Journal of Contemporary African Studies

ISSN: 0258-9001 (Print) 1469-9397 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjca20

Chinese eyes on Africa: Authoritarian flexibility

versus democratic governance

Johan Lagerkvist

To cite this article: Johan Lagerkvist (2009) Chinese eyes on Africa: Authoritarian flexibility
versus democratic governance, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 27:2, 119-134, DOI:
10.1080/02589000902872568

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/02589000902872568

Published online: 20 May 2009.

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Journal of Contemporary African Studies
Vol. 27, No. 2, April 2009, 119
134

Chinese eyes on Africa: Authoritarian flexibility versus democratic

governance
Johan Lagerkvist*

Research Fellow, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs

This article seeks to shed more light on the consequences of China’s aid to and
trade with African states. It attempts to answer two questions: First, does China’s
‘no-strings-attached’ policy in Africa constitute a challenge to Western aid
paradigms? Second, is there as an emerging state-sponsored Chinese model of
‘effective governance’, guided by a south-south vision of mutuality, equality and
reciprocity at work? It is argued that China’s Africa watchers are cautious, not
wanting to project any false hopes into bilateral relationships with African
countries. In the light of China’s reform experience, these analysts propose that
indigenous contexts should determine what developmental model to choose.
China is unwilling to force its experiences of ‘a market economy with Chinese
characteristics’ upon other nations. The article concludes by arguing that,
although not unproblematic, there is reason to be positive about China’s higher
profile in Africa.
Keywords: foreign aid; China model; democracy; China’s Africa watchers;
authoritarianism; Sino-African relations

We respect the right of the people of all countries to independently choose their own
development path. We will never interfere in the internal affairs of other countries or
impose our own will on them.1
China’s President Hu Jintao

The above statement reflects the continuity of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
in officially propounding its stance on sovereignty and non-interference in
international relations. It serves to show the continued validity of longstanding
principles held by successive generations of Chinese leaders. First, sovereignty is held
to be a sacrosanct principle never to be compromised. Second, China will never exert
hegemonic influence over other countries, as it has had its own bitter experiences of
colonialism. Third, although not a principle consistently advocated by Beijing, the
PRC is a developing country that acknowledges that indigenous contexts make it
difficult to apply a universal development model.
It is the third principle, in combination with China’s high-speed growth in the last
three decades that has turned China into a hard-to-handle spectre haunting the
minds of Western development agencies, policymakers, financial institutions such as
the IMF and the World Bank, and NGOs. The spectre is that of a rising China, a

*Email: [email protected]
ISSN 0258-9001 print/ISSN 1469-9397 online
# 2009 The Institute of Social and Economic Research
DOI: 10.1080/02589000902872568
http://www.informaworld.com
120 J. Lagerkvist

market-friendly one-party state with a poor human rights record set on a course to
deliver the message that authoritarianism works as it alleviates poverty with an all
too firm hand. It is with this mindset that Western policymakers and media
commentary increasingly view Chinese capital, labour, and goods entering the
African continent. In African countries, addressing issues of development aid, good
governance, and economic reform has since the fall of the Berlin Wall mainly been
conceptualised in terms of Western schools of thought. With the rapid expansion of
Chinese influence on the African continent, however, there is also a growing need to
understand whether aid and governance with ‘Chinese characteristics’ are concepts
perceived as useful by African bureaucrats and Chinese technocrats alike. Chinese
views on development, security and poverty reduction are increasingly important as
China continues to integrate strategically with the world economy, especially in the
developing world (Eisenman et al. 2007, xvi; Kurlantzick 2007).
One of the big issues for international relations in the twenty-first century is
whether China’s economic integration may lead to alignment with international, or
perhaps even Western, norms and beliefs. If so, some of the above-mentioned
longstanding principles, outlined by the incumbent PRC President, who also heads
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), are bound to evolve into something new
even
though it is too early to tell what the eventual outcome may amount to. If there has
in recent years been an increasing merger between aid and security policy and a
structural change in operating with nonstate actors such as NGOs, China is largely
exempt from that development, not least because the Chinese Party-state is not used
to co-operating with NGOs (Hilsum 2008, 138).
The question that this article seeks to shed more light on is whether the
‘no-strings-attached’ policy guiding the increasing volume of Chinese aid constitutes
a challenge to Western aid paradigms, be they packages that are in the old state-centric
style, or new ones focusing on NGO-led sustainable development, or ones coming with
economic policy conditionalities from the World Bank and the IMF. Is there such a
thing as an emerging Chinese model of ‘effective governance’, guided by a South-South
vision of mutuality, equality and reciprocity at work? A model that contrasts with
Western notions of good governance that have, in different ways since the 1980s been
incorporated into the Western and therefore by definition also the global discourse on
foreign aid? Or is there a dark Chinese hand at play working with unaccountable third
world dictators, endorsing ‘bad governance’ because China fears democratisation per
se, as the development economist Paul Collier has argued (2007, 183)?
To answer these questions, this article sets out to present how some of China’s
‘Africa watchers’ view the continent, how they comprehend Sino-African relations and
envisage economic development, foreign aid, and democratisation processes in
Africa.2 Although by no means sufficient to give a thorough answer, the views of
these scholars help us to narrow down the spectrum of inquiry. Seeing what the
Chinese view amounts to is especially pertinent; for in the global discussion on China’s
new and ambitious engagement with Africa, Chinese perspectives have seldom been
heard or even sought.3 This article thus attempts to locate and analyse some of these
voices in Chinese academia, largely hidden from the non-Chinese-speaking world.
They by no means represent the government’s position, though at times they echo its
statements and analysis on development in third world countries. Arguably there are
other important and even more hidden voices such as the CEOs of state-owned
companies or banks investing in, for instance, the oil fields of Sudan or the Copper Belt
 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 121

