Murdaugh Jail Calls Order

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The case involves a request for recordings of phone calls made by Richard Murdaugh from jail being released to the media in response to a FOIA request. Murdaugh filed suit, alleging the releases violated federal law.

Richard Murdaugh filed suit against the director of the detention center alleging phone calls he made from jail were improperly disclosed to the media in response to FOIA requests in violation of federal law.

Murdaugh filed a motion for preliminary injunction seeking to prohibit the detention center from continuing to disclose recordings of his phone calls in response to media requests.

3:22-cv-00608-CMC Date Filed 06/01/22 Entry Number 61 Page 1 of 20

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION

Richard Alexander Murdaugh, Civil Action No. 3:22-cv-608-CMC

Plaintiff,
vs. ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
Washava Moye, In her official capacity as INJUNCTION (ECF No. 7)
Interim Director Alvin S. Glenn Detention
Center, Richland County Government,

Defendant.

Plaintiff Richard Alexander Murdaugh (“Murdaugh”) filed a Complaint against D. Shane

Kitchen, then Interim Director of Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center (“ASG”), alleging Murdaugh’s

outgoing phone calls were recorded, and the recordings disclosed to the press in violation of federal

law in response to a South Carolina Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request. ECF No. 1,

Compl. 1 Murdaugh also filed a motion for preliminary injunction seeking relief under Title III,

the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §2510 et seq. (“Title III”), to

prohibit ASG from continuing to disclose such recordings in response to media requests. ECF No.

7. Defendant filed a response in opposition (ECF No. 23), and Murdaugh filed a reply (ECF No.

31). Murdaugh then filed a supplemental memorandum (ECF No. 53), to which Defendant filed

a response (ECF No. 54). The motion is now ripe for resolution.

1
Kitchen resigned as Interim Director after the filing of this action. The Interim Director is now
Ms. Washava Moye, who was substituted as Defendant in her official capacity pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 25(d). ECF Nos. 55, 60. Moye will be hereinafter referred to as “Defendant.”
3:22-cv-00608-CMC Date Filed 06/01/22 Entry Number 61 Page 2 of 20

FACTS

Murdaugh is a pretrial detainee being held at ASG on South Carolina state court charges.

During his detention, Murdaugh made calls to family and friends. These calls were recorded

pursuant to ASG Inmate Rules, which state “[a]ll calls from the housing modules are collect calls

and are subject to recording and monitoring.” ECF No. 7-1 at 7. When a telephone call is initiated,

both parties receive a recorded message advising “all calls are subject to monitoring and

recording.” ECF No. 23-1 at ¶ 8 (Kitchen aff.). 2 Richland County contracts with AmTel to provide

telephone services to inmates at ASG. Id. at ¶ 3. All outgoing inmate telephone calls are

automatically recorded by AmTel, except for attorney-client calls for which prior arrangements

are made. Id. at ¶ 5.

The Murdaugh cases have attracted media attention from local and national news outlets.

In January 2022, an electronic media organization submitted a request for recordings of

Murdaugh’s outgoing telephone calls from ASG under the South Carolina FOIA. Any FOIA

request received by ASG is forwarded to the Richland County Ombudsman’s Office. That office,

the County Attorney’s Office, or both in consultation, determine what public records in possession

of ASG may be subject to disclosure under the FOIA, or whether an exemption applies. ECF No.

23-1 at ¶ 9 (Kitchen aff.). In this case, recordings were released to the electronic media

organization, portions posted on Twitter and approximately one hour of calls publicly released on

2
While he was Interim Director and Defendant in this case, Kitchen submitted an affidavit in
support of Defendant’s response in opposition to the motion for preliminary injunction. ECF No.
23-1.
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a podcast, as well as on YouTube. Subsequently, other news organizations submitted similar FOIA

requests for recordings of Murdaugh’s calls.

THE INSTANT LAWSUIT

Murdaugh filed this lawsuit against the Interim Director of ASG, in his official capacity,

for injunctive relief. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 3. Murdaugh alleges a violation of Title III, when his

telephone conversations were recorded, and the recordings released to the press pursuant to a FOIA

request. Id. at ¶ 29. He seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive relief preventing Defendant

from disclosing recordings of his telephone calls to anyone or for any other purpose except as

expressly permitted by Title III. Id. at ¶ 30.

