Motyl, Turn To The Right. Ideol Origins & Dev Ukr Nationalism 1919-29 (1980)

THE TURN TO THE RIGHT:
THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS

AND DEVELOPMENT OF
UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM,
1919-1929
ALEXANDER J. MOTYL
EAST EUROPEAN MONOGRAPHS, BOULDER

DISTRIBUTED BY COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
NEW YORK
1980
EAST EUROPEAN MONOGRAPH SERIES, NO. LXV
Copyright1980 by Alexander J. Motyl

Library of Congress Catalogue Card Number 79-56524
ISBN 0-914710-58-3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction 1
1 The Pre-War Background and the First World War 5
2 Skoropads’kyi and the Conservatives 23
3 Petrushevych and the Galicians 33
4 Petliura and the Socialists 44
5 The Sovietophiles 57
6 Dmytro Dontsov 61
7 The Students and Their Organizations 86
8 The Soldiers, the Sich Sharpshooters, and levhen
Konovalets’ 93
9 The Ukrainian Military Organization 105
10 The Ukrainian Nationalists: Their Organizations
and Their Ideologies 129
11 The Ideology of the Organization of Ukrainian
Nationalists 153
12 The Ideological Origins of Ukrainian
Nationalism 162
Epilogue 174
Notes 176
Bibliography 192
Index 203
List of Abbreviations
AUNR — Army of the Ukrainian People’s Republic

CP(b)U — Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine
DOPS — Action Union of Progressive Students
HUNM — Group of Ukrainian National Youth
KPSH — Communist Party of Eastern Galicia
KPZU — Communist Party of the Western Ukraine
LUN — League of Ukrainian Nationalists
OUN — Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
PUN — Leadership of Ukrainian Nationalists
RUP — Revolutionary Ukrainian Party
SUNM — Union of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth
SVU — Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine
TseSUS — Central Union of Ukrainian Students
TUP — Society of Ukrainian Progressives
UDKhP — Ukrainian Democratic-Agrarian Party
UHA — Ukrainian Galician Army
UKhSP — Ukrainian Christian-Social Party
UKP — Ukrainian Communist Party
UkSSR — Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
UNDO — Ukrainian National Democratic Union
UNP — Ukrainian People’s Party
UNR — Ukrainian People’s Republic
UNTP — Ukrainian People’s Labor Party
UPNR — Ukrainian Party of National Work
UPSF — Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Federalists
UPSR — Ukrainian Party of Social-Revolutionaries
UPSS — Ukrainian Party of Independists-Socialists
USDP — Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party
USDRP — Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party
USKhD — Ukrainian Union of Agrarian Statists
USS — Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooters
UVO — Ukrainian Military Organization
UVU — Ukrainian Free University
ZADVOR — Foreign Delegation of the Military Organization
ZUNR — Western Ukrainian People’s Republic
ZUNRO — Western Ukrainian National Revolutionary
Organization
I
INTRODUCTION
A qualitatively new Ukrainian political movement arose in

the decade following the First World War. Specifically labelled
“Nationalist” by its adherents, the new movement represented
a radical rejection of the pre-war “nationalism” current among
the Ukrainian revolutionary intelligentsia. Whereas the
earlier “nationalism” had had no difficulty reconciling Ukrainian
national aspirations with democratic and generally human
values, post-war Ukrainian “Nationalism” regarded the
claims of the nation and the claims of humanity to be mutually
exclusive. In order to differentiate between the two, John
Armstrong’s example will be followed throughout this study
and post-war “Nationalism” will be spelled with a capital ‘N’,
while pre-war “nationalism” will be spelled with a small ‘n\
Ukrainian Nationalism arose in the atmosphere of political
chaos that followed the Ukrainians’ unsuccessful attempt at
building a national state in 19174920. Several competing
Ukrainian governments-in-exile, innumerable political parties
and organizations, and a large mass of increasingly
radicalized soldiers and students faced a bitter reminder of
their nation’s failure in the existence of the Soviet Ukraine and
in the division of the remaining ethnically Ukrainian
territories among three (not even formally Ukrainian) states —
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania.
2 THE TURN TO THE RIGHT
The Ukrainian Nationalists saw their movement as a reaction

to this chaotic and desperate state of affairs. In diagnosing
the fiasco of 19174920, the Nationalists came to the conclusion
that democracy, socialism, and lack of will were to blame. In
their place, they emphasized organization, authority, solidar
ity, and faith as essential to the successful mobilization of the
Ukrainian nation and the attainment of the Nationalist goal
— an Independent and United Ukrainian State (Ukrains’ka
Samostiina Soborna Derzhavd).
Although clearly a native product of the post war Ukrainian
reality, Ukrainian Nationalism shared many similarities with
a variety of non-Ukrainian as well as Ukrainian ideologies,
ranging from French integral nationalism and Italian
Fascism to Ukrainian conservatism. Was Ukrainian National
ism, therefore, “integral nationalist” or “fascist” or neither of
the two? The question, of course, is critical, not only for
Ukrainian Nationalism but also for students of the Right. The
question is also difficult and made no easier by the fact that
scholars themselves are not in agreement over the meanings of
the two terms. Carlton J. H. Hayes, for example, considers
Hitler and Mussolini to have been — “integral” or
“totalitarian” nationalists. Eugen Weber writes that Maurras’
“integral nationalism was royalism.” Ernst Nolte, on the other
hand, believes that the Action Française was a form of
Fascism.1 Who is right? The best way to answer this question,
which ultimately muddles the issue, is to sidestep it. Instead,
this study will refer to the definitions given these terms by
Maurras and Mussolini themselves and then compare them
with the ideology and politics of Ukrainian Nationalism.
Although this method may not definitively resolve the
question concerning Ukrainian Nationalism’s “true” nature, it
does have the very substantial merit of confronting the issue of
ideological origins in the simplest possible manner and in this
way avoids confusing arguments of classification. After all, it
should not be enough that a movement or regime be
authoritarian, prone to violence, and nationalist to make it
fascist, unless of course the term fascist is to be employed as a
loose and virtually meaningless description of “style.”
INTRODUCTION 3
Likewise, if the terms “integral nationalist” and “fascist” are
interchangeable, as Hayes and Nolte suggest, then all
discussion of the two as separate ideologies becomes
purposeless. Thus, although the two ideologies doubtless
shared many features, the most important question — even if it
is of largely theoretical value — is whether they were also
identical in their “essence.” What, if anything, stood at the
center of integral nationalism, Fascism, and Ukrainian
Nationalism? After arriving at this answer with the help of
Barres, Maurras, Mussolini, and the Ukrainian Nationalists,
it will then be possible to determine Ukrainian Nationalism's
fundamental relationship to both.
While clearly a question of vital importance to contemporary
Eastern European history, Ukrainian Nationalism remains a
mystery to most Western students of nationalist and right-wing
movements, with the notable exception of John A. Armstrong,
who devoted a whole book to the subject. For example,
Peter Sugar's two collections on nationalism and “native
fascism” in Eastern Europe completely disregard the
Ukrainian dimension. The same is true of the works on fascism
and the European Right edited, respectively, by Walter Laqueur
and George L. Mosse, and Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber.
Western European scholars fare no better in this regard. Even
Nolte, perhaps the foremost student of fascism, finds a fascist
movement in every country of Europe, including Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Russia, but manages to
overlook the immediate neighbor of the four — the Ukraine.2
Ukrainian emigres have produced a rich body of memoirs as
well as several semi-scholarly attempts at describing the
Nationalist phenomenon. With the exception of Michael
Sosnowsky’s (Mykhailo Sosnovs'kyi) study of Dmytro
Dontsov, however, none of the emigre works provides an
adequate historical analysis of Ukrainian Nationalism.3
Soviet Ukrainian scholars, on the other hand, tend to avoid so
politically complex a field of study as Ukrainian Nationalism
and instead leave the job to pamphleteers whose diatribes
against “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism” are of no value to
the researcher.4 Of Eastern European scholars, only the Poles
have seriously examined Ukrainian Nationalism as a crucial

aspect of inter-war Polish history. The works of Ryszard
Torzecki, Krzysztof Lewandowski, Antoni B. Szczesniak, and
Wiestaw Z. Szota stand out in this regard.8
This study will deal with Ukrainian Nationalism as an
ideological and political phenomenon. Although the social and
economic dimensions will not be ignored, they will occupy a
position of secondary importance to the ideological and
political processes that led to the formation in 1929 of an
organized movement of Ukrainian Nationalists — the
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Furthermore, this
study will deal only with the origins and development of the
Ukrainian Nationalist movement — a period that began
approximately in 1919 and ended in 1929, and attempt to ex
plain how and why the transition was made from pre-war
nationalism to post-war Nationalism.
Note on terminology:
All place names in the Ukraine in general and in Eastern
Galicia in particular have been rendered in transliterations
from the Ukrainian for two reasons. First, because it is
incongruous to use non-Ukrainian place names when writing
about so radically nationalist a phenomenon as Ukrainian
Nationalism; and second, because this eliminates the
confusion that would result were the place name corresponding
to the period in question to be used: for example, depending on
the year, L'viv could have been referred to as Lwo'w, L'vov, or
Lemberg. Certainly, the use of “L'viv” alone is much simpler.
CHAPTER I
THE PRE-WAR BACKGROUND AND THE FIRST

WORLD WAR
The First World War, the revolutionary turmoil in Russia,

and the social and political changes they unleashed in Europe
were the events that transformed the politically immature and,
for the most part, incoherent Ukrainian national aspirations
of the pre-war period into the nationally conscious but wildly
divergent political currents of the 1920s. The war years created
a distinctly Ukrainian political question which became the
cornerstone of post-war Ukrainian politics. In particular, the
various interpretations of the period from 1917 to 1920 served
as the basis of the political rivalries of the post-war decade.
Crucial to the dimensions that the Ukrainian problem
assumed during and after the war was the distribution of the
pre-war ethnically Ukrainian population between two empires,
Austria-Hungary and Russia. Some four million “Ruthenians”
lived in the former, while just under 24 million “Little
Russians” lived in the latter. Although the term “Ukrainian”
did not come into broad use until the beginning of the 20th
century, it will be used here in place of “Ruthenian” and “Little
Russian” for the sake of clarity and convenience.
Ukrainians in Austria-Hungary populated Eastern Galicia,
Bukovina, and Transcarpathia, all of which comprised an area
later known as the “Western Ukraine” (Zakhidna Ukraina).
Ukrainians in Russia primarily inhabited the gubernias of
Chernihiv, Katerynoslav, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kiev, Podillia,
Poltava, Tavria, and Volyn', together referred to as the
“Eastern Ukraine” (Skhidna Ukraina). In dealing with the
Ukrainian movement in the Western Ukraine, this study will
focus only on where it was strongest — Eastern Galicia.
The Ukrainian populations of both empires had similar
social structures. Peasants formed the vast majority, the
working class was small in relative as well as absolute terms,
and a nationally conscious intelligentsia was as yet only in the
process of formation. The ethnic cleavage paralleled the urban-
rural cleavage, with Ukrainians dominating the countryside
and non-Ukrainians (Russians and Jews in the Eastern
Ukraine, Poles and Jews in Eastern Galicia) dominating the
cities.
Existing under radically different political conditions, the
Ukrainian movements in Austria and Russia developed along
very different lines. The Habsburgs supported Ukrainian
aspirations in Eastern Galicia, the so-called “Ukrainian
Piedmont”, as a counterweight to those of the Poles, the
dominant nationality in the whole province. As a result,
Galician Ukrainians (hereafter also referred to as Galicians)
regarded Austria with a fair degree of loyalty and reverence.
More important, the Ukrainian movement in Galicia assumed
many of the characteristics of the conservative and
evolutionary politics practiced in Vienna. Eastern Ukrainians,
on the other hand, had continually to deal with the opposition
of the Russian state in advancing national goals. Severe
limitations on the uses of the Ukrainian language, for
example, were contained in two ukases issued in 1863 and
1876. As a result, Eastern Ukrainians came to practice an
illegal and conspiratorial form of politics which led to the
development of ideological similarities and close ties to the
Russian revolutionary underground.
The early Galician nationalists espoused Populist ideas and
in this spirit founded the Prosvita (Enlightenment) Society in
1868 and the Ridna Shkola (Native School) Society in 1881.
They followed with the first Ukrainian-language daily, Dilo
(The Deed), in 1888 and with the Sokil, the Ukrainian
counterpart to the patriotic Czech gymnastic organization,
Sokol, in 1889. The Populists finally organized in the liberal-
democratic Ukrainian National Democratic Party (Ukrains’ka
Natsional’no-Demokratychna Partiia) in 1899.
PRE-WAR BACKGROUND 7
They faced a powerful opposition in the Russophiles (or

“Muscophiles”, as they were literally called), who considered
the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia to be a branch of the
Russian nation and advocated Galicia’s annexation to Russia.
Both groups fought for the allegiance of the nationally
uncommitted population, which regarded itself as Ruthenian.
By the end of the 19th century, when the national movement
had already broadened its horizons to include the Eastern
Ukraine (in 1848, the Supreme Ruthenian Council had become
the first Galician organization to declare the Galicians a part
of the Ukrainian nation) and political goals supplemented
cultural-educational ones, the term “Ruthenian” was progres
sively replaced by “Ukrainian”. With the politicization of
Ukrainian aspirations, however, the national movement came
into conflict with the Poles and eventually assumed an anti
Polish character.
The late 19th century also saw the growth in Eastern Galicia
of a Ukrainian socialist movement which drew its strength
from the increasingly large number of Ukrainian workers
employed in the recently discovered oil fields in the Carpathian
foothills. A large role in its development belonged to the poet
Ivan Franko, one of the founders in 1890 of the Ukrainian
Radical Party (Ukrains’ka Radykal’na Partita). Not to be
outdone by the National Democrats, the Radicals founded
their own version of the Sokil, the Sich, in 1900. A member of
the Radical Party, Iulian Bachyns’kyi, published a landmark
brochure in 1895, entitled Ukraina Irredenta, which for the
first time articulated pan-Ukrainian aspirations to an
independent state. Ukrainian students assimilated many of
Bachyns'kyi’s irredentist and socialist views in their journal
Moloda Ukraina (The Young Ukraine) in 1900-1903.
Students dominated the national movement in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries by loudly agitating for the creation of
a Ukrainian university. In 1901-1902, several hundred of them
went so far as to organize a “secession” from the University of
L'viv, leaving it to study in Prague, Cracow, and Vienna in
protest against the Polish character of the institution. Large
anti-Polish student demonstrations took place at the same
university in 1906, 1907, and 1910. A student, Adam Kotsko,
was killed in the latter disturbances, thereby providing the

Ukrainians with their first national martyr. In 1909, another
student, Myroslav Sichyns'kyi, created a sensation by
assassinating the Polish governor of Galicia, Count Andrzej
Potocki.
Between 1909 and 1914 the Ukrainian movement in Galicia
assumed many of the features of the militarism then current in
Europe. In particular, the Bosnian Crisis and the First Balkan
War led many Ukrainians to believe that a wider conflict was
inevitable and that they should not be unprepared for it.
Students again took the initiative, organizing secret military
groups throughout the province. They also played the leading
role in founding the Ukrainian counterpart to Baden-Powell’s
Scouts, the paramilitary organization Plast, in 1912.
The exploits of Jozef Pifeudski, in Galicia since 1908,
provided additional inspiration for the young Ukrainian
militarists. Most enticing was Pilsudski's success in per
suading the Austrian government to allow the Poles to form
organizations of Strzelcy (Sharpshooters). The Ukrainians
followed suit with both the Sich and the Sokil founding their
own sharpshooter societies in 1913-1914. The high point of the
Ukrainians’ militarist fever occurred on June 28,1914, the day
of Archduke Ferdinand’s assassination, when the Sich and
Sokil organizations staged a monumental show of strength in
L'viv.
As war broke out, the Poles received permission to organize
two national legions. The Ukrainians once again followed in
their footsteps and began lobbying for Ukrainian units.
Finally, in August 1914, permission was given for the
formation of a legion of Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooters
(Ukrains'ki Sichovi Stril'tsi—USS). The USS served in the
Austrian army until Austria’s collapse in late 1918, whereupon
the legion was integrated into the Ukrainian Galician Army.
Two figures dominated the Eastern Ukraine in the 19th
century — the poet Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861) and the
scholar Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841-1895). The former proved
with his impassioned verse that Ukrainian was a literary
language and that the Ukrainians were indeed a separate

nation. The latter provided the Ukrainian question with
European dimensions and in the process popularized socialist
ideas among the intellectuals of the Eastern Ukraine and
Galicia. In general, political currents in the Eastern Ukraine
paralleled those in Russia, with the Populism of the 19th
century eventually giving way to the revolutionary socialism
of the twentieth. Ukrainian national aspirations, meanwhile,
increased with the growing intensification of the nationality
problem in Russia. As in Eastern Galicia, intellectuals and
students played a crucial role in these developments.
A short-lived Taras Brotherhood (Bratstuo Tarasivtsiv) was
founded in Kaniv in Kiev gubernia in 1891. Named after
Shevchenko, it espoused a mildly nationalist and vaguely
socialist program. There followed in 1900 the Kharkiv-based
Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (Reuoliutsiina Ukrains'ka
Partiia — RUP), whose program, based on Mykola Mikhnovs'-
kyi’s pamphlet Samostiina Ukraina (Independent Ukraine),
first raised the slogans “Ukraine for the Ukrainians” and
“One, United, Indivisible, Free, Independent Ukraine from the
Caucasus to the Carpathians” that were to be adopted by the
post-war Nationalists.
Mikhnovs'kyi, a young lawyer from Kharkiv, soon left the
RUP and founded the small and outwardly nationalist
Ukrainian People’s Party (Ukrains'ka Narodna Partiia —
UNP).Although it supported socialism out of political
expedience, the UNP regarded the nationality question to be
the most important aspect of the Ukrainian problem.
According to its program, “All the evils which the Ukrainian
people have suffered up to now derive from the fact that until
recently they did not view their cause nationally, but only
socially, and that they did not have the ideal of an independent
Ukraine.”6
In the meantime, the original RUP underwent a schism in
1904 over the nationality question. Those party members who
downplayed the issue founded the Ukrainian Social-Demo
cratic League (Ukrains'ka Sotsial-Demokratychna Spilka)
and thereafter joined the Russian Social-Democratic Workers’
Party. The national wing of the former RUP renamed itself the
Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers’ Party (Ukrains’ka
Sotsial-Demokratychna Robitnycha Partita — USDRP). Among
the USDRP’s more prominent members were Symon Petliura,
Volodymyr Vynnychenko, and Dmytro Dontsov. Several years
later, Ukrainian moderates, consisting for the most part of
scholars, writers, and other intellectuals, joined in the Society
of Ukrainian Progressives (Tovarystvo Ukrains'kykh Postu-
poutsiv — TUP).
Nationally conscious Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia and in
the Eastern Ukraine, whether revolutionaries, writers, or
scholars, maintained close ties to one another since as early as
1867, when the journal Pravda, which came to serve as a forum
for Ukrainians on both sides of the Austro-Russian border, was
founded in L'viv. Of particular importance in fostering this
vital exchange of ideas were the Eastern Ukrainian emigres
living in L'viv, thanks to whose efforts the Shevchenko
Society, a literary and cultural association, was established in
1873, and then expanded to include scholarly functions and
renamed the Shevchenko Scientific Society in 1893. Most
prominent of the Eastern Ukrainians was Mykhailo
Hrushevs'kyi, a prodigious scholar of Eastern European
history and author of the 10-volume History of the Ukraine-Rus',
who became editor of the Scientific Society’s periodical publication,
the Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk (Literary-Scientific Herald).
Dmytro Dontsov, meanwhile, the up-and-coming young Social-
Democrat whose anti-Russian tendencies caused numerous
conflicts within the party, played an influential role in
politicizing the student movement in L'viv.
On August 4, 1914, Dontsov, together with Volodymyr
Doroshenko, Vsevolod Kozlovs'kyi, Marian Melenevs'kyi,
Oleksander Skoropys-Ioltukhovs'kyi, Mykola Zalizniak, and
Andrii Zhuk — all emigres from the Eastern Ukraine, formed
the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine (Soiuz Vyzvolennia
Ukrainy — SVU) in L'viv. In late 1914, the members of the SVU
moved their organization to Vienna in reaction to the Russian
advance on Galicia. Skoropys-Ioltukhovs'kyi then founded a
branch of the SVU in Berlin in April 1915. Enjoying the
financial and administrative support of Germany and Austria,

the SVU was allowed to conduct its propaganda among the
Ukrainians interned in the POW camps of both countries on
the condition that its agitation have no anti-German or anti
Austrian content. The SVU published newspapers and
brochures, organized cultural events, and conducted educa
tional work aimed at reducing the high rate of illiteracy among
the Ukrainian soldiers. Above all, the SVU tried to instill them
with an awareness of their Ukrainian identity and of the need
to oppose Russian political and cultural domination. The
SVU’s platform foresaw an “independent Ukrainian state”
with a “constitutional monarchy”, a “democratic internal
political order”, and the status of an “autonomous territory
within Austria.”7 The Union dissolved itself after the
establishment of a Ukrainian state allied to the Central
Powers in the spring of 1918.
The first two years of the war saw no particularly important
changes in the pre-war status of the Ukrainian movements in
Austria and Russia. The Ukrainians for the most part
continued to see their problems within the context of their
respective empires. It was only the collapse of first the Russian
and then the Austrian Empire that provoked them into taking
radical measures leading to political independence.
The February Revolution offered the various political groups
in the Eastern Ukraine the opportunity to put their ideas into
practice. The Society of Ukrainian Progressives (TUP) took the
initiative and on March 17 formed a representative and
constituent body in Kiev, the Central Rada (Tsentral'na Rada
rada is the Ukrainian word for soviet), and delegated Professor
Hrushevs'kyi to head it. Given legitimization by an All
Ukrainian National Congress held on April 17-21, the Rada
proceeded to take hesitant steps towards its goal of an
autonomous Ukraine within a federal Russia. In the following
months, Ukrainian units of the Russian army were
“Ukrainianized” — given a specifically Ukrainian character,
and measures were taken to introduce progressive social
legislation.
The growing political and social ferment led to a proliferation

of political parties and military organizations. The TUP
reorganized itself as the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-
Federalists (Ukrains'ka Partita Sotsialistiv-Federalistiu —
UPSF), while the Ukrainian Party of Social-Revolutionaries
(Ukrains'ka Partiia Sotsial-Reuoliutsioneriv — UPSR) and the
Ukrainian Democratic-Agrarian Party (Ukrains’ka Demo-
kratychno-Khliborobs'ka Partiia — UDKhP) were the most
important of the many that came into existence. The Socialists-
Federalists, socialist only by name, espoused moderate
political and social goals within a federal Russia. The Social-
Revolutionaries, the largest of all Ukrainian parties,
represented the socialistically-inclined Ukrainian peasantry.
The conservative Democratic-Agrarians, founded by Serhii
Shemet and Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, stood for the interests of
the middle-peasant stratum and supported Ukrainian state
hood.
Most Ukrainian parties either did not desire more than
autonomy or were committed to some form of anti-militarism
and therefore saw no need for a Ukrainian army. Opposed to
them were such groups as the Hetman Pavlo Polubotok
Military Club and the Ukrainian Party of Independists-
Socialists (Ukrains'ka Partiia Samostiinykiv-Sotsialistiv —
UPSS), whose members were for the most part soldiers.
Predictably, Mikhnovs'kyi played a large role in both
organizations. In spite of the soldiers’ persistent pressure,
however, Ukrainian government circles did not treat the
matter of a standing army seriously and continued to think in
terms of popular militias. The result was that the Central Rada
was left virtually defenseless before the Bolshevik invasion at
the end of 1917.
Reflecting the growing strength of the military movement
was the spontaneous formation in the second half of 1917 of
local peasant militia units called the Free Cossacks (Vil'ne
Kozatstvo). First organized in Kiev gubernia, the Free Cossack
movement then spread to Poltava gubernia, and soon came to
occupy a large part of the Left-Bank Ukraine. Although
intended to maintain law and order and prevent “counter
revolutionary incidents”, the Free Cossacks consisted of many

middle and rich peasants and frequently assumed an overtly
anti-socialist character. On October 10-16, delegates repre
senting some 60 thousand Free Cossacks gathered in
Chyhyryn and chose General Pavlo Skoropads'kyi, the
Ukrainian nobleman and landowner whose 34th Corps had
the distinction of being the first large army unit to be
“Ukrainianized”, as their Hetman.8
At approximately the same time that the Free Cossacks were
mobilizing, several Galician officers interned in a Russian
POW camp near Tsaritsyn were planning to escape to Kiev and
there organize the large number of Galician soldiers in the
Ukrainian capital into a military unit loyal to the Central
Rada and committed to Ukrainian statehood. Radicalized by
the revolutionary changes in Russia and the Ukraine, these
officers were among the first Galicians to perceive the Galician
problem within the context of the overall Ukrainian issue.
Together with the Galician—Bukovinian Committee for Aid to
Casualties of the War, the Galician officers organized a
Galician-Bukovinian Battalion of Sich Sharpshooters in
November 1917. At first based on a system of soldiers' councils,
the Sharpshooters were reorganized along regular military
lines in January 1918, when levhen Konovalets’, Mykhailo
Matchak, Andrii Mel'nyk, Volodymyr Kuchabs'kyi, and
others purged the unit of its communist sympathizers and took
control of its decision-making body, the Sharpshooters’
Council. At the same time, the unit was renamed the First
Battalion of Sich Sharpshooters in order to emphasize its all
Ukrainian character and placed under Konovalets’s com
mand. Although highly politicized, Colonel Konovalets’s
Sharpshooters (who are not be be confused with the Ukrainian
Sich Sharpshooters of Galicia, the USS) were to be unswerving
supporters of Ukrainian independence and of the several
Ukrainian national governments existing in 1917-1919.
Events of an overall Russian nature soon pushed problems of

an internal Ukrainian character into the background. The
Bolshevik coup, the creation of a rival Soviet Ukrainian
government in Kharkiv, and the Red Army’s invasion of the

Ukraine exposed the weakness of the Central Rada govern
ment. Pushed by the tide of events to ever more extreme
measures, the Rada issued the last of its famous four
Proclamations on January 25, 1918 — two weeks after
Woodrow Wilson’s presentation of his Fourteen Points, and
declared a Ukrainian People’s Republic (Ukrains'ka Narodna
Respublika — UNR). The steady Soviet advance forced the
Rada to evacuate Kiev on February 7 and then sign the Treaty
of Brest-Litovsk two days later. Soon thereafter, the Central
Powers occupied the Ukraine and the Rada returned to Kiev.
However, the Rada proved incapable of governing the
Ukraine effectively and providing the land with the law and
order demanded by the occupying generals, Hermann von
Eichhorn and Wilhelm Groener. At the same time, it faced
growing opposition from the Democratic-Agrarians and
Ukrainian and Russian circles representing landowner'and
business interests — the All-Ukrainian Union of Landowners,
the Union of Landowners, and the Union of Industry,
Commerce, Finance, and Agriculture. This opposition culmi
nated in the Union of Landowners’ Congress at which General
Skoropads'kyi was proclaimed Hetman of the Ukraine on
April 29. Skoropads'kyi’s coup was over by the next day, when
he ceremoniously announced the replacement of the UNR with
the Ukrainian State (Ukrains'ka Derzhava). Colonel Kono-
valets’s Sharpshooters, who refused to recognize the legitimacy
of Skoropads'kyi’s takeover, were promptly disarmed and
disbanded.
As the German and Austrian occupying troops intensified
requisitions of foodstuffs and other natural resources, the
Hetman’s repressive measures against the Ukrainian peasantry
and inability or unwillingness to give his government a
Ukrainian profile brought him into ever greater disrepute with
the Ukrainian population in general and with the already
hostile Ukrainian parties in particular. Most of the parties
thereupon joined forces in the Ukrainian National Union
(Ukrains'kyi Natsional'nyi Soiuz), an anti-Hetman coalition
which demanded that Skoropads'kyi rid his government of
excessive Russian influence and increase its commitment to

Ukrainian national ideals. The National Union also en
couraged Konov alets’ to petition the Hetman for renewal of the
Sich Sharpshooters. Skoropads'kyi gave his approval and on
August 18 Konovalets’ began reorganizing the force in Bila
Tserkva, south of Kiev.
Skoropadskyi’s reactionary policies provoked significant
changes within the Ukrainian political spectrum. The Social-
Revolutionaries crystallized into a right (Mykola Kovalevs'kyi),
center (Mykyta Shapoval), and left (the Borot'bisty) factions. The
Social-Democrats divided into a left wing led by Vynnychenko,
formerly general secretary of internal affairs in the Rada
government, and a right wing led by Petliura, the former
secretary of military affairs. At the same time, the left wings of
both parties drew closer to each other in increasingly favoring
a Soviet socialist Ukraine in alliance with a Soviet Russia.
With the war clearly coming to a close, the precariousness of
the Hetman’s unpopular government became dangerously
obvious. At their Congress held on October 26-28, even the
Democratic-Agrarians criticized the Hetman’s national policies
and pro-Russian leanings. The Union of Landowners was also
divided over Skoropads'kyi. The Russian wing supported his
federalist tendencies, while the Ukrainian wring, organized in
the All-Ukrainian Union of Landowners, favored a Ukrainian
orientation. As to the Ukrainian National Union, it began
plotting an uprising.
On November 13, ten days after the armistice with Austria
and two days after that with Germany, the National Union
formed the Directory, a five-man executive body headed by
Vynnychenko and Petliura, and empowered it to lead the
revolutionary anti-Hetman forces. One day later, Skoropads'kyi,
at least partly motivated by the desire to win favor with the
Entente, proclaimed the Ukraine’s federation with an anti
Bolshevik Russian government Responding to Skoropads'kyi’s
act of desperation, the Directory began its uprising on
November 16. Within a month, its forces, spearheaded by
Konovalets’s Sharpshooters, were in control of Kiev and
reestablished the Ukrainian People’s Republic. Several days
later on December 14, Skoropads'kyi abdicated.
Events of equal importance were also taking place in

Eastern Galicia. There, on November 1, 1918 in L'viv, the
Ukrainians overthrew the local Austrian administration and
proclaimed a Western Ukrainian People’s Republic(Zakhidno-
Ukrains'ka Narodna Respubhka — ZUNR) with levhen
Petrushevych, a National Democrat, as President. The coup’s
organizers were the Ukrainian National Council, a repre
sentative body formed in October out of members of the
Ukrainian parliamentary delegation to Vienna, and a group of
army officers who laid the groundwork for the takeover by
establishing an underground network of Ukrainian soldiers
throughout the province.
Eastern Galicia’s Poles immediately rose in armed
opposition to the Ukrainians. In sore need of reinforcements,
Petrushevych then sent Osyp Nazaruk, a Radical, to Kiev to
request that the Hetman transfer Konovalets’s Sharpshooters
to the Polish front. Although Skoropads’kyi was not averse to
ridding himself of the troublesome force, the Sharpshooters’
Council turned Nazaruk down, considering the Eastern
Ukraine, and not Galicia, to be crucial to the success of the
Ukrainian Revolution.
The Directory, meanwhile, was proving just as incapable of
holding on to power as Skoropads’kyi. At first enjoying the
wholehearted support of the revolutionized peasant masses,
who hoped that they would be given back the land that the
Hetman had taken away, the Directory suffered a progressive
reduction in its popular base as a result of its inability to assert
itself and introduce much needed social reforms. Its weakness
stemmed in large part from the crippling power struggle
between Vynnychenko, who favored adoption of pro-Soviet
policies at the cost of Ukrainian nationalist goals, and
Petliura, who called for armed struggle against the Bolsheviks.
Petliura’s supporters, among them the Sich Sharpshooters,
proved the stronger and on January 16, 1919 the Directory
declared war on Soviet Russia. In reaction to these events, the
Social-Democrats followed in the Social-Revolutionaries’ foot
steps and formally split into pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet
factions in mid-January.
The Directory’s last important act before its flight from Kiev
in early February was the proclamation of Ukrainian
sobornist’ (a religious term denoting unity) on January 22,

1919. Although the UNR and the ZUNR agreed on principle to
unite in one Ukrainian People’s Republic, formal unification
was to be implemented by a future Ukrainian constituent
assembly. Till that time, the ZUNR, although renamed the
Western Oblast of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, was to
remain under the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian National
Council in L’viv.
As the Directory steadily retreated westward before the
advancing Red Army, the Galician government still continued
to hold on to most of Eastern Galicia. This favorable state of
affairs lasted only until spring, however, when General Jo'zef
Haller’s well-trained army arrived in Poland from France.
Although ostensibly mobilized to counteract the Bolshevik
threat, Haller’s forces were sent to the Galician front and in
mid-May began an offensive that resulted in a rout of the
Ukrainian Galician Army (Ukrains'ka Halyts'ka Armiia —
UHA) within two months. As the ZUNR’s position became
desperate, Petrushevych was given dictatorial powers and
appointed Dictator.
By this time, the Soviet drive had pushed the Army of the
Ukrainian People’s Republic (Armiia Ukrains'koi Narodnoi
Respubliky — AUNR) to the Zbruch River, the boundary line
between Eastern Galicia and the Eastern Ukraine. Still further
to the west — in Hungary, Bela Kun was busy establishing a
Soviet republic. Fearing this two-pronged Communist threat,
the Allied Supreme Council authorized the Poles to occupy all
of Galicia. On July 16, meanwhile, the UHA crossed the Zbruch
and joined Petliura’s beleaguered forces in Kamianets’
Podil's'kyi.
Events were no less chaotic east of the so-called “Triangle of
Death.” The Bolsheviks faced armed opposition from Otaman
Grigoriev, the anarchist bands of Nestor Makhno, and the
peasantry. The French, who had arrived in Odessa in late 1918
and on whose support the Directory had counted, left the
seaport in early April, while the Russian anti-Bolshevik forces
began organizing a Volunteer Army in the south.
Petliura, now a virtual dictator, also faced serious
difficulties. The Borot’bisty and left Social-Democrats were in
open opposition to the Directory, while pro-Bolshevik
sympathies were gaining ever greater currency in the army
and among the peasantry. What is more, Petliura, although

nominally the Supreme Otaman, was proving incapable of or
unwilling to maintain order in even the small strip of territory
that he still controlled, with the result that Ukrainian soldiers
and peasants engaged almost unopposed in anti-Jewish
pogroms of terrifying proportions. The atrocities committed by
Petliura’s forces, together with the no less numerous ones of the
Bolsheviks and the Whites, not only decimated the Jewish
population of the Ukraine, but also poisoned Ukrainian-
Jewish relations for many years to come.
Equally debilitating to the Directory were an anti-Petliura.
anti-socialist opposition led by Opanas Andriievs'kyi, an
Independist-Socialist, and the growing strains with the
Galicians. The UNR government viewed Petrushevych’s
appointment as Dictator as running counter to the democratic
ideals of the Ukrainian Revolution. The ZUNR government, on
the other hand, became increasingly alarmed at the growth of
radical socialist tendencies in the UNR. To make matters still
worse for Petliura, the internal UNR opposition joined forces
with the Galicians in an alliance that survived into the post
war years.
Reinforced by the battle-heardened Galician Army, however,
Petliura was able to launch a combined UNR-ZUNR offensive
in late July. Aided by Denikin’s drive from the south, the
Ukrainian forces occupied Kiev on August 30, only to lose it to
the Russian general the day after. The question of Denikin
became another point of disagreement between the Galicians
and the Eastern Ukrainians. The former saw him as a
potential ally against the Bolsheviks, while the latter regarded
him as a counterrevolutionary who had to be resisted at all
costs.
Further complicating the situation was the Red Army’s
successful counteroffensive against the Ukrainians and
Denikin in the fall. In order to secure his rear, Petliura agreed
to a 30-day armistice with the Poles on September 1,1919. As
the Ukrainian front continued to crumble, the head of the
UNR’s diplomatic mission to Poland, Andrii Livyts'kyi,
opened further negotiations in Warsaw. Both moves were
severely condemned by the Galicians, who began fearing the
worst from their Eastern Ukrainian allies.
The Galician Army (UHA), meanwhile, pressed hard by both
the Bolsheviks and Denikin and decimated by typhus and a
lack of supplies, began negotiations with the White general

and on November 17 agreed to join his army. The outraged
Eastern Ukrainians promptly decried the move as treason.
Considering its relations with the ZUNR to be abrogated, the
UNR concluded a pact with Poland on December 2, whereby
Petliura granted Eastern Galicia and the western half of
Volyn’ gubernia to Poland in exchange for its political and
military support against Russia. It was now the Galicians’
turn to charge the Eastern Ukrainians with betraying
sobornist’. In spite of this formal exchange of accusations, the
de facto break between the Eastern and the Western
Ukrainians had already taken place in November, when
Petrushevych fled to Rumania and the Western Ukrainian
members of the joint UNR-ZUNR delegation to the Paris Peace
Conference formed a separate Western Ukrainian delegation.
While the Army of the UNR was engaged in its First Winter
Campaign, the UHA, once again caught in a desperate
situation after Denikin’s collapse, joined the Red Army on
February 10, 1920. Just as indicative of the extent of the
Bolshevik victory was the decision of the Borot’bisty, who had
reconstituted themselves as the Ukrainian Communist Party
(Borot’bisty) in August 1919, to join the Communist Party
(Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine (CP(b)U) in March 1920 after
several unsuccessful attempts to gain recognition from the
Comintern. The left Social-Democrats also founded their own
Ukrainian Communist Party in January 1920 and were
thereafter known as the Ukapisty.
On April 21, 1920, Petliura’s government concluded a
political treaty with Poland reiterating the conditions of the
earlier pact and three days later followed with a military
convention that resulted in the combined PiTsudski-Petliura
offensive on Kiev. Two of the three brigades of the now Red
Ukrainian Galician Army (Chervona UHA) once again
changed sides, only to be quickly disarmed by the Poles.
Supported by General Wrangel’s offensive in the south, the
Polish-Ukrainian armies captured Kiev on May 7, only to lose
it to the Red Army six weeks later. The Soviet counter-
offensive, which was to reach as far as the Vistula River, drove
the Polish-Ukrainian forces out of the Ukraine in July.
Although AUNR partisans continued their struggle until late
1921, the summer of 1920 marked the end of large-scale
Ukrainian resistance. The Poles, in the meantime, abandoned
their Ukrainian allies and signed a peace treaty with Soviet

Russia at Riga on March 8, 1921.
A radically different political reality now faced the
Ukrainians. The Austrian and Russian Empires had collapsed;
Ukrainian ethnic territories, however, continued to be divided
among foreign states. Eastern Galicia and part of Volyn’
gubernia had gone to Poland, Transcarpathia to Czecho
slovakia, and most of Bukovina to Rumania. East of the
Zbruch River, meanwhile, there existed a new state entity most
Ukrainian nationalists considered to be a puppet of Soviet
Russia — the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkSSR).
As the state-building efforts of the Eastern and Western
Ukrainian governments drew near collapse in 1919-1920, the
focus of Ukrainian politics began slowly to shift to the emigres.
Although, as the example of the Union for the Liberation of the
Ukraine shows, Ukrainian emigres also played an important
political role in the national movement during the war, the
collapse of first the ZUNR and then of the UNR resulted in so
large a flood of emigres, that the Ukrainian emigration became
the center of the national movement in the post-war decade.
The followers of Petliura found refuge in Poland and France,
those of Petrushevych fled to Czechoslovakia and Austria,
while Skoropads'kyi’s cohorts settled in Berlin and Vienna.
Political emigres tend usually to be forgotten or ignored.
Denied the opportunity to play a direct role in the political life
of the country they left, emigres often turn their energies
against one another, preoccupying themselves with petty
questions of ideology as a result of their inability to deal in
practical politics. And as they increasingly withdraw into their
private world, their irrelevance to the political processes in
their native country correspondingly grows larger.
An emigre group can maintain its relevance, however, as
long as it represents a sizable political current unable to
express its aspirations in the home country. By this means, the
emigres acquire the essential political base at home, while the
base acquires a mouthpiece, albeit removed, for its interests.
The resulting relationship may be termed symbiotic. The
Eastern Ukrainian emigres in pre-war Austria, for example,
served such a function in relation to the Ukrainian movement
PREWAR BACKGROUND 21
in Russia. Significantly, the emigres are essential to the

natives only as long as the two groups’ interests coincide or the
latter remain incapable of assuming the emigres’ role as
mouthpiece.
The many Ukrainian political emigres who left the Ukraine
during and after the war all tried desperately to maintain or
establish vital contact with the homeland. However, some
became politically irrelevant as soon as they set foot out of the
Ukraine; others maintained their relevance at first, only to lose
it with time; still others were able to adapt themselves to
conditions in the Ukraine and thereby attain the desired
relevance. Nevertheless, whatever their ultimate fate, the
emigres played a crucial role in inter-war Ukrainian political
and cultural life.
The post-war emigration had already been preceded by
several waves of Ukrainian emigrants. The pre-war emigrants
consisted almost exclusively of impoverished Galician and
Bukovinian peasants in search of work in Europe. Although
most of the war-time emigrants were also Galicians, these had
usually either fled from their homes before the Russians or
been forcibly evacuated in the course of the war. They were
supplemented by the thousands of Ukrainians held as
prisoners of war in Austria and Germany, if soldiers in the
Russian army, or in Russia and Italy, if soldiers in the
Austrian army.
The first large-scale, strictly political emigration took place
in 1919. It consisted of UNR supporters who had fled before the
Bolshevik advance early that year and of ZUNR supporters
who had escaped to the West after Haller’s offensive and the
UHA’s crossover to Denikin spelled the end of the ZUNR’s
active involvement in events in the Ukraine. The second wave
took place in the winter of 1919-1920, when Petliura’s pact with
Poland resulted in the internment in Polish camps of large
numbers of AUNR soldiers, among them the Sich Sharp
shooters of Col. Konovalets*. The final and largest emigration
took place in the second half of 1920 with the collapse of the
Ukrainians’ military efforts. This wave consisted of Petliura’s
remaining troops and of the soldiers of the peripatetic Galician
Army.
Although having been decisively defeated by their political

and military opponents, the various Ukrainian emigre groups
resolved to continue their struggle to the extent possible in
emigre conditions. In so doing, however, the emigres fought
one another as much as their national enemies. In particular,
three competing governments-in exile — Skoropads'kyi’s,
Petrushevych’s, and Petliura’s — offered obvious evidence as
to why the Ukrainian Revolution had failed.
CHAPTER 2
SKOROPADS'KYI AND THE CONSERVATIVES
Following the Directory’s successful uprising in late 1918,

Hetman Skoropads'kyi and his entourage became the first of
the Ukrainian governments to go into exile. After spending
some time in Vienna, the Hetman eventually made his way to
Germany and established residence near Berlin. Although he
received a yearly stipend from German government circles
associated with General Groener, Skoropads'kyi’s benefactors
refrained from openly supporting the Hetman. The Germans
recognized that the kind of Ukraine envisioned by the Hetman
would be in Germany’s interests, yet at the same time realized
that the dictates of realistic politics, which demanded that
Germany break out of its isolation by establishing diplomatic
relations with the UkSSR in 1921, by signing the Treaty of
Rapallo in 1922, and by entering into economic and military
cooperation with Soviet Russia, made the Skoropads'kyi
connection of secondary importance.9
With General Paul von Hindenburg’s election to the
presidency in 1925, however, Skoropads'kyi’s fortunes turned
for the better. First, because conservative military-Junker
circles favorably disposed to the Hetman acquired a greater
voice in the von Hindenburg government; second, because the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs saw that the “Ukrainianization”
process and the NEP had created a strong national and middle
peasant stratum and believed that the resulting tensions could
make the Ukraine into a trouble-spot demanding the requisite

German attention — all the more so, since England was also
beginning to reveal an interest in the UkSSR; and third,
because after Petliura’s assassination in 1926, Skoropads'kyi
became the central personality among Ukrainian emigre
politicians.10
Aside from the increase in Skoropads'kyi’s personal stipend,
the greater German interest in the Hetmanite movement
primarily manifested itself in the creation in November 1926 of
a Ukrainian Scientific Institute (Ukrains'kyi Naukouyi
Instytut) in Berlin. Although formally underwritten by the
Society for the Support of Ukrainian Science and Culture,
which was headed by General Groener, the Institute was
actually funded by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of
Education. Groener, a close friend of Skoropads'kyi, also
served as the Institute’s curator, while Professor Ivan Mirchuk
was designated Director. The Institute had five departments
dealing with various aspects of Ukrainian studies, published
several scholarly periodicals, and came to occupy a special
place in the Ukrainian emigre world as a serious scholarly and
political institution.11
Lacking mass support among Ukrainians, Skoropads'kyi
devoted himself mostly to behind-the-scenes contacts with
influential (as well as not-so-influential) conservative and
right-wing circles in the West. Besides Groener, his German
contacts included von Hindenburg, General Max Hoffmann,
General Riidiger von der Goltz, and the publicist Paul
Rohrbach. The Hetman also met with representatives of the
Orgesch in 1920 and with Alfred Rosenberg in 1921.12 At the
same time, the Hetman enjoyed the financial support of
English circles closely affiliated with the British Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.13 Most of Skoropads'kyi’s remaining contacts
were to Russian monarchists and restorationists, including
General Wrangel. Individual Hetmanites, meanwhile, actively
agitated among the Ukrainians held in the internment camps
for Wrangel’s troops in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Turkey.14
The Hetman’s supporters, among whom was a sizable
number of non-Ukrainians, organized themselves in political
SKOROPADS'KYI AND THE CONSERVATIVES 25
groupings usually bearing the name Agrarian (Khliborob). The

ideological offspring of the Ukrainian Democratic-Agrarian
Party, they were found in Austria, Germany, Poland,
Rumania, and Bulgaria, with the strongest Agrarian
organizations in Berlin and Vienna. The Berlin Hetmanites
controlled the Ukrains’ka Hromada (Ukrainian Community),
an ostensibly non-political organization for Ukrainians in
Germany, ran a publishing house, and put out a newspaper of
the same name — Ukrains fke Slouo (The Ukrainian Word). The
ideological center of the Agrarian movement, however, lay in
Vienna, where the pro-Hetman wing of the Democratic-Agrar
ian Party, united under V. Lypyns'kyi, Dmytro Doroshenko,
and S. Shemet, founded the Union of Ukrainian Statehood
(Soiuz Ukrains'koi Derzhaunosty) in February 1920. The Union
was soon renamed the Initiative Group of the Ukrainian Union
of Agrarian Statists and formalized as the Ukrainian Union of
Agrarian Statists (Ukrains'kyi Soiuz Khliborobiu-Derzhaunykiv
— USKhD) by late 1920.15 The Agrarian Statists published a
non-periodical journal, entitled Khliborobs'ka Ukraina (The
Agrarian Ukraine), which appeared five times between 1920
and 1925 and which reflected the high intellectual level of
Skoropads'kyi’s supporters.
Although the number of Ukrainian Hetmanites was
relatively small, their social position, intellectual capabilities,
and broad contacts gave them an enormous advantage over
other Ukrainian political groupings. The Hetman’s minister of
foreign affairs, D. Doroshenko, his envoy to Vienna, V.
Lypyns'kyi, and I. Mirchuk, for example, were all eminent
historians and publicists.
Lypyns'kyi, however, was also the Hetmanite ideologue. A
Ukrainianized nobleman of Polish descent, Lypyns'kyi had
already supported Ukrainian independence before the war,
believing that the local aristocracy would have to play the key
role in attaining this goal. After the war, he remained in
Austria, where he wrote his monumental Lysty do bratiu-
khliborobiv (Letters to Brethren-Agrarians), an important
political work which attempted to describe the “idea and
organization of Ukrainian Monarchism.’’16
According to Lypyns'kyi, the essential principles of the