region of Northern Zambia. These are more influential and better connected to senior
decision-makers in the foreign policymaking process than academics are: and they
have access to information and time spent in the field, something that most of China’s
academic Africa watchers lack. Nonetheless, what Chinese academics write and say
reflects the concern and debate about China’s growing importance and role in Africa.

China’s new role and foreign aid in Africa

The weight of China in international affairs is growing. It is felt almost everywhere
through a strong balance of trade and a growing market presence of Chinese goods and
services. An ambitious diplomatic effort conducted worldwide, not least in African
countries, has recently caught the attention of foreign observers awed by a cunning
Chinese soft-power strategy (Kurlantzick, 2007). Indeed, it may seem that active
diplomacy is paying off, or rather
as Chinese spokespersons in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs would have it
mutual interest exists. Since the late 1990s, the African
continent has attracted much Chinese attention. President Hu Jintao has travelled
extensively in Africa since he took office in 2003. In November 2006, the heads of states
and leaders of 48 African countries participated in a uniquely large and focused Sino-
African summit in Beijing. Today, Chinese investment, loans, and foreign aid is
growing at a tremendous pace in almost all African countries. China is not the only
Asian donor though: Japanese aid diplomacy has been around for decades
and is
given new impetus in the light of China’s growing role in African countries (Ampiah
2008). India is also emerging as an important investor and donor country to be
reckoned with (Naidu 2008, 125), making use of Indian diaspora networks in eastern
and southern Africa. For these Asian states, in their different ways, Africa can be
viewed as a screen on which their long-term global ambitions are projected while their
economic and energy needs are to be fulfilled for now. This observation follows the
arguments made by some pundits who point to the Asian giants as once again turning
Africa into a battlefield for yet another scramble for natural resources, in a world
witnessing a deepening conflict between democracies and entrenching authoritarian
capitalist powers such as Russia and China (Gat 2007).
Foreign aid constitutes a means to other ends beyond the goals of poverty
alleviation and economic growth. According to the United Nations Millenium
Project Report, development aid has the potential to help countries to achieve the UN
Millenium Development Goals. Thus, the contributions of emerging new donor
countries such as China and India become increasingly important (Manning 2006,
371). In this context it is imperative to assess the arena of international aid provision;
how different programmes overlap, complement or contradict each other. The playing
field is obviously changing when the emerging donors become more significant
sources of financing for developing countries. It is therefore important to analyse the
way in which these new donors will change and challenge the established positions of
traditional donors. As the Millenium Project Report identifies the current develop-
ment aid system of the world as suffering from incoherence and being ‘in need of a
much more focused approach’ (United Nations 2006), an already complicated issue
may become even more difficult and politicised if aid policies cannot be harmonised
between East and West.
It is, however, difficult to make comparisons between the aid programmes of
existing donors and other emerging donors with China’s, as its foreign aid is a ‘black
122 J. Lagerkvist

