Salvation Army Federal Lawsuit

Case: 1:22-cv-01250 Document #: 1 Filed: 03/09/22 Page 1 of 29 PageID #:1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MICHAEL CLANCY, STUART LOVE, and

MERRICK MANN, on behalf of themselves
and all others similarly situated,
Case No. __________
Plaintiffs,
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
v.
THE SALVATION ARMY, an Illinois

nonprofit corporation,
Defendant.
CLASS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs Michael Clancy, Stuart Love, and Merrick Mann (“Plaintiffs”), by and through
the undersigned attorneys, bring this action on behalf of themselves and the collective as defined
below, against Defendant The Salvation Army (“Defendant”) for failure to pay minimum wage
as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. Plaintiffs also
bring this action on behalf of themselves and classes of similarly situated workers against
Defendant for violations of select state labor laws. Plaintiffs Clancy, Love, and Mann
additionally each bring this action on behalf of themselves against Defendant for failure to pay
overtime as required by the FLSA and select state laws. Plaintiffs allege as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1. There are approximately 120 Salvation Army residential adult rehabilitation
centers and adult rehabilitation programs (“ARCs”) across the United States, approximately 21
of which are located in the Salvation Army Central Territory and operated by Defendant.
Thousands of vulnerable individuals (“ARC workers”)—people who are unhoused or marginally

