19~8. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
136
137
138
lIto
141
91.
1~3
92 .
Tne U.S. viC'\" l. s thA.t for
150
xiv
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Secti o n 3.3 NND P roject Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECP-ET .. Sensitive
93.
The U. S ., i n asse:,shlg Bao Da,i, .:.;annoL. lI irretrievab1y c omLl~.t U. S. to support of lla ti ve govcrrm.E'nt v;bicb ... night become v i rtti&.l ly pUpp0t govt ... II Lovett (Acting SecSt.ate ) 1 4 5 to Paris, 17 J'annary 1 91.~9. ........ , .... . .. "
152
9L~ .
The U. S . caut i ously avo i ds any premature endorsement of Bao Dai i n order to r etain freedom of net,ion in face of French pessimj,sm. Acheson ( SecState ) 70 t.o Saigon, 2 M y 19 1 ...... . .. .. ..... . .... . ..... . ......... . ....... , . . .. 153 a .f9 Abbot. , Sai gon Consul , r evl e,ls the eDt ire I ndochina s i tuati on ( fo r t he NovT Delh1 Fore i gn Servi ce ConferE;ncc , February 19~9 ) for the State Departmcnt . "1'he alternati yes t o the Baa Da.i solut i on 8.re e i ther c ontinued c os t ly c ol oni a l 1'T8.rfare or French 1 thdra';-r8.1 l e8.v:i ng 2. ccm:munist'li c ontrolled governnent i n c. strategic area of Southeast As i a. 11 Abbott despatch 93 to SecState, 5 Na.y 1 949 .......... 154 The U. S , desires the success of Bao Dai exper i ment and \dl1 extend rec0 6 ni tion , as there appears no other a 1 tcrn8.tive to t he established comrmm i st pattern i n Vi etnam and possible cO::1rc.unist success j,n Ch:i na . Acheson 7'7 to Sa i gon, 10 Nay 191 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190 +9 U. S , f ears France i s offer i ng "too l ittl e too l at e " and t he U. S . sh01.~l d a,Vo i d " a consJ)i cuous po s it i on" o f any kind. Acheson 83 to SaiLon , 20 I'lay 1 949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 93 The U. S. feels that the question of Ho Ch.i Minh f s n a t ionali sm v ersus cOr:1m1.mi slJ1 is rr i rrelevant . " "All St8.1,i.nists :i n c ol onia.l are8.S are nat i onalists . I f Acheson ])+ to Hano i, 20 t.;e;y 1949 .. . ........ . ........... . .. "
9 5.
96 .
97.
98 .
1 96
99 .
The U. S. submi ts c orl~mel'.ts on the 8 nar ch Franco , Bao Dai agrecc.,.;;nt to Pre,nce . Essentially , t he U. S ., wh i le hopiDg the 8 1,1&;cr.h 8.f-ree"lEnts ,,:'ould succeed, i s pessj.!;~istic the.t the requis :i te c oncessions Ivi l l b e r,lade b y France. Butter,iortb , FF;J~~ 1 e:tte:c 289 to Bruce ( Pe.r:is ) } 6 Jnne 19~9 . . . . . ... .. ... . ......... . ........ . . 200 Secrete,ry of Defense Louis <Tohr:son rc'qUEs ,s the J\:at i Ol~3.1 Securj.ty CODLeil to study t~c Asian situation to 1(; C:;~8..nline cU.I're.nt policy". "1'lle ad\rz,ECC 0: CO:-: ~~:.niST.1 iJl large arC2.S of the ;,.'o:rlc1 8..:nrJ -pt;.rtlcule.j'ly tbc; succc;sscs of cor!l~1 . 'JJ.lisT:l :tn C11iLE:.. s8rj c~l.lsl:y affect the fllt:u. .r"c ~ecurit.I of t}~e \J:_jt;jC~ ~)te.tr.S . l1 J011f'S011 l!c::'~'J to T'r'"'('., lu~ J~'''lc.. 19),0 . .. ....... -,.;;
1,~:> ~Al
4' 4' .. .... , ... .. " . .. .. .... 4' ....
1 00 .
..
...
....
..
..
...
...
....
..
"
217
xv
,"['OP SECREl' - f: ";2:") s:i..ti ve
TOP SECEEf - Sensitive

.~
101.
The U. S. reeards establishment of Bao Dai as only tl1e "first step " in the evolution of tlie V:Letnam probJem and that France ,d. ll have to concede more to accommod.ate nationalists. \'Jebb (Acting) 1~5 to Rangoon, 20 JUIle 19L~9....... . .. . ........ The Singapol'e Confej,'ence reconunends that the U. S. join the UK in support of Bao Dai, that the French clarify VietJ'.8Dl's legal status, that de facto recognition be granted on 1 Jamlary 1950, and hopes~Ehat the U.S. \"Tould fulfHl its Ul,\f duties in event of an attack on Indochina. Bliss (London) A2063 to SecState, 9 November 191.19 ......... . ............
0 ,
219
102.
223
103.
The National Security Cou.ncil submits a report, "The Position of the United States "\d th Respect to Asia, I: \'Thich, from a military vie"T, indicates the "current basic concept of strategic offense in the ',\;Test I and a stra,tegic defense in the I East. t The importance of Southeast Asia is principally as an exporter of strategic mater'ia1s -- tin, fibers, and rubber. " NBC 48/1, 23 Decelliber .19Lf9. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
~:'he President approves the conclusions of HSC L18/1 as
225
104.
arnended. The basic objectives cited are -- development of stable nations and suffi.cient military pov.rer to prevent communist expansion in Asia, reduction of USSR i.nfluence in Asia, and prevention of pm'Ter relationships "rhich could threaten the U,S. Specifically, in Indochina, the U.S, Hill use its influence to resolve the colonialist-nationalist conflict. NSC Lf8/2, 30 December 191 +9........ . ..............
265
105.
The JCS revievs the current Mutual Defense Assistance Program and certain objectives evolve as the ba,sis for future militaTY assist2,. nce programs. A specific 10Dg range obj ective is "development of sufficient military poio:eI' in selected nations of the Far E8$(," to prevent encI'oachment by com:.rnuIlism. J"CS Memo:cand1..Jm for the SeCI'eteTY of Defense, 26 J anuaI'Y 1950 .......................................
273
106.
The St8.te Depclrt)'-lent recorrlYnends a.nd Pres ident Tlouman approves recognition of the three legally constituted govermnents of Vietnam, Cambodia, a:od Laos. l';crlorandum for the President, 2 FebTlJ.8.Y'Y 1950.......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The U.S. fOI~ards the letters of recognition to the Associated. States ,mel requests a reply to the sllggcstion on excl"le.nc;e of cUp1o::~ti c rep:cesentati ves. Achc;son 59 to SaigoE, ~. Febrne.ry 1950.....................................
2'76
107.
2'(8
xv:L
TOP SECHET - Sensitive
'fOP SF,CHET - Sensitive
108.
Asiatic nej.gbbo:cs consider Bb.) Dni a French pUppet , The U.S. should realize that ECP, and m) litary ai.d from the U. S. do not constitute decisive ff.ctors in Indochina I s problems. Therefore the Griffin Mission should not commit ECA or military aid to French Indochina 'unless France " gives requisite public undertakincs re fl.1xther steps l eading to status similar to Indonesia." Ste.nton (Bangkok) 160 to Acheson, 17 February 1950. . .... ..... . . . . ... The State Department submits to the rISC a report on "The POS} tion of the United StcLtes i:ith Respect to Indochina," \,hich analyzes the problem to determine measures to p:cotect U. S. secrrci ty in Indochina and prevent cornm1.111ist expansion i n the area. NSC No. 6)1, 27 February 1950............. .... . President Truman appf'oves the designation of Mr. Robert A. Griffin as Chief of the Economic Survey gission to Southeast Asia, \vith rank of JVlinister. Five basic objectives of the Mission are outlined: (1) determine needed projects of political significance; ( 2) p:cepare for Point 4 programs ; ( 3) advise local officials of ' methods and extent of participation in Point 1+; (4) brief U.S. representatives; and ( 5) investigate regi.onal aspects of technical assistance. Department of State letter to Griffin, 1 March 1950......... The State Department mai:ntains to the Department of Defense t hat Indochina is subject to immediate danger and is the "most str'ategically important area of Southeast Asia. II Dean Rusk believes that the reSOUTces of the U. S. should be deployed to " reserve Indochina from further Cormnunist encroachment. II Dean Rusl~, Deputy Undersecretary of St8.te to General James H. Burns, Defense Representative to Southeast As ia Aj.d COYr1!littee, 7 March 1950............... . ...... . Acheson instructs Saigon) in light of anti.cipated Fre.ncoViet friction on handling U.S. aid, that f1.111c1.:.ion of Griffin Mission is 'Iclea:rly undei.'stood to be fact finding. II Acheson 136 to Saigon, 9 f/iarch 1950 ... 00... .. ... .. ...
0
280
109 .
282
110.
286
111.
288
112.
289
1130
Gl"if'f:i.n replies that III 1Ll1del'stand that ours is an economic aid mission " and that tk, budding controversy could jeopaTdize the econo:nic aiel prog:c2...YJl. The French S110".'! no entlmsiasm for Point lL Gullion (Saigon) 176 to il.C1KsoD , 13 i::arch 1950 ~ c: c..
0 0
(I
..
"
to
..
..
..
(I
..
..
.:,
"
(;
(I
"
"
()
(I
290
llLf.
Griffin submits his mj.ssion's preJiIllina:cy conclusions on Indochina i.'ith a. list.ing of specific urgent prog2."2mS totaling $2305 million exclusive of military aid and indirect
TOP SECm;:T - Scnsitiv'2
Declassified per Exec utive O rder 13526, Sectio n 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63 3 16 . By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRF.,'I - Sensitive
U.S . aid ( e,g., throuGh Frc.nce) . Obstacles should not permit indecision to allocate aid yaoney or materiE'cls; the " crux of the situation lies in prompt decj_sive action if desi<:'ed political effect is to be attaired. " G::::,iffin file copy of telegram sent to Acheson, 16 JI;Ia:cch 1950.,.. . . ..... ..
292
115.
The U.S . assumes that France is determ:L ned to protect Indochina from c0l1LmUl1ist encroachment, that success depends on i ndigenOl.Is support, and that Fl'811ce supports Bao Dai , but that the French position and ultj.lnat e i ntentj_ons are not clear to the rest of the 'I-;orlel. The U. S . requests France to ma..'k:.e a public statement of the concessions to Indochinese nationalism. Acheson 1363 to Paris, 29 Harch 19500 .
0 .............. 0
(I ........
..
..
..
...
..
..
..
....
..
..........
CI
..
"
"
..
..
..
..
......
..
..
301
116.
Acheson advises Griffin tHssion of the implications for U. S. policy in Vietnam ; ( 1) The prospect of U.S. aid i ndirectly would cause crisis (induce hyper-confidence in Viets); ( 2) Viets bitter at Huu appointment ( and the U.S.) may magni fy the U.S. role; ( 3) i t is better for the U.S. i f a nat:Lonal union government is set up; and ( 4) the aid program can more cas ily be ,vorked out with Huu Govermllent. Ache son 244 to Griffin, 9 April 1950.............. . .. . ......... ..... Department of State requests an assessment of: the strategic aspects of Indochina from a m:i_lital'y point of vie'l: because of the t hreat of comnlll.l1ist domj.nation. The Joint Chiefs of St aff indicate that the "ma i nland states of Southeast Asia also are at. present of crit.ical strat.egic import.ance t.o the Un it ed St.ates, " because of t.he requirement. t.o stockpile st.rategic materials acquired there, as irell as t.he t.hreat t.o ot.her stat.es OD the "line of containment I I JCS Memoran dmo for t.he Secret.ary of Defense, 10 April 1950 .
0
305
ll'{.
0.000.
308
118.
The Joint Chiefs of St.aff concur i'lith the St.ate Department on t.he LlJ1.pOytance of Southeast. Asia t.o t.he U. S. Hm'Tever, t.he JCS urge a more forceful and posit.ive U.S. position t.han expressed by St.ate -- n in order to ret.rieve t.he losses resuJ.tine; from previous mistaJ~es on t.he port of t.he British o.nd French, as 'l'lell as to preclude such mist2J\:cs :Ln the fut'Ll.l'c, the Joint Chiefs of St.aff consider j.t. necessary t.hat. positive end proper leacl.ership arnonE; the VTestern Pm~ers be 2~ss-cf!ned by the United_ states in Southee,st Asia matt.ers. I I JCS 112Ywrc.ndDY fo:!.' SecDef, 2 Nay 1950 ... . . :C
0
0.0
315
119.
The JCS reC015'lend t.E.lJ.:Lng the French tho.t the U. S. is pre-pared to ass:Lst France and. the three As:::ociated. Stb.tes a.nd. ths,t 2.I'Y8'(1e;ements for U, S. mil ite.ry b.id be ma:le. JCS HemOY8.nd.-ura fo:(' SecD e r, 2 l.J:e.y 1950 . .. . . . ... . .
0 0 0 0
318
xv:i.ii
TOP SECRET - ScrcE;j ti ve
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Sectio n 3.3 NND Project Number : NND 63316 . B y: NWD Date: 2011
TOP
sr:Cm~:T
SC'D[:itj Iff:'.
120.
President Tnnno.n app:coves $10 million for r.li1i tary itel:ls to Indo cbina. Acheson 201~9 to London, 3 May 1950, 00 . 0 , ... 0 . Griffin reconstructs the Indochina situation for Secretary Acheson. Griffj_n injicatcs that the present status quo cannot be m::.dntcdned. "Time is of the essence .,. 0" if Bao Dai starts to slip, "it ,,,ill be imposrible to reston; h:i.J.:l." Given that the French are mmre the,t a military solution is l.1_nattainable , "the U 0S. must fi.Ed out "That the French expect of Vietna:rn. " Griffin Memorandum to Secretary of stat e , h J'.'13.y J_qr;Oo . oo o e o o oo . . . o o . o o o o // The special survey mission headed 1)y R . Allen Griffin recollEnends a modest$60 lEi11ion economic and teclmical assistance program for Sout.heast Asia. State press releas e Lf85, 11 May 1950 .. 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 . . 0 0 ... 0 .... 0 0 , ..
321
121.
..J
':>22 -
122.
327
123.
The Ministers of the U. S., U.K., and Fra:.r1ce agree that ,vhile Souther st Asia is of strategic :i1nporta.nce to the U.S., the direct responsibilities of U.K. and France make it of greater concern to them. Extract of Tripartite Ministerial Talks , 13 May 1950 . . ........ ,.0 . . 0 .. 00.... The French affirm responsibility for Indochina, acknm?ledge " supplementary!! U.S. assistance, and assure thQt 8 March agreements iwu~d be "1:i.bera11y implemented. I I LondonSECTO 256 , 14 May 1950 ...... 0 ... 0 . , .. 0 .. 0 .. 0
U. S. fO:rli1ally announces int ent to establish an economic aid mission to th e thr ee Associated states of Indochina. state press relea se 545,25 Hay 1950 ...... 0 .. 0.
0 0
328
1240
330
125.
332
126.
On the b asis of the Griffin recom.rllE'ndab.ons, the U.S publicly announces the launching of a progrmll of r apid economic aid to Southeast Asia. Secretary of State Dean Acheson letter to R. Allen Griff:in, 3 June 1950 .... 00 0.0 .... 000 . ... 0 0 North Korea attacks South Korea and President Tn"LT!lan announces U.S, military assistan.ce not onJy to South l~orea but also an II acceleration in the i'l..li'nishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indochi.na and the dispatch of a mili t&.:ry mission ... II Presidential statur'.e nt , 27 June
335
127.
1950 ..
128.
Co
CI
..
I.l
Co
"
e c.
....
Co
......
..
"
.....
....
Co
...
....
"
CI
e ....
..
..
..
336
The DoS. clarifier- theprinc:i.:r;>les governing DoSo militsxy aid to Indochina. E.sse)Jtj.ally, the basic pr:i.nciplcs c.re : U 0So e,id supplements French c"ssi ;~t[:.j1ce to As socjQted sti.;.tcs
xix
TOP SECRET - S::,rls:i ti ve
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011
to achieve internal. security; 2.ssist aD:lY of t.he Fl'ench Union agajJlst corwHmist aggression; Korean. event.s could cause di.veTsion of aid from Associated States , Acheson 4 to Saigon, 1 JuJ.,y 1950 .. ., .. . ............. 1 29 .
0........ 0....
338
A SWY'1lal'y of existing policy on Indoch:Lna reveals the J'CS v:Le'liJ on NSC 73 that the U. S. give consicleratjon to pl'oviding air and naval assistance should the Chinese provjde oveTt s'Ll_pport to the Viet Hinh. Consultants ! Meeting, 25 July 1950 .. e
0 0 0
&
Q
(>
(>
(>
130.
The U.S. feels that French requests for overall assistance (mili tary ~ economic , and poli tif"al) are inadequ8.te to " consu..rnYrlate U. S. broad objectives in Indochina" a.Dd assis t ance '\'Jill have to be increased to resist encl'oachment of conmmnism. Heath ( Saigon) 170 to 1\cheo3on, 7 August 1950 , .. The U. S. vie'l';s grm'Ting political and military deteriorati.on i n Indochina "I'7i th concern; especially ev:Lc1ent axe failure of the government to gain sUPJ?ort, disincli,nat ion of Bao Dai to aSSllJne l eadership role, and indications of CHICOMViet Minh mLl.itary collaboration. The U. S. seeks to have Vi etnam establish a national e:nny and declare a national emergency. Acheson 238 to SaiGon , 1 September 1950......... The U. So in forms Fra:..l'J.ce that the U. S. v'as prepa red to incre ase assistance to French Union forces but could not.. furnish money fOT loc al use or d:i,rect tactical air support. Extrac t of S'lumnary Mim.1tes O:L Tl'ip2.rtite, Foreign IhnisteTs 1'-leeting, France, U.K., and U.S., lLf September 1950.......... The Southeast Asia Ai,d Policy Committee ( SEAC ) proposes a statement of U. S. policy on Indochina to the NSC for con 'sideration. liThe U. S . 'I-Till not comnit any of its anflecl ,for ces to the defense of Indochina against overt, fo:ceign , t - " ' a.ggresslOYl. . . . II 'b u> S h 01) J_d clSSlS"C In t'nc II l,Or'IH,s.t :Lon 0'f ' nC,'7 national ar-mies of the three Associated states. II ~' he U.S. should also "press the French!! to carTY out t..he agreements of 8 Mal'ch 191 9 <md 30 December J.9~9. SEAC : D-2l, 11 October 1950 ...........................
,c,
131.
34)!
132 .
3)n
133.
0.00...
3~9
13~' .
" 1'1)8 dl'aft statement of U. S. po] icy in Indochina is ':Te8.k from the poli tic2,l side .... the Dei'ense reprcs ent<::.t ives argued. ro:c a st]'O:'l[;, he.Tdhitting policy on political e.ncl eCOl'101:'!ic con~;essions . The Stat.e Dep;"lrtment rep:c esentati_ves flatly l 'efuscd .... to con side}' Ind.ochin&. in that l.!13.YDler'. Consequent ly, tbe paper ended 'vi t1'1 e. cor!:promise. II K, T. YOl.mg , DoD Off'j ce of Foreign H:i.litary id:'f'2irs, J ctte.-c to CenC:l'a1 It:dony, SEAC, 13 OetobeY' J.950 .
0 0 0
369
xx
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63 316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET - Se:n,;itivc;
135.
The State DepaTt.ment am101U1ces the results of high level conversations ,ii th French Ministe rs and. th2ct the U. S. Congress has appropriated one-half billion dollars in military assistance for the Far East. Depa:ctmerrt of state pre ss rele",se 1066, 1'7 October 1950 ....
0... 0................
3'71
136"
state and Defensc recapitule,te taJJ\'.s Hith the Fl'cnch Ministel's, analyze Saigon I s viev,'s or] Indochi,l1a., and revie':,' the proposed NSC policy statement on Indochina : The French had not Pl'OC'T8mmed equipment for 18 battalions in the 1951 budget and f'LU'ther had requested that the U. So pay fOT and maintain the National armies ",hen formed. It appears that the French \\:Lll \,;1. thd.rm; from Tonkin and may throw' the problem to the U.N. The dra.ft policy statement is considered quite adequate. IvIemorandu.:.rn for the Record (IvLi~ . K. 1'. YOUIlg), 17 October 1950 .............
0 '
373
137.
The current situation in Indochina reveals serious \',eakness in French mo..npOI';er, lead,ership, and i ntellj,gence. The Viet Minh forces are build:Lng up for large-scale offensives to seize complete control of Indochina. The French Union forces of 353,970 are oppo sed by 92,500 Viet Minh regu~ars and 130,000 irregulars. U. S. Naval InteLligence l'!Iemorcmdmu, 17 October 1950 ...
0
OCt
(l
..
.,
.,
Co
382
138.
The U.S. informs Emperor Bao Dai, ,;it.h ernphasis, that it is imperat :i.vc 'Chat h e give the Viei,narncse people evidence of his determination to personally lead his coul!t.ry j,nto ll[unediate and " energet.ic opposition" to the cOJ11.T.lUnis'i., menace. The U.S. has int erpreted his "prolonged. holiday" on the Rivi era as lack of patriotism. It is tactfully suggested that further displ8.ys of proc:castinatton lrli ght lea,d to loss of U. S. support for his government. Acheson 38 1f to Saigon, 18 Octo ber 1950.: ~
(> ......................
CI
...
(I
..
..
388
139
A Defense viel'; i s that it is "most important that the FTench do not quit' cold. and. l eave 0. political vaCUU.l.1l behi.nd them." The U.S. shou~d g:ive inCl"e8,:::cd military aid bl.l,t not j_nte:cvene and stress political steps by the French. Memora.:.ndum for Secretary Finlettcr, 19 October 1950 ..............
391
l~O
U.S. desires the :iInmeclinte pob_ticc.1 and lnilHary adv[-cnte,ges sought in the Fational 2rmy plan be. fOQnd tlEough irrL.egY2"ti,OYl of armed native continGents ( Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, CatholiCS, ctc.) into an a"!..'lity cc::~,?n:;.n~led 'by BCio Dai.. Ac:r"SSOD 1r36 to Saigon, 25 October 1950..................................... 393 U. S. app}~ove::: FrC:llch request to L 'c,r:::'i'c:r 2Lt -105 rem hO','j tzers and 6 -155 i~:m hO'i'~:Ltzccs of :ND!:.r e.Gi::isi.2.l"!cC' "LO Inc1oc:hillb.. Acheson 2250 to 1'::2:is, 27 Octob'2Y' 19;:;(), ,
0 ,
1)+1.
39J.~
xx:i
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011
'l10P
SECR]~J:
- Sens iGi vc
142.
General Br:lrLl.;:, Chief r.ll\.AG-ID(lochins., repOJts that the French contemplate cha..n.c:ing troops from "pacii"ication" dispositions to largel' unit reESrolJ.pment. French mil 1.tal'Y ploDs are }ceyed to delays in political decisions . Saigon 763 to Acheson, 1+ November' 1950 ( see Enclosure A to Document No. 1 1 +6, belO\v) ... ... . . , ....... ,....... .... ... . The U. S. (loes not favor use of the Peace Observation Commission in Indochina and if the Indochina subject is to corne into the United Nations , it j,s preferl'C:d that the French do it. Acheson 516 to lJN, 22 November 1950 .. ..... , . The U. S. publicly ,relcomes the French statement ',hich assures i ndependence of the Associated states of Indochina uithin the French Union and that thej l' resources irill be dire.cted "to the defense of Indochhw. against comm.1.lJ1ist colonialism. " Department of State press release 1187, 27 November 19500... "If the Comnnmists are successful i n Korea, thi.s mC.w so \:eaken the French in Indochina that they ,,!i11 pullout He LSecretary Acheso~ doubted if ~~y one of the President t s advisers '\'wuld urGe h:iJ(l to intervene i n that situation. " Extract from Truman-Attlee Conversations, 4 December 1950 ...... ~
0
405
Ilf3 ,
395
144.
397
lLf5.
()
'"
"
......
....
..........
.....
....
..
..
398
11f6.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff po,sition paper on possible future action in Indochina, 28 November 1950, is circulated for NSC consicl.eration, This paper i ncludes the Brink report (Lf November 1 950) as a reference The JCS short term obj ectives emphasize m'Gent action to deny Indochina to commw1ism, insure retentj.on of respoll sibili ty by France, and development of an over-all military plan fOT Indochina . The long t erm obj ectives seek to prevent com:munist expansion, to establish interne.l secuTi ty conditions such as the foreign armed fOl"CeS i'Tould be removed , to p:cess the French to car:cy out coYt1,rni trocnts, and to es tablish a reg:i.onal secur ity 8.rr~~ge mcnt in S011thcfl.St Asia . Executj,ve Secl'etary to the ESC , NSC 6)+/1, 21 December 1950 ............. c 399
0
0,.,.0
lLf7.
President TTuJri,an reasserts ths:t U. S. aid to the F:ccnch Union forces cend National s.rmies of the Assoc i ated States will continue . 'I'n)}(l2.:.'1-Pleyen Conversations, 30 Janu8.ry
1951 .. ..
ll}8 .
ec " . . . . . . . . . . . . . . o .
... . . . . . c. . c.
4J7
The U. S. is very unl:!.1:ely to C;i1UCe itself to finance the bndgeta.:ry deficit of T're.r:-.ce ( 25 bHEon fr anc s) required for the Fe:tional 8.Tllies in lndochim.. Acheson 97)~ to Saigon, 30 J anU8.ry 1951 .
0 0 ,
L~19
TOP SECRET - Sem::LU.ve
TOP S.E:CRE:J' .- Sensit:i ve
1490
The first progress repoTt on ESe 61 \-.'hic11 172.S appTOVC~l1. :, on 27 l~arc:h 1950, assesses the most S':;VCl'e tlrre<lt to FTench Ind.ochina 2.S the increo.sed capability of the Viet I'hnh resll~ting from Rec, Chinese aid . O:0tjJEistice.lly, the r eport concludes that "kIlcricc-.n milit'. .C'y D.id furnished the state I s forces and the ArJ1Y of the Fn:Dch Union may have been the decisive factoT in the preservation of the area agaj.nst COllJm1Jllist agGTessiol1 ." State Departmf,nt Nemorandum to NSe, 15 1-1(',rch 1951. .... ...
0
l{21
150.
President TnlJnan appToves l'JSe Action 1:8/5 \;h:i.ch states U.S. policy 011 Asia. Hith Tespec:t to 111do(;hill0., U.S. policy seeks to continue to increase French military effectiveness, to encol.u'age internal alJ.tollony, [:.:nd to promote international snpport for the three Associated states. Nse 48/5, 17 Ma y 1951. ..... " .. ......... .. ...... Dulles discu~'ses problems i ~ith Parodi of participa.tion o f the three Associated States as II sovel'eign" "rith respect to u.n. membership, Viet Minh riva.l govenDnent, and positions of Ind.ia, Burma, and Indonesia. DuJlesParodi ConversD:t:i..on, 11 J'1Jlle 1951. ..
0 0
0.
425
151.
4)[6
152.
The U. S. i nvites Vietn2r!l; Cambodia, 8....YJ.d LEWS to parti6 p ate in signing of J'ap2!leSe Pc;ace Treaty. S8igon 132 des patch to State, 6 SeptCill)Cl' 1951.............. . .. .... .. .. . .. The U.S. and Vietnam enter into an ecoYlOmic cooperation agreement. Agreement entered into force 7 September 1951. . The U. S. agrees ,!j:t,h France that they ,,"ill continue to b~ p:dJ!larily responsible for Indochina, that U S. troops should. not be used, anc'. that first priority in military aid should go to Incloch:ina. U. S. - France Foreign Ministers Meeting, 11 September 1951. ...........
0 0 0 0 C
L~1j.7
153. 154.
4Lf9
~52
155.
President Truj}1:?l1 a.nc1 Secl.'et2.'cy Acheson pledge support for Generc:tl DeLattre and. tl1d.t I\;e ,<'ould not let Indochina fall i nto enemy hands. II l1elnOrcmo.vD of Conversati.on, Acheson, Scl!m:'l2x~, aDd DeLattre, 1h ,september 1951. .. .
0 0 0 0
1+51+
156.
General DeIJattre cmnI1ents to the State Departnent that the aid TJrog:c2:n h:;.1 not bee:c. "v:c.cl:.inz out satj.sfhc:torily due to \"Ol]"(1(":" m ..... n l! v]1l c'n )"A.s.rie i-1" ' lIe 11..l. ....;;:)_ o;<'.;'y zPQ'j l! o.l' cp"-'-.;:,in 1Y J. ...... 1. v_____ v t 1.- i,,:",,]. . appear tlw.t the Uo S. '. :2.S extend.:lng its il'.fJlJence. ste'te DepartY;;ent Disc:uGs::'onoo i."j. J0 h DeLe.ttTe, 17 Se~:fGember 1951.....
1 .... _.
,-.~""_
--0
___ ...... __
\,_
_U
__
L,56
xxiii
TOP SECHEt - Sensitive
157.
'l'be U. S. recounts th,,~ doubts <"..no. dj stl'llst remaining on the subject of' colonialisn in Indochinc. but mainto.:Lns that the
real j_s~~ue is i:hether or not the Indochinose people \:,i,ll be a11m:ed to exel'cise sovereignty or be subjected to COY:1munist ten'or. Dean Rusk Adc~ress, 6 NOVember 1951. ... 0. . . .. 158 . France requests th at conversation take place in,.nccliately b et'l-leen U. S., U. K. and Fi.'all co concerning Co~cel'ted c"ction i n t he event of see.mingly j.iimlinent Chinese intervent.ion i n Indochina. Bruce ( Paris) 3765 to Acheson, 22 December 1951. France delivers an aicle-meLoire to the U.S. on a proposal to appeal to the U."N:- i.rRecl Cilina intervenes . P-;l'i; 3856 to Acheson , 29 December 1951 .............................. . .
L~)9
460
159
462
160.
Acheson revieT'ls tripartit e military discussions in l,rh:Lc 1} stat.e did not participate. GeneY'al Braclley, "hile l.mable to comluit or i.neli cate the extent of U. S. military assi.stance in the event of CHICOM invasion, \Wll~d recoY'JIIlend to the President that a dec-laxation be issued to Red China that retalio.tiol1 I':ould fo]lm'i any aggression. Ache SOl} 97)~ to Saigon , 15 J anuilry 1952 . .... ..... .......... . ,. .. .. The NSC considers the consequences to the United states of comrmmist domination of Southeast Asia. Loss of Southeast Asia is seen s putting econom:'_c and political p:cessures on Japan~ opening sou:cces of strategic meteria1s to the Soviet Bloc, rendering the U.S . pos:ition jon the Pc.cific precarious and j eopa.rdizing lines of COlrmnmication end t rade routes to South Asia. If Red China intervenes, the U.S. should tak e appropriate rnilitary action as P8.rt of a U.N. action or in conjunction ;:dth others but not lmilater ally. Annex to NSC 124,13 February 1952 ... ......... . .. . ..
465
161.
~68
162.
The CIA estimates that, e, joint -,:arn:"lne; ar;ainst CBICOM int eT v ention in Southea.st Asia v.'Ould tend to deter them, that i nitiation of 2,ctjon in the LJ.l'T. \'iOlIld prob9.bly bring 8. res:Qonse sbni1ar to that rega:cding Ko:cea, and CHICOl;I defiance of a joint I;a:cn:ing i:ould prob2.bly involve pr~_or conse::lt o f the USSR . CIJ\ S}J2c:i::l E.stirr!c"te , SE-2?, 29 Fe'b:cuary 1952 . The JCS vie',';'s on. ESC 12~ cmd P.r!21eX to NSC 124 8.Te the.t rr..Hi .. te.ry ope:ce.tioYls in clefeYl:oe of Inclochinc ag2.inst Chinese Co!;;rmm:;,st invc-csion murt b2 8.cco:np(mi.c<1 by action against Corr::nmist Cnir:s. itself ~- a COUl'se of e.ction 'l-Thich might result in e. lone; 8:'"::3. ez:pensive ':-:2:(', 2)1'1 that frOY:l a mi1ita:cy point of vie'.:) the JC2. 0t:}~c.:e 2..(;C,,,:;;t?!'1C2 of all the lnLLitary co!:"r1:Lt.lner~ts of l';-SC l~:?~. JCS J. r CXflo:r~-;_rJ.dJJ.r:: foY.' the SeeDef ( forKer-eJed to the Ee.U.o_lc:.1 Se;c;-u.r:; i.,y COl.;1l(;:L1) , 3 llexch 1952..
163.
1,86
xz:iv
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63 316, By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECR:t<l' - Sensitive
JD+.
The NSC recommends that the military implications of going to '\<'0,1' in China be studied further and explained. to the COlllCil and the President; that the greater danger to Southeast Asia is subversion and not external aggression ; arld. that contingencies fOT a French ui Udl'a'i:al be exalilined. -rsc 1 1"'L1, l' ee .!- . . (I' . "') ) ) ,,. ,. , lor2 r.:; l'l _.) l,,11 ~1 l"ll1g "Gem.J darcn 7)
0 0 0
502
165.
The U.S. stresses to the British that rumors of French intentions to ,'lithdraI'T or negotiate '\'lith Ho Chi Minh are not trueo The U. S . believes that France Hill stay in Indochina as long as sufficient UoS. aid is forthcoming. Acheson Conversation T,-lith British Ambassador, 28 March 1952 ....
0
508
166 .
French stress t hch" problems at tl'iparti te meeting concerning their EDC commitments : ( 1 ) the French effort in Indochina, ( 2 ) financial difficulties and I'Thether the strategic ~nportance of SEA justified continued effort, and ( 3) Indochina i s part of the European defense problem. France c a..Tll1ot-continue t o bear II alone such great share Indochinese b Ul'den . II French attach great i mportance to U.S. aid . Acheson 7LI15 to state, 28 May 1 952 .. ........ . ......... .. . If the Chinese i nvade Indochina, II he fj.cheso!27 said it vas clear that it l"ras futile and a lfiistake to defend Indochina in Indochina . He said I'le could not have another Korea .. . vie could not put ground troops in Indochina ... our only hope "I-TaS of changing th e Chinese mind. II Secretm"y of State Note ( L.D. Batt l e ), 17 Ju. e 1 952 .... n
0 ... ... 0 .. 0 .... . .... 0 .... . 00.
511
, 1 6 7.
515
168.
U.S. informs France that appropriations would be prepared to provide up to 150 million dollal"S additional IT 1953 aid in support of overall F r ench effort i n I ndochina. Ach eson 740J.~ to Paris; 17 June 1952 ....
0 0
517
Acheson publicly annOU:"1.Ce8 optimism over the conduct of the National armies in Indochi.na C'xld that COl1l.mUIlist " aggression h as b een checked" a..nd that the IIt ide is nOI': moving in our f avor . " State Department Release 473 , 18 JUDe 1952 ........ 170. The President approves NSC J.2~/2 ( ESC 12 L f/l as <",:mended) on the U. S . objectives and courses of action ,lith respect to Southeast Asia. 1,hth respect to Indochina, the U. S . ,-!Quld continue to aSSUl'e the Fl'eneh of the i.nternetiono.l interest of the Indochina effort; use U. S. influe~lce to promote political,mil:Ltary, ';conolr:ic, and social policies; ,provide increased aid in the absence of ovel't Cbj.JL'se agg:c(;ssi.on; oppose Fren r \';ith6,.l"~~,,- C'.1; and ;;ce}: collective c;.ction c.gcjnst ..:ll R~d China inte:cvelrc,jon. NSC l2 LI/;:'-" 25 Jlme 1952............
518
520
xxv
TOP SECRET . Sens i t:l. ve
TOP SECRET
- -Sensitive -.
171.
The UoS. and Britain discuss issuinG a \ntrning to Red China inter ention in Indochina. l"rencll successes could tri gL~er Chi:ne::;e intervention and the U. S. had '\10 infa.1'J.tl'Y available for ol')cr&tions "idthin Iniochino. ." The U.S. thinking is along the lines of' [l, DC"vD.l blockade of China ' s coast . Lond.on Ministerial TaL~~'; 26 June 1952 ..
Oil
0 0 0 0 0 .
535
172 .
The French request that 150 American Air Force mechanics

b e detailed to Vj.etnam receives an op:inioll for favol'able
action from General Trapnell, .HAAG Chief, \,ho also reCOHlmends expedit:Lng delivel'Y of aircraft p:comised for 1953. Saigon 111}9 to Acheson, 5 Decernber 1952 ..
00 0 0 0 0 0
00
'
538
173.
The U. S. approves parti.cipatjon of 2530 USAF personnel in maintenance of French aircraft in Vietnerr-. Acheson 1;286 to Saigon, 22 December 1952 .... <
0 0 0 0 0
540
xxvi
TOP SECRET - Senr;itivc
(-"
. r-- .
)', _
THE STA-II:\',jA:::-rJ/\VY
C001''l)ii':AT1~;S
V',I,\SHINGTOi'! , D , C.
1 c 'I-I ~r' ' ......
110 ..
_(1
j~~)::-'J.}4
:?t:; ;,:i !'~ ~~ :::!1CC!

tll-'O nf'0~r:
!'.:R~
"
t01l:~'1'~P st:~':~c:d, J:'~2.. t.
. t'2;
t():~~: jiO (\AGr:'TfC.:~_O!1
t.o c'j :~~ri:rc.ch

r:.;~lC~,:::3~~'::c]
o.f th0
~~r.
!107J(!
tJ
tj-;'~;
~1~(;:4lcl:.. t. :'""~b~"~'1C~::'(~OI' :c:~-t :~.f0~1 ~t;
b:;
0~~
D..l:~n,
b1.1t~
j!ointc(i. QUJL,
-C}1"'t, i.l:1~~8 ),10:.';; CrY'TOr-S cn:~'~i!~(. ;~:~~~ =~(~
S8[:(:-':nt of tl"'J
C':-t ~irc I):,o"t;l?:"~1'
":1:~;; .
D.
:',.:1~1J_
t.:.J. qLJSt.:1..C~1
is a r~~J:~8~:- of ..!..:i_,"cl~ r::"l.I;" t"-4~:2; :L~!.t:;:rcGt, ::l~d t,~. ~1t... . the :l.G,r;}: 0 .[" :.? ". "Oolic.':t :is ' /~ :~C'~:;..~; o:~ t .:;1't.LOl1,S cLl~-,p-rr~ . [=t.s::r:~-:;:lt, to t~:'j~ ! Lil :~.tp.;:-,:l e lIe poi4r:~/J("~. on:' t,:12 Ju ;~(~:i:tr21, 7f~1!c~"'Id h.::.s t-.:~e:l ~_!s:L~~: r. :,\,,~c~)'j15.qlt,) 0.:" f;~l ::,,".I:tt~.:j:.!g a s"~r:lG0 o:C Cl1.1:)St.;Ol1S to "i':;.::'~. OllS rtS ::!~c:i I'":S of ~)lQ l.rrr!.-t-,r.,~-l. S :,:~G'J r:; C(rJ",;lr~'"s'l. l:. allcl t~T' 01>c. ;-!~lr:j ,1[: o'r.')i\ r~.c:-;Gt..~":I'2 0;~ ::-lO~~l-::'C:" '"tit ~>-:-. J~ l"'8[~~)':':-'~' .. 3 G~y)~:':;t0 }~\C~3 t:E.:.C~1 i:1 cr-r'cc.fJ \,;1'.i~=l.nr; ./ :r l("!::,:i_cC':.~ ?o')~j c: r C~1 ~ir;~'1o .. -C1!j :-:;8..~ ,Al ~:'C:~~:l1 .:\(~;;~r~tJ.. r\'; . . 1,S_'..~1. ;,).P,s [)~r~L.:;cl "i:,~a :j he :~r-; cO'i",,-)_pcorl ot o:~r' [;COC! f.J~~ t:~ i:~l --:',:113 !~2 ~,ter\, the l}2~ :~t8r:1 is [;~1(:_ ... l .. }l:t,.;j [~1...1:,~'i~:i.O=1S llEn/3 a.::i. 0i.':~ ij.1 ?tl..l.'5.s f':).~.: to t~'~e J.1~i:\ . r;l;':;:~t.;(l ~~.:;,0~8 ~)osj:c.lo:1s
'~'
0'_ ;1-- Il1('.C.-,.G:--l :l"1r'.. pO.,~.i.c~r
a",
a1.i.~: s-:~,~i('::. rye"' rc~.~~:",:('rr:": !;"e!1t,~
cj
".r:i.l
<'1(""'1.; !"~ist,::a-(/i.O'-l
ir~ In.(~G-C}1:'
()2.
d,:~~~5_rl;; t1:.~)
~:8r~.. O( . o.f ;','i ~_=~ :(~'::~J C:Ci))~:~".j.(i~l. ;'5.~- ~t !"orc

J
[3....")?~.'0~!:.
iCJ.,~,~.l~t t~
vO t.~~e C:,~:_j).2:C i"'~-'.::'~"lr;.r '0:~;'7"1
h
~E'~f:'t' !'_:!1
r'l l
C0l#-:'t':'1 :"'' 1:
'.'Jl;,.i.. l
G:~~8:f'
of"
r.~ . ,
0;~[~7~.f J\.-:.~.r~~
l~.~!:; :~~cr
a.:.:"\~ e: :.c~ .~}~~,
..:,
#~ ..~~.
~,,;~(:,-_:.l(3
' ~, ;jE)':':"
;-!,J ':, } ..... ~.. " :"~r,:!t. ~ ::-1 O~:':2"\~'+:~.OP"'~!. y~"L[i~h~.:~'n;~ ~:.~l ..
(~.:.. -~:_:l '~cl ~J-['-
'.
thf1 T''lI''
-
l:j__;~;--;~";;.-;::;.OTl
?r?i~G~". l~':?j
~l():1'::
0:'
2:fl(:o--Cr.!.:L::-.. :i:::
,
~,
1..?,:,!-:'10:,.'~";~
'."":::'' :; ;;'
.:~~~,::;
~l~:~
2<)""'\ :~"'_f()Yj,-' ':~ -. ;-l "' i.~':
.(....... ; : .'t",
~ .. "t:.;
21,'1 -!:j~:'"l
r.:):.:' ..~~'-!
CO:i '.
.-
.,
't
....
r.: n
';',~:C .......
~I.'
.. ";~ ..'-::" :~ . ''-~ . . -.

,~:' ~ ;.
~.C
"
"
>.['.:("'~"~_:"lL~
~.,)'.)
~7'~2:"'I"':~"!.
:~"_-'=,:'"
=::-.. i_ ~: ~ .,~ ';~.; :',
-;:C ~::;.'" ~:
t/t c:: I) :~ ~1 0:-<': "z\, l", i~l'\:3
the lit)c!r2.ti..r.~l of Inc1Q-,Ghi'.1o., j .t ,;ocl.J..~l five GIl':; Br'i t:i r:;l D n: 1 ::fj"t::'11C ~l 2j'1 c..r' ;_:ur"'~<"'.i ~', t.o SI.l ..~~':'~1i.rl -G~ln vJe~.r th;:--d~ Irl.'~,?--C}:i~n"'~ t)l1o'1JC~_ 1)0 iri t . -:) j31"j_ ~:ls11 50hoJ"'c r2t~lcr t:lnn tl::J 114) So ~9T"~l"':~ O~ strtlt,cE~:Lc .
1
," <,' l, '1,')'' es:::,on.J . I..; ..'L.L..L t'jr
0
Il1co-Ghirlt"j. op')r::-ttilQl1-S 1~:! felt t!1C..lt j't, is 8ss\-~nt/.i.Ctl thnt. T',~C (J.8-Gel'lrd_r'J ~lhcl.~~ 0:.11" \Pol~i.c~r i:-.; to b-:J 2.11 r1 l)[G. . t.li--.o:t cuJ.a~l'" t}1t1i.:. th!-~ F'r:-jDc:l ' e irl.to:":-~:?(l t:ll-~ !10 rrl~.jor operations r:..~C8 b con'L'G;i'.p12~,od :in Inc'Q-Chi~H~. :rlrJ alc,;o f::<l:i:, :i..t c'3ssnt:i.21 tIFt:, IJ:t"'t)sid.-:-J!I.t 1~.,Jo~3(~,.t~~lt, t s l)Y'o:ril)it:i_on. l).l")Oll rliscllS,)j.O:1 of' or~::-a 111do Gll.i.na }Jo15cy b') l'OC0l1sir]s':'.3n or n~af.,. iri,:cl pro:'qyc,Jy ~ 1m" !.~\TT::;:.:S "2:l't,cd th:dj 'tilE:: titl8 h2 s cor;,:'! Ville!l on::' posi tiO;1 lTi.11C:j
110
l.r it i s
apl)fLl~I~-~nv
t.11at
S~~}~PC~."lt 01"'
., ,...
.A. . l
to b')
fOl'thco'iL~n~; :1'0;1
the
C~hi\1a j:'her.rcPl' ,
tJte DOO~,:hlj poi .I:,ec1. 01J.J0 t,hrtt th8 Su.t:co1! .. nit:;t,G3 j~or t~le :lli<"l ~asc to " ,,"hic'1 ';:'h8 Q<Jvelo:i)['9Dt of o\~r 111(1(- Ch:Li'l'l pol:i.cy h;-ts b:'I-3:0. n;.:;siC?1'3c1 :Cor Stll(:.~r h3.S 1)~~811 U11~iQlo to ri'-;l)Ol" Lr ij1 v'ic":,~ of 8. (li~Tor' belle; of -vieYfS "\"'T&i~c,hin -0113 Sth1.~C J):;:P2~~ ~~'f3l1)-~ ...il1.~l.(![l h.3.S _lOt, ~:j8't-J 1)':)811 ro~J,)l\r(~(l.:I\ ~jno :,=':\!?C:~.~~) st,'l't,(:!(l th.at he 11~(J. 8;)()~"c;rt t/O J'~l~() JJluln ;"[110 ff:' J_t th8.~j it If) 11.'3 C~~ 0 s~r:l to 1"8 so:t;r::! t,>,~; 88 di:C f81'1ej1~~ s rti1cl cJjJ.rif~T th8 r~olir;y.
AD:~1.).:\!. :. n.LSO~! qu.t~s;~i.m18d -(,;19 di:~si~2:b:i.lit,:'l 0:("
Ii'1'8l\ch c.ef:.'Lnite\.r t.hD.t no 0lJerat:Lons
~-C\~
YJlnnno;d for
t,e}Jj. i'1~ 't . :8 Indo~ 811i.na,.
b~
A[.rcc! ~~. t!:J{ t. t118 })r3p"~ ~.~ ~,~:~ ~n~0 of St:lt.0 sho"Jl(l t()o!~':; un t}le q"tlO G~~ion of a r;ro;""LI)"C, cl::: fice!. tiO"'1 of CfL11-' r-i
})ol:Lc:{ O'il IncIo-C\1.i,~::1. ;{ 1"\c:e:....:;11~e 0: b to the I'l.'8::":i..QC!?1t J n the l~i. S:l'G of the . e11~.L:1~ra u:;(l b:r :, .. -:-. I'J'J8 tJ t Ii
j)
t,l~e J:!3.tt'31't t~lloeJ
fr.c-(:.ol"s
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3 ,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
\\',\:--1 ! I:\CTI!:";, ,\p;';11!i , 1:1,;",--8 p , m,

1 , ,(j. }'rOin ".\[;111:10\\";--; .1 0 \
rrhp
}1},('llCl!
1-:nd)(ls"y Lii;:':
hPl"lll illfo~'lnlllly
H' l;'l't't'll:fll l (\!;lllilp\\':-:, 1)il'l'('i(Il' (d'Jill'
Cl:lil'(' (Ii'
l:1l1\i}H';ill ~\I"(;liJ_-': .
no:ifl l'c1
1)(,1'
tl~:;1
for
liw llc'1'io(l "'\ 1 ; \I' ('11~!) 10
,\n:"] 1:',
:Ii, :jl ',)m" ,;:\l,l,'l1l1111-
of llii,~";(>I1" 11:1\"(' h,'\'n flo'.\';1 il~IO;' I1,I"'C:lill:;-~t:-:li';"(:\~i -~(,;;~~~-~'l 'of
ihp }'l'{}l1('ll i;~ ;~(ll1il i()~i 'i~ (It I vj"ali' fOl\:rs..()~)("'r;ll iOl1~ ini() lr:d()-C1:i~);l. E'm J):I ,'':;\' '\\:;l,," ~I)i'nl'l, '(',1 I );;It ":lL'n,~ h:\\"l' h l 'Cil l:d:(,;1 to (1 '1 \)') 1':lt io: ;~ . sl11:lll ;11'111:~ '11lel ('lnll ',ill'<!' \(1 (iJ~,' l)'li'iicli 1'r ,O::WlJ) ill TI1(lo,('l1;I1:; :11~d
I h:l1 nllP,.:lioll of 1'111"111('; ' :1':,;;,,(;\11,',' W 0111(:1' gTOllP':; i,.; :'llhje"1 of aClin'
lH'p.-of i:lt iOll s,
Pht 11le\\"s,]
'1'1H' :;;('('1'('1:11'\' O'~ :--;i:Ii" )):"'.~I'l1h lli" (ollIll1imr>lIh \0 TTi" l\'J'\'lk~w)' '11](' ,\jl~h:l ,;,' :\(1nJ' of' Ill<' Fl'l',;ch nl'lil~lJl:' ;111,1 ;1\'l,liO\\"1,'r1~,'" illl' 1',""ipl fir' dll' Eli11);lss\'\ 1Io;r 'in , :;(J J 01 ' "\1:11\,11 1:;, 1:,,1.\ COll\'(,Yin~'1l1(, (k,;;'(' Oi' ;1:(' T'1'1..'il('11 l)l'i)\;I,i .... ic,l~:t~ (~n. \.'\rnl:l\'ld IO cnj';('lu{L"\ \\iil1 [l~p GOYl'i',1lllC'ilt or il,(' 1'lli,('(1 SI nib ;n l :I,~:T\'el1l('i1l :tll:l1og011;:: 10 I h(' FJ';lllCO',\ llir<1 :lgl'\'C'i11<'lIi SigiiP(; ill LOll(l,,;1 ()I) ,\11g11S1 J,:" l~H;, and IIppli(';)blc to Inr1o(,ilii1:1. (';I1'ri'I!l ('(lllSi(lp1':11 iOll 11:1" 1ll'l'11 ,!2:i\'\,11 to il\(o :,],0\'\' proposal ,' The rl1il('(1 :--;t : II(,:'; (;O\'l'1'lllll,'lH 11;)"; (,()llsi:", "llt l\' 1)('li,'\"('(1, an,1 <1ei(,l :1("
C01'l1in[.!'l\'. tl1;1l lilr ~1,('~~':',l('i"I-,I:J:l of I" Jil;(1'\: o1!C'J.::ltinl~"; ,in
n1l'
Fa1'
East mm:1 h" :lilll('ll :Ii l~l(' ";;1"1i( ' ''1 i' O.-,,.: ;!>]\' r]l'!',';ll of .I:ll':lJ1. Sl1, ' ~l Ol;p-l';u iol'!~ l'pr:llil'l~ lllP ('nnVI..\J~.i.::li.ioll cli!d l1:--:l' (}T :tlll\}-:(l1il'('(,~ i"n ;\r111t\(1" fOl'( ' e,.;. mlli'i;ioll:', ;\iHl-~1"I'ipj)i'l ,!~' ;\11(1. ('OIl":\':Pl<':li 1\', i h(' ,<1j~'\"l"SiOil, ii1 , th.r.~I.).! l11 :)(J;(~'.\ fi.ll1r(, cd' suell I'\'>~dl1:\'l~ .. i0. ~p~~_i:;\' r:.il:l;lI'Y Op0r~tl i(/~lS
:i n
111(lo-('l1ii);1 1~~.1.!~I!)I,l,:~ ..(,(']Il(:I!lI)l:: ll'~l.
Tn Ill,'
l'il'('1illl,.:t;\I1(",''';,
Ih('
nO\'(']'lllilC'JiI
(II' i I,,'
rl~ii,'d ....;[:11(..; ],110\1'<;; m! ll() lJ..;"hl1 PII]')l0":P \\'hil'~J
\ \'011](1 Lc' :'-(,],\",,1111\' lilt' C(l]l, ' lll' :(,11 ;It thi:, tillll' ni' ,:111 :1!!T(','nh':1i <ljo!l~l' ill(' lin(',: N,jl1,'lilpLi,.\l ill i1l;' Ei"l)"~,.:.\' ,, 110te- 1I1l(h'; ' :,("lmc)\\" (',l~'ilil':n , \ \-,\";Iii:";(;')"ll:";, .\pl'i1 ~IJ, H),~,) ,
''-...I''....) ~.\ .......-<
.r'1,r-. ..... -r
-"1""',
-r-:'\"~
:... -.) ..:...i.J.A.
.. 1. .-:.i-A~
-T.'
--
....)
")
EDITORIAIJ NOTE: With the death of President Roosevelt on 12 April 1945, the indecisive policy toward I ndochina took on a new approach unde:;: the n eH President, Harc), So Trumcmo Shortly "lfter being S"\'70rn in to office, UoS o policy Has thoroughly revie'iVecio On 13 Apri1.~ the StateWa'. r-Navy Coordinating Committee met and discussed the urgent need for c1ar:tfication of U So policy tOiVard French-Indochina, document number 3 0 By 20 April, a Nemoranc1um to the President on Indochina policy had been drafted by the. State Department Division of European Affairs (EDR) , doclllnents number 5 and 6 The Division of Far. Eastern Affairs (FE) revised the EliR vel::' sion to the extent that i t was substanda11y different from the original submitted!) document number 70 The final compromise bet~\7een the two vel'sions resulted :i.n a draft action cable for Paris and a Hemoranc1um on American Policy with Respect to Indochina for the president~ both of which app8m: as uocuments number 9 and 10 0 The record shows that t he policy statements in the memorandum was neither sent to no): approved by the P:ce.sident and that the cable \Vas not dispatched to Paris. The documentation concerning this evolvement of policy is included here as a revelation of the France-Indochina commitments internal to the Depa:rtmGl1t of State and the impetus l ent to po Hcy making by the Hal' Depa1:'t.mcnt in the latter phase of Har1d Hal' 110
0 0
Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Sectio n 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
..-.:
'.
, Co.
..... \
\:. '
h oO t'
'.
;~
. .,..
T~j::J ~~ ~ ~:,-:~,~!
~, \:.~Il":
'i:;,' ~i~ ,;\.o. .f'Il.~
lvlElIIORAlIDUJ'.1 FOR Tlill PRESIDE'NT
Suoject :
Su~gested Reexamination of American Policy with Respect to Indo-China
General Observations
1. The Japanese aggression against the French in Indo-China last month has brought about a marked increase in the numbe r of proposals advanced by the French for the use of French forces and resources in the Pacific.
2. The consequences of these mili.tary developments mal\:e it clear that our past policy, Ivhich held that the disposition of Indo-China \'Tas a matter for post-I,rar determination a.nd that the United States should not become involved in military effort for its liberation, is in urgent need of reexamination and clarification. This is particularly so in order that American military and naval authorities may have guidance to enable them to take appropriate action ,dth respect to the French proposals referred to above.
3. The United States Government has publicly taken the position that it recognizes the sovereign jurisdiction of Fra:nce over French possessions overseas when those posDessions are resisting the enemy and has expressed the hope that it Ivill see the reestablisbJ!lent of the integrity of French territol'Y. In spite of this general assurance, the negative policy so far pursue d by this Government vTith respect to IndoChina has aroused French suspicions concerning ou.r intentions vii th respect to t he future of that tel'ri tory. J'his has had and continues to have a harmful effect on American rela'bons with the French Govermtlent and people.
L t. On AprD. 3, 19~5, the Secretary of State with the approval of the President issued a statement of v;'hich the follouing excerpt is pertinent to the present pl"oblem :
liAs to territorial trusteeship, it appeared desira.ble that the Governments repTesented at Yalta, in consultation vii th the Chinese Government and the li'rench Provisional Government, shov~d endeavor to formula.te proposals for submission to the San Francisco Conference for a trusteesb.ip structure as a pad; of the genera.l orga.ni7,ation. 1'hi.s tTlJ.steeship structure, it 'Has felt, should be defined to permit the placing lLrtcter it of the territories taken f:rom the enemy in this i-car, as might be alTreecl uuon a.t a later date, and also such other territories a~ might ~ vollmtari.1y b e placed v:nder tr:u"Steeship . " - - - - --- --- ----- - - -----..---~-
COP Y
T:~~:) ~; ~~ 1:~"~~
~
L..i
Uil'..l;~fi'l~,
rr
5. General de Gaulle and his Govermnent have macle it abu...n.dantly clear that they expect a proposecl Inclo-Chinese federation to fu...'1ction vTithin the fra.rne'lvork of the "French Union ." There is consequently not the slightest possibility at the present tLrne or in the fOl'eseeable f uture that FraIlce Hill volunteer to place Indo-China under an intern at ional trusteeship, or' 'I'Till consent to any prog.cam of internat ional accom1tabili ty 'Ivhich is not applied to the colonial possessions of other pOlTers. I f an effort were made to exert pressure on the French Govermilent , such action 'Ivould have to be t aken by the United States alone for France could rely upon the support of other colonial pOi',ers, notably, Great Britain and the Netherlands . Such action 'lJould likewise r u.l1 cOlmter to the established American policy of aiding }'rcU1ce to r egain her strength in order that she may be better fitted to share r esponsibility i n maintaining the peace of Europe and the vTorld .
Reconmienda tions I n the l ight of the above considerations , the follmving recommendations, Ivhich have been com.111uni cated to the IvaI' and Navy Departments , are submi tted for your approval.
1. The Govermnent of t he United States should neither oppose the restoration of Indo-China to Fra.n.ce, \vith or \'Tithout a progra.m of international accoUJ1tabi.li ty, nor take any action tmvard French overseas possess:lons v.rhich it is not prepared to trute or suggest with regarcl to the colonial possessions of our other Allies .
2 . The GoverIilllent o f the United States sh01.l.ld continue to exert i ts i nfluence 'I",Uh the French i n the d icection of having them effect a l iberali zation o f the i r past policy of l imited opportunities for nat i ve particip ation in goverIilllent and aclministratj.on, as well. as a l iberalization of r estrictive French economic policies fOl'merly pursued in Indo-China .
3. The French Provisional Co ernr.1ent shou~d be info:rmecl confidentially that, ovTirJg to the need of concentrating all our resources in the F2.cific on o:fre.tions already pl.e,nnecl, large-scale military operations a i med directly at the l iberati.on of Indo-China cannot be contemplated at t h:Ls t:iJne .
French offers of military and naval ass i sta.n.ce in the Pacific be considered on their merits as bearing upon the objective of defeating Japna, as in the case of British and Dutch proposals . The fact that acceptance of a specific propos8,1 might serve to strengthen French cla:iJJ1s for the restoration of Indo-China to France should not be r egardecl as groumls for rejection, On the contre,ry, acceptance of French proposals for militBl'Y assistance in the defeat of Japan should be regarded as desirable in principle , subject ali-lays to military :ceqt1.irements in the thea.ter of operations.
shou~d
L~.
COP Y
1:
".~""'" 4 " ,
r .1
!~~ .~. ~ .~ '1 ro

..
~,
"ofl
!
;;
.l
I ;' l.. \ . . 1
"
:. _
~~:~.
, . . 1
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011
t iI:z~
l~,~~r-,
o.:, .~:! ~ ~~~~ j
~"'-::--I
-;=1 "-.. ,:~
~:"T
5. Hhile avoiding specific commitments vrith regard. to the amount or character of any assistance i-rhich the United states may give to the French resistance forces in Indo - China, this Government shou~d continue to afford all possible assistanc.:e provided it does not interfere 'Hith t he requirements of other plann ed op e:r'ation s
0
6. I n add it jon to the aid vihich vTe are able to bring from the Ch i na t heater of operations to the French forces resisting the Japanese i n IndO-China , the United states should oppose no obst ac le to the implementation of proposals looking tmrard the despatch of assistance to those forces from the southeast Asia theater of operations, provided such assistance doos not constitute a dive r s ion of resoUJ.'ces "lhich the Combined Chiefs of Staff consider are needed elsevlhere.
COP Y
<;'0"') L' ~j
..:'; P
, . ". I
TO
---,
l:'_~~J
Dunn
\ ..
'P -r>
J,'.~..I.
II
DATE:
.'
;""'I,-j "',::-'- " 1 --
~-I '-'---,
"1 -
C",t;-,~.
.-
- __ ._ .v_ . .' ."

I
'.
SUf'.jEC')::
I.iQOl" fl
~-j
' ,- "
,
I
~1(l.l),:~1
-,
" -".
'-'
-'
;: j
.c.
-'
'
, I (\ ,
{ I,
,
-
[I () \ .
Ii '
l),~~ee.rl\~pr.t ......"' .... ........ - ..
---_ _.
~--
J. ......
ll
,.
r-"'"
( ' .1
Po
b8
S J~~~~~~J~5:i~:l-(; (~C'''t o(
:p~.'.:t~1e ~<!.~n ":-; ;1. .2!l
';.~
belJ F)V' Q;) {Jr..ctt tIL-.S !)~:I.l~'''''~52")EI.::) .~''1 ~}l~()l~l(l I tJ.::'j rlC'CH~l f\C):i.") 8.. cl.c;t ;::::.;;t ~i . n.2..~. "
tion
bi). ~j
O~~ ~90J_~!..cy 0
)? 2. i:''':1. ~;~ ~ ::.:q i~. ,

bc: :1.1 ni/8.~~
3~
l~ S
~:. }:\ci.~]
(j () i 1r:~ L~l"l ::-.i '",.; :1.. ...:~ rio t ,1:\ ::) :~ j ~c<~ ~~ CJ c; t\ ~ t} ~~ ':} f? lf1 [';.~;::P}.. ~1..r:L(~~l:~:~.Ol~) :(E::~'C.:t'C;:l~;() 2.:1{)\'l-L(~
bo ffi2(U to tho fact th~t ~2JOC~~~~ t . . v.,..... c. 0" 1-.1- '-' ~' ~ .~- n ~ 'i'1 ~-; ~-l .!- tl'-) CI'1 rlr";J'/ ."-_
h~s
~nt~l
or:.
'-J .
w
~GC~ntJ,7',:~ :-,'L~
"''''''''
._4. r \.-./
c ,"
(~.',,'
... ) . ' .
l~, J
r;
."j ..........
,' . _"' .....
v1.J,.. ) .
,- j-, "/-, '
1 ::', -_'" ~.....
'_ f,:, ',,7 r-"." '1_ _
'l'',_: ,'~,~" "',-"
..,
./,'\
.~
? P:.1')['L~~J."'D -:):,: 8 ~: nn/~ S ~ l?li~ f'l).:L :i.:-r C~C>.j: :; t' y .[) '\ 1jtrt f; r\~;2~ 8 S ",; S tl-;. ~1, t .j;. . .-t:'~~i ~~~.::;;. "-S'L1l::~i'~':-t':" ~~t~r:: -':~;~1:1. C:"t to (; -:J-"~l!: I f] ~:. (;: ~') i.l'~" ::.) CI-')~) :'-;t3. s lJ..CJ u.} cl J.. D(;J. U.(t ( ; :e ~1 'to [3). D. e.~1 t r.~:;J O;j n ~t::~ It! :.~ "it ~\. f; l'j s ~ ....::TO L~l,ct s Lr~ ~~~ \ (~ i~ It; p.. lr]() "Del1c;\/ct~ tf\:-!.-'c t~lC: }_Ll.\3~:, D8titf-;!'~CC O :I~ ~C:8.~Cl-:~~~.,tl..:'<.--:t. f..~ i s imD~rt&nt en8ugh to ~2~~~~t CSD~~R~8 sta~s~8~t ~lt~ fl. Cfl-J C r~";3 T' CG~~I\l~j. r.~:; i).!.~e ~c J '.JP.:1 111 e(~!)e {] .~ ~:j . 111 S'J ti. "t~.(: 8 Cl8 t
J
1\G1.no
I .Il p .. o.(l,:l. -'s :;_0 11 t:O ./~hc f~e!lC.r 8.)_ 0 bE; el~':l D:l~ i or! s :1. . 11(: J_ t1c1 :;;~. D8~Jr~n~um) F2 belioves th~t to preJ9nt a 0o~plc~o -- , ..... - .... v --h,-., J'-.'r,,-,cO-r'~r'C"ll"7') sl,r t.,11 (1_ _ J.J I t ). ) ..'/ 0 -L"'c'l"('I".lO l).l..C tJL~ ''''', v .... v ~I'.. l, . _ i..1. ! J. ... ~.. " _.
i n the
.,L. .... \,.
).\~
ft.
8t8.tGr:~8r:.J~
of t .:18 jOi11t t
Sta~e" "~';c\l")-'~:~~l ~y-
c:ec~
."
sio~s 21re~ay
B~
,.!....
Dade
reC2rJin~
Indochinnft
Q~
r:-'\
._~;\..~' .J\_' l~
. 1.... \.,.1.
t .J j
Rel~e~'J:;!lCe
~.:.
t,rl'3
11 _.' y_ .....
r.'-' ~") (1/'") ''''''
0 .... . . . 1 JI1... 1 r.+.\ (\1-.... c.l.. ~ .. __ ...'.~ ...... ._ t:t. L-.~ ... Ll
to th.c coJ_ln.1~}o :'')2<.tior. i.s't 11:l.SJ~O:::Y '.! . . ;-y. . in -,' '..,ri.-...;. .......~__l")f""I\. .~ l) . .-!]._0 J_'L "r. ..I1 c-: " .. I.J
. ..
.t.
t ..
;:""_.:-.~
to the
~:.. 11
recc~a
of the colonies of
o~r ot~sr
Allics.
~~
-~ ,
t -:.~ ~I~-'
:'_'; :.-\ ....
c o f.
St2te~ents 23 ~~ t~~) Lf!1:L t (; ('w
to
t~s
~~
S t ':: .:~ 8
. P! S ~i. ~~ ",
T~
J '
.i
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 20 11
.';
'.-
\
"
D. A stAte~8nt l "l'n,(Ll) c.!, :...ll'"J ~ ".~ \_. .'

\ Eo
~J('l"l .A'~
J_.1.l:'~)
\
a8 to the
in~o98nacnce
scnti8snt
Reference to the tronch statc20nts on Indochlr~

S'"'--"(.') .... )l.~t.:,
I"'"lr'~C,",)C:1C' -lo"""\Q v ......'.1! 1...... )\...,;_ !'."'_'
J
n(t~.G,-"""i.
~i
'+-1"0 u ... ,.,.,
1; J. \ ,;.!.!. .' ". \ J.... ,...."'~C )
>"1\.:)-,1 "j') "~L'7',-,f"'LOn c. JJ . __' .. .1_ ~'J ._~ ("'J ""'. .:.J.
.1-" 1---, r .... -1('r.:0 w'. . } b~.t.J _.J...:,:<..,;. 0"'. . . . l:..... '... '-,.._.\. ___ .!.'. !) T<,:;r";..1 , .. ~ _.
J
o~ .l
(~ ... .
r,ll""onn"'"'I'T" !) _.A. .~. t i~ ,j

\'.~:.'.'.l.r;.~.l. ._\ . ,\..
.P r , ~I.. ..J ....
'U 't.l. ~~ ~ . v
l:'lO
l,).-,,',j V
:i.nd:1.cato o.n
co v8rn~snt;
5.n~cn~~:\on
to por:n:;.t; CO:1'..1:i.ne
appa~8nt r8~son8
Incl.oohlI.1C~)8
E;C],:->
and to tho
for thoso
l~.~"crt(~l~,. ~rC)I' l;~J8
co n ('. :2 f.: ;:.;:1. (l r: s ~

Ii'!/ PI.S:L8Y'21iC(; to tho ei:Ccc"'c or! 0.~.1:1_rl:t o:f pc:..st ecoDoEi :i..(~ r)O~L::'cJ_os 1r1 It}(loc}.1~1 ..:.'1[l; ['.rid. Ch :i ,J.je8C~ fet:. ~~\3 8 nf c ty 0 f :t t s 8 Ot~ t 111:; 0 c-~ t e:erl :lJ. C'J1J~c
B~C!fe.l.'G.n,(~G In (10 crl1, r!~~', lie, l~flCI. ,~i.:;-:\~r C~~
t()
tllC: (.8.r'2~OX j~rll.ls:;j0:-:I.~ :t!1 "'~ hc ~~\}):').:1.}..').n:1. . .
(1 \..1.88 t ::. c, Tl;j c

"" r. >,,'''1 P~i r.'\ ,."'l; . ... c.,)v ... , ... :-.[l.,~\,.
CI.~(;I._l)._.,:t )
.... ",ir
f~--~-;'--"-'-:~--:~\-::)~'(4':,---::-:-;:-~ ~,,"-:()'::r-J"-';"'~~.l "' 1(;1.".,;')

,,~
Be co !T:f.:(:n')J'I. t:'lO.liS 1 p.r,,5. 2. c

1 ,.,
J.<...
u.:o;;..'1
Rc ~O;;'~!lot,,~"~Cl t -:r
} \IC
:'1. 0
- .. rtl~I
rl. ],) c. . ::j .

"L;'
'~' .. c'.
.j .\; , -.~ ... . .. fl ,,! tJ ...... .':J
:f 0
).~.
O (y"
:1. ns t ~~.rI.C; ,~] , }) 1,'.) O:L C~;. G :1. r~-:lO J. \:'" C ("1. :1. 11 'G.:.18 0 () 0C. c=-;1t.!'}~j_I,1":1
C r l [':;.--:10.n t
C) 1--
G<>
t~}:~, G ~~ C~)
Iic.!'!J:;::i. (~,8 [; c
f'~ ';:,~, t ~~ [1
CO J1C 'J.i~ ::;
j" ft .At: ~rlB

;;~
b G.:~ i
1)0 1 ~I, C ""-! ,. v

!:' ]~4 :i. p
D'Ll t~ (: 11
1; }-!.:t. t
7;:;' (;
t.T [l:L .~ (~(1.

0::1
r-;b,r) 1..'.1 0. 1 0 ~~ 1
f~ G C ~~~
t:e i..: S:~:, 8 r; . . ~

11,: l}. (~D ~1
f' c' }~')

? :(
:( L'.(lO C~J:1 i ..n,:!.

F:.ct~~~Cirl J.S
r~ t; (~::'.:lc~ ~J ~!, 0 :'1:?\1
r.c c ~) ll..i.1i.:2.",-'J ~I. J.]_ t ~7

'~1:--;\~ D:.l:l.~.::l..s}!.
GJ..rnj.l.[~,:~"
t~ be
sO:).C:; :-t~~; f:rl,:';?Ll
[:Ji6. tl.e
t be !.. 1 8:1 CS $ DO~,'; e",:" 8 X) ; 0l-1'::.~: 1\):." :~r.I.O ~J:~""') .;~ E~:) .AL1 G ~ of . L~rl~~3:.. J.(;. 1I1 i(l -~~s:J:"e~,t s Jt. :ts o;:i[::.cn~:~_(~.:L tl-~:~"l: Ij1\~::jl'l:'I,~.1 :
C ..
p~l:'~c~~?, ;.~ IV p~ ::::~l;c:::~r~~~n~~O:~~~::.i 2. P~~~'L,:n~;\ ~'~~;:~ ~.~.:~;n~~~~~. ,~) ~~~\ LO.~ C)_...:.. u.:.. _. . 1JL, .... ( _ t:,l Pi!.l '.! ~I ~:~_J OC ..:...... l., ... ... ,_
': .,
oJ\.. .......:,.
l.;
...
V':J
(;L.... 0 J
l l.l"!cI,C:C L~ ~_'''~O:3 C:.i.l ~~
C:i.. !~C ~.r~! S -::: ,-:.i1('. e S

[t C~:l~t
L~ ~ '1o].:L G j
c::E'
J~! f;r e ly
c_\:e : . t :i .).l~;
II
1 n :~ 1 tl c'll c. e to
1/
e ~ 1..1 ell
Et -1"8 ['. t~ 1 t
, 'oj .tJ_l
11 0 "~
~r C 2..l"" G
: q:CO"?1 G a ~le Cl ,I.G. "'Co e

tl:t ~J
S(:r .r~. J:'~I.}. t 1 r;l C G (~\ 1.1~""i 113 tile , [l.S t f Ruthoritis3 have madG announcements
~ f::.':.n().
~
Ct,!
[;,:(,(; :.1 (; !)
- ./,.\ b . , i \.~.l
"::.~.L
J:"o.' "' J Lr::.; L.. v
of InclGc}".:Ulf::. \;h:tch, t:::.(Ju[;h - '\1 ~ i". c> v . ...L .,/(.'''> ; S, -'- ,.., >- J ~ -'l.v ...... '" JCh.'-" ~;. ~:J'e--;: ~.r '0811 t:L c e s '-0 ()1;; n.~5.G ...... _.-. ....
'Je.J.I)..L
. ; . . ..
_ .......
...1.
.J-,
.J .............
'1 . ..,
('>
rGgur~ins t~8 f;l~~rc st:l.Jl :)_nc~0.8q\.w..\;e to 2.SS(.1.~~C ~'~1.3C8 )' ....... ~ C ~I '.- .-, c a n r c~ ~ n 1~ c, i",c,1 i n 1" :. ~) \.' ... - ::'.:,1.c., ..... " :', ~ r' -. " 'J,--, --' (1.':' _".1, v ' ........ J~....... .a. "-,,
_..t.... ,(.".
,.
()J.
..c'
17 ... ~ ~:~ __
L-L
J.
~1 ~~ ~.... V.:._ ,. .v
.. n L ") C' 1,.,;'..1..
c .':-::-"'I ,:;'..'":\ \~A,--)"O~ ....
_ ... 4 ...
( .......
.j ......,
J~D.(loc!:~i n?. 0 It i:3 ~l -:- . :- i .'- i)"'~~' !..- ... C't b n.~ ' ' '''.)"J_l.\'.v _l,':)~,:)oJV '1
jO" ...
t:--.(:
C ~ ,.~,~n...
,
~vt::) ... ..:....
r;,
1""' ~.....)1"'1 1 __ 70"'-'j)n ~ o-J'. ' .. .... .:..-!. _. ._\.

J_
[:} (; 1. i ~)
"!I
..... ..L
1 r~le_'.1l'
' .
'
'"")- ........ ' , ' (._ .. :~h-, ....lc,) ..!
v~ 1 ,~
r~
.:'"Y"\,..~...\.J (" 11.t _......... t..... "-~i C) ...... .\ nr:.o"':) ..\,.1 t,\. ....... ,.,. ......
.J
-'-1 -'1":'\ lJ .... oJ
, ')V\.r....; J.J,. u,,_
r-;'"'r'::-:'':Ir~~r1 .L _ ... _ , .L~ ...... 0 u...J

{"!- ~,::')
.... . .. .
";"';'1
-"
1\ l"'lS;!Ci'l Gv.. . I.:l:-'. . .l..l..l...~,

A..
.'1 ......,
''''I': -:"-...,...
~ C'..
'-~ .:::;
,)t".
r") .1_
t.)_
uO
_ t'
-'7'- ....' L.. . !1() 0.:..'" IJc....: ' ..: ..... .:. ' /~'
'~-I"!.~
. . . . p' C"' 10 .11 ..!..D ';"J t~i::"t :.J<. .J _ ... t:.~
~-..\
-("I.
V'-J
b, '.;....
"'\~....... )r~
in'l ,-:-~).')~):lr - 1..:.\". ....... .i...- , , 1 ... .. ... ._..

T. :'"").-"',., .TOO v,...... ..1 /.'l ..!..
.. \'-.......
Y' ...-lt::l
lJl1.
.........
c C''''OC''
~.".
,.. ..l~ v),
C''';1.1 . v .~\..) ,J .... ' -' _

,~
_kJ..t.
V V_I.
"-:" ~":\{:)
~J
"u'n-j
...
c .... ..!.';.'"
._
t"""\t"i,i
.. . .,-,.."r-...~ .... .:} uv.J._~lJ."-'_,
~",:::-/'I
JOV .... 1.
(-\ ...i .-~~~r.l'"'

~~
VL';
";l.'",~
cl:l(l. a i'eDJ.~l~1~ ~~~.:?~ :; Li~J.;~2:~ S~~1..1.t~s !:..,u.=:~:'~\~:; ::-()~C") rcs~~:-..J:. l.:l~~:~:11} c ~ ~1 O.!) sa ('i j)~:. ~:~ c~ ::) :~112l '0 ~r "S.':l.c);) .:; :~~. 071 (,:.~ :::.. ::~Q ~'1~; 1 ~L b c _-~.''::' J. 2:<) ~_ :i.::.~ :\! ~ .i\ tlY' i r~ _~._;. ('~ r. ~.~ J.t) ~~"l. P.~ t.:J.i:3 1., j, ~j'; I~:, '~;:J 8"~~ t}:1\~ tJ~1 :1.. t r,; (1. r, tE".t (; G :.~ ~4.).:L
:to
n ot; 01)})o;:i8 Fr)8~-.1c.b. l'Gsto:r,::lJDion l r1 :(rtl}OC}1~Lr:tr-:. \'JOLl lcl rJ.(;f;;;.~:t-;,7~; l~i'!1Gl~ i C [lpD j. nrl tl.8 rlC0 :1 fl G e CtJ.~C 5- 1:.g I~:eerl (~ l) "D0~L ~!.. c~t e ~-) (~onso nel.!'} .;~
.':,..' _L ~.' r~!~1, e.t .... c'"'n ._ r. . .J.. ~0 ... v , .. 11-' _~ -.") _ 0_ ..) v ~ r''''s~-0 , v11 ,.
S t2. te!:18!1 t
,,~C
"",. C() 2(,!.)~ 11;; --L~l!l
0 -
'r.1--'
1i 1}.,
' ~ S Ll.[:~:g8 s " ' . JG11~':llj l~ 8
1'2(.)
of }\8(-:'l1"lj. cO.n p:J ],j.c:.t ~Jli)i.1 ~:'~e;:~l)ec t

l
to POf3 t:-'f. iGj~
Inc.lDchL1fl shou.Jc1 b3 COi7"!i1ii.U.l.:''..co.te-:l. to
t~.i.8
Pj,"-'o-.; :Ls:i.one.l
.. Be6auso t he liberation of
c.
l p")~n;\ r:- )l'" .......... J. t,', ... l",ll':;:" lJ O~j .. 1_ 1\~.-.~Y1J'-'"\-::I;--1 ..r:~ ,t_\ '_ , .. . l.l ...... .. .. (l,~t:; .J.. p-:l~ :::'\ " ,,--,v... 1... .
Indo ch~na iS J
lJ
in factj
~:I'f") .. j - '
r.-.. (.:1... e'.",;r.) V
O""L Jr-,-I,I:'\n , v:..:.:,C ... .:. ...
b 'O'~0 '1''''':"\ ....;~,~. '- ....J-..J
Sacl' .1..liCl.:1S b100cl C1.ncl. "tre;:wure 't;o 8.SSU.Y.'O pe8.Ce ano. st.::.b)_J_ lt~! :1. n t:.tle J?[!.r E2,St~ post-;--~~s.J~"I nl;s.~Lnte rlt?:.rlce of \"J.1~lc .r1
yo "1 '::1'\ r rt 0 ., ~ .... : . ... ' .... (;SPOdo J. 0.. _..-1. T ..'.. , .,001,J'.:ll),~) oJ ..~'J.L .JIJ:.lo;J .1(: " ., " ' no "'" l,J, C d YJ..' (~l!1:I... C J. e 11i~~. fJ ,l.J01]8~ 1')(1. 8 8 8 1 1 "-f~O'V 8 i:' DLiE;I1'~ '1 '" ., . ~ \ r ;e 002; [1:L .J.. 1. () ~ ..J. I.; v:C __ n .J. ' 1 .r.>,.....\18:-('8 CD.ri t)3 i1C) l)o;.~ce cl.nCl E~tai)l_!.),.. ~Gy ., " . , . 8.rr.OrlG Cr'l8 ~)C~)~9 __ 8f3 0. .t\~-;J..a 1.1 ~ T':'I . 'i .:: .. -l'a 11.(1. .L.!"o. }!8()I) 1 cs Ol 1..-):..ltt.QCas .~ _1.8:18.. rn::.l.~r "'" l ,!.J...... ~'") ~ ..t.t l11 J ) (,.~l~ J: i: .I4 l~,.,._.>:J t: .. l.) en1 D ~co c~ e j. clf]J =L (1 &:""~.. C~ G () 0 1'"1 t r ;~l !: -/ ~;o 0 l.r:; O"L j::1 0 :''') (1.(;''/ cl00 <:1.. 1) 8.D _tlS ie. t:i- G r;io\t Cfi: e :1.1C E.tg;c1.1 D~~ t e.l J. ~';OE1 -'G (;~:~n. r)C ~ 7 c:;~,~~; I:;, j?~~ b 8 J.:i G \r C ~3
.. J, , ; \.1.\. .J." '.L :.....
U c
1'.'J. 1'" b .>._
~'(') .,
v":".1
.. r
1..:.1
1 - 'i
.,
-i"1
:-1 -'
..,
L.
r .
.......
t.
_.
.!.
t.G.Ct '-v it
t:,.. . ., v __
~I.! J.
1.~ ou.1(1
-i,; ~
.t--};!").J; w .... C '. U
[ l,')t
7, ;1 (.':'. ~........ "-...1
be rtJ':1J:'Gc1.E30 :1 c:.bJo.(:
~.
:fo~j
'G"~lC
U!lt"t,.:CQ
[Jt.~:l~"t.;::~-S
p,. .~ .... C:::.
~.-, .--. v
.; """,('. .~ l""" 1_' .....:>
~ ~rn""{'~- _ .. \.J J., ' ........ _1.
('!"~~r(') L).t." u
r:1-i"~{,,'''''r'' - \. , c ......... \.: ... ! .,.1_f. '. ~,,-I ::)
crl'<:.J' .811'.I.~r"''."!vr~::... ( ', _ '. .. ..
th c:: ir.1p J. 8::18 l!.t ~i.. n. S O]~ I>:) 17. c, 18 S J. 0 ~( li jO(~ lli 11 D.
co rl S J. (~8 ~(' F8_J~' E?st~ 8:) S G .~"t ~.: lSl.l.
..Ie 0
'!::}.1 j. (;~1 1i~)

:\.11 t~~~.d3
e~8 G Ll:~C~
} C Cle 3 )
ar.ul
t .s.i::::'L 1<,. -LJ
.,.,r e
l~7.2
e,
~J 8 st:.o 1J.~. d. In 6.t) C;J~.. J.:'8. to E~"'~ E1.. il(; c
S -'G::'_ t
.IJ:c~.\~:J"'l e:tCCt
t118 :?~e ():1C!.1
2::1.. \i ~'; cCi.8c' ~l :;, Je :~~
assuraGCCG as to
t8
th e,follo~ins:
a~ Devc1olJ:-:18nt or: a ne.'cioD?l 0]" :f cJ.o:r':;:J gO"lc::'--r:c,'.rnt 1 )0 r 'tJ.n f01i e.n(l 1!1c;~ec(J.8:!_rl2J_~y" b:,r "elJ8 :(n (J8c.hi~S8C !;;~~.e!'['~""<i s el~if).s ":i :1.tl} ~o E~)8Ci;::. J_ ~rl-r.llJ . -8E;e8 for F'I"an.c~1 O~~ O'0~;8~~i
Sc'
De~S0nR
t~"1.2\ t
who are not inhabitants and ci tizens of

;;.~
Ind0o~ina
f' 0 :~i C 8 C e a.l~)18 ft.1~ t 11" 8 :[I1Cl~c) c 1.1:Lrj.') Il;;:J,:.i 0 ;) i'lll- -I- v E; C 1 :1' ';;0'[81'<11.;:r: and. a'..l"to nOElO u.s a:Lon ....... US !"!:C.) 0 :r'.:.1.~ 5. C V cr .... 1.......... ...
t.llG
:t. t f1i n
l-C'_ .. It-..... ,~ _ . Y' 'J.....
p VI--.C'I ....
'"-'_ .. v C:'_..J -t' 1,.'
..........
~ r,
#.....
rn c.. .... ~-j',Jr::! ,. V

t"", _
....)
0'[ ->
- -, ; ,~.i:)
r;-,Y'.~ (ii lrJ1'v_ ~ ..... .
Crtn0.r-;"""''''-l \. .... ....... ' "" .L..1
. ...
11 1'''~1 -'1 ....., . ...... r\~'~ .J ...
Inc1ochl:'19, shoulcl be a p2rtner> I n the F:."'orlC::-l "UrU.on .,
Hni!1te z:2.nC8 of a pol_j,(;y or: non-<Liscr:1.!.nln.s.tCJP~; tJ\8cJ.t ;i~etl t cln.cl of c.O::l~:;i:'L8te ec.o!lo~nic e.rl r:t (~o:!~r:~e :r-(jlRJ.. equ.c~, ~t1 t~r
bo
c~ E~Gt.;1~t) 1~.,3h~:10Clt
(!
of:
H~:~~~.:<n,o~~-:~
tLS
El i. . . ~C f:3
1?()rt 17:1.th
D,!'!6.
t D.:': -. i..":c e 8 t rD. ~lS~. . 0t, f c.O J. ~L 1 ~G:~ 0 8 1;8 t \':8:-:; 11 I18. \ yh () .~1g
C.:~''t ~.~ !1-9vt)
m'("-;. _.. ~~~'l , " !... -:. ~ .. ~,. _~: _i'
1'~ 0..: '-'
~o~ '.J
r.l.~.~w ...- -, ~~.~,.1~~~..0 . ' ... ~ ~ - -
1~.-. ,r ... .
ec :-:,":'. ~~~: S:l. 0 l~ n
11.
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Proj ect Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 11
}18co r.~i~718;::cl.:1. J\.; i() 11

.P .... ,
:) n
, !/;:i.. "Gll 0 .J. rn1l:i. t2!.'Y pln.nEl D.ll'eo.dy ('1. clop~c(l so t .b.:<:; ths F:.'cn:::::l ~!:U_l no'0 v Hi nJ. ~: h(2)8 fo:;:' e1 the1.' Ar:~f)X' ~.CD.. n 8:l]' ).1~3.r~! oP!.):c~;":'. t:1.o [18
(Jr.\".':,.
:>-~::",-::-::~,~'"--; ::;')-'-1- -;;:-1""-:-l ~1. ~Jl.... 1,. cI. 0 J. '--..:.!. CJ.\ \.)L, __
r' ""., ~.i'-'
JfE
b81le~l C 3 ". t!.~r. "'c the :Lc.s t "'0-'1 ........ _I........ I...L ."\ ..... c . \..,'",;O.;.. L);1.; '\.~"> i f'~ 0'" ).) ~ .... ~ ""1 ')"'n J !~ I".i.
P21,\JI..~
0 ):" i\r,18l"iC(';tD
supp11es for the Ilb erat:!.oD of

FZ
- . . . .'
Incl.ocJ:~j.~n)
___
Rec.o! n!:". (~lJ.'5.~-l. _ _ _ _ ........ _~o;; .. _ _ ._. _ _ . .....,.. _ t:tC).t1 ..

~_
SLlf~~~'(~st;~ _-.J
~G'(I. 3...t
t . B f.:i.~")S 't: h
s0ntcnco be
'" C-\.J'_ C C'
clar~.!~ed
.... ~\ 11 . __
"'-J ........
to specify
I.. ..... . .
iJ,-
t~~t FTD~Gh
. _~_ " ~'~J. l~
offera of
~.\.
be ('.... , :"l '~'1 (l-'('(">.=] !! ,.., r) "I r11i en 'cohn ~ -n ,....Ii 1 .', '~-:: ~".:, v ... .:..J I":1 e:c ~l ~ D lJ I ~ 1) 0 J. l E) 'l e [) 1~.~1 [I. ~~ '17 :~. . ~;~'1 " ~:1:1. ~J (j l1D. rl S e i~l~.'J 1J::l J. f.l r2~ () : ij of cr1c I)3. 1 ,s.;r\8.:)~\ j .. 8 Unn2C (; S:3 S.)."~1 EJ.T.l'l S~J/)l~=Lct -08 Of.~:\. t t G:l:)
~L.l-'
s;
J
c:
Lr-: >1 (V!

_ .1 ...
'-
....... , ..
1 - . - .. . _ .. 'lo.V~- .
...
~:.:':':~-;'': .; ~:.':~ :__... ~:., ___::::': . .
D --."" ()!' rY'!.-:' "~lC1;l
t i
r'\:-1
8111J li.l(l ':"!{J.J..C 11
,j2
Cj:~.i;~ 1~(~ :1,..
1:J..ll -
2.),,(1 :i.l1
[j..4
Iil.~ 1.,)0 1 ~t.. e~r e 8 t.' l:=':. t t ~"tj.. 8 _ !)G }'"[4 ~~.~(J ::~'_:)11. ~ _ _8.S f; i 8 t~1 i.10 0 c.1.n 08 g :1':}"Cl-1 tl'~ (; fl'rB_r10 ~.~ : tt~e (J.e':"8:}.'~~ ():Z' j':;.]2)) ~i). ~-.; :.tOLlt; :L n.j(;c:~}~ra:()1 ,:~;S
;. ~ c
r-;
I:t'
v::~(-:. t~; Sic co tl!"":) :'.. 0.:::::" ,,:,.t ~L0 n,;'1 j "Gl1 3 rn~t}. \ ~~8.. ):'S ~Ct1:l. S 8 [ 1, D:l l)() ~~ ~t. t i c.::~ J.. q t'. C S -'G 5~ (} ~18 :\ It'/ () 1 v~~:; ~1 at t h ~'. t 't1 :J":.0 c: [: 0 ~'. n .~.~[::. i J. f], F.::;~ b s 1.)" C' ~i (~ ,:-) "c .t-:!.~~ -0 J..~~ ~ I':) ~::. ~L(l b (; (1 e G ~" ::" r.; .~) ~1. e 90}- j. t i c{"t.l :1.:; for' ~G .~ 8 T.::.t.2 ~\...;~ r ::} f, t, :'.~ .~~ ::~ E\ n.l") '-t~ t:) 8 ~1:} !'nili t8.Y~/" [li(~. ~o ( ) l' [)8 'If';::~DC :L :'ltS~~1. \,;":L';~kl t:~13 ~"'.J,':':~) ~~~',(:)}.:l.8~.i.:'.'!~~!~!.t 01.... F ]:le riC 1"1 C r:,' f\ ":, ':~G:' 0 -.)" O!"l :11(1 ') (~r..t~~ ~~lr~_~
\,[ 1
t!-l
;\f:":8:C ~~ c:. [$1
Ett~ '~rl(! .::-, it i C~:l
C 0.11
:t
l'i'l'(,;t:J.("" . .:. 1. c rio :; f:. 8 {3~
_ . . ____, ,f'\.E!-?~0 :}~r,,~.0;~ ~'~::-~~ l~ .",(?~crTe ~ :t';' .. ~:lCt:~~.7 }~\~.~, ~ .~..,<,

v .'; .t....:
. I , ,, ..
AC ....
..1.0 .... .........; ..J
t.r:e
be} reTe l' :'::J
..... ~l\...:.Q ... _ L.. :. . .. ;:'~ '0 ~~j. ~1 c~_ ) a :}Ct " . 8 (:;!1j
.1,,0
1',.9."V-::'"tl~~ :9:::"..:!.l fl. :';I\?~)~l. -::':'i i_I Tc~"

\
~ .... ,' ._
ras.Lu
th'.J.il
E\
t>.C.:}.:c~E-;. :1('.
J.I:) 1"1,~~ tr
a.')~~) -3 a ~"J L~. n:'1 ? .::~ 8:3 ~L.'1 -:.~J~ 1\~ctaclJ.8d.

t.~~e
1 n e..
a ~ (;!'J :; Z"r~~
:t' 1) 0 1 ~L C Y r
0(; C ~:'. ~!l ~3 t~ d.ci. t
l; r e (j 16.8 ~i t,
'I
i~3 cL s$.;2:eStecL (1'':-'G.ft of "Gne L1e:!:c?\:.~J i~. l.~.;i ~ e;y:coG.~- t 11~:; ~:18 8.00 ~\ro rt,ocli~' i 08.. t ~I_ ~ Df; G.:),}
....... ~
t~'j
, t""l '-':':)'-' CD;-I..1' 6 t ...
l:G; ;)0 ,:""~G~tlC e 1\.J~l
...,1 .. "I._:'. ' VJ._~
"ri (14
~:;'
e .....:.1Y'n~c-?--l_.~ r _ .. _v~\J _ v
1)n1'\.~ "'::l't;-~0 .. .; ...__ """,,_L..J
ax' 8
0f
~~;.a 8,:'
D8~C8
a~d
tlle e 8 t~~~-Dl i 8 Ll;7; (3 n t 211{1 stability in the Far ~RstQ
~j'~ RiI1-::en. 3.!lC:--)
01'
'"J1 })O __ ~.' ......
~l__ ~):Jc...._
J"'","':'""'I~~.,.~':~1''\ .\J._ " ,J .....
-:)r""/''7~ v ('''c . C'0 c..; ... :l ~ .J\.)'~lO"';'1 _._
C~~lt..\.
--:'Iry:,'~1"1'-I<"'>, .. _.:. .~) ...
:-....,l.j.~ }_i .,.'G~,.!.0 1.!. ,1J.t .. \,.! ....., __ _ '''' __ _
XJl c..1oc11:Lt1 2~ :I.e.S t r'~On-~~1 b.8S b~.~(')llG}1"~; e.1:0rr~-: <..1 !]::t ~r:,~GiJ :i._:1C:\"\e~-)..3r) j~.~1 t~1'3 nr~:!lb-3}~ (}:2 P~Op'Js~~Ls O.(}~lc\:"1'~;3(1 liy 'G tl3 I:1.10.-:1J~'1 :~O:i") ~ .t~-:! \.1;19 0;" jf2:0.r).(~lJ. O:~C2S R:1Cl 1)eSOl~"';~':;C~;3 :1...i 1 t;18 I)~\.c:liJ~(') 0
'"\ r:.o
r,l'r"'''S'''' !.J_.\....!!v.)'.-:._ . . ,~ ""......\).~,v .... f ' -)Y' ... c,~l C'
<",J,.~
"""1(1
4
' >""C ~~- .~v ,~c~.~!...
.".!...... .. f .... .:::.~.;; l'1"-!::>~"c, } ;l,J
c~r) "~," -'-'"'1'~'... J ... Y~('\ -~"'n ,", ./_~J'."J f.J 1.1, __ .
m::t::co :t:~: (!SSC:.r1.t:t~~~~L t 11o.j~ '(,118 U~.i C8~1 ~)'C:~tC::~ :~~00.0:1 Q (19:(:i..'"(i:~. C:i~r.::?0 (1. e -i.: 8}7L]~1. !l. Z!..;: :1~<)~'~1 :,-"8 Cs c;).r: (1.:'l..r:.:S :i. -t}y J 0 1 :!_C:~~?' ai_~ Cy, 7,~.:C r:1. ~~~ :( \"l (1 ';) (~ ~.~:!.::'\.~ . ~~\:I..:: }.:f~~ ~.:~-. )
F (' 1') '1 r C ' .'. ;.i 9-- c'. )
1" ,,\.:'.'.
#-). ) ' j ' . ' -.
~-I,."~""'. "
~:-'O ~ ~)
' .
C('~1r
, '"
.).:~.
-:1 ri 0-:'" :. '
' -'-:''::.1
~ ..:."
\.\<...... " .h.J .'.L~'
:1 .1 <:' .,;...... ,""'\ =-.
-~ R. ' ~
..... ___ ).o .. ,'-. r1 ( .1
r.,..... ~.,.I,. ."h _:-"'J I: ........ f'~ "' . \.~ . :~.... d
TI1a:t t,c~'.~~ ~0 ~") -l~'0S ;:-r::i::'1.~'} ,. (u:;:t.e:c::::r~~~::.~,S~~).C':I""O
3
C'._~:t:'c,(,,;
rj~ }!.:::;
~ '\ .~ -~ 6(..I'!.C (:"Jl.OC:"I.. ~)_~ 0"1 ......
+ ~-,.-....''J
jC):]---l-C. . f)"~,~ '~~ 8" :,7(~.1~C':~r~lJ:-/ 2.1v1;:.~~Q~():l.. t t:;,.2.J r t':J.. ~I~~ l.;2:~r,~~::~.J::"l "", ', 1 i:" ~"":r-''} -i ~ (1'-:'-",.. j.~'~ 1 ~l\... ..r~-')r \"".1~":'IC) ~"~-f"l ~~ \.... ,.-.. :" ~ '_.1.-...; : .,!~:. 1. ~ ... t.> () .... ,'. . :. ~-' t.'''::''
..... "' .. , ..
._.1&,' . . . . ..
'J'.)
" ""I" '!'"". ) ';.'"".,
).-...)
:'1
::"),.~ .....,.') . ."I
.... /~ _l
(:lv- \..~i".~~1,~:?'
_ ._l'-''-'''~
.. ,I
'.... 0
\J .
' \" -; 1':)

\.... ... ~
" "1':l-~" " (. ). , ', ; \,1 . ..
i"'~r"' ; l"~ ' ~'._ ."'~
r'l-;-:'
v
rl . . . . ;.,t::'l ':"';.;---; -) r'f . . . . , . ~ .. ~ . J.'",~
<)'_' .~'_'
... . . , ) . , .) . ,
J.1.0T~. 0J..2=..'.C!' [i.-:\C1 C:.1;:~.~i; ~ J~o:r~ i.n:i J.:'i"'~~'::"'.:L")::i" ): ':-;:'~.. ~~:-)~.";.~~ 4) /~-~:: :)~:.~:j~::!~r'.1 tro O~)S D~0lLJ.. Cj. l~(;'~':: 1)~) 1).'J2(1 0:; Cfl1i.:~.~;~".. :;~~;~ :(1,'23(!.()) :~.;:l l~;:\.~ l:.~tC;.:-;_.~t~ o p~::ila~~5.o~1~) --D8 1J. ~,:i_J. ~~:-~~~;{l fo -\ t:ll~1 :1. ;~~~)~:.:;~~-~ ~j,,':):.l. 0:'1: :L:~(1Jf.;:~:1:c~:_'. o
;l:.'\ :t i~S
th~ ~~e~ch 2~~inistratio~ t:)8 J2.P[j:C.~3~33 j .:l r.1~\l) ~ \2C.1
of
c01c~icl 2~en3
b31o~~~
7 r;
.....
]:I"\C ;;. :1_(~. ;:.~;. -:~ 1,.::) (I S :3~J ~ (;!,,'S 7--'0"\ c:, ;;~l ,~. :.3 3 C: ';~~.:.~! ~~l.~ ~~ -:C~8
.V I
:~.. :::' (;.;:"2 '..~3~"
l ; .. ~ : ~
c' ::: [3 0"}~ t ~~~. '';'' c. ~ .:~ 1\. ::~ :i_."3..~ F~'2 ~ i. . ,.... , r: r:;() (~l '''''<) ')~I"!-\ 'L~ ~.0::"t::~ ... - . '] ;,... - - -........ ~-;:-..:-:' ~J~';/:1 ~~(.~-::~~:?~',~~.. ~~~;f c<:: r.:.~.:.1:~3 (:~c.c)~.}. :; ~~:~_r-:. c";-':~~. ~":):1.5_ t. :1.C~~_1.. 5:'.::"~r}~.1:~l~.~f~'),::,,, ;:'''!:; ..J.:.i. r:-;,':~..: ' ( ~ ;-:!-:..;..~; ..;.:';::':(~. r:. .) :~:~ . :'..i_,
o
'.;:1
j. ~. l-, ~ ~
R;~, ,:~.r1. S ..~~
~~: -::'
~~1-..)
l7~~.:~. .:~
; C.
S~ \:..;~~; S
~~
.t . .. :') ...
~
"-
',' \.
",\r,\
~.,....
-1"#_
,,-.
13
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Secti on 3.3 NND Project Number : NND 63 3 16. By: NWD Date: 2011
J:;r"I"}
fie
11';(' ,~,.,
... \ )
' -""').~
~r' 11":.'lon ~."' _ _ """'_'
0'(' "tJ. _...... '~l'jr;

. .. ... I ....
P" "" "I). . . . ....,._ '. l~ J . }(:\;-:'

. . ....
<.. ~!..)
'";"
". .'j_lJ
-" 0 l.. ....
" ( ,", l - A "'I
1 ...... "" .:... t.l. v\.... _~ ! .-".I.l.,:-I. '1

... " ....
~- r , r, '!' (~I ~-"\.\'" ..":. .. )~~':~0 .t.. . ~....( " t,.t

C ..-
':J(\:~ c ,r-(~ 'I .'J,\ .. J~)L.; :;'i ...:, .. _ t..;
-~ .~_ .' ....
1 r)", r"
-rn('o~'-. ......l~l.-""\ ,,-,- 'C~,\~'l . \.._I. j. _~_.) t.,_:._.(-\,. ....;.__ '.:....l
r1
-'l ....t"}l)('\ '.(-r-. . . . . ...:. ~') .. J. .Io.)l/ -:~'-...;:, ..' ... . ~o
~ ..>.J.J "--v v -.9
~.r( . -: ~ .. r')r:-TC'! ,..,>
..
~..--) ......... -).,.,r... ri \~.V .....\... .,:; ,1
0"1. f,~I') ..l l ,\. ~ .!:/_'" _"_
J) ..'~":".
1'81")'\""", ..... .. ,,_.'-''''' . . ) .... ..T ~r. ~ .., ' "

~
-, ..)')
. . .'...... . . ) . 'IC) :~~ ., /.,, /~)
of ~:;'ca '(;8 '7~t tll '"Cll'2 PI)~):~()~~c'.]. (,? '~-'!::'./) }~!.)E~;3:Ja-(; :~::.1. ~t ;t ~~~G 2::::(:~~J;:;:1 ~~ :r,,\ (J=t~~:~~::i.'";J(~ ~o t:J.-:.'3 }):l.. f~-:.13 D,l):~J~~::; .. /'){i. f: J~ >~{-~'l. ).,;:~l~ , rll1j_cI1. \ ji)l1:;.C1 :I.~lci.:1..(!t\-l:e 'L;!lci;~C :L~I.r::~.c)~:l).i .~lQ (jc;i.:.::_(l {;~) . ~9 'i:,,(1{l.3::~~ ~~l,,":; "_',~ (~'.(~ ~ 'n,'i_ :.. .___ , !) (."1 ";-", ........ '~- '\I ' ('r.:l 0 '~"l -l V 1,",(;, "'J-.........."',_i 71 ';' t.....-;~.. \,. (.-";o."..; .-, o<,._.s. (\:: .~.,; . ... .... .~ r "ii) -j ' ' ) r .; .. ()J " ~.,') . v u.., ... ".' ... _ ", 1-"' t! \ -.; t Ile
8c; c:r, t~i~e~}. .,~~.; is !-':;l.~.0{t
""J .'"._,. .... ... )
,}
.~
',)j ' ) ~
~' ,_ . L v
~..,:
~ _~
2.t
' 1; "'-
- l ........ .....').....J ) \l -'c:-. ..~1.t.... .<"
th 2 PT~)f; C:X;.; t i.)~n ():~1 , :~. ~,). ~~~.~:_::; l.'~~:':'(~~::J~~.bJG :;::'~-rt.;;,~:(>? t}:. .:~-;~
\.:'".'):1..t}1.!.C0('~e
:::~, "l- 'n 1 ... J:"V
r
T..J-. . .. C
. ... :.J
'11~
l..,"-.,; "~,-",,,_- ,J, \.I _" ' .'
~;-\1 )-, (1 .:l ..;... ;- 1~7'
c : ':.;~: ~
"-~ ''''' , . ,.
:<1,") ~~
'.1 :.J._ .. _'
.'--~ .v ..~ . 'J-,"")~,=, J._, . ......
. --:.'
'j ,:\
"'I.")
~\ ,~~...
Jo v : J ! . - .. , ... ... . , ... '.l"'c./
'(; "-1S-1"h-i l:~ .r~~~,-
FT~4..:0.C:J \,l:l~ ..LJ_

..! \ /.l!.. .L ('1 ;' '\. ...... }
~): C :)11 .~)8XJ.-:; .~<:~ O,.l..~l r)j."Ci~:"':\~'~' O:r :i.,, -(1~8~.~>.')/\ t~lo~:?:!.J t\: :80l ~J."~. ;'.:l~) :1.:I.:j.. ;. . ~;/"~ "
oj ( 'I _,:J
\~8
1')~~.r-\CC!
.f. n.c10C~}:'-?~.~:~ "C.~-:.(~. C:l.'

t-"'.' .. ~L.1~-' ..
r-;
~tC-'.~ t.lS i~ !~-':),: ~)-.!.~~O ~~

() ..:=' :..
\. ...~ l, ......
11.') .~.: ' . '-
..
-1 (:'I, l., .. .. [ ) . '-. .~'")...~ C ,"'j ~1~v. '. 'o~. :":.1_ l:. . \..1 Vv :~. .. ("\ ~. "-'I'('~ ... . ., '..
__
~ r.:-.
.''1
-::~ -1t ..... . ,...c--; (', "".-'
.....'. >1 '"")~"") "'t.'=-
f.~~~~~ ~~ ~ r.~~.:}.,~;~~8:~r~'() ~~~~~~~<~~;~~~ ./j~;~.~~O,\'~~~~J. ~;~~~~~:;;~ l;:;~~~; ~'~l':~ ~,_{~~~:._1:~~~;~~

t J .18 lJ.r~J.-~(~6. ~=) J,,~~\~:3~~~f;
(:.J. 0~:l/2
;.'(..I~;,') }~_:'l~~!.C;a .
C(}~.~~~(l :r' o:..-~~l.~r 1 :;,~ -:)21 t;!~2:!
~,~~~?~ ~:::~ ~ !'t;;~ ;;~:~;:~:).~~ z ::on -'';'1 ;.' ':)":1:;:-:' S?
Y l: ~).l ~~L:r:.O
G:~'(~a .;~ :i)J.~:i.t8.:'l,~.1
1\.S:t (1.,
.. I( ft
,r
b1..i~; C~f0~:.2 l~h ~.l O(!0.rtt S.J(;QCf.~:!1 ~3::(;~ O ~~ i'T;:}J.~c.ll ? ~\. :lfJ ;lD.tZ:_1.~,:; c~~'l (l, " ~;l' ...... # ' I-- .... ~..,...,"") ............ ~l ' 1'1 "~]1 (") .-. .. .'1':-, ~ .--t''')ri. ...\.vc .. :";"';.. :J ..1--lJ. '-10 t . . -~ - 1 v .. '.. o. n 0:,. ") Y/J.'!.~ ...:1. t:..: _,\. ~_. i; ':'). . ~. .:;\. \ ..... 0_.. ..c..;;._\. v . . L ........ ~", \~l...D~ _.I. . ~J ..Jl,\. '- "}j' t"\'r'!:'1'j. .. "t' .;- ~i' ___ ' ':' ) -n" /1'1(Y(: ll'j n8 ... .........-2.-.c'l~1'1 (~, -~;\ -~'"J t'n'") 1"11(J r i C~") 'l;1 ':).c..-' ,.. S0 t . . . . .... .. ril~'l '') 1: .. o. "''' :,)"" .... :'1';'_ .:- ' . '-'-','", " ' f" "-l"1 '-_~I...L._~... . . .4j_ .r:.~ Or::.l -' 1"")-;'" -... "..1 1 " . '- C ') ~i . T\'-''l l'"-:''\ ;"'l ... .I.r:'l..':~).. ..:)(., .'_ 'r't. .l..I.. ...... .. (:") ~.,< <. v v 1 -;-- 11 rl_C' .'V~"(" ..;-. ::;. ,. .... "":1. ,) ~:;,. ' -1 ", -" ,':\\ .. <.J " ~._~,""Y'C'" Vv.'.. ... ' .. ,,', '.
~.\.1 ~ - .~ .
.J
~"' ...
_t._ "'- .- -.. . _. _'--' .

qe-l .. .-j _ (:)L ... ""'Ir) .!1 r7:1 \.I. _.... .t LI. ~
(, } . ........ t
~-.."
.0- ... .... .
-.
".
CJ
n ....
1..........
\,0":).,............. 1.1.:- \',,"_'
"\'01":)"1
LJ. . . . . v.\_
orc,,:~r.1-1()nC\r l ',/ !,....... !J.- .......... _,-'\..
1" . . ,"; ']

; ~I
"""t "':","': .... "'. ' ( 1 \ .,.; __ \ ..... f _J'..,.
(J.r) ..... ..!..