“conservative” ideology were contained in the following
propositions:
—“No one will build us a state, if we do not build it ourselves
and no one will make of us a nation, unless we ourselves will
want to become a nation.”17
—“Only the Ukrainian agrarian class is capable with its
own strength and with its own authority of organizing
politically and uniting nationally our ethnic mass, that is, of
creating a Ukrainian State and a Ukrainian Nation.”18
—“The unification and organization of the whole Ukrainian
Nation depends on the unification and organization of the
Ukrainian agrarian class.”19
—“Without the remnants of the Russified and Polonized
Ukrainian nobility that are morally healthy and capable of
community work, a new agrarian-peasant, state-minded
leading stratum cannot be created, the agrarian class cannot
be unified by it, and that means that the Ukrainian Nation
cannot be unified and the Ukrainian State organized.”20
—“Without a Ukrainian Monarchy — in the form of an
hereditary and not elective Hetmanate, the politically honest
and state-mindedly creative part of the Russified and
Polonized noble upper strata of the agrarian class cannot
return to the Ukrainian Nation; a new, healthy, and strong
peasant-agrarian aristocracy, [built] with their participa
tion, cannot be formed; the Ukrainian agrarian class cannot
be unified by the authority of this new peasant aristocracy.
This means that only with a Hetmanite-monarchical form of
Ukrainian statehood can the Ukrainian agrarian class
unite, organize, and acquire that inner strength, without
which it cannot unify the Ukrainian Nation and cannot
build the Ukrainian State.”21
—“Without the rebirth and restoration of the traditional
state-national Ukrainian Hetmanate in the person of an
ancestral and hereditary Hetman, declared the Head of the
State, those conditions cannot be created in the Ukraine
under which the agrarian class, the strongest in the Ukraine,
will be able to act with its greater real strength in the name of
the ideological and all-national interests of the State and

Nation, gain for itself the necessary moral authority in the
eyes of the other classes, and thus use its greater strength
for building a Ukrainian State and for unifying the
Ukrainian Nation.”22
—“Without morally worthy, politically honest, disciplined
and organized Hetmanites, who are devoted with all their
soul to their ideal for which they are prepared to make
sacrifices and who are capable of creative community work,
the traditional and national Ukrainian Hetmanate cannot
be restored and the period of reconstruction and creativity,
that will come to the Ukraine after the present period of
democratic destruction, will not be able to acquire Ukrainian
national forms. Because without a Hetmanate there cannot
arise a new, authoritative state-creative nationally Ukrain
ian stratum, the agrarian part of this stratum will not be able
to unify and organize its agrarian class, and the Ukrainian
Nation will not be able to be unified and the Ukrainian State
will not be able to be organized on the basis of this strongest
Ukrainian class.“23
Lypyns'kyi’s proposed “organization of the nation” was a
“classocracy” (klasokratiia), a harmonious, cultured society,
divided into “productive classes.” The alternatives to
"classocracy” were democracy, which was characterized by
the “disintegration of classes, lack of a common faith, and
complete communal amorality” and was equivalent to the
“material and moral ruin of the nation”; and “mobocracy”
(okhlokratiia, from the Greek word okhlos, meaning “mob”), the
rule of “nomadic barbarians united by some kind of primitive,
fanatical faith, and primitive morality and organization,” equiva
lent to the “rule of the fist” and the “authority of fear.”24
Because the only feasible Ukraine was a Hetmanite Ukraine,
the Hetmanite ideology had to become the ideology of the
“mind of the nation”, the intelligentsia. But the existing intel
ligentsia was democratic, socialist, and revolutionary and
incapable of infusing the people with the desire for statehood
so necessary to achieving it. The “healthy” conservatives,
therefore, had to “isolate” themselves from the “sick”
intelligentsia, organize their forces, and respond to the

“despicable invective” of their “sick brethren” with “love and
quiet”, as does a “doctor to the ravings of a sick man, whom he
loves and wants to cure.” In this manner, the conservatives
would attract to their side the “healthier” intellectuals, “less
afflicted with the sickness of non-statehood”, eventually cure
them of their illness, and thereby provide the “ideological
impulse, which makes of stateless nations — nations with
states.”25
Although probably the most profound Ukrainian political
theorist of the 20th century, Lypyns'kyi — not surprisingly —
was relatively uninfluential among Ukrainians, who, while
adopting many of his ideas, generally rejected his class-based
aristocratic schemes. Ironically, Lypyns'kyi’s influence was
strongest where it was least expected — among the
Nationalists.
Not all Ukrainian conservatives, however, supported the
Hetman. The leading figures in the anti-Hetman camp were
Mykola Chudinov, an Eastern Ukrainian and one-time
member of the RUP and the USDRP, the Archduke Wilhelm
von Habsburg, and Viktor Andriievs'kyi, a Free Cossack
activist from Poltava gubernia. Chudinov, also known by the
more Ukrainian-sounding and patriotically evocative name
“Bohun,” led the Ukrainian People’s Party (Ukrains'ka
Narodna Partiia — UNP), the Archduke, who went under the
assumed name, Vasyl' Vyshyvanyi, established his strong
hold among the emigre Free Cossacks, while Andriievs'kyi
worked with both.
The Ukrainian People’s Party was founded on May 15,1919
in Stanyslaviv by the former All-Ukrainian Union of
Landowners and discontented elements in the Democratic-
Agrarian Party. Although claiming to represent the
Ukrainian middle peasantry, the UNP differed from the
Hetmanites by not rejecting democracy and the parliamentary
system. Moreover, the UNP adopted a distinctly nationalist
line. It called for “safeguarding the nationality of the
Ukrainian people”, the “independence of the Ukrainian
church”, the “defense of small and middle land-ownership”,
and an alliance of the middle peasantry with the urban

Ukrainian petty bourgeoisie. Most important, all of these goals
were to be achieved with “our own forces” (ulasni syly). Opposed
to the Hetman, because of his rejection of parliamentarianism
and reliance on Germans and Russians, and to Petliura,
because of his socialism and orientation on the Poles, the UNP
came strongly to sympathize with the anti-socialist, national
ist emigre camp led by Petrushevych.26
Vasyl' Vyshyvanyi’s involvement in Ukrainian affairs
dated back to the war, when he joined the Ukrainian Sich
Sharpshooters, learned the Ukrainian language, and later
became colonel of the legion. While stationed in the Ukraine in
1918, the Archduke became the focus of a controversy
revolving about his pretensions to Skoropads'kyi’s throne.
After finally settling in Vienna in 1919-1920, Vyshyvanyi, who
managed to publish a collection of mediocre Ukrainian poems
in 1921, plunged into Ukrainian politics in spite of serious
difficulties with his father, the Archduke Karl Stephan, who
strongly disapproved of his active involvement in Ukrainian
emigre life. Although a supporter of Petrushevych and an
advocate of a constitutional monarchy, the Austrian
nobleman maintained close ties to such Hetmanites as
Doroshenko and Lypyns'kyi throughout 1920, apparently
in connection with Petrushevych’s temporary rapprochement
with Skoropads'kyi at the time of Wrangel’s offensive in the
Ukraine. It is also likely that Vyshyvanyi first came into
contact with the UNP in 1920.27
An event of some importance for the Archduke took place in
November 1920 in Berlin, where two former Free Cossacks, P.
Romanovs'kyi and K. Novokhats'kyi, the latter a member of
Chudinov’s party, founded the Initiative Committee for the
Renewal of the Free Cossacks.28 That the move was probably
an attempt by conservative anti-Skoropads'kyi forces to
mobilize the conservative Ukrainian emigration seems clear from
the appearance one month later of an open letter from the
Ukrainian Union of Agrarian Statists to the “Officers and
Cossacks of the Ukrainian Army” imploring the Ukrainian
soldiers to join the USKhD in “one, broad, straight road” to
Ukrainian independence.29
As the Free Cossack movement broadened in scope,

Vyshyvanyi became the logical candidate for leader of this
strongly nationalist, conservative, and anti-Hetman political
force. Already possessing the support of the UNP and of
Petrushevych, Vyshyvanyi also acquired the valuable
services of Viktor Andriievs'kyi in March 1921, when
Andriievs'kyi, together with the Galician wing of the
Hetmanites, left the USKhD and joined Chudinov’s UNP.30
Andriievs’kyi was already well-known for his brochure,
entitled Do kharakterystyky ukrains'kykh pravykh partii
(Towards a Characterization of Ukrainian Right-Wing
Parties). “By right-wing Ukrainian parties and organiza
tions,” wrote Andriievs'kyi, “I mean those who do not consider
themselves socialist, who do not take the socialist doctrine as
the basis of their worldview, and who do not have as an
imperative goal the achievement, to a greater or lesser degree
and either now or in the future, of a socialist order. Not one of
these Ukrainian right-wing parties ever . . . took part in
governing the Ukraine... and can therefore not take upon itself
any responsibility whatsoever for the state-building in the
Ukraine.”31
Andriievs'kyi’s analysis of the Ukrainians’ unsuccessful
revolution was typical of the thinking current among his
ideological comrades. Foremost was the conviction that the
socialists had betrayed the Ukrainian cause:
“The role of Ukrainian socialist democracy in creating a
state was • . . destructive. But having destroyed its own
state, it was incapable of building anything else; so as not to
allow its right-wing competitors —the real Ukrainian, the
agrarian — to come to power, it made use of an alliance with
foreigners on the outside, and of demagogy ... on the inside.
True, Ukrainian socialist democracy succeeded in drawing
away the poor, unenlightened Ukrainian proletarian and
the landless or small-landholding Ukrainian muzhik from
right-wing Ukrainian democracy,... but Ukrainian socialist
democracy was not capable of attracting them to itself and
instead threw them into the hands of the Muscovite
Bolshevik centralists .. . .”32
In October 1921, Andriievs’kyi began publishing the

newspaper Soborna Ukraine, (The United Ukraine) in Vienna.
Billed as the “Organ of the Free Cossacks”, Andriievs'kyi’s
venture enjoyed Vyshy vanyi’s political and financial support.
Anti-socialist, unremittingly nationalist in its hatred of
Russians and Poles, and resolutely opposed to Skoropads'kyi,
Andriievs'kyi’s newspaper advocated the primacy of national
over class or party interests, the establishment of a national
Church, an “aristocratic democracy” which would reconcile a
monarchical order with the democratic strivings of the
agrarian class, and an absolute reliance on “our own forces”.
Significantly, Soborna Ukraina adopted a neutral attitude
towards Petrushevych.33 The Hetmanites, as was to be
expected, regarded Andriievs'kyi with barely-concealed hostil
ity.34
In the meantime, Vyshy vanyi’s fortunes continued to rise. In
April 1921, levhen Chykalenko, a former Eastern Ukrainian
landowner and an active supporter of the pre-war national
movement, argued in a prominent emigre journal that only by
summoning a “Varangian, before whom all our intellectual
forces would bow,” as monarch of the Ukraine could a
Ukrainian state be built and maintained in the face of the
threat from a restored Russian tsar, the inevitable outcome,
according to Chykalenko, of the “centralist-autocratic com
munist rule.”35 Even a White Russian newspaper in Prague
reflected the Ukrainian mood, claiming in late 1921 that a
“Habsburg would never want to become the vassal of a
Romanov.”36 Several years later, Lypyns'kyi still considered
Chykalenko’s ideas to be of sufficient danger to the Hetman to
warrant writing a lengthy article on “The Summoning of
‘Varangians’ or an Organization of Agrarians” in Khli-
borobs'ka Ukraina.37
Vyshyvanyi appears to have lost Andriievs'kyi’s support
sometime in early 1922, when Soborna Ukraina dropped the
Free Cossack sub-heading and became the private political
organ of Andriievs'kyi. At the same time, the newspaper
replaced its former ideal of an “aristocratic democracy” with
that of a “peasant national democracy” bearing no trace of a
monarch.38 By May 1922, Soborna Ukraine, ceased publica

tion, probably from a lack of funds. Although Vyshyvanyi’s
alleged flirtations with Russian monarchists may have
contributed to his quarrel with Andriievs'kyi, more likely was
the latter’s own evolution towards an extreme form of
nationalism, in many respects an ideological sibling of
Dontsov’s Nationalism.39
Vyshyvanyi receded into the background of Ukrainian
emigre politics in 1922-1923. Galicia was granted to Poland,
Petrushevych turned to the Soviets, and the Soviet Ukraine
refused to collapse. His Free Cossack supporters turned
further rightwards, while Ukrainian emigres in general either
moved en masse to Prague, the new Ukrainian emigre capital,
or adapted to the new situation by returning to Galicia or to the
UkSSR. Clearly, there was little room for the Austrian
Archduke in such an environment.
As emigre politics were increasingly shown to be fruitless,
Ukrainians began turning to radical solutions to what they
perceived as a national crisis. Reflecting the political disarray
and social dislocation that were particularly characteristic of
the Free Cossacks, this rightward trend found its most extreme
representative in Ivan Poltavets’-Ostrianytsia, a political
adventurer who served as Skoropads'kyi’s secretary in 1918.
After emigrating to Munich, Poltavets* established contacts to
Ernst Roehm, Hermann Goering, and Alfred Rosenberg in
1921, and soon thereafter began organizing the openly
reactionary “Cossack Movement” from former Ukrainian
soldiers in Denikin’s and Wrangel’s armies interned in
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.40 He also published Ukrains’kyi
Kozak (The Ukrainian Cossack) in 1923-1924, a newspaper
adorned with swastikas and called a “terribly stupid thing” by
D. Doroshenko.41 In July 1926, Poltavets’ was proclaimed
“Hetman and national vozhcT of all the Ukraine” by the “All
Ukrainian National Insurgent Cossack Council.” Although the
second hetman continued to consort with Nazis and even ex
panded his right-wing connections to include the Czech fascist,
General Rudolf Gajda, his political significance remained
quite minimal.42
CHAPTER 3
PETRUSHEVYCH AND THE GALICIANS
The second of the Ukrainian governments to go into exile

was that of levhen Petrushevych, who escaped to Vienna in
late 1919. Intent on exploiting Eastern Galicia’s uncertain
international status, the Galician Dictator began a massive
lobbying effort aimed at convincing the Entente powers that
an independent and neutral Eastern Galician state was in
their interests. Fundamental to this strategy was to dissociate
Galicia from the overall Ukrainian issue and thereby make of
it a question that could legally be settled by the Allies.
In particular, Petrushevych placed his hopes on Article 89 of
the Treaty of Saint Germain: “Austria hereby recognizes and
accepts the frontiers of Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Poland,
Rumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and the Czecho
slovak State as those frontiers may be determined by the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers.”43 The Dictator not
unreasonably interpreted this article to mean that the Polish
occupation of Eastern Galicia, sanctioned by the Allied
Supreme Council on June 25, 1919, was only a temporary
solution to the Galician question. With allies in Lloyd George
and Sir Lewis Namier, who regarded the Galician question as a
way of curbing France’s political ambitions and of main
taining a balance of power in Europe, Petrushevych was able
to make some headway in advancing Galician independence in
1920-1921 by playing on England’s great-power interests.44
The Dictator offered the Allied Powers, and particularly the

British, powerful incentives for regarding Galician inde
pendence favorably. Foremost among them were the province’s
large oil fields, long since an area of competition between
French and British petroleum companies. Second, argued
Petrushevych, a neutral Galicia could serve as a convenient
link for Western Europe’s trade with Russia. And finally, an
independent but neutral Galician state, established and
guaranteed by the Allies, would stabilize Eastern Europe by
removing a much disputed territory from the field of contention.
The ZUNR’s relations with Czechoslovakia occupied a
special place in Petrushevych’s international politics. Already
at odds with the Poles over the question of Teschen, the Czechs
saw the Galician issue as a means of checking their neighbor’s
power in the region. Besides wanting Galicia’s oil, they also
believed that an independent Galician state, with close
political and economic ties to Czechoslovakia, could serve as
the trade corridor to Russia they so desired. Petrushevych, for
his part, assured them that “Czechoslovakia’s only possible
window to the whole of Eastern Europe and to neighboring
Asia is an independent Galicia. It was not, is not, and will not
be so industrialized as ever to be able to compete with
Czechoslovakia in Eastern Europe.”45
Much to Petrushevych’s chagrin, however, Poland was
treating Eastern Galicia as an integral part of its territory.
Although lacking legal jurisdiction over the Ukrainian
province, the Polish government progressively integrated
Eastern Galicia into the overall Polish state structure. In
March 1920, Eastern Galicia was officially renamed Wschodnia
MaJtopolska. In December, the province was divided into L'viv,
Ternopil', and Stanyslaviv wojewMztwa. A census was
conducted in September 1921 and elections to the lower house
of the Polish Sejm were held in November 1922 — events that
the Ukrainians boycotted at Petrushevych’s instigation. At
the same time, Polish colonists streamed into the land-hungry
province and the Polish authorities introduced repressive
measures aimed at limiting Ukrainian political and cultural
life. Thousands of Ukrainians were imprisoned, political
PETRUSHEVYCH AND THE GALICIANS 35
parties and cultural organizations were severely circum

scribed, and Ukrainian students were denied admission to the
University of L'viv.
As conditions in Poland and the Soviet Ukraine stabilized in
spite of the Dictator’s dire warnings to the contrary, the case
for an independent Galician state began seriously to weaken.
The harshest blows to the ZUNR government occurred in late
1922, when Lloyd George left office and the Polish Sejm passed
a law (never put into effect) granting autonomy to the
Ukrainian wojewodztwa. Likewise, Czech foreign policy had
taken a turn for the worse with regard to Galicia. Seeking a
political and economic rapprochement with the Poles, the
Czechs expressed a willingness to support Polish policy in the
Ukrainian province in exchange for Polish disinterest in
Slovakia. At the same time, Czechoslovakia began establish
ing political and economic ties to the Soviet Ukraine, thereby
proving that an independent Galicia was not necessary to
trade with the East.
When the Council of Ambassadors met in March 1923,
therefore, many Ukrainians in Galicia and in the emigration
already knew that its verdict would be unfavorable. Satisfied
that the minority question had been adequately handled by the
Poles, the Council agreed on the incorporation of Eastern
Galicia and Vilnius into Poland on March 15 — a decision
which proved disastrous for the ZUNR government-in-exile
and left bitter feelings of betrayal in the Ukrainians and the
Lithuanians. One pro-Soviet journal captured the resulting
mood in the following manner: “When you meet a non-socialist
Ukrainian acquaintance in L'viv and ask him what’s up, you
immediately get a short and concise answer — chaos! After
meeting a socialist comrade on another street and asking him
the same question with regard to the non-socialist camp, you
hear an even shorter reply — a swamp!”49
Petrushevych’s government soon collapsed after the March
catastrophe. Although Petrushevych continued to address
statements to the “Ukrainian People of the Galician Land” in
which he condemned the “Entente’s betrayal,” his government
had obviously lost its reason for continuing to exist. Poland, in
the meantime, declared a political amnesty allowing Ukrainian

emigres previously involved in anti-Polish activities to return
to Galicia. Many Galicians took advantage of this opportunity,
thereby further depleting the ranks of the Dictator’s emigre
supporters. Petrushevych, however, was not discouraged and
resolved to follow a different course in pursuit of his end. He
moved the remnants of his government to Berlin and there
established ties to the Soviet plenipotentiary to Germany,
Nikolai Krestinskii. As a result of his talks with the Soviet
diplomat, Petrushevych shifted his “orientation” from the
Entente to the Soviets, coming to regard annexation to the
Soviet Ukraine as the only possible salvation for Eastern
Galicia.
Petrushevych’s change of allies was not too surprising in
view of the Russophile and Sovietophile sentiments occasion
ally voiced by his followers during and after the war. In 1919,
for example, the ZUNR organ, Ukrains’kyi Prapor, had editori
alized: “Our basic position on the Ukrainian statutory-state
question ... is the complete state independence of the
Ukrainian People’s Republic, the union of all Ukrainian lands
in one state whole, the attempt to create a close state union with
neighboring states, and in the first place with a renewed
Muscovite democratic state and with a Czecho-Slovak
republic . . . .”47 That same year, Petrushevych’s right-hand
man, Kost' Levyts'kyi, advocated peace with Denikin and a
confederation of the Ukraine with a democratic Russia.48 And
in 1922, Vasyl' Paneiko, the head of the ZUNR’s delegation to
the Paris Peace Conference, published a brochure, entitled The
United States of Eastern Europe, where he argued against
Ukrainian independence as an “organically harmful con
cept.”49
The clearest indications of Petrushevych’s pro-Soviet
tendencies occurred at the height of the Soviet counter-
offensive against Pilsudski and Petliura. After the Comintern
recognized the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia’s
proclamation of Galician independence, Ukrains’kyi Prapor
pointed out with satisfaction that the Soviet occupation of the
province did, after all, result in driving the Poles out.50
Somewhat earlier, the newspaper had also written: “ . . .

although we do not conceal the opinion that we do not believe
in the Bolshevik ideology of our people, we nevertheless stand
on the position that were the people to reveal it [the Bolshevik
ideology] in a truly free and unmistakable way — we will follow
them. We will follow them and a Ukrainian government.”51
The ZUNR exile government had diplomatic representatives
in Vienna, Prague, Budapest, Paris, Belgrade, Berlin, the
Vatican, Rio de Janeiro, and Winnipeg. Athough it received
some technical and material assistance from Germany during
the war, the ZUNR’s exile activities appear to have been
largely funded with monies brought to Vienna from Galicia.52
In 1921, however, the ZUNR began to experience a severe
financial crisis and thereupon turned to the Galician
emigration in the United States and in Canada for help. By
issuing bonds, Petrushevych’s representatives in the USA
succeeded in raising several hundred thousand dollars for the
Galician government. Osyp Nazaruk, Petrushevych’s minister
of press and propaganda, was dispatched to Canada in 1922 for
similar reasons.53
Emigre members of the Ukrainian People’s Labor Party
(Ukrains'ka Narodno-Trudova Partiia — UNTP), known as
the Ukrainian National Democratic Party before 1919, and of the
Ukrainian Radical Party occupied the most important
positions in the government-in-exile. Most prominent of them
were the Laborites Kost' Levyts'kyi, Dmytro Levyts'kyi, and
Pavlo Lysiak and the Radical, Nazaruk. Petrushevych also
maintained close ties to the Ukrainian parties in Galicia — the
Labor and Radical parties, the Ukrainian Social-Democratic
Party (Ukrains'ka SotsialDemokratychna Partiia — USDP),
and the Ukrainian Christian-Social Party (Ukrains'ka Khrys-
tyians’kosuspil'na Partiia — UKhSP). United in an Inter
party Council (Mizhpartiina Rada), a broad anti-Polish national
front, since late 1919, the Galician parties recognized the
continued legitimacy of the exile government and sub
ordinated themselves to Petrushevych’s authority.
Not surprisingly, Petrushevych and his supporters attempted
to assert ZUNR hegemony over as broad as possible a section
of the Ukrainian emigration. Alongside of the usual emigre

politicking, Petrushevych concentrated heavily on prop
aganda aimed at discrediting Petliura and the UNR and at
defending the concept of an Eastern Galician state against
charges of “particularism” and “provincialism”.
The ZUNR’s principal political opponents naturally belonged
to the UNR camp. Even before Petrushevych’s break with
Petliura, one pro-UNR emigre journal had mercilessly
attacked the Galicians for their “separatism”, “particular
ism”, and “provincialism”, and for thinking that “they can
exist as the Ukraine, as an independent republic, even if the
Eastern Ukraine falls into slavery.”54 L'viv, one UNR publicist
wrote, could “vanish from the face of the earth and there would
be no great harm.”55 The Galician Army’s negotiations with
and crossover to Denikin led a prominent journalist to
comment: “Compared to the overall Ukrainian problem, the
Galician question is only partial and particularist.... They
[the Galicians] are ready even to allow the Ukraine to be ruled
by the Muscovites, if only Galicia not be under Poland.. .”56 As
if to confirm the validity of the Eastern Ukrainians’ criticism,
Osyp Nazaruk once went so far as to claim that Galicians were
a nation separate from the Eastern Ukrainians.57
The Dictator’s followers, meanwhile, had made their first
coordinated attempt at consolidating the ZUNR’s political
position vis-a-vis the UNR in March 1920 in Kamianets’
Podil's'kyi, where they founded the Ukrainian National
Council (Ukrains'ka Natsional'na Rada) together with other
anti-socialist parties, including Mykola Chudinov’s UNP. At
the same time, several Eastern and Western Ukrainian anti
socialist parties, among them the Ukrainian Party of
Independists-Socialist, the Ukrainian People’s Labor Party,
and the Ukrainian Democratic-Agrarian Party, founded the
Ukrainian National State Union (Ukrains'kyi Natsional’no-
Derzhaunyi Soiuz) in Vienna. Claiming that the Directory had
violated the principle of sobornist' on which the Ukrainian
National Union, the body that called the Directory into being
in November 1918, had been founded, both organizations
declared that they, and not the Directory, were the true holders
of the National Union’s authority. With Petliura’s final retreat

to Poland and the de facto decomposition of the Directory,
however, the two organizations lost their rationale for existing
and quickly fell apart.
Another attempt to organize the anti-socialist emigres into
an anti-Petliura coalition was made in January 1921 in
Vienna. Accompanied by the usual fanfare and overblown
expectations, ten groupings came together to form the All
Ukrainian National Council (Vse-Ukrains'ka Natsional'na
Rada). These included, among others, the Independists-Social-
ists, the right-wing faction of the Social-Revolutionaries
(Mykola Zalizniak, Mykola Kovalevs'kyi), the Ukrainian
People’s Party (M. Chudinov, V. Andriievs'kyi), the Labor
Party (P. Lysiak), the Radical Party (O. Nazaruk), and the
League for the Restoration of the Ukraine (General Oleksander
Hrekiv, Col. Ie. Konovalets').58 The Council collapsed in April,
however, after Gen. Hrekiv and three Independists-Socialists
delivered a declaration to Warsaw in which they expressed
support of the Supreme Otaman’s Polish policy. The Galician
parties promptly called this move treason and left the Council,
thereby causing its dissolution.
At first, Petrushevych enjoyed broad support in most centers
of emigre life outside UNR-dominated Poland. However, as the
Dictator increasingly dissociated his actions from the overall
Ukrainian problem, opposition to his “separatist” politics also
arose within the ZUNR camp in 1921. The arrival of
Konovalets’ onto the emigre politial scene in 1920 was crucial
to the crystallization of this opposition. Uncompromisingly
committed to sobornist’, the Sharpshooters’ colonel quickly
came into conflict with Petrushevych over the latter’s
handling of the Galician issue.
Siding with Konovalets’ and the Sich Sharpshooters were a
number of prominent Galicians living in Vienna. Foremost
among them was Pavlo Lysiak, the former editor of the ZUNR
organ, Ukrains'kyi Prapor (The Ukrainian Flag), and at one
time a staunch supporter of the Galician regime. At
Konovalets’s initiative, these like-minded Galicians joined in a
loosely organized group, called Young Galicia (Motoda
Halychyna), in mid-1921. Besides Konovalets’ and Lysiak, the

group included two other Sich Sharpshooter officers, Andrii
Mel'nyk and Ivan Chmola, the Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooter
officer, Kost' Voievidka, the Labor Party member, Dmytro
Levyts'kyi, the journalist, Ivan Kedryn-Rudnyts'kyi, and the
latter’s sister, Milena Rudnyts'ka, later to become a prominent
politician in Galicia.59
According to Konovalets’, Young Galicia set itself the
following goals: “to counteract the spread of the ideology of
territorial separatism, taking into account that such an
ideology would throw all the Eastern Ukrainians into the
embrace of the Poles, and the Galicians into the embrace of the
Muscovites. Raising the slogans of pure nationalism: to
struggle against all manifestations of Russophilism and
Polonophilism in Galicia; to caution against excessive
optimism about the success of the Galician government’s
diplomatic action; to be prepared for a prolonged period of
Polish occupation; to stimulate the organization of all the vital
forces of the people in all areas of their life, and, most
important, to concentrate on youth, women, the peasantry, and
the workers, that is, on those groups and classes that most
quickly succumb to the demagogic slogans that are hostile to
the all-Ukrainian national ideology.”60
What is immediately striking about Young Galicia’s ideas is
that they reflect a very pronounced political realism. Although,
as Konovalets’ wrote, Young Galicia “was far from the thought
of interfering in the diplomatic actions taken by the Galician
government,” it believed that the most important battle would
have to be fought in Galicia itself: Galicians had to be made to
think differently so as to be able to accept the “all-Ukrainian
national ideology” and reject Russophilism and Polonophil
ism.61 Most important, the Galicians themselves had to get
involved in the national struggle, one that would be long and
hard given the “prolonged period of Polish occupation”. And
finally, the “organization” of the masses had to be
“stimulated” by such nationally-conscious groups as Young
Galicia. Statehood, Young Galicia believed, ultimately
depended on the nation.
Although Konovalets’ left Vienna for L'viv in mid-1921,

Lysiak continued the ideological struggle against Pet-
rushevych. In a landmark article written in November, Lysiak
argued: “I am certain that real liberation can come to us in
Galicia only either directly from the East... or indirectly from
within the land, but also under the influence of the above-
mentioned revolutionary maelstrom. On the other hand, I
believe that Western European diplomacy can, with respect to
us, only sanction that final order which will come upon our
lands .. .”62 Osyp Nazaruk immediately replied with an article
heavily laden with innuendoes, claiming that Lysiak had
personal and not political motives for attacking ZUNR policy.
The damage, however, had been done and ever greater
numbers of Galicians began leaving the ZUNR camp.
Ironically, even Nazaruk left Petrushevych for the Hetmanites
after returning from Canada.63
Discontent was also growing in Galicia, which for the most
part still continued to represent a solid front of support for
Petrushevych. The first outward manifestation of this
dissatisfaction occurred in July 1921 at a congress of
Ukrainian students in L'viv, “accidentally” attended by
several Sich Sharpshooters.6* Resembling Young Galicia’s
ideas, the resolutions passed at the congress called for an
“Independent and United Ukrainian State” and exhorted “all
the political parties of Galicia, who stand on the basis of all—
Ukrainian national statehood, to mutually agree to create a
provisional Galician-Ukrainian Government with its seat in
Galicia.”65 Sensing an obvious threat to the ZUNR, Nazaruk
again reacted violently. Branding the resolutions the work of
"secret provocateurs”, he reiterated a claim that more and
more Galicians were regarding with scepticism: “. . . the
existing Government of the Galician land has indisputable
facts that Poland will never get the Galician land and that the
Polish invader will soon retreat from it.”66
Of even greater significance than the actions of the students,
however, was the fact that the Ukrainian parties in Galicia
were forced by the very flow of events in Poland to deal with
concrete problems of everyday political and cultural life in the
province and therefore felt themselves ever more estranged

from the Dictator’s international machinations. Although
outwardly loyal to the ZUNR government, the Galician parties
increasingly looked askance at what they considered the
exaggerated optimism of the emigres. What is more, the
emigres themselves were viewed with some animosity as
people who had left the scene of battle, but still continued to
have pretensions to its manner of conduct The rift was
perhaps inevitable: as Petrushevych shifted his attention
wholly to the international plane, the local parties became
preoccupied with local problems whose solution did not require
the existence of an exile government. The fragility of the
Dictator’s relations with Galicia became evident after March
1923, when the Interparty Council fell apart and Pet-
rushevych’s own party, the Ukrainian People’s Labor Party,
suffered a serious schism.
At its Congress held in L'viv in May 1923, the Labor Party
(UNTP) broke with its practice of refusing to work within the
structure of Polish politics and adopted a program with
maximal and minimal demands. While acknowledging that its
ideal remained an independent Ukrainian state, the UNTP
also expressed its readiness to cooperate with the Polish
government on the basis of Galician autonomy. Two
oppositional currents developed within the party in reaction to
the autonomists led by Volodymyr Bachyns'kyi. The first, and
by far the larger, current, known as the Independent Group
(Nezalezhna Hrupa), was led by Viacheslav Budzynovs'kyi and
advocated the pro-Soviet line of Petrushevych. A far smaller
group led by Samiilo Pidhirs'kyi and Dmytro Paliiv rejected
both the autonomist and the pro-Soviet tendencies and instead
advocated an independent, Nationalist course. That same
year, the pro-Petrushevych wing seized control of the Party’s
leadership, while the autonomists grouped themselves about
the L'viv daily, Dilo, and were thereafter known as the Dilo
Group (hrupa Dila). The Nationalists, meanwhile, left the
UNTP and eventually founded the Ukrainian Party of
National Work (Ukrains'ka Partiia Natsional'noi Roboty) in
April 1924. On July 11, 1925, however, the three groups
overcame their differences and merged in the Ukrainian

National Democratic Union (Ukrains'ke Natsional'no-Demo-
kratychne Obiednannia — UNDO), the dominant Galician
party of the inter-war period. The UNDO willingly participated
in the political system, eventually took part in elections, and
even sent delegates to the Polish Sejm. At the same time, it
“recognized the Soviet Ukraine as a serious and farreaching
stage in the statehood of the Ukrainian people.”67 Both
attitudes, and especially the first, were to be condemned as
“conciliationism” (uhodoustvo) by militant Ukrainians in
general and the Nationalists in particular.
The politically centrist and mildly nationalist UNDO
continued to maintain close ties to Petrushevych until
November 1926, when it condemned his exaggerated reliance
on the Soviet Ukraine and rejected his call to boycott the
forthcoming Polish elections. It broke off its remaining ties to
Petrushevych in early 1927 by substituting a loyal UNDO
cadre for the former dictator as the UNDO’s contact to the
German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.68 As a result, the pro-
Petrushevych faction, by now a small minority, left the UNDO
in May and founded the uninfluential Ukrainian Party of
Work (Ukrains'ka Partiia Pratsi).
The UNDO’s official plunge into Polish electoral politics
took place in March 1928 when it succeeded in sending 23
members to the Sejm and eight to the Senate. The Ukrainian
Socialist-Radical Party, which arose from a merger of the
Ukrainian Radical Party and of the Ukrainian Party of Social-
Revolutionaries of Volyn', won eight seats in the Sejm and one
in the Senate. These elections, which marked the first time that
Galician parties formally acknowledged the status quo,
marked a crucial point in the polarization of Galician society
into mutually hostile “legalistic” and “revolutionary” camps.
CHAPTER 4
PETLIURA AND THE SOCIALISTS
After settling in Tarnow in the south-east of Poland in the

fall of 1920, Petliura and the remnants of his UNR government
soon discovered that their dependence on Poland had led them
into a political impasse. Poland’s peace with Soviet Russia and
the internal triumph of the centralists (as best represented by
Roman Dmowski) over the federalists (Pilsudski) made of the
UNR’s political centerpiece — the anti-Russian alliance of
Poland with an independent Ukraine — a category of little
relevance to Polish policy. In spite of substantial reductions in
Poland’s financial and political support, however, the UNR
had no alternative but to maintain its “orientation” on its ally.
As one UNR spokesman argued: “For us, Russia, whether
Bolshevik or any other kind, is the most terrible of enemies
threatening the independent existence of the Ukrainian people,
and that is the major reason for our readiness to maintain and
strengthen the friendship between the Ukrainian and Polish
peoples.”69 Only with Piteudski’s return to power in May 1926
did the federalists gain the upper hand and support for the
UNR somewhat increase.
The UNR’s political supporters came almost exclusively
from the pro-Petliura wing of the Social-Democrats, from the
Prague-based Ukrainian Radical Democratic Party (Ukrains'ka
Radykal'no-Demokratychna Partita — the former Socialists-
Federalists), as well as from various Social-Revolutionary,
Nationalist, and student groups.70 Also associated with the
PETLIURA AND THE SOCIALISTS 45
UNR camp was the journal Volia (Liberty), which appeared in

Vienna in 1919-1921 under the editorship of Viktor Pis-
niachevs'kyi, an Eastern Ukrainian journalist. In late 1919,
several of Volia s more socialistically-inclined editors, headed
by the Eastern Ukrainian poet Oleksander Oles’ and the
Galician writer Antin Krushel'nyts'kyi, formerly UNR
minister of education, left the journal to found their own, Na
Perelomi (At the Turning Point). The new journal adopted a
moderately left-wing position, with Krushel'nyts'kyi, who was
later to join the pro-Soviet camp and eventually emigrate to the
UkSSR, articulating its most radical tendencies.
The vast majority of Petliura’s followers, however, were
AUNR veterans, living in Poland, France, and to a far smaller
degree, Czechoslovakia. The UNR, as a result, devoted a great
deal of its attention to the military sphere and persistently
toyed with interventionist schemes all throughout the 1920s.
Thirty-eight Ukrainian officers, for example, served in the
Polish army so as to maintain a Ukrainian officer corps in
constant readiness.71 UNR military circles also conducted
intelligence work and readily shared their information with
the Poles.72 In spite of all these plans, however, the UNR’s last
armed engagement with the Soviets took place in November
1921, when several hundred AUNR soldiers attempted the
Second Winter Campaign, a short-lived foray into the UkSSR
that ended with the almost complete destruction of the raiding
force.
Petliura moved from Tarnow to Warsaw in 1922, where he
remained until late 1923, when he left the Polish capital for
Paris via Budapest and Switzerland. He appears to have left
Poland in the hope of revitalizing the UNR by reducing its
dependence on the moribund Polish-Ukrainian alliance.
Following his resettlement in France, the Supreme Otaman
began publishing a bi-monthly journal, entitled Tryzub (The
Trident). His colleague, Viacheslav Prokopovych, the head of
the UNR Council of Ministers, was appointed editor of the
periodical, whose first issue appeared on October 15, 1925.
Revealing the degree to which the “Petliurites” (Petliurivtsi)
had abandoned their commitment to socialism, the opening
editorial proclaimed the UNR’s “commandments” as “the

state above the party, the nation above the class.”73 The shift to
the right was perhaps inevitable in view of the constraints
placed upon the UNR’s political maneuverability by its Polish
connection. Apparently, the only way out from this seeming
dead-end was to turn one’s energies inward and seek political
salvation in the one area which remained fully accessible to the
UNR camp — the nation.
By 1927, this rightward trend had become so apparent that a
certain Mykola Koval's'kyi could write in a manner of which
the Nationalists would surely have approved: “To believe and
to be certain are, one would think, two different concepts, but
for us they are long since synonyms. We believe in the
realization of our national ideals because we are certain of the
correctness of the paths to their realization, and we are certain
of the realization of these ideals in the near future because we
believe in them . . . .”74 Koval's'kyi’s remarks were not
surprising, considering that there was little else that the UNR
could politically do but have faith in its eventual triumph.
In March 1929, meanwhile, an anonymous author once
again echoed typically Nationalist sentiments by praising war
as a “factor in the development of culture.” “When war is
destructive,” he wrote, “then it ruins that which is already
incapable of life, because it is a law of nature that that which
cannot survive the struggle dies.”75
By far the best indication of the UNR’s progressive
assimilation of Nationalist ideas is found in the writings of
Dmytro Andriievs'kyi, an Eastern Ukrainian living in
Brussels. Andriievs'kyi, unrelated to his namesake from
Soborna Ukraina, was a well-polished and urbane engineer
who eventually became a leading activist and theoretician of
the organized Nationalist movement. Accepting the basic
UNR principle of the irreconcilability of Ukrainian and
Russian interests, Andriievs'kyi believed that the only
solution to this problem was for the Ukraine to ally itself
politically and spiritually with Europe — a concept to which he
assigned well-nigh mystical significance and which mani
fested its inner spirit and character in what Andriievs'kyi
termed “Europeanism” (Evropeizm). This Europeanism, ac

cording to Andriievs'kyi, embodied the souls of Greece, Rome,
and Catholicism, and was characterized by “clarity, exactness
of outlines, certainty, and equilibrium.” Because the person as
the “alpha and omega of the universe” stands at the center of
the Europeanist “philosophy of life”, Europe was able to enjoy
a “great blossoming of human nature” which manifested itself
in a well-developed “mind, consciousness, and gift for
abstraction”, qualities, which “first gained control over
themselves so as to be able to influence that which lies beyond
them: the unconscious and the mechanism of life.” In other
words, continued Andriievs'kyi, “although the mind, the
intellect, played and continues to play a tremendous role,
having raised the person above the level of other living beings,
it is an irrational force that moves it [the mind], breathes life
into it, gives sense and taste to all our existence, and
constitutes the starting point and nerve of our actions....” The
genius of the well-balanced European lies in his ability to unite
these two forces in “fruitful cooperation.” As a result, the
“spirit of the European” is characterized by “that striving and
endless searching for new shores and heretofore unknown
values, which are primarily tempting and fundamentally
desirable in and of themselves.” The European strives to do
something “for the sake of the process of doing.” The “physical
struggle, the rivalry of ideas and characters, economic
competition, competition over wealth, power, and authority,
the desire to force one’s will upon another and inculcate one’s
faith, one’s way of feeling” so typical of the European have led
to the development of different “roles” and “forms of
organization”, which, in turn, result in a “certain hierarchy of
values, both material and moral” and in the rise of elites. The
final proof of the European’s genius was imperialism, the
“flooding by the European race and civilization of all the
continents” as a result of the “overpopulation of its own
continent and still more of the overflowing of the moral
organism with vital forces and with the taste for fighting, for
struggle.”76
All these European qualities Andriievs'kyi purported to see

— although in a less developed form — in the Ukrainian
character. The European’s ability to balance the “conscious
and unconscious” reminded Andriievs'kyi of Ukrainian
humor, the “result of analysis and . . . lyrical feelings.” The
European imperialist drive brought to the author’s mind the
Cossacks and, less plausibly, the Ukrainian peasants who had
emigrated to Canada and Brazil in order to “conquer nature.”77
Although there was no doubt that the Ukraine was spiritually
related to Europe, it lagged far behind its western cousin
because its European traditions had been interrupted in the
past. But without tradition, without a past, that “regulating,
unifying, synthesizing factor,” “national energy” is and will
continue to be wasted. In other words, statehood could not be
attained. The answer to this problem, according to
Andriievs'kyi, was similar to that proposed by Dontsov: “The
task of our generation ... is to transform our potential
tradition, which remains in the depths of our national soul,
into one that is kinetic, consolidated, and crystallized in
certain formulas; to create a certain system of moral and
intellectual categories .... A powerful factor, the enzyme that
quickens this process, is the closest possible contact to, the
most frequent relations with, and our participation in the life of
Europe.... It will not be difficult to repair the torn thread of our
European tradition, because the basis of our national soul is
composed to a significant degree of those very [same] elements
and develops for the most part under those very same
influences as the all-European character.”78
Certainly no profound thinker, Dmytro Andriievs'kyi was
typical of the many emigre Ukrainians searching for a way out
of the impasse to which their political convictions had led.
Seeing that “orientations” brought no results, they sought
“allies” notin countries, but in ideological, moral, and spiritual
values that could guarantee their nation victory in the struggle
for statehood. That Andriievs'kyi saw these essentially
Nationalist values in “Europe” is not surprising. There, too,
the ideologies and movements that radiated the most vitality
and promised the best results were authoritarian and
nationalist.
The relative uneventfulness characteristic of the UNR camp

was violently interrupted on May 25, 1926, when Petliura was
assassinated on a side street off the Boulevard Saint Michel by
Samuel Schwartzbard, a Jew who claimed to be avenging the
pogroms perpetrated by Petliurite soldiers in the first half of
1919. Ironically, Petliura underwent an immediate trans
formation from one of the most reviled of Ukrainian statesmen
to a national martyr and hero — a symbol of the suffering
Ukraine and of national unity. Even many Galicians forgave
the dead Otaman, although Petrushevych and his supporters
in Berlin remained true to their hostility and refused to attend a
requiem for Petliura.79
In an unusual manifestation of unanimity, 53 Ukrainian
organizations in Czechoslovakia joined in the “Committee to
Honor the Memory of the Head of the Directory of the
Ukrainian People’s Republic, the Supreme Otaman of the
Ukrainian Armies, Symon Petliura” and declared: “Un
breakable is our commitment before the grave of the Great
Patriot and Indefatigable fighter to realize the Ideal of
Ukrainian Statehood .... The killing ... was directed against
the whole Ukrainian People. The Enemies of the Ukrainian
People, the occupiers of their Country, the violators of its will,
and not an avenger of the Jewish nationality in the Ukraine,
directed the hand of the killer onto Symon Petliura.”80
At the same time, Petliura’s death was assigned mystical
overtones and the Ukrainian cause transformed into a well-
nigh religious matter. Volodymyr Sal's'kyi, a general in the
AUNR, wrote that the dead Otaman “will continue to be our
Vozhd’ up to the attainment of independent Ukrainian
statehood. Dead — he will be even more terrible for our enemies
than alive.”81 According to the young Nationalist poet and
former AUNR soldier, levhen Malaniuk, “The cause of the
Ukrainian national state struggle has been covered with the
sacrificial blood of its Leader. The greatest sacrifice has been
brought before the God of the Nation. The bread and wine of
our national efforts have been transubstantiated into Body
and Blood.” Petliura’s assassination, wrote Malaniuk, was a
“clever Muscovite-Jewish business.”82 One Ukrainian student
saw Petliura’s death as being necessary “so that the National
Ideal of the Resurrection of the Ukrainian People become a

religious impulse.”83 Another drew the following lesson from
the assassination: “There is something mystical in this last act
of the great tragedy of the Ukrainian People.... Yes, I believe
— You will resurrect, O my Ukraine. We will overcome.”84
For Ukrainians, however, the full tragedy of Petliura’s
assassination took place a year later during Schwartzbard’s
sensational trial in Paris on October 18-26, 1927. Under the
skillful handling of Schwartzbard’s astute defense counsel, Henri
Torres, the trial was turned into a tribunal against Petliura,
who was charged with tolerating and encouraging the
pogroms which swept the Ukraine in 1919. According to the
defense, the Ukrainian head of state was a war criminal, whose
assassination could only be welcomed. The prosecutor, on the
other hand, referred to Petliura’s democratic, socialist, and pro-
Jewish convictions, argued that the chaotic state of the
Ukraine had prevented any effective control over the
Ukrainian army, pointed to the Jewish ministers in Petliura’s
cabinet, and charged that the circumstances of the assassina
tion as well as Schwartzbard’s background, recent activity,
and ideological beliefs suggested a conspiracy, probably
directed by the USSR.
Jews and Ukrainians the world over, meanwhile, mobilized
their forces for this critical judicial battle. For the former, it
was vital that Schwartz bard be acquitted as the avenger of his
people; for the latter, it was critical that Petliura — as a symbol
of the Ukrainian movement for independence and statehood —
not be branded a pogromchik and the Ukrainian cause thereby
be discredited as anti-Semitic. The trial, as many Jews did not
realize, struck at the very heart of the Ukrainian national
movement. Schwartzbard’s eventual acquittal not only made
Petliura a criminal, whose only consistent policy was said to be
the systematic slaughter of Jews, but it also transformed the
Ukrainian revolution, where thousands of Ukrainians had lost
their lives, into a minor chapter in the history of pogroms.
Predictably, the Ukrainians immediately reacted to the
verdict with outrage. Believing that the world had treated them
unjustly once again, they agreed with Dontsov “that only
traitors or idiots can speak of an understanding with the Jews”

and sought refuge in national introversion and isolation.85
Significantly, hostility to Jews had been absent from most
Ukrainian publications prior to Petliura’s assassination. In
general, the tone was conciliatory, probably reflecting the
realization that Ukrainian-Jewish relations simply had to be
raised from the low point they had reached during the war.
Following Schwartzbard’s acquittal, however, a marked shift
became evident in the Ukrainians’ attitude toward Jews.
The moderate Galician newspaper, Dilo, for example, wrote:
“It is not a matter of Schwartzbard, but of something far
greater and far deeper — Ukrainian-Jewish relations. It must
be said clearly and explicitly. The Jews blackened the
Ukrainians’ name before the world groundlessly and without
reason.”86 Ukrains'kyi Holos (The Ukrainian Voice), a
Hetmanite newspaper published in Peremyshl’, put the matter
more bluntly: “With their tactic the Jews have dug a canyon
between the Ukrainian and Jewish peoples. The Jews must
also consider why they are everywhere not just not loved, but
actually hated.”87 According to the Petliurite Tryzub, the
Schwartzbard trial was “sadistic-cynical” and “clearly and
unequivocally showed the greatest idealists that we have no
friends among the Jews. The Ukrainian nation does not forget
and will not forget such lessons.”88 Even so pro-Jewish a
Ukrainian as Tryzub’s correspondent in Bucharest, a certain
Dmytro Herodot, wrote: “Rejecting with indignation . . . the
accusation that the Ukrainian nation or its leaders are anti-
Semitic, Ukrainian public opinion has unanimously ascer
tained that the conduct of all Jewry during Schwartzbard’s
trial and the way the defense of the murderer was organized
were a graphic and indubitable manifestation of the
Ukrainophobia of the Jewish nation.... We will be very glad if
the leaders of the Jews show us the error of our conclusions. But
until they do, we will consider all talks with Jewish
representatives to be unnecessary and even harmful from the
point of view of Ukrainian statehood and shameful and
inadmissable from the point of view of our feelings of national
dignity.”89
The events surrounding Petliura’s death were crucial to the

development of Ukrainian Nationalism. A leader of the
Ukrainian Revolution had been killed, his name had been
besmirched, and the Ukrainian cause had been vilified.
Clearly, the world was hostile to Ukrainian national
aspirations. “Orientations” did not work, the loudly pro
claimed principle of self-determination seemed not to apply to
the Ukrainians, and the democracies of Europe had ignored
them in drawing up the post-war map of the continent. The
only solution, concluded many Ukrainians, was to withdraw
into the nation, close ranks, mobilize all available forces, and
ruthlessly pursue Ukrainian interests with no regard for other
nations.
The UNR’s most serious socialist opposition came from
Mykyta Shapoval’s Social-Revolutionaries. Shapoval, who
represented the SRs’ centrist faction while still in the Ukraine,
emigrated to Czechoslovakia in February 1919 and there
established himself as a powerful rival to Petliura.
The developments undergone by the Social-Revolutionary
emigres were even more chaotic than the norm for the
Ukrainian emigration. Originally organized in the Foreign
Delegation of the Ukrainian Party of Social-Revolutionaries
(Zakordonna Delehatsiia UPSR), the SRs suffered their first
internal crisis in June 1920 when the faction led by M.
Kovalevs'kyi and M. Zalizniak was purged from the party
because of its right-wing tendencies. This group then founded a
rival UPSR which closely cooperated with Ukrainian anti
socialist parties in Vienna. In 1921, however, the Foreign
Delegation underwent another, more debilitating, split. This
time, the SRs divided over the issue of the Soviet Ukraine.
Mykyta Shapoval and his supporters believed that the
emigration should continue its struggle against the UkSSR;
Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi and Pavlo Khrystiuk, on the other
hand, believed that the emigres should return to their homeland
and help build a Ukrainian state. Shapoval thereupon left
the Foreign Delegation and founded the Foreign Committee
(Zakordonnyi Komitet) of the UPSR. Most of Hrushevs'kyi’s
followers were eventually to return to the Soviet Ukraine, with

Hrushevs'kyi himself making the move to Kiev in 1924. There
he continued his historical studies and became a leading
member of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences.
Hrushevs'kyi’s stronghold was in Vienna, where he
published a journal, entitled Boritesia-poborete (Struggle and
You Will Overcome), and ran a research and publishing
organization, the Ukrainian Sociological Institute (Ukrains'-
kyi Sotsiolohichnyi Instytut). Shapoval’s power-base was in
Prague, where he founded and headed a whole series of
organizations until his death in 1932.
Most important of Shapoval’s many creations were the
Ukrainian Public Committee (Ukrains'kyi Hromads'kyi
Komitet), founded on July 7, 1921 and intended to provide
Ukrainian “refugees, emigrants, internees, prisoners, and
others” with “various kinds of assistance,” the Ukrainian
Community Publishing Fund, and the Ukrainian Institute of
Sociology (Ukrains'kyi Instytut Ifromadoznausta).90 All three
organizations enjoyed the Czech government’s monetary and
political support; Shapoval himself maintained close ties to
President Thomas Masaryk, Foreign Minister Edvard Benes,
and particularly to the latter’s vice-minister, Vaclav Girsa.91
By 1925-1926, however, Czech interest in and support of the
Ukrainian emigres, including the SRs, had substantially de
clined. At the same time, Shapoval faced growing opposition in
both the Foreign Committee of the UPSR and the Ukrainian
Public Committee. As the internal and external pressures
mounted, Shapoval left the Foreign Committee and founded
his own Foreign Organization (Zakordonna Orhanizatsiia) of
the UPSR in early 1925, while the Public Committee collapsed
on September 3 of that same year.92
Undaunted, the tireless Shapoval founded a Ukrainian
Committee on February 13, 1926, and a Union of Ukrainian
Organizations in the Czecho-Slovak Republic (Soiuz
Ukrains'kykh Orhanizatsii u CSR) on April 17, 1926 in an
attempt to regain lost ground. Although enjoying some Czech
support, neither of the organizations proved to be of
significance, so that in late 1926 Shapoval found himself

turning for allies to left-wing Russian and Belorussian SRs
and joined them in the Socialist League of the East of Europe
(Sotsialistychna Liga Skhodu Evropy). And in a move that
occurred as often as its opposite among the emigres,
Shapoval’s Foreign Organization became reconciled with the
Foreign Committee in late 1928 and the two formed a joint
political body, the Supreme Political Committee.93
Far more important than his feverish organizational
activity, however, was a journal Shapoval began publishing in
March 1922, following his break with Hrushevs'kyi. Entitled
Nova Ukraina (The New Ukraine), the journal was anti
Petliura, anti-Soviet, and socialist in spite of its claim to be a
“non-party bi-weekly of community, cultural, and economic
life.”94 After V. Vynnychenko joined the editorial board in
January 1923, the journal, now billed as the organ of
“Ukrainian democracy and in the first place of socialist
democracy”, declared as its guiding principles the “national
state independence and the all-round free development of our
people; the liberation of the person from all forms of
exploitation, violence, and oppression.”98
The fiery Vynnychenko had undergone a remarkable
political evolution since his resignation from the Directory in
early 1919 and subsequent emigration to Vienna. By April of
that same year, the former chairman of the Directory had
come completely to reject what he regarded as the
counterrevolutionary policies of Petliura in favor of a Soviet
socialist Ukraine, and then entered into negotiations with
Bela Kun in the hope of establishing a military alliance of
Soviet republics including Russia, the Ukraine, and Hungary.
Although his plans failed, Vynnychenko continued his drift
leftwards and founded the Foreign Group of the Ukrainian
Communist Party (Zakordonna Hrupa UKP) and its political
organ, Nova Doba (The New Era), in early 1920. After having
written his three-volume Vidrodzhennia Natsii (Rebirth of a
Nation), his highly opinionated memoirs which portrayed
Petliura as a dark villian and blamed him for the Ukraine’s ills,
Vynnychenko departed for Moscow and Kharkiv in May 1920,
hoping to reach an accord with the UKSSR government.