Murdaugh argues recordings of his telephone calls should not have been disclosed to the

media as disclosure is “strictly limited” by Title III. ECF No. 7 at 3. He contends Title III limits

disclosure of intercepted communications to the following three circumstances:

(1) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means authorized by
this chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, oral, or
electronic communication ... may disclose such contents to another
investigative or law enforcement officer to the extent that such disclosure is
appropriate to the proper performance of the official duties of the officer
making or receiving the disclosure.

(2) Any investigative or law enforcement officer ... may use such contents to the
extent such use is appropriate to the proper performance of his official duties.

(3) Any person who has received, by any means authorized by this chapter, any
information concerning a wire, oral, or electronic communication ... may
disclose the contents ... while giving testimony under oath....

18 U.S.C. § 2517(1)–(3). He seeks a preliminary injunction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2020(b), a

provision of Title III that authorizes preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief as may
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be appropriate, to enjoin Defendant from disclosing the recordings for any purpose except as

expressly permitted in § 2517(1)-(3). Id. at 5.

Defendant filed a response in opposition, arguing Murdaugh failed to address all four

factors supporting preliminary injunctive relief, including whether the absence of an injunction

would cause irreparable harm, the balance of the equities, or that the preliminary injunction would

be in the public interest. ECF No. 23 at 3. Defendant further contends Murdaugh is not likely to

succeed on the merits, as Title III has no application to recordings of his calls because, based on

the law enforcement exception to Title III, no interception occurred. Id. at 3-5. In addition,

Defendant asserts Murdaugh consented to recording and monitoring of his telephone

conversations, and is presumed to know the law, including as to FOIA rights of access to public

information. Id. at 6-7. Finally, Defendant submits issuance of an injunction would interfere with

the “strong public policy that underpins the Freedom of Information Act.” Id. at 8.

Murdaugh filed a reply, contending the law enforcement exception to Title III does not

apply because the calls were intercepted by a private vendor under contract with ASG, not by any

investigative or law enforcement officer. ECF No. 31. Further, he argues the consent exception

may permit recording of the calls, but public release “exceeds the scope of the consent and is

therefore prohibited.” Id. at 2. He contends public policy requires a narrow construction of Title

III and release of recordings for non-law enforcement purposes will have far-ranging

consequences. Id. at 8. Finally, he asserts § 2520 of Title III specifically allows for a preliminary

injunction. Id. at 9.

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On May 3, 2022, Murdaugh filed a supplemental memorandum to detail information

recently obtained by subpoena from the two companies, AmTel and Customer Service of America

(“CSA”), that provide telephone services for detainees at ASG. ECF No. 53. AmTel’s and CSA’s

responses note the contract with ASG expired November 6, 2019, but has continued on a month-

to-month basis since then. All detainee phone calls are recorded except privileged calls with an

attorney. An employee of AmTel/CSA has access to the recordings, and anyone requesting access

must contact AmTel/CSA’s operations manager. Id. at 3. Also produced were activity logs of all

users who listened to recorded calls of detainees at ASG from January 1, 2021, to March 14, 2022,

and activity logs of all users who listened to Murdaugh’s recorded calls. ECF Nos. 53-7, 53-8.

Based on the documents and information received from AmTel/CSA, Murdaugh submits

the law enforcement exception to Title III does not apply because AmTel/CSA are no longer under

contract with Richland County for telephone services at ASG and clearly are not being supervised

by law enforcement officers as required. Id. at 4. He argues recorded calls of detainees at ASG

are being monitored almost exclusively by outside law enforcement and prosecution agencies for

criminal investigative purposes unrelated to jail operations, another reason the law enforcement

exception does not apply. Id. at 5. Finally, he contends the consent exception does not apply

because release to the public exceeds the scope of the consent. Id. at 6.

Defendant filed a supplemental memorandum in opposition, arguing information received

in response to the subpoenas directed to AmTel and CSA is unsworn, not authenticated, and not

provided as declarations under penalty of perjury. ECF No. 54 at 2. Defendant submits a

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contractual relationship between Richland County and AmTel/CSA continues on a month-to-

month basis, and the law enforcement and consent exceptions to Title III apply.

STANDARD

A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy . . . which is to be applied only in

[the] limited circumstances which clearly demand it.” Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med.

Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 811 (4th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).

The traditional purpose of a preliminary injunction is to “protect the status quo and to prevent

irreparable harm during the pendency of a lawsuit ultimately to preserve the court’s ability to

render a meaningful judgment on the merits.” In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d 517,

525 (4th Cir. 2003). To qualify for injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show (1) likelihood he will

succeed on the merits; (2) likelihood he will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary

injunction; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) the injunction is in the public

interest. Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Real Truth About Obama v. FEC, 575 F.3d

342, 346 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, 559 U.S. 1089 (2010), reinstated in relevant

part on remand, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010). 3

The Winter-Real Truth standard requires the party seeking the injunction to make a “clear

showing” he is likely to succeed on the merits. Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 345; see also Winter, 555

U.S. at 22. This standard compels the moving party to show he is likely to prevail. Regardless of

3
As noted by Murdaugh, § 2520(b) includes as a remedy a preliminary injunction. However, that
does not mean analysis of the Winter-Real Truth factors can be ignored.
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the balance of hardships, it is insufficient for the party to show only “grave or serious questions

are presented” in the litigation. Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 346.

Second, the moving party must make a clear showing he is likely to be irreparably harmed

if preliminary relief is denied. To meet this test, the party must show more than a mere possibility

of harm. Winter, 555 U.S. at 21. Third, the moving party must show the balance of equities tips

in his favor. Id. at 21, 26. Fourth, the court must consider whether grant or denial of the injunction

is in the public interest. The court must give “particular regard” to the public consequences of

granting a preliminary injunction. Id. at 24; Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 347. The Fourth Circuit no

longer recognizes a “flexible interplay” among these criteria. Instead, each requirement must be

fulfilled as articulated. Real Truth, 575 F.3d at 347.

DISCUSSION

I. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Murdaugh alleges that by releasing recordings of his personal telephone calls to the media,

Defendant violated Title III, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522. In order to prevail on his request for a

preliminary injunction, he must first show he has a likelihood of succeeding on the merits of his

Title III claim.

Title III generally forbids interceptions of “any wire, oral or electronic communication”

absent a court order authorizing it. United States v. Hammond, 286 F.3d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 2002)

(citing 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)). Title III’s protections apply to prisons. See, e.g., Hammond, 286

F.3d at 192. Therefore, the recordings at issue here were properly released to the media only if (1)

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the initial interception was lawful pursuant to an exception to the general injunction prohibiting

use of wiretaps, and (2) the media’s subsequent acquisition of the recordings was lawful.

Defendant contends the “law enforcement” and “consent” exceptions to Title III apply, and

thus, recording of the calls was not an “interception” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(4),

(5)(a)(ii). The court examines both exceptions.

a. Law Enforcement Exception

The “law enforcement” exception excludes from the definition of “interception” recordings

made by “any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component thereof

. . . being used by . . . an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his

duties.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(ii). In other words, if the contents of a communication are

acquired by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties, there

is no interception for Title III purposes. United States v. Lewis, 406 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2005);

see Hammond, 286 F.3d at 192.

Courts, however, have consistently held the term “ordinary” should not be read so broadly

to mean all investigative activity by an investigative or law enforcement officer. If “ordinary”

were read literally, warrants would rarely be required for electronic eavesdropping, a result clearly

contrary to Congress’s intent. Consequently, courts have agreed “ordinary” in § 2510(5)(a)(ii) is

reasonably interpreted to refer to routine noninvestigative recordings of telephone conversations

such as recordings made by prison authorities, who routinely monitor inmates’ conversations.

Amati v. City of Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952, 956 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Investigation is within the

ordinary course of law enforcement, so if ‘ordinary’ were read literally warrants would rarely if
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ever be required for electronic eavesdropping, which was surely not Congress’s intent.”); see also

Lewis, 406 F.3d at 18 (“That an individual is an investigative or law enforcement officer does not

mean that all investigative activity is in the ordinary course of his duties. Indeed, the premise of

Title III is that there is nothing ‘ordinary’ about the use of a device to capture communications for

investigative purposes.”).