housed, who are very poor, who have drug or alcohol addiction problems, who are entangled in
the criminal justice system, and/or who suffer from mental illness—enroll in Defendant’s ARCs
annually. Some enroll voluntarily, while others do so as an alternative to incarceration.
2. The cornerstone of all of Defendant’s ARCs is that all ARC workers must
perform at least forty hours per week, and often more, of difficult work for Defendant. Most of
the work is performed in direct support of Defendant’s thrift stores, retail establishments that are
in direct competition with other such enterprises selling used goods. Typical tasks performed by
the ARC workers include sorting donated clothing, hanging clothing on hangers, putting price
tags on the clothing and other goods, sorting and cleaning bric-a-brac, testing electronics,
rehabilitating furniture, and loading and unloading trucks with donated goods. All the work
performed is suffered or permitted by Defendant and is under the direction and control of
employees of Defendant.
3. In exchange for the ARC workers’ full-time labor, Defendant pays wages to the
ARC workers that start as low as $1 per week and may increase each week up to a maximum of
no more than approximately $21 per week, well below the minimum wage required by the FLSA
and applicable state laws. As further compensation for the ARC workers’ labor, Defendant
provides ARC workers with dorm-like sleeping arrangements, board in the form of food that is at
least in part donated by third parties or purchased with ARC workers’ SNAP benefits, clothing
that has been donated and would otherwise be sold in Defendant’s thrift stores, and rudimentary
rehabilitative services, the value of which is far below the required minimum wage. ARC
workers who complete the program often leave the ARC penniless and jobless, unable to survive
economically in their communities.
4. People applying to the ARCs who are unable to perform work for Defendant are
ineligible to enroll in the ARCs. Defendant typically expels from the program any ARC workers
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who, after being admitted to the program, become unable or unwilling to work, including if they
become unable to work as a result of an injury sustained performing work for Defendant or
because they fall ill.
5. If ARC workers did not provide labor for Defendant, Defendant would have to
pay other workers from the community to complete the tasks it assigns to ARC workers.
Defendant employs other individuals to work side-by-side with ARC workers performing
substantially the same duties for wages in compliance with the FLSA and applicable state
requirements.
6. Because ARC workers are suffered or permitted to perform tasks for Defendant’s
benefit, under the direction and control of Defendant’s employees, and with the expectation of
receiving compensation from Defendant for their labor, Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated
are Defendant’s employees under the FLSA and applicable state laws. Nevertheless, Defendant
has and at all relevant times has had a uniform policy or practice of failing to treat its ARC
workers as employees. It is well established under the FLSA and applicable state laws that
absent a specific exemption workers cannot waive their right to be compensated at the rates set
forth by law. As a result, Defendant has and at all relevant times has had a policy or practice, in
violation of the FLSA and applicable state laws, of failing to pay Plaintiffs and all those similarly
situated workers minimum wage for all hours worked. Similarly, Defendant has and at all
relevant times has had a policy or practice, in violation of the applicable state laws, of failing to
provide wage statements to Plaintiffs and all those similarly situated workers. Defendant also
failed to pay overtime compensation to Plaintiffs Love, Mann, and Clancy for all hours worked
in excess of forty hours per week, in violation of the FLSA and applicable state laws. These
systemic violations have been, and are, occurring despite Defendant recently publicly
acknowledging the importance of the minimum wage and overtime protections of the FLSA,
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particularly for the working poor, and stating its intention to comply with the minimum wage and
overtime provisions of the FLSA for its lay employees.
7. Defendant at all relevant times knew that Plaintiffs and all those similarly situated
workers were suffered and permitted to work for Defendant but were not paid wages at the
required rate for their work, and willfully and intentionally engaged in a widespread policy or
practice of failing and refusing to fully compensate Plaintiffs and all those similarly situated
workers. See 29 U.S.C. § 255.
8. Plaintiffs bring this action for violations of the FLSA as a collective action,
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of the following proposed collective (the “FLSA
Collective”):
All persons who, between March 9, 2019 and the date of final judgment, are, were, or
will be enrolled in any Salvation Army Adult Rehabilitation Center or Program operated
by Defendant, who perform, performed, or will perform work for Defendant, and who
are, were, or will be paid less than the applicable federal minimum wage.
9. Plaintiff Mann, who enrolled in an ARC in Michigan, and Plaintiff Clancy, who
enrolled in an ARC in Illinois, also bring this action on behalf of themselves and the classes
defined below for violations of those states’ applicable labor laws. See infra ¶¶ 76-97.
10. Plaintiffs Clancy, Mann, and Love each bring this action on behalf of themselves
individually for failure to pay overtime as required by the FLSA and applicable state laws.
11. Defendant is liable for its violations of federal and applicable state laws.
12. Accordingly, as set forth below, Plaintiffs seek unpaid compensation, penalties,
liquidated damages, statutory penalties, pre- and post-judgment interest, and attorneys’ fees and
costs pursuant to the FLSA and applicable state laws on behalf of themselves, others similarly
situated, and the state classes they seek to represent.
JURISDICTION
13. This Court has jurisdiction over the FLSA claims in Count I and IV pursuant to
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28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
14. This Court has general jurisdiction over Defendant because Defendant is
incorporated and has its principal place of business in Hoffman Estates, Illinois.
15. This Court has jurisdiction over Counts II, III, V, and VI pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1367(a), as Plaintiffs’ state law claims form part of the same case or controversy as Plaintiffs’
FLSA claims.
16. The action is properly before this Court and this Court has jurisdiction over
Counts II and III pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). This is a civil
class action that was commenced after February 18, 2005, in which the matter in controversy as
to Counts II and III exceeds $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs. Plaintiff Mann is a
citizen of Michigan and thus at least one member of the classes bringing Counts II and III is a
citizen of a different state than Defendant. Plaintiffs Clancy and Mann bring Counts II and III on
behalf of statewide classes which, on information and belief, consist of more than 100 class
members in the aggregate. Upon information and belief, none of the exemptions to jurisdiction
found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(3), (d)(4)(A), or (d)(4)(B) apply to this action.
VENUE
17. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because Defendant
resides in this District and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiffs’
claims occurred in this District. Accordingly, Defendant conducted and continues to conduct
substantial business in this District, a substantial part of the transactions at issue took place in
this District, and Defendant’s liability arose, in part, in this District.
PARTIES
A. Plaintiffs
18. Plaintiff Michael Clancy is an adult resident of Illinois. Plaintiff Clancy most
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recently entered the Salvation Army ARC on Des Plaines Street in Chicago, Illinois on or about
July 29, 2019. He completed the program six months later, on or about January 29, 2020.
During the entire period that he was a participant in the ARC, Plaintiff Clancy was required to
work for Defendant, performing tasks including working in a warehouse, sorting and hanging
clothing; loading donated furniture in and out of trucks alongside drivers who Plaintiff Clancy
understood to be Salvation Army’s acknowledged employees; and working in a security role at
the ARC facility, answering phones and patrolling the premises. He worked at least 8 hours a
day, 5 days a week, in each job he performed and worked additional hours on the weekend from
time to time in addition to 40 hours during week. Plaintiff Clancy was never paid the FLSA
required minimum wage, the minimum wage required by state and local law, nor overtime as
required by the FLSA and state and local law. Instead, his weekly wages started at $1 per week
and incrementally increased until he received wages of $21 per week, at which point wage
increases stopped. Plaintiff Clancy was suffered and permitted to work by Defendant, and his
work was under the direction and control of Defendant. Plaintiff Clancy qualified as an
employee of Defendant under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1), and 820 ILCS 105/3(d).
19. Plaintiff Stuart Love is an adult resident of Indiana. Plaintiff Love entered the
Defendant’s Salvation Army ARC in Kansas City, Missouri in November 2019 and completed
the program in May 2020 before Plaintiff Love re-entered the program in January 2021 and
concluded the program in April 2021. During the entire period that he was a resident in the