Disillusioned with what he saw and the way he was treated,
Vynnychenko returned to Vienna in October, convinced that
“there is no dictatorship of the proletariat” in the Ukraine and
that the “commissar is everything.”96 The Foreign Group
continued to publish Nova Doba until October 1921, when both
were dissolved. Soon thereafter, Vynnychenko found a new
ally in Shapoval.
The first issue of Nova Ukraina under their joint editorial
guidance contained a landmark article by Vynnychenko,
entitled “A United Revolutionary-Democratic National Front.”
The ideas expressed by the talented playwright, although bear
ing the stamp of his communist convictions, accurately reflected
the thought processes at work in the entire Ukrainian emigre
community. According to Vynnychenko:
“Playing the nationalist chords of the Russian political
parties... Bolshevism willingly enters into a united Russian
national front, presenting itself as its assiduous executive
organ .... The task of Ukrainian socialists and democrats
is extremely difficult: to oppose the united Russian national
front . . . with a force capable of halting the advance of
Russian imperialism. . . . Obviously, none of the socialist
currents can take such a task upon itself. A united front of
the Ukrainian toiling democracy, that is, of almost the
entire Ukrainian nation, should stand in opposition to the
united front of Russian nationalism.... All anti-democratic,
conservative, and reactionary groupings (monarchists,
communists of the Muscovite conception, Petliurites) should
be kept out of such a union.... Every supporter of Muscovite
‘communism’ is ipso facto an enemy of democracy .... The
united front requires one will, one mind, one plan of action,
that is, a certain limitation on individualities. But without
a united front, without a systematic, organized, unanimous
exertion of the strength of a large part of the Ukrainian
nation its liberation is impossible.”97
Significantly, Vynnychenko’s conclusions were almost iden
tical to those that many Nationalists unequivocally opposed to
socialism had also reached — that the core of the Ukrainian
problem was national and not social in character, that

patriotic Ukrainians had to unite against the internal as well
as external enemy, and that organization and the subordina
tion of decentralizing tendencies to a center were necessary to
win the struggle.
By 1924, Vynnychenko’s vision had begun to assume
concrete form. United in the Democratic National Front
(Demokratychno-Natsional'nyi Front) were Vynnychenko’s
Communists, Shapoval’s SRs, the anti-Petliura wing of the
Social-Democrats, and several Galician Radicals. Although
having pretensions to all Ukrainians, the Front shared the fate
of similar emigre attempts at consolidation and never left the
realm of coffee-house politics in Prague.98
CHAPTER 5
THE SOVIETOPHILES
According to the post-war political vocabulary of Ukrain

ians opposed to the Soviet Ukraine, Communists and Soviet
sympathizers were termed “Sovietophiles”. Although “Soviet-
ophilism” generally made few inroads into the staunchly
anti-Soviet political groups, its overall influence was
sufficiently large to have significantly accelerated the political
polarization that gave impetus to the rightward drift of the
Nationalists.
The earliest of the non-Bolshevik Ukrainian Sovietophiles
had been the left Social-Revolutionaries (Borot'bisty) and the
left Social-Democrats (the later Ukapisty). After abandoning
Petliura in 1919-1920 and reorganizing themselves as
Ukrainian Communist parties, both groups eventually merged
with the CP(b)U and came to play a significant role in the
political, cultural, and economic life of the UkSSR in the 1920s.
Thanks largely to their pressure, for example, the policy of
Ukrainianization was officially proclaimed at the 7th
Conference of the CP(b)U in April 1923 and actively put into
effect at the April 1925 Plenum of the Central Committee.
Galician Sovietophiles were found in the Communist Party of
Eastern Galicia (Komunistychna Partiia Skhidnoi Halychyny
— KPSH), established in 1919. Too weak to play a major role in
the disturbances that rocked the province that same year, the
KPSH had to wait until the Red Army’s invasion of Eastern
Galicia in the summer of 1920 before it could proclaim a

Galician Socialist Soviet Republic (Halyts'ka Sotsialistychna
Radians'ka Respublika), a cardboard entity which collapsed
immediately after the Red Army’s retreat. Despite the fact that
the Galician peasantry radicalized nationally and socially
after the Polish occupation of the province, the KPSH proved
far less capable than the legal Ukrainian parties supporting
the ZUNR in harnessing this social force.
The KPSH lasted until 1923, when it was renamed the
Communist Party of the Western Ukraine (Komunistychna
Partiia Zakhidnoi Ukrainy — KPZU) and placed under the
jurisdiction of the Communist Party of Poland in view of
Eastern Galicia’s new status. The KPZU differed significantly
from its predecessor in addressing itself not only to the
Ukrainian proletariat but also to the peasantry, by far the
largest Ukrainian class. As a result, Communist influence
increased substantially in the countryside and came to pose a
serious threat to the non-Communist Ukrainian parties in the
1920s. The various factions of the KPZU’s front organization,
the Ukrainian Peasants’ and Workers’ Socialist Union (Ukrains'-
ke Selians'ko-Robitnyche Sotsialistychne Ob'iednannia), for
example, managed to garner 18 out of a total of 48 Ukrainian
mandates to the Polish Sejm in the elections of 1928. The
Communists, however, proved no less fractious than their
“bourgeois” opponents, and in 1927-1928 both the KPZU and
the Socialist Union underwent damaging schisms over serious
differences regarding the nationality question in the Western
Ukraine and the Ukrainianization process in the Soviet
Ukraine.
General Sovietophile tendencies began to manifest them
selves among large numbers of emigres and Galicians in 1923-
1924. Originally opposed to the Soviet Ukraine because of its
allegedly non-Ukrainian character, more and more Ukrain
ians, even those with no socialist proclivities such as
Petrushevych, came to regard the UkSSR as a truly Ukrainian
state deserving the support of all patriotic Ukrainians. The
immediate reasons for this change in attitude were twofold:
Ukrainians, on the one hand, became increasingly aware of
SOVIETOPHILES 59
the ever more apparent political impotence of the various exile

governments and parties and, on the other, witnessed political
and literary-artistic developments in the UkSSR that seemed
to be leading to an undeniably Ukrainian state. Most
impressive were the peasant revival accompanying the NEP
and the national progress made as a result of the
Ukrainianizing policies of the people’s commissars of
education, the Borot'bist Oleksander Shums'kyi and the Old
Bolshevik Mykola Skrypnyk. Mykola Khvyl'ovyi, Pavlo
Tychyna, Mykola Kulish, and scores of other writers and poets,
meanwhile, were proving that Ukrainian culture was vital and
growing.
Not surprisingly, many Ukrainians, for the most part
veterans and peasants joined by numerous intellectuals such as
Hrushevs'kyi and A. Krushel'nyts'kyi, decided to “re
emigrate” to the Soviet Ukraine. The question of “re
emigration”, meanwhile, became a controversial issue among
the Ukrainians who stayed behind, polarizing them into two
mutually exclusive camps. Those who rejected the Sovietophile
alternative gradually turned to Nationalist positions, brand
ing the Sovietophile phenomenon as zminovikhovshchyna, a
highly derogatory term considered equivalent to “turncoat”.
(The term was derived from the title of the Russian emigre
journal Smena Vekh (Changing of Landmarks), which
considered the NEP to be the first step in the USSR’s ultimate
transformation into a Russian national state.)
Most prominent of the groups that abandoned their early
hostility to the UkSSR and adopted Sovietophilism was the
Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party (USDP) of Galicia. A
member of the Interparty Council, the coordinating body of all
pro-ZUNR Ukrainian parties in the province, the USDP
adopted a pro-Soviet platform in early 1923 and thereupon left
the Council. It cooperated closely with Galician Communists
until its liquidation in 1924.
The Social-Democrats’ most articulate emigre spokesman
was Semen Vityk. In Vienna since 1919, Vityk established his
power base in the Ukrainian workers’ organization lednist’
(Unity) and published Borot'ba (The Struggle), in which he
attacked both the ZUNR and the UNR for betraying the
Ukrainian working people’s interests. Although a socialist,
Vityk did not immediately become a supporter of the UkSSR.
This transformation came about in several years time and
culminated in 1923-1924, when Vityk published a “socio
political journal”, entitled Nova Hromada (The New Commun
ity), in Vienna. Assisted by Antin Krushel'nyts'kyi, Vityk
advanced a pro-Soviet and pro-Communist line with heavy
nationalist overtones. Uncompromising in its demand for
Ukrainian sobornist’, Nova Hromada upheld the principle of
reliance on “our own forces”, defended Ukrainian national
aspirations as an indisputable good, and proposed that the
Ukrainian state be based on its ethnic frontiers."
Together with Ukrainian emigre Communists, Vityk’s group
worked closely with emigre Galician veterans who had
formerly belonged to the Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooters (USS).
In the course of their stay in the Ukraine, first as members of
the occupying Austrian army and later of the Red Galician
Army, many of the USS became supporters of a Soviet
Ukraine. Heavily influenced by Hrushevs'kyi’s Social-
Revolutionary group, the USS emigres formally made a turn to
the left in 1921. Two years later, following the March 1923
Ambassadors’ decision, the USS’s coordinating body issued a
communique in which it strongly condemned the autonomist
line of the Ukrainian People’s Labor Party and the rise of
“fascism” among Ukrainians. Singled out in particular were
Ukrains’kyi Kozak and Zahrava (The Glow), published,
respectively, by Poltavets’-Ostrianytsia and Dmytro Dontsov.100
CHAPTER 6
DMYTRO DONTSOV
Dmytro Dontsov occupies a special place in the development

of a Ukrainian Nationalist ideology. A complex historical
personality, the controversial Dontsov has all too often been
subjected to oversimplification by friends and enemies alike.
The former generally regard only his contributions to the
formation of a Ukrainian national identity, while the latter all
too happily focus on his totalitarian tendencies. The “real”
Dontsov, however, escapes both sides. Non-systemic and
frequently erratic, his thinking was based on a wide range of
personal experiences and intellectual influences and cannot
easily be compartmentalized into convenient categories.
Instead, all of Dontsov’s ideas at any given period must be
considered as a logical whole in order to be understood. The
complexity of this undertaking will become evident in this
chapter, which will deal only with the “early” Dontsov, with
the period from 1919 to 1929 when he developed the essential
ideas of his brand of Nationalism.101
Dontsov was born in 1883 in a heavily Russian-populated
border district of the Eastern Ukraine. While a university
student in St Petersburg, he joined the Ukrainian Social-
Democratic Workers’ Party and wholeheartedly accepted its
ideological tenets. Unlike his comrades, however, Dontsov
persistently maintained a strong attitude of distrust towards
Russia and regarded the Russian threat as a mortal peril for
the Ukraine. After breaking with the USDRP over this

question prior to the war, Dontsov progressively replaced his
socialism with the belief that national independence was the
most important aspect of the Ukrainian issue. His paper at a
1913 student congress in L'viv, recommending the “political
separation” of the Eastern Ukraine and its annexation to
Austria, marked a watershed in his intellectual devel
opment.102 There followed Dontsov’s short-lived involvement
in the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine in 1914 and
several years of publicistic activity in Vienna, Berlin, and
Bern, where he gained a reputation as the “apostle of
Ukrainian separatism.”103 He returned to the Ukraine in 1917,
and in 1918 joined both the Ukrainian Democratic-Agrarian
Party and Skoropads'kyi’s government apparatus as
head of the Ukrainian Press and Telegraph Agency. It was at
this time that Dontsov seems to have undergone a profound
shift in his political thinking. Although he was to leave the
Democratic-Agrarians and turn against Skoropads'kyi, Dontsov
accepted the fundamental principles of Lypyns'kyi’s party and
of the Hetman’s type of rule. He recognized the importance of
the peasantry and of decisive, strong-willed leadership to the
success of a Ukrainian revolution. These convictions were
further reinforced in 1919, when he witnessed the collapse of
Petliura’s socialist and democratic regime as a result of the
Supreme Otaman’s inability to maintain the support of the
revolutionized Ukrainian peasant masses and to control his
own army. Like many other Ukrainians, Dontsov concluded
that the Ukrainian leadership’s constant vacillation had
prevented it from taking the bold steps that were necessary to
attaining statehood.
These three fundamental elements of Dontsov’s maturing
worldview — Russia, as the Ukraine’s foremost enemy; the
peasantry, as the backbone of the nation and of the state; the
necessity of a strong sense of purpose and of will — found more
coherent expression in a work which attempted to outline the
principles on which the Ukrainian state-building effort should
be based. The result was Pidstavy nashoi polityky (The
Foundations of Our Politics), published in Vienna in 1921. A
DMYTRO DONTSOV 63
remarkably sober and stimulating book, Pidstavy is usually

ignored by students of Dontsov, although it contained most of
the ideas on which the publicist built his ideology in the 1920s.
The fundamental dynamic of European politics, according to
Dontsov, was the “great conflict of two civilizations, of two
political, social, and cultural religious ideals, the conflict
Europe-Russia.” This conflict of two spiritually contrary
principles explained both tsarism and Bolshevism: . . both
the ideology of Russian communism and of tsarism are only
different forms of one and the same essence, of one and the
same phenomenon of a more general character, which is
nothing other than Russian messianism struggling against
the West.” “Why is Russia fundamentally hostile to Europe
and why must she fight it?” asks Dontsov. The answer is
simple: “the amorphous Russian mass can be led only by
absolutism, while the independently-minded European society
only by self-action. Therefore, Russia must, on the one hand,
defend itself against the European principle and not allow
European bacilli to itself, because once latched on to Russia,
[this principle] can lead only to debauch and to the
decomposition of the state mechanism. On the other hand, she
must strive to destroy this Europe and to destroy its ideas ...
because these ideas are the only defense against the all-
inclusive Muscovite absolutism which wants to rule the
continent To destroy this spiritual compound which in the
West joins individuals into groups, into strata, into classes and
unions, and make of them an amorphous mass, incapable of
any kind of opposition.”104
The Ukraine, according to Dontsov, with its highly
developed sense of peasant individualism ai}d “self-action”,
was the first bastion of the West to experience the Russian
onslaught. Most recently, the Russian desire to subjugate the
independent Ukrainian spirit had taken the form of the
campaign against the kulaks, a “new peasant class, which has
awakened to conscious political life, and, imbued with the
ideals of democratism, is the greatest obstacle to Russian
despotism in the Ukraine.”105
The Ukraine’s fate, therefore, clearly lay with Europe, with
European “imperialism.” Yet Dontsov was astute enough to

realize that power-political realities complicated the issue.
Foreseeing a German-Russian “union”, he suggested that a
“strong Rumania, Hungary, and Poland” and the support of
the Entente powers, and especially Britian, were critical to
Ukrainian national interests. Aware that any suggestion of
Ukrainian-Polish cooperation would outrage the Galicians,
Dontsov appealed to Realpolitik as justifying his proposal: “...
the great and old conflict between Europe and Russia throws
us, whether we like it or not, together with Poland, on this side of
the line of demarcation, on this side of the barricade.” The choice
facing the Ukraine was clear-cut: “.. . either to seek support
from all of the former ‘western Russia’ (the new borderland
states), something that would be impossible without Poland
(and without Rumania), to make the appropriate, but in the last
analysis temporary and almost necessary sacrifices, and to
strive for the sovereignty of the Ukraine. Or again, through an
anti-Polish or anti-Rumanian policy, to break up the bloc of
western borderland states, to attempt to take back the
Ukrainian provinces of Poland and Rumania, at the price of
uniting them all under Russia, at the price of losing [our]
national sovereignty. To sacrifice a part for the whole or the
whole for the part is [the difference between] a national policy
and a provincial policy.”106
The social group on which Dontsov’s national policy had to
be based was the peasantry, which not only constituted the
vast majority of the Ukrainian nation, but was also the only
Ukrainian class with the vitality, strength, and vision
necessary to attaining and maintaining a state in the face of
the opposition of the urban-based non-Ukrainian minorities in
the Ukraine. In this respect, however, the Ukraine was not
alone: “The socialist sympathies of the few barely conscious
and wholly unorganized urban workers in the Ukraine and the
Bolshevismomania of the still less numerous Russian and
Jewish parties in the Ukraine do not change anything about the
nature of the revolution, which took place in the Ukraine in the
years after the fall of the tsar. This upheaval is now taking
place in all of Eastern and Central Europe. Hungary,
DMYTRO DONTSOV 65
Rumania, Croatia, Poland, and the Balkan States, just like the
Ukraine, stand under the sign of the great peasant-bourgeois
revolution .... The result of the war — the decomposition of
three great states, Russia, Austria, and Hungary, and a
revolution in Germany — was the end of the political influence
of the landed aristocracy in these countries... [where] the weak
development of urban life and of an urban bourgeoisie had led
to the fact that political influence in the state remained in the
hands of the landed aristocracy.... To divest this class, which
in the most obvious manner lost its former political elan, of
political influence became the goal of the revolutionary
movements. In place of it there came a new class — peasant
democracy .... Such an evaluation of the revolution also
delineates the major outlines of the internal and external
policy of the Ukraine. Together with the revolution, the war
transferred the center of gravity of economic and social life to
the villages .. . .”107
Dontsov’s “ideal”, therefore, was a “peasant, petty-
bourgeois republic.” This alone could save the Ukraine from
“Muscovite socialism”, which “operates only with slaves” and
wants to “rule over a mass that understands nothing besides
its own intestinal interests and demagogic slogans.” In
practice, this ideal demanded rejecting all foreign political
ideals and subordinating the “purely cultural, or purely
economic, or purely social, or purely tribal . . . needs of the
national collective” and all “cosmopolitan goals (world
revolution, international socialism, pacifism)” to political
sovereignty and to a “national ideal.” But, “only a clear
awareness of this ideal will save the life of the nation.... Only
a clearly formulated national ideal makes a certain national
idea into a crystallizing center for individual and group wills
within the nation, which otherwise search for other centers of
gravity.”*08
Giving this ideal a clear profile was the task of the
“independence-minded intelligentsia”, which understands
that “only the peasantry and the ideology that corresponds to
its interests and manner of thinking” can save the Ukraine.
The 19th century Ukrainian intelligentsia, as best typified by
Mykhailo Drahomanov, “who considered the Ukraine’s

political interests to be identical with the interests of Russian
imperialism”, had failed to provide such an ideal. The
“bankrupt social-demagogues” of the revolutionary period,
who had ignored the peasantry and thereby subordinated
Ukrainian national goals to their own social and class ideals,
had proven equally harmful to Ukrainian interests. And just
as the monarchists, whose lack of peasant support would
inevitably lead to “agitation for the benefit of the Russian
monarchy”, harm the “cause of Ukrainian independence”, so
too the socialists, “who have nothing in common either with
the ideology or the manner of thinking of the peasantry,” and
instead “know no regulator in society other than the lowly
materialistic instincts of the masses or the arbitrariness of a
lord over a flock of equal slaves” cannot possibly serve
Ukrainian interests.109
Dontsov’s solution was peasant democracy, which, however,
was not a democracy of “pacifism, egalitarianism, anti
militarism, mobocracy [okhlokratiia], intestinal socialism,
and class struggle ... of general levelling, of the deification of
numbers, of sentimental-anemic popular sovereignty [nar-
odopravstvo]” but a democracy of “work, hierarchy, social
solidarity, responsibility, and the strong fist.” Dontsov’s
democracy was one of “self-discipline and of higher ideals,” of
“production”, of “freedom and of independent action.” It
“recognizes equality in the competitive struggle of life, but
equality with regard to the starting point and not to the finish
line of the race.” Somewhat surprisingly, Dontsov considered
the qualities of the peasant democracy he advocated to be best
exemplified in “northern America”, revealing an infatuation
with the United States that was to persist throughout the
1920s. In fact, one may go so far as to say that America served
as a model for Dontsov. That Dontsov’s perceptions of the
United States may or may not have corresponded to the reality
is not important. What is important is that Dontsov, who made
no secret of his admiration for the Fascists, chose America and
not Italy as his ideal form of society.110
Furthermore, argued Dontsov, accepting the peasantry as
the foundation of Ukrainian statehood could ultimately lead to
DMYTRO DONTSOV 67
a reconciliation between the hostile national minorities and

the Ukrainians. Once the former realized that the “true
physiognomy of militant Ukrainianism” was “peasant,
private-property-minded, and nationalist”, their fears of
“socialism” and “national Bolshevism” would go away. In a
remarkably hopeful tone, Dontsov then concluded that such a
rapprochement could result in the “ultimate crystallization of
the collective ideal of the nation as a group of people of various
classes and nationalities, living on a common territory and
joined with common historical traditions.”111
In the last analysis, however, the crucial role lay with the
intelligentsia, with “our generation”, which had to find the
“formula of the great popular movement in the Ukraine and
clearly define its goal.” Without this, the Ukrainian struggle
would become an easy prey for “foreign national dema
gogues”, remain mired in chaos, and never rise above the level
of a “struggle for expropriated cattle or for confiscated grain.”
The “Muscophiles of the right and of the left” had to
“disappear”, and their place had to be taken by those “who
understand that our national ideal can be realized only in
uncompromising struggle with Russia.”112
Dontsov’s writings since his arrival in L'viv in early 1922
revealed a thematic continuity with the ideas expounded in
Pidstavy nashoi polityki. A certain shift in emphasis and
direction, however, had already become evident as early as
1922-1923 in his articles in Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk and
Zahrava, both of which he edited. Dontsov now began
developing the ideas of ideological purity, faith, irrationality,
and will which were to dominate his later thinking. His
infatuation with the peasantry and hatred of Russia remained,
but a significant radicalization took place in his view of how
Ukrainian statehood was to be achieved.
In discussing Dontsov’s intellectual development, it is
important not to place undue emphasis on ideas themselves as
the source of his inspiration. Without doubt, the well-read
Dontsov surely borrowed and learned from whatever
intellectual source that appeared to him to be of significance.
This intellectual inspiration, however, far more affirmed
rather than formed Dontsov’s own ideas, which he developed
on the basis of a very astute and penetrating perception of

ongoing events. The revolution of 1917-1920 had taught
Dontsov the importance of the peasantry, strong leadership,
and ideological clarity — ideas he developed in Pidstauy. The
Fascists, meanwhile, opened his eyes to the importance of
“initiative-minorities”, a fact which seems to have escaped
him until then, primarily because of his absolute rejection of
Bolshevism as a purely Russian phenomenon of no relevance
to the Ukrainian situation.
By late 1922 and early 1923, Dontsov was openly declaring
his admiration for the Fascists and the Bolsheviks. The first
indication came in the November 1922 issue of the Vistnyk,
when Dontsov used a quotation from the “catechism of the
Fascists” as a lead-in to an article on the zminovikhov-
shchyna.113 In January 1923, there followed a long article which
compared Fascism to Bolshevism and analyzed the reasons for
their success. Dontsov found four points of identity between
the two movements. They were both “anti-democratic”,
“populist”, “uncompromising”, and were led by an “initiative
minority.”114
“Thus,” wrote the Ukrainian journalist, “the reasons for the
success of both movements were: their populism [narodnist'],
their ability to touch the deepest instincts of the masses, their
irreconcilability, and their militancy. With regard to the anti
democratism of their program (antiparliamentarianism) and
of their tactics (not coalitions, but coups d'état), at the least they
did not harm their success and, at closer view, perhaps even
helped it; after all, their opponents found themselves not on the
wagon, but under the wagon, in spite of the democratism of
their program and tactics .. . .”11S
Whether Dontsov had hereby abandoned his former
endorsement of “peasant democracy” or whether he con
sidered it reconcilable with Fascist and Bolshevik “anti
democratism” was left unclear in the article. What was made
explicit, however, was Dontsov’s new conviction that not only
new political “foundations”, but also “new people” were
necessary. The implication that Ukrainians should draw their
inspiration from the Fascist and Bolshevik examples was
DMYTRO DONTSOV 69
obvious, if not clearly articulated: “Our [country] needs new

characters, who know what they want and who would have
nothing of that sentimental-pacifist, internationalist-slavish
psychology of the ‘former people’ .... The conflict over
‘programs’, ‘coalitions’, ‘concentrations’, and ‘orientations’
being conducted by these people will lead to nothing. They are
living corpses, who forgot to die .... Theirs is no longer to
conceive of an idea, for which people would go to kill other
people ... ,”118
Dontsov’s unconcealed admiration for the Fascists and newly
acquired appreciation for the Bolsheviks by no means meant a
blind acceptance of their ideological tenets. Rather, as a man of
not inconsiderable political perspicacity, Dontsov borrowed
only that which he believed applicable to the Ukrainian
struggle for the ultimate ideal — statehood. Naturally,
Dontsov underwent ideological shifts in the process. But for a
pragmatist, whose only goal was Ukrainian independence,
such shifts posed few problems. In fact, he considered them
indicative of a capacity to think creatively and remain in vital
contact with the world. Dontsov’s pragmatism, for example,
was most evident in his attitude towards the question troubling
all Ukrainians — the question of “our own forces” or of
“orientations.” For Dontsov, “there was no such dilemma: We
say, always and in the first place — ‘our own forces’, and then
— ‘orientations’.”117
In one respect, however, Dontsov was uncompromising, even
rigid. Whereas he revealed a pragmatism in most political
questions that few Ukrainians could match, his dedication to
purity of ideology and clarity of purpose was immune to all
changes in the political climate. His concern with these two
notions, which he had only fleetingly discussed in Pidstavy,
was given precise formulation in the first issue (May 1922) of
the revived Vistnyk. According to Dontsov, the task of the
journal was to “extricate our national idea from the chaos
within which it threatens to die, to purify it of garbage and
mud, to give it bright and clear content, to make of it a banner
about which the whole nation would rally.”118
The point of ideological purity was very practical. It would
determine the success or failure of the Ukrainian revolution:

“... only clear, simple, and unconfused slogans, coupled with
an unshakeable faith in their sanctity and with an unbending
will to realize them, attract the masses to themselves.... the
masses will never follow unclear slogans or those, who do not
know what they want.... Only he who does not hesitate at the
appropriate time to say yes or no will impose his will upon the
mob. This is precisely what has been lacking in Ukrainian
nationalism until now: this irrational faith in the historical
vocation of one’s people . .. .”119
Although his comments seem to dilute his earlier belief in the
peasantry’s ability to act on its own and to lead the Ukrainian
revolution, Dontsov himself apparently differentiated between
the peasantry (an active force) and the masses or mob (a
passive force). In Dontsov’s eyes, therefore, the peasantry
continued to embody all the qualities he advocated. In
particular, the peasantry had “revealed ... a remarkable
courage in the defense of its interests, an extraordinary
activism, and an enormous readiness to make sacrifices ... It
knew what it wanted, and that which it wanted, it wanted very
much.”120
It naturally followed that the Ukraine’s social “ideal” had to
be that which the “peasantry developed in hard struggle” —
private property, labor discipline, productivity, organized
collectivism, hierarchy, cooperation, social self-action, per
sonal initiative, and the sanctity of the family and of the
church. But “most significant” for attaining these goals was to
“maintain the purity of one’s own ideology, clear in content
and active of will, as well as a faith that knows no doubts. If we
lose this ideology, then the most heroic efforts of the nation will
be branded as banditism. If we maintain it, then we will attain
everything.”121
The quintessence of Dontsov’s evolving Nationalist world
view found expression in the first (April 1923) issue of Zahrava.
As editor-in-chief, Dontsov outlined “our goals” as “wanting at
least for ourselves to finish once and for all with the dominance
of phrases, which inhibit the political creativity of right, left,
and center and which destroy the people’s resistance. We want
DMYTRO DONTSOV 71
to remove these phrases from ourselves .... And replace them

with a pure national egoism and the uncompromising interests
of the class on which it [the nation] is based and which
constitutes the vast majority of us. We want to bring about the
formation of a group, even if small in number, but stubborn in
its convictions, which knows what it wants, and that which it
wants, it wants very much. That would detest compromises;
that would pursue its goal with firmness and clarity, which
attracts the masses, and that would affirm its ideal with pure
religious fervour, without which no movement and no idea
have yet triumphed.”122
Dontsov elaborated on “national egoism” in the third issue
(May 1,1923) of Zahrava. A profound shift towards an extreme
form of Nationalism, approaching racism, became evident in
his “formula” for “putting in motion the mob’s potential
energy”, which, if uncontrolled by the intelligentsia, could
manifest itself, as it did in the war years, in pogroms. This
formula had to “tie their [the masses’] everyday hurts and
expectations to one general idea” and “synthesize their
scattered energy and give it a goal.” The “idea”, meanwhile,
had to emphasize the “racial allegiance of the peasant
majority of the nation” and its “ethnic individuality,” and
“deepen this feeling of racial individuality with all the
consequences flowing therefrom .. . .”123
The fourth issue (May 15, 1923) of Zahrava, meanwhile,
revealed the degree to which Dontsov had moved in the
direction of elitism: “Only a group, which knows what it wants,
which needs the masses for its actions and for educating them,
and not for decoration, which sees in them and not in
paragraphs the beginning and end of everything, and which
can awaken the sleeping energy of the nation, is capable of
organizing the masses.”12*
As his hatred for the “doctrine of liberalism” and for “snail-
like democratism” grew, as he even ventured to call Ukrainian
Nationalism “Ukrainian ‘fascism’", and as he proclaimed
that the “worldview of contemporary nationalism” approx
imated the “theological worldview of the Church” and named
Maurice Barres its “apostle”, Dontsov finally took his elitism
to its logical end. Obviously impressed by Mussolini’s con

solidation of power and Pilsudski’s growing influence, Dontsov
devoted an article to “Napoleonism” where he preached the
virtues of such great leaders as Bonaparte, Cromwell,
Mussolini, Piteudski, and Khmel'nyts'kyi, who carried out
revolutions by appealing “first to the ‘rabble’ and not to
feelings of legitimism, which revolutions destroy” and who
were concerned with “controlling the revolutionized mass and
not with principles.”125 Where the peasantry fit into this
scheme was unclear. Certainly, its revolutionary role, already
limited by the existence of an “initiative-minority”, could not
but have been further circumscribed by a Napoleon. Although
Dontsov may have denied it, the peasantry had been deprived
of its earlier initiative and transformed into a tool of the elite in
his ideology.
The July-August 1925 issue of Vistnyk summarized the basic
tenets of the ideology Dontsov had been propounding in the
journal for the past three years: “This was a worldview that...
proclaimed the right to life of the stronger and not the
weaker, to the old question... intellect or will, it gave first place
to the latter; it saw the meaning of life in its [the will’s] struggle
with others, and it [regarded] the virtues necessary for this
struggle as the ideal of the modern 'kalokagathia' . . . .126
This was the worldview of... Bergson and Sorel in philosophy
and sociology, of Kipling in literature, and of Roosevelt and
Kitchener in politics.”127
Crucial to the further radicalization of Dontsov’s N ationalist
ideas was Schwartzbard’s assassination of Petliura. The
Otaman’s death was proof to Dontsov of the correctness of his
social Darwinian belief that life was a struggle and that only
the strongest survived: “We do not approach this problem
[pogroms] from the viewpoint of bourgeois morality. For us the
victory of the Ukrainian idea is more important than the lives
of thousands of Ukrainians, not to mention the lives of
thousands of Schwartzbards and Bronsteins. And if the
liberation of the Ukraine demanded these thousands, then, I
believe, no Ukrainian patriot would hesitate before them ....
But such Jewish hecatombs were not necessary for us and
DMYTRO DONTSOV 73
Petliura is not guilty of them. They were not a mistake of his

policies.... His mistake lay elsewhere: in that he unnecessarily
called Jews into his cabinet and gave them autonomy ... He
wanted to win the support of a cowardly and slavish race with
concessions, when all that Ukrainian politics should have
done with regard to them was to break their power in the
Ukraine and force them to uncompromising loyalty to the
Ukrainian idea .... The point is that Jews are fundamentally
hostile to Ukrainian statehood.... The Jews are guilty, terribly
guilty, as those who helped to consolidate the Russian rule in
the Ukraine, but — the ‘Jew is not guilty of everything’.
Russian imperialism is guilty of everything.”128
Following Schwartzbard’s acquittal, Dontsov again took to
his pen, essentially repeating his earlier beliefs but with a
noticeably greater impatience and intolerance: “What’s the
matter? Whence these shrieks? What are the hyenas concerned
about? About pogroms . . . What pogroms? There were no
pogroms in the Ukraine. There was a civil war in which masses
of Jews, Muscovites, and Ukrainians died . . . .” What,
according to Dontsov, was the Jews’ real concern? — “... the
awakening of the millionfold masses of the Ukrainian people
and especially of the peasantry to economic and political
independence is a pogrom! This cannot be allowed because it
would mean the end of the blissful times.” And as to the
“lesson” Ukrainians should draw from the trial — “Let us
master several rules for the future: never give ‘minorities’
cultural-national autonomies which end in Schwartzbards.”129
Significantly, although Dontsov was clearly no friend of the
Jews, neither of the above two comments sees the Ukraine’s
problems in exclusively Jewish terms. The first statement
makes Russia “guilty of everything”; the second puts the
blame on “minorities”, that is, on other nationalities. Both are
consistent with the nature of Dontsov’s Nationalism, which
saw the Ukraine caught in a struggle with all nations in
general and with Russia in particular. Ukrainian-Jewish
relations, therefore, were secondary and even incidental to what
Dontsov, and many Ukrainians with him, perceived as the
whole world’s hostility to their nation.
In spite of the great number of changes he had undergone

since 1921, Dontsov’s “perfect” society in April 1929 remained
what it had been at the time he wrote Pidstavy. “The Spirit of
Americanism” was the title of the article in Vistnyk which
clearly articulated what Dontsov found so compelling about
the United States. Very simply, Dontsov believed that
Americans embodied that one quality Ukrainians lacked and
which he considered essential to all great achievements. To use
an earlier phrase, Americans “knew what they wanted, and
that which they wanted, they wanted very much.”
According to Dontsov’s article, Americans were always
“driven forward” by the “idea of the new, always joined
together with the idea of the better. The Yankee does not know
the impossible. The impossible is only that which has not yet
been tried.” True to these ideals, America had declared war on
the “Utopians of reaction and of socialism, both of which deny
the law of private initiative and place obstacles before the free,
human ‘I’.” Every American “is far too preoccupied with the
thought of conquest to pity the conquered and far too in a hurry
to get ahead in order to stop by those who are left behind.”130
But American individualism was a “social individualism”,
an “individualism of voluntary self-discipline”, which “exists
only in the group and cannot find expression outside of the
group.” The result was that “there is freedom, but also
regimentation and discipline, there is no anarchy. But the
freedom which the individual enjoys by no means implies
tolerance for an individual who goes outside of the law. Every
time that the ideal of the nation or its vital interests enter into
play, the law immediately directs the unrestrained individual
to his place. Those, who in this singular democracy do not
accept the general faith, are not always treated very gently.”
The reason for this intolerance was the “moral tyranny of the
majority.”131
The model American, for Dontsov, was William Jennings
Bryan, the renowned lawyer who steadfastly held to his belief
“in the word of the Bible” during the so-called Monkey Trial.
“We may laugh at Bryan,” wrote Dontsov, “but when his
opponents came to be involved with this person, who firmly
DMYTRO DONTSOV 75
believed in his truth, the smiles quickly vanished from their

faces.... And when I consider some countrymen, who are very
progressive and, obviously, supporters of Darwin’s theory, but
for whom no dogmas exist, who freely go — without being
punished by public opinion — from Ukrainianism to
Muscophilism and to Communism, who, like some at
Schwartzbard’s trial, served foreigners against their own
people, then I regret that we have no dogmas, which would
forbid doubt, that we have no tyranny of the majority as in
America. I begin to think that it is better to believe in an out-of-
date Bible, in Jonah, in the whale — and in one’s own nation,
than to be progressive, accept the monkey theory, but in
practice jump monkey-like from one faith to another .. . .”132
Like so many others written by Dontsov, the above article
does not easily fit into all-too-casually formed preconceptions
of Dontsov’s political and ideological convictions. Surprisingly
sad, even despairing, in tone, Dontsov’s article offers
convincing evidence that his intellectual horizons extended far
beyond Fascist Italy and Bolshevik Russia. The “singular
democracy” Dontsov so admired (and as he described it) can
hardly be termed totalitarian and is even arguably author
itarian. Dontsov’s “majority” was tyrannical, but it was
nevertheless a majority. Likewise, the individual remained
“free” in Dontsov’s ideal world. In fact, the ideal individual,
the Yankee, was the greatest of individualists, ever driven, self-
reliant, creative, free-thinking, and forceful. The nation, the
society, however, set the limits on the Yankee’s individualism.
Moreover, he accepted these limitations voluntarily out of a
sense of responsibility to the nation. In this respect, Dontsov
was echoing a motto he had coined in 1923: “Ukrainians for the
Ukraine” instead of the more usual “The Ukraine for
Ukrainians”.133
The most systematic expression of Dontsov’s Nationalism
appeared in 1926 as a book, entitled, simply enough,
Natsionalizm (Nationalism). As with other Nationalists,
Dontsov’s point of departure was the reality of the war. “Only
one law emerged unscathed from the catastrophe. That was the
law of struggle . . . ,”134 Nations struggled for survival; the
stronger ones won, the weaker ones lost. The Ukrainian nation
had been on the losing side in 1917-1920. Who was responsible
for the defeat? How could the Ukrainians win? Responsibility
for defeat lay with “our nationalism of the 19th century, the
nationalism of collapse, or Provençalism.”135 The way out was
to adopt Dontsov’s proposed Nationalism, which was
“fundamentally hostile” to the views typified by the
Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, Mykhailo
Drahomanov, Ivan Franko, and Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi.
Dontsov’s Nationalism took the “will” as its starting point;
their worldview began with the “intellect”. As a result of this
infatuation with the intellect, the 19th century Provençale
overlooked the most basic aspect of life — will — and thereby
created an ideology that could not but not respond to the inner
strivings of the will of the Ukrainian nation. The Provençale
had committed many sine: “Narrow and etupid intellectual
ism, faith in the mechanical nature of social ’progress’..., the
rejection of the national affect as a ‘causa sui’, making human
and national will dependent on countless sanctions, primitive
objectification of will, raising the individual over the general
and the national, emphasizing the passive aspect of the nation
(the ‘number’, the ‘people’) over the active (the initiative
minority) — all of this led not only to the degradation of the
entire nation, to its being pushed into the role of an apolitical
tribe..., but also to the gradual atomization of the concept of a
nation; to its negation, to the complete exclusion of the element
of struggle, of the role of the willful factor in history, and
finally to the negation of the very instinct to life... .”136 This
“decline of the will”, this “lack of faith and lack of will”, could
be cured only by a worldview that stressed just the opposite. “It
is not important,” wrote Dontsov, “whether a nation is
aggressive or not, or whether an idea is aggressive or not. It is
important whether an idea is connected to the appropriate
feeling, to the abstract will to life and to growth, or whether an
idea is an intellectual abstraction that wants to kill the affect
(as Drahomanov and the Drahomanovites did)... .”137
The point, therefore, was to find the kind of “idea”, that
would speak to the “heart” of the nation, to its will, and thereby
DMYTRO DONTSOV 77
move the “masses to give up their lives” for it.138 “But such an
ideal can only be that ideal, which is a faithful translation of
the subconscious will to self-rule of precisely that nation, and
which draws its content not from the slogans of an isolated
doctrine, but only from the whole of the needs of the people,
from their geographic location in the world, from their past,
from their traditions, history, and psychology .... Every
nation has its own law and its own truth and should submit
only to them .... The national idea can only then become a
powerful factor in life, when it happily consists of two parts:
the affective and the intellectual, when the intellect is tightly
bound to the popular instinct and conscience. But this is
possible only when the content of the idea, when the national
ideal is not foreign, abstractly deduced and imposed . . . .”139
But who was to create this new idea? — . never the
people!” replied Dontsov. “The people are a passive factor with
regard to any idea.... The active factor which carries the idea
and within which the idea arises is the active or initiative
minority .... This is the group that formulates the idea, which
is unclear for the ‘not-conscious’ mass, makes it accessible to
this mass, and finally mobilizes the ‘people’ for the struggle for
this idea.”140
For this idea to be realized, however, it was first necessary to
break with Provenâlism and adopt Dontsov’s “active
nationalism” (chynnyi natsionalizrri), a voluntarist ideology
which alone understood human nature and the means by
which ideas were made triumphant. Sosnowsky provides an
excellent synthesis of the kernel ideas of “active nationalism”:
“The answer to the lack of the ‘will impulse’ was to be... the
inculcation of the ‘will to life’ and the ‘will to power’. In place
of the exaggerated importance of the weight of the intellect
and knowledge and of rationalism in general in the life of a
person and of peoples — irrationalism, romanticism,
illusionism as the fundamental motive factors. In place of
pacifism and the lack of desire to ‘encroach upon another’s
freedom’ — the idea of struggle, expansion, violence or
simply ‘imperialism’. In place of scepticism, lack of faith,
lack of character — a fanatical faith in ‘one’s own truth’,
dogmatism, exclusiveness, toughness. In place of particular