box’. China’s state council or government ministries do not disclose how much aid it
gives to foreign countries on an annual basis, or to which countries and in what
form
loans or grants (Davies 2007, 47; Tjönneland 2006, 10). This is not just a
problem for outsiders, however. Even Chinese scholars have a hard time figuring
out what the aggregate sum of China’s foreign aid might be. It has been estimated
that China’s foreign aid reached 1.4 billion USD in 2007, and that China’s aid to
Africa may expand to approximately 1 billion USD in 2009 (Brautigam 2008, 210).
As for quality or efficiency of aid, one Chinese scholar has stated that only rough
evaluations of the benefits of aid are made, and with no systematic methodology
(Davies 2007, 64). According to the Chinese sources, in the past 50 years, China’s
provision of foreign aid to Africa has amounted to 44.4 billion yuan RMB and
more than nine hundred infrastructural and social projects have been carried out
(Zhan 2006, 67). From studying the different levels of effectiveness of Chinese
agricultural aid projects in Gambia, Sierra Leone and Liberia, Deborah Brautigam
(1998, 3) has pointed out the limited value of viewing aid as merely an element of
foreign policy. Instead she argues that domestic politics in both the donor country
and aid-receiving countries analysed as a whole can explain how particular projects
and programmes are designed and implemented, and why only some are sustained
over time. Further, very few on-the-ground empirical and assessment studies exist
on Chinese foreign aid as very few researchers have conducted fieldwork in Africa
(Brautigam 1998, 5; McCormick 2008, 74). As Chinese assistance, aid, and trade
with Africa have exploded since Brautigam wrote her book, and Chinese aid and
influence increase, there is a great need to start evaluating the experiences from
Chinese assistance
not least, the tricky question of how effective it has been.
Chinese scholars and officials are often quite proud of China’s practical approach
to aid and African leaders’ praise of it, which the Chinese say means that Chinese
aid has been more effective than that of the countries of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). And some argue that Western
aid has become an industry with bureaucratic politics and waste of resources spent
on expensive consultants (Davies 2007, 64). According to Penny Davies who has
interviewed Chinese government officials and scholars about how they define what
aid effectiveness means for China, the common answer was that Chinese aid ‘is
effective as it is concrete’. The implicit argument was that Chinese aid is providing
Africa with concrete things they can use
infrastructure such as buildings and
roads (Davies 2007, 63)
and thus, really helping the poor. Chinese aid was
effective, inexpensive, and managed to reach out to poor people on the ground.
Arguments such as these are contrasted with expensive, non-efficient aid with
limited effect that has come with ‘strings-attached conditionalities’ from the IMF or
the World Bank. In fact there have been occasions when African state leaders visiting
Beijing, have ridiculed Western aid for being expensive and largely inefficient.4

The Beijing consensus

To say the least, the increasing trade volume between China and Africa has in recent
years grown rapidly. By 2007, China ranked as Africa’s second-highest trading
partner, behind the United States and ahead of France and Britain. By 2003 trade
between China and Africa was 18.5 billion USD, and by 2007 the Sino-African trading
volume amounted to 73 billion USD. By 2008 total trade between African countries
 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 123

and China reached 106.8 billion USD.5 Up until the end of 2005 the number of
Chinese state-owned companies investing in Africa was more than eight hundred.
These companies are involved in trade, manufacturing, resource exploitation, traffic
and transportation, comprehensive agricultural development and other areas. The
accumulated value of these companies’ contracting projects and labour co-operation
was 41.3 billion USD (Zhan 2006, 67). Zhan Shiming, a researcher with the
Department of African Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has stated
that in 2005, 82,000 Chinese were engaged in contracting projects and labour
co-operation in Africa.
However, trade statistics show that behind what is sometimes called ‘China’s
African safari’ and ‘Africa’s silk road’ lie different goals. Development assistance is
merely one of the many tools of the Chinese strategy for Africa, institutionalised in
2000 with the establishment of the China-Africa Co-operation Forum. Several
Western NGOs and African civil society groupings are concerned with China’s
cultivation of ties with corrupt leaders of African states. But apprehension about
increasing Chinese engagement is also shown in statements made by political leaders
such as former President Mbeki of South Africa and leaders of opposition parties in
some African countries such as Zambia.6 There is some evidence that suggests that
the Chinese government is sensitive about how its is perceived on ‘the African street’.
The Chinese Africanist, Xu Weizhong, for example, argues that China faces three big
challenges to transform Sino-African relations. First, elite diplomacy must expand
into mass diplomacy. Second, official diplomacy must expand into popular
diplomacy. Third, bilateral diplomacy must expand into multilateral diplomacy
(Xu 2007, 320). Another Chinese Africanist, Liu Hongwu, wants to cool down the
euphoria and exuberance that followed in the wake of the Sino-African summit in
November 2006:
The nature and content of Sino-African relations now also started to turn even more
into a new form of relationship
from politics to economy, from the diplomatic
relations of governments’ guidance or government interest to the market or the guidance
of economic interest. [. . .] Moreover, it will give rise to the wholesale expansion and
advancement of the content, forms, and scope of bilateral relations. It must be said that
the process of this new form of bilateral relations between China and Africa that is now
emerging, has just gotten started. Therefore, it is also too early to predict how its new
characteristics in reality may perhaps produce complexities impacting both sides. . . .
The fact is that regardless of one being Chinese or African, the contemporary
understanding and knowledge of one another tends to be rather general or superficial.
(Liu 2007, 13)

Also sobering was a recent report from an academic conference in Beijing, where
it was reported that both the central government and Chinese companies investing
overseas should ‘appropriately handle emerging problems in Sino-African co-
operation, like trade frictions etcetera’. It is, however, virtually impossible for the
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to exercise any monitoring of the 800 or so
Chinese state-owned national and provincial companies and thousands of individual
entrepreneurs operating on African soil (Gill et al. 2007, 12). In line with Xu
Weizhong’s call for a new styled Chinese diplomacy targeting ordinary Africans
through popular diplomacy, many participants at this conference were strongly in
favour of intensifying the level of publicity work in Africa, in order to strengthen the
exchange and contacts between the peoples of China and Africa (Zhan 2006, 67).
124 J. Lagerkvist