Murdaugh contends the law enforcement exception does not apply to calls made from ASG

because the calls were recorded by AmTel, a private company, and not an investigative or law

enforcement officer. Defendant, however, urges this exception applies where, as here, a local jail

(ASG) contracts with a private company, AmTel, for a detainee telephone system that

automatically records all outgoing detainee calls, except for certain attorney-client calls. See ECF

23-1 (Kitchen aff.). ASG claims there is no active monitoring of calls as they are made by staff at

ASG, but that Professional Standards staff review random calls as well as calls on which there may

be issues that arise. Id. According to Kitchen, former Interim Director, the calls are used for law

enforcement and investigative purposes, including to conduct internal investigations of potential

wrongdoing and institutional violations, as needed to maintain the safety and security of ASG, its

detainees, and staff. Id. ASG concedes access to the recordings is extended to prosecutors with

the South Carolina Attorney General’s Office and the Fifth Circuit Solicitor’s Office, and notes

the system logs the identity of the persons who listen to each call. Id. On the other hand, Murdaugh

submits there is no evidence of supervision of AmTel by ASG officials and it appears AmTel

controls access to the recordings.

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i. Law Enforcement Officer

The statute defines an “investigative or law enforcement officer” as

any officer of the United States or of a State or political subdivision thereof,


who is empowered by law to conduct investigations of or to make arrests
for offenses enumerated in this chapter, and any attorney authorized by law
to prosecute or participate in the prosecution of such offenses.

18 U.S.C. § 2510(7).

The Fourth Circuit has held that a prison official qualifies as an investigative or law

enforcement officer such that calls intercepted directly by prison personnel need not be judicially

authorized pursuant to the law enforcement exception. See Hammond, 286 F.3d at 192. Circuit

caselaw, however, does not address whether an entity acting as the agent of a prison pursuant to a

contract may qualify under § 2510(7) as an investigative or law enforcement officer. 4

District courts that have considered the issue have reached mixed results. In Huguenin v.

Ponte, 29 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.R.I. 1998), the court found employees of a private detention facility

operated pursuant to a contract with a Rhode Island municipal corporation could not be considered

“investigative or law enforcement officers” for purposes of Title III. In United States v. Rivera,

292 F. Supp. 2d 838 (E.D. Va. 2003), the court found Arlington County’s contract with Verizon

and Global Tel*link to provide the means and equipment used to record inmate calls came within

the law enforcement exception where the private companies acted exclusively under the direction

4
The First Circuit has implicitly approved the interception of inmate phone calls by a private entity
with whom the Department of Corrections contracted, pursuant to the law enforcement exception.
Gilday v. Dubois, 124 F.3d 277, 282 n.7 (1st Cir. 1997).

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of prison officials, did not listen to or monitor the calls, nor have any discretion concerning which

calls to record. The court relied on a separate section of Title III, § 2518, providing, where there

is a judicially authorized interception, for conducting such interception “in whole or in part by

Government personnel, or by an individual operating under a contract with the Government,”

acting under the supervision of an investigative or law enforcement officer authorized to conduct

the interception. Id. at 843 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (emphasis added)). 5 Finally, in United States

v. Faulkner, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (D. Kan. 2004), aff’d on other grounds, 439 F.3d 1221 (10th

Cir. 2006), the court found the law enforcement exception did not apply to recording of telephone

conversations in a private detention facility providing prison services under contract with the

United States Marshals Service.

In Rivera, which considered the Verizon contract with Arlington County,6 Verizon and

Globel Tel*Link’s role “was limited to providing the means and equipment used to record the

calls. They did not listen to or monitor the calls, nor did they have any discretion concerning which

calls to record. All monitoring of Rivera’s calls was conducted by prison officials.” 292 F. Supp.

2d at 843. At ASG, AmTel’s system automatically records the calls, and it has no discretion on

5
The legislative history indicates Congress desired, for judicially authorized exceptions, to permit
the government to contract out monitoring functions to private entities in order to “free field agents
from the relatively routine activity of monitoring interceptions so that they can engage in other law
enforcement activities.” S. REP. No. 99-541, at 31 (1986).
6
Faulkner and Huguenin, however, considered facilities that were wholly privately run, as
opposed to county-run detention centers with a private company contracted to provide telephone
services, as in this case and Rivera.
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which calls to record, other than attorney-client privileged calls as arranged in advance. However,

it is questionable whether AmTel is acting under direction or supervision of ASG, as it appears

AmTel controls access to the calls for purposes of monitoring.