ism, anarchism, and demo-liberalism — the interests of the
nation above everything, a hierarchy of values in political,
community, and social life, and the subordination of the
individual to the national, to the collective. In place of the
morality of the ‘burgher-bourgeois’ — the ‘amorality of the
person of action’ who recognizes as moral and ethical only
that which increases the strength of the nation and
guarantees its growth. In place of indulging in various
ideologies which decompose the nation and the society —
ideological exclusiveness, intolerance. In place of the
provincial conception of the political symbiosis of two
nations, Russia and the Ukraine — the self-rule of a
sovereign and independent nation .... In place of democra
cy — the principle of the initiative-minority and of creative
violence.”141
All these qualities were best exemplified in the “strong man”
(syl'na liudyna), the ideal “active nationalist” whom
Dontsov transparently patterned on Nietzsche’s Übermensch.
Dontsov’s “strong man”, however, was very much a “beast
who lusts for gain and for victory” over the “masses”, who
“desires struggle for the sake of struggle,” and who knows
“how to bite him, who bit us, and to hit him, who hit us”, and in
this respect was precisely what the Übermensch was not.
Curiously, Dontsov did not specify the “strong man’s”
relationship to the initiative-minority and to creative violence.
Would the initiative-minority consist of strong men, and if so,
how could they possibly overcome their “joy to kill” instinct
and lead the masses? And were the strong men not to be in the
initiative-minority, then how would it cope with such “beasts”?
Likewise, was the strong man’s proclivity to violence “creative”
or simply destructive? Dontsov left these questions un
answered. Moreover, he left the very concepts of intiative-
minority and creative violence (the latter obviously borrowed
from Georges Sorel) so undeveloped as to cause great confusion
with regard to the who and how of implementing the
Ukrainian idea.142
But what, then, was the Ukrainian idea? Dontsov’s answer
was again vague and those Nationalists who awaited a
DMYTRO DONTSOV 79
proposal for an explicit course of action were sorely

disappointed. The Ukrainian idea was based on the “Western
European concepts of family, community, property . . . the
organicity of our culture, personal initiative, social distinct
ness and clarity, form-ness, hierarchy and not numbers,
personal activism and not its enslavement, production and not
distribution, organization and not anarchy, idealism and not
materialism.” More specifically, when “transferred to the
sphere of concrete relations, this ideal would be sovereignty
and imperialism in politics, a church that is independent of the
state in religion, occidentalism in culture, and private
initiative and growth in economic life.”143
For Dontsov, there could be no question of not accepting his
proposed “active nationalism”. “The struggle for existence is
the law of life,” he wrote at the very end of Natsionalizm,
“There is no universal truth .... Life makes him [right], who
proves himself morally and physically stronger. We can
acquire this strength only if we become filled with a new spirit,
a new ideology. Every nation faces a dilemma: either to
triumph or to die.”144
In general, what Natsionalizm had to offer was either not
particularly new (struggle, faith, the Ukrainian idea,
initiative-minorities) or not sufficiently developed (the strong
man, creative violence). Where Dontsov did contribute
something significantly new, however, was in his elaboration
on an old theme, will. Taking his cue from Schopenhauer,
Dontsov accepted the “will to life” as the irrational motive
force of all life. He then arbitrarily reinterpreted Nietzsche’s
“will to power” as the “craving for power” over others and
proclaimed the two wills equal —a step of more than doubtful
logic. Thus, the “will to life” implied the “will to power”, which
“lives in almost all of us to a smaller or greater degree.”145 Both
wills, therefore, were unchanging constants possessed by all
individuals and could be neither increased nor decreased. For
the nation to manifest these wills in the proper form — in the
struggle for statehood, however, an idea, the “Ukrainian idea”,
was necessary in order to channel these latent energies in the
proper direction. The “Provençale” had not provided this idea;
the Nationalists, on the other hand, would. It was not
a question, therefore, of “reeducating the person”, of

inculcating a “new will”, as Sosnowsky concludes by taking
Dontsov’s sloppy use of terminology too literally. This would
have been logically impossible, given the unchanging nature
of will. Rather, as Dontsov repeatedly pointed out, the question
was to find the right idea that would reflect the strivings of the
will. This combination of idea and will would then guarantee
the nation’s survival in a hostile world.146
Where Dontsov is inconsistent, however, was in blaming the
Provencals for espousing the ideas they had. For, as one critic
of Dontsov correctly pointed out, if will is the motive force of all
life, then it — and not the individual — must be responsible for
ideas as well.147 By the same token, Dontsov’s “active
nationalism” was not his own creation, but the creation of his
will. Its “appearance” in the 1920s was certainly fortuitous
given the sad state of the Ukrainian nation, but by no means
necessary or even in any way related to the intellectual and
socio-political reality of the time. In this respect, Dontsov’s
ideology was ultimately pessimistic. After all, if the fate of the
Ukrainian nation depended on the whims of will, what basis
was there for thinking that Ukrainians would ever achieve
statehood? Granted that they were now fortunate enough to
have the answer in Dontsov’s ideas, but who could guarantee
that the nation’s will would not eventually “revert” to a 19th
century Provençalism? Were that to be the case (as it clearly
could), the Ukrainian cause would obviously be lost. Ironically,
therefore, Dontsov’s “active nationalism” contained a passive,
even fatalistic, and ultimately fatal streak. As an ideology of
change, it was simply much too dependent on forces outside of
its domain to be of practical value.
Although generally considered the high point of Dontsov’s
Nationalist thinking, Natsionalizm lacked the coherence of
style and clarity of thought so much more evident in Pidstavy
nashoi polityky and in his articles. This fact, together with a
large dose of pseudo-philosophical meandering, made the book
unreadable for a sizable part of the young Galician generation
that otherwise tried to practice all that Dontsov preached. The
book also laid bare Dontsov’s philosophical weakness and
DMYTRO DONTSOV 81
inability to think systemically. Of course, Dontsov was not

trying to create a complete ideological system, but only a
“worldview”, and in this respect he cannot be unduly faulted
for not having achieved what he had never set out to do.148 His
aim, as his articles very clearly convey, was primarily to
describe what Ukrainians had to be like in order to achieve
independence. What they were to do and how were questions
that would answer themselves once Ukrainians were
sufficiently capable of asking such questions. As he repeatedly
stated, the most important thing was to “know what one
wants, and that which one wants, one wants very much.” What
it was that one wanted would be decided once the wanting was
there: “when there is [faith], a formula will find itself.”149
Furthermore, Dontsov was too much a pragmatist, even an
opportunist, to be able to construct a complete ideological
system. His willingness to sacrifice thousands of Ukrainian
lives for a free Ukraine is a good example of his political and
ideological readiness to take any step to attain his goal. For
Dontsov, the end very much justified the means. His frequently
criticized political zig-zagging and his apparent inability to
maintain the “line” were, in Dontsov’s view, consistent with
his belief that everything was allowed in the struggle for
Ukrainian independence. In this respect, Dontsov’s infatua
tion with the peasantry, for example, sprang not from an
innate love for this particular social stratum, but from the
perception that this class alone could provide the foundations
for a Ukrainian state. Likewise, Dontsov’s support of the
“singular” kind of democracy he believed to exist in the United
States stemmed not from a personal conviction that democracy
was the greatest political good there can be, but from the very
practical observation that American democracy appeared to
have made America into a great power. In other words, only a
“democracy” could channel the nation’s energies in the proper
direction and mobilize it for the Ukrainian revolution. Thus,
his argument with the Hetmanites, for example, had less to do
with an aversion for monarchies as with the belief that a
monarchy would have no social support in the Ukrainian
population and could therefore not survive.
It is therefore incorrect to label Dontsov a fascist for the ideas

he professed in the 1920s (but only in the 1920s!), if only
because one could just as easily and logically brand him a
Yankee or Bolshevik. In spite of his open admiration for all
three “types”, Dontsov admired not so much what the Fascist,
the Yankee, and the Bolshevik had done, as the manner in
which they did it. What bound Fascist Italy, the United States,
and Soviet Russia together in Dontsov’s eyes was obviously
not a particular social system or organization of the state, but
the fact that they were all ruled by ruthless, vigorous, and
willful men. In fact, if Dontsov has to be typecast politically,
then the term that describes him most accurately is not
“fascist”, but “laissez-faire capitalist”. Of course, Dontsov did
have very pronounced fascist tendencies with regard to
political “style” (a question already touched upon in the
introduction). But “style” alone surely cannot be the substance
of fascism, which, if anything, is a way of organizing a state.
Questions of state organization, however, were largely
immaterial for the Dontsov of the 1920s, who considered the
attainment of that state as the first and only priority.
On the other hand, Dontsov was without doubt an “integral
nationalist” of the Maurice Barrfes/Charles Maurras variety.
For him, as for the two Frenchmen, the nation was the criterion
by which everything was to be judged. Still, as even a quick
look at the footnotes to Natsionalizm reveals, there is no basis
to speak of his “main intellectual inspiration” from Barres and
Maurras.150 As this chapter has tried to show, Dontsov
formulated his most basic ideas primarily in response to
concrete political events. What he drew from the writings of
Barrfes, Maurras, Pareto, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Sorel,
Simmel, Le Bon, Hegel, Sombart, and many others was
confirmation of the correctness of ideas, at which he had for the
most part arrived independently. The very style in which
Natsionalizm was written, for example, supports this
conclusion. After stating an idea, Dontsov would endlessly
reinforce it with quotations from the above authors.
Significantly, these quotations did not so much prove his
points as illustrate them. Were one to seek a “main intellectual
DMYTRO DONTSOV 83
inspiration”, however, this would have to be Viacheslav

Lypyns'kyi, who himself accused Dontsov of stealing his
ideas. As the following passage from Lysty do bratiu-
khliborobiv indicates, Lypyns'kyi’s charges may not have
been unfounded:
“. . . there can be no state without the conquest of power.
Power cannot be won without idealistic passions, which
morally support the warriors in their struggle for power,
give them the satisfying feeling of creating a great and noble
deed, and morally justify their struggle for power in the eyes
of the popular masses, among whom this conquest and this
attainment of a state are taking place. There can be no
idealistic passions when there is no strong, organized, and
highly worthy intelligentsia among the local population.
Because only such an intelligentsia can create an ideology,
can morally support those who are fighting for the realization
of this ideology with the material strength of the sword and
of production, and can with its influence on the popular
masses call forth from them love and respect for those
warriors-producers, who are realizing the given ideology ...
and building ... a state.”151
Disregarding differences in terminology and emphasis,
there is no reason why Dontsov could not have agreed with the
above sentiments. The point, of course, is that Dontsov and
Lypyns'kyi did share more or less identical views on the how of
achieving statehood. Where they differed fundamentally was
on the practical question of who: the nation and the
Nationalists (or “mobocrats”, as Lypyns'kyi called them) or
the agrarians and the conservatives (the “classocrats”)?
Related to this was the equally important fact of the
irreconcilability of Dontsov’s absolute hostility to Russia with
Lypyns'kyi’s and the USKhD’s belief that Ukrainian
cooperation with Russia was not only necessary for historical
and geographic reasons but also desirable.
Whether Dontsov actually borrowed ideas directly from
Lysty do brativ-khliborobiv is debatable, however, primarily
because Lypyns'kyi wrote his opus in installments published
in Khliborobs'ka Ukraina at the same time that Dontsov was
busy at work formulating the basic concepts of Natsionalizm

in Pidstavy nashoi polityky and in his articles. Nevertheless,
there is no denying that Lypyns'kyi’s theories were “in the air”
and significantly influenced the intellectual and social climate
in which Dontsov developed his ideas. In this respect, Dontsov
may very well have “adapted” (and in the process
transformed) some of Lypyns'kyi’s thoughts to his own
already existing, but continually changing, views of the world.
Two examples of ideas which Dontsov may have adapted in
this manner involve Lypyns'kyi’s concepts of will and of elites.
According to the Hetmanite, will was indispensable to attaining
a desired goal, while an “active minority with an elemental
inclination to power, to leadership, and to organization” could
be found in every nation and in every “human collective.”152
Although Lypyns'kyi’s will was a conscious striving and
therefore an essentially rational force and his “active
minority” was to consist of the vanguard of the agrarian class,
so that both ideas had substantially different content from
that which Dontsov gave them, it is nevertheless likely that
both concepts serve as the basis on which Dontsov developed
his own versions of the irrational will and of the initiative
minority. Thus, Dontsov probably accepted Lypyns'kyi’s ideas
as starting points, but then arrived at his own conclusions. In
any case, relations between Dontsov and Lypyns'kyi could not
have been worse for personal as well as ideological reasons.
Alluding to the other’s supposed non-Ukrainian origins, the
two publicly referred to each other as “Wactaw Lipinski” and
“Mit'ka Shchelkoperov.”
Although Dontsov exerted an enormous influence on all
Galicians, he enjoyed an unchallenged and unquestioned
popularity with the young in general and students in
particular. Dontsov realized that a reaction to the Ukrainian
defeat was inevitable and that this reaction would be violent in
rejecting past forms of Ukrainian politics. He also understood
that the generation of the 1920s would perforce take the lead in
turning against the Ukrainian past. As a result, Dontsov
preached primarily to the young. In so doing, however, he did
little else but try to persuade the young to be young. “What
DMYTRO DONTSOV 85
usually characterizes the young? — a terrific thirst for

knowledge ... and a firm faith in oneself, because theirs is the
future.” Youth, according to Dontsov, was supposed to be
daring, bold, and certain of its convictions. Most important,
youth meant change, action, and vitality — precisely those
qualities the Ukrainian nation needed. “But who, if not the
young, is called ... to proclaim judgement, . . . set new
guidelines, and destroy the old? Let this be done with an
unskilled hand, but with the never-failing instinct of a creator,
with a faith that upends mountains. Because when that is
there, a formula will find itself.”153
Galician and emigre youth took Dontsov literally. They
accepted him as a prophet and passionately tried to live what
he taught. In this respect, Dontsov actually molded the entire
inter-war generation of Galicians and determined the
intellectual categories with which they defined their reality. It
was perhaps an indication of the poverty of inter-war
Ukrainian political thought that a fiery journalist with a keen
political sense should have so dominated Ukrainian ideolo
gical and philosophical thinking.
CHAPTER 7
THE STUDENTS AND THEIR ORGANIZATIONS
Youth in general and students in particular played a

disproportionately large role in Ukrainian political life since
the late 19th century. In fact, this dependence on youth was so
great that Ukrainian politics frequently experienced radical
directional changes with the political activization of a new
generation of students. The generational nature of Ukrainian
political life, particularly evident among the inter-war emigres
and in Galicia, made Ukrainian politics inherently unstable
and often concealed serious ideological and political dif
ferences behind the facade of generational conflict.
Eugen Weber provides an excellent explanation of this
phenomenon by relating the political importance of students to
the level of their country’s socio-economic development.
According to Weber:
“Where representative institutions do not exist or, existing,
do not really function, schools and universities provide
almost the only and certainly the most convenient platform
for public discussion of national and international issues,
and students are bound to form the vanguard of all radical
movements. The more backward the country, the greater the
part that students play in its political life, if only because, in
the absence of other agencies of human concentration such
as factories, schools will take their place, gathering a
similarly uprooted and concentrated public, facilitating the
ORGANIZATIONS 87
formation of groups and the preparation of action, creating

a student self-consciousness and solidarity before the
appearance of other politically significant class solidar
ities/’154
Weber’s description of a “backward country” applies directly
to inter-war Eastern Galicia and is also not without relevance
to the Ukrainian emigration. The latter, if considered
abstractly as a socio-political whole, was also characterized by
an absence of “representative institutions” and “agencies of
human concentration” other than the schools. Eastern
Galicia, meanwhile, was neither industrialized nor urban, with
the Ukrainians, in any case, living primarily in the
countryside.
Ukrainian emigre students were for the most part
demobilized UH A or AUNR soldiers, who had interrupted their
studies to take up arms and who had little else to do as emigres
but to resume their student life. Their numbers were
supplemented by Galician students who had left the province
after a law was passed in 1919 which allowed only veterans of
the Polish armed forces to study at Polish universities,
including L'viv. The greatest incentive for studying as an
emigre, however, was the financial support that the Czech
government gave Ukrainian educational institutions and
students as part of its anti-Polish foreign policy.
The most important of the emigre educational institutions in
Czechoslovakia was the Ukrainian Free University (Ukrains'-
kyi Vil'nyi Universytet — UVU). Founded in Vienna by the
Union of Ukrainian Journalists and Writers in January 1921,
the University was moved to Prague later that year and
officially opened on October 23. The institution at first received
100 thousand crowns monthly from the Czech Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. However, this figure was steadily reduced as
Czech interest in the Ukrainian question diminished and by
1928, when the UVU was placed under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Education, the yearly budget stood at 500 thousand
crowns. Students, of whom there was an average of 385 per
semester, also received government stipends.155
Equally prominent was the Ukrainian Agricultural Academy
(Ukrains'ka Hospodars'ka Akademiia), which had been,

founded in Podebrady in the spring of 1922. Although under
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture, it too received its
funding from the Foreign Ministry. In the second half of the
1920s, however, the Czechs progressively reduced their
financial support and in 1928 the Ministry of Agriculture
called for the institution's eventual dissolution. With ever
smaller numbers of students, the Academy was finally
dissolved in 1935.156
In July 1923, Mykyta Shapoval’s Ukrainian Public
Committee founded the Ukrainian M. Drahomanov High
Pedagogical Institute (Ukrains'kyi Vysokyi Pedahohichnyi
Instytut im. M. Drahomanoua) in Prague. At first supported by
the Foreign Ministry, it shared a fate similar to that of the
Agricultural Academy, ending its existence in 1933. Prague
was also the site of a Ukrainian Gymnasium, founded in 1925
and also funded by the Foreign Ministry.157
Although the largest number of students, some two
thousand, was in Czechoslovakia, several hundred Ukrainian
students also studied in Germany, Austria, Poland, and
Danzig. In general, student life closely paralleled Ukrainian
emigre life. Just as divided as their elders over questions of
ideology, students proved equally incapable of transcending
coffee-house politics. They outdid their elders, however, in
regarding political questions with even greater passion and
intolerance.158
The two major points of disunity before and particularly
after the Ambassadors’ decision were the questions of social
ism and the Soviet Ukraine. According to the students' own
categorizations, socialists, communists, and Sovietophiles
were considered “leftists”, while Nationalists and all those
who gave the national priority over the social question were
called “rightists”. Many of the latter were veterans, usually
officers, who had been given the opportunity to leave their
internment camps to study. The numerous battles between Left
and Right frequently overstepped the bounds of heated
discussion and developed into brawls, with the rightists in
particular finding this an expedient method of advancing their
viewpoints.
ORGANIZATIONS 89
Unlike their elders, however, Ukrainian students were at

least temporarily successful in uniting in one, all-encompas
sing, “professional” organization in July 1922 at an
All-Ukrainian Congress of Youth in Prague, which called the
Central Union of Ukrainian Students (Tsentral'nyi Soiuz
Ukrains'koho Studentstva — TseSUS) into existence. The
TseSUS immediately became a battleground of the Left and
Right. At its 2nd Ordinary Congress, held in Podebrady in July
1924, the ideological and political differences over the question
of the Soviet Ukraine finally came to a boil. Overpowered by an
alliance of the rightists and the Shapoval socialists, the
Communists and Sovietophiles left the student union and
founded a rival student organization, the Action Union of
Progressive Students (Dilove Ob'iednannia Prohresyvnoho
Studentstva — DOPS). The DOPS began a powerful
counterattack soon thereafter, challenging the TseSUS’s
legitimacy at international student gatherings and agitating
among Galician students.
In 1922, the TseSUS began publishing a monthly journal,
entitled Students'kyi Vistnyk (The Student Herald).
Aside from carrying news concerning various student
activities, Students'kyi Vistnyk also featured numerous
ideological and political discussions of which one deserves
particular attention. Initiated in late 1924 by the later
Nationalist activist, Volodymyr Martynets’, it concerned what
Martynets’ saw as the existing conflict between “parents” and
“children.” The parents, so claimed Martynets’, regarded the
question of the Ukraine’s independence with “deviations and
compromises.” Their children, on the other hand, knew what
they wanted and knew how to get it. More important,
Martynets’ associated each generation with a particular
ideology. The parents, who failed to build a Ukrainian state,
were socialists; their children were Nationalists. By means of
this simplified formula, socialism was made responsible for the
unsuccessful national revolution and Nationalism hailed as
the wave of the future.159 Although criticized for being
simpleminded, Martynets’s theory clearly reflected the
muddled thinking of a large segment of Ukrainian youth,
which increasingly came to see itself as embodying the modern
Ukrainian nation and as best understanding its hopes and

aspirations.
The more radical half of the Ukrainian student movement
was found in the krai (country), in Galicia. There, directly
affected by the Polish government’s repressive policies and
faced with radicalizing experiences in their everyday life,
students turned to extremist solutions, whether communist or
Nationalist, with far greater intensity than their frequently
demoralized emigre comrades. Of particular importance in
radicalizing the students was the government’s policy of
Polonizing Ukrainian primary and secondary schools.
The Galician students were organized in the province-wide
Ukrainian Student Union (Ukrains'kyi Students'kyi Soiuz), a
nationalist organization that went underground after being
banned in the spring of 1921. It was replaced in November of
that same year by the equally illegal Ukrainian Regional
Student Organization (Ukrains'ka Kraiova Students'ka Or-
hanizatsiia), which published an underground periodical
called Nash Shliakh (Our Path) and which was eventually
renamed the Professional Organization of Ukrainian Students
(Profesiina Orhanizatsiia Ukrains'koho Studentstva).
In July 1921, the Ukrainian Student Union organized a
secret Congress which called for the creation of a Galician-
Ukrainian Government that would mobilize the population of
Galicia into “mass movements” and prepare the way for the
“violent liberation of the Ukrainian lands from under Polish
occupation.” Petrushevych was exhorted to subordinate the
ZUNR exile government to the proposed entity, while his
advocacy of Galician neutrality was condemned for separating
Galicia from the larger Ukrainian issue. At the same time, the
student congress resolved to continue the struggle for a
Ukrainian univeristy, urged its emigre comrades to return to
study in the province, and called upon all Ukrainians to
boycott those Ukrainian students attending Polish schools.160
Just as before the war, the demand for a Ukrainian university
became the battle-cry of Galician students. The immediate
reasons for resurrecting the issue were the abolition of the
Ukrainian chairs at the University of L'viv and, more
ORGANIZATIONS 91
important, the official exclusion of all those who did not serve
in the Polish army — in other words, of all Ukrainians — from
studying at Polish universities. Several open attempts were
made to found a center of higher Ukrainian studies, but after
continued police repression the decision was made to go
underground. Informal underground courses lasted from 1920
to 1921, when they were given greater organizational structure
and remodelled along the lines of a Western European
university. The resulting “underground” Ukrainian Uni
versity consisted of the departments of philosophy, law,
medicine, and technology, with the latter soon breaking away
to form the Ukrainian Technical High School (Ukrains'ka
Vysoka Tekhnichna Shkola). In its first year of existence, the
University had 1,408 students, for the most part former
soldiers, attending 66 courses. Student fund drives, along with
the voluntary contributions of individuals and organizations
in Galicia, Europe, and particularly North America, provided
the financing. The head of the Shevchenko Scientific Society,
Dr. Vasyl' Shchurat, became the University’s first rector.161
In spite of continual police harassment, the underground
university managed to thrive by living off the patriotic
sentiments of students and faculty, who regarded support for
the institution as a national duty. After the March 1923
Ambassadors’ decision, however, the rationale for an under
ground university disappeared for most of its supporters. The
way to Polish schools was now open, police harassment was
intentionally curtailed, and the battle had obviously been lost.
The last point in particular resulted in a wave of disillusionment
and apathy and a desire to adapt as best as possible to the
existing conditions. Ukrainian interest in maintaining what
appeared to be an anachronistic institution waned and the
University fell apart in 1923-1924.
The effect of the March decision on the emigre students was
just as devastating. One young Ukrainian in Prague
complained in 1923: “Almost all of us sense a breakdown in our
public and intimate-personal lives. Speaking honestly and to
the point, if we have not yet ceased, then we are now ceasing
profoundly to understand one another, to feel, and what is most
important, we are ceasing to believe/’162 The situation had

apparently little improved in 1925, when most students
“refrained from joining any kind of organization, because this
includes assuming certain obligations” and were indifferent
“to everything that extends beyond the boundaries of their
own ego/’163
The major beneficiary of the disillusionment rampant
among emigre and Galician students was the left-wing Union
of Progressive Students (DOPS). The tactics of the Right
appeared to have been discredited, and the DOPS, with its
“orientation” on the Soviet Ukraine, offered the only existing
alternative to students interested in national politics. Left
wing attitudes grew in popularity among Galician students,
providing the background for the formation in 1924-1926 of
overtly Nationalist student groups and organizations. The
Nationalists supplanted the left-wing students in several years
time and eventually came to dominate the entire Galician
student movement.
CHAPTER 8
THE SOLDIERS, THE SICH SHARPSHOOTERS,

AND IEVHEN KONOVALETS’
Although Ukrainian soldiers played a particularly prom

inent role in post-war Ukrainian politics, they had already
been an influential political force in 1917-1920. Konovalets’s
Sharpshooters, for example, never hid their preference for a
nationalist Ukrainian government and often played a key, if
hidden, role in determining government policy as the mainstay
of the army. Moreover, as the successive Ukrainian
governments revealed their inability to govern effectively, the
military often proved to be the only body capable of not fully
succumbing to the destructive centripetal forces at work in the
Ukraine. In this manner, Ukrainian soldiers established
themselves as an element indispensable to the vitality of
Ukrainian political life.
There were at least two cases of soldiers actively involved in
underground military organizations with political goals
during the war. The first such group was founded in Vienna in
the spring of 1917 by Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooter officers,
who conducted propaganda among the Ukrainian soldiers in
the USS and in the Austrian army aimed at “breaking the
Ukrainian lands away from Austria and annexing them to the
Great Ukraine.”184 The second such underground military
organization arose in October 1918 in Galicia in conjunction
with the Ukrainians’ plans to seize political power in the

province. Led by Colonel Dmytro Vitovs'kyi and consisting
mostly of Ukrainian officers in the Austrian army, the military
organization agitated for the planned coup among the rank-
and-file Ukrainian soldiers. Working through strictly con
spiratorial methods, the organization was open for member
ship only to those soldiers considered “nationally conscious
and reliable.”165 Although neither of the above two organiza
tions survived very long, they set a significant precedent for
soldiers wishing to continue their struggle with political and
military means after the war.
As the war ended for the Ukrainians, some 20-25,000 AUNR
soldiers found themselves in Poland in internment camps in
Wadowice, Kalisz, Szczepiorno, Tuchola, Piotrkdw, Alek
sander Kujawski, Lancut, and Strzalkowo, while approximate
ly half that number of UHA veterans were interned in
Deutsche Gabel, Liberec, and Josefov in Czechoslovakia. In
both groups of camps, the soldiers took part in educational,
cultural, and political activities in many respects resembling
those organized by the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine
during the war. Many of the soldiers, and particularly the
officers, were given the opportunity to attend schools in
Czechoslovakia and Poland and thereby served as a link
between the interned veterans and the students. As a result,
the veterans instilled the students with many of their own
values. This pattern was especially evident in Galicia,
where former soldiers played major roles at the 1921 student
congress and in the underground university.
In both Galicia, where many UHA veterans stayed behind,
and in the countries of emigration, soldiers found themselves
facing a reality whose emergence they had fought for several
years. Imbued with military values, embittered by the war, and
wishing to continue their struggle in whatever way possible,
the Ukrainian veterans became very receptive, to the
radicalization that often follows the frustration of defeat.
What is more, the aftermath of the war placed the
soldiers in a position of social as well as psychological
dislocation. Unable to adjust to the new conditions, the
IEVHEN KONOVALETS’ 95
Ukrainian veterans became all the more set on changing

the post-war reality in the only way they knew how —
by force. Although hardly comparable to the German
Freikorps or Horthy’s officers, most Ukrainian soldiers
also espoused conservative political values and believed
that the demands of the nation superseded social reform.
The bulk of the Army of the UNR and of the Galician Army
left the Ukraine in late 1920. Parts of both armies, however,
had already been interned much earlier. Konovalets’s Sharp
shooters, for example, were disarmed and interned by the Poles
in late 1919. An UH A brigade, meanwhile, had crossed the
Carpathians into Czechoslovakia in May 1919 after being cut
off from the body of the army during Haller’s offensive. After
assisting the Czechs in fighting Bela Kun’s forces, the
Galicians were placed in a camp at Deutsche Gabel, where they
were reorganized as the Ukrainian Brigade (Ukrains'ka
Bryhada). The Brigade was later supplemented with other
Galician soldiers. Some, such as General Anton Kraus’s UHA
unit crossed into Czechoslovakia after separating from the
combined Polish-Ukrainian army as it retreated before the
Soviets in the summer of 1920. Many others were former
soldiers in the Austrian army who had been demobilized in
Austria or released from POW camps in Italy. To meet this
growing number of veterans, the Czechs built a second
internment camp at Liberec in July 1920. In April 1921, both
camps were liquidated and the soldiers transferred to Josefov.
The Ukrainian Brigade in Josefov recognized the ZUNR
exile government and filled the role of Petrushevych’s exile
army. The Brigade’s existence as an organized force, however,
was clearly dependent on the goodwill of the Czech
government. Engaged at the time in their territorial disputes
with Poland, the Czechs willingly financed and trained the
Brigade to keep the Poles off balance on the question of
Galicia. The Poles, in turn, supported emigre Slovak
nationalists and demanded the Brigade’s dissolution as the
price for better relations. After Polish-Czech relations
gradually improved and the Galician question had been settled
internationally, the internment camps were indeed liquidated,
albeit slowly, and the Brigade eventually dissolved.
The Ambassadors’ decision affected the Brigade just as it did

all other Ukrainians. Disillusionment and demoralization
followed the first spurt of defiance. The desertion rate rose
rapidly and many soldiers took advantage of the Polish
amnesty for Ukrainians and applied for permission to return to
Galicia.166 Although the March defeat demoralized the
Galician soldiers, it also contributed to their radicalization and
swing rightwards. The journal Ukrains'kyi Skytalets’ (The
Homeless Ukrainian), the “organ of the military emigration of
the ZUNR lands,” captured the mood of bitterness and hatred
in an editorial on the Ambassadors’ decision:
“The Ukrainian Galician Sharpshooter never placed much
hope on the ‘fairness’ of the Entente and regards its decision
with indifference. Drawing his strength from faith in his
own people and basing the future of the nation upon the one
real law — unremitting struggle against all enemies of the
Ukrainian people up to liberation, the Ukrainian Galician
Sharpshooter considers the Entente’s decision to be a scrap
of paper, which binds him to nothing and which will be torn
sooner or later by the combined forces of the entire
Ukrainian nation and by the blood of its Army.”167
The above passage succinctly reveals the conclusions that
many Ukrainians, and not only soldiers, were reaching. The
Entente, so went the thought process, had turned its back on
the Ukrainian cause. Only by withdrawing into one’s own
nation, insisting on a revision of the incurred injustice, and
applying force could the damage be undone. In other words,
nationalism, revisionism, and militarism could along guaran
tee Ukrainian victory.
Understandably, officers were the most politically active of
all Ukrainian soldiers. Generally more conservative and
military-minded in their thinking than the regulars, the
officers represented a significant political force of no small
nuisance to the various governments-in-exile. Most important
of the officers were Colonel levhen Konovalets’ and his Sich
Sharpshooters. Unconditionally committed to an “independent
and united Ukrainian State”, the Sharpshooters represented
the most nationalist wing of the anti-Soviet camp and as such
played a crucial role in the development of the Nationalist

movement.
Following the Sharpshooters’ Council’s decision to de
mobilize the force in late 1919, those Sharpshooters who did not
join the AUNR in its First Winter Campaign were disarmed by
the Polish army and forcibly placed in a camp near Luts'k,
where they remained for the duration of the winter. There,
Konovalets’ and his officers, opposed on principle to Petliura’s
April pact with Pilsudski, began hatching farreaching plans of
continuing the “organized active struggle” on their own terms.
Resolved to “create a new center of the regular Ukrainian
army” and “acquire a new operational base” in the Ukraine,
the officers turned their eyes to the Ukrainian Brigade in
Czechoslovakia.168
The officers hoped to supplement the Brigade with the large
number of Galician and Eastern Ukrainian soldiers already in
emigration and thereby create a force sufficiently large to have
an impact on the fighting in the Ukraine. The new unit,
according to the officers’ plans, would cross into the Ukraine
through Rumania, march south towards Odessa, and there
await the outcome of the Piteudski-Petliura offensive. Should
the Poles win, the unit would serve as a Ukrainian
counterweight. In case of a Bolshevik victory, it would resume
the Ukrainian struggle.169
After providing Petliura with a censored version of their
plans, the officers gained the Otaman’s approval and soon
thereafter were released from the internment camp. The
leading members of the Sharpshooters’ Council, Konovalets’
included, then went to Prague to win Galician support for their
project. Much to their surprise, however, both Petrushevych and
the UHA veterans reacted with violent opposition to their
proposal that the Galicians lend military aid to Petliura. The
ZUNR press went so far as to attack the Sharpshooters as
“Polish mercenaries.”170 Petliura, in the meanwhile, perhaps
having learned of the Sharpshooters’ real intentions, came to
regard their plans as detrimental to the Polish-Ukrainian
rapprochement. Isolated and attacked from all sides, the
officers abandoned their project.171
The Sharpshooters, however, were not alone in their belief

that the military emigres had a large role to play in the struggle
for Ukrainian statehood. A Ukrainian Union of Officers
(Ukrains'kyi Soiuz Starshyn), founded on April 18, 1920 in
Vienna and consisting mostly of Galician Army officers,
provided an additional impulse to the soldiers’ growing
political importance. Although claiming to be “non-party and
apolitical”, the Union apparently supported the Petrushevych
government. Nevertheless, its ideological leanings closely
approximated those of the Sharpshooters. Its stated task was
to “eliminate all possible disunifying elements” by “fighting
narrow provincial differences.” Its ultimate goal was to “guard
the honor of the Ukrainian Army and of the Ukrainian
Nation” and to preserve the “ideology of the One United and
Independent Ukraine, for which it would be no shame to die on
the field of glory.”172 Although the Sharpshooters neither
founded nor dominated the Union (despite rumors to the
contrary), they do appear to have exerted considerable
influence within its ranks.173 Evidence for this is the Union’s
official participation at a Congress of the Representatives of
Ukrainian Military Organizations Abroad (Z'izd vidporuchny-
kiv ukrains'kykh viis'kouykh orhanizatsii zakordonom),
organized by the Sharpshooter officers and held in early
August 1920 in Prague.174
Present at the congress were representatives of the
Sharpshooters, the Vienna officers’ union, the Ukrainian
Brigade, and of other UH A soldiers in Czechoslovakia (but not
of the AUNR!). Not surprisingly, the resolutions issued by the
gathering bore the stamp of Konovalets’s thinking: “The
Congress supports the complete sobornist’ and independence
of the Ukraine without regard to the social or political forms in
which this independence appears; The Congress asserts that
the Ukraine’s present catastrophic position is the result of an
unwillingness to work, unsteadiness, vacillation, and con
trariety with the slogans listed in the first point as well as of the
very fact of the existence of up to three Ukrainian governments
and their organs; The congress considers it correct not to offer
military resistance to the unification of the Ukrainian lands
that is currently taking place as a result of the Bolshevik

advance and simultaneously calls upon all officers and soldiers
of the Ukrainian Army to further steadfast struggle for the
independence of the Ukraine; The Congress considers it
necessary to maintain in organized form the military units
existing outside of the territory of the Ukraine and to unite
them ideologically with one another/’ The Congress also
suggested that the various military organizations be placed
under a “central ideological leadership” and called on all
Ukrainian soldiers to return to the Ukraine and there continue
their activity.175
The above resolutions, just like those later adopted by the
Young Galicia group, are remarkably level-headed and
realistic in their approach to the Ukrainian problem. Without
in any way being sympathetic to Bolshevism, the soldiers
believed that a step-by-step approach to the problem was the
best course to follow and therefore supported Soviet occupation
of all Ukrainian ethnic territories as a means of furthering
8obornist\ In this manner, at least one part of the
“Independent and United Ukraine” would be achieved. The
next step would then be to attain independence, a difficult task
made substantially easier by the simple fact that now all
Ukrainians would have common interests and fight on the
same side of the barricade. It would no longer be a question of
Kiev vs. L'viv, but of liberating the whole Ukraine. The
soldiers, meanwhile, organized in units and united in ideology,
would be in the vanguard of this all-Ukrainian movement.
Immediately after, and apparently with the approval of, the
Congress, one of the Sharpshooter officers left for Warsaw with
a plan for organizing a combined ZUNR-UNR military force.
The officer proposed to Petliura and to the Polish General Staff
that Petliura’s army withdraw into the Carpathians and there
join up with the Galicians interned in Czechoslovakia. The
Bolsheviks, it was hoped, would then overrun Poland and
begin threatening the Entente powers, who, in turn, would
organize a broad anti-Soviet front, including the Ukrainian
army in the Carpathians, and thereby give the Ukrainian
problem international dimensions. Both the Poles and
Petliura, however, rejected the proposals.176
As was to have been expected, the ZUNR saw the Congress

as a threat to the Dictator’s authority. According to a
surprisingly restrained commentary in the August 28 issue of
Ukrains'kyi Prapor, . insofar as this military congress was
to have been the beginning of political agitation in our army,
we consider this action of some irresponsible officers as a
very dangerous experiment for the army itself and for our state
cause.”177 In view of the extent of the ZUNR’s past criticism of
Konovalets’, there is little doubt that the ZUNR newspaper
considered him to be one of the “irresponsible officers.” In fact,
it is logical to assume, as Ukrains'kyi Prapor no doubt did, that
Konovalets’ was the driving force behind the military
congress.
Colonel levhen Konovalets’ played a crucial role in the
Ukrainians’ war-time and post-war efforts at independence. As
the dominant figure among Ukrainian soldiers and in the later
organized Nationalist movement, Konovalets’ undoubtedly
exerted great influence on the direction that both these
currents took. Perhaps more than any other factor, his
oftentimes baffling political and ideological personality
provides the key to many of the events associated with the rise
of Ukrainian Nationalism.
Konovalets’ was bom on June 14, 1891 in Zashkiv, a small
village just north of L'viv. His grandfather had been a Uniate
priest, while his father was a teacher at the local grade school.
The Konovalets’s, moderately rich and occupying positions of
importance within the village, were Zashkiv’s leading and
probably most nationally conscious family. As was customary
for a young man of his social standing, Konovalets’ attended
Eastern Galicia’s most prestigious Ukrainian secondary
school, the Academic Gymnasium in L'viv. There, under the
influence of Professor Ivan Bobers'kyi, then the head of the
Sokil, Konovalets’ became an active member of the gymnastic
society. After graduating, Konovalets’ took to studying law at
the University of L'viv and wholeheartedly devoted himself to
extracurricular work in the Prosvita. His student activism was
also limited to cultural-educational matters, specifically, to the
struggle for a Ukrainian university. At the July 1913 student
congress, where Dontsov created a sensation by advocating

the annexation of the Eastern Ukraine to Austria, Konovalets’
delivered a paper on a more prosaic topic, “The Cause of an
Independent Ukrainian University of L'viv.”
Konovalets’s political views slowly crystallized during his
stay at the university, when he joined the liberal, moderately
nationalist, and anti-socialist Ukrainian National Democratic
Party, generally regarded as the party of Galician intel
lectuals, officials, and priests. As a member of the party’s
executive body, the Inner People’s Committee, Konovalets’ had
all the makings of an up-and-coming young politician.
Through his work in the party, moreover, he doubtless came to
meet Galicia’s leading Ukrainian politicians, a fact that
worked very much to his advantage in the 1920s.
With the outbreak of the war, Konovalets’ was inducted into
the Austrian army. His actual service time was short, however,
ending in June 1915, when he was captured by the Russians
and interned in a POW camp near Tsaritsyn. The rest of the
story has already been related. After escaping to Kiev and
becoming commander of the Sharpshooters, Konovalets’
remained an active participant in the Ukrainian war effort
until late 1919, when the Sharpshooter force was interned by
the Poles. Although having only an incidental relationship to
military matters before 1917, Konovalets’ proved himself an
outstanding commander. The Colonel, however, always
remained what he originally was, a politician, and as such was
the vital link connecting the Ukrainian military and political
worlds. This fact also explains the Colonel’s ability to become
so politically influential after the war.
Konovalets’s pre-war, essentially cultural, nationalism
underwent a profound transformation during the war. Perhaps
because of his continual efforts to defend the fledgling
Ukrainian governments, the notion of statehood became
dominant in his nationalism. But, as Konovalets’ learned from
the destructive strife between the ZUNR and the UNR,
sobornist’ was a prerequisite to Ukrainian statehood. For
Konovalets’, however, sobornist’ was just as much a manner of
thinking as a political goal. Sobornist’ meant understanding
that each Ukrainian, regardless of his regional affiliations,

owed his primary loyalty to the Ukrainian state and was
obligated to work for the good of that state. Furthermore,
sobornist’, just like Konovalets’s conception of Ukrainian
statehood, transcended all, and particularly political, bound
aries. As a result, a Ukrainian state need not consist of all
Ukrainian ethnic territories in order to be consistent with
sobornist’. Most important was that a Ukrainian state, in
whichever part of the Ukraine that it arise, consider itself the
representative of all Ukrainians and aspire to the eventual
unification of all Ukrainian territories. Herein lay the basis of
Konovalets’s disagreement with Petliura and Petrushevych.
The former had formally renounced the Western, while the
latter the Eastern, Ukraine. Both, as a result, were guilty of
identifying Ukrainian state interests with the interests of their
particular region only. Nevertheless, the existence of the two
governments-in-exile was an established fact which demanded
recognition. Konovalets’, as a result, realized that he had to be
willing to cooperate with both, without aligning himself with
either. Otherwise, he would consign himself to isolation and
certain ineffectiveness.
Konovalets’s views of sobornist’, therefore, may be
considered a blend of lofty idealism and common-sense
realism. Although the Colonel would not compromise his
nationalist ideal, he was crafty enough a politician to realize
that only a politics of realism could attain that ideal. And
realism primarily meant taking advantage of every available
opportunity to advance the Ukrainian cause. The ability to be
realistic, however, required sobriety, subtlety, and, above all,
sobornist’.
After analyzing the Ukrainian problem in all its dimensions
as it appeared in early 1921, Konovalets’ reached conclusions
similar to those of Petrushevych: “It is necessary to
differentiate between the situations of the Eastern Ukraine
and of Galicia. The first is par excellence a question of the East,
whose final solution depends on the solution of a whole
complex of other questions of the East. The second is a question
of the liquidation of the old Austria; the Entente States,
however, would like to resolve it completely at the same time

that the matter of the East is settled. It is therefore necessary to
treat these two problems completely separately.”178
Although appearing to contradict his commitment to
sobornist’ by supporting the ZUNR’s international efforts on
Galicia’s behalf, Konovalets’ considered cooperation with the
ZUNR to be justified as a means of furthering the liberation of
at least one part of the soborna Ukraina. An independent
Galicia did, after all, appear a distinct possibility and
Konovalets’ himself wrote in February 1921 that “Galicia will
not be Polish.”179 Practical cooperation, however, did not mean
ideological agreement. As Petrushevych came ever more to
emphasize the purely Galician nature of the Galician problem,
Konovalets’ replied by intensifying his pan-Ukrainian
agitation and founded the Young Galicia group in Vienna.
Although “our realistic Ukrainian politics” demanded
treating Galicia separately from the Eastern Ukraine, “this
does not exclude a rapprochement between wide circles of the
public of both sides.”180
After the failure of the Pilsudski-Petliura offensive,

Konovalets’ shaped his attitude towards the UNR government
according to the same criterion he applied to the ZUNR: could it
be helpful in furthering the Ukrainian cause? With Poland
weak and the Entente showing a desire to stabilize its relations
with Russia, Konovalets’ realized that an “orientation on
Poland, any kind of hopes for its help in our liberation struggle,
is absurd.”181 On its own, however, the UNR could do virtually
nothing to influence events in the Ukraine. As a result,
Konovalets’ condemned schemes of military intervention in
general and the AUNR’s Second Winter Campaign of late 1921
in particular, because they “not only exposed the active
participants to terrible dangers, but also brought no real
benefits to the Ukrainian population, and, moreover, evoked
savage persecution from the Bolsheviks.”182 In view of the
UNR’s (and ZUNR’s) limited political usefulness, therefore,
the only solution to the Ukrainian problem — whether in the
Eastern Ukraine or in Galicia — ultimately had to lie in the
Ukraine itself, in the Ukrainian masses. Thus, Konovalets’

concluded, it was necessary to go to the nation, as the soldiers
at the Prague military congress were exhorted to do, mobilize
it, and eventually lead it to victory.
Konovalets’s fellow Sharpshooter officers also believed that
the struggle for Ukrainian statehood was impossible in the
emigration and had to take place in the Ukraine, if only
because the emigres stubbornly resisted all their efforts to
unite them. What is more, conditions in the Soviet Ukraine
were highly unstable and could perhaps be exploited. Even
more encouraging was Galicia, where opposition to the Poles
was acquiring mass proportions as a result of unconcealed
Polish chauvinism and the unemployment, land hunger, and
overall socio-economic dislocation exacerbated and produced
by the war. The peasantry was especially active, staging
numerous local uprisings just as often for national as for social
reasons. More important, however, was the destabilizing
presence in the province of thousands of demobilized soldiers
— generally Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooter or Galician Army
veterans loyal to Petrushevych but with an enormous esteem
for Konovalets’s heroics, who continued their struggle against
the hated Poles by means of individual acts of resistance.
Realizing that the soldiers were of potentially great
significance to the outcome of the Galician question,
Konovalets’ and his fellow officers resolved to organize them
into a coherent force that would exert military and political
pressure on the occupying Poles, involve the masses in the
revolutionary struggle, and in this manner instill them with
the sense of sobornist’ and the desire for national in
dependence so necessary to final victory. In short, the intended
military organization would continue the armed struggle and
revolutionize the nation.
CHAPTER 9
THE UKRAINIAN MILITARY ORGANIZATION
The following account of the birth and growth of the