ARC, Plaintiff Love was required to work for Defendant, performing tasks that include sorting
donated clothes and placing them on a hanger in the warehouse for sale in the Defendant’s store.
Plaintiff Love also sorted an array of donations at the Defendant’s store, including clothing,
electronics, furniture, and household items. He worked at least 8 hours a day, 5 days a week, in
each job he performed and worked additional hours on the weekend from time to time in addition
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to 40 hours during week. Plaintiff Love was never paid the FLSA required minimum wage, or
overtime as required by the FLSA. Instead, his weekly wages started at $3 per week and
incrementally increased until his wages were capped at $21 per week. Plaintiff Love was
suffered and permitted to work by Defendant and his work was under the direction and control of
Defendant. Plaintiff Love qualified as an employee of Defendant under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(e)(1).
20. Plaintiff Merrick Mann is an adult resident of Michigan. Plaintiff Mann entered
the Salvation Army ARC in Flint, Michigan in October of 2018 and completed the program in
April of 2019. During the entire period that he was a participant in the ARC, Plaintiff Mann was
required to work for Defendant, performing tasks that include working on the docks sorting
clothes; working in the dispatch office; doing pickups of donations alongside drivers who
Plaintiff Mann understood to be Salvation Army’s acknowledged employees; working in the
kitchen; and working at the front desk accepting calls and performing other reception duties. He
worked at least 8 hours a day, 5 days a week, in each job he performed and worked additional
hours on the weekend from time to time in addition to 40 hours during week. Plaintiff Mann was
never paid the FLSA required minimum wage, the minimum wage required by state and local
law, nor overtime as required by the FLSA and state and local law. Instead, his weekly wages
started at $4 per week and incrementally increased until he received wages of $20 per week, at
which point wage increases stopped. Plaintiff Mann was suffered and permitted to work by
Defendant, and his work was under the direction and control of Defendant. Plaintiff Mann
qualified as an employee of Defendant under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1), and M.C.L. §
408.412(c).
B. Defendant
21. Defendant is a 501(c)(3) organization incorporated in Illinois, with its
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headquarters located at 5550 Prairie Stone Parkway, Hoffman Estates, Illinois 60192.
22. The Salvation Army National Corporation conducts its operations in the United
States through four administrative territories: Eastern, Southern, Central, and Western. Each
territory is separately incorporated, has its own territorial commander serving as leader of the
territory, and oversees programs and activities within its own designated geographic areas.
Defendant is responsible for the Central Territory, which consists of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota and Wisconsin.
23. Defendant is, and at all relevant times has been, an employer within the meaning
of 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d) and 203(g), as well as applicable state laws.
24. Defendant is, and at all relevant times has been, an enterprise within the meaning
of 29 U.S.C. § 203(r)(1).
25. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs were Defendant’s employees engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§
203(s)(1), 206, and 207.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
26. Thousands of individuals enroll in Defendant’s ARC programs annually. Some
enroll voluntarily, often because they are poor, unhoused, sick, suffering from a substance use
disorder, or simply have nowhere else to go. Others enroll after courts, probation or parole
officers, or other criminal legal authorities require them to choose between enrollment or
incarceration.
27. Defendant requires that, to enroll in and remain at an ARC, and in exchange for
room, board, clothing, rehabilitative services, and nominal wages—the value of which is far
below the required minimum wage—all ARC workers must perform assigned tasks for
Defendant for at least forty hours per week, and frequently more. The Salvation Army touts this
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requirement on its website, explaining that a person cannot enroll in an ARC program if he or
she is not “[a]ble to perform a work therapy assignment for eight hours a day.”
28. Defendant generally requires every ARC worker to complete an intake with
Defendant before enrolling in the program. Among other things, applicants may be asked to
describe their work histories and any health or physical problems which might keep them from
working. Applicants must be able to work at least five days or forty hours per week.
29. Once enrolled in the program, ARC workers, including Plaintiffs, perform tasks
that are often physically grueling and sometimes dangerous. Such tasks include loading,
unloading, and hauling heavy furniture, home appliances, and other donations from trucks;
sorting through mountains of donated clothing and other goods; cleaning, testing, and repairing
donated goods; operating heavy machinery such as balers in large warehouses; driving or
traveling on trucks to pick up and drop off donated goods; and cleaning, organizing, and
maintaining Defendant’s thrift stores.
30. The jobs performed by ARC workers are not in furtherance of any educational
program and do not primarily further ARC workers’ rehabilitation. Defendant does not provide
ARC workers with job or skills training, nor any other training that would further ARC workers’
employment once they leave the program. Some ARC workers enter the ARCs with skilled
training and experience and long histories of gainful employment. Defendant does not provide
any meaningful job placement assistance for ARC workers leaving the ARC.
31. The jobs performed by ARC workers, including the jobs performed by Plaintiffs,
directly and substantially benefit and are essential to the operation of Defendant’s multi-million
dollar commercial thrift store operations. The ARC workers, including Plaintiffs, perform tasks
assigned to them by Defendant and are under Defendant’s direction and control while
performing work. Defendant’s thrift stores, retail establishments that compete for business with
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other commercial enterprises selling used goods, could not operate without the labor of ARC
workers.
32. As of 2020, there were more than 1000 Salvation Army branded thrift stores
across the country. Defendant’s thrift stores generate millions of dollars in annual revenue for
Defendant. In 2019, The Salvation Army National Corporation reportedly generated
$598,449,000 in revenue from sales at these thrift stores.
33. Defendant also benefits from the jobs it requires some ARC workers to perform
inside the ARCs themselves, like cleaning the common areas, kitchen work and menial
administrative and clerical tasks.
34. If Defendant did not receive the benefit of ARC workers’ labor, Defendant would
have to pay workers in compliance with the FLSA and state minimum wage laws to perform this
work. Some of Defendant’s advertisements for paid positions at its ARCs describe job
responsibilities, like sorting donations, tagging merchandise, and cleaning furniture donations,
that are substantially the same as jobs performed by ARC workers. Indeed, Defendant employs
other individuals from the community to work side-by-side with ARC workers performing
substantially the same duties. Unlike ARC workers, Defendant pays these other employees
market-rate wages that meet or exceed federal and state minimum wage requirements.
35. Defendant controls all aspects of ARC workers’ job assignments, including, but
not limited to, the task each ARC worker must perform; the days of the week on which ARC
workers must perform assigned tasks; the start and end time for shifts; the work location; the job
duties for each position; the manner in which ARC workers are required to perform job duties;
standards of performance; the rate of pay (or lack thereof) for each position; the training, if any,
provided to ARC workers regarding the work they are required to perform; and all other working
conditions. Jobs are assigned and overseen by supervisors who are Defendant’s fully paid
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employees.
36. An ARC worker’s refusal or inability to work is grounds for Defendant to expel
the worker from the ARC, even if the worker follows all other program rules. Defendant
routinely expels workers from its ARCs if they become unable to perform assigned tasks because
of illness or even injury suffered while performing tasks for Defendant.
37. ARC workers who miss scheduled shifts, even for legitimate reasons like illness
or injury, typically are required to make up those hours at a later date.
38. The policies or practices for the ARCs provide that if ARC workers perform their
assigned jobs for Defendant and abide by other program rules, they will be provided with food,
clothing, shelter, rehabilitative services, and wages—sometimes in the form of “canteen cards”
redeemable only at Defendant’s canteen and a meager amount of money, paid on an escalating
scale. Defendant typically pays ARC workers approximately $1 per week for their work when
they begin, with their wages to increase by $1 each week, before topping out at a maximum of no
more than approximately $21 per week as they participate in Defendant’s work program.
Defendant does not provide ARC workers with wage statements. The policies or practices for
the ARCs also provide that if ARC workers are unable or unwilling to perform assigned tasks,