ii. Ordinary Course of Duties

The law enforcement exception only applies to contents of a communication acquired “in

the ordinary course of [an officer’s] duties.” § 2510(5)(a)(i). Caselaw makes clear the recording of

telephone communications in prison is performed in the ordinary course of duties of prison

personnel “provided it is part of a prisons’ routine procedure designed to safeguard security, and

not part of a criminal investigation of a single inmate.” Rivera, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 842 (citing

Hammond, 286 F.3d at 192); see also United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 292 (9th Cir. 1996)

(“[Metropolitan Detention Center] is a law enforcement agency whose employees tape all

outbound inmate telephone calls; interception of these calls would appear to be in the ordinary

course of their duties. . . We . . . therefore conclude that the law enforcement exception applies in

the Circuit to MDC’s routine taping policy.”). 7

7
Not all calls recorded in a detention center are excepted from Title III. See Abraham v. County
of Greenville, 237 F.3d 386, 390 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding judges’ calls, though made from a county
detention center that also housed state judges’ offices, not subject to the law enforcement exception
because they were not recorded for purposes of security in the ordinary course of an officer’s
duties.). However, Abraham noted its holding was a narrow one, and the court did not “impugn
the County’s need to monitor for law enforcement purposes calls relating to Detention Center
inmates.” Id. at 391.

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Here, it is questionable whether detainee communications from ASG are recorded in the

ordinary course of law enforcement duties. According to Kitchen, the Professional Standards staff

at ASG monitors calls for law enforcement and investigative purposes, including internal

investigations, as needed for safety and security purposes. ECF No. 23-1 (Kitchen aff.). However,

data from AmTel/CSA shows approximately 91.55% of the total monitored calls from January 1,

2021, to March 14, 2022, were monitored by outside law enforcement or prosecution agencies

such as the Attorney General’s Office, the Richland County Sheriff’s Department, or various

police departments and solicitors’ offices. ECF No. 53-7. 8 Murdaugh notes all of his calls were

reviewed by prosecution agencies, and were not in the “ordinary course” of an officer’s duties

because he was singled out for monitoring for purposes unrelated to prison security. Rivera, 292

F. Supp. 2d at 842; see also United States v. Green, 842 F. Supp. 68, 73-74 (W.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d

sub nom. United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688 (2d. Cir. 1996). Records show Murdaugh’s calls

were monitored 417 times. ECF No. 53-8. Individuals associated with the South Carolina Attorney

General’s Office monitored 410 of these calls and the remaining seven calls were monitored by

8
From January 1, 2021, until March 14, 2022, there were a total of 16,436 detainee calls that were
monitored. Of this total, 15,057, or 91.55%, were monitored by individuals affiliated with the
following law enforcement or prosecution agencies: Richland County Sheriff’s Department,
Columbia Police Department, SLED, Forest Acres Police Department, USC, Camden Police
Department, Fifth Circuit Solicitor’s Office, and the South Carolina Attorney General’s Office. Only
631 calls, or 3.84%, were monitored by individuals associated with ASG. There were another 758
calls, or 4.61%, that were monitored using credentials that were not identified by AmTel and CSA.
ECF No. 53-7.

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individuals affiliated with the Fifth Circuit Solicitor’s Office. None of Murdaugh’s calls were

monitored by any individual affiliated with ASG. Id.

Although Defendant argues the information produced by AmTel/CSA is inadmissible, the

court will assume for the sake of this analysis Murdaugh would be able to authenticate and properly

admit this evidence. If so, it is questionable whether the law enforcement exception would apply

here. It appears the recordings of detainee calls at ASG may not be made with the primary purpose

of monitoring for jail security purposes, and thus may be outside the ordinary course of duties.

Moreover, Defendant has failed to show AmTel employees are supervised by ASG personnel and

thus considered “investigative or law enforcement officers” for purposes of Title III. However,

the court need not decide whether the law enforcement exception applies, as another exception to

Title III applies.

b. Consent Exception

Defendant also argues the consent exception applies to remove the recordings from the

protection of Title III. The Inmate Rules Orientation provided to Murdaugh states all calls from

the housing modules are collect calls and are subject to recording and monitoring, and callers (and

recipients) are notified at the beginning of each call that all calls are subject to monitoring and

recording. ECF No. 23-1 at ¶ 8 (Kitchen aff.).