Ukrainian Military Organization (Ukrains'ka Viis'kova
Orhanizatsiia — UVO) is necessarily fragmentary and to some
degree conjectural. Although individual facts are known, their
interrelationships are not immediately visible and have to be
adduced by analyzing the given data in relation to the overall
Galician and emigre reality and then drawing what appear to
be the most likely conclusions. What follows, therefore, is a
history of the UVO that is logical, likely, and coherent, but
which cannot pretend to describe completely “how it really
was.”
“In July 1920,” wrote Konovalets’ in an article in 1929, “we
held the last meeting of the Sharpshooters’ Council in Prague, at
which, after ascertaining the uselessness and aimlessness of
further remaining abroad, we decided to exhort all Sich
Sharpshooters to return to Galicia. After this meeting of the
Sharpshooters’ Council, the Sich Sharpshooter Organization
in fact ceased to exist. The Sich Sharpshooter officers who were
abroad for the most part parted ways — some to the Eastern
Ukraine, others to Galicia. There they became the same kind of
citizens as all others. Each of them joined that group or
party, which best corresponded to his personal convictions.”183
Although the above quotation is generally thought to imply
that the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO) was founded
at this meeting, Konovalets’ himself clearly provides no

evidence to support this contention. In fact, the Colonel does
not even say that the Sharpshooter organization was officially
dissolved, but only that it “in fact ceased to exist” — a
statement that could easily have been made with the benefit of
hindsight. Likewise, the occasionally aired hypothesis that
Konovalets’ declined to mention the UVO’s founding out of
reasons of conspiracy does not hold in view of the year (1929)
when this passage was written. Far more plausible, and
painfully obvious, is the simple conclusion that the UVO was
not founded at this meeting. At the most, the creation of such
an organization might have been discussed by the Sharp
shooter officers. This discussion was apparently continued
and expanded to include other emigre soldiers at the Prague
military congress in early August, which also called on
Ukrainian soldiers to return to the Ukraine and proposed that
a “central ideological leadership” of all military organizations
be created. It was probably only after the congress that the
Sharpshooter officers parted ways: Ivan Andrukh left for the
Eastern Ukraine, while laroslav Chyzh, Mykhailo Matchak,
Vasyl’ Kuchabs'kyi, and others returned to Galicia. Kono
valets’, meanwhile, went to Vienna, where Andrii Mel'nyk was
serving as the UNR’s military attache.
Before parting, and obviously in conjunction with the above
two meetings, the officers apparently decided that a military
organization coordinating the activities of Galician veterans
was desirable. They must have realized, however, that their
efforts to organize the soldiers without Petrushevych’s
approval would be as fruitless as their misadventure with the
Ukrainian Brigade. Konovalets’s reason for travelling to
Vienna, therefore, probably was to discuss the matter with
Petrushevych. But in order to gain the Dictator’s support for
his plans, the Colonel had to overcome the Galicians’ mistrust
of the Sharpshooters. Consequently, Konovalets’ must have
promised Petrushevych that the military organization would
neither be under predominantly Sharpshooter control, nor
aspire to an independent military or political role that could
undermine the ZUNR’s authority. In any case, these presumed
UKRAINIAN MILITARY ORGANIZATION 107
talks appear to have resulted in a “certain rapprochement

between the two sides.”184
In early September, meanwhile, Chyzh and Matchak took to
forming an executive body for the military organization and
persuaded the former Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooter and
member of the Radical Party, Osyp Navrots'kyi, the Galician
Army veteran and member of the People’s Labor Party, Iurii
Polians'kyi, and the judge and member of the Labor Party,
Volodymyr Tselevych, to join them in the Supreme Collegium
(Nachal'na Kolehiia) of the Ukrainian Military Organization
(UVO). Significantly, not only were the Sharpshooters Chyzh
and Matchak a minority in the Collegium, but the non
Sharpshooter Navrots'kyi became its head. What is more, the
choice (certainly not accidental) of three highly respected
members of precisely those Galician parties that supported
Petrushevych reveals the degree to which the UVO was bound
to the ZUNR and to the Galician parties. And indeed, not only
did the UVO maintain close ties to all the parties, the ZUNR
Delegation in L'viv, and the Interparty Council, but the latter
body also provided it with funds.185
The initiative for a military organization, however, did not
come exclusively from the Sharpshooters. Sometime in 1920 in
Czechoslovakia, several officers from the 6th UHA Brigade,
among them Omelian Senyk and Iulian Holovins'kyi, met a
number of times to discuss plans for continuing the
“underground struggle.”186 Whether they actually formed an
organization is unknown, although it is probable, in view of
Senyk's and Holovins'kyi’s later active involvement in the
UVO, that their group was absorbed into the UVO after
Konovalets’s rapprochement with Petrushevych in late 1920.
A similar initiative came from UHA officers interned in the
camp at Josefov, who founded the Fighting Organization of
Galicia (Boioua Orhanizatsiia Halychyny) in the fall of 1920.
Soon thereafter, its headquarters were moved to Prague and
several months later the entire organization was transformed
into the UVO Representation in Czechoslovakia (Ekspozytura
UVO v CSR). The ZUNR’s military attache in Prague,
Lieutenant Ivan Rudnyts'kyi, held the dominant position in
the Representation.187
In general, UHA veterans in Czechoslovakia provided the

Galician UVO with many vital services. Guns and explosives,
for example, were smuggled into the krai by means of the
Carpathians. The Josefov camp served as a convenient hiding
place for UVO cadres, as a training site for new members, and
as a repository for military materiel. The UVO Representation
in Prague, meanwhile, had close contacts to Czech government
officials, looked after the legal needs of UVO activists who had
fled from Galicia, and maintained an illegal crossing point to
Poland at Teschen.188
Konovalets’s role in the new organization was that of its
foreign representative. Although it is usually claimed that he
was from the very first intended as the head of the UVO (but
being in emigration did not immediately occupy the position),
this seems highly unlikely in view of what would have been
Petrushevych’s strong opposition to seeing so powerful a rival
in charge of the organization.189 In any case, Konovalets’
remained in close contact with the krai organization. However,
in so doing, he appears to have bypassed Navrots'kyi,
Polians'kyi, and Tselevych and instead corresponded primar
ily with his Sharpshooter colleagues, whom he addressed in his
letters as “members of the Sharpshooters’ Council.”190 What
emerges is a picture which suggests that Konovalets’ and his
colleagues still thought of themselves as Sharpshooters, as an
organization within an organization, and that a Konovalets’-
Petrushevych power struggle had been brewing since the
UVO’s founding.
Not too surprisingly, the Colonel’s Sharpshooter supporters
in the UVO were encountering considerable difficulties in
gaining acceptance from the mistrustful Galicians. Kuchabs'kyi
and Chyzh complained that “after returning to the krai, we
disappeared from the horizon and fell to the bottom of public
life. Relying only on our own abilities and experience, having
neither funds nor friends, finding in Galicia a negative attitude
towards us that was imported from the emigration, we began
our public work, at times fighting great material poverty.”191
Some Sharpshooters were even beginning to voice doubts
about the need for the UVO’s continued existence. In February
1921, Konovalets’ himself noted the “ever greater decline of our

organization,” the “ever more visible loss... of the awareness
of belonging to our organization,” and the “non-execution of
tasks and duties.” Even the Colonel was having second
thoughts about taking upon himself the “role of leader of such
an organization” or about remaining its representative.192
In addition, serious strains had also appeared in Konovalets’s
as it is tenuous relations with Petrushevych. Their growing
difference of opinion regarding Galician “particularism” and
the subsequent formation of the Young Galicia group touched
off another anti-Sharpshooter campaign. Probably feeling
himself at a disadvantage in Vienna anyway, the Colonel
decided to return to L'viv in order to revive the ailing
organization and use it as a base for the advancement of Young
Galicia’s ideas of independence, sobornist9, and mass
involvement. Although Konovalets* was politically con
strained from turning his back completely on Petrushevych, he
was determined to pursue his own plans to the extent possible.
This meant paying lip service to the ZUNR on the one hand,
while giving the UVO a more independent political role to play
in Galicia on the other.
His colleagues, Matchak, Chyzh, and Kuchabs'kyi, had
already taken some steps in this direction, playing a
particularly prominent role in the Galician student movement.
Chyzh was head of the Ukrainian Student Union, while
Matchak headed the Academic Aid organization (Akademichna
Pomich). All three attended the July 1921 student congress,
where Kuchabs'kyi delivered a speech in which he argued that
a “national state is absolutely essential to the healthy
development of the nation.” After all, continued Kuchabs'kyi,
Woodrow Wilson’s right to self-determination had been shown
to have little practical worth, because the “question of life is a
question of force and only force.” Instead, Wilson’s theory
made self-determination into an “exactly defined fact”, when it
was really a process. As a result, “struggle and only struggle”
is the “method of every process of self-determination.” This
process, however, as an expression of national energy and will,
had to involve the entire nation. Therefore, mass struggle,
when the “whole population without exception applies all its

strength, all its energy to attaining victory,” was necessary. In
time, when the nation had proven its readiness, mass struggle
would turn into armed struggle, the “organic conclusion of the
whole complex of national work, of the whole process of
national self-determination.” At the head of this process were
to be individuals who “feel an insuperable striving for a
national state.” They were to “break the passivity of the
public” by “transferring national work from the path of
occasional explosions of enthusiasm onto the path of steadfast
struggle.” But before this could be done, the masses had to stop
“hoping for outside help”, rely only on their own forces, and
comprehend the “goals of their own statehood” and the
counterproductivity of individual outbursts of opposition.193
Kuchabs'kyi’s emphasis on the importance of the masses to
the national-liberation struggle flew directly in the face of
Petrushevych’s efforts to gain Galician statehood by means of
government action alone. His theory not only was theoretically
dangerous to the ZUNR, but also threatened to undermine the
exile government’s authority in Galicia — precisely what
Petrushevych feared most from Konovalets’ — by isolating the
ZUNR from the Ukrainian population.
Upon arriving in Galicia on July 20, 1921, Konovalets’
immediately took charge of the organization and began an
intensive drive to expand its network beyond L'viv. The
Supreme Collegium was replaced with a Supreme Command
(Nachal'na Komanda) and Konovalets’ became Supreme
Commander. Apparently feeling itself strong enough to play a
more active role in Galician affairs, the UVO finally
terminated its year of inactivity in late 1921. On September 25,
Stepan Fedak, the Colonel’s future brother-in-law, committed
the UVO’s first act of terror, when he attempted to shoot the
visiting Pilsudski but instead wounded the L'viv wojewoda,
Stanislaw Grabowski; and in November, the UVO joined the
Galician parties in organizing a boycott of the Polish census.
Several months later, in the late spring of 1922, the UVO
launched a province-wide “sabotage action” of arson gainst
the property of Polish landowners and colonists. The action
had the twofold goal of serving as a protest against the Polish

colonization (and more generally, occupation) of Galicia and
as a prelude to the intended boycott of the Polish
parliamentary elections of November 1922. Seeing active
opposition to the Poles, the Ukrainian masses were supposed to
radicalize and break out of their passivity. The “sabotage
action” succeeded too well, however, eventually went out of
control, and soon approached the scale of an uprising. The
Polish authorities thereupon increased their repressive
measures and the situation turned clearly counterproductive
for the Ukrainian side. The head of the ZUNR Delegation in
L'viv, who also represented the established Ukrainian
economic interests, persuaded Konovalets’ to call a halt to the
campaign. The Colonel readily agreed, being aware that an
uprising would end disastrously for the Ukrainians.194
Another act of protest against the elections was registered on
October 15, when three UVO cadres assassinated the
Ukrainian writer Sydir Tverdokhlib for actively advocating
Ukrainian-Polish cooperation through his tiny, government-
subsidized Ukrainian Agrarian Party (Ukrains'ka Khli-
borobs'ka Partiia). Tverdokhlib, derisively labeled a khrun’,
was the first Ukrainian “collaborator” to fall victim to the
UVO. His assassination was also a sign of the radicalization
that the UVO was undergoing. In their turn to Nationalism,
many UVO cadres came to divide Ukrainians into friends and
enemies of their movement and, by extension, of the Ukrainian
people.
The aftermath of the Tverdokhlib affair proved disastrous
for the overextended UVO. Already weakened by the arrests
that followed Fedak’s assassination attempt one year earlier,
the UVO now received an almost lethal blow from the police.
Although most of the members of the Supreme Command
managed to avoid arrest, many of the organization’s middle-
and lower-level cadres did not. In order to rebuild the shattered
organization, the Command went underground, while Kono
valets’ left the province with the probable intention of
clarifying his relations with Petrushevych.
Although the UVO enjoyed the ZUNR’s support and was
formally subject to the exile government's authority, relations

between Petrushevych and Konovalets’ steadily worsened
from the time of their initial rapprochement and reached their
nadir during the Colonel’s stay in Galicia.195 The reasons were
twofold: not only did Konovalets’ appear to be molding the
UVO into his private army, but — worse still — he also began
acting like the politician that he was. Using the greatly
expanded krai UVO as his power base, the Colonel
reestablished old political acquaintances in Galicia and
plunged headlong into the province’s political life, even joining
the Publishing League of Dilo and a nationalist (probably anti-
Petrushevych) student grouping called Young Ukraine (Moloda
Ukraina).196 Most upsetting for Petrushevych, Konovalets’
was using the UVO to propagate Young Galicia’s ideology as
well as the idea, first advanced by the 1921 student congress
“accidentally” attended by Chyzh, Matchak, and Kuchabs'kyi,
of a secret Ukrainian-Galician government (with the UVO as
its underground army, of course).197
Particularly illustrative of Konovalets’s independent be
havior was his close association with Dmytro Dontsov.
Although it is unclear whether the Colonel shared Dontsov’s
feelings about Galicia, he realized that the journalist’s
ideological and political convictions made him a valuable ally
who could do much to help set Galicia on the path of sobornist’
and Nationalism. Konovalets’ and his UVO friends thereupon
collected enough capital and revived the Literaturno-
Naukovyi Vistnyk (Literary-Scientific Herald) in May 1922,
insisting that Dontsov become editor-in-chief. Interestingly,
the first issues of the Vistnyk disappointed Konovalets’, who
complained that they lacked a “clear profile” and propagated
khlopomanstvo (a reference to the mid-19th century “peasant
lover” movement in the Right-Bank Ukraine).198 Why
Konovalets’ should have criticized Dontsov’s infatuation with
the peasantry is not clear. Conceivably, he may have found fault
with the fact that it was only an infatuation and did not offer
any suggestions for concrete political actions. In any case, their
ideological differences were apparently still small enough to
allow Konovalets’ and Dontsov to meet with Dmytro Paliiv
and Ostap Luts'kyi to discuss the idea of forming a distinctly

Nationalist party.199
Konovalets’ again made use of Dontsov’s talents in early
1923, when the two joined forces and began publishing the
journal Zahrava (The Glow). The UVO supplied the financial
backing, while Dontsov assumed the position of editor-in*
chief.200 Although the first issue may have been intentionally
timed to appear on April 1, two weeks after the Ambassadors’
decision, Zahrava more likely represented the culmination of
several months’ cooperation between Konovalets’ and Dontsov,
being intended as the mouthpiece of the Nationalist forces in
the UVO and as part of Konovalets’s strategy of popularizing
the political positions which he believed the UVO in particular
and the Ukrainian liberation movement in general had to
represent. A certain Teodor Martynets’ was appointed
managing editor. Iurii Tiutiunnyk, who had led the UNR’s
Second Winter Campaign and who emigrated to the UkSSR in
late 1923, a mysterious “O.V.”, Dmytro Paliiv, and Volodymyr
Kuz'movych were frequent contributors and probably mem
bers of the editorial board (Volodymyr Kuchabs'kyi and
Mykhailo Matchak are said to have been on the board as
well).201 Other prominent UVO members, among them Iurii
Polians'kyi, levhen Zyblikevych, and Volodymyr Bemko, were
among the small number of Ukrainians (including Viktor
Andriievs'kyi of Soborna Ukraina) contributing to the
Zahrava Press Fund.202 To what extent did Zahrava simply
reflect the UVO’s (and Konovalets’s) positions and to what
extent was it an organ of, and perhaps even controlled by, the
military organization cannot be determined, although the first
possibility appears more likely in view of Dontsov’s intractable
personality. Clear enough, however, is the UVO’s heavy
involvement in the journal.
Understandably, the journal bore the stamp of Dontsov’s
ideas. Even more than Dontsov himself was wont to do,
however, Zahrava placed the Ukrainian peasantry at the very
center of its ideology. In an article appearing in July 1923 which
almost rhetorically asked the question “Are We Fascists?”,
Zahrava’s editors underlined their absolute commitment to
peasant politics: “Our state must be peasant. When we place

political above social liberation, then it is precisely because
this state cannot be other than peasant.... It is not true that we
reject the principles of democracy. These principles are “All for
the people” and that means for its vast majority — the
peasantry.”203 Dontsov, meanwhile, even recommended that
the Ukrainian peasantry form its own party and “strive to
acquire political power.”204
The above article on Fascism had appeared in response to
charges that the Zahrava group (hrupa Zahravy) advocated a
Ukrainian fascism. True, the Zahravites, admitted, they were
indeed different from other Ukrainian parties because of “this
activism, this desire to impose one’s own thoughts, ideals, and
methods on the broad masses, and this class and national
egoism we want to introduce to peasant politics ... and to our
relationships with other nations as well as with our own
masses and the existing status quo.”205 But, the journal
claimed, “because we stand not on an international but on a
national platform, just like fascism, we cannot be fascists.”
Probably aware that this logic was not too convincing, the
author of the article conceded that if the ideas propagated by
Zahrava were the “program of fascism, then, according to me,
we are fascists!”206 In another article, meanwhile, O.V. — a
particularly virulent, but always nameless, Nationalist, who
admired Maurice Barras, contributed to the Literaturno-
Naukovyi Vistnyk, and who may very well have been Dmytro
Dontsov writing anonymously, wrote: “The political program
is nothing, action is everything .... the ‘mob’ instinctively
senses the path that is shown it and the resolute will leading it
down this path, about which it has long since dreamed. To
infect one’s audience with this will is all that is necessary.”207
Nevertheless, in spite of the Zahrava group’s flirtations with
Fascism, its overwhelming concern for the peasantry places it
— as later events were convincingly to bear out — more in the
tradition of Eastern European nationalist peasant parties and
less in that of fascist movements.
Hoping to win the support of the Ukrainian peasant masses,
the Zahrava group expanded its horizons and began
publishing an “illustrated political-economic newspaper”,

Novyi Chas (The New Times), on October 15, 1923. The UVO
activist, Dmytro Paliiv, was appointed editor of the new UVO-
funded publication. As with Zahraua, Konovalets’ probably
hoped that the newspaper would strengthen his position in
Galicia vis-a-vis Petrushevych.208
The Zahrava group’s own plans for political action began to
crystallize in 1924 and assumed concrete form on April 4 at a
congress which brought to life the Ukrainian Party of National
Work (Ukrains'ka Partiia Natsional'noi Roboty — UPNR). The
reasons given for creating this new political formation were
the split in the Ukrainian People’s Labor Party, the “shaky
ideological base of the Radicals”, and the Communists’
dependence on a “force that is hostile to the nation.” In other
words, the Zahravites perceived a political vacuum which they
thought could best be filled by a new party. The executive
committee of the UPNR Central Committee consisted of Ostap
Luts'kyi, Dmytro Paliiv, Samiilo Pidhirs'kyi, Kyrylo Troian,
and Iulian Sheparovych. Plans for eleven district executive
committees with seats in L'viv, Peremyshl’, Drohobych,
Stanyslaviv, Kolomyia, Dubno, Luts'k, Kovel’, Berest’, Pins'k,
and Ternopil’ revealed the scope of the UPNR’s ambitions.209
Most important, the new party drew up a program, which
reaffirmed the group’s peasant-oriented and Nationalist
worldview:
1) The party’s goal is to group together and organize people
from various strata of the nation who would be a) conscious
of the political and social aspirations of the Ukrainian nation
and b) united by discipline, and who realize them [the
aspirations] with common means. . ..
5) The party’s socio-economic goal is to bring about the
elimination of that abnormal state, whereby the nation is
reduced to the level of one (the agrarian) stratum economically
dependent on the foreign city and capital. That is why the
party strives for the domination of the economy by the
Ukrainian element, and with this goal in mind desires
that: a) the entire land fund of the country be at the legal and
actual disposal of the Ukrainian peasant masses and that all
trade and industrial capital of the Ukraine pass into national

hands; b) [the party] will especially aspire to create
conditions for intensification of the peasant economy and its
production.
6) In its economic policy the party stands on the position of
private initiative and responsibility, insofar as they do not
come in conflict with the general good of the nation. The
interests of each economic group must be subordinated to the
interests of the nation and of economic progress. In stating the
fact that the Ukrainian nation is primarily a peasant nation,
the party stands on the position that the interests of the Nation
are in the first place the interests of the Ukrainian peasantry.
7) Considering nationally conscious workers to be a valuable
socio-economic stratum and an active factor in the building of
a state, the party will defend the workers from economic, social,
and political exploitation by capital. That is why we
acknowledge the workers’ right to free coalitions and to group
in corporations for the defense of their economic and social
gains within the bounds of broad, work-protective legislation,
that contributes creatively to the state.
8) With respect to culture, the party considers it imperative to
raise the cultural level of the broad popular [illegible]... of the
family, of national traditions, [and] the personal and
corporative dignity and the free self-activity of individual
strata and groups in the nation. With respect to church
religious matters, the party stands for complete freedom of
conscience and religion.
9) Considering that all cosmopolitan slogans contradict the
eternal law of inter national struggle and are either a utopia or
a cover-up for the imperialistic plans of temporarily stronger
nations, the party rejects all international doctrines.210
Significantly, the UPNR program was the first “pro
grammatic” statement of Ukrainian Nationalist intentions
and as such marked an important watershed in the
development of Ukrainian Nationalism. As will shortly
become evident, all its tenets were to be expressed in more
developed form in “mature” Nationalist writings. Unlike the
later Nationalists, however, the UPNR had a very vague
notion of the role of the state in the future society. In fact, except
for two minor references in Point 7, the state completely
escaped the UPNR’s attention. The later Nationalists, on the
other hand, gave the state an extremely important active role
to play in their socio-economic, political, and ideological
schemes. In this respect, the UPNR, like Dontsov, was “purer”
in its Nationalism than the organized Nationalists. By the
same token, the UPNR, again like Dontsov, was specific in its
principles but very vague in its practical suggestions.
Although Zahrava appears to have ceased publication in
1924, the Party of National Work continued in existence until
July 11, 1925, when it joined the Budzynovs'kyi and Dilo
factions of the former Ukrainian People’s Labor Party in the
Ukrainian National Democratic Union (UNDO). The UPNR’s
offer of cooperation, made in the summer of 1924, was severely
criticized by the former Zahravite, O.V., who chided the party
for not taking the road of “party exclusiveness and self-
sufficiency” (Dontsov’s favorite themes).211
Dontsov, in the meantime, had progressively loosened his
ties to the Zahravites to the point where he actually left or, as
he later put it, “betrayed” the group.212 He remained editor
until June 1923, when he was replaced by an “editorial
collegium.” His articles continued to appear until December 1923
(and those of O.V. until January 1924), after which time
Dontsov’s name is inexplicably absent from the pages of the
journal. His leaving the journal clearly took place between
then and — at the latest — the UPNR’s announcement of its
readiness to cooperate with other political groups. In any case,
that Dontsov was neither on the party’s executive committee,
nor a member implies that his decision to leave Zahrava was
related to the Zahrava group’s plans to found a party and
therefore probably occurred at the time he stopped con
tributing to the journal. Why Dontsov, who had earlier
proposed that the peasantry found its own party, should have
been opposed to the Zahravites’ intentions is not immediately
clear. Considering the degree to which the party’s program
reflected Dontsov’s own ideas, his reasons to leave Zahrava
and not join the UPNR probably had to do with the belief that
the Zahrava group was not being true to the principles of “pure
national egoism”, hatred for compromise, firmness, and
clarity which he had expressed in the journal’s first
editorial.213 Perhaps the very fact of wanting to found a party
of Nationalists (and not simply of peasants) was a
contradiction in terms in Dontsov’s eyes — a not inconceivable
conjecture, given his conviction that not “phrases” or
programs, but people “who knew what they wanted” were
necessary. Or, as O.V. put it, “the political program is
nothing, action is everything.”
Whatever the publicist’s precise reasons for leaving
Zahrava, his move meant a break with Konovalets’. While the
Colonel searched for and found allies among Ukrainians and
non-Ukrainians of almost all political persuasions, Dontsov
was evolving towards positions of ever greater ideological and
political purity. Their basis for cooperation was clearly
eroding, leaving Dontsov no alternative but to retreat into his
stronghold, the Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk, and there
proclaim himself the ideologue of Ukrainian Nationalism.
Unfortunately, Konovalets’s attitude towards the UPNR
can be guessed at only. Zahrava’s discontinuation suggests
that it (or the UPNR) fell into disfavor with the Colonel, who
may then have decided to cut off its funding. Perhaps
Konovalets’ considered the UPNR’s declared willingness to
cooperate with the legal parties to be a form of uhodovstvo
which was incompatible with the UVO’s revolutionary aims.
On the other hand, why should the level-headed Konovalets’,
who was not averse to working with almost all political groups,
including the ZUNR and the UNDO, have turned his back on a
journal and party, whose ideology and personal composition
could not but have appealed to him? Were the latter case to be
true, Zahrava may have ceased coming out from a simple lack
of funds — a not unlikely possibility given the severe crisis in
the UVO in 1923-1924 and its perpetual financial difficulties.
And as to the UPNR, the Colonel may very well havesupported
its merger in the UNDO as away of infiltrating the legal sector
with his own allies.
In early 1923, an important UVO conference, held near

Danzig, temporarily resolved the Petrushevych-Konovalets’
power struggle in the Colonel’s favor. Konovalets’ was
reaffirmed in his position as Supreme Commander, the
Supreme Command was officially transferred to the emigra
tion, and a Krai Command, with Andrii Mel'nyk as krai
commander, was formally established in Galicia. Both
commands were instructed to rebuild the shattered military
organization in their respective sectors. Mel'nyk thereupon
drove the organization underground and proceeded slowly to
rebuild its base through strictly conspiratorial methods.
Konovalets’, meanwhile, expanded the UVO’s contacts abroad
and promoted its international standing. Related to both was
the enlargement and activization of the intelligence sector.
Intelligence gathering, logically, best suited the weak
capabilities of the krai organization; at the same time, it could
prove useful in establishing ties to foreign centers.214
The Ambassadors’ decision of March 15 soon followed the
Danzig conference. Petrushevych’s politics were proven
bankrupt, the Galicians became demoralized and gave up their
resistance, the Interparty Council (and with it a source of the
UVO’s funds) collapsed, and the UVO was again plunged into
a serious crisis. Seeing continued armed resistance as useless
in the face of the harsh reality, many veterans left the UVO,
thereby reducing the organization to a highly conspiratorial
group of Konovalets’s and Petrushevych’s most loyal
followers. Moreover, with the collapse of its political base, the
UVO suddenly found itself adrift and with no clear idea of
where it stood in relation to the new political reality. As a
result, a Political Collegium (Politychna Kolehiia), consisting of
the krai commander and of several chosen advisors, was
created so as to increase and define the UVO’s political
range — a move which clearly worked to Konovalets’s and not
to Petrushevych’s favor.
Petrushevych, in the meantime, almost immediately turned
to the Soviets. In negotiations held in Copenhagen, the Soviet
plenipotentiary to Germany, Krestinskii, agreed to Pet-
rushevych’s offer of cooperation on the condition that

Konovalets’ be removed from his position as Supreme
Commander and the UVO be placed at the Soviets* disposal.
Petrushevych agreed to the terms and began to rally the anti
Konovalets’ forces in the UVO. His efforts to gain the upper
hand were indeed successful and in the fall of 1923 Konovalets*
left his post.215
Petrushevych had already tried to have Konovalets’
removed from the UVO one year earlier, in mid-1922. After two
officers sent to organize a putsch went over to his rival’s side,
the Dictator resolved to have Konovalets’ killed. Ironically,
Iulian Holovins'kyi, later one of the Colonel’s most devoted
supporters, was chosen as the assassin. After meeting the
persuasive Colonel, however, he too changed sides.216
In view of the importance assigned by Konovalets* to the
UVO, it is highly unlikely that he left the Supreme Command
with the intention of permanently abandoning the organiza
tion. Isolated in the emigration, confronted with a powerful
pro-Petrushevych emigre opposition, and lacking an equally
large power base in Galicia, Konovalets* probably decided to
leave the scene of battle and quietly reorganize his forces.
While his friend, Mel'nyk, worked on rebuilding the aparat in
Galicia, Konovalets* sought support for “his” UVO among
Poland’s enemies, in particular, Germany and Lithuania.
The krai UVO, meanwhile, lacking funds and cadres,
seemed to have disappeared from the public eye. What its
relationship to Konovalets’ and Petrushevych was is unclear,
although it is very likely that Mel'nyk kept in close contact and
coordinated his activity with the Colonel. Only the low-profile
and inexpensive intelligence-gathering sector, headed by the
former Sharpshooter Osyp Dumin, testified to the UVO’s
existence. Its military intelligence figured prominently in
Konovalets’s contacts with the Reichswehr and the Abwehr
and was usually exchanged for German financial and political
support.217
In early 1924, however, the intelligence sector and with it the
whole krai UVO were dealt a shattering blow. In a series of
arrests spanning February to April, a large number of leading
UVO cadres, among them Mel'nyk, were arrested on charges of

spying. Setting off the wave was the arrest of Ol'ha Basarab,
an UVO courier with close organizational ties to Dumin, whose
suspicious death in mid-February made her a national martyr
and further inflamed Ukrainian hatred of Poles.
Soon thereafter, laroslav Indyshevs'kyi, a Ukrainian Sich
Sharpshooter as yet unknown to the police, came to L'viv from
Prague and assumed the position of krai commander, while
Konovalets’ somehow reestablished himself as supreme
commander in June. Indyshevs’kyi, who envisioned a greater
political role for the UVO and who eventually appears to have
been willing to enlist Soviet support for the organization, from
the very first faced the opposition of Iulian Holovins'kyi and
Omelian Senyk, who believed in activating the UVO’s
military/terroristic capabilities. In mid-1926, the two finally
succeeded in forcing Indyshevs'kyi to leave his post and return
to Prague, whereupon Holovins'kyi became commander. It
was perhaps at the time of Indyshevs'kyi’s stay in power that
the Soviets made several unsuccessful offers of cooperation to
the UVO.218
With the organization somewhat stabilized after Kono-
valets’s return to power and Indyshevs'kyi’s appointment as
krai commander, Holovins'kyi and Senyk renewed the UVO’s
terrorist activity and on September 5, 1924 organized an
unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the Polish President,
Stanislaw Wojciechowski. Interestingly, after a Galician Jew
was falsely arrested and his trial developed into a Polish
version of the Dreyfus affair, the UVO released the following
communique: . we are sorry that the UVO action
unintentionally brought serious harm to a completely innocent
person of Jewish nationality and became a reason for a
renewed attack by the Polish side on the Zionist party and the
Jewish community.”219
As a result of the UVO’s almost perpetual state of crisis,
however, its ranks had thinned out to such an extent that the
application of Konovalets’s and Kuchabs'kyi’s “mass in
volvement” theories had become a practical impossibility.
Holovins'kyi, who, ironically, was the owner of a bus company,
therefore changed tactics and created the Flying Brigade

(Letiucha bryhada), a small, mobile group of reliable cadres
assigned with committing acts of terror throughout Galicia.
That such a group was at all considered necessary testifies to
the virtual extinction of the UVO at the middle and lower
organizational levels and is an indication of the UVO’s
weakness and not of its strength. The Brigade’s primary
targets were mail trucks and post offices, which not only were
symbols of the Polish occupation but also served as a source of
sorely-needed funds. (The UVO, of course, was familiar with
Pilkudski’s exploits.) Moreover, the Brigade’s raids were
intended as spectacular reminders to the Ukrainian popula
tion and perhaps also, as Dumin claims, to the Germans, that
the UVO, although invisible, was still busy at work.220
Although frequently decimated by arrests — thereby revealing
the same kind of conspiratorial amateurism that plagued the
entire UVO, the Brigade managed to last until October 1926,
when Holovins'kyi himself was arrested after the UVO’s
assassination of the L'viv school superintendant, Stanislaw
Sobinski.
Konovalets’s major problem, however, remained the still
incompletely resolved conflict with Petrushevych. A con
ference, held in January 1925 in Uzhhorod in Transcarpathia,
resulted in the final parting of ways. Petrushevych’s followers
were forced to leave the UVO and soon thereafter founded a
rival organization, the Western Ukrainian National Revolu
tionary Organization (Zakhidno-Ukrains'ka Natsional'no-
Revoliutsiina Orhanizatsiia — ZUNRO).221 Although quite
strong in the Kolomyia and Sniatyn powiaty of Stanyslaviv
wojewodztwo, the ZUNRO was incapable of offering the UVO
serious competition and survived only until 1928-1929, thanks
to the increasing unpopularity of its Soviet orientation. The
ZUNRO’s underground organ, Ukrains’kyi Revoliutsioner
(The Ukrainian Revolutionary), first appeared in 1926 and
advocated the unification of the “Ukrainian people of the
Western Ukrainian lands” with the “whole Ukrainian people
in one, great, United Ukrainian State from the Carpathians
to the Caucasus.”222
The Colonel’s troubles with Petrushevych’s followers,

however, were not yet ended. Osyp Dumin, who had left Galicia
for Berlin after the arrests of 1924, organized another pro-
Petrushevych opposition among the emigres in 1924-1925.
Although personal rivalries may have also played some role,
Dumin’s loyalty to Petrushevych appears to have led him to
plot Konovalets’s overthrow. His plans failed, however, as
most of the UVO’s leading cadres rallied to the Colonel. Dumin
was then purged from the military organization in March
1926.223
Following his ejection from the UVO, Dumin wrote a lengthy
denunciation of Konovalets’ for the German Abwehr.
Possessing close ties to German intelligence circles through his
involvement in the UVO’s own intelligence sector, Dumin
probably wrote the denunciation in the hope of ruining what he
knew was a very important connection for Konovalets’ and his
UVO. Although unreliable as a source of information about the
infighting within the UVO, the document does point out the
degree to which the Konovalets’ faction was dependent on
the Germans.224
Berlin and Danzig had become major centers of UVO
activity by the mid-1920s. The Foreign Delegation of the
Military Organization (Zakordonna Delehatsiia Viis'kovoi
Orhanizatsii — ZADVOR), in Berlin since the early 1920s, and
the Union of Ukrainian Officers in Germany, founded in 1921,
promoted the UVO’s interests in German military circles.225
Riko Jary, one of the Colonel’s most trusted lieutenants, had
established ties to the Reichswehr as well as to A. Rosenberg,
H. Goering, and E. Roehm in 1921.226 Born to well-established
German colonists in Galicia, J ary served as a cavalry officer in
the UHA, took sides with the Konovalets’ faction in the UVO,
and later became chief of the UVO’s intelligence sector and its
Berlin representative to the Germans. Perhaps most indicative
of Germany’s importance to the UVO, Konovalets’ himself
established residence in the Berlin area after leaving Galicia.
Danzig, meanwhile, thanks to its position as a bridge
between Poland and Germany, served as a transit point for
weapons and couriers and as a meeting place for the UVO’s
leaders since 1921. The UVO Representation in the city

developed close ties to anti-Polish German circles, including
the head of the paramilitary Heimatdienst, the Danzig chief of
police, and the city president.227
In 1924, several Berlin-based Ukrainians, Germans, and
Lithuanians joined efforts to publish a journal with an
obviously anti-Polish slant, innocently entitled Osteuro
päische Korrespondenz (Eastern European Correspondence).
Although controlled by the UVO, the journal also enjoyed the
support of prominent Galician politicians, Lithuanian
government leaders, and German individuals (including Paul
Rohrbach and Axel Schmidt) and organizations with
revisionist pretensions to Poland’s western boundary. The
editors-in-chief were first Vasyl’ Kuchabs'kyi and then Zenon
Kuzelia, a Ukrainian scholar who sympathized with the UVO.
Funds for the journal were supplied by the UVO and the press
section of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.228
The UVO also used Germany as a convenient site for
training krai UVO cadres. At least four such training courses
concerned with military and intelligence matters took place
with the cooperation of German military and intelligence
circles: in Munich in 1922-1923, in Preusisch-Holland in 1924-
1925, in Breslau (Wroclaw) in 1926, and near Berlin in 1927.
The UVO also ran an officers’ school in Danzig in 1925-26 and
a training course in eastern Slovakia in 1927, probably with
the knowledge of the respective authorities.229
The high point in the UVO’s relations with the Germans
occurred in 1926 when the Supreme Command set up head
quarters in Berlin and began publishing the official UVO
organ, Surma (The Trumpet), in January 1927 in response to
the pro-Petrushevych Ukrains'kyi Revoliutsioner. Possibly,
the UVO’s increased contacts to the Germans were stimulated
by the Locarno Conference’s unwitting confirmation of the
identity of German and Ukrainian interests with regard to
Poland. In 1928, however, Surma was moved to Kaunas in
order to downplay the UVO’s close ties to Berlin. The move
appeared necessary in view of the fact that the UVO’s many
enemies, and particularly Poland, were exploiting its German
connection as proof that the organization was on Germany’s

payroll and little more than an instrument of German foreign
policy. A sensational trial, held in Cracow in late 1927, at
which a certain Volodymyra Pipchyns'ka and 30 other UVO
members were convicted for spying, lent credence to these
accusations.230
Not surprisingly, the UVO also had ties to Lithuania since
1925, when its intelligence was first traded for Lithuanian
funds.231 As both sides came to realize the mutual benefits of
close cooperation, the contacts between the two greatly
expanded. Relations became particularly warm after Augus-
tinas Voldemaras and Antanas Smetona overthrew the
democratic government with the help of the Nationalist Union
and the military. An UVO representative was thereupon sent
to Kaunas, an UVO front, the Ukrainian-Lithuanian Society
(Ukrains'ko-Lytovs'ke Touarystuo), was established, and the
UVO itself entered into close relations with the Union for the
Liberation of Vilnius. The Lithuanians, in turn, not only
increased their financial subsidies, but also granted UVO
cadres Lithuanian passports and political asylum. In May
1928, Konovalets’ and Volodymyr Martynets’ even travelled to
Kaunas as the official guests of the Lithuanian government in
order to take part in the festivities surrounding the 10th
anniversary of Lithuania’s independence.232
Surma explained the UVO’s foreign policy alliances in the
following manner: “The UVO is an organization for which only
the interests of the Ukrainian nation are and will be decisive in
its activity .... The UVO does not consider serving the
interests of foreign peoples. At the same time, however, the
UVO is aware that it has not only the task but also the
responsibility to look for allies and to carry on propaganda
among the peoples of the world in order to prepare the proper
grounds and sympathy in the world for the general liberation
of the Ukrainian people.”233
Although Konovalets’ had succeeded in winning undisputed
control over the UVO by 1926, he soon realized that his victory
was largely a hollow one. The UVO had been so greatly
weakened as a result of the conflict with Petrushevych and the
constant arrests of its cadres, that the very survival of the

organization and of the ideas it represented was in danger
unless a new political and ideological ally could be found.
Moreover, the fact that all Ukrainian parties in Galicia had
followed in the UNDO’s footsteps and were now participating
(and thereby legitimating) the existing political system
isolated the UVO from the Ukrainian political world.
According to Konovalets’, the stabilization of Galicia and its
progressive integration into Poland meant that the UVO could
no longer simply engage in “loud underground combat
actions”, but had to adapt itself to the new political reality and
employ political methods as well.234 The solution to the above
two problems lay in allying the UVO to the growing
Nationalist movement. After all, the UVO had already had
close contacts with the Nationalists and in fact shared many of
their ideological beliefs. Moreover, young Galician National
ists were joining the UVO in increasing numbers and
replacing the original cadres, many of whom had either
reentered civilian life after the March 1923 decision, or had left
the organization in the course of the struggle with
Petrushevych, or had been arrested. By allying the UVO with
the Nationalists, therefore, the Colonel hoped to provide the
military organization with a political base, which would not
only supply it with recruits and assist it in its actions, but, more
important, give it a distinct political profile and thereby define
its relationship to the Ukrainian political reality. At the same
time, Konovalets’ believed that it was necessary to reach some
understanding with the various Nationalist groups in order to
coordinate their increasingly prominent activity with that of
the UVO so as to avoid potential friction. In particular, the
young Nationalists in Galicia were revealing a restlessness
and dynamism which could be made to work to the UVO’s
advantage if harnessed and applied wisely.235
But the prerequisite to an alliance with the Nationalists was
that the Nationalists represent an organized and coherent
political force. Some steps had already been taken in the
direction of organizational unity, but, by and large, the
Nationalists still remained grouped in several separate
organizations and lacked a common set of concrete political

goals. What they did have in common, however, were ties to the
UVO. Together with other leading UVO cadres, therefore,
Konovalets’ set out to try to join the various Nationalists and
Nationalist groupings into one Nationalist organization. As
he visualized it, the future Nationalist organization would be a
“purely political organization... which works conspiratorially
or even legally depending on the situation and the conditions
and which cannot openly and gloriously have relations with a
terrorist organization [the UVO].”236 The Nationalist organ
ization would propagandize Nationalism among the masses,
prepare them for the national revolution, and serve as a base of
support for the revolutionary, elite UVO.237 What is more,
Konovalets’ hoped to use the future Nationalist organization
as a base for his own foreign policy work in Europe. The
Colonel believed that his (and the emigres’) propagandistic
and diplomatic effectiveness would greatly increase were he
the representative of a political organization with a mass
following and not simply of the underground, terrorist UVO. As
a political organization, however, the Nationalist organization
would infiltrate various Ukrainian economic, sport, cultural-
educational, student and other institutions, but not take part in
the political work of the legalistically-inclined Galician
parties. The latter course (which, in Konovalets’s view, did not
exclude contacts with individual politicians) was unacceptable
in that it would compromise the UVO’s commitment to
Ukrainian independence and statehood.238 Typically, the
Colonel’s attitude towards the legal parties reflected the
combination of idealism and realism that characterized all of
his dealings with other political groups.
Surma had alluded to the need for such a division of labor in
its August-September 1928 issue. After first stating that “it is
clear that only the UVO can properly exploit, strengthen, and
direct in the proper channel the elemental movement of the
popular masses to build their own state and can train these
popular masses at the proper moment to cast off the yoke of the
invader and become masters of their own land,” the journal
pointed out that “this preparation must go in two directions.
First, the organization cannot allow that, on the one hand, the
Ukrainian public, which currently finds itself under the fist of
the Polish invader, get used to this fist and accomodate itself to
the existing regime, and that, on the other hand, the ruling
Polish occupier not even for one moment feel secure on our
lands.... The second direction is positive work, which involves
raising new cadres of the Ukrainian public, who in full
awareness and steadfastness, with unshakeable energy, and
in an organized manner would strive to attain our goal — the
building of a Ukrainian state.”239 Konovalets’ probably
envisioned the UVO as continuing with the first “direction”,
and the Nationalist organization as carrying out the second.
Opposed to Konovalets’ were Volodymyr Kuchabs'kyi and
the leading krai UVO cadres, Dmytro Paliiv, Liubomyr
Makarushka, and Volodymyr Tselevych, all of whom argued
that individual UVO members should actively participate in
the legal parties and thereby advance the UVO’s goals. What
their proposals ultimately meant, of course, was that the UVO
cease being a revolutionary organization apd place itself at the
disposal of the legal sector. Kuchabs'kyi himself joined the
Hetmanites, while the others primarily became members of the
UNDO. With regard to the envisioned Nationalist organiza
tion, the Colonel’s internal opponents believed that it too
should work within the legal Ukrainian parties.240
The conflict between these two conceptions, which were soon
to be joined by a radically different one — that of the young
Galician Nationalists, is at the center of the developments
described in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 10
THE UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS:

THEIR ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR IDEOLOGIES
The oldest existing emigre Nationalist organization was the