they will not receive these benefits as they will become ineligible to remain in the program.
39. Defendant required Plaintiffs Love, Mann, and Clancy to work more than forty
hours per week. Yet Defendant did not pay them overtime wages.
40. Notwithstanding the significant benefits Defendant derives from jobs performed
by ARC workers, and the ARC workers’ expectation that they will be compensated for their
labor, Defendant maintains, and for many years has maintained, a uniform policy of unlawfully
failing to treat ARC workers as employees or pay them minimum wages.
41. The policies or practices described herein are consistent across every ARC
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operated by Defendant. Every ARC worker must perform their assigned tasks for at least forty
hours per week as a condition of remaining in the program. Defendant does not pay any ARC
worker minimum wage for all hours worked.
42. Defendant permits ARC workers to select for their personal use a limited number
of clothing items from those donated to the Salvation Army. ARC workers must live on-site,
typically in assigned sleeping areas and dormitory settings with shared showers, toilets, and
sinks. While enrolled in an ARC program, ARC workers are reliant on Defendant for food and
shelter.
43. Although workers typically are not charged a fee to participate in the ARC
programs, Defendant requires them to relinquish to Defendant SNAP benefits they are already
receiving or to sign up for SNAP benefits if they are eligible and have not already enrolled and
then turn over the benefits to Defendant.
44. ARC workers generally stop performing jobs for Defendant in ARC programs
when they complete Defendant’s program (i.e., “graduate”) (typically after 180 days), leave
voluntarily, or are expelled. The ARCs provide no meaningful job placement services for those
leaving the program. Upon information and belief, only a small percentage of workers
successfully complete Defendant’s ARC programs. Many leave or are expelled from the
program prior to completion. Some are required to stay longer than 180 days as discipline for
supposed infractions of ARC rules.
45. At all relevant times, Defendant was aware that ARC workers were paid no more
than a few dollars per week despite working at least forty hours.
46. Defendant willfully denied Plaintiffs and all those similarly situated minimum
wages for all time worked.
47. By failing to treat Plaintiffs and all those similarly situated as employees and
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failing to pay minimum wage, Defendant has sought to avoid various duties and obligations
owed to employees under the FLSA, as well as the labor laws of Illinois, and Michigan.
Through this action, Plaintiffs challenge Defendant’s unlawful policy of failing to satisfy its duty
to pay proper wages to ARC workers as well as comply with other provisions of select state
labor laws.
COLLECTIVE ACTION ALLEGATIONS
48. Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of themselves
and the proposed FLSA Collective, defined as:
All persons who, between March 9, 2019 and the date of final judgment, are,
were, or will be enrolled in any Salvation Army Adult Rehabilitation Center or
Program operated by Defendant, who perform, performed, or will perform work
for Defendant, and who are, were, or will be paid less than the applicable federal
minimum wage.
49. Plaintiffs and all members of the proposed FLSA Collective are similarly situated.
They were subject to substantially similar job requirements, pay provisions, and a common
policy or practice that required or permitted them to perform work for the benefit and at the
direction of Defendant without receiving proper wages.
50. Plaintiffs estimate that there are thousands of similarly situated current and former
workers in Defendant’s ARC programs whose rights to federal minimum wages are, were, and
will be violated by Defendant.
51. Defendant knew that Plaintiffs and the proposed FLSA Collective performed
work that required them to be compensated at the federal minimum wage. Defendant willfully
and intentionally failed to properly compensate these individuals as required by the FLSA.
52. Defendant is liable under the FLSA for failing to properly compensate Plaintiffs
and the proposed FLSA Collective, and as such, notice should be sent to the FLSA Collective.
There are numerous similarly situated current and former workers in Defendant’s ARCs who
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have been denied proper minimum wage in violation of the FLSA who would benefit from the
issuance of Court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join.
53. Those similarly-situated employees are known to Defendant and are readily
identifiable through its records.
54. Plaintiffs and members of the proposed FLSA Collective should therefore be
permitted to pursue their claims collectively, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
55. A collective action will provide the most efficient mechanism for adjudicating the
claims of Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed FLSA Collective.
56. Plaintiffs request that they be permitted to serve as representatives for those who
consent to participate in this action and that the action be granted collective action status
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
RULE 23 CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
57. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, Plaintiffs seek to certify the
following classes:
a. Michigan Class: Plaintiff Mann seeks to bring Count III below on behalf
of himself and all persons who, between March 8, 2019 and the date of final judgment, are, were,
or will be enrolled in any Salvation Army Adult Rehabilitation Center or Program operated by
Defendant in Michigan, who perform, performed, or will perform work for Defendant, and who
were, are, or will be paid less than the applicable Michigan minimum wage..
b. Illinois Class: Plaintiff Clancy seeks to bring Count II below on behalf of
himself and all persons who, between March 8, 2019 and the date of final judgment, are, were, or
will be enrolled in any Salvation Army Adult Rehabilitation Center or Program operated by
Defendant in Illinois, who perform, performed, or will perform work for Defendant, and who
were, are, or will be paid less than the applicable Illinois minimum wage..
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58. The proposed classes are easily ascertainable. The number and identity of class
members may be determined from Defendant’s records.
59. The claims of the Michigan Class and Illinois Class (the “Classes”) herein have
been brought and may properly be maintained as class actions under Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure because (1) the Classes are each so numerous that joinder of all class
members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law and or fact common to each of the
Classes; (3) the claims of the representatives of each of the Classes are typical of the claims of
the Classes they seek to represent; and (4) the proposed representatives of the Classes and their
counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes. In addition, the questions
of law or fact that are common to each of the Classes predominate over any questions affecting
only individual class members and a class action is superior to other available means for fairly
and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. See infra ¶ 61, 64.
60. Numerosity: Although the precise number of Class members in each Class is
unknown and can only be determined through appropriate discovery, each of the Classes, as
defined herein, is so numerous that joinder would be impracticable. Plaintiffs are informed and
believe, and based on such information and belief, allege that that there are likely hundreds, if
not thousands, of other members of each of the Classes. The names and addresses of other
members of the Classes are available to Defendant. Notice can be provided to members of the
Classes via first class mail or email using techniques and a form of notice similar to those
customarily used in class action lawsuits of this nature.
61. Commonality and Predominance of Common Questions: Plaintiffs and the
members of the Classes they seek to represent have all be harmed by Defendant’s failure to
compensate ARC workers at the applicable minimum wage on an hourly basis and for all hours
worked. Accordingly, there is a well-defined commonality of interest in the questions of law and
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fact applicable to Plaintiffs and the Classes they seek to represent. These questions of law and
fact common to the Classes predominate over any questions affecting only individual members
of the Classes. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation:
a. Whether Plaintiff Clancy and members of the Illinois Class were
employees of Defendant under Illinois law, 820 ILCS 105/3(d);
b. Whether Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff Clancy and the members of the
Illinois Class the applicable Illinois minimum wage for all hours worked;
c. Whether Defendant violated Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS
105/4, by failing to pay Plaintiff Clancy and the members of the Illinois Class the applicable
Illinois minimum wage;
d. Whether Plaintiff Mann and members of the Michigan Class were
employees of Defendant under Michigan law, M.C.L. § 408.412(c);
e. Whether Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs Mann and the members of the
Michigan Class the applicable Michigan minimum wage for all hours worked;
f. Whether Defendant violated the Michigan Workforce Opportunity Wage
Act, M.C.L. § 408.414, by failing to pay Plaintiff Mann and members of the Michigan Class the
applicable Michigan minimum wage;
g. The proper measure of damages, restitution, interest, and penalties owed
to Plaintiffs and the Classes.