{-l'?
.'-'r""It:)
V.!. .... 0
\. ~:~ ; ~! . : .. ..,..,
,....~ .,.'
- 1Y\ ... :'l ...,,....,, ':1 .:'.ll...t.!I.......~ ...
rt-l ...'\ ....: !r\"""l"..-J .... ; ,:. '-j '~r: _ .... ~'lJ
....., : ...... () "Ylt:/ ( ~.'..!. ..... ~:. ... l:>
~-h0
l .... ......' _~.\..'. '--...:. ..... ,.
'\'~1"""~~~-1' ~ ";-".\ ("1
V ...... , .J
''Y1r'
()..
"\
p .:. ..~&.~::. . . ..t
~"l ..j
' .'. {
L .).1.,~t.,
;-\ , ' -
l\:1 !2::':' ::.. CQ-:'. c.Oj):.'ov21 of J7:!.~e::."l. (;h :re8 t;'J :ec?:~ :i.OJ.":l. e ?:.:.l by n 1:U:;8 ~.':,,', 1Jznt5.ol1 of :i:(:;8 p()l:j. c :~o s ~ O."1,:l. :\'d;:.;
b3 ,\ion 0l1.L;? I:nclo;;Li.::w. 0
.- ..,
.!
, '.
t.
'.~}
... ~
'.
',' :.)
15
:b\7;
\ 'j ::-':1.'
for
1. 0
~C hG GO V8~;n}n3nt
r1C1
unl0 s ~
Dutch
~11C\ V. _ '-"
~:~01~;!C
r)
:l ~G \';;13 :;i~~-" ~Jl~:Li~::,~-'~t:;.~'{{;,~'0~;;~,~i;:t}')" b;>" :~1:!.;-}3~';i. t~l~)h ;~;:t.J"-'"' 9

O'18~~~
t -r'"1".'"t
of.' .th:-:: Unl'Cccl. ste:i:es

O~') T\J_l').:'":>-l r .~')
r;r:~)t~Jd Tl.()';.;
O,",i(-)r;-:l . .{":'"'I/~:-' r. ~.-")~i
-" lr:)
q;'1"ti:)
-lfj~"'-:'~ : I'") 'n~ ~:-"t O~(,,~ "l
'L'\ -., "l -1 .:- I':l ,/'1 -("'~ .'. !I -r' t:\ C.:; '_1. __ Iv _ -\. ~.) v(.,> v .......
:6ui7l':la Gnd the

....} ,..., "-' .. \.
('t ( J t'""\ " -
NeJl;}").r:;~~].['".(l.s
.. '\..,..~
..
j ....1-1'I ~I ",- '- ( -:-. r, ~j, ' 1 V ....., .....I..~ ~ .. ;,.:I." } .!.'. ~"I.
f";'l-,"
:l.nc1:Los')
C .. "v' "'fl..,) !o. "
D.0:t'
r:bcri..;.:!Jl r"'C'
fj}::!.v ~).:t(). rlE!8C~~
~,' ,...:1. ('"l""" ' , 1 ~,-l '.~'-''.. _ "~ ~-, ~t,'...... -.!, .VJ "\/ .;_1~:. <;.:,-1 '. r !_. .-' -I .... ', .r .. .. ..
:1..s r.t()t f3C.)1.lg]~r;~ :('O:\.') ~.,}J.EJ
c~(l.jc,'J;:):'J:t,
o :;~
C:01C~ ~.lJ_ ,}.I. CI~ll?.. '!~
t9.:~.~Jf;C'~ r;o
7?}.1;..~.-'.~~':~r.:):;
nat
o:~)})c'nG
~~.~(!f~;":~()\~ct,'G:to:J..
:(1),C~~)Cj.~~l ~1J.::.l Cl, "t~,)
)~i~"O-~T5.,.c1.(;~1
t I1G [ 'J..'E:Tlc!ll. g:~. \l(~ nc1.c3cl-L-t,";'lC(: t~f3C:.~l..~:.;:'O.~:.!.C G\:~ the fC':U.O\Ti:n:; cO:".d:i.t :.:.OJW ~
'cl~J::~Ji1"
\7:1:J",:1.
-i "Y'r
l\
OJ:'
0_
.\',JoJ: ;> --J " J""t, :; "'1 '~7
r;
t T)r,,; j's:) 1 r) i "\1"(\ '~' ....,v ,.,.v .. _~., ... ,c.. ~1 ..

c
-;-:'...., 0 .. t.'
..1 :.,~~~; ..... or 'i ,. C. l.'J.C ,O ..... LIJ,_<'

l
-1
.. \ . l'~,"""~1.,:_~
'I ~ ,.-
.r,1
J: e(t<:;~(l(.ll t()"'j8:'."TlJ!1~:::1~~
1'1 ~7 ' ""11-::" .J J ~. oJ
0 ....
t~o
~.)._ .
(f
b8 1"")l'21 ~;~"\(.l:e D.-J,(-J . :~.n.(;~"G8. S~~

.'~/ ..... ~.... . . " . ~)r,""1 .~ )
'J
........ ... ""
... ".).v.
'C',- ri
.'),...,}, ._ ~10 j !._ . ....... " . ~~

. >\_ _~
n.
c,Ot:, ..... j.. _.>~~:.~ '! -../v,,
'0. . ' '; ";; .j -j C,(":e:" ',.., .; /t,)l\-'tl

,. . . .
':'n'p
. . ~ _ , ." .,. .l . ~ ..
i;p;; ' ...,r~,
(" -', _)~\.
1 '";'.'r-. ''< ';'1'1 .''::, 1..':) 1_.,_, . ~;:oL_:. . ... '- 1) ."' ~, .)':,.( .. (" . . ..-, ~ '. ... ) L ..... ../ . J. .-'-'" ~::>l.,.;,,1. \,. ..J
'.J
1 ..
..
rT11:o
c1.~~}c~ r:.'')~~
:i.X}]:2.(-::1.~O:}.;~,C."..:.;~;;
c'..r}J. ..
C:i. t::1i .~~::; :(;. r-~ o:~" :(j.1:1.0:--"'

r.""!
Y7r.t:i.Cf~ :~)(}O(~}:rt rlF:~
'oc L'. (. i!l")-r .. I TtC!. . . . . "--r,)., J v . .'\: 8 ":('::-")'\' O ~' O'1c'

}l~!... . ~.;,) ~ .o'~"""lv
Cl1iD.a. [30 t,;.~l):r(, 't~7 J:c11J.Tt t, :J.'~ fo:~.:;iJ~)i,)cll):t.0 ~flrtl1-.r () ~a .-:'\'I)j "~..,~. c.'r:-.Cj.':'"!' ,.~,-...,. .. ~~ n ..I ' ~.. ""'rl r-.') -~tl ......!.}.. ' u;-... J. l.. .. . ~ ... L (y t ) ......... . H,. "'0 ',) '.'\..:,.- .t .' ...... -}. . ~O (""':" 1.\... '--~.". !J~) ..L
'1~1 . . -. v"-...)'-o/ ..\)..,;. "' n'? .. _\ . . .].i'l.. :;-r'-.... ~'
jr\lr.-, .,. .. .... "., .. ... ;..,.. , ~\.,i::11

:~) ~,t:\)~~.!.}(;}.:
Cr\,C'p."',l <c.;. . :.. ' ............
... __ .J ,' l ....
S}J011:t_Ct b8
:i.:\1 (,~.1:3
I::e(~l1. (!11 IT:~.I>J..G'.lJ.;)
"'
1) " .
1,7 ;I-j_. ~ .~~ w .. ,<.. . r"I c. .L .. 'I"' ,. '-o YI ~ '1 ...,v
0 f1 _.~
..., c..
c1:i.s c :i:' :j"~l:i:nc:c.:jry t~('eat:~lEmt o ccn~) ;... .:i.c 2X1.c.1 COmr:18:C'c:loJ. equa,l:ltyo
p"" .-L -"'l(i~7 0 ,'. "JIf').. .~~ v ,J _, 'll"'" [LD.d comp ~1.o'G8
or
c {) Estab1~lShr.:l811t; o :~ Haiphong as a f:i.'Ge j)o~c t ,\'iith t2x...,fr88 -('1'2.11s1t fHc~LlJt:i.e8 b8ti'i"een }I'::l.iYJho.ll[; e.nd C:h:i.nCl.o
ell> AcceptaD.co o:~ a fJ.'ontj,-,?I' be:~'.'i'88Xl I ndo chins. and Tho.:U.8,nd? to 1)8 c1ete:.n)':L:o.E)Ct by ' nn :UI1 p2.~C t:1. 8.-1 iu -t e I'11a t~ :lOItcl cCjEJ"~:L ~1 s :1.07:1 "
<. ""~ """l ,.,_._.

-'"
},"! ) ~-:-;' :~.~.i ~~(~~

'~.,~;::
::
:i ':'-.::, ~:"~~":~~
'
. ........
...
~.
):~
.. ,::,~.: .~ :~.-"' , ~ ;. ;
"' c J'".0
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
"
',~
"
..
...- .
.~; ~ -~l
.~
':.. .. ... , .
r . ..
0. \ ._. "
t.
~I
J.
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Secti on 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. B y: NWD Date: 2011
"
DE PARTI't'lE:r-iT 0;'- STATE
1i2lORAnDF:,:\ __OJ! . . . ___.. ' _ ':)c:-r.Dl!~ __ .........._______ ._4 . __ :i'jjJ~ ..--.:.. ....... ...-........ _ ...
1, 1
Nra Dunn
to
~rD G ro~
~ 81t
tho
on the
rollo:~~S m088~go 8U~jOOt ol Indochina:
to
C (' -.
, I
t.
~) I
11 r~1)
})~).r~:l
or, ;
[r~;c. !;~~{1
t '..).~. ~~
().~!
1)':.;~I~~ln~l:.:r~~
~~t [~ :~
j l.:.S'"c
11D~ l
82~'
p c C. ~t Et J~ 1 ~l
D }~ c; 1).}. ~1.
e :: l'lO \), 1. 6. (1.1~r~: J C}. () ~'J ~J
""c f)
(::':;' ;.,;
.).-t E.:,.:. J. 4'0 n. \ ~ 1
.::~ 1'~ ~1
I~~ ~:. r t.!~:

'"t
i
0. ~ ~~ C .'-,;~) ~_: ';; ') J:')C: ~"~'~j '.7 C ;~ :-J.~; ::.:) ).~. : ."~; 'J D (J:'.J :2.~ '1 c -"s 2. ~J :l L~ c . . . t ~";GC:-l ?-;'lt~. nc.J :..:';1(1.. ~~ !"!8 lJrl:. ~~(,I. fjt:{.tn n C.t;.O, C~\01:~2r:L t~':{ ~;;';" ca') .~ ....., ~J "(') .... . . . ' .... . .. .... .,.;~ !' R 11._C~J ...,. .1)"') ~' ; (.1'':.,1: ._ ........ .. -\ f':J"':J"!. r.)~\'j n -:'~1--:)~' \ ,"rl t.:ii) ...../ L)' oI'--.!.;) "'oJ ,:...'_' ; ,...1:./ J") -) '.:'l, .:"ll_.~).t--' . . _ .' . ....... -nn"""')I-,~~" . -.~\, -!.. . ~ i;.~",:~ .... _ '...... t C::~::' :i, "'C'~:::" :~' " :)C ~;[l.~;~O!1 [\..';7.':\ -:/ :~r~O>l ~"}C ::';o ~r,:; l~, ::< .:' O 1'1.0 :: .\C~ :'\ ~:' .c. ) 6, i e '\ ~~;~~; l,. r) ~;" :(1 ~'\ ~'l C G n 0 J.""t t fJ "'~ ;_~ :.: 0 [ I. : l ::i.:.r D. ~-J::-' '~ (; !: . ~.. .i~ ~:~) T":i . . " .,.1:::-
~~~ta~~~~~~D~iy~2~~~~t~~~~~~~~~ ~O~~~~1~C~~jn~c~~0~~)~O~) e
I.,) , / ' : ..
;-j:3
-. C...').... l
O~
-, 1 - ..
.... . ..1
1 ,- ~ ... ,.......... J
. ..
~ ~
l,1,....
.,...,
r,
..,
.Il
JI '.~; .. {> .1 ( . n ";,-'1 .:) -: v'..! A

(-~ ......
:,"
.. :.
'l -;-. ~1
. t . ..
v ...
.. . \..
:-.. . " : : _--" ;-..-:, y; ~J'.JO

0 ... <1..1 ,.. v
(., .~
,.
~"'j
..
/: _
't ..
\ ,
J ..
.'~:.:( I
~"" .",...J .
(";
"1 - ,
~ ..t..
;1
(--:., i >... _)
r..rJ ~j
.. lU;!
.~? .:. ~. 1'0:; ~,::<~-:~. ~ ~,J ~ 'i~

l;
()~
;....~C.,J~ .... .t.._ . ! ::l
(r~,:.'> :':.~ ,' ~~ ,1 ~~~ 'r;:?~; :G ~ ,_, ~:, ~:)~:), :.: ~;_ ~,~~/'; ::>. ~~::;} :,,: ..
_t
C,""'_ l... ~, . lj).. .... , .. ~[J
l.~' . ~
\I,,~
l.,. ..
.t.)ll..:~ . ..
In thl S co rl T: e ~; 'c ~i" J rl he C ;:->(; r,y'e,:l 'c'J h~. 8 .z"'O C E:!.:~; co n ~l cr' 86. "~ 1 O~l ~li ~;t!. 3id?J,.)}"v ~'~n ";;:"~).. c '~! '~n8 l .s,:t(~ ::' o '~ .~(::-3o(~0. t,~j~0 :~?6,~::-~!3 ?O~.~ \lc:. ) 1;'8:.~:J
J..
ci 7 1 1iia~lcn
aa a
roa~l~
o~
~~8 ~o~lnRnc8
of
Runs~a
in
: ....., .
"
;-
-.. : .... :. -., ~ "'.:'. " .. :.... '.
18
MElviORM'DUl\1 FOR THE PRESIDEI\TT Subj ect : American Policy l.;i th Respect to Indochina General Observations
1. The J apanese aggression against the French in Indochina has brought about a marked i ncrease in the nwnber of proposals advanced by the Fr ench for the use of French forces and reSOlITCeS in the Pac i fic .
2 . These proposals and recent military developments make it essential that the United. states reach a definitive determination re garding its policy tm."ard Indochina.
3. It i s established American policy to aid France to regain her strength i n order that she may be better fitted to share responsibility in maintaining t he peace of Europe and of the Iwrld. It seems particularly important that at this time the United States should dray," close to France and Great Britain, the strongest Hestern Pmvers, and attempt to relllove the sources of friction betl'reen the United States and Fra.nce, Ivhich include French apprehensions that VIe are going to propose that French territory be taken away. Hm,rever, i n pursuing this policy, the United States must not jeopardize its increasingly important i nterests in SoutheD.st Asia and must take into account the dynamic forc es leading to\vards self government in t hat area since social, economic or political instability may thre6.ten t he peace of the Far East and the vTO rld .
~. The Unit ed States Govermnent has publicly taken the position that it r ecognizes the sovereign jurisdiction of France over French possessions overseas 'when t hose possessions are resisting the enemy, and has expressed the hope that it I'Till see the re-establisltJnent of the integrity of French territory. The surrender of Indochina to J apan , however , not. only opened the vray to J apanese conquest of southeastern Asia and the I ndies but exposed China ! s south'iJestern flank in the midst of it s w'ar I'lith Je.pan, Until recently there vias active collaboration on the part of Indochina I'lith the Japanese, but Japanese aggress ion i n Indoc hina has nm; given ri se to resistence on the part of local French and native elements.
5. Although President Roosevelt had in the past expressed his preference that Indochina shou~d be placed lmder trusteeship, he nevertheless approved a statement issued by the Secret.ary of State on Apr-il 3, 1945 re~_ative to the pl2.n8 approvecl at Yalt.a I'ihich c8.I-r-ied t he clear jmplication th2.t Indochine. l-TOuld only come w1der a Pl"oposed trusteesbip stTuctu.re through voluntary 2.ction by the F:cench . The Unit.ed States position that trusteeship should apply only to m.andated and enemy territory and tenni tories volu.ntaTily placed under the system
COP Y
19
.........
"":"':
...........
~; . "~ . :.;~~~ J
by states respo!lsible for their administl'ation has been re-affirmed dtrring the current discussions at San Francisco . It is abundantly clear that there i s no possibility at the present time or in the foreseeable future that France vrill volunteer to place Indochina tmder trusteeship, or consent to any prograJJl. of international accountability \-Thich i.s not applied to the colonial possessions of other poviers.
6. French policies i n Indochj.na b efore the i'Tar iTere unsatisfactory both as regards the Indochinese a.l1d as regards economic and commercial relations vTith other countries. There is increasing i ndependence sentiment among the Indochinese and this movement appears to have B.t least the tacit support of China. There are indications , hom~ver , that the present French Government i s embarking upon a new policy which i s taking these factors i nto accollilt . On several occ asions in recent years, French authorities have issued policy statements on the future of Indochina. These follOl'7 a general trend tOlvard greater autonomy for the French adm.inistration of Indochina but the most recent statement, that of Iv1arch 24, 19~ 5, i s still vague and indicates little progress tOlvard the establishi'nent of genuine self rule for the Indochinese or of an open door economic policy in Indochina .
7. The economic policies ptrrsued before the Imr by the French administration in respect to foreign trade '\vith China through Hai phong and over the Yunaan railway affected adversely the economic developments of southlvest Cl1ina and for eign COl'mnerce -vrith t hat r egion. Unless the situation i s changed, this vrill be an i ncreasingly important source of po stimr friction.
8. The fro ntier bet'ween I ndochina and Thailand is also a potential source of future trouble in southeastern Asia because it does not conform to etIm i c and cuJ..t ural groupings and involves conflicting historic cla ims.
RecolYlJnendations In the light of the above considerations, the follo .,i ng recom:men d at ions are submitted for your approval.
1. The Government of the Uni tecl StB.tes shou~d make lmOlVll to the French Provisional Govermncnt its concern for the future peace and stability of the Far East and its viei'Ts as to hm-l French action "lith respect to Incloch ina can contribute tm-Tal'd the maintenr.nce of pea.ce and stab iIi ty . To that end the draft of a proposed telegraphic instruc - tion to the JunericCL'1 PJnbe.8sadQ]~ at Paris is enclosed hereHith. In this instruction the Ambassador is directed to seek the vic'l','s of' the French Government on five specific .pToposals Ivhich appear to be of chief irlporta:nce for the future peace ancl stability of this area..
'~:' ~; ..~;
4 ~J~i
:--" ';-1 ,';"\'
\ .. 1":,
~;.
0 ..=-'.i
T r\! ,(,;'-,\ :...:~ ' : :-J~::l : 7 L ~ .. oJ ~' .. ~ '; -1 ~ ~ ' 'I

IJ
~
\,;;j.J
.......)~..J
.:....I. {
... ...;.,!I
....
2 . Pending the outcome of the proposed discussions in Paris the follO'l'ring procedure , '\{hich is in line "Tith the knO'lm vie,-~s of the J'oint Chiefs of Staff '\'rill be follo'iled : ( a ) vihile avoiding so far as p:cactic'3.ble uJl11ecessary or l ong-term conlllli tments ,h,th l'egard to the amollnt or character of a.ny assistance v!hich the United States may give to t he French resistance forces in Indochina, this Goverrnllcont should continue to afford such assistance as does not interfere ,-Tith t he requirements of other planned operations. The French Provisional Government should be informed confidentially that O'Ivi.ng to the need for concentrating all Oul' resources in the Pacific on operations already planned, l arge-scale military operations aimed directly at the liberation of Indochina c annot be contemplated at this time . America11 troops shov~d not be used i n Indochina except in Amer i can military operations against the Japanese. (b ) Frenc~1 offers of military and naval assistance i n the Pac j fic should be cons i dered on their military merits as beari ng on the objective of defeating Japan as in t he case of British and Dv,tch proposals . There i'TOv~d be no objection to furnishing of assistance to any French military or naval forces so approved regardless of the theatre of operations from uhich t he assistance may be sent provided such assistance does not i nvo l ve a diversion of reSOl.lrCeS IThich the Combined or Joint Chiefs of Staff consider are needed elsew'here .
c;I;~i r i
d
I
~ 'J
\ .1;;
':;. ~;~ ::~ ~: :~1 ~: : ':~

\.'~'.~ :~i ~ ~...:J
21
.J...
1!1
tJ11[J
..'
C()l!r:ecti(;~*L
i~~ ~::1
~~:.!.
OY~J.~:.':~"t
:~:~ .~.l. Jt;
; ;s
: -. ~ . ~.7
1;<:
:- -. -,". f" ;~l >. . --
22
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number : NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
1' ' ' ' ' ' .... .~.,I ~j . .:~
-' \ r :"',. .-=
I ....... , (:,,:\.. '.
','
:.:~"l..,., __ #)... ~~'\! 1 ~; '.J, \j.'~ L/.l.
__ 1") .;.
t~.'1.r1 .... _
""" ... J _ '.""'.~
'_' ~~'~.:. ~:~ ~'" _ ~ ....
[~
}~ :,!"';/f; J (.~ ~:' :~" C: l'e .
~. l"l '::'.; -. C '\ ~ " i. ! -: ~: ~L:! 1 i ;/ .~. ~ ': c! ~.; ';,. "i.; 'M ~. i I :.1 ],-!;~ ~~ 5'~,1j Ii :~ ~ ;J. :.:: '}
0 ~2 D. 0:\ \1' 2; X-I L'~ (~; 1 t .~ \') t, ,,) J ! 1 ~~. 0 C,; 11 :i 1~~. ':.~ ~:,:..! t l! .-; . : ~.' ,",;). '... \::-',J
i. .j~.! n
.~L r,; :-1 ~~).!) ~j
~ C;
J) E' 'r i~) ~1
:<:. t,'l:'~~L~ C 111 ~"~:1
~~::? ,':; ~~~;;\'\ n i:L\: c:~i.~~ J.~;~~ t~~g'~:~ ~;~ n ~~:~~;~i; "J ~~: .~~}~ j:! :~;;'~ ~~; ~:~ c r~~ ~,:.j:i~;: ~.'~ ~ ~~~:~.
, ', t?:;..Lt):... .1 .., . -" . ( - .,. )'-~ .) \. . I .1 .\., ') :~~1..,I, ~ .,;: ". V\ ~-.'"\ i"' ... ~,.,. '~~'" ..... ,... , !..\;..:::!J-...... ; ~ J"'\,:..-:c.r~ ~;,: 11:L :; ~.~. i).:~ (~ :;! i:; G t~ 2. i .. ;}~,t (~ '1 (1;;) 0;'; 110 t
'.J
';
'I'
:", ~~ :.:
~J ::.~
. l:', ~~ 1 ~/ r
-!.
J~ ~"
," :.
~.;
F- ~:- ~L f\....
1 j)
."'\ ' .r
... .
1.-.. .~.. "
. ' , ' ::-
. ' ) ' 7''-" ~.~;._.,.L..: . _ - ! . j ..
.!.
1" .... v._:.:
~..
-~ r'\ Jl ...
"" ....... , ""I ~~
;_.1.-'.\., .... \. .. -,'.'
rCi.} tll;,.; Il~(:l~:t(;hi;1~:: ~:{~ n~1:I CL)=---:t:~::. :]~~::: ~:':';r;t::e.::: ~1t~~; ~J

tn.C:~l
'r
1) ~r',~) "v- i
.. ") ...,;-
D. :
1 "", "
),
C 5 'i:L ~l. .
',' ~,"'l
l~:
i'".. L'"'i:.. I..
to t'r~::;~:~ ~;',~ '1\.

,.....
J_:t"C:J ~.~ ~~; ';~ ;~ :::

..../
(3.C1~.!.:.~\;:-,
'
~..........,
'[, .', -:-
.' .. _~'i
&\;,,~),""h'"j'...JVC! ..,.iJl;{ .. l!.L-
~ ' ..('.
.... ,.... .
"~A'"
.'1"':;
...... ~"".h- . L
,..oJ .... .
?"': j
.... t.~
',~
, "
~.
".
,' 1 \
..... /
; .... I-
1'> . 1j e.l ~'1 t ~:.\'~ ;~n. G n () ~~ 01 u. ).1 c e I:) T1 o:~~j. C D.~l':l C ~~~:W:::'; c: 1~05. l~; 1 ( j j: j: ,)?" t u [ii Jc:r f' 0 :-; .:J.11 11 ~~..~; i t) Ii ;:; &.~"~J t!,\:;~. l' f! ~l5_ 1):~(lv J_ f.;
{; .
;,:~:- t~1.~~)J~. ~'.(~).:0:. }t

I
0:-;' l~::I~~~~':'O:}~; ::t,;; :)

"Ii
~~ (~:.'f C: \::~ .~ r t 1 c:: t.~ .J.
.Ier-:::_1'"1 ~r:c: ~.: t r' -~~}1 ~:.1:~ 1:10 t ~.. ~ ,~~ .
:-l
fl"\;':":~ ~ ::) :~~~ '''I.t>: ! ~:: ~ r;~;.~)?::; r.'0'1 ;:~ C:::' ':1 "'...
):" (~(;,:" '') 't .:~ ~."l ~~ S

r .;_
':.
...........,....
r.
-I
,.~
'
"C,)
(J f f1 'J" 1.; .::::'j t 'L .~ 1"' ~: ,~~ t .. ; ',.; :-:' ~:. 1.;':,.:, ' (l-st .:::~':.:':~~~-l ~\j. 1~.~." ~:'rl j.~: ":.::f"~~ll-'}_
C:) .
-;:i.' :.:'lC:-i
:~.:(~t:
-;:;':'
-~~l;::
'..~.: e
l~1
;'i1
~:;.~..:,:~_., '.:-~
'\>~)
f~;::':-,.~. : ~l!,
()f"
-""1
:i
.. ; ....
I"~}~ ' . C;:'
\:':".:c:-;
'l'"'!:
(;l~~:-:~:.r:'~:.,t;
:-':.:)-:;!.L~~~.- .. 1
r,)'~~:~(;~:;-,:
1.:. ..-;2:-
F~.r~r:.;~r1~~'::;"':: I'~):!~~~
ti';:]
1:.1 J~" e::'~l1 :-.,t

.l~ J.
~;:'i ::. :..

1
:!'':l:( 1.'.;8 c~;:t(;~(\):Ll1~(1 to l",~:.) rl:::C;-:;..;,:J'.;)~~' !\(: ~. n!:; ~l~!.." 1 t:! j .. ll t},-l D ~ \ P.i'," }~:1. ~~.~ \:, i n. c~ ~L t1"-~ i !: ~::;
... ("' . -. . . . 'ry~r . b .,t~. L~.l. . J;;.I
~""" #)" '~~r"(: t_~ ~~'I
.)
<..t', ;',., ~1.},{.,, ..
l.}J,.
-"
("1"1"'_ t...., I .. ..l I..:, L';i
.!~-J"t.';.l
l\~~.,!.
..i. J_~'...:..:~ ... ..
.('"
,.
'! ..
~" "
l...I~i
t_~(:n
c"f
-:"" .
~J
... "
.. ' .... ... /"l}"t

'. -I :... t
'''' .
'.~
:!.-.
--:
' . \.
-
~
,-'
. . . .,
'":'-<
,~
..-
"";.
'.j ..
24
Ji.,il ...,.
.r~.:.'.,;:-;;.' ~:.(. .o"~_ ,~_ ~ ~
~~ '-.J. . _.. . . _
't:;1;'! '. ~.'I.... t..'t.!.~,(',...- ,;:'" . _ . ....l~ .... _ ._" \
,-J\ ..t, .. t .....-..~ .. :' ".., " , :;..t..l..)\.~_\.ul.:. ;,.:.
l"\ . . ~,.,.. ..!.;..V:.
i~. . I"-\ ....,;:.}:.-~;J.
.............. - ........... . .:_~ .. :.,:.i:~j.l:..:\;"':
..:(;
0:"
:!,::: ~~ ::~ ~ ~ ::. ~.,;:~. ;;; ;;;~ ~~~~ ~;~;; ~~.~

(>I~ ;.;::~..
:~~ t [~!., ~.~ ('~~ ~rI{ ('~ ~ .~; ~.~~:; 1~;; :~:~) ~~:'~'~ ;:'(~~c:~" ::3'J
~\':)1.\..).~!
E; ~:~ ~:: ,;~:~~ : ~:_~~~. :.~: :~'~.~~:; ~>:j~ : : ~ :~~~.~ ~.~ ;:~ ~~ c~ ~ :::.:~ j:'~;:i' ~~:.}: ~~;. ~;~:~.~-l =~ ;.: ':.' ;, ~.~ \~ ~: ,',
J'
C}_,::~.~~:.:~;';.~l
~:rr:.54:~~;~1~C:~
t1::J
1..!~)5_-~ ::.~
,,~;,'-t::';i:-'
t:.::"~/
~~';:,~-;[~,:;..i'l 'c'l~f':::r'c)
()f
!..'~.}~2,,~:''',~:~:''
r:-: 1 ';'~~'
C);'.!
'.i': . ~.,
~~,.--:~ .. j . .] t"-~:
~.~~ ~'.
ir}
~~-G
"'i.~~~:,~
:-~:t~.:.:,~.r:LC: :i.~~,
c:"':{)~,,::ld
\_~c t=~c;
c:)t1:;5.~~~':1":~:"'-J. ~~~ Ujl.:<:~t.\~/~)
'~:~1 ; -._"
it..
~:'~J
{~'c~-~ ~t ~(;3
1,~:::T\~.T1i~~
or)
j~l"t
t!\._.~ t:'.-~:~~:
():c
:~t:tr:~ f~';'~~'1
;:1;' (1c-J.~'~;.::~;,~:'i'~~ 1.:!~' n J~:~ tt.(.il r':~'~'J~::}~~:?:-L'~' . :).1~1 ... :~'1-.: .( "~"~~~'~:!
~; ~ } ~: .;.~ ..! ~.). J~~:.~ ";;; ~:~:,_ i: G! ~~~2;;'; :.;~; ~j, ;~\:'~:~~G:,; ~~.~ 3. ~,~ :~;~ ~~~.~ J :~~ ~; (' ~~~~ ~/.,;~' . ~:1 ~~~;~~; ~J'~~~:i ~~L'l~~{~:~:~~:~~. ')~ ~ ~ ~~~'~~~p ~;\.\.';.:~~.~~; ;hl~ ~~~ ~ c~.;~,~;~ ~~~ ~)? :.:~~: \.~~:: j. ,";-1
c~f ~:~C;-;Ji.:r'G"?E ~:-htc::"l
't.:':r) (; . ~-~)iy~':<t :j~~._J. . (Ji!lt t::.)~!~f'e ci
?~c.:~. ;~'~
~f'
,,'
........ '
... ..
. ' ,',.
.l _
'"
'.
..
25
._'~.
.'-.~~"~ ) ....... ":1 ...
"
; ~'.~,-4, . . ~-!:,f
.THE: STAT.:'-Vl. F{-N.'\JY
'..
..
~;.
""
tOO~D;i;;'\Tli'lG
Cc.;viMlTTEE.
WASI-:ll\;GTON, D. C.
'liE
fir..
Eonb],~ if,h~:.,
Reference:
S'
S'J.::;g'3 stecl. R80:X~1):J.ina tion of 1.:! le:.'icc.n pol:i.cy -"~ii th ~\~)SDect to
;rcc 35/l0 9
r.
co
(')
c.
Indo ~Chin::.,.
o
FC1.:Ct
~ OJ. S"'rc(' ",', )~I
;;:;
"C'/'l0
0 .,)
01
R
as foIlo',iS :
.:~iJ..e
i )
8.'rtoid.in.3
0p~~/~ f~~c~
.. _.4 _fR":' ....... _... _ _ _ ~1,~~
rio
"
uJ
fo::~c,. s
-1
In~~lo.,C;h:~!1~,
th:is
[!OV7!7:'?l"'_~::.1.t
~=--'1.;Jl1 1_d
"
... ., ....
\:) ....
("1 . ,
I" ,
\:
'-.
... ... .... --~
I .'
26
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Secti on 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 , By: NWD Date: 2011
' Y,bll 1:\"(:-1"0:\, :.'I [;1 , ',0, 1!),Lj-llOOI1. \ }0-j.0, Fnllo\\'illg' il:h'gT;llil ,L1(,(l :'ILl};~ 1\2("e iH'cl fn;lil th e Secretary at. S;ln Fl';1I1Cii;co,"" is ""-]ll'akd fot' y ou r i'nf()J'l~~a r i()I~ ,
/'
:"Tlll' 1.'IIiit'd' :\;li i>lll." (''';II>l"l'l1("P 011 LI(, ",' iOlla l l) ;';';allizati(,ll lll<'t Fr:l!l(,l....: {'() fj' ()l\t' 4\pril :2., \0 .TUIlI' :~ ( ). 1!) (:i . .'
,
at
;);111
"Tlw ,.;nb,iccr of Jllllo-('hill,l (';\Ilii',):"i) ill a 1"('('('i\( COli\'(,l'o;;dion I hac1 \\"i(h Hid;\IIlt."1 alld BOI1~h'l. T1Il,,:l;llt(,l" rema]"k,:d 1h at" ,,11ilough (he
./
:1
/'
G('oq.!'( '::-; ni<1;:nH . ~"'r(llC'h )Iil .li :,t'Pl" Cor Ft/rl)i.~JJ 4\ffa il':-:.
F]"Cl ll'h Gonl'lllll('nt in["I"] )';'0IS :'IL]": ' '.Telles' ";latl'mcnL of JD-B 2~ C011 c0ming rhe rc,.;t('l';U i<!Il/of Fr.'l1chso\'(,I"(.'igllty o\"(']' the Fl' Cl1C~l Em"Fill" I('xi' of 1101(' 11 ; 11("(1 ,\pri! 1:3, l!) !~ , fmlll ,\,' l i n,:':: :-; ('( 'l"('i;lI' ~' o f :-;tale St1l1l1ll'1" "-ell" II) .\I<;l ';I,~;\(l,, ;' (:'I,,(I,ll HI'IIl",I"ll:I,I"(', "P,' 1-'(II"I'iUJl Hc!ali Qi/8 . lOU, '"vI. H, p , , ,)()1. (,I' TI<'I"lrIlill'Jil ni :-;i ,II e I;ul/dill, ,\l,l" il li>. 1!l I~, p, :;:::;,
/
"
pin, ;1 "; i)ldl1di11p: Tn(]0-C'hiI1<l, 1he'. ]ll"~,';S ('ont ill\l('s jo impl,\" that :t spe('i;d"slai liS \\'ill !w ]"(',.;,'I"I"l'cl for tlli s cnloili;d ilJ"C';l. Jt \\"H :-; madc', Cjllit.o /(']l';lJ" to Bicl:lu][ :hn: til0 I'l'cord is C'lltin.'ly i; :ll o('cn( of ;\1l~' ofli(i:d st ,\t<'illCllt of 1hi:-; go \"('1' 11 11 11'111 <]11 0;-:t inning, ('\" l' 11 , by implicali oll , Fn'lll'h !"OI'(,j"pi1fllt\" OWl' Jnd o-('hin;l. (\'l'tain Clrllll'Il!S of (_\Il1~l'i ("lll puhli(' Opil'li,)li, 110\\'('.\ ' (']', (,OI1l1l'1l1 IlN] FI\'llch gO\"(~],Ili1lCll tal policics ;mc] pl ';lel ic,'s ill Jlldo -('llin:l, Bid:llllr sc'elllcd ],01,i2.:?,~l n]lcl 11;\ :; no doubi c;d)lc,cl });:l'is thll t lH )"ccC',il"{':l,'cllc\\'ecl nssl1nmcc:-; of ' ollr l"CCOgllltlOll of F]".'ilch SO\'C'J"Cigili ,\" O\'Cl' t h,li a 1"0<1 ."
"I'iT, \SI11XlIT(I).",
:.'lIn)" lG, H)-F)
Y (11 !'c,;pcC'i to GC1l0],,11 dc. Gn 1111,:'::; mcss;\g(' of ~In} ].') ", conccrn ing \Ti
~' .-\llIlC'X
to this
1ll1'lllllr;llH111l11.
llis ('xl n'lilC drsi]"(- to h,ll"{' French f o],ces j),lri iripnlP III r11('. fight of _ mCI'ie,\lI JO!:('(',"; iJI t.1I~..dC'('i"i\~c...<.:nlllp:ligll,ag'ninsl .Tnpi111" a -~;;I;,\:-of -\ \\~-;-i'(~l-;-T;:; '~nl'jos,'d, t hcfollo\\'infl' COl1sitlC'l";il iOll s :ll'(, olrl:l"crl fol' po,,~iJ)Jc lise in ,YOUI' COll\'C'] 'o;;llion with thc F!'ench Fo]"C'i!2':l ~\Iilli:-,rE'1' ;\11<1 CCll('1';11 .Jlii n ",' ilO\\' scLc:cllllccl -for tOlll OlTO\\', :.\Jny ]7, -for :'\Ir, Bilb nlt,
"Gell, .\ll ,Jl(1I1~l' Pil'tT(' .Jllin , French ('iiil', of C('Jl('l"a! SiatY,
nnrl :.'If:\y 1;) fol' C1,'Ul':ll .hin , The Cjll C'c't io n of (lil' l)J}nj"jJl;~t i01l or both F1'<'i1C11 11lijilnl') :lnclna'-al ':"ll""'''; :11 tJl e F;II' Ea"t \\';\:; ]':\i:"cc11n' iLc' Chic'{ of the French ;\,\\"al :.'If i,,;,,; o\i in iIll' ,1~ 11 i {,~( 1, <t~~:~~-":: o~'l ";\i;{1"cil -~(;,-- --I \"ll~n the' .TQ.i l,lt J'h,~(i:3
'. . _ _ ~r.\,oo' _ _ _ . . . . .~.... -
,,; .\dlll, 1~ ;\~' J. t(;ll,l F,';,;)n1 ,
of :-;Lt ll' ]'"r,'lT\'(l ~lh'_!.:I.:;)jt(,l', tolll" ]),'p,~UinS~llt fOJ';li1 ('xpre;-;SlOll of -;-'ir:.~s lj-;C'--:"';;;:-I:~t-I'I'Y of :-;i;I:P I'P:,lil'd Oil -\i/:'il .j ihat ,lC('c'])lllll(,(' CJi ~hc: ]ll'opo,.;als ill ]>l"ill('iU1e \\'il;-. cOi,:=.icll"J"(.',l (,") ill: (ll'sir,.!)](' fnJnI Ilrc: point of \"il'\\" (,/' ,'e:;\! i()ll~ \\'illl I!;,' FI','lle]1 Pl"C,\"j"ioll:ll (.;o\'eJ'l:IL0nl, SllJ);e:ct of ( 'dUl':"(\ i(l J11:1itill'.\' ! 't"~;~:l'l'llh;in~ ill ( hi.:' t1.,:liltl'l' o'r OI/(,l'l~t1()n~, Jr i::: 111H!l~1' . <uod I~l;t.l Jj'{i"! 11H' 11lil;iill'Y l.i(,ini of \"i~j\\' rho l1~l) 0:= 1:'l'cIJ('h JOl'el:""' illlli.ll tL ,';d~',,-Cl's--I .,';-L~lr\:l'l.''' li llh: (f allj:""yalllt;. rmij fmthcl'
\ .101\ ........ ..v....:.J.A'
r.., ."-~
""t,
!-~7
T-.:-' ~? "{\:TTI'
,,_ ~"'.>..J
~ .'~
-- .
27
i'lll' 1)"P;I1'llllt'lli of' :-;1;11r "holild taL" lip th,' ql!C',-,lioll of jil'Olilpt ('Ia]'i -, fil';ll iOll or OUt' policy on Tildochilia, III as lln;l,h it,.; l11l' fill;tl tll'trnnil1;ltioll oi' poli(,y \\'iill l\'''lh'('i 10 I!ldoclli:l;l \\'ill ]>l'o!);tl)l,r ill\'oh'c illld c1epl'IHl11POll <1i:-'Cl;",sioll;-, Il'i t h I Ill' F I't'll ('I I (;(j\'l'J'Il1l1'~IlI, alld ill n,.; 111111h ~s thl' ':-;e(,I'l'lal'Y of .'-'i;lle' ];;\,.; ":-':Pl',''''';l'd 11w \I'i sh Ihal Ih esc di:;ctls:oiolls SllOUld not hl' ilii! i;\lI'(1 ill kit,,! ",hi1\'- Ih,' P1'(';-;('11! ('onfl'l'('lIcr ill San Frit11l'is('0 is ill ~l';-:,;iOll, ,'ollsidt'l'ai :on of t 11(' !'I1;d'ti'l' has lJrrn l"'Sll'ic(pd to th0 illlllll'diatt- illl]>licii: iOIlS of :(;l'11("';11 de (;illllk's lll(,SS;t~l' to the ell'l'c[ Ihat Fl';llll'l' \\'ishpd tr. pal'li,:ipalc acti\'ely ai' th" sidl' of ,\Illl'l'i(';m fot\",S ill tIll' C;1111Pili,!2:ll a~.!'ail~";l ,)ap;!ll , This lIlC'SS;I~'C. \\'as disC11 SSC<1 "'illl ihL' Frelich Forc i;":'1l ;\Iiili,.;ll'1' by the Pl\'sir11'1l1 ;\11(1 Ily rhc .:\ ('{ ill;.!' Sl'cl'l'tal',I' of SI;;iC and l'd'cl'l'(,d to in the Pl'csidcm's puhlic stntl'il1i!llt"' I'rg;;j'(1illg IIi:; talks \\'itll :\1. Bicl:tnlt. 111 the lattcr "the
"Rl'lc-:1Sl'd iO the pn.'.-" ::\;:I~' 11).
p,
0~,,'
l)Cp;ll'llllent
of StaU' J)/ll/rlill, ::\1<1)'
20,
10,1;:;,
Prl's iclcl1t empl1:tsizl'd tha t "'I.' al'l' h('C'd \\,jih a st ill stnmg and deadly CllC'])lY in thc Far East to \\'11O";C rldeid thc total rCS01,)TCS of this CO\lJltry, both in Ill:\lljlOI\'C'r ;m c1 1l1:1trrial, ;11'1.' pll'(lgw1. He indi cated (hai, sHc'll :lssist:11H'e as,F t'i1I\Cl~ alld OUI' oihei' .\lli es l11ay brill'( (0 (hat S(Tl1!.'.'glc ;l1lc1 1\'11ic11 111,;,)' bc sY,llchro11ized \"irh opcration::; alrl'Hl1y pl:ulllccl or 111ld ()]'\I'ay, \\'ill he \\'Cleomed ," Tn th e. COllH'I'S;tl ion \\'h iell ('Gok pL\ ('c ill (he ,Yhir e HOllse Oll :.\hy H), ID-J:), th" Pl'PsideJlt ]'ci'ern;cl (0 (.;,>ner;11 l~C, Gaulle's llh'ssa~!,e, alld expressed 11is appJ'cciat ion of ],'1';,])(,c\ ofl'.:1' of n;;sistall C'C. The Prc:3ic lent' tlH'll saiel ;:(hat' he h:1cl l'ccciH'c1 ~ ll1ess:lp.\' }'r011l General llc Gnul]r to (hr ciTed il,at Fl'ance ,,'ouid be gbc1 to p:1]'ticipate in the I\'as agilin~t .1ap;1I1 al<Jl1g:;i<1e (he rnitcrl StiltC::; and thc Pl'e;.;i(lelli,; rxpn':-'..':ipc] his apu]'(:ciatioll 01' }<']';111CI"S oirc]' of ac:sistallC'c. The Presiclpll( s;lic] that it is his policy L~ lp;~\,~_ to the ('onllnanc1er-ill-('hicf ill th e field n1:1(icrs ],l'lnt i11g' to tlip ('onc1~l~( ~{i'he ,~,;;~:' ;;1-;'<1 i'll;)'t i;l-' tlli's casl>, ;11:--0 h~~_,:\'oi11d "'ish to 1(';1\'(' to thc ('olI1mall<1CI'-in-Cllic.f, _ r,s, ,\ 1'1\1)' 1<'OI'('es, P'l ('ifie,_~,J_,,~lP_~~etel'l11inati<-?ll, of \\,llClllCr it \,-onld
L
'" C(,IH'J'ill or 111P .\l'l ll,\' D01I,,,, :ts :\['1(';\ J'thul' , ; pr;lciic;lhle an,] llC'lpFlil 10 hal'(' Frcnch forcr,'; join \"ith 11 S in the oPl"/,;ll,iOlIS a,!.(i,ill";i '!:ljJan, Ill' indicatec] tllM such a"s:::;! al1ce as France and om otl1rl' .\Ilie,~ mig'ht ]'l'ill;2' to thc ;.;tl'll,!.(,2:]e> ill (hc Pacific, \\'lli,:h ! ,\'onM sylldll'Ollizl' \\'it 11 Opt'I'<lt iOllS aire:t<l ,\' p1.1ll11('(l 01' unclcr I\,ny, \ \'0\11<.1 hl" \I'(,lcomcc1 , The Pl'c,.;ic\rni thongin th,lt tlll" qlll'stion \\'ou1,1 c1ep rlHl ili ln1'~~I' lilC',IS\1rC' 011 thc ]Jl'nhl,>m O-!' ll';\1l;.:pori, :11111 , as the )'Iillistci' no rlOltlJi ,,';IS :11\';(1'(" this \";IS all ililpOl't ,Illt IJl'olJlclIl im' oh-i lln' thl'l'e' lill W.'; ill(' ;\IllOnll! of tOll11:IQC !hn't had ;)r('ll lI:"e<1 jll the '1';11' ill/hc ,\t In~l! ic. This slii,jrcl \\';1 .'; 11;; i'l1]'[hl'l' Pl1l',-;l1e'c1." 011 t he' follOlI'illi~' cby 1 he S,111l0 Sli],jC'ct \\,;1 S ag;lin l'rfrl'H'<1 to in' Ole folIO\\'iil,'2: trl'111S ill n ('('li\"'l'~aii()l1 lwt\"eell ihe .\ciill~i :::l't'l'eUl1'Y of S!:\tr ;\1111 thc F1'011l'lt F01'l'ig:1 )Jil1ister : :'1 li1l'llt i(l!lClllh,t\ <1111ong [hr points \\']lir';11::111 hee11 (ol1c1:t'cl upon ;1[ the '\YllilC Huw:;c \\'[,S Ih:,t of Fl'l'I](,]l miliinry :lC',-isi;l11ce in thc> 1<';)1' E;ts: ill Ill!.' \Y;i]' :t,~':tillS!" .]';lP;ll1 , J l'c'lltillded :'ifl', 1~iJ: lll jt i)I;" \\')Iile t)IC 1'J'l';:;(1<'/l1 h;ld ,.':\Pl't~s(')c1 hi~ i-!\'Ilcra1 n~)I>l't1\T ; d lO }"'j\lihll . i,:ililill'Y ;l.:-:,:;(}(i~lIjon ,\"i:h llS ill this rll(':Ill'l'. he h;ld ('LI')!J;["i;',l',l ill;, l tlll' 1)J'ui,ie1l'l \\' :1" ;, milit1ll'Y C,!h' and \I'(1I11 c1 I:\" 'l'ss;ll'ih~ \t;\Yl' io'l )(, jil<1!.!:~tl on it.s l11VI'irs -l;'\~-ll;c milit:try il\lt;IOJ':ti('s,- I ,,;~i,l ill:1\ in ,hr; ci;'c,t\lJist;;)1('I':S it \\'a.'; :"p to
Ii
28
Gr~~~lJI.l)J<l~>\I:t]'lll'_ili ..<1t'l'idp jli";i. ho\\' m'llch anr1 ,Y]ICl"r tl10 Frrl1ch military COlltrilll,i :Oll ,'olllcll)c 11(,,.;( l1iili%<'c1. Thc ;,IiI1i:'itc}" Ilh~l1(iol1('d thai tl}(,!\, \\"('1\' t)'{o :,'n'llcll di\i,.;ioll;:; l'r;HI} for illlllH'r1i;uC' t !'<1l1<:pol"fation to (h(' Fa]" E;b i . III ]"cply io 111 .\' illlJllir~':1i; to \\'lll'1hcl" Ihpl"(' ;\1"('. SC]1C!2-":llt'se (mops ;1 11 lOll;.:' rhelll: 11(' a(l111iitl'<l ill:11 tlli:-; \\"<1S Im)])a],]y ;-;0, nl(holl!2-"h 111l'l"c' \\"('1"(' :11 ";0 snb,,( ;lll l i;d 1l11111L,'I":-; of \I'hit" FI"l'l1 ch. l1e rllad c it CIe:1)" th:\! tLl' F}"(']1cl) di\jsiolls cOlild h" utili%l,r] :tl1 .\"\\hc]"(~ ill tll("}':lr E;1St, alJd thc1'e \\',IS ]10 illtl'lJtiOi] ni' lililifill;!." theil" con - tl"ibll(ioll to ;1tiackillg- ill(' l'IH'll1} in 11ldo('llil1il. 1 l"l'itC'l'aiC'cl t hat t.l1i c; lll;ltkr .:.:D.l.lkl be plncccllJeloJ.'C'.ol1l' _. 1il.ilil:ll"} nll(hol"ilil's iIll1l1l': cl i:ll ply, ] n ;IS J1lllC'h ,)s (he ,\dill;':' Sccrctary of :~tHI(' ap:re(>;l (k\t tilc 111:1((C1' \rouldlll' pl:tl'l'd lH,fol'l' milit;1}".\- alltll()l"iti ('i' illll1lc,c1iatPl ,Y , i( is r(> C011lJl1l'IHll'Cllh:ll tI ll' flJl~i'goillg- h l , hroll!-!'ht to the ;u tel1tiol1 of the Joint ~O~i('f::,~)f::'l;I.lr . :H tl1c e:(]'liest possii.lk 1110111CIlI , Til this cOllll('ction, the follo \\ illg- :-;ll!-!:gP:-;( iOlls \\'llicil arc hclil'l"l:r1 to be ill h;lI'illOl1} ,\"jill thc (,~P1'l.':""l'clyic\\...':i .of tJlC .J ojlll Chi('!\of ~taf1' nl"~' p'lrfol"\\"nnl:
(II) " While n\'oidill~' so fnl" :1S Pl';](,( ic;t]'le l: llIH'C(,;;:-;;ll'} or lOIl~:'-(cl'ln c011imirmC'llts \Ijill 1\'~:tj"(1 10 the ;\lIlCH;n( 0;' r'!inr:I('(,l' of ;lllY ;1,osi;-,i;lI1('C "\"I"h;('h tlJ('.l'llit('(L ';;;(,;-; l11ay ~'i\' e to F},('IICh rt''-ii:-;(;lIH'l' 1'01';'\':-; i1l111c10chinn, i his Gon'l"iIIJ1{'liI Sh(";l1id (,Ollt ill l:C' to ,111"01'\1 sucil :lSSistaIH'(' :IS clo"s llot inrl'l'f('.l"e \riill thr ]"('<; Uil""IlH'llis (d (lth(,j"p1:1l111Cd o[)eJ';ltions. O,,ill!. . to til(' IH'l'c1 !'(ll' C()llc(,I1(I';ltin~.!: :1110111" l'l'S(),lrCl 'S ill (he P;;cilic 011 op'l'j",ltiol1'; nll'l';;(ly pLulJIerl, In}"g~;-'''(':tIC' milit:ll',\' operat iOl1s :tillled dire,'tly ;It the liberatioll or llldo('hill:l (":11111ot, ho\\,cY('I". he {,OlltCillplnl C'(l":l( Ihi~ timC'. ~\.!il(']';r :nll troops should 'llot . he ll sed ill h<1ochilln (':\('<,!)(. III .\.111(']'1(';111 111111r:\I'y op(']";1110J1S ;1,c:';1l1ht Ill e . Jap;Il1(',~e. (u) Frel1ch o/i'(']':-; of 1l1ilitary nl1d ll;l\";ll :\,,:-;i,,(nlll'(' ill till' Paci:ic S11011ld b~ C'l)llsic1el't'd on ti1l'ir 111ilil:ll'Y l1l('rit :-: ;IS h,'aril1g Ol1 the' ohjl'ctin of' rll'f(',ll illg .J;;p~ll1 as ill t he (':l~C or Jhit ish ;lllll Dutch propoc::l1s, Th ('re \\'ollld he no ObjCl't ion (0 furnishing of a:-;sis!aiWl' to allY French miljt;ll'.\" or n;)\";]1 flJl"<:l';'; so ;lpPl'()\'('rl, l"'I.!;,rr11e:-;'-i of thl' tlll';l(re of op(']';11 iOlls frol11 \\'hicll i lie ;\ssi:-ot :\11"(' nIH.\" Iw :-;l'llt, proyided :--11<:11 a'-'sist:lllce dnl'S 1:0! il\\'oh"c, a rlin'l'.~i()n 01' l'CS{)1I1,(,(,S "'llif'h tlle Combinecl or Joi nt Chiefs.oJ Sf;\:)" cons i(ll'i" :ll'l' 1lC'L'clcd clsc\\"hrl'l' ,
~,-'-'-'-'~':.~ -.
"- ,-- - - .. .~ ......
~:~ "! ?-~':
~j,
::
.. ,
", ,_ ,.'..:
H,
FHl;Df.\::\
)' IxfTJ IEWS
29
S~~Cn ST
\
\
';;r:;.0hiD2,toL
j
Juno?, 19Lf5
p.r:l.
POh
r-'~;"t;"
't/.'B t. r- ,~ !j"..Jh 1no.-l ..t,d.L:\ S ,..>.;.';., "\~-
'l'he j)r- estdent thanks you for yOUi' constde:cec1 tele. " . , .. . -., , grrl'll lD r o~os r cl 'co t'no i/L-oo 1 ems J.)i. e::entec oJ ",ne ;'e E)8'L/?D11.sh,'n.ont of h ::O f.I.Cl:! co ntrol in Incochill~: L-l"c1 U::8 Fri tish dc si re to reoccupy HOLf::1-::onG ..nd f'ully .a?!.:':"GC ia tes t~1e diff icu.J.t i es in Y ihicb you [tnd Gens:!.'nl ,;edef:1Gyor' r;,s.y be plsc ed on account of tte lack of specS.fic directives in re 3 '08 G t to both of the s e '0 1' 0 bletns \; ;}1 i c11 h ave be 3n \.1.1'1([0 j.' c8r;:rul stUcJ~7 both here a~d in conn. Gc~j.Ol! !.: ith thE) cl:i.s~ ct'.s sior:s nt S[;ll Pranc:1sco.
~
L
"I
I h:... V0 also recoived ~"our L1GSSauC Noo 15b.S of June 6 2nd l'e~r et th.:t t;l1 e:ce 11d.S boen delay i1: :c e;::.lyin,.; to YOl'.l' earlier' on8 oViin::.:, to tLe s'cudy \':hicl', l,a~ bssn r6(~t'. ii'8d of these m::,tt ers in c onnection \'i:i.tll ~.:: re scnt dcvc10,xU;EtEi [~t tl-;e Cor:fer' ence" 'i.'be i't'es1.cJer:.t b:AC .::;s:~ed (.10 to 81 y that there has been no b asic chanGe in t he pollcy in respect to t:Jese t l:;O queSU.o nEj arlC.. tL;t tLe ~)r csen t lJO s.Ltion is
[1
S f 011 0 'tJ;3
:
J.
~_
'-1.'1 1e .I.~"" .e~ ld;-;l~,t v ....' ''-' ,. p ". .... } __ t. '~0"1 ~: " 'e .lI',cr' l l i ,-,,:c 'il t1'l J Iv 'OC'QU;'1 -h" v ... ,i. <.,..... 01 _ ___ 1... stFteclent LLc:e by the Secl'ctc:'l"Y of 0t,,tO on 11.;>:.'11 ,), l)L~5 vi iti} the o.pprov'-'l 01' ;.;reslcJcnt l-(oo sevGlt in which l :~r. ~~tettiniu s Ci.8cJ.2YeC; that [;;8 8. re sult of tLe YitJ.t3 disc usdons the "t rusteeship st~'UCtUi.'8) it \::~s felt" BLoulc; be c1efincCt to ~enr\i t ti'l'3 plac~.nc:: unCle r it of 30.ch 01' tLo tSi.'L'lto(iec t~~ken fror,1 cb(: C 18 L!Y in this \,i[.:-, 83 might be ~Gr eed upon 8t a l Qte~ d2te, 2nd al~o such other ! terr:torie3 ss i:,d,,;:ot volll.nt,nil:r be pIe.ced tlrJdar tr':tsteGshipii. 'T11G l:-~o3.Ltiol1 tll~~s pub,l~cly m:nounced ~1[; .s b69r1 con, fir med b~r tLe (;onv,::l' C:::;. tlollS ":[ECl:: 8!.'e LO':; tcJ-::1DG plaCE)
o,J ..J
. v
fJ'
L"M'L
-A
o.
...
in San Francisco S L C
it . .
,.,., .
;.
30
Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Sectio n 3.3 NND Project Num ber: NND 633 16 . By: NWD Date: 20 11
c.;
i l .. J
in San h< 8.Dc i sco i!l rSGGr-a to

o
t--~.
'"'I j,.
uuon the neCOSSl 'VV" of ',):eOVHlU1;( [OJ: a Dro.~;:CeS:::l ve r.]o?snl'e of selI""2,OVenl,r.0nt 10):' 8.J1 derenccnt 1)C(l::;12S lOCl~'~:ln[; tODsrd their eventual indep endence or inco~ porGtion in sor.lS fOl.Ti'l of fcdel.'at.Lorl ~'ccordiDb to eirc'cuGtE:l":'ces FDa the ab11i ty of the peOf)l es to aSSl.l!i1e tbCE:8 l'es)or:sibilities. Such decisions Dould preclude tte estnblishnent of a ty'u.steeshJrJ in Indochin<' excc1Jt yd. th the consent of the 1:"l'el-,ch G.:)Vernr.18nt. 'T~e 12.ttel' SeeiJl2 unlikely. r8vor~ the l ess it is t:-le President's intent :i.on 2t SWle a~;~)l'o~)r-i8.te time to ask th~t the French Government Give SO~3 ~;si~ive i ndication oi' U:;s intentioDs in j,"'egni:'d to the est[.bJ.:i.shment of civil liberti es and incre~sing measures of self~, 1 '1 Goverm,ior,c In T ' l ' ~nuoc llna ,~ Ol'e i~ Orl1i1..La t' OG.i. ' J.n8 lU.1' t' -nel' 08C .. 8.' 1'a t.ions of Jolicy in this H:spec
~
" ... , . . . "-'
r. , '1 t ' thC.'.:lG U1SC1).S810n3 i the A!;l8P:LCb.11 ue. OS8. 'lon .

"'I
tl'w:tooshj~.:, s.
11GS
1---
'l'lU;OU-:)lOut
111~:n~;"Cc(-,
'
-::-.
t.a
In. th8 0esntime the Pre~idcnt has explained to the Fl'ench l"orej'on iHn:tst81' tn3.t ':,[}81'ea.s \",'~? 1:;-81co((;e }<'i'ench participation in the war aJainst JepaD the determination of the extent th~t it would be pr2ctlca1 2nd helpful to have j~rencb for-ces join Vl.L t:n us in such oL)e~etior.is must be loft to the Co:mn2.nder in C:Lie2'J united SVtes Arl'1Y Porces, Pacific. '}'he Joint Cl"liel's of Staff are at p:c-e[:ent en~aGed in G study of the Dossibilities of Pre~ch h e lp al~ns t.he lines 01.' tbefolio\,iinG sU0 . . :,8stions~
( a ) ~hile avoidin~ so fer as ~racticable unnecess8.ry or- lor~0ter'm co,,1r:-dtrr18n t~; 1."!lth reGard to the smount or dh2racter of Bny assistance which the UniteJ Stetes nwy Live to F'rerlch :C8sis~ t2nce forces jx, InGochin:::" J this Gove:cnr:J.ent sLould continue to &fford such assistance 2S does not intc:cfel'e vitth tl-J 8 roquil'ements of othor planned oj)En,ations. 0';'in8 to the n'J'3d f'Oi' cO:1cent.~"'l:1.tinz 8.11 our resourc es in the Paeific or: Ol)er-ations all' ec."!.dy p18Dri.ec, 1[;r~s8 -sc2 J.G militrry Ope1'2.t::"or:S aL,led directly at tLe liber.'~t:Lo 11 ,)1' Indochina c~nnot, ho~ever, be contemplated 2t this tiDe. Ar.leric~m troops snol.~ld not bo used in Indoc:"1ir.a exce p t in ih!18 l' .1.C 8n rr.l li t2. ty 01)(3 r !Cit i on s aG8.ins t the Japc:nese .
( b) French offera of military and n eva l aSS:l.st 811ce i n th'3 1:"'8Ci1'1c should be consid e::6cl on th e ir militsry merits as bC8rir:~ on the objective of C:;efe~tins J8pEn as in the C8se of
31
Declassified per Execut ive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
Bri tish [,ne! Dutch proposals. 'l'here '.muld be no objection to furnishin~ of assistance to \\ al"!.\T French lili li t81"Y or' nG.v.:::. l forces so a _ ::nr-oved. J '\ reG E;rd J. estJ 01' tl)::;.ther. tre of o IJe l'c,t 5.o~,s from , whlel) the 8.ssist;:~nce liley . be se~1t, p:covtded such I assist2nce does not in volve a diversion of . re source s rihic]} the Combined 01' Join t Chi ef s of ~t E:ff consid er are needed els e ':J:;cre
J.;. "
l si
G i1E.1.'i
Ac tine
c: ....,
1:
._.J
ii. ;,.,
.,
'I'
32
S.i.:~}=~l::.g
,.
pi'-~11~C:;C3
UI)
:t:
SA~'.'::
P~-.c~~c. ,::.S c~2,:,c:'~b::'l~ ~~~::-.:;\~C
is
:!;-..<)l'Q i!~:~)o:':~~:lt t-~J:.l~ ~)~rjy/"
of J 8
slli:)2
~Q (:,:,._.~.-. ~:~J0)S ~D.d '.';~O
2.x.?c:ct to d-cOl)
l~0:'PC':~~ :o_~
EDIrrv~i.'S ~,\ crj:';;. .-3(;.;..~ th8 fjI:C!.l COL:Z2,:.~8t>C;3 t:):;t~ 0:1 ~::.:s SL~:D:;t,
LS i:~0:~d~2.
':.n
'~h8 ~l.);?o~~~
by
t:l3 OCll~:bi:-~c;c~ Cll:0~.~
oi
S~.:..~~
::'
.)._~
~er0.3: :1 (;:l'~ s~.:2.
tl13 Pl'lr.:"l3 2\'lin~st0~ ') see lJcst) )~-:gC3 ~.~ c.~ fi.
(.,-.- ...--.
~ .:-~
~:~~3~, CI-~: L.l~:; ~:~~r;=-=r:~:~.~:'[~ ~ j~ -_~r_'~, ..:;: ~ .. /_~,,,,~ ,:. ~\ ':1"
"'- - 1 " )
'"
-- _ ....
._'-.:"_ . __ " ..:.J_
"
c ....
~.-'r.
~'-'-?:~~\.'
I~o.
L'223
fJ....
O?
s:;c:"!:~r.r
O. (J . S . 8S5
PAI~''':~C::P .:'_r~.!.o~\
0:..'
~\';:)
S':..~:L~~'\ c-~::
Co~.;(;'X:.~_L ':"~'3'_.":.._ -~_\i:Y"
1.)::: 'vI:':':O~':s
12\" :s'A~: EAS".L':2T~X G::):2:~.:\.'.:.lI;)SS
!~:-:11C::iC~:'~:
,.
,~_l;~.i.S
g:-'::::.lcn ?:~J:pO':',c to pL:.ce ~: ~7:.:C:"}C~L 00:~~X3 o~ ~\\~C : :-:;~:n.t ~J"' (:ivis~o:~3 -_=-c~~._ C0T.c.::1f..:r:C ~~:. L~:(; ?:.-. ~~f:0 Y.~ . . . ~. L:.-,d (~~:!elos~.l'G ':2 n) ~ l~~";:-<7 P:(1)..:J3ccl by .~ : G TJ::~L~:~ E~t~_~~5 r;biG:s of St~~Z. S:'~~~3 L~_v ~~~:~=U_I~:
..
"
C~ S~, :"'-[i J!':~J~ }u~-.tQ Y:G'Y'':. 2_5 to tLe [.. r(;~~s i :'1 \,\T~.!.~Gl_ '~~~~'2(; ~~r~.;:c::-_ S~~C.1!~~l 02 or.!-.;.l)~Jy8C~, :J-'.oI..~.s~i PG:~:..t_)::; :8_ot :'~.Jc10: "I.;rJ.itcJ. S~.;_t(;S
~\~:l(;_j.... :tt~~D:- )~';))C~2CS) j: ~!._0 li'.:."~.~(2) CO:... .)3
is,
:_:::.si~>-::.,-,dLO 11~ ::':', tD 19-~:0.
"J.se
:~
irl
{!.!~ rr~:=:iI::. efio~'~ ~1';2L_~.. ~ t;i.:P:':"~l

1 C(j:~S:(:\,;~'0t':
L:-.!.l2..tc. S) .:~.n.s or'
S.:;c;
af1..~c )
:)/ !"J . 118 .
~:-~8
Cu .. >i:--iC.C.
CJ::~:':;
G:
f-~t:~:-i' ~~t t~~c::;: 1~i0~:A
u .... ...:
33
tj
t:
-'
2.~0
'..I:. :~""4'~":! ;''"!"''rS ],'j ~C:G\,,::,:.:':(~0('"=
~~TL~:l
:;:;:
0_-<t 01
;L:;1S
-) ,: \);.~v.) -:::/:~J:,
.1
\j~i.~
\.,:;
... . . . v
.....
.::~
-.
.,....
oJ ..
r ; .. v\. ~
'~'\l\., lI:~t,.J
L~'.J~:.1G ;};"~( Cl~~1 .,/.0 T"JS'::,-S ..
8_:'~~.\.~() c; .. ~ ,:",: ,:;~"':~ ~\~~'~iC S:~~:C8 ~~\.,-;~-c s <!.~
::,~:;~,;;~~~f'_,t~}~~~~~;I,);~~s{\~~<rJo~~~B~"~i-~2J/{:~
',J
's,:o:p.r;;(:o jO .rJP0~n J:~1 l:! -~" l (iO P,) ''): TF~ S! "-'-0Te; c'-n . ~:~'~~J~r;:S
s~ ~t'!Jl::.:6~l. ~)J s~~
().:GJ0.I0 ~r-1
]0
_'=':v_\.~ ~'JP o;'u ~p ~r~n:'l:~
(;';-L.. :~'l
~\~,- . ~s o.~J
n, :.l:o-':-J.T .. OJ -': .) r,8qClOJ .I0} F ,)( L"-\ -~',~0.:'; sno:Lc .. (l0'~1 JO ",'.v:_, i..~ 'c; ~un .r':"/;U[ c,~~ r;c. ,~ ::c~::;JJ:):0
0~}C l:~'UO'"
_'~~'t;.).I ~
::;'~:~~~~~1~;J(~~~ :~~~~
<:q o~ :' ~' ;=":'1
~~~,;~\~ ~:~~~~~~:~'~/~'~~:;}~~'~}J J~~~'I:;'~~:~C~~: ~,~= J~?O?~~~ ~'~~~2:"'1;~_\~~\~C~J(~ ;(\:~
~~i.:H:;~~I ~~~~~~! 'I~~:O;~~ ;~O~:~~S~:~~~/:~:~'~~)U~J~~tI~:~~~0~~[~~~I~:~~Y;~(~~~~~

en
~\1G:~:;:6~~~ ~~~ l~~lJ~~; ~~~~~};~~~~L~1'+gC~~~; .~~'J~,cGJ~rS~i(.~?~!.~~~~~\~}t
' (i'~~ __ ~) S\~0S~ .. J ..\O :[O~: ~1JE~:' -( .. ;.J:.:.i JO ~.,'00rli:llo.\. _~q ~;r.. Jl:=':'0~L(~!J.:) :J'~"~0S,:i)cI ~~O E'.~O}8r~0,r~ i:[~~;.rc'J 8.T~~:b;).: ..:~lr~o P~(:o::l. ~cIs~.~~? S~1.:} (c~c~~ ~0 ':... ~'C~~Jl;c-I vr~~ \:~ 0'1r...~:!:ado 01 ~)~C(0 ~J~ C"~ ::J't),TO ~::I
5lc:.\'G 't
,~:~~:~j':1(~~;;~~~ _~~~~~'. ~~f, go~~)~~')~~:~ ,'~~i}':~:l,;~t~~~I~;(;bT~6~{Lu(~l q

~-: Jp,.~~rc~ p~l~0:[S ScTJ00 _\~f.:"G s~r:,..T.J
s~ ~l:;,-!. c<): ..:\..r~s

,"i\jd ~)";T1 l[~ Sl:O ~'rJ:0cI()
llc'"j zn~
- ~~:(,dd:lS - SC:.:cJ SJ:)~S()q '~-t:'o~s~_\.~p o_~'.'~ .z-~!~s':, :cIn,:oJ s(L!G~ _~rc,::J 1[-:] l.~srl:~\I
.TOJ
::::'l~";';l.tr~~~CJ 'L!"';Jy!:;}tL~'( J~I1
JC
:'-JSG(I:):l~ 0.T~'~UO
O~I+ ~.'J StllC: ~:l~Jl[~11::J_\.G0 1.Fn~J ,II.:I J:J~~ 'SUO~'_~-02,T8_\.UO,) CS0tl~ :)'~~*~\Or~O~I
'_'\.~qr,,-~.IO_'.I.rJJ ~)~:L.'''X)":_~
;j'\.:'J 1~"~~~~.I''';:\= p':.::C:~0S
s .'J....\ l~0d"C[ '.1s\"[~r,:':~'J

'})1..::"G-....I (JUO
,T'J.\\.
(L~1
"\,1.-: ~O:~;:;l!~.)-;1.:JJ l[:'~v.t2.~ '"J JO O~(:~'':l!~ .lCl Cl:'~ ~ ..:~~r,o CHl~ '\.;:0 l~~i.lr r~1.~(:,1.:vO
: ::-~. '-~I!,::,II.~.1 ~l...vp~Sv.TQ )1..:\::
0t.:~ "i.:0
z 'l~l::C:'L::~.:J:.. O::) F;::O f:';I-'-O.IC: r~~:.rv.~ ~L ~.~~'.} :0 s.:: :;~j\T C.~~~~.:0.!I ~'O .2:C~S~"(':~~\= : '~:!.",:/"".;p~a ..:~.\: LJl.:'J "G:3-:~Iri:..I\.L ~GC-~):SJ.TJ (iJJ:.V:'(~rt s~:o~'~'~;s.::) _).-l~(jJ ~u!:i:l([
Sl~O~'~"~.lv~O L[.r~Y~s,:;=
rl'1YlTS:!:\'~'\:
.rJL
LI~ tro~('~"l~C~~~~~ ..~r0C:

'liO.:!:
. . :.J";.Xv.I.!:
: '4~0fqns
'0
C:9::()~=9
rl';~.2~[~:3:8
_\~.:1a).:\"rdO =\::;[:,\=
],\::'::1/ Z;S7 .0 s:.

~ ~:0T
. 01.
' G6 _C"cJ\" '..': C.l.~)~i!_:SV ;~'\.

_
~ ~_
J'.~,r:lJ~!S
,:O.T..
( 77 [jll,~'./:J'(IY) l~ w':'7' S-::);'Ji(Y .7J);'~[0 Jo..J __
'.'T0?(Y ;!'u 'v

~
-;p
t:."'I..5'~'O.lrf ) S '..,J 'lJ,).2'~U,r: 'J1D10 .

~
_~
,,){/2 ~~ ':L01S.S1,.':lT Jl.L'D{l.,:n::I~ 1/J:':/).1,, ~1l?~O J 1.I1.'el,) 91f[ .' _ L . ..... _ . ...... J V
. ..1
co
J~I.II) J'i!; 0' ( ,O','i1fL 7U.,'!'-U(Y " . J.J

L>.,/ ... "
['/ O.::l:;Ol:)L:I]
S~':::2:C: :r _~Vl._~2:\.:~'~C:C _1S C:_'-~~
S.I_\::::::::L. .~JOC
z:).:\::zt::~~~OJ
TTOl :~lleQ QA\.N :,.(8 '9T9 QNN :J;)qwnN p;)rOJd QNN ' UOI1::l;)S '9l~T J;)PJO ;){\qn::l;)x3: J;)d pa!J!ssupaa
Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Secti o n 3.3 NND Project Num ber: NND 633 16 , By: NWD Date: 20 11
r"TI orgJ,::iz!1.tinn
}\"..I" E:1Sii.
si}ni~:1r
to
~,h~t
of
co~.::c:s~:'~=:'~~~:":'6' ...:~::lc::ic::'2:
:!r:.its i::
~~~2
It is tho:tcfol'c l"cqricstCQ, i:a !'c;;:1rd to ~~>lisio:'lS rus ,vc:l [:s to 3:'.~, porting ~Tnlj- corps units ~r!.cl services, thr..t the ty'pcs of u~~its to ~:; be c);!}'ctly clouned. . It is finJ.lly suggested, in order to r:1cilitf1.te IurLlicl' ::lc,gotir"~ions , ~~1:1t 8upro1110 }Ien.clqu~l:tc~s , ltlliocl Ex~~odition~ry' lrol"CO, be [!'t.:thO:':7.0d to dc:"l du'cctty with the :!3'l-c:ach command in what co:accrns dctc.ils t}J.o mattors hCl'Qwith r cfclTcd to. A. ~1 . BnossIx DE S.UX'l' DI:::C:2
o~'g::t::lizod,
0:
lEnclosu:'(; Bj
'2.'0:':> SEc::mT
TO TIl ;:;
~J}~~!orL\ X DU)'l FOr:. rl' HE OI-IIEL' OF TI:I:~ FREXCII :\lI:.r.r.';"H": :\'~IS3IO::\
U XITED
STArl'}~S
1. \Vi tll rcference to your rr:cn~.()!iLndurn of ~g ':'\.!"f;,y 10:~5 :; ~::,d(~rcss~d to th.c Cb.i~i of St[~{,iJ U. S . j~:'ln3'J th3 unitc.:l S~~~~cs Clli:Js cl S:~'t.~~ SCCGI)t i2.1 p:!.inci~lo that pOl'~ion of : you:' prQ~)os[':,I ,.V!~C':">c b:/ t~:0 =i\: o:"lC~ Govcn"nrner..t Pl:t.S ~t .the e:at!l'c disposJ.l 01 the; .:\.:-n.cric;l~1 (;G~n:-n~}1..(-1. ::. Frcnc~l UITf:Y corps of t \VO 111~--:'71tr}r cliv:s:ons, \~:i~l: CO:1~s-.3l:p::;0:::' ~:-.i: D:!ld SCl'v:cc t~nits 011 t~lC U . S. senile, for Opcl'i."ttiQ:~s i}~ the \':~:.:. ~:'';:.1il:S~ J~~~1n. 'I\llis accc:)t~I~CC in. pl'!I!ciplc, is \V':r.:l 'llG UlldGrstr~llclins t11:1..t the ~g!'C0:nC::.t on this ~1f',,ttGr ,\lith t.:lC Pl'CY1C~: G()vel"nmc.T".i.~ \;".:11 include t1u; follo'.'7i!!.g Iy!.ovisio::1.s :1'his ~'l' C:1Cll corps 'N:~l b3} bot::. dl~ li!1.~' tIle pG!'io d of ~"1Ds~i~itics [tn(~ in t~1C post-hostil~t.ic3 re r:.u j ,-1Str:~(-..:lt period ~;n.cil ro:ci:s3(~ b,Y t.~~c t :-Ilitocl St\.:ics J subj cc~ to tb..:: co:r::;I~nG cO:::1n1~:.rJ.d e,nn cOl:t.;:ol c;:' ~~:G UJlitod St ~tcs CO :111Jl~:lcl i:c. tl{c S~l'l:"G :11~.::11:'81 c:s u. D . S. :..'"I'l:-1:l C0i':)S . ~". r. ~, 7,." ',~ "\ .. '''f\ "lr,-"';";""'r,--,)L. ~"!"",... .L~ n. O. 1\10\ Cl . . .:..'-'.~l.t or t:"lr'. '-,O . . . p;:, -':;'''''''(Y' .l. L~L.IC\...i , ". :ll 'IJ'oJ "-'d !..:.t,....:..:!..:,..:.l~u U ... _~ .. v ~L l..ilv 1.1'raDch CJ1":?311:1vir~g, i:'l t~lC o:):nion. of tllO United S t[',:,~es c0r":-!:'-:l~"'unc:, ,1co!nbc~t cfl:Gic::.:.c:yr bf;.S:::ci 011 L~~:tGd S tC~t2S st::.nclD.l'ds . c. i).SSUl'r.HCQ :J!.~'..t r_ dcqu~-....tJ ~r~1:11C(~ :'c,ln.co:ncil ts \vill bG ~rovidcd by the li'rcne;}l G 'OVGl'l'll1: ont ns rJ.C:(;J3Sa~'y . d. :v~~1xir:'1l1In ll :30 ",:~ll be 1l1J..GG of C(~l..:i:;Y'QGI:t l)rovi(~(!c. uncle:: thG
Cf,.
1
T. _ ....... ( ,...")L
."
Y',
! . V ..
.I. ...
HJ:1
....
'";\ T OJ. l ".l. ....A --:;1' ;C'")'"1 <"l~_ r1 , " ' , . 1. .1 '.:)"noli~lI' ;,,'n .. L "'\LOI." ..:. . ~:L.." __ l\ 1"';"\ _~:_ .....,..
e.
1'110. ,.. . .y ..'~')Yrlcrt'q:.'on oj; v ...... ...

J..lJ~v.:.
.!.
i?C:"':'t'7''''~''l'T')C-:-'''I.!. -")lOr: " 0.1-~ ................ _ .1 ... ~~ "-~u.. J..;. ,::)1.. ...... :'*~ ' .
u.
,A .
.L
f'1~S ..... ''CTC,.,.~"\,...:.:.:.OJ ... u.v_ r d ""1C .!.;.~(.vL ._,. ~ .Sl~r.l1 v: ...... t l .... "'U :-~l"0 7"r'"\("-t')"'l"'""'1 '8 v;' .. v _
.=;
..............
UCCO~~~1 11ylr:.g 5l!9~)OrLE1g n..n.tl 5C::." /'183 ~::lltSJ ~l'OY!'510IlS ~o~" GC~l.llpmc;::~ }
and tIle })lal:ning i!.~~d t::nir:g for ~llG 2"'i.:OVCIl1Cnt ~:nd crn~)!o)#:1!.c:n~ vI t~~i3 corps '.viil 03 it: ::1cc0:'d[!'l"lCC \\-it'~l plt:ns f'.::ld !.1~1";.:116cn1cllts to be c.ct(;fmined bS# t11C United Stn.tcs l~'1ilil.~!"~/ 2,l~tllOl'i tiCis \;r~lO \vill dC~ll directly with tho .:.' ronch :;-llilitD.l'Y auClOri ies .
.:J
Enclosu:L'c A, supra.
[No . 1233J
35
2. J?;:f'S':-'''g'
c:~']S
~0'~!~~:irtJ::1C:l-~S {O~: O~):):~:[-.:'.iCt]s 1 ~ ~'~10 ?r/('.i~.c. o.~ .:~~:; ~~"'o
..
C07"1~.~~_~ ~..:.c;').::lS ~ :l[',kc. c-~J:tr;i:c. f~. ~. . ~j :'J~ \r'~llllot,
00
p0ss:b~ o
to
~ ~l()ye t~lis
f:"O::1 ::-'rc;;:-'.ce :r.~);: rut J.e~s;j ~cye;.'[')
IilO:ll;J.5 ~:.'~tcr
(,!.lC (~f'./~0S you

co::!.;r!.i~tcd ~')
s:~.. -.:.;cs~) ~:::::d
it
.2'l))C~,I'S u:,lti~(o~= t.ll~/t, ~his co::.'~)S
17ill DO
OlJ0I':.~t.io:'.s ]:':')1.' lQ
tho
s.P;:i...l~
0':: j. f:'{<:5 .
3 . rJ~l:!.c l:jli~,ccl S~':\;~~S Cll.io~s 0~ S~f:{:~ 'Si:.l C,cl-y"'jsO ~\~ou lurt3:.c:; i;.l tills
J. C. S.
:!:~l!'!::;
c. C. S. 2"''2/2
'I'l' ')
L:}i'L'~'C:
St8 t~~
C11.iQ~s
of
S~~,.': rcc0:11;nc..~.:.:~ ':~.}:.~!/j '::'~:lC
Ci;':C'~EI c~ S~~;,:1' fO:'\V2T(~ +~.~ 10 e:2C'.0!:~:~. :::0."110~.'['..:-'.~~:,"~n t~ f,:~:: :::'3J.1C~.).
1\ 0 :,\c::.'~.':.::).c:s
=-~C.:P2~::;CJ'.tf' j-.,-cs ~ ') :
t.> 0.
(:o:n ~;~r.cd r;,:vd
CO:~10i:.~~(~ C~~i':,"s o:~ E<.~{"_
o~ ~,~~Q !r.::;:o.L<:'..r~clU~ll
il:
J.;~~3 ~l~e}.of-:):-I') t,0
C. 8 . c'.
:::. .L13~::
~~~2/l . 2
C'2 :"':f. ~ ~:. ~ '0 '~,: 0::.
.,
"
to
:',gf:Ji,-;,:-.t.
('l~"~V:/~.~,,:::'.
~".r>.~.;,:;:.
oi
J1J::'C.~1/2'~c:.~~c~~[:.~(;S ~.;;::.~'.:~i?~.:~i0:'
iI,
t~10
Y/f~T
[,:I'e:
-,;:, '~ S~1 ~'() i~:~8::",,!. 2,-0-;'1.
c.;
~,~'\.ci;:, Vi.3'.~-S \~~.~ ):~J.
2:'D 2r-. l:'~l~)',~;s :-
: .=....... -:::(: . '.:::'r~

f3c-: ('''. '-:: , -:;.
S~: .
'jy .:.:.:~ C()~~.:.\~:"..C!(l G"'::::~
c':
S'J~~:"'C ~.~. \..--..:::1' J~.)J~:~ \.:~ ....:~3.l';: ::.::y .!. 0 .

("
.)~.:.:"~r~,.~
? ~}(, .~.;- ' :: ':. ~\-;) . ("/': . , .. ,:",'
>r: :... -:(

',,: 'J
, 1.
4 .
"
.. r.' ", ... :,'
;~'. ~'"r' C'~
"',r.
~(l'::~. : r.:~:r;.
t')
~ '.1.,) ?.t;:~f" ~ : ~:--<
." . ,1 ~', '"

,
C,.'
<.\~:!::;J"
S~~C.i:~w~ r~~ ~
of
:~,:;c: Co~~ .:->'t,r.,,~ C;~~_' .
:s
.J
') (" i.)
-,
1:;' ~1.1' }j (~s ~'"
i n~\):111:.\.:.,i0i o~ :J.:(i-r.' i;:t~~nL : G:;'s :.!l l'cS)cc:t o~ ~~::~~- 0~c:~-. :L:O:~S t::::..~ c: : .~CCtlv nfl.c~t I'~ onc!l/~\\;t~,:,C'=I:.l~:r~::) ~2::"_'itc::~2S c..:."' ,.r.!:-~ ~d _0.:.':::~S 1.1
\'.-:11 lob ..;
J . C . .3.
I'E~.'
c. O. S. SCSj"P /. . :r-:~l":ICI? .:\.'.rIO~~

..
CI'
r r":,,,o
li':L;:::XCI:: C)O~.O~I_\'L
Ix g.!.XfJ.'~1.Y
~=.-~S!O:\~)
:::x
I~""..:\R E.\'ST~C~:':::{ C'~J:::!~.:'..'rlc=\;-)
Stnf~ ~o:: ~~lJ c:-L:::;~oY!l1cnt
1. y'~T G ~'t t,YO e;:~~iTl!~::Jd tI18 pr0]OS~~S by' tl18 Ll1.i)~,od S~::~GS C:~~.:f:3 o~ o! L:.\o .l.~i(:':10~1 co:o:!.i~l i~1~a!"!.t:..)r c~i'r~~i .~::J:-_S i:.:
l~a~" E:t"lstO.I'Il 'ol)l~~'2/Lior:s ) f;.S S2t
0:10 in C. C . ~; . SD0 ,2 2. =:: -t,ll~ lig~lt. 01 .ll_l~c (~~sc.ns.::or!. ftt C. C. S. lS~~~~1 ~V~(;G .. ~: .. ~,; ~. :;~~~ 0 .. l ? July' 1 Q:~5 /~ \V ~ Sllg~~CS~, it, '\vo"'21cl be-. Plc;~cJ.'~~)lQ :OJ: ~~_8 'C\':/,j ~2"'::c:"le~~ c2.!"'llsin:1S ~~ ~")a G::1)~OYCd. ill (1_1.10 COl~r:)~ i~ li';'cTIc:: ~!~n.~:c-J~2:~:~: .
3. r~.:",-~ (:lcsi,io?J of l:TiL(;~... \.-~lO~3 ~0::~:;r!.[.::2 :~~~s =-'",""!' ~0 .~:~1_~~l G)~,_'2~0 \vol:ld, Y.re; SU~';2S0 ) b3 d3C:dod j-;: '~:}e E.;l:L oi J~~~-3 s~~u~t::.;~!. :'"..tt t~ ~ 0 -vi,.:':10 .
1
S~.:::
3
~ Doc\.r;n2:I~ Xo . j ::'~;S . SCc Gn[:; , P:) . ~'!:S-51 .
.:udc, p .
Co:~~i\:-. G~cd by 1 ] ~1 .
thQ 'Co:nbt!'J.cd
Cl~i0~s
01
St[t~~: ~'.t ~:~0h' IG~lf:; ~1-IC3-~':;;6~ J~:!y
10.
J . C , S. l-:'nes
c.
C . S . 805/3
I:\.:\.2 ~GjLsr.i:'J~::-!:\ ()~):;~-~Afi'::O:-'7S
PAR'l'IC:C:".;'~ 'i'\i:()N 0:7 r~' .\yo l~:~=::--'~C.fr COI...O:.\-ZAL IX~'.-'~ )'-l':"~~ l)IY:.3:::-:':\;.> ~C\
C:.i:.'.fs of St~.fZ };~\-O C0:rlSi-::.~::c:~ ~.l~c C:C;: ~.1[~.:~-;._~ o~ th~ 1~J:it~3:! C!::i2~S 01' St:-::~ : l~ C. O. S. S~J;)/l 2 t~s to t:10 ('~_~1:;:Oy:~C~_'lJ c: the t\'.~o ~~:\~:':.ch cE. vis:o:ls n::~c~ :' c (:orrl:;,",~c~T_d i-I:: t t}~G (:;lclosc{2. ;::'0:1:01'1.-~ncll:.l:' be j'o::, !,'.-[~.::clc(; h:y" the. CO;Ylbjl:O,J Chip~'3 0~ ~)~:~~l to . . ::c: C~":i,:, G: t:~e FJ:(;2;C~1 >~i~i~~2. .- 2. -=!sslon to 1}:.o l.-7~~~t(;~~ S~::.t . .-_. :_: LQ~: G~ =I!C~vs-"~_' e . ::B" "LO C. 8 . S. 805 .3 TJr..itQJ.
I Co:. si(L;:'0~: b:," ~hc: CO~i"~b:::cG. Ch ~ (.lS S~...; GI~~fJ, p . 11:J ,_ 2 ~)OCL:T..::C71t, :\ o. 1:?~;;J. ;) j')OC'CT.1C:.t ~-o " 1:3tJ.}.
Tr\~~
S.i~:..tc;.~
oi
S'~~-,:-f ~t t~!2::- lCi[)j' .. ~,:~..:: .. :;:~, ';l:~Y
1:).
!.~
~-
- . .. .. ,0 .:..:.-..)
~
37
COXFnHE?\CE DOCD)'IE,\'TS AND SDPPLE)'IENTART Y\PEHS
[Enclosurc)
'1'01' SECJm'l"
:t1'1J~~rOTI .~?\D{j:-,r FOn 'l'Im enm}' OF '['IfB Fm;?\CII 11rLI'J'ARY

IN' 'l'Ille
1IhsTo:-:
Ux
ITl:U S'J'.\'l'ES 4
TIle Combined Chiefs of S[ufi' [tccept. in principle y our of1'el' of ~l

]french corps of LIYO inL:.nl ry diyisions to the understanding UWL:S0.],l'e i n
tho P acific war
0::
a . W hcther t)le eorps::,,-illlsern under U . S. or B ritish command
amI the nren in i'.-hich it i\-jll op er,lte ii-ill he detcrmined htcr. b. Finn l flCCl'plDllCC of the corps will illi'oli-c nn ngreclJ1cnt with
th,~
gOYel'nmenl coaeerned on bnsic mnlters including command , eOi1lb~lt oDiciellcy, r eplaccmcIlts . ancl logisLicn l support. c. l\ luxililum use ilill h c Jlwcle of equipmcnt p l'oyic1ecl u ndcr tlH.' K orth Afr ican find ?\ Ictropolital1 HCflrmamcnL Program. d. T he t ime of moycment i\'ill be in nccorclflllce i\' ilh the prioril l' of tllC opcnltiol1s in idlich i t is t o h e used . P r ess ing shippillZ rm;j oth er rcquin'Illcnts for operat ions in the Pacific make certain thal the corps can.noL b e mOHcl from France for fit leas . seyern l months. ViTh et.her used in the main effort. or in the Soulh Chillit SCIl. urea , it will not. be p ossible t.o cOlllmit. it to opera tions prior t o the spring of 1946 . "
!1.
( T his t cxL \,::lS communic:ll cd to thc Chief of t hc French :-Jililan" :- lis~ioll in memorandum disj):llched by thc Combincd Secretarial, of the Conibincd Chi,;f, of Stafr' in \Yashington on July 10.
38
?.:3?O?v':' 3Y- 'T~-=~

3~,,-r_~'~~=::~
S~f'J~r-I'~~~:' !\,~,~~;)
~-~~~ii~'~L'S
r::J-J::2;S Ox: S';"\j':.'.]':7, l\:??;:IC-:(-~J) 87 ::;2 -~-~~~::~,~\~\~~=~}.' C~ ~~~=-i~~ :;}~~-_:3D ~~'::~3 ~__T:\~~~:~:) ~(~::\G=O=I.'~
8J~,'~~:3=:\:S~-=';
~.~;-,;: C0;-no~,:?.~r1 C/~?~t;fs
of J~:c:jJ' ,~o X':>'i'cs-idc:ni

CJ~'El'chi~~
!
S:;~:.~~.:\-:'~-.'~ 0:7 fJ8:'-~L~iS:O~~S ~~~.:'j.:\(!:.::~!) ~: .~:.~~~ 8C~' ~ D:::7'::-;::J c::::::~?;::;

0::' S~"'.1:\'7? .\-]."1 S?::~~ ({~~}~;~,~'~!.x;\.:./: CO:::-:'-':::-:::J~:C~~
1. ~Cl'\ () s g,.. c:;~: r:.~JTr: 0.['.....: :'- 0; (;')"_)(I.'.FS~ 0~.-S ;:'::s. ~,_"'.0('. Co:-:J r,;.~'~-- 80 ~.:. s l.~:::- . . ~ '.~ 2.(-. !~ 3~~,\--~ ':~.- ~.. .
2.
'"'I-;~:
'7' GO
".,:1
~,.
...... -
-~
L-\...:
n';' ! . . . '7',(",-,\
\...:.. t.. ..... ,.'. I . .
3 . .1.1-::
CO')?C~'~ :~i8~"\.
YriC'"'
C<,:-.;'81' i~ ".~~.c;S ~C' b:~:DZ ~,bc)lr:. [:.1j ~,:-.:.~ C'"',.?.'.:.::3.
1J'23~~ : 1.;lo (' n~c -~ '\: c~.?:'~c ~ _~,
of
t.-::-::][:--:-:~
OJ-:
I0Y~-~l"i-:~;
~,=}~\~J.C'2.'~: n/:) ~ ::~,y' :~,:~C:
~~'" j~l t.o r8S>~~ ~) ~~ cS.' ~ ~)~::-- ~ }-~i~; ::'2, [.-'-". : ~:r b10f_'.: -~f"C:C~ : CO~:C~ 1.' '2J~.i:.,,:~,,: i"\.~'2:: :,>,-.)
;J)~';c..~;~~~:
;,.,.-,,'.
::,~1.Z ~~~;
C,' l,~
:::~/-,i"";\-c.':;
.: -.. ~:1.C ~~'[~pP..":.25:; ::O~~:G ~:": '::1(~"3 [,S t~~('.
rQoj.~l C~~C.:J;; C:;.-~~.~li.C ~ : .J.~~ S:'lt2.~.' 0~)':;:~\ .~O:13 ~.;['.,:.:_l'-t, c :)j CC.ljv (~S
i.::.
C<,:~.2?
t. .,":')
"
1 .,'.) :'-n.~"):.z .. c)-r.. ,,, ... . /\ 'ir ;~.'ri~~ ....,' -,,/ : j1 C.0-,:J .. ,_~ "'; , " ~ l'r) ~"":' l ....... :<Yl Cr:C' . . ~.; , . . \ .'
.'
"~_,';-:'
-.. ,".J"
:~ -.:~
, .
.- ;,,:;.
...' __ ,
~~. =~.:. r:';~'):";:':J~'~':)::l
y<...::
C<>.v .... l:, - ~iA,.:.. ~0 C3~ ~,JL. :\ ~:i.J rnc",::'::.:~. il
CS ..
rl(;;.~":??::::: .J~ : In~:.; ~~' :'}" ~,.:-i." ~:; .. ~ ~ C~ C~cr~"''' fllY [::Cl~. .L :x: ;"~' : ~:, . .
.J ~.:
-,
~:
39
:~~ ~r 0 ~. ;': ~? r~: ~:~~
r'-,
~Nj ,~:;;( ~j!; ~ c;~~~~~ ~J~iJ~ ~~, lj

(""1'-
~:'
(.
:"0
~1~ C~.: (-~) ~~~: &~ ;~ . E~., <: ~~
-' 1 ' , . , -
c~ !-'
\h
(:)
... ..
~.I . f-> ~; tJl c~ rJ~ ~~~ ';l b-' ~,,, ~'~J ;:)~ .~ () . : t ~ :-.i f; c:-t" f - ~ } ': .... ~ (~ . ' ') ". 1 'd r;:., " ~ '., v~ c' 1)''' ' "1 ,.. C. il . , . . . \ /'
~!J_, ~ ~
en
'0
[,) In . ,.1
UI
0 ----------c-:
~.:; ' ~ .:J
tf)
, J .
'l
f?, f?
:'J
~.J
"'s (1".)
I,))
c:::-
_ ('"
r)
1-';'
," 1.-'
t:-f
~ -J
~_;-.
()
}._I . tj lj ~;
tb ..-<
t')-1
CD
(' '1"
r:'~1
t>: ~~
[;1
t: -I'- ~ , .
Co!
~. ~II
,~ ~
(,;
L~ (~ (~ ~~
i.jJ
(,':-' . /
~ CD
lJ;n '::~ P:::: ~ ~~: ~.

(.~
. ~-
~' ;'; fr'!~l';,1t,~~ ~: ~, ~' ~}]: ~'

; fun' ~t,:1 :: f; i; ii i;.:;~;
r, (. ;, (:) (.) () :. (j)
C~
fJ g.
S~.~
~l~.
u'
I ' ....
~j
F;:
-o
~.;
(or
'd
i:
~ )' ~~:.
;"! t_ r'.
<.
f ... )- ' J,
Ij
cl
~.; ~,
,
"
r~~ 8' (.) 1-' o ;.:.. ((! C'; f:'

.~
rr"}) ~.~ if ~: ~. '~. ~, .,

:;," ~~ 0
() 1_: ",
t,... . . ~J
F o ,- . i~l.~ g ~:' ~l\. ~. ~~: ~:, ~i; ~.;

o
~"
\
~J
)--: ('0.1
ty'
~,
r_: ". '

()
(~
....
(',)
tf.l
8. .:.. 9. ~~:,~ (-)' . ~. ;.: r;' ~) ~: ~~ r) . ~~ tJ ~~. :-,)

t-~
t~ ~y t~; I~~
f~
v)
0'") I"
:.:.;
,-;
(')
(,)
(-l..l
(0
()
(-~
c> , ;,
~ t,~
(i)
(:l
" :.; c5 1-] cC: ()
n' \
\-
>-1
M-
~t~:~I~:~
<~
r~~
t:~ ~Il
'"
, ,
) '
(~
I '-~
C,n
, .:
" .-\ f~ ~~:~

('
("' J
:-J
(.l
~ .I-
0
~~
'.Jj
~.;
~.~::
.,1
<'.:_
t-,"
E~
, ~,
(":: (.) r.. - t:,' o ,. . .

"
1--:"
,.... ...
~~, ~? s' qJ~

O--J
,,' s;
,.
, 1
o
<..1
!..j
Ij
80
.,,~
~~j .
,-'
(~
(J
1- h
0:;
~).!
(.:~
" (j
11
,J
~J
~.
Z 3
c
-
'd
el-
c-:~..:.:
I-.J
c....-::
;.;
,J
~?
(') o '"
[ _.
::l
Q.
~
. Pol
I..) ' )
P ,
.. .
r ,
,:'
t;
},'
C>
.
'~j
, ~1
I,
:~
(.~
;'j t) ~~ 0
c'
r?
f~
" ,.'
(J
)")
' (
r.!
!,-; "
(lJ
O"~
"'0
~J o
(
Ij
,.. ..
P :'~.:
~
.~
:~"
"
()
I,
t'
1 01
H~~
: ~ i'
l.v, "'1
~ ~ ~ ~ ~. ~,:-'
I~ ~ t~ '}.,,;
(;~ f2'. .~~. ~~;' [:. :~~ ;" ~~' f'; i.(
" (0
( ~..
:.~
.r
r~ ' E.~' ;~. ';

(.1
(.'J
~j
(~r'. f~:
P
!'
t:.,
(\;
';
I
~-~
l~j
ei
'J
0
L' -l
~.
~I
t,,;
~) ,',
83
0\0
~ tT1 " >< z~

<
u~; <.
t'l
("
1.--.1
L:'
<1
, ... .
t~
{J:~
c..:' 1/
(.)
"'---i
t.,;
C'.>
(;l ..
,.:.'1
l'
' ~"
~);~
,. u
C'
~; ~
'
c:
:;
;'.~
~I~
,.) c'; c'-'

,' , ;_;
~ ;:~
~ ...
(;.
~~. (,:' [> ~; ' t;~~
J
c~
I -"
,.
rot
()
(.
~:..: . ~:~
v!. . ,.
(>
tt'
(,) (:'t
~.::~~ ~.;
!',
~.;
o "
0 (" \
( .
"'<~ iT~; :. \/ ,. .
.' I' ....
(.'
. ?r~'.; ~ ~~~
".;
I
;:
.'
(J'~
r~
;,
:<,
... "'"I
.'
) ;'0
U'
(..
C> l)
; j
()
',"'., .
)'
, ,
l
'
t'~' ';,!. ~'i ~'~

(,J
I ' ..
;>
II
f:,:P: ~ ~~ :~ ~\ ~~ 0~' ~~, . . . ~ 8~ ~; ~~ f~ ~.

C'
{tJ
,f~ ;;;' ~- '~', p ~~ . fC:<~ ,~:' 0._=),

... ' . " , . (.1 .
'0 :./1
,
,>
;'l
l.._ '
~:; '
'
' ...:j
C')C':'I ,. 6 ,<;-l
r',
~:J
g (,:.
(,)
o
{J'
fl')
~J.j c~
n]:i' ~';
r- ,
",
Lt-
(',; ' (-~ . ~'~
\ (~
J [-:: ~:~.
(.> . ...
~~,:J C'; ~~r~,
'. c'
:-:1)
~:'JI',
0 C.. -4
U'
-I ;'> ,...
I'j l;
~o >- ..,
to
~
>VJ
0\0.
~.1
() ..
~]
p
(
"..
,.J;?
<G;
flo ::~.
;)'
I'
bO
~
~,~-:
,~
C'
'i
( >
()
,.:
I)
(jl
it.!
I.~
LJ
'-<
1:1
("
I.:
t.....~ ,)
;
1-' I
Lt ,f 15
ij"
P.
: 'J
.J
{II
f? :';
'I .. '
()
r. ;-: .
,I .'
('!
~)
!, I,',
l'
~:~ ~;, lLtH~~~' ~'~ ~~;
"\ . ) ,./ v '

1-. ,.
o ,'
c' ,
..
;~: ~., cJ
(. -
2\ Co', { f: :.J ':" ;. ;,'. t(:: :.J

l..~
1-)
" J
r,
~;'
;:., ~ ~~ i:: (~ I r.~ p I,e I l.'j 0 P :~. :.:~ CC2

~: !_~ (~ ~,~.:,
.J
c..
:'
I{
(
c ~ j
t;~
to
z~
~9'
0
r~
~~. ,-,
.. ,
r:.
rl. I"" '...,
f" : o
~~
l-)
o I ,j
(f)
tJCIl o
,...
~
$>:>
I';
tJ~ , :J
r~' r~<J
(..Ie)
p.
c"I'
{~... (~ ~::.
;-;~ U~ 1-:- ~~ p c,~' ~;- f~ c' ~ ~: ~:~ ~"~_"; ~.~ () I'j hoi ~
('"!-
f:
t)
F~
t:
t)
}-O
:/
F !~
r'".
('.\
c'
;-~ .
't' (.)
f'.
co:-
<:1 (;- J f; /.-, ~d.: f'-,

tj
(.... c'
p-, ()
~-:.
[;~ f} ' .. ;.,'

(I' ()
t,
0
r f> ~~ c:,
(""}. () () 1--'
;~..-I'
.,
~~.
,,;" '" :. 1 .1 ,-'

'
to.::;
:.-,
lr,
r-;
~J
,' !J
o
:.~
!-,:,;
I.'~
\ ',
(0
:")
~ '.J
f':
(J
tv Ow
VJ
(,
j
:-1
,j
cJ
~;
'1
~'.' --'
14. -
..
-~
(.~
(,j
U:
G'
(.1'
(.'
t,
.'
C,
I'
:)..
(') "
:.~
,; c' ;...J
d. In cooperdioll v,jih othel' Allies coaducL opcmtions, if requ! \\ . to liberate encmy-oceupied ['..1'8U3.
II". 'I'HE
1',~Al\
AGAINST JAPA:-i
(
Strategic Direction oj the War
8. ,\Yo hayo di scussed the strategic direction of tho J apan :lnd h ,,\-e agreed itS fo11o\\'s :-
II. [t1'
[lg?ir. .
, a . The control of opcrtltionnl stl'[ttcgy in the Paeiuc '1'h('(1.1.o1' v.::: rem ain in t ho hands of the Unite.d Stules Chiefs of St[\[1. b. The United St.ate;; Chiefs of St:tiYwill p1'ol'iclo Lho l~l':ti i;h CL: c': of S1nH \\'ith full and t.imely illfonnfltion as to their futEr.:: plans [,L: int.entions. c. Tho Unitell S(:11es Chiefs of StnfI will consult. the ]3]'i(i:;h Cll;,... of Sl, ~,{f 011 Jllo.iters of gcnornl strflLcgy on t.he wlcl erst:mc1ing thi1 i, .t the evenL of disngrecm en L tho final decisio,l on 1..he fiction Lo be t:l:~!., .. \';illho wiLh t.ho United SLate:; Chiefs of Starr. d. In the ol'enL the British Chiefs of Start should decide tltfLt tl;.; cmmot commit British t.roops in support of f1. d ecision made by U" United StfttC3 CbioIs of Stp,[j' itS imlicatecl in c. nboyc, t 10 Brit!:.L Chiefs of StnH will givG l.0 LlIB 'United Slates Chiefs or StrdY Si.lt:. ad vallce Hotiee of ih eil' dcei:;ion as will permi L t.hem to 111U];:O time';', rCltlTiLltgc,me nts . . e. In tho oyent. tho U. S. S. H. ento]'s the lIar Rgl1insl. Japan, t> strategy Lo bo pursued shoulcl be c1iscu"sed u cL\':eell tho pm'lics co:; corned .
Operations in th e Pacific
9. , Yo huyo t akon note of the plans and oper.1,t. iollS propo.3ccl L:: the United Stalos Chiefs of SlnJi in Appendix CIA." 10. We 11[1,\"0 considercd th o scope and mdure of British pal'ticip," tion ill op era tions ill the Pacific area, Our conclusions n,l'e as foll ows: ..
a. Tho Brilish P n,cific Fleet will participate ns at present. pb.lllH"'1. b. A Britisll Yory long r unge bomb er forc o of 10 S(11.laclro!lS, i nC'l'':~'
in" to 20 squadl'OIlS when more ail'fldels become In-'1.ibblo, "'ill P,T ti clpn,te . There is litLle prospect that nirfteld sp[\ce for moro th :1c' 10 squadrons of Lbis fol'cO \,:i1l become available boroec 1 DGc ctlll~:' 1915 at the earliest. c. 'IV c h :1,'e ftzrced in principle ikl.t a Commollwc:::llh bnd fOJ c' anel, if possible, a sllln1J tacti cal flil' force, should t~ke pmt in t 1:" fin al phase of th e war against. Japan, subjoct to t.h e satisCactor:: r esolution of opora tional n ncl 0 lher problems . I n :cdclitiOll, son,,' units of the 131'itish 3 Ea.st. Indies }'lect may also take part. 11. In conncction with p urng]'[lph 10 c. aboyo, wo h ave ngrl'c(! tlUl, t tho apiJI'Opri[lte Briti;;h commandcrs and staff should visit Admi ral ~i m itz and General 1Iac\.rLhur and elmw up \~'ith th e," a plan for suhmission to the Co mbined Chiefs of Stair.
3
The word "B:'itis!l" dOi!'; noL D.ppe:u at this point in C. C. S. 900/2.
nr;PORl' BY
Ct)~fBl::\J~D
CHH:FS OF Sl'Ar'F
ti')f{alions in SOUtllwst Asia Oommand 12, Ire hnn discussed the instruc tions thaL should be i:::SllCd to '.!IC Supreme .A.llied COlii.1l11l11c!er, Sou theas t Asia, und h:1 ,-e agreed ~pOll the terms of the dirac tivc ill' Appendix "13." ;\allocal'ion oj Areas and Command i n the 'Souf!tH.'cst Pacific (fnd South'.. east Asia L17'eas 13. lYe haH agreed in principle that t.hat part of the Soulll\','est j\lCific Area lying south of the boundary described in .:':..ppendi:-.: "e" ,llould pass from Unit ed SLales to British comm a.nd as soon as p0 S:;,blc, The BriLish Chiefs of SL8,[l' h::t,:o l.lnclert"kell to obt aill L he s '~rcel1lent of the /,.l.lSlrolliall, l\elY Ze::t und , and Dut ch Govl'l'nmeuts ,~these proposals ::tucl to investigate :Uld report tIle earlies t pl'a cl .icuule ,':~\te on whi ch the tl'all::;for C!l n be efrecled . 14. \\'c consider it clesimblo th[l..t initially Admiral illo1111tbuuC'll .:ont 1'01 op era tions undertaken i ll SOll thcm Indo-Cll illa sinGe these ,;rt) morc closely l'ola.lccl to those of Southcas L . :'I.sift Command thnll (0 those of thc China Thealer. IYC are ugrcccl that the best arrilngemcnt ,vollid be to include that l'orLion of Indo-Chill::t lying south of htiLudc IGo llorth in Southeust Asia Commnllrl . This arn1l1t;en1ent ',lOulcl c01ltinnc Gcnerd \\eclcmeycr's control of tk1.L part of JndoChin~" whi ch coyers the flank of projected Chine3C' operations in China, und \,'ould e])f1.ble Admir"j.lllonntb::ttlGll to p repare the ground in the southern half of Inclo-Chil1u ' I'hcre any initial op errl tiolls by him wou ld develop, Wc rccomm Gllcl that an approach to Genera lissimo Chi;)ng Kai-shok'\ be macle by our b l'o governments to SCClll'e his agrCCll1Cnt to this
','1
~rr[lngemcnL.
At a later date it may proye to bc clcsirublc Lo pbce nll or part, of

the remainder of I ndo-China wi thin the sphere of opera (ions of the
.~outbcast
Asia. Command,
French and Dutch Participation i n th e lVal' 15. We have considered the arrangements which call be madc for French and Dutcll pa.rticip a tion in the ,nu' ngainsL Jf\p::tll finel om :onclusioll s arc as olJo\\'s:a, Whilc it is at present impracticn1)Je du e chieDy to logistical difficulties for l"nmclt 01' Ketherla.llcls nrmed for ces to tnke a major P3l't ill the immccliutc OpcLltions in the raJ' East, the pro,-isioll of such ~'5istancc v,hich l!1UY be synebro:lizecl with oprratiollS will be taken ::1to account. The use of such forces will clc]1 cncl solely on milil<ll'Y 'oflsieleratio ns . French or l\ctherbnJs forc e:; so ncceplecl must -,pef!tte ulleler the complete control of the c0mm::mc1er in chief :<Jflcel'ned.
, C. C, S, 900/2 reads :
((~r.
approach to
t~lC
Gel;('r.,lissimo".
U\o. BSl]
42
n e . ~-.-i; :.:..~,;.()~: ':~~'_c; GO;.~~J ".,' ~:: S'.)2.,-.t8 -~: :.~'. ')-: C. E,. '.);~' :?~::'..~,:si (,':':2~-;"'J.['J:2c. ~.:1~~ t~10 f~?C <"'\.' j::, -t-r~l.~ C'.1,:_ i-~~ -,:,-:~~ c::'I'\::~,~:'0 Y1-.::.~ ~-~~ (~_:-"L,:.~:t:~.:;~:.:'':~ l2.1t~;.~ .
~~~~~::~:~;.:t~fJ~~:<~:~~:~~.~~?~~;;~~I:~:t:~~~~~~l~l~~?( ~;ii~~~~~~?c~~:; ,.~j;;.~~~~

j\~ ~';C:'" ~::.:::t 1. 'j~~l~; :;?,_~:~'.;;!,:~~;~: i~~~;~~' 3l~::'~~'~{~~~~~\'f~"~~;:;lC~~ c:. -l~.l'. cl::1' ~h 3
~. :"l\~:~:'~(C~:" .;:~,,:~O~:~:_;'[,:~::'/,~::,/~;;;::'s ~:~l :~;~ 8l~~~\~~?;'~~:~~':~:~;:i;':?:~~,o ft:'~~

G0~'-:;S
\l
"(: . r~,_:.c ~.~.-r..~, c{ =ns-'-:C-~lC~"'It, Y;.:.:~.
Lc i--:-.
::'CC0:(_~:1~~8 '<'''-.~.Ih
t,:18
-;y;::o::'it-t
c: ~.: . ~: :,,:. b~; :.0.C<-C/C ~:.'(~~:.1 ~ir:\~1(:0 ic.~" ~ . ~ ~.c:'.:J ~JY~).'~~ }1'..0T'1.~.~.'1:3. ~~,,; .,,",\;i.' -=---;.~,::~,"'. ;-:. .1'>0 ~ ~.::i7-'. :-,"""~:."j o~~ :".=' .I~.-'_:; C~I..\8. C~.1~:12J E>',),:,. ~~:8 .:'.: : :~ .
,~
Y,-i-_~. ~.0~
~ !"',' f!. ......1 1.. .
;..
.'
-~
~.. .L
. r---'
_"..'"
')
1( .
";17 s
~-:;. YQ e:::'~~L.~T-.CG ~ r2.~)'.)~<
o:y
~:.:J. ~:~ng~,:; -:\~ ::2:...:~2:l ... ,:~;:.i ":::'.!:'~y
"".~.: S.3 .C: .... y.->i0~:::. 2':SCLS38:~ Y.i:~"~_ ~.J~18 llCl'~-:':_;;':":'2:;'J 2:.-.:1:t-~\":r 2.n~n.o::~t,~.?::.
J:C':."~"""' ~;1}.'2:,8 :-:<i.O~~C'S0..:,: )~0r p8..::(.l.G ... )~."',_,:aD. !.u

(;YC:il~"l~ ~1:~ i;') c0~:.6\.-:.ct~,.~~
r_.,:,~'1.':':_".
S1.~t;,.J.
O.-:C::;1:.'~.0:2.'3
"
:::'JS
:~0=-
t.o c:\) C.;.
~:_:3 ::rJ~~'~.-"c:::.o f;:Oi'l ?o:~.,..:g'i2.38
', e :
~~.70 : ~::ro!,:r:~:c. ~.l:-.'3 CI~"".::::; ~':::;'J.?.:..:.'.~~~~_(=.-~ ~.. l.~(~
O;:.-~.) o.~ ().1r -;.i_~~'73,
-,-,<--.;.0.2 ~.;"C EC~
o ....:~ i~.-: #:~~:7:.~c=lc:.i_~:
u:J . n
1 ;.3
.. l~-:.:l) . j
."'\ ~
'I'0~~ S00~'C~ L'OT:l t~}C
}'l\.:sic1cl1t
~o .:i.~-_-.:.'J~ss~!clor J-IL:!'I~J"'"
Ple,-.::'2
(l2::YtYC
t he
:c>:i.o " ."~l:g ~7lC'SS~;'0
fl.'Onl n:c t o
,..c :. . . :: . l:.:.~, : :'. )O
C ~ ~ n; }( . :.1-S\0:':. ):J
I. < ... ~ ]")o::>l.1.. l_ Cu :!; . .-~l \..';.:...:~j :j! . . ~ l<;it!~_0 ~\ !il~!'lLc ~' o { :_:~\:~:.L ~ ~l('L I J j ~'L CO~lSl !d1~;l~:: . . \-i . ::. -l.;lQ Cn: __ ";./~J.('d (;..':.~~~':3 S: . ,,~~) }!:.: \rJ l . ~:c~ u;::~: ;.\:. CC;1::3 ~ (~";: L::~-iv.l.: ;l~t.Ull! ;}l ~ i.i :. ~...'y o:)~ ! ~~.,~.,~ o~ . ~, li: SCj~ll h-
=~ .' i t~~i
;' 1. _ '_s
1
c:
~~~(tst. ..:4,.2 -:- .
2 . C:L ~:;c
t ht;
} '~l
~l~~~ ~~1~}~~\-~ ~ l~~' ~~~:::; lJ~~\~;;~:::~~l~c j ~~~~}:i~ ~:;:~~t ~:'. ~~}:\:!:.~~-":'~':C!l~\~;:1 ~~~~ t,:
tl~o Cj-)jn ~'", ~C11 ~'o..t.(\~ L1!~',~ ~):-~;"L
Ci_ I~l(~o - ~n : ~li!. '.'.:-.ie~ :
n,d\-: c.c ~l~c~ C\)::'i!1j ~ ~~c'\.: Cl.ic/s 0:" ~) .... ~;~' \'/"C h~,vo j \.~ ."'.,~ . t.' . . : ~():~(;.}~:s : on t} ... ~'~ ~"Ol' CJL:.: .. ~~O~1~~~ )i.:'!';J02,,::i it is c~[::< .. ~-,:,.. ~_c 'lJ il;r~1.~~~L:
(,Ci\~C'-:.s ~'~l~:
or
t }JI_' sO'=..~l,LG'tJ.l
0 .
~i:~~~~}~ ~~~:l;; ~~~;~l~:t .8; ~:~;;:~:~' ~l~~~;'l'/:;~~~,(L\: t~;: ~~~~';'L~: ~;; ~,~:)_\~.~~l;i~';~S' ~i-.~
h . J~~ (J~' ~>1(1o-Cl~1 " t: .
"'~ ,,":"( ..... ,~.,.~'L
-lAo
.,
.i
T r," ".," ~l'T 1~ .... "\ ~ r~"

t';Iil"~:I..~
",'.v H ..I,v\ ~
L"~'f\ ,1"'"'-~-) / '~',"l ..... l'''''' .. r ...... "'\T- 1~ "' \. CO"")"~ ~,," : ' .I, ; \.. _,..~~>.,t;:' :;,j. , ;::" d ~ ,...
sc,lvcs to l()~~~' J-.J~~;>j~il~:~(~y f..~ICi t.l~~'\t,
Ie:..' t~-!c: l)~!:" ~J0S~' 0_ :; .... (;: ~ lt:...~: ... <!:
-r1:'1 _ ~-~ l-:~J.. 1 L~._ : ....
~~.~~ :~ii ~l~~:~.~;Dr:.:.~l~~j ~t~:i;)1,E~!~~~r:. ::::~~::::~T{sC:~~~o:,~. (~~~('~:1~~~(;~-~i\:~]ll3 ~:~~~
/
,...,..........
~
V .'"
'.
; I ..... j , ;
.~ ! I
'.
Dear J :LElmy:
I t hink the Secret.ary will be i nter"

o
ested lnthe enclosed

' \unmlng. t a~lve In K .
l '
fron ';:'112
ass repr8sen-
till you kindly see that i t Thank you.