Group of Ukrainian National Youth (Hrupa Ukrains'koi
Natsional'noi Molodi — HUNM), which was founded in 1922 by
Galician Army officers and soldiers in the internment camps
at Liberec and Josefov. Soon thereafter, branches of the
organization were also established in most Ukrainian student
centers in Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Germany. Its
members, for the most part Galicians, were at first united on
little other than the belief that Ukrainian national interests
should take precedence over social questions, that the socialist
menace had somehow to be resisted, and that Ukrainians
should rely only on their own forces. The tasks which it
initially set itself were to “unite Ukrainian students on the basis
of the state independence of the Ukraine, to study the national
development of other peoples, in particular agrarian ones, and
to learn the means and methods by which these peoples
attained and continue to attain their national-state goals.”241
In order to further its ends, the HUNM organized rallies,
lectures, discussions, and concerts and actively took part in
student organizations, and particularly the TseSUS. Natural
ly, it belonged to the “rightist” student camp.
In the same year of its founding, however, the HUNM was
already expressing characteristically Nationalist viewpoints.
At a festivity honoring Galicia’s independence, for example, a

certain Iliarii Ol'khovyi prophesized that:
. in the future there will come people who will understand
that the independence of the Ukrainian state must in the
first place come out of L'viv and Kiev and not out of Paris,
that only the Ukrainian people can decide the fate of their
state, and that independence must be founded not on
Wilson’s self-determination of peoples, but on our own
Ukrainian, unyielding ‘I want’. The law is the weapon of the
weak, while the strong Ukrainian people (and such will
they be) should only demand and take. There will come
people who, knowing the past, will remember that state
independence is attained with weapons, while international
conflicts are resolved not by feelings or sentiments, but by
force, that the factor which is ultimately decisive is war, and
that the argument which best speaks to the conscience of a
hostile neighbor is a sharp knife.”242
A commitment to sobornist’, a reliance on “our own forces”, a
rejection of abstract rights in favor of ruthless action, an
acceptance of struggle as the basic law of life, and a vision of a
future elite — all these elements can also be found in the
thinking of Dontsov and Kuchabs'kyi.
In January 1924, the individual HUNM branches held a
congress in Prague, where they elected a central executive and
resolved to publish a periodical called Natsional'na Dumka
(National Thought). The journal appeared from April 1924 to
December 1927 and was partially financed by the UVO
Representation in Czechoslovakia since 1926.243 Its many
editors included, among others, Myron Konovalets’ (the
Colonel’s brother), I. Ol'khovyi, Stepan Nyzhankivs'kyi, Osyp
Boidunyk, Oles’ Babii, and Volodymyr Martynets’. Dmytro
Andriievs'kyi was a frequent contributor.
According to an editorial in the journal, the HUNM’s
ideology was based on the following propositions: an
Independent Western Ukraine as a step towards a United
Ukrainian State; the reliance on “our own forces”; a “strong,
holy faith in ourselves”; the inviolable national principle “I am
supposed to live, I want to live, I must live”; eternal struggle as
UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS 131
the means of attaining the right to life, because “life lives off
life”; the acknowledgement of no rights or “limitations” in
waging the struggle for life; force as the ultimate arbiter of al)
conflicts; and the principle of the survival of the fittest.244
Having established that the “weaker one dies”, the HUNM
concluded that everything that “poisons the national
organism” and makes it vulnerable to defeat must be
eliminated. This meant replacing love of one’s enemies with
hate, mercy with “destroying the enemy at every step ... and
with every means”, “international altruism” with the “holiest
national egoism”, and “humanity” with “national pride.” As
for the practical attainment of its ends, the HUNM suggested
monolithic national unity: . the nation is a collective. If
every one of its members is not filled with the same goal, if he
does not merge his own ‘ego’ with the ‘ego’ of the nation,
subordinating the first in every respect to the second, if he does
not enter the struggle side by side with the others, then all our
efforts will be useless, then the outcome of the battle is
beforehand decided.”245 Interestingly, this last passage brings
to mind Volodymyr Vynnychenko’s very similar arguments
concerning his United Revolutionary Democratic National
Front and reveals the degree to which such thinking was
common to all anti-Soviet Ukrainians, regardless of their
political persuasions.
The Group had undergone a significant ideological
transformation in the first two years of its existence. As a
comparison of the above two passages shows, by 1924 the
HUNM considered the Ukraine’s enemies to include not only
other nations or states, but also “dangerous” elements within
the nation itself. In granting the nation the right to purge these
elements, the HUNM took a decisive step towards affirming
the prerogative which the later organized Nationalists were to
grant themselves: to decide, as the nation’s foremost
representatives, who was a true Ukrainian and who was not.
At the same time, the HUNM supplemented its earlier
inclinations to external agressiveness with muted advocacy of
internal repression and social control.
By 1927, however, the HUNM was already expounding
distinctly Nationalist positions: “In place of internationalism

we must foster the idea of national unity, in place of fratricidal
class slaughter — the idea of cooperation, positivism, realism,
and patriotism. And this excludes synthesis and compromise
because synthesis and compromise always harm the weaker
one. The national-state principle and the class-international
communist one are fire and water. And if someone wants
to create a synthesis of these two antitheses, then he wants
to reconcile fire with water. We do not believe in this
synthesis. And that is why in place of internationalist phrases we
bring to the people the slogan: Ukraine above everything.”246
That same year Natsional'na Dumka published an article by
D. Andriievs'kyi, entitled “The Building of the Nation”, which
articulated the essential ideas of the Nationalist movement
and proved of lasting significance for the development of a
Nationalist organization. According to Andriievs'kyi:
“Until now our Nation was an amorphous ethnic mass, that
is, it was really not a nation, that vital, organized cell of
society which is creative and active. Now it is one [a nation]
psychologically, in the souls, in the ideas of its more sensitive
elements, but it is still not a final, living fact. The spirit of a
nation moves within this mass, which, however, lacks a
physically real organization in order to be a living organism.
In and of itself the spirit has neither form nor direction. It
moves in all directions and when it faces an obstacle or
boundaries that are too small it roars, destroys, and breaks.
Then it is a destructive force. Only by giving it proper form,
by channeling it in the proper direction can one extract use
ful work from it ... . Thus for a nation to be a vital and
creative category, a subject and not an object of history, it
must have a real, material organization, one that is intrinsic
to it, organic, and derived from it and not imposed from
outside .... The building of the Nation in its present stage
requires the wholeness, cohesiveness, and the monolithic
nature of our national body .... Iron discipline, order, the
subordination of the secondary to the basic, of the personal

to the general, and of the particular to the fundamental must
be the law.”247
Significantly, Andriievs'kyi saw the key to victory in organ
ization and not, like Dontsov, in inspiration. This very simple,
but critically important difference, was to lie at the basis of the
Nationalists’ inability to draw the publicist into their
movement.
Following an unsuccessful attempt at unifying Ukrainian
organizations and parties in an “organ for the defense of the
Ukrainian emigration in the CsR”248 in the late spring of 1926,
the HUNM executive and several branches initiated steps
towards organizational unification with other Nationalist
groups. Negotiations were thereupon undertaken with the
League of Ukrainian Nationalists (Liga Ukraine'kykh
Nateionalietiv — LUN), an organization of Eastern Ukrain
ians, mostly AUNR veterans, that was founded on November
12, 1925 in Podebrady. Three like-minded organizations had
merged to form the League: the Ukrainian National Union
(Ukraine'ke Nateional'ne Ob'iednannia) headed by Mykola
Stsibors'kyi and Dmytro Demchuk, the Union of Ukrainian
Fascists (Soiuz Ukraine'kykh Fashystiu) headed by Leonid
Kostariv and Petro Kozhevnykiv, and the Union for the
Liberation of the Ukraine (Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukrainy —
unrelated to the pre-war SVU) headed by Iurii Koilard
and a certain Hryhorovych. As its motto the LUN adopted
the rather banal statement “Thoughts are thoughts, but
swords are swords” (Dumka dumkoiu, mech mechem).
The question of the League’s attitude to Italian Fascism
proved to be a major divisive point within the young
organization. The minority faction led by Kostariv, later to be a
prominent activist in the organized Nationalist movement,
proposed patterning the LUN’s Nationalism directly on
Italian Fascism. Stsibors'kyi’s majority and ultimately
victorious faction opposed this “orientation” on foreign models
and instead suggested that Ukrainian Nationalism seeks its
inspiration in Ukrainian history, culture, and tradition.
Significantly, the disagreement concerned not the author

itarian organization of the state and society, but the imitation
of non-Ukrainian examples. The League, in other words,
reaffirmed its commitment to Nationalism, but by no means
rejected what the Italian Fascists preached.249
Despite the League’s public support of th UNR, its
ideological leanings were clearly far to the right of the Petliura
camp. Besides Mussolini, Maurice Barrés and Dmytro Dontsov
exerted a particularly strong influence on the thinking of the
LUN. The extremism to which its members tended was already
evident in an article written by one of its future cadres, a
certain V. Voin, several months before the League’s founding.
Writing in the TseSUS journal, Students'kyi Vistnyk, Voin
proposed 13 theses concerning the “state-minded youth”:
1) The clearest feature of a person in the universe is his
ability to master his living and non-living environment, even
in time and space. Indivisible in their essence, ideas and
actions, when systematically executed, are means to [this]
mastery. Beyond them there is only chaos. The eternal struggle
with chaos is the basic task of the person. The ideal is the
eventual subjugation of chaos by the person.
2) The greatest imperative for Ukrainians, the struggle for
the Ukrainian perfect nation, is simultaneously a struggle
against chaos in the familial and societal spheres, as well as in
material and non-material culture. This struggle is possible
only with the training of leaders, who will systematically rule
over these spheres, without any compunctions to destroy
everything hostile within themselves and in their environ
ment The creation of such leaders is the basic task of the
Nation. The ideal is a Nation, where every individual exists
only for the Nation in the name of its perfection ....
4) The creation of such leaders, the preparation for the
foundations of the luxuriant blossoming of the nation, is under
present conditions possible only within the Ukrainian
intelligentsia ....
5) Primarily in view of its great task, the Ukrainian
intelligentsia must preserve its moral and physical health ...
10) Where there is no will, everything will appear to be very
complicated .... On the other hand, organization is the
expression of will. Of all intellectuals, Ukrainian youth is most
suited for this [organization].
11) The character of the organization of Ukrainian youth
must correspond to the character of the Ukrainian nation. The
most fundamental and most famous organization, instinctive
ly accepted by everybody in the Ukraine, is that of the military,
praised in songs and ballads ....
12) The organization must know and appropriately guide the
entire personal life of its members .... In the sexual sphere,
everyone should remember that he is supposed to create a
family, the basis of the Nation. People, who give much weight
to transient sexual refations, should stand on the lowest rung
of the organization’s hierarchy.250
Voin’s almost pathological obsession with chaos, order, and
organization represented a qualitatively new element in
Ukrainian Nationalism. His goal was not so much statehood,
the traditional Nationalist objective, as the “perfect nation.”
The organization he proposed was unabashedly totalitarian,
implying, therefore, that the nation, whose character the
organization had to reflect, was also totalitarian. Pseudo-
philosophical and conceptually primitive, Voin’s theses were
an expression of the kind of fanaticism prevalent in the
extreme right wing of the Nationalist movement. Not
surprisingly, the Nationalist extremists, like Voin, were
usually students.
That Voin’s extremism was probably not untypical for the
League is suggested by a public statement released by the LUN
in the late summer of 1926: ”... the only possible form of state
rule, at the beginning and under present conditions, can be a
dictatorship of groups of organized Ukrainian patriots-
nationalists, who have state-minded tendencies, [a dictator
ship] which should be realized in the person of that national
vozhd’ who will organize and complete the liberation of the
Ukrainian People.”251 Reacting to these comments, one Tryzub
publicist asked: “Is this an inability to express one’s thoughts
in Ukrainian, or simply an inability to express one’s thoughts,
or finally the complete inability to think?”252
In spite of all these inabilities, the League managed to
publish two issues of an ideological journal, Derzhavna
Natsiia (The State Nation), in 1927. According to the
Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk, the first issue contained a
“nationalist platform”, “much popularization of Maurice
Barras’ ideas”, and “argumentation against doctrinaires of a
certain type of government”, while the second issue, published
in collaboration with the HUNM, offered little that was new
and was essentially a continuation of the HUNM’s Natsional'-
na Dumka.263
Although avowed Nationalists, the League’s members did
not immediately regard themselves as an independent political
force and, in fact, supported the UNR. Consistent with this
viewpoint, the LUN considered its mission to be to promote the
integration and unification of the various Ukrainian political
currents under the national banner. Thus, immediately after
its founding, the LUN took part in the formation of the
Committee of Unified Ukrainian National-Political Organ
izations, whose platform demanded “sovereignty, complete
sobornist’, and independence”, a “democratic state order”, the
“nation above the class and the state above the party.” Other
members of the Committee included the outwardly pro-UNR
Ukrainian Radical Democratic Party, the HUNM, the Union
of Ukrainian Agrarians in the CsR (which eventually merged
with the LUN), the Union of Former Ukrainian Soldiers, and
the Group of Kuban Ukrainians.254 And following Petliura’s
death, it was the LUN which prompted representatives of over
50 Ukrainian organizations in Czechoslovakia to join the
already-mentioned committee to honor Petliura’s memory.
Despite the fact that the two committees did not last very
long, the LUN’s integrational ambitions were still strong
enough to prompt it to initiate the founding of the Union of the
Ukrainian Emigration in the Czech Lands on June 10, 1926.
After renaming itself the Ukrainian National-Political Union
Abroad on September 1, the organization drew up a platform
where it pledged itself to stand on the “basis of the
independence and sobornist’ of the Ukrainian State”, to
recognize “only the people as a whole as the source of state
power”, and to pursue the “goal of organized assistance to the
Ukrainian people in their struggle for state, national, cultural,
and social liberation and for the renewal of the state
sovereignty of the Ukrainian people in the form of an
independent democratic republic.” Along with the LUN, fac
tions of the SRs and of the SDs, the Radical Democratic Party,
and the TseSUS joined the organization.255 “Party egoism and
elements of competition”, however, led to the Union’s rapid
demise.256
As the LUN’s involvement in the above organizations
shows, its members clearly had a very vague sense of their own
ideological convictions. On the one hand, the League signed
statements demanding democratic republics, while, on the
other, it proclaimed the need for a dictatorship. Although at
least two of its members were avowed fascists (Kozhevnykiv,
Kostariv) and one wasatotalitarianfanatic(Voin), the League
appears to have regarded its integrational efforts as being
entirely consistent with its ideology. In this respect, the LUN’s
superficiality, ideological imprecison, and lack of self-identity
placed it at the opposite end from Dontsov, who always knew
what he wanted and who insisted that all Nationalists be like
him. Nevertheless, extreme as it was, the LUN was typical of
the early Nationalists in its groping attempts to divorce itself
from its ideological heritage and develop an independent
Nationalist world view. Unlike most of the other emigre
Nationalists, however, the League made this transition in a
particularly simple-minded manner that clearly reflected its
disdain for “thoughts” and infatuation with “swords.”
Following its unsuccessful efforts at unifying the Ukrainian
emigres, the LUN turned to consolidating its forces with those
of like-minded Nationalists and, in particular, with the
HUNM. In the summer of 1927, after several months of
negotiations, the two organizations agreed on the formation of
a coordinating center, the Union of Organizations of
Ukrainian Nationalists (Soiuz Orhanizatsii Ukrains'kykh
Natsionalistiu), with M. Stsibors'kyi as head. The Union’s
stated goal was to “struggle for the renewal as soon as possible

of an Independent National United Ukrainian State, which
would guarantee the well-being of all strata of the Ukrainian
people .. .The means towards this end included “fostering a
consciousness of the unconditional primacy of Ukrainian
national-state interests over all other interests, be they of foreign
peoples or of our own political, social, religious, military or other
groupings or of individual persons” and “maintaining a clearly
hostile attitude towards the occupying regimes on the Ukrainian
lands as well as towards those Ukrainian political groups who
in their activity find support in any one of the occupying
regimes.” The Union also resolved to take steps towards the
“final formulation of the Ukrainian nationalist ideology” and
the “creation of a new Ukrainian nationalist organization,
which would unite all like-minded nationalist elements abroad
as well as in the Krai on the basis of one organizational
scheme.”257 Further steps towards ideological and organ
izational unity were taken on January 28, 1928 and June 25,
1928, when, respectively, the Brno and the Berlin branches of
the LUN and the HUNM officially dissolved and merged in
Unions of Ukrainian Nationalists (Soiuzy Ukrains'kykh
Natsionalistiu).
The growth of a Nationalist movement among the emigres
was paralleled by a similar development in Galicia. A
difference of crucial importance, however, characterized the
krai Nationalists. Whereas their emigre comrades lived
through and took an active part in the revolutions of 1917-1920
and considered that period as the major inspiration for their
Nationalism, the Galician Nationalists were generally young
students, who did not directly experience the Ukrainian
Revolution and who therefore formed their worldview on the
basis of romanticized interpretations of that time and on the
basis of the ideological and political realities of the 1920s. As a
result, although the emigres were also inclined to extremism and
authoritarianism and were heavily influenced by the Fascist
example, the young, impetuous, romantic, and revolutionary
Galicians rejected all forms of coffee-house politics and became
active exponents of a radical Nationalism which made no
secret of its admiration for the Italian dictator and glorified
direct and immediate action as the only solution to the
oppressiveness of the Galician reality. Impressed by deeds
alone, the inter-war generations of Nationalists became
incapable of dispassionately regarding a phenomenon and
delving beneath its surface appearance. The result was often
an uncritical admiration for all that radiated vitality as well as
an uncritical rejection of all that smacked of excessive thought.
True to the dictum that generational change was a major
determinant of Galician politics, upper gymnasium and
university student youth dominated the Nationalist movement
in Galicia. Confronted with overt discrimination against
Ukrainians and the progressive deterioration of the already
unsatisfactory economic conditions of the Ukrainian popula
tion as well as frustrated by the Polonization of Ukrainian
schools and the inability to advance in a society whose all but
lowest tiers were largely closed to them, the embittered
students immediately joined the ranks of Poland’s implacable
enemies and sought radical solutions to their problems, which
they identified with the problems of the Ukrainian nation. The ’
experience of the underground university and of the UVO’s
“sabotage action”, where students had a first-hand opportun
ity to make a contribution to the national cause, helped
transform nationally-conscious youths into Nationalists. The.
Ambassadors’ decision, Petliura’s assassination, Schwartz-
bard’s trial, and the communist challenge, as represented by
the Soviet Ukraine and the powerful local communist student
movement, drove the young Nationalists further rightwards, a
direction that Mussolini’s success in Italy seemed to suggest
was the wave of the future. The students’ extremism received a
powerful impulse from the rioting that rocked L'viv in the early
days of November 1928. Sparked by a massive Ukrainian
demonstration in honor of the 10th anniversary of the
founding of the ZUNR, the ensuing city-wide disturbances
resulted in enormous damage to Ukrainian cultural and
economic institutions and in violent confrontations between
Ukrainian and Polish students. Not surprisingly, the fighting
only served to increase the students’ determination to
overthrow the hated Poles.
The first semi-Nationalist groups in Galicia were organized

in 1923-1924. Consisting of small numbers of trusted friends,
the groups possessed no clear ideological and political
orientation aside from their agreement on the necessity of
Ukrainian statehood and their hatred of socialism and the
Soviet Ukraine. The groups were usually found in student
circles and in the scouting organization Plast, with the latter in
particular often serving as a training ground for future UVO
and Nationalist cadres. Not surprisingly, many young
“rightists” had ties to the UVO.
In 1924-1925, several formal organizations with Nationalist
leanings came into existence. One was the L'viv-based Organ
ization of Upperclassmen of the Ukrainian Gymnasia (Orhan-
izatsiia Vysokykh Klias Ukrains'kykh, Gimnazii), which put
out an underground journal called Meteor. Far more important
was the Group of Ukrainian State Youth (Hrupa Ukrains'koi
Derzhavnyts'koi Molodi\ founded in 1925. Significantly, not
only were many of its members Hetmanites, but the choice of
the adjective derzhaunyts'ka was inspired by Lypyns'kyi’s
Lysty. The Hetmanites left the Group during the Lypyns'kyi-
Dontsov feud, while the remaining Nationalists renamed the
organization the Group of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth.
Riding on the crest of Nationalism’s growing popularity with
the young (thanks in large part to the appearance of Dontsov’s
Natsionalizm in 1926), the original L'viv-based Group
managed to establish branches throughout Galicia as well as
among young artisans and workers.258
In need of some central coordinating body, the individual
groups of Ukrainian Nationalist youth established a Union of
Ukrainian Nationalist Youth (Soiuz Ukrains'koi Natsional-
istychnoi Molodi — SUNM) in 1926. The Union was centered in
L'viv, which had the largest concentration of Ukrainian
university and gymnasium students, and established its
headquarters in the Academic House (Akademichnyi Dim), the
Ukrainian university student dormitory. Naturally, close ties
were maintained with Dontsov, whose Vistnyk served as a
forum for the more talented young Nationalist writers and
poets in the SUNM. Although itself illegal, the SUNM
managed to put out a legal publication, Smoloskypy (Torches),
which advocated a softened version of its hard-line National
ism. SUNM cadres were also active in legal Ukrainian
educational, cultural, and sports organizations such as the
Prosvita and the Sokil.
Two rival camps existed within the student organization.
The smaller one, led by Osyp Bodnarovych, the Smoloskypy
editor and an avowed fascist, supported close cooperation with
the legal Ukrainian political sector in general and with the
Ukrainian National Democratic Union (UNDO) in particular
— to the point of campaigning together with the UNDO in the
March 1928 elections. The second and larger camp, led by Ivan
Gabrusevych, a fanatical Nationalist and driving force behind
the SUNM’s radicalization, believed that the SUNM should
stand on Dontsov’s principles of radical exclusiveness and
unconditional non-cooperation with the existing Ukrainian
parties. According to the stronger faction, the very willingness
to participate in Polish politics was tantamount to a betrayal of
the Ukrainian cause.259 Outnumbered by the Gabrusevych
radicals, Bodnarovych and his followers left the SUNM prior
to the elections.
Although greatly influenced by Dontsov, the SUNM
Nationalists made several more or less original contributions
to the Nationalist worldview. Foremost among them was the
creation of a Ukrainian “mythology” whose centerpiece was
the “cult of heroes” (kul't heroiv). Soldiers and UVO cadres who
had died for the Ukrainian cause were idealized, honored, and
set up as examples to be followed and their graves made the
objects of veneration. The Kruty battle, for example, where
several hundred students died on January 30, 1918 while
defending the Central Rada from the Bolshevik invasion, was
assigned well-nigh religious significance. Besides motivating
Ukrainians to heroic action, the cult of heroes was also
intended to serve as a reminder that statehood could be
achieved only by means of arms. In this respect, the SUNM
was in agreement with the emigre and UVO Nationalists. The
Galicians, however, drove this, as they did many other notions,
to its logical end and developed a theory of “permanent
revolution” (permanentna revoliutsiia). Somewhat similar to
certain ideas expressed by V. Kuchabs'kyi and Konovalets’ in
1921, the theory of permanent revolution also envisioned the
liberation struggle as a process which would culminate in the
national revolution after much preparatory work. Kuchabs'kyi
and Konovalets’, however, had emphasized mass involvement
in “certain concrete matters” such as the struggle for a
university or against conscription, rejecting mass involvement
in “armed actions.”280 The SUNM, on the other hand,
considered that the masses had to and could be “permanently”
involved in direct revolutionary action. In this respect, the
SUNM envisioned a far broader mobilization of the population
and demanded the active as well as the passive support of
every Ukrainian, whose position within the nation, therefore,
was to be that of a soldier in an army (an idea also articulated
by V. Voin of the LUN).
Not surprisingly, ideology played a small role in the SUNM’s
action-oriented world. Reflecting this intellectual paucity and
concern with deeds was the Decalogue (Dekaloh), a list of ten
commandments intended as a set of guidelines for SUNM
members:281
1) Attain a Ukrainian State or die in battle for It.
2) Do not allow anyone to defame the glory or the honor of
Your Nation.
3) Remember the Great Days of our efforts.
4) Be proud of the fact that you are an heir of the struggle for
the glory of Volodymyr’s Trident.262
5) Avenge the death of Great Knights.
6) Do not speak of the cause with whomever possible, but
only with whomever necessary.
7) Do not hesitate to commit the greatest crime, if the good of
the Cause demands it.
8) Regard the enemies of Your Nation with hate and
perfidy.
9) Neither requests, nor threats, nor torture, nor death can
compel You to betray a secret.
10) Aspire to expand the strength, riches, and size of the
Ukrainian State even by means of enslaving foreigners.263
Resembling the esoteric instructions of a mystical sect, the

Decalogue is striking for its advocacy of the total subordina
tion of the individual as well as of all moral and political
principles to the concept of the Nation — a cardinal tenet of
Dontsov and of the French integral nationalists. The analogy
with religion is not accidental. Nationalism was conceived of
by the SUNM as an all-encompassing system with the
capacity to create its own traditions, construct a meaningful
present, and assure a glorious future. The individual person,
meanwhile, would be safely enclosed within the structure,
guaranteed a preordained position that would enable him to
transcend his petty self and merge with a far greater being, the
Nation. Not surprisingly, a strong current of inferiority is
evident in many of the commandments. Equally important is
the appeal the Decalogue makes to the irrational, to the
elemental. Life is reduced to the primeval struggle of good vs.
evil and the person to a participant overwhelmed by the awe
inspiring simplicity of it all. The world of reason, logic, and
doubt is abandoned for a well-nigh religious one where Dontsov
reigns and natural laws, human passions, and mighty forces
decide the outcome of everything. Such a world cannot be
understood, it must simply be accepted. In these respects, the
young Galician Nationalists, although indifferent to religion
themselves, bear some resemblance to Codreanu’s Iron Guard.
There, in particular, extreme nationalism fused with a
fanatical religiosity to produce a simple but potent ideology
that made of Codreanu’s a mass movement.
Their many drawbacks notwithstanding, Konovalets’
believed that this wide array of Nationalists was best suited to
carry on the struggle for an Independent and United
Ukrainian State which the Sharpshooters and the UVO had
begun. The Colonel was aware of the generational nature of
Ukrainian politics, however, and realized that he and the
emigres could only provide the initiative and set a general
direction and that the extremist Galicians would soon come to
dominate the movement. Although Konovalets’ had serious
doubts about many of the young Nationalists’ radical views, he
understood that the demands of “realistic politics” required
allying his beleaguered forces with the up-and-coming

Galicians.264
The most important of the early Nationalist contacts that
Konovalets’ established was to Volodymyr Martynets’, a
leading student activist and editor of the HUNM’s ideological
organ, Natsional'na Dumka. The well-read and incisive
Martynets’ was offered the editorship of Surma in 1927 and
given the responsibility of spearheading the unification process
by organizing a conference of Ukrainian Nationalists.
Martynets’ had already written about the need for a
Nationalist organization which would “direct the national
energy into the proper channel, which would give the
appropriate forms to the content of our life, and which would
give a unique spirit to the national matter.” The Ukrainian
nation, Martynets’ claimed, had already proven its vitality,
but the Ukrainian national struggle had collapsed because of
the “uncoordination of the released energy... [and] the lack of
leadership.” The Nationalist organization would, of course,
occupy this position of leadership and, as such, it had to be
“supra-class”. Class struggle, therefore, was to be replaced
with class cooperation on the basis of the central organ
ization’s “synthesizing” policies. In order to achieve these
goals, the central Nationalist organization had to “force its
way into all areas of national life, into all its recesses, into all
its institutions, societies, and groups, into every city and
village, into every family.” The process by means of which the
Nationalist organization would gain control of the society was,
however, evolutionary, demanding “long and creative work,”
and “stamina and stubbornness.” Although Martynets’
differed fundamentally from the Galician Nationalists in this
respect, his blueprint for a Nationalist organization and
society resembled theirs and that of the LUN in being
essentially totalitarian.265
The First Conference of Ukrainian Nationalists was finally
held on November 3-7,1927 in Berlin. Of the fifteen unofficial
delegates who arrived, close to half were from the UVO, with
the rest more or less evenly divided among the HUNM, LUN,
and SUNM. Although the delegates were united on the need for
a Nationalist organization, they disagreed over the question of

its relationship to legality in general and to the UVO in
particular. Resembling the Bodnarovych line, the pro-legality
faction led by the UVO member L. Makarushka argued that
the future organization would be most effective if it maintained
no open ties to the UVO and to Konovalets’. The pro-illegality
faction, led by V. Martynets', insisted that a legal Nationalist
organization was by definition an impossibility in Galicia and
that the new organization should waste no time and
immediately go underground. Konovalets’ was the focus of the
argument: should he, as head of the UVO, be chosen head of the
Nationalist organization or not? The Colonel himself was
unsure. In the end, although the delegates agreed that the
existing Nationalist organizations should dissolve upon
merging in the future organization and that a Provid
(Leadership) of Ukrainian Nationalists (Provid Ukrains'kykh
Natsionalistiv — PUN) be elected and empowered to take the
necessary steps towards founding the Nationalist organ
ization, the questions of legality and of the UVO were left
unresolved. Nevertheless, Konovalets’ was chosen head of the
Provid, while Martynets’, Mykola Stsibors'kyi, and Dmytro
Andriievs'kyi were appointed its members. The PUN was also
authorized to publish a journal, Rozbudova Natsii (The
Building of the Nation), as the official organ of the Nationalist
movement. The prolific Martynets’ was appointed editor.266
In its official proclamation, the Conference traced the
origins of the “movement of Ukrainian nationalists’’ to the
failure of the national revolution of 1917-1920 and to the party
strife that followed. “Strong in faith”, “burning with shame”,
and “conscious of their mission”, the Nationalists had realized
that the “secondary” had to be “subordinated to the eternal
and elemental in the being of a Nation.” Having arisen
spontaneously, the Nationalists were now organizing in order
to “take into their hands the helm of Ukrainian national
political life and strive to renew and defend the Independent,
Free, United Ukrainian National State.” By its very nature,
the Nationalist ideology strove to “dominate all of our national
reality.”267
As the Nationalist movement and ideology began in

creasingly to crystallize, the unresolved problem of the
Nationalists’ relationship to the legal Ukrainian parties and,
of course, to legality in general assumed ever greater urgency.
Of particular importance was the fact that many of the UVO’s
leading cadres in Galicia supported Bodnarovych in believing
that the Nationalists should be active in the political life of the
individual parties. The emigres and young Galicians,
meanwhile, were for the most part in agreement that affiliation
with the legal parties would condemn the future organization
to ineffectiveness. What added particular urgency to the issue
was the question of whether the SUNM should declare its
support for the UNDO in the 1928 parliamentary elections.
The question of affiliation was the major topic of the
Second Conference of Ukrainian Nationalists, held on April 8-
9, 1928 in Prague. Attended by the four Provid members and
representatives of the LUN, HUNM, SUNM, and UVO, the
Conference took a decisive step towards establishing the
Nationalist movement as an independent political force. The
PUN was authorized to act as the representative body of all the
Nationalist organizations and as such it resolved to “distance
itself from all Ukrainian political parties and groups and not to
enter into cooperation with them.” All the Nationalist
organizations were enjoined to do the same.288
The Second Conference marked an important watershed in
the Nationalist movement. The Nationalists had taken
another step towards consolidating their forces; more
important, they proclaimed themselves an elite group whose
unwillingness even to associate with other parties clearly
revealed their conviction that they alone, by being “supra
party”, were suited to lead the Ukrainian liberation struggle.
As the vanguard of the Ukrainian nation, the Nationalists
conferred upon themselves the right to decide the entire
nation’s fate along with the more elementary question of who
was a true son of the nation and who was not. The decision to
break all ties to legal parties provoked the eventual departure
of the above-mentioned UVO cadres and, with the SUNM
Bodnarovych group already gone, resulted in the emigres’
virtually complete reliance on the young radicals in the
Academic House. Significantly, the Nationalists who decided
to leave the organized Nationalist movement and participate
in the legal parties did not for the most part represent a
democratic current any the less committed to the authoritarian
tendencies so evident among their comrades. Paliiv and
Bodnarovych, for example, were convinced Nationalists. Their
decision to join the legal sector was a tactical move founded on
the anti-Dontsovian belief that exclusiveness would be
harmful to the advancement of Nationalist goals.
Although the exclusivist position advocated most pas
sionately by Martynets’, Stsibors'kyi, and the Galicians had
become the official line, Konovalets’ himself continued to
maintain very extensive working relationships with Ukrain
ian politicians and parties and, in particular, with the UNDO.
True to his moderate character, the Colonel appears to have
believed that public pronouncements had little in common
with private politics and that the Nationalists could not afford
to isolate themselves completely from the Ukrainian political
world. Typically, Konovalets’ occupied the position of
middleman between those Nationalists advocating total
withdrawal into exclusiveness and those who regarded that
the best results could be achieved by infiltrating the existing
political structure.269
The Nationalists’ relations with the legal Ukrainian parties
were in any case very strained — perhaps an additional reason
for the Nationalists’ resolve not to have anything to do with
them. Besides viewing the rising Nationalist movement as a
possible threat to their own positions, most emigre and
Galician parties also accused them of being ideologically
demagogic and politically irresponsible. The Nationalists, on
the other hand, had many charges to make against their
opponents. The UNDO and the UNR were “collaborating”
with Poland, Shapoval was consorting with Russian
socialists, Petrushevych with Moscow, and the Hetmanites
with Russian monarchists. In all cases, so claimed the
Nationalists, an independent Ukrainian policy, with the
Ukraine as the starting- and end-point of everything, was
lacking. And this they intended to supply.
The Nationalists’ exclusiveness, however, also flowed from
their conviction that there existed a fundamental incom
patibility between the new type of Ukrainian, the Nationalist,
and the old, the party politician. Martynets’ elaborated on this
belief immediately after the Second Conference:
“The crisis of our political life has its source not so much in
the programs and ideologies of the parties as in the people
themselves who make up these parties, in their psychology,
in their moral categories, and in their actions. And if we
evaluate the parties and their members from this point of
view, then we see that... these are all people of one type, of
one structure. And it is in the existence of this type that there
lies the crisis of our political life. And however that one may
repaint their signboards and correct their party programs,
the people who comprise these parties will not change. And
not this, but a completely new type of Ukrainian can free the
nation from its age-old slavery. Cadres of such new Ukrain
ians have now to be created — by cultivating them from
among the youngest generation, which is still not en
dangered by the lack of ideals and amorality of our political
life. It is completely certain that they will not be cultivated
by the existing political parties. This young element must be
completely isolated from party influence.”270
In spite of the fact that in this as in many other respects the
Nationalists clearly drew their inspiration from Dontsov, their
relations with the journalist were poor. Although the young
Galicians were Dontsov’s devoted followers, the emigres
generally regarded him critically. According to Martynets’, the
emigres faulted Dontsov with having no practical suggestions
for making Nationalism into an organized political force and,
more specifically, with ignoring the Ukrainian problem in
Poland. Nevertheless, they did make a number of attempts to
draw him into their movement. But Dontsov refused their
offers, probably feeling that the Nationalists in general and
Konovalets’ in particular were far too “impure” ideologically
and politically to justify his cooperation. Writing in 1928,
Dontsov tried to persuade the “nationalist youth” that “self
organization, group exclusiveness, a concern for the complete
ideological homogeneity of one’s group are the slogans with
which nationalism will triumph.”271 Although Dontsov’s
comments were certainly directed at Bodnarovych, they were
probably also intended as a general criticism of the Nationalist
movement. The Nationalists, in any case, understood his
criticism in this manner and assigned D. Andriievs'kyi to write
a rebuttal in Rozbudova Natsii. The task the Nationalists set
themselves, according to Andriievs'kyi, was to transform
Nationalism from an “ideological category into a political
factor.” Referring to the Petliura camp, Lypyns'kyi, and
Dontsov, Andriievs'kyi wrote that “our parents have not been
able to do this because they were ashamed by it or repudiated it
as a heresy or narrowed its ideological base.” The last sin on
the list — narrowing the ideological base — clearly belonged to
Dontsov. Only by broadening the base and thereby necessarily
allowing some degree of ideological impurity could National
ism be made into a “political factor.”272 Konovalets* himself
reportedly considered Dontsov to be a “fanatic and ego
centric”, whom one must accept as he is if he is not
“immediately to become a fanatical opponent.”273
Interestingly, Dontsov for his part believed that the
Nationalists were insufficiently aware of the Russian menace.
In a review (November 1928) of an English-language publica
tion of the PUN’s Propaganda Section, entitled The Ukrainian
Question. A Peace Problem (sic), Dontsov strongly took the
Nationalists to task for beginning the brochure with an UNDO
declaration in the Polish Sejm and for devoting no space to the
Ukrainian lands under Czechoslovakia and Rumania. Above
all, Dontsov wrote, “One is struck on the basis of the book’s
overall tone by the calm, almost sympathetic, tone with regard
to Russian ‘work’ in the Soviet Ukraine. Cui podest?”274
Although it is certain that the Nationalists were not
“sympathetic” to the Soviets, their concern with the immediate
Galician situation along with their flirtations with Germany
and Lithuania and the political limitations resulting
therefrom probably combined to divert most of their attention
from Russia to Poland. In Dontsov’s eyes, however, anything
but a complete and all-consuming hostility to Russia was a
political sin of the greatest order.
Although the difficulties with Paliiv and Bodnarovych

delayed the Nationalists’ efforts at consolidation, the process
continued undeterred and culminated in the founding of the
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsiia
Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv —OUN) at the First Congress of
Ukrainian Nationalists, held from January 28 to February 3,
1929 in Vienna. Thirty delegates, evenly divided between
Eastern and Western Ukrainians as testimony to the
Nationalists’ devotion to sobornist’, attended the primarily
emigre gathering. Of that number, at least 12 had been either
officers or soldiers in the First World War. Ten were engineers,
nine were teachers, journalists, or poets, and three were
students (the occupations of the remainder are unknown).275
As these figures show, the OUN was largely the creation of
middle class intellectuals strongly influenced by military
thinking. Although the intellectual component alone makes
the OUN little different from most other radical — whether on
the left or on the right — political movements, the large
military presence underlines the degree to which the socially
dislocated veterans contributed to the formation of Ukrainian
Nationalism.
The Congress appointed special committees to formulate the
OUN’s policy positions on a whole range of ideological, socio
economic, military, political, cultural-educational, and organ
izational questions. Two opposing ideological currents — one
represented by Dmytro Demchuk and the other by Iulian
Vassyian and the two Galicians, Stepan Lenkavs'kyi and
Stepan Okhrymovych — became evident in the discussions of
the ideological committee. The former and weaker current was
apparently somewhat “utilitarian” in its worldview and
supported a more or less “democratic” Nationalism of the UNR
variety (a not very surprising fact, given Demchuk’s AUNR
and LUN origins). The latter and ultimately victorious current
stood for the kind of idealist and voluntarist worldview
propagated by Dontsov and fully accepted by the young
Galician radicals.276
Although the emigres were finally able to resolve most of
their differences, the long-brewing emigre-fcrai conflict came
into the open and revealed radically different conceptions of

the nature of the Nationalist movement. Arguing from the
perspective of “permanent revolution”, the two SUNM
delegates proposed that the OUN be a mass revolutionary,
terrorist organization — an extended version of the UVO, but
with a clearly delineated Nationalist profile. Consequently,
they wished to structure the Nationalist organization along
the lines of a military dictatorship, with Konovalets’ as
dictator. Konovalets’ and the emigres, on the other hand, saw
the OUN as a mass political organization that would serve as a
base for the elite, revolutionary UVO. According to the emigres,
the OUN should propagate the Nationalist ideology and
organize the masses into loyal cadres, whose relationship to
revolutionary actions would be indirect and supportive. In
essence, the conflict was a question of the OUN’s relationship
to the UVO: should the two be merged into one as the Galicians
demanded, or should they remain separate as the emigres
desired. The question was finally resolved in the emigres’ favor
so that the formally accepted “Structure of the OUN” even
foresaw childrens’ (8-15 years) and youth (15-21 years)
sections in addition to the full OUN members, who had to be
over 21 years old. Moreover, the duties of the members were to
“obey the instructions of the Structure and of the codes and [to
obey] the resolutions and directives of all the leading organs of
the OUN, to spread the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism, to
attract new members, and pay membership dues on time.”277
The Galician radicals could not but have been strongly
disappointed with so obviously non-revolutionary an organ
ization.
A new Provid, consisting of Konovalets’ as Head (Holova)
and of M. Stsibors'kyi, V. Martynets’, P. Kozhevnykiv, D.
Andriievs'kyi, lu. Vassyian, General Mykola Kapustians'kyi,
D. Demchuk, and L. Kostariv was “summoned” and given full
powers over the organized Nationalist movement. The
inclusion in the Provid of Martynets’, Andriievs'kyi, and
Vassyian testified to the great weight placed on theory and
ideology by the Congress, which adopted a lengthy set of
resolutions that outlined the official principles of the
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Ironically, the

resolutions were as much a party program as those the
Nationalists so opposed.
In the months following the Congress, the individual
Nationalist organizations were dissolved and their members
officially joined the OUN. The UVO’s continued existence,
however, meant that the krai OUN came to be dominated by
the young radicals in the SUNM who began transforming it
into the mass revolutionary organization they envisioned
without the approval and occasionally even without the
knowledge of the emigre leadership. This development led to
serious disagreements with the Provid and the UVO, which
continued to see the OUN as a purely political organization
that should not meddle in the UVO’s sphere of activity. In the
end, however, not only did the UVO have to merge with the
OUN in 1932, but the krai-emigre differences deepened and
finally ended in a debilitating schism in 1939-1940.
CHAPTER 11
THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS
In its essence, Ukrainian Nationalism was simply an

attempt to explain why Ukrainian statehood had been lost and
how it could be regained. What had been done wrong in 1917-
1920? Who was responsible for the defeat? Which forces and
events were positive and which were negative from the
viewpoint of Ukrainian statehood? The Nationalists, like most
other post-war Ukrainian political groups, tried to give specific
answers to these troubling questions.
Responsibility for defeat, concluded the Nationalists, lay
with the political leaders. Very simply, they had proven
incapable of leading the Ukrainian nation. Why? Because as
socialists, who believed in class struggle, and as anarchic
democrats, who lacked all sense of purpose, direction, and
organization and who instead had an absolute devotion to
parties, programs, and parliamentarianism, they had been
incapable of seeing that statehood could be attained only by
mobilizing the entire nation, by relying on all of “our own
forces.” This, of course, required seeing the nation as a whole,
something that the socialists, who perceived it as a ragtag
mixture of warring classes, inherently could not do.
How, therefore, could a Ukrainian state be constructed? The
answers appeared clear to the Nationalists — rejection of the
“socialist and democratic psychosis” of the former political
leaders and mobilization of the Ukrainian masses, of the
nation.278 This entailed replacing words with action, dis

carding parties, programs, and an excessive commitment to
democratic and parliamentary procedures as elements that
contribute negatively to determined leadership, rejecting
socialism with its emphasis on class divisiveness as a
nefarious ideology which created artificial conflicts and
weakened the strength of the nation, and placing one’s faith
completely in the masses, in the Ukrainian nation, as that
force which would ultimately decide whether Ukrainian state
hood would be attained or not.
Mobilizing the nation, however, first required under
standing its true nature. “The Nation,” D. Andriievs'kyi wrote,
“is a living organism, that is, a hierarchical whole. It is not the
sum of equal and equivalent individuals, but the coordination,
the organic interconnection of individual and collective
(classes, estates) persons of different weight and character.”279
What is more, the “most fundamentally essential character
istic” of Ukrainian Nationalism was, according to lu.
Vassyian, the “understanding of the nation as a whole.”280
Getting the nation to function as whole, therefore, was the goal
of Nationalism, because the “attainment of statehood is
possible only... [by means of) the harmonization of the actions
of all the component organs of the national body.”281
Here, as in several other respects, the organized Nationalists
differed fundamentally from Dontsov. For him, simple
harmonization or integration or organization was not enough
to mobilize the nation and lead it to statehood. Instead, his first
priority was to find the idea that would mobilize the nation’s
will. (A consequence of this belief, incidentally, was that
Dontsov, although a Nationalist, paradoxically lacked a
developed theory of the nation in the 1920s.) It is not
surprising, therefore, that Dontsov and the Nationalists found
it impossible to cooperate. For Dontsov, the problem was
essentially ideological; for the Nationalists, it was essentially
organizational.
That nations were living organisms, however, was a
statement that led to several important conclusions. First, as
Andriievs'kyi pointed out, that they were “hierarchical
IDEOLOGY 155
wholes”. Thus, some individuals — clearly the Nationalists —

were innately more qualified than others to lead the nation
and, by implication, the state. And second, as a living
organism, the nation obviously lived. But life, as Darwin had
pointed out and as the First World War had very clearly shown,
was a struggle for existence. Those who were stronger
triumphed, while those who were weaker perished. Con
sequently, in order to live, nations struggled and inevitably
came into conflict with one another. Wars, as Andriievs'kyi
argued, were unavoidable.282 Imperialism, wrote Vassyian,
also followed naturally because nations grew physically and
spiritually and therefore had to expand.283
The nation’s continual involvement in struggle, however,
meant that it had to be organized along goal-oriented lines that
channeled its energies in the direction of national victory. Only
a state could offer the nation the needed organization and
assure it continued prosperity. The state, therefore, was
necessary to a nation’s spiritual and physical growth and was
the form within which the nation found its self-fulfillment and
creative self-expression and without which the nation was
incapable of assuming its intended place in the world of
nations and states.284
But a state was the organic expression of the internal
alignment of forces within the nation. As such, it had to
represent all social groups and act as the harmonizing factor
regulating their interrelationships. In this sense, according to
Vassyian, the Nationalist state was both democratic and
dictatorial. Democratic — because it guaranteed the active
involvement of all members of the nation in the national
process. Dictatorial — because it alone determined the means
and ends of this process.285 As Martynets’ wrote, “the state will
have the final decisive say in all matters. This refers not only to
relations among the various social groups, but also to all other
matters that in some way relate to the interests of the
nation.”288
Several ideas expressed by Martynets’ in 1926 before he
became active in the Nationalist movement may help throw
some additional light on the OUN’s conception of democracy.
It goes without saying that many, if not most, Nationalists

understood democracy simply as anarchy and disorder, as a
“psychosis.” Martynets’, however, possessed far more so
phisticated views. Democracy and capitalism, he claimed,
were inextricably related. As capitalism takes the place of
feudalism, democracy takes the place of theocracy and
aristocracy. But just as the basis of feudalism is the aristocracy,
so the basis of capitalism is the classes which it brings
into being. Democracy, therefore, as the political manifesta
tion of capitalism, cannot exist without classes and is, in fact,
the government of all classes. Many young democracies,
however, are not fully capable of discarding their feudal roots
and, as a result, find themselves in states of crisis. The way out
is to summon a “democratic dictator” who will guide the
fledgling state to complete democracy. According to Marty
nets’, an example of such a democratic dictator was
Mussolini.287 Interestingly, the OUN’s resolutions make no
mention of democracy, whether in a good or in a bad light.
Perhaps the Nationalists considered democracy to be, as
Vassyian wrote, inherent in the very concept of a Nationalist
state and therefore in no need of elaboration. After all, the
Zahrava group also believed that its peasant state could not
but be democratic.
The place of the individual in the Nationalist state flowed
automatically from the Nationalist understanding of the
nation and of the state. Although an individual lived and died,
the nation as a whole, in other words, the idea of the nation,
existed independently of him and was eternal. As an expres
sion of the nation, therefore, the state had the right to demand
the absolute loyalty of the citizen. The individual, however,
secure in the knowledge that he was as necessary to the nation
and state as they were to him and seeing therein a
“relationship of mutually complementing creative advance”
continued to retain his individuality and his liberty.288
Elaborating on this idea, Vassyian wrote that Ukrainian
Nationalism aspires to the “solidification of the various by
means of completion and synthesis and not its simplification
by means of exclusion and negation. With regard to this it may
IDEOLOGY 157
be called integral nationalism . ... its goal is the greatest

synthetic achievements with the smallest loss of the forms of
the variety of life and with the smallest limitations on
individual liberty.**289
That nations were living organisms had another very
important consequence for the Nationalists: they were all
fundamentally different. The manifestations of a nation’s
physical and spiritual vitality were peculiar to it alone and
could not be transplanted to other national organisms. The
socialists had tried to do this in 1917-1920, but their attempt at
grafting the foreign socialist ideology onto the body of the
Ukrainian nation had ended in a temporary sickness that led
to the artificial breakdown of Ukrainian unity. The only
ideology that could accurately reflect the true needs and
aspirations of the Ukrainian nation, therefore, was clearly a
Ukrainian ideology, one that grew out of the nation itself. And
Ukrainian Nationalism, as an ideology which based itself
exclusively on the past, present, and future of the Ukrainian
nation, was clearly the ideology of the Ukrainian nation.
Neither the Ukrainian state nor the Ukrainian ideology,
however, could be expected to come into being automatically.
The prerequisite was the existence of Ukrainian Nationalists,
determined, strong-willed individuals with a fanatical faith in
the Ukrainian nation and the Ukrainian state. On the basis of
their unconditional commitment to “all-Ukrainianism, supra-
partymindedness, and monocracy’*, the Nationalists best
understood what the Ukrainian nation needed and how the
Ukrainian state should be constructed.290 They were therefore
the “leading stratum” within the nation.291 Their position of
leadership, however, did not flow from their social or economic
position within the nation, but from their moral qualities as
Nationalists who knew no greater good than the Ukrainian
nation and who were willing to sacrifice everything for it. In
order to further their goals, Ukrainian Nationalists joined
forces in the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, by its
very nature the only political grouping that could carry out the
ideas of Ukrainian Nationalism. As such, only the OUN could
administer the future Ukrainian state. Moreover, the OUN had
to aspire to “dominate the Ukrainian national reality in all

Ukrainian lands and in foreign lands settled by Ukrainians”
in order to ensure that the Nationalist ideology take root in
every member of the Ukrainian nation.292 In so doing, it would
oppose “all party and class groupings with their methods of
political work,” because the “notion of taking different paths to
one goal is a stereotypical untruth since different means
produce different results.”293
But how did the Nationalists intend to attain Ukrainian
statehood? Unlike Dontsov, who gave no answer to this
question, the Nationalists had a fairly specific idea of how the
“national revolution” was to be brought about. First, a special
military “nucleus” would “prepare the Ukrainian popular
masses for armed struggle” and train “organizers and
schooled leaders.” Then, “only a military force, supported by
the armed people, which is ready to fight for its rights
obstinately and bravely, can free the Ukraine from its
occupiers and make possible the organization of the Ukrainian
State.”294 A “national dictatorship” would develop in the
course of the revolution and would “guarantee the internal
strength of the Ukrainian nation and the greatest [possible]
resistance to the outside.”295 And finally, “only after the
renewal of statehood will the national dictatorship... go over
to the creation of legislative organs on the basis of the
representation of all organized social strata with consideration
for the differences of the individual lands that will enter into
the Ukrainian State.”296 The “monolithic state body” would be
ruled by a “head of state summoned by the legislative organ”
and by an executive branch appointed by him.297 The state
would be administered on the basis of “local self-government”,
with each krai having its own “representative legislative
organ, summoned by the local organized social strata, and its
own executive authority.”298 In the meantime, a “regular,
supra-party national army and fleet” would replace the
military force of the national revolution.299
Committed to Nationalist principles, the Nationalist state
would conduct socio-economic policies aimed at the “nation’s
self-sufficiency, the augmentation of the people’s wealth, and
IDEOLOGY 159
the safeguarding of the material well-being of the population

by means of the development of all branches of the national
economy.” The economic system would be based on the
“cooperation of the state, cooperatives, and private capital”
and would be so geared as to reflect and best utilize the
distribution of social forces within the nation.300 As the
Nationalists often claimed, their policies would be based not on
preconceived notions of what the society should look like, but
on the direct observation of life itself Since the Ukrainian
nation was primarily a peasant nation, agriculture was and
had to remain the lifeblood of the national economy. The
middle peasant stratum, as the Revolution had shown, was the
most nationally conscious and nationally constructive social
class and would therefore have to serve as the major pillar of
support of the Ukrainian state. Unlike the peasantry, wrote the
Nationalist poet Oles’ Babii, “other strata are either foreign or
hostile to our statehood or still too weak to create the life of the
nation on their own.”301 The state, therefore, would “expropriate
landowner holdings” and “guarantee the well-being of the
peasantry by means of supporting middle peasant farms,”
while the peasantry could either own land in the limits set by
the state or join cooperatives.302
Industry, however, would not be ignored by the future
Ukrainian state. In order to assure the independence and “all-
round development” of the national economy, to satisfy the
“needs of state defense,” and to “give a living to the surplus
village population,” the state would “promote the industrial
ization of the country.” Those industrial enterprises con
sidered “important to the existence and defense of the country
will be nationalized”, while all other branches of industry
would be left to the “private capital of individual persons and
associations on the basis of free competition and private
initiative.”303
Trade would be in the hands of private capital, cooperatives,
and the state. “Defensive, supportive, and protectionist
measures” would be employed by the state to “guarantee
Ukrainian products and wares the most advantageous sales
conditions on the world markets.” The state’s finances would
be assured by a “single, uniform, progressive, and direct tax”

and by several indirect taxes.304
In its social policy, the state would regulate the “inter
relationships among social groups” and possess the right to
“final arbitration” in all social conflicts. “Members of all social
groups” would have the “right to coalitions, according to
which they will unite in professional organizations with the
right to form syndicates along territorial lines and along
branches of production, and will have their representatives in
the organs of state authority.” Relations between employers
and workers would be based on the “right to free personal and
collective agreements”, although labor conflicts would be
resolved by courts of arbitration with the final say belonging to
the state. In addition, strikes and lockouts would be allowed
and the eight-hour working day introduced.305
Production councils of “representatives of the owners,
managers, and workers with the right to supervise and control
the technology of production” would exist at the factory level.
Workers’ councils would also exist in all “agricultural,
industrial and trade enterprises” in order to represent the
workers before the “trade unions, employers, and state.” The
workers’ councils would participate in the production councils
as well as conclude “collective agreements.” All workers would
be assured unemployment benefits and be subject to a “general
life-insurance” plan. All citizens over 60 years and “lacking
their own means of sustenance” would receive assistance from
the state.306
The Nationalists* foreign policy envisioned the Ukraine as
occupying its intended place of glory in the world. The
Ukrainian state would “aspire to attain the most defensible
boundaries which will include all Ukrainian ethnic territories
and guarantee the necessary economic self-sufficiency.” A
cornerstone of Ukrainian foreign policy would be a system of
alliances with those “peoples with hostile relations with the
occupiers of the Ukraine.”307
The state would also guide the inner life of the nation
towards Nationalist goals. The “cultural process”, although
“based on freedom of cultural creativity”, would be brought in
IDEOLOGY 161
line with the “spiritual nature of the Ukrainian people.”