Section 2511(2)(c) provides “[i]t shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person

acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where such person

is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent

to such interception.” The Fourth Circuit has found the consent exception applies to prison inmates

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required to permit monitoring as a condition of using prison telephones. Hammond, 286 F.3d at

192; see also United States v. Cox, CR–17–4–H–CCL–JTJ, 2017 WL 5153405, at *5 (D. Mont.

2017) (citing United States v. Faulkner, 439 F.3d 1221, 1224 (10th Cir. 2006)) (“[T]his court is

persuaded by cases from the First, Second, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits that readily

apply the consent exception by holding ‘we have no hesitation in concluding that a prisoner’s

knowing choice to use a monitored phone is legitimate consent under the Wiretap Act.’”).

This case is similar to cases from the Ninth and Second Circuits finding prisoners

consented to having calls recorded and holding “[w]hen one party consents to a tap, Title III is not

violated.” Van Poyck, 77 F.3d at 292; United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373 (2d. Cir. 1987). In

Van Poyck, the detention center posted signs above the phones warning all calls were monitored,

and the defendant signed a consent form warning of taping and monitoring and was provided a

prison manual warning of recording. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d at 292. Similarly, in Amen, inmates

attended an orientation lecture at which the taping and monitoring system was discussed, each

inmate received a copy of the Inmate Handbook with a notice stating calls were taped and

monitored, and notices were placed on each telephone stating “your use of institutional telephones

constitutes consent to this monitoring.” Amen, 831 F.2d at 379. Here, Murdaugh received the

Inmate Rules Orientation explaining calls were subject to recording and monitoring, and a notice

at the beginning of each call informed both parties 9 of the recording.

9
“A recipient of an inmate’s call who ignores a recorded warning likewise implicitly consents to
the call’s recording.” J. Carr, The Law of Electronic Surveillance, § 3:4 (December 2021 Update).
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Murdaugh stresses although he was on notice the calls were recorded and monitored, he

did not consent to release recordings of his calls for non-law enforcement purposes. He argues he

did not expressly consent to such release, and it is outside the scope of any implied consent.

While Murdaugh argues the release of his conversations to the public via the media is

outside the scope of his consent, it is clear he consented to the recording of his conversations. It

is well-settled that the scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object. United States

v. Correa, 220 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D. Mass 2002) (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 US. 248, 251

(1991)); see also United States v. Conley, 531 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2008). Here, as in Correa and

Conley, there was no expressed object for the recording and monitoring in any of the notices

provided that would limit the scope of the consent. Correa, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 64 (explaining

inmates were merely told all calls would be monitored and/or recorded, without any indication of

why such recording was happening, in the inmate orientation or recorded message before calls);

Conley, 531 F.3d at 59 (notices received by inmates did not reference institutional policy and

instead asserted that all calls, except privileged ones, would be monitored). The court in Correa

further found no limitation on the consent existed: the defendant consented to a “monitoring and

recording system that was unqualified in all relevant aspects,” and the institution’s officials

“expressed no object of the search that could be construed to limit its scope.” 220 F. Supp. 2d at

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65. Therefore, the court found the recording could be utilized despite the defendant’s argument

that he did not consent to recording for that purpose. Id. 10

The same holds true here. Although Murdaugh contends he did not consent to recording

of his calls for purposes of disclosure to the public via the media, the consent he granted by

utilizing the phone system after warnings via the Inmate Rules Orientation and recorded warnings

at the beginning of each call was unqualified and not limited as he argues. “Consent, once having

been given, will be deemed to have been unqualified.” J. Carr, The Law of Electronic Surveillance

§ 3:4, at 2 (Dec. 2021 Update) (citing Correa, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 65; Lewis, 406 F.3d at 15).

c. Title III is Inapplicable Here

Because Murdaugh consented to the taping of his calls, there was no interception within

the meaning of Title III. Where there is no “interception” within the meaning of Title III, the limits

on disclosure in 18 U.S.C. § 2517(1)-(3) do not apply. Hammond, 286 F.3d at 191 (“[T]he district

court concluded that once a recording is permitted under either of the above exceptions, it is

thereafter exempted from any further restriction under Title III . . . [W]e conclude that the [third

party] was free to use the intercepted conversations once they were exempted under either