" . 1"-'
c: ",,_. _'.. rea f">110..
1} i
.10
...
Q w
c1r <"; de U.u...
()
. ' D1 'pec" ",'"

4-0 . _ , (, ''';'.
DonOV8H
(l';
.
....
J
!.
EnclosUT2.
r r'
\
~.--.~
,.(,,,.,
,..
/'~
(n IT') "'"CJ
-.\
' ''.-.,'', I' I
.." ~ .. ; ott:
\ ,. ;
I
~:>
i.J
\J .'t...
i
\"
i, f
C>
r..~1'_.4~\"""
iI ,
< .
r~ ...
~~'"
t/1 <
r:
. . . . <'. . . . .
<":-J
~
L..
~
:
~
1-
::: ....
-.~~
~-- ..
..-..- "
\
'\ (
......-:.
<.''1
.~
. ..."r-:- 1
~.'-}
\
\
\
'"
";l
',.
,;
.,
I
I
.... ,
L;5
'
--
- - - - - - - - - - -
OFFfC!'::: OF STFU\ :EGIC
.' .i:-:nVi ",:i:S
- - - -
_ _ _ _ 4' _ _ _ _ _
'-~~-f
"""',--
c-~
----.:-l
t '
!
iIi
VlASHIN C"TON 25, D. C.
..-" I: \ ,;' ,I,:' ~ '_ :
..
.,
;;.
.
;
! ..
I ,
1
t
\lIn conclusion, the IndoCilin.ese T!o1.::1d lj.l~'2 to 1 ;:~ pl::lcect on t.he ss.me frtat.~1J3 8.S t.he Phili:ppines for 3D. UD.C1.S-GO:CFlined p21'
).0(\0
J
L 7
Will:i. cLnl .1 (. Donovml

D~.~(ect.or
Thc i1ct;'lg ,,,'('cl'etal'!!
oi
8t((t('.
to the Cll{lIg/; in
('hin({
(f.'ooa/son)
1 GL~ . FiI)llO\\"il1,!2" p('dil1('nt ('X1J';1('(S

X(' \\"
D('lhi
'Y.
:J I
' 01'
(j,'rol)(']' .), ] 0~,)-G p , m. frolll ])('1)1 G,")I ,\ ngnst :.30, to Bishop:!:> arc rcpea(('\\for your iilfoJ'll1alioll.
'i\'.\ SJTlX,;TOX.
!J[ I h(' ,\J)l(,1 ' ;(":11l COlllllti ........ inll ,11" :\"Plt"
31 !\..
:\"(It p ri ill p(l .

~ j:tX
n i,.:]1 fill. S('("1"t'I;})".'"
Dclhi.
('(":"S has 110 thou~r1d of opposing th (' l'l'C';::al)li shlllPni of FJ'cnch control ill Jnc1 och il1;l and no ofhci;ll statcmenl 1J~' rs non has <"jllC'slionc\l eYen hy implic;llion French sowrcigllty on']' In(10ci1in,1. T1O\\"('\'pJ', it is 110t rhc polic~' of this GOYl ro assist il]c ]<'l'('nc11 to rpcst;\l)li "h their cont1'ol 0\"('1' lndo('hina by force nl1(ll he \\'illin~llp ::;s of Ihl' to see Fl'~ncll l'oni]'ol l'cest;\h'lislH'd :\S': \lll1~S lh at 1'i'n~;]ch chim to. ll a."\"(' the snpport of th e populnl i'on of Indochina is hol'lll'- out by future eYC'.Ilts,"
es
Acru:.:;ox
S;';1 (;,f10 / 1 0 - 1:21.) : 'N ll';':THm
Th e Amu{/.\'s({dor i n FmJlcc (C(I/ici'Y) to tlie S('ue/rlt'/J of ,Slate

Oe(ohct' 11, ln~;i- -7 p. 111. Octohcr H-l : 30 ft , m.] Last night's scmi-ollicin l L(,11/ondc
[I~ec ci\"('<1 P ,\J:T~)
GOO() , :\/y : )DGJ., Odobc r 10,3r,

3"
l\" (J I
jll"i 11
t ,-,(1.
f)i n';.; 1'll1'tll('l' ('il,tails l'l' Fr,llh'o-Jhiti"h il!,!Tl'CI11C'1l1 011 J11 c1ol'hina, ]~e , i1fo/ldf ,,(;](('S agTcC'mellj, \\ill not he published at tlli s li lliC but tllnt prillC'ip:\1 pl'O\'isiolls il l\' li:11C)\\"ll . III the np:l'c(,lllE'llt Fl'cnch C' i\"il .\c1mi11i stl"ilrion is r('cogn iz('c1 as solc al1jhori;~' ill ihnt pari of lllclot'h in:l south of Hi!h p:]1'a11('1. Only cxccpr ions reC'u l: from Pl"l'Sl'llC'C. oJ Hxiti3h troops in thi s p;n; of' IlHlochina ;1 ]](1 tlws(' ('x(,,'])t iOlls do not "freer principlc;:; of ngrermellf . L c J/()/dlr nch1s ap'l\'~lJll'llt is c1e"ig'llcc1 to determine rc-lntio11S be\\\"l'\.'ll Fn,llch Cl\il _\ci mini:-lll',llioll ,m,d Briti",h military nnthoJ'itic3 a11d p rO\'i c1rs ill;]! j)rit ish ('olllm:l1l<1l'r \yill not illtC'J'\"P1"IC in ci\' jl afl'nij's exeep: tl!l'OllP'h Frcnch authority, Lan rr ill Tlll');:P'y ngrcC' to fltHill ;iny l'Nl1Il';';'s :lri :-: ing' from )Jl '('S('lH'(' of Bl'il ish i mop;; . '\.f:"],(~\'1l1Pllt })l'O\'idps Bl'i!i ,;jl !l'Ch}j'" \\"ill o111~' be th en' It'illj)ol',\l'iiy 1'Ol' plll'j)OSP of ell [ol'cin,!.!: t('rlllS of ,bp ,0111"]'('1](11']' allc! \.() ns...;ure l'l'l) ,1tria j ion of .111icc1" pri C'olH'r;-; and ci,iliill1 i11lc:rllC'l's. ](. is ;t g',lin (,Jl"ijlhasize'(] that cordi :ll :1tlllo:,;phc'l'e of lleg-oliatiolls ' \\" ,\:'; indicat ion of solidarity of Fnlllco-J{rii ish relations in ('kd part of I he \yo:-lcl. ' SClll J)l'P ,tJ'! lllC'lli as COOG, l'CP(';U ed Londoll :l,'3 / 1S,
~
C.\FYEltY
49
The A III U((S8(1i!0/'
ill
Fl'lllIce ('(/;j'Ct'y) to the Scc,'cl/II'y of Slate
P .\I:J.", XOHlllh(,l ' :28,10 Li, [H('cein'c1 ::\O\"(,'I111>cr '2~--J.: 0;') p , m,} G S,l(, Spt.'!akillg of lllcTocl1in:t C ha~lyel;l , said Ihat \\'h(,ll t]'ouhlc'
"' .T(',w Ch<ll1\'(,l.
Sl'('l't':a l' ~',Cl'II(' l '<1 1
to
tll('
FI'('lIcll :\Jillist('1' flil' FUI'l' igll "\ f[ail':i~
w ith I11C' .\ nl1<llllitl'S hl'(Jb~ Ollt (1(' Gnllllp hac11JC'clllll'gC'(1 by Ihe FrenC'h )J issioll in India to makc SO]]]('. sod of policy SI:ttl'llIC'l1t announC'in9,' F ranc\"s illtent iOIl 10 adopt a fnl']'caehing' prog]'rssin policy designcd t o gi\'e t he nat i\'e pOplll:U i011 llIilch gw;\ie]' i11t!hority, r('spollsib ilil)an(11'l'presC'lltntioll in god, J)C' G,lllile l'onsidC'l'P,llhe i(le,l lmt rrjeC'trc1 it bC'(,HIISC' in the state of clisol'ller pl'c\'ailillg ill ]Jl(lochina hc he lic\'ecl Ih,lI 110 slI('h pol icy l'01il(l 1)(' ili1plc:nlC'n1cd pell(lill~:' restO]"ttioll of 1<']'C'n('h a\1tl;ol' it,Y and \\'(JIllcl th(']'dol'l' j\\st 1)(> consic1C'l\'cl by C'\'c]',Y0ne nS "n IC'l'\: 1y nlO],(, fi Il e \I'o]'(ls", Fun hC'l'lll o!'c ell' G n Iill C' all d Ihc FOl'eign Minister hC'lien' that tilr P1'('';C'11 t s ituaiion is still so ('ol1fu:-l'd a11d the}' h an~ so littlC' illfol'iI1;)tio11 ]'C':llly ]'eljahlc on thc o\'l'I';\ll Jl1c1oehill:l picI:1 l1'e 11::11 sucll plans alld thonght',; as tlle,\' 1]('1(1 hC],l'IOfo],C', ]]]:l,Y lIaY to c be \'(, I') tho],ollghly ],(,\,js('d in thC' l ig-l1t of n'('l'nt (knlopmellts, De;;pi!c IlI C', {ad tll:ll' tlie FI'('l1eil do not feel ilwt thcy ('all :IS yet, ll1:1kr, an)' ~\'l\P]'al stalell1l'llts out'linillg SlH'cifil' f\ltnl'~ plallS 1'0], ]ndoch illa, C'h;\\iyel S;\ys thai tlle,\' llOj>C' " \'P]'Y SOOll " iO pui illto opC'l':\iiOJI ill crl'l:lill a],C':ls ]m).!!.,],;)lllS illCllldillg' loc:ll ell'ciiolls \\'hich \\'ill Lc (lcsignC'cl 10 gl':\llt lllllC'1t gl'l'at(']' aUlllol'it y 1l]](1 gI'Ca(C'l' yoicp ill nil'ni]'s to ( lJ(, l1nti,'cs, Th is ll P s, li d \\'0111el hl~ a liludl hr.'lt,CI' indicatioll of (he si nc 'C'l' it)' of F l'cnch i11tl'lIiio11s th:ll1 nlly policy statemellt , I n this COllilC'ctiOll he sai(l (hal .\clmir:tl CL\.l 'g-Pl1Ticli ", is ill tOllch
" .\ cllll.
Tllii'I'I'Y d',\ r,'-:'l'lljiPI1,
(:0\'('1'1101'
CClli'r;i1 "f Fj'('lH'h I l l(joc'llinn,
\\'jill 111(>, Killg' or ('al1l!;otli;\ al1e1 tll,; bill']' has i11dicail'(llha( hc h,1S 10 ih0. Fl'('ll,'h (l.mt on Ihe COll(T ,\l'Y aPP;l,I'l'litly fl';)],s both AnllHIl\ite ;]11(1 ~iall\c:-;e aspiral ions) , The F1'('llch hOjlc, soon to llegot inrc an ag'l'l'r11H'nt \\'itll him which \\' il ln,slll\ in \he g'l"ll1ling of' milch ' gn':lt('l' l'l's)loi1sil)i1ilY :lnd ;\lllho]'ity, 10 the C amboe1i,\llS, IIp 11IC'11tiollP(l spC'cificall y Ih<1( I h('!'c would bl' lllnny mOI'C' nat i\'('s intcgra(er1 illto rllc local ,lc1l1lilli;;il';ttil'e s(,j'\'j(,(,s nll(l it \\<1S ,11:::0 hop('cl ilia!' 10('<1 1 cJC'Ci jOlls cOitlll SOOl1 1)(, 111'111 , The Frt'll('l~ IH' said intend to follo\\' the ~nl11C pJ'ocedl1i'l' in Lws \\'hen t hp sil I:;\t ion pCl'mits lllld C\'l'n( lullly nlso i ll .\ llll:l lil nn (l TOllkin, ,\'11('n orckr is l'csron,d tIl l'oil!-.:'hou \ Im10c;Lina and a~l'C'C'mC'i1\S ha\'l', becn l'eaC'llrd with the incli\'ithlill stales
l ~(l hO~'ljliiy
,)0
('hallnl said tIl(' Fl"l'll("h illtC'llCl to Plilhody !lIC resnlts of these sepa1"a/"p :l!l'I\'l'ilWllts illin a gl'nl.'ral j)rogT:IIll for all of Ind ochina . Jnsof;lr:1 S the Chinese al\' ('o!}('t'rIlP(l ('halll'el said thnt Ill' (lo,'s not hcli('\"(' tli py al'C' CIH'OIII'<l!l'ing thc ,\llllailliil'S \\"llO hal'c a hearty dislik\,. of ill(' ('iJil1('Sl' lior (loe!"; Ill' lwlil'I"l' tllc'y ]1:1I'C al lY t\'I"J"itorial aspirations ill Jlldwhill:l. 011 th(', \) th('1' 11;\11(1 JI(' tllillks the Chillesc nrc cll'fin itely tryillg- to gl't the lll:IXilllUlli "SqllC'l'Zl'" 1'1'0111 the FrCllch ill illP fOl'lll of oc:clIjl;d iOllal ('.osts foJ' th eir ;ll'JIl}) eL eeier:\ (my (iHl\ XOI"l'lllbc)" ~W,,,,,)
"1\,,1 jlrill I\'d.
Ilc ;Jl :;o llll'ni ionc(l Ihc' ('C'ollonli(' l1e~!"oti:ltions \rith illl' ('hinese 1\'-:, );1!ing to llldoC'hill:l nll(1 said that thc Frl?nch arc perfectly agl"l'cahle (0 tIl(', estahli~;lling of 1'1'('(' ports foJ' the Chinese \\"11 h ccrtaill (J'ansil rig-IdS ill1(11i sC of milll';\}s, pt (,('tcra ill TOlllcin \\11('1\' liJ(',Y \l"onll1 11\' of r(':11 nse hu t 1"11c ('llinC'..-.;e nn' (l clIlanclilig' /'n' v POI"t ,uHlll':\ll sit I'i g-hts for t h~ '1"1 101c of JIl(1 ocllinn . FlIJ"th e111101 '(', the ( 'hinpsl' are dcsirolls of ohlnillil lg" i iil c to tl10 nOJ"tlll'J'l\ sect.ion of (hp JllcioC'hinC'se YUll nan Hail- 'w ny, Chal1l"l'.l \\'as not inclin ed (0 pIn el' ,\IlY ,!2,Tl'n( inl})()l'iHnce of [01/'1 these d i fl'm'clH'PS oJ opi Il i 011 all c1 I hough t (11 a t agn'cml'n t II' i n be l'l'a c11 cd.
CC\!'YEJ:Y
Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. B y: NWD Date: 2011
856E.OO/I-J.846
OF StrATE OF E1.JROPEAN AFFAIRS DIVISION OF HESTERN EUHO?SAN AFF AIHS
DEPARTlI~~r\lT
O:FFICE
J anuary 18, 3.91;.6.
As you know we have been following a policy by which we will not permit the French to buy armament and military ma5nten8.nce suppLi..es for use in Indochina o The Bri tish mllit2,}:y authori ties in Indochinn have DOH asked pe:CJil:J.ssion to turn over to the F:cench SOllle 800 jeeps and t:cucks 1 '1111ch h ad beon given to the British under Lend-Lease, and ~iliich are now in Indochina. The British state that the French must have this equipment so that they can maintain order i n Indochina \-!hen they have taken over from the British" O 01,oln military autho:ci tJes have recOlJ1.lnendecl 8.1)"pI'oval of ur Ule British request. The French, and no doubt lhe British also, '.1ill be very much upset if He refuse to penuit tr.ds transfero Howover~ in the light of our recently adopted policy wS may be subjecting ourselves to criticism if He permit this trensfer for the purposes stated, i~e., maintenance of order~ . . I would appreciate having your dil'Gct:1.onas ' to the response which we should make to the military~
WE:PTC
H. Freeman Matthews
LHand 1.JTi t ten note by Acheson! .
EUR Hr.
Natthews c
"1,'10
I di;ycussed this Id th the Pl'esic1ent \!ho thousht that should aZJ.'Q !) to the trans fSl' He pointed out tho.t thi!"3 docs not bTing any nm! equipment into the area 8.nd that. to remove the trucks and jeeps would be impracticable
. DAo
52
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Sectio n 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
F REXCH IXDO CI-II:-\A

THE TIO:\' TO
I~T EnE:-)T or THE L\TIED ~:n TE ~; IX X.\TIOX.\U:-;T Ol'PO SI l~ESTOlnTIO~'; OF FI~EXCH I ~CLr.: IX !:\l)O Clfl X .\ I
~ et' "')J TiUIl Rd 'l li uJI8,
1 Fl>r prl"\i(.)IL" (l'>("lllllen['llioll Oil tll(' fu[ur e of Tllll,'citillil, 10-1:;, y oJ. n , Pl>. - IT.
Th e SC(;1('I,lry
(1/ .':/tI!., tu flit, _1""i"/"1I1 ('hie! 0/ th~ Di"i" ioit 0/ Soulhead A.si(l}i .-1t/(l i/'.~ (DI],do}l ) , Th eil at ,so/ligon
'Y.\~l!lXGTOX , JallU a r)
SECR ET
.28,
l!HG-llOOll.
Pl ease procced ILu lOi, l'l'IlI:lillilli;":U('h tilll(' asyou cOll~iLlrr nece,:;s,'l l'Y, and n:pon' to Dcpt nO' fully as pOssi \ll e on conditiolls llortllel'll Illdochina alld e.opecia lly OIl allY FreIl ch- Yi et ) Iinh llE'goi iatiolls .. D'Argrl1lieu "understood to hal".: sta teLl pl'i\'ately tklt Fn'llcllllegot ia2
.Ad Ill. Thierr~' (L\r;l'llii eu, High coulllli~~il)n('r of Frenc.:h Iml lJdtin;1.
ti OllS
\I'ith Iro Chi '}l ill It ' ha\'c becn proceeding sillce !:ttl' X O\' and
()~
, "P res ilicn l of th e Prll\' i" iol!t11 GO\'erlllll l'lll
Yi dn,llll D,,:lJI)l:\'iltic TI L' llubli c",
satiS'filctory agreelllent :l lllicipatecllJ} end of JaIl. Othe r reporls deny exi ste nce !lPg-ot iations. I)'.\.l'gl'!llieu a1 :::0 report cd to k'l\'e cxpres;;ecl
p erso!l,tl \l'i11illgllC::;S ac ccpt l'ltili ppinl' Illocld for _'\.Imam \\'itlt illCle. p enclcllcc at e!ld ;30 years, Cdc! from. Saigolt l'Pcein'd .JaIl :!.J: 4 ap'X,)t pl'in[P<l, lJ\lt ~el' lJ,U',l graph :2 of t('Il'::1'''111 1 S2, ,Jallu;lQ' :::0, G p. lll., t o ChU Ilc;kill;;. p. - ,
p reciatl'Ll. P ka::c try to sccure maximUlH infol'lll:lli()llllctn il s Frc!lch or . \.IlIl :llllC;;C C COllOll li c. agreeme nt s with Chil1c;;e alld statns of such agl'eClllCll ts,
~ ~ T~ ex pl or in g p o<:,; i bilit~ for n eed' ('-xpeL'lec1 Saigoll end of Feb,
sse
represen tatil' c p roceed Ih noi.
Sjl(;.n O/1 -:~fI1O
.lfeillOJ'(fndull1 of ('OIII'I'I'." ,tioii . 7)!} JIr. Ric/lfl l'd L. Sluu'j), Diri.<;ion of ",'oul/lCllst .L,,;uJI J ;j'rril'.'
RESTT:rcrw
of the
Participants:
nri~'adi e r
[1".\ "ruX(.T()X. ] .L'llllla lT :itl, Fl,W . Genp ral Philip E . Gallug-h er, ,1':11' J)q)n rJ-
ment; Colon el Y itll'llp. 11';11' Deparilllellt Liai:-:on ; J fLCltal'le.s~ . TI,'etl . F:-;U ; . :\ [1'. ' Yoorll'llll' Y'i"alil ll'l', ''i'E; )Ir. _\.j)hot L o\\- :'I [nILit;' ~L\'; ~\[r. n. L. :-;lw'p, ;-:;L\..
" "
!,1
Asked 'H hen, in his opinion, the Chines~ ;,vould get out of Ind9china, General Gallagher said that General Lu Han 7.; had told him the
]J
COrrLmand ing General of Chinese armed forces in Indochina .
Chinese I[ould move out 'I'Then the j ob given them by the Allies \'las completed. General Gallagher . said he thought they really i ntend to do this although the whole matter depends upon the removal of the LTapanese . To date , shipping for this purpose has not been available but no,\,[ it is understood t hat United States bottom.s ,rill be used . The question is, therefore , Hhen will such ships be al;1,qcat ed . General Gallagher said he had recom.lTIended to General li'!edemeyer ~that high priority should be given such allocation.
~ Lt. Gen . A...lbert C. '\\fedemeyer , Commanding General, U. S. Forces , China Theater , and concurrently Chief of Staff , China Theater .
There are some 20 to 30 thousand J'apanese in Ha i phong and the Do Son Peninsula. No political settlement can b e reached in Indochina until the Chinese move out and they cannot do that until the Japanese are repatriated . General Gallagher added that he thought US army teams vrould ha.ve to be put i nto Indochina to concentrate B.nd prepare the J'apanese for evacuation. General Gallaghel" vms asked vThether he kne," of any arrangeI'lent I'Thereby French forces moving into the north vg1jld . overlap d eparting Ch:i.nese fOl"Ces . He r epl:i.ed that in December Sainteny 2J Bald that no French v!Quld enter until
2J
Jean
Sainten~T,
French Commiss:i.oner of Tonkin and North Annam.
I
J
t he Chinese left. General Gallag}ler thought tb e French HC1"e probably not get ting ver:f far in negotiating with the Chinese on problems connected 'Ivi th the ir rem.ova L Unles s i n the meantime something has been arranged bet\'Teen the French and the Chinese , the French ,[ould probably infiltrate overland from the south rather tban land i n force in nortbern ports. General Ga11agber pointed out tbat li'Ltle love ir as lost betw'een tbe Cbinese and tbe French; tbat the presence of tb e Amer ican group in Hanoi re strained anti - French Chines e action; and that he himself bad influenced General Lu Han to bring Sainteny and Ho Chi l'1inb togethel" and confront both vrith a strong directive that order must be maintained. The existence of a vacuum in the north '\dth neither French nor Chiness tr oops present \'Tould be extr emely dan8erous, as the Annamese 'I'TOuld react strongly against all French in the area , \rho 1{Ould b e belpless in protecting tbemselves. To tal~e over successfully, tbe French 'Iwuld need a sufficient force to cover the vrbole north. One or tHO modern F:cencb divisions COUld, in General Gallagher 1s opinion~ defeat the Annamese . In respons e to the question 'I,fhe the:c the Frencb could do more than take key cities, be admitted that the Annamese \'Tould ta}ce to the bills and continue guerrilla I'Tal'i'are. Even in Saigon) he pointed out , things are far from peaceful despit e Byi tish and FTench claims to tlJe contral'.'l. Establishment of French control could be speeded uJ) if they IIC:CC able to maJ.:c large-s::ale air drops tbloOI)Ehout th'2 north. The lI.r>..namese, hOIrever, are ':-7e11 ore;anizec1 and ~ so faT as small arms go , a:ce quite 'I'jell armed, .B.lt,hough they have no navy ) shore batteries and pTobably little arti1leTY
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 , By: NWD Date: 20 11
The (ll\(,~i iOIl \\",l"; rai""'lt I,.-/tellll'!' thl' Fr(,I\(:11 ll!i~,.;i()1l ill ITanoi I\':\S ill fael I\(,!~,()tiati!\~ lI'itll lIn ('hi '\fillk Ci-c!!('r:tl G:tllaglll'l' replied that tI ll' , "iet :,[il;\t Pro\"i:-';on,\l GUI"l'rlllllcllt \",,1:' at fi!,,,t "I' i11ing to !H'gotiatl'; tllell ill Oewl)l'r, ai'ter lit' (;a\ll1 e'", ", pronoull celllellts 011
G'lll]]C', Pr.'"itl,'llt "r tlIP Pn;,'isi, lll;ll GO\'el'lll1lPlli o( lilt> l.'I';lllCP llllti: .T;llltl;1t"~- ~(i, coloniHl polie'y, tlte _\Ililanll',;(, refll,O'p(l to l1e;~'nti:\tl' \\"itlt 111(' Frcilch nnd l'cacre>d yi,!..(I)roll :::ly llg';till,01 all Frcnch Il;l(ionals ill H;ll1oi , The Chill P:=:C Illay s\lcC'pea in putting in H less anti-Frel1 ch ~\nnam c;;c go\"emm elll so th:\t nl';,,::o[ ;:lrion 1~ li:!ht [II) fon"anl. _\ll Frenl'h rll"orts to "tillllll:tfC ,I palace rel-01ul iOJ\ ag;lills t , ITo \"Cl'r of 110 '1\",\i1. ITo hilll se1f \\"illllot dc;\] 1\":t11 'hE' Fn'lll:h. The Yi ct .\tinh ;s strong ancl, re!:y,ud 1l"S of Ilcssihlc ~!ll'('rf,:ial ch,\l',("~es ill the Proyi;.:ionnl GO\"(lrJ)Jnenr. I,h \"i 11 l.)(:, l)pl]:"d ;;ny rO]1t ill!!!I1 ,' :' .\.I1]1HJlleSC 1'10\"i~li1Cllt. , GE'l1ral G;,l1ar,:her sai(11~;d ~aillf-PIl\' had told him he ex])cC'!i;ll j1c:,cpful agrN"~H'nt 1.p! \\"('ell the Fl:ench nnl1 t.he ~\nnamcsp \\'oulcl l'e rcaehcc1 1)\- ))r erl)'i ;,t ion. Grnera1 G,ll1;'!l"lwr "-,\S ;1"krcl h('\,.- e-Ilceti\"(' fltr Yi pt :\[i11h ;t(11l1inistm j inI' would be \\,itlt J1rithrr Frellrh nor Chil1p~c fOITl'o; )ll'e;;ent. HI? l'ep 1 ircl that 011 the \\"h01p l'e \\w:.: imnrps"pcl by the l'p;~l<1rkloly effcr! i\-e ,'l1n:lIllec-p ncll)ljnistratloll. Thprr \ nlS nn ahle prr:::olln el; they \\"C're ;]]1 rntlll':::inst-ir :11Vl \"('1'Il O ' , Opf therp m:'rc joo fc\\" of them, \,\'11ntpwr nl (:r Ipchnir,\1 !"kill. 11lp\' ])crhn1);; 1:lck cxrc\1tin nhility Hnd cxpel'iPJ'cc si}1('c tJtp tC('1111i("<11 sf'nirc:, in ILtnoi- \y ere at first \"('ry \\"ell run 1 ~Tnc111:1 1h cl('tPl'inl"<\ipc1 Trainccl peo))le for tltp I"o\'ernment mt and nt thc 11l1~ni('il':<llen' 1 ;trc.1:\rl;:;]1'l", III 0-1'11 0 1',\1 G,111n',l"ltrr's opinion t11r ~ \ Il11nl1lr~e arl' ]l ot ',"rt rr;t(h for splf-,[!"OH'l'Pnt(,l1t ,111c1 in fn11f1Nl~~'pd cOP'I~elitioll \"itlt 0tlH'r p;t! iO)l" they \'"nulll "los(' their sh il'lS", Ho\\'e\'f'1', thc c1eJ'lancl for iml pJ)('w1pl1cr i.:; \\"irl e" Pl"l'a'l a )lcl eYen in the \"illa,~'r,:: thc pCHc:;tn( s rrfer to illP PX;\l11J11C of Ihe PJ!ilippines. Ho i" "\',.-illiJ\o: to ('00nerare I'.-itl, (;"P"t Hl'it,l;ll . rssn., 0r t 11p r lliiecl Stafrs i"1nd lI'oldc1 pcrh:lps c\'el1 ;.:('ttle for Fl'E:'llr h ll!ieh!.!"e if tll;lt' \,prp S11bnl'dinatprl to cOlltl'ol 1)1- th> o'llPl' p,lt-ions, Frel1'( 'h COllt 1'01 ,Ilone, h ()\\"c\"Cl', \\' ill br !"ll'ol1!l"ly resisl pel. Tl l(' deep-sc" t pel h :It r('(l fol' l'llC Frf'l'l'h 1t,~,:: j-,pe!l f.lJ1ll ed by e~: ('ceelill!~h- clen'r \~i Cl' -:'IJillh ])["()l),lO;'lI Hla , General G:lll;\I!'llL'r 1I',t:-; a"].;-e(1 \\'f1E:'ther the c\nnal1\P;:c \,;cre reali st ic rp,[!":ll'clill'"(" 111ei1' Hoi 1i! ,\- t'o sh\nll \111 ,lg,\il1;;t Fl"i'llclt military fOl"C~e . ' Yhile thpy arE:' too en'hll!"i;''7tic :wcltoo nain~ , he saill~ th2Y pl"Obably kllO\ \' t1t:,t r11p\" II-ill Ill' l ilkell. Thcy <lI'C stron,'Y Oil ))<lra(1e,:; ,Illrl rcitemt'(' thcir \\'jllil\!21](,~ S "to fi.',:'ltl in tl,e Ins! m,\ll ", hut thcy \\'ould oe slau~'htere d ,11111 thcy lta\-c heelJ t~hl that and nJ"obab 1.'- l,,)()\',' it. The ..::\1111;11l1('''C \\"ottl(l hr 110 Ill;;! d1 f01' forces \" it h modern Hrms e\"cII if th ('y th cm;::e1n's ll,\\'e ;;n:lle, \yhi..J1 11Ip.\- may h:ll"(' since thc Chinese fOlll Hl IJO Japallp:-'e roll:n!.!: Hrtillpl"\" an(l nl1l1l(>rnll:" J,l;)'ll'(,,'0 a!\tiairc'l"<1 ft glll1:-: seem to lu\\-e C'omplPteh' (lisappc,\l'c(1. rnilcll Sr,\les ..:\.rnn' !'pnl'l" 'E' lltai\-rs I1r" -CI" di!llp;lJ"ll tlte e~;te1\r o{ ",l"l l1;: C01\1 1'011('(11)1.' tlle Yi ct :\Ii!1h, ('criail!l\' (liP (,hin e;o:p are not tlll"llin(~ J;I1"):ln po;0. am';s o\"er to the!l1, nt'fol"e Y-J D:n' rlll: .r'IJl'~l1(, :::c l1l1r1011J:1C'l11y h;Hl H1'I\\ (>(1 f:nrl trai necJ mal1\' ~\.nnanl e.;"(' , ~\ Japal'P:"p g'e!H'l";l,l l'lailil etl t!try 1;;\rl t:lkrll ()\'Cl" all .\Ltn'!t ~I ,.:illl])l.\' o.'C:1ll":P i1\c FI'P1\cl, ('mild no l ():l !.!' ~' l" COIl tro~ the ~\!l!1a11\('~(', hilt tlli" S!;:"l'i]; ,'!1" 0-(,!1I'1";11 G:llla,!.:"l:cr l'!I:I \",I:'te :'!zt'l1 ns a lir, He lta(1 hC:l!"Cl Ih nt l'! lrjP l" tllc prpll":t of <llTI1i11''': ,\n)::ll11 l''-C grl:cl:ll"l"l' ~ 1'0)" pol:,,\.' 1111!\' ii' Fall r,i , the J;\p;tll r'~ l' 11<1<1 :l<'tu:tlh, anne!1 threc di ", i!!f"[ "{Jll!ilIc~"l>'11~, rli':llli ,~"ilig (':1clL '::l"O!tt' \\'hl'll :l!"!;,cd an,l ,. Gt'll,
ell"r!'c'" ell,
Repllloli': 1)(
55
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 , By: NWD Date: 2011
brjll"'illl.': in a llt'\': 0111' ill he ;trlllPJ :lml lraillP(l. rllnhc:-Jllore, the .\.J1I~~m;':,c had acquired .Lp: \!\l'''C ,\I'IU;'; fJ-<'!'! :',:'::":::1 1:-, \\hi:::h bId teen 0])1'11"(1. (;011<:'1':11 Ga)!;:!.!,l'cr- did not k11 0 \\- ,yhe[!tl'l' or not Tai Li 11 \y<ts:,c1Il1iltg-anlt" totlte Yiet :-'filih.
u
npi,n ty
I Hrp(:ttll". Pnrp'lll
(If
In \-l':'f i.:"::lti(!ll :11 if l f' t:ltL. ,tj/':'. C'i:illl';--.('
~-;l[i tl!l;l l
COllll!!j~~i o!l
flf
~[ili tnry
.\Cfnir:<,
G(,I1 cl'a l GalLtgltcr was ;I::],:c(l \\"l!t'Tlll'r tIl,", pre,~C l!\'<: of 17rcl1('11 hostagr,.; in tl\(' north \\"Ol:1'[ rl'::train Frclle1 t fon'p;; ,\"l:clt tlwy elltPl' the )"rgi,)l1 _ ITe ]JOil,jpd out thaI only n fc\\- French ciyilial!:" kId he(;n !C'sidc,: ,0111C n\'c tltOu:=:al1rl (1i,~nrll\l'd H'll1oH (l by air. .\'11 thc rcst, 1 Frendl troops, \I"\:'re :=:til1 to hc n:l\to\-ctL Th c _Chincse cannot takc thcm out HOI' \,.. auld Lll ILln enn prrlllit thpir cyaruatioll to {h e Do Son Peltill ~lI 1a_ Th 0ir prcsrll!'C haa lH'L'n :l cOIlc;jant' n,,,trailtillg illflu C'llcc Oil Saint-en.\-, ,\ c:kcrl \':h ctl11'r th c _'- llll"1l1t':,:e ,,-onld let the:-:e French be' cYaclt<lre(l, (i-c!1cl'al Gall:l !!her r~plied rh:~t they \\"Oldd han 10 if th c Chin e:-:e \H'rr ,,(-ill there, hilt th at thc;c Frendl natio111s ,,'ould be fl. rp;1ll'roh1Plll if the ChillC',o'C "-err 1ll0n,d out. The .\meriean Anny group 11:\(1 to C'xert considrralJ1c IH'\',,"tlre Oil thc CltillC'se to g'pt tllell1 tolgi\'e nlly fr C'c dclYl at all to Frcllch ciyilinns ill Irniplwll,Q:: Hur ,mel othpr ('('Ilters l )c~;:cle~ H:llloi . }In,,'e\'C'l" the Chin C'se and Frendl alolle had alT<1n;~rd f or :=:ltil'llll'llt:-; of fo nd from the sontlt, Th e .\.mprie:1Jl group. incillL'lltal1y, h:\c1 [0 internnr to prewnt the monopoly by the Frcud) of sv,ch foo (l cr of foocl (li:-tr ibu tcc1 hy thc "C,S, .\ rmy, The Fn'llcll lIali()llal ~ could be c\-aclwted from Hong-ai a11(l TOlll'HIIC by th e rnit l.'ll Stale'S \i'hc]) the .Tapall Pse \\"I:'1'e rrllloH(l if thc Chinese \,-oHld concentrafe tllC'lll at tlto:':e porl", ITo,,'e\'er, Grncrnl G'lllaghcl' no led, t1tat would phc l' us in a p osi tion of \\-orki!lg ag-;lillst ihe Ann:Hm':.;c ,' Originally, G0Il er;I1 Gallagh er cSJl1ainec1~ i1t;;- Frl'llch cS]lccfC'cl tl lc rnitccl Statrs to play the :=:;1111(' role in th nortli th nr !lI e Bri ti"lt \\-ere. playi!lg in th ;.> ~olltll. "lrl lf'1l (hey fou11d liS neutral titey IJ('C"l'lP !lINe nnc1ntorc nllt a~'oili~tir: allll di(l enrythillg- po::sihle to jlC'r"ll<lc](' 'r-llited States ] )('r:-:()llIlCI to fayor tllc Frenc]t p o,.;iri011. T!t r y haclllo apprec.i<ltioll of the actual lu:lp which tl w .\meric<ln group g,l,;(' to the pri:::oller,,'o f \'-nr and ~Cli~C' of the ciyilian Frcnch ill t:le form of fond, IDc,dieal ;:id~ :llld so Oll , Th e .\!lllall1l'Se, (00, c:.\:1)['ctccl .\ !l]('ri~'all lwlp origill'll1y, ha\'il:;:: LeC' n rllOro l!~,JJl .r ind oct rinat ccl \ritl! thE' .\tlalltic Chnrtrl' and ()t];rr id ro lng ica l prollo'-'1ICP1::rllts" III our Ilcutral role. "-e \\"('re tluiS:l cli~ap)J oi ll tmcllt to both ~ ides. I n resp on~l' to n qllcstir'll, GellL'rn1 G,llLtgher ga\-c llis opinion th at Lu ILlll \\" oalll bc faitlt fill to Chnl;!!!,in::::- n1th01Il.':h as !!IWCrtlor of Yl:lln;\n he \\"ulIlc1 ;11~(J lw infil:Pll('cd to ~l1'lil;-i ain a;; tltlly a;,;~ p ()~"ih l e r elat'io!1s l:ei "'cen Yunnan anrI !l orth Indoc hina \\'Jlidl \\"olllcl be ,profital)l e to hill :, Uel1 er; t1 (~all:\!,.d H'!' :'::l id Illat tllC ha f dozen or;co top Frell, '1 1 lllilitan- o[fi.-pr:' hcld I)y dtp ,TaJl:lll(',~e h,lc11 )pelt 1'et'l\rlH'\l to Fr,1l$'c sllOrth ::tft;'r ~i\il ll\:ny n';t,:h(',11 LlllO i, Il l' (1i,111ot kno\y \Y]t:lt !t,lc1 h:lppe"e~1 to Dec()\lx,' ::
12
Yi ("L'
.\d IlL .TP;lll
r)~("(iliS. (;,,"t:rnur
IJf
Fn'l](:h Induchill:!.
iJt'c ;lI J1P n
pri"'''1l01'
of
W:ll'
"f .r"l lillJ ill
~[; 1l"'!. 1~'-!,1,
_\;.;I,ecl ltf)\\" ~:cO!llnlli:li"t,,, the Yi p! }[iilh \ \"1:'1'\' . (;cll('r;\l Gal!a;..::1!l'1' repli ed Illat II\ey \':\.'I'l' ::n\an awl 'i$I "' ,,,,,rulh- !.(:I I'C' tlH' illlllrf''''';('lIl of ilOt I )l'ill~ C()llllllllni~l, Rlther, tltey ellll'lt;t~i/'l:\l rlleir in!~rl';,t ill in-
clelW1H1E'Il(,P, ;\l1cl tlwir . \ ))11;\111(';::(> lMirintism, T\lf'ir p:\:I'pl1pl\f or!:llll7-"rinn ;)11(1 n)"o]):,(";\I1(b tN'l\l\iflll~''', [;P11pr;,l [;;,l1;\.<"h"r l)oilltprl 0\1[, , nllllrl "'Pf' 1~1 10 l1;1\'p lhp P;11"1l1;1l"];:':: of s()lllpT~II~,-i:tl\ ill fl\lCllf'I', [;Pll Pr:\l n;lll;,,()'lIPl ' <:I':\rpll flw t t-h0 minority (';10 n ;',i ((rOll]) \w'n' dp(ini{l'ly ('OJl'lllllllisl, Tn hi s o])il1i()ll, llO;\'p\'p l'. the Yi el ' ~rillh <:hOlilc1110{ hI; J aoplpr1 flll L f$'(lo,,',(l rln('iJ'iJl>li,'p ('oJ\ll1\llI1ic:r. At thf', nrp"pl)1 iilllP l1 1 P TT;lllni ]';lio i;:; l'oldTnl1"r! Ly fllr ('hill e';::2 !;O,rh:oI t1)Pl'P i ;:; r'()I))ll'll"j";llinn h pl \\'PPI1 TT;'l1o j :111(1 S:li,0.'on, ,\ n,.ilish milit:llT :)nrl ('i\'i1i;lll lini ,oll /-P;1111 "':l" SPill In TT"l\oi <111(1 ;1 ('hill (,'=p (,0l1)1tf'I'I);11'1 II' Snio',m , T11r Bl'ili;::lo in IT:\l1ni :li' fir.::!' mnd,' 1ifl'lp pro,!res;; \"i'l! l11r (,],jl1(''''' hlli GCllcral 'G-:I1];\C!'h L'l' t11lClpl'::,I:\i1(l;:: t1wy lla\-e sj)l(''' ))),,(1(, ll)Ol'P l\f':lll\\':lY, Tllp ('l,iJ\ P~r' cn'l, , \ 1'1')\' ill t1'r <:01111\ of flip ('hil\ p;::p %(>11(' ;lIld the 0:;[,(1 , \1'Jll\' ;1 ,'nll ll ,l, TT:Ill()i. $01,1\ tol,)llj'lo' "(1])11' ,"I n r1\O\l'::!l1l(1I1lPll. h:1'1'G , hef'Jl 101,1 II) ( ' 0nl'!'l)! l':liP f"l' 1'f'1)1 0\';j l j'n ,f""r,h\1l'i ;1, 1ml \'.'1]pI1ll'1' thcy h :lyr ,>("1Ia 11 \, Jl10\'Nl 011t Pl' "0 1 Gp))o,,;,l G,,1l:\,,'1lf'l' (lnp,:; llnt kno\\', B): DN'f'P] Wl'. 1](I\I'('\'P", 1'1 1(' (,llillf'''''' :"):;"[1 , ']' J1\\' 11,\(1 \W():lll\ 10 ('omr in
frnm
Y\1l111:lP
and \\'mild prob;\lJly pl'O\'idc

11';)1
l1l~ o'1)cli('
],pp 1a"C'!ll C!1(:=;
f nl'
!ll('
othl'r
t ,,-o ,\ l'I)]ir",
minl':'; bo,H' llnt h(,Pll cn rll;lt flIP Il'l'(';lt P1'(1\,;,lpc1 h" thl'''p ])lip,,;: 11,,<: 1)(,1 1Ir(1' <1))(1 "'011 1\1 ('n".t'i"l1P "n 11r1n Ll't'p tl!p F"f'''l'h f"O]ll 1111 fl p],i;)1.: i l1!,' 1;ll,(),(,-O",';11r> ,lall(lin ,{!' olwJ'al'inns ill that flrE-a, , }Tp frlt t]':lr l' p~!.'11 1;),' r;) i1 (,npl)Jlllllic'atlolls o Ct \\'CCIl Saigon alld Hanoi Illight !lot be opened fot' anothe]' ycar.
c;.P"l?l'"l (i."11;) ,,,,hpl" ]lot-prl
(,lp;l1'rr1 ;1('
ti re1\'
11';1;::1'
f1'0]l1
Ill!' ]1nl+1,1'1'11
))(11'1" ;!pel
57
Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 20 11
'i 'tw .1.,si .,{t'I/l f C //,/1' oT flu' L), I" ;.\ .:(Jii of S 0/' t/; {, I.,t ~l-' ift;! .-1 fl'( iI'S (La i/dOli) to the SCCldtll!l oj ,'::"';',tte
SE('I:ET.\P.Y
. S.\!cox : F ehni:\l'Y ;J, 1fl-lG. [Recein:,cl Febrllary .:5- ,5: 0.1 p. 111.] :
'iYa r Serics S;\ig' 002T. Hefcrcllcl' \\'a sh OCt'!(i"j". 'iYc fire ;111'0;1(1:; ill positiol1 to shed .~OlllC l i.'.!:ht 011 ft11(,:,tinll;- askec1 . 1. D '.\.rgrnlirll-Ho Chi ~Iillh IlPgotiati()ns h:l\"l~ in f;lct bcen p:ning Oll since Xrl\"l'll1her, Th roe ne!:!'of' j;<! ~()ns lookill!! tOI"anl Freilch rr "og ~ nition of indcpendencc for .\ llna111ite to bc \\"Ot'I,,cl Ollt sOll1c\yhal nlon;; PhilippinE'linl':;, I han' no kl1o\"lp<!:..>:l; of pel'ior1 til\1P contelilllhtel1. ::\"rgotial iOI! S \':ollle! Ill'olJah 1,\' 11;1 \"(' l)l'PIl ('ol1lp1drd hy J1n'\" bll t for L rc1cl'C' rn;:::i'1": ;111 nbi PC't ioll . Hr 1<..,1(1 (hE' .\c1Il,il':~r s C01lncil 'kIt if th ese nE',f':ot iati oll:" Sl1C'ccpJre1 tl](' French might as ";e111 c;ln Imlo,:hinn a lto,~!pth rr . TTl' l'ecommcIHlcc1 milit;1l'Y l'cconflllc;:,l anc1 :;l;\te[c1] IH~:-:i _, !'J1I, ' \\';1;, ;~ll rl':u ly for it. \ Xl'\'(,lt l le l p~:-, l1cg';)! j,ltinns \\"(,l'C latel' r esl1l1lcd and arC' eon' inning heb\"(,C'11 no Chi "}'fillh nne1 ~aintC'IiY \\" ho 1s Fl'CllC'h ('Ollllllissiollcr fOl'lonkill. Hopc (hey \Iill be complelr'c1 in :2 01' :~ \yeeks. 1 .;
nHlr~-
'-' Thb l':lI,lg-l":t1lh ,,",I,.; l"el'nrtl'(1 hy tI l(' T. l!).! r: , 11'. Ill., to !':tri,.;, 11 (, ! I'riJIll'(l.
D'L'l"lrlllll'llt
ill ii~ t l'l egl'1!lll G~(), Fl'tJ-
2. Th rrc an' 110 ('hi1l 1':"(> C'<:nnoillic ap:n'C'IIlC'nfs \"ith tll e _\n n;lllli(cs. 3. RefC' rcnrl"' Francn-Ch incse agl't'r111Pnts nothing formal yet . Tem pOl'a I'} 1I nc110cn 1 ngrpcllJc~1l ts a n' a:' follo\\'s:
(t. In north Frcn ch P;lY ill pi:1:-'!r2s for ll\;linten;ll1C'e of Chincse troops, T1J('sc p,l~'l\1 en~s cons ielc rrcl :1"; acl\-,111('r"; 011 ,1lllounts Fn'lH.:h nre SII})})o:3rd to l'l'c'pin.' as \'::11' damage frolll .Llp:111rsc. b. Small part of th c."(' piastTE' ac1\'aners is <:uppo:=;eLl to he usee1 for \\'itllc1r;\\yal 01' somc Chinesc Qold units at ofTici,l ll':\t e. C, Chil1 rsc Gm'crllmellr alh':lllrp;; Qol(1 uni t,.; ,,hicll arc frrrlY ('011 vel'ti 1,lc illto Chinp"r ]latinJ):,l c101l;11\; for pX"CI1~e" of Fl'C'J\ch 'l'ep1'escntali\"es i11 ChUIl!2:1-:ill !~', K\llllllil1~:>: el1l(1 ~-:;k1tl!.!.lt;l i , SUdl :llh,1l1 C'2S are only fr,l Ct iOIl of :l111C)lJIlt Vl'l'llC!;' :l.rr p:1y ill :.r'for Chil1 cs(' tI'OOp,~. d , 1'l1r1'(' is nn a!2:l"C pnll'l~ t for E'-,('h<ln~'e of Hanoi c(;:11 for Coc-hin Chill" ri ("C'. Duc t'o lack of shipping" ;lllc1 trouhles of ,"ari ous sorts tll c "01ul11c of exchange uncleI' (llis ;lgl'Cell1cnt ha s been c1i s'lppointillg ly 10\\',
4. Clar;lc- lIO\\" in Chungking hying p:ro\lncb'or];: for important. agrecments. .\ mo11g othcl' lhin g.~ -follo\',ing ,He c('l1teillphh::l1:
a. Ylll111;1n-Hai]!ho11~ ILlil\\";l.'" \\i11 be oprratcd joint ly b.'" Chinesc , b. II:1iph ()n~ ,,ill be('olllC' frl'P port. c, Frcnch \\"ill e.v,ll:\Ilge all li\'e (.,ir) hUllllrCll piaAl'e notc:" Il elc1 bv Chin(>se llli litary. Tlli s I"ill lJp \'pry profi table to Chine"e \yho h;n'e been uu.\"inp: ~1H'ill l~p all o.ier COl1lltry at c1eprcciatc(l prices, rl. Clillngkillg. "'1: h as"l:,r"!lCeOT Chillt':,e COil:-;ul ~ai!.!.()l\ i:, no\': prCpal'illg li "t of exi,,! lJ\g' Fl"!:lldl 1.1 \\"s ancl pl':ll'tic(>s \\'l;ic!1 [cllcl to d i,:crim.ill'\\l' ag'\ll"t'-;t Cl,inC':-,p 1)\I,il1C'''SI1\\'1I in II\\\O-('hi11;\, Prill cip;ll COlllpl:lI11 t" ;lJ'r poll tax. ot lll' l' (1i :-'l'l"imin;ltnry ,axt':';, di ;::('l'imlll:\tion in a mounts o~ ~~11)1I!.'\ '1.110\:"'<1 (o .be p::[l!Jr!('(~ : illlpUlT(1if]ic-nltic,; ;\lHl all eg'r-clly 1I1lJ::t: d:;.;t l'JlJlillOll of I'<!lllllled .!.!oods, FrEllch inclicate williltgll c.~:; to cnll:,iclcl' ac1 j u:,rilJg- thc.~(' pOill'~,
fL.\ Xllf)X
t=-.,8 ....
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16, By: NWD Date: 20 11
SECr:ET
P,\ln,.;, Felll'n;lr} r" 1!),;C-0 p,

[1~ecC'i\"l~d
Ill ,
FehJ"ll;!r} 7"-1:2 : ~,,;\. nl.] 5n,), Dppt's ,,(H, f"t,1)l"Il;II"Y 'k ,,'hilt, T l:;I\'e not a:, q': IIp !;\ ihd i llfOl'lll;Qioll Oll thr '(lill"l';'(,llc!:':' of OP:":("1I1"; llehn'en T)',\.r~l'll li ('ll antl Lel'1ere' Ol1 Fn'l1c]1 1;0li cy tOI',,\1"(1 IlltlO-Cltillil all il1(li.";1t iol1:': ill T\\l'i s point [0 I'he fad I]I:I[ the Fl'l'lll'h nrwt at tlli,.; till ie' f;]\ ' I)["s a cOlwi liaton' aml 1110(] "[":l t e noli,'~' , Th l"' For D i!~ 11 Ofrke lu " heell ;::fn,,,,,.ing to th e Gmt tl lP fad tll:lt 11l thp li,!.dlt of th(' p\'olulirm of P\'Pllt;: in the Far E:ts r al1d SouUI(';tsl' .\ sin. F["pl]ch intpl'P,/;; call bp"f ),;, :';1 fp':u '\I,tlcc1 by n, libE';-;t l and pro!~n':;,i\'ecolollial p(llic,\" in Indo-Chill;I , Th e Socinli -ct Parh', \\']lich al prpsE'llf is in a po:, itioll t o eW1'<'i,-e \nnc1l illflU E'lH'e 011 Frrl1ch ,Q'OWl"IllllPl\!' al polie,\". is al so in tn'or of "uc'h fl policy ns is the 1)['e2cllt Sr)(:i;llist ~rini "le 1' of Cnlollips. ~Ltriu :, ~[ olltet. Thi;; lloes not nle;),n , l'o\YCH'l'. th:tt they are thinkillp: in terms of Indel'rIl1l(,!1c(' for Imlo-C hil1<l for no FrelH.:h'men appr;\!' to lJl' thilll:illg 1n "[l(']1 rpl'ms, ' \\'hi 1p it i:o , of C011]'''e. ill1p o::s i] )lp at thi" timp to Filze to o hI' into the fllt 11)'(" l)] 'p,~rll ! P\- i(~rIl C(, \\"("![l1 c1 ~celll j 0 ill(li f':\ie that the J))'P=,Pllt GO\'I ",ill try to fo]lo\\' ;) cO'lC"i1i,\j()1'\"-nl1c1 mo<1cl':lle polic,\' ill TndoChinn .111(1 \\"ill be' mo;'C' nro.'~l't';::";n' in its ou t loo1.: than th(' (ll' G"ul1 c Go',L' r. .-\." the Dept' ls :1\\'a1'(" in the lattr1' GO\'l ' t}lE' infll1 r nc c of
1<: A'11hn':': "" ,l f'- l' r:l ffpl 'r
1'f"lll)l'h.d in
tIt:1t- th p 'f."\'Pllch G' . \-r"rnnlflllt
tpl,\lTl':11l1 S ~lf). "-"(1]1'11:\1"'\' :?1 . 101":. :-: n. 111.. 11;1(1 (lp('illptl tr) !!i~'t-, .\ (11111 ,' ;11 d',\ !..f'1I1iPll. tl!Pll on
a yj,jt to 1"11';;:, "'!r1H'1":11 al1t11l11"il\' tn ('111 1 .1':\,'(1 1' til ]"\',l("h ,\ ;:n1"li<)11 "itll natiH' ,'11'111('''/ " , 1I1pNill:; thrill u\1;dl 1I101't' tllnn l!,l1E \'::1~' '', (,>C'-i"lr.,n()-:!l-j(~)
tllo
certnin ol(l-lit)p milit:l.1"\' lra(1c>1':'; sometimcs had <1n llllfOltl1n atp inf1ncll cc on French cololli;,] policy,
C,\ lT:F.ftY
1'71 (' A,'i"istilnt ('Ide! of t1i(' n:I'isin )) o.f ,"{jIII/INlst .1"iilJi .,17il/:!'" don) to the i\'eClrtrl l"Y of ":.,'/lite '
SECRET
! 'RWP.ITY
H,\);"(lI.
(~t7 I1-
F('hl'\lal'~'
H\.1011),
[TIccC'il-Cc1 Febl'tl;\l'.\" :?O-lO: :1-1- a_

Cl!ll)(,rt~OIl:
17
111,J
2, From L<1mlon for -:\[of1:':11 :Illd

r.
ChinC'sc inform ally
1';"[ nl T, Cn1 liP!"t ,;on , Cit ire. ni \"i,;ioll of \Y E',tt'l"ll Enl'ol'('i1 n .-\flit i l'';,
state that Fr('l\('h ~ll'e 1l('l-!"nl i,ll in~' h\'o ill stl'lUl1el1 t r.s 1 <It C'll llngk ing : I , .\J) <l0.TPPll1cnt il1 rr,Q:,lI'll to Clti!lPSe t l"OOP" in Tll, loehill<t , () _\ treM\' of ("OIl1IilC'l\'C': Th ai Ill(' a~~Tel'lllellr t()l1c]lc,,: on:
(I , The amount 1'0 h c p;li(l the Cliillr:,E' by the Fl'elldl to ('o\-er Lroop espcn,:.l"'s in TlFl ochin<t, b, 11 e1p to he g-i\-en Fr\'llch troops by ChinC'o:;(' to r ee~ta l )lisll thems('h r~ ill TOllkill, t' , Till W ;1nr] IiIPtl1()(l of \\,;t1l (1I'<1\\';11 (if Chin t's!? h'()op" , It is be lie\'p(1 th:lt FI"I 11('h \\' ;1 !1\ Chil1 p;,:p In \\'itllcl!-:1w :/1 tnfo :It on('c ilnd to c00t'11ill;)t(, tll0ir \\'iili'll';l\\';!] \\jlh Fl'Pllrh ('IlIIT \\'hilp ('hill P~r \\':)I~t to . , il"1 l /ll";)\\' ]li r>(",'IllP:l 1 (I\'l'!" an !?X t (,I1 t1 ,'r1 neriod, Tit I'his ('(11\1'1'('[ ion rnrll ,\ l"l'l\- 11('("";111 '"j,L /1","\'i,,.-r 0 1 1 1,) "['('hl'l1:'1'" \\'1 1"1l 1 ~1]\ n;lie:i()]) ::.1";1l'tr'-I Pl;Ij"hil1:' tOl', ,\I':I :\;ll'l:iJ1f'": (h,~f "h()lIt 'en'!'\" 1() lh\"~ :lllnlhp], cli"i.3ioll \\il! 112~'illl'!:\rl'lt ll11lil all of ~n1"(l .\.l"Il1Y exi'[ ,;, ITo'Chi :.l illh
'59
. .
. ,
.. ' "
.....
....
,~
".,.,
\1: '"
"
ILII IL.-\..
C.lLCi
and aholl t ;>,n(\o Fr",w h lro:'l):'; from CI'!lla po w at Ll~ichall 'n oar LnoklY raiho;1<1 to Hanoi, TTr state,1 that ;1111,oll!.:h FI'P]1rh t ,:nons sU11n0~('d hr;,(l(V' for L"o~ 11')<]'in'" t'..., , ,,,n,'n ... t t-l.n;,' trainin!T n11y (l:~,' fnl' Hall o i frr ((III /) {r/~!(tf , Ho Chi '. rinll (1ir1 not sprm to fr,'l' Fr"ll r h tl'oon;.: ,It L;,i ,l';\ll O t- ll l'r .\ll!1all1(',~" pxnl'C';::s'hcli ef .-\ 1'11;\I"C';;r (';1 "able (\f di,,;'_rplilW Chilll'se I ro Ol\S ill Ton!:in, H
bC'~ii1lli!l!! pxir
rn-
to ]1wrli;,j-(> ,']111,1 ]11 <><'1' in<1 enr'nrlrnce ;Inrl prp\'l'1lt- -"xl ppsi,'r h1(1 oc1~ h,'(1. III thi.:: ('oPl1 P(, I' ioll C],inp.,p sl-;'I e Ih" t h,':I\," l r'ss of lj\,,,,, :=-PPP)C i" ,, \,i(ahl e :1!1 (11l,at fl il>Y "'onlclliJ-,, 1-0 refpl' Tprl(whin:\ ci 'Il;l fiP 11 In rxn hilt. c;lnn01: (10 ~'n 1)('(" '11" 0 nf Chi '1PSP l)(\ ~' iiinJl ill 1''''''a n1 In ,' f:1Jlchuri,l, Thr> nll ppwl Sinn-Fl'l?l1ch Irf':tty of CI1I1I 11\<'1\'p "aid by Chi l1P--p to be sta11N1 O\'pr !lll",' t:nl'i of " hltll,~ ,,, f Ch i ]1 """ i" T J1r1n:,l';n:l r'l\in cse
r pflllire Jll "~ !Chil1 r~p
;.:rrlll;': (,prLlin th:d ,\ n l1:111'l';:,' ])1;11 \ dr"lwr:1/p r p;:: ; ~I;'I1"r tn Frr'l1 ch, Hor hilnil1]l c; t:,.tprl th;ll- l,p ('011' ir1p r ill!.!: l W( i' inllillf': all l-pitp r1 X:I~: ons
COllllller('p slIppo:"ccl to inrlllCle ('onres,~ i ons by French Lo C'hille~e of :
f-'H1l" 'rl 11:'1' i ()) \ trr ;\.fp)(,lll 1'01' rlli"l'S'" b" "ic; of riti z(,ll~ lliJ) nalll cl,' j;t,< - "" i/Oll ill is ,
p;)fi(l p;\ li s!-s on

Tj.i.:; h'r:lt,'
of
[1;1 , Fl'rp ;'('(P":'; t o l' nJ'f' of TTn11oi, 2, .roint ('ollfl'ol of TL1 i pll()l\o'- \~l!JlIl: l)l railroad, 3, .ToiJ1j "harc of profil s Oil Chin;] cnel of li,lt', '1-: DlI(Y fr l'e tr:lllsi( of gonc1~ c()]lsigllP(1 to Chin a ,
Tbrse r0l1 (,f'""i01l,::; bn"cl1 on C'hi llf'''00 r,l;,im of hp;In' 1 n.::"p~ (ll1P to 1"J.'~]lcll """ll1 i ,::- i(l1l tn ,\ l'llamr,,'" In Il "P Tnllkil1 ;lS base. aHark ('hin;l, 1"rp11('ll "f;';f11' S;I iplpll Y oP'- imi.:;' i,.. on' " nll; rl;: 11 ,"Trrl') (>]1 I- \\-i,11 (,hin;l n1thr:lj(~'1\ ('1:']';1(' \ )'(, 1 IlrJ) (1(,1'11'((1 i"rl l'h ll i i p 1'L S"ill l'PJ1 \' ill~i P1 :)tr.c1 th at ;;lrllpl',,'h nOI fOl'lll;\lh ;::p;I I('(1 [.<tl//nd .J l t11(' tI'P;1h' of COllll1wrre
,,;ill be cont in ;;-ent
011
Chin csc troop<
a~si:,,(nnce
a11(l coonlin:lt ion,
[L.\xnox]
GO
Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Sectio n 3,3 NND Project Num ber: NND 633 16 . By: NWD Date: 20 11
CO ~FTDBNTJAL
Th e _1..<,~i,~f!lJlt ('llicj oj tlie Dil'l'siOJl of SO/lthl' I/.'i/ -1silli l Allai!"" (Lrlllrlon) to the ,\'ecreflli'!I oj . SO/life
SECRET
TL\xOf, llllthtcc1 , rnccein'c1 Fcbnl"ry 27-11: J.'l n, m.l Frolll Landoll f(.r :.\[nJTat ,lnLl ('tt"1hcrison. 1. S,1il!tC'1IY si;lte(1 thai in C'oll'"e[''!atinll '\'itll Ho (,hi ~fi Jl h h e offereel _ \.l1llal1le:'(' cOlllplerc inc1 cpe l1 c ce \I.-iHlill Fre]lch COllllllil11ity: 1PJl That tllis 11ll',1llt rh;ti _\lll1;111 w;::e \\'olild han brncilt of Fl'e11dl ad\'i;:;el's in cn'ry (lpnartl1lPlit of 0o\'('l"Ilmcnt: Th nt for i]1stan cE' ,\ 11l1anH?Se Forri9:n om('e ,,"ou1(1 c:-;prrss its n01 ic: irs th1'01lg'l\ Fn'lll"h ch;mn e1s: That .\n11a111c5e .\l'lilY nll c ,Yat' ~rilli st lY \"\"mllel be c00nlilla c('(1 with l Fl'P]1rl\ _\.I'm'y ,111d ,1',\], Jfini st I'Y: ,\ ncl that _\nnaJllese if rin?l Fin<1ll cc and ('01n111 (, I"('r ::\finistl'ies w0111cl 1>ee(l FI'PllCh achisel's as _\nnaml''3e ~' ere in E'xlwrt ill t1l c;:e lll:lLters and mig-lIt jeopanlize f;lllparentl':,l l'ul e} Fren ch in"E'stlllE'llr. Sainlell~' saiel that ,\nl1ameso in ('ochin Chill<! ,yonld prd),J.1)ly prefel' to r ema in Pron cl1 ('ol ollY l';l clir]' COlnr 1111c1el' northp],)) ,\ nn"ll'p ~P (;o"\'CI'illnen L In thi s C0J111(,C i ;on TTo ('hi. :,[inh said thai 1'1'(,I)ch officials had rOllfrrrec1 "'i tll him hut t1la t thcy \\'21"(> ,ag'lle ill (h eir COlllmen(s alu1 h,1c1 Hyoiclpcl thc real issues of ~\ 11l1rtlI1e:oe imlpl,enclell('e so that h e ha(1 asked th C'm to p:d speeifi.c term s from Pnris \\'j1ich \\'o11h1 make c1 ";11' \\"h('thpr th c French re,111," offered An11ames" inc1e])ellc1\' llc(' 01 ' \\'el'e mel'('h USil,lg ne\\' langu ,lge to descrihe> 11:,,\\a 1 FI'Pll C cont 1'01 .\nl1:111\e;::(> :1ffn irs, h 2, Ho Chi ~Villh 11:l1lc1ecl me 1\\"0 leiters n(1c1l'e'-;,ord to P]'(>,-, ic 1cllt, of rS_\, (,hina, TIll ssia. nn c Britain. iel eni ieal cop;es of \"h;c1"l '''ero 1 stnlpcl ro l'nn' h "('11 fOl'wa1'i1rc1 10 other P'O\'Pl'J111H' nts nanw(1. In 1',\-0 lette]'s TTo (,11i ).ril1h l'P'llle"ts r"S ,\;1 S O1\P of rl1it'pcl Xatiol1 s to S1l1)])0r( ic1E'f1 of .\nn:\IlW"'l' ill clL' ]lpl$l C'llc(' accoJ"(lin;.!: i'o Phi1ipp i nrs (':\,1I11p1e, to ex,1l11 ille t1le ensp of t11e _\llllamese. nllel 10 1:1ke step<=; l1e rE';:;;:: Hr} to mainten;1n("e of \\'o rld pp:1ce \\"11ich is hein;!" enc1nll!~'el'ecl by FI'f'nc]' e11'o1'/s to reCOI'CI)1CI' Ind och i11:1. He as~pris th;lt ,\ nn:1lnC'se will G<rht 111\1.i1' Cnilc\l Xat;olls illl(,1'fer(> in Sll ))DO!'t of ~\l\11:1nlesc illrl\'pe l1[lel;~e. The petifion ac1c11'esc.ed to lll;\jOl' l-nl tec1 Xnrion s contains :
( I . RE'\'i e\'\ of FI'Pl1C 'h I'pbt ions \\"itll Japanpse \"\"l1erE' French Indochina allr!2'C'c l1 \' H ic1rcl .Tal)<=;: b. 81";\t (.I11Pl;' nf pst:lh1;shl11rnt on Q Spntpl'11 ~0 r ]f)-Iii of [Pl'o\'i ~ i ona 1 Go\'crJ1I1\ Pllt onl Dp III O(']';t ric TIenulJ]i r of Y;p( :\[inh: r:. SlllllJ11<1 ry of Fl'l' 1lC"11 conc)lI Pst of Cochin China begull 2:1 Sepi l(l,J.;'i alld st ill in rol1$) letp : rl, Ollr1illP of ar('ollm1is]lllH'llis of _\nn,\l"llP"'C Gon'l'llllwnt ill Tonkin incll'clil1g." pOJlubr e1('dioll". "llo1itiol1 of llllc1 rs il':lb1e taxes. exp:tn,::iOil of P(]lll',l! iOll and rC:-llll1ptioll "S fal' as po<;ibl .: of 1101'111:\1 c{:ollomic acti\'iri p;:; : e, TI eC!l1esi to foul' PO\\"('I':'; : (1) To int plTcne ancl stop the \\' ,11' in Illllodl il\a ill m'd,' 1' to Ille(]i:lte fail' "'('lt lr))1enl ;Iud (:2) to l)1'il19: t1l\~ Illrl()chinp'-'t;> i"~\le !Jcfllrl' thr T-nired X;tiion;:; Or;r:111izntioll, TIle pet;rioi1 Pllcl,~ \\,;th sl"relllPllt (Ilat ,\nn;1I11r:::'0 ,1sk for fl>11 in dependencc il,l {a ct a\lr1111:\t in intpl'im \,,!t il c :\\\';,it ill!.',' (jpei"iol1 tlli? ,\lll\;ll1\(':-:e \\'ill coutll111e to fi.:..::llt thE' l'C'c::t,lhli ,:: l;lll C'll t of Fl'uwh im peri:lli;;;m . L et tcrs ;t It< 1 pet j t inn \\' i 111)L' r I'll nSlll i r re'1 t I) Dc! 1>:\ \"tll1('t<l SOOl1(>,t,
r:\o
[L.\:\DOX]
61
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Secti on 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 2011
T he Co 11 JI.',e7o I' oj EIIIUII.,.<>:; in ('hinl' (SllIylh) fo lite

S FCr:F.T 'Cs rm;EXT CII'CXCT\:I"C; ,
,\'(Udru'.'!
of Stuff'
FelJl'li:l ry ~S, 1fl -Hi-5 p. m . rnccein'rl 11 : 1:2 p. 111.]
: t X nt prinlpcl. htll ;:ce' ((lpgr<llll of Ft'iln1'lry 1!) to) S'liglln. p. - . Shih-chirh , ) [inistrr for Fon:ig-n _\ tra i 1';;. c;1l]ell tlle (0 Forei!~'ll Office . nnd said tllar Sil'o-Frrllf:h trp<'lty Oil In(lochilln \\'oultl be sigllrc1 ,\t 4 p. m. IndaL TTl' ";licllllaill point;; in treaty \\'ere ns ginn to me by Yice ) [inisler Lil1 C'hirl1 on Frll1'\\,lry 1:2. - D r. -YrallQ,' said that C')' illr:::p forres \\'()11 1d hand 01'('1' control of their nn';l in lntlochina nt end of :\Ial'ch. C'hille;;e troops \\'()uld \\'ithc1ra,,1'0111 Ill(lochilln nt rnll of :\ rarc:h. Chillese troop;; \yo1l 1cl \I'itllclr;(\\ f ro)] 1 Tllc1oehin:\ cll1rill~: :'.[an'11 . by sea nncllnncl. hnt eluc to r1iflil'l\lti('s of sl,ippin[!: and of I\'ithdra\\';ll by hml, Chineseforce5 1\'()l\1c1 proh:\bly not be ablr r.ll cnl11nlple \1 ;lh<lr;\II:tl ]lnt il n short time after end of March, not 1:\1('1', he felt Slll'l' . tll:\11 _ ]1l'il1.). \ He sa iel thai Chinrsr Go \,('rJ\l1\C'1lt lInd informally b\lt e111pll:ttic-a lly ll rgNl French :tutllOrit ips to 1'(',l('h n :'Lloo(11<'5s" ngTN'111ent IIit:, th~ I nc1oc:hine:::e : he exprps:;cc1 opinion tll:\I' presl:11l' French (io\"('l'Ilmcltt )s less intl'ansi,():pnt than 111:11 of c1e Ga\llle. He :oni(l that Chinese ill I nc1orhin;l kHl aJ~o tlrged the Il1l10chinesc to reach a "hloodle:;s': agreement l\'it JI 1" l'rl1ch . . . D r. , Yang said that tTle C'lt itl('se Go\'(?rn11lent woplel be \"illing to mediate betll'erll French and 11ldoc'1Iine~e, if ref/\\psteel b\ borh sides. H e tl H'1l asb'L1 me to nscrl't:)in the "icws of the Secl.'rlnry of SLttc regarclill!:: the po:"sihilit.l of joint C'hincse-..\meric:lll Jnrc1i:tt ion, if rcqneslec1 bv holh French nncl Indochinese. He I'efel'l'l'd to the p:l'eal iute!'est \rhich tile late Pre;;idenr Roo"cn]t- had <:ho\\,11 ill clppellr1f nt peoples: remarking: that cll1e to opposition f\'Olll crriaill conlllrie3, i'1w P 1'rsiclrn(- had heen ull:\hle to esi:11)lish tru;;t('('shiJ) nrinciple fOl' coloniC's of Elt!'<)pe:m ])OI',-('rs. He inelicltec1 th:\t, i-f 'CS Go\-cl'lll1lent shonlc1 agrC'E' to ,iOi11I' lllPlli;lt ion, r l lE~ matter of reqnc;:.:t ing sncll tilecli;\ t ion could be "supg:r'.,-,er.1" to thi' French :\llc1 Illl1ochine:::e. Dr. \\~;mg commr-lltec1 Ih:1L ns re;lllt of Chine:=:e ;)ct iOllS c1millg- rpcent mouths, he felt th;lt f' rcllch \I'ere cOlIl"incec1 of Chine:::e good fait h. Dr. , \T;\ll? ex])res"i'd (minion that, if joint C'h i nt'"c-Allleric:1n mediati on is agrpecl \lpon, it "houlcl he 11IHlel'lak~1l d\lril\g the com in;..: 11I0nth. He said (hat lIe would :t]lpn'ciate Ycry 1l1\\c11. recei\'ing: the -I-iell's of the Secretary of Slale :\5 ;::oon as po2.3ihle.
S~IYTII .
62
Declassified per Exec utive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
The COi/sul at Saigon (R eed) to th e S'eCl'ctil /'Y of St,de

S.\lr.nx. :'-r:11'('11 7. 1Dj.(;-7 p. m. [Rece in>c1 ::\Ll'ch 7-1 : :1.> p. m.] 20. Spokf'sm;ll1 fo), the Go\"('t'll me1\ t i 11 TJlc1or:ll i 11;1 ;1 111\011 11 ('t'(1 s i :Ql1 ing .01' rrg-I"Pf'lllf'nt \'rsh>nby at r-Tanoi \\"h t're!)\' YiP l ll,lm Iw('()mb ;1 free shlte \\'ithin HlP TndochiJla fefler:ltion and \\'illl1an O\\"n ,1 rlll\". direct. own in'ern;11 n H';l ire:: ;lnd finanr'e. Furt her nrgoi iations Ol\Ot1H'l' points su ch ;I S f Ol'('i,,!"ll ,dbi!"s. F1"ell('h rconomic inl'ere;:;[;:;, Pl ('r'era. to he h eld "llor l l.\", TIdrJ'l.'J'rllllll to he herd in Tonkin. ,\]1)1;1111 amI C'o('hin Chilla to (It'tt'l'lllille 1'01'111 of g!)\'er J1 l1lt'nt clf':::irecl :\n(l f"lW\' lllay he sepnr;lte or l1la~' unite. Full text of agreement \\ill be fnnl"arcl('cU'
l tE."TRICTED
"'T"j""I':llll :21. :\ r"I"(]. . . F).Jr.. not llrillt('(T. " n l'"'pntr'h .tnp. :'1[;11"('11 .". frolll Pal i~ . Pll('1",('r] (''']10' (,f I,' );! ;h t:'a!l~};ltt'(l fl"nlll tho P;\l"i~ Fi'/llr'). r;f tllP prl'lim, i nnry (' ()ll\"t,llti(lll ~i .:':llC't! at 1l :1Il(li. ::I[arch at :I p. lll.: llC'ithl' l" prin tp(l.
n. Spokl':=:nl<lll ('ollclllClrl1 th<lt lll;lll\' ('ollce::;::;io!\:::Oll ho!h ~il1es , .\nn<llll i tes nrc frallkl .\- pleao'''c1 and Frcllch military OCCLlp;ltioll no,\' procrecling smoothly.
REED
SECP.ET
:'Irardl 1-!-, 10-~()- i) p . 111. [R cccin~(l :\brch l(l- 9 : :2-1 n, ill.]

S,\ lG()X,
::$:j. Info)"l1l;ltio!\ from north indi catE'S Chillecot: putting many obstacles ill \\'n,\' or Frcllch, and Sai!2"on pl''':''" quP]'ie:; Chill C::-C intentions. C1arac l'E'Yic\\"ecl \I'or;:;pning- sit 11ation in c1d:\iL Illentioning un cx pected h si llli!ll:ie rdlls;ll Chilw.'-"e Gcne)":! l Shllf to SiP':1l :lgTC'C':nell l for relief Chincc:C' hy French (to bp,;:: ill hefore ::\1"<l1"('h 1,), to c11(l hrfol'c ::\farch 81) becan:=:e nel,drrl nppro\'al C'olllhinp(l Chier" of Stnlf'. 'I'll !::: ha" heen [app:1l'rnt P::1l'I)h'l1>llt Clame not clear if they han~ H(lcr1. :\1:=:0 :\(l(ling Mnc.\rthul':!c lwd said it \ \';1S not hi s l!llsiness \\'hich CJar:1c found
,Q O el1!'I'al (If the> .\rlllY D"ill;.;l;l~ :.\I;:('ArtlIlll". Supreme Cumlll<llltler for th e AlliN] fOI"Cr' . .T:ll);\ll.
astonishing in \'ic\\' of
~\rnlllltb:lttPll 'S"7
appl'on11 of relief Jh'iti;:h by
".-\.(II 11 . LI)['(l L(llli~ ::I[ount!t;,tlt'll. Snp1"l'lllP ,\JJi"P(] (,(l1l1l11,lIH1"". S"Uth p:1~(" .\Si:1.
French "ot"]) of l() rh fll :1l' allpl"], Hl' i;:: ~\'olTiec1 ;lS (,hiIlPc:0 (1i~ging trenche" TT:lipholl,Q' flncl elH'irclillp: cit:lc1e1.JTanoi fea r.s c:criOll~ clash bll t hnpe::;: ,Ln Hall's nnintl ye::;t('nl:ty nl:tY pnse ten ;: ion, al so Ln may ha\'C' :1ll f'horify to illlplrlllent relirf :lp:l'eClllent.~' (,br,te 's inforillation
'" Tl'l"~";ll1l :3,. 'I[ 'll'..Jl 1.1. l!Hr.. 1() p. m .. fn,m S,li:::on . !"p[lor t r'(l that Iht, Silll)Frl'llCh lI!ilir,,!".\' :1"rt'I'1I1l'11[ \\',1~ ~i:::l\ (>( ] :ll ('hlln:!ki!1 ~ "II \,f:\l"("11 l,L thl'l"ph.,' illll'Ie, llj('ntill'! !hp r:lI"lil'!" ;1!-;n'l'l11 Pllt fl))" !"l'li .. [ (If (,hilll'~E' h,' ;;')"eac-h f(ll"("t'~ (1.'1. !lV:)- l:1-J.G). .
"}I)"nm ('hin n c:hO\~'" !:!:ro\\' i n~ Cll;p esp c:Pl1til1lel1t ..;l~:l illc:t Yi rtlll inhFrt'llclt ;10.TP1~1l1('l1t pl'oh,:h 1y b:\'-'C'r1 O!l Chi)1 (,,,,0 rr'e;1l' nfl1 COllllllllni st state c:outh of Chin:1 :\l1c1 ;11'0 fch e to f;li 1ll!" o (,1IiI\0"=c ;::nol1~o)"ecl 1(:' in YiC"lllinh. TneI""a"in.l) 11lll1lhC'l' il1ci(lC'nts pal'ty to 11;1\'0 ! );!!'()'f'J' 1'0 Sni!:;011 ;1.11<1 t'1",c,\\'1l\'l"L' but on who1p _, l111;llllif'C'S \\"ill i ll!::' to \\"ol'k (,ut ap:l:eCJnpnt ;le: 1,1 ;\1111(,([ ;11'<1 (!."E'ltPl':ll helief if Chillc~e hied not r'hangpr1 nttirll(1 e thing,: '\\"()1l1l1 1\ ,l"C' !lrme \\'l'1l. neED
63
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16, By: NWD Date: 2011
S~lG.(!O/-t-l tl~: T j>li'~r;L!ll
Th e COl/,ml tit ,)lIigo)1 (1?1'(1l) to the Sp('rrt11ry oj Stllte

S,i [(;o:\, _\pril 1, 10+t1-1O:t , lll. [Receiyc'd .\pri1 :2-10: ;~I) p. m.] 70, .Assas: i n;ltion Dr. Pkl t, ]}l(,1ll ber Coc:h in eh i n<1 ('o\111ei 1, on ~ fnn:h :20 by ];:n O\m Yi etminh extremist" and thrc;\ts to](ill lllcmbers opposcd to Co('hin Chill:\ joinillg Yietnalll 11;IS llot helped Yietunm canse. Incrcasing cxtrellli;::t ;lcti\'il ics S;ligon alll1 Cochin Chilla also bad eJi'Cl't am1 modcr;lre Cot:hill ChillP;:e not p;nticlllarly pro-French comlllcnt " ietlllililt trying to forcc jOillillf!" Yictl1;l111 \\"hl'thcr ('oehin Chin e~e c1e:=:i1"e" Ol' not. On other hand Frell('h seiZllre of Tn>asury Hanoi pl'l'c ipitating gPIH>l'al strike nad inci(lellts in Tonkin klH not help ed Frell('h cnn:::e nllCl illspires little confidence that thcy \\"i11 ].:eep fa it h, O ne might llOpC' th;lt both "ides bl:e itO steps dmin~ ppriocl of !legol'iafi oll \\"11i('11 might jeopan1ize fin;t1 peaceable ontcome lmt ewry lil,elihooc1 storlllY period ahead, particllbrly so far as concerns l1Utlll"(' status Cochin Chinn, REEO'
CO:\FIm::\T1.\ L
851G.OO I-I - :i~
r.
Th e S eCi'et(ij'!J
'" 'fhi, lIott' 5
J).
0/
State to the French A)})u({.<:sadOl'
(Ro/(I! e tr~
\Y,l': rt'\'t1rtr(] hy the T)l'!l:lrtllll'lIt in tell'gr;ull 1(;:1.1..~p ril 12. 1rl4G. Ill., t<) I'<lri,: ;111(\ r('p('a\l'rl t" C'\ttll1;.dzin;! nlHl S'li~(lIl.
The SCl'rdan' of State presents hi s COll1pl~lllellts to TIis 1~xcrllcllcy th e Frcllch ~\ Jllha;';;::ilc1or and has the honor to rcfer to the ~'--lllhas~<1dOl"S llot e no . Wi of :\farch 7, 104G:~'1 ellc:losing a copy of thc ]'nl11co" :\" nt print c f1.
eh'illesp .'-- ~rrel'l11etlt ,,,ilh regan1 to the relirfof Chin ese forces in north erll IIlc1o ,(,hin;l_ II.\" Frc!~ch 1'orcrs ;\1$1 reqnesting the approY,ll of th e ('oll!hille(] Cllief", of Sta rT thereto . The SrtTpt-;II"Y of Sf-air is plea"(>(1 to inform rhr ~\Il1I I;l"":lc1()r [hilt th e C'O!llI):llNl ('Ilirfs of SI;\f}" It;ll'e !I O ohje..t ion to the relief of ('hil1c"c troo!'s ill l10rlllrm Frf'llch Tndo-Chilla by Frcllrll forcc~, Sillrf' the\' cOllsi(Jrr tll;\t sncll nrr:lll'!CIi1"llt". ,Ire a n;nttcl' for deiel"!;li!lation b~' Sinc p tlt r Frill1('o,Chil1e;::e ;'[0;rrOl'ICI1I- ('ollll)lotc" the n','er::ioll of ;111 Incl oJ ' ll i :l;\ to Frrwh ("ontml. thp ('ol1ll)i!ll't1 ('hid.:: of Stalf ennsic1Ic'1' that' t-llP Frc)l(,11 Illili t an' ('Ol1itll;u:c)el' in Illdo-('hillil slioulrl ad ilS il mt'dit'1l1 for th(' } 1"('1]("11 GOYl'I'l}!iH'nt for \,oort1ill;\l ion \\it-!t thr Su]11\'1I1r C(\!11Pl;l)Ic1 ro r for thr .\llit'd POII'er" Oil 1'1: d trl"S n'];lIill0. to th: l'rp;ll"ri;ltilll1 of ,1;\]l ;] I1l' ~e from Tl1(lo-('hillil , ;1n(1 fhat tlw ChinoSI:' Sll p n'lne COIIIlll;\lH1el" ", 'lt1!1.\(11tliml -:'fount$;llien s\toul(1 be re1"I('\'el1. t'f
"GlJ)('''ili~~illl{) ('lIi;II1_" K;]i'~h(k.
.Jap;]neq~
their dutie" :\l1rl l"l':=:poa ..;ibilities for cli",U'I!l:llncnt allcl eYaclt;ltioll d ill Indr)-Cllill;1.
64
Cu rrent rpp;!tri;lI i011 SL'l!l,dl:k,., cl!\'i";!ge thc rOlllplcticll of thc e\';lCn;ltioll of tll~ ,hp;lIll'sC fr(ll11 IWt!lC'l'I1 l!l(lo-('hill;\ hy ,\ pril 1.'1, Thr COlltllillCl1 Chief" of :-;(;til' t..:ol1sidl' r t hal it is nlO::;1 c1cs;r;\h1e to h;\\'(~ the F'rcll('11 r.oll1lll;lIllkr ill Tl1 l1n-('llil1;\ ('O!lfonn to prl'''l'lll' ~<:!IC'lh; l cs . A c('onlillp,'ly, .,"elmiral :\[()lI!1 tl);t'tl'11 1ws bce1\ tlirectclllo m;il.;.p the n erc,,"ary arr<lngPl1lcl1ts \rith tilr FI'CllC'11 mi li tary ('OIll 1 11:lllc]\'l' ill Illl10C'h ill:t l'l'!.':;tnhl,!!: thc trallsfcr of hi s :::ha l'(, of thc abol'E'-lllelliionec1rcsp o1!si l):lil,\' at the l'arlil',.;t p(l,,~;il)I(' clate . Th c SlIilrell1E' CUl11lll;U111el' for tIlt, ,\lli pL,l Pi)".'e]'" :lllll 'he anpropri ntc ('hille:::c :lU1'horil ie:;; ha\'e 1)C'el\ inform cd or the Comhined Chiefs of Sin 11' ;l ct ion 011 th is lllaUeI', I It is IlI!d l' I',~'oo(l that a 111Cll1ol';11l<lulll has he('n :\lhlre;::"l'l1 (lih~ctlv t o l'1IC Fren('ll :\[ilitlll'.\' .\.t l ;1 ('h (. to tllt' 'CnitC'll Starcs illforming hil il of tllP al)O\'e HllcII'C':[Ubtin,g' that nppl'opriatp illstruct ions be.' i S~ llC{1 to the Frcll ch military COIlIIiJalllleL' ill Incl.o ,China . ,\Y.\STIIXGTLlX, ,,"pril 10,104,(.
8,;1 (;,f10/,!-1 ~ ,Ifi : Tel,',r: ra!ll
TIl(>, riC(' ( 'Oli8u7 lit Rrllloi (()'Su71 il'{1)1) to thc ,8cuetli)'Y of State 3~'
"Tltb tl'I("~T;]lJI \\'11~ ~uJtllllal'izl',1 ill:l n,'p,1I't1l1pnt ('irC'nl,\!' tl'lt'~T'l111 (If April Hl,
l!l"(G. noon. h, nangkok. nataria. Chungking, ~l;tllil:t. an(l P:lri~,
,\pril 18, ]rqr,- S a. m. [R ecei"pcl _\. I)Ji l 18--8 n, m.l , 2. Despitc llIan)- f/UP:'( in ns \\'hi('l1 arp st ill in Aui,l stat P, con dition s ' in IIalwi nr" sllrpri;;in ...~h fillipl', Fr01li'h ,\)lJ1 ulll i! c awl ClliJ1('sr troops are ill city ill y;uying- force but, \\'ith comp;1l'at i\'cly li tt le fridion . FI'cnch f mop" 1111(101' OC11('[';1 1, \~a 1111\', C0I1 I))()c;0(1 of (>1(>111el1t;:; of Sccond ,\1'll1 011t'ell <111d Xilllli ('01011i:l l TI'f:l1Itry Di\'isiollS, are 1ll:1king: Stl'P!'l1(1ll;::offo\'f~ to ,n'oiel '1llI n!?,'<)!l i ;~ i!l 0; (,hille,oe , Fifty-i-hinl ,'Ul1.\' \yith ~(':1j-fcl'ecl seniccs are onh' ('1I ino"p troops \\'hich rpJ11ain in \'i cillity of Hanoi, D;lte of th eir \,ithlha\\'al is 1111k1'O\\'1\ 11C1'l'. 'Rcpntrin t ioll of ,T:tp ,l1lC'~'c :"()lclir1's ;\nd ci" ilia !l:" 1' 01'1]1 of Hill! 1);\.r,11le1 h;lS !>e'(,1l j';lk ;n!.!' pl:\('P clu!,ing pact:? '1n'cl,;:;, ,-\ p])l'Ovim:1te l y:1() of ij;i,(J()O h:1I'C becll shipped, HC11l;linclel' ar(> schedllled to le;l\'(' ill 11ear
('OXFl })!::XTI.I L HAXOT.
l'J:IOlnTY
flll' l\l',p.
Fl'('nch ;l,ppC'ilr to he (>'\c['(' i"ill0,'llo Cil'ili,lll fUl'ctiolls h cl'(>. , 'ipfnal\1 is d r (Nf o [!,OHl'llllIC1\l' of Ha!1oi , 1'\1I\nill,'~ 1l0' iC'E' anc1 ac1n:illi;:;rrat iye sen'ice" _ Th cre l\l'e in c r'at ions t'll<lt 110 cfTcdi\'p cen'l':11 <111'1101'ity 1i exi sts ollt"irle of ciry ;l,l'e;[3 nltJ:ollp:h n;l,ril'es ;'I'C c;:li(l to be Liqprh' alltiFl'CI:ch , P:l s~:;\~re of l'l'Cf'n' Freadl ('()!'\'O\' from H: liplwll,o; 10 Hnnoi, fol' rX:1Jllpl" , \\'<1S ]'esi"frrl l)y barril'acles (hl1l' llppal'Plltl), IlOt I,)' rifl e fir( in \'ill;'p: 0~ along 1'01lte. :\'P!:'ot- i,l1 i~"~ !I()\\' o)wnil"r lwt\':el'll T'l'cl'ch fll'll ,~; ptJ'n111 a l D;11:1t (D;ll;lt is l!ill ,'ratio)) ill ('(llhi ' 1 Chinn! to iJ11n l l-lllellt preliminary agn'C'I:I Pltl l" '[';11',,1, (;"1, )fo:"t important i!l111lerli;lle llue:;:;tio l1 :lppe:1l'S to Ill' "'a'lIS of Cw'hill Chill'l. Food ,, ;t11 :1, iop !.!:el 1 PI';11!y !H.! fl,J' t1Ul) 1:1 '-'t \, (,;11' , TIl')I0rl S illclil'ntc th ere sl101l1d lie IlO f:llllil:P in nortllP],ll FT(, illllear futllre.
,,... rI,),,:>
Declassified per Exec utive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
"" A t B:LH,;kok, D:lt:1l'ia.