In any event, the issue of conditionality of aid, based on the so-called

Washington Consensus and later the post-Washington consensus,7 is tested against
China’s emerging role as a major donor and what has been termed the ‘Beijing
Consensus’ (Ramos 2004). Irrespective of ideological positions, it has become
conventional wisdom to regard Beijing’s aid model of ‘no-strings-attached’, as
expressed in the government’s policy paper, China’s African Policy,8 as a way to exert
pressure on European governments, the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund to lower their tough conditions and standards, and find instead more
acceptable international standards that the whole world can unite around, though
not necessarily acceptable to Western liberal democratic countries. As a matter of
fact, Chinese aid projects have been competing with the World Bank on a number of
projects and the bank has been defeated (Naim 2007). Thus, it is no wonder that the
director of the World Bank, Robert Zoellick, strives hard to have joint discussions
about how best to alleviate poverty on the African continent. There is a growing
awareness that co-operation between Western and Chinese donor organisations is
crucial. To avoid competition may turn out to be more harmful than beneficial to
long-term African interests. Therefore, the European Union has started to engage
China in joint aid talks. As of now, however, few discussions on this topic have been
held between China and Western countries (Tjönneland, Brandtzaeg, Kolås et al.
2006, 11). Although the Chinese were indeed invited as observers to the EU
Africa
summit that was held in Lisbon in December 2007, they were not invited to take part
in the very heated trade discussions between the European and African delegations.
Development analysts such as Xu Weizhong are aware of Western nations’ concern
and nervousness. He argues, not without dry satisfaction, that while having to
acknowledge that China is more popular than the West, they are jealous of the
results obtained through Sino-African co-operation: ‘while being jealous of the
successes achieved in Sino-African relations, Western nations want to strengthen
cooperation with China on African issues. Hoping that China will join the Western
track, play by Western rules, and share the costs in African affairs . . . ’ (2007, 318).
Other analysts such as Zhan Changlong echo the Chinese government’s position
that the World Bank should not interfere in the affairs of other countries. He argues
that China must ‘constrain the politicisation of the World Bank Group’ (Zhang
2007, 32). In effect this means opposition to the notion of conditionality baked into
aid programmes. This position, however, amounts not so much to Chinese fears of
democratisation, as argued by Paul Collier and others who have expressed concern
about how the voting behaviour of the PRC in the UN Security Council obstructs
development (Collier 2007, 186). It is first and foremost on the issue of territorial
integrity that Chinese leaders are anxious not to set any precedents that may have
implications for the People’s Republic’s ultimate goal of unification with Taiwan.
There is, therefore, also an evident risk that friction rather than harmonisation
between Western and Chinese views on development in Africa will grow. Chinese
policymakers are perturbed by demands and complaints directed against them by
Western governments, while at the same time, as reflected by the above quotation,
they feel that they currently have the upper hand. In articles and at conferences,
researchers and experts have for some time also been occupied with refuting the false
theory of ‘China engaging in neo-colonialism in Africa’, which they are at pains to
describe as something stirred up by Western countries (Zhan 2006).
 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 125

Thus, at a time when many are contrasting how much Western aid is following the
Washington Consensus and principles of good governance with an emerging Beijing
Consensus, it is useful to refer to the sociologist Huang Ping who has argued that there
is no such thing as a ‘Beijing consensus’ or a ‘Beijing model’ as there is actually not
much consensus of anything in Beijing (He 2006, 55). It is a fact that the ingredients of a
Beijing Consensus, that is, market reforms without democracy and an emphasis on
self-determination and sovereignty are also part and parcel in other non-Western
donors’ aid policies. This is notable in the differences of opinion between Western and
Arab donors on issues of aid conditionality (Villanger 2007, 238).

Effective governance and democracy

As an OECD report (2006) has argued, the rise of India and China presents both
risks and opportunities for African countries. The hunger for minerals and oil
presents short-term opportunities, while there are serious long-term risks related to
weak governance standards which may lead to failures to invest in other
nontraditional sectors, as there is a growing trade dependency of Africa on China
and India. Brautigam is therefore probably incorrect in saying scholars should move
away from viewing foreign aid as an extension of foreign policy (Brautigam 1998, 3).
At least in China’s case, and probably also in what could generally be termed an East
Asian model of aid, increasing dependence on overseas natural resources makes the
boundaries between trade, aid policy and diplomacy hard to disentangle. Some
observers argue that both India and China view aid as an important foreign policy
tool, to a large extent based on nationalistic policies (Kragelund 2008, 580).
According to the Chinese development scholar Xu Weizhong, the strategic interest of
China in Africa rests on these three pillars: political interest, as a rising China needs
the support from African nations; economic interest, as China’s need for energy
resources and foreign markets increase; and the need for reunification of the
motherland, as Africa can contribute to contain Taiwanese independence (Xu 2007,
318). In similar vein, Japan attempted to increase its influence instrumentally over
Africa in the 1980s, driven by the same hunt for natural resources as China’s. Tokyo
was also motivated by economic interests, but especially in the case of Africa this
resource and energy rationale was supported by foreign aid as a key diplomatic
motive, that of laying the foundation for a permanent seat on the UN Security
Council.
A clear example is when Chinese scholars argue that there is a need to strike a
balance between democratic politics and the politics of stability. If you have too
much of either ingredient, they say, in the given cultural and socio-economic context,
it may invite instability. Democratic disarray and political instability is a state of
affairs that in the Chinese mindset amounts to the same as negative GDP growth.
He Wenping for example argues:
Irrespective of the country, it looks as if ‘democracy’ is not at all the effective miracle
drug for every conceivable disease. Having ‘democracy’ does not automatically mean
that there is political development. Clearly, one cannot easily draw an equal sign
between ‘democracy’ and political development. Only a democracy that accounts for
both order (social stability and rule by law) and effectiveness (economic development)
can forcefully push for political development. (He 2005, 375)
126 J. Lagerkvist

