06 - Metrobank V Perez
06 - Metrobank V Perez
06 - Metrobank V Perez
580
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
Solidbank was later acquired by its co-petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
(Metrobank), the latter as the surviving entity.
On September 24, 2002, Metrobank sent a notice of termination of the lease contract
effective September 30, 2002.[2] Respondent, objecting to the termination, filed a complaint
for breach of contract and damages against herein petitioners Solidbank and Metrobank
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan praying that, inter alia, herein
petitioners be ordered to pay her "the would be unrealized income for the ensuing idle
months of the said building."[3]
Metrobank asserted in its Answer with Counterclaim, however, that the lease contract did not
prohibit pre-termination by the parties.
After respondent rested her case, Metrobank was, by Order of January 12, 2006, declared to
have waived its right to present evidence after its counsel incurred several unexcused
absences.
By Decision of April 5, 2006, Branch 22 of the Malolos RTC ruled in favor of respondent,
disposing as follows:
On appeal, Metrobank challenged, in the main, the trial court's award of "unrealized income
for the ensuing idle months" despite respondent's failure to pay docket fees thereon to thus
render the complaint dismissible for lack of jurisdiction.
By Decision[5] of November 23, 2007, the appellate court affirmed that of the trial court[6]
and denied, by Resolution of February 21, 2008, a reconsideration thereof. Hence, the
present petition for review on certiorari.
In her Comment, respondent admitted that the filing fees she paid did not cover her prayer
for unrealized income for the ensuing idle months, for "at the time of filing and payment[,]
the period that the building would be idle could not yet be determined."[7]
For one, plaintiff-appellee Perez could not have been certain at the time she filed
the Complaint that defendant-appellant Metrobank would no longer return to the
Leased Property. It would have been speculative therefore on the part of plaintiff-
appellee Perez to allege in her Complaint any unrealized income for the remaining
period of the Lease Contract considering that the possibility of defendant-
appellant Metrobank reconsidering its decision to terminate the said Lease
Contract and returning to the Leased Property at some future time was not
definitively foreclosed when the Complaint was filed. In light of her predicament,
plaintiff-appellee Perez was thus justified in just making a general prayer for the
court a quo to award unrealized income for the "ensuing idle months" of the
Leased Property.[8] (italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
Metrobank takes exception to the application of Sun Insurance Office to the present case
because, by its claim, respondent deliberately concealed the insufficient payment of docket
fees.
Metrobank's position fails. The ensuing months in which the leased premises would be
rendered vacant could not be determined at the time of the filing of the complaint. It bears
recalling that the building constructed on respondent's leased premises was specifically
constructed to house a bank, hence, the idle period before another occupant with like
business may opt to lease would be difficult to project.
On Metrobank's raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the complaint for respondent's
failure to pay the correct docket fees, apropos is the ruling in National Steel Corporation v.
Court of Appeals: [12]
Metrobank raised the issue of jurisdiction only before the appellate court after it and its co-
petitioner participated in the proceedings before the trial court. While lack of jurisdiction may
be raised at any time, a party may be held in estoppel if, as in the present case, it has
actively taken part in the proceedings being questioned.
The foregoing disposition notwithstanding, respondent is liable for the balance between the
actual fees paid and the correct payable filing fees to include an assessment on the award of
unrealized income, following Section 2 of Rule 141 which provides:
SEC. 2. Fees in lien. - Where the court in its final judgment awards a claim not
alleged, or a relief different from, or more than that claimed in the pleading, the
party concerned shall pay the additional fees which shall constitute a lien on the
judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of court shall assess and collect the
corresponding fee (underscoring supplied),
A word on the grant of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
The Court notes that respondent's witness-attorney-in-fact testified only on the existence of
the lease agreement and unrealized income due to pre-termination. Since an award of moral
damages is predicated on a categorical showing from the claimant that emotional and mental
sufferings were actually experienced, absent any evidence thereon in the present case,[15]
the award must be disallowed. And so too must the award of attorney's fees, absent an
indication in the trial court's Decision of the factual basis thereof, the award having been
merely stated in the dispositive portion.[16] Parenthetically, while respondent prayed in her
complaint for the award of attorney's fees and testified during the trial that:
Q: Now, in connection with the filing of this case and hiring your lawyer, do you
have agreement with your counsel with respect to attorney's fees?
there is no showing that she submitted any documentary evidence in support thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is in part GRANTED. The November 23, 2007 Decision of the
Court of Appeals is MODIFIED. The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan is ordered to reassess, determine and collect additional fees that should be paid by
respondent within fifteen (15) days, in accordance with the foregoing discussion of the Court,
provided the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period has not
yet expired, which additional fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of
said lien. The award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
[2] Rollo, p. 82
[5] Penned by Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. with the concurrence of then CA Justice Jose C.
Mendoza (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) and Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr.
[10] G.R. Nos. 79937-39, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 274.
[11] G.R. No. 140954, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 460, 475.
[14] Proton Pilipinas Corporation v. Banque Nationale de Paris, G.R. No. 151242, June 15,
[15] Bank of Commerce v. Sps. Prudencio San Pablo, Jr., G.R. No. 167848, April 27, 2007,
124, 137-138.