62. Typicality: The Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of members of the
Classes they are seeking to represent. Defendant’s common course of unlawful conduct has
caused Plaintiffs and members of the Classes to sustain the same or similar injuries and damages.
All members of the Classes were subject to the same compensation policies or practices, through
which they were not paid minimum wage. Defendant’s policies or practices affected all
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members of the Classes similarly, and Defendant benefited from the same type of wrongful acts
against each class member. Plaintiffs’ claims are thereby typical of and co-extensive with the
claims of members of the Classes, and the relief sought is typical of the relief that could be
sought by each member of the Classes in separate actions.
63. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiffs are members of the Classes they seek to
represent, do not have any conflicts of interest with the Classes they seek to represent, and will
prosecute the case vigorously on behalf of the Classes they seek to represent. Plaintiffs will
fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Classes they seek to represent.
Counsel for Plaintiffs are competent and experienced in litigating large, complex employment
class actions, including large wage and hour class actions.
64. Superiority: Pursuit of this action collectively will provide the most efficient
mechanism for adjudicating the claims of Plaintiffs and members of the proposed Classes.
Individual joinder of all class members is impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a
large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum
simultaneously, efficiently, and without the necessary duplication of effort and expense that
numerous individual actions engender. The expense and burden of individual litigation by
members of the Classes makes it impractical for members of the Classes to seek redress
individually for the wrongful conduct alleged herein. Because the losses, injuries, and damages
suffered by each of the individual Class members are small in the sense pertinent to class action
analysis, the expense and burden of individual litigation would make it extremely difficult or
impossible for the individual class members to redress the wrongs done to them. Should separate
actions be brought, or be required to be brought, by each member of the Classes, the resulting
multiplicity of lawsuits would cause undue hardship and expense for the Court and the litigants.
The issues in this action can be decided by means of common, classwide proof. In addition, if
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appropriate, the Court can and is empowered to fashion methods to efficiently manage this action
as a class action. The prosecution of separate actions would also create a risk of inconsistent
rulings, which might be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Classes who are
parties to the adjudication and/or may substantially impede their ability to adequately protect
their interests.
COUNT ONE
Unlawful Failure to Pay Minimum Wage
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
Plaintiffs on behalf of the FLSA Collective
65. The allegations of paragraphs 1-56 are re-alleged and incorporated herein by
reference.
66. Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective assert this count pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b). Plaintiffs consent to join this action. Copies of Plaintiffs’ consents to sue are attached
hereto as Exhibit A. As this action proceeds, it is likely that other individuals will sign consent
forms and join as plaintiffs.
67. At all relevant times, Defendant was an employer engaged in commerce and/or in
the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. §§
203(b), 203(s)(1).
68. At all relevant times, Defendant employed Plaintiffs and the proposed FLSA
Collective, and Plaintiffs and the proposed FLSA Collective were Defendant’s employees,
within the meaning of the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e), 203(g).
69. At all relevant times, Defendant has had gross operating revenue in excess of
$500,000.
70. The FLSA requires covered employers like Defendant to pay employees like
Plaintiffs and the proposed FLSA Collective federal minimum wage for hours worked. See 29
U.S.C. § 206(a).
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71. Plaintiffs and the proposed FLSA Collective’s employment do not fall under any
of the exemptions to the minimum wage requirements of the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 213.
72. At all relevant times, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs and the proposed FLSA
Collective at least federal minimum wage for their work.
73. At all relevant times, Defendant knew that Plaintiffs and the proposed FLSA
Collective were not paid federal minimum wage for their work, and willfully and intentionally
engaged in a widespread policy or practice of failing and refusing to pay Plaintiffs and the
proposed FLSA Collective federal minimum wage. See 29 U.S.C. § 255. Defendant is a large
and sophisticated entity familiar with the requirements of the FLSA. Defendant’s violations
were willful because it knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct
was prohibited by the FLSA.
74. Defendant’s willful failure and refusal to pay Plaintiffs and the proposed FLSA
Collective federal minimum wage for hours worked violates the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 206.
75. As a direct and proximate result of these unlawful practices, Plaintiffs and the
proposed FLSA Collective suffered and continue to suffer wage loss and are therefore entitled to
recover unpaid minimum wages for up to three years prior to the filing of their claims, liquidated
damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, attorneys’ fees and costs, and such other legal and
equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper.
COUNT TWO
Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS 105/1 et seq.
Plaintiff Clancy on behalf of the Illinois Class
76. The allegations of paragraphs 1-47 and 57-64 are re-alleged and incorporated
herein by reference.
77. Plaintiff Clancy and the Illinois Class assert this count pursuant to 820 ILCS
105/12(a).
19
78. At all relevant times, Defendant employed Plaintiff Clancy and the Illinois Class,
and Plaintiff and the Illinois Class were Defendant’s employees within the meaning of the
IMWL. See 820 ILCS 105/3(c), (d).
79. The IMWL requires covered employers like Defendant to pay employees like
Plaintiff Clancy and the Illinois Class the Illinois-mandated minimum wage for hours worked.
See 820 ILCS 105/4.
80. Plaintiff Clancy and the Illinois Class’s employment do not fall under any of the
exemptions to the minimum wage requirements of the IMWL. See 820 ILCS 105/4(a)(3).
81. At all relevant times, Illinois minimum wage has been at least $8.25 per hour.1
82. At all relevant times, Defendant paid Plaintiff Clancy, as well as the putative
Illinois Class members less than $21 per week.
83. At all relevant times, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff Clancy and the Illinois
Class at least the Illinois-mandated minimum wage for their work.
84. At all relevant times, Defendant knew that Plaintiff Clancy and the Illinois Class
were not paid the Illinois-mandated minimum wage for their work, and willfully and repeatedly
engaged in a widespread policy or practice of failing and refusing to pay Plaintiff Clancy and the
Illinois Class the Illinois-mandated minimum wage. See 820 ILCS 105/12(a). Defendant is a
large and sophisticated entity familiar with the requirements of the IMWL. Defendant’s
violations were willful because it knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its
conduct was prohibited by the IMWL.
1
The Illinois minimum wage was $8.25 per hour from July 1, 2010 through December 31, 2019, $9.25
per hour from January 1, 2020 through June 30, 2020, $10 per hour from July 1, 2020 through December
31, 2020, $11 from January 1, 2021 through December 31, 2021; it will be $12 per hour from January 1,
2022 through December 31, 2022, and is scheduled to continue increasing until it reaches $15 per hour in
2025. See 820 ILCS 105/4(a)(1).
20
85. Defendant’s willful and repeated failure and refusal to pay Plaintiff Clancy and
the Illinois Class the Illinois-mandated minimum wage for hours worked violates the IMWL.
See 820 ILCS 105/4.
86. As a direct and proximate result of these unlawful practices, Plaintiff Clancy and
the Illinois Class suffered and continue to suffer wage loss and are therefore entitled to recover
unpaid minimum wages for up to three years prior to the filing of their claims, statutory damages
pursuant to the formula set forth in 820 ILCS 105/12(a), attorneys’ fees and costs, and such other
legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper.
COUNT THREE
Michigan Workforce Opportunity Wage Act; M.C.L. 408.410 et seq
Plaintiff Mann on behalf of the Michigan Class
87. The allegations of paragraphs 1-47 and 57-64 are re-alleged and incorporated
herein by reference.
88. Plaintiff Mann and the Michigan Class assert this count pursuant to Michigan
Workforce Opportunity Wage Act (“WOWA”), M.C.L. § 408.414 and M.C.L. § 408.419.
89. At all relevant times, Defendant employed Plaintiff Mann and the Michigan
Class, and Plaintiff and the Michigan Class were Defendant’s employees within the meaning of
the Michigan WOWA, M.C.L. §§ 408.412(b), (c).
90. At all relevant times, Defendant has been an employer under the Michigan
WOWA and has been subject to the Michigan WOWA, as the applicable federal minimum wage
provisions would result in a lower minimum hourly wage than provided by the Michigan
WOWA.
91. The Michigan WOWA requires covered employers like Defendant to pay
employees like Plaintiff Mann and the Michigan Class the Michigan-mandated minimum wage