SE ('l~ET
CIJll!l;.:-ldll ~,
L Olld,,!! , ) f:ll1il:1 . Pini :", all il Thp
ITa ,~l!e ,
\\,\ SfIIY(;T():'\" . . \p ril
lS , 10-!-(;-1 p,
m.
Yi PIl<l1ll np"llbli ,"" PI'Psi(lC'llt nO ,CLi :\rillh l'ef1Ul';:tl~tl rs, rIC nnd othE'1' 1'('('0g!1ii'iollS app!'Oxilll:1';n o: Fn'I1('h , 1 'C'C'o!:'J1itioll us fr ('c si"<1te " ' ithin FI't'IH: ll 'r- I ~i()!l , rK ill form:' ]1\' l'cpli c(1 1l1l:ll)le rccognize be cnn;;e negot iation :=; 1'(' Yie! lIam act ual status continning.
, BTRXES
Th e ('OJlSltl at S({;gon (R eed) to th e Serl'et(t;'Y of S{(lte

co" FIDF:yrL\ L
[ Rece i \-~d ~\p ril i0- 2: 1:) ", Ill,]

~7,
S,I,lCO", , \
l>ril
n, l!H G-l J :1. m.
, 1:2:2, :\[ytel1:?1, April

""
IO n, m."'
net umed yest erda y from JLmoi

'/If ,\pri,! :',1),11
:1, !l1 ..
~ot.]1l'illtl'll :
[til'
~t1,lIJl!lll':;-, ~f'P
dn '1l 1:n; tf'! (',!.!: I':l1!l
i llll'([,
where sitn:ltion tcn~e , C':\l1et1 on ,Ill hi~h Fren ch. Chine,'e, Yirtll,Ull oml;;!l;:, He fllo,)'1 (h'clt hr;!ch' on Coehill China i s~uE' , fhst , must Jo in \~il'tllnm, ::;ecol;d. Frcnch ';m~st cea"p ('ntel'illg' C'ochin China; h e also Iilenl iOJl('(l need for COll1pll'le fin,\J1cial ill lleprll(lenrc~ 0\\'11 bank nnd om1 1>:\11k 1I otl' issue, He 1\'<l S highl.\- inc1i g'lIa nt' action of French in nrrest iJlg <lltd (1i,~rel1illg- rl',~'/)() 11illgJ from D,llat. Dr, T11:1ch, Cochin Chinl'2c c1 clcgatc to Dalnt conf('relwe. He CXpl'C';.::"cd hopc for flit llrc jf Frcnch lil'ec1 up to thl'ir a;2yeClllen:,..; Il'hiell he ratlH'l' clollb::cd bnt (1<lrl('(1 tklt o\lt side help, c11il'fly capita l and technical aill, lllust be suppl ircl. PE'SSilllist ic "icII's held by all Fr('Pch r C[" <lnling- sneer'''' of Dabi' ,c 'onfcrcilce II'li!ch i:=; 110\1' sllspencLd for a fpII' (lays '.I'hil c \~i etn :l.m dl'l1lal1lls n'f',al'dil'g Coch;n (('e,lse l l()~l iliti cs , rell'<lsc political illtrl'llcrs Al'l1li si icr CCIl1ll\i ,~:=;i() n [lml polij !cal fl'c('(101ll) and Fl'rn ch connteroffer ]'cp:arrli I g a11 Tnc1cchin;\ (est,\bli.::h spccial committeC' iO in\'est i,f[,lte Yi eln:cl\1-F1'cllch inc-illenls) are l)ein!! stnclipl.l alll1 ill a t French 11:l.ye II !)I'\' ndopl ed th('sis ('onl'e1'('nrl' J\\c1'~ly pl'r1iminary and Paris npprnl';!l 11\",:t be' obtainccl I.-h idl is I'ontrary prcy iou:=; undE'rst:tnc1illg:. Fr(,l]('h defelld nne,,>,, ('xJ) r l1illg Dr. Th ach 01\ grollllll" that lie is 110toriolls ,!I!Li -Fr('lich Cochill Chinese and thai' Cochill Chilla not yet part of Yi etn,\Il L ' Fr('l\ch ill.~i slC !l C(, \\'ithc1rnll'a l Chil\P~C frOtj.lllo1'th nne1 all-m'e1' ]11'0 cl'a"tipat ioll to Daht I\\a~' l\;\\'c \\l!('l'ior Il\()til'es as it is]lot inll)o;;.::il)le Frc!1(h l\Iilit:ll'," COliP may hc til'Oll!!ll! otT n;; soon as (,l,j l1(',:;e gone , SOl1 lP Fl'cll':h c,il'ilj,\I\~ kl\'C spokcll of thi.:: "as pllttin~' Yi CI II:\l;If::::c in th eir place ", JlI nlly Cl'('lIt o\'(!l'-all p;dure i;; lIot happy olle 'and mu ch COlll[ll'OliIi:=:e, 2:ooc1 faith Hl1l1 to]cr,ll1ce Jl C:'cdcLl to elrl'ct peaceful sen 1ell\ ClI t,
1
S;; 1 G.on ' ,) - l -Jt; :
( ' j n'l\Llr tf'l""~J'alll
Th e A rt;lI[j
." ('c l c/tli'!!
oj
.",'till e
I()
oilia /','; ~"
(tN/tlill Jl i j,lot!l{/{;r
{{lid
C()1l8ul({l'
:111(1 1'11,' If;t':lIe, 1. 10 ~G-';" p, m, FrC'llch \~ietll,llll con f erp!we DaLtt rplllporal'ih "l1,~pC'l)(h'll for ~tull.r c.onfli ct ill g: \'i e\\'s l'e (' of'hi llchi na, Yi ptnam o[1l('i,l1;; hope for fulme c1 0mlr r l hy c10nh ts 1'[,(,11Clt \\'ill ;d)illC' hy 11 1C' ir n~n'(,ll1C'nt;; , French p ess;misr ic J'e 01.l!CCllle , \~ i efn:ll\l clC'l ll,I IHls ('(':,;"at ion h ost ilities Cochil) rhi11:1 , I.'p1pa",p poli lien l in teI''lC'Ps, C'srablislll1H'nt a\'l ni,-t:ce COIllmissioll and noli t ical fl' eC'c10111 ('n('h il' china, Fr Pllc h COlll1trr-of1'er spec i;ll ('('lll111i ttee stllrh FI'Pll (' h-Yi l,llllln inci(l enl" thl'O\l'~hnllf Inc1o,c1 lina, FJ'en('ll no\\' hol (l D :lla t' C(mfer2nce merely preTilll innl'Y and r esul ts !11\l S~ h:\y e Pari s npnrOY'l1. Consn1 S:1 igon obse lTt's '" French lll:lllP\\\'erS P l'OP<1~'lnc1a to fOl'ce
" A t P,ll1c:k(,I" n at;lyi<l, L Olllloll,
:\" lllk i n~
P'll'i:"
S ill:.!"ll'OI'E',
COXF mE ,Tf.\L
"\Y, \ :" TfIXG TfIX , ~L1 y
"T('!f'~r'l'" 1:~() ,~p"il ~(), l!) ~r., ::: n, n;" not lll'inr('rl. ' If\ i t, ('(ln~l\1 n "'('rl !ll(,llti OllNl th,lt no ('hi :'I fill!' 11<1(1 ~tl'('c~ \"(1 to him at I Lll'''i "lItllloq' ll('('p:,~it\ of ill t('rp~Hll~ A1] ]I"'iC'an capita l nlltl Plllpl()~'in~ ,\ IlH'riclII tco('lini l i,11" in i'i eln,i!ll," ( 8:1 1G,00/-!-:~()tr; I
\yi(h c1ra\\';ll (,hinpse troops T onkin an(l c1 ('1a yin!~ hlctirs Thh t ('011f er(> nC' c, (' 0\1\1)<\ li11 1(> \\' it'h possihility Frend; phnni ng miliLlry ('oap \yh ell Chin ese \\'ithc1m\\', '
ACUESOX
TlI f d rfill[j S('uct(U'!! () f St{!le If) ( 'pdllin DijJ7olJltltiC' (wd
of!i
('Ollsu7tIl ' -
(,'el',';
,j~
"" At
:\"IIlkill ~
aml S'li ~on ,
SE('HET
Fl'ell ('h FOI)Ofl.' ollle;al C'onfidC'!1i llltim;ltr "\1('('P:':" np,(rotialions \\'i (h '\"iet n;lll1 I"hi ch Ill;lY Ill' prolonged,'C \~ i (>tnam cl p1eg FL\lH 'P illlpre:":"cc1
<:: Tplp;,rr;1()] ::::?-!,~ , }r:I~' !), 10-lr., ::: p, Ill., frnm Pn l' i:" lint prillti'rl., hi m 'f;\\'('l'.lh 1" 1m! h(> r l',O';lr!l,'c! r ('cent del'p10pPll'qlS f nr16,dlill<l Chili;, distllrh:n .n: ;;'''('(' bp 1 iP\'pcl Chinp',,'" r'<l!l1l11:',I1c1rrs TI1 (lricl li n<l oprIl1,\' c1efyin,Q: nn df'l'!'l;1l,il1f)' (,I\i;lllg T\;l;-:"h('k 's ;.; illrpre ('lYon::: (,\'<lC\\,lt(' Tn<1ndlina, Chill(,"1' dfl('i:\l Paris ~ta(('l l H that Yirtlinm d('leg r: olllpo,oPll n\-e ('0111-
Pl'i'1II P (1, 1111t ('01111n lll1 i;::j'", rr "l' il.;',l thin nnn-C()n11111111i3I,~ :111(1 SllPI)(ll'iNl hy Yi pP':lPl jl(>!'ter nr Fr(> llclI Cnl!111111llii':", !h:1[ (,11il'p,o(, troop,: \\'n~:lcl 1'1- " ('11:1\ 1' , th:ll' (,h'nr:::l' n O\'j \';0\11(1 ],P 11(,l1tra1 , \'.-oul<1 not intennerli;l;'1' for .\ nn;ll11C'~l' ~~";pkT:' g' l::~ '~~ll~llOrt, ('011 0,\11 J ralllJi ol ),e\,\,e;;" Cltin(':::e <ll'pcu> try""Tel "l.!l';llll ~ :.2 7!1. }f;,.' 10, !!'li~,.j p, llllll,j"t,-. f ou l' nn p-('''Il ' lll ll pi ,-h,
Ill ..
frolll P:lri"
l1nl
01 '('
K11('l1l;nrall,Q',
be
<-, T('! ("~)'a!ll
illg
10, ll lldl'!'J\li,~(,
:'1[;1,\'
G, l!l-V;,
";1. Ill .. l10t
I,rint(' c l.
Jc.;l\'C
dOlllin:l~ell
Yi e t )1ill)1 pari y and It';Jder,,hip hopiilg Dong:'IinlI H oy i " \!'() illPO\\'PL
Cllill('::'C'-
6~(
8:)1 U.IlOl;;- H
{r :
ri "CIlI:i r
t .. le;.:ra m
Th e A c"ting S eCi'ctai'y of
... A t n:tn gkok.
CO XFfDEXTI.\L
81111('
0 t1icr l '8~6
LOllll oll. ) [0;;(:0\\' .
to r ed({ill. DiJ>70lll(lf i c and Consuhli' ,

) r()~(O\Y.
X ank iw:.
P,ni,;, :JIl!1 S,li;:",)J1.
Y'i~ASJ[lX(;'rox, :.\ Lty 11. I0-tn-II n . m . . Yi etllal~l HqlLlhlic 's President b c li eH~s s;ltisfactol'Y ;lgreement can be rene-hell \\"il'h FrC'llch, expn:,:,secl confic1<?llcc thcir good faith in Hanoi P;lris but c1istmbccl by French ncrions Saigon.
- A CIU:SOX
Th e Acting SecI'etl1l'Y of ""af(' fo CCllrm7 of the _ my O(,O"I'ge C, h J.l!arshrtll, at .-r. ud,'in[j

SECf1ET
'Y,\ S!f1X(;TUX . ~ray
Hi, 10-Hi--G p.
m.
1:3:-;. For n('Jlcral :',brshall. Dept concel'llC'cl by rep orts rpC'ci,-cc1 from bot h FrellC'h alld T-S sources i ndicltillg ~crious e!fects of conti nned pl'e~(,lH'C :):;nl Chinese .\ l'n~y ;\nc1 inc1 epClllIl'llt lln:t;; 1l0l'tlH'rn III (1cC ~ l;lla desp ite. ; gTecment to wlthc1ra\\' all troops hy :.\far :11 Ol' 1 ":\.])1' 15 nl lat cc;t . . '. .. Conslll Halloi (R,iilfotel :',In,l' 14) reports chll~e r [hell actions local Chi llesr lllilirnry Tonk in \yill eilibittcr Franco-Chill(':'3e relations (Sec Pari s Eml)tel () to Chullgking :.\fay !) .7) as well as oktJ'Uct recent
"Tl'l p;'. r"lll ~~~:~ tn Dp''lft!llent. :\ta~- n. l~)~G . :2 p. hut ~('e ('in'ula!" ( plp:~r;lnl of :'II ny l:~. 1 p. Ill.. p . - .
Ill.,
frum rnri~.
ll(>t
print ed,
prop-rf'''s Fral1<'o-Yi r t X;llll rclat ions . . \.l so thnt Yi:;t Xam Prbidl'l1[ hinted hi s tasks e:l:;iel' \\"h c!l ('hinese lean. Hanoi h!'li C'\"(I;'; that few problelll s facing Fl' enC ~ l and _\nn<lm c::il' C;lll be han111l'd unt il Chin('se
e'1\(~llnted.
. FrC'llch End) 'YL1 ", h :\b.Y !) ycrh ;tll y ('mplw<zec1 i lllpnri nnce French Go\"t. :tit:1C 11C'S to proll1pt C'hinesl' (,\';If'lHl" j Oll to a\'oit] fnl'ther imic1ents, nnc1 r e~el'l'e(1 po~ " ihili t y (''.";lcnn f io!) .'):1rc1 .\],IllY b.i- ship . Dept hE'ren.''; el"(;rytlling ]lo"~il)l(' should be clone 1lI'grl1tl.\' "j)(,E'cl C\:H'l1il(,-'n C'hi!w"l.' t]'(,n~)". TI L''lllC1st yOlll' ,ie\\'5 ns [0 \\-h at ar:ticn, if any, l!l;J.h t be tnkrll t -S (~Oit [0 as.: ; ist ill solil t ion this pl'Obje!~l, ;wcl yom' l'ecOlllm enc1d ions th ereon.
..'\.(,H1:5 0 X
68
S51G.()n /5- ~I) I'~
: CirC'u!nr tf'J"gram
TId' )~eCl'etI/I'Y of Stille 10 ('nIl/hi D':p70rlll!tic 0fFr-eJ.:i 1,

-"l.At
X:lnl~in"'" alld Th~\ II a~l1(>.

l fl-ll~, :~
:Uay 1-1,
p.
Ill ..
:lnll 1fJ3. }l:Iy 1:;.
T!li.:-; te 1 p!2't'i!'ill "':1~ "~l:-: ('<l f' n It\l'p;!l'nlll;:': 160. f:'ilI11 S,'igt>ll. ll':irhl"1" I'r\ntl'(1.
'YASlfIXGTOX,
CO:\,FT~F.XTT.\L
:"by :20, 10-Ul-S a. m.
D'.-\l'?C'!l'jp\I to El!,pt PreE' ;c1 rl'! Yi('lll,~m S0011 prior clep,\rture Fl'pnch, Yietn:~m c1('lpg:s Pari s for filln1 nt'g-i'tiatiollS 1'\, go\"emll.lrntal stl'llctu:'e In rl.or:h ina ,~1l (1 ':ir'Il,1m's status therr!ll. French propose fedp1',l' Ol"{;;\1l:zntioll I'l1c'e1' High C'0111m ;ss:O]l r l' ".-hl' C':;,p~'C;:::e 1"1'rl1c11 rnion's PO',\'C'1'S and \\-ith ..:\ s8C' lnb 1y initi,lie f ec1rm 1 le0:i sbtion . _\.ssC'lllbly ('01111'o:"('c1 Fl 1"n'1\ch 111E'1l1 bpl'::, 10 Hl(,ll1hC'l's p,tcll frpl!1 Tonkin, Al11'nl~" C'ncL inchin G: Lao:::, C'amhoc1ia. Eflch sr;,te forlll own go"t, t>led P;l.r1ial ~ l('nt, \'ol e (")\':11 con;::tjtl1l inn re(']'uit clpft'n"C' <"lrmy, fix bm'gd, Ol'!2";ll ' ;,ze n.:l"1ini -= trnf";on, rn,lct inl ~r wl.l h\\"s. Yietn;\1l1 COUlltC'1'-llrOl )('~ ;ll \\"0\1],1 limi t f'.'ll~rnl pO\\'er,< to cu<Joms policy Clll'l"ellC'Y find sl1npli es coorchia'ion, ,yon lc.l p1<1cP r el;lt:ollS l)('t";C'('n Yir :n:lm and fcdernt':oll on sial-us intel'llat iol1nl re'atiO!ls ,,,ith High ('Oll\l\l: ss ~ oner as GJ1lbass<Hlor to fe c1eration's member slates,
Th e ,("cO'etIfI'Y of Stl!te to tIle _ IIIOrl.'.'i(l(/OI' in Fr({nce (Crt(/Cl'Y ) -J

RJ'::::TltlC1TD
" '.\Slfe;mo:\"
jLty
Qn, 1fl-l:r,- ;} p,
/11,
2-1:27. COll:=:'l:1:lfe ~a:gnll l'i.i: :::c(l to ('on sul;\tc Genel'i.l1 elrpctiyc
llll-
mccli;\tely.
Inforlll FrC'llC'll GO\-C'l'lllllellt.
Th e r ice' Consul (It [[II no i (O 'S ul7i 1'(1 Ii ) to the SCCl'rin i'y of St(fte
:20, PleCl ;('> P:hS
.. H.\:\,o: , -:-Tay Qn. Hl-tli- G p. 111. fR ecein:cl :'ILly :2:~-ll : ;~n p. III I to General ":'If:tl':oh,lll fllI' in fOl"m:ltio!1.
59
The n' n re t Im'(' im ))01'1 ,til t pol i fica 1 pa 1't ies in Yi et X a 111 . T1ley 11 re \~i('t" ::'IIi 11 h L ('agll e, com pose(l of fOl'lller I n(lo-(,lI in ese ('olnl11llllist PHrt)" (PC1 cli ssohell itself XO\'('llllH'r ::)0, 10-1:.)) ancl D elllo('ratie Party, son r"ir ] Yi e(nam Caell ).[enh D Oll!': :\fillh Hoi, gen (' r:,lly referred to as DOllg :\Iilll i Hoi 01' D:\IH; and Yi etnHlll Quoe Dnll Dallg'. 1'h(,1'e ~lr(' ill addition sen'ra1 splinter part ies \yhi ch seem to sen-e ell ir. lh as wl \ ic 1rs for org;ln iz ('(l b:llld it ry. Doth Dong ~\l illh Hoi ;\lld 01l0(' Dall D nng seem ha\"e support of Chin ese. :\[ost :tc:lir e part of Yi et :\1i11h is factor composed of former
pel
m ('m h ('r~ .
\~let
Millh streng-Ill seellls to he sp1'en c1 tl11:'oughollt nort hern Ind oill
CTlin<l. Dong :\[il1h Hoi and QIIOC Dan D:lllg control teu itor.)' )[oncay, Ln ngson, \ Tilth Yen a 1'ea.40
"Yif'P Consul OSnlljl:ln. in tple:'rnlll r,0 . .TIll.,: 2G. 10J(). -l p. Ill.. 'frolll H:lJloi, r f']lorlp(l thp stl':Hly plillliIlntill!1 of all on:,lIlizt'(l o[>pn"itilln to !ltl' '-iet :'IElih Lea Q"llE'. Th p 11011((" :I[ililt II"i :lll(l Qll"(" Dall llall z It:lr1 l o,.:! i llflIH'Il("P II'illl t1w <l ep:lrtlll"(' of tll t' . 2lld Chiup,.:p .-\. l'l 11.\' frolll T,,"kiu. ( 8.'1G.()O/ I -:2I~IG)
As yE't no Catl101i c )l,nt)' has :lppeared nor (10 Catholics appeal' to he C'omI11itt e(1 to supnort of anyone p art\". Vi et :\rinh Leagu e ha s been mak ing tentntin 1110\'(,5 to eaptl1l'e Call101;(, Sll))])Ort but i;:; said to be too 1',\(li e;\l 10 obtain fnll roopeI'<ltion from church.' In \ie\,; of fnct Cl1\ll"c-ll cbiJ)l;:; million lllPllll)f'r;:; in Tonkin.f!, and .\nnam (large percenl'ng'e h pjieH'c1 to hE' ';rice Chri stialls"), it seems Pl"Ob;\hle that Catholi cs as.r:rollp \\" ill rnot?l ),Plllaill lon o;,lhsellt frolil nolities. Sent D ep;trtmcl~t, r epeated X anking ; Sa igon informed ail'l1l:1 ir
OS"CLL1Y.\X
70
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Secti on 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. B y: NWD Date: 2011
1un'e })(,"ll 01' ,0 , ,d (0 c\' <\c\ln(e h~' hll(l :1nc1 to rl',l~h Chin('~(' territory befol''' 10 .; 1 lle ,or, \\'cathcr permitting, hefore thi' ell',l of ~lay, TIe maining c1i\isioll is 1\0\\' at ITnipllOng n,,'aiting tmn::;porL!lioll to .Japan. ,At. request of Foreigl1 sc.\.p luts ueen inform ec1 of , foregoing.
omce
S;\IYTH
851(;,00 Ifl,j{fl : Telo;!ralll
The rice C'onsulilt Hanoi (O'Su71il'llll) to the Secl'etlli'y of State

H.,\ XOI, .Tnne ;\ 10-l:G-5 p. m. [Hecei \'Cc1 .T nne G-7 : ;,):2 a . 111 ,] 36. Hi Chi :.\Iinh proLnLly ",ill cnll at AmEmbn ssy shortly , He. h as constantly ginn me impression he \,OU 1cl pay great ,1l tent ion to any suggcstic-,s made by D ept. CO::-'TffiEXTI.\L
851G,OOjf)-;;,\r, : 'l'e!c;!l'ilm
The Fice (}on8l1l at nillwi. (O 'Sulli"IUI) to tll e Se(,l'etrllY of Slate

H ,\xor, J \lnp ii, 1!HG-S p. lll. [TIecci\'ec1 .TullC G-I0: ,I:;') n, 111,1 37. Thf'l'c is gI'O\\'in,!?: C'oll\'jctioll ill Y iet Xnm circles that principal ,'!!,'Ot'j:tt iOlls ",ill be futlll'c stntus of COCItill pDint in\'ol l'(:<l in Paris IH C hinn :111(1 ho\\' it ,,-ill hf' clete1'l11illPcl, V iet X'lme<'E'!!.'Pllpr:1l 1y HilTPP that \\'ithout CocItin China :til)' inde, pellc1E'IH'e \\' ill bE' largr )y throl'et iC'll. Vi et Xnm no;,;iJion l'ep:;I]'(l i ng rrfrl'f'l1tlll111 a]))>eflrs to 11,,1\'p un(lel'O"one extensi\'p cktnges. Hn Chi ~[illh \\'110n he signed COIl\'E'nt ion ~f ~rnl'ch (ith \\':lS (,~Il\'i!l ('E'(l tllat in nny "fail''' referelldum Cochin . ClI inn \"011 hlllot j/o/p."l to ait a ('11 i tse 1 f {O Yiet :'\:1 m, l Im\'('H' ]', D;t 1at \o!lfl'rpll('e (1p\'g'a t ion nl1P,HPllth- l'f'tlll'llecl to Hal10i \"ilh l'palization that Yirt Xam strE'llgth in Cochin China \\'<1S d iminishing, This they :Ittl'ilillte to French pl'opag:\1Hla flild nl)SellCC of 'fl'Pefl0l11 fol' thpir ()\nl :Igell t~. Rpa1i zation of diminishing 'i~iet Xam strE'I1!',(th in Cocllin Chin:1 is probahly principal 1'f':1:-'011 why Ho accol11p ,lll ierl dE'lpg'ation to Paris. He l10pps to I'each s:ltisfa('tol'Y sohltion on thi s nll,imj)or::tll t qllestion on basis of num erous fricll(bltips y,hicIt he lw s \\'ith L eft lYin g French circl es.
71
Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Sectio n 3,3 NND Project Num ber: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 2011
CONFIDENTIAl ,
FL'pndl hen' gin; illl[)],t':'sioll tlll'Y \\'()1\lllllo( o]ljed (0 l'd'en'llllllllt i'n Corhin Ch :.l.H. Ho\\'e\'(~ r, (hey ill(li ca(\:' ll ll')' \\'oll lclllO( Cim:' to al]o\\' eOlllpl ete ('lTellolll for Yi el Xalll agell!s tllel'e, Th eil' oi>jedioll is (hat sHch a~"(,llts I\'ou ld l'(';;Ol't (0 terl'Ol'i:-lll (0 illflllPllce \'oie, (Thel'e secms to he certain :llllount of jll:';l ilicatiol\ for li'rl'llcll contcntion. Yi el Xalll polic e ha l'(' i H'(,lI tr\:'ating' pro-F rellch Yi pl Xnll lC'~C ancl ~ rctis \I' illt Frellc h llaliollalily L'a tllL'rs(',\'lrc.ly ill TOll kin ,) Ou tcomc of any rel'erelllluill \\'oull! pl'olJalJ ly ]>" largely llell'l'lllillCcl' by cOllllit iOll S uucler which it Il'ou ld be held, Frelldl feel Cochill Chi na, ,,'oulcl I'ole SOl: fot' auioll olllY. Yi et Xa lllc la illl Cochin Chilla " 'olllcl \'ole S07r for ill corpornlion \I'ilh \,Tict :lam. Doth clnim[s] 11 fl \' e all ullspokell pr olllj'~e [F /'elll:"e? ] th at clni lllallf ('ould' e,;tablisli con ditions of rctel'(, lI (l11lll, Xeut ral 0],::c]'\'er5 here f el, l \ 'Ole illreferelldum fr ee of ull due illfl u\'lIce frOlll eitll el' o;ic1e \\' oullI he close. S ent D ept as 3i, June 5, S p. 111.; repeated Xankillg, Saigon informed' n.i rlll :'l i 1.
O'S CLLI O?-;,
Declassified per Exec utive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Num ber: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 2011
851G,OO/ j' - j',!':: Tclt-;:rnlll
Th.e .,lmbass({doi' in FtlOlr:e (Caflery) to the S('Ue.trll'Y of State

P,\RfS, .Tuly 7, Hl-lG-l p, In, [Recein>d .Tuly 7-12: :~9 p, m,] 3:i21, Opening' of Frilnco-Yid Xam conferellCl" at FOlltainl"blc'l11 yesterday brought to an appill'Cllt pnd prc-cOnfl"l'ellCe hOll eYll\()on period during "'hich French and Indochillese officials had ri\"alecl ,\\"](,11 eilcll oth~r in (li:;plays of Franco- Yict :\am friellcbhip, After long \\':Iit for ,\dllliral Thi erry cL\rgenli eu snppo:;ec1 to preside OYel' confercnce, un expected' am10\1l1Cement "t h:ll ".\.dmiral '''as indisposed'; cl'eatec1unpasiness illldl'umors to etrect \~i et X;llll clelp!!'ates had ntoecl presidency of Thil"lT,)' cL\.rgell l1eu \\'ho, in their e,res,' "typifi ed Fl'ench imperialism'l, Max .\nrlrr, head of FI;'<'llch delegation, assnming Prpsiclenc}, at last, moment, cl e li\'E~red inllocllons speech of ,,,elcome .lllel el ccLrecl conference opl"n, ::\[1'. Ph1ln Yall Doug, head of Yi et X.llll cll"legation, imllll"diiltely protestpd agaillst thi s unilateral assmnption of the clwi:': of the direction of the proceedings, In a fighting spl"ech ,,'hich COlltrnsted sharply "'ilh plntitlldes of .\ndrr's address, he went immediately to the core of the \\,Ol'st difficulties \\'hich tIll' confel'cnce \yill haY6, to fnce, In slwrp \\'orL1s, he Pl'otpstcd againO'-t "th e mutilation of the , Viet 'Xalll -:'IIorh erhnc1" t11rollg11 th e crcation of n,n illllepenc1ent state, of Cochin Chin:1 outside of the Yi et' :\nlll , He \I'ent on ('0 accuse the,' French ,lllthoriti es in Inc10chinn of hayin g yiolatcc1 thc accords of, Dalat ot -:'IIarch (i, 19-iG and of 11:1\'ing used these aecon1s to penl"trilte ' peaceflllly in th e north \\'hilr Illilihn} operations \\'ere bei ng cal'l'ieel ' on in the south and in th c intrrior. This lIne~qwctecl oifc'nO'-i\'e of the Yi pt Xalll clelpgat ioll Ol~ the first cla~' has createcl a sPllsntion, Illcl pj)l"ndent and impar(i'll Combat: gel1l1illely intcr(>stl'cl ill colonial P I'Ohlt'n IS, lll'adlinp:=; \~i et Xalll accllsa tion a('\,os;:: the clltirc first page and rCL'oi-!'nizes Frcl1ch mistakes m:H11" in Indochina , ("OllllllUlli st [lu l/I(llIil1' frankly sides \\'ith Yi et Xnlll, Socialist:=; J>(;/J117({;i'1' gins fail' and illlpart i,ll accollllt in a ,-ein sympat hct ic to Yi et Xnlll, ~Inp, _1l1bc regrets :,tlwt 1"relll.'h gooel\yill did not fillcl n cOlTespolltlillg' pcho' ~, In th e 'conselTati\'p ,mel ' Xat iOl1itli st papers there is literally nn explosion of \\T,lth against Yi et Xalll cleleg:It iOll, In(,l'P;lsing'ly Lcftist hut al\\'ay3 nltTa-X:li ionalist Ol'rli'1' (l"l'lllS Phan ~ 'nn Dong''::; siatrlllcnis "sllof'killg" :Clld alre:lCly blalll Ps y 'id XnlH f()l: all\' fllt'llre hI'P;]b10\\'l1 ill ])('gol iatiol1s, .\ll thesc p:\]wrs play lip yiohtions of Dalat :cgl'ePIllC'lIt hy th p Yi pi Xam flllcl l1lH1 crlill c n:;;~as:,;illations, ki(lll'lppin~:: and rapr of EU1'Opeans as j ustification of continu ed militar)' opcrations by Frellch expec1ition<1l'Y corps, On the whole COil fpl'PllcE' 11:1(1 gottrll ofl" to bncl sta rt. \~ ipt Xil m Ipac1ers :tl"o C'xpress t.hpir l'pgn't tlIat confrrence "of snch considerable im])Ortal!('p" ShOllh1 hp IICl(l outs ic1 e of Paris, Int pre;;t in g, to noll" thai Yl"sterc1:\y afl emoon C:Oll YCl'S:l ( ion h cld behn?ell ITo Chi ~[inI 1, Yi ei Xam Pre:-;illE'nt, nllcl ,\If!,'er ian depuli es of' fri ends of ll1:cnifc"'i grollp h pi\(lc<1 hy Ferhat .\hb:1S (my clp:,;p,\lch 5;')71 of .TIll) :; ") 011 sin1ilari(y het'.\'pcn probl em;; facing ,Al geria and
RESTRICTED
Fl'l'll;lt,,\td"I":,
it !'Pll()l'rp(l ,111 illh'l'\'ip\\' ,,'itl! tl!r ,\kl'rillll f111tOlltlllli.,t I p;1th'!' , .\ (]Pl',-;:;)! i lllt of pjt'\'Pll ,\j ~('ri,,1t r1"[1lItip.-;, l'''IIl\I!'i~ill;.!' th' prr>in flf-pt'I1(T"Il<'( ' [!!'Otlll. "f1t'IIlO('I,,)ti(' uni(l!1 in ra\'or of tll(' :\I :;l'r i'lll :-'l:lllifl'~t", \\,;1": ill Pi.! ri,.:, ( S-i lIU1(lj 7-:;,U;)
'"
~f)t prillll~l:
Viet Xal1l, Sent Dept as :.n~:;, repeat ed Lonclon as 509 ,
73
Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Secti o n 3.3 NND Project Num ber: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 20 11
8')H;.OO IS~ :!.jG
T~l c ;:mm
Th e A/IIo(I.';'(ldol' in Ft,rtllre (('a fj'ci'Y ) to f7l(' ,c,'CCI'('flll'Y of Slate
.\.llgllst Q, 10..Hl-G p. 111. [HeceiYed s: IG p. m.] 3801. Yi et X,un delegat ion al FOlltainebleau confercnce yestenhy broke oH' neo'of iation s on ,~t'Ollll(l th.1t Ft:ellclt ha\'e yiolated ~rar('h 6 <"' . rrcconl by cOl\\"oking ne\\' conference nt Dab!. Head of deleg,ltioll nl1eged that French intend to use ne\\" DaL1t conference (to ",hidl Viet Xam W;1S not im'itecl) to engineer their O\\'ll slatute for IndoChinese fc(ler,lli on and to fix futlll'f:> of C'ochin Cllina and other are,1S c.la imec1 by Yid Xnlll. H e added that Font,linebkw confercnce is not. terminat ecl hut only sllspencletlunt il French cle,11' lip thi,: '; eC]ui\'o~ cal" situ,ltion , Delegat ion \yill relll,'l in a t Fontain ebl e,lll for tim C" bein~ an(1 is prep:1recl to Il1nintain contact \\'i th French dcleg,ltes on uilo!1icia l b,l Sis, This dec isi on h<1s becn r ecei\'('c1 by press as a kind of bomb shelf althollp:h reports 1);1c1 hee n ('l.1l'l'ent that cOllfE' rence \\",1.S entering a. eritil';d sr,1ge ancl that liP rTloJ, Chi :'finh, \,"ould dep,lrt soon for Inclo Chilla, Pl"l's.;; rpact ioll has follo\l'erl expected lili es \\'ith left .. ,yin." Ol'!~',lll;:; jll;:;t ifyillg: cl eci;:;ioll \\"hil e rigllt,,\\" ing <111(1ra<1ic;tl papers aCCIFe Yi et :\am of blac'kmail and ill sist tllat" Frellce helS perfect right to con:::lllt orller peoples of Illdoch ill 'l ill par,l11el Dahl' conference, R,Hli cal _tUt'fit' I' delllanc1s th ,lt F],,1I1rC shall not "abdi ca te" in Indo .. chill,l and ;1(10))[s f:jlofju(' lill e ill cl!argin~ tll<lt "olher imperialisms:' nre ut iliz;n .Q -ri et :\am for 0\\'11 pllrpo;::es, 11[01l11r in si:::ts that France is playing rol e of imp,tl'f ial arbiter and must not retrc,lt bpfore ultimatulII. J[(mdp al so takes ofl' gloycs \\"ith respect to Ho Chi :'fillh. r e<'allillg th,lt he \ \";15 friend of Doriot and that in 10~.l he ))llhlicly expressed (Ierermillation to "break oil' all reO. laliolls \" itl! Frellch people":. COXFlDEXTLI.L
PAllIS,
CONFTDRNTTAJ ,
Am ollg c1 pfenc1el's of Yi(,t" Xam l'umnnlllist llllli j./(llitri is most oulspoken, Imlepellc1ellfs COI/10llt continllE'S to stress "the Hagrant dissona nce ': bet \H'{'n Frellc 11 stat"ell1ellts in P,ui; and Frenc It pol icy in Illclor hin<1 \I'l!icl! h<1s recent ly amolllltecl to a "pro\'oc'lt ioll". Combat expects ser iolls reperclIs.;:;ions ill Indochina, Callght in the lllitlLll e, bolh Socialists and :'fTIP are ell1Dari"1.ssec1 and worriec1 , Pop1l1/{il'(' bla mes _\.c1miral (L\.rgenliell for unjllsti .. fiahl e poli cy \\'hi ch 11l1lsthe repllcli,ltcc1 by FrE'nrh Go\'el'l1ment. VAllbe, on other hancL hIke's ap:p:rie\""Ccl [stallc1! ] anel in sists D nbt conference is cntirely propcr ullder :'[nl'ch G accord. I3<1udet, one of Forpigll OftiCE' r1 pleg,ltes <It FOllt,lillchle,lIl, admits si hwt i011 is s('rious but l)e 1ie \'es confercnce \\" ill resumc in n week or ) 0 (hys, H e insists nc\\' D,lht confe>l'l'l1ce is only c:o.:ploratory and consultat i\'e, Ihuclet ollce ,\gain inc1iratecl French oflki,Jls are not parti cli larly anxious (0 speed up \\'ork of FOlltainehlr;1ll cOnfE'rCllc('. ane! are quite \\'illin,!.!" for rel:!tions \\'ill! \~ i et Xall1 to cont inue under prese,nt n,!2.T~rlll~lIt untilille pilcillcat ion of Illclodlin<l allc1 part iCl.llarly COClll1l ClIma IS completed, He a(h1e(1 tll,lt secllrity sit u,ltion in Cochill Cllin,l is more sprioll,) than FrPllcll pu1)li<.: is a\;al'c . Sent Dept ,1S :~,3(Jl; Dept ple"se rcpe,lt to S'li!:.;on : repealed London rrs 578, ~ . ..
C~\rrEHY
74
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number : NND 63316 , By: NWD Date: 2011
8,,1 G,Oo,',,,-a,!G
Jle7ll0"(flid/lil~ by the ('hief of the [)il'ixioll of Soutli.ell,,;t .:lxilill .,LJfrti,'8
(JIotl" t) to the Di.lectol' oj the Office of (T 'il/cent)

R~ce nt
Flu
E(ldel'll A.tluil'8,
[\\T,\ SII!X(,'W;-; .J .\ Ugllst 0, 10,16, , cl cn>l oplll eli rs indicat e that the French arE' 1l10"iilg to reg,lill n, large l1l enSl ll'e of th ei r control of Im10cl lin a in ,' iolation of th e spirit of th e ~hl'clt G conl'cntion. The el'idence, as :oet fort 11 helm\' , SllggC'sts thnt th E' FJ'C'nch arc attempting to ~a i n th C' il' ol)je('tilc by mnnOelllTeS des ig ned to confine and \I'ea,k en Yi et Xal1l, III Ill e el'ent that Yi et Xall1 c1eci(les to rC's ist these elll'l'o;lchments, \yhi elt is by 110 me,lllS ulllikC'ly, I,-ides pread llOst iliLi es m;lY resll lt. The chief oppositioll to the l'PC'''tab 1 isll!1IE'llt of Frcnch rill e in Ind ochina has all a long (,0111C' f!'Olll th e .\nn;lm ese, \\'ho inhabit the thrN> east cO:lc;t;11 p1'l)1' in ccs of Tonkin, .\n n;lll1, and Coc:hinchin;l, \I hi ch once COl1lpri~cd th~ Killg(lolll of . \ nl1an1. Th e populations of th e othE'r (1\"0 COllntri~s of Inc1 ochina-':"Ca Il11 >oc1i;1 and Laos-are not in. a hi g-II stafe of polit ieal c1 f!n~ loplllcnt or ill any conc1ition s(' ri ollsly to resist Frelldl COllt m1. ,.A !JIorlus (,;I'(,IIt/i J)ptI~-cen nlc Frelldl and the Anname sC' \I'as achie\'ecl in thc prrli lllillary connnti on of ~rarc h G, 19-1:6, Ly whi rh th E' .\nllHlllesc ;;n c[>uldi c of Yi ct Xam" 11":1 ;;; recogn ized as a free state Iyithin the Ill(l ocTlillcse Fc(lemti on ancl thr Yi ei Xam GOHl'I1llH'nt c1 e(:Ltrcl1 its rea c1iness to reee il" c the Frellch _\rm)', The COlwClltion le ['( for futm r ~etl l elllC'llt \"\\'0 crucial problcll1s : th e statns of Yi et Xalll in its e:\temal relatio ns, ;111(1 th e ~!:cogl'apltical e,\Jent of Yi el :.'\am, On thc form rr p oint, the prO\'isioll<l l agreement statecl that ;'each cOlltracting party \yill take all necessary measures . , .55
w Olllb ~ i ()n indi('a ll'(]
ill the original.
to Cl'pn i'e th r Lnor:!1)l C' atmo:::phcrc ner-eSS:lry for all il1llll ccliat c open ing of amie:lblc, tlnc1 free negotiations, Th c;::e Ileg-oriat ion;;; \\'i11 bear partiellbrly upon dipl omat ic rC'lat ions h"(II'een tlH' Yi et Xam ancl foreign sta t C's~ nil' fut I1re statlls of IIH1or:hill:l. French eC'onom ic ancl cultl1r;ll illil'rr:::t;;; in '-iet Xalll." On tll e latf er point the> :l,greelllcnt ,stated that ;;\\'irh re:=lll'<"1 [0 th e h rin!?:in[!' to,o:etller of lI e threE' (prO\- incc;:L th e Frcl1c h GOI"!'rlllllent [ll ec1~'es 'it'"eH to ratify tIl e c1eci:::iolls takell l)y th p pnpltlafioll'-; ('oll,-ultC'd by referendull1. " The crllX" of Ihe prC"cllt sii\lat iOIl li p::: ill thc ,lpl>:11'el1t' in tent ion of the French to O'c[t 1e both })latters to their 01\"11 nlh-antage anc1 \yit1lOut reference to Yiet
Xnm,
75
Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Sectio n 3,3 NND P roject Number: NND 633 16 . By: NWD Date: 2011
The hOAilily 0:' tlll' .\ nnallle,:;p tOll-arLl the Fr'~llch beg;lI1 to monnt t o its pre:;ent inten:::il \" II"11('ll rhp 1.','o':r!1 en .Tulle 1 nnnO\1IH '('([ t1w
i-na\1gllr~\tion of the Prol'i"ion:d Gnn'rIl111ent of th e R epuhli c of Cocl1inc-llin;l. .\ ])n:II11t':-'P le;lIler,,;; 11:111 lOll,!.!" PIIlI,h:15izrd tllC'ir l"ipl\- that thC' inf'lusion of Cfwhin ('l1 illa in ,-jel ::\al1l \I-ns a matter of li fe and de;ltll to tll0i1' cOllntry, Cocliincllina , it Illny he nlPntioned, contains the important llwr,:nni ill' cit it's of S;ligon and Cholo]), in('111(1(:5 th e mouths of the :\[ekon,!!', an(1 is the ri ehe,.,t pro"ince in Tndochina , Callpcl thC' Southern Prol-inl'c by the Yi et Xanl ese , it is ra cia lly indistinct {t om Tonkin and.\nn;llll, St;ltements b,\- the French thnt the r eferendulll in C'ochin chin<l (as pledged in tlte }fnrch G connntinn) -wollld srill be held failed to 1'eas:;Ul'e YiC't Xam le;HlC'rs, who pointed Ollt that snch a referemlulll cou ld not possibly be fair o\,'ing to the suppres-s ion hy t]; e French of pl'o-'~icr Xam politic,tl parti es and of nIl anli-FI'pnch opinion, SE_"-\ information tends to suhstnnt iate thi s point of ,-iCIL Tension hell\'('en the Frellc'h and the _\l1nallle",e reached its present pit'Ch \I-helt th e Frcnch (lll _"-ngll:"t 1 conn'nell a conference at D;llat (in southern .:\.nnam) l(l Il'hicll the Royal Gon'111l1lellts of (':lmhoc1ia and Laos, the c;.ol'('l'lll11ent of th e autonol11ous Repuhlir of Cochinchin:1, and the natil'e l)('oplcs of soutIH'l'l1 _\.nn:1111 and high plate.w of Indoch ina (but 1I0t Yiet :lam, rcc()gn ized by the French as part of the Indochina Federar ion and Fn'nch "Cninn) to send cle1e,!,r;lles to "stndy the fl;l1ll('\\'ork of the French l~nioil" , SuhsC'rlll(.'ntly puh, 11shecl agencla of tliC' coltference indi ca tecl that the saliC'nt aspects of the Indochina FeL1crnl'ion wOltlll nl ~o bp delillemtecl , :\ s an immediate resn lt of this cOllfercnce, th e '~iet Xam drkgatioll \I'hi ch lwcl been di scu;::si ng' the future relation behl'('p n Fnlncp and Yi et X;~ !1l \\'il"11 th e representnti\'es of thc French at Foullt:linebleau since J\tly G annO\tIH:ecl that tllPy were sllspemlil1[( IlPgotiations until the French sho\tld h:1\'e cleared lip thr "C'Cjui\-OC,l l" situation \I-hich had he en cl'r:.Jpc1, The llead of the '~iet Xanl clelcg,l(ion, Il'ho had oprned th e confprence \I-ith a yiolenl bl.l:'i( ngainst Frel1ch poli cies, ch:11'ge(1 that the Fl'C'I1('ll \1-e1'e nOI\, trying to engill('('r their O\\'1l statnte for th e Inc1ochillE.'se Federari oil and their 01\"11 settll'mellt of th(' status of Cocltillc1lin:1 ane! oth er al'C'as claimecl hy Yiet Xalll, Th E.' "iC'\\' of Consul Saigon is 11 0t \'C'l'y clifh'rent. ITe g;l\'(' as llis opiniol1 that n, f ront again st '-iei X;l11l Il'as ill the llwkin,!:, th:l(' the stat-es partieipn,t il1p: in tlle Dalat ('ol1fcrel1cr \\'err at least tn citly J' ('cogllizcc1 as, f r('(' states by tlt e Frrl1('h. and tlint' France nnd thC'sp frrc states are no\\' dp(erl1llning th e S!:l(ns of th e Illll oc'hine:"C' fecIcr:tti on Iyitho ut l'pferencE.' to Yiet Xa111, In hi s \-i ell' it inr.licated douhle-dealing on the part of the Frenc11. and ltp rE.'pol'tcll tlHlt the Frenclt COllllltissioner for Co{'hinc:llill:t llac1 forc cd (hr issue by threatening' to re:.;ign unl ess h is poli cy is canicd Ollt , Sothing 11;1" Ilcen saiel at tllr cOllference about a refel'C'llClulll. FiI1;tlly, CO llsu l Saigon added th at he had' leal'l1P(l j'hat rcpn>:"cnhlli"es of (liP sOlltlic-m regions of the T'l'O'.-ince of .\ nnill11 (,,:hidt h~lo'; alll'ay;; !H;c'n chimec11 ly Yi et Xam) \yill petit ion 1'0], illC)IlSioli of their tl'l'iturir,:; i1\ ('oc'hill('h in;., III \-iel\- of the cOll1pl e(Pllc,:;s of the :l,!.!'l]Hla of the D~lLtr Conferenre, \\"hicl1 COH~rs th E' P:'-:"C'!ll i;!l fn llll(>I\'(lrk of th e Jnc1 orliillC'se federat iOIl . amI in \-ie'lof Ih p dl'l il)C']';](r C.'\C'lll",ioll of Y; pr Sam frolll th e con ference, the cOlidll~ic)ll j,-; in!'''(':q1a!,lp thnr thp. F'1'e]1f'h ;HC' l'1Ic1l';ll'(ll'ill,2' to Irllitr1e clown Yi l't X;11I1 <t1lc1 t<) ""'t ll' the fllllll'p.fol'nt of or~:11liz:lti()n of l11clocli [11;\ \':i t II I ho:,l' \yllo 1l1:ty be cxpc(:tNl to 1)e amel1;,!)le to Fl't'liCh infiu Clll'C,
CONFIDENTIAL
--c
{O
A n namese, r eact ion to Fr(>nc 11 1l\0\"l'S has been sha rp. and Inl1o\y inp: ' th e sllc:pension of the FOll!ainehlc;lll lll'gotiaiions, th er,' \\'PH' pro- Yi et :Kalil 1l1allifestatiolls in ~;lig()n, T he ;ll'llbllSh of a Frellch supply colllmn n(><11' Ihnoi by .\n nallle;;e solllil'rs, during wlli ch the 1" I\,]]('h suffered ;"):2 easllalties (one of tlle \\'orsf of !HallY inci(lents durin;2' th e' p ast sc\'era] months), 'may hay e beell relatecl to th e open ing of the DaJ:lt ('ollfel'l'l\cc, 'Yhile it is 1 he c1ou!Jtell that th e Frenc-11 "ill a1l o\\- the Fonhtil1e-0 bl eau COllfen'llee t o break c1o.\\'11 cOl1lpletrly , Ell1b:I:3SY Pari ,:; qll otes Bamlet as lla\'ing stated that Frel1ch oHici:\ls arc in IlO hurry to speed 11p ncgo{ iatioll s unl il Ihe pa ci/kat ion of Illdochilla, and particu larly of' Corliillchilla, h;lS berll cOlllpleted , In thi s cOlll1cC'tioll, COl1sul Saigon r eport;; th:lt !\lore troops are atT i\'i ng: ill I nllocll in<l Clnll Ih;lt the French military position h;IS gro\\'n ml1rh strongl'J', :\ fe;\11\\,hi le, the Saigon press has been carrying: \'i trioli r attacks against Yict :.'\<1111. Sillce thi s prr!"s is conJpletely conl]'olled by the French, th ere \\'ouhT appear' to be no ollicin 1 ob ject ion to thi s 1ine, . I n his btest report, COll sul Halloi states tllat th ere 1l0~'- exists an immincnt (hngcL'of an open brenkbc-t\\'cen Ihe French anlT Y ict Xfl!n. He adcls th at n. rnptme of relat ion :; \\'()ltlc1 pr()b;l1Jly l;c f()l1o\\'ed by ~ period of nnarchy and that, although the Fn'lIch could Cjlli ('k ly 0\'[21'run tlle country, th ey cou ld not--as tlley th cl~lse hes admit-pacif)' it excepl through a long amI hi to C1' mil iIn ry opera i iOll . t In ron clusioll, it is SE.\s "ie\\' th;li the .\. l\lI:lllleSe arc fa ('eel ,yith th e choice of a costly submission to tlle French or of opell l'('sistnnce, and that Ihe French lIl ay h(' preparing to resort to force ill 0l'l1er to secure th (' il' positioll tlll'O ll~'hout Indochina , It may not be <1<h'i""lb1e for this (;oH'l'l1mcni to LIke offici-all\ol-ice of this situ ;ttion during Ihe Peace Conference,"" but the Depart lilent sllOu lll be pl'cpa lwl, SE:\.
~e E' YO!. -
.. For d OC 'U!ilE'llt:ttion OIl thE' conference, h plcl oet\\'('l'n .July ~D and October ]3', , pp, -- ff,
beli en's, to express to tlle Frl'llCh, in yic\,- of om int erest in 1 e ;l nc1 )(>;)c, orderly c1e\'elojllllent- of depcndent peoplcs, our hope th ,lt they \yill febic1 e by the sp i 1'i t of th e jIa ['eh GCOllnn( iOJ), " A[IH\OT] t[o,,"] ~I[ofF-\TJ
77
8;;lG.OO ,'S- 17~r,: T,' I"~r "m
Tlie
('OIUiL!?
(It
.Sui:;on (Reed) to the Sec/'etl/r'Y oj Stote

S.\100X, Au gust 17, H)-kG-lO n, m. [Rccei \w1 _\.. Ugllst 18-,:2 : ;') :) :1.. In. ) .
COXFIDEXTT,\.L
3-1-~ ..\t Dalat cOllfercllce. \Y];icl! clo,::ec1 011 1-:I:th, delt'gat ions inre
r e<1so11n hh ullallimou s as to desil'cll stl'llC'tllre alll~ scopr of feclr[';ltioll and l'ClatiOllSllip of mcmber states \\'ith f eclei'nt ion and e,tell other. Cochin-C'hin esl' delegat iOllS "o\\'eel [dr7c g llfioil sholl'ed] 11101'0 iudeprllc1 ellce of t hougl1t than otl1er c1rl egat ions :lncl follo\\'ecl h'ss :;1.1'-ishly Frellch pattern for Indochina of future. This is part to impress C'ochill-C'h ill cse allc1 to help lessl' 1l hclief pn'.:.:cnt C'oL'llinChincsc God only a pll[>]lrt, h\lt a;; prr\'io\lsly l'l'porrec1 lllf'llllJers of thi s god sincen'ly ,,'allt morr i'recc1011l of action :111(1 les:-: domination by French. ,\\~hile finding,.; ;Ind l'c coll111len(latiol1s of cOllf(']'('l1('e nol binding they appe,ll' (0 hc reason;1hlc basis for futlll'c, l)l]t ir is rcrt:lin Yi et Xa m \yillfilld 11l11r-h f;lult thrre\\'ith, flS they fall short of the lar~er deg1'ep of inc1epe!1(lelll'e c1c;; irecl hy tll<1t state. Gro\l-ing heli ef Hi gh C'ol1lIl1i:;sioner and Conlllli::;.~ ioner for Cocltin-China 57 m,l) go as th pir policy subicrtr(l ill(']' r ac.:in(~ (']'iticis111 hel'c flml 1'epo1'l rc11y in Francp, particularly in rallillg- Thlat cOnfl'l'l'lH'C l-::110'x inp: Yi d X"111 cOldrl ohjrct and in creat ill!: ('0(:hin-C1Ii11;1 G od \\'itllout rpfPl'el1Ce to l'Pfl'],l'1ll1nlll . TT()\\'l'ypr, thl'Y arglle 110 rea"nn "'11:' Frrll ch Yi d X,ll11 n egot iat ions SllOlllcl decillr flllul'e \Iitllour rrll'l'C'llr(, to 01 hp], "tntr" <lilc1 that 1 1('l'es;,;;11'\' ailll()"pherc for l'ef('rPllclll111 is l:lckill;,! (lane:' prol),1Lly true a;.; allY refp],pn(11lJll ll!lller cxisting' rOlll.litinnc.: llli~'ht \1' (']1 increase pflrli san acti\'iti p;,; ). -CnqU e..; tiollal)ly IXJI11 ofli('ials arc Ie,,;; li bera l in "ie".-s re nafil'p neopl p;; than \I-h"n fir:::( C;lille io French In(]ochillil. X(':d mO\'e \yill be sllhmis:::ion 11;1.1.-]( ])rono~Hls io Fl'(,llcll G()\'t and flth' J!lnlj'() r('I'(11l<' il (' nro]1osal-; 1\'iLll FOlli;lillph1p;lll ;l,:pn(la. ITO\I'e\-el', regan1k:.:,., :::O\1I1<l"r"" mallY th ese Pl'ol)o ~,\ k (lilTi l'l1lt [ol'l';.;ee allY p':r('at c1('!rl'ep "l1c('e~::: ill O1ho\'(' so lon o; ac.: C'oc-hin China ~i an apart from Yiet Xam, \\'hich is one point of Frenrh policy in Frcn ch Indochina.
~
"'I
REED'
Th e .-1ct;lIg Sccl'et((j'Y of St({fe to

SEcnC'I'
fli p r071su7
at S((i:;OI1 (Reed)
,Y.\SHIX(:TOX, Sept ember -:1:, 1\I,W-:'i p . m. 2,to . .\clion mt el :3;')-1- ..\u~ Q() cOllllllcnc1cc1. 5g Lo:;e no opportunity
os Not jlrilltffl.
COllnfrl'act \Iith pel'.~ ()ll;; ]'r,,])ons ihl e lJl'PS'; oricnt,1/ ion , ;llld in manner yon (1r (,111 l1lo:;t eiTeet i I'C'. Fr\'llch C010lli;11 trll c lpllr\, pict 1ll'E' rs as flggres:.;i\'(' :1]111 inqll'ri ali st ic, Tlli::: br i lw" rcrrain FrPll('h ('olonial~, un'., it-t ip!.'!1\- for most part, \'('l'\' ('103e to Comml1nist Party line. ,\Yit!l hi :; kn o\l-lrrlgl' Clal'<lC (l'elll'tl'1 :;;,7 .\..u .!!: 20) :::110111,1 ];:nO\\, beftp r tll<ll l Pll('0(1l';1P-t' ;w ! i-.\.mpl'i c<lll Sll."Dicioll.:; ihis ,illllctUl'r Frnn('o_-\ 111rrir<l)) 1'1'1:11 ions, :1/ 1 c1 1I('!)t !w ji('\'l'.:: lJe (';111 br P Cl'SllHcl('cl i'ake and 0:5 /(,1' attitude J'l'(jllil'crl by log'ic e\cllis.
rs
CL.\ 1.'10 X
78
Th e Ar:tilifl SCCl'ctm'!/ of Stifle to tile

SF.cr.rr
COIISl{l
fit S;II[/01l (RN'd)
' Y.\SlllX"GTO)',
S ept emh: r 0, l !1Hl-:! p. li1."
stat p rSSIl (({) anxi ous see Fro Chi ')fillh SllCCl'l'd unite I,hree I\y::: 1Il111er '~iet ~:U1l. for possible ('1rnt1l., 1 I\"eapon against ~:lt i ol1[11 GOIt C11ill:1 and (b) has instructrd French COllllllunist s manocuyre reli;lbl e Frelteh Ofl'icers to Indochina for tr:tining cadrrs fuime \~ ict ~atll army. Keep Jlept-. in formed indi ca tion s sllbsen'ience to Party line by no and other 1eac1rrs, reblin' stTeltgth COllllllultist and nOll -Communist ele1l1enrs Yi et :\alll, an ll contracts 1,it]1 ('onllllulli;:(s OIlIer cOllntrie,;. Inform O'SulliYan. Sent Saigotl. Ilepeatec1 Pari s"~ for info.
I nt e]l !!!'l'l'Ce
renor!,:;
lID
~-l:1.
of
UIl (~.Cl"[;l i 11 I"C1iahi] i t . \
.As t" legT;! III 40.';0.

CL.\YTOX
S;;lG .OO," D- ll-lG
TII p, Al/ll)fI8.'<({do,' in
COXFJDI'"TI.\L
F" (lllce ( ' ait'CI'Y) to th e SI'CI'etl{i'Y of Stflte

~.
P_\m~" Septemhcr 11, 10..j.(i. 1\0. G1:il [Reeei ,-eel S('ptrtll bel" 17. J . . Sm: I ha\"(~ th(' hO!1or (0 rellort lhat at his rrrtuest T l"e('pi"e{l a ,-isit. thi s morning from )1. Ho ('hi :'Ifillh, "Pre"icl(,l1t of the Repuhlic of Vi et"X:uH"", who confiml('cl thE' lil"I'S pu1>lishl'cl in thE' local press thnt th e Fonlaill('h1e,\lt nrgotiatiolls h('[II"l'(,1l Ihe Yi e f .. :\[l1l1 repn' sentn ti,-e;; nnrl th(' Vrpl\ch l"r[>]"('",elltati,l'.::; han' ]l ra(ticafl y l!l'oken clOl\"ll :mel tlle Yiet .. Xam clcleg;ltiol1 ,Iill he retlll"lling to Tnclorhin n ,,ithin the next fe'\" clays. Th e nrincip:ll point on which they f:1ilecl to reJch [lg-reE'l11 ('nt con .. CE'rllS Cm'hin ('hi)1a: 111 E' Fn>J)ch l'E'll)"('s"nlaliH's insisr that ('oc11in Clli lla be nn "inc1f'penrlcnt" entit y in an Indochinese federation, "'llil e t he '~ i pt"~ ;lll1 l"ej}1"I'<:('1't;11 il'p" i11;:.:i,.;( that on(' (('nt-ral p'OH'rtlll1ent in Inclochina 111U "I' (lomill;ltc th e ,,-1101r couMr.'" . He sni(l that he [lnel hi s n:ll"ty fl "' nirN1 10 Yi01..~am "ill(l e j}pnc1ellce"" in [Ill "T-nion Fran .. (<lise". TTe said thnt tll('Y I\"olllcl l ike tl) l';'cein.' SOl11? "help" from ll S, 1 )11t (lid not sperif,' "'klt he me;1l1( hy tltnt. He took occ:lsioll to i ay ll111t he lI'n;; 1101' H rOlllJ1111llisi. s From the .<:;p)1(')";11 fll/:zipe;;" of hi s J"(' 1ll:11'J,:;; , T !1::1t11(,l"E'f1 th;lr he \I'oulcl li ke llS io Q"rt into th (' .':!.":lIl\ (' and hi' \\"Olllc1 he \"pry pl E'a:"r(l if hI' c01:lcl nsf' nO' il' 'oml.' 'Y;l)" 0r other in IIi ::: future ll eg-ot iations \Iith the Frpnch ant-llorit i('s. I eYnl'Ps"pc1 OIl!" in'Pl"('''1 in Indochina and lite peo ple of Inc10dlina our 111 ;\(11' "0' ('nmrnitm ents. I{('spect fully yoms, JEFj:-El~S(lX C.IT-Tl:r:
79
Thr COII.wl ((I .\'/I ;gOi/ (R( rd) to tlu' .(,'cudtli'Y of St,ife
S .\ rG0X, Sept cml!pr E, 1~-1- G- 11 a. m. rR el'eiycd ScplL-nlhcl' 18-1: O:j n. Ill.] :r~+ . Doth (,lal'n c anel ('hief of Sill'Pte han in forlllN1111C' in':1'l'a:::c [c1] COlllnlllni ::: tir ;tct i\' itics ill Frcn('ll InL1(whinJ ,H'C' c1i:'<llli C't ill p:, Int ercep ted lrt tcr::: indi ca te ('hi ]]('sp ('olllll1 l1nists nt'(' ent rcnchprl in ('ili nC'::e centc)'s S:li~'OIl nll el Thijlholl;~: and th:lt .\llnamit e:=; rhiefly ill Tonkin and ..\.nll:llll, hut al.~o to c('rtain extpnt ill ('ochill (,hin:l, nrc recpiying' mu ch ('Oll1!lllllli:::r p roP:l.~a ll ( 1n. They fp e1 Yi et Xam 1e,\(le1's not entirely rf's poll"ihle for this :lpp a ~'C'llt trend hut- poin t out tho;::p leaders ha\e ('omllluni st tmining and l e:lni ll~::;; . ('J:lrnc ac1d t'Cl tllnt on e cliffi cu lty in bll c lling ('Olll11l11llist pl'Obl em i" illlpo;;:=;ihi li ty llsing ,yorc1 "('ollll11ulli:::t" ill l'PP:,Hc1 thi s 1l10H'IilPllt as strPllgth of ('olllllluni.:;t p:1l'ty ill Fl':lnc(' precludp;; any 1lI1fa\'o!'<lhl r mention . Doth helienc1 continll:lllcP 1lllcerhinty Frelli'h-Yiet Xnm relatio ns despi te signing pl'o\' i,,;on al ngrE'r ment m \\' ill contribute to such acti\'ilies but st re s~e d
SEep-F.'!'
to
'" ~ E'E' f('lP~r;l111 ,H.T1. illtn l .
COlllnlllni sts n1'C alrf':lc1y in Fl'cnch Inclochinfl (no Rll ssi:ms) and c10se \~'ntc h on)!' cleycloplllC'nts must bE:' lllflillta ;llf'cl as flp:rllcies outside Frel'clt Inc10china are llnclonhf eclly supplyillg Pl'oP:1:~nnc1a . This trlegram :1T! to D ep artmcllt , repen ted ns :2 X:1l\king. D epartment p1en sf', n' p e:lt Paris.
Th e ..17II'Orl,,8(1(10;' in Fl'({lI ch (('rlflcry ) to the Src-J'etr/l'Y of Sitrtfe

P.\ RIS . S eptf'mber 1T, HHG-5 p. 111. [TIf'ce il'cc1 Scptel\\he!' ]T--:1 : 2-1- p. m.l 4G'i'1. _\l final cOllfcl'f'ncf' ",ith FrC'llch S r plf'mher 1,k lT o (,hi ::\[il\h sig1lCc ioint cl ccl;u'a tio ll and lJIodllS I,i /'Pildi nncl c1ep,nied f p IY honl's l lnt0l' for Top1on i-O "nil for .'ai~~on . .-\grreme nt ,,jll br su hmitt ed to ' French ('al)illC't tomon-ol\' <'1 and nfter expected npPl'OI'al, g i \'(~n to
COXFIDEXTf,\L
., Til l' Fn>Il('h col1lHil of )!illi ~1 rr~ :1 pproy('(1 ttl(> agrl'rllH'nt on Sl'ptrlllhpl' 1 R: \y;t~ tr'111~1l1i ttPc] 1'0 n l'l':ll'llllL'llt ill d E'~!latl- h G~()~, ::iPlltelllhe , 20, 1 !)-JcG, fro lll P;t rb : IH' i llir[' pri llll'<I .
th e tpx t
10. F0 11 0\\ jllg nr C' es:'-'cnij:,l points of 'lgreement f1'(,])\ te xt oh t a ill E.'fl from Forpi.'~ll O ffice . .Toint cl C'c 1a1':lt;01l rlllpl'ns izr;:: an;reenwnt of }[nl'f'h G, 10-1G . st ill in e.ffpel hn t modus ;';'- ()l(Z; pro\'ic1 ing pl'OI'isio l 1nl :::oln r ions of ll rgrnt pl'ol)lpllIS \I',IS neceS":lrY \ll1t il )1('I'111;\lIf'nt nnd rl d ini l- il'C' agreC'ment cOlllcl he 1'(,,1(,]1 (>(1. D ,\fC' :1I1c procC' cJU l'l) f rw l'r fel'C'll rlUI1l in (' och in l China i::; to lJf' fis('cl latr1'. II is rxpectecl Foni"ai ll('ble:lll confe rence willl)e l'P>'ulllrc1i n J'1:tWI],.'i' 10-11. ~llnlJ1 ]:1 l'i e::; of nll101hC'recl P:ll'<l!.[raplt" of itlor1u-'i lit'l'l!di foll 0\\ :
prec:s on
~ rptplll l )p r
s1111lm:1 l'i zC'c1
1. TI rcipl'(Ic ,ll "democratir." ri ghts for citizens of one c'O\\l1try ltl territ nry of otlle r. 2. Tlp('o':1Iil iOll of lrr i])l'(I(':d property ri!tlits. French propf'rty . r eqll i, i r iOI \td nl' ~p;l:('d i!l 'Yi Pi :'\;1 1:1 ! n l)p l't~..:t 01:('(1. :;. Frl.'I H'll ,:(hno 1" tn O:)('[',[[P hl' l' h - ill Yi et X:t m : Pa :::relll' inst irlltc to hr l'('slol'{>d 10 Frpi l" li. ' . ,t. \~ i pt :'\'\In 10 pi\'e Frilnco priority 1\,1I f'll ~el'kin!.'. arh-i ;;ors. i rchni i' i,\ll'" ( )I' r\!'i!'ts. ' , , r,. Pi ;:1 r (' ! il-'(] io 17'1" .'1\(11 fra1l(' 10 hr " i llt ~'1 1~ t'1!lTency for 111(lo.-]lin'l \\'i th 'l1'lll\jlll) II p rrml r),,11 illc ,\.:.: tC'111p'JLll'Y bank of i .~"'ue ~
6. E sh\blishes custOlllS lIlll on allc1 f l'e~ tretele 'w ithin I nclochillese, f eeler;) t ion . 7. T'l'o\' ic1 e;; for cool'(lill:ttioll of t l':IIlSPOIi: and C'0ll1l1111llicatiollS of all tYl)r;:: \\'ithin fptlcm ti oll illld ('1/;011 FI "I'I,',!i.~(' , . 8, T'entli llp: ag'l'l'Pll lrllt 011 '~ i Pl X:ll11 lliploll1atic l'C'htioll;::, '\fi Wtl C0I11111i ;::sion \"ill ;Ul'all ge C'onsula r l'l'prcsclltat ioll \" ilh ll cighboring st nt e:;, fl, He Cochin ('lli n<l : (II) all fif>'h(in[)' to (:P,I"'P : (7;) ~ri ~:et1 COl11mission of P:CIH'l',l l starts to control thi s : ( r; ) all politic'll ancl lllilih,ry pri sonc l's to hr 1'eleaseel cxccpl (h osp :1C'cll,,('(l of C0l111110n crimp;;; ; (d) clelllocnlt ic' l ihp1'ties rcci procally p:ll<ll'ilntcpd: (e) 111lfrielllll y prop:lp:alHla ll111fi'<llly ( 0 cC'asc ; (f) coll :d Jol'atioll ill cOllt rol of ex-C'nemy cit izens; ( q) rep l'co:ellta( in of ' -ipt :\"a111 accl'edited to IIigh COllllllissiol1 rr \rill control ewellt ion of ah()n~ nrOl'isiollS, ' Sip:nec1 by ITo (,hi :'finh ancl ,\farius ~ronleL
It \"i ll be scen lllat ITo Clli :'[illh oh t ninC'c1 satisLlct ioll on 1ll,ljority of point :3 renorted in 1l1yt pl ~:i0I, Sept e11lhrr 12. . Boi;;;st-Z011 of Forri[','ll Offiee Si:l( es Frenl'h generally snt isflrd \yith np:rE'pmrnt bId wou ld fh,li' P1 1ik('(l to inc 1mle ]1:1l'<I,!!,Ta phs clefin! ng l1Iore nrrC' ii'ply rl'1a~ions of Yi et Xam (0 Inc1o chillC'~e f cderat ion a;lcl French 'Cnion . Thr) \yerr also nn sliccrssflll in ha yin g written info agreemen t p ro\'isiolls fol' cli sal'mamen( of l'esistance eleme nts in Coch in (,hilla h ut BO; SSl-Wll claims it \ \-,IS omlly llnc1C'l'sloocl \yith ITo Chi ~[inh t'llat such rlrlllents wou ld kIn chance of either l'Pt iring- to Tonk in \\ ith aI'llIS nnd bngg-'lge or g i\' ing up ~ll~lllS if l'enw iuing 1ll Coch in China . ._,eut Dept as ,lGTl, l'rpl':liec1 Louclon as (l!)n, Dept ple,l:oe r eby to ScI igon as 2.
851(: .00 In -10 It' : 'l'!,!p;::ram
Th e C01lsulilt ,,\'a;goil (R eed) to the ,i,'CCI'e/{lI'Yo/ Stllte

SAIGOX. O"l o1;c l' H), 1 flLG-G p. m . [Rccei I' ell 0('t01)('!' ~:2-2 : O.l p . Ill. I 411. :.\[cct illg' High ('Ollllllic:o:ioIlC), imd ITo tool;: pLl('c yl':"ten1ay :IS r epoderl :Uyt el JOfl, Od l S.';~ Fe\" details kno\yn hut un(lcrsland
COXFlD E XTL II,
G. Odnlll'r ~~. 1fl.tG. frll lll 11:J!1fIi. Yi ct' Cnn-n\ l'lll'!'p Oll'O(,lo\lt.\' ~1 of IIII Chi :-finh ('1'''111 F!',llll'" b\- \\',1\' (If ("llllr;lllh T~;l\'. \\'hpre hI' hac1 ("nfplTl,j wirh .-\,lntil'al ,l'.\!'~'('n!il'll nn o"dnhl:r 1.". <11](1 ;1(1,1(',1 : '''C l'lll'l'Oll'': ;::"(',.:t\1n" (,n thf' part of bOlll rltp Fn'lldl and Yi l'tna!Jlp,(, en,ll!'!\ ,111 1'1l1>;II"Ill,j,,1 ;HllIlI'pIH'!'p "f plll>lk aInil,\' :lllll ('!)l'(\i;llity , bet\YPf'1l tlil' tlYO .::T'IlIl"'- '" (.':. lG,f10l/1O - :!:!,/G ) -'
m ce!'ip~ mo;:;t flillicahle \\'ith Ho llllll:"ll:llly pro-Frcllch flllll c\-en denoun cing \~ ic( nil 111 tenorist fl('( i\-it ics. So much c:O one rccall;: e:tdier lllmo!',:; Ho 11as sold oilt (0 French. Tf ,tl)on trllc. quest ion po"es itsel f ,.... h etl l c1' ITo ('all keep unC{1l <1 1i iiotl c:llp]lort in no1'th, p:ut iCllLtrly ill yi c\\" of further report ;:; 01' ('Ollilltlllli st charncter of tkli state. I st ill helip\-c Frrnch ('0111111Ilni ,,{s <lc;:;!rl' sofl prt1:11 COl1llltllnist trellch Vi etrli1lll for politi!'a1 1'l'n;:;OllS and \yill <ulopt pilssiH at'r itllc1r lliltil aft er elcdiolls. FIC \-ote against constitution (myiel 404 r.~) is be-
., ~ot prillt C'll. In clp~I"lt('h ()' ~nlli\"lll !'!'[I"l'I,(\ till' rp lnl'll
"" ~ nt printerl' i t' I'l'llnrtl',l tltnt pl'!,lilllill;ll';I' fi",ll'P": ~11()\\'ec1 an O\\'ndlC'lmillg , lllajnrity "\'ntl'lllln" p:::;:n tn 17(H) (S.,l(J .nOJ / lO- l:i.fI;i.
lien>c1 to he \'of e <1.~'itinc:t left :lPd is possible Fnseist react ion flgain st theol'} illc1 epellc1rllce for nati\-e peoples.
R EED
Th e rice Con sul at [Jllnoi (O'S lll1irall ) to the

SECB!:],
SeCl'ctrtJ'Y
of Strtle
Octobcr 2.>, Ifl-l-G-lj n. m. [nece intl !): 20 p. m.l 9G. In prinlte conn'rc::tt ion, Ho Chi ~Jillh tolclllle thaI- efTcctin~nr s"i of 1II0du," I'il'elldi ,youlc1 c1epenc1llpOlt French actions in Cochilt-China. "If they allo\\' sprend of democrai ic libeliics, rclr<1"e polit'ical p ri~'ol1er", :mcl sto p nttilckin,o' my )! rople, things \\'ill go \\'ell for them in Tonkin . Ot!lel'l\'ise tl H~ COlllllli:.:sioIiS (prol-idecl for ill modus 1'i'cendi) \I'illnot accomplisli much", he saiel . H e nilllcd (i.glll iu g ill south \\'ou ld not sto p unless French flpp1i cc1 aareemcnt locally. ""He strrtcc1 Yil:lltaUI('se policy rema ined unchanged: i.e ., :lambo ~J,
HAXOI:
.. Southern e1i,,( l'iet.
n\!"l llill~
('or-hill-China,
mIl st be lmired to \~i(,[llalll. He tJlnU~'I!t that Frendl had l'e;teherl cOllelusiol1 thilt rcferrnc1ultl in Corltil!-('hill<l ,,:ould Lt\-or 1lI1ifi.cntioll and t hry hercfol'P c;rel1lc,d t () be 'Cf'ki Il~ ,0 ,,,-oid it. H e saiel ll ' h;t(l \)erl1 promi.:pc1no er:onomir aic1 11llt tltotlp:ht French '\'0111<1 pro\ ide "'hat they could i f :tnt1 \\-hell defI nite a~rel'!l1l:11( \\-as rearl1 ed . I II ('ollf'luc1i!l,Q' TTo c;;tirl that if th ere WHS nil) informat ion I required h e \YOlild ;:cc that I obhtilled it.
8:;1
(;.IIO / l1 - 1-t1~: Tt'l !'~r ;lm
Th e rirc ('01-'-'11 7 "t 11rl),O; (O ' S!!77;nlil) to th e Srr,,.efrl)Y of Stote

SECJ ~l:T
IbxIH. :I ol-l'ndJcr 1. l!JH; --s a.

[J~ e"l'il-t'(l
:\-On'IllUe l' :2--11:
:;n
82
101. Rel kptel :2-1,1, ::-:entelllbpr o_ :2 I). m' j to S:li!!(\11. 'T!~ el'e apparent ly is ('Ol1fad Iwt \\'{'ell Yi etll,1l1l alld C'hille:'e C'01l11111Il1i:,rs. R eports difllrll lt to \-el'i l'y inelicate prpsenre in Yi C'tll;Ull of C'him':'C' Communi:=;!:=; \\ 11 0 are sa iel to he \\,rc1 as aehisor;; in proyillces. Xnlllber:- are pot knO \\, l1 hut e,,! illla~es t'lill i'o l11111ilrc(ls. Trame app:1l'ently i ~ clin'ctecl hy se;l from Shanghai to HOllg K Ollg, thenCe to 1Ltil'hollg. }To \\'C' \-el'. any repo rt :.: ('ollcernill,Q' j)l'e"rllce of C'hillcse C'olllllmlli sts ill HaipllOl'g it:scl f slwlI] lI 1)(, l'c(.?,';lnleL1 "itll sli:::picion _ Pil'ntC'" from South Chin;1 h,lYe rontl)illerl \\'ith C'ltil'ese .Arllly de;oe1'1C'r:' to bhtckmai.l Clt;nesc cOllgl'c!!ilting tlwrc. '\'illile calling them::eln:,s Com-' 1111U1i sts, th ey arc adu:tlly olltb\\'s.
S51G.(\n/l1 - ~:ql1: Tl"ll"\~ralli
Th f A mbass(ldoj' in France (('0 fl(' J'Y) to the SeCi'C/fl/'Y of Strife
G~
--
""Repeat('(] hy the ])cpartlllE'llt to Hanni ~> So. 1:; :111(] to ~.lignn :1,. :\0 . ~0!).
SECHET
PAlO S, :\OYeIll})C'1' ~n, l!H(;-~
p. m .
rnccein'L1 X owmbed9-1:2 : :'):1 p.
m.l
fi B;'),. The FrC'llch are H'l'y cOl1cE'l'1lccl o\'('\' c1c-\'(']opnlcll(s in
Tllc1 o-
chi J):1 . _\. hi gh FOl'C'ign ) fin!sll'Y official sa;cl thc\' arC' ll<tl't icularly \\Ol'ricc1 hccausc thE'\, h n \-e "posit iYe proof that ITo Chi :\Iinh is in direct ('ontact ,\'itlt :\[o:;ro\\, amI is reC'ei\-illg flcl\-jce ancl instTllctions from th e SO\- ie(s." r,r, .
r <'>jlOll~f'
.. C(lll~\l1 n r('{l. in t f'I('2T;1111 -lro:1. D('('rllihel' ::. I n-!fI. ~ p. nl. . from Sai!!Oll. in 1'('''or('(] ":\[n i f/l'it) 111)' (Ollr.lc-t~ ('Olltil'll! '~rll('rc1II .\ (leq'lflplllrnt Ilf ('(1Jl1-
:'(':111' in :'1('. ('Ilit,fly in TtJnkill. :'\'(1 rlh .- llll.lnl " . :1> prel'illll>I.\ tl'l('!!rajlll'p( \ \ TLll'"i 11:1 (] ><'11 t a lll1Il1h(' l' "f I elp.:!ra in> n ntl de~p:l t!'lll'" in .re~iln] to n"-llIilH' nt lInil'l1 ollC! !1r!\\'Pl'!l Frl'IJ('1l all,l Yie(II;]Jl)p>t' fOl'r'('> s i11ep :\'')''Plllh('r ::>~. f"l1,,\.... ill.~ Y'll'i flll> ilH'i(len!~ E'~l'lipl' :1lltl a Fr(,l1ch ulcillla!11Jll to \,i etll.l111 ( n ('\' ,Il'nal(' cel'tc1ill .11',,;15 .
m11lli~t
(S:; 1r. .00/1 :'-:!.t(; 1.
R epc;ltecl LOlldon as
'j,~n , }[0:::('0\\'
ast lG.
-'
. C\.FrER'I
83
S~1r.,Of.l / 12 , 3Hi:
T ele;.:ralll
r, :
TIl e r ice ('Or /Sid fit IIrliloi (O'Sulli."(lII) to tl/e Secl'el((}'y uf State
'j' p, Ill,
"RepeMed by th t' Dcpa,l'tUll'll( to P;\\'i~ ill tele,C:I';l1ll G:1:';:!, D('(:elllol'r ::;, l!'l-!G,
SECltET
vn,
63
December :}, HlJ,r>-lloon , [Heceil-ecl DecC'mber -1--,1 n, Ill, ] R eDeptel 15, XOI'emoel' :20,G' Possibilily ITo Chi :J[illh ill
HAXOI. ,11,-,
r,i'
See foot notl.'
COll(;lCt '\Io,:.coll' suggested Illy tclcgml1l 00, Odobcl' :20

eo "ot print 'cu ,
out ha I'e
IlO
furlhcr ini'Ol'lllatiol1 al-aihh10, Am beg- in1l inf!' !Jrli CI'C ITo fo1!o"' ing lin e ,I'llich II"ill keC'p him in cont:lct I"itlt Frc11ch and ,\'ill n",slll't:' rel'tnin nmollnt French innucncc , h ere after thrce 1\:ys united as sngf!'C's{Nl De!lfel :?-l1, Spt){emlwl' 9 [0 Saigon, Then, if nnc1 \\'hell, COlllm)lllist God cstablisllecl in France, Yi el n:l111 non Il'ill Pl'Og'l'l':"o: i I'C~ y njJpl,\' :Jb l'X pril1ci pI e;::, HOII'c\'cr, thai' Frcn,'h should only nOI\, becornc cOlv'rl'llell Il'ith de ye.lopl1l rnl is pecu li ar, rn GOI't : r SOIl' "reds more nntiolla l i::;t than
;0
(;()\'PI'IlIIl f'lIt of t11e l'n inl1 of Tn(ln('liin('~e "t'lre~ ,
yE':ll' ;1[!'O" Fl'rll('h t o llly c('!'lain [ klWlrlE'tt;,!'l' han kll()\\'ll since 10:":\ thnt (?) is TTo Chi. '.\I illh (!) inppnn' llt gnl'h1el stnn(h H'ry high ill Third l 11ll'l'llationnl. They fu]'th er 11n,'c strong-I," sll:"pc('(c(l for fl.t 1e,lsl' yr,l], t hnt if ITo Il'as not l'C','pi,-in g instl'lld iOil S from :Jr()~C()\\' it' W;l" only bccilll;:r of technic;ll di ll iclIlli es in tl';1nsmi ss ion, It is fur tJICl' "cry pcculi,l], that' FrC'llch COIlI'em shou ld be broug'ltt lo D (' pi~S n'ttenl ioll at \,(~ l'y momeut ,\'h en 1"1'en('h appal'rl1tly al'p lJegiun illg' to. [ nppHrpllt omission] program ill Tonkin <1n(l \I'hE'1l Frcnc-l1 may be , p rrpal'illg to force Yi cr l1;\lll GOI't to collabor;lte on French trrms or to esta b1i;::h ]> llppet god in it s placc, " Frcn ch concC' l'll 0\'('1' COlli Illun i"t 111:1)' well he clc\,lsecl to c1i"t,rt Drpt':,; attcnt iOIl 1'1.'0111 Frcllch pC'lic.,' ill Tnclochin,l. '
O'S'LLLIUX
SECRET' 85lG aOO/12 - 346: Confidential File O UTGOING 1'ELEGRA1-1 DEP JillTNENT OF STATE vlash i.ngton
AEEEICAN COESUL
SAIGON , (INDOCHINA )
FOR HOFFAI':
305
Assume you ,ril l see Ho in Hanoi and offer f0 110l.'11n8 summary our present thinking as guide~ Ke e p ~n mind Ho t s clear record as agent internationa l communism, absence evid ence recantation }joscO'.', affiliations , confused po Ii tical si tua tion Fr8.' ce an.d sUppo:t.'t. Ho rec eiving French Comnuni s t Party. Leas t des h 'ab :Le eventual ity would be establishment Communist-dominated , Mo scow-orientad state I ndochina in view DEPT, which most interested UJFO strength noncommunist elenents Vietnam. Report fully, rep 8a ting or r eq"t.1es ting D EPI' repeat Paris. Recent occurrences ronkin caus e d eep concern; Consider l'lar ch 6 2,ccord and modus vivendi as result pea.ceful n egotiatiori provide basis settlement outstanding Questions between France and Vietnam and i mpose responsibility both sides not pre j udice futu re, p&rticularly forthco ming Fontainoblecu Conference , by resort fo rce . Uns ettled situat ion such as pertains c er tain to offer provoc ations both sides, but for this reason conciliatory patient attit ude especi8.1 ly necessaryo Intransigence either side and di sposition exploit incid ents can only retard economic re~ habilit ation Indochina and cau se ind e finite postponement corrditions cooperation France an~ Vietnam which both agree e ssentia.l. If Ho t akes stand non-implementat ion uromise by , Fr ench of Cochinchinn referendum relieves Vietnam respo~si bilj.ty compliance wj.th agreem~nts, you l~iEht if you SECRET
85
SECRET
851G.00/1 2--3 46
c onsider advisabli r aise question whe ther he believes r eferendum after s uch l ang di sorder could Droduce worthwhil e result and whether he c onsiders cOQpromisG OL status Co chinchina could poss 5 .bly be r eached t hrough nego ti ation. l-Iay say J~mer ican people have \~'elcomed att ainments I ndochinese in efforts r eaJ.ize praise worthy aspirations gr ec::. ter autonomy j.n fra.r;;eVTork derrloc ra tic j. l1~) tj. t1x:":i.ons and it would be reg~e~table should t his int8?8sL and syr!.1path~/ be imperillGc1 by c:m:1 t e~1dency Vie~~,- -:-1m adn:i_r:.:Lstra,t ion forc e i ssues by int rans i gence an~ viole~cG. M inform Ho Caffery discussing situa tion French ay s :L rni l a;.~ fr anln:es s" F0:;:' y OUI' n~FO i B2UC~8 t in LEe 3 C O~l versation s tc""'.. ted l) no '.J.uestj.on recoD.{ue s t I.r:do::::h~.na as such \'lCJt:.ld be counter :"renGh pub1:i.c opj.n ion.::.nd p:coba 'o ly boyond French mill t ar/" r esou:cces , 2) 17'rencb ~t.':i.l:L (: ont in"\].e be.s8 policy Larch 6 ar~col'c1 [;no. ;J1\;c1.1.-:'s \j h 'e[l,ji and , 1 -r '. l,r -:>0' maKe e,ery e, . 'f" or-c o.,'.. p._., t h __ LC.Yj t;~ '1.-.'"'"' neuo ti,,. , 'T"i .tr , D10u.::Jl __ .... "(;10". .. ,_8 _.BTH 3) French ':lo1..11c1 r esor t forceful E1easu:c'ss only on 1" estricted scale in case flagrarit violation agreements Vi et nEll!1 , LI_) d f Acsenlieu f s usefulnes S irt1pClirecl by out .. sp oken dis li ke Vietnam officials and reulacem ent perhaps ' . o ,,) ;:'1"""o11C l ~ o 'j "1ni s ts ,-,rr'o"l'r",. .:> -...; r -r;,. c: 1. o r'C'ed J' . n ''''''~C'O d .... d e S 1 r" - le guardian Frer:ci: interno.tional interests by b8TTage" t e l egraphic appeals fron} Vietnam . Ce.ffe ry ,Ji ll e~:press gr a tific ation this stateffient French policy with observClt ion i mp J. ementation 5 1_lOh policy should go far obviate any danger that 1 ) Vietnamese irreconc ilables and e xtrem~sts might be in position make capital of situation 2 ) Vietnamese might be turned irrevocably against \Jest and toward i deologies and affiliations hostile democracies which could resul t TJeruetual foment ' Indochina vIi til conS8Qu.ences all Sou theast-Asia. "1'"\
<:>;
./
.1.
....
;.!..
f""I 'J
t I..,.
_.~
"
t"';.j.~ I
O.
~.J
"_h.)'
..I.
. Avoid i mpression US Govt ffiaking for~ a l int ervent ~on t hi s junc turc. n..l.blic;i.. ty any kind Houle. be unfo rt1.ma te . Paris be guided foregoing. 1\ch85 ("n Ac tL ng SEA:COgbnrn
'v IE: iU alIne 1"'
SSCRET
86
TIl(', ('011,,"1 (If .."'f/igoll (RNd) to fli p ,"(:crd(fJ'Y oj ;:"'Iflte

co~
Fm;::"TT .\ [,
5,\1(;0". n,>('cmber fi, l!) -W--~ p.m. rn pcein:d n ,'l'cmhc r 7- 11: I:? p, tn ,]
l:7:!, ni:rii~~ \'j"jls }fnfl'ar to hig,lt FrclIl'll ot!ir'i,!1s 1:HtPl' ,11nlo:=:r, iln-al'i;l\)ly "irl',~>l"l Fl'L'n,,'h desire <lni\'c at l'C';lcp:t!,] r sett1{:lllPllt \\'itlt Yi ern:l11!, cOllllllelltil!g diHir:ulty dc;di ng with ".-ietll:llll Hnd tlut t1tter n11!IO';f :!1\\'ays Iri pd pur ]loljtic;t1 a<:[>('('t 10 P\,('1\ ;::imph',-! pcollOmi(' nep:nt i'llio)1s. and 11infillg' Frall('e coull( :\nd \\'01l1(1 go onl,'- so far in l ill e f1P.~irpll srtf1Plllrllt. On in (errs'-illp: rcmark In' ('Ollll !l is,.: iclil cr fo[' Fi1l<1I'(,C ''';I S to pfl't:-c:t 1"n\l\('e not \\'orkin!2' i'()r politir"11 f pde r:ltion jn 1"['('11('11 Tlldo(,hiJla IJlll 1':\t11('1' build lip Pl'ol1oJl1ic ft'd l'[';)! ioll ill \\'hi ch all ipt f>1'''''IS \\-oldc1 hp rpprl:'SPll il'f1 :111\1 protp ('t('c1~h e pointc ll ol\r innllility Yielllam ul\(ler:::tanc1 purply l'C0l101;lic O\\ e;:;t loll;:; <111,1 pre:-,ent l11r1itl'eI'PIlCC to ;::1]('11 nr i l!l:1]'Y 111,1tteJ'S :l.~ ,,{Tel,r thl' nnri0.11al pt'OnoillY , Hc ;lllfl :\n()tll('l' hi,!:'.'h olTi"ia l sf ""s:,,('cl \\' il1illgl1(,;::S ('\'(;'11 c1r::: ir(' fol' [01'eign capi/al 1l1\'es t Jl\eJlts ill FT(, if th ey \\'P1'P for' con:::I1'\\rt-iH ])111'p o.::!'::: :lnd not (mentiolling Cltinrsc "p"cih(';lll\-) sp!'culatin' . ('om mi ssi())1el' f()1' Fip;l)1('P. 11<) \\'p\'(,,1', ]'pcOlll1l1p]1rli1Ig fOl'Pip:n (';l])iral should be un itl'Cl \\'illl Fl'pneh kno\\'lpdgt> cnll,l if iOll s, In abo\'(> r'onnect ion C[11('sri0]1 is mi ;::('(l \\'It('111 cl' FrPllch \\'onlll in sist upon 1<11''''(' 1' slI:lre C11 fl it;) 1 ;111 fll or J1) l' i()1' it y hon 1,,1 c1 il'PC.'t 0 1'::: , . ('0111111 i,,5 iOllP l' for E( 'OJ) C)Jll ic Aff)lir" \'-ns op/imi -J i(' fOJ' l1 (':d \, (';\1";:; 1'i('(> ('1'0)). p:::tip\a1in o ' :It l!'ast 2?io.oon I-roPe: P:O(1)0),I-:"h1r Sl!l'1)ll'S ,1]1(1 if ))oli~ir:ll ('()nclil iOl1s ill1J)\,()\-P as 1 mn('l\ ps ;'ion.noo, Pl'f'S lwd for l'\\b!lPJ' 1'Pt;::o h"i[H (p C' J'h:l])S :10,0102;'5.000 l-OPSI ]1111 f'~S l,lhn1' c111Pstioll "nl\'Ccl ;111(1 l', pnl- im '('c1 nbn llnder shIel) ip 'pori ;i,nOO C'l~i!'(' s" ('()olir'" hllt S:lirl FT(' 1I:1t i\-(',:: 'YOll1t1 no;:; sihly 1101 rr';1(oI' kindly 10 111i s , ~rp!>i iOJlPcl nho allneal i"'ll:'; of FTC rire p'-porls fhis Ye:l1' 1\,1\-P 1'0 1. 1'''(,11 takpn \1]) cOlnnlpt.,l,, .\ mOllg ~th('l' l)oiJ1rs ('01l11n is;:; i(,I1l'J' fnl' Polit iClll .-\ fl:1il'," starpd l'P['S0l1l1pl all mi:'>'Nl ('0J)1mi s,~if' ]l " p]ll-ic-ngrcl by m{ldlls l'il' (')I (1i h;)n~ IF'P 1l J1f\)11N11mt still c1is(,lI S~ ioJl \\'11('1'(' tllp\, HI": to 111"Cl-- 1llHk" st'1ncl :'(i:-;('(1 :\fili!al'Y ('()n'mi~'" i()n bas tp1l'pn)',n i1 \- f'Pc:prl' tl('il it,:: "'(1]']( in TIall oi unt il sit Ilati on is ('l;ll'ifipd, .\ 11110:::t all official" J'(>Jll,' l'b'd in on (> fprm or :l 11 ot l1 e1' ('0111111llni;::I' ('harnf'fE'J' of )'C[,. iI11 P in north a)ld OIlC staterl snef'i(ica lly So\-iel' llli,::sioll h erc (111ylel -1-,") 1, XO\'('111bc1' 21 '4) has already \'ioln! ed
H
Xo t print('(l.
its 11l1c1nt nkil ',0.' 1lot to pnr:,l,<!~l' in p oliti cal art 11"1 IPS in FIC. In (,0111111 C11 1 ahon: and, ])rt'-,-iollS trl e.QT;l l11S fl'(> l French l,\'(l1l 1<1 accepj-' c:olllrioll Pl'Ot-Pl'!i1W inil'l'e:::ls bllt \\'ill ol\l~' go so f:lJ' (\\'irn css pl'e"cllt :::tifTpl' at i/Il c1 p) hilI hC':-'il,tip hpljr\'(' FI'E'l't'li \Y()l'l(l P11,O:",<),'l' l11)on full <:C':11p l!lilir:\ry n]1l'),;1t iOllS 1I111p:::" nh~oluIP1\' f()lTPd, Fr(,lI"l) ;1])1)('<11' to 1'ra lizp )In 1n l1l,('c1' no,::;;il)lp m:lin t:l ill e1n::rt1 (1001' 1l el'(, and !\O!l- Frpnch illl eJ'P:::I" \':ill h",\'(' ('h<1I'(,(> /0 p,ll'liciJ)nle ill II 11 flne:-:I iOll ('(11'idl pcnnnmir poc:si!)ilitit'.-, refoJ'c !],j ;:; C';tll h;lj)jl(,ll politi cil1 sil 11:1.f iOll n1l!;.;t be sprt 1pc] II prj ;11 dr'i 1'.0' (lJ i" C('ell i 11 ell i)):\ Ii 11 Po:!' iO!1 \\' ill I;p tfl]'11i lW poi I1lstill L('liel-p Fn' l1(' L II-ill rind it ll;t1i"ult to ",1\'P ('o(' hi!l C!1;jjH link ,:;::: pl'cp,m>d to fi~lll, for in r-lwi n , 1>,,(\',-ep11 "i rt'nanl alld Fn'llr'h the Cor hiJl C1 JillC'ol' \"ill join fo!'me!' dr"pi:r c1i ~ lik c of Tonkilll'.::e and fenr of C('ol1oJ\lic :tn rlpoliti(,;tl c:o:ploitatioll by th em,
t
87
851(:.OO ': 1~ - 1
,-I f) : CirClII:lr .\i rgr.li11
T he
SeCl"rf(Ii'Y
of
s.'tltfe
to ( 'at(/in J/i8Siolls Ab /"()(fd
77
".\t Loudon, :\l""l"ow. ;111(1 :\;l!lki!l;::.

\\~,\.'rrr:'-<nTl):\.
SECHF:T FOil ClInT OF
)n~~ IOX
D ecellll)el" Ii, 10-:l:G-1:05 p. m.
After cOlll"crsa tioll ':; \yirl! French and Yi etn<1111eSe ollicials and Britisl1, .Chill e:"c ;lll(ll~S ('oll:'nls lTanoi ~rr. .\hLot ~rv frat, \llIo i::;::<t pre:::ell( ill ~E. \, ha::: ll el'elol! ec1 I'ie\l-s in \I'hi ch Consul Saigoll concnrs nloll~ the follo\\'ing li ne's: ;{'
"Tplp;.:r:lI11 ,!'fl. D ('('P IIl 1>pr ]:2. 1 fl-l(; . :) p. Ill .. frt11ll S;li.:.:-nll (1':)1 (;.(lO/J :2- 1 :2-11)). tran"lllitinl :'Ifr. :'I, ,ir ;tr~ I'l'jlort ill \\-I:i("11 tH, "talf'll I", 11;1(1 left ILIJ10i Illl Dl'Cel!I' bel' fl h(' I""I'P 1'(,(-p il ' iI !g tlll~ n pp:lI'll::CIlt'" t;' lp~T;lIl1 ~n.). Dl'I.'t'lllher .). 3 p . Ill.. p. - .
The Yi et ll:tlll (; O\'C l'IlIl H'nt is in ('olltml of a ~1ll:111 Comllluni ,,' !:,:l'Ollp possi bly inill (l in'ct towl! witl! :'[O,c('(}il' alld dil'cd touch \"ith Yellnll, A nntion;lli,.;t Ifl'OUP ;,.; ul ilizillg COlllllll111i :--l jlal't~' teclllliqll Ps and di sc ipl ine \\'irh \Iltiel! they are falllili;ll'. The peoplr are con:3en'nt.in hllc1o\l'llers am1 attCl!lpts (0 COlllll111l\izE' th e country nre second:l],), allll \I-ol:lc1 a\I-;lit s[wce,::,:ful 0p0l;t:ioll of a l~atiollali,:;( state, .\ppnrenily SOllle l( ';l(h'!'<;, like Tlo Chi :,[i llh, cOll,:;ic1cr collahorat ion I\'i th the. Frcnl'll e:,,~ential: tho,:c lik e (;iap;" \I'ou lll :ll' oic1 collaboration fearill6'
"Yn :\;.:t:.':PlI (;:;tp. :'Ilill:,-t l' r (,f :\ati ollal f' efl' ll se . .
Frcllrh l1 0111inntion ll llt ll1i~ht HO t n~ .iI' I' I Fn;nch illR.llenc0 anr1 aiel. X a(ion;tli:--t ;:clilinlcnt rllns dCl' \> ;11l 10)1g' the Yi etnal11r.:c a11(l cl oes oppos it !O ll to th e Fl'l' ll<'lt, ,mel tltey migk c;t:=;ily tllrn a~aill;::t all Iyjlites. Frrn (' lt infl ill'!lI'P i ,~ ill l[>IlI"I:Ill! llot on ly ;t~ all :111ti(]ote to ~()\'ict influ clH',' but to pr(}ll'ct \~i r-In:ljll and SE.\ from future Chil1t'sc illlpNiali ,cll l. Del:ty ill ;wlli(,I'in.!r a ;::cttlclllPilt I': ill progre;::,:;in'l y di~ min:i~'h th e po,,:=; ihili ry of ult i'mall' Fn'll< 'h influl'll"C. The hOIll,:'ty or l)oth Fn'llch ;\11(1 Yil'tn;\1ne~l' ofTi(i;\l S i" qlH'-:r iollal )h' jn ronl~(' c tion \I'itlt r (,(P Ill' illCickllt< O'SUl1il';lll h l' li;-, \,p,= fh e, Y;,,(
88
Declassified per Exec utive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
cleal' tllai \rill! a dilrereni French COll1IlIHIHIC'1' at TLliphollg than Colo nel f)p!Jc,:;, \\'ho is Iloiol'ioll;:: fot' gl'<l ft nnd brutality and \\'110 has ac1l1littl'd thnt he cnnllOt ('Ollt t'nl lli :-i O\\'ll troops, the lrou\lle might 11,\\'(, been conrint~c1 to tllC' orig'inal inl'illellts, ..-\cconlillg to the 1"rrllch, tllc Yiernall1C'seenlal'ge their ('him:; afrer :1ch agrcl'ment and nrC' so i1ll6ral'l'icnl Hnd dod rinail'c, thilt ;111 conycrsation;:: nre in ell'l'ct llal. The Yiet 1l;\lllC';:e fr cl that tIlE' Frcnch renf'gc Oll c;teh agl'ccnH'llt amI are trying to ree,.;tablish control. Howenl', hoth sa y d lPY han: approximatel,\' tlie salll(? ohjcdi\'es, although Gi np says Yiefll;lnl opposes a political IlHlochil1 C'se f(,llcl'<ltioll but, f ayors a fcclerat iOIl dealill,2.' v,'ith COllllllon CI.'OllOln[(' problcllls, ~rofTat' has melltiolH'{l [0 the Fl'cllcll tlll'ee a11p;nellt htsic tl'ouhh:s : (II) compl ete 1l11liual clistrllsr, (7;) failure of the French to resoln~ (lleir O,Y]! yi e\ysoll "frC'estnte \\'ithin Fn'l\ch rllic)n", (r) almost chillli51! Yietnamese nf'{it\](le nlHl kl1o\\'IL'cl;2:c of economic- quesl ion s and \'a;2:\lc groping fot' "illdepcnclPl1ce". Agl'(,Plllrllt cannot 1;e reached by trying io rear-It acC'ol'cL Oil ill l'ic1ellta1 prol)lellls, Basic Yi pt Ilalll 1 )()\\'Cl'S and reL,tiol1s \,i ill 1"rallce must fil':-it he r:::tabli:-ohec1. Sot on 1)' ne\y f,lc es are 1l'cec1ecl uut lH'utml good olTicp;:; 01' eYen mediation may bc p'::;::elltial.
BYIlXE"
89
Th p S (,Nr tIIJ 'Y of Strite to ('e;fain Diplo!lla/;r; and COlIsU1i!I' Off/aI's

,S!
~~
At :'IIo:<l'f1 \\', X;tl!kill;;. ;tilt! ~aigt111,
COXF[DEXTL\L
.\1111> Paris Shlh?~ 1 Inu!ct. 1Ii!1!:"t pr 01'('r"l';'8. ",ill lE'<ll'c soon Yi~il' all J)al'l~ Tndoehin;l ('01 1fc!' \\'irh Ho C'lli Vi!\h aftE'l' " 'hirh hr ",ill go l ~'l"l:i"(V (l;Q'l' ,'S Chipc;::p rrb' ion " " 'it'll Tnc10C ,iJ1a, n',\r,o:E' lllil'H \,'ill ftlTi\'p Tnilocllill<l same t illlc as 1rontct. Cairl'[,) says'~ ([ucstion
<i:lrrr1t"'T:l1 1l r:1(:~
f) fJ('''''' IH'l" 10, 1!).Jfi . .-;
n.
111..
nllt 1I1'i ntp(1.
Fn'n('h polin' II1l1oc1lill<l '\';I~ ililjJOl'!,lIlt Ltrfo1' <luring' ['('ccnl political cri s is, onil'iop h pi l1 ,O: Sl',ll'l)ly iIlCI'C;1<::ill,Q,l y (1;,'i t lcll 01' S1l1)jPct, Left'\yi pg' ],,\,11,1 irs (lpfpl1<1 r{l libpl'al policy to\\';ln1 Yi c rn;1111 . Hccnsing' e1'.' l'o'p "li (,Il , FrPllch milil;11'\', ci"ilinll ;1lltl'ol'i' ips T"ilor,h in;1 of S;11lOtag-ill!'" )f:, l' (j a O TPE'lllf'J1t :)11(17}1()r/II," r i n ' lIdi , TInclic;,l S(1('i;lli;:.ls 1IHP a]1(1 (,1],,,1' r(,nlp!, :l1lc1 )-i,,']'I' \I-il'O- nnrtirs ,lr('ll~rtl :'\IOlll-rr nf !":i"inQ: ~, '.\'a.r Fr: l l '('p'S most y;\ll\ ;, lllt, cololl\- , cTE'll1al1r1ccl nl'll1P[, ai-I itl1rll' to'I'an1 Hn :')1 (1 Yi\,rn: 1 111. Tn ~j)('erh to ,\s"rn, llh, \OIll1ll11ni s i- nnc 1o::; spokc of 11 p(,(1 fpl' noliry 1)1'Oi(,r- lillD,- int(']'r"l;:; Fri>l\<,h \l]1inn. l1\:1111Iail1il1~ 111tcrr~rs FI';lnrc cYcl':nrllPl'P in ,Yorlc1, IT!.' \\-;11'11 ('(1 1"1';1l1ce lll m:t not make Tp (lo(,hi 1ln S;llPP l1li~I,lk(>s t]';lt ro~t hpr nnsilion Lr,'ant. This morlpJ':llp hu l rt"l,-ntir :::lnl'C lllrnl I'd!refs 1"('r(>111 C'Olllll!lll1i':;f C;lurio]] 1'(' Tncll'rh;n,1 \,-llir]' O'PJI(,l'nl 1 \ , il1fr!,J)!'rlpd ns clrs i !?,'ll(,c1 ayoirl ()l)1)(),~illg T )11111;(' f'l)ipi0 n ,,-l, jrh is il'rl'r;'sil1Q,ly ,l11"iolls {\YPl' ))os"ihiliry losillg Inllo~ l'in:', \,dr",T ]'P111;1)'](::: l ~l\ln' Go,'t- ' s rlpC'i"i0n SPIHl1 ){\fh "[oufrt. (1'.' 1':1"<' I)li l'll T\l (1{\('hinn <'CPlll" l )p C()lliPl'()111i5~ \'\-1Ii('11 aYoi(ls allY de cision h "i-\l- rp,," 1 (1)110"i n o.- ;1(hor;)i-rs or f;l'lll ,1))(1 rn))ri l iaf'(11T ])nlic)-, Hp rln\ll: r~ \\-]Jp;h'l' sl1rll C0111P Ciln llOpC soin 8IJc('essfulJy sP['ioll;; crisis \Thich ar iscn IIll1ochill;l,
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16 , By: NWD Date: 2011
.11eIllO)'fI/idllli/ lJy tIll' Dil'rctui' of tll (' n [ll'(' 01 F,I)' /:;' II,\/enl (T'inrent) to tllr' ["lId e l' S'J'Ic!tli'!j oj S trIfe (.lch l"'OIl )
Arf(lirs
[IY,\Sr, r.'CT():\ ,J 1)c('clIlhcr :2:i. In :!:\> , Thp 5prir)llS illlpli f'at inn,:; of the fi ;:dll illg between tIll' French aml the Yi erll:1111l'o'p \\'hi ch took pl:lrt' ill thc T()nkiI 1 e~c to\nlS of Haiphong and Ll i1g:"0l1 (luri ng th e \\' eek of :\on'lllher Q (~-:? I \\'cre l1 nte(l in f\ ' ITIcIl1 0randUlll to yon of :\o\,\:l11oc r QG , ~r. It \\"a s feared al that time
>-; : \
ot pri ur"(1.
th at ;t 5110'.\"(101\"1l hy forcc \i"ns in the making, Thi s no\, appcar," to h a n: c\'pnrtl ;lt'p(l, For (h e pa st :o ix clays, open \\'H r has bern r aging in T onkin :lll(l ;1t !"C\"l'l';l] ])oints ill .\nn;~ ll1, The Yi e( ;\i1111('",e Goyern, m Cll t. ha;:; fl E'( 1 Ir.'ll oi alHl tIle 1<'1'el\('h :H'(' l'nc1enYol'ino' to rl r:11' the city "" . of rem;lil1ill!1: Yi etn:lll1C'e.;C' ~):ncrilhc: \\'it h ph ne;:: [\11(1 hnl;:,::, Yi etn;11l1e;.:C' cil.c:l!al t iC';:; d l' rin?' th r p;,,,t month arc p1'Oh<\hh' 11 0\\' \yell 0\'(:1' :?,nno, ~\lth 0l1p']1 Frrneh c;l"u:!l(ies 1):1"e bee n 1'<1t' 1i f!'hlr1', S:1inteny (C'ommis si oM I' fo!' To nkin [ul(l nor (h l'l'1l ,\lllum) lI'n s hi m~elf seriously wou n,lc rl fOllr (by" :1g(), You may \\, i s1\ to mitkp th e f ollo\\'ing poi nts \\"llen you c:ee .\. mh;1Ssac10r Brm nC'; J 11 i;:; ;1 ftrl'noon : 1. \\Y p ;1l'P rl rr])ly eOJlI'e1'l1ec1 1n' tl1r ollthl'eilk of \\'a1' in Tonk in and Annilm fl. 1H1 hy rhr ;1)JJ)i' rcnt :O(,\'Cr;ln('p of 1110:,,1 of the cont;1ct<; \1r( \\'p(:n the Frppch :111<1 th e Yi e t ni'111 l'S(, ,1,n(l, iHP fulh :1\\',11'(' of the unhappy position in \\'h ieh th e !tn'neb 11:1'1'(' lwrn pbcNl: 2, ,Yr nrr Q t if1c(1 1)\' th !=' np\ys t'hat :.r. :'follt e( n[ini ;::tcl' f or Onr Ti1 sens Fran eE' ) i:: nl'occeding in lJ1)cdi;ltely by air to In ,loch in a to obtain fi1'51- 11:11H1 informa tion on th r ;:;itl1 nt iol1 : ;1, \\Tp [1\'(' ;l"';ll'C' th\( s1wh 1'11c:pt(" led ('onrli f iop s as 11O\Y )I1'c\':111 in 11ol'thr l'n Tn l1ochin:t olTel' proHlcat iOIl to oll('C'ide intcrfe rencc and :He d i<;t urh ed lcst : ([. TIle conf1ict Le brought to
1)(';1('e :
l1p
llc fo1'c the Security C'ounc il as n threa t
b', Of'l,l'l' ]101\'CI'<:: nt'(rlll11t ,,0)11P f(':'il1 of illtE'r'l'f'n t ion , in ,,'h;c11 connrl'(iol1 it ]11<'" he potpcl t'h:\t :-]w C'hi11c;::e 1 1/'('3'; hn::; 1'1'l'ol'tpr1 (k\t tho c1isP;1tch of C'hinp,o(, t1'OO]),' tn t11E' <'1'1';1 is !>r> ;1W considpl'crl (l\ying' to tllP' 1' r;]\'y los;:cs c:l1s(',linecl by the loca l Chinese ill the ;\o,-cl1lbct' firl'htin c)" o c-'
F (ii' l i()ll I' ii' f()!'IJ)(fti()J) .' Alij,o uf+ tl ~e Fre\1ch ill T!ldncllil1a h ,\\-e made f il l' -l'pi\ ('hin,~' p;1per, con ('es:~ ion s to th p \'i r~llnll1r'p rlr;::il'e for nlltn1l0m~', Frrllf' h ction.'> on th e sc('n(' h;l\,(, hepll r1i1'Pc'pc1 t()\\,i1l'(1 \\ l \itrlill~ (10\\')1 till' ]1()\yrr" : m1 , tIlE' tenilo ri;' l r:-:lent of (hc Yi etJ'i1n1 "frf'P c:h1tr", Thi s, nrOC P ;::3 th e \-j etp ;11lH'Sr h;II'E' (,01it illl' Nl io l'P"i"t. ,-\1 the O'i1111(' tinw. tb~ Fn'1~ ( 'h th rn1:ochr;:: adm it, th ai tl~ l'\' bck 11' e militill')" st)'('ll,,-th tn rer-nilqllrr th p ('Olllltr'.', In h:'i rf , ",i!h in;lclC'C!,,;1te fCfl'r:-', "'jtll 1111l>li c op illion sll;l1'l'h' at (;r1d". 1, jlh n. !,'OHrlllllrd rendl' l'r rl Inr~'E'ly in,'!l'l'!'t i\'o tl ' rnl' o'h ill trl'l\;1 1 rli\';"ion, th e Fl'f'nc'il han tri E'd tn ;),c(-('mp1i,~ h i !l Inc10I,1I ill ;\ "']l;lt n Sh'n!lg and imitrll Thitain 11;1" fOlln r ] it l\l\\\'joe to at tplilni in n\ll':!~:\ , (; !\'rn th e 111''':Ol'llt ekm en ts in (1\ (' sitll;,rinll, ,~,\l e ri 1 \'.";11' h l'\.' I i1 :1,Y ,'Imt i n UP i l1!:1C' fill lte 1~, 1:1
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
III conllC'('tioll \"it It th e possi biliiY of C'ltill (,:"p illt el'H'll t ion in Inc1 ochin:l, Th e Chill P:,C' F.lllb a",~.\' ill L Olldfil1 ha s appl'Oa ch pcl th e For(' ign OJliC'(' 10 nl'Ol) ()O'c' ,i oint Cltil' c"l-Bl'i rish illl l'ITl'll ti ()]1 ill T!l(1 (wll in'1 ,111\1 th e Cltil1 P<;r EI ]lba:~s,\' ill Pari s h as :Ippro:ldlrd 0111' EI1l11.1:;:'.\" ill Pa r is to p],()I'():~(' Ch i I1 Psl'- Driti ;;ll -,\l1wri c<l1l inl('rn'llfioll , [t is lwli eH'c1 that th e C'hil1l'sC' EJllba""y 11<'1'(' Ill:,.\" anpl'naclt li S 10 the ::::1I11 l' Plll'l)(l;':('. If so, if is ropc:illpl'pll that \\'c::;holl ld 1'(,1)1\' a::: I'JIC' Bri t i,;jl l'l'p l ircl, to the ellec f that ;,f"ll tc,t is PI1 ]'Olltp 10 Illd och ina 10 l'l'\'i(' \\' thc ~itllati()ll, f'liat the Frl'llcll li ll(' ill JIl (l ol'h ill a \I,ill proba l)ly h(' cb,ri fiecl as,Fn'llch in.rPI'Il;ll ))ol:f if'S C'lllcrge frnm th eir prp:::e llt ('01' ft, ,.:;iOIl, alld thal an otrer of nwclial ion at- thi s time wo uld prolJably b e )'C" ;" l1 t('(l and l'C'jrctecl hy tIle FI'l'I1 f' h,
J[onxJ C[,\rrn,:rrJ
Y[lX CEXT]
Th e rice
SECRET
F)~,
{'O ilS!,?
((t ilalloi
(O',\'1/ 11i",/iJ) to th e S er'!'etm'Y of S tate

H,lxnr, D CCPll!1J('r :2:;, 10-1G-!1 p, lll. [TI ec~ i\' etl DecC"nJl)er :2-1-1: 0,> p. m,l
11 C';1S0ns \Yhy Yiet nnlll cse n!hckec1 Fl'C'llch D ecPl11her ] 0 nnrleHl'. ITo\\,p\'pr, ih ror ie" l\r]'e :lrc: (1) R C':"ll lr nrt!ers from -:'Ifo:::co\l' (,.1.) pos;:: il )ly c: iPl1)l\' 10 111l<'er Snlltlll> ,lst' .\s i,l. (11) p o:::~ ibl~' to o:in' FrL'nch C'0I111111l '1i ;::t T\Ij,t\" should it ("ke ))O\\'C'1' \\' lI en JWl'"rJ'l f nll'JIl G on'rl1 ment ,(),opc:, OpJ)I)!'!J1Jlih' I I) m:lk .. quic k l ;I \'OI';ll)l e setl1C'JIl"Il T \I'it' l! \.~i C't n ap~(><:C' thu s pn:l hlil1'~ Frl'IlC'h ('0111"'1111i<:;i'S to pn,:::e ;1" ' :l!ro!pl'fnr::; of Frenrl ill rrrp",\:::" tll rrl'hy in('r r;lc: i nr~ CP !'tl'f'll.o:!11 in Fr,l)H'P: (:?) TIpsIllt SI'IPpJ11"'n i .l; l\':tnf'.~C' r,lh"inl'<l frn!]) TT"lL,iH1 h\' fin: 1 I t in0: \\'hill' ne,0:or; ;11;n o: <1'" Yi r!n"j'le"p :IPI)nn'nt l,\'l oct all hope s:n isfaet(JI'Y settle ment \\,hO)] \, cd lll'!l d'.\.rgt'll li pli annOllllCl'tl, Rep enl to Paris,
1
92
Declassified per E xecutive Order 13526, Sectio n 3.3 NND Project Number : NND 63316 , B y: NWD D ate: 2011
O UTGOING TELEGRAM
DEPflR'j.'l1ENT OF STATE Hashington Confidentlal _ December 24 , PAHIS . 6586 The UnderSecretary asked Bonnet to call yesterday aftel"nOOn to d3_scuss the situation :Ln Indoch:Lna . Mr . Acheson said that we ar~ deeply concerned by the o~ bre2.k of host:i.l i ties in 'r onkin and f..nn3ltl and are fully aware of the unhappy situation in ~1ich the Frenc]l find t hemselves . We had anticipated such a situat~.on developing in November and events have confirmed our f ears . While we have no wish to offer to mediate under p resent conditions we do want the French GOVT to know t hat i'le are ready and "\\'illing to do anything Hhich it might consider helpful in the circumstances . We have b een gratified to learn of Moutet ' s mission and have confidence in his moderation and broad vieHp01nt . \'[e be l leve hov,rever that the sj_tuation is hj.ghly lnfJ.anl!":latory and if present unsettled conditions continue, there is a possibi l ity that other po'.':ers might attempt to br:Lng t he matter up before the Securlty Council . If this h appens , as in t he c ase of Indonesia, the question will arise whether the matter is one of purely French int~rnal c onc~rn or a situation l ikely to disturb the peace . Othe:e pm'lers might li~e\?:i.se attempt some IO:CID of :tntervention as has been 8us;csted i.n- the-Chinese press . He:: would be opposed to such steps, but from every poi.nt of view it seems important that the question be settled as soon as possible . Mr . Acheson added that he wondered whethRr the French would attempt to reconquer the country through milita~J force which was a step that the British had found um'; ise to attempt in Burma.
19~6
93
Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. B y: NWD Date: 2011
CONF' IDEII'r I AL
Bonnet said thit he had little direct info with r egard to the present situation in Indochina but ref~rred t o Leon Blum 1 s speech in the !isserilbly this morning . He sUHu"i1ar:i..zed important pOints of the speech 1'!hich he sa i d clearly indicated that Blum ls policy is to settle t he cj"l.l.es tion as fap as ;pos sible by c i)l1C i l:latory meE.tnS and t hat this was the purpose of Mou~et ' s visit . Be said t hat Blum had reiterated that French policy isto as sure the indcpenclenc e ( Ill thln the French e;iir)l:cc ) of VIet Nam !3.11cl complete se If GOVT. It \'laS unJ"'o:C'tunatc that :i.t had been i mpossible up to the present to h lp lement \;118 far reaching concessions embodied in the French aereement with Viet Nam.
lie said that personally he would be surprised if the Chinese brought the question up before the Secur1t~l Council at this time for he felt that the Nanking GOVT was syn~athetic to the French position in Indochina. He concluded by saying that he "!'lould infornl hls GOVT of our friendly interest and of our deep concern over the situation and let us know the reaction from Paris .
BYRNES
Declassified per Exec utive Order 13526, Sectio n 3.3 NND Project Numbe r: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 2011
Th e _ ct inr; $u'/,Cir{/,y oj J.
."'/11/1' If)
Ihl'
('/11/1'[//:
in tIn C,,;!e(l h'irr[/dOllli
( (il! llllrrll!)
v
SECf:r:;T
,,\'i
.\:'lJISGT(1 "-.
D<.'ceIiJlH:r :2-;-,
1!).!:1~-1
p. m.
s:n T.
Cl'te1::; 10:21(;, Dec :?1 a llll Ill:!} .., Dec :2+.'"
X 0 Chinese pro-
p osa1 n-'ceinc1 here {OI' illtencnt iOIl Tndochina . Ennt ::illch npp1'o,lch, D ept 1'e,lct iol1 \,i11 bl' lH'f!'at in> \"itlt reply h<lsC'c1 :::<1111(, con5 itler,ltions einplw si7.ccl. by Brit F.-mOlT in rel?ly such sll!!ge~rion by Chinese. nam l?ly (1) po,.:"ibility reslllts l'rolll ".\[ouret trip, (:2) likeh cln1'ific,ltion French liJl() llidcchina as Frcncll in tel~!la l poli(i/~s eli~c]';::e from ( 1)J1fll";;01l, and (:1) cerr,l inty ofrer of mediation \\'ould be 1'p"cllLfully i'ejected by French.'0 .
.. 'fl'l rgr:\Il1 In~.!). IlPll'lll~ er :30. ll)j(j. 1 [I. Ill .. [!'I,m Lou(l()ll. l'l'l1tH'l('cl th;lt till!
Eritbh
~'''rl'igll
Ottlt-('
\\.;t.;
g-r:ltitil'/l at
l'~;(' J~el'nrt:IIl'l\t'~ ~illli\nr
ll/I:'itioll :lB(l
sratpd tl:nt tJ~e (~hi~I(~:--:p E!lIh:l";:-:.\' \\"a:-: hpill.~ il1 flJl'lll~-'tl of P,riti~h l'ejet:tion lIf tlu~
Jlr()p ()~l'( l illtl' t'l'l'lIli rJll ill Indndllll:t
(.,,:;t(;.r.Ojl:?-:li)!Gl.
S"ll to Lr)lld()11 :\5 ~nll . and ::Inliking ;1 ::; 1:2-J.4:.

t
TIq)eatecl to P;\ris as CGO.3; S:ligOll as :j1G;
Th e Consul (It Saigon (R eed ) to the SeCi'et(/i'y of State

CO::\FIDJ:;::\TI,\L
SAIGOS,
December ClO, 10-l:G---J. p. m. [R ecei,'ed 10:21 p. Ill.)
499. L eclerc al'l.-iHc1 Saturday O~ p. m. with many his original staff

'" Decetll l>('t' 2S. randl is ]H'o(?c('tlinQ,' ITanoi Tueslhy. Aft er confcrence \\'irh Leclerc, l\folltet left fo!' Camboc1i,l, Lnos anc1.\ rgrillieu for Hanoi Sunday n. 11l. French makiIl!?,' progrl'ss in north [111(1 \\-eSf and proposal from Yietll ;'tl11 lllilit;\ry leader fro] \Iithc1m\\ hi s troops frolll city is beillg: fn,-ol'nhly considrrcrl. Hi.!!.' question no\\' with \\'hom -:'Ifout et can c1ecll, pl'O-Y irf11f111l elrlllrnfs ill"istin<.!, sti ll cnn tl'l'at \\-ith ('oblle, Illost ob~ sen'Pl'S thillk this unlikl?ly. Solut ion as I ha\'(~ p rel'iously reported may he CrC[ltioll ne\\' Yi elll ,lll1 GO\'ernment, S'l} Hnc1er Dao Dai 0~
~'hlll[>("l'() l'
()f
.\llll ;llll
\"ho :l!J(licntE'/l jn
.\llt:\l~t ]!)[.i.
find/or Tam (n ow in -:\;llllzinn: ) \\'itll \\'l1ich Fre1\ch C,tIl trt'nt \"ith ont loc:ing fa re and \\'hiclt \\ ill ha',c in(l UE'IH'E' \Iith nati\'(> population. :\fam' nalin"s dcflllitl?ly tirPll tl\i s SPPI1\ in ;'Yh rnellC'".'; insecur ity and want r'l1;l1\ce rCSI'lllr J)eacdnl li fr. 'yrith r1 i l,l/wla t jr han(11ill (!. solution C;lll ht" obtained but e:dl'cll1 i c:r clrmpnt \\ill rnntillllt' llHlkc trouble posc:ilJly I Oll(): till'e fo ('onw. ::lot illlpoc:c:ilJlc Yicfll:111l GO \,(:l'I1n\ent thlls CI'f'a t pc1 will ('1:1 i m olllv Tonkin .. \n nam as o\-C'rhp:ll'rl rCII1<\rk J[olltrt to T\' (Yicp Prl'"iclf'llt COI:lli'l (,hina GO\'Elrnll1ent) in(licatec1 Frl'n('h l!;lr !..:;I W ind rpE'l1(len ('ochin Chin'l. "Cnnuec:t !nn;lh1\ ai t,lek ' and airrwillPs (f"om !\YO to nl'c llillldrpc1 Fn'nrll ci\'ili:lllc: kille(1) hnn rOl' ~rt1 rrrl1l:11 ft>eling-eI'PIl :\fOlltd surprisingl.\ OtItc:pol;:cll-nnd nn t il pll other 111e;1l1S exli,ulst('d Fl'encll \yill ue disinclined acccpt mr<liaiion. Depnrtmcnt p1e:l~e repent 1'<lri::, London, ::I'l.l1king;.
REEn
Thp ,,,'('('/'Clrli'!! of Sill II? 10 th e rite ('on,llI?