While by no means writing off the merits of democracy or democratisation, she

wants us to assess critically the merits of promoting democracy in all places and at any
time. She cites South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Mauritius, Mali, Mozambique,
Senegal, and Ghana as countries that have acquired the right balance between
democracy and stability, and thus shown how democratisation sometimes should be
expanded in order to get the appropriate level of efficiency to promote development.
Especially important has been the establishing of the rule of law, expansion of popular
participation in politics, a growing rights consciousness, and the supervision of ruling
parties by public opinion, as this is precisely the road toward more inclusive politics
that reformist political leaders and intellectuals argue China should take.
I would argue that these Chinese analyses of Africa could also be viewed as a
projection screen, not only revealing China’s global ambitions but also disclosing
arguments in domestic Chinese debates about its own development. The phenomenon
of the Western world projecting their superiority and advantages vis-à-vis the ‘other’
has been well analysed by Edward Said in his seminal work Orientalism (1978). When
Chinese academics project images of their own society and development, however, the
approach is more cautious. There is certainly no notion of supremacy in their
arguments, as Chinese analysts in general are uncertain how the market economy and
concomitant social development will eventually impact their own political system.
They are thus more inclined to admit to various shortcomings in China’s
developmental experience. Nonetheless, He Wenping also sees the need to temper
democratic ambitions in unfavourable contexts. She observes that democracy has in
some countries sped up and revived age-old African tribalism or local nationalism
and thus proclaims that, when ‘democracy’ cannot well co-ordinate the relationship
between effectiveness (economic development) and order (social stability and rule by
law), reversal and setbacks in the democratisation process cannot be avoided. With a
technocrat’s glasses she views the contemporary African situation:
. . . even if the logic of development means that nation building and economic
construction must be carried out in advance, the politics of development compels
Third World countries (including African nations) to, at the same time, confront the
strong wish and demands of people to participate in politics and enjoy economic
distribution. (He 2005, 381)
Interestingly, He Wenping is a realist insofar as brakes can rarely be applied on
the developing of democratic popular process in today’s world. The technocratic
logic of China’s top leaders, however, does not play out well in smaller nations with a
different colonial experience and political culture to China. And she holds that even
if difficult, Africa must go forward while negotiating between a plethora of different
demands from both the domestic and international scenes. To He this means that
African nations can neither use tradition as an excuse for hindering political
development, nor can they reject tradition by replacing it with Western culture
without considering more alternatives. This is where China presents a viable model to
consider and perhaps offer us some valuable experiences to absorb and digest. She
advocates that African countries should learn from ‘advanced modern Eastern and
Western political culture’ in order to create a brand new African political culture.
 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 127