21
for hours worked. M.C.L. § 408.414.
92. Plaintiff Mann and the Michigan Class’s employment do not fall under any of the
exemptions to the minimum wage requirements of the WOWA. M.C.L. § 408.420.
93. At all relevant times, Michigan minimum wage has been at least $9.25.2
94. At all relevant times, Defendant paid Plaintiff Mann, as well as the putative
Michigan class members less than $20 per week.
95. At all relevant times, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff Mann and the Michigan
Class at least the Michigan-mandated minimum wage for their work.
96. Defendants failed to furnish Plaintiff Mann and each member of the Michigan
Class with a statement, in each pay period required, specifying the hours worked by each class
member, in violation of the WOWA. M.C.L. § 408.417.
97. As a direct and proximate result of these unlawful practices, Plaintiff Mann and
the Michigan Class suffered and continue to suffer wage loss and therefore seek damages in the
amount of unpaid wages, liquidated damages, attorney fees and costs, and such other legal and
equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper.
COUNT FOUR
Unlawful Failure to Pay Overtime
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
Plaintiffs Mann, Clancy, and Love
98. The allegations of paragraphs 1-47 are re-alleged and incorporated herein by
reference.
99. Plaintiffs Mann, Clancy, and Love assert this count pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §
2
The Michigan minimum wage is to be adjusted each January starting in 2019 “to reflect the
average annual percentage change in the consumer price index for the most recent 5-year period
for which data are available.” M.C.L. § 408.414.
22
216(b). Plaintiffs consent to join this action. Copies of Plaintiffs’ consents to sue are attached
hereto as Exhibit A.
100. At all relevant times, Defendant was an employer engaged in commerce and/or in
the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. §§
203(b), 203(s)(1).
101. At all relevant times, Defendant employed Plaintiffs Mann, Clancy, and Love,
and Plaintiffs Mann, Clancy, and Love were Defendant’s employees, within the meaning of the
FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e), 203(g).
102. At all relevant times, Defendant has had gross operating revenue in excess of
$500,000.
103. The FLSA requires covered employers like Defendant to pay employees like
Plaintiffs Mann, Clancy, and Love no less than one-and-a-half times their regular rate of pay for
all hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek. See 29 U.S.C. § 207.
104. Plaintiff Mann’s, Plaintiff Clancy’s, and Plaintiff’s Love’s employment do not fall
under any of the exemptions to the overtime requirements of the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 213.
105. As described above, Plaintiffs Mann, Clancy, and Love worked more than forty
hours per week for Defendant.
106. At all relevant times, Defendant did not properly compensate Plaintiffs Mann,
Clancy, and Love for all hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek, as required by the
FLSA.
107. At all relevant times, Defendant knew that Plaintiffs Mann, Clancy, and Love had
worked overtime without proper compensation, and willfully and intentionally failed and refused
to pay Plaintiffs Mann, Clancy, and Love wages at the required overtime rates. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 255.
23
COUNT FIVE
Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS 105/1 et seq.
Plaintiff Clancy
108. The allegations of paragraphs 1-47 are re-alleged and incorporated herein
by reference.
109. Plaintiff Clancy asserts this count pursuant to 820 ILCS 105/12(a).
110. At all relevant times, Defendant employed Plaintiff Clancy, and Plaintiff was
Defendant’s employee within the meaning of the IMWL. See 820 ILCS 105/3(c), (d).
111. The IMWL requires covered employers like Defendant to pay employees like
Plaintiff Clancy no less than one-and-a-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in
excess of forty in a workweek. See 820 ILCS 105/4A(1).
112. Plaintiff Clancy’s employment does not fall under any of the exemptions to the
overtime requirements of the FLSA. See 820 ILCS 105/4A(1).
113. At all relevant times, Plaintiff Clancy worked more than forty hours per week for
Defendant.
114. At all relevant times, Defendant did not properly compensate Plaintiff Clancy for
all hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek, as required by the IMWL.
115. At all relevant times, Defendant knew that Plaintiff Clancy worked overtime
without proper compensation, and willfully and repeatedly engaged in a widespread pattern and
practice of failing and refusing to pay Plaintiff Clancy wages at the required overtime rates. See
820 ILCS 105/4.
116. Defendant’s willful failure and refusal to pay Plaintiff Clancy overtime wages for
all hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek violates the IMWL. See 820 ILCS 105/4.
Defendant is a large and sophisticated entity familiar with the requirements of the IMWL.
Defendant’s violations were willful because it knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter
24
of whether its conduct was prohibited by the IMWL.
117. As a direct and proximate result of these unlawful practices, Plaintiff Clancy and
the Illinois Class suffered and continue to suffer wage loss and are therefore entitled to recover
unpaid minimum wages for up to three years prior to the filing of their claims, statutory damages
pursuant to the formula set forth in 820 ILCS 105/12(a), attorneys’ fees and costs, and such other
legal and equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper.
COUNT SIX
Michigan Workforce Opportunity Wage Act; M.C.L. 408.410 et seq
Plaintiff Mann
118. The allegations of paragraphs 1-47 are re-alleged and incorporated herein
by reference.
119. Plaintiff Mann asserts this count pursuant to WOWA, M.C.L. § 408.414a and
M.C.L. § 408.419.
120. At all relevant times, Defendant employed Plaintiff Mann and the Michigan
Class, and Plaintiff and the Michigan Class were Defendant’s employees within the meaning of
the Michigan WOWA, M.C.L. § 408.12(b), (c).
121. The WOWA requires covered employers like Defendant to pay employees like
Plaintiff Mann no less than one-and-a-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in
excess of forty in a workweek. See M.C.L. § 408.414a.
122. Plaintiff Mann and the Michigan Class’s employment do not fall under any of the
exemptions to the overtime requirements of the WOWA. See M.C.L. § 408.420.
123. Plaintiff Mann worked more than forty hours per week for Defendant.
124. At all relevant times, Defendant did not properly compensate Plaintiff Mann for
all hours worked in excess of forty in a workweek, as required by the WOWA.
125. As a direct and proximate result of these unlawful practices, Plaintiff Mann
25
suffered wage loss and therefore is entitled to recover unpaid overtime wages, liquidated
damages, attorney fees and costs, and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems
just and proper.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, and all those similarly situated, collectively request that this
Honorable Court:
1. Issue an order certifying this action as a collective action under the FLSA and
designating Plaintiffs as representatives of all those similarly situated, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
2. Authorize that notice of this collective action be issued by the Court or Plaintiffs
to all persons who have participated in Defendant’s ARCs at any time during the three years
immediately preceding the filing of this suit, up through and including the date this notice is
issued. Such notice shall inform these persons of the filing of this civil action, the nature of the
action, and their right to join this lawsuit if they believe they were denied proper wages pursuant
to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
3. Grant leave to add additional plaintiffs or claims by motion, the filing of consent
forms, or any other method approved by the Court.
4. Issue an order certifying the Michigan Class and the Illinois Class pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
5. Issue an order appointing Plaintiffs Mann and Clancy as class representatives of
the classes they seek to represent.
6. Issue an order appointing Plaintiffs’ counsel as Class Counsel for all of the
Classes.
7. Issue an order providing for notice to the Classes.
8. Enter a declaratory judgment that Defendant’s violations were unlawful under the
26
FLSA and were willful.
9. Award Plaintiffs and all those similarly situated actual damages for unpaid wages
and liquidated damages equal to the unpaid wages found due to Plaintiffs and the proposed
FLSA Collective as provided by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
10. Award Plaintiffs and all those similarly situated pre- and post-judgment interest at
the relevant statutory rate as provided by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
11. Award Plaintiffs and all those similarly situated attorneys’ fees, costs (including
expert fees), and disbursements as provided by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
12. Award Plaintiff Clancy and the Illinois Class actual damages for unpaid wages,
statutory damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs, as provided under Illinois law.
13. Award Plaintiff Mann and the Michigan Class actual damages for unpaid wages,
liquidated damages, attorney fees, and costs, a provided under Michigan law.
14. Award Plaintiffs, the Michigan and Illinois Classes, and all others similarly
situated further legal and equitable relief as this Court deems necessary, just, and proper.
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, hereby demand a trial
by jury on all issues so triable.
27
DATED: March 9, 2022 Respectfully submitted,
COHEN MILSTEIN SELLERS & TOLL PLLC
By: /s/Christine E. Webber