tele;.:rilill t,) P ar i" . LUll (]OII. Xii llki II); .
SECHET
rlf
llan oi (O'.'..'ullil'(ln)n:;
., TIl e Dpllilrt lllPllt :11:::0 s('ilt i nfol'lII:1tioli t! ' l p':;l:IIlIS. g>illg' tIl(' f'i.--:t of this :I II (I :'-:aie:oll .
'\~'\ S[[T:\(;-l'()", D p('elllUel' :n, If) -~G-i p, m. 2;'). Xo objectioll your acting llllIllHuital'i,u: grounds as described
lll'tell (;0 Dee :~s
no
or, \\ lrh Frell('h agreeing, ill any ot her st rictly local,
.., Til t\li" t p l""T:11I1 "if't' (',)11:<111 n'~llllinlll I' PI)I )rl ('(l tha t 11(' h:1(l il1l'''1'1I ',('(1 tll(' Chill" '<' ('ulI "ll l (; l'IIPI': ti ni 1l:llIu i 111:11 Ill' \\'''\1](11)<, \\'illill , : [II air! ill 1l1l,\" C: lP:ICit., : t o whir-It Frl'lIC 'h :lulh"l'iti,." ,::,1\'(, :Ippr""al alld 1'1''11\(',,1<(1 Ihp ])C']J:lrfllll'lll ', ill!<trll c-l ioll " oll,thi, p"illt. Thf' ('hi m'"p h:1I1 slI'::,::('"I'('(1 thilt th (' Yielll:lI11P"e IJlig-ht \Yi~h lll! ofti" i;ll pn'''Pllc'':' nf Hriti "h <1n(1 .\.I IIPr i(<l1l ("c)I1"nLlr oflir-l'i''' ill <l1l~' IIIP('till';with th (> Frt'llrh. (K"i I (;.OI)/l:2-:!~-j(;)
military, n Oll-pol itica l "iruation in order Si1\'e l i\"E~s. YOH shoul{lnor, hmn> \'PI', \I"ithou! ('xt)t,'ss D r ])/' alltlloriza!ioll hecoille illl'ohecl any 'situation allY \\'i\Y \\'hich conltl l,c inler]lrpte(l ,15 ll1P(]ii\hll\ bil"ic political is<; IIPS hpl \\"l' r n opposil\(~: :>ilrt- irs. For yOlll' SPCl'l' ! info, .\.el in!.?' Sec.\" in D!'c :2:1 cOI\\'prsa!ioll \~'ith Fl'pl\ph .-\.mb h pl'e pXJ)l'P;';<::['cl OHI' COll~ cern Ol\t]lI'l'll k 1\0<:! ilil ies it\\(l our rp;l(lil\ 0'ss (10 amt hil1~ \\'hi ch might br con c: :(l prpcl hf'l ll-fllllJllt "htte<l \y e han' no \yi"ll offcr mec1i,\le prescnt condi t ion;;; . Furthrl'. on l'Pcp in t info tlla t C'hinp.:::c 11,([1 appl'oa cltctl Brit FopO(l' ;\11\1 ,\.II I Eplh Pi\l'is with nroposal joint l11ccli;\lioll. Dept cl('ci c: iol\ \"i\ " ilrl\'''r,e thi s iUl\ C! Ilrt' ill \i e\\" cerhl imy 1'P"0'11 1 flll rr.jcdion by Fn'pf'h, n,it ['('adion ;11,,0 lH'.O:at il e. C'hinese dcsire pxl'(, I1('l illflU P1W(' 111 (loc11 i l1a ;::ppms Sf'ems cl("H n url Fl'pnch C'o 111 n1l1l1 ists re;Hh. makp inc:rant cnpihtl [\llY appeal"<lllCe outside illlP1Tent ion Indochina as '(foreig n imper iali sm.';
~
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Secti on 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
SECRET 855. 211-!1-3 l j'7:;

SeCY'8 t FJJ.e
\ ,
I
O UTGOING TEL:SGl1fJ-I
J'anU81'Y 8, J..9)+7 7 pm
ANR1f.8J\SSY PAIUS
DEPT ' s present policy on arms and armaments approves QUOTE sales to France by the FLC of reasonab:e quantities
of mi litary supplies except in casas which app ea r to rel ate to Indochina UNQUOTE c French requests for purchas8 s urplu ~; military suppltes in BUTIilD. B.nd Ph11ippir,.(~s fo:c u se I ndochina have been consisterltly refused on basis this policy ""hic1."l consequently should be vJell lcno':m to FONO.'F' and OFLC Paris. Since French have apparently stated t.heLc proposed purchase ammunition subject UHTEL 33 :1.S 1'8~' l ated to Indochina hostilities~ DEPT could Dot approve its resnle to them by Belgians. You may wis~ inti~ate as much t o FONOFF' be:ore. receipt note you e.nt:Lcipa to.
BYRN2S
VIE: \'Pdcl,llnel'
S ECHE~C
OUTGOIHG TELEGRJdl URGEl'iT

AhErm!~SSY
PARIS
Fe brua:cy 3, 191:,7 8 pm
There is ree.son for incr eas ing concern 01782.' sltu8.tj.0l1 as it is developing in Indochina and for that reason I feel you might vJell "CB.ke early occas:J.Of' to l"lave franlc talk '<Ii th Renno.d:Lel' or Bidault or bot.h sOl(lG1.'lha t alonG lines cODversations you have already had with Blum) but at this t ime going ill f2.(; t beyond posi t:ion you tool,: in those tal1-:s. We have only very friendliest feelings toward France and we are anxious in every way we can to support Fra~ce in her fight to regain her economic, political and r:iliti:J.:ry strength and to resto:ce her8(.;1f as :"Ln fact one of rr:ajo:c PO'.'!8l'S of ",orlc1. In spite B.ny mtsunderstandjJlg \"!h~.ch might h8.ve arisen :Ln minds French in rega :cd to OUI' posi tlon concerning Indochina they must appreciate th a t we have fully recognized France I S sovereign position in that area and ",e do not "'ish to have it appear that we are in any "Jay enc1eavorinz undermine tha t posi tion, Etnd FI'ench shOUld l{noH it is our desire to be helpf"L1.l and 'de stand reD-ely assist any appropriate way we can to find solution for Ind ochinese problem. At sa~e time we cannot shut ouv eyes to fact that there are two sides this problsn and that our reports indicate both a lack French understar:.ding of other side (more in Saigon than in Paris) and cont:i.nueo. existence dangerously outmoded colonial outlook and methods in area Fl,lTthermorc) there is r;o escape fro m fa.ct trlat trend of ti mes is to effect that colonia l em9ires in XIX Century sense are rapidly becoming thing of ~asta Action Brit in India and Burma and Dutch in Indonesia aTe outs tanding e):ample s this t::.'end , and French tr,emsel've s took -l, l~ 'nelr co gn~zance or lu t)0 t"n lU new C t ' t uv~on Rna . t' , ons 1 + -' agroements ",ith Vietnam~ On othe~ hand we do ~ot lose sight fact that Ho Chi Mi~l has direct Communist connections and it should be obvious that we are not interested in seeing colonial e~plre administrations supplanted by , .. ' ' po l 1 pn:Ll osopny aDa 1 - GlC2._. OJ.'ganJ.za l~'1 ons e!JE:nc~ -f.':; lr..g f 1'O!1 Cl.nrl
0 '
.L
..l
SECRE ~e
I ,
controlled by Kremlin. Fact does remain, however, that a si tuation does exist in Indochina '\Oihj_ch C8.n no l onger b8 consid ered, if it ever was considered, to be of a local Ch aJ'D.ctel"c If that situation cont:Lnues deteriorate some country in di rect in terest is very likely to bring matter before Security Council under Chapter 11 of Charter c We h a.v8 no 1ntent:Lon tal,,:Lng such actj_on ourselves at tl"d.$ ti ns 9 but French 'H i11 surely appreciate tho. t we do have a vital interest in political and economic well being thi~ are8.c If some cotmtry should bring matter before Secur':L'GY CouDei ]. we would f:Lnd it difficult to oppose an investigation Indochinese probiliem llillessnegotiations between parti es were going on. It might be added that it would not in our estimat:Loll be in France I s long~ range :tnterest to u se her veto position to keep L~ a tte:e fl'om coming befol'o Cmmci1 Frank1.:Y __\'l~ __hD,-YQ .-110 __s.ol_ utiOl1 _ Q~ problem to sug , gest. It TS--t1asically ma tfe-r for two par'tles--'t6 -\i6r}: out . '''t11cJ:1selves and from your reports and those from Indochina we are l ed to f eel that both parties have endeavored to ke ep cioor open to some sort of settlcment o tve apprec1atG fa ct t hat Vietnam started present fightins in Indochina on December 19 and that this action has ID2.de it more o.:Lff1, cult for French to adopt a position of generosity and ' corlCi lL3.tion. Nevertheless we hope th8.t French \:i11 f i nd it possible to be more than generous in trying to find a solutloYlo
0
MARSHALL
1tlE:PTCulbertson
SECRE'j.'
. 'C '- ; ~
Declassified per Exec utive Order 13526, Sectio n 3.3 NND Project Numbe r: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 2011
S ECHE~C
\ 85lG . 00/5--1347:
Sec:ce t F:Lle
OUl'GOIEG TELEGTIAH
l-'iay 13, 19l:'7 . 8 pm
1737
W becoming j.ncreasingly concerned by slow progress e toward settlement I ndochina dis~ute. W fully appreciate e French are rnakin~ effort roach satisfactory settlemsnt and hop,,: vislt COlllmiss ionsr Bollo.ert t.o I ndochin8. \rill p:coc1uce concrete r8sul ts. The follo,'iing consici.erations, hO\'!ever i are submi tted for your use B.ny conve~sations yQ1..l nay h av8 'vi th Frencl1 authori ties a.t appropriate time th:i.s s ub j ect. \1e l'ecognize :L t might not be de sir8.ble make such aPP1'oEtch to rOo8I,rly constitnted gO\TernJ:lent in fh'st days it s reo::'g2.ni zation, but nevert~eleS3 feel early appropriate opportunity might be fOWld inform French Gov of our concern i n this matter.
. Key our position is our awareness t hat in respect developments affecting position Western democrat ic po~ ers in southern Asia , we essenti&lly in same boat as Fr ench, also as Br i ti.Sll and Dutch. \-Je c a ~lnot conce j_ve s8tb::wlcs to 1 0ng~range i nterests France Hhich Hould not also be s etbacks our own .. Conversely we stould reg ard close associ a.tion Franc.:e and nlemters French Union as not only to advantage peoples conc erned , but indirectly our own.
In our View, southern Asia in cr~tlcal phase its hi stury with seven new nations in proce~s achieving or struggling i nc1epen.clence or autonomy. 'l'::-iese La t.icc;) L1cludo quarter i nho.bitants "1Or1d End th e.:.. :t future C(Jurs 2 , Q1,'!ing sheer ~eight populations, resources they c02~and, &nd s t l'ategtc loea ti on J v.rilJ. be m0r.13iltous f 2c tc,Y \-ro::"'ld s ta bility. Followi ng relaxation European controls) internal racial, religious, and nat5,onal d.ifferences couJ_d plD.l1go new nations in to violent discord~ or alr eady apparent anti-Western Pan-Asiatic tendencies could become dominant poli t::1.cal force ~ or CO:fu'T:unists could cap tur e c ontro3.. o \-{8 consider as best safeguard against these eventualit~es a
SEC:ctE l'
100
SECRET
continued c 10s8 as soc iation bet"reen neuly~a.utono;:ilolJ. S peoples and pOi,re:rs ,,!hich have l()ng been respons :L ble thoir we l fare. I n particular we recognize Vietnamese will fo~ i ndefinito period require French material and technical a~:sis tEl.l1CC 8.nd enliehtened poll tical guic1.ance ,,!h} .ch can bo provided only by nation steepGd like Franca in democratic t radj,tion and confirmed i n respect htunan liber'ties and v:o:rtl1 incUv1du8.1D VJe equally conv:Lnced , hm,rever, SUGh assocj,atiol1 ml.}st; be voluntary t o be J.asting and achieve results , and that protraction present situation Indochina can only destroy basis voluntary cooperation, leave l egacy permanent bitterness, and irrevocably alienate Vietnamese from France and t hose values represented by France and other Pastern democrac :Les~
Hhi l e fully apyreciating d:tfficulties French pos i tion t his conflict, we feel there is danger in any arrangement "'hich might p:cov1de Vietnamese oppo:ctuni ty compare l..mfavo:r.'~ a bly their 0i\Il1 posi tion and that of other people s southe:cn Asia who have made tremendous strides toward autonomy s ince -vrar ~ \1/1:1ile ' 0[8 are still reac1y and \\Tilling do anything Ire c an ,'lh :Lch m:Lght be considered helpful, French \1rill understand we not attempting come forward with any solution our own or i ntervene in s1 tU8. tion Hmlever, they \till also under-s t and we inescapably conce~ned with situation Far East generally , upon -viliich developments Indochina likely have profound effect.
0
P1a i n fact j.s that \<Jestern democratic systetl is on defensive in almost all emergent nations southern Asia and, because identified by peop l es these nations with what they have cons:Ldered former denial their rights, is particulal'ly VUlnerable to attacks by demagogic leaders political moveDcnt:.::: of either ultra--nationalist or CmT,nnm ist nature which promise redress and re~ enEe past so -called wrongs and ine'11..1a11 ties . Signs development ant:1,~\'!est el'n Asia tj,c , 1 . \ ,. conse; i_,ousness cL1 re8.0Y !TIU.It Ip. Ylng, OJ. "./nlcn I n-cer-.hSJ.e.!.1 COPF an example. U nanimity support for Vi etnaues8 among o ther Asiatic countries very striking, even leading to moves Burrn8., India) a.Dd Halaya s em!. volunts-8T foy'cos thG:i.:r
.i:" ,
S:SCRET
Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 20 11
SEG8El'
851G" 00/5-13 L:-'1

assistanceo Vietnam cause proving rallying-cry for all forces and playing in hands COHUIIlli.lis"Cs all areas. We fear continuation conflict may jeopardize position all Western democratic powers in southern Asia and l ead to very eventunli ties of "Which \ve most appJ.'ehensi ve ~
anti\"!est~:l~n
T
He confident French fully a1;.. are dangers :L nherent in situation and therefore venture express renewed hope they Hill be most generous attempt find early solution ,,-,hlch, by recogn:tzing l egitimate desires Vietnamese, vl:D.l re storo peace and deprive anti-democratic forces of powerful WGapon. For your INli'O, evidence that Fl'ench Communists 0.1'0 being directed accelerate their agitation French colonies even extent lose much popular support Fra.nce (UETEL 1719 API' 25) wa.y be indicat:Lon Kremlin prepared sacrif:i.ce tern" por ary gains with 40 million French to long range colonial strategy \-,i th 600 million dependent people) '-lh1ch lends .great urgency foregoing views. French posit1on I ndochina dispute since DEC 19, which based on Vietnam initiative attack, seems DEPT dangerously one-sided in ignoring Debes attack Haiphong NOV 23 and understandable Vietnam conten~ tion that stand had be made some point view steady French encl'oachments after NAR 6 on authori ty and terri 'em:'y Vi etnam ( e.g. , establishment Cochlnchinese REP, occupation southeTn Annam and Moi Plateau, and Dalat plan French-d omina ted Federa tion to vlhtch Vj.etnarn ",ould be snbservien.t, ) DEPT much concerned lest French efforts find QUOTE true r epre sen ta ti ve s Vi etnc.u:n UNQUOTE \<,i th vlhom negotiate result cr eation impotent puppet GOVT along lines Cochinchina regime, or that restoration Baodat may be attempted, i mplying democracies reduced resort monarchy as weapon against Communism. You may refer these further vieus if no. tuX'e yOUI' conver so. tions French appears \-lO.rrant. Saigon and Hanoi should be guided by this TEL in any conversations Bollaert.
SEA: CO g bUl'D
MARSHALL.
SECRET
Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Num ber: NND 63 316. By: NWD Date: 2011
r' nf~' S ;'l; d- T

....
l~
.. .
851G. 00/ 9- 1147:
Secret Fi l e
SECRET
OUTG OING TELEGRP.J.1
DEPARTMENT O STATE F
S ep 11 M1E rlcl.~\ S S Y
1947
For t he Ambassador He h ave read \,1i th concern recent t e l c,Sr2ms f rom i n I ndochina ( repeated t o you ) t o t he effect that l ocal French milit~ry are seriously COD'tcl]lp l ating an ofi'ens:Lv8 against Vietnarnese in dry season besin~ing a t end this mo~th . I t is d ifficult f or us give c redence these reports in l ight French e conomic , f inancial and food poslti aD. It i s obvi ous t hat such an offe~sive , if it took place u~der th3se cond it ions J ,'!oulel have seriOU8 effec t on p'U.blic op i n i on here ,'."hi,ch 'Houle1 be refJ.ec ted in a Congre s s which will be ca l led upon t o consider extensive ,f inancial aid for western European nations , i nc l uding France .
oU~iofficers
f .
Pl ease make appropriate i nforma l i nquirias and r epor t urgently . For your info Dept considering approach French on apparently rapidly deteriorating prospects for Franco-Vietnam settlement and is' ~ awaiting your reply this pOint.
MPcRSH1-\LL
,.
Consulate Hanoi , li'rench Indochina September 12, 1947 Recd CONFIDENTIAL Oct 7, 191 +7 ACTION SUBJECT : PE - enc INFO OCD - enc DCR EUR-enc SPA OlE WAR NAVY CIG POL Speech of Emile Bollae:d on Sc:ptembel' 10 on French P-:>licy i n Indochina
THE HONORABLE THE SECRETARY OF S'l'ATE WASHINGTON, D.C. SIR :
I h av ) the honor to refer to my telegram number 286 of September 11 , 8 a.m . and to report further on the speech delivered by EMILE BOLLAERT, High Cormnissioner of li'rance for Indo China . ~~here are enclosed five copies of the speech as published by " L ' Entente " in a s upplement to its regular daily edition. The site selected by Mr . Bollaert ,ms HADONG, a provincial capital ivhich lies 10 miles southeast of Hanoi , and "lhj.ch \'las, for a time, headqual'ters of the Viet Nam Government after its flight from Hanoi in December , 191.~6 . Hadong apparently 'was chosen as the place for the speech t hat M. Bolleart might ma}~e reference to "thi.s razed city of Tonkin, in ruins still haunted by memories of terror ". Robert Sherrod of "Time " h ad previousl y described i t as "probably the most thoroughly "lar-wrecked city i n the ,'lOrl d ." The speech itself "Tas delivered at about 5 p.m . i n a public square. Around M. Boll aert , ivhen he spoke, Here gathered the several hundred c i vilians (vlh i te and Vietn8J!lese ) and the many military officers "Jho had been i nvited . Some 1 ,500 Vietn81nese, largely peasant i-:omen and children, were kept behind ropes set up to form a square in the center of ivhich vas the rostrum that the Vietn8111eSe guerrillas had tried to bLU'n the evenj.ng previous. This speech represents the most importe.:o.t decla::.' ation of French policy that has been made in the last year . M. Bollaert , it i: ill be re called, "as orig:imdly named H:i.gh Comrnissj.oner for Indo China, replacing Admiral THIERRY D ' .ARGEJ"TIJIATI in March. He arrived in Indo China early in April, and subsequently returned to Paris in June . He Has in Saigon again in late July and shortly thereafter revealed to the press that he intended to deliver a major policy declaration in
COP Y
Tonkin in the course of the next month . He came to Ha..110i on August. 7, 1 9L~7. The RaJnadier Government, at that time, faced the difficult questions of the statute of Algeria and the Ml.U1icipal Election lm{ and "ias under attack from "lithin its m"ill party. Bollaert, i nstead of delivering his speech, when the government ..... No less than four "conseils restrients des Minist:ces " and one full IIC onseil", plus a series of private interviews bet,veen Bollaert, the Generals de Pellet a..l1d Valluy, and Ram.adier Ylere need ed to settle the final form of the speech, which I am informed, I'Tas much changed from the original version. The speech, t hen, "Tas Imrd by ",ord and sentence by sentence l abori ously assembled by the Ra:.l1laclier Goverruuent, aJ1cl i s the logical conclusion of Frcmce policy as p1.lrsued in Northern Indo China for the past tl'70 years. For as the French military position in TonJ;:in has improved militarily, so i n almost exact ratio has declined their \.,rillingness to make concessions. M. Bollaertfs speech represents a definite retreat from the French position tEL'ken in the March 6, 19~6, Accords, and indeed its terms on their face are no more lib eral than the 1884 Treaty of the Protectorate. stripped of its verbiage, the speech constituted an oblique offer to the Vietnamese people to bring forth a " representative govermaent " Ivhich vlOu~d accept the t erms Offered by M. Bollaert on "lhicb there vTaS to be no Ilbargaining" as this I\vould be in truth l.JnvlOrthy of such a noble cause. II Thi s seems to be designed as an escape clause for the French govern.ment and is directed against Ho Chi l'ilinh i'li th whom the French apparently I',ill deal only in a last extremity. fl.t thepresent time, the Frencb have no int ention of dealing i'li th Ho and should he accept the terms as offered, the Frencll would unquestionably demand the lll1.I!lediate surrender of his arms and armies for li the "Teapons must grmv silent. II Bollaert first defined the goal to-wa:rcl I'Thich lithe Vietnamese people aspire freedom Hithin the French Unj.on cmd uIli ty of the three Kys II. He said this freedom is in no Hay restricted other than IIby the limits forced ll on it by the fact that these territories belong to the French Unj.on But France, he maintained IIdo es not take any position with regard to the problem ll of Unity of the Kys save that II she recl'uires that the Union should not be made under pressure and according t.o tot.alitarian forrnulas universally condemncc.l ll Then shoulcl the Union be der-ived from the popula,r- vrish duly expressed, lo cal particularisms should be pr-eservecl, and the cohesion of the A.rmarnitc coun.tries shou..ld Ilbe founded not on the interest of only on e but on the confidence and friendship of all ", he stated. As for the states, separated or unified as they I- ish, H. Bollaert said : I\,e al'e reacly to hand over to the fully qualified goverl'llnents the rr..anagements of public affa;Lrs " "i'i hich means the o:cganization ,'lithout French interference of lIits representative iYlstitut:Lons, judicial proceedings, j.ts Oim finance, education , social legislat:Lol1, and hospitals" . The states of the peninsula, 1"1. Bollaert then foresaw by the facts of geog:caphy have certain CO!'!'llllOD intc:cests vrhich I-Ti11 require common policir.;s. He pointed out that n811 right l!linc1.ecl people ll vTill concede that among oeh,::1.'
t hings, a " common customs system, comlllon currency, and conrrwn policy of ilmnigration " is necessary . (This latter vras added because of the prob l ems posed by the prox:Lrni ty of China. ) These states, M. Bollaert continued, ,.Jill also plan together the reconstruction of Indo China in vlhi ch "Of cou..rse, vie ( the French) have our mm point of vie"," . "Th:i.s collaboration i s , after all , unavoidable and all those conc erned ( the French Repub lic being one of them) vIill have to decide together hOi'!, under the supervision of the High Commissioner, ...... ..... also be " commissioners of the republic " t o defend "French economic and cultv..red interests ". "The High Commissioner, or his delegate ( \'Those functions or position i s not specified), v!ill take good care that our country-men are enabled to enjoy all the democratic freedom enjoyed by the cHizens of the states belonging to the Union and Hill see to it that our concerns do not fare '-lorse than local ones; the citizens and concerns of Indochina being, i n r eturn, certain of finding the same advantages in France. The High Commissioner or his delegate 'will t herefore insist on ascertai ning that the personal and material status of French subjects is never one-sidedly changeo_. " And finally, M. Bollaert said , the High Commissioner will have a special status drmm up for the " southern and northern mino:cities of I ndo China "\,Those rights are considered by the French as having a sacred character . " All t he Indochinese states viill be, M. Bollaert said , in the French Union which "must frame i n the autonomy of the Indo Chinese people ... it does not restrain private irffilnmi ties . the French Union is resilient and dynamic enough to alloiv a nation to develop freely in frame'iwrk .. . it i s an aggregate of forces, ever on the move, each through a never ceasing interplay of exchange , giving and taking at one and the same time . . it is in the French Union that men \"Till find their raison d ' etre ". But, he added, the French Union can have on ly one army and one diplomacy . "The police forces of the associated states of Indo China l.Jill assure in time of peace internal order on their O',:n territory; in case of foreign aggression , t lley w:i.ll be i ntegr8.ted i n the armed forces of the French Union for the defense of their countries a:.f1d of the Union. " M. Bollaert also promised that the French ''\-muld not take reprisals and that all poll tical and lnilital'y prisoners v:ould be liberated reciprocally . He made a thrust at the lIoriginators of the December- 19th aggr-ess i on " vho have lost "much of thei:c c:cedit v;ith the French people ". He extolled the French Union and i ts accomplishment anel possibilities at some length a nd concluded :
' 1 f ~'Lj' ,:;~_ ~ J~, ~L. ~;

''''0
.'~,,~
, ... - , , \
"This peace depends upon you ( the Vietnamese people) to obtain it. II A-WALYSIS I ndividual States The speech left the vmy open for unification of the three Kys vrhich the French f eel as a foregone conclusion. The Fl'ench cleverly do not propose any solution but l eave the burden of preparing a plru1 acceptable to all Kys in the hands of the Vietnamese . The status of the states, either unified or separate, is one of "liberty and freedom" uithin the French Union. There is no recognition of Vietnam as an " etat IJibre ", such as ,-TaS done in th e March 6 agreement. There is nO\'1here any mention of IIindependence " save in the statement by M. Bollaert in Vietnarnese : II BOC LAP TRONG KIWI LAEN HIEP THA'l'" (Independence within the framework of the French Union.) Nor vlill Fra:.1'lce hand over anyLhing to the states which resembles " sovereignty". Rather she ,vill give only "public administration" . Thi s omission is com..mented upon by the from Hanoi as follOl'7S :
Al~P
in a September 12 despatch
"On the other hand, French circles eA.rpressed appreciation for the liberalism of the French government , a lib eralism i-Thich may reduce the ten sion. It is only regretted that the vlOrd I independence I, as being capable of producing a ( favorable) psyschological shock , VTaS not pronounced . II Each state or states will organize its representat:Lve institutions, its justice , its finances , its education, its social l egislation and its hospit als . The exact judicial fonnula has not yet been settled, hOl{ever. Didier Yl.A.CHEL, Political Counsellor to the High Cornmissioner, ",hom I sal, after the speech ,vas delivered, pointed out it Has uncertain iv-hether the courts of the states i.;auld have j1.lrisdiction over French and foreigners 'within its ten'itory. He dj,d. not specify i"hether Laotians and Cambodians li'ould be considered foreign er s with a special status . He suggested , as his personal opinion, that perhaps there might be a solut ion in the establishment of "mixed triblmals" or possibly mixed or wholly French al)pelate courts ove r Vi etname.s e courts of first instance. The state governments i'Till have the help, if they so desiI'e of "OUT functionnaires and our techn,icians", another retl'eat from the previous posi tion as only French II counsellors, technicians, ru1d. experts " i'Tere mention ed in Article L! of the Nodus Vi vendi of September lLf Finally, FTance solenmly renounced all aciministration dir ec t and indil'ect. Frru1Ce solemnly renounc ed I'direct II administ:r.'o,tion in the June 6, l88 Lf Tre aty v7hich states in J\.rticle 7: The ( French) residents (in Tonkin) \-Till avoid t:ceating details of int er ior aO.lninis-cY"ltion in the provinces
Q
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63 3 16. By: NWD Date: 2011
Grouping of states Bollaert did not abolish the 'lFederation ". He diluted and '\V'at ered i t dmm and his staff maintain that it i s dea.d . HOI- ever, at l east three r II conmlon services II ( a euphonistic naJne fer federal services )vTill exist: finance , immigration, and. customs.. It j.s probably a:.f'J. economic fact that i f there were no federation in Indo China it i-;Quld prob ab ly be necessary t o i nvent one . Bollaert indicated in his speech tha t there might be more " common s e rvices " than those he specifically mentioned. Didier MICliEL maintained vehemently there ivould not be ; that the concept of the Federation, as proposed by D ' Argenlieu, had been completely abandoned . Hm-/ever , the history of ' French administration in Indo China is not one to inspire confidence in such l imitations as the French volun 'i:;arily place on the activity of their services. No l'I'here is there any mention of the " Surete ", that ubiquitous French combination of an l<'BI ( for Europeans) and a Gestapo ( for Vietnamese ) . MICHEL maintained the Surete of the state or states vlhich emer[!;e vlOuld be in the hands of the 10 cal government. He said that in Lao s and Cambodia there 1 ms not a single French member of the Surete vrhich v;as entirely in t he hands of the i ndigenous peoples. He considered that d'ltring the early stages of development in VieJcnam, there 'Ivould be tiofO Suretes iv-hieh v;o'Llld t hen be mere;ed as gradually French persorLnel lofOuld be eliminat ed. tlyou will understand, I believe, that the situat'~on in Tonkin is not such that vIe can eliminate, at the present ti.me, the French Surete completely '\vithout danger to French lives " , he. said . There i s no good explanation of i'lhy Bollaert did not mention the eventual disappearance of the Surete in his speecho ]\Tor is there any good reason i{hy it 'IV'aS l eft to Pre.mier RAlvIADIER rather than Bollaert to state in a Paris Press Conference tha;t the government " undertook to elimi nate t he network of the ad..ministrative corps which control or dil"ect the administrative service ". Special Status Special status l'iill be prepared by the High Com.:.m.issioner for the minorities of the North and South I; hose rights have , since the vTar , assured an ovenrhelrning " sacredness" to the French. It mi[!;ht be ment:i.oned that the Dutch in Indonesia and, for a time, the British in Burma developed similar sentiments at about the same time . The }!loIs of the south - the Nune;, Tho, Neo, Nan, Lolo, Muong, Black and White Thai, [([nong others in the north - '\rill b ecome more or less special vrards of the French . Didier MICB..EL did not care to elaborate vrhat kind of a status the French proposed for these people. This is the ~_ogical development of French policy vis- a -vis minorities set as early as April 9, 1946, as revealed by documents \;hich the Vietnam e;overnlllent
f'T ~ "'.~' ;' ." ,: ~" "; ~ J i_~

. I;.1L,ij
L ~,
')
....
. .,l
~ 'i
obtained from the French Headquarters by \rays more or l ess devious . It i s also interesting to note that throughout last year, French officials ,str i dently denied that they intended to enclose Vietnam in a frame '.'!Ork of directly administered French territories . Exte:cnal Relations Vietnam or the indi v i dual three Kys. are flatly denied a....Y)Y fOloeign r epresentation as such . I t or they '\ViII have the right to partic i pate i n t he representation of the French Unj_on particularly in the surroundi ng cOlmtries ,.,-here i t or they have economic and cuJ.tural interests to defend . But Vietnmnese diplomats will represent, regardless of their grade , only the interests of the French Union . Army The States ,-rill have only armed forces '\{hich irill be integrated into t he single army of the French Union . The army of the lI etat libre !! of March 6 has thus disappeared although in time of peace the poli ce forces o f t he associated states of I ndo China "rill assure "internal order ". Commissioners The Commissioners of the Republic 'Ivill be attached to the local government . According to MICHEL, h e or they "rill have only a very small st aff : a political, economic , and possibly a cultural adviser or C01U1sellor. His or their task "rill be to protect French interests. His pos i tioll as defined is very nebulous but i t ,-Till develop great strength as t he defender of French interests. I t offers such possibilities t hat n o atte.mpt can yet be made t o evaluate i ts iwrkings. CONCLUSION The position taken in the speech is the ,logical development of French policy in Inslo China. As France ! s military strength irnproved 'I<Ti th 'I'rillingn ess to maJ\.e concessions diminished. Befoloe French troops \'rere in place i n Tonkin, France was i'Tilling to concede rec,ogni tion of Vietnam as an ll II etat libre , having its 0I'Tl1 government, parlieTnent, army and fina....Y)ces. By t he liJodus Vivendi of Septemb er 14 France 'I'/aS demanding much strengthened Federation 'ITi th control of customs of prirnary importance. It 'I'TaS on the willingness of the French to enforce this customs control that the Haiphong i ncident of November 21 developed . It '\'l as from the desir e of the French to reduce the Vietn81ne Government to irlipotence that the French c01Ult er pos i tion of ~Tove..mber 23 with its f81o.ous llJ.timatmil '\'las taJ:cen . At the present tirne , there are only t-,w reasons for France to make any concessj_ons ,',hatsoever; 'I'!OTld opinion ( to 'I'lhich the Indochinese French have ah.-C'Ns been more 01' less :i...l'nmm1 e - note the pre-,'Tar opium monopOly) and the fact that they aloe fac ed Hl,th armed resistance.
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 303 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
But should this res:Lstance be broken in Tonkin during the coming fall c ampaign , the re is no doubt vha tsoever that the final s ettlement "\vi ll in practice be even less liberal than its present fonn. As i t nOl{ stands, the French position a c ' expres sed by M. Bollae rt i s an elastic i nstrument ,orhich "rill become a vise i f the Vietnam Government i s crushed but Ivhich, i f this task proves b eyond French mili taloy strength , can b e stretched e-,-en to cover n e gotiations Hith Eo . Re spe ctfully your s ,
J ames L. 01 Sullivan American Vice Consul Enclo s lITes : 800 JLC 1Sullivan :j cf cc: Consulate General Saigon Five Copies of M. Bollaert 1s speech on September 10
f.:;'~; ~ri;"
."a~~ ~~ ~~:::)j ~ ~ ~;~~~4
'''\~ --: ..
r"j r;
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Sectio n 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 2011
8S1G .00/ 9-1247 :
Secret File
, I ncoming Telegram
SECRET
,.
Rec ' d September 12; 1947 2 :30 p .m. FROI1:

TO :
Paris
Secretary of State
NO ;
3715,
Septemb~r .
12 , 4 p.m.
I talked infornill l ly to Bidault along the lines of Dept I s 31~33 September 11. He sa id he 'J...nders tood our point of view and as far as he knew there are no plans f or a military offensive against Vietnamese in dry season beginning at end this month. CAFFERY
,.
SECRET
11.1 .
J'O"~7":21_~~~:; : ~:~~
-.-/.
-'
" \
,DI\'JSION OF
T El[ G ~APH G~ANCH
'.
i
'\)1; 'J ) \ I) 'I'",\ 1"\,'J ~" 'II 0 .Ii' sr'\, .... \'-_,'1 1T~ ,,' _. 1 .. l L __ J.J
. .J
.j \
,I\":-rH):, C'({=;
C (l~ :,~'U:~IC i\ II'l~;c A~:u RECOi,D5
...
\
\
. .
\
.J_ :-;. + 'r.>~
..... '--- -_... ... -- .........

..-
.f\.
.~-;:--<,-:..
t-
s:- IJ 1" ':1 7.:-b I:) :t' 1 G,

3~30 p.r:l~
'~ .......; .,_. L ..
\..." .. v~t
. .,.."
.: ..
r\}
/,',." j
("
t-,
i,
i'i")O~~ _
'.',
O J
J:!'~
~:::''':'j~~'(J.:...:.t>J
(~r~ ;:;!:"~)J,,~:.~,,t:;
~~\ ::~. :;- ~! -;~;\ ..... (~.r
~~1 ;~:,U,~~;"''', :l.Ij,!.t

(>
ul
~y 1 t 'i~
1',:_ t;
I:\'
:-:!:,.:t:]; \r~:7_ :-; (~.:~}
l:.t:J n :~.t-:" ~: t; '_:1, 1'.1 C: i ~:.J. ii' {-j .~,:\~;_~:. ~::~~. (~t_: ;7{.1'; ;;~)C _OJ :i.1.l _:3 U ~:.':""O~..il }1\ X~~.1I~~ -:;:1 t.!.l:r:!.~, '~J :~"~' J. t~ J c! :') :~.:.). :(1,::'~ ~ .-, "'_~i I.:L~) :-~ :to :.:. ~~J j. j.~;~~Sl: f~ :-;~) ~j~, .~~ :1. ~]-,~1 '~ ::2; 1,\ ~11 :LD. "~:\l i:
j'\:'~;;~:[i~ ::i.:i.~';i,t:::,>
\~
t"
.- ,
.... \
q';.. ,~
r",,:
.:/'
~:
;Z:~~:t.:.;~~.;t
:-'\~')~'~'~: .:.~r~': ..~).-,.:;:~::~':;'~':~ X~') Cr;i.i>l_~. 1:.1 J~')~H'~d:;:;

C"'" ..'
'!,
':_j. " ,!..
~ }--,-,
.,1"
~'J"'}
t1.::;'.l(~J_!"2 "I::.~'::i;t'j
:1.rl
!-Ic~:~::
, . :-::.-..,r ,.'"
")
;~:i:;.':;;~(~~ ~i; ~~\/'~~'~"i::~':~:I~ ~~.~~ ,[. :~~ '''~,~~\~~;.~ J.;~:~r'n~~~~ O'2:~~~~-C ~.,~~.~~1:~~~,~ 8I:~ ~~t:~J.;~~:'"';
l)o.~;(..~"'~
'f' "
:tt:;..;;.\"_:~;" :V"
~:.. ~';. ~~.
ro
..
r(.'~I~>~..(,\{1:(\~
;,:), : ......rJ~\{J :~:1;1!:i, ;)i:;~.~:tn. s'~ \';~~1;; :~(:'~?:~::'~O:\l~'_8-:"::i..(~ I r I' , . .., ~.") ~ ...--; ~ ',"'I . ' I'.t '," ., . ... l'" . .(.') +.,,, "\. I l. _~. :.,..,(.1, .....!..l.L.\ 't'"f",'I~".],'1.~.u~~ .'l. ..~'...Cl::\ ('.).. 1...,... ~ ' '''~ ~L,._ t, .:.((, ".~I. L _ '.l~r;''":.;,;.l ~
. . . . . . I";
(t""'_~
:J
"
r_'
:~:OVf"<~[ '1,. ,.)~,!. -:,
I.\Qj.~J~:;:~~~~.f'L~~1-~\ L~,~: I:~".J:I.~~~Ci ~j t:~:.;.;':J l:~tF (,~~~~~iC:i..[l~t r~)Go~.~~.f.\~~~.:i.t,~:}.:; l~:':'')~ b8~F':~ C~L(t~ .~':,.,J \ri';;h 2"~ D~j. bl.."~c Uf~):1.~,~~ t~'~L '~h:~t:J, r'::;!I.)C~b,. r:0.(t~~.-4("."1 ~""-"l(\ i, ... l":f,":":' ~"':.~;,)I"~ .:C' 1. --It"")\;',J tr~"i rn,.'C' y("->~'l ~)~-.::~~v~tJ "j,)\.;;;..,.).,~ ,.-1 .... ~, '.. ... ;. . l." , k .. L ..... \...... ,,,:1. \ ~:. ~,~
J.. '._'
10-./
_j,)..
..)
.... ,.. . . . .t
'-",
._ .............. \.
..,
... -....
,.'
..,' ..
~5C'J
0)
}:'(,;.
:IJ:~(l~'-(;:_~:; .. IfJ
;(::I..;:~~r~j~.\
~.J
[.,':,'}.)
(~(;-.....,;...,:;",;j"~~.'~
;,.,;') .j ._. '::: i:;:1.~.1~: ...~ [' ;:::', .' , .;::..~ :;.
:t;. I,t}.. )Y~1.;..1t:1-'". -2 _:1

(;I~,:~.."';
\:.:< ~~"'>~~1 ~".r~\ :.r)~,? ::>~~.~:\:::~~.,.>:~!"i,~ \; Z.~ir: (3 ;'. 1>

'\~~"':
rl1.~t:Ly
~"...J
.7/:~t:,.:;
~i..~~.!? ~
l~.J"C:ll "';'~~(J
1. ~:J
d
. . . ..
r.J
.1 __
C.J ...~ . ,~ . ' ..' l . ' , /
... ' ....
'" ....
fli.}:~.
tt~:lJ.'r
~'lz~1~1:'1 !!:-t!"~.~,.::)
f ~,~o.,:'t' ~::.\j"-';~l.;J~lit~}
J"i":.
~1 ~)~~,~-:.. :l.:j~~ ~./ 'V(.:1 l:?[JC'.
'D:~i_ ~';'~<;1~J. r1 ljr2 ":Jf: "~~:'''-.:l.::':~,:.:- ?~~~l~;j 11)~;~1

V 'LC}~7~?:~:Ll . i~ ~
t Jl'J. ~~.ttj r~:l~l (~(~:~;..~?:'~J..i~~~:..,'1

{")
':_~~ c _'_1~~'~:~' ~-;.t.J. .:-: ... ~ ;-~ f..11~t ~.I.; ~ ;:..: P~) ~~ 31i: i) -n t~~. (~ .~. i ':~ T;'J :r-S f.f:,3.l~:'.l!l!; ~ }.)0J.~J.,-"1:::.~f B ' S},,;.;;. :',. ;1S.\\\ \',11:) I.J8i{}.-tJ~LJ_~1-:::;T ):;f~~ !:.l1..:.:~3~~1~~'::-"t.\J, ~
~.::.,
I')/)3. ' 1 n q 1. ~1 (~.;"~

1,.1
-'J b;-.. "'.- ...1. - 1"-'""'t:e:, . . .. '/...L.t ~.~ ...
-,,_' ,.;...:.v ....... _.
~j~::, ..... I,_:,.;.:"-.-..., ~.':j .........

:...,.:..:' .-
:-';~-;)~:,:~ r~\~
v._
.,\,.}_
J.\,
a:~t: ...
,\ .
__ 1..
,,7,,)-,'r-j,'\,-\'-)'"t
_ "' ....
...... - ~
.......
...... ..1
__
'J."'="
r....
J: ..
:.~~,r:'(-(=--~.':~
v . ... !.~
....
-.J .... \';\'
QU.'w.I
.;-. . . .~.~ ... ,."
:!rlf.1~~~~ ~~t~\.~;.. I[. c'

[Jt.~~c.1C;./'\f.J~~l.:~t)
~~::J::) rrJ1.L~tt::
U:10 \\ lio.o' .....
~:.):~} ~);:~]\.~~:'::~:;~,._.. -:~-..;.l. ... ".:'/~ C . . ~.J _~.' ':I,:~: .. ,~:\~:~ i;::.;~;:'C:.f~'>2~.1.';.:.":,~:: "(;'~~.:'.~.l~. ~~:,;/:.~:,;:~,~~;~:::.:~,,~::<::.~;)? 'L (!.I ..... ~ ... 1: ~
j
..
\,-
1."~
. . .'
,'t'('."~.~':
:i.\:._\..~l_)
';:\-(~:-lV'o;,"1 " ',;"'"

~ .'~_l{ , ._.
'. '
l;""'~~~Pf'"
L
........ \.
'.~
~ ... I
" ,)
~p
""l:lf'3,~-r"'''r.\d
v-'\i_vl. \.10
r"iq . . . . '
",'"-'::-
f::.J
<:.t j
t.
J .
......
(-/'
wo,
,.J
'-
.,.
{~~j;1
"~:"\.'j
i.\( .. ~ . ',"} c...'~.:( !.~ t. (Y:-"'~!::Jr; ~ ().<:- ' ~rA:~ 1,":_ !I~. (::.: ~'l~ 1 J,'i ).t~:} _~ (2) '~:11,~
...
,:,,~,
'(::
:r<. :Q ~,.,-~,'fj
,~ ". ...
./
r- ..
,..
--4f
/., '
r..
Pft~I';"
\."~!J
il
if.
". l
~
- '; 1-,
("
,l..
\ ..,;
,..
'
. . .;/_..~-r_l'(. .._f.) ,,'.. . , .._~. ' .....:,.:.. .I.~ :: :> y > ~., .... _ _ _
t' ...
-",-' ~:!
.. ., .:-~
f~; :).) \ ~ .... ~ .- ....
''',
,.
""": ,'"" r:
~
J..,)
SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE I NC OlfJ.lNG TELEGRAM
Control 5638 Rec ' d October 18 , 1947
7:17
FROM: TO: NO : Nanking SeCT?tary of State
a . m.
2096 , October 18 , 2
p.m .
I n conversation ,vi th Embassy officer on subj ect of Indochina, Vice FOmHN George Yeh and Director of European Dept FOWOFF expressed follo"ring vie,:rs :
It i s difficult to foresee a settlement of Indochina question under current French policy , ,'rhich i s maing position of other powers , particularly China and US, extremely difficult . It i s unlikely that a govt can successfully b e formed without participation of Ho Chi Minh, as Ho and his group are t he only ones having a genuinely popular follovring. Attempts to alienate Ho ' s adherents under present circumstances unlikely of success . Persistence of French i n present military course carries danger of forcing entire freedom movement into hands of Extrem.e , Comrnunist elements.
Ho i s regarded as Comrnunist but many Vietminh leaders are not . Vice Hinister i s impressed 1irith Ho t s personality and commented that Ho was an abler individual for example than Sjahrir of Indonesian Govt, both men being personally kno\,ffi t o him. The question of possible danger to China from a Communist-influenced regime adjacent to her southern border did not appear to be of critical importance . The Hationa.l Union Front does not have a solid popular base. It consists in the main of a group of prominent figures and i f these leaders Here removed frow the picture (the recent assassinations in Saj.gon and Hanoi ,rere rec::Jlled) the TClovement "TOuld probably have little force left. As regards Bao. Dai "the SECRET
11LI
SECREI'
#2096 , October 18 , 2 P om ., from Nanking

Da i li the Chinese people \"iould not regard favorably the r eestab l ishment of a monarchy i n Indochina o Bao-Dai has not recently been i n Nanking ( REDEPTEL 1205, September 29 ) and FONOFF officials made oblique reference t o a IIFrench storyll to that effect. Embassy comment : volhile no dj rect statement "Iras vouchsafed b y FONOFF officials as to Chinese attitude tovrar d Nationa l Unj.on or Nguyen Hai Than , foregoing ,,ould appear t o indicate FONOFF does not contemplate support of Bao-Da i vTho would seem to be an indispensable element i n present :French Illans and that a dubious v iew , at best , i s taken of National Union movement . As Dept is mT81"e t here are diverse Chinese elements interested in the Indochina situation and vic"Irs given above do not purport t o represent crystallized Chinese attitude . No allusion Has made dur i ng intervie"lr to possible mediation by third po,ver or po,,,ers .
STUART
BB: DCB
SECRET
115
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16, By: NWD Date: 2011
-- --
."
C O;ifIDS:j~:' lilL - - ... ".- -. -_._--.-_ ...

-
"",
J Brt.29,191~
.'
r) . )
' Wl!shin~llo n/l:10 p.m.
SUrJLCT:
Hr;(;/i.iJ)If;G . IiWCCi:iNl\.
"
" To
L LJ.l
11 ;
iJ
..
t/.
1,<3
" ~'
-:vi '.
'-{
I,
th e
Certa:Ln AI;le~rica.n Dj plor:lCltic CLnd Cons1.1.1.::.r Offi cers.
::
..
'
t ~J.:;.:._ ,_-.:-~~.>-).~~.M.~-\. f -},'--() .
,- ,., / ' /
.
J Go~;cr[1jpe nc
I'r
....
"
.,
~ 'r .;'0
,)' /;
" ,'
/. ' ..
' ' /5
Alrem1)<'l5sy, He'..;' De lhi, lv\ s l'cport c~ rJ fo .-l()'.'r1 nc re[arrJinc; ' l 0 f - " t S a.' t i ~}. t 'Ufe to"i8.rr.1 1n:::\oc}dna as fur- . .LnClla ni she d by offici al Ext'Jril~~l .1Hfa.:i.rs Dep t:
. (j)
-.
_ ,/AJ . . .,
.
....
r'?"--t'" -'
.. I .~ /I ,/ ~ J,-:' . ') '-./ ( . t~i-< .

-
(le C'p SY!l1 -' pathy f or efforts :outhe as t Asian countrie s fulfill nationnl a spil'a.tior;s ;nlc1. ir:'prov8 t bsir l'copl'2s l ivinc st 8n rJarlls. lTot','fitl1stDnclinG :,his IndJQ ','f ilJ. hC'sit.'.Ltc 5ubr:d.t (lu'.=s tion Ill rJ.0c }t:Lrn UE : jf;C,Juse (on: ) Franc e 8S ri'2l'f.il!Y~nt .11 1 (011 11)01' CC c ollld ve to <my c:c t ion c on tr::try l"rcnch in sere s t sand ( t-:IO) GO I not cc'nvinccd Vietn: i.!,l GxerclsC's' de f'::lCtc authority lnlloch:"'na 01' 1 i n ccntrc.,s'c Ind. ones l~" l it rerr8~_;c llts Vir:;':I!)oint nw.joi.'ity Inc1oc}ljn8;'0 . For. tir nr~ bc:i n~; J n:lia IS 3;TJIlpathy Inclo(;~!inesG (lsl'ir2.tiollS -:li l1 t::ll(o nq;ativc fO.i'r;ls such a.s .1<:1 l.~c v,sed :::l~ 1.1858 Fl'cn~ch onC'J':l.t:;,CllS in r efusi:H- J)E:l'l'lit 1 n r1 Ind ochj_~a ' c.1.11d GO I l'Ii 11 not t a\c pos:t. t i \'I~ :~t(: ps - tU:i 0.1':l i nt(;; l' v-2llti,-,n. Lnstl".j 1 n--l io. ;/C'.lJ1 ' 10 t l:LLc sul)T,dt Irl'iccLincse oues t ion mf as long 83 GOI GC'? dis;)ute rega~~Hnc L'1si11r-ir ~ W181' cOlls l cte r3.tion bjr l1 ~'r. .
hCl.5
,'
liAs fr e'lu ntJ.y exprc~ssc(l by I:ehrn ,'t I nr.1i e. ;
. ... _
' .
...
"I"
..
' 0.
I.
' .'"
I\)
ill
.~
OJ
,",'
" a
. . ,_::<:
'.
'
.." :., ..
",
. .
. '
'.
. u Embc-tssy' fc.',l s t k'.t abov e' I' cprc:scmt s tl'llS D.ict.m' 9 of Exte i'n~!.l . f.f.f;.;. irs Tiitl jsc 17 I sat t i tude.. This c;. t t i t l1rlr:) 110':.'. ev er sub ... c t to I'ev 'C;rs<~J in. c ase j;e lJr-u beco;:',8S iE1l'.tl.e c1 '.i:l.:th -jr:. , ., . " . . f e(~ l ins . that Frencn ol)prt?~,;slnc - (1C CnJn8:;~ :Lll \' .i C" ,' " S . J.11 !'l
..
,"
.' ~ '
. fr rortl1ent 8);!otiol1a.lapprcl[tch si..l.cil !)l'o()leFls .. E :ctrel~cl~- 1..:11. lj'!'{ e l v 1ml.i:_\ \,r :L11 t.:th:; b.ny ncUon rl:?gc;.l" hn~: In clochin:l 'lliltD d ecision TO dis!-'1.1te 'il 1th pai-;:ist.an hcmc1 e d dO\',T! b:r' Uli. 11
,.
~liJUTtON-'
'0
.
. 1'.
c .....
(()
. ,.
.'
~.:~<
<r~
E S l l'rEO ,
/1o~.\Lt!
. ,
-;:;;
.115
.~
.'~ '
SECRE'r
DEPA.RTJvlEN'r OF STATE
Washington
AIvlCONSUL SAIGON 21
Control 470 February 3,

19~8
7 p.m.
Hil Attache Bangkok reports Pham Ngoc Thach one of Ho Chi Minh ' s chief lieut enants in course recent visit (1) said he departing for India 29 Jan
va th
petition
signed by Ho Chi Minh requesting UN intervent ion (2) confirmed suspicion previo1..l.s1y voiced by Ai'l1ER correspondent of ilmninent offensive vlhich certain involve fighting in city Saigon. Sent Saigon as 21 Saigon repeat Hanoi. rptd NevT Delhi as
79
MP.RSHALL
Colonel Reginald F. C. Vance "president of the Provisional Government of Vietnam Democratic l ' Repub _J.C. 11
IJ7
COPY
DEPARTJ\!.ENT OF STATE INCOMING TELEGRtUlj
SECHET Control 5884 Rec ' d February 19, 19L~8 1 2 : 03 p.m .
FROM :
TO : NO :
Hanoi Secretary of State 31 , February 19, Noon
Re APF story February 17 Cannes that Bao Dai had postponed departure Hong Kong for indefinit e period, usually reliable Vietn8JTIese source gives folloi'ling sUlJnuary recent events.
At Bai dalong conference December ivi th Bollaert, Bao Da,i signed accord of tvlO articles : (1) France recognizes independence and unity Vietnam ; ( 2 ) once independ ent, Vietna..'11 will freely adhere to French union . I',ilien General Xuan, Tran Van Ly, and Diem (,:ho according this SOlJ.rce continues as " eminence grise " Nationalist ) met Bao Dai Hong Kong a,fter Bai da.lollg c onference , Diem persuaded Bao Da:L signature of above accord viaS tactical error , that Vietnam should only bind itself to France by allj_ance , not French nnion, (To what extent this position taken for bargaining pur poses not Clear ). Finally decided best method of alloHing Bao Dsd. V thdravT gracefully from corr:mi tment was to take pos it ion he signed only ii as individual, not for his people , then h ,ve " asserribly of notables" cal l for his return Indochina as emperor of state freely allied i'iik-h France . This strategy nOlI' being appl:ied. Bao Dai , \'Tho [3,nticipated failure Geneva conversations, intend::; for pl"eSent to remain F'r8,nce lt7here he can deal directly \-lith Bidault , Schu.r;ian in preference Bollaert . Heani'lhile opening gun in prel)al'ation public opinion for c8,11ing " assembly
. :/ 1 .J ,I...)
-2-
1131 ,
February 19 , Noon, from Hanoi
of notables " by General Xuan '7as article by Nzuyen Ph:;.n Long in Saigon journal ECHO DU VIE'I'NA.M of February 17, demandj.ng repr esentation all groups i ncluding " resistants. " Hanoi ' s THODlcU, \:-hich in November sabot aged Xuan ' s proposals for assembly of "homInes distingues ," v7ill beat dru1l1s h ere and Tran Van Ly's paper in Hue .
Appears Bao Dai aware of fact r ecent French promises l ocal population r e his early r e turn, combined vrith lack of French success in military operations , have strengthened his bargaining position.
Repeat to Paris; sent Sa:Lgon
RENDALL
COPY
DEPARTNiENT OF STATE INCOMING TELEGRAJ.l
COl'rFIDENTH\.L Control 3885 Rec ' d May 12, 1948 9:14 p .m. FROM: TO; NO : Pa ris Secretary of State
2567,
May
12, 6
p . m.
Baeyens has informcd me that French Government has authorized Bollaert to approve formation provisional Vietnam government headed by Xuan but to insi.st that seat of government be located at either Hanoi or Hue and not at Saigon. Bollaert-Xuan negotiations I-Till b e conducted on b asis Bay of Along protocol "ihich Xuan I,Till countersign . Bao Dai vTill countersign agreement reached I'Ti th Xuan .
Baeyens stated Foreign Office 1-7as not opU..mistic as to extent popular support provisional government could achieve and eXl)ressed hope that r epresentatives from Annam and Tonkin I-Tould be of sufficient stature to offs et at least in part government ' s being characteri.zed as French puppet .
He had no i nformation other than press report of early Bao Dai - Bol.1 o,ert meetinG and Bao Dai I s visit to Europe Forej.gn Office endecworing to block l atter 'w hich they consider could only l end SUppoTt to charges of puppet government . . Department po,ss Saigon as No .
18.
CAFFERY
SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE I NCOMING TELEGRAl'1
Control
9859
Rec'd ~~y
29 , 1948 8:22 a.m .
FROM: TO: NO :
Nanking Secr etary of State
971, May 29, 10 a.m.
Resp onsible Foreign Office officials states tbat according to Chinese information very little entbusiasm bad been aroused among Indochina natives by ne,IS of formation of government by General Nguyen Van Xuan . He expressed doubt that much more result wOllld b~ obtained by ne,'T group than 'vms attained by local administrative committees, unless Bao Dai came back. He b elieved Bao Dai. I'Tas adopting vmit-and-see attitude and that bis decision \-Jbetber to return 'iTould wait upon signs of favol'able reaction to govermne nt by native elements. Upon being questioned , officials said latter point \<Tould in his vi evT be more important vli tb Bao Dai than question of i ndependence; tbat Bao Dai "IOuld himself in the end accept about I'That Bollaert has already offered ( given appearance of popular support) despite counsel of most his advisers to hold firm for independence , and tbis even tbough be incurred risk of playing role of Henry Pu Yi for French. He said Bao Dait s supporters are j.nsisti ng more strongly on foreign policy ind ependence , being less intractable on question of wj_li tary control, probably in realization that native levies ,-TOuld be incapable for some tj.me of putting dOvTn any continuing internal revolt. VThile all Chinese elements are not one on line of action to b e follo 1:!ed in Indochina, Foreign Office itself seems to distrust Bao Dai, vieHing bim as possible vehicle for restoration French prc':Ta.r sta.tus . At S8.Jne time many officials plainly give cv~dence Chin ese wish to ke ep on freiendly tern~s 'tTi th Ho Chi Ilinh. As j ndicated in E~illTEL 251, February 12, 19Lf7, Chinese problem j_s to chaD_Del and in time capture or at l east hold veto over pO"rer elemr::nts in SECRET
121
SECR1'l'
- 2- #971 , May 29 , 10 a.m .
elements in Indochina. 'I'hus natiopalism suits them , as does Ho Chi Minh I'Ti th his galvanizing political force . Their expectation is that Indochinese political groups, vTi th their rivalries and easy realignments, vTill provide their olm equipoise, if the French do not have the f:Lnal word . Chinese have no i llusions as to Communist bent of many of Ho I S folloi'Ters and possibly Ho himself. They l'Tould expect to be in a position to intervene, vTi th the Communist menace as a pretext , if' a decisive Red coup took place ; moreover , they Ivould probably attempt to take some steps toward intervention immediately (especially in Tonkin) if a ConmlUnist coup took place in France ( this thTeat has, of course , diminished recent.ly). Finally, if the Chinese Government itself is further weakened or possibly driven southvrard, the Chinese may not i mpossibly feel that the US Ivill not in i ts ovm interests allovT such a strategic area to fall to Communism and vTill necessarily come to the rescue. Department repeat Pari s, Saigon and Hanoi, pouched Hong Kong.
STUART
NOTE :
Relayed to Paris, Saigon and Hanoi at 11 a.m. May 29 . F.M . H.
SECRET
122
:o;'t;' _
COpy
DEPARTI::lENT OF STATE INCOlvflNG TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL Control 3213 Rec ' d June 9, 1947 2:47 p.m .
FROM:
TO: NO :
Paris Secretary of State
30 63 ,
June
9, 5
p .m.
US URGEliPr .
Baeyens has informed Embassy that prevailing 0pllnon in French Government circles i s that Xuan Government has only dubious chance of success and that b est indication its viability \rill be extent decrease in g1).errilla activitie s during next month . State$ both Foreign Office and Overseas France would welcome changes in Provj.sional Government giving it. a more repre senta ti ve character, a.s for example , replacement of Xuan by Diem . He add ed that Bao Dai vrho dislikes Xuan has repeatedly stated Provisional Government 'tTo"Ll.ld remain i n pO"Ter only l ong enough to 11 secher l es muX's . 11 Commenting on Bay of Along agreement, vrhich r18. d previous approve. l of French Government ( Saigon ' s 1-30 , Jm1e 7, to Depa~ctment, 34 to Paris) , Baeyens stated referendu_rn in Co chin China VTaS prerequisite to Assembly approval of change i n status ,'Thich vlOuld undoubtedly be vigorously opposed by Gaullists (my 30 06, June 7) . ( Baeyens spent three h ours ''lith D' Argenlieu y esterday in discussion devoted primarily to means of protecting French . inteTests in Cochin China .) In addition to published text theTe l.S secret . B "b .. annex vllnc h . aeyens oeser). es as " nel"t h er more nor 1 ess " th an Bay of Along protocol of last December . Implementing arrangements called for in paragraph 3 of agreement ( text in irrL'11ediately follol'ling cable) must be " nego tiated from scre. tch ," a.cconUng to Baeyens \Tho envisages conference sirrd.lar Dalat or Fontain.ebleau.
Bolle. ert returns to Paris about J"Lme 20 in oTder confer v1i th Coste-Floret before latter ' s departure for Hadagascar June 23 . Baeyens does not belie'Je
t~-)
COI'Y
..
- 2-
,.
;.
,. ,
#3063 , June 9, 5 p .m., from Paris
he vrill return Indochina . Baeyens gives as principal reason other than personal for Bao Dai I s fo :cthcoming Euro:pcEm visit his desire to remove h imself from Far East during difficult period of establisbrnent of P'covi s i onal Government and negotiations vli th France.
(
Department pass Saigon as
23
CAFFERY
/'
run' 1) '>:?'n2 F-~-':") ...
'1,)]~11) 1 \'}' Tr,ll :.J ,L._.~J_\.
r\1""\n;;
OF
~ /
.
"
(", J
.t'.'
"
,.<
I,
'! -
" .
"
.
'-
'
l'
__ ,,'"_"1,-
f, f~:; .) r'l
j
,'" !'JlO
.;r;.~:J Q
22.,:
" . ,,
-':;-:-J,"",,,"
J .. J. 'l '...
f"" ....... ,.,
'7 ~ C'.
~t')r1e
.t' _,-I':.
J ..... -..
:.::'cr!. ..
T'
C'
.. }l.,.)
.~:~;, "', \;.- ~. :,:
C .:.' :~:'I
!. ':'..~=~'~
t~,~),~.:::.
f:r~-~,J :.::i'~ ~\ '"<., ,-~ .. ,~
(~~.".[~; ;C~). ~.i.:1' ,t~ () --::.r :i.:! I.:j
!~~:~. L""_!~
"';~1"~~~, ;i.~'~1l~.",.l;'J :iJI.-4'~;;:':'~:~J.~~~):~ :~;c~;',,~_'\l:n'l~J ~~'
n:~"E :J..:l_.;1~~.~)5
~.:>.~
"',.:';_',' {:."1(. ~)C~,(:_.J

() :~~
~ -~~.~ c'!. ~~
13' err ~ :~<:) i~ :>-:" }-[\)

::~:<t:)(::l
~? 0
~.~; ~i~i~}!.::;:i_J_:~.:_~.f ;;;;(~J ~~!1";~:.J.~~ J::~; .L ',',' :." :': :'t. :.;~.. ~. ....
~~: .~~.t !'"TI
'11."__ "') .~l
i.:r?\. ::t~": l~~\:(}
(:. ~ .~.
;i"'c).!~
:~~ :--;.~.~ .:~.. 8lL~. :~r:~,,J .~.:

."",:
5. :.l ;~ , . ::. ;} ---: ... ~.. ~~~::~

- :..:C\.:2'
(i. -~, 13 ":.-~~ ?~:
~ (~':1~; ~
t'~. ' \~
",:';: r:.' :~.:t
8?1 '!..C'.
1:::'" i-~
J 0_~:..;,
.~!!:~.
- -: :1. !...~:;-:t ~;~\.'}>~:~'. :-,i (1':1
7 :t.::r~1
:.. : . .... ~~1~,~
()~~
()r~.".. l
lJ~-.t'}I~~~\1:05..r!\~!,
----
~i~L~A:--~::1
~.C:.~:~r1
~Jr:>':.~ .. ;}t;.
D.:?'
).
r~-:1.:~::..~;J.;
:.
:1~'~:: t.'~~. ~~;

I
~~l.y;?
....'" oJ
~.~ ,," ':.', '-;;');.. ~.
f::!'.
':'~';b' .r; ''j ,;

:;')~:
) :;.'., ~.I~.~.~P:. 2(J.C~:':.-)~~.::i ~~ (":-~, ~"r():'1 ) .. ';\ .)";~':: ;.v :c' :L::; ;:: !.~, J ' "'.(~::;- ~j:"~.:- /~;j .~~ c:..J. :
=.;C') L;',)
'~~!:."=; !~::~.:1.. :~.;,~;~,,;;
';.~ .. i .
t)(.)
co
?:?:.:-:; :(:'1..:......,:~ iJ:'l~;
lj
:;t!:;(>~?'t:);;:,1.
C'~;':~.l1(}\)':': {;.~;. C:--)
":j:.,.....=
:? ;.~~.. ! .~;,:,~
"\l:~: ":' t:: ~~:'!'-t:;
p ~):_:. :Y.. :; :t(! I~ ~,..

J.TC'"
"-', '.:
..~;~:i
F.'j
r:;~?;.~.~ (~
,
.1.\
~~ ..1.f'~:.~, .
':-,:L">;-
7.::~. ~.J.1
':'~~.;:) (;},I.:.~~l. :,;~ >~
_-:
~) ' ~'~~:~:!.'~;
~~~.\.~~
:.I:i
C,::,~~:-:. ,,~
:;~1.1~.. ~~~
Jc~~~~)
'1 r.
::,_!. ,.~u
..,
,-' ....~ '. \'. --:; ,;,. .l:::i., -:a:.~~
-: C', r,":!
I ,I
I'
\ 1_,
125
\"
r. .
..
'
.,r-.
:: ;":: .. . -J
"\
12G
./
("
..
,I
l~
i)
i)
\~\
... ~?"4 ~~
;/.~. ~.
r. ...
,J \J ~ . .
nn
n~6mb~t91
1116
~l~
. arld th:1..:eties,
'",.
', TO .. (' 1... 'c!~ 0'"{
" I .. -; _ ( "'1- _,_ C 1~
1.
CL11J.8C}
". ::,-.
as - ,......" .. ... Dnilv

.
.
-',.-
"'~
~0rt~r ... -".' . ........
makes
(:'C:_~.C].~J. ;" :f.0l~
~bO
..
\
2.
Dept
h~s
no evidan1s
~f
.'
I~.'
In:c ge
1)1-;.r... I....J. '" ~ i D~Si "H'::ry
.,'~.,~I'.'O
o;{( y)
( OFFIC:~S
h:'
(l :.
I'
\
'j
I.' ,
,; :..... -:.f
-"
:': U."'!,tC'i
>
iH:~I~.~I-":
... ~ t~!I!,$~ J~ ",',
,
!N:J.1CA1'E
' <..
.'.
.ill
Col!.::d:
di;:"sipntc DCA ass:i.s-Lance .~. Ii'l'"' :-;. ~~i. (! C~

!
10""")_ _
c-h,O' T"j'''' , .' (,C' ;"~:~ C 1-: IJr""J... _, v .'1

._
L . __
'
Inc10dlina ':l:i..th no
) '-, .... C +"., <""J..

.~
procession
o~
French
PU?)~~
go~ts.
1.) ;',.,",''. (~ - .. _.... ..,. !l]
"-'~
e
~
J_" I ' ... J v
.'-
~." I . l, .!..:.. -. ~. ~ I .
O,L,.,'
r,";:"" l' '~,"'l ... - ' " . """~,.

__ .. .. - .~,._.
0
\..J " I"~
",:.t.
'1 - 9,j/,.
,~
4.
ConnuJ.
h.l~i
-------1
l)!STC~rSU'rI0N
Or,SIr::;D
(0FFICC!S O"LY.I
t .... , ,. .... .Le.;.,
.~l ,,: .I.

, "'
.~~.: ...... i,.. _' ";

_,-.,
1. ( ....... ...l_
I
,".',::,' r.......:
-"l "'."":~ -. ...
,-."."",_::::""._-"
.~.,lo.'_:-, r, ','-"
.... _
~_,~,'''lJ_.~ '.~ .>. , :,::-~ .,... -;., ., ~

J _ _ .. "...
\.
I~" _~, .i~ "l"'>.- ,~J

_
..
...1 ")"""{ ........ .. :.\_-:-.~:)-~C.~_ ..... I _ , - "': ...... .... ... 1 ',' ,.., 1 "'.. ..:.."'-::.:-
..~ ".1'; ..
..... _
\'r:~
w
r
~~
I .
" 4.
If\:'::ICATC
:. ,. '
,~ .~
.:t ....'t ...~. . .

.,-W.l~-:",
"
}"'r'r... :.,. :.;
'\.1. ;." 1-" "'0f-' '" A '.I \or:,.... ..~
.,
-""n ~ .... " b' '. "'~' ",'.
f~
, t,,!~~:\~..) :.61 ,
-~
r~
-. f :;
0-'-
i\)
::0 ......
-t" l-t"--:,~r - -:-"-.

w
_~
t '
Dr:3' ~1~O
(O::,o'!C ;':::; CI>.lLY)
I - . __J __
I
;,~'";.,.:~;r-;-r:j:t,
.-."'.......
; (; . ,
(" ) c ;.,', , .. .: . ,;.~...
IJ
01'"
.1 .."
i '<'
........
.... -c/-
A'
I
i
12~)
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 11
INLoI.CATi:
QUT.GOING I ELEGRl !Vi

"
C olioe!
1D J.J H H r f ULC n f ref

. . . ". .
#.
f u 1: l~
li :J . :
.. . ~ } ~;~.~ ~.: i '
: ..... " l: - Wllshinqtoh' . t . ; ::: -~OP - SE"' CflE~ . ~ I\

..
TOP SSCHEl' ---- - .- - ----- .' Ch.s8iflcnt.l,0 r.. 2. p ':.rovcd by: ..

\.)J
1 p n, 0 11 IJ) - \=3
CuifTR{}L
. -'
.' ... .,
:
. . _. '.'_
..
;
: ':.
.
~.
PA~IG.
' ;"? .I-/f.&:;p

":;0'-0
//
".;
. ~ 0-/~:::" . ~ / .' ( -) ( ~/()~U.b 3 '1943 '.

\<iJ.yS
,,~<'
. .:
'Dept
iderlng
of iri)le!lientinG .r'8co:n!!l encl;::.tlon6 cen'"
..
(""'
., r
t n 1necl . in f 1ne.1 pClra' 3ai!j0l1! 8. tel
156 Jun~'O
to
Dqj~lr.t<1
Pnris
,"
,, "
[(s <to, 311<1.it ~.!:pc[(ro dCGiX'Eloln thllt vrlth Ell-lb ', YOJ. sonsult'
lr.fol'P.1o.11y ':at i"l'cncn offlciuls, pilJ'tl(,:ul&rly 9::. lL::E:l't, c~fJ J~o
points 1&n1 2
. ' m~irJlng
(D'
(Yi
bclo~-i.
PIG~ . f,e
comment on these i.\C \:ell
C.8
l'e...:.
po 1nts. / .'
t[;.'-i t; , i n ,
1)
i:)arid8~;1:aG
. his oDinion Asselnlily ~-lOuhl nJ'\ .Jl:'!')' t ~: ;;o-_t h::tve to r2.tif:,' Beia d'. . . ..' ..
o ' .
(J)
I
. .~.
.' . .' ' . , (N . Along Clgreeri1erJt .. He ' ~olntoJ. out:: hO\."elc~'; thCl.t definite agrce- 0 '
CD '.
"
assu'n.J.01~r bj,ve
to b e so ratified.' Dert inclined believe F'rencli

':' j '
. Govt i;ou1(1 t[;ve to ilvc, :10'o\'ever~r\lbll.c evld'er:ce t.b~"lt It Dc-tClt: 8Cll :.'.
5dllR~rt'8
..
slznaturo of agreement.
. '
Plsrep0rt current Fren~h

. .
thlnkinry t~10 auestion. o . ' .

t5""1'RISU"".ION"-
2)
~n
event Darldan'o.
int8rpr~tationc6rrect,
Dept
.r' "
O e SfREt>- ;FIC E:,; ONLY) - '
t:Yi.t on.1y measure
\. r:-, ichFrencIl
Govt. Kculd have to sjoJilt for
rtr-.-<\;. \:t \ '. t. l. .

l'
"pl'oval .:\s3or.:tly ,{aulc1 be (jL:.8stlon cf' chan,:;'e
of
--
stntus cochin cb~~F:
t') ~l. l). OH I~uote union throe kyIJ Un C~'ll)te to be~ [,chievrc1 by .Vlete
d au state~ :~~. 5 a~rce~ent. ould. such ' .
VHoodr uff TJallner, Hcstern
E1f'r["lssy ir: ?r [4i~Ce on J ~il:.j 21; fie ~~Jas 0"r1
:1
..
receyli~lyM:scciRte eni ef
of tJ---.c
Divisio~
(j .' ;
'.i __ .-
If'
of
visit t o PJ.ris.
\ / rot pri!1tco.
Vco--nSclcr
of the French
~b(}~)sy
130
; ., .;,,t;. 4C. .
r,,4G
..... -.....
"-' - ' ' ' -
'-~
....................."
- .....
/. /
. Olj~-(5ir,fG TELEG_R~\!\~ z::.':' ,.: ..:, ....-. .--.'. ~<

....... --'
~ --"---.---. .-.. . ;,;:-
'--~
....... -
CLASSIFICAT ION
Coli~,~
"I.",_.!
...-, ") ....", 1_
.~ <;-" :'- _-.1._
'. '- rno p 'sv C-;:)1"'1" 1 '.J.~

L.1
. .
... t
..
'~
such no've by
S~Chum'an\~o\'t'
prec( ipitate
crisi~?
2..S
"
,-
Is. there ctny
poss ibili ty that Comi:1Unist s might support S LlCh a measure or

, '"
',- ~
. ,'
I
~
.:
. at least abstain from voting af:ainst it)

. . .
t:heir line has

' . . ,.
consi st2nt ly'fa~o!8d Quote Union of
3 kys Unquote?
,. ' .
: ,- '
3) ' ENi can approach to Fl'enc:h best be llnde? .In r~;sp'?ct ~T~l'~"' ~- c;..:(/r('c,./",/~ Baeycns' v :Lew s ( El,lL1S tl'.;l 3453 , JW'l (.3'0) iJ.l'lcl,rptcl s'tf-I;,;sr:le nts of
"
"
,/
.:
....
D'a ridHn that he does not bE;lieve Schuma n cbvt Yloulc1 risl'.:its
})olitic al Itfe to brine qlJ.csU.on' DeforE' assemb ly, D c~pt
l:c:.l:i. 8ves th at if d~stl'cc1 rc:.)lJ.ltstobe obtalned, it nn)st
. .
,
... ,-
be done at highest level; i. e ,~_}';9hilEl':U1

~1'-::.,..- :-"::-..-
BirJ.cwlt and Costc- '

.
" Floret in sl'itelattcl1S l'eccn1.... stntlllC:l1t to Asse~!ibly

. -
. " (E!nO'Gtel
3l)5J;~~Y5i;;;~~JJ-.~ ~:~;
J]Oilne0/Jn Vfasflington.
ifl;:ade
<-
_' , .
. ... .
of course by hiC,llleve l
.,
"
~
i:ll)pI'~aC!l 'to
Oi1'ly to
.
be confincd for l'I'csl?nt
. ".;- i' ,"
...
,':
..
"
1~),8hou.ld8.p pl'OacIi~
Ci1imCC
j "
.:
in status, .Coc.hi ncllina rf "' In tllis connection, "

'.
I'.
' y lwtis be3t timing? i

,...o.I-S-TRrlJU-TION~
--o.,E,5 I n ED ,
_~OFFI CES ONLY) '
5)~h at concessions
arejtdgednecessary to give, plo.n

I
)0 "
.-..,'
fall' st;J.rt?
Dept cOL',nizant of fact that fighU.ng' in Indochina h2,s

nO~:i cont~niJ.r~ (l for alr.'ost thr ee yeCll'S;
t:ho.t
Vie
b e lie ve ,given .
? I ,:
:-;enr
POn!!8
t, Frc!' cD A:nh,ss[,dor.
..
-'.
-. -
'.
...
-':-.:
':
I. ' .
. present l'iorlc1 polit.ie;al arid economic conditions,. French

..
',
simply do 'not have andli8.\'8 no prospect of (li1E(ssinL suf...:

. .
" .
:"
",:
.
....:
ficient
stren~th
Indochina reach mil solutic:n ; that

. .
. ..
" :
,-.
"
"
insteo.d of . being . eler.lcnt streneth to 'Fr.:tnce, Indochjna . . sj.nce war,
at~r ~~en~ ; :~~~
for fore sccabiefuturd,

\,1
unles~
', -
'
. .. . . , - "
~. -, '::',
. .:".:.;
'."
','
si tu~\tiOIl' c han[;es l;adlc811y,
i l l remEiin l'iev0usly costly
..:
. '
~ : :< .,,~ ,
_,
en . t~l'pd,sc \~eal~ellinG France. economically and all ';;est

generally in J ts relations
VI
..... J _,
' -
:i.th Ori-:mtal' . people ~;. .

,
.". .<" -:::: :~. ' ~'.
. In
01.U'
ViC-I'/ )
cc)ntinu~tion
of paraJe ' IJUppets such as

~.
.. , :. .,
French !'I;lVepl'oduceu ov~r past hio years v/iJ.l str(;llgthcm hanu Ho 'ChJ Minh find. 'may V/cll
j,n SUl'C
..
... .
-'
~
,
.
'ovcntu;,\l
81;W l'.:J:n.C8
of
:. M :" "'",::
st'[!tc l'll'oLD.bly .dol ldn;-.!.t~d l;y COl;Jtl r~m1sts ' (Hlr.1 al!i:o:;t . certainly .
. .
'
'
,.'
'
, It -j. s to avoit3.
"
SFC h
cvcntlJELl it:,!
.
"';',
r-
.
",
.,',
."
"
.
.
' .
..
..
. '
.. . . .
, "
.....
.':
gove rnJi!Gnt, be Gi.venevery

l SOTTON'
cl:! ~nce
to succeed by . the' r:r8.ntint;

.
.
"
"
i
.. :'.
!lIR'E D iES OIlLY}
to it
of
. .
~
'J
",
such conc'essionsos ~'lill attrnct f::1'88:test' 1'0~ siblG
'.
..
number of non -CO!nli~U!1ist eleinonts;

' No action
.' .
. '; ,:f'
...
.'
.I .
.:.
'-
.,
.
CLEARANC f.: .
.,
1 ':'l?'
"')
("-..
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526 S . 3 3 NND P . ' ectlon . roJect Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
." .
f' ~-:--":'
. ; ....... ' .,-" . ,.".
- OUTG O ING TELEGRj:\i\1 -- . . .
CL IICS I I" ICATI ON
..... ol eAT E:
. '. . . ) Ch~r9:,~~~:~~~~~~....
ColI.d
- -----...:::.; .,...:-;... -_.,.-;: ..-. .. -.

~--:..:..-- - -
.~ ~;f'r"-;::
-"'v<
.~ .J: ~ ~.~ ~ J; J..h,,- l>.~ J~ ~ t.
t l '!I" .Jt
~; 7 ~ H:I..
n .~
'.1-.':.-,
\.:..S~~;o. l"._ .,' .. ._.~.~" .._~.:.~~-;~~-..-......--~Wl.l s hI 0 9 lo n
-4... ..
-:.
Ho action contelJ1plated . .1in e your . roturn ':-f a si1incto I1 . PC'llc ' . ( . ... / .. . . ' . o)./,LI -/ ' . . t ' S;I\/ . /'02Sen t P arlS as_~~-:-~ , repe a eo cLgC5il asJ_ --'
'
. ....
."
...
. . .. . :
... :
' . . t :.'.
.- ' . i"
:- .
.........
....: .
.. .. ..
. ...... .
to
i. '.
-'
.
~
,.:.~.
' . ,',
;. ~.
..
"
... .
:( I
-,
(
.
'
..
.. ,
I
.: ~:
.,'
..
,
it~
ent ir ety .to." ..... .
..
,,'
. .'; .
.'
-:"
:. ,I
I
IFF ICE90HLY )
. Ii
El.JR .
'.i
.'
...
TO P
._--------CP
~~,R ANCE
-------
SF. C~-3T
\\
'\
,J
_.-"
....
.. '
-~. ~---
Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP 851G.Ol/7 -948:
S ECRE~
Top Secret File

DE? ART1\'m rT
I NCOl~ING
O STATE F TELEGRAl1 Rec'd July 10, 1948 6: 26 a.mo
FRO),::
Paris
TO: NO:
Secretary of State
3621, July 9, 7 p.mo
FROB \'JALLN F21
(I
Dept may \'lish ins tn:w t Embas sy infor1:1 Schuman Govt from
to p level down of US conviction tha t France is facod with of unequivocally and prompt ly approving principle Viet ind ependence within French union and union th ree KYS or losing Indochina. Vlliile i mmediate Assembly debate seems onJ,y solution, Erriliassy should be given dis , cretion in ap plying pressure to avoid charge giviDg tactic al advice on political maneuvers or becoming identified 'I.>"i th maneuvers that may i;Ylper il gov'c
~lternativ es
0
Ambassador concursc
CAFFERY
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Proj ect Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 11
TO P SECRET
8510. 01/7 -948:
Top Secret File

DEPAR'rHEN 'f ,OF STATE OUTGOH!G TELEGHAN
AliEHBASSY,
PARIS6
2637
Dept approves line of action recommended last para
EI P>JEL 3621 and \,i she s you proce ed irrmedie.te ly to a. scertain
di sposition Schwnan Govt toward dealing with Indochina situation before Ass embly adjournment. On basis your fi ndi ngs you should apply such persuasion and/or pressure as i s best calculated produce desired resulto In applying such persuasion and/or pressure you may in your discretion c onvey to Scht..1.man Govt th8.t once Ba.ie d I Along e.Ereen:8nt to gether with change in status Cochinchina approved, Dept would be disposcd consid er lending its support to extent publicly approving French Govt ' s action as forw ard J.ooking step tmJarcl sGttlenent of t:coubled s:L tucd:;~.on Indo(~hj,na and to'I'la:cd realization of aspire. tions V~Le tnar:1c se people. It appear s to Dept the t above stated US a.PPl'oval -\'lO'tJJ,d materially assist i n strengthening hands of nationa lists as o pposed to conU!mnis'Gs in Indoch:tna. Ke ep Dept clos ely info:cmed.
NARSHAL L
VIE: vrvJ2.J..lner
SEluCSReed
TOP SECRET
'135
PR:PARING OFFICE
VIlLL It'I D )C ATE "~l1 iCTH r. R
TELEGRAM
SENT
5
.
r5EP~.~ING
O F FICI:. VlILL
fi t
\ 't't:/lE CLEARLY T HE
CO ~!fhtL'F'C/lT'Orl
MESS. CE:
or
Til E
Ch.rg e Dep orlmenl:X
- - El~)T(.~lhT
t J..;"'J II
. ...
........:..
'j
. : .' . ":,,. ",
t
.~
~rg.
10
.
~.'
JUl 29
PA-HIS
.
.:
1 ()1i~ oJ ' ,' ...)

J "_
co
.: .
Ul
'. '
:. 0
, ~"
., , ,'"
,
,., '
. ~. ' . :' . ', .,.
. It)
". r
1 . .7 '." .I l ,~'
" .." I
.
1
" it! _ f ~ i . '., 1

! ' .
~rr
. .
.'
" I)
... .
I
. 0 , ..0 ........
..
; ,
.;.~
,....",t. .
"
:. "--.
~tl~i.cle by
Please ~,sc:rtain Bo118.~rt I ~'}cac ~lon/~co yolnts

l.!uri e
.
' .
~nci Coste~FioJ:'e t ,' (m.1BT'.c:L '~34)-;

.
.'
. .1
'"
They
. appear to be evadinc cent ral

WllO~';8 stetus
a3 F.r&llCI1
iSf;U8
of CochinOhina
C010ny cannot be r:\l.terod
8'~Gept by la'll
./
,
1'
of ,.f'~ss8mbly.
Unless this stCttus is
,....., ._--
. .".,--'
..."
definitively. altered Baied'Along
nuJ lified. o
Saigon' 5 42 July 6 to AS
s ent Paris as
r I;
l'pt d
, . if:
. :.
._--' ' :
~.
'V July 28, Dot printed.
"
See telegrar1 155,
~te,
~
p.
.
.-Anc1re- -Fari<T,--R-.;XGi.lliixY.::X:rd:mECOj.::ri3('' {..'l,x-J?res-i.rlorrt- -of .. ,the --French . -6eur-c-.B.---o'r- Vinistars ( pre;d.er ). -
Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
SECRET
DEPARTI,lEl\i"'r OF STATE I NCOMING TELEGRAM
Control 1 TTl Rec 1d Lugust 6 , 1948 12 : 11,3 a.m .
FROM: TO : NO :
Pari s Secretary of State
4034 , August 5, 8 p omo
Bollaert is of opinion ( DEFrEL 2891 , July 29 ) that President F".cench Union may legally ratify Baie d I Along agreements b'L':', that change i n status Cochinchina requires Assembly action. He maintains that he ,'Till not r eturn to Saigon unless there i s an l\ssembly debate on government I s polic~r i n Indochina and approval of Baie d l A10ng agreements and change i n status Cochinchina. Baeyens, DeLavignette and Moutet share Bol1aert 1s vie\'Ts . All c onsider tbat regardless of legal considerations, f ailure b y Assembly to meet i ssue squarely ,Till bave practical effect of arousinG such mistrust in I ndochina as to nullify completely such progress as has been made. I n l ast night 1s session of Assembly , Frederic DuPong ( PRL ) introduced motion calling for discussion Indochina p r i or to ad j ournment for summer. Despi te request by Ramad i er that motion be 'i'Ti thdrmoffi "as i t deals Hi th subj ect too delicate for govermlient to undertake I'Ti thout p rudence and 'without a full review of all aspects of the situ,ation. " Hotion viaS carried by narrO';'T vote 288 to 286 . Date of debate vTi11 be set by conference of p res i dents. Sent Department )~034 , repeated Saigon 36.
CAFFERY Governor - General Robert De1vignette vTas head of the political section of the FT<:~nch Einistry of Overseas Territories. Marius j',loutet uas Fl'ench I,;inister of Ove:cseas Territories from January 26, 19 L to November 2 L , 1947. 16 I Paul Ralnadiec
viaS P,n~sident
of the French Council of If:inisters in
1947 . 137
SECRET OUTGOING TELEGRAM
DEPARTrlJElIJT OF STATE Washington Control 6!~89 AMCONSUL SAIGOi\J, FRENCH DDOCHIKA. August
27 ,
19~8
136
Bollaert ' s position as expressed in Paris tel Aug 24 to Dept ( rpt Saigon as L~8) unclear .
4384
Dept notes
( pgh 7) Bollaert believes as QUOTE I~~RQUOTE i t
b ecomes apparent that Bao Dai has been able to achieve more by negotiations than Eo has or will be able to achieve by force of arms END lIOORQUOTE there lvill be increasing tendency i n ranks of non-Communist elements of Viet Minh t o s,'ri tch over. UNQUOTE It not clear ho,'7 Bao Dai can ShOT/7 he has
gained more from France by negotiation than Ho has or "rill gain by force arms when French no prepared to maky any QUOTE irrevocable cOIl1.rnitments UNQUOTE ( pgh 6) to Bao Dai or any provisional govt of which he may form part as High Commissioner states (pgh 5 ) that such govt \Vill remain provi sional until peace restored sufficiently to permit popular referendwn on permanent form govt. Abbott might see Bollaert (-vrho reportedly left Paris Aug
26 for Saigon) and attempt clarify anbigu,i ties his stateAt that time, you may ,'rish point out that
ment to Embassy.
it difficult see ho\'r course action h e pToposes ,'Till in absence SECRET
138
h . O' lf"' ;;'l". ...." .',C - -, -.
811 t ()ff
-.:
.',
I I
" .'
>
.'
. -.j
\.
"':
I
-,
\ I
i
.
", I
.'
.. :.:
"
-
OTS""fRH'UTIOr-. ....o.r:SI R ED-

O-I'.FI CI!S ON L
. ,"
... ." ~
n'
.... ,.
: .. ...
-
1
I i
139 I
Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
Department of st ate OUTGOING TELEGHAil1

SECRE'l'
A!:IEMBASSY ,
PARIS.
3368
Dept concurs views Saigon's 188 Aug 28 similar those Deptel 136 Aug 27 to ~ a igon (rpt Paris as agam ). Dept appreciates difficulties facing any French Govt taking decisive action vis-a-vis Indochina but can onJy see steadily det e riorating situat ion unle ss more positive approval Baie d'Along Agre emeht , enactment le gislation or action permitting change Cochinchina status, and imme diate commencement fo rma l negot:ta-, tio ns envisnged that Agreement. Dep t believes nothing should be left undo ne which vlill strengthen truly nationalist groups Indochi na'and induce pres ent supporters Viet Minh corne to side that group, No such :tnch.1ceJ;'!cn t pos sible unles s the t group can shm'l conc:cete evIdence French prepared :implemen t pro;nptly creation V:Letnam as fre e state associated French Uni.on and with all attrtbutes free state. When you de em appropr5.ate please point out to French Govt Dept's views regarding Ind ochina and repeat Dept 's re adiness pubJ.1cly appr'ove French Govt act10n along above line s 1'Thich \'Jill ass is t bringing about solll tion of Indochina problem. In foregoing connection you might refer substance second para Deptel 3331 AUG 26.
HAHSHtlLL
l~O
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011
. ID(CU\SSlPIED
CO:'ll!'WL
'. "
- ,,
Ai'.JCONSUL
t~c.' _ _ -.t ~_'S 1' IGO"T) ~' Il) 9 . . . .F..:O.l::-c't-B ~xt s t2.tcmen t t2LDept spokesman Sept 16
,
--:~I~
~-rcsponse pertinent question~Q.'l'E D0pt has riatche~ clos ely .. . . ..

.
~. ~
.'
t .' ." : .. '
(f'I
CD
" 0
'/ t: .
.,
,.'/
"
r~)pid
-""
"
A , 0 " 0 in southeast Asia ~ince e~rly this'y~~; _ and ' ha~ ' naturally CD , ........ t~lken this development into considera tion ,'in doterminil,!g
~J
incl'e.s.se of Communist acti,vlty nhic1]. has t8.1Cen place
(l
tLi
I
\.;
its course of action. Burma) fiIalaya) ..
Results of these activities in ..

":/
' .
; ; ...
~
Ind~chlno.
2nd Indonosia have been, reported

', '
',. f'J
-'::"
"-,
'-- -
by press as they oc curred from time to . time and need not

. .
".-' 'C f.)
be revieV1Elc1. tovr'?rd One rna j
Hov"reyer, li ttle a ttentlon'

OP S
has
b een directed
t:ra. tegem- employed by Comrrmn:i,s"ts in dof
pendent areas. of southeast Asia.

. .
'r o win support

.
' .
and allies
in their drive for po\ver, Ccnmunist leaders have consistenYly . pretended to champicn cause of loc21 'nationalis ts and have
I
r-I
.attempt~d to identify communis~'with n~ii~nalism in minds

~IOUTI ON ~ GIREO.
.. "
Cp en I
p
of', people of area.
This scheme worked

", ' ,.-
.,
~ell,
at least until
:ES ONl..Y}-
Cominform f s denl)ncia tion of Yugos18v. Communis t le aders as bein g) among other thing s, guilty of nationalism. There
is some evidence thnt sincere nationalist leaders in south'e2st AS~2 .) originally deceived by this device) h2.ve non
--~??C;
f C_EAR/\~~y::,: 'r () ~.
./ al,';2,~i:e!1ed
to fact th8.t J in Oo:ml;.1J.nist cO.!:1trolled

J
'.'
----l~'~;"'// .
~
out sic:.o
.
.~~--.JJJ_GCiU JOWO HY ni ::'rrl: ; 3- (jnr~:-I- n.::~-,,; :, ~' t ! r '
-. ,.
'~'...
..-/
\.
.j
<
J !
outside Soviet Union" no. t:l.ona1ism to. vlhi'ch they
U Pire
.1 .,
.1
;
is rega:r~d eq as a high crim e and grounds 'for 'ruthless in ....
. ,:
.... .
" ~ :
~.
. ;
. :... .
,,: ~
.'
.'. .. .
. ;.,
'.
...
,,'
:. .:-:: . : :
.' . . ".,' , .! -: .. ~". "': .":'". -~' ..
'\/As
~s
45 and 151.
.
-",
....
SE:CR[:T
.
~
'_ ("'1 ..- ' ")

. .... .'
I ~.J~X c L
'. '
- Cj '
.-7. ,,'
..
"
, -~
..-..;, /1 .
c-(.i !
.'.-:'-
..
"
':-::"
.
,", ' I
,",
:.
"
.. ~
"
.
',\
', ...
.
.'
~.~.
.. . . . ,'
~ ~
.',:.....
-:
.. . " . -.
/,'~ .:;
,~.
<~
,;'- .:.
.....
"-,f,"
1 .;.:
'. .
"
.
.
'.
..~
~ ', '
;..
, ' :
-::;
,
" I,
" ~'
!." ,
,.'
"',
,-
"
"- .
.~.
;" ,
"-
," .
'.
... ' .
..
. ,.
.',
"
.'\,
..
. ;.
.> ..
"
....
... . .
::-:
" ,:.
,
' ."',<:
..'
.
' ,~
......... ;,:. . "; .
.~:.
,
~. ~~ ,
"'.:.
......:.
"
.:.,
:.-',
'-.
. ,.!:'
..
~
. .'::: '. ~ .. ... : ~.~~ . ... .
". '
... ':'~.
": .
.'
.;'
-.~
",'
. ~.
;.
'.
'.
.;
..
"
;-
,-: .
,-'
,
.:', .'
' . :;' ' '
'. ,",,:.
-'
:.:...
~.
- ' . ..
I .
..,
::
"
.. ' .
~"~.:'
7'-_ ,- -0 ..... '.::.; ',',.

','
"
..
) ."-
~. -:. ,,-:-. . !
. . ... :
:,
":."
"
"
.:'
:-'
"
... . -- ..:,"
.::>-
- -': .::' ",.

r. , __
,,' . ".
,
. _ ~
..... '
.'
. -'
"
.D EPA RT jlA E N T OF STATE

....
;
,,',:
......
"--.
.t ~} ,
~.
Executive Secretariat Files, Lot 57 D-649 Departc.!ent of State Policy Statement on I ndoch ina, September 27 , 1948
SECRET
A.
OBJECTIVES
The immediate obj ective of US policy in Indochin a is to assist in a solution of the present impasse which will be mutually satisfactory to the French and the Vietnamese peoples, which will result in the termination of the present h ostilities, and which will be within the fram ework of US security. Our long-term objectives are: (1) to eliminate so far as possible Communist influence in Indochina and to see installed a self-governing nationalist state which will be fri endly to the US and which, commensurate with the capacity of the peoples invol. ed, \vill be patterned upon our conception of a democratic state as opposed to the totalitarian state which would evolve inevitjtbly from Communist domination; (2) to foster the association of the peoples of Indochina with the western powers, particularly with Frarlce \'iith whose cllstoms, language and laws they are famili ar, to the end that those peoples will prefer freely to cooperate with the western powers culturally, economically and politically; (3) to raise the standard of living so that the peoples of Indochina will be less receptive to totalitarian influences and will have an incentive to work productively and thus contribute to a better balanced world economy; and (4) to prevent undue Chinese penetration and subsequent influence in Indochina so th at the peoples of Indochina will not be h ampered in their natural developments by the pressure of an alien people and alien interests. B. POLICY ISSUES
To attain our immediate objective, we should continue to press the French to accommodate the basic aspirations of the Vietnamese : (1) unity of Cochinchina, Annam, and Tonkin, (2) complete internal autonomy, and (3) the right to choose freely regarding participation in the French Union. We have recognized French sovereignty over Indochina bllt have maintained that such recognition does not imply any commitment on our part to assist France to exert its authority over the Indochinese peoples. Since V-J day, the majority people of t he area, the Vietnamese, h ave stubbornly resisted the reestablishment of French authority, a struggle in which we have tried to maintain insofar as possible a position of non-support of either party. While the nationalist movement in Vietnarn (Cochinchina, i\nnam, and Tonkin) is strong, and though the great majorit~y of the Vietnamese are not fun damentally Commun_lst, the .ijlOst active element in the resistance of the local peoples to the French has b~.cn a Communist group headed by Ho Chi Minh.
1~.l,.}
/.
This group has successfully extended its influence fO'lnclude practically all armed fo rces now fighting the Fr ench, thus in effect capturing contl:Dl of the nationalist movement. .- '. The French on two occasions duritlg 1946 attempted to resolve t he probJ em by negotiation with the government established and dominated by Ho Chi Minh. The general agreements r eached were not, however, successfully implemented and widescalc fighting subsequently broke out. Since early in 1917 , the French h ave employed about 115,QOO troops in Indochina, with little result, since the countrysidc except in Laos and Cambodia remains undcr the firm control of the Ho Chi Minh government. A series of French-established puppet governments have tended to enhance the prestige of Ho's government and to can into question, on the p art of the Vietnamese, the sincerity of French intentions to accord an independent status to Vietnam.
1.
PO LITICAL '
We h ave regarded these hostilities in a colonial area as detrimental not on ly to our own long-term interests which require as a minimum a stable Southeast Asia but also detrimental to the interests of France, since the hatred engendered by continuing hostilities may render impossible peaceful collaboration and cooperation of the French and the Vietnamese peoples. This hatred of the Vietnamese people toward the French is keeping alive anti-western fe eling among oriental peoples, to the advantage of the USSR and the detriment of t he US. We have not urged the French to negotiate with Ho Chi IVIinh, even though h e probably is now supported by a considerable majority of the Vietnamese people, because of his record as a Communist and the Communist background of many q,f the influenti;:!.l flgures i ~ and about his government. '> postwar French governments h ave never understood, or have chosen to underestimate, t he strength of the nationalist movement 'with which they must deal in Indochina. It remains possible that the nationalist movement can be subverteel. from Communist eontrol but this will require granting to a nonCommunist group of nationalists at least the same concessions demanded by Ho Chi Minh. The failure of French governments to deal successfully \vith the . Indochinese question has been due , in l arge measure, to the overwhelming internal issues facing France and the French Union, and to forei gn policy considerations in Europe. These factors h ave combined with the slim parliamentary majorities of postwar go~ernments in France to militate agaInst the bold moves necessary to divcrt allegiance of the Vietnamese n ationalists to nOl1- , Communist leadership. , In accord with our policy of regarding with favor the efforts of dependent peoples to attain theil' legitimate political aspirations, \ve have been anxious to see the French accord to the Vietnamese the largest possible degree of political and economic independence consistent with legitimate French interests. We h ave t11erefo1'e declined to permit the export to the French in Inc10chba of arms and munitions for the prosecution of the war against the Vietnamese. This
Declassified per E xecuti ve Order 13526, Secti on 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 2011
policy has been limited in its effect as we have allo\ved the free export of arms t o France, sucllexports thereby being available for re-shipment to Indochina or for releasing stocks from reserves to be forwarded to Indochina.
2.
ECONOMIC
Indochina's trade with the United states before the war was relatively small as the greater part of its commerce was carried on with France and the French Empire duty free. Indochina now enjoys a limited customs autonomy , and the US should be able to compete more successfully with France. American investment in Indochina has also been of minor importance in part at least because there has been no treaty basis for the protection of Ameri can interests there as activities in certain business lines are prohibited or can be conducted only with the consent of the French authorities. Should a political solution satisfactory to the French and the Vietnamese be reached leading to the establishment of peaceful conditions within the area, t he US should endeavor to have the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade made effective in Indochina and to m.al(e an arrangement which would afford protection for American enterprise there. The increased trade and investment in Indochin"a which might result from these measures would tend raise the level of economic activity and standard of living. We do not wIsh to press for these matters, nor to develop a long-term fmanciaI or economic policy in the area, until such time as a political solution, such as may terminate in large measure the present hostilities, has been achieved. With respect to the important question of whetherECA assistance shou1d be extended to the area, we have informed the Prench that because reconstruction and development of Indochina is impossible under the present conditions of warfare which perta.in there" no direct ECA financing for Indochina will be forthcoming,at present although 1"rench requirements will be readjusted accordingly. We have indicated informally our willingness to r econsider the question should conditions change. As regards French claims for Japanese reparations on behalf of Indochina, we have taken the position in the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) that 1"rance should receive two percent of the total amount of reparations which may be determined to be available. While most F;EC countries feel that the proposed share is too large, in view of the French wartime performance in Indochina, we have indicated a willingness to allow the 1"rench an additional one half of one percent. France presumably \\lould also be eligible for a. pro rata share (or a portion to be determined by negotiation) of the 18 of our 28 percent of total reparations which we have proposed to maloe available to such FEC countries as accept our schepule for reparations distribution. This question remains unsettled. We have not allowed the French a: portion of the advance transfers within the interim reparations program . We have uncler consideration a French claim to gold valued at 37.5 million dollars earmarked .for Japz~il in Indochina. The gold represents the settlement of certain trade balances b~~\.:leen Indochina and J<-1.pan and oCJ2.pJ.nese local
to
,.146
Declassified per Exec utive O rder 13526, Sectio n 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
i r
./.
!,
currency reqnirements during the period AugusV1940 to March 9, Hl45. Since the earmark:ing of the gold transferred title to Ip'dochina,ancl since there are no general considerations of equity or public policY' of a sufficiently compelling nature to justify withholding recognition of title thus transferred, the tentative posit.ion of the Depr,atment is that SCAP deliver the gold to Indochina unless an early FEC policy decision precludes such action.
C.
h .i! I! :1 .,
Ii
Ii
i:
":
RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES
The French, whose policy since the Japanese surrender has been a failure with regard to the Vietnamese, have made some progress in normalizing ,their r elations with Cambodia and Laos. Both these Indochinese protectorates have now been formally admitted as "associated" states to the French Union. The peoples of both these protectorates bavc been allowed some degree of autonomy, which apparently satisfies them for the present. Unquestionably, however, the current modi vivendi will be altered by any French settlement wit.h the Vietnamese which gives the latter more autonomy than now possessed by the Laotians and CambocEans, , The most recent French attempt to res.olve the question resulted in the June 5 Baie d'Along Agreement between the French High Commissioner of Indochina and General Nguyen Van Xuan, head of ,the Provisional Central Government of Vietnam, and countersigned by the former Emperor of Annam, Bao Daf. In this agreement, France recognizes the independence of Vietnam, whose responsibility it will be to unite the three Vietnah1ese provinces of Indochina, with only such limits as are imposed by its membership in the French Union to which it freely declares its adherence. Further negotiations to fix relationships of France and Vietnam are provided by the agreement which must now be nltified by the French Assembly, particularly as it relates "'to a change in the status of Cochinchina, now a French colony, to permit its union with Annam and Tonkin. As regards international conferences, the US, as it recognizes French sovereignty over Indochina, has upheld the right of France as a metropolitan power to submit the applications for associate membership in ECAFE of its dependent areas in Indochina. French relations with the Siamese Government have improved since the November coup d'etat of Field Marshal Phibun . . Phibun apparent1y has given assurances to the French that. he has accepted the solution of the recent Siamese'Indochinese border dispute. He has furthermore taken limited measures designed to reduce the activity of Indochinese clements in Siam hostile to the ' French. Chinese relations with Indochina, based upon a 19'16 treaty which confers substantial benefits upon the Chinese in the peninsula, are la:-gely determined by the needs and interests of the commercially and economically powerful Chinese overseas community in Indochina, numbering almost one million. On the surface, Chinese official relations with the French officials have been
L,
('
I
i I
-tl'':j"L.
<) .
,'I [,I 7 "'".
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 20 11
correct although signs of tension develop from time to time. The Chinese have pressed the French t.o indemnify Chinese who have suffered property loss in Indochina's fighting . The Kuomintang h as striven to m aintain a tight control over the Chinese community through consular representation, while the French have endeavored to reestablish the situation of pre-war years wherein the French authorities successfully maintained a degree of control over Chinese \vithin Indochina. The Chinese, hO\vever, have also tried to protect the several hundred thousands of their fellowmen who live in territory not under French control. There have been contacts between Ho's agents and Chinese government oftlcials which apparently resulted in Chinese tolerance of a munitions t raffic from China to the benefit of the Ho government. French eiIorts to enlist Chinese support in Kwangsi and Kwangtung to suppress Chinese bandit and Comrnunist bands which cross the Inclochil1ese border have not been successful despite an agreement in principle. An increasing Soviet interest in Indochina, as demonstrated by a step-up in radio broadcasts, was evidenced in th~ first half of 1948. The line t aken by these broadcas ts has been constantly to discredit the United States by attempting to identify it with "imperialistic France." There continues to be Iho known communication between the USSR and Vietnam, although evidence is accumulating that a radio liaison may have been established through the Tass agency in Shanghai. D. POLICY EVALUATION The objectives of US policy towards Indochina h ave not been r ealized. Three years after the t ermination of war a friendly ally, France, is flghting a desperate and apparently losing; struggle in Indochina. The economic drain of this warfare on French recovery, while difficult to e,:,timate, is unquestionably large. The Communist control in the nationalist movement has been increased during this period. US influence in Indochina and Southeast'Asia has sufIered as a result. The obj ectives of US polky can only be attained by such French action as will satisfy the nationalist aspirations of the peoples of Indochina. "Ve h;we repeC],tedly pointed out to the French the dcsirability of their giving such satisfacti on and thus termin ating the present open conflict. Our greatest difficulty in talking with the French and in stressing what should and what should not be done has been our inability to suggest any practicable solution of the Indochina problem, as we are all too well aware of the unpleasant fact that Communist Ho Chi Minh is the strongest and perhaps the ablest figure in Indochina and that any suggested solution which excludes him is an expedient of uncertain outcome. We are naturally hesitant to press the French too strong'Iy or to become deeply involved so long as we are not in a position to suggest a solution or until we are pi"i)pnred to accept the onus of intervention. The above comicler[:tioris arc fUl.~L:!er complicated by th e fact that we h ave an im.-/ .
j
~,'
. I
,
i
I
metHale interest in maintaining in power a fri~liclly French government, to assist in the furtherance of our aims in Eurol)c. ~ . This in'lmeclin te and vital int('l'('st has in consequence taken precedence ovei7 'active steps looking toward the realization of om objectives in Indochin8.. We arc pl'ep:uecl, however, to support the French in every \yay possible in the establishment of a truly nationalist government in Indochina which, by giving satisfaction to the aspirations of the peoples of Indochina, wi1l ser\'o as a rallying point for the nationnlists and will weaken the Comnnmist element.s. By such support and by active participation in a peaceful and construc:tive solutlon in Indochina we stand to rt"gain influence aneI prestige. Some solution must be founcl which \vi1l strll\:(' 8. b;tlance between the aspirations of the peoples of Indochina anel the interests of the French. Solution by French military reconquest of Indochina is not deS11'8.ble. Neither woulel the complete withdrawal oJ the French from Indochina eflect a solution. The first alternative would delay indefinitely the attainment of our objectives, as we would share inevitably in the hatred engcnderecl by an attempted mUitary reconquE'st amI the cl.enial of aspirat10ns for self-government. The second sOLUtion would be equally unfortl1na te as in all likelihood Indochina \voulcl then be taken over by the rrdlitant Communist group. At best, there might follow a transition perIod, mmhd by chaos and terroristic activities, creating a political vacumn into which the Chinese inevit8.bly would be (1.1'mvn or wonld push . The absence of stabilization in China will continue to have an important influence upon the olJjective of a permanent 8.nd peaceable solution in Indochina. We have not been particularly successful in our information and education roO'l'am in orienting the Vietnamese toward the western democracies and the P US. The program has been hampered by the failure of the French to understand t1l8t such informational activities as we conduct in Ine10chin8. arc not inimical to their own long-term interests anc1 by administrative arlC.1 flm:'.l1cial considerations whiGh have preventcd the development to the m8.xln1um extent of contncts with the Vietnamese. An increased efiort should be made to explain democratic institutions, especially American institutions and American policy, to the Inc10chinese by direct personal contact, by the distribution of informRtion about the US, and the encouragin g of educational exchange ..
t~
it
f
I
,f.
, ,i
'l .I
j
_ . 6.___
149
"
c
',.
~ Ir
OF THE
'
_ .
jr:r :. .'. .
"7 "I
~~'.J1,1..
UN ITED STATES 0;-- AM!:R!CP.

_.'1 , '.
No. 195
SSCr..:::T
I "JI:
\." .:,,.
_'.1
., I'i .
'.
3
S:~.'\', -
Sai~:on,
~Oi , ~----' Indochina, i;ovcmver 5. 1 9'18 "

!
,.
I
I
.:
Subject:
Sovi o~ Policy in Southeast Asia.
. . I " ... ;;,
:I;-OF
.~.
I he.va the hOLlor to refer to th0 DooartJr:.ent 1 s socret circub,r "'instructionof October 13. 1 948,V en titled IIPattorn of Soviet ?oli<.;yin Far East o.n-::1. So,)theast Asiu" and to sub~rit certuin cO:;ll'1E;mts, us requ ested by the Department.
1.l
.L' . ' .," ,, 1~. In recent rno.:1vhs parG1Ci.ilnr ernph9.S1S Jlas Deell 2,)b.cea on (:co- ~J:- 1" -, '.11S " l ' ] ' nas lnC 1 . 1 h unnne; O.L rIce !:'.l_ 1 S an'_ r~, b'8e1',.. ; .;~\ . .. . ,1 ~ , fiOl1UC S8.00~9,g;e. _UQCQ , c" :l a,,"G<)'c~:s on eomm'J.nlC'l \- .L <> 11 t y?9S, ~ ., ' 'jfG. rehouse~j In uf.l1Z;On, a~( v10l1S 0:1 3._ :: .,: , i\ .: 1 inclu.:iinc, ra~.lrot'.cl::;. rOf\n convoys and bal\:;e !.;)."a:1S!?Ort. 'I'hi!3 :~:9.S ~. ';j be0n .so succe:3si'ul -::'h9. t t110 ~nO\lA !rr3rlt of padd:r nYld riC9 to S?. i~;0!;'''' ;.Sl:/ I Cholon hElS pro. ccic:ally c8ns)rl in rec ent :r:;J~:s. CU1'iou::;J.y e:101.1)1 ~ ;' ~ ~ I iw ;j' there have oo::n no S81'ious 3.~l;,",-c',;:s on the 2 ;U~iGJJ.larly TJ1.)lc19I' ,;" blc C pctroleu!":l. c.:;~)ots i-:1 S9.5..:on aild I-!Jlip:';'021,; 110r }t~.7e the ~9. !~Gor r'.l-bbor ~1 !.-.~0 ~J
~~:-i'" ~ '"
Soviet policy in Indochino. e.PI)e9..rs to follo".'- in bcneral tho o lines described in tho final section of the instruotion undor acl~no.'[lt;cl[;en~:D.t hut ';,:i 1;11 cortain minor v8, riation. In ;enor8.1 it Tl}8. JT bo snic{'thc.t Indochine. presents an ideD, l picture fron. tho poj.nt of viev[ of ]., '0$00'::. A S:11P.,J.~ Group of Ti~OSCOW and Chinese t rainod Cor::.munists has firm cOl:!trol of the strong ane deGP seated. TI::l.tiYe JI:at.i.o11a.lis !il. .4. na~i ve GOV~l'ninent undor Cor;1:1mnist directio!:"l cO:ltrols ., ' } . - -. ."" ~ ... -I .{'} L co n::; l'.l.?1'f"J.'J.0 cu'oa:::: Ol -c- ~J " '-' 0 1.1 nJ- ana !TI..';.lllv[\ 1ns an army $1.1...1..... 1cl:;n(J.'..Y ,,1,::, "r'y strong to pin C:O'."ffi 10. 1'';0 ?re~"1ch forcos. '.rhe country ho.s been l~ el)t i n turFl';' il since the e:ld of the war, " -::.1:ing it a serious dr3.in on the ;niJ.it~\ry [,nd econor:'.ic resources of ?rance instead of a sour'CEl ~0 .., \'[oa ILl !;" .Lh e pOl"l" O.L V18W oj.n .'.,03 COW, pros1l8c"s are exce 1 -'"'-! /,.,. ",.L. ",,, ., .L \ 01 'J.1. rO!:1 v. ',7'-~ ~ 11 .. lent th8.t Eo ."j1l ,.:": 'lrl 'liJ. . . ' "11 " 'II eV9n,;Uo.. y f01 'CO the vlit~1dr8:r";o.l of the I, ,: -. 1 ' t: up ".' J. II " ..' J.. ' ";") b l' ,.. 001J.v.n8!'.S .L 1\ . . .L' lrone.l arlo. S8J "no 1.11'8" 1,el'l J)o:noCro."lc l"\.epu 1(,," 1n .... Asi a. At the sam') ti!r.o Com;,n.1.llist control has bo,en CO!1(~o~\l'3d. U!"lC1. i dentified. with :tiationo.l:~sm so successfully as to confuse ::\D.d. delude public opinion in France and the Ul1ited States and thus gai~ th e sUD'Oort of' l 1'\1'ge Socialist and liberal groups in tho s0 cOlntries.
a
"'t
r,
C> ' .
I'i:
plnlltC'..tio::' ~i bG0~ sGric)\.t~l~r di.stu r'oedG
~t~ ,i,
" i.
:'
\) ..
, ..
\~
~1
<o._
150
on the s'..lrface e.nd t~0.t tho st:.>.ndard anti-.~eric:;!'!l line is ooi::lG distribut ed. in directives to party leaders. No evidence hns yet tur,w.l 1..1p t:l9.t Eo Chi :-iY'..].1. isreC8ivi::lg cU.rrent directives eHh'Jr ~ fr'Jm !.:osco':r, Chin?, 01' the . Soviet Legation in Bangkok. It m[\~r bo ass'Jnl:3d t]1.9.t L;oscow .;."'801s tl:at Eo and his lieuton9.nts have had f I sufficient trab.in~ nne. experience and are sufficiently l oy!', l to ! be trusted to dctor~ino their day-to-day policy TIithout supervision. Mot:cor factor ?eculiar to Indoc!'1.ina is the apparent quiesca~lc8 of COl['jTtunis t clo!~!()!1.ts a;'lon[; the re::;ident Chinese colony. Hot. only are t~ese beliovGd b:' the Surote to be relatively fe . . " in nurnb.:)r , but any pIn.ns they !:19. y have had to emulate jhoir cOJ7Irn.cles in l;:n.lp,ya h~'Te lJ!lclo'JbtedJ.y be:;!} )-~a!1lpered by the SUl'ete which has been quiotly rO UnCi!lG u? nne:. de,9ortinb th'9ir leadors for sever3-1 months. It rP.'3.y also be t;l~t ;':oscow feels th3.-G ~mti-ChineslJ feelinG i s so strong i!l th o VietYlo.:n that').ctivo cooperation of Chinese COiilCllUllis ts vrith tho Vietmi::1h ,'[ould furnish too vu.lu 9.ble a propaGB.nda weapon to tho French. Hespectfully yonrs,
George ~. Aboot~ --.A..'1lW"+C;?,J1-.C.on::rlt1---G,,--naF-a-}--
~~~~
ShO"""1:;he.i
r1'
n c;apore
_' . ~j<).J.L"J;..J '"
'\''\...'.!-.1.
oM-r'J ~--------
U
:x
__.-J
151
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Sectio n 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63 3 16. By: NWD Date: 2011
Department of state OUTGOING TELEGRAM SECRET J anuary 17 , 1949
6 p .m.
PJiRIS
. 145 Daridan haJ expressed to Dept same view contained penu1tima~e para urtel 107 Jan 10 qun11fying his remarks however with statement that he uninformed developments past ten days which micht explain optimism Overseas France officials in urtel 106 Jan 10 re necotiations with Bac DDi. .
V {!1i)..9..__ ~?p!_.9 _E:.~1.!,-<?us__E...t?-:r.lCh_9.2.~J.ng to .J.~Il}JJ with Bao Dai or any truly nationalist , group which }ias rea-so-i13 bJ.e- chanc- -wIrlnfiig---6';;-el~prep-onderance -of e
Ofj1.Jj:.ve_.G<?vr ~if1"icli -by- fa iltng _ develop appe~l omong Vietnamese might become I -vTrt~a'1Iy_ p~pp~~t.~~goyJ-~ -=-~ei2?~ra ~~d_fr9}il people and --e'x istine; only by presence French military forces . --Accord:LngfY, .Em15--s)1oulcr-i:18ke- n6-'aadi tinal [sicl_representations to French until and unless further instructed by Dept which does not believe it desirable go beyond position outlinSd Deptel 2637 July 14 i ts ref tel 3621 July 9 from Paris and Embtel 5129 Sept 30. I
VTetnames.e ~w'e c8-n-not~it- nils t'irnelrretrevably- E~sic] com-
mI t . lJ_S-- To-_-s-ipRsi)~t
Dept Hl11 inform Emb re possibility (my common anti-Communist action Indochina (tll:l.rd pal"u Embtel 107 ) after it has recd Brit vieHs as Emb London reports Brit Fonoff hElS instru.cted Brit Emb Hash discuss matter with Dept. LOVE11tf Ac ting SECRET
OUTGOING TELEGPAM
I NDICATE
Coiled
flOC :;
CONTROL
Ch argo
~o
AllCorSUL
SAlGO r)
-~
1"'\ t~
f1 19 I.;. 9 'I~ ~
FOR
DclT
U Se: ONLY
{J .
I n forthcoming difficult
" . guera c ar8I u1 J Y [lGD.lns t ...
~
p~riod
~.
Dept desires you
o.ny
. nc ulon
~:mlC~l
, .
l ;'Ugl1 t
08
sel zed
upon as prC'DitCl.ture enci.orS8l1Cnt or de fe.ct o reco g nition by
en
o
US of Baa Dai or Rny r egime he may establish.
FR e;iving
0
(;1
ti
cvic1.e nce pessim ism re vie.bili ty Bs.o Dr-.:L solution end D01)t desiree ret2.in
8. 8
much freed.o; n of Bction re 10 as l)oGsible
wi thont In D .ny mr-nn81." ESi vine i mpre 8si on He opr'O se or \'li sh to hlnder ex-Errperor. Dep t h88 aJ.rc8cty,
disCU8SE;(:t
informally
i'lith FR Emb ( as \'ye ll as Brit Er;]b here ) c1es:i. r~1bility app:coprie.te FR offici 01 s issuin g to consul."=lr' corp 8 invi,t8-tions to attend 8.11 c eremonie 8 lnvol ving DBO D8.i' ( f:lfth po.r2 urtol 92 Mar 29 ) . Dept
I;
0'
~ishes
you and Gib son c ontinue reporting situation as you h ave
'-',
AOHSSON
/\c \\(-,!, (J'1

:)I STr<m U71 0~~
...~
DESIR!:./:J
:J P'Plcr;:a Or;I,Y)
,~ ...... '
Cf!Ii)
.r
",t '('\." ....:!.
...-;..". 0;.;.1/.', 0 JT ' ()- I Q \-.t1'"1/ V-",1 V' i7 1.:..:J ;',,' ,\ .. I.) ,J. , . .
Q~ ~<.-9
.... . \
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Sectio n 3. 3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
S), iG(n~ L"'.1ocl1.5 :t:!. 9 I f :\,: / 5 ~ . 1 !;)::9 ..
SECf~ET .
:<
"
!:~i":~~i
1'::" ..I.. ~'l;: 0.. -;~.!; i:""".; )\:i;.li ~l0~:ctl . }]-)111:5.. Cor:::0i"' Z! :lC~
i\1.:\.
DC?
t3~-
ETj~.!X
l ~. //-"-).8 i::-~lic:\-::c:~ cl ~.t t:1C J'~~::'!l;
': ...... "\
'l'j,~t l ~
...
'. \
-------._-. -..
L'-0111i
?cr~::t6;1 S02'\- j.C:) CO:J.f:)rO:1G'J

[J.::1Y n.dd.:ltio:1 ~, l
eLl
D.,"~".~
-~
""'. 't}~~t t~-.:..~ I~,:: p~!.:'t,f:!.':~:~-:~: 't:!()U}t""~ D.~?i"' ;~ Gi;.\-t;c ~~(;C .:; i "lin~
ccp:loo .
h~\~
of
t::~
C] l~~j-+:: :~:i" p ,:: pCT:3 -:..l-l :'t, r.~i Gh '~ 'bo I.. ~~l j 10.010 0
I accordingly
J:" I..~/)
,-, . I
'
.. {~}
2/
poli-:-~~_c ,-,J
is
7ih'1_C2-l
"l'i~~;':;:
:.'.l~~) A ~l't~.r.L::}!T!.i..t/G!.: d
n:s
~rldi tiC:':l~l
Gup~ll.::;~";..-);:(:t;
CO-'l:.~; ~(,-: ~.:-lS
c.:J v .:; 1 (: ;1:::::;::1t!': :).2.:

"
I r~c. 0 C}'l ~_2'!::I. i
11 F.~ b :rl.l.:'\ ~ry J.~1 d
i.:)':I:' cl~l ). 9-~ 9
cn
{j)
o
~.:'~~::~'~'~ 12d b~r ; ~:'J \ZI'~1ilc
C21~OUt~)
to t'll'::
CC~:lro;."" .)L1.CJo
1'.1
c>.~ r'~ji~ -:'.Tt;J-~<~l.-~
).. n C:..~:,:'\rG "t:-~c 'l\)~;'r:,.~co:ll(~l J\1~) . . ~::.~bJ:'t.,. di~1 .G'!...'1J:::[~.'l~.

lIQ\'j'~)\"':;~'D
i11. ~_:l1:1.:3 r;;,_~:)~)l'::::'~J:~~1; ~:: t\~"; (::.~l:r" !101rJct~,:;d~; ~l:1d . .;~:r.j,:c1. c:?'.. !\pj."i). ' ;'~3~ J. D t~;~J ~ .
P- . :r<l ~O:l.).-~- ~.~:1
[;:"..j;,:~.r.1 ;:-s t~;~1. ~~r 01' t}}.0 \iJ. -;-t.:~_~\ : :!' Q
.ts..)
11)CJ] ~~~}I~~~/'
( ~l
~'-':-'f;:l'2l1 .?0.:,rlJ.:'t::~,":.:rft; "~O :~:.rJl~:;~:~ -;:r~ '~11iG :r,.)(>')-"":~~:rJ.ct~)::';;.. 0:,1 h':l.[i r,.)~;:-J. \"~:1::(:I .::c:~:.,_. . (1-1:t (~. (.l~'i..:;"-::<l oJ' t;l ~J [:.dj:)ur:rl7:1f;~~-:~ of .~}~:) li';;'! :j: :c::~
aC-(;ic:l ~).~:r
:.:i.-:;
... , ,
r':'!'J.~1 j::i.~ ~:. .~.~.j2t;:i_ J~ ?,~:tY 17 r.

