A.M.

SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997

335 Phil. 1096

THIRD DIVISION
A.M. SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997

SOPHIA ALAWI, COMPLAINANT, VS. ASHARY M. ALAUYA,

CLERK OF COURT VI, SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, MARAWI
CITY, RESPONDENT.
DECISION

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E.
B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company.
Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a
District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned
firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan
was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a
letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract
with the company. He wrote:

" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of

my intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me
and your company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator,
SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan de
Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the
aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales
agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts
which made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and
interests."

He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the
"grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed
with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract,
even as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the
contract **. I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said onerous and
manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your
sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro,
Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went
through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the
description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage — PD 26," had been typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga,
Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and

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void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan
in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of
P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:

" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul,

cancel, rescind and voided, the 'manipulated contract' entered into between
me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales
agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently
manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing
loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is
deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my
consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and
abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between
me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be
the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21,
1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already
cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of
deductions from his salary on account thereof.a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to
Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to
the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in
relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he
was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."b

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court
requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and
began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage,
and ** the refund of ** (his) payments."c

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi
filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she
appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the
typewritten words, "Free Postage — PD 26."[1] In that complaint, she accused Alauya
of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds

through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established
reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of

the Philippine Bar may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger,

manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the
essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies,
baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting
that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She
closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or be appropriately
disciplined (sic) ** "

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with

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established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of
the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P.
Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.[2]

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in which he questioned the

authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining,
according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive
Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief
Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link"
between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint
had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive
Clerk of court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a
scion of a Royal Family **."[4]

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even
obsequious tones,[5] Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint
in order that he might comment thereon.[6] He stated that his acts as clerk of court
were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as
sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him
to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya
contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless
nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six
months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[7] He declared that
there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had
merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege,
saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted
with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage — PD 26," were
typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated by the
affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before
respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J);[8] and as far as he knew,
his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage,
and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had
occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.[9]

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a
rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is
often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a
local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any
man unduly prejudiced and injured."[10] He claims he was manipulated into reposing
his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend.[11] He was induced to sign a blank contract
on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for
correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups"
he still does not know where the property -- subject of his supposed agreement with
Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated;[12] He says Alawi somehow got his
GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did
not do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his
contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents
as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the
house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw.[13]

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for

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the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious
and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with
unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and
demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court
Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters
both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya"
-- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as
"DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
report and recommendation.[14]

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious
and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing
her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia
that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross

misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized

acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had

fooled him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract

with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without ** (his) authority and against ** (his) will," and "concealed the
real facts **."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting
in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded
feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of
P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[15]

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA
6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and
utmost responsibility in the public service.[16] Section 4 of the Code commands that
"(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and **
refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, public safety and public interest."[17] More than once has this Court
emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an
agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most
junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their
conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and
decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary."[18]

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or
public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts
believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively
intemperate. insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has
a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with

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propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner

consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or
otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith."[19] Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort
to vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar
and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than
for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language
which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.[20] As a
judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of
others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by
prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms
might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction
that he had been grievously wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion
to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts.[21] While one who
has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine
Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or
advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of
"attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study
of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it
is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law,"
because in his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly
similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no
moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of
the title of attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the
record contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the

use of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language
unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned
that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

a 'Annexes B, B, B-1, B-3 of Alauya's Comment dated June 5, 1996

b Annexes F and G, id.

c Annex C-2, id.

[1]
Annexes A and A-1 of complaint; Rollo at p. 14; copies of the letter were also
furnished the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation. The Finance
Management and Budget Office and the Financial Division of the Supreme Court.

[2]
Resolution dated March 25, 1996

[3]
Dated April 19, 1996.

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[4]
Rollo at p. 23.

[5]
Evidently, he had since become aware of the immemorial practice that NOTICES
(or communications informing) of Resolutions adopted by the Court En Banc or any
of its three (3) Divisions are sent to the parties by and over the signature of the
corresponding Clerk or Court or his Assistant, the Court's Resolutions being
incorporated verbatim in said notices.

[6]
Dated April 22, 1996

[7]
Rollo at p. 28.

[8]
Id. at p. 60.

[9]
Id. at p. 32.

[10]
Id. at p. 34.

[11]
Id. at p. 35, et seq.

[12]
Id. at p. 35.

[13]
Id.

[14]
See Resolution of the Court en banc dated August 21, 1996; Rollo at p. 61 et seq.

[15]
SEE footnote No. 7, supra.

[16]
Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275

[17]
RA. No. 6713, Section 11 of the same law punishes any violation of the Act with
(1) a fine not exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months' salary, or (2) suspension not
exceeding one (1) year, or (3) removal, depending on the gravity of the offense, after
due notice and hearing by the appropriate body or agency, and even if no criminal
prosecution is instituted against him.

[18]
Apaga v. Ponce. 245 SCRA 233, 240, citing Callejo. Jr. v. Garcia, etc., 206 SCRA
491; Angeles v. Bantug, et al., 209 SCRA 413; Icasiano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,
2109 SCRA 377; Medilo, et al. v. Asodisen, etc., 233 SCRA 68; SEE also Policarpio
v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275

[19]
ART. 19, Civil Code

[20]
UP Rules 8.01 and 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which should
apply by analogy to Members of the Shari'a Bar. The Code also proscribes behavior in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession (Rule 7.03).

[21]
Resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 5, 1993 in Bar Matter No. 681,
entitled "Petition to allow Shari'a lawyers to exercise their profession at the regular
courts;" SEE Rule 138 (secs. 1, 4), Rules of Court

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