U.S. Policy Toward Russia Recommendations

U.S. POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA
A Review of Policy Recommendations

Rachel S. Salzman

May 2010

The statements made and views expressed in this essay are solely the responsibility of the authors and
are not necessarily those of the Carnegie Corporation of New York or the Officers and Fellows of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 4

INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 10

STRUCTURING THE RELATIONSHIP……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 19

NUCLEAR SECURITY……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………... 22

NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 34

POST‐SOVIET SPACE……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 45

ENERGY SECURITY………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 51

TRADE AND INVESTMENT…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 57

DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND CIVIL SOCIETY……………………………………………………………………………… 66

TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 75

CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 82

BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 85

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PREFACE

Six months before the election of Barack Obama, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences launched
a large, multifaceted project entitled “Rethinking U.S. Policy toward Russia.” When the effort began, it
would be an understatement to say that U.S.‐Russian relations were in sorry shape, having begun to
spiral downward in the last years of the Clinton administration. After a brief interlude following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, they continued their descent, aided by fallout from the war in
Iraq, U.S. plans for missile defense in Europe, and the prospect of a new round of NATO enlargement. To
many specialists in government and out, including some within the George W. Bush administration, the
deterioration in U.S.‐Russian relations seemed neither logical nor, more importantly, in the national
interest of the United States. It did not seem logical because no deep animus drove the tension, and no
narrowing gap in the power of the two countries justified a serious strategic rivalry. It was not in the U.S.
national interest because, on a host of important issues – among them, managing a nuclear world,
enhancing energy security, dealing with terrorism, and mitigating climate change – the United States
had much to gain from cooperation with Russia.
The Academy’s project – not only sponsored but, in important respects, instigated by the
Carnegie Corporation of New York – set about exploring questions that needed to be answered were the
deterioration to be reversed and U.S.‐Russian relations set on a more positive course. Rather than
looking backward and pointing fingers, project participants focused from the start on the future – on
identifying the range and scale of the stakes that the United States has in the relationship, the obstacles
to realizing them, and strategies by which these obstacles might be overcome. The Carnegie
Corporation, our colleagues in the Academy, and those of us guiding the project had two main goals in
mind: first, to reach out and mobilize a critical number of analysts and experienced policy‐makers and,
with their help, to think our way through these issues; and second, to take the results directly to
Congress, the interested public, and what would soon be a new administration. Thus, the project had
two ambitions – one, analytical; the other, practical – and equal energy went into fulfilling both.
Early on we decided that, in an effort to serve the different constituencies, project participants
would concentrate on developing as many different forms of analysis and modalities of interaction as
needed, and not confine our energies to producing a single, comprehensive, one‐size‐fits‐all report. By
the early months of the Obama administration, numerous organizations were filling this niche,
generating useful reports explaining what had gone wrong and offering general prescriptions for
enhancing U.S.‐Russia policy. We began with a series of working groups – one in Moscow and three in
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Washington – each focused on an important dimension of the U.S.‐Russian relationship, including
nuclear weapons and other hard security issues, economics, frictions over European security and the
interplay in the post‐Soviet space, as well as mechanisms for managing the relationship.
After weighing the results of these workshops, a steering committee that included Deana
Arsenian, Coit Blacker, James Collins, Rose Gottemoeller, Thomas Graham, Robert Legvold, Thomas
Pickering, Eugene Rumer, Angela Stent, and Strobe Talbott undertook four tasks: first, it developed a
strategic assessment of the relationship, prepared as a PowerPoint presentation and shared with
officials, congressional leaders, portions of the media, and members of the expert community. Second,
at key junctures, the committee produced memoranda for the Obama administration on (1) the reasons
for, focus of, and modalities of a strategic dialogue between the U.S. and Russian leaderships, along with
lessons from previous comparable efforts; (2) the utility of and possible themes for a presidential
address laying out a comprehensive U.S.‐Russia policy; and (3) ways of addressing the crucial strategic
