G.R. No. 227447 - MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION v. HEIRS OF FRITZ D. BUENAFLOR

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The principles

§ Compensation for injury or death


§ Application of POEA-SEC in case of insufficiency in the terms and conditions of the
employment contract or CBA, which renders the seafarer unqualified or unable to claim
benefits therein
§ Illnesses not listed in Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC are disputably presumed as work-
related
§ Exception to the general rule that death in order to be compensable must occur during the
term of the contract

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 227447, June 23, 2020
MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION,
v. HEIRS OF FRITZ D. BUENAFLOR
REYES, J. JR., J.:
Fritz D. Buenaflor was employed as Second Mate by petitioner Magsaysay Maritime
Corporation for and on behalf of its foreign principal, petitioner Masterbulk Pte. Ltd., under a
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration approved employment contract dated February
6, 2012, for a duration of nine months.In March 2013, Buenaflor experienced persistent pain on
the right side of his abdomen. Later, he was found to be suffering from "infiltrated
adenocarcinoma in the liver parenchyma." Thus, the attending physician recommended that
Buenaflor be considered unfit for duty and repatriated for further medical treatment.
Dr. Agbayani, the company-designated physician, reported that Buenaflor was suffering from
"Adenocarcinoma of the Liver with Peripancreatic Metastases, Retroperitoneal Metastases, Lung
Metastases, Malignant Ascites, S/P Chemoemobilization, Stage IV." He further opined that
Buenaflor's ailment is work-related only if he was exposed to chemicals.
Due to difficulty in getting blood donors in Manila, Dr. Agbayani recommended that Buenaflor's
radiotherapy and chemotherapy procedures be transferred to his home province, Iloilo. Thus, on
July 26, 2013, Buenaflor was discharge from MDH and transferred to Iloilo Doctors Hospital.
Unfortunately, Buenaflor passed away on August 2, 2013 due to "Cardiopulmonary Arrest
Secondary to Hepatocellular CA Stage IV."
The heirs of Buenaflor, represented by his wife, Honorata G. Buenaflor, initiated a complaint
for death benefits, attorney's fees and damages against petitioners Magsaysay, Masterbulk and
Marlon P. Trinidad, the Fleet Director of Magsaysay, before the Labor Arbiter.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint as there was no evidence that Buenaflor's liver
cancer was caused or aggravated by, or related to, his work.
The National Labor Relations Commission granted the appeal and reversed the decision of
the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC ruled that the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), of which
Buenaflor is covered, clearly intended to compensate any injury or death suffered by an officer
regardless of its nature or circumstance.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the NLRC. Hence, this petition.
§ Compensation for injury or death
Q. State the rule on compensation for injury or death.
The CA, in deciding in favor of respondents, applied the Masterbulk Agreement, as according
to it, they are most favorable to the seafarers and are not contrary to law, morals, public order or
public policy. According to the CA, the NLRC correctly held that the coverage of the compensation
for injury or death benefits under Section 28 of the Masterbulk Agreement is too encompassing in
that it does not require that the cause of injury or death be work-related. Section 28 of the
Masterbulk Agreement pertinently states:
28. COMPENSATION FOR INJURY OR DEATH. —
(1) x x x
(2) Compensation shall be paid as stipulated in sub-clause (1) of this clause for all injuries
howsoever caused, regardless of whether or not an officer comes within the scope of the Work
Injury Compensation Act and includes accidents arising or not arising out of the course of his
employment and accidents arising outside the working hours of the injured or dead officer.
xxx xxx xxx
(6) If an officer dies during service onboard through any case including death from natural
causes or death occurring whilst travelling to and from the vessel, or as a result of marine or other
similar peril, the Company shall pay the maximum amount of compensation for the affected officer
as shown in Appendix IV to this Agreement. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
§ Application of POEA-SEC in case of insufficiency in the terms and conditions of the
employment contract or CBA, which renders the seafarer unqualified or unable to claim
benefits therein
Q. Does POEA-SEC apply in case of insufficiency in the terms and conditions of the
employment contract or CBA?
Employment contracts or CBAs may enlarge the minimum requirements of the POEA-SEC to
make them more favorable and beneficial to the employees. However, in case of insufficiency in the
terms and conditions of the employment contract or CBA, which renders the seafarer unqualified or
unable to claim benefits therein, the POEA-SEC operates to fill the gaps in order to raise the
seafarers' benefits to the minimum.
Sec. 20 (B) (1) (4) of the POEA-SEC provides for compensation for work-related illnesses and
deaths which may not occur under the circumstances specified, but existed during the term of the
seafarer's contract. This Section pertinently reads:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS. —
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH
1. In case of work-related death of the seafarer during the term of his contract, the employer
shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US
dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to each
child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate
prevailing during the time of payment.
xxx xxx xxx
4. The other liabilities of the employer when the seafarer dies as a result of work-related injury
or illness during the term of employment are as follows:
a. The employer shall pay the deceased's beneficiary all outstanding obligations due the
seafarer under this Contract.
b. The employer shall transport the remains and personal effects of the seafarer to the
Philippines at employer's expense except if the death occurred in a port where local government
laws or regulations do not permit the transport of such remains. In case death occurs at sea, the
disposition of the remains shall be handled or dealt with in accordance with the master's best
judgment. In all cases, the employer/master shall communicate with the manning agency to advise
for disposition of seafarer's remains.
c. The employer shall pay the beneficiaries of the seafarer the Philippines currency equivalent
to the amount of One Thousand US dollars (US$1,000) for burial expenses at the exchange rate
prevailing during the time of payment. (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the above rule, the Court established that in order for the beneficiaries of a seafarer
to be entitled to death compensation from the employer, it must be proven that the death of the
seafarer (1) is work-related; and (2) occurred during the term of his contract.
§ Illnesses not listed in Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC are disputably presumed as work-