§ 2510(5)(a)(1) or § 2511(2)(c).”); Lewis, 406 F.3d at 19-20 (“Recordings authorized by §

2510(5)(a)(ii) are ‘not the product of an interception, consensual or otherwise, governed by Title

III; therefore, they are not subject to whatever limitations Title III places upon the disclosure of

10
The Fourth Circuit similarly rejected an inmate’s claim that the use of information contained in
wire communications should be limited according to the precise terms of the applicable exception
or authorization. Hammond, 286 F.3d at 193.
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information that does result from a covered interception.”); Smith v. United States Dep’t of Justice,

251 F.3d 1047, 1049-50 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[Section] 2510(5)(a)(ii) does not authorize the

recordings but instead excludes them entirely from the coverage of the statute.”). Therefore, Title

III’s limitations on disclosure of the recorded calls are not applicable, and Murdaugh has failed to

show likelihood of success on the merits on his Title III claim. 11

II. Release to the Press

A determination that Title III does not apply to the recordings here does not mean such

recordings were properly released to the press pursuant to the South Carolina FOIA. Although

prisoner calls are routinely recorded in state and federal detention and prison facilities, the parties

have cited no case in which such recordings were released to the press pursuant to a freedom of

information request or otherwise. 12

11
Murdaugh’s failure to show likelihood of success on the merits is fatal to his motion for
preliminary injunction. Therefore, the court need not examine the remaining three factors.
12
The Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) considers inmates’ privacy concerns when it receives a
federal FOIA request for inmate information. It applies the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, and
federal FOIA disclosure regulations, including an exception for privacy. The BOP appears to have
anticipated some of the potential issues arising from disclosure of information as requested in this
case. BOP Policy Statement PS 1351.05 discusses FOIA requests, and Attachment A notes matters
that “(A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would
deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” among others, are exempt
from disclosure under FOIA. Even for requests from law enforcement for previously recorded
telephone conversations, disclosure is only appropriate when requested in an emergency situation,
criminal activity is discovered through routine monitoring for prison administrative purposes, or
requested through proper process.

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Murdaugh, however, has not sought relief based on the FOIA. Further, this court has not

been made aware of the basis for the FOIA decision here. The court notes South Carolina’s FOIA

statute states a “person has a right to inspect, copy, or receive an electronic transmission of any

public record of a public body, except as otherwise provided by Section 30-4-40, or other state or

federal laws.” S.C. Code § 30-4-30. Matters a public body may exempt from disclosure under

§ 30-4-40, however, include audio recordings compiled for law enforcement purposes to the extent

their production “would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication” (§

30-4-40(a)(3)(B)); “would constitute an unreasonable invasion of personal privacy” (§ 30-4-

40(a)(3)(C)); or “would disclose any contents of intercepted wire, oral, or electronic

communications not otherwise disclosed during a trial” (§ 30-4-40(3)(G)). Thus, under state law,

recordings compiled for law enforcement purposes may be exempt from disclosure. 13 And Kitchen

has conceded that the recordings here were compiled for law enforcement purposes. ECF No. 23-

1, Kitchen aff. at ¶ 5. (“The telephone calls are used for law enforcement and investigative

purposes, including to conduct internal investigations of potential wrongdoing and institutional

violations, as needed to maintain the safety and security of ASGDC, its inmates, and staff.”).

Murdaugh argues disclosure could affect law enforcement and prisoners in significant

ways. He submits privacy and fair trial rights of prisoners may be violated, and over-burdened

prison staff may be required to respond to FOIA requests by defense counsel in many cases. ECF

13
Section 30-4-40(a) provides “a public body may but is not required to exempt” such recordings.
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No. 31 at 8-9; § 30-4-40(2), (3) (A) – (F). Because no supplemental state law cause of action for

violation of the FOIA has been alleged, however, that issue is not before this court.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Murdaugh’s motion for preliminary injunction pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 2020(b) is denied. The parties are directed to confer and determine whether an

Amended Scheduling Order is necessary at this time. If so, a proposed Amended Scheduling Order

should be submitted no later than June 21, 2022

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Cameron McGowan Currie


CAMERON MCGOWAN CURRIE
Senior United States District Judge
Columbia, South Carolina
June 1, 2022

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