China as an alternative development model

Should China perhaps be viewed as a golden opportunity, even a new model for
development, for Africa to become a more developed part of the global economy?
Randy Peerenboom discusses this issue and the view of China as a possible paradigm
for developing states. He argues, contrary to He Wenping, although rather
incorrectly I believe, that: ‘China has attempted to persuade other countries to
follow its lead’ (2007, 9). Peerenboom does not give any clue as to which Chinese
leader tried to convince a particular foreign leader that China’s route to development
is correct. And even if there is certainly a difference between the views of scholars
and policymakers, even in China, the scholarly view on these matters also reflects the
deliberations among the foreign policy elite. The scholar Li Zhibiao, for example, has
argued for caution on the part of African development specialists and leaders:
If African nations really want to study and learn from the Chinese experience, first, they
must thoroughly understand the differences and similarities between their national
situation and that of China. Second, they must research in earnest all of the aspects of
China’s, and even other countries’, developmental experience, and moreover, on the
basis of that, search for the developmental strategy and road that contains the
characteristics [most appropriate for] themselves. (Li 2007, 50)
This is a far cry from telling people that your model of success is a ‘one size fits
all’ solution to be emulated everywhere. Another Chinese Africanist, Liu Hongwu, is
of a similar opinion when he observes how some view China as the new saviour that
will reduce Africa’s poverty. He believes this to be as ridiculous as when people in the
past regarded the West as Africa’s saviour (Liu 2007, 12). The same argument is also
heard from China’s government agencies. The Chinese government’s State Council
Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development, for example, has,
like China’s Africa watchers, also stressed the importance of formulating policies that
are context specific, as opposed to a fixed model. As the factors causing poverty
vary, different approaches were needed in different regions in China. Gradual reform
is also seen as key, to introduce pilot projects on a small scale to test different
development ideas on a local level (Davies 2007, 34). This, together with a
multidimensional approach to poverty reduction through capacity building of
farmers, and a long-term focus where growth is coupled with poverty reduction,
were said to be key lessons. Likewise, Li Zhibiao warns African nations that they
must consider their own situation and not copy mechanically from others. While Li
does not want to paint an overly rosy picture of the results brought by the post-Mao
economic reforms, he still believes there are a few pillars of wisdom in the Chinese
reform experience that Africa can study. First, he argues that it is important to
introduce economic reform gradually in order to avoid the outbreak of severe unrest.
Second, he believes an opening up to the outside world is necessary as the Chinese
reforms were carried out against the background of rapidly developing globalisation.
Without opening up China could not have made use of foreign direct investment.
Therefore Peerenboom is right, on the other hand, when he argues that China’s
developmental path does not provide a detailed blueprint to be followed slavishly by
other developing nations (Peerenboom 2007, 21). Rather than buying advice
wholesale from the World Bank and IMF, China has adapted basic economic
principles according to its own circumstances and perceived needs. The question now
is whether China will continue to reduce poverty on a global scale by actively
128 J. Lagerkvist

engaging in other Third World countries; investing and becoming an important

donor of foreign aid, and giving loans on favourable terms. Numerous developing
countries, both authoritarian and democratic look to China and invite experts from
China to lecture on law, economics, and politics (Peerenboom 2007, 9).
The problem for African countries may be that they look to China as a model to
follow wholesale, which may be bad for several reasons. There are many Chinese who
caution against this. Is there one ‘Chinese model’ they ask? As argued by Li Zhibiao:
Apart from setting up special economic zones, ever since the start of the reforms, there
has been a surge in many local development models: rather successful ones have been
‘the Suzhou model’, ‘the Wenzhou model’, and the ‘Dongguan model’, and different
models have different characteristics. The Suzhou model is an economic development
model led by the government. The Wenzhou model is an economic development model
guided by the market. The Dongguan model, on the other hand, is a model that makes
use of foreign investment to develop the manufacturing industry. (Li 2007, 52)
This is also what Peerenboom judges to be the most important lesson for other
countries looking to China as a model. He argues that one of the keys to China’s
success story has been the willingness to experiment and to evaluate the results free
of economic, normative or political dogma (2007, 290). On the same line of thought
we find He Wenping, who argues that there are many successful cases of rapid
development of economy and society in the world besides China. To her, all these are
valuable for African countries to study (He 2005).

Chinese views on corruption and conditionality

During the much-highlighted Sino-African forum between 48 African heads of state
and cabinet leaders and Chinese leaders in Beijing in November 2006, China
promised to increase its foreign aid to Africa and to sign debt relief agreements with
33 African countries by the end of 2007. Beijing also stated it would double aid and
interest-free loans by 2009, and preferential loans worth three billion US dollars
would also be provided to develop infrastructure. According to a Chinese official
with the Ministry of Commerce, all the new aid packages destined for African
countries were offered selflessly and there ‘were no political strings attached nor
interference in internal affairs’.9 The lack of conditionality in aid projects and the
traditional strong emphasis on sovereignty by the Chinese government might be
attractive not just to undemocratic African heads of states but also to populations
who have been on the receiving end of structural adjustment programmes formulated
by the IMF and the World Bank in Washington (Mawdsley 2007, 415).
Some Western observers are certain that China is not prepared to support civil
liberties and rights in Africa beyond those it provides to its own citizens. They
argue that ‘China is exporting some of its most dysfunctional domestic practices,
including corruption, bad lending, disregard for labour rights and poor environ-
mental standards’ (Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small 2007). Other scholars are less sure,
though they correctly suggest that accountability and transparency are definitely
not ‘core values’ in Sino-African co-operation (Melber 2007, 9). Some researchers
point to the exact opposite. They argue that Chinese experts are invited to
developing countries to lecture on China’s experience, and that PRC government
officials even lecture fellow Third World nations on how to combat corruption and
strive for good governance (Peerenboom 2007). What is one to believe? The only
 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 129