However, the Nationalists also made very clear that “only the
development of that cultural creativity and those artistic
currents which are tied to healthy manifestations in the past of
the Ukrainian Nation and to the cult of knighthood and the
voluntarist-creative relationship to life will be able to awaken
the healthy drive of the nation to strength and power.”308
A system of universal and free public schooling would “edu
cate the popular masses in a national-state spirit.” Religion
would be the “internal matter” of the individual, although the
church, while officially separate from the state, would enjoy
the state’s support in “matters of the moral education of the
nation.” Only religions with no “denationalizing tendencies”
would be allowed to be taught in schools, “religious cults active
in the Ukraine” would be Ukrainianized, and active state
support would be given to the “development of the Ukrainian
national Church.”309 Interestingly, no mention was made of
the Jews.
Considering the above sentiments, it was not surprising that
all other Ukrainian political groups — whether in the
emigration, in Galicia, or in the Soviet Ukraine and ranging
from the Petliurites to the UNDO to the Communists — greeted
the OUN’s founding negatively. The threat was clear. The
Nationalists had declared their intentions: the envisioned
Nationalist state would have no room for non-Nationalists.
Tryzub called the Nationalists “our future dictators.” Dilo
pointed out that “if the Nationalists are against parties, then
they must take into account that by organizing they have
become nothing other than a new Ukrainian party, and a
fascist-type party at that.” Bil'shovyk Ukrainy(The Bolshevik
of the Ukraine), as was to be expected, labelled the OUN a
“young Ukrainian fascism.”310
CHAPTER 12
THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM
A comparison of the ideology of the Organization of

Ukrainian Nationalists with French integral nationalism,
Italian Fascism, and Ukrainian conservatism is warranted
because all four ideologies flourished in the same historical
period; because the Ukrainian Nationalists were acquainted
with, sometimes admiring of, and perhaps even directly
influenced by the other three; and because the core elements of
Ukrainian Nationalism — the organic nation, the all-powerful
corporate state, and the indispensable peasantry — first
appeared in the other ideologies, thereby suggesting that
Ukrainian Nationalism may perhaps be viewed as a synthesis
of the three. Should this be true, it does not at all mean that the
Nationalists consciously borrowed ideas from the other
ideologies. Rather, it is only to say that the core ideas made use
of by the Nationalists had their origins elsewhere.
The question of the OUN’s relationship to French integral
nationalism presents the fewest difficulties. If one considers
Charles Maurras’ own definitions of an integral nationalist as
a person who “places his country above everything” and who
“conceives, treats, and resolves all questions in their relation to
the national interest”311 and of integral nationalism as the
“exclusive pursuit of national policies, the absolute main
tenance of national integrity, and the steady increase of
national power,”312 then it is immediately and indubitably
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS 163
clear that the OUN was integral nationalist. Maurras’

royalism is not at issue here, because it represented the form in
which his “placing the country above everything” could best
be manifested. After all, what distinguished Maurras from
traditional French royalists was precisely his integral
nationalism.
Moreover, Ukrainian Nationalism can also be fruitfully
compared to Maurice Barrés’ nationalism. Using the
“foundations” outlined by E.R. Curtius as the basis for
comparison, Ukrainian Nationalism, like Barrés* nationalism,
was: 1) collectivist, in that it subordinated the individual to the
whole; 2) determinist, in that the individual’s fate was
determined by his belonging to the nation; 3) anti-intellectual;
4) relativist, in that each nation had its own truth; 5) empiricist,
in that the national truth was to be derived not from theory but
from reality itself; 6) traditionalist; 7) anti-parliamentarian; 8)
militarist; and 9) federalist (the OUN’s “local self-govern
ment” and the administrative division of the state into krais).
Curtius’ tenth Grundlage, religiousity, was also common to
both nationalisms, if defined broadly enough. For Barrés this
meant Catholicism, for the Ukrainians the virtually religious
passion of their ideology.313 Of course, the most important and
decisive point of identity is the fact that both integral
nationalism and Ukrainian Nationalism placed the nation at
the very center of their ideology. This was true not only of the
OUN, but also, obviously, of Dontsov.
Ukrainian Nationalism’s relationship to Fascism is sub
stantially more problematic. Obviously, there is no denying
the many similarities. Even a superficial observer can
immediately see that the two ideologies shared the following
elements: the glorification of the nation and the state, eternal
conflict as the essence of life, the exaltation of militarism and
imperialism, will and faith as the motive forces of history,
action as the solution to all problems, the nation as a living
organism, the individual person and the social class as organic
parts of the nation, the absolute rejection of Marxism and
communism, the commitment to state-regulated capitalism,
the subordination of social conflict to national unity and the
regulation of class struggle, an authoritarian, hierarchical,

and corporatist state and social structure, a totalitarian
national ideology, and a totalitarian political elite. The list
could be continued. Nevertheless, do these points of identity
make Ukrainian Nationalism “fascist”?
Benito Mussolini suggests an answer to this difficult
question: “. . . for the Fascist everything is in the State, and
nothing human or spiritual exists, much less has value, outside
the State .... It is not the nation that generates the State ...
Rather the nation is created by the State, which gives to the
people, conscious of its own moral unity, a will and therefore an
effective existence.”314 Fascism, therefore, took the state as its
starting point and the nation as its end-point. The state gives
the nation a “will” and “therefore an effective existence.” In
other words, no state — no nation. The ideological premises of
Ukrainian Nationalism, on the other hand, were just the
opposite. “The nation,” claimed the OUN, “is the highest form
of organic human community ....” Moreover, “the Ukrainian
Nation is the starting point of every action and the end goal of
every striving of Ukrainian nationalism.” The “sovereign
state”, meanwhile, was only the “condition which guarantees
the nation a lasting active participation in the world.” In other
words, a nation could very well exist without a state, and all the
more so since it already possessed a will by the very nature of
its being a nation. The advantage of having a state, however,
was that a nation thereby “becomes a full member of world
history, because only in the state form of its life does it possess
all the internal and external marks of an historical subject.”315
For the Nationalists, therefore, no nation — no state.
This difference of emphasis on the state-nation relationship
is vital and lies at the core of the problem of establishing the
difference between Ukrainian Nationalism and Fascism. To
point out that both movements shared similar worldviews and
political goals and methods ignores the fact that the
philosophical premises of the two were radically different.
Naturally, if one ignores these premises as unimportant
and concentrates only on the fact that both movements
were anti-Marxist and authoritarian (as Ernst Nolte might

have done), then one could perhaps conclude that Ukrain
ian Nationalism was indeed a form of fascism. How
ever, if the latter term is to have any precise meaning and
not simply be considered a synonym for authoritarianism or
totalitarianism (whether of the Marxist or anti-Marxist
variety), then the fundamental philosophical difference
concerning the nation-state relationship primarily defines the
relationship between the OUN’s Nationalism and Fascism.
In order to be consistent with this viewpoint, therefore, the
Ukrainian Nationalists should have cared only about the
nation and the means by which it could be mobilized to attain
statehood and not about the form and role of the desired state.
After all, as the Nationalists pointed out, overemphasizing this
question of form had caused the downfall of Ukrainian
statehood in 1917-1920. Dontsov, of course, was largely faithful
to this theoretical distinction by means of his uncompromising
commitment to ideological purity. He could and did avoid the
question of state form (at least in the 1920s), simply because his
concern was theoretical: to create a new world view, Ukrainian
Nationalism, which would create a new type of Ukrainian, the
Ukrainian Nationalist. As Dontsov repeatedly wrote, once
these were on hand, the “formula would find itself.” For the
action-oriented and politically-involved OUN, however, con
cerned as it was with organizing the nation and attaining
statehood, this theoretical distinction was not so easily
maintained. Where was it to draw the boundary line between
theory and practice? How could it realistically avoid the
question of state form when it was actively seeking a state? Did
not the methods by means of which the nation was to achieve
statehood to some extent determine the kind of state that would
result? And most important, could a Nationalist afford to
ignore the question of state form when it so obviously affected
the nation? Would this not be irresponsible and an abdication
of his duties and ideals? Dontsov answered these questions in
abstractions or not at all, for which the organized Nationalists
criticized him severely. Seen in this light, it is not surprising
that the OUN devoted the greater part of its resolutions to the
future Ukrainian state, its form and its policies. Just as

Mussolini could not in practice pretend that the Italian nation
did not yet exist, so too the Ukrainian Nationalists had to take
a stand on the form of statehood they desired. Politically, they
simply could not do otherwise without limiting their own
effectiveness through ideological purity or “narrowness.” In so
doing, the Ukrainian Nationalists adopted a position
(nation state) which closely resembled that of the Fascists
(state nation). Although the starting and end points of the
two formulae are different, the dynamic relationship between
the nation and state is essentially the same for both.
The Nationalists themselves approached the problem of
Ukrainian Nationalism’s relationship to Fascism from the
point of view of the state-nation question. The difference
between Ukrainian Nationalism and Italian Fascism, wrote
levhen Onats'kyi, a Nationalist journalist living in Rome, was
of “tremendous principled importance.” Both had in common
that they were “vividly expressed nationalisms.” Fascism,
however, was the “nationalism of a state nation, opposed to all
irredentisms, and ready to sacrifice everything and everybody
before the cult of its already created state.” Ukrainian
Nationalism, on the other hand, was the “nationalism of a
stateless nation that lives only by irredentism and is ready to
sacrifice everything and everybody for the destruction of the
cult of those states that do not allow it to live.”316 Onats'kyi had
indeed touched upon an interesting difference between the two
ideologies: Fascism was a way of organizing a state, while
Ukrainian Nationalism was a way of attaining a state. The
Ukrainians, therefore, could not be fascists, because they had
not even reached that point — a state — which made fascism
possible. Thus, even in practical terms, the Nationalists’ end
point was the Fascists’ starting point. In other words,
Ukrainian Nationalism was in its essence a national
liberation movement. As Konovalets’ remarked in his closing
speech at the OUN Congress, . . the renewal of a Unified
Ukrainian State is in and of itself equivalent to the liquidation
of the Muscovite empire as well as of Polish historical
imperialism.”317
How both of these imperialisms were to be “liquidated” was

the problem confronting the OUN. One way to learn how to
conduct one’s own national-liberation struggle was to study
the experience of other nations. Thus, in prefacing an article by
the Fascist publicist Giadnto Trevisonno on the virtues and
universality of Fascism, Rozbudova Natsii pointed out that
“Ukrainian nationalists, who vigilantly follow all manifesta
tions of national activism in the various countries of the world,
dare not overlook the movement of the Italian nationalists
with their amazingly great achievements.”318 And indeed, the
journal also contained articles on the United States,
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Korea, Latvia, and Lithuania.
Revolutionary movements, such as Zemlia i Volia, Pilsudski’s
anti-Russian underground, and the Irish Sinn Fein, were also
of inordinate interest to the Nationalists.
Not surprisingly, the Fascists, as nationalists who had
succeeded in making “amazingly great achievements,” most
fascinated the Ukrainian Nationalists, who made no effort to
hide their obvious admiration for Mussolini and openly
considered the ideology and practice of Fascism to have
relevance to the Ukrainian situation. As early as the second
issue of Rozbudova Natsii, the normally staid Dmytro
Andriievs'kyi revealed the awe with which the Nationalists
viewed the events in Italy:
“After almost a thousand years of slavery and disunity, Italy
is only now coming to its national life. Rejuvenated with a
barbarian injection, revitalized during the time of her great
historical interlude, the heiress of ancient Rome turns a new
page of her existence. The post-war international agree
ments did not take into account either the ancient traditions,
or the youthful freshness, or the material difficulties of the
Italian nation, cramped on a small peninsula. In the soul of
the nation — raging, spurred on to action by a brilliant
dictator — there awakens today an awareness of its
difficulties, the rapaciousness of the ancient conqueror, the
sense of the great, and the invincible desire for daring and
dangerous actions.”318
The parallel with the Ukraine was too obvious to be
missed. It too had once had a brilliant past (Kiev Rus’),
experienced a “thousand years of slavery and disunity”,
and was now on the verge of asserting its “youthful
freshness” and “desire for daring and dangerous actions.”
Onats'kyi expressed the analogy with Italy openly. “The old

and young Italy,” he wrote, “[are] almost like the former Little
Russia and the present Ukraine.” But whereas the “extra
ordinary organizer and leader Mussolini” along with his
“group of young, energetic people, armed at first only with
their passionate love and indefatigable energy,” had raised
Italy from its passivity, the Ukrainian national effort had
ended in “bankruptcy.” “The fascist Italian movement,”
continued Onats'kyi, “evoked a completely understandable
interest” among Ukrainians, particularly because it “im
mediately had to wage armed struggle against Italian
communists, who received money and instructions from
Moscow.” As a result, “many Ukrainian nationalists began
calling themselves Ukrainian fascists and seeking support in
the Italian fascists.” Although this support did not materialize
because of a divergence in foreign policy interests with many
Nationalists therefore becoming deeply disenchanted, the
“young Ukrainian nationalism adopted some things from
Italian fascism and, first of all, the recognition of the need for
an iron hierarchical organization and the subordination of all
private, party, and class interests to the interests of the
fatherland .... Furthermore, the recognition of the superiority
of the strength of the spirit over the strength of matter.”320
Interestingly, Onats'kyi concedes that there actually were
Ukrainian Nationalists who called themselves Ukrainian
fascists. His remark, together with Dontsov’s reference to
“Ukrainian ‘fascism’” in 1924, Zahrava’s answer to the
question “Are We Fascists?”, and the absorption into the
League of Ukrainian Nationalists of the Union of Ukrainian
Fascists, gives incon trovertable evidence that Ukrainian
fascists, at least of the self-styled variety, did in fact exist. Not
accidentally, many of them found a home in the organized

Ukrainian Nationalist movement in general and in the OUN
in particular. Clearly, the ideological and philosophical
subtleties differentiating Ukrainian Nationalism from Fasc
ism did not in practice mean much to the Ukrainian fascists.
Although Ukrainian Nationalism’s similarities with French
integral nationalism and Italian Fascism are undeniably
large, the historical and ideological origins of the Nationalist
ideology are to be found first and foremost in the Ukrainian
conservative parties and ideologies characterised as “right
wing” by Viktor Andriievs'kyi.
The ideas advocated by the Ukrainian Democratic-Agrarian
Party, the Ukrainian Union of Agrarian Statists, Mykola
Chudinov’s Ukrainian People’s Party, V. Andriievs'kyi’s
Soborna Ukraina, and even by Vasyl’ Vyshyvanyi’s Free
Cossacks were all forerunners of Ukrainian Nationalism.
These “right-wing” groups’ high regard for the peasantry and
for military action, their endorsement of national unity,
organization, hierarchy, and strong government, their
unanimous opposition to socialism, their disdain for democ
racy and parliamentarianism (with the exception of Chud
inov’s party), and their general unwillingness (excepting the
Democratic Agrarians and the Agrarian Statists) to collaborate
with non-Ukrainians all found a place in the later Nationalist
ideology. Dontsov’s involvement in the Democratic Agrarians
and in Skoropads'kyi’s government, the absorption into the
LUN of the Union of Ukrainian Agrarians in the ÖSR, the
prominent Hetmanite presence in the Group of Ukrainian
State Youth, and the very simple fact that all the Nationalist
and conservative groups under consideration were Ukrainian
and therefore shared a common tradition imply that an actual
transmission of ideas must have taken place and indeed did
take place.
Crucially, the central feature of “right-wing” thinking —
the indispensability of the peasantry to Ukrainian statehood
— assumed an equally central role in Ukrainian Nationalism.
The writings of Dontsov, D. Andriievs'kyi, O. Babii, and M.
Stsibors'kyi, the program of the Ukrainian Party of National

Work, the editorial policy of Zahrava, and the resolutions of the
OUN all reveal the degree to which the Nationalists built their
ideology around the agrarian class. Unlike many of the
conservatives, however, the Nationalists regarded the peasant
ry as the strongest social class and as the core of the nation,
thereby giving their brand of integral nationalism a social
content quite different from that of Maurras. In this as in many
other respects, the Nationalists infused essentially “right
wing” Ukrainian ideas with their own content.
The Hetmanites, in particular, provided the Nationalists
with many of the starting points of their ideological
development. The Hetmanite state itself, for example,
Skoropads'kyi’s flabby rule and the preponderant influence of
Russians aside, closely approximated the Nationalist ideal.
The most convincing evidence of their ideological kinship with
the Nationalists, however, is found in the 1920 statute of the
Ukrainian Union of Agrarian Statists (USKhD), which in
many parts reads like the OUN’s resolutions:
“The Ukrainian Nation cannot exist without its own
independent and sovereign State .... That is why the
USKhD takes upon itself the task of organizing those
forces who want to build an independent and sovereign
Ukrainian State on all the lands inhabited by the
Ukrainian ethnic mass .... the USKhD takes upon
itself the task of . . . basing Ukrainian state-creative
political work exclusively on the permanent forces of
the Ukrainian Nation and not on accidental and
changeable outside foreign aid.... the USKhD wants to
create the kind of State a) that would rely on the
support of the natural and permanent groupings of
people within the Nation — on the materially produc
tive toiling classes, b) that would guarantee each class
the maximum of its cultural and economic development
as well as participation in the governing of the State....
A higher and lasting form of statehood ... can be built
under the following conditions: a) the self-organization
of each class and each Land in one solid and healthy

political-economic organism, b) the unification of all
classes and all Lands by means of the permanent and
sole principle of national and state unity as personified
in the person of the unchangeable and unelected Head
of the National State. Such a form of statehood is a
Toilers’ Monarchy. Standing above all classes and not
being a dictatorship of one party or caste, it is interested
in guaranteeing each class the possibility of self-organ
ization and the broadest development of all its produc
tive abilities.... the USKhD... rejects the principles of
partymindedness, voting, elections, and so on, because
this leads to the development of careerism, demagogy,
irresponsibility, antagonism, disunity, and weakness
within the very organization. Instead, the USKhD
builds its organization on the basis of selectivity, length
of service, assortment, solidarity, and discipline.”321
The Hetmanite vocabulary was, of course, different
from that of the Nationalists. The essential Hetmanite
ideological beliefs, however, clearly found their way into
Ukrainian Nationalism. These included, among others,
the absolute priority of statehood, the necessity of
sobornist’, the principle of “our own forces”, the
integrality of the nation, class cooperation and admin
istrative “federalism”, an all-powerful executive em
bodying the nation’s will, the rejection of parties and of
parliamentarianism, and the necessity of a new, non-
party type of cadre. Most important, both the Hetmanites
and the OUN, unlike Dontsov, recognized the importance
of organization and believed that without it Ukrainian
efforts to attain statehood would remain unsuccessful.
Unlike the Hetmanites, however, the Nationalists
believed that their support of the peasantry entailed
rejecting the primacy of the landowners. As Mykola
Stsibors'kyi wrote in 1928:
“A policy supporting the interests of the peasantry is a
directly expedient and necessary demand. Even dis
regarding the economic significance of the peasantry
in the Ukraine ...»we must admit that a total defense of
its interests is imperative because the Ukrainian
peasantry is the most important carrier of organic
national forces, of power, and of creativity and is that
well from which the nation-state draws its strength and
striving for development. The strength, wealth, and
development of our nation in the future will be directly
proportional to the well-being and strength of the
peasantry. If for all these reasons we correctly evaluate
the politico-social, economic, and state importance of
the two actors (the peasantry and the landowners) who
are fighting over the land, then the practical national
ist policy must clearly and decisively defend the
interests of the peasantry.”322
Ukrainian Nationalism’s historical and ideological origins
in “right-wing” Ukrainian conservatism point to the fact that,
in spite of its ideological affinity with non-Ukrainian right
wing movements, the Nationalist ideology was primarily (and
obviously) a product of the post-war Ukrainian intellectual and
socio-political climate. The political chaos, social dislocation,
intellectual self-searching, and moral disillusionment virtual
ly demanded that a movement considering itself a negation of
the existing reality arise. Equally important was the fact that
many of the canons of the Nationalist faith already existed in
either partially or fully developed form among politically
active Ukrainians. The principle of “our own forces” is a good
example of how a generally accepted post-war belief was
appropriated by the Nationalists and made into a central tenet
of their ideology. A xenophobic hatred of the Ukraine’s national
enemies, in particular the Russians and Poles, a tendency to
think in exclusively national terms, the desire for all
Ukrainian political and social unity and for the abolition of
unnecessary party and class strife, and the recognition of the
need for strong leadership and some degree of coordination
were notions which also figured prominently in the post-war
political thought of virtually the entire Ukrainian emigration,
including the UNR, ZUNR, V. Vynnychenko, M. Shapoval, S.
Vityk, and many others. In this respect, Ukrainian

Nationalism was as organically Ukrainian a phenomenon as
any other Ukrainian political current of the 1920s. As a result,
there can, for the most part, be no question of Ukrainian
Nationalism’s having “borrowed” from or “imitated” foreign
examples or of its having been “artificially transplanted” to
Ukrainian soil. The Nationalists, therefore, were not incorrect
when they said that “Ukrainian Nationalism is a spiritual and
political movement, which arose from the inner nature of the
Ukrainian Nation at the time of its violent struggle for the
foundations and goals of creative existence.”323
EPILOGUE
The founding congress of the Organization of

Ukrainian Nationalists was the watershed dividing the
period under discussion, which comprised the origins and
development of Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1920s, from
the period of the 1930s, when the organized Nationalist
movement came as close as it ever would to becoming a
form of fascism. This second period ended with the
assassination of levhen Konovalets’ in 1938 and the
subsequent division of the OUN into two hostile camps.
Most significant of the trends which the OUN
underwent in the 1930s were its increasing “orientation” on
foreign models in general and on Nazi Germany in
particular and the intensification of the krai-emigre
conflict. Both trends, as this study has shown, had their
roots in the 1920s and were built into the Nationalist
movement from the very outset.
Ironically, the organized Nationalists of the 1930s
thereby undermined the very principles which the
individual Nationalists of the 1920s had regarded as
essential to the very notion of Nationalism. First, the
Nationalist dependence on Germany went far beyond
wanting to “learn” from the Nazis and, in fact,
constituted a classic case of the “orientations” the early
Nationalists so despised. Dontsov, incidentally, also
EPILOGUE 175
increasingly oriented himself on the Nazi model. And

second, the division of the OUN into two warring factions
revealed the degree to which the Nationalists had
forgotten their own belief that party interests should be
subordinated to national interests. In both respects, the
Nationalists betrayed their original resolve to be different
from the other parties and in fact joined the “party” camp.
In this manner, the Nationalists eventually completed
a full circle and reached the point where their own
ideology and politics became the objects of internal
réévaluation and criticism. What followed then was the
third and final period of the Nationalist movement, which
ended with the elimination of the krai OUN in the mid-
1950s. Ironically, this third period saw the Nationalists
turn against the ideological tenets of the 1920s and 1930s
and adopt generally social democratic positions similar to
those they had rejected in the 1920s.324
NOTES
1. Carlton J.H. Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion (New

York: Macmillan, 1960), p. 140; Eugen Weber, “The
Nationalist Revival in France, 1905-1914,” Univ, of
California Publications in History, vol. 60 (Berkeley:
Univ, of California Press, 1959), p. 64; Ernst Nolte, Der
Faschismus in seiner Epoche (München: R. Piper, 1963).
2. The best study of Ukrainian Nationalism remains:
John Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism, 2nd ed. (New
York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1963). Relevant English-
language works on fascism and nationalism include:
Walter Laqueur and George L. Mosse, eds., International
Fascism 1920-1945 (New York: Harper & Row, 1966);
Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber, eds., The European Right
(Los Angeles: Univ, of California Press, 1966); Peter F.
Sugar, ed., Native Fascism in the Successor States 1918-
1945 (Santa Barbara: Clio Press, 1971); Ivo J. Lederer and
Peter F. Sugar, eds., Nationalism in Eastern Europe
(Seattle: Univ, of Washington Press, 1969); Hugh Seton-
Watson, The East European Revolution (New York:
Praeger, 1956). Although Nolte has written extensively on
fascism, only the following book is of relevance to Eastern
Europe: Ernst Nolte, Die faschistischen Bewegungen
(Munchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1975).
NOTES 177
3. Although valuable to the researcher, most of the

following works must be approached with some caution:
Roman Ilnytzkyj, Deutschland und die Ukraine 1934-
1945 (München: Osteuropa-Institut, 1958); levhen Kono-
valets’ ta ioho doba (Munich: Fundatsiia im. levhena
Konoval'tsia, 1974); Volodymyr Martynets’, Ukrains'ke
pidpillia vid UVO do OUN (West Germany, 1949); Petro
Mirchuk, Narys istorii Orhanizatsii Ukrains'kykh Na
tsionalistiv 1920-1939 (Munich: Ukrains'ke Vydavnytstvo,
1968); Orhanizatsiia Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv 1929-
1954 (Paris: Persha Ukrains'ka Drukarnia u Frantsii,
1955); OUN v svitli postanov Velykykh Zboriv, Kon-
ferentsii ta inshykh dokumentiv z borot'by 1929-1955 rr.
(Munich, 1955); Mykhailo Sosnovs'kyi, Dmytro Dontsov:
Politychnyi portret (New York: Trident International,
1974); the memoirs of Zynovii Knysh, too numerous to
mention, are all of great interest and considerable value.
4. One of the exceptions to this rule is lu. I. Rymarenko,
Burzhuaznyi Natsionalizm ta ioho ‘teoriia’ natsii (Kiev:
Naukova Dumka, 1974).
5. Krzysztof Lewandowski, Spraiva ukrairiska w
polityce zagranicznej Czechostowacji w latach 1918-1932
(Warszawa: Polska Akademia Nauk, 1974); Antoni B.
Szczesniak and Wiesfew Z. Szota, Droga do nikqd.
Dziatalnosc Organizacji Ukrainskich Nacjonalistow i jej
likividacja w Polsce (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Min-
isterstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1973); Ryszard Torzecki,
Kwestia ukrainska w polityce III Rzeszy (1933-1945)
(Warszawa: Ksigzka i Wiedza, 1972).
6. Martynets’, p. 120.
7. “Nasha pliatforma,” Vistnyk Soiuza vyzvolennia
Ukrainy, 1, No. 1 (1914), 1.
8. “Vil'ne kozatstvo — narodnia militsiia na Ukraini,”
Rozvaha, 3, No. 42 (1917), 7.
9. Ihor Kamenets'kyi, “Ukrains'ke pytannia v nimets'-
kii zovnishnii politytsi mizh dvoma svitovymy viinamy,”
in levhen Konovalets’ ta ioho doba, pp. 857-61.
10. Ibid., p. 859.
178 NOTES
11. Ibid., p. 859; Torzecki, pp. 112-14.

12. Lewandowski, p. 173; Torzecki, p. 112.
13. Kamenets'kyi, p. 858.
14. Lewandowski, p. 170; “Chorni kruky,” Nasha
Pravda, 1, No. 23 (1921), 1.
15. Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi. Tvory, Arkhiv, Studii:
Lysty Dmytra Doroshenka do Viacheslava Lypyna'koho
(Philadelphia: W. K. Lypynsky East European Research
Institute, 1973), VI, p. 20.
16. Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, Lysty do brativ-khliborobiv.
Pro ideiu i organizatsiiu ukrains'koho monarkhizmu, 2nd
ed. (New York: Bulava, 1954).
17. Ibid., p. 67.
18. Ibid., p. 72.
19. Ibid., p. 72.
20. Ibid., p. 76.
21. Ibid., p. 80.
22. Ibid., pp. 96-97.
23. Ibid., p. 110.
24. Ibid., pp. 191-92.
25. Ibid., pp. 462-67.
26. Oleksa Bumatovych, Ukrains'ka ideologiia revo-
liutsiinoi doby (Vienna: Ukrains'kyi Prapor, 1922), pp. 71-
74.
27. Lewandowski, p. 170.
28. Ukrains'kyi Prapor, 2, No. 60 (1920), 4.
29. “Lyst Ukrains'koho Soiuza Khliborobiv Der-
zhavnykiv do Starshyn i Kozakiv Ukrains'koi Armii,”
Ukrains'kyi Prapor, 2, No. 64 (1920), 4.
30. Volia, 2, No. 6-7 (1921), 281.
31. Viktor Andriievs'kyi, Do kharakterystyky ukrain-
s'kykh pravykh partii (Berlin: Ukrains'ke Slovo, 1921),
p. 3.
32. Ibid., p. 23.
33. “Partiia chy narod?”, Soborna Ukraina, 1, No. 2
(1921), 1; “Lysty vid ukrains'kykh khliborobiv do
ukrains'koi intelihentsii,” Soborna Ukraina, 1, No. 9
(1921), 1-3.
NOTES 179
34. Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, p. 55.

35. levhen Chykalenko, “De vykhid?”, Volia, 2, No. 3-4
(1921), 102-04.
36. Volia, 2, No. 9-10 (1921), 369-70.
37. Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, “Poklykannia ‘Variahiv’
chy Orhanizatsiia Khliborobiv?,” Khliborobs'ka Ukraina,
4, No. 7-8 (1922-23), 312-40; 5, (1924-25), 296-376.
38. B. Brodians'kyi, “Muzhyts'ka natsional'na demok-
ratiia,” Soborna Ukraina, 2, No. 7 (1922), 1-2.
39. Theophil Hornykiewicz, ed., Ereignisse in der
Ukraine 1914-1922, deren Bedeutung und historische
Hintergründe (Philadelphia: W.K. Lypynsky East Eur
opean Research Institute, 1966), vol. I, pp. 306-09;
Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, p. 222.
40. Torzecki, p. 114.
41. Viacheslav Lypyns'kyi, p. 55.
42. Ukrains'ki visti, 3, No. 62 (1928), 2.
43. Stephan Horak, ed., Poland’s International Affairs
1919-1960 (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1964), p.
233.
44. Kostiantyn Zelenko, “Velykobrytaniia i Ukraina,”
in levhen Konovalets’ ta io ho doba, pp. 883-906.
45. S.R., Halychyna i novi derzhavy levropy (Vienna:
Ukrains'kyi Prapor, 1921), pp. 10-11.
46. “Rozval i bahno,” Nova Hromada, 1, No. 3-4 (1923).
47. “V spravi skhidn’oi Halychyny,” Ukrains'kyi
Prapor, 1, No. 3 (1919), 1.
48. Kost' Levyts'kyi, “Kudy dorohy?”, Ukrains'kyi
Prapor, 1, No. 4 (1919), 1.
49. Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk, 1, No. 1 (1922), 92-95.
50. Ukrains'kyi Prapor, 2, No. 44 (1920).
51. Pavlo Lysiak, “Kudoiu ity?” Ukrains'kyi Prapor, 2,
No. 29 (1920), 1-2.
52. Volodymyr Triembits'kyi, “Amerykans'ki Ukrain-
tsi v dopomozi Ukrains'kii Derzhavi i ii narodovi 1914-
1923 rr.,” Al'manakh Ukrains'koho Narodnoho Soiuzu na
rik 1971 (Jersey City: Svoboda, 1971), pp. 49-62;
Kamenets'kyi p. 853.
180 NOTES
53. Triembits'kyi, p. 57.

54. Volia, 1, No. 4 (1919), 6.
55. Ibid., p. 5.
56. A. Khomyk, “Ukraina iak chynnyk internatsion-
al'noi polityky,” Volia, 6, No. 4 (1919), 149.
57. Ivan Kedryn, Zhyttia, podii, liudy (New York:
Chervona Kalyna, 1976), p. 76.
58. Ukrains'kyi Prapor, 3, No. 2 (1921).
59. Kedryn, p. 74; Pavlo Lysiak, “Sovit nechesty vykh,”
Volia, 3, No. 9-10 (1921), 352.
60. levhen Konovalets', Prychynky do istorii ukrains'-
koi revoliutsii, 2nd ed. (Provid Ukrains'kykh Natsional-
istiv, 1948), p. 45.
61. Ibid., p. 45.
62. Lysiak, “Sovit nechestyvykh,” p. 350.
63. Osyp Nazaruk, Pro nouyi typ kyryni. Prychynok do
istorii emigratsii (Vienna: Ukrains'kyi Prapor, 1922).
64. Konovalets', p. 45.
65. Martynets', p. 34.
66. Osyp Nazaruk, Studentstuo i polityka (Vienna:
Ukrains'kyi Prapor, 1921), p. 10.
67. Zynovii Knysh, Na povni vitryla! (Toronto: Sribna
Surma, 1970), p. 34.
68. Kamenets'kyi, p. 856.
70. Tryzub,2,No. 16(1926),pp.25-26;2,No.45(1926),pp.
20-22.
72. Ibid., p. 61.
73. Tryzub, 1, No. 1 (1925), 2.
74. M. Koval's'kyi, “Nakaz natsii,” Tryzub, 3, No. 4
(1927), 6.
75. R.S., “Viina iak chynnyk rozvytku kul'tury,”
Tryzub, 5, No. 13 (1929), 10.
76. Dmytro Andriievs'kyi, “levropeizm”, Tryzub, 2, No.
32 (1926), 8-12; 2, No. 33 (1926), 12-20.
77. Ibid., pp. 10, 12-13.
78. Ibid., pp. 19-20.
NOTES 181
79. “Vidhomin smerty Symona Petliury v Berlini,”

Tryzub, 2, No. 35-36 (1926), 50.
80. Ibid., pp. 38-39.
81. V. Sal's'kyi, “Vozhd' z lasky Bozhoi,” Tryzub, 2, No.
35-36 (1926), 17.
82. levhen Malaniuk, “Natsional'na proskomidia,”
Students'kyi Vistnyk, 4, No. 7-8 (1926), 4-6.
83. L. Volokhiv, “Tak mav umerty Symon Petliura,”
Students'kyi Vistnyk, 4, No. 7-8 (1926), 6-8.
84. Ie. Halovins'kyi, “27 travnia 1926,” Students'kyi
Vistnyk, 4, No. 7-8 (1926), 32-33.
85. “Zvil'nennia Shvartsbarda i ukrains'ka presa,”
Tryzub, 3, No. 43 (1927), 18-20.
86. Ibid., pp. 18-20.
87. Ibid., pp. 18-20.
88. Ibid., p. 20.
89. Dmytro Herodot, “lednaimo svoi lavy,” Tryzub, 4,
No. 4-5 (1928), 28-31.
90. Nova Ukraina, 1, No. 1 (1922).
91. Lewandowski, pp. 273-99.
92. Mykyta Shapoval, Shchodennyk vid 1 sichnia 1925
r. do 22 liutoho 1932 r. (New York: Ukrains'ka Hromada
im. M. Shapovala, 1958), pp. 5, 16.
93. Ibid., pp. 35-46, 79.
94. Nova Ukraina. Bezpartiinyi dvotyzhnevnyk hro-
mads'koho, kuTturnoho ta ekonomichnoho zhyttia, 1, No.
1 (1922).
95. “Do chytachiv,” Noua Ukraina, 2, No. 1-2 (1923), 1-2.
96. “Povorot t. V. Vynnychenka z Ukrainy,” Nova
Doha, 1, No. 33 (1920), 1-2.
97. Volodymyr Vynnychenko, “ledynyi revoliutsiino-
demokratychnyi natsional'nyi front,” Nova Ukraina, 2,
No. 1-2 (1923), 55-71.
98. Nova Hromada, 2, No. 2-4 (1924).
99. Nova Hromada, 2, No. 5-6 (1924).
100. “Komunikat Strilets'koi Rady USS,” Nova
Hromada, 1, No. 2 (1923), 119-20.
101. Dontsov, of course, did not stop writing in 1929.
182 NOTES
This admittedly artificial cut-off point was chosen for the

very simple and obvious reason of examining only those
of his ideas which were accessible to Ukrainians in the
period under discussion in this study.
102. Sosnovs'kyi, pp. 98-107.
103. Dmytro Dontsov, Pidstavy nashoi polityky
(Vienna, 1921), p. 212.
104. Ibid., pp. 3-5, 66-67.
105. Ibid., p. 67.
106. Ibid., pp. 87, 92-97.
107. Ibid., p. 113.
108. Ibid., pp. 119, 123-25.
109. Ibid., pp. 140, 202-03.
110. Ibid., p. 203.
111. Ibid., p. 208.
112. Ibid., pp. 209-10.
113. D.D., “Emihrants'ka ‘smenovekhovshchina’,”
Literaturno-Naukovyi vistnyk, 1, No. 7 (1922), pp. 80-86.
114. D.D., “Bellua sine capite,” Literaturno-Naukovyi
Vistnyk, 2, No. 1 (1923), pp. 58-71.
115. Ibid., pp. 60-61.
116. Ibid., p. 71.
117. “Nashi tsili,” Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk, 1,
No. 1 (1922), p. 4.
118. Ibid., p. 1.
119. Ibid., p. 2.
120. Ibid., p. 2.
121. Ibid., pp. 4, 5.
122. “Nashi tsili,” Zahrava, 1, No. 1 (1923), pp. 3-4.
123. D., “Za novym haslom,” Zahrava, 1, No. 3 (1923),
pp. 34-35.
124. D., “ledynyi front?,” Zahrava, 1, No. 4 (1923), p. 52.
125. D.D., “Agoniia odnoi doktryny,” Literaturno-
Naukovyi Vistnyk, 3, No. 1 (1924), pp. 63-67; D.D.,
“Tserkva i natsionalizm,” Literaturno-Naukovyi Vis
tnyk, 3, No. 5 (1924), pp. 75-76; D.D., “Pans'ko-
muzhyts'kyi tsentavr i neomonarkhizm,” Literaturno-
Naukovyi Vistnyk, 4, No. 4 (1925), pp. 362-64.
NOTES 183
126. An Aristotelian term denoting perfect character.

127. D. D., “Try roky vidnovlennia Literatumo-
Naukovoho Vistnyka,” Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk, 4,
No. 7-8 (1925), p. 335.
128. D.D., “Symon Petliura,” Literaturno-Naukovyi
Vistnyk, 5, No. 7-8 (1926), pp. 326-28.
129. D.D., “Memento (Do paryz'koho protsesu),”
Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk, 6, No. 11 (1927), pp. 261-64.
130. D. Dontsov, “Dukh amerykanizmu,” Literaturno-
Naukovyi Vistnyk, 8, No. 4 (1929), pp. 358-61.
131. Ibid., pp. 362-64.
132. Ibid., pp. 364-65.
133. “Na dva fronty,” Zahrava, 1, No. 9 (1923), p. 138.
134. Dmytro Dontsov, Natsionalizm, 3rd ed. (London:
The Ukrainian Publishers, 1966), p. 11.
135. Ibid., p. 13. By Provenâlism Dontsov meant
“looking at the world from the point of view of ‘numbers’,
of the plebs, the province, of one’s native Provenqe, as a
part of some greater whole.” Ibid., p. 186.
136. Ibid., p. 205.
137. Ibid., p. 262.
138. Ibid., p. 273.
139. Ibid., pp. 333-34.
140. Ibid., pp. 285-86.
141. Sosnovs'kyi, p. 233.
142. Ibid., pp. 267-68.
143. Natsionalizm, pp. 337-38.
144. Ibid., pp. 341-42.
145. Ibid., pp. 228, 232.
147. Ibid., pp. 252-53.
148. Natsionalizm, p. 13.
149. Dmytro Dontsov, “Zamists’ vidpovidi,” Stu-
dents'kyi Vistnyk, 4, No. 3 (1926), 19.
150. John A. Armstrong, “Collaborationism in World
War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern
Europe,” The Journal of Modern History, 40, No. 3 (1968),
400.
184 NOTES
151. Lypyns'kyi, Lysty, p. 464.

152. Ibid.., pp. 186, 426-27.
153. Dontsov, “Zamists’ vidpovidi,” pp. 17-19.
154. Eugen Weber, “The Men of the Archangel,” in
International Fascism, p. 106.
155. Symon Narizhnyi, Ukrains'ka emihratsiia (Prague:
Muzei Vyzvol'noi Borot'by Ukrainy, 1942), p. 133.
156. Ibid., pp. 155-64.
157. Ibid., pp. 185-96.
158. Ibid., pp. 70-82.
159. Hryts’ Andriienko, “Bat'ky i ‘Dity’,” Students'kyi
Vistnyk, 3, No. 4 (1925), 10-15.
161. Ibid., pp. 85-114.
162. Nova Hromada, 1, No. 1 (1923), 109.
163. Chumak, “Pid suchasnu khvyliu,” Students'kyi
Vistnyk, 3. No. 1-2 (1925), 2-6.
164. Ivan Nimchuk, Ukrains'ka viis'kovaorhanizatsiia
u Vidni v dniakh perevorotu (Vienna: Ukrains'kyi
Prapor, 1922), p. 4.
165. K. Holub, “Spomyny z mynuloho,” Natsional'na
Dumka, 1, No. 7-8 (1924), 9-10.
166. Lewandowski, p. 239.
167. Ukrains'kyi Skytalets’, 4, No. 6 (1923), 1.
168. Konovalets’, pp. 40-41.
169. Ibid., pp. 40-41.
170. Ibid., p. 42.
171. Ibid., p. 42.
172. Ukrains'kyi Prapor, 2, Nos. 27, 65 (1920).
173. “Zaiava Soiuza Starshyn,” Ukrains'kyi Prapor, 3,
No. 33 (1921), 4.
174. “Viis'kovyi zizd v Prazi,” Ukrains'kyi Prapor, 2,
No. 46 (1920), 3. This article appeared on August 28.
According to Konovalets’ (p. 42), the military congress
took place on August 31 — obviously, Konovalets’ made a
mistake. Curiously, this glaring discrepancy has gone un
noticed in the literature on this period.
175. Konovalets’, p. 42.
NOTES 185
176. Konovalets’, p. 42; Kedryn, pp. 297-98.

177. “Viis'kovyi zizd .. Ukrains'kyi Prapor, p. 3.
178. “Lysty levhena Konoval'tsia” in levhen Kono
valets’ ta ioho doba, p. 247.
179. Ibid., p. 254.
180. Ibid., p. 254.
181. Ibid., p. 251.
182. Konovalets’, pp. 46-47.
183. Ibid., p. 42.
184. “Lysty levhena Konoval'tsia,” p. 259.
185. Zynovii Knysh, Vlasnym ruslom (Toronto: Sribna
Surma, 1966), p. 76.
187. Osyp Mel'nykovych. “Do istorii UVO v Chekho-
Slovachchyni,” in levhen Konovalets’ taioho doba, p. 334.
188. Mel'nykovych, pp. 328-40; Martynets’, pp. 54-58.
189. Osyp Navrots'kyi, “Pochatky UVO v L'vovi,” in
Sribna Surma. Pochatky UVO v Halychyni, vol. 2
(Toronto: Sribna Surma), p. 33.
190. “Lysty levhena Konoval'tsia,” pp. 243-45.
192. “Lysty levhena Konoval'tsia,” p. 243.
193. Martynets’, pp. 37-40.
194. Osyp Navrots'kyi, “UVO, politychni partii i
Dyktatura ZOUNR ta Uriad UNR,” in levhen Kono
valets’ ta ioho doba, p. 299.
195. Mirchuk, p. 33.
196. Kedryn, p. 106; Martynets’, p. 36.
197. Martynets’, pp. 36-37.
198. Ivan Kedryn-Rudnyts'kyi, “Vydatna indyvidual’-
nist’,” in levhen Konovalets’ ta ioho doba, p. 347.
200. Ibid., p. 171.
201. Ibid. p. 171.
202. Zahrava, 1, No. 2 (1923), 32; No. 3 (1923), 48; No. 9
(1925), 144.
203. “Chy my fashysty?,” Zahrava, 1, No. 7 (1923), 99.
204. “Na dva fronty,” Zahrava, 1, No. 9 (1923), 133.
186 NOTES
205. “Chy my fashysty?,” p. 102.