4\'"
l~l:;:::;c .) d
o.r:
~.r;i'l "\/i: \[; :i~1 S~ ~~g'~/:l o ::~ i\;.)~I,~l~ .
r:'c)
:1
p 1:-. =.::~. -:";(l))
13~.o
),, 0:::,). .:\.1. Le, :\ , 'Sl:\{:" :; .:. ~ I) c:. ~~<\ :;1.

t}1'~
oJ...
1:. \' l:.::1 '.:;(1.. /)pr:i.. I, ?, a C/~t p J.2.~'1.::; i:~ r~).l~t -::; \~ '11 :J~" ..J jl!j '\'/:.~:~ 1. : un ';U . t;l '~ ?r":H::!1 ~\ \: 1? :''':1<;: 1:;:, . lle',:J (?-;;;-D. '
':-Y,
.::,
UI'
OX:?jC~IJ\.l. ,\C';::]_CJ~)~
,
,J.-l!o l:.l\.~O:;'V,)tt~~lg p:)~}~cct vtj,j....I.

0
E;~:cr)(Jl~(.i~;.'"' to CG:~h'J.lt yri.'::t1'1 \)\:)li ti!.~:\ l l o::tdi)Y'.J

-
by ~;.lf) Eolcct h3.:1 l}::.~"':7 0--::;:)A~-:.!':-(!)~.1 J

Ct"1
tD
\ , "':;SCl
\.,J
(j~d T:"":.~. }): ':.; PJ..;\l~fi r~!~c tl10 ir:lplc :":1c:-.-!.t.ntii):1 of tho ~~;~!. rch 8 l~ s:r)O~ JJ).\'b:Jo V1~11() ~ " ti.) t ~:::~) ~,; :.lJ. ~o J:; t.;, :::n t i r~31~T rs'J. r:t 0 d; i t i [j ]1 ~3\1',:,:rt;rlo]. 0 C 3 ~o :v~
t h'}.t the j. .<l ~: :l i~ cxtr(;:'l~~J.y unfortu~~~.tf)o

c~-'lolo;i(il. . l
lro~~ OT!)..;;.:, [.i.':\:] t},:.')
!)r.;y~)
i 11 S:'..iGC)Zl bj. . i:-'tg~.!\~ tl.1:.i~y t\nc~ i~ .l dj)p ,~~~,.:. ~":l -~~-J -t;G::l:1 I n.rg.:J~r (3.~.~si!):J. J~~~dlf l'ut t; 1 1 ~ l"(;'\pld 1):t0;~~'10GD oi:' G~;JJ C .hi:~c ,-\::; ::;07':':(i,:t-1':~ti:.:tn C:'.. :-) ;;~) ~). l C~i.;~h':':!i~!S .l~~l~~do~.'j' ovJr Indo'..~hi.n::\J (',~~"J. oV')~" "j'" ~/</ c~ ct::l:1:7" :L~1C_~~"'~~f).:J ~h() d1.f.f lc~:l "~y of J),:\O D:!.:i,. t\ch5~~) 'rJ.:',:; . h ~. :; (~ ~ <j~; r;';': i -:.:,.-~::; .,
_Oi'i'0ct
o: Bi\.,~ r'~i i ~
f.t,r~i "'.:\1
"
G~O:\'IGC: l.~)
/
.:,\i)-j:;ct
G :::~18r!.\ 1
"
::;nclo-~:...1~~:J~ ~
.t~;:['/Jr'5.C::'~1 CO~)':J'uJ.
S.:'..:i":~:O~\ ~.~;'.) f'JT Jel~i

/'
;:"';;J.
C~n~2 r~~ ~G
~ :1\~t ~:~. ~ ~i.-l.: ;-l
::; 'J
})e.2 :~ r~.:-:-. -~ '':-~~
CG~.)~' ~:0 .\ ;:~ :::1';'-1.':':;f'j ~~ Q C ~Pj

~HO
?t::::".'Lt!
to
!~ C~n1~:~t~~
~.'.
r ,':'.:'"
....... .!.
SBRVICB
__
SECTIO~
~~._._ ~_~.
__ . . . _ _ _ ___ ,... . . . _ _ _ _ _
I.
POLITICAL
~OC-~ '-
_~-...D-._
SECTIO~
.,.. _ _
}~ 11.1J. () X
:.~. 0 "
. '\. .~"6'-' , 13. ".Jl! ..:, . - - 'J -- . ",:) l~ 1' ~ .... t..l.. -,-S L10 IJ 'OiJ::'UC\.i.'Y F 0VBrJ.S.l ,~"'r:'" "J.- J_,' ')~ .,,i'c: -_1 .!- O_l In .. . ,.. .! (LL..... ..,..-. .1.. ',) '1' r.OJ.~l'!.\ 0 '(~ F 1 !1 .JJ.d tb..:) (~:\J:" l~l d~ :;y:J of :',,:::.J. :rcl1.0 'l~'lr~y -tijT":; ~ l ~:to~.:d; -i):co1~'~~1 0:2 -\yh~~:G. Frir.:J }!i nist"5:," ~1jSlLLS c:oc.iQ:-.::d tn.3.t 1'0;" i-nJcf;rr;.Ql polit:i.G~J.. rC'~\'SO!1.S }1 .'~ could . ..... ~,~ -l...;"" , -is ""! -~ ... r"" ...,r~ ,,,.': ("'''' .u 0 J. 1---l. ). (~~ t' '..... [1.!.. .:..l... ..... t. O .. ..;..l .. '~...: v''-'' ,,"Y' it) ~ ~; ~..~..:. v! l" . . Co,... lr no 'D~O"'-"'\" .-) \... ~ ""-"')'. . ; -,,,-'. .,..,~ ..... ;:. J.. F () "....:""Ic~ (.., 0): ~ L. . .!.J. v t o ParJ.i::-'1~'J~tt :'0:::" ,:" a1~if}.(:~\"tj.C\::,,"1. ~J':Jfo~"'c t,n.o IJ:\I; s rotur~.1o H3 'f clt t11J:c tho only Ch ~~ C0 to o~t~i~ a ~~vorabln ~~"ot.J ,';o1..11d t::~ nf-'c/JI'. ttlO E:-~:po.ro:r:" :h ~~d :l~~;turrl c d rl.?ld C.~L.r;c!l.~.~h.;d 2.. stab1.G g07,;)xm;:.mt which. G .pp'J8.r(:d to "' .r> r...1-1~ . .~ "J J .vc..t .... . . . ~~ "0".0 . . . . 1 .'" I lD.\J{; a .;.r. j .. ~ , id,:'. . . '....... J ot"" ...' .._ . ..... .!.~~nlY1.:; l.#;'~:) SUP?O.I."~ OJ. a . :"1:.... or...>..' '0"", .IL:'v . 1 v ~._,() ., . and r0Bto~i~G pcacoo 3~o D~i fi~~lly ~cc0ptcd T.!1l3 out l'i0.:3 C. d ,:\r.:',"\1:rt "t l1'j.-t. tl-,,<; j()i:-~in .; o~ Coc;1i:'"lcI;i;::A Jeo t}1.J "l:i.ctl"'.2..D r:llJ st DO c..n ~ cco;:;,p l is!ud '. 'J.
(.t.
oj \;.
J
I.. -:
1 '
.....
..l. .......
.,L.. "l
I.
}:)..
0 -
r' ......
.J- "\
[\
f~ct
b~for~
he nrrivod in
]ndochj~~o
. };o",\[ difficultir;s :''\T'0SG O-:10'r 2~:->';; tl:'. i8 ViUS to b0 ucco;'plis};.odo' Th.6 . qlJ.ick n.~ld ClfJ:;' l~ "'CUJc ,\I{:\,y \';~"s to net U!'l (: ()~ t11:) p:-:tr~gI'~p}l of tr~(~ Frcnc;i.1. : ".. Go :1S t i tut iO?1 b 0 "l'J l" :: i ~.~~ 1.1 i :.:?l; . . ~ i 07:' Ol~ a c1 U:L s i 1.:~. 0:1 of ?r ~.:nlc}l ~co r:c i t 0 ry'v ,l ..... c .o, . ~; -Y'"~-1 , ... 1.,..J...,r-.~;. . \ . .;", a;.l,.':t " ..)..,) .... . l :... . ..I'f . l..'_ .. ...""\c..r>(ll . . ~..: ... - ."' . . . . '" c"'o.,"',,- Ol~ Co~"''''i . ,,~ 1')'ln'' .I"' D -t"'"r) r.rl..l .. '.,\,.'...... . .oJ;> . .!.:.C., lL._i.\ ........ .... \...t,. \,.' _ _ ' .... V 'ir;t n:'J"\,-, };O~i!j~'CJr'S) it ~'!:l.::; 2..l"r. l.~~:'di-' fi!'S7; th~'). t t - is viould roq\~~~l~O D.' o r0foT'C:ldll:~ elf th :, p::~opl,') Qfr;cd~>i.r.~)o::;sibl.~ to hold LF:.doi' p:r'0BGilt'
p ~'
.l.l
.~
\,.0,1' ....
...., ......
~~ ./
....
_..l,.
c O!'l.ditio11f)"' .. r~E d SO(;oYl. ,:l$ t~1~ ?1~Op'Jr" :-~ ") \'~no~l
Vi:\S
to ~:,.ct 'l~ z'. d')r p ~\r:..'\C ~"o. P!'..
7 5 por:-.::~t':-:i :(:6 B. c~n').ng:) i:r: Bt~t'...l8 \')f p[tr-t;3 of t:10 ?rc.r:J.c}l U:niO:-:l'') . 1111~.$J .p, . . }." -':""r")'" ,..." ....., .. A ... .... ., :1 ,,.... . ... .p""1C"" " ... r eqUl, ras l\ ' IT Ol''0' b .:;' . .',.'.'" " " ... 0,." ,.",... St;.u'.\.).,y 2..t. \..,-,. '. l'Jq 1., ','t,. ,,, >.A h .\ -'4 'n.) . ... 'l~~rr:"tori f~ J. )\sse~ :1.bl~.";j T~1.~ con8 ':-.;itu~ici~;J. l c:;~pcrJ~8 nrguad t}lC\"G ~10 PrO;);)).' 8.S ;;:'):-::.bly ~9.d eyor b')cl1 es"tG.'d ished in COGhi:lchirL.1 sillc~ th'.l ~:d ~;t j, n:'~ _ ____ .__._-....1 y ______....... _________ ... _ l V':;, d {)(: or! . npp 0 :'.2i'(;cd nnd YlO'(; 0 J. () (;'c cd 0 o Ass ,j::"I.'J ____ d () Sud ',- i ~t :12.;1 Th() C <:!.bi:c~c.~..; hl.1l'ri(~ny tl,id'tG(1 <lT~d ,:;uk~Ht.Gd. -to tho Fl'cnch P~!'1:t n ~7'..0r:;~ u bill to 5(r~ U? n Torrl.t~0ri.f\1 .;8:;c!~b J ~'" 'r Ilis b5.11 rl:lG j::\! ;::t ~)d' '"' J.. ~ \ "\... ~ (> ...."""' ' n " t 'no " r OLlon . . J!-88C?1 ) 1 Y fl..":.'!.f.). ~ tllToug~l vi11-) .: 8Se~1l).ly OJ. '", [1::\ .: r~n':lC~ u;13.011, r ... t:1G Cou:lcil. of -'v :~(') R3?ur;lic :1~"':. ~ 'Vj(; tJ ~: of n11 11:1.ght c1(\b,\t'~fio TllO . ' . . "::> . ... ..:> " .~1J.. . . :. -~~.';') -r . -..; ""' .; l'~'r- }-::r "r1 . . . (.. ' . . . " ,'\ \.-'0 .i -'~\ S OC l~.l 1:'1'.. 1 - .'.1..,.,\.1,/ !,.., -'~ ."), ...." ~'1" t.. -. .... 81" --0 ("'1\_!..!.., .:.....l~:J." P..... l_ 0l...'PO.-)l .....J()~.,;. .'. 'rl, O D:1.1 b}'o~:r) 5~ t1: '; f:lrst (:I:::::-tt~) f\~ll t}:,; ~O~.':~r-:lr __J!1-t; :r'O(',O)~ v""Qd h:;~v"-\l ,. ._ r'!',".'., () ....... ,r -7- '-' Cr- :. . -,, ;,,: --,::J_,.) ~ ....., .. , ,..,, v ' . ' -J O',",-lO"' ~ -' ''' ..4 1 ,,' .,".': . , . ..... ... .. .... J j ~J. j Co r i -:; i IJ S -f -,ne,... -1-}::..~T'\_....... v__ v 10U :--1"l7
.('> ....... "r<I
.~
".
J.
v~,.~
L.~ ..
1.1
.... ) __ \
~/.~
~-''''':';40
J~h :1
bilJ,~
"'lh~ .J
j .V b -. iJ
:)r~"'"'i}-' {'T ....-" . .,. "',,,:,,~ -'-'..--,'"'.\ 'i(~,_.o(~~ir.,_-,n ('\lfl .!.,,,....., -r'.r.,,.~ 1"I "''''~''l..-''''''''1'-J r-, "'!t1O:-.r. ; ;.JJ_.i...... ,;,.........1 I:/! ..... ..... ~J J.... .; .... ',."., +.() C .,,c v CO,.~"'lC:.... .,. .1._ " colo"v J.,..., :'.", '"""" " c_ . __ ~ - C"" "pc "" O .l. C. v . , .. ...c '''J " ........ 1J J.. s::-:oci.'l~~f..;d ~}~....'\..~.; t !. e.l:6 .l~O jO~\.~\ t::8 \.ii )~:"'>_'. ~~ , ai'!.d th C~~l r.,. !1 (;';; o~Jri :}s of' yot:)a in -!;;--l J F'!":~:lCh ?~r}ir.I..:.-:':~ltl to i ;.~.:):.l)~:~~:'lt t}-~if]:) Tl1:1.n rt:~~f3:'; r.J.l
J .......
J . . . ..
'oJ .... ' "
..
... ~
\.J ~l ";
r." {)''')..J ~ . , .
(. 10
<
L!
b0 f.lc::;:>:~_)1in:;.)(!. h~.~ .A::;.:-iJ. 25;, th ) d~,1..;~ ::ct ::.."'o!.~ ~:---~ f) Z:"?'Jl'0~d:; r-')tu:';l
~o Indochi~~o
It is
of L";.o
diff~cul~
D;.~L'?
to sco
'i-::.
h o~
it
c n~ h ~
donn
~~rl
PO~~]O ~:.:;:--.~)Yl:;
n.~r:1.~,.';:..l
S.-!.if;O~"'~ C,'\.l
1 ")".1
C'.~.!.t~~eip"",~')d:~
It shottltt
155
of> ,
-1 b () r'i~;-~:cio:--~'-:;"_~ -t' ::'.~t t11~ i1e .c~";$oit~l fa:: t;hi r; c or.1f> 1 i c::-;,.~;.; {)d i t. 6 :-:::;tr.j ) r!.:J.s b":I,:Tl 15_ "':~tl') t~;.1.G:lrs~()od jn InC:oc}l:2..::.~~\ b~y Ci-C!l'Jr
l:t..
S}-i ()~{~.
SECRET
}'!';:~::1C:l
~':- '!):lC;l
:):"" ~li~t;l[',.:-.'!")s::;
?.:lQ ~:~~i. c:!. t'"1..:lditic::'.~1_J:15.s-t:~"uqt
c.:lld s1)spicio:.l
of~
..L.' -.J{'~ .
::"l)ti 'fIe s h~;".; b~J0Ll '.)~l~:".:~do:r'J(~ ., T;n:.JT~ hns n1 SO O~(::1 S<I-"-''J r o C!"i::;:t . . ~ ci 8:") of' -t l~9 r:.!\~~(J.nt:.p of th:'j t:~:. . r:.:o.::it'l..l aE [,:;=blJ-I2-t~8 ;:t'r.J_lch Cl-l:t.y:ti:1g 0 ,-,-ill "'~-~ 1'~ ... c1c-n,,,+-~i '- ~ ')"'""'''' ~-~<"'c ( 1 G 0"'1.. 0-" C" .. . ,.J ; . .. ')-,,,. J , \,. ),1 ) ~ .: ___ .. .:.L:'-' ..to l."- "",,,),.,.:....!.vv... __ -x n"11
~ J.~
....... , "';.. ...
.,I .....
-. ~
...
".
;,...( ' J
":"
I .... .
..
...J
.&,_ ........
th~ Vi ~tl~~~SC
prot osting
+ '....,r... -..IJ. ... _
0
~S~i~st
any
-: ......
Fro~ch
ropra~crr~~tio~ ~t ~llQ
,. ,1 .f') ( 1;,. 1. ll \.J. J- .,.1.
L..-. ~ .......,-:T'J' V...,.\I
Gi ,,,! _~ (,'r'l h;) .... - - _

~-..;
D'l"O C" ~."";: _. ..... ~
Bao
I:n i ~. rri 70S i T!. ~ SniGO ~l !J..~c t::":.~ l~J. lr.5.v l C'~B~;:. . o ~!1.i ngr08T.l(}::..t Sig!l1)d i:l Par i s !,:nrch 8, 1 9t.:S , go as i Y1"tO' cffc)ct " subjcc-c 'co f uture! ra"cifie::..tio:'l. Tho tOA-t h.~\;) ::10': y :J -G DC ();1 puolj.sh3d 'C'..lt !:"t r OS1.tI:~~ yt~S gi Tl:)::l to th ~ pr oss aftar tho CXC!"w.ll[;O of l ()-;~-~o"s nne. . so::c:) c.ddj.-t;io}1':11 do-c2.ils ',';,.JI'.] r evTJD.lcc. O~{ t}lC 6o~,-lJrn2'1;J:. ~t c.'u:. . ing t!lC d~jc .r;'. +",,) i ~i t!!.:":", l~f)so:;t'}..) ly u].:d t ,y'" Hi o r.h CG~:.ai. Sf> iO::1C ;" ?IGl:Ci; i}~ ::;. SDO -:len i:1 S3..i o o-on 0:1 L:.r ch 2;) 0 _ .
It co ~i' i n:'ls tho pro7iGio::u; of -eL') :s.~ i d'Alo;1g AgrOe2"'i!:::l-::; of 5 9 1 918 ..., .... t.:.l~it~,r n:ld i ~lC.OPG:"lQI):lC:; y,i.ti[l:;l ~!""'.c Fj:~:;}lC}l 'C:::io~, pl"'Ot 'JctiO:l of ?rc;r:c!"l cul-'cur~~l n:J.u CC.O~10~C I)osi':cio:J. a~'..d. .prcf0rr)~1c,')
Juno
no;;otir:.-cio.n 'by t h:-I.:c

tl: ld:)!'"
a~TCG:-.::j:it"
Th ~; \riC.t~3.:'1
-diJ.l
}l~\VJ
it.~
o-~~~ t\t T~.y
Y7iJ.1 ).. . ccoi\/,:, T xil:t-fj":\r:l ~lld :~.j.\-.!. l b:'.80S -,'f j_'~!l c::.rcf\1.11y dcfi:1Jet :;,: 'i~)rt:J of. C O:~l~ nu~ieJ.;:; :i_o:1o Tho ViO ':;220.,.1 \fi JJ. havo i 'vs 0 , 8 diplo:-xt.ic r.ud c O::'Gl\l~\r 'n:) r'lri 0) J b1..1t Vi 0-c:n.::.T'.\ r~~i a~; :1.0~~,'J 7lill (>:3 r"s ~)t r i C-C ad t 0 '~~1ro Jnt;oa'll Gt.i C2 :.1, fji'1: J. n.:ld G hj_:,,~J. o Fr?,:i.cc ....,ilJ. r;.?D :~r:Oj: 8.' OD:.':'_-\:1(l fo~' 8.d::d58io~ to U:'IO~ ? r ';:J. ch cLi z~:L'J ,.-5.11 ~c":,-::\ :b. !'lu1)joct to ;;':;' c:ich 1".-.70 Tho:, 'J "\ r:il1 OJ ' ~ .,,~ ,,.q . . . - l~ .,-.~ ~ ,,0 ~~-1'.,., ~.,\. '. , ___ L . . _J,,_ c"t' t'o"-n-"" ! ~" ,'-' 1 0 . . ' ,-,. T" 'l-40(".,~1"'0 ",' l~" 1 r c . J O:L _ v C,._~.;.,_: .__ uy ,l. '. "'j .l_ .. "'."_'
J
i~c s O','i11 , c O:-:::;.J.J1d o :~C)pt
5. ~1 ti}:l-~J of "t,':'l' ~
};~l" '-,\~1C'~].
<.J
., _ _
..
. __
(\"1
T\
.:
LI'r'n_"IC~ O .. ....... .., ..... J. ... __ J. _ :"JC t',"'r;--, i C ("'--ld 07':n"".,.. l-"'l~-:;- . .Jr <~ i nC} \1 di:-tg t:l~ tb.O::''''21~l ft ?lG i:-:..por vD.i:'C
~ ~-
.J ...
, . _~
....
u.
..J
t. ... _
'"'f'f f)".l.; ~C" tll ............................ 0 ,,_ ..
C~.p ...:..
T"",,,.10 .-' h;"1~ -. . .) ......." .. .,-'- .. ... ,, $
S.').O~tiO~l
of
Cc)~::\jrol
of} t11 J
n~.fi~.4:;io : l)
J.
"' o~ ()"~ J.. 'J. '_(,
cO .. _ r' ''''J''~'''u :rt;o''-r '''-;ri .:;J

\.J -J
'-' ..
.J ,
rflll~'O~(lr' _ . . . _) . . ....J. J. . _ .\ ."~ D""'!.'"
U .J ..
~ '''''''iC-i ;. ; . ,.. _
hi o ~~!rlj-~!. "J-i} c.J~ C .... r-.o.:lTi) to 0 0 C~iHCU Ss()d .. Lao:J ~,nd 'i:l. (rt~'.n.!.l iil l!~ ~y 01' J\.;:., o of
f\t n. CO:'l.:::Ol~()L.tC -). -chic YO::'.ro

~
or
V
C~. ;.\L"cii C:\,
H; io u")_ dor:rtood ' tn -:d; tho <... u "C-l'I" O "" '"1"~- 'Ct\'1'Gf'\ -~ '1" .'-~'lV ""'1.'0 "' ; ,'io,r v_ .... .. "; . .c) . u f:.vo r2.o1,"') to t~Q Viot:nn ....iId.c:Il th o Fz'(ucil GO-/0:C:'I.;-;:~!:r~ p roforrocl no'c to rO'7c::J.l pr:tor to tho AG~J~1',-)ly cl f)p-~,too f\::.d -i:;}:o 0"'1"
J..
. _OW'J.\V
..,..~
. u
'1 __ ....' _
..
d istinctl~r
tO~21
cloctio ~ ~o
It i n p~:.,:;.t;ur o '':; 0 c.i scu'-l :J ~hQ pronp0cti3 1.'0:' ~m CC():JD of J;;n!) n v;, v '.'.:) f; '-J---'_ -:: ""t; '''J;''O'-'') t ... . ..... -~:- 0:" -i-h,) "::-'r ,.., .. ..,"1-~ 'n._~\(', 'c_)v .'.I. C -\" .. {',,1. ll :.f v_ ... J .!>v_ <04 .... P n1;udi cd H7 1 l 1..'....,...05-.1 ttl '] arr:\':'.gc;:::):"1t8 f or, c}{~.~~G~. "1 "C!:t) n '~, ~ttu') 0::.." 5 Co C:17:.:1 c.:ll:,:':'.. . . . r:..~l) 0:;-):1 DLlC-:->:.J ~:;i'ull:i cO!'lpl:-:; -c']d., \ 7~1'::';0 G.~" {: ,r tt~'':IJ:~J Ci l~(,ul::\;. :'16 -c:;'rt."t ~\.:;;.,.) dj. o n ~l. rd C(JJ.o ~l j. ~"'~ l istr; i:n [~:\:i. SO:'1 \ ;111 [\-::,tJ'):-';0 '~ ...:}.'
J._~-.1.'''r' ''
r
'''''-
.OJ
....1 . .. '-1
,-"o,~,~~ , . .I.-v
" .;-
""c -' l 0 J,",.. ".; o,o,.Jjn""~.~ u ,"";;, -lr-,,' ' -" ... '--'- - -' ........~, "') .L .. c' vr ~ ;.' v Jo' ~ . tho votl) foi~' nu"':;c:\o:-::.:- or ~ i.~~O ~'.j
\ .J '
.,I , ......
~.
"0"" ..
.;.~:! .\ ~
~~ -il 1 (i -r;~-1," i..\ _ .I. .fJ v .'-0 .... 1 0 -,-... ~ ho r -. L< .. - _...; v .. ;.) ... C .. I '.)".
1i~-: '~ ly,

__;...0, ..
t.!-l.o.
...
",o -:~o f'o:~~

thJ~"" .........
";;' ~ .-.,-tl'l ~ " .i.J. . _~ \ ... lj,
.l1 :-\i6:1.
~.r1--c:'}.
)
t:. :)
, .>: "0' , J._\
r"....'C'" o:C 7 V
~1-,,) ;J _ ..
V~ " -'1_~ .. . ~,~ ....-'u .. "~.l ...... . ,..,."""'1 .t "
-C"J .. .. _ ~ 0''-' (". c:Li .... ' ? ;--'" kj;) ..

~
~ .... ~Jo 0
-, ,- ,-1,., . ,--. o 'oi~"":-'i '-'. .,; .. v '-,' .....,.1 .... Jy

J .i,.. ~. ~.\. '_."._ ..l
.[' . ',)'....1 . . .. .. , ..... 0 ... ;"\-rJ ... .-l"i"--0
, . ,~-,:I., r--.\,)' ;,.... (.. . \..4J ..... ~ . ,J _ . . . . . 1
C:"'C"",1"""'('~1~~'""'\ :..; .:..1 _ ... ,.." ... _.............
n , _-",I.\. C "\~ " ,"\..-
Cr.-:,'J.'V~(J..Leo :J .. 1-""~I' '''''
D:-\' 1. r ..!1.1ij {\.l ~O

I'\,.'_~d
"....
:'i~.:.--:ho __ ., ..... ... __ -.r.i .. ~~l .
"'\v -~_,":'l~_~
j~O:""~l 0.. GO . ,:,.l~..::0 : ~~:; (.:1 ~ i ~ r .).I~ t~l':Tl l'- J. {';:..;, -J . ___ 'lt, ...,. ,:;;. '-, ...; .~. ..,~ ...c. ..,. . "'\." ""l,..;."!.. ... I ""1 .:-'\~J'_"- '. 0 OJ... .. .. , ...... . ..... oJ \.
-.,-i t :l
? ~\1C_1 ,;..lO~lC) P:('0:;
t :l[;O
..
l!oI;J/~)~"\ ~
f. U~)~') '2. "-J:: 'J:---!'-~ J. i."' y
i:~ ~~'11j f ull t,):::: t:;

[J.';l-C:':;-: ::::t a
0:'-'
tl! :) ~\Sj,..,O._~-1J::<:. of 1 ,;:. ~c:\ 8 ~~:3.

!'. Fr.} :<J. r
fa -:' it s ir-\? 1 E;;-.~ ';:~l ~~. ~i 0:1
to ..; J~ '. t(~ i :1 c\

.
..
'.
.rO:\~30~~.'.1
bl 'j
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Sectio n 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63 316, By: NWD Date: 2011
fo:t s .~l.i...i:)f:yi:-l2; -t;ll{) ;:li~.I.i'M.i.~_":l dOT.""..1.:1d:J of th o ..ViQt:-':'~J:~-_ ~80 ~rt " :"\f- ' .... " ' l CO " Q':t. ~Jo')~ '-',J.!.J '\"l)"t- ; : , . ' , . ' .'-.!. -:~J n~' u;..J f l'J ;. <'b .... ~- ........ T""I","\- "~ l'O'l ' '~' '~ v .. . . '~!.. ' 0. _.J ~ <J i (~ b ';Jj ') -\...-~.-:~ :..~~lO I) ~~ ~!_ 'y ;llJ. }: _;.;r~"": P. frti l' C!18.:::c;a -'co ouc:caod i:"l n:.ls pJ.O. ~l . ~o " s :)J.., ~ r ~;..;..;.;.: -::,h~ ~~ ~,):"t-C0; ~c~~n:.1 i::;,:; ':llOT::~.~O . o;~ "c'ho r os iS"C:1:le~J j:l'O:;. "c~ :) \l~.~r'(, l'~ I iJlbo . i:. -1 0y::..1 t~.:rl.d Ii b:J~"I[,.l B:~.::~i:-.'..:ic by' t'8-;':; ~1 sidDC dU~" :.1. ~lg -(.jl~) crj,tic J. :t p~::5.od of Cl1:!. :'tf;~J O-:lGr' f~o r~ !Tr ::;::~ch to \li o..t~1~rl ad:r:li-:":list:t~\-lii.o:l 'I;rill bJ . . n vj:c !l l .fc,c.;::;o7" i~l . ?(;t or;;rill i~i.g thu c}~a:~1(;3f) of sucC :;GS 0
L + ne.. -;,...lO ;_'J_ .. , _ .~ST, ..~ :? n
:;
rG=l.so . !:\.b l ~; 1:.,:..:-;:"!~
';:::..,,"Il "~ (
..... """
;.l t_ . ;. V
...
1"'-"" ;")
.!:.l. t .
'. This
rai:Jo3 t!l'J qtl ~t;T.. :LO::;"
of
-eri0 8.--c-titt~.d ~J
or th.c U::'t j.-t cc,1
!)t:J.'CC3
C- O VOL'\J.l,~;1"t "co':~\rQ:J the plxb It h.J. ID b C)"):l j.::'1 t 5. Y:'c!). J d to t hr; F:r c~c;.l co ~ . t!ln.t Vif10;"!. a}1. s.G~"O :)::7~'1:: t 't,'.4:"1.5 !,'J~ c11c c1 'i~l I ndo cr-!i=.r. . "(.-h i ch .c..?pu8.T'8cl . mcc"V ';11.6 nininill.l d C:'W.!lclsof' 'C!lO Vic;t:~an 118. r:,io:'l..'.J. li 8t;:) n:).d"to h'.J.VJ ::: r o:\~or::t bI r) . cli !;~\ c o of 6UCCCJ'3di:tJ.G,~ ;'[8 -rfould bJ p .r cpo.:rod -Co i:2dic ),t~)
to
off i C',in..Lly ou~' t\pp:~o-.,"':.\l (c~d sup~)orts 3.nQ t o CO:1<j id ,:;}' di~'cC'0 c.1J.oc:'.~ t ic~ of Earshc. ll Pla~ funds to ! ~dochin~ nud p e rh'.J.p~ other cco no~io
. ' J
.0. 1 00 .
It i f; b0lic'!c c\
t~lat
t~i~
poli cy ::J!lQ'..ilc1 1:; i np 1 8ncntcd
[~'C
th 'J
c~rll~.Jc"'c put!sib.l o VtO: .~~J:lt. O.1"t0r

c.....
J
I.. .. _ _ _ ~
trlc
... . _ .......
CBSC:lt;io,l
cO~l d i Gio~".8 }::'0~1~io:19'd

'-
5 tho p~'c7 i01. ;:1 p:u'c'. ,p 'n.phs h~"J0 b~C~l ;;,Ij 't;o Jbt~ir~~ l.i.y i f BJ.o D ,l:~ f~ il a .n "i"c' (;}. Olll' u ; :"~.)Ol~ t. --- . 1:: .~'Cll~~'i nO l1~, , ,~,,::t th n p,- .);:;r ; 0 O . Or ' t}:!) iJ::~i._ t G fj, ., '""U . '-1 :;8 IO ... _ ..... Stat; c3 Buffors ,i . seriou s blo,-ro 0:0.. .th o o'Ghc:;~ h :t.:1d. 9 t in'] l nc"k OU~.' SUP:?Ol't; would. b o a n. C3, vj no.:" di C-:'lP ';,-hi eli ;;'.igh"c ', "iOlJ. eli>.nll",t; 'J a~~y C?l['.;l CO of SUCCJ8 ;J 0 Tho D.ltcr~'l:).ti V(':o to th o J> ,o Ib i . sohrt:i.o:l D.y"G WG '; ~lu:d co~+l'" col o ,')~ " l "" 1 "L> " ,(,C 0 '''' F'AC"'ich_ 'Ti:'.'ClG."",,;"\ l J . v ....1. ...... 0 ou"':~H:: v_l. ' .1 '" . _ ... .1 / .... ,_u _ _ 1.-, .' -"-' O l' )-}, O'" CO -_ .-- Po. C o:.L,ltr:.~ i[) t~ co~ltrol1 -c:d gO~l(tr;-!.:::';;t.t i ~l 0..' ~rv r;t -G Gg ic n:t():t. of: Sou"'C!1 '~:[\D'0 J.\fJi c.. O) ~L~itilor of t};.-j S '.) -rrou.ld f'lPPCC.:r to CD . cO ou.:c i :1:t C!os1;?
... .... , _ .... .1
~
".1-
of
0\"#
~I
.l. ....
) ~I....J,
J. (.I" ...
_\
"
.:
. . ..
SI-
. . _c,..." ,- . '" .
t...
~
t..--
"
\ L.u l ~~ , S'1' . r 1, ,.. 1g0.
i. (
'I' li_l
; .:
.,
.
S IF.:
.
'. '
.')
':.-- '
-f.:
; ,..
I }1::1VC tL e honor to r cf:':;.r to t.h0 ;)r:'jY.l't''1<.JJ!t;: s circulccr tch;Grc,:;~ of t..1~::u:!.~-:l 12, 1 9~ 9: 3 ; 00 c'..o;;1q,::.r:d to -t/r:~ . rlG':l2.~~ 11 C!~(;"J:titl1 fi'/8 copics of th e; J '1C;;~:o:f[\,)lc.: u!:l pr-::r:c:rcd oji th:i.s office fo:' t:1G j!c)'I'j Delhi Hcgio:1C.l
For eign Service Conforence. Copi es t ereste d posts cs i ns tru cted. Refip actful ly yours ,
~~ve ~c8n fon1~rded
to other in-
Ge oreo
A~cric~~
r:.
Abb C?tt
Consul General
Enclosure:
liCT~lO r::l.: ;dul~l 0:,
FC'.i
I;-,do chi :::::. for Dc:lhi f ore iGn Sen'ice Conference, dtd Fcb. 12, 1~4~
,
Ori Gi!l~l :\ nc~
onlid to
r: o i.x. ~rti:!en:t
Copies t o :
l~n:c:r:1~~.ss :,~, R~\nGoon
./1,..'11C:nCC.ssy, Co. il'O

}1..r.1C 8bn.s::; y, 1 ';c';;
Delhi
l' bn i 1.:1. E:-J. r.C ~,,: c 1: . j~~",c rico.. Y: Con 3nle, to G, :;noro. l, Col onna lu~crlC~~ C o~s~ l~ tc G:r:1::J ro. 1 , :Sor.-.c<:\y : Am'3rico.::. CCJ1su l c.. ~o Ge:ncrCl 1, C:-:lcutto. ( 2)
J\ r.o; 'ic ::;. ~1 C 0:1 s1.:~1:1.tc l~rlc r'i C~ n CO!lS l~.l ,.. ,.
A!c.c r.','!X::s::; y, l~I1~cn~bc.. s s y J ./l.r:l~:;":C.~c. s sy. li:-n~~~b~ s S ~t,
Tclir,:l.n. '
K~ l'~"'~ c~i
i:. fl'lcr i C~11 k ::sd. c~\n J~<>;::or i c:: 1!
. to Gcr..or[';.l , va. t;D.. \C1o.. CO;lsul8. to Gcnerc..l, LC'.hGr.) Cor:s') 1:;.. to ~ :;ncrc.. l; Si ~tt;[1j ...J orG CO!l s:)lr:. t c Caner;:.l , C;::-. 1lton
"'")'
G.():-!t):r~l s ! .~':'..d TnR
,.
__ ~ '~<''',~.. .Y
r: (')
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 , By: NWD Date: 2011
\.!
Ef'I')l:'T S \.J!\ t. .
.,
SRiE;on , Inr.i.ochir;'J., F'e"lJn.lhry 12', 1949.
SECTI01~
1.
}?OLl"l'IC;\L SITUA1'j OI !
A.
In~:3ri''.l. l
? oLtic!ll SituCl.tion in the Vietnam
f 01'
-1"rl0C;;-~::-~---;':r.-:::-,,--r~ s- "-':11-'- .... ... t . . : . ~ ~!.:.~ , ! . . ....1 ..... . a L.. _ -.'
'\' 'J.. ,... .... ~,,-.., } " ....... l.n ... .:. . I ..
("A
"r'e .1. .... ~.t--4c.:._ .'-"J~ ... C :11y s: TT'1' 1'"' r .Lo th 028 '''"r.,.1'1'n< >lT j . . . .J.!:1 _c:.;. l>
in
othc:r ~'id'-:;S of' ,:;:;in :' ~l t::nt tl!;:;y stc:;; fro!" [, ?o'::8rf 1_l1 upo:u2'l~;o of is m. 7[:0 \jiotr:~l.::1 !::tn:J.ds ou:~ f~o!r: ot~'Jr r.6i..0~ls i:1 th:J.t COl:Ln'J.?1::.sT71 h~,,3 Gai!lscl ccutrol of '::;he lb.tiod[, list r~o-v~1r,8nt 8.~d crcD.c3d n. sj.tuo.tioYl ''-lhich is 8. cl:J.ss ic cX:::.!7:::,lc uf '~;! e ::~UCr.8S2-':-UJ.. uppl~ (;~~tivn 01 CO:-:--!:--!lun ist strC'.te~~y i E a co10)15.:11 :-1,' (;" J\. SI<1::,-11 >ioo.co':: o'YlC! ChiuC)s() f;l'8. ).lled group hsts s(;izcd l endcrshiI> [lnd CCIyC,j 0 ). of -~ ~:' 0 stronG a;~d a:'h;ost u Lj ,'vc rsu11y supported i I:dcf,c;ldc:!C0 1~;070 !:1 :: 1rt" ~ h o cO~An"!:'::j- ;-"as bC)~l ~('Jpt j.71 c.. S~:;Cl.tc of strife end
. CO:1fus j. OIl fo:, tLrrJ:J jrC8.rs.
OnJ h:.l!!.d::;cG. tL,JU.38.~.1d
F'T2TlC }1
tr:JGPs o.re pin~cd
d o';rn i!1 I:-'J.do cll i!'Ul [ .. ~(l ~~O~ s. -I.~o. -;. lr::. b lc :l ~l :~~1J rCI)C ~ T~o 8. r eno i 3 C. S C ~ i O~}S drair:. on Frc~ !:1C0f s r c~our c cs i!1s-t~.3at~ of Cl sO'.:rcc o f i,",:-":-3l~h end ra-l", r;::.z.tc . . . rl 'J. l s foY' F'rar:GG ~':'ll d t}-;.) \":or ld. cI:unc c th::tt -che out nnd ~h(; first COI7'ru:JLst ou.tposc in SoUtfWC',st Fr:::nGh r:_'ly be dri vcr:: Asia cst~b1ishcd.
Tt.c rr onch J, ,\ \- O ;x:b.tadly co;~':C; -co 0. pJ.~'cinl P!!Q';rsten,lin G of the sit untio!1 -.... ith -;kic;~ '~h0J ':'..:rc :L'G '2c r3. u:\d ['.1'0 c'16c::,.':or~.ng to crc;o.t 0. :'..on C O~illI1U~1i st o.J.tO~lO:;.')US SC7or:1r.lc:!t un-:lcr the lC:J.c~!]rs}:ip of forr:~'3 r Sii:pcror Bo.o D..\l. Tho~r h c I) o to rct~~irl t:-gJ i/ir;t~l f\. r:l 't',-ithin th'J r.a-oulous French Un ion [~nd !".o.intc, i n F'rcnc;1 r:l.~li::[,r~r cur] ;co:,cr.:~_c :)osi-ciO!ls<
2. D(,_C'~i,,;rc~;n-:l - '.::'0 und(;rst o. ~1G. ho',", Jchc i'rcsont si.tunticn r_rOGO ~. bri of :rc\'ic:~.7--;f--0\e hi s '~ ory oT' the co1 0!l:;- is n Cc. cE:S:1ry. I r..dochir::o. co.mc unrlcr:2uron .;:J, !l dO::l:i.n~tion oor.::;idcl'c.b1y l~tcl' tLc.n In(.~oncsiD.., :::ncio., or the PhiL,l-lpincs, the FrL)!,C;l fi rst occupyil1C p::.rt of CochinchiYjQ. in 1 851. Th,; nrc.'l (f this c o 1 o~:y ,":1S cx?o.nded . .;bi.lc protcGto:-o.tJS ':181'0 cstc.o1ishcd over th,J n:;:"c.inins parts of th r; :)(m:i.n~ulo. 0.urir.f,S SU~)scqUCl1t yours. Tile [,dminisvl'c_'.:.icn t::;!""r':':]d to bcco:n::: more cC:ltn~li;;cd o.:ld O\Tcnt\.l~lly cvolv.3d , .t 1 . J' . r ;) t . " "l.. , J.. i nto e. tig,ht.LY }~nl' TlO~lC1CC, 1 an 1 eCOnOJ:llC .I.C\..o.c::nlO1": l!~ '. 'l:J.C): tl- -:3 rlgr.l.oS ~ _' n!1d nov:C!rs ')f .l~n0 E~::!(.:;ror of _\.r'~-:G.TIl " Ki:!G of C~\;;-~boc.ia ~ nr_d Pririccs of l,:~os ho.d ;~ -r_ c~,;ic:. ll.J- diG:.1;:Jpc~\lc;J. T}-' . ;rc \';~U3 little [\utO;L02Y or self g01l0I'?"lm.:;nt :,;v'on ~'C t~G loc,:~J. Ie'vel nr:d l.ittlc p!.['.cc fo~-' n ,"~-ci":.TtJs ir: tho) a::b,~i:listrntion c:ZCC);,Jt in winoI' cr cssci1tic;lly hon:~l'C\l'y ~os-;;s.
r
L '
Trt l')' Fr,:;r~c~'1 u:rQ jus-+~l~l pre.u.c of t}~o t~~sl( "I,'fL1:'cl: tl'cy '1ccol:-i';.:lis1l.GG. . n b Ul 1" ' c!'l~g ro~ '_t...:..) rl1,1 l"'i'~"A:'<"") , Q'--- \.... 1 o~1 ).'0 ....,or'" , C O-\T"'Y'-!-;n'- '1",..1. ' s-' :...!:~.: ,,~ d.~ '-. r; ->--0 ''~ ')C I ..... -.. :...~ ..... '- ... ,. 't .... . ~J " 1t" . . ' J~ ,.t v.!. v_ .... b
.,1.,.
of tho
.L' ~ l..o:l ~
Coc~~~cl.in oso d c:t~s

,",Y"':
into J'ice
l ~nds ,
~nd
dC7cloping the mi:10r21

r -"
A ... .... _
of l O!:!::':i.!1 . Thc~l c.] GC r..~_do co;-:sicjr-::;.blc prof;:cs,,:; i:1 jT:1pl~,:::.ti~~ b ,..,. "\ - .. '-'r ' (.' ( ."':"'Ii1..,,: L__ .....(') , ..... ... r Y' I.; ~1 I:! ,n 1 [L. . .~. =::'.:1,.-... t~l C <..... "" .:. ~l 0.- , 1 'C''''0 "'J l ..... '~-;,..i V,.i!' .. 00 ...:. v rn t +.1.t.., c>'r~1..1 L\ V! \~. ~~ b.l. '"' .t nrc; ~. ()o_:.t t . ,:o T:~illj,)?1 Y"l:'.ti'.:'"t; C0_t~:CJliGt; i~ t!:. :-,: \i"i(;t!l~~:: , rl o~~rly l C':~ of t}~ -,J r"D,lr ~- '; r'n ') ~ i:; :-i.r J\- ~ 11 (;cl1~C~11:.(:C. ;:.~: ~~~:-:_:J0C s-;)'~ui: SC::lO ?rQ~1c~r:. _./ .L u. -.r :"JS'.JUY'8.:::J
oJ '..-\
..L
C,.... - , ...
.A.
.......
.L
oJ ..... \..
?!11") o~r.:::.i)~s. -!:;ir..i:--~ [~~~d p,:,.cif':'c~~t}.O ll of t+Ile cou:1tr~" ";::J.S :'"lot [~ccr:)r; ..... p 1 i 5h~.d ":i .!.:j-:O l t .,:u!~0r0~.J.S rC:1;')lt~.:; \":~'1iC}l ;;-e:rc. Pl:t c.o-;,;!~ ":.-ith grc.n.t sC-,~':'l""' :~_ty. .. Tho 1!~~JC':C;11"'~ li~t :;1.:)\-r;j.C::'lt , hcv,rc: ~,::,;r , ~:,-C'",3 L ~ ,.rl..r (; ol~1 :;1()t;ely S:1I)].)}'oSGf]d CtE:l
. S1:'Qr; ,'(
l_
i'ts9
developed particularly rapidly in the pel"iod bet,veen the ti-ro vJOrld '.'rars. The Conlllmnists early became influential therein although never nwnerous. The Trotzkyist factioll Has strong and at one time controlled the Indochinese COlllllmnist party . The shattel'ing defeat of France by Gerw.any and the immediately follo,.ring Japanese occupation of Indochina dealt a severe blo,v to French prestige vrith the natives , vrhile the early Japan.::;se victol'ies in the Pacific eA"tended this loss of face to all vThi tes . Even though the Annamese hat ed the Japs, five y ears of anti-Ivestern propaganda l eft per manent effects on the winds of the people , ' In the final months of tbe vrar 1IThen defeat liTaS inevitable , Japanese leaders in Indochina deliberately created a situation vrhich would make the return of the French difficult by setting up a native govermnent and alloi,r lng arms to get into native hand s. The allies had contributed to this situation by parachuting arms and supplies to the native underground fightinS the Japanese. As in most occupied couJltries both in Asia 8.nd Europe, the Conrrnunists Here one of the most active and b est organized elements in this underground . Some months before the Japanese surrender Ho Chi MIl\lH returned secretly to Indochina. He has had a long and proltlinent history as an Annamite revolutionary and a Comintern agent under a vari ety of aliases. For the Conrrnunists there vras no question of his lead ership ; to others he vras kno"iVil as a lift long fi ghter for independence vTho had returned from exile to lead his people. He had around him a small group of able Communists trained as he was in Mosco,v, or v eterans of the Chinese Communist movement. Following the then current popular front tactics, Ho organized a coalition of political parti es ImOi'7Tl as the Viet Minh League and set up a government in Ivhich Communist control was at first concealed. Thus when after some delay the Chinese arrived in Tonkin and the British in Saj.gon to disarm the "Ta.panese tr oops , they found a native goverrunent established and in controL A more detailed account of events from this point on I,rill b e found in th e annex to tbis memorandem,
3. French Colonial ~olicy, Past and Present - l\111ile not allvays clear or consistent, French colonial policy before the war Has generally one of assimilation. In its highest and simplest form, this viaS based on a complete absence of color or race prejudice and a belief that the mission of France loJas not to prepare her subject peoples for ind ependence, but to convert them to French civilization, culture, and religion and prepare them to become French citizens and their bomelands to become integral parts of France. (l-1artinique and Guadaloupe viere examples of the cOnYplete application of this policy .)
~r:his policy bad been questioned even before the ,rar and in 1943 General de Gaulle held a conference of colonial exper:t;s at Brazzaville to consider postl,rar colonial problems. At this conference Has bOTn the id ea of the Fl"ench Union \Thich Has to be a centralized colonial federa tio n Hith varying degrees of local autonomy but IIi th essential control remaining in Pari s .
160
When France vTaS liberated and the drafting of a neli constitution was taken up, colonial policy played an important but confusing parto F evT of the deputies to the bro constituent assemblies kl1e~'T much about c olonial matters I,rhile the fevr " expeJ.'ts " Here sha:cply divided . It must be remembered that the average Frenchman believes \'That he Has taught in school - that France is the only colonial pOi-reI' that really understands t he natives , that the latter are universally grateful for the benefits of French civilization and that any discontent is the vlork of a small mi nor i ty of professional agitators . .
(
Those \Tho reali zed that the era of colonialism was past and that France must make fundamental changes i n h er policy if she i'lere not to l ost her el1'l]Jire could make little i mpression on the general apathy and i gnorance. Even the Communists were hesitant about going too far against p ublic opinion by advocating i ndependence for the colonies, and I'rere probably also doubtful about the ,'Tisdom of breo.king up an empire "Thich t hey expected shortly to control. The result of all these factors vTaS a constitution \'Thich ,Tas extremely vague , confused, and conflict i ng on colonial matters. It provides for three classes of overseas territories - ( a ) the overseas d epartments which arE" an i ntegral part of France , (b ) the overseas t erritories which have limited local autonomy , and ( c ) the Associated states. The latter category Has created to take care of Morocco, Tunis , and the states of I ndochina. No details vTere given as to their positi on in the Union except that i t should be determined an "Act" or a greement with each Associated state . The overseas territor i es (and , of course , the overseas depart ments ) are represented i n the Assembly and even more heavily i n tbe Consei 1 de la Republique, the upper branch of the French Parliament. I n addition , t here i s an Assembly of the French Union composed of half c olonia l and ha l f metropolitan members ';-'1hi ch , hOlrever , has only consultative povrers . Final ly there is to be a Council of the French Union composed of a representative of each Associated state , t he President of France , and certain cabinet members .
It was expected that t he Vietnam ,-iOul d be the first Associated State and that the agl'eement "ri th it ,-Tou1d establish pl'ecedents for t he entry of MoroccO and Tunis. Unfortunately by the time the constit ut i on 'liaS adopted and in operation, the situation had already gotten out of hand in Indochj.na . Ho Chi l'-'linb vTaS not ,-Tilling to accept the extremely 1 im:L ted autho:ci ty vlhi ch the French i nsistence on control of defense, foreign aflo.irs , and economic policy would leave him , and i ncited b y the i nept policy of Admiral d ' ARGENLIEU and his subordinates , he made a surprise attack on December 19 , 19~6 , vlhich almost succeeded in overrunning the French forces in Tonkin and ]umam and r esulted in the murder of many innocent F-.cench civilians .
This attack strengthened the in..:fJuence of the conservative and r eaction ry circles in France and Indochina and vT8.s follmTed by a desperate attc:rr;:pt to pacify the country by military means . Hbile the c ontrol of most of the cities I'TaS 1'.'egained , the countryside remained i n the hands. of Eo ' s forces and open fighting gradually shifted to b itter
161
bitter 8nd
o~ i.~~y
dc::;';;n;.et:iv\~
[~ncl
rtu:;n''':'lJr, '::r:rf:'.:'c:o
~)~~l~.r:c ,jG. h:,~ ~-.}J.J si~c-:
0tlJr{t I
i!J. r;.r~~s
cql.J.~p~~O!lt .\(~S
of the count.ry,
GT e .~ ~ ... bul:~
t Ile ciiffj t:.1tl ty of tho ?::p\.;L:.tio~l.

j:'h~
t~lC t:;~cr:~.j.n.;
f:~Ed -:: }:c
hcs--cj)
~.-:~:t
of t..F10
of
' if poss::'b1c, v:cJU1 : :1,
p::t~ifico.-:io~l o~ the cou'--rl;ry by~ f0rcc:, O'7cn L .Ji".g f'l1'lcc;s~]:! p,C;:::C2:'~ ) z\:1d f8 ->.l' t!-lftt Y':or~d p:_tl)lil~ ('pi~-ti~2i !:liGh~ for co LJi~C or ..(':..:--:!c:riC(~!L ~_:,:.tcrl/c:r.tiG!l caused t.he Fr ;;! ~lC }-t vO~Jor:1!::c=--.!.t to shift po] ic~- in. t:~c sprir-,-g of 19~: 6 r.:1d rCi)1f\.c8 l~dr;~i r ::!. l c.: 1 J. r;cr!lic1J b~,:, ~.'~ ci \.ri~_i:;.ll, r.~c r=r:.5.. lc :3ClLl1S::T, as i1ig}1. CO~l"'" ~nissi()~-!.r.~ r4 lI ~:- '. 1:.."'\_:3 scn~:. to S ~ i;on -:.rit~J. r.') precise irlstr11ct ioY'. 3 but " [1+-'1 th ; .11 ') 10 0 t\" . t 1'0 ~"lU ' ci "" ,;. ... ~h "~r~..,~"'!1t WlLll U ~"enc> ....__ .. <'o .IV ~.l. _ _ v_ l .................... .... -.... b ... \. . . ..( . . v.! v '- :Jr1 uv cJ th' n v :)C
rc::.li~. ::.i:j. o!"'.. t}1~\t
;:~
J. . ...
..
v~;
. I...A
J.
I:) judCin C 1~}-. c ~:ltu:;,tio:1 on l\pl'il 1, 19 / "\':r..::::n he [',rr::"JC:c. ir~ I nGocLi:1[', c.o'/cloP:"]';:lts i:1 tho ~'rO~~0r. , :. nr1 incoLi.J.t::"c:n.c.l politicc.l situo.tion s:i~c0 194 5 l:,ust be ::c:pt i:c r"ir.d. li,e no"t i mp""J!'t':Glt ','rc..s unGcnl.bt c r]l;/ tho Gr0~:ti:-~g split 'bot-::.rcc~ t~1C ~'io~;~Gr:! l,):""-;'iC::-'S C!.jlG }Ioscc':,;'o ~\l1cn til e: Fr~n~h :irst r~('.c c ~)tcd -::0 {!cg () i~i :-J.t0 -~'rit~ :10 C}li ' J..liYlh, his COT~C1Ul1i~t b~'"c~(grC,t}~1C: ".',rCl.~ of Z:li~lor ir:~po~'"'t :':~i'.cec Fro.:'lce ~:o..s a~ [\.~l~i of Russio., :mcl the Fronc~l C')l;:r""mists vrcrb ~~!l in::ol,J..; ~.1.n-c element in the coc...liti0r. t;o . ..7ornr~ont it:. ~~.ris() 1;1 iJlO ~(r; [~r -ch~:/.:, ~ ~:.SS Cc.l. 8cforc; B011~crt ~.rr:i ".'ccl on tjlC seer1':;, tho ir:J.~c r T~tion.". l crisis h~1.d b3CO::18 clc'J.r, thG C0i!!l7:1.~rJist-s ~.VQT'O 1"!O loncer i~n th:J F~"'onc}1 [;o\'Jrn~~H;l:t.~ ["nel tl1c f.~ct tilJ.t tl:o 'li c t ~'.~i!1h '.\-~S C GI~~_\..t~i~t CO~1 '~:!"I:):] c.l" b(!r~\.:ac: o.Y1 i:nport D .nt ;?c>litico..l
f~lct 0 r.
,'1,
...--'
Eis d cci:-;io:-: t"

~"" '.',) "1,..;'T' (; .'..I.. .. ~
"'-J
er(;c:.~o Cl.
'/:"J
no"!
.
l.'
?"li~ic".l
0' . . ( .... \.;..:..
:orr;e
.....
Qrc~):1cl
,~
t1;::; cx..!.. .-
:~"C' .!.. .:.. ~.,
""J"-. l ./-
tr.is ['-1',::; To.nd ur;l . As it fiID~ly t')ci: for:l, y,};":'<t is c o::-:r,oT: ly co.Jlccl 1;!'.e :Sollo.ertBo,o D:-d. s')lut i Cl r:::. y OD ':>U T:'.:,:n. ri z.ed 0.. s f 'J 11 o'.'iS :
0.. It \':0:"2 n '~~ccss:,-Y'y to roc'"'-ptq1'o f:")1'l ~~hc Conrllun ists contrc 1 cf the VLtn,:-:, l'o.ti:)n"li st ; :1ovc)Tle~!ts.
lc~.'ec.
['nd th e 1 (",("" 4. )....,, 'tn." C"" 11""'"S"" " ~~,."",L ~,,Lic'"\< '''11' -; A~ f'ol_ ....... c. 't.."-' "' ............ . ....... J . _ ........ .1.1. rk:3C,'i2-:,C. :::'n co>:,:; clet:").::'l :."!'l. 'che [,,!1il0X to t;'lis ;-:lC""J"
b. To do t~is it ~u~ necessary to ~roup togother untiCoyu,;unist i'o1'sos ['.r')uwl S,)GO p c litic[',l fii,';ure v:ith no,tioTlc'l . D"c",J-igo ~ ' l(l i.",fluo'lGC " DC1.0 D[~i ',"ClS sclc;c'eed. - "\iith C(;Yl.sj.dcl'..1..* _ u"blc rcll.':c c~.EcC'- ~i r!c'3 it 'X~t.8 fc-lt th::-'.t tr8.ditionC'..11"'l.cr..c'trc~lis!71 :.I.;;:~. S s~ i 11 C:. f\'):r'cc r""..;.I::'::r:.:-; the p::o!:) J.o, ( n:l..:l ~8 cc:.us C . i -;:, v:"::. S fa 1 +!:: tho. -t Li s :~G?1ch CCU8f .. tic);1 ["Dd tr:c fC'. ct tho. t 11is vrife i s ;. :. GO-v'o:;t C8.t~01iG ~.:.~~ul(: rl.~.l-:o !:j."-:-l c:. ;-aorc re C:.son:).b l~:) p8rso:l to dGf'.l 1:,r it::)
_ oJ. ...... '--, . .. .1..I..
C.
_!...~~ Qbrcc;r"\Q~1.l,
-:r()ulfl.. be
~l r--;otiC\. tcd.
\',i 1;h
:8::'0
Lo.:l
grc..!l~ in;
the
Tilinir.~u.r:l ~T8. tic!~;tl~_ st clc:~.e~nc~s.

0.
Jao D~i ~0u11 l' 2turn to }~( ~~d ~Gt up

b~ ~
0. ~OV0rIT~2n~
O;fl".ich
i~-:G !~o
-::~'uld
pole; 0f
'1tt~::tC~~iO~1
t. 'J
t~C)sJ
cl (' : ~8n ~:s
~u;')~' 0 rt
Chi
~'.;i~.h '::! 'fi:-~~h O.:cr .") rl:~-t
CO:7--::.ur.1.sts cr sr:pr;.tLiz ::; rs .

( P J. 'J LI ...... 1_' l'r " ~"~'"'
"
i3:J.o
D~ i n} '
110
~i.ff icu1t.
Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
( probably 80'% of the total) and vrhich 'H ere becoming increasingly fed up ,vi th the totalitarian methods and discipline of the Com.munist leaders of the Viet lv'ri.nh and discouraged by months of hardship in the jungle. e. Gradually Bae Dai ' s strength '\vould increase and Ho ' s decline until the latter vTOuld either have to surrender, flee the country, or become a m:Lnor guerrilla leader . It is obvious that the success of such a plan required granting sufficient authority and concessions to Bao Dai to enable him to est ablish a stable government in at least a restricted area and to convince native l eaders that their essential demands had been met and that there 'was no longer any reason for continuing to fight. In this Bollaert failed, largely b ecause of the poli ti.cal situation in France. The various "Third Force" goverrunents ITere not only VTeak but sharply divided on colonial pol:icy. They '\'i'ere particularly anxious not to give armnunition to the gro\'Ting strengtb of de Gaulle ' s forces, ahmys r eady to exploit the average Frenchman ' s o1.J.t-of-date viei-Ts on colonial matters. Thus Bollaert vms not even able to persuade the Government to request Assembly ratification of the extremely vague Baie d ' Along Protocol of June 5, 1948. This fact ',TaS largely responsible for Bao Dai's decision not to return to Indochina '\'i'hich made further stops in t he implementation of the plan impossible, even though a Provisional Central Government had been set up under General XUA.l\f, former President of the Cochinchina Provisional Government. Bollaert gave up in disgust and vras replaced by M. Leon PIGHON, a young career colonial officer ,vi th much experience in Indochina.
4. P'f'esent Situation - M. Pignon, being a civil servant rather than a politician brought a fresh viev~oint to the situation, and appears to have made considerable progress to,rards a solution in his short period of office.
He has adopt ed the policy of his predecessor but has been successful in having it accepted as that of the French Government rather than as a personal poli.cy of the High Commissioner. In this he vras aided by a number of factors, the most i mportant , of course, being recent developments in China. Even the most die-hard French political l eader can realize that "Ti th the arrival of Chines e Commun:i. st forces on the Ton.kin frontier \'Thich I'Tould assist or perhaps even j oin 'Ivith Ho Chi Minh , the pTecarious French lililitary position "rould become iIllpos sible . Moreover, a growing n1.JInber of prominent Frenchmen in and out of the Govermnent has in recent months advocated liberal concessions to Vietnam Nationalism. Even the Indochina res olution of the RPF (Gaulli st ) Congress last fall vTaS surprisingly moderate, (althougb General de Gaulle himself has been less liberal). Pignon reopened negotiations Hith Bao Dai in November and continued them in January after bis return from a brief turn in Indochina. Little definite is knmm as to the exact status of these n egotiat j.ons, but .p:.uarently concessions have been made on both sides. Bao Dai bas agreed to return to Indocbina if the F:cencb l\.ssel'lbly ratifies tbe Baie d ' Along Agreement and cbanges the status of Cochinchina
Cochinchina from a French colony to 2. part of the Associated State of Vietnam. A debate on these points is expected early in ~:arch. Bao Dai also vTishes the prompt signing and ratification of a treaty covering the subjects reserved under the Baie d 1 Along Y.cotocol, but it s e ems doubtful if this can be accomplished in the time available before his return . Disagreement still continues on certain points, the most important apparently being over separate diplomatic representation for the ne"\'T st.ate . The French are believed to have offered consulates in neighboring countries and Vietnam officers in certain French missions. Opinions differ considerably as to the chances of the French Government t o obtain the necessary parliamentary action. Undoubtedly opposition Hill be violent from both the extreme right and left vrings iibile the Socialist Party \-Till be seriously split. Ho,.Jevel' , specull ation at this t:.lme is pointless since the matter ,rill presumably be settled by the time the conference opens at Nel'! Dell1i. A more pertinent question is - assuming Bao Dai retuTns - "';-!hat chanc es has he to establish a stable government, split avray the nonCormnunist followers of Ho Chi Minh, and eventually pacify the country? It is believed that the most important factor "lvill be the nature of the French agreement "liith Bao Dai and the meaning \rhich it gives to llindependence \'Tithin ' 'the French Union. 11 If this independence is a sham with most real authority remaininein French hands, then Communist propaganda proclaiming him a puppet and a traitor will be vindicated. A second factor is the manner i n vThich the rel.urn is staged and the agreement is implerllented. Because of the delay, inaction, and disunity on the part of the French in recent months, the Vietnam leaders and people have become cynical and distrustful. The popular enthusiasm "ivhich might have been aroused by the return of Bao Dai last June can no longer be expected. Furthermore, the French civilian population i n Indochina 'V'Till be sullenly hostile to any ne,i regime 'while fevT officials can be counted on to offer real cooperation in the difficult transition perido . The result of th e r.cench local elections in March vrill also be a factor since :L f they forecast a return of de Gaulle, doubt 'iill b e cast on the permanence of the agreement with Bao Dai. Finally much i'iill deJ)end on Bao Dai 1 s ability to resolve the rivalry and intrigue bet'ween Vietnam leaders and the regional j ealo1.,lSy and suspicion bctvTeen the three provinces vrhich are to form the Vietnam state. The 'l'onkinese are poor but energetic, intelligent and aggressive, the Annamese poor but cultured and proud, \'Thile the Cochinchinese feel that the other provinces are i nterested mainly in sharing the ,realth of their region. Opposition to the French and Chinese is about the only thing that the leaders of the three provinces see eye to eye on. Cochin chinese se-paratism has been encouraged and supported by French business interests ~nd less openly by many French officials.
B.
Internal Situation in Cambodia and 1.aos
The people of CaElbodia and Laos differ in race, religion, and temperament from the Vietnames e , and the problem of their relation vri th France is less difficult and acute. Cambodia has good reason to feai~ the aggression
164
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16 . By: NWD Date: 2011
L}:.!.... . c..6:;r(3Sl0~~ G r. ' " v l

}1'-'~ ~
2..
b 0,,:11. ('l ~n I ~1 .L l"-~ ,\,.,~'L, '11", J\, ' .~_.LL, . 1..... ~_, -,_,..
II
u!
SEC PEl
.11,.-.,*\
l,oj
'r' ~_. J':"'.
-Ior "" ._~:;
,-".~...., ~1 l .r:.~,,,; _: .. ~vQ.:.['tvl; T'~-tf'~ ' " .1._ ._ ~ : ....... ~'
litcri.'..l ~;J:".!1inbC. Fo:10,.-j":~~.:; t1-t 0 ~1.1r:a:'pP-J.::r (If i-~18 J~lrn_1r:E:.j ~ 1:~')C>J..fj s:"f;r':.cd i!~ 1~ 1]6 ":::i""v!; -t.~:l'3 ~r,;~.-~-: ;l ,::;!"'};:.\;j~:s J.o':"C'..2. 8~J.}:()1lc:::.~r: - --.-- ..'. .+~~:-;(, r"' ..........)l-Qi;o. r ,Y'l/ ' lJ ....... .., l.rr~r'l\~. V ... V J. lr';- ~ ~.:>. oc-\,...:~('~ SJ~.!..,.t'" -'-_1 ';"'hn . v J1..,..~ ~ I v f' h.U _Cl~'.. . . ~""") ..... , :) _ ~ .. ~ ~J,' ........... v ...... ...... L F~0ncll 1J:~ion, n:ld rl.;C c lltl~l l.,!-:O . f:~21d r::PQn~l o""1c,~:1l of CJ.~-tlcoclifl iIl th o F\rc~ch l]nion -:/?.1S pl'oc2.c.i? :~odQ ~hC) rl cL~',)"t~. ;J.t:'Oll~ f;Jl' ['.~'~ ::'.Cl-0c:r.'Jl1t or tr8.s.ty to cotcr!:linc tho :-;.c~!linG of tJ10SC tc~r!i:~ 1"1[~S 1JC C-:: '1 d::JJo.:,. . cc.. F:l~~.l th'.) 11i Gt~1Cl.;-:-1 problC::1 is scttlClG, -;{ith thn 1r-:;1;c11 pr';I~,i;,;i:1G t~1<:'..t C8.;'i:)Cd.io. v.'ould 1'0c eiv~ nt lo~st the s~~a c0nc~s s io~s.
~~i"'';G~:di ....::::'..s
u,":.l,-- r,f"\":"
...
1..... ......)
l,-'
C ~: nbodin has 0. norr lib or~ l c cns t1tutioh and h~s ~Dde so~o prog r ess i !1 ndcpt:rl.r; the . f C' r~:1:: . 0 : c1cTI10Sr[~-;y c F:"Gnch offici~ls nrc ~ o. 't cn.llod nc:visors t ,::: their C~, :nh:::c. i ~~n co~u-Ge:,.~po.~,ts [\1c-:l e:-:or 2.::, t :-w ir [\'...lt hority lorbcl; bohirH tho sc en'J s. l
There 1:0.5 b oeD incrc: ~'..si~lb c-,~idcr_c6 ;:If C::.,- ~.boc.i8.n b:p>:",.tioEC C; over the dclc.y i~l fixill' 0 their fin ::d . s~~<:'_t,.,s, 0.:'1(1 [\ ci.cter::ir'.n tion t o i'iic.cr D.utono;,w :1nd s overo iGGty. 1 ?i:::;no:1 0.::; f,)l'm.:;r Govcrn;)}' of ,i. C cu:;bodi~ C''l21 bo CXPGctcC: to b o s:'T!np::.. thctic to t:lesc d OJ:,':',:1ds 0
\'li~l
Lnos :':ith 0. p C j)ul~t i on of only C:'1 0 :~iJlic-~1 , thi;1ly sco..t;torcd [l1011g th .] uP2 c r ;Ic:kons, is e;er: less n politic')l pr c blem. AftOl' tho , . .1 ' ' . r> T 'w er 'en o r,~rcnc } 1 so t UI-l \;.10 p" ,rE:'co 01.., L tnng F ro.uCl.:1g o.ST~'J.ng 01. .w?,OS under [I. tc npo rc.ry n[;rce:-::cnt s::niJo.r to tl,:-~-t ':fit.:1 C8.l'\b,')di~. 'lLa French ndl':ini~;trc.t:i.o '1 in 1,05 is, hc,:c,: cr, f,mC!1 r..or '~ dir act-o Qnd op';:n:. 1'118 rCGio~1 hCts been ;;c;l'Jrnlly pc '..ccfu l s but tllcr c ho. va recent ly b':Jen r ur.:ors of conce;nc.'o.tion of !lFl'CC L,<oti::\ns " i~1 the; Si;;':~'0S.J proY:inc cs Ctlon; the l.lok orlt; ".-;11i(:h r~y for ec:<st rC:.id~:) :ir:~o IncJchinc;sc; territory. - Thc object.ive of tho Free b.oti:,ns is o.p?~~rcntJ.J' nn inc:o;::>cnr}(; llt grco.tc?' LD.tJs i ncludinG beth tho Frenc}l provineo c.rlcl tG!'J'i~~ories inhc.bitc d b~T L~ot.:i. o.ns i n SiC.;;lo
C.
I ntcrilcctionc.l Rcb.ti.ons.
1. United State~ - Post uar rolations betwoon tho United Stutos nnd Indo'chjr:Q [,~'C-6ff' to Q, b o.d sturt-,v;lth Prosidcn~ ROOSCVG ; t. 1 s vic\'!s on intcnntiorlcl trusteeship for stro.tog ic ur8U~-; i:!1 t!18 ha nds of p owors urnblc 'to clefeno. thein , folloY.'cd by the 0ve:rentllUsic.stic o.c-::;i vi t ics of cc:-tain ass o.t;or..ts i:1 ti,e pOl'iod jt..:. s'c jofo l' C and nftr t:10 Jc.pD.'-OSC surrcYldcr. T::c boli e f th' .t thcpelicy of tho Unitoc: StJ.to s i s to t:JI' G-'; tr-,e Fronch out Ol~ Incl ochino. stj.ll por sis~s in ;r~.ny circl es - . . . , . ,...j "':)"l[ r ~"" " r r, ~ r . ,- ~ .. ,-. ' -'_ , i '''_ J. ,, - -,-- l"L. 1.10 t l.1 III. .llLClC~"lJ._,' ~r:, r1 1'",. l';' - 0 71", v. ~"e cd..... c. . .]s C< 'b1rt'r'lC'lQl 'PO'" _p,"'t"'-niL.J l" "6 +hr->
c.pe E~blish to cCCt.;P:'T -tl10 llorthcrJ.! [~J~d ['ou'~r!8~n ha l 70S of ttc c ountry to disQrn J apaneso tro ops. Our p crsis teYlt refuso.l ~o supply oquip:-::c~ t ~nd urrs ~or Fr cn ~l nili~nry operations in Indochincc is a sr..;::-,"o subj (;ct ';:itil r.~c\st Fr.c.:::1Crl n.IT'lJ cf~ic0rs, ~\ no-: }1 c:r sc:urcc of irrito.ti on !l':'l.S be en the; o.l~ :1':):sL ).t~ ~i\.-3rs "i.J. -~c:r:.J.or:c~t of ~l.:~:~ric::\n corrcsp8l:dcYlts visiti:1::; Ind ')c}:.in~~ to . . . . rit e 8.r-Liclcs c:.:t~"c::}Jl:/ critic!:l of tILe Fr :)nc~~ '.
As co:::d iti cD.s b::. ''/;:: d(t0rio!'~trjcl in Irdcch:i. ll i :\ (n ?lJ in Eur:>pc) tr:.orc !l0_S "COO?: rl.':~ rC} uI::1er:.tD.::--L:li~lG c f our polic~.r ~~d :':or.J desire to ob t'l i~.:. our' 9.~~)r i)-~-r..:.l Ct:-l '~: a[;si:-..:t~:-:cc i:n i:-.~)l,~:~_.J~"'..;~i~lG Pl""CltCIl ::10.:15, c~i. d n t It :1.t)lC;T 1 a '10 1::; :-.~; ~~.. t i O~-l S n. r c rc l [~ t. i -\'" C 1~,r co rJ 1.8 10
C lii~1CSC
~EC RET
165
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 , By: NWD Date: 2011
.,
[\c.ti -::'~ l~' f or fC\l::~ p o-::e :!. . co ')p{.).r:t.t~on jrt ~~Ol..l -:~!18 C'lS:-' 'l. . sir.. -tc I);" 8'ucnt thD s:=:reo.d of C 02~U :li;;~:1 ~ r:.nd t .}lG:'''S !1'J. 3 bOC~l :-:-~:)C:}! -cl.'.l~: .:;b()1;'-:_~ -t..l'"!.::.: stl:"l.;~cGic iTrlI)Or"t~.nc'J of Iri.Joc11.i:18.. ~s fl. b ,}s':.:;iol1 ~t t/" .. ir:.s t t~1 8 scu"'cr-..~:i:-'t :rd 0!!.rc r:. .l of C1:.jncso ' . C::;::"L".Ull is 1;S
0
As f:-tr
'lS ti-L O ;\.:-'.!l::!.r.lit cs
G.ro CO~ lc(~ :,rtcd, ~h 8 y \',-01"'0 e:lcou~"'D.gc:d
to beli evo t:t~~ 8.fto1' tLe c:.cfo:1.t of cTc..po.n ',iC u o')lcl - nssist thcl:\ il1 obt nining; iy'tdcpC1~ds~1C0,& :.\.s it b:; ('.8.::~o ::p~)Qrc.:r.!.-t ' th"\t ou!' s~,rrn~rJ.thics '.'fG rc
t C!-apcr0c~ b~T
U~li ted
s-:r;::. totj.:c
C 01!S ~C: '::~D.. t.i('.~1S
in Eurcp'""
the puptllc:.rit:! of tho
Sttl.1..:CS hc:.s di::li~lis~10d. ]Jo -lJrthol()ss , t }10 prestigo of t}lG Unitcc. St;::::.tcs is still hieh, ['.ne! e'Yon ~Io, Cili ?hYlh h'1s bccm cc.r ,::; f~l to p;:-ev.::;nt ~~ny .?ublic !:Lrl'ci-"\mc::-icn,n pr0~ '.'"'c ~,n.dn . 2. ~.!2:i_Tl:l. ~ T}-,o ci 'Ii liz.c, ';~i o:'. of -l::hG Viotnc.:n is essontir:.Uy Chhl~SO,.? nnd Doliticul ~~d cult~1'~l t~es h o. V0 ~ oc n clo~~ thrcu gtou t the centuri es. 1~-::;v3rthc lo3s, t.here i s little sy,n.pc.thy or n:J.tuY';;l li',(i",[; b CJe,'i00r:. th o hie I'C. COS l.rrr;oly bccr:.uso of the [e.:'.r of future Chinese Qxp~n3ion Q!ld jC!1lousy of th8 b.l'gc ChiYl C: 3C :-:;inori':;Y oJhich controls most of the bnsiYlGss [,nc. trf\do ')f tile coun try. The: Chinose occupying f orcr:s in TOYl~=-in [lYl el nort.h ol'Yl .F.Tl:H'1 left r)ohi:nri [, bi ttor :rTl9mcry. In the Frcnch-Chi~:'8S-:; T~"c~~~l of 194G, ?raD0o CT8.!1ted i!nport~~'1t The se }:-'ccluclcc. -thc return 0:': tho :ronch co:1.c 8ssio:l in ShC'..r'.sr,rci c_r.d the: lc').s cd tor-:'ito:'.'1 of K"':['c nr.;cr.o-;!~ ~cho Sf',}c of t he Chinese portions 0:' tho Y~l!l~1c. n R.').iJro~d , c. froe !Jort in Eo.i!Jhong, [\wl tr,c; cO)":.ti!1\.n.tion of free Chi~!G~C: i;~"iC 2' n, ti on into sout~orn ICl~o C :-ti~l~#J The l ,:':.ttcr ~so pro\~iGf0~:S Cl.Dt:8rcd \ri8t~ r:..i:l lc:-\d c ~~s, and t:hcrc ' r~~ "TiO been rcpc.~tcd .:!~ rn i n= s ~~h :.. t s inca t}1C'J' "\"'[ 0 rc :lot COIl SU 1 ~(;cl il1 dl""8.f..tci~l f. tLc tr8 :~ t:,', th e:/ did !-:ot cO:'."lsi(~or tl'..c:-:1scl-":""83 bO~.l nd to 110:'101'" it '.';hC:l t:1C;Y re;:;C\i:HJc. their ir.c~c:p r:m(:cnc c. A~.:t::.c:(S on Chi_nose i iT'::1i grntio~1 8.!'(; fr eq uent i~l til') nntivc~ pr sss . T}-~G I~rcr:ch [;.uthoritios have b:::on fc.r from rcluct~nt to ho o d ~h o voice of public opinior'., and 0.1'0 snclonv-oriq; . -1;0 check irc,ni gr:,:tioE by stl'ict on:orcer<:::nt of c;u:::.rc.ncino o.ncl other l'o;ulntio~5.
c onccs~;ions ill Chiln .
T:-.c ~J?:oblcm. of Chinese Co:-:v;!uni~ts -,vi11 tel trec.~ced in
0.
suo-
soqu crlt
3.
scctic!1~
Pl1i1if:? ir:c8 -- Politic~l ~n(.: CCOYloTJic ro1 2.~io~is b et':rCC:1 I~d0""
chi ~c. o.~:~ -E1;;--t.r;{il~?2jnG I~cppbl2.c p.re of su!pr:f,ir~. [).~/ nir.or ip"!]c~ t[\ncc o Th3Te: i.s n-:,J. ::."~1~0~-.:. c. .?!!.il:!?piTll: Co:!s:.~ )_c:.tc iT! S ::.~_LOl1c "fict~o.r:1 politiCQJ. c
l csJ':crs c..~G ::lUG:: i_1t or8st~s d i~ Phili~~ino j ~l ~~ cpc~!dcnc c ~. :!d t}-t O n~!~tx!"e .' o f cnc.; r:>O lL-,.,)_, .,;11.1.""'\f , ~r ....:.. C"~o-'. V .. !_ ...... c. . ~.>J. l..t..":'i ....... . ,v ,,-';J-l, t\..~ u-;~t(-' lvlC ' l J. ~ V LI. 1. .... ...... " ....... \.i l ~n -i.~ "~""'C;~~"l'~-S .l_ '.... ~... I~v L.l. : L.:.
.... _
Stc"tcs.
SiC.::l - Th ~: cossiou of C2YlC:oc1. i 8.!! ::md Lr..oti8.n -territory to Si~m t1n~l c r Jc..p;'~;;.~j C pr C S S'd, rc j.21 19s~ ). Ie r't F rOE c"h-S i~~::1~' s c r eID.. t i or. 3 j n c~ . .1 .... _ .... c.LI""\L~ .. ' r'J") .... -r- J..r~ .... :J. r cV'\(1r.~ jl..f~~ 8r prolo:l,::~,-1. r!. r; ._v L:. <>11 rY" v . vv _ J..... '- r_', {..'..J.l~-.1.C\.j':;1.o _n_,.), .. . Si ~n r ct~rncd th0 pro7incos ~u t hns never officinlJy accepted the d,::;c i sio:l of th:J cO~'lcil:i!"\t10n r,o!:"!>tissj.o::,.
4:.
[:~J,. Cl.~.:;)
...J
.1
~: ..... _.
IJ _':'\.
', 1-
J.. _
_ ._. ,..... "
"'!,' Jit:l.
ti~8
c.d,,:/c;fr:' of
l;-:~do ::; 1;:r'CJ1UCUS c:fc;:~:) to
v;er c
cO~1 (..: l u(;c(2
1.'1s~~ yo:~r
P(:~'f(;r of ~. :,:,~rs 1: f\ 1 P~:1~U=~ the PrcT:el-1 : l;,~."'J i .. ~ro--:/ c; r01r.tio~'ls ':.ri th Si~, ~l & j\. grc,:n;'t~nts for c ()o?cr~,tio:, i::1 p!\:;vcnting "!~'UfG lir;s :-,::o.~l
'='C'?I:-' .(,_, t ..... /
TI10V>:!lT.(;JltS
15G
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Sectio n 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16 . B y: NWD Date: 2011
O-L.
.,..
P9.T\',J.5C'Jl3
['.cros:;
J ,
G'i(:
~f'" ~~-.:+.:Jv,~,," : l ,_ _ _ ..... ~.
"'1="CR:=T
t:i..") ~l!~Q~C'rl-!(' Si('.P"~'3:iC
GOVIJr-1'J:1~!1~-.
is ?:i.'_1ch J.C f:S

r\Jsic1:'r:~
s:,-r:_.:):-:-:.t:1~:tiG -t~'-::-O-.r",-~s
t..h:) llTC 0
l~CUD
of
Vie~
}:Ii"'1n
rof'~lf; t;I~S
i~i. Si~::"
I\':rll :-:,<;''-"''_ . rrith t}1C o~rt~) ."!"C!8. ~ of ciisOl"',.::nr!l i:l. J:I~1n ::Cl 12~J....; ~l0['.. r the Fr'81lc~1'-;cTt th::c ~,'. 'c hoy c ou lc1 C(r'2;:;t g l"e::d~c::, sy;-!:?o. t:-,yo.nJ c-JQ~)C Ll. "d. 011 fro!".:. the IJri'cis}l f':.ut!10riciG:3 ill Sir~[:-J.porc ~ ThfJrc h~,vc OC01'1 Q n\.1.1i'.l>Jr of visits b . . . . c~~ [!'11.:l fO!':.}1 of r.:i~~.t:::I'-.i cY'.d ci""/iJ. io.:.l. cf]~~i()ir'..ls:; ~h c gon.3ral i r.::Jr~ssion is thc,t t!. C French r, 1'e DU'::]: :J.oru e::.ge:: t!l8.n tho British. 1 5., c.nd supported Til-:; rocent ?olicr; r.ction [l~S b.J(;~ 0rrt.}n~(")i~s-ci8~ll:.- .:-~p~;."'~t)i.~-=.:d, L:-:':: ::..hc ntti-tudc 0:' t~c United Stntcs c.nd J~UG l;!':din ~i t'~erly c,tto'ck;:;c~ . Tlw~'o is Lm~',ou,;)tod l y o.n unC:.a r,~urr cnt of an'!'} r..nc1 j0D.J.0us1y over the cO!ltr[',st bohrcon JU-CC1: ;,lili Jso.ry Sc(CCOS20S and F'rc11c}l ic:.ilurc3
C!
6. l r.do:r cG io.. .. T::c Frene}} r~o.vc !l.~.. turnl~~l t h) DutcT1Til'';:'hclr cli.f:;,~icul~j:::s .ill L:c'.:)~lC'siC'"
;:y;n~x~-thizcd
i'ho ifietm.r;l ?co')lc llJ.turCtUy sYJ:ll: :..... thizc Yfho]ci10[xt,sclJy vrj, t~ their IndoncGi~n foP,o'il suffo;'(;Ll, c,nc. the l'acci.-;t clavolopnanJ,,:;s hD.'!o b ee n t;iven r,s 1 .'UC1\ p:::'o;il}.ncncc ii} the n:"..tiv0 'pr0SS 0.8 ce nsorsh ip \',"ou::'d pormit. The dcvclo?~cn-c~ in tho Sc~uri~y CO~~Gil h~ve [on0rully b o~n " ' " C'1,L ~ ,,-';,...-1.1. v i.,,,", v.i.10 b 1',,.-''+',-,,1 --'I .L', ~~ ' v .. c.'i ~i 1) " -""- .'. \.\v .l' O"~--'11,L ,....... _\..L, u. 1"l"-O"l...l.1l.o '~"enCJ'I' 01' h n Lt "~:,.,, .L'Jn.L ,'-, rJ .:.._l ....... u n Y'" _. \. . .. ,-" I .. mistf~}:C of -CDO I!lQc:10si:'..!i.S \. !~S to plo..c',-; teo :-,~:.;.(;h -t.:-.... i.lst i~l t~10 Unit ed l I~tio!!s D..TJ.;.: iT! t~1C Jr:itod States ns J chc lcnd:l~G rnO!T~b(5 ! uf th8..t orgc.n i .. zc..tion. The l';c\'j ' rc11--..i Co:rlfGrCllc,: crcn-tcd Ii tf-~c c:cc:i:clJr~C:"?:"li- O~ cr:...Ic.l""'..1..~si .. J, ...... 1 .\ ~ .. ... .'.L." . ,... " nSTil, ::.,,(.., Jv,! "; c. .l.-..t'"c'cJ or"> (',...... ..r~ ~ l.,...,l 0..!- 1)"01'')'- r- ...... --,r~n .." . , J. v'J .L ,<:..>cu, ,-,-1. ",,_,'0 C'"': r:r rl "IT .,...... i (:). ". -. 0 ..:..,;" _,) '_u ' (..t. J l' n ccrtni:l nrticlc:J G.C!1o . . ~?1cinG ~rr;h~.. u :~s Ct !~.Jr.1QGr 0:2 tho irl.? c rio.lj.s:; CJ.n.~lD ' +' tl --, ~ J .L' 'J ' . .L ' . , ' D ).s ;}.. Pl)al~"1~::.c:r: -:; c\"cr . lv l C'.. G ~ ~ 1..Jr.. ::.C . J.c-cn'J..D rc~:oC:C:l :... c...l: :_\rcZi -~-t.:J:--C :-~o-:.:; i lJ.i.:"itcd nE~. t:1Ctt In:~oc11inn VtC'.s ~lot (~iscu~' sccl "I'!a.~ ul:do-.~rrtc~l ~; G. factOl" i n tho poor prc;,'J,'J rccei ,,.,)c. by t:1C ccr.fc!cnce.
_,-,V'V'\.
_.!.
. ' : . ..
C'
.j
7.
.t..
lY!r.lin" - Tho consider::.blo

I
.:.
ShOD l:es ~)or.3 ((He'.. r.'.oY'.c :/ l enc101'S

b G~,'!oon I!'..c.oc}~:i.w:
I:~dir:n !Xlnorl-::'y, T~OS-t~ of ';:hon o.ro is the most im)oI't~!lt fQct'.)::, i~1 l'ol o.t~, ons
-
nnd :;:,.O:;,C, . Tho prescnce of 0. nUnlGCr of l7linor offici'J.ls, c hj,o fl'y police ) f:-or.: PQnd~chcr =l. ~lso ten-:ls to he. rm rcle.tions bot',:rcen the Victn~lil:-:so 0.n:-l Ir..rli::HlS. Difficul t.i,]s over -tho futu~'o of t::.o Frcl1ch t erritories' in Indio. r..aturnlly gets n'.lch o.ttontio!l icl tho French pross. I t is not be l ioved that nn inCG~cndont Vietnurn ~ill bo onthusiestic c..L10U-C ncc::ilti:r.; t~c lc: c~\-:c r s }1il} cf I:ldio. i~:. S01.liJ:..o.~ s~ j~.sio. 1\:1 effort to pl'.~ ~/ off." t1!c Indio.I: _UC:l :!Ji_S'C, t:l':; Clli:1GSC; s~n Da c::'~}?0(;ti)do
0
A beief
c.0~crip'Gi c:l
of -t.ho Co',c:l'Jnj sn in
til-=:!
I;,;.clo~hinn
befol'o o..!l-:l
!".1o i I0::ler. -G
du~'i21g
tho ~;['::..r [:']ld h o-;,'" i-t G:\i~lCd (; O~1-crol of

clt~ r2od i~: SccJc~.o:-.:. j~. , P::.r~,;
IIo:ti o:-J.8.1ist.
is in . . .
20
CO!~.-~)n is t C ':; ~i 'I~ 1"',J]. is 0 :cc r c~. :-:-; :;d 8.). (;1')'6 S t;;.:1 j~"'\_;,cl J. i!:::~ S ...ii '!c!'"'. t 01) c,l).thoT jty i:1 t ;-1/J hc.~~C:s ('-;..'"" n. S(.:!l:~~~l ('.) ::-::~~-i_ttc.:-:,; 1~::1 ':":::1 C:..fi -t'1..8 T~_7!.::; Bo .. l l.ll :-:-l i li ~~': 1"~t- \..1:-1i c0 !1r...':"'3 ~IOJ i-:::,2.("j.~I. cr;~~}~ ~-;~~!."':J ~l;.d pro::;c'.t:2.y!I::o. ll!1it:::: c::i s~ at [\11 1 . -;-",:: J.0<:. "1::0 ~oc:rc':~ :) .) lic l:; i::; "':j.::J.l cr;c.l1i-:..-.;d :\]l'~ ~ct.i"':,-co .
167
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63 316. By: NWD Date: 2011
110',:/ ri:~:l~l Cc~n!;-cJ.!1i!St.s t:-::~r . ; D.Y(: i :n I::--",': ocll).l"!fl., l)t~ 'G t:l(; . nn1J1.> Jr OJ.... r 08. 1 P~\2~ t. y :::.ord:'::o:!,"s j s C 01"t.c.. j_~!'- j;. 0rra1. ~tl T:~1() 1-:ig11CSt c3ti:~; r).to i f) 21)~J~ of t l1C t r aor:.; f iG>.-t~.!~~ ~:.~i tn. ll'J C~:i l.Ii;Jt:. nnd 'chis i nc l l~.r:lC's s Jn:--:p:_~t : li:.crs o .r:o-:.r:)<t/c r , -::-,110 ~l;J.r:1-L)Cl" iG un.dG-. ~"'t\~c~.(~l~l g1~o~;"ri11g > [~rl~. r..t t~G S3J:!.C . t :ir.o r!Oll . . . Co~a~.l~i.s-!.; L."d.li "t-;.,r:r Ui1-i. ~~C) c.rc b~i:IG stc:C"~dil~l inl.. i J. trc..t ;c. ~ji t11 :
1";0
<:I
O~lO
1~11C;',,i0
SECRET
s ecret
C ~0Jr
['~ c.::t.!!i~0n
Ul'lits
u:ld~,~" C \)!r~:~.tnist
c0:~~;~:.r. c1 ~r0
Th1J.s t } p roblcI:: for t!10 l ordo r }O

aI10 .
c('lr_ t(:nn.?~.atinG
;;;or:orc. l ly Gct~cr ~~r!:1(;d e c:1C'..ngir.g sidcs i~ not [.l.n
; mo t her p oint; 1.',hi r:h c:.cf::'':!itc i ni'orrr..::;,ti-:ln is l Qc~: ing is the c h:-\lm'J l of CO!"~"1unicc.-sio:1s ':r:,tr-t l:,s'c" eUl;:: t }:J3 c ': :-lt.Cll' of rCEior..o.l CO!1 'Y:; tro1. 1.--. ) s - oh~b J. 2 t;~'J,t :clJ. 0 :" -t11c ::tv~,ils.blo ch::mr.o1s 0.1"3 usee. rit D! . -. o \."'~r l r..nd fro!:! Ch:l.l 'i0. , BU~"'I~:':l J ~.. nd 0:'.n::l , 8.!lQ by S02.. f r oI! Chi!1D.. " lio:1E 1 KOrlG , [,,::cd Si!:~['. p oreo I t i s ~lco YO,'Y poss~b1c t:-:f'.t Lioseo':r di!>cct~,'.rQS " r r l V(' " 1 ' '" ?r~n~c) Ccrt'1;n l y snf-';sf'r, c ';''''r'v CO'~l:ll"'l C" "Cl -'(1~ "'Xl s't .... __ _ ..... ' ' " "';'"c-" ...,.. ' Eo seo'.'! , ;Jt.\ t;J,ic~1.tio!ls o f' fo.ir l y 1'ec(;nt dn:i.;c c~ ro f !'::-quontly se i zed 1):1 the Fr cnc}:~CC o!~::11UClisJ~ hc~dq ___l'J."t2!'S i n So,-,th AsL.. t.ro v':1.riously r e:)ortcc. t o bo in HO~G Eor..g , 3~n~ko ~. Sinrnporc, n~ngoo~ ~ n~d C['.lcutt['.o Hong Kong 5081:1:: to bo -C r.3 J~C)st 1 i ~{'.::: l jJ
...
~
on
..
...
....
~ . "-'
............
-~
......
'-'.~
.........
L~
.....
v- .
l.:.. _ . ....
.Iv
\. . .L~
. :>
....'
O ?ccu1inr th i nG ntout \,Tj,Ct.T_:t;~l C OT,oml)Lisl:~ i:; tLlt there ;1.D.::; been ne v cry J. ittle e.n-ti,;,;"c:r i c:',l1 rl'O~:::.:.gEl.:lJ8." It is o'!wio'..l.s tl',c-t. this is not ' ~"1~"f'r1CC nf' + 11" c"r'rc',t, )~'rt'c I ij':;;. I t [..r' ')~,. -r ''''llt l... v > '''vrc"C'l'ts v :0. ...... ,} 1..1 _ .... '-" d po +0 l u.I.....- . c. hope c:: t:lO jXu'-;:; of Eo e ,i :!i n h t!1Ctt !1i3 n :<>, s'Gi ll ob'~.::dn AT:1ol':i,cn.n support f or or ~t l east .ncccptnnoc of - c. V io~ Minh ~ovi3rnment un~(;r his l CD.dorsh~p. Evidenco th~t this hopo i s e.i2i~ishing i s furnished i ~ n r Ot;io:-18. 1 p~';.r-t :/ c.irccti"\.Tc do..taQ i ~1 l'Io'.0~:1hor 1 9~1S \':hich stQJ.;cd t11~:t n cti 'If) c.r:ti . .. l~r:1C'ric[\!1 l)rol1Cl[,C'..llC:C'i. sr:01 .l1d be: c O}'~~1).cted i 11 p~r.Jcy ci~c l cs o,:,(~ 'oy Yj'J r c n f' JlO'lt>. r,::1ong: tho p;o:i l o bi.J,t shoulcLnot y ,]t np.;:cc.r on : ', "1 ~; r> " ,' _n \., ~ :)'~s i ) ..... J . ~s.L_-nc . c.dv " +.f 10 r::l.010 , ~ ~, } l " L len~ , O .~ 1.1?,-, ' 1"lC 0~-~ ,., C''..,~ "\ 1", y;1,,~n .L~ "".,,O OJ. t~ iG prr)~)::CGc, rdc. '.';:.,S to 1 0 " .:;}'.o.t t:18 01' i~ Gd St:ctC3 i s G.!'l i;':190rio.J.ist ,,'' +0",,1 ' '-'O"};; ' .. ' , . L- .... v t . 'lD.n"'er p o\:ur .. ,,111.....,.11 "i"lr "-0 0 ..\. ....... J. ...... i t v r'o~~ " '~+';()n ov'r Irr'........... .. l<\ "in G T l ..... it C-'l(~Yl J:l0),O cru,J l ::'2:l.. r uthlcs~ t h8.~ t.he l"l"CDch ~ l .. n illtcrcstiY!.g ito:'1 iNC.S t h~ .:~ IJ:!"o-.. \!1.Qr i ~:J. n ./lY!1i~!:li tcs ~i!t.::rc to be dorlour. cec~ i ~1 o..no!l:;!n01...lS l ctt~rs t 'J .F'rC!lCh of'ficinls -/ r~:.i c:t i :1d i c:.'..tcs t rl!J.t t h e CO:Tl!flUrlists nrc '(\'..'m r .) o f tho' s ::'s il::, r i t y bctv;ccn t he il' ) ro :xlt~:~~l(~o. (\~1d the be l ief of certain Frcllcll ci rc l es
A
-~
.J_
-'~
-.A.
.-
,1
.. .........-
"-" ...... _ -
Cl
... ..;
! . !.lLl . ..
-..1 ..... \ . . _ _
~._
~~
_L-<.
The prob l o:1 of C o:::-~-nunis:n (\ '""011[; tr:o Ch5,l1oSC lilinori t y i s 0110 Y;})' i ch h ~s b30n G i ~an rnIc h (\ttantion by the F r ench ~ut h or itias ) cspcciul1y since t.i'!o s i t 'J!:'.tio:!. bOC:'T1C c ri t icn. l i n ChiE~o Up c\DtiJ. no':; t:-:m'(;! hc,s b 8e::1. s-:'lrpri:-i':1[, 1. :::, t}3 c:' i.r, ::ct c oci,)OI':t{; :" on bC-!.;-:i00n 10c:t 1 Chin.8!O.'C C'~n":" : rrJJ ~lists [~:nd tho lf2.c~;~ r1i~lh "J T ! 1~r3 [~ro -\-O:t'":l f:':':r Sh.ino3o c.~onG t~10 ,.... J. n~) \. ........ ",) ....,.l_ ~-l' (,...... .: , ... l n . -.... -L~;(l Ch- i r ... ' .... or" SlLJ,r~to .S-:-: :1.-CCS -t~hD.t no C.hine~)o h . -:r.".( ~ G ' .... '-' , ~ ~. '"'\f")-JS (' :.. " v ~ '-" .. -. '-'... 1 . . . . C-Icr l )C~'J~ ~~"'.U~:lt t~~~:ir:b p::.::--t i:!1 r;r ' :1;-i.~l(; t1:1"' Ci':,~=-ns or etc._CI' tCl"'!'o}is-=.; D.s ti "/iti.cs., IIQ-;;c'FJr : t h.c C }Li!lCS0 pIny ~l.!1 i~-~;?Ortr~!l-~ ?0..rt i :r.L cort":.::-:unic ').tiO ~!'3 ~.. n(~: j.; l srr.1J~Gli:nc C. l"~IS r'.11'': s'~l~pl ics.) For S0S~ Tl.c::1:clls TlO'l\r ttlC F ronc}l ~lC"..-';O 'b;,)c~ ~ui.otl ::, r .,)lJ.n ~:inG ~~) ~ :1r.~ ~l0pOl'tjnG s:-:'.D.. ll bo.tc~:03 of y'~;'~';.;J':_ C o::,~~u?i.ist l G~c.:]:,s [t!!. r] th,-:; S~_~rct8 fG31s .!~}-:G~"'- h0.-.. -c tr1t3. situ,::..tio~ . I~ n racc~t co~vn~~~tion TIi~h tho ~C~~ of the Surctc
}1C " nC
9
: crt:1cl'Jss .\
(::':~JrQsst)(l
~:0r:ll) (~.:~(rU2.ct C7'jr- t:~o

()':'i'1.d
t.:~n~cl!'Cj' of t:-!.8
Chi!1J3C cr;1 ~""\.J:-li':7 '~O olin'o on the v ictorje~ i:'. C::~i71r~ i"'(,12.1~c.1 t.l~c
l oc~\l
';:ncoa r,s CO:'?',u:1is"c
158
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16, B y: NWD Date: 2011
SECRET,
_.-----.---. ---- ..---:C'1cl-:::~rc~.l~'J I~..~O~ "' :;3J..'"t :1.()~
---. - ~
It j.s beli e vod tLlt a b:-:i e : discu:sil):-l of th e bfl..::l:2:!'ou::.d. '3 9sscntip.l to -:}:-3 u!1.c1,:;rst:~!:.di~;: of tJ-.L8 PY'oJS C?"lC situ~tio!1 :'n ::ndoc!linS!.o ~;!8 follo-:rinG ?~l"f.~~;r~~)hs 2~ccort.!i:~;J - pr8 S8!1..!"; a ~ sor~e;.r.r~;-l~ ,/ o'70r--si:7lplifi cci vf]rsio:l o:~ e c ,'ents 0lECO L'(5. I.\1.rch 9 , 1~)-~5 J tho ~ :::,i),-,, )~,:,se te ok over direct control of th:.: of' -r.L..,--'OC'.- l ... '1~ C~-; S ... l .... ~-~'... ~1G ... 1,.... ......J............ + "-'0.ep:- a'.1d ).Y1.l+eln~Cl' -:-.OS I_ . _t. V F r CnC;i. of:icinls :::"71G. ci~..riliC\!"..s. E:-1?OrOr 20.0 D__\I \'h~S rete. iTlcd in por,r0;" v..:;~d prol'i:.is (! ~ i~:d :; :)0!H2o:1(; C: . ~':;le.~1 Js.t> ~\'!l surre l1ccred ) .J aps.!lCSe of.ficicdc; i:l IllOOchir'.c. P8Y'r.li -tted COl l-:: ~'ol to be seized cy J\nna:'l.0Se 1l2,tioEQlists. L::1;)C;ror BOlo L;i o.hlice..-~(:(l on i.u;;u st 26, 1 945 .. ond }io Chi r:EE:, n pl-o::ti;: cnt Cenintc;r:, I Gl.dc , procl8.i:-:o:; d th.:; Vi etnQ~ . Ropublic OJ:. Se?4~cDI.)cr 2. 'l'hc Britis0., ':';1-10 ; ;lOV,::;(~ into th .:; sou-;;},ern r cgi(J~~ to dis a r ::~ (.r n p D.~:':-!~G tro ops, r c.!. "'u~cd to r,:;co6~"!izo the l!.8"\J' r)public c.nc'. prol::ptl:r' h<r;:cd over t11e e.drai:lis!~:r<-!.tio!! to the Frtmc!lo Tho!'o ',I[:,S SO::1:3 fiGhtinG in S~iGOll e.r..d co!!t inlJ.cd g~).E;rrill a "" 'o.rfaro t.hro1.J.[;ilo'.xt Co c:l ir.chin" .
..:.... .
rl'-"'lT"","; " l~ ... . t -L C".!l"~':i '''''''1

...Io...1
en
I
-.l
. l l.... __ ' - ' .
J.._l.~
t.
_ ... (.~ ,
._
~ ~_
. !.:.' .. ......:.
....
__ \ .......
~..
_......
In th0 north the Chi;;.o:::o occupG.t ion forces recocniz.cd Eo ' s , _ 0 3nd sUPl)()r~od 2rOc.Chi!:GSC clQ~r;r~ts irJ. tr.. e dOTr'in~"llt Viet ~i~l p~!'ty co~litio~. After prolongodncgoti~tio~s und considera ble c on~OSSiO!lS 0:1. tho p ::l rt of t~lO FroYlch ( Sh':'.~!;;ho.i, 'ltl.:lnD.n Railroo.d, et c ct01''l) the Chir..cG C G.e;reccl to y;ithdr e:;" On r::-:.reh 6, 1946, just hef02'o tho ChirlGS C ',-rith lro:.;nl, n ropn:; scntct ivc of tho Fre nell High COl:c;llssio::H;r . signcu 0. brief pretocol I'.'ith Eo C!:.i Ilinh t r 0COs!) :i,z~-Z'.g the V:i.eGI::D.l:l <\ S e. freo c~) lm'i;:,~y ','iicrd..i1 th,) Fnmch Un5. 0:1 fI.!J.d tho Indoo11i:i1CS8 Fo.:~. eJ'i.'."..;i.or, ~'i-th i ts (,~."t!1 n:rny ~ fi!: : :-t ncos ~ o.n.1 gO"ir0:C'n~~Qnt" f'h,Q ~tatu 8 Oj~ Coch:ln-.:. i c hi;~[\ "(r::ls to be c13tcrt.',incd by e. plebisc:i.tc. Doto.ilsYieI'e: to bo \'/01'1:cc.1 out flt c. SUQscquon'c conference.
gO"'lor!,)::lcr~t
After UYlsucccssful n egoti ~tions nt Dnlnt. Ho Qnd fl iflrgo dclogo.t ioD c::.nc to Fro.ncc o~~rly in <hwo. 'lhc so c~lled Fonto.inoblo8.u Conf orence b .stcd fro;-:-t July 5 to 3cptcmbc'r 11. It broke dO~iYl OV0T tho i ssues of t h.) unity of CochinchiY!o ....:ith the rost of An:![ll71, !"ililit~"'y r c l ["t5.or..s , (~nd Victncu!1 cC:7'D .ncs for 0 sop':'.ro.t c diplo:::::c tic service D.:!.d control of custO!"ilS , fir:~,ne ,:! o.nd cconm:u.c "''J.ttCT S . J ust before le o. vins F ro..nc.:) , :::0 sir:-rl1.3d ~ _ _ r.loc1u3 _ _ _ __ _ ':iit.11 ?:inistcr of OVCY'S8:',S Fro.ncc vi \=--o :1di 0 1.:OUTEI' ';;hich provi0.cd for stopp:'nt; guerrillo. n(Tti. '12; in sout::crn I ndochin -::. , rcl c;o.so of pri so"-IC l'::; ~~ nd hos~c o'bo s , ond for tho r ::su!;r~,Jcion of negotiations in J o.nu~ ry 1 9~7.~ .
- - - - - -------_._--_._--------_._._--------_._--- - - - - 1 . It . d'J."1.!!.~
...";,-:"r0 " _ '-'"
s:~ O. ~ }~(:
.Li_""'I
:'8
~'.j
...... ~: . .
" rl ;.) '"}. r.1.o..... ... :
r 8c'"'..11cd ()f" . L h'"":l. . ......