way to find out, of course, is to listen to the Chinese voices and writings on this
matter. Unlike most Western observers, Chinese analysts do not necessarily view
the prevalence of endemic corruption practices as an inherent problem of
autocratic politics. He Wenping, a scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, argues that there are many power holders who ‘utilise the loophole of
having democracy but not rule of law’ making it possible for them to engage in
large-scale graft and practice corruption (He 2005, 381).
One thing is evident though: the Chinese aid specialists are definitely concerned
with how their resources are dealt with (Sautman and Yan 2008, 14). They certainly
do not see squandering of their resources as unproblematic. In fact, their focus on
‘effective governance’ amounts pretty much to the same as good governance in
fighting corruption: only the methods and packages are different, though of course
not without sociopolitical implications. According to Chinese officials with the
Ministry of Commerce the fact that China does not give aid in cash but in kind
means there is less risk of corruption (Davies 2007, 64). Although this method of
avoiding corruption may be feasible for some time and in some places, when Chinese
labour is also included in the package it may create equally strong sentiments and
reactions in African labour markets and civil society (Polgreen and French 2007).
And the Chinese insistence on building shiny new infrastructure with their own
materials and manpower in return for the output from the drilling of oil and digging
of precious minerals may indeed prove a bad recipe. In order to develop native
African industries and not just leaning toward the income and support of Indian and
Chinese companies and government agencies, a more proactive strategy is needed by
African governments.
The problem for China in Africa may be that the Chinese underestimate many
latent potential conflicts and security threats as well as defects of the political
systems on the continent and thus may find themselves involved on a scale and depth
they did not at first anticipate. Further, they have no strategy to tackle corruption
problems of lack of transparency, which may become a bigger problem as the volume
of foreign aid grows (Gill et al. 2007, 11). That China’s ‘effective governance’ may
turn into ‘bad governance’ due to neglect of corruption and embezzlement is perhaps
the greatest lacuna in current Chinese aid policy and developmental strategy for
Africa. As argued by Xu Li, an official with China’s Ministry of Communications’
transport research institute, China’s infrastructure expansion is not as restrained by
rules as it is in the United States and elsewhere. According to her, once a plan is
made it is executed: ‘democracy’, she says, ‘sacrifices efficiency’ (The Economist
2008, 29). But something else is lost in Xu’s understanding, namely the need to
establish a fair and just system of rule of law, equal rights, and effective mechanisms
to combat corruption. The problem for many African countries may be that there is
not yet a foundation for a Chinese developmental model to take hold. At the time of
the Chinese reforms, an elite existed, but it was an elite with limited resources, and
the state already existed in the form of operating institutions. In contrast, many
African states are endowed with a kleptocratic elite ruling over a weak state with
poor institutional functions. In such a setting, how can the Chinese model contribute
to building this kind of desperately needed ‘weak infrastructure’, not just
constructing bridges and roads?
Nevertheless this is still an open-ended story. If the Chinese learn how to deal
with African realities better than the European colonial powers did, and the US and
130 J. Lagerkvist

the Soviets later did during the Cold War, there may be some potential for China
contributing to global equity through becoming a solid partner in taking the
industrial revolution to African nations.
‘Aid with Chinese characteristics’, or rather, the Chinese perspective on
development assistance cannot be viewed in isolation, as aid is integrated with
other components. China’s engagement with Africa should instead be viewed as part
of a matrix in which aid, social stability, and government-to-government
co-operation guides the course that bilateral relations with developing nations
should take. It therefore comes as no surprise that recent year’s kidnappings in
Nigeria and killings of Chinese oil workers with the state-owned company China
Petroleum and Chemical Corporation in Ethiopia in April 2007 met with outrage in
China. The Chinese engagement in Sudan is another case that seriously impacts on
Chinese policymakers concerned with ‘distortion’ of China’s image in ‘the court of
global public opinion’. Actress Mia Farrow’s warning (2007) that the Beijing
Olympics would perhaps be remembered by future generations as ‘the genocide
Olympics’ followed by Steven Spielberg’s decision in February 2008 to withdraw as
an adviser for the opening ceremony of the games, was definitely contrary to the
image the government wanted to project to the world in the run-up to the games.
These and other cases illustrate how China is now drawn into largely unanticipated
debates and conflicts with its ever-increasing integration in global economic value
and resource chains. Due to the rise of public opinion on China’s internet and
alternative channels of information, Chinese citizens are already discussing the pace
of domestic political reform and the nature of China’s overseas engagement and
bilateral relations (Lagerkvist 2005, 125). Questions that ‘netizens’ have been asking
one another is what is needed to prevent the loss of Chinese lives in conflict-ridden
and war-prone areas of the world, and what measures China should take in order to
prevent casualties when drilling oil in say, the Congo, the Sudan, and Nigeria. One
can anticipate that, with an increasing global presence and concomitant demands of
great power responsibility, domestic debates will begin to deal with issues such as
China needing to project its power abroad, perhaps even including breaking away
from its longstanding emphasis and arch-conservative conception of sovereignty and
territorial integrity (Zhang 2006, 11).