206. Ibid., p. 98.
207. O.V., “Naivyshchyi chas,” Zahrava, 1, No. 13
(1923), 197.
208. Volodymyr Martynets’, “Ukrains'ka natsional-
istychna presa,” in Orhanizatsiia Ukrains’kykh Natsion-
alistiv 1929-1954, p. 232.
209. Zahrava. Orhan Ukrains'koi Partii Natsional'noi
Roboty, 2, No. 9 (1924), 3.
210. Ibid., p. 1.
211. O.V., “ledynofrontova metushnia,” Literaturno-
Naukovyi Vistnyk, 3, No. 11 (1924), 176.
212. D.D., “1927,” Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk, 6, No.
1 (1927), 78.
213. “Nashi tsili,” Zahrava, 1, No. 1 (1923), 3-4.
214. Knysh, Vlasnym ruslom, pp. 43-50, 91-103.
215. Torzecki, pp. 55-56; Mirchuk, p. 40.
216. Knysh, Vlasnym ruslom, pp. 56-57.
217. Torzecki, pp. 56-57; Kamenets'kyi, p. 855; Osyp
Boidunyk, “lak diishlo do stvorennia Orhanizatsii
Ukrains’kykh Natsionalistiv,” in levhen Konovalets’ ta
ioho doba, p. 370.
219. “Pislia atentatu,” Natsional'na Dumka, 1, No. 4-6
(1924), 23-25; see also Zynovii Knysh, Dva protsesy iak
naslidok diial'nosty UVO v 1924 rotsi (Toronto: Sribna
Surma).
220. Osip Dumin, “Prawda o Ukrainskiej Organizacji
Wojskowej,” Zeszyty Historyczne, No. 30 (1974), 103-37.
221. Torzecki, p. 56; Mirchuk, pp. 40-41.
222. Mykhailo Bazhans'kyi, “Pochatky UVO na
Pokutti,” in levhen Konovalets’ ta ioho doba, pp. 316-27;
Ukrains'ki Visti, 2, No. 34 (1927), 2.
223. Dumin, pp. 132-33.
224. It is logical to assume, however, that Dumin’s
remarks concerning the UVO’s relations with the
Germans are accurate insofar as these were facts which
the Germans themselves would know about and could
therefore verify.
NOTES 187

226. Ibid., p. 115.
227. Torzecki, p. 109; Martynets’, pp. 58-60.
228. Martynets’, pp. 191-95.
229. Mel'nykovych, p. 335; Dumin, pp. 113, 118-19; Marty
nets’, pp. 175-76; Mirchuk, p. 34; levhen Vrets'ona, “Moi
zustrichi z polkovnykom,” in levhen Konovalets’ ta ioho doba,
pp. 466-72.
230. Zynovii Knysh, ed., Sribna Surma. Spohady i materiialy
do diiannia Ukrains'koi Viis'kouoi Orhanizatsii, vol. 1
(Toronto: Sribna Surma).
232. Ibid., pp. 263-65.
233. Zynovii Knysh, Pry dzherelakh ukrains'koho orhani-
zovanoho natsionalizmu (Toronto: Sribna Surma, 1970), p. 39.
234. Vrets'ona, pp. 468-69.
235. Boidunyk, p. 368; Zynovii Knysh, “levhen Konovalets’ v
ochakh molodshoi generate» UVO,” in levhen Konovalets’ ta
ioho doba, p. 277.
236. levhen Onats'kyi, “levhen Konovalets’ i PUN pered
problemoiu rozbudovy OUN v Ukraini,” in levhen Konovalets ’
ta ioho doba, p. 671.
237. Ibid., pp. 674, 682.
238. Vrets'ona, p. 469; Zenon Pelens'kyi, “Mizh dvoma
konechnostiamy,” in levhen Konovalets’ ta ioho doba, p. 506.
239. Zynovii Knysh, Dalekyiprytsil (Toronto: Sribna Surma,
1967), p. 193.
240. Martynets’, pp. 222-25; Stepan Lenkavs'kyi, “Natsional-
istychnyi rukh na ZUZta 1-yi Kongres,” in lehven Konovalets’
ta ioho doba, p. 406; Mirchuk, pp. 76-77, 84-86.
241. Narizhnyi, p. 82.
242. Ukrains'kyi Skytalets’, 3, No. 21 (1922), 43.
243. Mel'nykovych, p. 333.
244. “Nasha ideolohiia,” Natsional'na Dumka, 1, No. 3
(1924), 3-7.
245. Ibid., pp. 3-7.
247. Martynets’, pp. 159-62.
188 NOTES
248. “Grupa Ukrains'koi Natsional'noi Molodi,” Rozbudova

Natsii, 1, No. 7-8 (1928), 300.
249. Mirchuk, p. 68; Iurii Artiushenko, “Legiia Ukrains'kykh
Natsionalistiv,” in levhen. Konovalets’ ta ioho doba, pp. 383-
84.
250. V. Voin, “Derzhavnyts'ka molod’,” Students'kyi
vistnyk, 3, No. 5 (1925), 13-16.
251. 1. Hodorozhii, “Anonimy ta psevdonimy,” Tryzub, 2, No.
42 (1926), 13-16.
252. Ibid., p. 14.
253. Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk, 6, No. 3 (1927), 285-86;
No. 12 (1927), 382-83.
254. Tryzub, 2, No. 16 (1926), 2, 25-26; Artiushenko, pp. 389-
92.
255. Tryzub, 2, No. 45 (1926), 20-22.
256. “Legiia Ukrains'kykh Natsionalistiv,” Rozbudova
Natsii, 1, No. 1 (1928), 24.
258. Knysh, Pry dzherelakh..., pp. 66-74; Mirchuk, pp. 54-56;
Lenkavs'kyi, p. 400.
259. B.K., an early SUNM activist, testifies to Bodnaro-
vych’s fascist tendencies.
261. According to B.K.
262. Volodymyr the Great was a prince of the Kievan Rus’.
His symbol, the trident, is considered the emblem of the
Ukrainian national state by non-Soviet Ukrainians.
263. According to B.K., the “enslavement of foreigners”
referred to non-Ukrainians living in the Ukraine. Mirchuk (p.
127) writes: “This was the result of discussions of whether the
Ukrainian State should give complete freedom to foreigners
even when they act against it as in 1917-18... or should it, on the
other hand, ‘enslave’ them, if this is what the security and
growth of the Ukrainian State requires.”
264. Onats'kyi, pp. 671-72.
265. Martynets’, pp. 162-68.
266. Mirchuk, pp. 76-78; Martynets’, pp. 201-04.
267. Mirchuk, pp. 79-80.
NOTES 189
268. Mirchuk, pp. 86-87.

269. Pelens'kyi, p. 506; Kedryn, p. 123; Martynets’, pp. 295-97.
271. Martynets’, pp. 225-30; D. Dontsov, “Probliema pokolin’,”
Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk, 7, no. 7-8 (1928), 328.
272. Martynets’, 302-04.
273. Kedryn in lev hen Konovalets’ ta ioho doba, p. 348.
274. Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk, 7, No. 11 (1928), 28586.
275. Mirchuk, pp. 88-90.
276. Mirchuk, p. 91; Lenkavs'kyi, p. 411; Knysh, Pry
dzherelakh . . ., p. 117-18.
277. Lenkavs'kyi, pp. 408-15. Lenkavs'kyi relates how shocked
he and Okhrymovych were to see how little the emigres
abided by the rules of conspiracy at the congress, to the point of
making a group photograph and sending postcards with the
signatures of all the participants. These two incidents, of
course, affirm the fact that, unlike the krai Nationalists, the
emigres perceived the OUN as a semi-legal political
organization in no great need of conspiracy. According to B.K.,
the differences between the emigres and the krai Nationalists
were so great that the latter even censored copies of Rozbudova
Natsii before disseminating them among the young. Moreover,
the young Galicians also believed the OUN resolutions to have
placed far too much emphasis on socio-economic problems; the
OUN Structure can be found in Mirchuk, pp. 100-01.
278. Dmytro Andriievs'kyi, “Nasha pozytsiia,” Rozbudova
Natsii, 1, No. 1 (1928), 8.
279. Dmytro Andriievs'kyi, “Shliakhy rozbudovy,” Rozbud
ova Natsii, 1, No. 5 (1928), 185.
280. lu. Vassyian, “Do holovnykh zasad natsionalizmu, ”
Rozbudova Natsii, 1, No. 2 (1928), 38.
281. Ibid., p. 41.
282. Dmytro Andriievs'kyi, “Vichnyi myr,” Rozbudova
Natsii, 1, No. 2 (1928), 49-53.
283. Vassyian, “Do holovnykh zasad ..p. 36.
284. OUN v svitli postanov, pp. 4-5.
285. Vassyian, “Do holovnykh zasad .. p. 40.
190 NOTES
287. Volodymyr Martynets’, “Krytychni uvahy do ‘Lysty do

brativ-khliborobiv’ V. Lypyns'koho,” Students'kyi Vistnyk, 4,
No. 9-10 (1926), 31-37.
288. Vassyian, “Do holovnykh zasad .. p. 38.
289. Ibid., p. 40.
290. O UN v svitli postanov, p. 6.
291. Andriievs'kyi, “Shliakhy rozbudovy,” p. 185.
292. OUN v svitli postanov, p. 15.
293. OUN v svitlipostanov, p. 15; Vassyian, “Do holovnykh
zasad . . .”, p. 38.
294. Mirchuk, pp. 98-99.
295. Ibid., p. 95.
296. Ibid., p. 93.
297. Ibid., pp. 95-96.
298. Ibid., p. 96.
299. Ibid., p. 99.
300. Ibid., p. 96.
301. Oles’ Babii, “Revoliutsiia chy kontrrevoliutsiia,”
Rozbudova Natsii, 1, No. 3 (1928), 78.
304. Ibid., p. 304.
305. Ibid., pp. 97-98.
306. Ibid., p. 98.
307. Ibid., p. 98.
308. Ibid., p. 99.
309. Ibid., p. 99.
310. Ibid., pp. 108-11.
311. Carlton Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion, p. 137.
312. Louis L. Snyder, ed., The Dynamics of Nationalism.
Readings in Its Meaning and Development (Princeton: D. Van
Nostrand, 1964), p. 52.
313. Ernst Robert Curtius, Maurice Barrés und die geistigen
Grundlagen des französischen Nationalismus (Bonn: Verlag
von Friedrich Cohen, 1921), pp. 121-48.
314. Benito Mussolini, “The Doctrine of Fascism,” in Adrian
Lyttelton, ed., Italian Fascisms from Pareto to Gentile. (New
York: Harper & Row, 1975), pp. 42-43.
NOTES 191
315. Mirchuk, pp. 94-95.

316. levhen Onats'kyi, “Lysty z Italii,” Rozbudova Natsii, 1,
No. 3 (1928), 95.
318. Giacinto Trevisonno, “Filosofichno-politychna otsinka
fashyzmu,” Rozbudova Natsii, 1, No. 4 (1928), 137-42.
319. Andriievs'kyi, “Vichnyi myr,” p. 52.
320. Onats'kyi, “Lysty . .pp. 94-96.
321. “Statut i Rehliament Ukrains'koho Soiuza Khliborobiv-
Derzhavnykiv,” Khliborobs'ka Ukraina, 2, No. 2-4(1920-1921),
261-72.
322. Mykola Stsibors'kyi, “Do agrarnoi polityky natsional-
izmu,” Rozbudova Natsii, 1, No. 9 (1928), 334.
324. For works on the post-1929 Nationalist movement see
notes 2-5 as well as: Jaroslav Bilinsky, The Second Soviet
Republic: The Ukraine After World War II (New Brunswick:
Rutgers Univ. Press, 1964); Mykola Lebed*, UPA (Presove
Biuro UHVR, 1946); Petro Poltava, Zbirnykpidpil'nykhpysan’
(Munich: Ukrains'kyi Samostiinyk, 1959); Iurii Tys-Krokh-
maliuk, UPA Warfare in Ukraine (New York: Vantage Press,
1972); UHVR v svitli postanov Velykoho Zboru ta inshykh
dokumentiv z diial'nosty 1944-1951 (Munich: ZCh OUN, 1956);
UPA v svitli dokumentiv z borot'by za Ukrains'ku Samostiinu
Sobornu Derzhavu 1942-1950 (Munich: ZCh OUN, 1957).
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INDEX
Abwehr, 120, 123 Army of the Ukrainian People’s

Academic Aid (Akademichna Pom- Republic (AUNR), 17, 19, 21, 45, 49,
ich), 109 87, 94, 95, 97, 98, 103, 133, 150
Academic Gymnasium, 100 assassinations. Sobinski, 122; Tver-
Academic House (Akademichnyi dokhlib, 111; Wojciechowski, 121
Dim), 140, 147 AUNR, See Army of the Ukrainian
Action Française, 2 People’s Republic
Action Union of Progressive Stu Austria, 5, 6, 8, 11, 15, 20, 21, 25, 33,
dents (DOPS), 89, 92 62, 65, 88, 93, 95, 101, 102, 129
active nationalism, 77-80 Azerbaijan, 167
Afghanistan, 167
agrarian class, 26, 27, 31, 169 Babii, Oles’, 130. 159, 169
agriculture, 159 Bachyns’kyi, Iulian, 7
Aleksander Kujawski, 94 Bachyns’kyi, Volodymyr, 42
Allied Supreme Council, 17, 33 Baden-Powell, Robert, 8
All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Balkans, 65
53 Barrts, Maurice, 3, 71, 82, 114, 134,
All-Ukrainian Congress of Youth, 89 136, 163
All-Ukrainian National Congress, 11 Basarab, Ol’ha, 121
All-Ukrainian National Council, 39 Belgrade, 37
All-Ukrainian National Insurgent Bemko, Volodymyr, 113
Cossack Council, 32 Benes, Edvard, 53
All-Ukrainian Union of Landowners, Berest* (Brest), 115
14, 15. 28 Bergson, Henri, 72
anarchism, 78 Berlin, 10, 20, 23. 24, 25, 29, 36, 37,
Andriievs’kyi, Dmytro, 46-48, 130, 49, 62, 123, 124, 138, 144
132-33, 145, 149, 151, 154, 155, 167 Bern, 62
Andriievs’kyi, Viktor, 28, 30-32, 39, Bible, 74, 75
113, 169 Bila Tserkva, 15
Andriievs’kyi, Opanas, 18 Bil'shouyk Ukrainy, 161
Andrukh, Ivan, 106 Bobers’kyi, Ivan, 100
anti-Semitism, 50-51 Bodnarovych, Osyp, 141, 145, 146,
Armstrong, John A., 1, 3 147, 150
204 INDEX
Bohun, See Chudinov, Mykola Committee to Honor the Memory of

Boidunyk, Osyp, 130 Symon Petliura, 49
Boteva Orhanizatsiia Halychyny, Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the
See Fighting Organization of Galicia Ukraine (CP(b)U), 19, 57
Bolsheviks and Bolshevism, 16. 17, Communist Party of Eastern Galicia
18, 21, 30, 37, 55, 63, 67, 68. 69, 82, (KPSH), 36. 57-58
97, 99, 103, 141 Communist Party of Poland, 58
Bonaparte, Napoleon, 72 Communist Party of Western Ukraine
Boritesia-poborete, 53 (KPZU), 58
Borot’ba (Vityk), 59 Communists and Communism, 55,
Borot'bisty, 15, 17, 19, 57 56, 75, 115, 161, 163
Bosnian Crisis, 8 Congress of the Representatives of
boycotts, 34, 111 Ukrainian Military Organizations
Bratatvo Tarasiutsiv, See Taras Abroad, 98. 104, 106, 184 n.
Brotherhood Conservatives and Conservatism, 2,
Brazil, 48 23-32, 83, 162
Breslau (Wroclaw), 124 Copenhagen, 119
Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of, 14 Cossack Movement, 32
Brno, 138 Cossacks, 48
Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Council of Ambassadors' decision,
Methodius, 76 35, 60, 88, 91, 96. 113, 119, 126, 139
Brussels, 46 CP(b)U, See Communist Party (Bol
Bryan, William Jennings, 74-75 sheviks) of the Ukraine
Bucharest, 51 Cracow, 7, 125
Budapest, 37, 45 creative violence, 78
Budzynovs’kyi, Viacheslav, 42, 117 Croatia, 65
Bukovina, 5, 20 Cromwell, Oliver, 72
Bulgaria, 24, 25, 32, 33 cult of heroes, 141
Curtius, E.R., 163
Canada, 37, 41, 48 Czechoslovakia, 1,3, 20, 33, 34,35,45,
Carpathians, 95, 99, 108, 122 49, 52, 53, 87-88, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99,
Catholicism, 163 107-08, 129, 136, 149
Caucasus, 122
Central Powers, 11. 14 Danzig, 88, 119, 123-24
Central Rada, 12, 13, 14, 15, 141 Darwin, Charles, 75, 155
Central Union of Ukrainian Students Decalogue, 142-43, 188 n.
(TseSUS), 89, 129, 134, 137 Demchuk, Dmytro, 133, 150, 151
Chernihiv gub., 5 democracy, Lypyns’kyi on, 27; Dont
(jhmola, Ivan, 40 sov on, 66; OUN on, 155-56
Chudinov, Mykola. 28-29, 38, 39, 169 Democratic National Front, 56
Church, 28, 31, 79, 116, 161 Denikin, General, 18, 19, 21, 32, 36, 38
Chykalenko, levhen, 31 Derzhavna Natsiia, 136
chynnyi natsionalizm. See active Deutsche Gabel, 94, 95
nationalism Dilo, 6, 42, 51, 117, 161
Chyzh, laroslav, 106, 107, 108, 109, Dilo Group, 42
112 Dilo Publishing League, 112
classocracy, 27 Directory, 15-18, 23, 38-39, 55
Codreanu, Corneliu, 143 Dmowski, Roman, 44
colonists, Polish, 111 Do kharakterystyky ukrains'kykh
Comintern, 19, 36 pravykh partii, 30
Committee of Unified Ukrainian Dontsov, Dmytro, 3, 10, 32, 48, 50,60,
N ational-Political Organizations, 61-85, 101, 130, 134, 137, 140, 141,
136 142, 143, 150, 154, 163, 165, 168, 169,
INDEX 205
171, 174, 181-82 n., 183 n.; and Gabrusevych, Ivan, 141
Konovalets’, 112-18; and National Gajda, General Rudolf, 32
ists, 148-49; and Zahraua, 117-18 Galicia. 7. 8. 9, 13,16. 33-43, 57-58, 59.
DOPS, See Action Union of Progres 91, 93. 94. 95. 96. 102, 103, 104, 105,
sive Students 108, 109, 110, 112, 120. 122, 123, 126,
Doroshenko, Dmytro, 25, 29, 32 138-43, 146, 161
Doroshenko, Volodymyr, 10 Galician-Bukovinian Battalion of
Drahomanov, Mykhailo, 8, 66, 76 Sich Sharpshooters, 13
Dreyfus affair, 124 Galician-Bukovinian Committee for
Drohobych,115 Aid to Casualties of the War. 13
Dubno, 115 Galician Socialist Soviet Republic,
Dumin, Osyp, 120. 121,122,123,186 n. 58
Eastern Galicia, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 16,17, George, Lloyd, 33, 35
19, 20, 32, 33-43, 57-58 Germany, 11, 15, 21, 23, 25, 36, 65, 88,
Eastern Ukraine, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 120, 123-25, 129, 149, 174
17, 38, 61, 62, 87, 101, 102, 103, 105, Girsa, VSclav, 53
106 Goering. Hermann, 32, 123
education, 161 Goltz, General Rüdiger von der, 24
Eichhorn, General Hermann von, 14 Grabowski, Stanislaw, 110
elections, 111, 141, 146 Greece, 33
emigres, 10, 20-22, 42 Grigoriev, Otaman, 17
England, 24, 33, 34, 64 Groener, General Wilhelm. 14, 23, 24
Entente, 15, 33, 35, 36, 64, 96, 99, 102, Group of Kuban Ukrainians, 136
103 Group of Ukrainian Nationalist
Europeanism, 47-48 Youth, 140
Group of Ukrainian National Youth
Fascists and Fascism. 2-3, 66, 68, 69, (HUNM), 129-33, 136, 137, 138, 144,
82, 133-34, 138, 162, 163-71; Ukrain 146
ian, 60, 71, 82, 113-14, 133, 137, 141, Group of Ukrainian State Youth, 140,
161, 168-69, 174 169
February Revolution, 11
Fedak, Stepan, 110, 111 Habsburgs, 6. 31; Karl Stephan, 29;
Ferdinand. Archduke, 8 Wilhelm, See Vyshyvanyi, Vasyl’
Fighting Organization of Galicia, 107 Haller, General Jozef, 17, 21, 95
First Balkan War, 8 Hayes, Carlton J.H., 2, 3
First Battalion of Sich Sharp Hegel, Georg, 82
shooters, 13 Heimatdienst, 124
First Winter Campaign, 19, 97 Herodot, Dmytro, 51
Flying Brigade, 122 Hetmanate, 26, 27
Foreign Committee of the UPSR, 52, Hetmanites, 27, 28, 31, 41, 81, 128,
53. 54 140, 147, 169, 170-72
Foreign Delegation of the Military Hetman Pavlo Polubotok Military
Organization (ZADVOR), 123 Club, 12
Foreign Delegation of the UPSR, 52 Hindenburg, General Paul von, 23,
Foreign Group of the Ukrainian 24
Communist Party, 54-55 History of the Ukraine-Rus', 10
Foreign Organization of the UPSR, Hitler, Adolf, 2
53, 54 Hoffmann, General Max, 24
Fourteen Points, 14 Holovins’kyi, Iulian, 107, 120, 121,
France, 17, 33, 34, 45 122
Franko, Ivan, 7, 76 Horthy, Admiral, 95
Free Cossacks, 12-13,28-30,31,32,169 Hrekiv, General Oleksander, 39
Freikorps, 95 Hrushevs’kyi, Mykhailo, 10, 11, 52,
53, 54, 59, 60, 76
206 INDEX
Hryhorovych, 133 Kitchener, Horatio, 72

Hungary, 17, 33, 54, 64, 65 Kollad, Iurii, 133
HUNM, See Group of Ukrainian Kolomyia, 115, 122
National Youth Konovalets’, Colonel levhen, 13, 14,
15, 21. 39-41, 96-104, 105, 106, 108,
ideological purity, 67, 69-79, 118, 149, 109, 110, 111, 112, 119, 120, 121, 122,
165 123, 125, 126-28, 142, 143, 144, 145,
lednist', 59 147, 148, 149, 151, 166, 174, 184 n.;
imperialism, 47, 77, 79, 163 and Dontsov, 112-18; and Petrushev-
Independent Group, 42 ych, 39-41, 108, 109, 110, 115, 119,
industry, 159 122, 123, 125
Indyshevs’kyi, laroslav, 121 Konovalets’, Myron, 130
Initiative Committee for the Renewal Korea, 167
of the Free Cossacks, 29 Kostariv, Leonid, 133, 137, 151
Initiative Group of the USKhD, 25 Kotsko, Adam, 7
initiative-minority, 68, 72, 78, 84 Kovalevs’kyi, Mykola, 15. 39, 52
Inner People’s Committee, 101 Koval’s’kyi, Mykola, 46
integral nationalism, 2-3, 82, 143, Kovel’, 115
157, 162-63 Kozhevnykiv, Petro, 133, 137, 151
intelligentsia, 6, 9, 10, 27-28, 65-66, Kozlovs’kyi, Vsevolod, 10
67, 71, 83, 101, 134, 150 KPSH, See Communist Party of
Interparty Council (Mizhpartiina Eastern Galicia
Rada), 37, 42, 59, 107, 119 KPZU, See Communist Party of
intervention, 103 Western Ukraine
Iron Guard, 143 Krai Command, 119
irrationalism, 77 Kraus, Anton, 95
irredentism, 166 Krestinskii, Nikolai, 36, 119
Italy, 21, 66, 75, 82, 95, 139, 168 Krushel’nyts’kyi, Antin. 45, 59, 60
Kruty, Battle of, 141
Jary, Riko, 123 Kuchabs’kyi, Volodymyr, 13, 106,
Jews, 6, 18, 49-51, 64, 72-73, 121, 161 108, 109-10, 112, 113, 121, 124, 128,
Josefov, 94, 95, 107-08 130, 142
kulaks, 63
Kalisz, 94 Kulish, Mykola, 59
kalokagathia, 72 kul’t heroiv, See cult of heroes
Kamianets’-Podil’s’kyi, 17, 38 Kun, Bela, 17, 54, 95
Kaniv, 9 Kuzelia, Zenon, 124
Kapustians’kyi, General Mykola, 151 Kuz’movych, Volodymyr, 113
Katerynoslav gub., 5
Kaunas, 124, 125 Lancut, 94
Kedryn-Rudnyts’kyi, Ivan, 40 Laqueur, Walter, 3
Kharkiv, 9, 14, 54 Latvia, 167
Kharkiv gub., 5 Leadership of Ukrainian Nationalists
Kherson gub., 5 (PUN), 145, 146, 149, 151, 152
Khliborobs’ka Ukraina, 25, 31, 83 League for the Restoration of the
khlopomanstvo, 112 Ukraine, 39
Khmel’nyts’kyi, Bohdan, 72 League of Ukrainian Nationalists
Khrystiuk, Pavlo, 52 (LUN), 133-38,142,144,150,168,169
Khvyl’ovyi, Mykola, 59 Le Bon, Gustave, 82
Kiev, 13, 15, 16,18, 19.53,99, 101,130 leftists, 88, 89, 92
Kiev gub., 5, 9, 12 Lenkavs’kyi, Stepan, 150, 189 n.
Kiev Rus’, 168, 188 n. Letiucha bryhada, See Flying Bri
Kipling, Rudyard, 72 gade
INDEX 207
Levyts’kyi, Dmytro, 37, 40 Mosse, George L., 3

Levyts’kyi, Kost*, 36, 37 Munich, 32, 124
Lewandowski, Krzysztof, 4 Muscophiles, See Russophiles, 77, 75
liberalism, 78 Mussolini, Benito, 2, 3, 72, 134, 139,
Liberec, 94, 95, 129 156, 164, 167, 168
Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk, 10,
67-75, 112, 114, 118, 136, 140, 146 Nachal’na Kolehua, See Supreme
Lithuania, 35, 120, 125, 149, 167 Collegium
Little Russians, 5 Nachal’na Komanda, See Supreme
Livyts’kyi, Andrii, 18 Command
Locarno Conference, 124 Namier, Sir Lewis, 33
LUN, See League of Ukrainian Na Perelomi, 45
Nationalists Nash Shliakh, 90
Luts’k, 97, 115 Nationalists and Nationalism, 42,43,
Luts’kyi, Ostap, 113, 115 44, 46, 55, 57, 59, 88, 89, 92, 96, 111,
L’viv, 4, 8, 10,16,17, 35,38, 40, 41,42, 117, 118, 126-28, 129-52, 157; and
62, 99, 100, 101, 109, 110, 115, 121, Dontsov, 61-85,148-49; and Fascism,
130, 139, 140 2-3, 162, 163-71; 1st Conference, 144-
L’viv, University of, 7, 35, 87, 90, 100 45; 2nd Conference, 146; 1st Con
Lypyns’kyi, Viacheslav, 12,25-28,29, gress, 150-52; in Galicia, 138-43;
31, 62, 140, 149; and Dontsov, 83-84 ideological origins, 162-73; and in
Lysiak, Pavlo, 37, 39-41 tegral nationalism, 2-3, 162-63; and
Lysty do brativ-khliborobiv, 25-28, Lypyns’kyi, 28; and Petliura, 52
83, 140 Nationalist Union, 125
nationality question, 9, 58, 88
Makarushka, Liubomyr, 128, 145 national-liberation struggle, 167
Makhno, Nestor, 17 Natsionalizm, 75-83, 84, 140
Malaniuk, levhen, 49 Natsional’na Dumka, 130, 132, 136,
Martynets’, Teodor, 113 144
Martynets’, Volodymyr, 89, 125, 130, Navrots’kyi, Osyp, 107, 108
144, 145, 147, 148, 151, 155-56 Nazaruk, Osyp, 16, 37, 38, 39, 41
Marxism, 163 Nazis, 32, 174, 175
Masaryk, Thomas, 53 New Economic Policy (NEP), 23, 59
Matchak, Mykhailo, 13,106,109, 112, Nietzsche, Friedrich, 78, 79, 82
113 nobility, 26
Maurras, Charles, 2,3,82,162-63, 170 Nolte, Ernst, 2, 3, 165
Melenevs’kyi, Marian, 10 Nova Doba, 54-55
Mel’nyk, Andrii, 13, 40, 106, 119,120, Nova Hromada, 60
121 Nova Ukraina, 54-56
Meteor, 140 Novokhats’kyi, K., 29
Mikhnovs’kyi, Mykola, 9, 12 Nouyi Chas, 115
militarism, 8, 96, 163 Nyzhankivs’kyi, Stepan, 130
Mirchuk, Ivan, 24, 25
Mizhpartiina Rada. See Interparty Odessa, 97
Council Okhrymovych, Stepan, 150, 189 n.
mobocracy, 27, 66 Oles’, Oleksander, 45
Moloda Halychyna, See Young Ol’khovyi, Iliarii, 130
Galicia Onats’kyi, levhen, 166, 168
Moloda Ukraina, 7 Organization of Ukrainian National
Monarchists and Monarchism, 25-28, ists (OUN), 4,150-52,153-61,162-73,
55, 66; Russian, 24 174-75, 189 n.; on democracy, 155-56;
Monkey Trial, 74 on economy, 159-60; on foreign
Moscow, 54, 168 policy, 160; ideological origins, 162-
208 INDEX
73; on nation, 154; on state, 165-66; 103, 108, 120, 123, 124, 126, 138, 147,
Structure of, 151 148, 166
Organization of Upperclassmen of Poles, 3-4, 6, 7, 16, 19, 29, 31,34,36,40,
Ukrainian Gymnasia, 140 95, 97, 101, 104, 172
Orgesch, 24 Polians’kyi, Iurii, 107, 108, 113
orientations, 52, 69, 103 Political Collegium (Politychna
Osteuropäische Korrespondenz, 124 Kolehiia), 119
OUN, See Organization of Ukrainian Polonization, 139
Nationalists Polonophilism, 40
our own forces, 29, 69, 110, 129, 130, Poltava gub., 5, 12, 28
171, 172 Poltavets’-Ostrianytsia, Ivan, 32, 60
Populism, 6, 9
pacifism, 65 Potocki, Andrzej, 8
Paliiv, Dmytro, 42, 112, 113,115,128, Prague, 7, 31, 32, 37, 53, 56.87, 88,89,
147, 150 91, 97, 98, 104, 106, 107, 121, 130, 146
Paneiko, Vasyf, 36 Pravda, 10
parents and children, debate, 89 Preusisch-Holland, 124
Pareto, Vilfredo, 82 prisoners-of-war, 21, 95
Paris, 37, 45, 50, 130 Professional Organization of Ukran-
Paris Peace Conference, 19, 36 ian Students, 90
particularism, 38, 78, 109 Prokopovych, Viacheslav, 45
peasantry, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 23, 28, 29, Pros vita, 6, 100, 141
30, 40, 58, 59, 62-67, 68, 70, 72, 81, Provencalism, 76-80, 183 n.
104, 112, 113-17, 118, 156, 159, 162, PUN, see Leadership of Ukrainian
169-70, 171-72 Nationalists
Peremyshf, 51, 115
permanent revolution, 141-42, 151 racism, 71
Petliura, Symon, 10, 15, 16,17, 18,19, Rapallo, Treaty of, 23
20. 21, 22, 24, 29, 36, 38, 39. 44-56,57, rationalism, 77
62, 72-73, 97, 99, 102, 103, 134, 136^ Red Army, 14, 17, 18. 19, 57. 58
139, 149; assassination of, 49; and Red Ukrainian Galician Army. 19, 60
Poland, 19; trial, 50-51 re-emigration, 59
Petrushevych, levhen, 16, 17, 18, 19. Reichswehr, 120, 123
20, 22, 29, 30, 31. 33-43, 49, 58, 90, 95, religion. 161
97. 98, 102, 103, 104, 106-07, 108, 110, revisionism, 96
111, 112, 115, 119-20, 122. 123, 125, Revolutionary Ukrainian Party
126, 147; and Konovalets’, 39-41; and (RUP), 9, 10, 28
Soviets, 36 Ridna Shkola, 6
Pidhirs’kyi, Samiilo, 42, 115 Riga, Treaty of, 20
Pidstavy nashoi polityky, 62-67, 68, rightists, 88, 89, 92, 129, 140
69, 74, 80, 84 Rio de Janeiro, 37
Prfsudski, Jozef, 8, 19, 36, 44, 72, 97 Roehm, Ernst, 32, 123
103, 110, 122, 167 Rogger, Hans, 3
Pins’k, 115 Rohrbach, Paul, 24, 124
Piotrkdw, 94 Romanovs, 31
Pipchyns’ka, Volodymyra, 125 Romanovs’kyi, P., 29
Pisniachevs’kyi, Viktor, 45 romanticism, 77
Plast, 8, 140 Rome, 166, 167
Podebrady, 88, 89, 133 Roosevelt, Theodore, 72
Podillia gub., 5 Rosenberg, Alfred, 24, 32, 123
pogroms, 18, 49, 50, 71, 73 Rozbudoua Natsii, 145,149,167,189 n.
Poland, 17, 18,19, 21, 25. 32,33,34-35, Rudnyts'ka, Milena, 40
38, 39, 41, 44, 45, 64, 65, 88, 94. 95, 99, Rudnyts’kyi, Lieutenant Ivan, 107
INDEX 209
Rumania, 1,3, 20,25,33,64,65,97,149 Sniatyn, 122

RUP, See Revolutionary Ukrainian Sobinski, Stanislaw, 122
Party Soborna Ukraina, 31-32, 113, 169
Russia, 3,5,6.7,9,11,12,13,15,16,19, sobornist\ 17, 19,38,39,60,98,101-04,
20, 21, 23, 34, 44, 54, 61-67, 75, 78, 82, 109, 112, 130, 136, 137, 150, 171
83. 103, 149, 166 Social Democrats, left, 19, 57
Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Socialist League ôf the East of
Party, 9-10 Europe, 54
Russophiles, See Muscophiles, 7, 36- Socialists and Socialism, 7, 9, 18, 30,
37, 40 45, 54-55, 62, 65, 67, 74, 139, 153, 169
Ruthenians, 5, 7 Social-Revolutionaries, Belorussian,
54; left, 57; right, 39; Russian, 54
sabotage action, 110-11, 139 Society for the Support of Ukrainian
Sal’s’kyi, Volodymyr, 49 Culture, 24
Samostiina Ukraina, 9 Society of Ukrainian Progressives
Schmidt, Axel, 124 (TUP), 10, 11, 12
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 79, 82 Sokil, 6. 7, 8, 100. 141
Schwartzbard, Samuel, 49-51, 72-73, Sokol, 6
75, 139 soldiers. 12, 16, 17, 29, 45, 87, 88, 93-
secession, 7 100, 104, 133, 141, 150
Second Winter Campaign, 45, 103, Sombart, Werner, 82
113 Sorel, Georges, 72, 78, 82
Sejm, 34, 35, 43. 58. 149 Sosnowsky, Michael (Sosnows’kyi,
self-determination, 109-10 Mykhailo), 3, 80
Senyk, Omelian, 107, 121 Sovietophiles, 36, 57-69, 88
Shapoval, Mykyta, 15, 52-56, 88, 89, Stanyslaviv, 28, 34, 115, 122
147, 172 St. Germain, Treaty of, 33
Sharpshooters, 8 St. Petersburg, 61
Sharpshooters’ Council, 13, 16, 97, strong man, 78
105, 108 Strzatkowo, 94
Shchurat, Vasyl’, 91 Strzelcy, 8
Shemet, Serhii, 12, 25 Stsibors’kyi, Mykola, 133, 137, 145,
Sheparovych, Iulian, 115 147, 151, 169, 171-72
Shevchenko Scientific Society, 10, 91 students, 7-8, 10, 35, 41, 44, 62, 85,
Shevchenko Society, 10 86-92, 94, 112, 129, 135, 139
Shevchenko, Taras, 8, 9 Students ’kyi Vistnyk, 89, 134
Shums’kyi, Oleksander, 59 Sugar, Peter, 3
Sich, 7, 8 SUNM, See Union of Ukrainian
Sich Sharpshooters, 13, 14, 15,16,21, Nationalist Youth
39, 41, 95, 96-99. 101, 104, 105, 106, SVU, See Union for the Liberation
108 of the Ukraine
Sichyns’kyi, Myroslav, 8 Supreme Collegium, 107, 110
Simmel, Georg, 82 Supreme Command, 110, 111, 119
Sinn Fein, 167 Supreme Political Committee, 54
Skoropads’kyi, Hetman Pavlo, 13,14, Supreme Ruthenian Council, 7
15, 16, 20. 22, 23-25, 29, 31. 32, 62, Surma. 124, 125. 127-28, 144
169, 170 Switzerland, 45
Skoropys-Ioltukhovs’kyi, Oleksander, syl'na liudyna, See strong man
10 SzczepiJrno, 94
Skrypnyk, Mykola, 59 Szczeiniak, Antoni B., 4
Slovakia, 35, 124 Szota, Wiesfaw Z., 4
Smena Vekh, 59
Smetona, Antanas, 125 Taras Brotherhood, 9
Smoloskypy, 141 Tarntfw, 44, 45
210 INDEX
Tavria gub., 5 Ukrainian Gymnasium, 88

Ternopil’, 34, 115 Ukrainian Institute of Sociology, 53
Teschen, 34, 108 Ukrainian-Lithuanian Society, 125
Tiutiunnyk, Iurii, 113 Ukrainian M. Drahomanov High
Torres, Henri, 50 Pedagogical Institute, 88
Torzecki, Ryszard, 4 Ukrainian Military Organization
totalitarianism, 135, 144, 164 (UVO), 105-28, 139, 140, 141, 143,
trade, 159 144, 145-46, 151, 152, 186 n.; con
Transcarpathia, 5, 20, 122 ference in Danzig, 119; conference
Trevisonno, Giacinto, 167 in Uzhhorod, 122; and Germans,
Troian, Kyrylo, 115 123-25; intelligence work, 119, 120-
Tryzub, 45, 51, 135, 161 21, 123; and Lithuanians, 125; and
Tsaritsyn, 13, 101 Soviets, 121; training camps, 124
Tselevych, Volodymyr, 107, 108, 128 Ukrainian National Council, 16, 17,
TseSUS, See Central Union of 38
Ukrainian Students Ukrainian National Democratic
Tuchola, 94 Party (UNDP), 6, 7, 37, 101
TUP, See Society of Ukrainian Ukrainian National Democratic
Progressives Union (UNDO), 42-43, 117, 126, 141,
Turkey, 24 146, 147, 149, 161
Tverdokhlib, Sy dir, 111 Ukrainian National-Political Union
tuorche nasyl’stvo, See creative Abroad, 136
violence Ukrainian National State Union, 38
Tychyna, Pavlo, 59 Ukrainian National Union, 14, 15,
133
Ubermensch, 78 Ukrainian Party of Independists
UDKhP, See Ukrainian Democratic- Socialists (UPSS), 12, 38, 39
Agrarian Party Ukrainian Party of National Work
UH A, See Ukrainian Galician Army (UPNR), 42, 115-18, 169
Ukapisty, 19, 57 Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Fed-
UKhSP, See Ukrainian Christian- eralists (UPSF), 12
Social Party Ukrainian Party of Social-Revolu
UKP (Borot'bisty), See Ukrainian tionaries (UPSR), 12, 15, 16, 43, 44,
Communist Party (BoroCbisty) 52-56, 137
Ukraina Irredenta, 7 Ukrainian Party of Work, 43
Ukraine, 3, 4, 11, 13, 14, 19, 29, 30,38, Ukrainian Peasants' and Workers’
48, 54 Socialist Union, 58
Ukrainian Agrarian Party, 111 Ukrainian People’s Labor Party
Ukrainian Agricultural Academy, (UNTP), 37, 38, 39, 42, 60, 107, 115,
87-88 117
Ukrainian Brigade, 95-98, 106 Ukrainian People’s Party (UNP —
Ukrainian Christian-Social Party Chudinov), 28-29, 30, 38, 39, 169
(UKhSP), 37 Ukrainian People’s Party (UNP —
Ukrainian Communist Party (Borot’- Mikhnovs’kyi), 9
bisty), 19 Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR),
Ukrainian Community Publishing 14, 19, 20, 21, 38, 44-56, 60, 99, 101,
Fund, 53 103, 106, 113, 134, 136, 147, 150, 172
Ukrainian Democratic-Agrarian Ukrainian Press and Telegraph
Party (UDKhP), 12, 14, 15, 28, 38, Agency, 62
62, 169 Ukrainian Public Committee, 53, 88
Ukrainian Free University (UVU), 87 The Ukrainian Question. A Peace
Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA), 17, Problem, 149
18, 19, 21, 38, 87, 94, 95, 97, 98, 104, Ukrainian Radical-Democratic Party,
107, 129 44, 136, 137
INDEX 211
Ukrainian Radical Party, 7, 37, 39, Union of the Ukrainian Emigration

43, 56, 107, 115 in the Czech Lands, 136
Ukrainian Regional Student Organ Union of Ukrainian Fascists, 133,168
ization, 90 Union of Ukrainian Journalists and
Ukrainian Scientific Institute, 24 Writers, 87
Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooters (USS), Union of Ukrainian Nationalists, 138
8, 13, 29, 40, 60, 93, 104, 107, 121 Union of Ukrainian Nationalist
Ukrainian Social-Democratic League, Youth (SUNM), 140-42, 144, 146,
9 151, 152
Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party, Union of Ukrainian Officers in
37, 59 Germany, 123
Ukrainian Social-Democratic Workers’ Union of Ukrainian Organizations in
Party (USDRP), 10, 15,16, 17, 28, 44, the Czecho slovak Republic, 53
56, 61, 62, 137 Union of Ukrainian Statehood, 25
Ukrainian Socialist-Radical Party, United Revolutionary Democratic
43 National Front, 55, 131
Ukrainian Sociological Institute, 53 United States, 37,66,74-75,81,82,167
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic United States of Eastern Europe, 36
(UkSSR), 20, 23, 24, 32,35,36, 43, 45, university, 7, 90-91, 100, 101
52, 53, 57, 58, 59, 60, 88, 89, 92, 104, UNP, See Ukrainian People’s Party
113, 139, 140, 161 UNR, See Ukrainian People’s Re
Ukrainian Student Union, 90, 109 public
Ukrainian Technical High School, 91 UNTP, See Ukrainian People’s Labor
Ukrainian Union of Agrarian Party
Statists (USKhD), 25, 29, 30, 83, UPNR, See Ukrainian Party of
169, 170-71 National Work
Ukrainian Union of Officers, 98 UPSF, See Ukrainian Party ofSocial-
Ukrainianization, 23, 57, 58, 59; of ists-Federalists
army, 11, 13 UPSR, See Ukrainian Party of Social-
Ukrains’ka Hromada, 25 Revolutionaries
Ukrains’ke Slovo, 25 UPSS, See Ukrainian Party of
Ukrains’kyi Holos, 51 Independists-Socialists
Ukrains’kyi Kozak, 32, 60 USDP, See Ukrainian Social-Demo
Ukrains’kyi Prapor. 36, 39, 100 cratic Party
Ukrains’kyi Reuoliutsioner, 122, 124 USDRP, See Ukrainian Social-Demo
Ukrains’kyi Skytalets’, 96 cratic Workers’ Party
underground university, 91-92; 94 USKhD, See Ukrainian Union of
UNDO, See Ukrainian National Agrarian Statist«
Democratic Union USS, See Ukrainian Sich Sharp
Union for the Liberation of the shooters
Ukraine (SVU), 10-11, 20, 62,94, 133 UVO, See Ukrainian Military Organ
Union for the Liberation of Vilnius, ization
125 UVO Representation in Czecho
Union of Former Ukrainian Soldiers, slovakia, 107, 108, 130
136 UVU, See Ukrainian Free University
Union of Industry, Commerce, Fin
ance, and Agriculture, 14 Vassyian, Iulian, 150, 151, 154, 155,
Union of Landowners, 14, 15 156
Union of Organizations of Ukrainian Vatican, 37
Nationalists, 137-38 Vidrodzhennia Natsii, 54
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Vienna, 6, 7, 10, 16, 20, 23, 25, 29, 31,
(USSR), 50, 59 33, 37,38,39,41,45,52,53,54,55,59,
Union of Ukrainian Agrarians in the 60, 62, 87, 93, 98, 103, 106, 109, 150
CSR, 136, 169 Vilnius, 35
212 INDEX
Vistula River, 19 Winnipeg, 37

Vitovs’kyi Colonel Dmytro, 93 Wojciechowski, Stanislaw, 121
Vityk, Semen, 59-60, 173 working class, 6, 7, 30, 40, 58, 116,
ulasni syly. See our own forces 140, 159
Voievidka, Kost’, 40 World War I, 4, 150, 155
Voin, V., 134-35, 137, 142 Wrangel, General, 19, 14, 29, 32
Voldemaras, Augustinas, 125 Wschodnia Maiopolska, 34
Voli a, 45
Volodymyr the Great, 142, 188 n. Young Galicia, 39-41, 99, 103,109, 112
Volunteer Army, 17 Yugoslavia, 24, 32, 33
Volyn’ gub., 5, 19, 20
Vynnychenko, Volodymyr, 10, 15, 16, ZADVOR, See Foreign Delegation of
54-56, 131, 172 the Military Organization
Vyshyvanyi, Vasyl’, 28-32, 169 Zahrava. 60, 67, 70-71, 113-15, 156,
168, 169
Wadowice, 94 Zalizniak, Mykola, 10, 39, 52
Warsaw, 18, 39, 45, 99 Zashkiv, 100
Weber, Eugen, 2, 3, 86-87 Zbruch River, 17, 20
Western Oblast of the UNR, 17 Zemlia i Volia, 167
Western Ukraine, 5, 6, 33-43, 58, 102, Zhuk, Andrii, 10
130 zminovikhoushchyna, 59, 68
Western Ukrainian National Revolu ZUNR, See Western Ukrainian
tionary Organization (ZUNRO), 122 People’s Republic
Western Ukrainian People’s Republic ZUNR Delegation in L’viv, 107, 111
(ZUNR), 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21,33-43, ZUNRO, See Western Ukrainian
58, 59, 60, 90, 95, 99. 100, 101, 103, National Revolutionary Organ
106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 139, 172 ization
Wilson, Woodrow, 14, 109 Zyblikevych, levhen, 113

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THE TURN TO THE RIGHT:

THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS

EAST EUROPEAN MONOGRAPHS, BOULDER

Copyright1980 by Alexander J. Motyl

AUNR — Army of the Ukrainian People’s Republic

A qualitatively new Ukrainian political movement arose in

The Ukrainian Nationalists saw their movement as a reaction

have seriously examined Ukrainian Nationalism as a crucial

THE PRE-WAR BACKGROUND AND THE FIRST

The First World War, the revolutionary turmoil in Russia,

They faced a powerful opposition in the Russophiles (or

was killed in the latter disturbances, thereby providing the

language and that the Ukrainians were indeed a separate

financial and administrative support of Germany and Austria,

The growing political and social ferment led to a proliferation

revolutionary incidents”, the Free Cossacks consisted of many

Events of an overall Russian nature soon pushed problems of

government in Kharkiv, and the Red Army’s invasion of the

excessive Russian influence and increase its commitment to

Events of equal importance were also taking place in

sobornist’ (a religious term denoting unity) on January 22,

and among the peasantry. What is more, Petliura, although

lack of supplies, began negotiations with the White general

their Ukrainian allies and signed a peace treaty with Soviet

in Russia. Significantly, the emigres are essential to the

Although having been decisively defeated by their political

SKOROPADS'KYI AND THE CONSERVATIVES

Following the Directory’s successful uprising in late 1918,

make the Ukraine into a trouble-spot demanding the requisite

groupings usually bearing the name Agrarian (Khliborob). The

According to Lypyns'kyi, the essential principles of the

the ideological and all-national interests of the State and

intelligentsia, organize their forces, and respond to the

and an alliance of the middle peasantry with the urban

As the Free Cossack movement broadened in scope,

In October 1921, Andriievs’kyi began publishing the

monarch.38 By May 1922, Soborna Ukraine, ceased publica­

PETRUSHEVYCH AND THE GALICIANS

The second of the Ukrainian governments to go into exile

The Dictator offered the Allied Powers, and particularly the

parties and cultural organizations were severely circum­

the meantime, declared a political amnesty allowing Ukrainian

Somewhat earlier, the newspaper had also written: “ . . .

of the Ukrainian emigration. Alongside of the usual emigre

of the National Union’s authority. With Petliura’s final retreat

Halychyna), in mid-1921. Besides Konovalets’ and Lysiak, the

Although Konovalets’ left Vienna for L'viv in mid-1921,

province and therefore felt themselves ever more estranged

overcame their differences and merged in the Ukrainian

PETLIURA AND THE SOCIALISTS

After settling in Tarnow in the south-east of Poland in the

UNR camp was the journal Volia (Liberty), which appeared in

editorial proclaimed the UNR’s “commandments” as “the

termed “Europeanism” (Evropeizm). This Europeanism, ac­

All these European qualities Andriievs'kyi purported to see

The relative uneventfulness characteristic of the UNR camp

Ideal of the Resurrection of the Ukrainian People become a

traitors or idiots can speak of an understanding with the Jews”

The events surrounding Petliura’s death were crucial to the

monarch.38 By May 1922, Soborna Ukraine, ceased publica

parties and cultural organizations were severely circum

termed “Europeanism” (Evropeizm). This Europeanism, ac

According to the post-war political vocabulary of Ukrain

to its logical end. Obviously impressed by Mussolini’s con

dogmatism, exclusiveness, toughness. In place of particular

Although Ukrainian soldiers played a particularly prom