_ J
~':'}i'"'.. t
C"" .''":, '(",Y)
..; __ \,.; . . . . . . .
t:H) ?o:--.1 tQi!lc"Vlc!:':.u

1 l!.
CO ~J.fc:rc~ncc
too
plC'~co
C ""S~7 ..L- ,.~. _.l, . . . L. oJJ vl., . . . r)...L.
.' -:"1. c:r.--;..l"'\ __ .....,...; . iJ_ .:I
-). . n .. ,.-,.:' . ;I_..!..cn

.1.
. . . _ ,-1r: . C .J l~..:.1_~ 1 .
p o licy . ;~.S ~ c~~ici::'l..l c-~ :~:d bitt'"-'~;' i 3:J~l0 :t 7:1::5 -:ho F::''' C !1C . r!c;~().!~i.:ttOl;S h . . . -.("""~-rnn =-. r ';- .- ... . ... 0.(' ..... "\ . . . . l_-,..:.Jo 0-" .. ;~ r.t t:~..-:: nO;'r C~71~t)~--:l -:..t";C"l .. Hr'll.-l ~;.c1.~ _--,-., . -,C;,-O ...... do [l.b-:.\l.~~::; ::~-.. r) Frc::--:C":l: Ur.ic~ ! -;. ~}~il~ ~;:r;.i] l/"i c.1.:. 7'!:.:.r.l c<~lct:2..-::i.c:--l -~: :J..S :'Ot~1 douo-: . . . ful of: -;-~:-. 8 Ct'-\~::,:~! .. it~i c: tIle ?~ C!!.c >.. c,::lc~:.o.tiC:1 fJ.i', :l C:JC(1).::-'1. 6 Cc1.. t()"be; i~ltr:.~:~;~i:.~:::-~-, "''''',J ~.-loll:;lT-!.~ S?:)~. C'.~t':.s if':. th.G ::. :33c:7lo1y bJ colo::.ir-:.l ~. r.:.c Co::... ~Jn i.st I':C~)'.it} :;S . 7>. ':) C0:r.f'e;:rc:-ic -; ~,: . . . s t::' lS forcdoc.:;-:lJd to f'.liluroe.
1_ . . . . . ~'-'
_ i...<I.
.J..
"
. 1,-..
_ .-....J
....
\.. .
"~
'-"I.....
,-'~:.._
., ....... -<. .........
1 .
SECRET
11hc:n : : ;0 h is &o-\"sr~-:-:.c.::t , is-c. b:/ C07~1:.:1i:st :ii:1if.~c'r 0f -~ .-:J.r GI,I~P , } ~:J..d l!:Cl"" :'?.scci t heir ir!:iv.-:::~c,:: c.::~i:"'_ ~ l"!~s r..c::.r l ~/ fi;:-o ::;.o:~-::hs : CtDSe:T1CC. Trlc !::'-~~:.S'..1r8S for sto??i~!; t ~ 1C i'i ;: . t: :1S i!1 C,']C}-lill.chillG -':;arc nc;-cr j r~.?lc~,"e~-:cd [!.~d r Glc:..t.io!lS -::i t7: t;10 ?r~~~:8=--.. GC:~':; '::' Q :";'J.~ci rJ.pid. l~-~ J.. c:i sputc O'.:"CT' ~~s- to:?!.s co~tr.Jl in :; C!. i?~r..'J : :..J iT! = :OY"3::.:'~ j.' !" csul.!~ed i:l l occ:. li z::::c fig}l~i~lS ' or.a on ~ccJ:~'..:-3r 1 9 , l S~~;:~ .; 2~ c-:,.r~:\111 ~y p~"c~c.r~G. St!r!J:rj,sc: nt-::;.(;~.: f:.l:G.ost
s uccco~~d i~ o~crru~~in[
t ~s ~VJ ''::1
Frcns~ ~orcos
i n(7c~:in
end
~l~~2.
Fi!jl-:..-:ir:b
co~ti~.;c:.;,s
~l:d -\,rici:r::it~.
si ~: cc: t~;.crl
i~
..
.I\ ~t.:)r D..

i!~to
fc-:r --JC'G~S 0'''"' .
rO fl. l
nbou~
"\'.;::~~':"'[.:. J',-;
i:l
-:-I~!1'Ji
Gc~-:'c:tiJ ~:":~ t.c:d
bitt0r
c..:1C~
cost ly
gU2~rill~
) c~d
o?cr~~io~s.
(ql_l:"p~S :-l~:'."
~i ~h ~r~~t
-~bi~
d~f~ic~lty Fr~~cc
C~!. i3fi.jT
"'-/!1~
conccntrutcd
180 J OeD trocps i::!.

l cc~ f0
Inc~oc}1il l::. rJ.:"r~cc.

:-:~.:'-.i ?~tc..i?1
P.Jnor ic~:1
feTc)J
-:ii tL. 3::i tish [l.~-;d I'3 suf':-' ici8:;.t to g2..T--
p:";-: c:lriol..!s ~07';-:-l~;.:!ic~~io:1S b~t.-.'GO!1 th c~ , -r',r:}s r~ot l~rGc ("?10U;!1 to p::.cif~y t!lC cO~ln:r~.' ~ Ci ":_:-il end !T'! il :'..lc~~ry offic io..ls i?l bot~l F ~ ~~. ~c ~21d J:r: :: 8~ :1i1'l:: I1J.-.. rc; l-'-:-r ~8rJ2 ti ~o ::::..d!=-:ittsd tho...t til~_s c~l!::ot b e do::.c \tith~n.:-:' br')s. .!.:;l~." i!:. cr(;:;..scd i"'crc8s -~;}l:.C~ fAre
r i~or:
tnc chi :f
ci~~ic:s
:,,::c.
not
~\.ci l c~o l ).
boc:--.. ~.:) c. '}J'~r t:;:1~ '.:.c~;.:~.!c e. ni li. t.::l:-'2: sO ~lrt.i0y!' . ~',"!:'..s !10t ?re:..ctito t}lQ isc;:J. '0_--;~ ;-l c:~clJ~i~""!:io:-,~so !~d::-lir~l dtll?GE~;I J I:':-:~; -,';~S =- O?2.C:.CCC. - ~lS =i~~[)1 C~;:-. ~_i:::::;ic:-~2~~ -'JY ?!., BCIJ.JJ~~~? , D. :"csistc.!1c:) l c~. d':;l" c.;.:2:l i'o~-: :!o :, c~.:rc;.::l" ?!~-::fcc-:' .. P:t!--tly tc.,c~~~).so of the pr-:jt:di ce of ? : i~1istor ~ :Q\"lt ::~c ) y;~ O co:-_sic.crcd t.h e :;.~.!.... ~ck of' lJSCCT:"108:--- 1S ['.3 n pc r s O:l '~~ 1 r: :. . ,;."J"O!: t t ~ r: i::-~ J .::.:-::5 ~: 1 S 0 b:J C8. usc -or""' S :-- ':j:i2.~~g: ~. :1't: i . . . CO~::-~_ln i S~ i r-l ?rf:t~ '~0 , t~ 3 :ro:1c}-.. ~.:::'; ;: 0 r cluc-:'~~l~ to r c:su~o :lJsot i ~,~icYlS -.-,it!'! ~ ~o Chi ?!iYl:: t1 1:1 t~c c:.b::c:1cC cf c..~!~l C'~}.J)~" l:;~ . C:Qr -~'t-~th f!. T...:'.tio:l!:!.] f ol l c-~':ir:g, t}~ c .F!'C!"'~C :1 t'.l:-=---~c::1 to t:--~c GX - :S:::?::ro:- 2:-:0 D:).i "d-ho "/::',,5 li ~i~b i:r.. exile i~ cnb l o th:
?r,::~c~l T (~t~r:::.c. c
'"'1 ___ '! . . . IJ. OTl.:....; : i. .O..... E; .
00
r~:VJ:-. i t
:"'M . . ,).Y"'I:;J.!~'" ' ' ' - 0
+"l~ v .. .. v
s'........,.-..-. . r . ._ ."[t
0:'" -
",,"'J
I GL.7
_
T. .... -~J ..
....
L! , ........ 'I...,;
....
"')c: 1
......... 1'~
r..-... -..A
c ,.........,('l ,v,v..... ' . coj"')Q

1....; .-1. ..:.
l1 r ->G" o J- 1 ,.....~u 1 ,.. . . -S .. "-"0 v - .J- ;').,I.J...
group of' p:::!.rtics , D~"';':)!J-~?!ts G::.d i Yl~i 7j~4~ls ~ill ing to s~~2ort p~~ Dni. T h~ nuclc~s . ~a~ tradi~io~al . r.lorlC'. . 7"c:-ti s ..t\.-.s fro::. / .. :l11f::-:1 ~:Q:l lOT_.":l~l . To t~::s \"'"[.'..S J Ol:s.CC:. C(;!"t:J.lJ') ;:~.. t l \ ?O C8.tr:c. l ic cl c :~c~-I.ts i:1 Tcn~ir1, t~lr:; C:;"O::!r'l:S -c. ~nd :IoJ. }~~~J religious s~cts i !"~ Cocl'i:lc~i!-::1' J ' c8rto.i~ c.r:ti-CC)=-:-::::u~'}ist !'} ~-~tion~lists, i.\nd \~rious ot:,,~r rrUrJ.or f; r 'Ju?s 'l'; it!"~ J:tixcc. r..oti ~w-os.
SUC8"; 3d.C-3.
i!"~
c o lJ_ccJ;i ~S
~ot l () :{
By
policy
l ir~j_-t.::2.
Soptc~b0r
1947 ,
~~ o ?~c~c~
offo~s i 7C
felt propared to or en
'.";~s -to :-:-;.:.1 ~ 3
~ c o~b in cd
[J.::1
dipl c~:C'_~;ic
C',::c. ;,-,ili tc:"-:..'
..
i J.!.?')!t~~~G
s?s~ch o~tl i~ ing
s cJct lc;'.:,::::t J \';:t ilc: r:.
c!'"';. e ol':T'~g8 -;;::::\~C'!"OT'5 ~-:8

Boll~crt ! s
;.1ili"t'lr:/ of'l. . ::r~~i ".-::; iT: lc~-:~:i2:' T:c:;;]"d -.&:SC.:.~:'2:1 :-~J C~i : ~2. ~ ~ :1 0.:::;:' r::.lly -to :::;'0 ~:ti . Un.:r:<!. .!.:;'.).?!:--l-t.:J l :.- , the to)=-S of:
speech
S:l
b0C~S3
?olit~c~; f oot~~ll
t}:,...~ i~ :-:-':~2':;
i~ ?r~~cc
and
05
dcY:::-l';.:.iv.~
li . . T~rc2. -::::'5
':: ::-~ -:.{.... rL:c.
CC',';!:.
c..
p::0~'
i:--:-.??"-3ssiG::1 i?1
c irclc;!:i.
Bc..o
O~ ::.
Fronch
cr uisc~ i~ t~6 ~~i~ ~t~lcn; on J3cc~bcr G ~~d 7, 1947 J ~~~ si~n:d ~ s':;c~::t :) T,~t-:,cc' l -~,:! ic!;. :"csclE;'{'"'_iz..::d -:,;r.G i::!(~(;p(;r' __ ~',,;::cc f:::-:~ u:1it.:,- of' -:':-!c Vi:;-:.::-:-,~:! -:.-i.t..::~:~: .l:}_:..:: ;7'Y"c:~!c!-.. li::_io::.,) ?7":: . .:-ic>.J.~ :;". . -:)1" t}~c pr:.t-3ctioYl ~:>:f\ ?rl):~":-~
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 , By: NWD Date: 2011
D.!ld tcch::.ici9.p.s , b'J.;~ left to l.c-tor J:cz;o~;i:~tiT'1S -Sr..:; detc..ilecl solut;ic,,o f dipJor r.::1.ti c, r::i]. it c, l'Y, econo:nic , fill '.,nc:;.Ct 1, nnct tec;l!1ic~ll r:'~\t.tC':rs. . 11J. cv"""Q''- I~or J.. .. o un " - ' L."'" ""L-_I..!._1...0 "IO ... Cl~ > c"'c-'-ly.!..h" 'l' . ;:, 1 ' L..: J. L,.~: ...-.J... ~o 1 "n-'- ~ /\.'--. 1...0__ v .. ~, ( "' } 11S ~1..G.lGCL . . r;- lL.. I.'.~l ..... , s :',mo c..s tho on:; signed on JU:!I.L' S, 1 948 , by BG )'la cr-'c , XU.').i1 , c:r:d E~o Dc.i.) r30 11 ~~0~t i s u~ldcr' stood to h~~t0 ~ g:rcod he -::.-ou.ld ~ot (~ of. l "/,:-i~h }IQ , It -::!C'..s D.!'rD.!l[';cd tjn.t th o t,'iO ',iclulcl 'neae q;o.in .i.:l ['0;)l'~r} r y to r:nkc fined ::nrnllgomonts for thc return of Ruo Dc.i tolndoc~inu.
"o r<:*\.. ..... I.J
SECRET
Doll C':..e rt r eturned to F r:u:cc to eX'olo.in his :r l nns t.o his g01.-8nl:":1ent o.nd ot i~0. i !l i tr: (',~Pl-o-;c. L rno D::ti lUlcxF,ec'tcdly f ollo':;cd 00 1 1['..crt , go ing t o S\.~it:crll.l.!_ . ! ~...~h c r o h() hC'~ d ~. r:oct.5ng ~-.~it.:-t :\':0 3011 o.crt in JCtnuf1. r~y'" . J:'}:.c HiGh Co;:-,,'"1i:::;s icllC:C rch.:rnc8. to I;lc1ochin~, on Jo.:lu::ny 28 to prep'.'\ !'S f or t:lC Decti:l[; ,'fi th Eho Dc.:: schcculcd fOl' Fc"l-y::-u'i.ry . The latt er , il 0'.'!8 '.,'or , wont to FrC,ECC ,,!lei 1,'.'o.s r cce i 'Jcel by r~ n;).rn.o'2!' ef high govc~'n:T,,)nt ofi'j.c i0-ls Th is i:1f~lr i Qt.c(: Boll e.crt , \,;:' 0 thl'.::n1.;C7F;d .to l' esigi'1 o.!lcl \'!~~s oel1y ploc:ltcd by o.n. off i cial s-l.c,t cl;;On:t; that ~ l,;gotj.o.t io:1s -::ith 30.0 Dni YJould bo exclu sively throu(;l'. hi~:l.
fr0Y'l this point on were cO!"lfussc.. Ob;!ious ly BnG D:;.i ho.d his r0~u. ctnn~ od; r c9::'iC~1-::: to l. . ~;ttlrrl tc J.;.T1no. lT~ [;:,11<1 felt th~.t ndc1iti ()n~ l c-J nccssio::ls :::1~ g~.~r~rf'. ntccs '~:-icr(:, 8sscntif. l if }lC -';lc rc to f , 1"] ,+ ' .L . . 1 't goin th<: suppor\" 01 SU,J.J ' l CIC;:l -I I,':'. C2.0;!'}_lS-C 0 crn.cn'~s v() IT'.sure s\"clb2._1 y ,; ' T for }~is 110\': ;;oY:3rn':"!1"Jr~..t~ In ~dditj_c!1 J hi s St.c..~l i n Fr8.:'1co j-r).d 0p0Y1GG 11is eyos to thc u:Jstc,bl.:: posi~~ion of tho lcrcnc h governJ'l~!~lt D.ncl tho p o:'i<3i- bi l i ty of C:. r ct'J.rl: to po':ror of de G!)JLL:::.
r CC011Sic.c ~~ cd
.... r,
E\'(; n~s
Bo.o D ~\ i did nClt l'ctu rn to HC:lG :<011[; until I,~~Hch 14, 1 9180 Tho foll o\"iin[; '0':(;(;).::5 ,';ero J1lnrke d 'tJy ;nuch cO;'linS o..nd going b eh';8cn SD.igon c. ncl n ong Ko;~g of Frcnc}l o.!1d Vict !~Ui;l rcprcse:1bt i vos , o.nd contiE1.w,ll;y' chc::.nGi:'1g; rU!llOrS of the sto.tus of the :lCgotic.tionso .Apparently d o-, sp Cl. iring of J?orsuf>.ding B::\o Dc. :i to rC'cu!'n i n t he nec.r future, BoHnert o. g rc cd to soJ(; up 0. Provision;).l Centra l Vi c-cn.o.n GoverYl..Dont \,illich '.'[0 ....,10. propn.r,;:; the ...my for the E! npCrOl', who !="grce:d t o gj.VQ h i:) Eloral b ncking to th e neYl rcgi mo. '
The r.C';j govornncnt I'.'['.S h co. d c c1. by General Xuo.n, tho n Pres ide n t of th o CocJ-'.inchincse Go-,,-crr.;:lcmt XU'l n . v:hi l c o.n !i"."'lnC:.J"itc 'oj' birth, is n , ,-' " . 1 gcncr!.l l ). ~1 tne l'rCnCl1 i"r-:Tj , a ~"h' ~. ' L'r(;nc, . C2.\"lzon, anu. l-::0.rrle d J. 1\ ". rench \"0 .!. wonc-,n. EC::'.'io.S , of c O ~lrsc , pr o :.~~)tly bnlCldcd ClS 0. Frc:'lch pUP:Jot ('.'[llich is not b o lieved to b o true ). XU0.n hcd croat difficulty i n pcrsun~ i~g p c rs o ~ls of :loj.li t :r n.l~c. i !1flu c!. .cc to j oi n l1i0 govOr7""I!cnt. , c~~Tcn ,l:ith th e !
0
"h-'C '1:. ; l b -l.,.....rr ..... , ..
0.(" ....
~'Ir_ .. ,......
Dr. ; , , ., -
r q ~....... "l ...... ) r
.Lh....... t"":lr") -1 [ 1'.) ..... i -'.. ...

J
C() ll octf!G. ~ 'J.:"'. S -r:-..-rJv \'r r:~. 1,..... , ..... - : .1.......... - - ,,
P".I.Y'C )' .Cl't... '

~
l ar1y
~3
r(;~~rJs
r c pr csont'lt i vcs fr an Tonkin .

~ith Xu~n
c rui~G:"'" C:. l r.~Gs:; p u~ lia
On J uno 5, 1 948 , 80:1'1ort net i:---1 ~ho Bnic d l }:..lo:-~; , ~nd ~\

c:~:r..!.ct~ly t h~
end BClO.Do.i , a go.in on a

SiG~1")G. 'r'.r}~iC:i 1,',-,}S
P.C;'.'/ o.crc:c::1:J~!t '::~\S
S':lr:10 uS -C:-!'3 l~ir st o~eo
Th ::"'"! tGxt V;~tS Pl"'c::.I}tly l~~Qde
i:::. cO~1~:ra::t t o
S-:ri -t zcr~:J.nd a:'t.(~.ri:~rd:~.:
trtC ~i. rst pr'otocol. 'l-'h'J 8~'{ -ET::poror 1ett fo~" the 5-:\;:1.9 c.:J.y -"'hil'~ ?:o DollC':.8rt r~:::'-;-~t~~"T"ed t,o rrJ.nc8 shor~.,;l~l Prcsicl0.r::-lt A'...~~.:..:-!. rl""\:~cl~1.i~~t3!r..!. :1is !ls:r 6c>-'.~c:"'!_!'~3!1t in }~:~:loif. ~r. l'lJ1)tI. F-~ll! \,. .. t.- Ii ........
171
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16 . By: NWD Date: 2011
The HiSh
Ca~~~ssio~cr up?~rently b~li0v9d t~~t
SECRET
ho
wo~ld cbtai~
hi!=) f;br8::;~~l~!lt b~ . . t:lC ?:::~r;n~!l C::'. ni!lS"C ~~lC~ ~.ss8::i":Jl::r . fol1ov:i:lb vrl~ic::. , [.9.0 Dr:. i ~:oulc.: r ()turn. co I:1c.o(;hir!8. , nnd t.:19 r:::bot}.r~tio!lS f or' tho su?plo~cnt~ry Q;rCc~2nts could then bogin. Unfor~u n~tely . ho r eturned tc Paris at G pnr~iculurly difficult )n~ n8nt. Tho Schu~~n~ Govcrn!7'.cn Jc V;9,.8 fnccc1. ~;.itl !. ErcY'itinS inte:r':l:J).l C:i3sor:.sioll und oppo:-;itio:l \'; itl1in tIle ./.. S2-C!:1blyc T1:c Soci~J.ist P<"\. rG~r Confcl'"e:n.cc :1[1.6 rc -,.rJ~118d 0.. s~ing to tho l eft an~ voted ~ re301~tion f&~ari~g ne~oiiations ~i~h P Chl ~lnn. ' ' ," C0_onl~ 1 l~C una conser~U~lVO Sr~u?s In -1~ GOC~2n~ UDa 1 ' ' J ' I , , " , ~o }' r a11co bognIl all ncti\rC] C0.:r:.p'J.ig rl uGo.inst. t!1:~ 3:1ic d !j\long r;[~3":Jcr:1Jrl-t 8.S t r.. {'.' J.. J_ ,..., ' - . _1.1. ".,,' .. :..;. ", L..:..C -~.', . ' ~.!. h v. t .d~1 _lrS!"" 5v p.... 1:' 1 .!1 t~ "o"'~L':'I,.C:i [h.,~,,"-,.. Cl!l.. Jlt~.,. 111 ~'l le Cl-lCU~ ~S0!;,.nCOS-, -l~_J
I
1
prOl;-~~?t r::.1tific~~-:'io!: o~
gO -Jc: ~''rL~1021t \ 'l;.,."\[3 n:J.-'t;1J.:c~!.11:,=- . rolU C":'C~.11~~ to tc.ko up a pro"blo!a ';lhic11 Inig}r~ violl result in its overthl'o':! by the .';'ss cm::: ly e.ncl ,.',':'t:Lch e.ppco.Tcd l ess u rgent th0.n other sOTlou.s intcrn:1 1 r-::::td in-';:; er::'1.':.t UOD1:1.l prob2.8;;:S~ l~f''sOl' the Schu?;[wn C~, bi:let finn lly fc 11, t;hc shor-Cli 'led ~;::uio CO.biuci:; ,';0.3
Whcm tho lonG schedulec1. intc rpol o.tion on Indochino. fin:J.lJy C:-'.'"c, up 01'\ tl10 uc;crclD. -' the P:cir:l9 1.~inistG~" asked -t.11~-t:. 'CllO d8UJ.tc be pas c .. POllOd illdcfirli tcJ.~!, lYl1t indicSttcd t}l~ gO;lOl"l'_"::O!rc ~ S 8.lJpTovc.l ot: [.1~ Dolla cr'i:; i s policy o.nd. tho DD.ic d.1Alo~!.G protocolo.nd an.no"c1.ncccl th~t G. voto in fnvol' of o.djournmc:;}t ',[au ld bc. cOYl,,:i.do:r cd as o.ppro"\:ing this poEcy" A su~sbnt;"9.1 f:'~jod:ty Vio.S oo-co.incd. o..tC'3::' 0.. hriof d3bn:co 0"1 t ho adj01.1.rm,lo)'-rc inotiol1 '.'Thich indico.tcd gC:t181'2.l 8.pprov~\l of the Bo.ie el l Alon; pro-cocol by n11. p:l.rtics except the: CO:T"<'mmists, bu.t con s :id o.r,~ nbJ.o c1ifforc:1c-:;s of opi:n.io:'l o.s to its intcJ.'pY"et:).cio:"1 and mcthous of.: o.p? }_ic::1.tionQ The Socic.J.ists in pctrticular wore cmbClrrassed oj' the po..ycy cl:i.l'oct:i. vo mentioned o.bo vo"
. 110 Bollnert returned to Indochiln b rc[d:;hil:[; OFciT.!:l.sm and p:ro f ossiLlg to be co::-:.p letoly satisflcd 'sith 'cho 1l.s3cF'.b l y i s c,ction o.nd c onvincGcl. thJ.t D::>.o Do.i vlould l'cturn, and the i)ill)lc2cntD.t:i.(t~ of th,o
e ,
Bnie 'd I Along protocol c ould proceed im:ned ia'cclyo This op'cimistic f [\cC',do crunblcd quicklyo Bao Do.i l ost no thr.o i n r::.o.kinG it cleo..1' thc,t ho ..ms not returninG until D. fOX'r!u l o.grccTr,s:o.t had bc:cn siE;nod ~nd r r/cifiod by tho French Govern!-:!8::1t , not only covoring the princi-, plos of tho B::. :i.2. d If.long protocol; but the reserved s'J.bjects left fo~' futu.r8 n esot intion o Privo.t e and public st8.teD3n!~s of X1.;.o.11 [me} his l7t111ist ers nrl~l ur+cicl~3s in t119 n.o.*t i -.":t') press Si1G-;iCd. th[\t they ;;,~er e i~ 720 . ,. ~ . rl .. , "0 b1';- ' h '1' ~ ~, .!..t"'~' u~ F,'", ' ,)Yc.. y sn.\;::tS!le,-~ V'-l""Cl1 --en_ 0 ..... t..lu:;:; .l."-u:1Ct_J.:1S Ol ~:lC rr:~v..".:;J. oy -1..,{Lt; .~ .... !1Cn. . G('"i/crn:::.~::p. '-:,~ Tho llJcc~l colo~i~llj.s~c pr0ss pY'oclQi;:~sd tl de2."e8.-c fo r Bollaol' c G:o.d took pnins 'co poi nt out that the ~holo situation in Indo~ c h. iD~1 -.It~~s ill(:b~. l 8.21c.! t~!1ccn stitutio~:.~.l :J.r:d tr-:D. -G .! ill pD.l~ticulc.!, 110 . , c.:n2:lgo c0111d t ~l,k8 J?}. ~co in the poli t ic ~1 st~.1:UG of Cochin.chi ~.~ ':;i JC!1.C).1t fo:r ;-;-.::~ l P s 38!!.~1 :/ c..ctio:~.J s incc C;J c:!in('.h i ~r~, iIl c ontrns ~ to Tor~i:1 D.nc~ . f.:.Y!.Tic..r.1, is ['.. ~r0!:ch colon J' e.ncl ?rGrlch soilo Il
I ' ~4
Bollc.:.ert
SOO:1
fl\rt18 ~' c:::tc : .s:!.orl n
1:y1; it b e kT!a~:,~l thr..:.t };c ;"-;J~l ld :lot rcqucs c D. tjf his to!":-.~~ of of rico , ~,':}1i c~ 8X;li:::'GQ Soptorl1:J'3!" 3t)~
i he:
:tis r~s~c1 to r..::"tu.r-n. to ~~~":. T~.!>J to }" 0 b uilc~ [~is pe; .... liti c~ . l :-C'!:c:::'3 ~o:'"' t:1C; co:~ti::.:, c10C!t5.o:1~ .r'or t~:'8 CC~lseil d:) l~ I~(;?:~101~_:~}1)Bo
ro':\so~ 61.\~o~:. ',;:'..5
co:. . . trol,
~72 1 .~
hi s
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Proj ect Num ber: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 20 11
his plans for a prompt solution of the Indochinese problem had failed and that much time and effort still rema i ned to be expended. The appointment , of Mo PIGNON as successor to H. Bollaert came as a great surprise since his name had not even been mentioned among the numerous candidates for the position' (The tHO most talked of "Tere General MAST, former Governor of Tunis, and General CATROUX, a former Governor of Indochina and recently French Ambassador to Mosco,\r ) . Pignon is a career colonial official just over 40 yea.rs of age 1'lho has spent most of his service in Indochina. In 19L he had been fS Commissaire de la Republique (provincial govel"nor) for Cambodia lThen he \-T8.S called to Paris for a r esponsible job in the liJinistry of Overseas France . His appointment is generally considered as indicating the intention of the Cabinet to keep closer control over developments in Indochina. The neyT High Commissioner spent the first yTeeks after his appointment in Paris, arrived in Saigon on November 21, and returned to Paris on December 11, 19L~S. His bri ef stay in Indochina lvas chiefly occupi ed in bolstering up the tettering Xuan Government. A more detailed account of his activities since assuming office vall be found in the main s ection of this paper.
GMA/jr
173
American Consulate General, Saigon , Indochina , Febi'uary 12, 19~9. MEMORANDUM ON INDOCHINA FOR NElv DELHI FOREIGN SE-R.VICE CONFERENCE SECTION II .
A.
mUTED STATES I l\lFOPJ'ilATION SERVICE
Need for USIS i n Indochina
No American nevrs service reaches Indochina. UP service to Indochina ceased in December 19~8 because i t could not meet expenses . AP i s negotiating vrith the Bureau of Press and Information of the French Higb Com.missariat for Indochina , but even if AP succeeds in selling i ts service to tbe Bureau , that organization ,-Till translate , select a nd edit i-rbatever AP material it sees fit to pass on to the public througb press and radio. Agence France Presse service is distributed in Indochina under tbe Bureau ' s supervision . The Bureau naturally concentrates on pre senting the Frencb point of view' and on excluding all nevrs ,-rbicb might disturb the population or be inimical to Frencb policy . New's of the United States and of tbe United Nations reaches tbe public bere badly truncated or not at all. Against this background , USIS Saigon should be disseminating the full facts on United States policy . Here is an illustration of this mission. The French in Indochina have admi:ced the Dutch "police action" of last December i n Indonesia. The Indochinese press, lacking adequate news sources , at first misinterp:ceted beyond recognition the United States ' attitude tovrard that action. If the Department's 'ITire l ess bulletin were being received here , it ,<TOuld have been possible t o provide the papers and Radio Saigon promptly vlith the full texts of the Department ' s January releases on Indonesia and of Mr . JESSUP ' s statements of United States policy. Though delayed, this material did reach here by pouch from Bangkok and has been brought to the attention of friendly journalists . As vrill be explained below', eff orts are be i ng made to begin copying the I'Tireless bulletin in Saigon . The British Consulate General distributes a sma l l daily vTireless bulletin mimeographed in English on both sides of a s i ngle legal size sheet . American and other English language books a:ce not on sale i n Indochina . There has been ve:cy little English taught here. Nevertheless , the public , ,,,hether Vietnamese, F:cench , or Cbinese, is acquiring some Englisb and is eager to learn about the United States and its culture and achievements . The large , steady attendance at the Reading Room is evidence that USIS ' stock of books and p"l1blications fills a need and at t he same time contributes to .AJ"{lerican prestige B. Current Activities
Since USIS Saigon f i rst opened a temporary Reading Room on August 26 , 1946, ther e have been periods of inactivity i mposed by problems of space and personnel. The pr esent Reading Room opened its doors on August 13, 1947. It has a popular corner location on the main
174
f:1.::l 2. ~1 b:;:;i~~ess
r:-'I~
s J~r'?;t?~~ 0f'S;:\~(:O~lo
..
'1 1'13
C~10.i~s "~.~"'8
8.:"8
'"
i\ r " \ ) - ' J '~')'-'
ccr."l:'or- .::.b18 J t
.,J ....
.l~~0
sn8lvcs
oJ ' .
e ttrr~c.Jci v-e , '~nd the "';iietr~~2;~(~SC ~t.-t C:(:(~[\ i:! (~S

1!10
stoc.~
1
01.
~ ~ ~JO"-:..J
1;::,
:_
:'~vc,,,,,S~
,,,
'
....
.t.
( : .1.
J'AS~
,~ r.. . . .. O~'-~.L
cfricj'.cy-~-t D.;lC~ c:)'.J.rt~..:;~~s. " V. .~ . . ; TI'JC: .. eu .... l!!6 _ .. b .1 r C";.... Y - rn,"" )
n.cc:uisitioY":0 r..:-c: flc~-.;:jnc i!l(;
r cc..dc!'s 2.nd v:si-so'Y's CX~ 80C.S 200 ( [."t01'2.~e 5,000 2 n r r.,on~ h) 0.1',0. is i:1 "-.;'::c i~tio c,f mo,,:: -;;h?n 3 A3iutics to 1 Europc~n. ?here is Q1so a Eritish 2a~ding R002 in So..i so:-'! , but j t f,uff81~S f'ro!:t ~\. ve!~: i:-.i.S0::1"';;C)!: j. ~!1t lOCD.tio~ E'.. ~~ .:i l~cl:s s-;;0..ff. .';'+;t e:r'_d'j. ~~c () [ I t th'2 ~ritish R8~cliEg ~r;on is only c, s:':.1.11 frClctior. of th~t e~ j oy8d by USIS. Fro:.
~ ~::ch
l ~ailJr uttC!lI~~:.L2,J o.~~
public affa ir s nrt-oushed c-..~,i ~:ill ed , '~:-'ltil the [I.rri.-vi..:.l of t.::o P~"OSC!lt. Infor;~:\t ::'on Offic-.;r on ~:ov ') ::-:Jcr 12 tr.C1'8 ".:[).s ::0 A:o,; ricnD l)crsonr,<31 rcttr:ched to USIS S~ibon. I~ o~cv0r , tho Consul Gano ~ ~ l in3truct~d n vice consul, ~r . Dnll~s~. COOLS , to give such 2ttc!ltion -;';0 t ho co:--:duct of' c. I!h o ldi ng op e !':.l.ti::mll at liSTS 8.S ';,ou1d bo cOr',sist ont ':;it:-i the perfor;;:("cnc::.e of his ot:r:c: r duties. Tho prc'.'ious ;"::-,cric[~n clircctor of 1'S1S S[:ison resignsd on J ~nuflry 15, 1 9'18. The P)'c;s(:nt diroctol" [,1'1'i VQ~ OliO yo ,,:- Ie, tor, on Jc,m.w. ry 13, 1 9490
a8D.!1nn
:1
7,- 1 943,
\',';-:Or1 ~~~TS.
S;~~C.~;i::S ,
essi s ~~':'..~t t'J!-~p0r8.~ily 5.:'1 ch ~ !"'s~
o.' ,(':;SIS, S:;.i,;cI: ,
-::.~S
to t :1C , ;ffcc.t i ",-0 '.'.~c~k of !.!ro Co o rs e!ld of -th,\.:! sll~~ll 2..r~d d Ciiotcu ~'.r i ct::-~<;:;t''::2C stnff, the 1::,',:"0 A!~~-'Jric~t!l of~icors 110"';'i e:.t 11S13 }:.~-ve t~1 '~: 3n oyer :;. ~oir:; CO?!'8':: r~:. l:i}--.ic}-... pro',/id cs , il~ c.(:di'~ioYl ~o tLe Rc~~irlG Roo:Tl J weekly filn ~:lo".';-iriGs iYl Cl },o.:l J.0C\2"c:::c1 by t;,o EurcClu of ?rGss ,~] ,.. ..... .) - ..,r. . . . .;I"r.- J " ..... s"rTC'" .l."~n- l ('r-'ir'~ __ _ . , .--. ''In'' "'-1";-'0.1....",- +0 SC 1'0 01S' ('.... :U .:. " ' -, Lv fi'I' ''' ' .t -''\,.:v L. ...... ..;) v __ c:!"! d ors!"":.:tiz~~\ .Jcio:lsJ t!:c c:!.st~. . i1;"'...lti'J:.1 of ; . ::,~ri~ ~__ :l p'"Jri0di.cc... l s to 8. c~r0-. J. ull~/ S~Jlcct. 0d li~; 7., the sift ~istributior~ of '.\'c.r'tiE1G stocL:s of p~"PG:i.~'" .... bour:.d C~[l o co :( S ~.!! (~ f\r:"'12,T t':-):-~800~~0J 8.nd Q li~: tl(: cl!lturo.l exch::..ngc vjor~. The pc:~ioc~ic.:-. ls ~~n:l ~.';:" r~ir.lc Da o].:s G.}~C !7'..::.ilcd or s}li~pcd 7.0 s ;.~_ 1.. 1')- ... ..t. c: ~l' '~"'" -~~ . . .,.-;...-t') pCl"'so n . "':1,,1........... ::;:; t':.l~ p...1 io"-!~J- ,J.. . . . .-'-r~'" -:~"."\ ... .~.... 1'.1- .... or> ' . . . d~ .~..:.~ _.:;, ' o liSTS l!8.s r "".:'i "'""'son to b~li8~. . . c tr~'J.t ~ O :7',~ o~ "tr:ls !~::.-::.L:r}Cl.l fll "Ccrs l!!.to c.rC !l3 t~!!Ct(;I" "I'l ic-c !~ir,h (rc b0J.) CO!". b"o 1
Ths.i1~S
.!..L_' _V~ --,
. . ; 0 ....
. , .1.
.1.
- ' ... ~ \.. l _
L..;.
J,. .'. ....
... ",U _
\..0
.I."
-.:'
"-
...
"I
1 (.. ... . . . . .....
Plons to nonitor nnd distributG the wireless b~lletiYl have gone on for [, lo;\~ ti;:JG ::nd ["TO nO"i.' b~i"b pus::'cd. T}':,o pr~scnt stU::tOJ.j~lg bloc}: is t:1C l ::tc~: cf office ~p:lc'J ~o ~CC0 !7[:~:)do.tG the Y lirc l ess equipner:t ~::.cl op o rntor and tl1c C~1)lO~r00s [!.;!d r:-_~C:j,i~l":)S to t~. . kc c":'.ro of du?l ic~tiQn ) ~i stribution , ~n~ CV?:1t UD ~ tr~nslat~~~ o~ the b~lJ.ctin.
Offico S?~cc:
l S
cx.1": rc :-:1'-Jl:: sC0",~ce
1}1
SD..l.~G:l J
btrt l:01S
lS
lC:l":!J.!l; no
steno u ntur~cd i n sc~rch of it.

Sr:~':\ll ~l.l~k ~ '.~b3C~"'i~Y!~io~s to Ti:-:c J I'~c~.t,rs',:r;?c ~:, ::lEd Life (2 5 , 27 ~!~d 19 ccpi:::s r,::s;')::;c~i\':;12r) '. !".:; r oc.:.:T:';cc[ i)5n.ci fic cJitlOYis) !'.r:.d distri.8ut::d b~r uSIS ~:>:) ~ ~cl (~ctcrl li st i~~cllJdi:1E; fri ..~nc:l~r j 'Ju rn':':.list s . 7!1Q I ni"cr::-:--.c:.tio:::. C:i'ic~r di~-t.!"'i~l.-!.tlJS rJ;",':s it 0;~S C;.:lG ph0tOS r ':J c 0 i':l0cl bv ujr fr o ~ t~o D~~~I~~?~~ ~~d C~-:'~ 2~l ~..-o;"' S to p l~:. CG t};. c; ::l ":/i1S Y'O -7:. ~lC~T ";l"i 11 . b e ~~Draci~tcd c~d ?~blis~c d . As -:'}-.is P!' GSS p~ o: r c.2 }:tlS jus t o8cn if re "ll.~i:.. . (l :lc~: of' p C: Y'so n~~:Jl r. ~l s C" 1.'30(,1 i"' s <:"'''D''''''sio~') J _ v ~ co .1. L. n~ _... early to ~cn su r~ its c~f o ctivcn css . Scv c r~l loc ~ l F~p crs . Vic t " ~~csc ,
l{c!rc--
;.j
-I.
. . . . . . . . . .A. ....
.:.J~
-10..-.)
\.._
?!,, (; ~! G}1. C't.;'l.8. C~irtC)sc
l Clnf,'.J~. (;,) , C~jt s
p ~. . . c -:,:, s
~:,:'lJ, J
1 s.l,: i c
r ..
~' :-.o:t
nrc s:-rint:~l.s TjSI G r:~tcri Q l, crli Qf l~r ? i r~... "tn s O'~C.:J :-:-:::t t::. ric:. 1 f1"o:-:1. T 2. 77'.0 ~:. Yld
175
c.
?ar ticu l~r P r oblc~ 3
E~countorcd
i n Indochinn
Tho ci.vil Y:Cd' in In (:()ch"!. ~1':~ c.r..d 1~hc;' 1"0.-::1; U,.a.-!~ Sc,jG,)~1 :'o r nll j.ts is f", b::::sie[;cd citj' h2. vc <:: (}ir cct bec.\ ~L ,g O!'- til0 o.c.} to d,:<y nctiv'iti cs of USIS . ilT'10ni; ?T(;DC~~lI:1Cn i ~1 lndochi~lO tr..e bGli e f ,I)Grsi sts tIn t the llnited St::.:::es nishe,:; i'or CCC;:l0;':.1.C ;-:easons to Gup;?la." t Frcl,-ch po'::er ctn:l influenc e) }:e ro. 1;1es,:; fc,-r;to::-'[; po.v') in t:1C P8.st 1 'Je. to o:'~ ficia1 French prot ests ~ g2 jn st one or uno~ho~ Qctivi~y of USISunJ still condition it ~ func t ioni ng . T~o ;?1o.i11 clothes men h c.b~t~nlly l oiter n c::.~ t}10 cntrD.rJ.GC to t!1,) RC0..diT16 RooTn.c .[\side froI ,1 tllC qu est i on of W},ct:1c r (',nyon:) is o.ct'J.::dly I:l')lcsteJ. for 0.tto~lc1ing tho j~:n.Jricc, ::1 RcndinG TIOO;'l, tho preSC!lCe of t:18S;:; (~ ot6 c-7;i'!cs T Y cO. use so me lnt c restc:d r.D. persons to sh,:;.' 0.\',-0.1ch~'-rm
The sho':,ing o.nd lencling; of filins i s oi,"cunberec1 ':rith cO::1t}'ols n.nd rod tc..p o . To b0 shoi'.-n [~t n11 c.. fil rrl rrlO)'st h:t ve boell granted 0. ;tvis c~ 1t by the Burec..u of Press c..~:d I !lfcr r'_'1.tio::1 . lu,-yo nc i','ishil1g to borru:r film~ for sh o'..'ings must hCtvc th;:; sp ecific np;?rc1vo.l of tho Bure!}l";'. For in stn :1ce , 0.!1 o'::~-!er of ruobJY pluntc..tions 'r equests USIS in v:riting to place his plantat ions on tho list for regular film loc..n s . Ho s-cc.tes t!J!l.t, t11c c..'J.di cncQs Y.ril~ COJ:1si s Jc of Viotn ':'tTrl()30 8r:~F1oycGs, French supervisors , loc~l guc..rds, Clnd French soldiors. liSIS write s to tho Buroau, oncloses c.. do~y of the lc tt~r fru~ tho rl~nt~tieD o"meI', ["Dd o.S!CS (:,p~):ro"is.1. Tllis is grnr:t,-,d p::-O:n;lt Jy> ["no LISTS is th~n free to circubto fil ;ns , e[',ci1 of '::hich must ]1o.VO b een "visQ '3c1 1! to tho plnntn tio11s in que stion. Alth ouGh the precise effect, carnot be esti ITu0.. ted, th ese fo;' ;r::-.li ties must C'.ct as a bro. l~e on c..p:21icc.tior:s to borre';, USIS filr::s, The Director of the BurcD.u of ?rc3s nnd In:'or~il'::. tion 11o.s [lto.ted thCtt ~p?lico..tion f or pcrmissio:1 to issue tho v:ir closs bullr.:tin ",ust bo E::tdo to him in -,::ci ting_ He f:c~rlQd thc.t he \"iou ::'d 5 .:1,;Tledi::\tely gra~t o.p?ro\c:l1. l~ovorth::;less, t!-'.is require S. proccc.'_:re illu stI'ntos the C).osr.:: control 0xel'c).scd ovor printed );'.0.tte l'. Th e Fronch [,uthorities \"Jill ccl'tc..inly prot est [',::;o.i'nst c..nd: ondec:.vor't.o stop c..ny USIS activities to \,'hich the~' tcJ(C cbJoction. Expo.nsjo::\. of the progn\m l1GrO or nddi tions to t;.-,.c l\.n:o:rican stC\ff of U8IS must be c~r~i e d out with circumspecticn i n order to ~void suspicion and obstruction.
i nforl1':-~lly
I
--
Tho short8gc of office sp~co is acco~p:lnied by n sC:lrcity of 1 i ving c.cco::1f':-iod:~tj.or:s. Tl-:c un so l ;.~ c~d D..!1d } )s.r:::..s;']inf~ h otJ. s ing probJ.cms of. th:; t',oeO A'.:c;ric,~n CGup lcG c..1'o cvj.de:c.co ti....l t S0r'h) tiE:8 nust el'\pse bafer", '3 v.--;n .:;. t~lirJ ; ,:c.;::,r i c::::, n is ['.ss iC r'.od 1;0 rSI S S0..i.:;on. On tho other h~,~lclJ :::dditio~1::\l loc(~l pCl's:::-nn.~l \'i~_ll 1 0 c::1plo:/od QS soon 8.S o.dditionul offico 3p~CO is obt~inod. Th is prospoctive i nc~caso i n l oco.l st~ff \'rill, in addition to p~ oducins ~hc ~ir81ess ~ullotin, eletle F3::S to o;,:p:-:.Ed tho distri'o~rLiJ'1 Oi" photo cxhi'oi ts end to sot up C! lCJ;. c~inG libl'[lry' of r ccordcci. :-r~usico
The P1"'3s:;r:t pcssibilitiss of O~(c:1'J.nt:0 of persons 1';orl:1DE hero nrc s c v , :.:!'cly li :::i t(;Q. 1\ fC.'i stu.r>:;n'cs h[:.vc o. ~)pli ed for scholc.rshi2s nt . 1~ 17i1::~ i r.~\!l \,1":: i . ;;c r sit i c;~.., ,~_ T_" . uS IS }1~ S fo r .r8. ru,:;d ~};, '3 i!'"' [,?P 1 i c~.t ions : CC! t:1.i~l [~ d.-"-.] r;)0 f~cto:rG c:<ist i:(lccpc!'1 (~ ont ly 0.7.."" t:~c (;i vi} v.~8.r ~nd of
<:
0
176
th o i m;Jossioility
Declassified per Executi ve Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16 , By: NWD Date: 2011
tho i::\p oss i hility o:~ (,::t. ~ i~i:l C d o 1ln.::- e ;,:r::!":.rlt~ e , 1'-81'Y fc;:t Viet:l~~.; ~.':::0e nrc suffici e nt l:y '::-c:1 1thy 1111.16r ~ll~{ c5. Y' c1.~;:-tS-:~. ~1 ~ es -to fj021d tl-:ei l' c~1il~ren h:l lf ;'!~\y nrourd t!18,:,-c)l-ld tc: collee:e. ]';,0 :i.! :!ple::lfl~l~:::. ~j. on of tho Fu1,..,..r'r.;.,..,.,c- ..... t "-l +1- ,;. ..... ..... 'Y'c, l" .::a ~ c i'Y"l \'" :'" \r01~~ rC>r Jl O~,. +- -11'1 _... .. _is. ~ t;" ..:. ...... '--' LJ\,;..o.';'!:.:> p,'lr Ti- ce~ ""'s . 1 ........ .. _'- ..... ............. b rlb!1v tilprot',olo t.i1["t th :tfl i::1~:'. e;LmtC'. tior-t -i;ill pl:::.c '3 Tnd ochin8s8 n?p li cccnts in dir oc-\: co mpet i tiO::1 '.'ii ",~h those in' Fro.!lcc? In the'. t C'1.50 t}: c).'e is :1Ot, likely to be :::.ny politico.l cliscri:nir:::..tj 0n. o.f,c~inst Vi (;tn:~mese or othe!' Indcc:li no5c ['.p.i.)lic:<rts 1'h3y -:fill, hO-"f:3'!Cr, co nsti t'.Jte b~lt 0. sIc,ll fr ::tction of thos e nE? l:,:ing inrrench t err ito2'Y D.nd ..ri ll ro.r e J.y possess u..cco: r:p li shr!1J!'"'1:'~; p '.:-. : r :nitti~i,G th0:n to r;:~ct t:hc c07"Jpctition. of sttl.coJrts frO :il Fr2.. nco itself, It ':,ill b-::: l' c:cf'..lJ.cd tl-co.t the F1J.lbri gh~ p rogrLl.ill is designed for Gro.du~te studc~ts.
j ......
t.,;"",'!ll.u.d
.~
\" .,~ l
~.!. l
.I' oJ
~J
1 .!IJ. ";
lbnoi is und e r more ir:tc ;:(sc si eGo th~~l So,i gon , nr..d h~,s expericnced morc d estruction. . ~ very rn0~cst USIS pr o~ r~ n . li mit e d pri; ~Y ily to rrtf;.g"zir:os nn.d so;~c filr:l di st rihuti on , is ubcut to bc l o..unch.:::d Ly tho Cons ulate there. The possibility of cxpo.nding this pror D.~ ~ill b o subject to p o riod:ic r e viuw, ?r cs:::nt pJ.o.ns f,}-C for t ile, Consul o.nd Vice Consul to dc -?to so~e of their ti ~o to USIS o. ctivities, fissisted b y on.o or h;o Victnc.DcsC emplC'ycd nt USIS c:YO!}sc. T!io p oss i8Hity of op o ning f, sJ!'.;~ ll rco.din.; ro om ~,-t ?}-::lOrr. POn..!i, trw c~\rit o. l of CqmoodiO" i s being consider e d. Despit c the
1,~~ J. o. y r.. ) ~nc1
D.ccclcr~tod
temno of eve nts in China, Ind ones ia,
Bu r rl::1. , the situ ).tio:l i ~ t!10 F;"cnchrh...;ld o..~oo.s of I!ldc'
chii!.8. 11::'.3 L '! on rcJ::-~tiV'J ly 0btic for sopo ti;1'.c p:tst. This rc~)ort b ean writt en in tho li Ght of this sta tic situation. Currant Fr ench !1e~ oti8.tio n s -,:i'.:;h cX-~"'J!cror B::l.O Dni of ;1.::Tl8.Ji'. r'1':l. y 1c:td to hi s o0.rly return to Vi()tr:.~:':-:i -.iit~ :J. trend tor;~,rd ,,1:)rc p C:l.cc f u l c onditions in bclocl: ir.:'. ,';hich I;ou ld p cr:7lit 8X'.fJQ.:ldod USIS ac~ ilJitios. The s in C1c f ::lctor of i Trl.2 2 '..-c: d tr::-,nspo rt:J.t:'on L~ ci li tic s would be ::1n -o '-~ ~n ~lf . ..,-, ..., 1' ' .. JCvonv ~ .... 11"'l',CD,,v :J. d,,,,J,, ,.-. . ~n" L'G~. _, } 1O,...~ vv r, CO. _0:.. 1t lO " S "\.... "..... mora.un0c.; ttl,.>d; -v
hQ5
USIS will soon be nd vc:rsoly affoctcd.
H?C/jr
177
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16 . By: NWD Date: 2011
IJt. ,'{m'. }': . !-!lUl)v.)1" . : :t0 r i CS\:1 E:;.~.~~ s s~' A

DaDG~:ok
?.,:y::- ~_:-:. i 1.-.s th:\rd ~; (?>~.:r" !~~S cor~-L in.1)~d its tho ~l~t SiA n~~~ll~. 7h3 usu al f~ 11 Q~d -.'tin tcr c~..t::1?':.i;:-!S j ::-;::;1'8 li-:!:it2:C :~ [cc:(:-3 tt~~:1 JJ:st )-Gc.r, ra sultcd in -:r!0 r cocc:.; ~)&..tion of ~.:;S!.! .. :lc::~! r:: d ~J ()-" -:lS [".. ...:c tj'!:; .lSt~,:l c::-:.:yc.~)} . . c of' stoc~<s of' '..rrns
'I~:(: ~:.r:~r i~~ Ir~ .::. 0c:--~i!:.:). :
ind 8c isi~ c
course
duri~s
ar:j cz:?losi -:." :-~s , ";iitt:cnlt r:'~~~' ~l;(;iEi~.:-c :(')~~JJi:~ ';r~c trIJis!.l t}~LC.t ~lthsrc: is no r'!.il~t:1.ry soll.l:'io:l n for I:1Qoshi~1:=- ~~-: ;~~')r\) p::;;t5.n.c~:.1~ rlo~r trJln c-:~:r~
100 , 000 ?r Qnc~ troo~3J ovor 8C% ln~o c ~inc~c. Seno6ulcse Forcj;~ or ot~"'"lcr ~lf')1~c811~:.rics:J :!:~i."(1.:":. ::; e TG th~~Yl r.G'':"":; ':':''J.~~\. -tt; ~~O hold t!1C pr') sont "'lor:,; li:ai.tcd r.Y" 'Jc.s :;1'"\ 80~1C.l'"ol~ ~!.:. -!~hi[j ~~cl.:;:.!~~~o, l arge 5c:'"-lle Chin ese Cc:-~n.;,:-:ist intar~e nt i()r: or -!:he c0:~r~) J . c;tc -~' 18""~kcl(.//I-fl of pres:;~t . .. po~itics.l :---.cG0t.i.:;.tioY'ws l e~~d i:1G to 3clf'--Go~/8r~"'L-:1o:-(t. -.\~o\.llc. }-~:\vc u scriaus s if n ot diE::\strous, C:l"\:"'SCJ.~ 0::' +~}-! ('; !)r 2S~:::-'I.t FY"cD.ch r . iJ ito.r~r .?ositio~!o
L ~sion
wit~
}~i s -: c 1'''~f -----
Since cnrly i~ 1946 ~ sucscssion of ?r cnc~ generals (i ncl~din;

I.I~ C~ ::; ~c 8.nd '/~lll_(/, ~.;o of t:10 ~olc~t) l11."f. ."f] tried -ch:;ir jY~:nl:: n-s
pacifyinG
I~doc~in~.
A high
~ oint
in
t~c
series of
c~m2~igns ~ns
roech cc i ~;. :~avc'l;i~--;::; l'" 1 9'-; 7 J -~tit}1 :). succc::;siul fnl1 c.:::::..r.?n.ign ir: T011;cin th0.t c. .:.;r.. lt c.. S':';-iG:lG c;..!!.G. 1Jnc:(p3ctc:~ blo. . ..r to the: Viet ::Iin}lo The Frc:"'!ch \1;ore ur.~olc: -to cc~solid[\t 'J t:1ci r r..:c.\-=:,.!y~~&C , hc.'{~;ver , nnd b~t Decc;71!y:;r
19-17 ';.:erc "::J o ins

l orcor...,
I~
~'1i:r~h
r>
->
t '0
',':).;.,Cln::"'8.','i Vl!
'
Cou~"1.tcr~:::.tt';?cks::l
.j..'
.~
Lo''';"
11 ~y
ell n1o:1S tho lin0 , fiT'.[', lly

~ ,.
b 8ir~g
co
Snell"
orlE;l?i8.J, !?OSrClon s .
" .
soitc of
..
subs~sucnt
rQids
of
or
c~ nb i~ cd '.
!~ ~. s
onerations into Viet

,1.,.
hold
t~rl'itor~',
the ir:it i::.tivQ

~iost
rc~~i;:.(;d
v,-ith
-::---10
Eo
Go~.~orr;.-
ncnt,
tObc;t~: c r \":5.. th c O:lt :'~l
of t1:c cour:.try.
T~0 ?~st f ~~ ~o~ths h~v~
fir :;t J f'iv o
.,
.L. '} CP :] !":}l.,.l::;n C' . : ::c..:.l:::C; ~ 1
s cc~ t~o cpcr~~lons

,.1'
;l;~ S
uC:Slf::-:e
d.L . r > r o "h 1.0 c ue:; o.!..! ~ .. lO
i~
Tonkin.
The
. :::.')1..~n~r-!.l~OU3
t : !10!~~f!Jrll-.c8C.'")UOtf1
c..c.t~.~lio~~) l'~~i,
fro7':'l ~~!-!C: ric:--t rice .prat}uci:;[: ~.Jl.Jv!:'~!a

~!:C! li r~C!
co
p:!.r::..t!"8G?, lJ.:-::d S).;-,::l Sc:-: l~:,- -.. ~:~~oi in th,~-i~~iti!"'. l st:'~[::;s C'~nc. 7":0 \Tj_Ct. storss 7.r (;!",c f o:.l:!~~ }=Qr':~ssin& CO:'l :!..:C~ ?"' r,~t ~c:..cS ~l~~S t~'1 -:; ??rir.~ctor o:~ tr!ic 2:) ' :Tj~G s~\liG~t. :r..:~k 8 it r. lrG~dy' ep?e~r do~ttful if it C ~~ b~ hold d~~in; ~h0 r~j~y ~0nso~.
S'C!1
co~oi~' -:;d
'i:::;';,:!":;'
:-,:i(l
It i~";'- 'Jl-\'~Gd c.. rive:r O?oT~~tio~ -:0 soize ?:o r.Js:5J~2Y!CC; -~;.~S !:::::;i~
. ]}~:.~.1 Di:':~i -~ ?i:~

~p!!
T~o SCC0~a 7c~ki~ ap~r n ~iG~ b e sun C~ S Dcc 0 ~~cr 8~~ h~d the li~c l..:,. - ~:~:.:2 :1 ~-~ b ('~S its 0C\jr::C-::".-0 , t OGc>;Lcr ;';itll 8. t ~clcrl~~
.l':::'1C;
cf'
5~~ C'-::~ . .;~ t
c ::; !.~_::"
':JT r::5is:'c,:-"':(;~:; ~nG [.:.r:~t3 sur;:r~~. ". in. th e Delt:-.. o

hc~vy rcsist~~cc ~ct .
and
178
co rlB ide ~':j. b lc
Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16, By: NWD Date: 20 11
con5id Ql'~blo slocks of D'..ly:itio;}s o.r~d S\.lUi: li cs v:crc: scizc~. Si.:1c ,:: thr~ 1:[,n Di!:.l: .. ?hu Ly - ~-i-:' do:,!; line is cClti!"(; ly sl.lY-rcurd.cd by Viet !Iir:h h e ld nre~ nn~ h~d to be sUP21icd by ~ir or rivcr-bo~t ) Fronch ~~thdrew fr o!~ t r'i. C ['~rc~, Y [!lcn objec-t. i '/0S h::td beor!. rc~c}le~ I o90r~tiG!l cni5.r:2; 21 J::'!1u':',ry.
This ro~~tivoly ~r8~quil 5CCtO~ er~ptad on 16 Jnnu~ry 19f9 ~ i th n I n r !;c sc:;.lc Viet Lenh ~tt:;.c:-( 0:1 t:10 :::'oul'o.nc:: - Ruo r ailroc.d resu1ti.:;g i n c.ostr'lction of the tr;.:.iCl c,nd. c::::.rturc of tho T:l9.n'1gcr of the} r8.i1ro(.\(1. Previously ~n l y routine French cle~n-up p~orntions h~vG beon noted durir.g the p':.st six :t:or.th" il;' tho L:.rro','f, hundrcd-r:1ilo-long co['.s-;:.o.l strip hol~ b~.r i'rc.nch ':orcQs in co!!tr.~l ./l.!ln~~} lte !~ S i n South Jl.TI1;8.Til, nn nttc:1u'~ .Lccc. C~~i:-i 0:: s:-:-..:J.ll fCl'tc: end ~lo~~<.~'1:')usss ~ ED.!1!lG:l by' sccc'~1clline troops, is subjoct to intermittent end ~d~ittcdly ncrvo-~r~cking nttucks. T~i.s attrition, plus niscrnblc living and s~nit~ry eon~itions
11~s rcducGG. r:l;):r"':::lc ~!1d
C oc!tinchin~
initi[~ti ".,e
j .l1
1)ot~ CC!ltrCll ['. r~
South
1~?1:18.n ~:r~[;.rplyo
Thr ee fc. i rly c.. blc SC:18 1'::'.1 s , LZ CLBJ.C , EYO, nnd 30jor Db LA l'O'JR !1~\TO tricc1 thcir'}-_8.n( at p8.cifyit!,?; Cocl1inchiI!c., but in 0.1I~ost three yo~rs tnt.) Sitl~~~tiCl1 hJS rcr.T"\i118d virtu~11:y' u:1c1:c~ng0do The French hold ~11 tho 18.r[;o tCY,':!lS nne. D. srrc.ll naJ,:;-:rork of ro::'.Qs n.dint;ing fro n S~igO;l to the rw:-thl \'Iost [lnd nort:r;iGGt quito firmly, 0.1thou[h D.tt ~(;!G:; (;","on wi"'.::.hi:-: this lh:cit:;d :rn:"O":iOl'~: e.re f requent [', :lee sonetincs seve ro. 0;:;YO:ld it, j.~"l spite of r:!:':ssive S"'.'08PS nnd ~;ncirclon:cnts, p~ro.~ tro op c.nd ::'.::tjJ}ti'uiGus opero."tic:1S, trc cou~tr~'sic.o ro"'-."ins in Viet ?d!'.h . C0~ t , . "'h 11 c ".ln~ cos vones nrea woct l sou~n 01~ SUlgen n~d 11 '~1 ' , T i l CDC ' ' - c~e ,~C_ 1.0 \';h01e riC!l, ricc -Gl'O-Ting C:'-l 1:",,1.1 ponin::;ulo. rCF.!..-:.in l)nrl;:i.cul':', rly stronG centers of "Jj.Gt r es is t.c.nco. Tho lo.test l'Cl) Ortl;d Frc~:.ch pl8.n for the Cn l:<"u p.".!!lin~\.Jl('. i s to permit ;:;0 rico to bc c:x:po;'te::3. fl'Ol-;i it, in spite of world 1'iC0 shortnt:os , so SQ1iclly i s its econo:.1Y co:c.trollcd by the Vi0t lEnh.
DU 1 .iOULII'I ,
C n~bodin
nnd Lnos
Those I nrgo, sparse ! y-inh~bitod, doficit n~cas usc up I nrge nu~ bor s of Frcmch [',nd Im~oe~:incsG g,:ll'rison troops to protect to'.-ms c.nd c o:~ur:iCS~~~:i0!lS fr ow nn i.nsignificc:.nt Inclopondenco mO\'GDont wrd_ch dro..ws rnost. of i.!cs strerl.;th fro::n Si~~ ~~U tl1c \li~3t ~'.~i:.:--.e Ir-!pcr-ce.r..t opo:'O:t.iOD5 on the p~rt of eit~8r e.dvcrsnry nro very rare, although lo.rge senle Free L!}.Os C'l)::;r[~tiors ['.re ropor~cd pl~n!!c:d for lc.tc Fo~~"u~ryb
Cun'Cl:t est5..",- .teG giv~ [t tc:;[\l of 100,OC Fl'cncn troops f02~ 0.1i " of Jndocl""!i::.'\. or th")so , o.l!!:c:>st 50% [:.1"'0 cclio'lcd to be Irt0.ochi:-il")Go j l~ti '\7'')S, U:1 (:or ?ro~cll :J.f'ficcrs o.nd 110~'1-c'.)r.:s y,"hi to }'r0nch .troc'9s J i ncludin~ c~~rcs; ~re not bcliov2d to CXC 0 C~ 20~ of the tot~l or nbout 20, 0)0. 12,COO ?or~iU1 1'3SioE nnu 0.. f:ii:i:turc J..1CC::- i ~.r!s) T'u::i s i~ E2, t.o ;'3~:hc r -,f-i th [.. fC-I'v Pon(~ i et c r~r Ill Q i:!. ns, ~;~~(O 1.;IJ th-=: t ::l:-:.ncc;~ ;-~ rc~i:-:-~C:~lt. o~ F:'0~iC!"l :.~"..rin:;s c.1so sc:r:"'vc ns ir:f~:.T!t::::... CO ~~):.:t tr00?3 ~ith t\a ?r0~ch Ground fo~ccs.
G
179
SGCE2T
Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Secti o n 3. 3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. B y: NWD Date : 2011
Native anti-Viet Hinh movements such as Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Partisans, etc . have b een virtually vlYitten off as an asset, and in the cas e of the l atter b'lO groups have become an admitted liability. Morale and discipline i n all combat units visited during past months shovred a sharp decline over the past year , particularly amon..g paratroop units. Hidespread atrocities have been reported by American and British sources in the North ; health and sanitary conditions in the field ",ere ob served to be very bad; and there is a -vTidespread lack of confidence in both the Fr ench government at home and French generalship i n Indochina among officers and superior non-coms . Feeling the general hopelessness of the military situation, many of the albest young officers are seeking staff rather than combat duty, and only the most recently arrived French troops shmV' much combat enthusiasm or smartness of discipline . In this com1ection, Viet Minh propaganda makes much of an alleged rec ent proclamation by Andre MARIE, French Minister of Justice, offering French convicts a chanc e to "red eem" t hemselve s by j oining the Colonial Army to fight in Indochina . The pay of officers and superior non-coms, hovrever , is good to excellent , particularly in comparis on Hith metropolitan France; professional advancement and decorations frequent; and thes e factors have i nhibited 'lfridespread resignations or desertions . Generalship The present two ' top generals in Indochina (BLAIZO'r and ALLESAl\1])RI) are thought by French officers to b e decidedly second rate, although served by a first rate Genera l Staff. Area cowmands (KOCH in Tonkin, LE BRIS in Almam, DE LA TOUR in Cochinchina ) are little more than autonomous sector commands. All large scale plans and decisions are made in Saigon by Allesandri and staff , vTi th some interference by the High Commissariat, particularly on the political implications of military moves. The Navy With a single carrier, a cruiser, a dozen colonial sloops, three LST ' s, 16 mines'\'reeps , and a vari ety of small landing craft at its dispostion , the Naval Connnand j.n Indochina is a minor military factor . I ts functions are: river and coastal patrol (ant:L-arms and rice smuggling) ; transport and support of troops in amphibious operations, and protection of river convoys . A r egiment of Marines (Fusiliers :M arins ) while offic ered by' t he Navy is und er Army operational command. They are recognized as the best combat infantry in Ind ochina at present. The Air Force Some 36 out-date~ German Junker tranSl)Orts (JU52 ' s) used for para troop operations, are the backbone of the French Air Force in Indochina. Additional planes are old Spitfires and C-LI7' s, plus li ght observation and persom1el planes such as Piper Cubs. Besides transport of parat roops, the mission of the Air Force is the bomb ing and strafing of villages not in French control , support of ground troops and p ersonnel tnmsport . As in
180
Declassified per Exec utive Order 13526, Sectio n 3.3 NND Project Number : NND 63316 . B y: NWD D ate: 2011
As in t he Navy, promotions and decorations are slo'J, and morale and ma i ntenance have both fallen off sharply in the past months . Pilots particularly resent lack of ground facilities, and various safety devices "rhich those trained in the U. S . ( over 50% ) there learned to r egard as indispensabl es. The Viet Minh Opposed to the French forces are about 75,000 Vietnamese troops of v ar i ous political complexions , l argely u nder Cormnunist dominated leaders h i p . There is considerable F-.cench- furnished evidence of COlmnuni st political commissars and indoctrination extend ing do>;'ffi to company strength levels It is certain that the disciplined Cormnunist element has b een the largest factor in maintaining the vigor and cohesiveness of t he r esistance . In this, they have b een greatly helped by French i ndecision and bad faith, and the terrorism of Fr e ncll troops.
0
I n spite of arms captures and occasional defe ctions , there i s no sign of large scale weakening of Vietnamese resiste.nce abilities or morale . The large areas und er Vietnamese control lack luxuries and medicines, but are wholly self - sufficient in the basic necessities and tolerab ly 'lye11 pdministered , according to what fe'i>l reports are available. Tlley continue to form a source of supplies and of fresh tr oops that are ?nly limited in numbers by the arms available . Although there are rumors of a Chines e Communist treaty ,rith Ho Chi Minh , and of a Chines e Communist genera l and his staff in Northern Tonl(in , there is little evidence , as y et, that the Chinese are of any c onsidera'b1e help in the resistance. French sources feel that there i s l ittle danger of a Chinese Coimnunist 5th column in Coch:inchina, or of an invitation on the part of Ho Chi l'-1inh to the tr oops of the age old national enemy to enter Indochina in force , in spite of the Communi st link. All French military sources consulted , h owever , feel tha t a large scale Chinese Communi st i nvasion "rou1d make most , if not 1 all, of Ton..dn, militarily untenable. For many months past , observers feel that the resistance has not put forth its maximwn effort, perhap s because the l eaders are vrai ting for the outcome of pOlitical negotiations going on be"t\reen th e High Corrrm.issariat , the French Government and the Xuan-Bao Dai elements . If these should break dOl-m, the resistance will be greatly strengthened by the adhesion of many nO',T neutral or pro-French elements. If the n'e gotiations are successful, the resistance army is sure to b e a dominant factor in any form of Vietnamese self-government . Comment Having long sinc e explored, and exhausted, the possibilities of a final military victory in Indochina, there is little incentive for the French military high comi11and t o plan beyond small scale operations of limi ted scope, "rhile ITai ting for the politicians in Paris and Mao Tze TUlIJG in China to make tbe really c1eci si ve moves .
WHH/jr
181
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 20 11
Am0ric~n CO~8ulate Gcner~l ,
S2CTIOH IV.
HiDOCYHTSE
ECO~TOLIC
SITU.ATIOr
A.
Genera l
e.g;ain Inc1oc:linfl. 118.::> ':\11 r.res. of 28(; , 000 ::;qu:-,ro miles - hnlf/o.s 1:>.1'&0 c. s F1' ~~cc - ~nd 3 )op~lo.tion of c.bout 26,000~OOO. The popul~tion is 10.1'';01:/ conccntn:-:.t':d in the dc1t[,s of uio Ree. [\1"'.0 ;:o::ong Hi.'fcrs and c, n~"r ro ':: strip ['.lons th'3 CO'lst. Lc. r,::;o :?~. . rts l)f the interior c.re pr~cti.. c:-.l ly uni;}::"bitol~. 'J.';-,o o(':onor,l:l of tll(! country is prii':"''l.r ily o.gri .. cuI tUl':11 I',::'id 1[\1'[;0 1:/ lnscLl on VK; ..;ro\;il::;,proccssing, D.nd o)"-port of ric '] ' H\.J.bb-::;r output .i'~S iltcro8.s ing L'pid1y bc'ol'o the '\'io.r ~ [',nd SOin8 progress ;lCl.d beon :n:-,do in dc-,;olopinC tl'.c . countl'Y ' s :r,incYo'l r 8sourccs.
Recovory since tly; 'in-l.r h~:'<s b eo:l slo'.'[ bec::1.\.J.so of -;:,he prc.otic,,11y co ntinuous guorrilb. Yi'\rf:;.ro. Even i';ith tho return of' por,co it I'iill prob[',bly titko tuo ycr,l'S for =woduc-';;i o:1 i n m:>st fields to r e[.\cn prc'i:::tr 1 0v.-:;15 , ,,~1Cl 10.X'GIJ c[~pit;~l in-.rOGCT<'.C;ltS ,'[ould be necas S!)'1'Y.
B.
Resourc e"
14
- -'-~------
l\r:riCl.l1 turo
Rico is t.ho IT::dn::d~~l.y of the Dc.tivo diet c.nd by fe.r tho nost ill:Dortnnt Cl'Ot). Ton1:in is only self surnortin:" in CXCGC)tio~'l~l ','oo.]'s , ~.:.:> 1: " .t\n~lflJ.1. an . ;, C~~~;]bodi[\ u su:l. lly nrc;.].: even; 'I...-hilo Cochinchj. n~ cc.;]. produco : 0. InrG c surplu s for cz~ort o.nd seldo!;] suL\.ll's i'. crop fai1urao Agd. cultl).rc.!. l;;otllOd:.; [,r,J primitj ve nnd yie~.ds pOl' o.crc 0.1'0 1 0YIo Othor ir<llJorto.:1t crops [',1'0 corn , gro';,11 chiefl:;.-- fOl' czpor v, suga l' cane , b co.ns ~ 6otton, tob~cco J ~nd v ocot~b lcs. Coprn o'ncl oil r eeds ~re of minor il nport".nco [',s c,ro coffoe , to::., and kc,pok .
J,.
J..
...
.I..
RubboI' plnnting b ogi'.n l oto in Ind dchino. and roached its grc::1.tost dOY010pt"lGnt i n tho period 1925 .- 1 9~1. Prosent ncreo.go is about 13 4:,000 h actnl'o:;; , p or}v:.ps 2G;:~ of 'I;hich h ,1.s bcen :norc or l oss s3rious1y dn, TrDgod ' , J ' , J.. 00 b y . the guorrLL ) .a::;. ' 0 " OGOnvlD. ) . p:;OCluc'~l on 18 OSvlrn.:::l. vCG C. t I~, 000 vons, but 1.::1.ny p1,-:;nt:-ctio:::s h8.'\.'o 1)C8n abr:ndo:noc'i bcc':'.uso of ins 0c-...:rity, C.1lC. the b a lance l~cl: lcb or. Product i on in 1948 w~s only n~out 45 ) 000 tons. Ruhb0r is o.l~ost c!ltircl:r in FrcEc}1 Jlr:.:1G.s :J.T~ \.l the Gl"' cc~t bull~ in l -~lYbO pl antr:.tioYls - t!lQ 33 lc. rGcst con.toill 60~ of tho t~t:J.l ncrc[\gco }"1reriCl1 pl[\ntcl's h,,'!(; bcon IHo;:-ipt to do -;c1op <1.nc. o.dopJc n'Jdor:l me-:'hot.ls, nne:. ovc:r 4:J% of t.he tJ'CC S o..rc f!'or:~ gr~l ft.ed 8.ncl s c 1e ctcrl seed lings It i s 1..l~1dcr stoed .J..;n:J.t C05 .~~ of l)1"O:..1uctioI: is 10\': C01~1?~\r '3d "';J~i-t}1 ot.hor gro','jinS rCf;ionsQ
j '
.L
.j
D.~iirr,:-,ls,
In tho Viet!1n3~, cr~tt1c 8.n~ buffc.lo arc 1' ...:tiscd chiefl'.' for drnft on"': their :1uEl~on; arc stj.ll bolo'.'" ;>rc':::'tr totc.ls. C:'-:.:oodir.. r :]..isc3 c f[t~r !:1J:-:--~:') C~-' o~ bL;':-;~' C~\tt~c ~ ~Ho g s c~rc t!.l C r:.CJ~t in:port~:lt food
G.,,:,,- ~;. i';G .~!l~l sh,~cp
e.nj.!:"'F-.l e,n {~ l:l. c:;r..t. . ['. l:1 J\..r:J1 ~l:-:~l tc p~OVlllCOS 0"ro an l!E?Or~ant :::;o\.~rC0 of
J.nC(j~8.
nro of :Lj.Hor
in:.po~-.t["~71C ~ ~
F'is:l
fOl'~-;lJ' 8.T't
182
r{E3T}1ICT!~ D
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16 . By: NWD Date: 2011
i mport!:l.nt pert of the r.:::..ti '.'0 di c;+;: D-n~ lc.r >;." q:;J1.:,:ch;';'cs nro C~'lJ.g:1't in tho C()C'..~Jt~:l \linters J the ri "'/,31'3 c.r~d pC~l'ticvl[J.rl:t~ ill tl:.c 'ro!11c S?.:;? L~.1~IJ i n C::-.mbodi(l. Lc.rgo qcllln-:;i UC3 of dricc. Ii ::;;1 ':,'e;:t] i'0:rr.-.crly cxperJeed. 1'{hi10 I ndochinc.. h~3 greD.t c..::O'.'lS of foros';:' :',nJ. J1"~)1::r vc,J.uo."olo 'NO'X', S, th e ir o:<ploi te tiQn j s di.ffioul c ene' d.JT1Jor 118.S rJ.o',ror beo;1 c..:l import".n!~
cxpor"'c'c '1'110 cuttinG of. c onstructiO!l tii.l:'"'l~r nr.d firo~.jood iG J I1 Cf\';cvcr )
un
iF,~)Ort::;.nt
10c<:-.1 indnstry.
3.,
Tllin.c::o. l s
The provinc~s of Tonkin ~nd L8.oS are r~ch in minerD. ls, the lo.t+,0r brgoly uncxploitoc: c Eigh qLt::l.J.ity n!:.thrc. oi to coo.1 deposits ure found nortn of l}eipllong, c..nC: bef010 th8 v!::\r ;?roduct :i.on reQc!13d over 2,OJO,OC) 0 to!1S c\. ye~r nostl::/ by open cut ni::1in;. Pl'oduct.io~'l in 1948 ,,/c.s only 340 , OOJ tons c.ue to lQ()k of : ~['C~1:i.:n..8ry end 10. bor [,nd. gu~rrilla cLc-tivities~ Coking cO[,1 is founJ only in insiGnifican'c qUfLll'b tios. There ure vulunble tin dODOS its in North Tonkin nnd Ccntrnl Production reClched 1800 tons i n 1938. CO:1 s i:1er::..blc cruce tin wo.s o.lso brought l':'O\';n fran Yun::::-,n, Chirli:'., for- s;:l~1'Cing o.t Hn.iphoYlf;> Prod1(ction is ut ploSe!1.t c..t a str.~1.d.stilJ. c.Lte to the EuoTrillo. 'i','C\rfc..ro, A fc','; tons Vl(;rC flo':rn out of YUL!ln.n in )' 9 /;3, but plC,!lS for devc10pj,:lg 'this huvc "o ,~cn postponed 00CC.USC: of tho prosent h~..::;:'1 prico ,of Ch~.no::;e t in. Tonkinosc tin oros contuin tungsten, and production in 1 938 rCQch cd 555 tons of c onccntrnt0 .
l-uoso
The ro nro 'm1u8.bJ.o zinc or(;s in l.'OY1k:iYlo
Production rOQch:;d
25,000 tons in 1926, but dropped to o.bout 5;000 boforo tho I'mr us world priccs d ~c li ncd. These nines ure 8.1so closed. Gold deposits
v;ero
\'[or ~ ~od
s.t various point;, boforo '\:.110 Y.'e.r but , ;ero of minor i r;1.-
portc..ncc.
There urc :'nportr-.,nt deposits of phospho.te rock in north"';ost Tonkin ne'lr the Chi nose fronti or I th0 dC701opr:,'J:1t of \'ihich \':o.s begun by the Jc.P Qnoso d'J.Li.n g -tho i'In.I'. Exploit.C',tion of thoso rich mines \'lill r equire !1O v or:J.y "eha pD.cifi c .':~tion of tho o.rcc.. but 1c..rgo invo stments ( I f
cr:.pi-t.~ l.
!'~~1y ot!lcr D1inoI'Ctls I includirlg iron ore, bn.uxitc, l en.d ; nnti, ...... ' ~ I- n "r- .~. nony, D-na ;;r::li.J:Lcu~ , (, . \:) Y-n ,.,.:,.1 to C' l' ;:)v } f';~ 'd Lnes p~rticularly h::\5 only :x -L __ .1 b oon partially pros?cctod~
N " ....
I ndust::,Y is of li ttl;:; i: r:portc..ncc in Ir:dochi::.:; c~nd is c[liofly c oncor~0~ ~ ;i~h thop roco ssinz of n&ricultura l ~nd forest prcducts. The T:l'Jst i:~~~:)Ol--c~r:.t r::~.lntl.~~D..cturing inrlustry is tho ccr:~ont ".':or~~s ?l:=.Jnr 11:0. ipilO:i,?: T,~1i3 pro (i.1J,cad 2GO,OOO ~;021C o oforo the "" ',[:'.r and c..oout 100 , 0S0 i:1 lS~3. Ot~sr ndnor 5n~~strios produce c.1cohol, tG~tilcs)
0
s\.~.;c:.~"
::-'.n-:l C~~{):.:..r:J JG Les ~
183
C.
For ciE~
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 20 11
c.
Foreign
10
~r~do
totnl
Before the v:::: r ric o , r ubbol' , :'.nd corn r cprcso"!1tocl 75% of tilo of o;.:r)o:rts. Of ether i~ cr:'.s , only co[',l , dried fisl1, tin Cln(l c e!"!lcr:~ \'.' 2 1' 0 oyor l 5/~ oi" tho to"to.L
,,('.1'.1 0
l'ubbcr is tho l c:.clbg export by v::l. luc . Shipme nts toto-l ed . nbout 1.2,000 ton.s in 19~8o Tl-:is con~)~)r~f, fo.vorc::.cly I'ri'chpro'\,'s.r but is l oss th~ ~ h~lf of p~osont c~p ~ cityo Rico cXForts at 220,000 tons inprovocl OV-.:l J.917 "tnt ';iC~'C only r'. r'l'::'..ction of tho pro'or:;.r o.vcr;lgo of over 1, 500.000 tens. In 1 938 ovor 500,000 tons of corn were exported, nl;llos t r.11. to Frcucc. DuriT".[:; tho \:o.r P1'0d.:lction pr".cticc.lly c e':lse d c.nd h 'ls !i'..'.'.<lo little l'ccovcry sb.C'c. '[[it:: t:lC decli:1c hi t:1C export of rico ~nd corYl, ccrtn i~ ot!lCr produc~~s such [t i !lic ' ;3 'J.r!d s}~ins, SO~.f0.. n:ad : oth er l ;C'lliS , pop~or, nn -:l l-::l.pol..: hc~vc !lssu::",c c1 rolclti" j rr.port9.!lCG6 \lG
The rocov'Jry of lndocninoso expcll'cS to prC'.'i::\l' l evo ls depor..ds priJ21.rily 0:1 p o litico.l fr.ctoro: c.nd the n:turn of sccurity. HO'.'.':JvGr, S'.lC:: reeo-,-or:;" '::ould not cccur i"'.Il!cdi:'.toly on -:-.he rC'':;ur:1 of ?C0.CO , SillC.3 J ,~uch destruct.ion r.nd C:otorio!~1.ticn h-::.s oCCU~Te(J \'ihich .Tould tCi.k e ti:-:t,; to r cp~,i !'. Thus , r ise CXDOr'-t.;S l':il1 be: hj.ndcrod fer some tin" hv _ <'o.ilur" to .... 1. un r1-;1-c~ ",-.:, GrC\1:1~\""'" o~ 1rri be. .. k"'CD "''''i-ior, c ~ n'1.s '-' ... .; ..... .,1..... _ .... _ . .. c........ l ack of jun~s to ~ovo t~e pc.dJy, ~~d destruction c.nd deterioration of ric e mi ll s . Rubb':;r CQulc. P:'CO\"Gl' J1'.0 1'O c:u.ickly 'out Y"'.;}ny troos h:cvc b 0011 slr.'..s!:.::; d or bur:l()c. n..:,:d ~~ctorics :J.;l(~ houses c.ostro:/cd(> 1\.~J1t~;). 1 norT or r col:cntinG sc~c~ulcs have been l argoly ~b~ndon:Jd since 1945. All cX20rt j:n d"~13trics -:,;,1"0 8..ffcctc~l b:. t:1C G0norc.. l c.ctcrioTntiort of -VIctor> ro C'.d , CI.!lc. reil tr:Hls~or'.;.
Tod::'..~
. .
1... ..
-4 ..... 1..
LJ
J.
--
I..\. ...... ... ~-.
O V01' 60;;;' , by v::.luo J of Indochi'l:\ t 3 exports [;0 to Fn.nco and thc S::.nirJ, :::.bou-:' tho s::.rr.o [,,3 boforo tho ;;o'r. l-'lost of the: bc.l:::'llce goes t~ Si:l[::lPOl' C: , :1on;:; EO:1[;, ('.ne. Chi::".". EX20rts to tho United Stn.tes a:nounted to 0:11y o.bol.1t 3~~ of the t oto. l v:::.luc in tho first ton :n.onths of 1 948. Tho p crcc:1b.gc ..,.r"S SOT:1~'.;h~t :~ig!i. or b efore t~c imr but h~s nO',TO}' 'b88:1 b.1'Go c.:::lCl p1'ob1.cly ilO-v-or '>':ill be unlcss tho oconomy of the 1 1 ,.-, .L ' ....L . 1 .L c ou?-~try ch::.;:gos sl'J.1"? _ Y ./ 0 (;,0 no~ 1!:ip01 \J 1'1co, corn, co o. J or ce,7'~cn JJ whilo Indoc:li=-:'::;S0 rubb:;r ':rill ;1::J r:~_'!.lly So to Fro.nce.
I ~1;Jo:rts f!r~J r..~t0.C produ c~s -\."~~iC:l
up
0:
8.
nrc
:r~GGdcd
c
b:/
1)'1".., ...
tl:.o uS'J~"l sclocti.o~ of r.~llufG.cturcd. ?1o::-iY1dtlStY'in..l ccn.1:1~r ~T cf l QYT per

to f.h e b ..... _.. ""'lc-n 1'01" QOt;1 C ..... "r\S~'--D+ir-. ..... ""'r-'''t .. . ...., ......
v~.
..I. ....... J.l.
....... ~ ~, .. j)1--C1-1"' . . -"w i. - . . .... . C 1r,... 1.) l +""~ 1 ~ .. ! - - :..... c:iy- r- n.. ....',' .-".) .......
..... ~ '~.,L.
.......... _. -
...
[';,;iG
Vi8.r
C ,~~~)it0.1
;CO~~:5
l:n i _"'{)
b 00~
of bloc1(-'.(1c, i rr.?OTts since ~!-~8 rt')l::. ti". "\"j ly lli,:;il c0r.:~:lrc~ '.'tith c:~:?Ol""ts D.nd }1C~'\"'O r8cc::.tl ~y" ::;ix
volu:-.~::;.
f o ~lc/iiIl6
~iC Cl.rs
cxcc:) (~(.(l l)r!3.':~t~~
U:-c.dcr supp l
~ ' ;f2
-j
t,~0 ?!"' c ".',"[~r

"! ... J :_/~ . . ; .
'"' '''..... _ rJ...
S:i~-t(.,;::: of o~:):i.r()
0_
~
p~~c\:!rC:l8C ,
~
F'rD.. TICC n8.t'l~;J.lly
.1_\
\.;.:.(..
....
n" 0S i "":i'')or-c d,~t..;,-.s r . c ..... h~; '~;,.~)~;".~';~;/'ilr:; J;;~';~i~~~ ;,;~~: ;''J p;'i'~c;cl Ge,;; ';;
cl -,r'rr"' c +.-. . , . ,. . , . , ":"" .... cf\-. ...... ,-,Y"tc:"')
St~tcs
:-'r-,l'
<:':'-r ", .. , - ~-: .. '-
" -. ,.. ....... J.,... l_.:?,~, ,,, V~ J
0'1 "
c::.,. "
....
n IC)7 r . . . v ._
l
..:')
0PJ.l:.'~;
.,
O~
..,
['~
'\':It:o
C O"'1 r-0 1"", ...... r-:r}
:';'-lS~~7. > I;:,;;~~~s
~T" j"I "1"""
fr om tho Unitod
cr;~c''-ntcd ~0
.
h".vo b oen
rnt
l~!<:i;" 1!1
,.... 1.-1
] 01. ,..
.2.07.
... lllS
c.:- C~).i?;((
"I
r~1".ti v0 1y l ~rGor . "I J 1 r.-!.

';(':11
of 1 0<~. 8c
:. i~s~ of
tl;.:: c~lo.nc'J c[~r:o
sinco the war ~nd . '" . co _<':/0 In lone flr:')~ t on r:1on.:.l,~ Chi}':.::. , HOT!g K~n:;, SiCt:l1 , n.nd In.~iC\e
18 L i
3.
Balance of Trade
From 1906 until the ,mr Indochina had a favorable balance of t rade except in 1923, 1931, and 1932 . The balance has no",r sharply changed and from January to October 1948 i mports 'Vrere valued at 1, 761.~ million piastres and exports only 926 , a deficit of 838 million. -x- The for eign exchange problem is thus acute , particularly as concerns doll ars . The defici-l:, has been made up by France under the plan for the French Union. The failure to include Ind ochina for direct allotments u nder the Marsha ll Plan resulted in considerable delay in the 191.~8 Plan, and it i s only in recent ",reeks that certain dollar allotments have been approved . Most imports from the United States in 1948 'Vrere de layed shipments under the 1947 Plan .
I
The ambitious ten year plan for the reconstruction and equipment of Indochina foresees large i nvestments of capitaL The present admini strators of the plan expect most of this capital to come from government sources, and there is little place for private capital , either French or foreign. It is probable that present plans will have to be considerably modified to fit the ne'Vr political conditions no\'i' developing. 4. Finance and Curr ency
Internal finances arc in relatively good shape in spite of the critical foreign exchange problem. The central govermnent has derived it s chief inc ome from customs fees , excise taxes and monopolies , of which the opium monopoly is the most lucrative. Subsidies were granted to provincial governments from the central budget . During the past year a nurnber of changes have taken place in pr eparation for the new political organization . The bank note monopoly has been taken from the pOI,rerfulBanque de 1 1Indochine and is being transf erred to a new Emission Institute . A separate Indochinese Treasury has been authorized, 'Iirhile the r evenues from the excise taxes and monopolies vrere t echnically transferred to the Associated States on January 1, 1949. All these measures contemplate a closely knit economic federation for Indochina in which French participation and influence vTill be prominent. The i nd i vidual states , particularly the Vi etnam, are strongly opposed to this , and l engthy and bj.tter disputes vTi th t.he French on economic and financial matters can be anti cipated . The Indochinese piastre vTaS "Torth 10 francs from 193)1. until 1946 vrhen the rate 'VTaS changed to 17. The rate of 6.95 piastres per dollar became 12055 as a result of the French devaluation of January 1948 . In October 19~8 the system. of a double exchange rate , 'TaS ext ended to Indo china, the official rate remaining at 12.55 per dollar and the ll free ll rate fluctuating i-Ti th the free franc. Current quotations are about 19 per dollar. Foreign trade transactions take place at the average of the tvro rates or about 15.70. The black market rate rose dur ing 191.~8 from around 1.~0 to about 55 per dollar . Even better rates are occasionally reported from Hong Kong and Bangkok 0 5 . Cost -){It is difficult to convel't these figures to dollars due to b'ro devaluations during the p eriod 0 Foreign trade i s nOlr conducted at about 15.7 piastres per dollar, the average between the official rat e of 12.55 and the free rate of about 19. 185
--
Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16 . By: NWD Date: 201 1
5.
--.-:::.-.----.::~:..:~
Co rt
01~
L i '"l'""
Tl:.c cost of li'-Tint; hC'~s rnountcd 2.'npidJy sinC0 tho -\,.r'.. r , n:!:..d the: i ndex for Europ ea ns i n D c cc~ilier 1948 wus 26~6 ( first talf 1939 ~ 100 ) conpL, r ccl \';ith 1G38 c. yc:;.r cClrl i cr . Corap:nn:ti'ic f::Gur c;s for w,ti'7o worki~~ clnsG os ~oro 3S6G und 2802. For A!IDricuns ~ttenptin~ to op ore. tc nt~thc " froo !! CXC;;[,:1(:0 rutc , pl;icos [:'1'C outr'.. t;Cous. (
S~ l nrios tond to l aG b eh ind prices with resulting unrcst n:no21g the wo1'ki1 '2: populntioll c,:ld tho lur:c cluss of civil Ser'lD.llts.
6.
Conclus io"
The o:.J.sic prGblcTls of th e CC O!10:.w Indochina. up::: simib.r to thos e of othor ;.:oi[;.t:i.c conntri.::s , v:iJch [,n,,' ir.crGc'cse in tho sJco. n J 2.. rCl of 1 ivinr; te,~dinG J(,o be checked by the T8.I?id rise in t!lE.' populc,tioll. ( Ca~ili odi~ is an exception in thnt the populuti6n is stntic. ) The dovc1opr:.on1. of the nine r:11 rcsourc(;s [,nd the ir:.c1ustrinl:i.zo. cion 0:' tho country i;i 11 requir e o!!.orrnous ~nounts of co.pi tul D.!l'l lTluch 'ci!1l(; .
J
of
The irllnocJic..to prob1c;a of

D. politic~l ono.
restori~1g
penco o.nJ order i s prir.'.lr i1:,r
186
S?CTIon v. Admi n is-;-:r:'. t iO!l A prohl on ',[} ich ccmf ronts C'. 11 5!:('.11 of?icc:" no doubt, i s the '\ . uY'.uSt~::'.lly h <"::2. -.:; l oc:.d of nC:mL,is-t~-~-'ci v.::. '.'rork i n propol'cion to th e uID8unt of crc~tivo ~ork .tu rn2d out. T~o rcquir;~~nt5 of tho Dc~::'.rt ment fOl' nci:;-tir,i stl'~.f;i vo r':;ro?'~;s ) ::md tt:c quC\ ntit :r of ndmj.nistrc,tivo d.::.t2i1 i !l-m J.-,c,;d i!l tho c :'.iJ.y oporJ.tion of Cl srrnll of rico j.s rou Ghl y tho Set:-:-l'J ~s for Q lurgo otfic c: o The nc'.....nin is-crr:.tivQ ir..stnJ.ctions u1d the forms pr osc rib ed are n::tturnlly dr~rt 3~ ~ith l~rgc offices in nind, and their us e in a fm~!l offico is diffjcult and r esult s in a disprop o rtion~tc ~ nount of time spent on nd2~ni3trativG work. It is urg,:d tha t tho Dcpo. rtr..ont in.'i/cstiptc tt,is T tter with a P..:\ to givin~ ::'.dditionaJ. cuthority to the field to J~k e decisions and 0.15e to trrms ferrinc to tho D e :x~rtJ :lcn t !'inch of tho "c 021troJ. " r ecords ~mc1 rc:por ~ inc thQ -'c is no\,; c~eI:'':r.nd()(l of t!lC; fie Id
vie~
0
Alien St[l.ff
S::,jgon h:1S bC 0 1l ;;x;,Joricncing consjc1ornb },c tr:lL\blo in finding and keeping ~licl1 porsonne l, ~ Q rt.icl.l1 nr ly FOrenC!l c;~p lOJrocs o Business houses aro in [\ position to off8r bot~cr salaries and Q sho rt o r work V/O 01(, n!~d the Cor:sul~. tc he. S DeC}l U:1C1. blc "'.;0 COl":lpct.J Rccor:Y:::C!ldn t i 021S h~ve recc:ntly b:;cn sent to ',io.s hingto~ v:hich, j.-c is hoped, 'I'!2.11 SO f.1Cv:k. t a:c.d ~or ,,-tc: this sit.'J.c'ttion .\ sinclo ';:o.Co :: Ylc l'.J.cl:':lg bC'..sic I':o.sc (', nd tC:';:?O~'cU::'l i;-Lcrccr.s'::: hc~ s boen S1.1 C;[,0 stJ d, -,'rhich ":ill bo s oni o.ni'1uo.. lly r..djustcc1 ~\cco rdi!!t; to Chcl Y'C,JS in the co.st 0 .... l iviEE; ind e x . llt tho so.:n':; ti~e c ~osii;ion c:!.Qs::;if~cC\-'..:ion SystO!:l },ns boen 2st::-,blish-:::d " ,/nic11 n 1 J.o~':s in~ g r[\d c pro:::otion~ for r.:cri t c.n:} servi C8.
6
To cncouraeo tho alien st').ff to ct):ltinuc its wor~( with the Gevern .. T:l.ent ~ c.nd to r.f\~:C 'U~C~l T;lorc vn.lur.\ '010 to U:c offi co , it is hoped th:-<t soraG W8.y CD n. bo found -;.'i th in budget 1 ini -I-;:-<t:i on s to provide J.c..:lgU"'.g e [:,11-1 ste:Eog rr."11r.i.c l o~so!_ s for thof3c r:1CT".1) ~;~"'s of ..l..:;hQ st::.ff \'[ho n;rt?c='.r to be qu~liricd. Stenc;r~phGrs nrc Ql~o5t im~ossi~lc to find in SaiGon , [',.n:l it is, t1"!cr;:;ft):"c, 110cc: ssc. r~r for of.;.""'icCI"s to COT;.GU!:')J r::uc}l v[l. lu~.bl c t iIf1.':' iE d::Qf-!; il1C c o ::rcsPQnd:::nc~ for ty:[)ist s . Th2 cost of su ch tn',i:-'1i~1:; is
~ ould
no?;~:~;.c.~~ ,. the t~!.~:'3 ~~l~o~::'Jd ':urincS 1x o:-}::irlf.; ]1ou rs for t}10 s -tud~r :
be n 0 311Glblc,
~nd
the rosults
undou~t cd ly
snt2.sfyinGe
SU;D lj cs .).'nd S:--l i.7J:)i~:,,,; _-=-_l_________ ._____ _ SaiGon for nor !y experienc ed serious losse s in shi2ffic nts of offi cic-.. l GUP 2 1':' cs ~:1(! !}Crso:1~2. cffoctG th~"ou;h sho:"' t [)!!ipr:.sI1ts , (;.nd b!.. (;~. . krJ.Gc e It Vi['.. S fo~c;d -~~~l':lt clr; !J. rinE D.co~ts l1.su ;:,. lJ:,.' took i rlt(:r(.;s~..: 5 .:'.. CQ~~ s:"l l~J.::-" S1'!jp-:::.:; .....!.i:s :=:j.nc'~ ;s ~~ :!1.:1c t llC :l ~~rc 51f:...':.11 ~h. (; r::.~~\l:. :.ri i .:.,I' tr1:J ti~:-.c n:n.:1 cffo~t 3iJ-:;,!t arl cJ.c:'lri;-tG docs not
t~1 cft ,
li~~ t lc
C'.~1G '.:;'.~rr:\:-lt
tho c:,t]'r". cfi'or-c, to SU~) C!"i.r ~.::!O c ;."\. rc~uJ l~' COrl:3 ~ll:. tc "-;:1 s st i 11 G?O:1G i:~G ril~ C!l -'c i=~G 011 c::.. eh
!T~l~:i::.:-;
Otlr
S
S 11i:jl:-..C~"lt~ .
ll:.c
:1 ip:J. . .)n-t; in
0. r:t['. J1 ~ :1.7:.(;
187
for
fo~
tho
fr c~
o~try
of tho coods
tho
cl~~rinG Q~cnto
It h:ls b aem fourle. thnt n con~itl8!"'nblc SlW: of lTIonoy C::.. !1 bo S 2.VeG. by tr[!.ini!1g un aliGIl Cl.121o:/co to h-:--.. :ndlc tilG cntir0 clQ?.rfln.c(~. ~I0 hQS sufficient offici::"Il S-f..;LlJ1\.li!1[; to penr:..i t hila to expC!dit:o peepors ['.no clc~"\r::.ncc proccd~\ros the. t '..'01.\1d othoY":.rise tr-.l:c days, ['..l:.cl by de",toting his full ti~~:.o ~~O th.c cle .:"!.rin~ of tIl0 shipmG!lt o.r~d r.10Vi!lG tho Eoods qu:ic;cly . losscc }:~:'V(; been cut to D. bTGG 3xtcmt.
!~il nnd Couri er Service
SaiGon hQf, b (;Ol1 Gx[)cricncint; con s idere:.blc d'Jlny in the t:rf,nsmiscicn of .?ouch ;,.0.i1 , bot!} co urier and U:J:~ ccon:po.nied air P01.1C;-;OS. I;; is noocs32.1'Y to allo':; up to thl'o(; v,'0Gl~s for the tro.ns!aission of mail to the D0p~rtn0nt. It i s possible th~t other offices in this nl'OQ h~V8 becn expcricndnG th o S2-me difficulty, and it is suggested tho.t 0. c oncerted effort co rada to 8!!,CO~l!-3.;:;e the Dcpo.rt;;nC::1t t.o ',':ork out a ]101'8 c:{peditious Vic'-J Jeo handle rniJ. to and f1'O!:l Southcns-c AsiC'.. Seft ~)ouch es 'bke a rd,ni;;mm of six 1':(0)':8 to ronch Saigono It is not s :1.fo to send perscJ!lD.l corrcspOllcl3rlCC of any ir:i.portu11CC the opon f ' :C i l in Inc:ochin:to In. spi to of fin1 d,;nio.l s there is o.Gcquo.te proof tho.t a form of c onsorship oxists o This delays r:-D, i 1, and cn.COUl';:t;os tho loss of enclosures Ilnd SJ~ll po. ckn.gcs0
thr01.l g~l
. J
----- -. -.--~-------. --
Vi sito~s
to Ind ochjno.
I t i s fl.;:;nin d6sircd to point out to neighboring offices thD.t Sa:i.GoT'. is not o.'Dle to GU:1ro.:ltec acco;;>.:noj~~tio!'!s visi-'c.iEE:; busine:ss men, fwd onl y "iii th gr . .t difficulty and. '.';i 'e.h o..:p l o notice Co.l1 e.c-' .:::-. co,,:;;o:J.o.t ions b:) [:!'I '~'.ngcd for off:i.ci::d visitors. A critical housing situ(,tion is r.ot peculiar to Saigono Hov;over , consub,r i'csidr:;nccs here ure sr~ll C'.nd ....;ith th ~ exce:;ti on of the consul bono:('.~l' s rcsic e:y.,ce do not p:::ssess g;u;st rOO:11s . :O:;vGn e. cO:'li'in:lOd rcso:rvn.tion u s~u lly monns 0. b ed in n dormitory TIith fro:11 three to te ~ people.
to
unofficinl t!"'nvclors hQVC been givinS the Consul nte Genoral D.S 0. refcre 2cc w;.en :lpp J.yi :!G for o.n c!!.try vi SD.. The French officials c::tll c,t th e:, CClnsul ntc G(n cr:-~l unticir;>6.tint; tho.t V[C; y,ill e;i'lC a g,-,o.re.ntee of lodgi ng - This , of cours8, is not possible, nnd it is , thoreforo, C:.g~i~1 ur;cd thJ.t b:jsi~lCSS_~':1Jn 8.ncl t.ourists be -~'::-. r118d. .1c~J.:J.t ttorc TI::''1.y 'not b::: C'.ny ~(cCcr:lI;!oclution o.vo. il~~blc in S",i;on o.nd tt:J.t they should ;:~ke , ' no c.tt.el.:~t to CO:-;1'::; to Indo811i:L'l. \.1.nlcsG t~lCy nrc assurcc. i !1 c.d~.;-:~nC8 of
l od~ins
r~ny
'.
\ .
Sn i g;O:-l concu:-"'s ,.~i th E:J.1..:" t"':ji;:-i. t}:.c~t so;:~::; eff ort shoulc. b: rr.~d(; to : proilidc nrl O?GTD.tions !::~~:1 ')rtl for ceteh cO::1sulo.r officoo 1~C"; officers cO~~:i!l G to -'::.11C f~clr} fo!'" -S ~ 10 f5.~. . ~~t t:':~~tJ , C\"C!:' :::..f-t-Jr :~ trc. i~ir_G ~') ,.::: - icd . j r: :.-,:"~3>i:1G-LcJ n} f'in c~ it !10~t c~i.f.l'icuIJ..:. to f~;'::1ili c.?izc .lC~C:~1301 ~..~0S -f ti -::'}l t~1:)ir -:;o:. ~:.) 0 .:t(;~1 .l\.J~lCy o.r: !"'Jpl8.ci?':G so:~ . ::-:or!o 1,',r!lG f~:).S c\lr,;Qcl:,r 10f~ :
128
Declassified per Exec utive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011
th e no~;t or i'rilO l co.vC's shortly Cl.ftcr his c, 'r'riv~tlo l~ is irC'..)os siblc to ~~si~ilo.te 0. 11 the details of procedu re in 0. shcrt time , n~d for this !" c~:'..son dctc..ilcc1 opor[\ tir.G irlstruc'~ic:1S fi}iOUJ.d be !;-~~ do (J."v2-.ilcblco
'l}1C proccclc:lt file Ei ves L'...~ch vc,luc,bla infon;ution D.1)ou1; condition e; pc'culinr to onG po.rticl..;lo.r post. I~o::,.:: -,rcl' , :.~o r instructions r Cf,nrdult: shippiD[ , SOCl.!Tl0 n, vis9..s, c.rld pnsSr:H.)rts or r!.oto.ri8.1s, D. dctnilucl Guide is CS.Jt.:;rr~io:~e. 111 D. S!t'.::"J.l pas 's 0.:1 officer r.tc.y nc\tcr I dur inc his to:'.\.: 1'0 , h r.'vc occJs~.on to io;suc ccrt.n.in tYl)(;S of viSQ~; or expcric~lcc u :l:,o;u"l shipping ~",::i soC'~r'lcn problc~1s. 'Jut occJ,siono.lly those situ~tions do arise , D.nd o.n u nc~pericnccd officer hus no r e c ourse but to refer to so:ne guic:o for o.SSistUDCO.
The Foroi;n Service Re~uJationG are, of cou rso , the basic ffi3.nuo.l. Expor:i.e!lCO hn.s prcvon , ho-:;cver , th~~t the sections on ~J'isas, p:J..ss~ orts , s:1ippi!1[!; r~11d sC~::lc nJ ij~:::liG:-o.tio!!. ar.d notc. ric.ls a r c " Iloticc-n.bly i n3.dequ~te ~~lon dotnilcd instructions 0.1'0 required. In the int erest of e ffici ent office routino 3.ncl t]~) propar execution of con su lar duties vii thin the b01.l~lds of' our pres en4.; b1.ldgat limito.t io ns s which r;'c.:.!:cs it esson-:;in.l to 01.X!Ll.tO Fi-:';}1 c, s;ull staff and 0. p......... :xiTli,J.D1 of productiv8 effort, it is urced tho.t these portions of t.he rccul atioris be;: r c-c:X~:lmincd "!ith'l. vim'; t.o ir:provi2'.g the::'r CO!ltent so thc..t t}v::y ;.;).y sorve e.s .3 , helI,)ful guide;"
---~.------. -
Tole (:"ro..r.1 fu:. tcs
..--
This post o.lso nGrc(;s '.!i ~h Bo.tnvic. t1l8,t 0. concer-ceel effort should b8 JT:~idc to obt:~in reductions in t.olcgrnph r,\~:cs bot-,':ccn posts in this rOGion. It is desired to point out to neiGhborinG posts that thoro is considor3.bl~ dcl~y in trofismission of telegrams bct~mon c0untri0S since ro.dio oircu~ts ~rc opon only onco or at most hric;; c. d"y, uSt<~, l ly o.t nit;ht. Thus pc)"so::!s tro.voling by air to So, ibon ofter, 1'eo.ch here be:ore tLo tcloErr~r.1 [,nnouncing the ir
n.rr~ '\i::\l.
"cjD Jr ,."
189
.''''_4
OUTGOING fELFGRAI\1
INDICI\'jE
Ch"90 Depar~me~~
C LASSIFICAT I ON
..
Approved ,
SAIGON ,
I~!DOCHINA
------roUJ
_ _ _ -.-." """
~-...;___
F OR DCfT USE ONLY
Assumption Urtcl 141 Dept desire3 success Baodai

..s:
~
__ -... _ _ _ _ - . .
_~
e xperiment entirely cOl'rect.