Concluding remarks
President Hu Jintao’s solemn words in his report to the 17th Communist Party
Congress on 15 October 2007 about the rights of countries to ‘independently choose
their own development path’ shows that Beijing in the light of its own reform
experience now acknowledges and advocates that indigenous contexts should
determine what developmental model to choose. This is a change from the period
preceding the 1978 economic reforms, when Chinese aid workers self-assuredly
propagated their (already failing) model of the planned economy. Today, rather
ironically after achieving poverty reduction unprecedented in the history of
mankind, they are unwilling to force-feed their experiences of ‘a market economy
with Chinese characteristics’ to other nations.
Interestingly, when China’s Africa watchers compare the positive and negative
development experiences in Africa and China, Africa is turned into a projection
screen where the contemporary drama of China’s breathtaking socio-economic
 Journal of Contemporary African Studies 131

experience of recent years is replayed and choices confronting Chinese society today
become discernible. Such choices concern the true separation of powers in the polity,
the establishing of the rule of law, expansion of popular participation in politics, a
growing human rights consciousness, and the supervision of political processes by
public opinion and the mass media.
As shown in this article, China’s Africa watchers are on the whole a cautious
group who do not want to project any false hopes into bilateral relationships with
African countries. This is a sharp turn from the earlier phase of Chinese
development assistance in the 1960s and 1970s when ‘emissaries of socialism’ went
to Africa convinced that China’s solutions would also fit African problems.
Nowadays, Chinese officials and analysts quite often say they are interested in
learning from donors with a longer experience of providing aid. The view is that
China is a newcomer and has a lot to learn (Davies 2007). If this is more than mere
lip service to a Western audience,10 it is part of an open-minded attitude of Chinese
officialdom derived from newfound confidence in China’s role in globalisation
processes (Lagerkvist 2006, 5). This willingness to learn from the outside world
extends to other sectors of Chinese society and the business world today, including
parts of the policy elite that coordinates and designs foreign aid programmes. For the
cautious optimist this bodes well for the harmonisation of various views on aid and
developmental models. But it is not going to be easy to align the national interests of
developed democracies such as the US and the EU on the one hand, and a
developing democracy like India and authoritarian China on the other. But the
outcome could be much worse. There is as yet no sign of a clash between
democracies and autocracies on African soil. On the whole, the world is witnessing
more competition, but that is not necessarily a bad sign. Although it does not come
without economic and political risks for both China and African states, there is
reason to be positive about China’s increased role and higher profile in Africa. For
one, Africa is no longer in the shadow of global media focus. The spotlight is on
Africa
which is good. An Africa forgotten and forsaken outside the attention of
global trade-flows is what should concern Africans and the rest of the world.
Although not physically present at the EU
Africa summit in Lisbon in December
2007, the Chinese spectre of successful authoritarianism
that is, the spectre of
flexible authoritarianism
hovered around the meeting hall. Its presence was felt
even more strongly when President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, tired of listening to
European sermons about human rights and good governance stated: ‘Today it is very
clear that Europe is close to losing the battle of competition in Africa’.11 The
president’s statement reflects how influence over the geopolitical map of Africa is
changing at a faster pace than Western media and policymakers have yet come to
understand.

Acknowledgements
The author is grateful for the valuable comments on this article made by two anonymous
reviewers.

Notes
1. Hu Jintao’s report to the 17th Chinese Communist Party Congress, 15 October 2007. See
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/24/content_6938749_htm.
132 J. Lagerkvist

2. For this article I have examined articles in the Chinese scientific journal Xiya yu feizhou
(West Asia and Africa) between 2004 and 2008, and the limited academic literature that
exists in Chinese on African studies.
3. A recent exception is the report by Penny Davies (2007).
4. See former Tanzanian President Mkapa’s address to a Beijing University student audience
in September 2007, Xiya Feizhou (West Asia and Africa), no. 1, 2008: 69.
5. See http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-01/19/content_10684845.htm (accessed 7 April
2009).
6. See remarks made by former South African President Thabo Mbeki: China faces charges
of colonialism in Africa. International Herald Tribune, 28 January 2007. http://iht.com/
articles/2007/01/28/news/sudan.php. Mbeki’s real apprehension was also relayed to the
author in an interview with South Africa’s ambassador to Sweden, June 2007 in
Stockholm.
7. Under the Washington Consensus and post-Washington Consensus, development
agencies located the causes of underdevelopment inside individual nation states.
8. See: China’s African policy. Available at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, http://
www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm.
9. See: China to fulfill its Sino-African forum pledges. www.chinaview.cn, 29 February 2007.
10. Complacent remarks and a more recalcitrant attitude are shown by analysts such as Xu
Weizhong quoted in this article and (Ying 2007, 92) point in another direction.
11. This remark was uttered at the European-Africa summit in December 2007 when
President Wade criticised European leaders for trying to pressure African countries into
signing new trade deals, saying China’s approach was winning more friends.

Note on contributor
Johan Lagerkvist is a research fellow with the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (SIIA)
in Stockholm. His research interests include the political impacts of a globalizing China,
change and continuity in Chinese foreign policy, developments in China’s media system, and
Sino-African relations. His email address is: [email protected].

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