Christine E. Webber (Ill Bar No. 6208020)
Joseph M. Sellers
Kalpana Kotagal
1100 New York Ave., N.W.
Suite 500
Washington, D.C. 20005
Tel.: (202) 408-4600
Fax.: (202) 408-4699
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
Michael Hancock
Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC
88 Pine Street, 14th Floor
New York, NY 10005
Tel.: (212) 838-7797
Fax.: (212) 838-7745
[email protected]
ROSEN BIEN GALVAN & GRUNFELD LLP
By: /s/Michael Freedman

Gay Grunfeld
Michael Freedman
Priyah Kaul
101 Mission Street, 6th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94105
Tel.: (415) 433-6830
Fax.: (415) 433-7104
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
28
RUKIN HYLAND & RIGGIN LLP
By: /s/Jessica Riggin

Jessica Riggin
Valerie Brender
1939 Harrison St., Suite 290
Oakland, CA 94612
Tel.: (415) 421-1800
Fax.: (415) 421-1700
[email protected]
[email protected]
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
29
Case: 1:22-cv-01250 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 03/09/22 Page 1 of 7 PageID #:30
Exhibit A

CONSENT TO JOIN COLLECTIVE ACTION AGAINST SALVATION ARMY

Pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
Merrick Mann
Name: ______________________________
1. I am over the age of eighteen and competent to give my consent in this matter.
2. I consent and agree to pursue my Fair Labor Standards Act claims pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
section 201, et seq. against The Salvation Army and any other related entities or affiliates.
3. I affirm that I attended a Salvation Army ARC program and performed work for the
Salvation Army as part of that program within three years of the date I am submitting this
Consent to Join form.
4. I understand that the location of the Salvation Army ARC(s) I attended in the three years
prior to submitting this Consent to Join form will dictate whether I am eligible to join the
lawsuit(s) and which lawsuit(s) I am eligible to join. I attest to the following statement(s)
(select 1 or more):
___
I attended an ARC program in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky
(outside of northeast), Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, DC, and West Virginia
(“Southern ARCs”) within the three years prior to submitting this Consent to Join
form. My approximate dates of attendance were ________________________
(month, year) to ________________________ (month, year).
x If you attended a Southern ARC within the applicable three-year

statute of limitations, your Consent to Join form will be filed in
Alvear, et al. vs. The Salvation Army, a Georgia nonprofit
corporation.
I attended an ARC program in Connecticut, Delaware, northeast Kentucky,
___
Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and Vermont (“Eastern ARCs”) within the three years prior to
submitting this Consent to Join form. My approximate dates of attendance were
________________________ (month, year) to ________________________ month,
year).
x If you attended an Eastern ARC within the applicable three-year