~--."
_._.-" -----
S.inco appears be no other
o
""01
altefnative to estab Commie pattern Vietnam, Dept c6nsiders

)t.... \.
r0
;"\
(J f)
l)
no effort 8h1d be spared by FR , other Western pOHers . and non-Commie Asi1n nations to assure experiment best chanco
. . . . \1;'/ ,\,.i
(I
\.j
At proper time and under proper circumstances Dept will
by such Govt
f~r US
arms and. econ D.osistance . . Nu-st be under.
stood henrever ald program t his nature l":ld require Congresslonaln . . h W approval. Since ..U S c ld OitJever scarce. y afford back.ing gov"G "'~.
i'I,hich \{ld ha ye color and be likoly suffer fate of puppet reglme,

~t
must first be clear FR will offer all necessary concessions

~
t o make Baoc1a.i' solution attractive to nationalists.
rrhis is
____-
posoibly shorttime remaining beforo 0088ie succesoes Chi .....,are -J'" ... . ....... -. ................- _ ... . '';-:,-',
... - - . . . . . - _-c. -~
___
...... _ _
_ " __
__
~ ~---"
-~ '~
...
) ISTnlt.UT10~ 1
fel t Tndochl n3..

... _ .... ~ . . . . ~.p..., .....
"\
Dl:!JIR ED
.. ,,~~c.r."
Noreover , Baodai Gov-c must through mm eff'ol"'ts

" "., , - - .... -,.; - - - - '"'
lI"rJcca OHI.'/)
demonstx'E"te. c8:~aci ty 0 rgan i~:.e . and cond.u ct affalrs 1'Tisely so ~~'8' ... ~ ....... ,.~ .~",-.... ~ .... ~ . ~ ... ~ ~~::;;,,,, .~ to \m8m~e r:la:~:1.mur:1! 0ppol"lJGuni ty obta 1.n:i n['; :f'equ :tRite po~)Ular (): (....., _ ........ "
-----.-
BUP)Ol't
(,..;
,
,\
,
.
Corr.,::ci::ons medu on Gli:; (...rigilV'.1 l.\UST
t: '.' ' ... " ~,I 5
..
r _.
",
.. .
t)~ r:"I~dc 0;"1
f.lI
. .. .." ... ........... .... . ..
'"
copios before dcl;v<,~'jy ~o Tt:I'-::Jr"~:' [:r~nch.
..... .... ..... ... .
.'
ChMg 9 to
SECRET
C Lt..SSIFICATION
Fon DC/T USE ON I. Y
Indo china _"A-_""'__ _ Kuomintang wId be L'_foredoomed_failure. analagous ,____ ,.. ,..... _. _ ...., ._. ....
~ "'~ ~ ~ ~
Assuming essential FR concessions are
forth~oming ,
best
chance success Baodai wId appear lio in persuading
Vietna~eBe
national ists (1 ) their patriotice.irns may be realized promptly t hrough FR-Baodai agreement ( 2 ) Baodai govt vTill be truly
w ____
--
representative even to extent including ou'Gstanding non-Commie leaders now supporting Ho and ( 3 ) Baoclai solution ppobably o nly means safeguarding Vietnam from aggressive designs Commie Chi. Whlle attainment theso objoctives depends initially upon
--
attitude FR and Baodai circle , Dept believes more will ultimately be required . Best hope might lie in active demonstration of
int erest in 0.nc1 support of Baoclai solution by othei non-Commie
Asian govts.
Appeai su~h solution to Vietnam nationalists wId
presumably be far greater if it appeared sponsored by free Asian nations animated by interest ... .
self-determin~tion
Asiqn
peoples and their own self-preservation in face imr!led Comm e menace rather tl1an if i t J:1a.d s,ppeare.nce gambit engineered by FR , US and UK as part strategy of West-East conflict.
RIBUTION ESIR C D
, "t
I.
Dept giving closest consideration to means whereby US

might assist attc.1.1nment these endo"
!
:::ES ONLY )
From above, you will see Dept th:.l1 :-1n3 closely parp.lloln
S}~CHET - _._----CLI 55 I FICA TIOt<
Corr.~cHon~
rr.ildo on thi :; original
}~\US~f
b'J
m~c")
on a:J
cop; c~ b"fol"o c! ,,!ilory lo T<:~e9ra:>h nr:r.r.h .
19~L
.,.
...-----SECRE'r
CLASSIFICATION
c:-,~,g ...
to
FOR DCIT USE ONLY
you r Olfn.
Dept agrees when time cones Baodal must certalnly
be fully warned of danger yieldin~ to any tempt~tion include Commies his govt and this connectlon again believes ot her Asian govts cld serve most useful purpose since India , Siam, Philippines, and Indoneians (both
Repub~
and Federalists ) are fully alive
gro111ng Commie threat Asia . Re last para Urtel 141 Q,TE reliability Daodn! solution
UNJ..TE
1-llaS
error.
Dept e1 70 shld have rend Q1'E vio.bll! t y UNQ,TE
meaning able live. While Dept continues believe it w1d be premature and unwise for you make special po int ( such as tI'lp Dalat) see Baodni , thel'e no objection your talking informally i'Tith polit persona lities clos e to him with 1V"hom you have doubt1eGs already made contact in normal course carrying out your functions. you might i'Je11 as sy.ggesteo. futility collaboration
U~. . tel
In such talks
141 take occasion clto examples
Cd mmid~
and grave danger such course.

ACHESON
,S():4 (Q~)
Telegraph Bran ch:

rRl!3UTrOH
DESIRED
Ack (,
Send:
_
AItlCONSUL,
AHEf1BASSY,
EUR
..-'.
' C!:O ONI.....}
5/9/ L19
WWS~hCOab'l~n J J~'ccn ..:.J. ...:::d1. <> J t:> l". .... .... . "C;;)
t
".if!" ..
/
~:~/iC/lO
1-'
SECE'-;::T
CLI\ SS IFI Ci. T10 N
"", [\ i
,\
--:'1.
_~""
C6rrcctioh'~ mcd" en this eri 9iM I MUST b~ mad., on 1\

c.o pias boror" d ~ li vory t'.1 Te!c9r,\p ~) Pronch.
r$
Declassified per Exec utive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
OUTGOING !
ELEG~F\M
Charg" D~p"rtm .. nt
BECRE'll
AHCONSUL
SAIGO NI J.HDOCHINA
FOR
De ll'
U:3E ONLY
'(53
Urtel 11:7: Dept believes extent to 'V'lhich FR conccselons embod'lod Mar 8 agreements will satiefy nationalists can be detormined only by reaction nationalists themselv'oB.
He~muhilc
CJ
Gl
uld
/ / ,>5) J (l
\-{)"
\ '\ ""
Cl
UJ
\1hile not fully informed provIsions
USX'
8 aGroements $
plus associated documents, Dept foara nationalist opinion tll11

follow line Duoc
V~et
editorial Apr 9 'iV'i1ich s"(iatos Q.TE aJ.thousr(!

. , -~
I'
. V:\.etno..mese reassured on scox'e thei:r country I D l1nlf :teat ion, tb'3J!..J
rema1.n uneasy'about question foreign relations
sovereignty wi l l not permit Vietnamese army be commanded by FR general nor will requirement of
. ',
a.nd.al~my .
VietnaB
BOVerCignt~bc oatlsfied,~y
d11'1ome.tic repreoenta'Glon only in China , Slam and Ve.tica~. tU1Q.TE

, >
\
f. .
As practlcal matter, Dept bel1e'..res that yj'hen indepondenc,o .

co~ony
movement in
too strong to be defoated , metropolitan pover

r~al c~olco
if it wishes preserve influence 1n area has no

DISTl1iDUTiON D;!3IFt CO ( 0?i'ICC9 0:';1..'/)
~.",- ~.----
but
attempt establish speCial relatlonship ui th former colony bancc't r C' . =I . 1'x'oo .aGceptn,nce terms b y ... .3. t'Ger, anc~ th c:.u 8.800C LiG (.~l"en me'GrG:- ";,'
h ,. J
.p . ( "
""\
J
>
.._ . . _ --.1'---_.-- __'"_ .____ ~ _ ,.,';") pC' 1. 'i.t.2 n 1)0:101' alt O. I 0 rmer colony 1s nora likely provo
;
J
~.
:'".,,J
-~
fruitful- :-~
' .r
.1 1
.~. '
' .. ' :
1.1 t
.-
~ .
..-;;> ...{::.~
C'.ll\1 d.uY"'i}.'ble j.f haceo. froe consent of J.attor t __ Cl.n if
i.:" 'liIann:('c:< . ~
"
" ~.
or ' h'
.
L
c.
\'-'
j~. ..
" r~l
.
'
Ch.rgo to
SECRET
CL ASSIFICATION
F OR DelT USE ONLY
of autonomous powers t o latter i s maele condltional upon it s
acceptance of such Important qualifications upon its independence as continued metropolitan control its fon relations and command armed forces.
/"
HOr-lever, Dept / mm:ca FR unlikely make further concosGion~-3
persuac1ed
this time and tha t any US efforts proBs them do so \l+d probably (Paris to indica te if thls not correct. ) miscarry.,'/ Hope ls, . . ._ _- . , that FR \7111...---- .. OUu their carr~ . _w t herefore ..
~ ----~~--....... _ _
oblJsr at ions ll.nu.er Hal' 8 agroemon'G S t11th sllch gene::o 81 ty ancl

~
_ _
.~ _
. -_ _ _ _ w,,"
._.
"'-____
__
_ _ _ _ ...
_.
_ _ _ _._ _ _ _ _that ___
expedition
~.
impressively constructi".... _ _ _ _ ...ere u:U_-_.....__ - - -_ _ _ _ _ _. _ 0 ntmosp ...._ - be

~_c ~_~
created and the:ii at same timo Viet nationalists ''lUI rapicll
apprecla te "true
charac~cr
r.1enace appro8.(.uinG fro m Chl and "1111
prefer cooperato BaodaJ. solution .ather thL-m a.ccept alternatitTo continued resistance ,and risk
Commies .
lOSD
all real autonomy to Chi
Presumably such outcome not impossib10 particularl:>y if
FR clel.. let it b e under.stood Baodal agreement does not permanently

define st~tU3 Vietnam but provides ba sis for further early evolut ion:. ~
At same time, shld it; appear as Dept fears that FR arc

rrnBUTlON
l egg ONI.V)
offe ring 'GOO 11 ttle too Ie. te, Dept '\r111 not be inclined lJake up - - . . _.".---, _------- - - -......------'" for FR def 1c 1en01e s by rushing in to bl'cach to Buppor\j Baodal . .. - -,~ ----- -..-~------, --_ ...- ... .., .--- .-------... ----............- ~-.... ..... ---- -- ... . - ~ ...
...
--_
'----- ----..;._._- --
...,.--__ ___ ----------r--:==....q-~r,.:Q.~)--C rredions me de on lhi3

origi~~!
Dept consid0!'s US thi s EJtagc shld evoid C0l1f3picuouo position nn,/

ct..;;;Z~iSiI'.:t.:/:~rloN
~-----
---..----------- ---I\UST bo l7lado en ell
_ .,_..- ......--.-... - -.... ... ~ ..' ,..., kii1\.<1..
copias bofer" c!"livery lo T""'!Jr~p~ r..anc~.
194
__SECRFT~'_ _
CL ASSI F I CAT I ON
FO R Detr u sr: ONLY
kind and try reach common attitude i'lith othe r lnterEJstcc1.30 vtL ,
--,~------------
particularly UK, India and -
Philip pines ~
ACHESON
Tele graph Branch:
Send to:
AMCONSUL ,
SAIGON
(K~) " R'3peat to: AHEH~foS8Y ,

~
Aclt ('-.) 0 vi
. PAHIS-L'7-k. . .
AJiCO~1SUL ~-'~fT-
'-.
t}[~l\)l. L-d_ . .
--
\ --;;.
FE: SEA: COgburn ,Jr: ccp

5/18/ 4~ v
~0
-'
ISTRIOUTfON
D E5IR1':D
~I"J eE5
'
...,
ONLY)
--t:--,Lt.~")
".:...:,. ,."\
SECRET ------ I FIC/\TIOf.J ~---CL ASS

Cc ;r~di or.g m8d3
0:1
~r.is orig in:, 1 MUST be (;1cdo
011
~II
copies bofors dfJlivery ~o T -=Jfcsrilp~ Br.)n!:h ..
,\
' ,'"
'f
----------195
-',
... ,
,'V
C"""l"
to
I I
I,
(.,-, !-\4.\<t
. . ./ ... k ..
~...,.!
"\.1'
~./'~
.':"0:
-.. ,'" ~
/'
-'
'..8
:n
',_:-.,..,. ......1. .-~ ..... _ - - <_:~_.~. _
_T~O j..:.:t
,.,...
i'ol
.., .~J .. r:e.
:.-"'r- . . .,.'" ... ),.,:. ... ".\1
J,
.".......:) 1"")1 . '-C)"" Oll~"l. .) . ""Y .., ,.- '. - ( ...~ .... ~
no
ot~8r
assumption
e..~u..
"
( I.:: I
( .
.'
.r:
"' 1.~!.1) ,; " V

"
" 1 -, ...~-- , ...
n':'l u - '.......
-!-
-.. -
.., ( ) .... "\
1.. .. 1. " , , _ - .. - '
-:.1
~ ::,.~
..'
'\
..
Q
-)
\.,1 I
i.
With
achievem8~t
:~.o~
Ot)l~r
ttlG 8.J.. J~
.,,
eleme~_ts
mu.st be
.:-~ S 3U.l!lccl
JIS':"ll'OIl71r;'ll'l D51f':!Z:')
/1
m~c", o.:'~":
I
"
-.~ _.j
.. ,
.
Cl,o\'''19'S''''i''
Corrc::;OIt:.i trnclo
Oll
l"i~i
or:q;nc:: l~USf b.J
rl1JJe
e'fl ail
, OUTGOING T:=:LEGRP,M
IN..J'C .... 7~
Colhct
_ _SZ_Q~~_i___
CLt, !-;S ! FIC,\TION
F OR DeiY U SS" OKL Y
probably
ev~~
less fav0rable natioD31ists than now.

E)Xif';-;; S
I~
muat
of
COurf:38
be conceded theoretlcaJ. pODDlb:1.1ity

Yugosl~7ia
es'~-s_b
National Communist state on patte=n
in any arss
Buch possibility only if

J" ..... p .... ,-''''El
/):'J " ..
eve~y
otLer
posslbl~
0
avenue
clo~9d
to
.~". ... ....... 0"" -) :J. J~~U
r.l1~e c. '1 c.: ....
"""J.
Y'''~n' T{r\-~!'11 'in ... -...,;_14.. ... _ ...... _"'"
cont ..'01
Moreorer , vrh.ilc
Fel is for
~l"\t: Df:J1..JU
u~lnfo
an~
such
r3~0rGnC8
I . .:....
as you doen judicious:
na-l-ln" .~\._ . l.tv. __ '~lly
co.,.., "1 ioe .... . '" on'J r."R . P ..,.1..,-,,,,,,,- ~
to D8:tio::lalist movement lay b8.s:1.;;5 for solution IiK1.ochins..

... ~'Oh 1 ",." P !. "~H ......... l!J. ..
PrOi" lied FE c1is:?1;J.:i

C::':::.~1.l''.J8.1istlc
c!.!'lCl ge::1erous attitude , mos",3
i mpo:'tan~ pa:,:,"~
f'-,l "i '- ._--
polit
CLASSIFICA.IO'
Ccrr'!c";c",
m~11
Gn t ": 5
c,ial,S,Isr ~.~ ",.,d-
on Ji!
C!lpiu:i cr~~cru
d.J:iv::r.: b: Tel ~,,\/) [i~n-::~~
OUTGOING TEi..,'::: GRA:-11

Coi i~cl
I
CLA.SS !rIC~ TION
>
-----------_._-propaganda support Baodai solution night nore them anyone eJ.se
FOR DC:'T USE: ONLY
be able deprive Eo of
tnlk~r:g-po1nJ.;s
in 67ent ~ .. O continues demand
armec1 res ista!1Ce Baodat rE:F.;ardles s circull1s-cancos ("Thiah a.ppcars
certain in light vitriolic tone. Cl..u.';.'ent Vietr.lin.l-).
broac1cao'~3
on
Baodai \'ihich g ivc no re oogn i tion P..i1Y FR co ncessions to na>clol10.1io t
demands. )
Ever. \-rit h conc1i t ions for US mrpport Baoc1al :realized ,

tas~c
it futile expect US be able assls'G cffectlvc:ty th13 initlc.l
beyond otressing requirements situation in talks South Asian govts and providing materials eJldencing realities of COB8unism through USIS for distribution as you an desirable in
CO!}j unci ion ':l i
Congen Snigon considor

arOUSG
th BD.oc1a5. efforts
eompatriot;o
t o Commie menace .
Experience Ch:l has shoi'm no 0.mt US Ulil nncI
eeon aid can save govt , even if recognised by all other poworG and possessecl full opportunity achiove nltl al:ns , unless it can
r~lly
support people against Commies by Rffording repreoentation
all important natI groups , D3.ni.festing devotion to 11atl as opposed personal 0 r P8,:rty in tero at s, ancl der.o.lo"GX'[1.tlng x'eo.l
Re Vi at opin:lOn x'eporteJ.
J5T:nOUTfO.l
DC~W~ZD
l6c.d0rs~i:).
B8.1(30:;1 1 8
145 that US abanctonment
Nat5.. o!.18.1.:1.st; Ch:lnap:::esents unfavo:re.ble augnry for DO!1-Co:".m.:i.e res;L_9
Fl'"ICEQ 0:<'..'1')
Vie tn9.!:l, there no
bj ection cupb.o.slzir:g to pel'l[)OnS l!l th this
le:-r
_---.S .E:crill~~.
__
~.)
CLASSj't'i=fJN
Ccu (:c~ivf'\S
m;)dl')
O~
thi:
ori:Jilnl
.... JoJ.\US . I,v m.!dCt

Cr:lnch.
an
COptCS
ba~o;o (k!i".:;~' to Tcl-]raph
FORI1 PS-322
7~1-4~
. OUTGOING TEt:.EGR/\.l'.1
~NOICA.t::
CaIicel;
C hargo Deportment Ch arge to
SECRErr - ------_."---CL ~SSIr_IC
..\TION
FOR DeN L'SE ONLY
above qUl.lit ies and lack Hill to fight; I no " be cause US Q.TE ;;
Re Xuan query Hhother US 't'rlcl propose Vle~.:;n[\m for member'sh1p
UN ehld FR renig, you
s~ld
avoid discussion thi8 matter, at

~'1111
most if pressed state circtlms'Ganc8a c::.t momont

determino US action. For urinfo only it
of com:'l0
unl~(ely
US cld oven
" \,lel
vo'i.;e for Vietnam membership UN if e.G :l.t o.ppears remain in control Vietnam fon relations.
nO:1 ~~R
Telegraph Branch: Send to: IMCONSUL ,
Act~ r~:~'.~ ( k10
ACHESON
HANOI
Cleax'ances:
FE
,STI'lIElUY10N DESIR[::O
"IE
Li '~Q:' ~~~ l'.r~':\. ('l;'" {j',S~'~'';''':f~~ ~~l~:I;i
hi.
I~;-\
'FIC;;S 01' I..Y)
.C:.;:.
li'=~:SE.:\:
COgbu:c'n,Jr: ccp
c:;~
(
5/j.9/ ~9
..t ...J J
c {-
: :~"~y ~,Ci]: 1 8 P . :. fH
. CLAS~ilF(:r{-b.ncJrJ
Corr~cti or,' rncdo on ~hi5 ";riJ:nal },IUST b~ made on nli

COi.ii~~ b~fo:c dc1;v~ry lo
:,
Tl!l
~r~;1~1 Br'lnrh o
,j .
"~
.)....
",
.J
.
~
St'~CR'S'T ...
"
--,...,_.
;-:'.
/.
" '-l-t'~
l. .
The HonoZ"r;bl0
David K. Eo Bruco,
Amcrlcnn Ambassado:"'>g
Pari So
'
Sir:
There :1.8 trn:o sml tt;od !lor'oni th n mcm01"rtl1uu:::1 fJOtti.1G fo:pth th e Dep flr'tmen tis vlo<::s o:'! the ag1"'00: l'3Ut slgncd on MnT'ch 8 b? the Pl'cslden't of li':r."illlCO nnd 'i:;;.1~ i'O:i.""i;i18'." Lu1.... pero~i.'" of Annal:! def5.:o:lng the futuro f.lt~t.u:J of t~o StnV,) of Viot:n[un. You are requested i,o pro~ont thi.." DCmox'o.n... dt.:'m to tlle lHnlstry of Poreicn: 1\:':i"3.:1:~n of tho Fl"cnch
Govcrnr.len'i:; ~ . .
OJ
rn
0
()
0
.......... G)
e
It in suggos tod th.ut the
E~b9. '1sy 9 f.l
noto
the momorHnd1.1.m be composed nJ.o:1g tl 0 :fol1cy.Ting
t~:,ancmi t;ting lin~s ~
C}
.}~,
to
Itrrho Ymbassy of tho Uni ted P.ta ton of ImoricG pre'"

"'0 1'>,":"1 1 t.s cr)[QP 1 l'"n"""'I""'(,,,' to l'~ (' I:'i'lj st~..,.. 01'" VL')I'~Ot'l(" l '!..I. 4,.. / . .... tI t:Y "' . . '" .... ..:~ .... ... 1 ,,) V.t..' AJ...l.CA 'I r~ an r14.D on .J,. n' '" '-,,-uc)' 011 /.-:>.....,~tl~!. _t."....:, t", V'Ji ..'.J.j~JJ..h. .OJ: LJ.-'I _ ..... \. . , '1 J~,.., ,..,oc,,(,-" ... ,..,,"n .
....1
,.~J
1,.1 _
'-.,
--
._J. .... ' _ "
~~
~....
~........
ho.s th.c honOl" to tl"anmd t 1:10)::c'.71 th c o~(.,t;D.:ln. C O(r;ncnts of the Dopnrcl:lent of St"1te 0:1 tllO a2yoC:~lCn/G eonm Cl'll.dod on Mn.'Ych 8 11 19<19 ~ b~)';.,\Jcon tLo fro:J idcnt 0 .....
tho Fren ch ?icpublic nn d t~10 f.'OT';';lc:e E:llP8:'''Ol? of r'-n f,o..\.,L'n 7r,n '-,or> 1l, J V _ .. 1. t....., (,1 J_... .1:. " ...} An 'l"lam \"hicll J-he l 'l ..'i~l'i ,..J'''''l,r or.> Po:'" vO> l. w _.L kInd enough to [J8.J-::0 8,'TJal1abJ.o to tho Gover.rmJcnt
_ .oJ. _
r'" {
J..
_,~
L,..' ...
a.,)
c.~
of tho United Statos"il

\
P\.s an nl tG1:na ti va, tho pl"('sents!;j].o;.'). of tho noto h-;r l:h~. Charles E. Bohlon may aprowr proJ,'ol":J.blo., 'Th.o p~.:'o1.Jw. lOE1s dealt "JJ.th in tho me ;llor:1ni..~.:.J.m 't';Cj."O cUoc ' l.8:Jod in n
'J ....
,0\
"0.',)'''' iJ
)., ...... u
~
f.fj
........
I.
c&nvGrnotion ,wlth the Secretary of Stato shortly bero~o c '''''''om ~;' "'''~1l11'''' ~O''' <-".' T~"'lC;l. "'.~'& ';"'h ',o'" -", ,,;...... n"- .J". H..... ' ... '0~' ~ !., . . . "" 11.!.13 C40P<-...,,.."r v ' .l.t ..
>
~?
t/ .!
~".
lr /
~alton~utterwolth
/
Director for F~r ~astern Affairs

COP:O,i. C ."',\.., ' J.v~
(;
/
~ '''.
/2QQ?)/t
t ti
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
available to it tho text ' of tho aGroemont concludod

(
OU
GoV'(;rnr.lOnt harJ f.'ollc":'IGd \7:t th
SCL",O CO~COl'.n
tho
C01X{'3C
of
:1~
events .in PX'eDch Indoc:h:tna o'7nco ';ho
C::1(~
of- tho u<;. :;"",
,:hD~]C
con ~-' Xl~. bll ted
PJ.'o(~cm.i1:lrm tly
201
(.
~~----
-~- -
orce . ~.
Tn Duell
<.:01 onj" tmd :1. ta. };)Qf1ni1Jlo eO:"1.::::-:1.butiO:J to \";0:;:1-:1 ","i;Qbil1';~J
n ... t ....... '"

'
)
202
lntioDE'U.:tp \11th the forme 1" c:11o:n,J D in tho prcDorvntlon

~I.G rc.lJ
e'~"'\O ~~ .... .>
of
t~ade
f.tnd e co;.
,
C!l1'<T J
lcnp.: intoI't.w:::hcd ... nr.\d In n _"'
rcud::noss on' the part of the: Go'.0"{:tial poople to welcome.

I
the continued technic,al and

the metropoli ta.~1
b~\s:ts
pOY1G~o I'~
rt{:"u.:l:Ld!:.it~[li.,;ivo
8.CG1s'i.ianc0
up y ca:pc("1., thn t only em such n
would
t}:18rc
be any
Co.crvcrspl:r:> :l:i:; aGomcd thnt 1111 1ntcntloll f'n the p2P.:h
tho
, '"' 0.. "'1 ';~c",)l~' C\~.,i"i7'.lj.", .. .... \0..4 , ........ \.t ... .. :-.4
,-_-. L
~,~
.s."'f~1
203
Hl1d that the con::::equont c.cstruct:1.c.l 0:' the
i'ac5.11t.io~
0:;
1 .\
\/on10. rencli cGa:l.nst
C00pt)!'i1 tlt):1 n:lt~
.f:he
::o;:;t
t.t.?1rl lv:;[;iDC"i;
I'
PD.[J~; '.f0'...1..!>
.'
I
l'
n tl:
1:1~;b:(;
of t his estilIlI'!te that t ho
. . .. . trnJ_t()f.l~ 0t:"to:;/Cr.:r\"0)7.l:r::1C~(.lt h~.s

;1 \
I
'f
; I
~.tD
;
'\
. \
/'::r ~
;
\
'.
F . .).J'."!- ....\~ ..... toJ'

..!.:"-t" , ~,.....
tq
'.
;:. :'
;
!:J tl)C:AG'~:.
o~
to.1.:;
C~~ Alone
provldo t00
b~o1i;~o~
,
I
"
C'C.-.iO: . .r:r:,l,JP' t?
;
.,
\,
r ." ....
204
It
be
'zt!:~tcd
(
onct:
tL:.C
Opl111. c:~
o i' the lJnl ted :3t::1. tes Govcrn::'1c .. t tl":.o 'i/;tctnn:a(;$t'j Pi;()P_.C
no t ter tr.tt;
t_!.... t:'
... 4~
-.~---
of tl?.c
cnuse~
it
c~mnot
bo
205
t)
9.rl
outcome Y!ould not o:n1S be f'n tt'!l to the
.:;0 fn~~(.
c. nc1
tho
5.nter0~ ts
.o f 0.11 freo pooplos"
pn:,~t;ic1J.l~n.. ly
those of:
appoaJ..'led to p).'lcmi r ,
I.;)
:lnclepcnden c(;
r::.~.ly
not!' it is
f'C:1 l~cd
o unoal:1:n "."; , ' .

.'
.,.
206
(.0
d " l' n.c. "'f' ,. v
+-d. t,; .. ,~'"
('0 <3 u t.,., tU '. l. c.
l' .~. F'
..... 1 '"' I/n<":."'_ J _ ~' - ,-,
:':'"'.'\1"'". . ~_'.""" f.n. y . _ ,)" :.J...1 _
t 1 -..,. v ...!.' t:o Pl"'Q"7! (;'(:1 . ,.. -, v ...--
Stut Ce
di::ml ,yeu. bv rJ
r
~...
it
of'
Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Secti o n 3.3 NND Project Num ber: NND 633 16 , By: NWD Date: 20 11
March 8 agreement, then it must be supposed that the Communist-dominat ed "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" "Till continue to receive the support of these Vietnamese . Certainly as long as the Vi etnamese are persuaded that the
(
two-and - a - half-year - old war uith France must be prosecuted to a conclus ion if the goals for 1rThich they have fought
are to be won, they vTill continue to regard the dom inant Communist element of the Vietminh League in the light of its effective lead ership of the natj.onalist movement and not of its inevitable intention to subvert the nationalist caus e in the end to the requirements of international Communism, with which they have had little acquaintance as yet . The United states Govermnent vTould be lacking in frankness if it did not state that in its considered estimation the paramount question in Indochina nOH is whether the country is to be saved from Communist control. Und er- the circumstances, all other issues must be regarded as irrelevant . Much time has already been lost. The
years since the end of the Pacific I'Tar have seen the Communist threat to Indochina intensified rather than other208
:into an emergel1CY
c.d:. t .le opinion

cult to save th:U'j situi.1.tlon end to p:pesc::,"'ve .!.:''Hloc11.n:.1.
f~on
they gould
contl~ue
to
.-'
and unlcsD the Vtet:nRu 0E0 c~'n b 0. conv:tl~ cd thn t t::tsy C~~!1
I
operat:ton nith the
GOlfe:rnr.w:.l t
tho narc-a 8
: choico 1:.0:1 Indochina to s:tmpl c cl't;o:'.nD. tl ven:

)
rdl1
'J"'iot~n~"in
209
r-
only if the
0qu~11ty
of
Vict~am
10
recoD11~ed
and
1f~
co
o f this re18. tior;~hlp , the 30verc1..go.ty of

!
ViCt~C.E1
is
Asie cince the end of th8
~8r
uould
DCO~
to lenve l1ttlo
I i I !
ftl1
s.n d endu.r:lng if'

"
ai~tl).:1nec \";')1'0
tho U:don ccncci ved no';;
voluntar.il~r es~m. u:ed
(jll
both
n:lc1c~fI
"
.
,
)
./
or
t_)~
210 -
....
--
in cODnection with every
~i01d
of
30vern~cnt
ao " the
~~oc 0~ n
(ls;,;i~)ntC'Jd ~.::J.
:. . .
nn it trlOG,Ph0:::'C
o:~
<1tr cord vnc1
tl5.~i:7'\w
""
",3
:in
211
the enter'priso '?
A dispas sion~. to llppl'linal 1e" ds the Un! ted Stnt3!J
Covernment; to beliove,:.> in f1hort;1 that the p,;.f:S01"Vatic:'l o:r.t
the 'willingness (If the met:ropoJ.i:;;a,l country to elvo en ...
tinio8; tha t 1 te pnrticlpL tiO:;1 :U1 'tb.c Fl'llonch Union
r;111~
the confidonce of the
Vi6 (;n~1 O~iO
n:'JopJ.o vihon
CD.OOO
shall
\;:1.011
and f-vnctio:ning of tJ..o n,r7 yoG:1 1..l,o" n:ld t!y. ,t
>.
tllO
c.,:)...
212
rorm cd unCcr tho

pEt t;ir':t".l
~arch
asrG6~ent
to invIte tho p&rt!c.-
in t':.11..S
C~~~'Jl:::-e.tD.:.?n t
ui' 't)c':1n:t ~- (~~; fil1tj~ t~:!?t~l:r 113. tJ.Dl:!n.).i.o t
~o
'J
-l [l~ t)
~"~,,,, ,..:1. . ..... ,
.fer
';~he
to the
''-11 I.J .
c:,.
213
Go'!er'nment; n01.l.1d hope
fllxoth:':r extension
00ubtcd fidelity to
tho A::-:!iM1 peoplon
0
b .". J
"
t"!0 21V:J.'tl C(;t..s.
'j
214
controlled foreoD on thc1:i." .f~olltlc:':"3c;
Unltod Statsf1 GOv8rnmOtlt
~~S tb:::.d;
(
thf)
G;J1JOr!1;,:~cnt;
1.'0.:.10:1
Ut'1der the rinr.cl:'1 8 r.sr001~Je::'1
of
\'r:tll 51.,1 cc;Jsd in i t3 erncic:!.
J: . . ... ~.,,.,_,fi" ..,.

i.... It
...
-:J- .. ,"
"\~1n.:
--
...
~.f,,:
~
....
., .
' ..
"'
-1'
,v
,r
,. r .I
J[tJN
rQ ,,-,
2: .6 1
FJ? gE~EJ1. ~ COgbm:-n ., .Tr :mp
C!.
II
/!(""\
FE
C lea~('ed \:::L th
}!;lJR an d
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3_ 3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 _By: NWD Date: 2011
.
TOP SECRET NOTE BY T:rill EXECUTIVE to the -NATIONAL SECURI7i COUNCIL on
SECREr~PARY
u. S. POLICY TOl-TAHJ) ASIA ---------------------The enclosed memorandum by the Secretary of Defense on the subject is circulated herewith for the information of the National Secm"i ty Councll and. referr'ecl to the NSC Staff; as requested in the second paragraph thereof, for the preparation of a report -for consideration by the Council .
I
-J
SIDNEY H. SOUERS Executive Secretary
---
DISTHIBUTION : The President The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman } National Security Resourc es Board
::sc
l.~8
217
TOP SECRET
o
y '
TOP SECRET
p
.J
"\
ITEE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
HBahington June 10 J 1949

MEMOHA NDUM FOR TEE EXECU'IIIVE SECRETARY NATIOK~L SECURITY CO'U NCIL
I .
Subj:
Urilted states Policy Toward Asia
>
I
I ,
i ! ;
1. I am becoming increas ingly concerned 2.t the cours e of events :tn Asia. The advance of comnmnism in J.arge areas of the \--To1"ld 8.nel particularly the successes of cOl1lmuD.ism in Chine, seriously affect the Suture security of the United states. I am awaro that this criti c al situation is being watched clo sely in the several depe,rtments of the government) and I apl)recia te that the current problems are being hand Jed as realistically as circtl.n1stances pel"mit. It occnr s to me ) hOi-leVer , that this day-to - day) conntry- by-coUJ1try approach may not develop a broad program lnour best long - r ange interests .
2. A majol" objective of Unl ted States policy) as I unde :p . stand j . t, is to cont ain communism in order to reduce its threat to our security. Our actions in Asia should be part of a c arefully cons:i.dered and comprehensive plan to further that. obj e ctive. I therefore r equest that the staff of the National Security Council tmdertake as soon as practicable a study of the cuxrent situation in Asi a to re-exnmlne and correlate current policies and to appraise the commitments and risks involved in the various courses of actlon--political, economic and mill tary- -'.>7hleh might be undertaken in support of the bro ad obj ective and recommend for the con sideration of the Nationa1 Security Council an appropriate plan of action outlining specific objectives to be achieved .
I
218
/s/
LOUIS JOHNSON
TOP SECRE1'
FORM 05322
7 1O ~6
...
OUTGOING TELEGRAM
IN D ' ';:\TE
1
.
CL A :: 3IFICATiON
/ / ' Co iled Charge

D apa;~mcn~
Ch arge to
}tEn ell! ttrf;st~it f (Jf ~ lai:e I~ashin&~ CR ET

(
. , - ,- "'"rt"> '
_
.. ; .
(\lr" ...."\
, --
'v,-J~iI
p -
"
', '
,;: :
"
JUN
1U~FJ1BAS BY ,
RANG{)ON o
; I, "
/ '?"- "-c:;~ On JUN 14 net'! Vietnam StD:CO ESTAB una.OI' Bao Dni
as assoclated ota:to of FR Union il1th u:lc.lo attribtrtoc ,
x~Z
interne.l B.nd external /3ovOJ."eignt~l bU:b ~lJ. th FE retaining . . ',' . . moasure of control oveX' (;xtGl"'nal :r-;iD,.t~.ono 8,11(1 defenoo ~
~
'1,
li'R troopn remaining in V1etnf'lilo .\:

-'
Rofer> Fo!'tinightly
01)111-
co
U1
o
. maricG for addl tional backg:<?otmd ospecially Bc.o D9.i

"
F:tI DEPT 'Hecently
6ml'~
PariD,
:;:o,~
(loll vcry F'ONOFF
~.
, :fy~.ng a
DI STR I BUTION Dt: SIRED ( OFF I CES ONLY)
f110 flU tl
onali ot maj" 1"'1'~Y Vietna!Yl, tha'jj :'.1. r'Bqi..dc1 to -
..
V~.8
.,- r,,\
~\.rrf.
us HOP0[J uld be
gGneY.'~).lly
h08clacl o
'
rhlcl FR C.;.QVT e.nrl

'thin
. .; : 1
US \,;1 th
expect~.t1on
coordination BRIT \11d. (joel':. obtain backin3

suppor~;j
other Sou'chAsio.J1 GOVTS and itself len('l

.
incluo.inl'"
.
CD
recognition nON regime e.nd ex:tenoion such aesistanco

(
possible ,in c1rcuIT.s;;.Sl.nceo" . Other hancl e fJhld. FH a.-r<l Viet

' GOVTS fall shoX''''lj 'l>'rhe.t onctmlben"G upon them, US . Hl<L refl.:'aln
..
fl"orn fJUpport1ng Baa DeJ. solution and It 1Vld be clear . so to 1"hy US 'Unable p revent COHHIE conta"ol victnp.fuo
Memo Hill be doli verGa. only Q.:'C).lly anc1 in

- EM.B Paris reports it s
deliV'el~Y
pnr~
as
e:t this
t:tmc Hld 1mpoa.c

1lu0:3
r ather t han encourage FR to move along

If Bao Dai
r'eg~lme suOCCCCl.8 ~'.n(l '{rie
DEPT
dGsl:~l(-wo
aro a.ble get

m[l~y
Indian approva.l Bao Dai aOVT, pOGs1bil1'{iY

develop get GOB appzoo'IJ8.1o
ov n'tue,11y
Houevc" undcrotand Bu;;::.nese

f~wtlon
. have friendly attitude Ho Cl:d !lin

propagandiz1.ng In
BUR~1
uhlch holiovod
again.!.:!'t Bao DaJ. o.
For your oon pider.R.t~J..on end act;ion 'you!' d isC1"'c'tion i 'TO :,::~~~spgg 8s tf on <" \."'~\ advance 1~r1;rn::IJ.~r. } tha t you explD.in GOB importD.l1CO i'io Al3l['. of / . \) . ;:;.t
tr
" succe ss Bao DfJ.:l regime uhich
mig~1't;
.'GhoZ'eby Cl'eato
bul"'2.!'1~
",
~gainf'j"(i
Cm.fi,1IE con tr'ol

~est
VietnL~~1Q
If COKl-lIES gain' cont1?ol
. Ie, THAI and
SEll. 1'1111 be imperllo(1.
Yon may
$,100
expresG hope GOB 1'1111 refrain :.lx'om public otatomeniJo Hh1ch
l
220
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number : NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
WLD prejudice chances his BucceOB o In explaining our position GOB you ma.y FT out that
fail ure
B~O
Dai experiment ma.y l'loll reBul t ehol"tly in
COM:f<UE con";;rol Ie ; that In vlo-;- iri't;crnal POl,IT p'1"act1cf;1.',,,, 1
conceEJsiono \'lhich FR GOVT could. ma e D that Bao Dnl ill only

person visible at pr csen; abOi.rli \'jllOlIl Vlotne; nesc i1atlonaLtotfJ may groUpa. You may also PT otr1.i
~Gh 9:t
Ho Chi. rtln haG long
CONS to Canton.. 1925 undex' Borod:tnc $
-VH:\Cl
ol'c:;e.n:1.z8T IO
COMMIE PaY'ty and, that; hiD Z'6oont gctiol1n have not changc<.1.
DEPTqs belief that he rcmainG
COHHIE~
.,
I
-j
I -. ,
i
I
only first
' s~Gep
tim~
in evolut on Vic'GnaEl problem and

--"-~~..Q'-~ ..... ~-
~Gb.[l'(;t'TO
-""- ~.--.---
~---........,..-~ ~~ ~.......,..
believo in
FR '(.-1111 have ICO E1CrlJ'O fm:" bOYOilt1. COnC0!3010nO .........- - - - .- - - - - - - -"---"-~""~.------------~- . I
'~hus far made. in oro.ex> r>.ccommoc.ln';';o na~t.i:1onc..lio t D,OPJ,ra"'G~.o i10
...-"'.,.........,."
...~- .. ---~-
~-~---
. ..-.- ...
-------- _ .
Vle~Gne>mese peoplo&
.-----.-~---.
----
Even i:rf :lmp!'ac't1ca1.Jl0 for ,you app:poach GOB along
thfJOO . 1noD ~m'J $ forogoi ng oxplD.n.::'.,tl on ou~ p08i -Cion may bo
221
useful replying any question s 'Ghi s mf',tter from' GOB
FYI PEPT planning e.pproEl.ch TIlAJ: and PH:rL GOVTS

wi th v1.el'; obtain (lome public cxpress'.('l!l encourD.gcment
for Bao Da1 solution o
... :..,
".'
.....
Cl(-:J8.:red " in
cl.:.'>aft
E
l:'l.:r <> 0' 01..1..1-.1.1. van all 1:11' co Ree(t
w:::'tl~
.SJYl".
-/(
u.
(j,
GOVER~!HP\T PftlTi.lI"G OHICl : I U3 780tSa
222
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3,3 NND Project Number: NND 63316 . By: NWD Date: 2011
INCOMING AIRGRAM Department of state

2027
FROtvl: DATE :
Amembas sy J London NOV 9, 1949
RECD: Nov. 15J 1949 2:12 pm Mailed: SECRET Sec retary of State_ Washir.gton .
A-2063
Unknown
Followin g in substance are the recommendations made at the Singapore Con ference in regard to Indo-China:
1. A failure of the Bao Dai ~xperim8nt'would in avitabJ,y result in a complete French withdrawal from Indo-,China; therefore U. S . and Commonvlea 1 th Government s should JOln the UK in asalsting the French in support of Bao Dai.
2. In view of the urgency of the situation Western nations cannot afford to await prior sponsorship of Bao Dai by the Aslatic nations. It is therefore' recommended that after the transfer of sovereignty to Vietnam on Janu ary 1 the UK support the new regime.
3.
Following action is a. b.
recon~ended:
The French should be asked to clarify the legal status of the Vietnam. De jure recognition is not possible until !1arch 8th .~greement is ratified . It is therefore recommended that de facto reco gnition of Vietnam ,be granted-on-fhe
SECRET
223
A- 2Cb-:J "Dat ed: NITV 9) 19~9

From: A;;18l:1ba s;::;y J
L()n~Li1.,
SECR'SP
transfer of so~ ere i8nty. It would be desirable to inford Bao Dai df the British Govern me nt's int ention before the British Government r ecognizes the new Chin ese government . c. The F~ench should be encouraged to expedltc the Y atH' j.cation of the March 8th Agreemen t and the tr ansfer of th s control of Indo - Chin ese aff'ai.:('s f~.>Ol!1 the MJnist.r-y of Overs eas France to the Fore ign Offic 2 .
It is hop ed th at Secre t ar y of state Acheson a pub lic statem:mt \': ith regc:rd to Jncl o Chi ne. :-1:lm:L1a:(' to that Ii13.dc ;l :i.th x"ega :ec} to Hong Kong on !,la y 18th \'.-1-1811 h e: statsc1. that. in t.1e event of an attc~dc on Hon~ Kon~ the United states will ful fi l it s duti c~ un der t he Charter .of t he Un j. ted Natj.oDR .
\,1111
:t SBUS
. ~~
4.
The UK Ehol-'.lc1 c021[-;ult c1 08e 1;y \';5.th t he French . in J ndo-Chini:i. \i~l.ch r 2gi::l:ed to c.n t~l-C or:::;!t.mls t p ropaganda .
5.
6.
exp e cted.
Neutrality fro m Indio is the mos t t hat ca n be
BLISS
NSC 48/1
TOP SECREir
..
Dec ember 23, 1 949

~.
NOTE BY THE EXEC UTIVE SECRETARY to t he NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
THE POSITION OF TIill UNITED STATES WI TH RESPECT TO ASIA Reference: The enclosed the NSC st a ff pursuant vice and nssistance of and Defense and of the Bonrd and the Director Nsc 48 and related papel's.
report on the subject has been prepared by to NSC 48 Cl.ud r elated p aper' s, '-lith the [:.(1representatives of the Secretnries of .St.!J;t.r3 Acting Chairman, National Security ResouY'C BS of Central Intelligence.
The enclosure is submitted herevri th for discussion at the special meeting of the National Security Council scheduled for Decembe:r 29, 1949, and fqr whatevel' action the C01.ll1cil me.y decid e to take ~{i th re spect thereto. .
Execut~. v e
SIDl'.:EY 'of
SOU:2RS Secretary
cc :
The Secretary of the Treasu.ry
NSC 48/1
TOP SECRET
Declassified per Exec uti ve Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 201 1
I .
NSC l~8/1
TOP SECRET
- December 23, .1949

D R AFT
\
. .
UNCIL REPORT BY THE NA'fIONAL SECURITY CO on
THE POSITIO]\T OF
THE UNITED STATES "lITH RESPECT. 'TO' ASIA
THE PIWBI"EM --1.
To assess and appraise the position of the United St[1tes
with respect to Asia* on the basis of our national security interests. ANALYSIS General Considerations
2.
The peoples and countries of Asia have in common a heavy
pressure of population on scc.nty or underdeveloped natural resources and a consequent meager standard of living: experienced in the war: disruption
the vj.gorous nationalistic spirit Hhich
characterizes ne,V'ly independent. states or l'estive colonies: and ac ti ve discontent ,d th their prevailing social, economic and p01l.tical institutions. In other '-lOrds the Asians share poverty The United states position \{j.th
j
nationalism, and revolution.
r espect to Asia is therefore that of a rich and pO"lel'ful country d ealing ,, ith a have-not and sensitively nationalistic area, and of competition together Hith friendly countries against the USSR for influence on the form and direction of the lisiatic revolutions. 'X-For the purposes of this report "A sia II is defined as that pc.rt of the continent of J\sia south of the USSR and east of Iran togethe r , \-lith the major off-shore islands- - Jap3.n, Pormosa, the Philippines, - Indonesia and Ceylon.
NSC 48/ 1
TOP SECRET
\
3.
ASi9 is an area of significant potential power--political, The development in this region of stnble
economic and military.
and independent countries friendly to the United States and seeking to direct their potential power. into constructive channels vTould
I
enhance the security of Asia and strengthen the \vorld positj_on of the United states. Conversely, the domination of Asia by a nation
or coalition of nations capable of exploiting the region for purpo ses of self-aggrandizement would threaten the security of Asia and of the united States. Recognition of these principles has been '" implicit in our traditional policies toward Asia: We have oonsistently favored a system of lndependent states and opposed aggrc.ndizement of any povrers which threa.tened eventual domination of the region.
4.
Our over -all obj ective ivi th respect to Asj_a must be to
as sist in the development of truly independent, friendly, stable and self-sustnining states in ,conformi ty vli th the purposes and
\
principles of the United Nations Charter .
In order to achieve this,
we must concurrently oppos e the domination of Asia by r:.ny single cO"illltry or coalition. It is conceivable that in the course of time
a threat of domination may come froIn such nations as Japan, China , or India, or f rom an Asiatic bloc. But now and fo r the foreseeable
future it is the USSR which threatens to dominate J\ siD.. through the complementary instrwnents of 'communist conspiracy and diplomatic pressure supported by
milit~ry
strength . For the foreseec.ble
future, therefore, our innnediate objective must be to contain Qnd ".. here feasible to reduce the power and influence of the USSR in N:SC 48/1
22r
TOP SECRErr' Asia to such a degree that the Soviet Union is not capable of' .i threatening the security of the United States from that area and that the Soviet Union would encounter serious obstacles should it attempt to threu.ten the peac e , national independence or stability of the Asiatic nations.
P0litls~l C0D8idGr~tlonD
5.
Asia is in the throes of political upheaval .
Communist
attempts to capture leadership of this revolution, nationalism and the r evolt against colonial rule, the emergence of new nations, the decline of western influence, the absence of a stabilizing balance of pOlver, the prevalence of terrorism, economic distress ane! social unrest, and the repercussions of the struggle between the Soviet world and the froe world are currently disruptive forces. The
conditions now prevailing in Asia render the realization of United stu.tes objectives there difficult and facilitate expansion of the area of both comnunist control and , Soviet influence.
\.
6.
The USSR is nOl7 an Asiatic pOHer of the first magnitude
with expanding influence and interests extending throughout contlnental Asia and into the Pacific.
I
I ,
Since the defeat of Japan, whic~
ended a balance of pm-Ter that had previously restrained Russian pres sures in China and the Pacific, the Soviet Union has be en able to consolidate its strategic position until the base of Sovi et po wer i n Asia noY[ compri ses not only the Soviet
Fal~
i
East, but also China \
north of the Great Hall, Northern Kore a , Sakhalin, and the Kuriles. The islands of Japan and the subcontinent shared by India and "Pakistan are the major Asian pOHer centers remaining outs10.0 the
ESC 11-8/ 1
N O T E
Due to a mechanical fail1..rre , Numbers 229 through 238 ' vere not u sed i n consecutive pagination. The t ext of
Page 228 is continued wi thout omission on the page numb ered 239 .
2 29
2 33
TOP SECRET
.. . . . .
soviet orbit.
I~
J apan, the principn-l component of a Far Eastern
war-making complex, were added to the Stalinist bloc, the Soviet Asian base could bec?me a source of strength capable of shifting the balance of world power to thedisadvantage of the United States.
(
Should India and Pnkistan fall to communism , the United States and' its friends might find themselves denied any foothold on the Asian mainland.
7.
While the military advantages of this position to the USSR
are great, the general Far Eastern situation also gives the USSR significant poli tical advatrtages. political
pres~ure
In estimatj.ng the degree of
that the USSR may exert from its present posi-
tion in Asia, it should be remembered that it s proteges deal "rJth Asiatic peoples ,.,ho are traditionally'submissive to pmvsr \-1hen effectively applied and habituated to authoritarian government and the suppressicn of the
individu a l~
Moreover, the USSR in Asi a as
elsewhere with relatively little overt interference in other states, at relatively small cost, and at
lir~tted
risk, is able to give The poli ti.cal
ass:Lstance and impetus to native communis t movements.
offensive of the Kremlin or its'proteges also tends to gather additional momentum as each new success increases the vulnerability of the next targeto
8.
Japan has ceased to be a world power, but retains t he
capnbili ty of becom:i.ng onc e mOl'e D. s:i.gn:i.ficant Asiatic pOl-ler. \rhether its potential is developec1 and the vWy in which it is used Hill strongly influence the future patterns of politics in Asia.
,.As
l
a result of the occupation, Japan l a political structure has been TOP

SEC:~ET
"' " I
NSC 48/1
2 ?'9""
.~ ~
\
TOP SECRET basically al terec1 and notable steps have been taken tOvrard the development of delnocratic institutions and practices.
. J
Despite
these advances, howeyer, traditional social patterns, antithctical to dcmocracy, remain strong. The'demonstrated susceptibility of
(
these patterns to totalitarian exploitation is enhanced by economic maladjustment vThich may grow more serious as a result of population increas es and of obstacles to the expansion of trade .
9.
Although, in terms of the Japanese context, an extreme
right-wing movement might be more effective in 8xploit:Lng traditional patterns and current dislocations than one of tho extreme left, a nwnber of factors combine to make the threat of Communism a serious one. These factors include the close proximity to a
"Teak and disarmed Japan of Conununist areas I-ri th the attendant opportunities for infiltration, clandes tine support of Japanese C0nU11unist efforts, and diplomatic pressure backed by a powerful thre at ; the potential of COnU11Unist, China as a source of rmr materials vita l to Japan and a market for its goods; and the existence in Japan of an ably-led, aggress ive, if still relat ively weak, Communist movement which may be able to utilize Japanes e tendencies tOlvard passive acceptance of leadership to further its drive for pOlvor while at the s ame time exploiting economic hardship to undermine the acceptability to the Japanese of other social patterns that are antithetical to Communist doctrines.
10.
Even if toto.li tariEI,ll pat terns in Japan Ivere to r eas sert
themselves in the form of extreme right-Iving rather than Comraunist ., domin.3.tion, the prospect would remain that Japan \oTould find more NSC 11-8/1 TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
compe lling the political <:Lnd economic fnctors moving it to\l8.rd

.i .
accommodation to the Soviet orbi t internationa lly,
ho~{ever
anti-
Communist its internal policies, than those that move it to\"ard mili tary alliance with the United States. dOl:lination of J apan, moreover, D..lthough Extreme right-\"ing i mmodio..toly mcno.cing
1 0DS
to the United StD..tes than Communis t control would r epresent a failu re , par ticulal"ly marked in the eyes of other non-ComraLLn.ist Asiatic countries, of a major United states political effort.
11. A middle of the road regime in Japan retaining the spirit
of the reform program, even if not necessarily the letter, "lould in the
long~run
prove more reliable as an ally of the United states Under
than ,rould an extreme right-H'ing totali tal"ian government.
such a regime the channe ls ,wuld be open . for those elements in Japan that have gained most from the occupation to exercise their influence over goverl1illent policy and to mold public opinion.
a regime would undoubtedly wish to maintain normal
politic~l
Such and
economic r elations 1{i th the COl1U11Unist bloc and, in the absence of open
hosti~ities,
would probably resist cODwlet e identification
eithe r with the interests of the United States or the Soviet Union . The existence of such a regime , however, will make pos sible the most effective exercise of United States political and economic influence in the direction of ensur:Lng JapC:LIlts frie ndship , its ability to Hithstand external ane). internal Communist pressure, a nd its further development in
12.
0.
democratic direction.
The basic United States non-military obj ectives i n J apan ,
therefore, reme-in the promotion of der.-loc:ratic forces and economic stabillt-y before and afte r the peo.ce settlement. NSC liB/l To further this TOP SECRET
TOP SECRZT
I
objective the u.q.ited states must ,seek to reduce to a minimu.m occupation or post-occupation interference in the processes of Japanese Government Hhile at . the same t ime pr oviding protection for the b2.si c achievements of the occupation and the advice and assistance that.
(
",illenable t he J apanese themse lves to perpetuato these achievements; provide further economic assistance to J apan and , in conc er t "Ti th its allies, facilitate the development of mutually benefi cj.al ec onomic relations between ,T apan and all other countries of the world; 1 71ake it clear to Japan that the United states Hill support it against external aggression \-1hile at the same time avoiding the appearance that its policies in Japan are dict ated solely by con-
r
\
siderations of. strategic self-inteX'ost and guarding against J apan ~ s exploitati on of it s strategic value to the United states for ends -. contr ar 7" to United states policy interests; and promote the acceptanc e of Japan as a peaceful, sovereign member of the c ommunity of nations.
13.
The United states has taken the lead in aSSisting the
efforts of the Korean people to regain that independence promised them at Cairo. In 'lISC 8/2, approved by the President on March 23,
1949, it \,ras agroed that "if the significant gains made thus far,
i n terms both of t he we l fare and aspirations of the Korean people and of the national interest ,of the Unit ed states are to be consolidated , the United states nlUst continue to give political support and economic, technical} military and other assisto.nce to the Republic of Korea.
11
The principal objective of this p01:Lcy is

\"he~ce
to strengthen that Government to the point NSC L~8/1

2J~,2
it can ( 1) success TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
fully contain the
thre~t
of expand ing
COR~unist
influence and
control arising out of the existence in north Korea of an aggressive

S oviet-dominat~d r~gime"
and (2) serve as a nucleus for the eventua l

entir~
peaceful unific ation of the
c ountry on a democratic basis.

(
14.
It c an be assumed that under present circumstances the Communist
communists have t he capab:Llity of dominating China.
d Or:1ination of China is significant to the US SR primarily because it eDhances USSR capabilities for obtaining Soviet objectives in Asia. Soviet ability to capitalize on the situation in Chlna Hill depend on the degree of control that the Kremlin can exert over Chinese c ornmunist leaders, and on the control that the Chinese c ommunists c an exert ov er a ll elements of Chinese society. Development of
these two varieties of control will not necessarily proceed in parallel . The formidable problems of overpopulation, l imited and
undeveloped natural resources, technical backwardness , and social and political lag \'7hi ch confront , the Chinese conununis ts have
co ntr~Lbuted
to the dov7nfalJ. of every Chinese regime in recent

the il~
hi storYe
Chinese communist success in surmounting
internal
di fficulties might well be accompanied by a l essening rather than an intensificati on of their subservience to the Kreml in. Similarly
Chinese c ommunist failure to achieve an effective solution of China t S problems might drive the Chinese c ornmunists to depend more r ather than less on the USSR. For the very i rrrrnediate futu re it
may be assumed that both Kremlin influence on the Chinese cornmunists and Chinese conununist control over China Hill grm-r more firm and that China will x'epresent a political asset to the USSR in accompNSC
48/1
TOP SECRET
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET lishment of its

~lobal
objectives.
But longer range development of
Kremlin in.fluence over the Chinese cOITL.'11unists will be subject to the interplay of sU9h presently unpredictable factors as Chinese cO!n.nunist effectiveness , USSR policy tovT8.rd the Chinese communists,
(
and the relations between the Chinese communists and the noncommunist vlorld. If the Kremlin should attempt to extend to China
the pattern of political and economic control and exploitation that has characterized its relations with its European satellites, it is quite possible that serious frictions would develop betHeen the Chinese conununist regime and Moscmol. Moreover, an attempt by the
USSR to mobilize directly all Chinese resources in pursuance of its

str~tegic
objectives might well result in China's becoming more of The actions of the
a liability than. an asset to the Soviet Union.
United States or of other "[estern pmmrs cannot be expected greatly to weaken Chinese communist control of China in the foreseeable future, but may have influence on/the relations between the Chinese COITL.'11unists and the USSR. In fact, any attempt on the part of tho
United States openly to deny Chinese territory" such as Formosa to the conrrnunists would probably react to the benefit of the communists by rallying all the anti-foreign sentiment in China to their side. 15. Furthermore, action by the U. S. to occupy Fornosa would
inevi tably expose the U. S. to charges of "impe:vialisr.l" and seriously affect the moral position of ihe U. Sr before the bar of world opinion, particularly in the Far East, at a time when the U. S. is seeking to expose Soviet
impel~ial:tst
deSigns on other n2.tions.
Such
action Vlould provide the Chinese communists \.;1th 2.n irredentist NSC 1l-8/i
r~J.10P
SECRET
TOP SZCRET
. . I ..--...'
issue for their propaganda against the U. S. and a cause vrhich would rally almost unanimous public sentiment behind them in Chj.na .
I ,
16.
\ cor.~ill~ists
It is not believed that denial of Formosa to the Chinese can be achieved by any method short of actual U. S.
As
I
mi1itar~ '_ occupation.
a CIA intelligence estimate of October 19,
1949 (ORE 76-49, concurred in by the intelligence organizations of the Departments of state, Army, Navy and Air Force) states: llVi thout maj or armed intervention, U. S. political, economic, and logistic support of the present Nationo.list island regime cannot insure its indefinite survival as a non-communist base. COnIDmnist capabilities ax'e such that only extended D. S. military occupation and control of Tahran can prev.:mt its eventunl capture and subjugation by Chine se communist force s. Faj.ling D. S. military occupation e.nd control, a non-communist regime on Tahmn probably will succumb to the Chinese cOIllil1unists by the end of 1950. 11 17. In the light of the foregoing, and in vie,, of the estimate
of the JCS, reaffirmed in NSC 37/7 of August 22, 1949, that "the strategic importance of Formosa does not justify overt military action . . 11, it is believed that ,D. S. military occupation of Formosa , which would require concurrent responsibility for the administration of the Island, would not be in the U. S. national interest.
18.
On December 23, 1949, the Joint Chiefs of staff stated
tha t events which have taken place in China have not changed their above views (NSC 37/7, dated August 22, 1949). However, within
these limitations, the Joint ChieTs of Staff believe that a modest, '''ell-directed and close1y supervised progrrun of ['lili tary advice and assistance to the anti-Communist government in Formos a would be in the security interest of the Dnited states, and should be'integrated
rTi th
a stepped -up political J economi c and psychologic !3.1 program
NSC 48/1
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET pursued energetically in ext ens ion of present United States progi')2:'1S there.
19.
In south Asia we are favored by the fact that communi st

(
groups and leaders played a minor part in the nationalist movements of the area, which att ained independence through a peaceful transfer of power by the British. The present south Asian
gover.n.ments are non-communist and, except in Burma , are maintaining Im,T c.nd order' and have good prospects of remaining in pOl-Ter for the next fel-! years. Soviet and Chinese communist hostility
and internal c om.'Tluni st opposition, on the one hand , and friendlii ness and circumspection on the part of the United States, the' Uni t ed Kingdom and the other Hestern pOl-rers, on the other, have during the past two years strengthened the Vest.ern orientation of the south Asian governments
20.
q
India and Pakistan, the pivotal na tions of the area ,
inherited from the British well t rained armies, a corps of expe rienced civil administrators, transport and com.muni cations facilities well developed by Asian standards, important agricultural .and extractive indus tries, and a feH large - sc a le proce ssing and manufacturing industries. They, and Ceylon, remain within
the COJThl1onwealth and have significant military, economic and cultural ties with the United Kingdom--as does Burma which chose to leave the Commonwealth.
21.
There are, unfortunate ly, adverse factors vThich threaten Active disputes
the continued relative stability of south Asia.
bet\'leen Ind ia and Pakistan and betlmen Pakistan and Afghc.niste.n, NSC 48/1 TOP SECRET
2~G
TOP SECRET
(/""
and suspicion off India in varying degree among its smaller neighbo:'s at the minimum i mpede essential regional cooperation . likely maximwll, they could embroil the area in 'i{3.r. all the governments of south Asia are faced
(
At the unInternalJ.y,
~Tith
the necessity of
bringing to their peoples l-1i thin the next fel-! years at le ast some hope of improved economQc and soci a l conditions. Failing this,
they may lose control to extreme groups of the right or the left. 22. Consideration of the foregoing unfav orable aspects of the
south Asian situation together with the current reluctance of the area to align itse lf overtly with any Itpower bloc" lends to the conclusion that it v lould be unwise for u s to rego,rd south Asia, more parti cularly India, as the sole bulvrark against the extension
.~-----....
of communist control in Asin.
He should, hmmver, recognize tha t
the non-colrum.mist governments of the area all'eady constitute a /

i
\
buJ. . . mrk against commun:i.st expansion.
He should accordingly exploit
every opportunity to increase the' present Western orient.::;,tion of south

11; "'3,
and to assist, 'iIithin our capabi lities, its non-communist
gove:r'nments in their' efforts to meet the minimum aspirations of their people and to maintain ( in the case of Burma to restore ) internal security. 23. The current conflict between coJonic.lism and native
,
independence is the most i mportant political factor in southeast Asia. This conflict results not only from the dec ay of European
imperial pmmr in the area but aJ.so from a vlidening poli tice.J. consciousness and the rise of militant nationalism e.mong the subject peoples. \-lith the exception of Thaile,nd and the
Philip~:t. nes,
NSC 48/1
TOP SECRET
2117
/
I ,
,
TOP SECRET
--\
\ the southeD.st JIsia countries do not possess leaders prac ticed in the eX8i'cise of responsible powe r. coloni al country
i~
The question of whether a
fit tO,govern itself, hOi-lever, is not all-lays

(
r elevant in practical politics . The real issue would seem to be whether the colonial country is able and determined to make continued foreign rule an overall losing proposition fox" the metropolitan power. If it is, independence for the colonial country is
the only practical solution, even though misgoverrunent eventuates.
A solution of the consequent problem of instability, if it arises ,

must be sought on a non-imperialist plane.
l
In any event, colonial-
nationalist conflict provides a fertile field for subversive communist activities, and it is nOvr clear that southeast Aisa is the target of a coordinated offensive directed by the Kremlin. In
se eking to gain control of southeast A sia, the Kremlin is motivated in part by a desire to acquire southeast Asia's resources and communication lines , and to deny.them to us. But the political
gains uhich v70uld accrue to the USSR from conununist capture of southeast JI sia are equally significant. authority in
Chin~
The extension of corrunun ist
iepresents a grievous political defeat for us;
ii' southeast Asia also is svlept by cOnu1mnism 'Vre shall have suffered
a ma jor political rout the repercussions of which will be felt
throughout the rest of the world, especially in the Middle East and in a then critically exposed Auitralia. The United States should
continue to use it s influence looking to,vard resolving the colonial n.stionalist conflict in such a way as to satisfy the fu nde,mente,l de me.,nds of the nationalist-colonial conflict,. l ay the basis for NSC 48/1 TOP SECRET
248
TOP SECRET
~ ,,~
--
political
stabil~ty
and resistance to communism, and avoid weakening HOiofOver 1 it must
the .colonial pOHers who 8re our western allies. be remembered that
~he
long colonial tradition in Asia has left We must

D..S
(
the peoples of that area suspicious of western influence.
approach the problem from the Asiatic point of vieH in so far
possible and should refrain from taking the lead in movements vrhich must of necessity be of Asian origin. It v Till therefore be to our
interest vrherever possible to encourage the peoples of India, Pakistan, the Philippines and other Asian states to take the leadership in meeting the common problems of the area. 24. Although European infJ.uence h2.S certainly declined
throughout Asia and Kuropean pOHers are no longer able fully to -.- ' shape the course of events in that part of the vrorld, nevertheless the influence of such powe rs is by no means negligibJ.e, This is
particularly true of the United Kingdom because of the advanced policies followed in Asia by that. nation since the end of the Hal". With the successful conclusion of the Round Table talks at the Hague (for which this Government can c1aim preeminent credit) the Dutch ,.;ill undoubtedly r egain much of their lost popule,ri ty, It
,vould be to the interest of the United States to make use of the sldlls J knOi-lledge and long experience of our EUropean friends and, to vrhatever extent may be possible, enlist their cooperation in mOE.,sures designed to check the spread of USSR i.nfluence in AsiC'." If ;]embers of the, British Cori1l11om'Tealth, pe.rticularly India, pakistan, .Australia and NeH Zealand, can be persuaded to j oin \.,i th the United . Kingdom and the United States in carrying out constructive measures NSC
48/1
TOP SECRET
249
TOP SECRET
of economic 1 political and cultural cooperetion, the results ,vill certainly be in our interest. Not only will the United States be
able thus to relieve itself of pert of the burden, but the cooperation of the ,"hite nations of tho ' Comrnom{eal th will arrest any
(
potentia l dangers of the growth of a white-colored polarization.
25.
With the rise of new nations and the declj.ne of colonia-
lism, a consciousness of common interes ts and a demand for regiona l colll?.boration is beginning to take form among the countries of Asia. HOvlever, tho wide diversity of political organization and development, the lack of' a tradition of cooperation and a sound economic ba,sis for la,rge-sca,le mutual trade, ' a,nd the suspicions i-lith i{hich the weaker' nations of 'A-sia view the stronger, have all operated to
>-\ delay the -formation of any' regional organiza tion up to the present.
But efforts continuo and will probably increase in tempo a, s the advance of Soviet influence becomes more and more a direct thre at. As stated above the peoples of As:ha are suspicious of the 'H est and in any cooperation the United states may extend to"'a developing
regio ~a lism
it viII be necessary to do nothing which would excite Asian leaders have already
furt her suspicion of our motives.
taken the initiative in this ma,tter and it should continue to rest in their hands. There are many indications for exrunple that India
,
aspires to drml Ceyl on, Burma and southeast Asia into a re gional association. These aspirations are aided by the considerable mora,l
influence ,>{ hieh India enjoys throughout this area, derived fro m the great prestige of its revolutionl?.ry le aders and its position a,s the l argest of the Asian dependencies to become independent of eolon:lal
NSO
48/1
TOP SECHE'.r
250
TOP SECRET rule. India has ."gained additional goodi.,ill by its strong support of Prime Minister Nehru is,
the Indonesian independence movement.
hOI-rever, aHare of the difficulties of creating an effective regional organization in south and southeast Asia, and is moving slouly and
!
cautiously.
He and , other Indian leaders prefer that such an
association develop from indigenous des ires and \TQuld not look \{i th
,/.'[WU1' UIJon
(J. t
t.;Olllpt 3 by outsido pOlwrs to impose, or evon too United
actively to foster, a regional organization of the area. States interests i'Tould appear to demand that be given to
OU1'
s;y-mpathet ic support
Asiat:Lc leaders to the end that any regiona l associa-
tion which may develop be one ,.,i th \';hich we could cooperate on equ1;11 terms and ,.,hich would be in harmony with the UN Char ter.
>. -.~
26.
Asia is only one of several fronts on \'Thich tho United Pressures, or The fortunate
States directly or indirectly confronts the . USSR. lack of them, on any front affect all the others.
circ umstance of occupying a favorDible geographic position both in Europe and in Asia allOi"s the USSR great flexibility in the pressures it may apply. Ope rating from the center of the Eurasian
continent , it may advance or retreat in the east or in the 'i,r est as the occasion demands. Because there is no longer a force either in
Europe or Asia ,,,hich can rrithstand ,vithout full United States tl.ssistance the povrer of the USSR if it shou1d be unleashed, determination of the effective use of United States powe r, in its total sense, on
/
any or all of its fronts with the USSR-European, Near Eastern, or

J,siatic~.-requires
decisions based upon a const ant and sk5_11ful re-
eva luation of the costs involv ed and the probable resu1ts to be NSC 1..:.8/1 TOP SECREl
1
251
'rop SECRET
(~
obtained in each.tCEse , both in the event of ,.;ar and its probable aftermath, and j.n the event of continued pence. The Uni ted Stntes
foJ:' its part must be able to apply pressure on fronts o..t tines of its oun choosing rather than spreading itself thin in reacting to
(
every thrent posed by the Soviets if it is not to lose the advnntnges of the initiative in the struggle bet,.;reen the Soviet ,wrld and the free i-lOrld. Mobilizntion of our cold Ivar potential and implementa-
tion by effective techniques is essential. 27. United States ability to exert counter influence against
the Kremlin in Asia .rests on U. S. ability to provide economic assistance and cooperation to Asiatic countries; on preservation and development of the U. S. tro..ditional reputation as a nonimperialistic chnmpionof fr$edom nnd independence for all nation sj on the frictions which will nrise between Asiatic nationalisms and USSR imperialism; on U. S. cultural and philanthropic contacts in Asiaj on U. S. ability to exert constructive influence on the European Far Eastern colonial pOvlGrs and to gain assistance fron these powers in the Far East; on U. S. military pOi-leI', and on the U. S strategic posl tj.on in the Pacific. App,ropriate developn8nt
e.nd utilization of these U. S. assets in Asia through effective diplomacy and propaganda Hill naturally increass the influence vhich the United states can now bring to bear to che ck the USSR in that area.
28.
It must be remembered, however, tha t helping Asiatic
countries to rosist USSR pressur(1 is not something we can do by our OIln policy alone. NSC 48/1 We will depend for success on interaction betvreen
TOP SECRET
252
Declassified per Exec utive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16, By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET
. ' r',
' .!
our jpolicy and \.,hat q)reo..dy exists in the way of will and ability to resist on the p.2.rt of the Asiatic countries themse lves . It must
also be borne in mind that the s\VGeping change s vrhich have been taking ple.ce i n Asia since the w'ar ha\1X) been stimu1o..ted in very
(
considerable part by the determino..tion of the peoples of Asio.. to c ontrol their

OVIn
destinies o..nd, to redress the grievances of the
past vrhich they associate \V'i th foreign rule and foreign influence. Intervention in their affairs, particularly by the Western povrers, hmmver Hell-intentioned", will of itself be suspect and be likely to result in the undoing of the ve x"y intervention.
intel~ests
Ylhich prompt ed the
In the conflict bet"18en the U. S. 'gnd the USSR, the
aclve.ntage in the long -run in Asia is li.kely to rest I, i th the side

/....
which succeeds in identifying its own c a use with that of the Asian peoples and which succeeds in I-Torking in ho..rmony with the dominant motivating forces in Asia today and in influencj-ng the se forces r ather than attempting by direct or impatient them.
m~hods
to control
2t3
TOP SECHET
r ...........
. Strategic Cons ide rations
29.
The potential power' of Asia is strategically significant
both to the United States and to the USSH because of its capacity in the long run to affect the relative military strength of these two
I
countries and hence the cha racter of military operations in the event of war between them. Translation of t he Asian 'power potential into
military strength would require development of each of its elements-organ iz ation and trai ning of manpower, exploitation of natural r esour ces, development of sea transportati on, improvement of communi ca tions and further industrialization--a s well as their integration toward coordinate d objectives. Even given the most favorable atmos-
phere for development, including the power to consolidate as ' neces- ~ sary, the authority to divert channels of trade , and the military / force required to protect long sea routes and other lines of communication--the full development of Asia's potential power is a long-term affair. In the power potential of ,Asia, Japan plays the most i mport;
ant part by reason of its industrious, aggressive popul at ion, providing a large pool of trained manpow'er, its integrat ed interna l communications system with 'a demonstrated pot ential for an efficient merchant marine, its already developed industri a l base and its strategic position. Because . of Japan's economic importance in Asia, of the ex-
treme vulnerability of Japan to blockade, of the long period required under the b est of circumstances for the deve lopment of significant strategi c potential in Asia, audof the hazards involved in attempts
to harnes~ Chinese potential to Soviet ends , there exists no serious
1anger that the USSR will in the near future be able to undert ake mil itary aggression b ased on Asia's strategic potentia l. NSC 48/1
'254
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET 30. The loca tion of Asia, contiguous to the USSR and separated
from the United States, presents different strategic implications , both offensive and
d~fensive,
to the United States and to the USSR.

(
The Asian power potential is more'valuable to Russia than to the United States, since American industrial power is so much greater than Russian. The industrial pl an t of J apan would b e the richest
F~r
stra tegic priae in the Far East for the USSR.
Japan and major
Asian raw-material producing areas, togethe:r with the necessary transportat ion lines, to be controlled by the Soviet Union would add measurably to the war-making potential of the USSR . Russia could
not, howe ver, quickly build up a powe rful self-sufficient war-making complex in Asia 'VTi thout access to -and control over Japan and could not effectively mobilize Japan in war 'Vri thout a larger merchant fleet in the Pacific than the USSR and Japan are likely to have for
I
I
years to come.
\
Other Asiatic assets of p6tential value to Russia Petro-
include soybeans , tin, rubber, and, South China 's tungsten.

.
I -
leum, co]""'" ng from Indonesia including Borneo, while not essential to meet Russian domestic requirements, is one of the most important . strateg ic materials 'in the region.
31.
The strategic value of Asia to
the United States rests on
three considerations:
In the first place denial , of USSR control over
. Asia mi ght prevent the acquisition by the Soviets of elements of power which might in time add si g6if icantly to the Russian war-making pot ent i a l. Secondly, to th e
~egr ee
tha t Asian indi genous forc es
d~
velop oppos1.tion to the expans1.on of USSR influence, t heY"Tould assist the U. S. in containing Soviet control and influence in the area,
NSC 48/1
255
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET possibly reduoing the drain on the United States eoonomy. digenous foroes of Asia, inoluding manpower reserves,
~Tould
The inalso be
a valuable asset, if. available for the support of the United States in the event of war. Thirdly, Asia is a souroe of numerous raw maI
teria ls, prinoipally tin and natural rubber, whioh are of strategio import anoe to the United States, although the United States oould, as in World War II, rely on other souroes if necessary. 32. Sinoe, from the military point of view, the primary stra -
tegio interests and war objectives of the United States oonsistent with the aim of destruotion of the enemy's means to wage war are not now in Asia, the ourrent basio
conce~t
of strategy in the event of
war with the USSR is to oonduot a strategio offense in the ",test fl '-'" and a strategic defense in the "East". In keeping wi th this basj_o
.-
conoept and in light of the strategio interests of the United States and the USSR as developed above,
ce~tain
prinoiples may be stated.
As a primary matter in the event of war, it is essential that a suooessful strategiC defense in the "East " be assured with a minimum expenditure of military manpower and material in order that the maj 01' effort may be' expended in the ""VTest ". In order to gain free-
dom of aocess to the Asian continent within these limitations, the United States must now oonoentrate its efforts on bringing to bear suoh pOI,,re r as oan b e made available, short of the cOlTh11i tment of Uni ted States military f01'oes, in' tho se areas whioh will sho'VT the most results in return for the United States effort expended . In
addition the United States must maintain a strategio position which

~ill
faoilitate cont rol of coastal and overs eas lines of oommunica-
tion in Asia. NSC 48/1 TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
""
.""-'
33.
From the military point of view, the United States must
maintain a minimum position in Asi a if a successful defense is to be achieved against fut?re Soviet aggression.
(
This minimum position is
considere d to consist of at lea s t our present military position in the Asian. offshore island chain , and in the event of war . its denial to the Communists . The chain represents our first line of defense
and in addition, our first line of offens e from which we may seek to reduc e the area of Communis t control, u sing whatever means we can develop, without, however , using sizeable United States armed fo rces . The first line of strategic defense should include J apan , the Ryukyus , and the Philippines. This minimum position will permit
con ~
trol of the main lines of communication necessary to United States
r,
I
strategic development of the important sections of the Asian area. Economi c Considerations
34.
Except for industri a liz ati on in Japan and to a le sser exPressure of
tent in India, Asia is b a sica lly an agricultural region.
popul a tion on the l and has depressed living standards to the margin of subsistence. Communi.cat ions and transporta tion facilitie s are However , Asi a is the source of i mport-
poor and productivity is low.
ant raw " and semi-processed mater1a1s, ma ny of them of strategic value. Moreover, in the past, Asia has been a market for the processed goods of industrialized states, and has also b een for the western colonial povers a rich sourc e of revenue fro m investments and other invisible earnings.
35.
,
' - ---
The Unit ed States has an interest in the attainment by the
free peoples of Asia of that degree of economic recovery and deve10p-
NSC 48/1
257.'
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
. ;.
r'
ment .needed as a foundation for social and political stability.
This
interest stems from the principle that a viable economy is essential to the survival of independent states.
(
In the two major
non-Corr~un
ist countries of this area, Indiaand Japan, U. S. aid (direct in the case of Japan, and via convertible sterling releases in the case of India) is averting a deterioration in econonic conditions that othervri.se threaten political stability.
~ould
Imile scrupulously avoiding
assumption of responsibility for raising Asiatic living standards, it is to the U. S. interest to promote the ability of these countries to maintain, on a self-supporting basis, the economic conditions prerequisite to political stabl1ity. ent living standard
~ ,
!apan can only maintain its presbasis if it is able to se-
needed cure a greater proportion of its/food and raw material (principally cotton ) imports from the Asiatic area , in which its natural markets lie , rather than from the U. S., in which its export market is small.
on a- self-supporting
. In viel? of the desirability of avoiding preponderant dependence on Chinese sources, and the limited availability of supplies from pre'\omr sources in Korea and Formosa, this '\orill require a conside rable increase in Southern Asiatic food and raw material exports.
36.
The Indian problem is somewhat analogous:
The size able
post-vrar Indian dollar defici t may be traced largely to this country1s unprecedented dollar food imports. These imports have been , necessitated by the fai.lure of Indian food production to keep pace wi th population grmvth and to the reduced post-irar avai.labili ty of food exports from India's soft currency suppliers in Southern Asia. Even with these significant dolJ.ar food imports, Indi an food con-
258
NSC 48/1 TOP SECRE'l'
TOP SECRET
'.. r;
-sumption has fallen belmT pre-vrar levels. A further decline would almost certainly produce serious political instability in the major citie s of India. A serious problem would thus result if the U. K.
were no longer able to bear the burden ( of the convertible sterling releases that have so far met the Indian dollar deficit.
I
I .
37.
It is thus difficult to foresee a time at which Japan and
India will be self-supporting in the absence of greatly increased food production and some increased cotton production in Southern and South. east Asia. One major prerequisite to such an increase is the restora-
tion of political stability in the food exporting countries of Burma and Indo China. Given such a restora:tion, perhaps as much as 2.5
million more tons of rice exports could be secured from these coun'~tries
with only minimal loans for rehabilitation of damaged faciliAnother major prerequisite is expanded
ties, e.g.) transportation.
agricultural development in 'the stable Southern Asiatic countries in which such development would be eC0nonlic: India, Pakistan -- which
exports wheat and cotton, . Thailand -- which exports rice, and Ceylon -- whose sizeable rice imports reduce the availability of Asiatic foo dstuffs to India and J apan. Japanese and Indian food requirements,
and Japanese cotton requirements, could be met if certain projected irrigation, reclamation, and transportation projects were executed in the above countries. ,
,
38.
These projects vrill pr'obably require:
({) a more effective
m6bilizatlon of local resources by the governme nts concerned, (i i ) some externa l techni.cal aid, ( iii ) some limited ext e rnal finan-
,0
Gia1 aid.
Most of the countries 'in questj_on are nm.,r taking steps to
NSC
L~8/1
259
TOP SECRET
TOP SECR.,"ST
'. ' 0, . ~ mobilize l ocal
re ~ources
more effectively in the agricultural field, External technical The extern -
and t hey should b e encouraged along thes e lines .
aid should be made available under the Point IV program.

(
al financial aid r e quired is of such a limit ed chara cter that it can probably b e adequately provided by the International Bank and the Export-Import Bank. We should, therefore , continue to urge these in-
stitutions to give serious consideration to requests for loans to f1 nance sould development projects that vould increase agri cultural production in India, Thailand, Pakistan and Ceylon . This encourage-
ment should, of course, be without pre judice to other additional loans thes e institutions ma y wish to make for non- agricultural purposes to thes e countries .
')
39.
Expanded agricu ltural development in Southern and Southeast
Asi a would make a contribution to the politica l stability and the welfare of the exporting, as ifB ll as the importing countries. Through
inc reased sales of ric e , whe at , anp. cotton, Thailand and Pakistan c ould IlloS t economically secure the imports of capita l and co ns umer goods to develop and d ivers i fy their economies . A comparable effect
would be felt in India and Ceylon, if increased food production enabled thes e countries to reduce the disproportiona te amount of for- ' eign exchange that they presently devote to the purchase of food i mports .
>
1:.0.
Our
int~rest
in a vi able economy in the non-Communist c oun-
tri es of Asia i{ould b e advanced by inc reased trade 2Jl1ong such countries. J apanese and Indian industrial revival and development can
. ." 0contribute to enlarged intra-regional trade relations i-Thich suffered
NSC
48/1
20
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
... r;a
set-ba ck because of the economic vacuum r es ulting from th e defeat
of Japan, the devastation caused by the war in othe r areas and th e int erference and controls .
res~rictions
arising from extensive governmental

(
Given a favorable and secure atmosphere--plus adequate
freedom to individual traders, readily available working capital, suitable commer cial agreements establishing conditions favor ab le to commeY'ce and navigation and genera l asslstance in' the . promotion of trade --it is expected that a substantial increase in intra -Asia trade can occur. The patterns of such trade, however, may differ from In any event, a strong trading area
those existing before the war.
among the free countries of Asia '{Quld add to general economic deve lopment and strengthen social and political stability, Some kind of
'. 'f) regional
assoc:ation) facilitating interchange of informa tion, among
the non-Conununist countries of Asia might become an importa nt means of deve loping a . favorable atmosphere for such trade among th emse lves and vri th oth er parts of the vTorld.,
41.
Asia, particula rly South and Southeast ASia, are among the
~ever a l
principal sources of United States imports of
b as ic commodi -
tie s vThich could contribute greatly to Uriited States security for stockpiling purposes and would be of if they remained available to us.
~reat
assistance in time of war
Exports to Asia from the United
States are of less importance th an are imports, but are not now insignificant and could . grOl-T in importance to the stability of our o'\m dome stic economy. In brief, the economic advantage derived by the
Unit ed States from our trade with non-ColMflunis t ASia is consi derable --.Jand there is little doubt of the vrisdom of its development .
NSC 48/1
251
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
42.
One effective means available to the United States for as-
sisting in economic development, particularly in Southeast Asia, is to enlarge,

consiste~t
with security considerations, and despite pos(
sible objections of U. S. competitors , the orderly and sustained procurement, both by private and public agencies, of strategic 'and other basic con@odities, such as tin, hard fibers and particularly natural rubber. United States purchases of strategic materials on current
account would represent an important source of dollars for use by Asian countries in and outside the sterling area in meeting their current and capital needs.
43.
The USSR is the primary target of those U. S. economic pol-
icies designed to contain or turn back Soviet-Communist imperialism, "jand not China or any of the Soviet satellites considered as individual countries. It would, therefore, be inappropriate to apply to the
willing or um"illing partners of the USSR punitive or restrictive economic measures which are not be;Lng applied to the USSR itself. This guiding principle should be the point of departure in application of procedures for conduct of our economic relations 'rith Communist China. It should be our objective to take steps to prevent the
Soviets and their satellites from obtaining, via trans-shipment in the Far East , strateglc goods now denled them through direct channels. It should also be our objective to prevent Chinese Communists from obt aining supplies of. goods of direct military utilj_ty which might be
u~ed
to threaten directly the security interests of the weste rn powers It is not, however, either' necessary or advisable to re-
in Asia.
,
\ strict tra de vri th China in goods 'i"hich are dest:Lned for norma lci vil-
262
'. NSC 48/1 TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
. {..... ....,.
~
ian u ses within China provided s a fegu ards are established to accompThree r easons exist for
lish the t wo object ive s mentioned above. this position:
(1) Japan's economy cann ot possibly be restored to a

(
self- suste~ining basis without a considerable volume of trade "ri th China 7 the burden of Japan on the Unit ed States economy cannot be rei ,
Inoved unless Japan ' s economy is restored to a self-sustaining basis and U. S. interference with natural Japanese trade relations with China ,WL_d produce profound Japanese hostility; ( 2) permi ttj.ng trade
..
with Communis t China in goods destined for normal civili an end us es wi thin Chj.na will enable us to obtain quanti ties of important corrunod -
. ' ities needed by the U. S. ( e.g., tung oil, bristles, tungsten , antimony, etc. ) and might contribute to internal economic and political
-r) tensions botl,reen the urban and rural sectors of the Chinese economy,
and permit China to choose between a Soviet and a Western orientat ion in their foreign economic rel a tions; and ( 3 ) restriction of trade for any purpose other than those indice.t e d by the objectives outlined above ,'Tould b e ineffective and impra ctical in viei'T of th e existence of alternative sources of supply in other countries vhich will not cooperate in export controls affecting normal trade with China. The
U. S, should seek the cooperation of friendly countries in exercising export controls to achieve the objectives indica ted, and request SCAP to conform to our general policy in this res pec t. Vhile SCAP should
be r equested to avoid preponderant dependence on Chinese markets and sources of supply he should not bo expected to appli controls upon Japan ' s trade with China more restrictiv e than those applied by W ste
(
\......-
~ :C'n
European countrie s in their trade with China.
At the SB.i11e t ime,
23
NSC
48/ 1
TOP SECRET
':r'OP SEClBT
'.
. SeAP should encourage development of alternative Jape.nese markets elsewhere in the world, including Southern and Southeast Asia, on an economic basis. Notwithstanding the advantages of the permissive
(
trade policy outlined above, there would be no advantage for the Uni tod States to extend governrnental economic assistance to or e11.courage prl va te i11.ve s tment in Cor.u:m11.i st China .
CONCLUSIONS
44.
Our basic security obj ectives with respect to Asia are:

a.
Development of th e . nations and peoples of Asia on a
stable and self-sustaining basis in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.
b.
Gradual r educti on and eventual elimination of the pre,
ponderant power and influence of the USSR in Asia to such a degree that the Soviet Union will not be capable of threatening from that area the security of the United States or its friends and that the Soviet Union would encounter serious obstacles should it attempt to threaten th e peace, national independence
a~d
stability of the Asiatic nations.

c.
Prevention of power relE:.tj.o;whips j.n f..sia
\oihic~ i-iou:'d
~nable
any other nat ion or alliance to threaten the security of
the United States from that area, or the peace, national independence and stability of the Asiatic nations.
~~~
T.....,
::mrs1..::' t of these ob iec ti ves. the Urli ted StE. tes

, v
~
i:~1..:S t
e:1-
c O "',,- .-p non-Cor.;;-nunist forces to taKe the ini tie.tive in Asia , must ex.....
l A._ .... ~o
' ~rt
an lnfluenc e to advance its own national interes ts and must t ake
NSC
48/1
TOP SECRET
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3_ 3 NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NSC 1;8/2
::: '
TOP SECHET
..
[)ece:;:b-3r 30} 19L~9

-,,
~,
on
THE POSI'J'ION OF T}IE UNI'I'ED- STATES IHT'H RESPECT 1J.'O ASLA
Referonce -:--~fsc"1:rbII
At its 50th Meeting, with the President presiding, the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Acting Secretary ot Commerce, e,nd the Acting Economic Coop(';rc:>.t:Lon AdministHl,tor, di~ clJssed a report on fl 1'h e Position of the United States "'Iith Respect to Asie" (NSC ltG/I), and adopted the Conclusions contained therein subiect to amendments at the meeting and to further amendme~ts subse;uently agreed upon by tho Departments of State and Defense. The 6onclusions as revised are enclosed herewith.
iThe National Se~urity Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Acting Secret2ry of Commerce, c:>.nd the Acting Economic Coopere.tion Administrator, reconmlsnd that the PreSident approve the Conclusions contained herein and direct their implementation by a ll appropriate Executive Department.s and Agencies of the U. S. Government under the coo rdi~ation of the Secretary of State.
SIDNEY W. SOUERS Executive Secretary
cc:
The Secretary of the Tre asury The Secretary of Commerce The Economic Cooperation Administrator
2.5
i;SC
48/2
TOP SECR8'I'
T()P SECRE'l' REPORT BY THE.

NATIQl\L~L
SECURI'l'Y COUNC IL
on
THE POSITIOTi_.OF _THE UNITED STNI'ES \<lITH RESPECT TO ./J,SIA
(
CONCLUSIONS
1.
Our basic security objectives with respect to Asia* are:
a. Development of the nations and peoples of Asia on a stable and self-sustaining bas is in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Char ter.
Q. Developraent of sufficient mili tal."Y pO'rTer in selected non-Communist natiotis of Asia to maintain internal security and to prevent further' encl"oachment by communism. c. Gradual reduction and ~ventual elimination of the ~re ponderant pOl,Ter and influence ' of ' the USSR in Asia to such. a degree that th e -Soviet Union viII not be capable of threatening from that area the security of the United States or its friends and that the Soviet Union would encounter serious obstacles should it attempt to threaten the peace; national independence'and stability of the Asiatic nations. d. Prevention of power relationships in Asia vhich would enable any other nation or alliance to threaten the security of the United States fro m that area; or the peace, national independence and stability of the Asiatic nations.
2.
In pursuit of these objectives; the United States should
act to:
.Q. Support non-Communist forces in taking the initiative in Asia;
b. Exert an influence to advance its own national interests; and c. Initiate action in .such a manner as will appeal to the Asiatic nations as being compatible with their nationa l interests and worthy of their support. For the purposes of this rep ort 'Asia is defined as that part of the contjx"ent of Asia south of the USSR and east of Iran together t}.{i v . ~f' :-1.1. t'ne me.Jor oJ. - snore island s --Japan ; Formosa) the Philippine s , Indon::;s ie. and Ceylon.
~
-------=::----:---.- - - - ,' II
I'l.SC;
QS/2
- -
TOP SECRE1'
'.'--~ .....
T\)P SECRET
S -t()... e ~ c-o". p0:,_en v
+~
~.
As the basis for realization of its objectives} the United should pursue a policy toward Asia containing the following :.. s"
.
The United States should make known its sympa thy with of Asian l eaders to form regional associations of nQn~Co~nunist states of the ~arious Asian areas, and if in due course associat ions eventuate, th ~ United States should be pre~ared } if invited } to assist such associations to fulfill their Durposes und er conditions 'Thich "rould be to our int erest . 'l'he ~ollowing principles should guide our actions in this respect :
a.
the
~fforts
(1) Any association formod must be the result of a genuine des ire on the part of the participating nations to cooperate for mutual benefit in solving the political, economic ) social and cultural problems of the area.
(2) The United States must not t ake such an active part in the early stages of the formation of such an association that it Iorill b e subject to the ch arge of us:i.ng the Asiatic nations to furth er United States ambitions .
(3) The association, if it is to b e a constructive fo rce } must operate on the b asis of mutual aid and selfh elp in all fields so th at a true partnership may exist b ased on equal rights and equal obligati ons.
United States participation in any stage of the development of such an association should be with a view to accomplishing our basic obj ectives in Asia and to assuring that any assoclation fo rmed viII be in accord vrith Chapter VIII of the Cha rt er of the Un ited Nations dealing with ' regional arrangements .
b. The United St a tes should act to de velop -and strengthen the securi ty of the area from Conm1Unist external aggression or internal subversion. Th ese steps should te.ke into e.ccount any benefits to the. security of Asia \<Thich may flow from the dev e l opment of one or more regiona l groupings. Th e Unit ed States on its own initiative should now:
(4)
(I) Improve the United States position with respect t o Japan , the Ryukyus and the Philippines .
(2) Scrutinize closely the deve lopment of threats fr om Communist aggression, direct or indi rect} and be prep ared to help within our means to meet such threats by providing political , economic, and milite.ry assistance and adyiee irhere cl ee.rly needed to suppleme nt the resistance. of the other goverL'Ylents in a.nd out of th e area \<Thich are more directly conc erne d .
,j
267
rlsc 48/2
Declassified per Execut ive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET'
',l
I
(3) Develop coope rative measures through multilateral or bila.teral arrangements to comb a t Commun ist j_nternal subversion.
(4) Appraise the desirability and the means of deve loping )_ ASj_B some form o.I" collective securi ty a:erengements , n be aring in mind the following consid e rations:
!
(a) The reluctance of India tit this time to join in any anti-Comrnunist securi ty pa ct and the influen ce this will have among the other nations of Asia. (b) The necessity of asswning that any coll e ctive securi t Jr . arl'angements '\-Thich might b e developed be b ased on the principle of mutua l aid a~d on a demonstrated desire and ability to share in the burden by all the participating states. (c) The necessity of assuring th a t any such security arrangements would be co nsonant with the purposes of any regional associatiDn which may be formed in accordance with paragraph 3- a above . (d) The necessity of assuring that any such security arrangement would be in conformity with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter relating to individu a l and collective self-defense. c. The Unit ed States should encourage the creation of an atmosphere favo:eable to econom:i.c recovery and developmen t in non-Com.l11unist Asia, and to the revival of tra de along multilateral, non-discriminatory lines. The economic policies of the Uni ted State s should be adapted to promote, "There pos sible , economic conditions that will contribute to political st ability in friendli countries of ASia, but the United States should car'efully avoid a'ssDJning responsibility for the economtc "Telfare and developme nt of that continent. Such policies might be projected along the follo wing lin es ~ (1) Vi gorous prosecution of the Point IV program in fri endly countries of ASia, in an endeavor to assist them, by providing technical assistance, to make a start toward the solution of some of their long-range economic probl ems .
(2) Maintenance of a lib eral United States trade policy with As5.a and stimulation of imports from Asia. Th e special problems co ncerning trade wtth China are treated in paragraph 3--(4) belovo
(3) Execution of a stockpiling program for strate3ic ma terials, b ase d upon Unit ed States needs for strategic
t~" L7v " 0/2

.J
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
,
\
'~
r
I
reserves and upon immedie.te and long-range economic effects in the supplying countries. .
( 4 ) Negotiation of treaties of friendship, commerce 2nd navigation with non-Communist countries of Asia to define and establish conditions facilitating capital movements, trade and other economic.relations between them and the United States .
( 5 ) Encouragement of private United States investment in non-Communist countries and support of the early exten sion of credits by the International Bank and the ExportImport Bank for specific key economic projects of a se lfliqu:Ldatlng natul~e, especially those directed tOiTards incre asing production of food in this area. ( 6 ) Efforts to obtain the adherence of Asiatic countries to the principles of multilateral, non-discriminatory trade as embodied in the Genel~al Agreements on 1'ariffs and Trade, as a means of reducing trade barriers and expanding the int ernational and - intra-regional trade of the region on an economic basis. This would include, fo r example, further efforts to secure th e benefits of most-favored-nation treatment for J apan . . ___
d. The question of a peace settlement with Japan, now receiving separate consideration, will be presented for the consid eration of the National Security Council at a later date and policies with respect to Japan will be re-evaluated after the decision r egarding a peace t~eaty has been made. e. (1) The United States should continue to provide for t he extension of political support and economic, technical, milit ary and other assiste.nce to the democratically-elected Government of the Republic of Korea . . x.'.
(2) The Unit ed States should therefore press fo rward with the implementation of the ECA, MDAP , USIE and related programs for Korea, and should conti nue to accord political s upport to th e Republic of Korea , both within and without the framework of the United Nations .
(1) fJ.1he Un! ted St?,tes should conti nue to recognize the National Govern. ment of China until the si tuation is further clarified . ** The United Ste.tes should avoid recognizing the Chinese Cor~unist regime until it is clearly in the United Sta tes interest to do so. The United States should continua
f.
I
I
-:;;'\ +* :;1
NSC 872, approved March 23, 1949. NSC 34/2.
?f-9
;;sc 48/2
..
'TOP SECRET
TOP SECRBT to express to friendly governments its own views conc erning the dangers of hasty Y'ecognttion of the Chtnese Comrnunts t regime but should not take a , stand which would engage the prest ige of the United States tn 8.n attempt to prevent such recognition. In general, howe ver, it should be r ealized that it would be inapproprtate fDr the United States to adopt a post~re more hosttle or polictes more harsh towards a Comrnunist China than tovtards the USSR 1 tself. It should also be realized that the according of recognition by other fri endly countri es would affect th e bargaining position of the United States in the absence of United States recognition and would affect United States private and nattonal interests in China . In the event that recognition of the Chinese Communists is anticipated, appropriate steps should be taken to make it clear that recognition should not be construed as 8.pproval of the Chinese Communist regime, or abatement of our hostility to Soviet efforts to exercise control in China .
f,
",
"
~.
(2) The United States should continue the policies of avoiding mili tary and poli tical support of B .ny non-Communlst elements in China unless such elements are willing actively to resist Communism with or without United States aid and u nless such support "YTould mean reasonable resistance to the Crnmnunists and contribute to the over-all national interests . of the Unj_ted States. * In determining "ihether or in "That manner any such assistance or encouragement should be given , cons idera t. ion ,;ould ha.ve to be given to the prote c tion I-7hich Ch inese Corr~unist authorities , as th ey become generally recognized by oth er goverf'..ments , i-l ould be able to cl aim under internationa l law and the Ch arter of the Unit ed Nations. The Unit ed States should maintain so far as fe asib l e active contact with all elements in China and maintain our cultural and informat ional program at th e most active fe asible le vel. (3) The United States should exploit , through appropriate political} psycholo gica l and eConomic means, any rifts between th e Chines e Communists and the US SR and bet\-leen the Stalinists and other elements in China, while scrupulously avoiding the . appear'ance of intervention . Hhere appropriate , c overt as well as overt means should be utiliz ed to achieve these obj ectives . *
The United St~tes should, as a security measure , seek to prevent the USSR , its European satellites, and North Kor ea from obtaining from abro8.d through Chin!?. supplies of . , n ' - 'I ' . s tre. teglC ma"[.e rIc.:. 1 sanG e q u IlJ-ne n-t .IT 'n 1 c'n are c u~"r8n .... l t.,_y d enle d th em by the United States and its European allies through
(4)
0
i
. f
;
270
TO P SECRET
. TOP SECRET channe l s . The United States should also use every effort to prevent the Chinese Communists from obtaining from non-Soviet sources supplies of materials and equipment of direct ml1itary utility C items). The Unit ed States IA should, on the other hand, permit exports to Cni na of IB \items within quantitative limits of normal civilian u se and iunder controls 1,-Thich can be applied restrictively if it be\comes necessary to do so in the national interest, and / lshould ple.ce no obstacle in th~ 'rray of trade 'rTi th China in / / non-strat egic comnlOdities . The United Ste.tes should seek ' th e support and concurrence of its principal European all ies in th ese policies. The United States should not extend government a l economic C'.ssistance to Communist China or encourage private i nvestment in Communist China.
g. (1) The Uni ted States should continue the poltcy set forth in NSC 37/2 and 37/5 of attempting to deny Formosa and the Pescadores to the Chinese Communists through diplomatic and economic means \,i thin the limi tations i mposed by th e f act that successful achievement of this obj ective will primarily depend on prompt initl ation and faithful impl emen tation of essential measures of self-help by th e non-Communis t administration of the islands, and by the fact that fr eedom of t;, S. - diploma tic and economic action will be in fluen~ed; n2cessarily , by action taken-by other countries.
f
di~ect
\.
()
.)
}.
( 2 ) Sj.nc0 th e United States may not b e able to achieve ' it s obj ec~.i:Ji'?;L' through political and economic means, and in view bf the opinion of the Joint Chi efs of Staff ( reaffirmed in NSC 37/7 of.' Augus t 22 1949) the. t , 'I-'hile Formosa is strat egical:ly important to the Unj_t ed States , lithe strategic i mportance of Pormosa does not ju stify overt mili tay,y action ... . so long as th e present disparity between our military strength E'.nd cur global obli gations exists ", the United States shculd make every effort to strengthen th e over-al l U. S. position with respect to the Philippines, t he Ryukyus, and Japan . The Uni ted State s shouJ_d, for example proceed apace with i ~p l ementation of the policy set forth in regard . to the Ryukyus in paragraph 5 of NS~; 13/3. .
J J
h. Th e United States should continuo to use its i nfluence i n Asia to~a~d rGsolving the colonial-netionalist conflict in such a way as to sstlsfy the fund amental demands of the nationalist movement whiJ.e e.t th e same ti~e minimizing th e strain on the colonial pm-:8r:; who are our '\-I ester:1 2.11ies . Particular at t ention should bG given to the probl em of French Indo-Chi na and action should ~e taken to bring home to the French th e urgency of removing ths bQrriers to the obtaining by Bao Dai or other no n- Co~~unist nationalist l eaders of the support of a substantial proportion of the Vietnamese . With the successful conclusion of th e Round Table Conference at The Hague the United
I
i
; '\
i..
~iSC
48/2
,.
271
TO P SECRET
TOP SECRET
...... .
State s should give i ITIJnedia to cons idera tion to the problem s con- fronting the new Republic of Uniied Indonesia and how b e st it can be aided in ma intaining its fr eedom in the face of internal and external. Con~unist pressures .
i. Activ e consideration should be given to means by 'vhich all members of the Brt tl sh Commoni-ieal th ll2.y be tnduced to play a more acttve role in collaborati6n with the Untt ed States in Asia. Similar collaboration should be obtained to the extent posstble from other non-Co~nunis t nations having interests in Asia.
.!
I , ,
!
Recognizing that the non-Communtst governme nts of South Asia already constitute a buhTa rk against Communi.st expansion in Asi a , the Unit ed States should exploit every opportunity to increase the pres e nt Western orientation of the area and to asSist, i-lithin our capabi lities, its governme nts in theil" efforts to meet the minimum e.spira tions of their people and to me.intain interna l security.
k. The Unit ed States should undertake an informe.t ion program-:- both for e ign e.nd domesti c, and publish Unj.ted States polic1es and programs vis-a-vis Asia designed to gain maximum su~ . port both at home 'and abroad.
J..
-' {
I
('\ \ \j
I
{.
Nothing in this paper shall be construe d as 2_me nding NSC papers unless a specific statement to that effect has b ee n made on each point.
1.
appr~oved
11, m. The sum of $75,000,000 for assiste.rwe to the gene ral . area-of China , v7hich was made available under Section 303 of If the I<1utual De fens e Asststance .Act of 19~- 9,. Should . b e programrned as a matter of urgency. \.
I i:..:,! '.
I
r
1
1
\
..
! I
",
272
.. ... HSC
~
~8/2
TOP SECHET
- ---
----~--- --.---

Pentagon Papers Part V B 2a

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Pentagon Papers Part V B 2a

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Pentagon Papers Part V B 2a

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3 NND Project Number: NND 633 16.

By: NWD Date: 2011

V.B. 2. J USTIFICATION OF THE H.A.R v - I NTEBJJAL COlvuUTlv1ENTS -

BOOK I ...... -.".......,.

TOP SECRET - Sensit.ive

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

V.B.2. JUSTIFICATIO!.IJ OF T.HE: \':llli - - I NTERL4L COHl\lITI"lE}',:TS

The Truman Ac1r!lini st rati.on , 1945 .. 1952

Cont ents and Chronological List of Documents

TOP SECRET - Sem;it:l.ve

Tor SECRET - Sensitive

Indochinese self-government -within a French

- Sens:L t:.Lv \:~

TOP SECRE'j' - SocnB i tive

TOP SECHET - Scn::;itivc

l'lj .lliarn J. Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic

TOP SECEET .. S8nsitiv(:

1' 0P SECRET - Sensitive

TOP SECReT - Sensi.tive

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

40 . U.S. notes three

" " " .. " " " " "

TOP S'ECREl' - Sensitive

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

TOP SECR:S'C' - Sens it:!. ve

T01) SECRE:'.L' - Sensitive

TOP SSCRET - SeDsitiv e

TOP SECRET - Sensi.tive

TOP SECIUi:r - Sensitive

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

TOP r;ECPEl' - Sensiti.ve

TOP S'ECRET - SeY'.sitivc

TOP Sr:C?.:GJ' - ScY!sjt:i.vc ----_._._----------

Tne U.S. viC'\" l. s thA.t for

TOP SECRET - Sensitive

TOP SECP-ET .. Sensitive

,"['OP SECREl' - f: ";2:") s:i..ti ve

TOP SECEEf - Sensitive

TOP SECHET - Sensitive

'fOP SF,CHET - Sensitive

TOP SECm;:T - Scnsitiv'2

TOP SECRF.,'I - Sensitive

TOP SECRET - ScrcE;j ti ve

TOP SECRET - S::,rls:i ti ve

TOP SECRET - Se:n,;itivc;

TOP SECRET - Sem::LU.ve

TOP S.E:CRE:J' .- Sensit:i ve

TOP SECHEt - Sensitive

TOP SECR:t<l' - Sensitive

TOP SECRET . Sens i t:l. ve

The French request that 150 American Air Force mechanics

TOP SECRET - Senr;itivc

1 c 'I-I ~r' ' ......

:?t:; ;,:i !'~ ~~ :::!1CC!

t01l:~'1'~P st:~':~c:d, J:'~2.. t.

t():~~: jiO (\AGr:'TfC.:~_O!1

t.o c'j :~~ri:rc.ch

~1~(;:4lcl:.. t. :'""~b~"~'1C~::'(~OI' :c:~-t :~.f0~1 ~t;

-C}1"'t, i.l:1~~8 ),10:.';; CrY'TOr-S cn:~'~i!~(. ;~:~~~ =~(~

St2te~ents 23 t) Lf!1:L t (; ('w