related
Q. State the rule on disputable presumption in Section 20 (A) (4) of the POEA-SEC.
Work-related death refers to death which results from a work-related injury or illness. A work-
related illness, on the other hand, pertains to any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result
of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC, which are compensable if
the conditions stated therein are satisfied.
This, however, does not mean that only those listed in Section 32-A are compensable. Under
Section 20 (A) (4) of the POEA-SEC, those illnesses not listed in Section 32-A are disputably
presumed as work-related.
A disputable presumption has been defined as a specie of evidence that may be accepted
and acted on when there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one
which may be overcome by other evidence. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court
states that a disputable presumption is satisfactory if uncontradicted and not overcome by other
evidence. In the case of Spouses Surtida v. Rural Bank of Malinao (Albay), Inc., we explained the
effects of disputable presumption as follows:
A presumption may operate against an adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut it.
The effect of a legal presumption upon a burden of proof is to create the necessity of presenting of
evidence unless rebutted.
To state it simply, unless overcome by contrary evidence, the disputable presumption stands.
In the case of Racelis v. United Philippines Lines, Inc., this Court held that:
While it is true that Brainstem (pontine) Cavernous Malformation is not listed as an
occupational disease under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC, Section 20 (B) (4) of the same
explicitly provides that "[t]he liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury
or illness during the term of his contract are as follows: (t)hose illnesses not listed in Section 32 of
this Contract are disputably presumed as work related." In other words, the 2000 POEA-SEC "has
created a disputable presumption in favor of compensability[,] saying that those illnesses not listed
in Section 32 are disputably presumed as work-related. This means that even if the illness is not
listed under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC as an occupational disease or illness, it will still be
presumed as work-related, and it becomes incumbent on the employer to overcome the
presumption." This presumption should be overturned only when the employer's refutation is found
to be supported by substantial evidence, which, as traditionally defined is "such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion." (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)
Similarly, in Phil-Man Marine Agency, Inc. v. Dedace, Jr., this Court ruled that the disputable
presumption under Section 20 (A) (4) operates in favor of the employee and the burden rests upon
his or her employer to overcome the statutory presumption. As this Court found that petitioners in
the said case failed to present sufficient controverting evidence to overthrow the disputable
presumption that the seafarer's illness is work-related, the benefits prayed for by the claimant was
awarded.
Buenaflor, in this case, died of liver cancer, a disease which is not listed under Section 32-A of
the POEA-SEC. Under Section 20 (A) (4), Buenaflor's illness and his resulting death are work-
related. Magsaysay and Masterbulk have the burden to present contrary evidence to overcome this
presumption, but failed to do so. The company-designated physician reported that Buenaflor was
suffering from liver cancer and opined that this illness is work-related only if he was exposed to
chemicals. It bears pointing out that with this opinion, the company-designated physician did not
totally cancel out the possibility that Buenaflor's illness is work-related. However, by simply stating
his opinion in such manner, and by failing to justify why he made such assessment, this opinion is a
bare claim which we must reject. The opinion of the company-designated physician is insufficient to
overthrow the presumption that Buenaflor's illness and resulting death are work-related.
§ Exception to the general rule that death in order to be compensable must occur during the
term of the contract
Q. What is the exception to the general rule that death in order to be compensable
must occur during the term of the contract?
The present case falls under the exception to the general rule that death in order to be
compensable must occur during the term of his contract, as pronounced in the case of Canuel v.
Magsaysay Maritime Corporation. In Canuel, this Court ruled that:
With respect to the second requirement for death compensability, the Court takes this
opportunity to clarify that while the general rule is that the seafarer's death should occur during the
term of his employment, the seafarer's death occurring after the termination of his employment due
to his medical repatriation on account of a work-related injury or illness constitutes an exception
thereto. This is based on a liberal construction of the 2000 POEA-SEC as impelled by the plight of
the bereaved heirs who stand to be deprived of a just and reasonable compensation for the
seafarer's death, notwithstanding its evident work-connection.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, considering the constitutional mandate on labor as well as relative jurisprudential
context, the rule, restated for a final time, should be as follows: if the seafarer's work-related injury or
illness (that eventually causes his medical repatriation and, thereafter, his death, as in this case)
occurs during the term of his employment, then the employer becomes liable for death
compensation benefits under Section 20 (A) of the 2000 POEA-SEC. The provision cannot be
construed otherwise for to do so would not only transgress prevailing constitutional policy and deride
the bearings of relevant case law but also result in a travesty of fairness and an indifference to social
justice. (Emphasis supplied)
Buenaflor experienced the symptoms of his illness in March 2013, while he was still on board
the vessel. In the certification issued by Magsaysay, Buenaflor signed off on March 25, 2013, the
day of his repatriation. While Magsaysay claims that Buenaflor's contract expired in February 2013,
it did not explain why Buenaflor was still on board its vessel in March 2013. Thus, we agree with the
CA's conclusion that Buenaflor's employment contract transcended beyond the nine-month period
and his employment was extended.
This conclusion conforms with Section 18 (A) of the POEA-SEC, which states that the
employment of the seafarer shall cease when the seafarer completes his period of contractual
service aboard the ship, signs off from the ship and arrives at the point of hire. Under this Section,
Buenaflor's employment ceased only upon his sign off and arrival at the point of hire on March 25,
2013. When he experienced the symptom of his illness, and when he was subsequently medically
repatriated, he was still under the employ of Magsaysay. Buenaflor's case, thus, falls under the
exception established in Canuel.

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