Geiser, et al. vs. The Salvation Army, a New York nonprofit
corporation.
[ I attended an ARC program in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan,
___
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin
(“Central ARCs”) within the three years prior to submitting this Consent to Join
2FWREHU
(month, year) to ________________________
$SULO (month, year).
1

x If you attended a Central ARC within the applicable three-year statute

of limitations, your Consent to Join form will be filed in Clancy et al.
vs. The Salvation Army, an Illinois nonprofit corporation.
I attended the ARC in a state that is not listed above within the three years prior
___
to submitting this Consent to Join form. I attended an ARC program located in
____(state), and my approximate dates of attendance were _____________________
MI
(month, year) to _____________________ (month, year).
**PLEASE NOTE THAT IF YOU ONLY ATTENDED AN ARC IN A STATE THAT IS NOT
LISTED ABOVE YOU ARE NOT ELIGIBLE TO JOIN A LAWSUIT PURSUED BY
PLAINTIFFS’ COUNSEL AT THIS TIME.**
5. While at the Salvation Army ARC(s) listed above, I performed work for Defendant, The
Salvation Army, and there were occasions when I was not paid federal minimum wage for all
hours worked. If I worked over 40 hours per week, I did not receive proper compensation,
including overtime pay.
6. I choose to be represented by Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Rosen Bien Galvan &
Grunfeld LLP, Rukin Hyland & Riggin LLP , and any other attorneys those firms decide to
associate with for all purposes in this action and authorize them to take any steps necessary to
pursue my claims, including filing new lawsuits.
7. I understand that I may withdraw this consent at any time by notifying the above-listed
attorneys in writing.
3/8/2022 | 12:30 PM PST
Date: ________________ _______________________________
Signature
Merrick Mann
_______________________________
Print Name
________________
Telephone Number*
____________________
E-mail*
_________
Mailing Address 1*
__
Mailing Address 2*
*Your contact information will be redacted before filing with the Court.
2


Michael Clancy
Name: ______________________________
(select 1 or more):
___ I attended an ARC program in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky


corporation.
___ I attended an ARC program in Connecticut, Delaware, northeast Kentucky,

year).

corporation.
I attended an ARC program in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan,

___
July 2019
(month, year) to ________________________
November 2020 (month, year).
1


___ I attended the ARC in a state that is not listed above within the three years prior
Illinois
3/8/2022 | 12:49 PM PST
Date: ________________ _______________________________
Signature
Michael Clancy
_______________________________
Print Name
_________________
Telephone Number*
____________________
E-mail*
___________
Mailing Address 1*
_____________
Mailing Address 2*
2


Stuart Love
Name: ______________________________
(select 1 or more):
___ I attended an ARC program in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky


corporation.
___ I attended an ARC program in Connecticut, Delaware, northeast Kentucky,

year).

corporation.
I attended an ARC program in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan,

___
November 2019
(month, year) to ________________________
April 2021 (month, year).
1


___ I attended the ARC in a state that is not listed above within the three years prior
N/A
3/8/2022 | 12:49 PM PST
Date: ________________ _______________________________
Signature
Stuart Love
_______________________________
Print Name
___________________
Telephone Number*
________
E-mail*
________________
Mailing Address 1*
___________
Mailing Address 2*

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Case: 1:22-cv-01250 Document #: 1 Filed: 03/09/22 Page 1 of 29 PageID #:1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MICHAEL CLANCY, STUART LOVE, and

THE SALVATION ARMY, an Illinois

CLASS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION COMPLAINT

1. There are approximately 120 Salvation Army residential adult rehabilitation

Thousands of vulnerable individuals (“ARC workers”)—people who are unhoused or marginally

annually. Some enroll voluntarily, while others do so as an alternative to incarceration.

economically in their communities.

because they fall ill.

overtime provisions of the FLSA for its lay employees.

workers. See 29 U.S.C. § 255.

situated, and the state classes they seek to represent.

28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(3), (d)(4)(A), or (d)(4)(B) apply to this action.

this District, and Defendant’s liability arose, in part, in this District.

understood to be Salvation Army’s acknowledged employees; and working in a security role at

Plaintiff Mann understood to be Salvation Army’s acknowledged employees; working in the

21. Defendant is a 501(c)(3) organization incorporated in Illinois, with its

of 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d) and 203(g), as well as applicable state laws.

25. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs were Defendant’s employees engaged in

203(s)(1), 206, and 207.

26. Thousands of individuals enroll in Defendant’s ARC programs annually. Some

maintaining Defendant’s thrift stores.

Defendant. In 2019, The Salvation Army National Corporation reportedly generated

$598,449,000 in revenue from sales at these thrift stores.

administrative and clerical tasks.

of illness or even injury suffered while performing tasks for Defendant.

or injury, typically are required to make up those hours at a later date.

failing to treat ARC workers as employees or pay them minimum wages.

worker minimum wage for all hours worked.

then turn over the benefits to Defendant.

supposed infractions of ARC rules.

wages for all time worked.

COLLECTIVE ACTION ALLEGATIONS

and the proposed FLSA Collective, defined as:

direction of Defendant without receiving proper wages.

will be violated by Defendant.

issuance of Court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join.

identifiable through its records.

permitted to pursue their claims collectively, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

claims of Plaintiffs and the members of the proposed FLSA Collective.

pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

RULE 23 CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

b. Illinois Class: Plaintiff Clancy seeks to bring Count II below on behalf of

members may be determined from Defendant’s records.

and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. See infra ¶ 61, 64.

customarily used in class action lawsuits of this nature.

61. Commonality and Predominance of Common Questions: Plaintiffs and the

a. Whether Plaintiff Clancy and members of the Illinois Class were

employees of Defendant under Illinois law, 820 ILCS 105/3(d);

c. Whether Defendant violated Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS

Illinois minimum wage;

d. Whether Plaintiff Mann and members of the Michigan Class were

employees of Defendant under Michigan law, M.C.L. § 408.412(c);

f. Whether Defendant violated the Michigan Workforce Opportunity Wage

applicable Michigan minimum wage;

g. The proper measure of damages, restitution, interest, and penalties owed

to Plaintiffs and the Classes.

sought by each member of the Classes in separate actions.