dilemma raised by the administration’s determination to pursue an ambitious, engaged, constructive
policy toward Russia, while maintaining a strong, independent, supportive policy toward Russia’s
neighbors. Third, on a regular basis, members of the committee consulted senior congressional leaders
and key staff members to offer assistance as they planned how their committees would address major
issues on the U.S.‐Russian agenda and, in particular, to encourage them to adopt a broad perspective
when approaching these subjects. And, fourth, committee members, in various combinations, met with
prominent members of the media and with world affairs councils in Atlanta, Chicago, Houston, Los
Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle to share ideas from the project, and, above all, to emphasize the
importance of again giving serious thought to U.S.‐Russian relations.
Meanwhile, each member of the steering committee, sometimes in combination but more often
individually, contributed essays, reports, op‐ed pieces, and congressional testimony on key aspects of
the U.S.‐Russian relationship, which were accompanied by recommendations for strengthening U.S.‐
Russia policy. These, along with major Russia‐related speeches by administration officials and
congressional figures as well as the reports from sister organizations, are available on the project’s
website at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (http://www.amacad.org/russiapolicy.aspx). The
site contains a wide range of materials and sources relevant to U.S.‐Russia policy and is being
continuously updated.
The essay that follows, by Rachel Salzman, program assistant for the Academy project, adds a
further dimension to the contribution we hope the project has made. As noted, both the deteriorated
state of U.S.‐Russian relations and the arrival of a new U.S. administration inspired many analysts and
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organizations to revisit this crucial but often underestimated relationship. So, beyond our efforts in the
Academy project, the number of reports and individual analyses commenting on the state of U.S.‐
Russian relations and offering advice to Obama and his advisers on how they should proceed has
proliferated since the spring of 2008. Much of this work is complementary, sounding similar concerns
and arguing for mutually compatible approaches. It also, however, contains differences, and in some
cases, they are fundamental.
Given the large volume of new work on U.S.‐Russian relations, I thought it would be useful to
examine key portions of it and look for common themes, consider where recommendations coincide
and where they diverge, and then compare this assessment with a review of what the Obama
administration has actually done to this point. This was Salzman’s assignment. What follows is a
comparative analysis of the key findings in several of the new reports and essays. It does not offer its
own policy prescriptions – indeed, it tries to steer clear of implicit recommendations, even by way of
criticism or praise of the material reviewed. It is for the reader to form her or his own judgments on this
score.
Salzman’s essay begins with an overview of the general approaches to Russia policy found in the
recent literature, and then digs more deeply into critical dimensions of the relationship. Salzman turns
first to nuclear security, a crucial dimension in U.S.‐Russian relations that presents multiple policy
challenges for the United States, from resuscitating strategic nuclear arms control to strengthening the
nuclear nonproliferation regime, including the vexed issue of Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear programs.
The Obama administration has moved quickly in this sphere, and much of what it has accomplished or
sought to accomplish fits closely with the urgings in the literature. Next, Salzman looks at how different
studies approach the question of European security, a topic that has been reanimated by President
Dmitri Medvedev’s proposal for a new European security treaty. It is a complex subject, encompassing
not only the frictions surrounding NATO enlargement but also the fate of conventional arms control, the
role of ballistic missile defense, and proposals for strengthening the NATO‐Russia Council. After a brief
discussion of the priority that the issue of European security has acquired in the literature, Salzman
reviews the advice offered on all of these topics.
In the third section, she turns to the closely related and still more tortured matter of U.S.‐
Russian tensions over developments in the post‐Soviet space. As she stresses, the uneasy interaction of
the two countries within what once were Soviet borders, but that now forms the frontier of Russia’s
external world, constitutes the area where trouble between Washington and Moscow begins. It is the
great, unacknowledged (or, at least, unaddressed) dimension of the relationship, and its challenges –
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including the August 2008 Russian war with Georgia, the jockeying over bases in Central Asia, and the
competition over oil and gas pipelines, not to mention the antagonism over NATO’s role in the region –
constantly roil relations between the two countries. Much of the commentary that Salzman surveys
focuses on specific instances of conflict, with less attention devoted to the underlying fears and
aspirations driving the two countries’ approaches to the region.
The fourth section addresses the impact of energy issues on the U.S.‐Russian relationship,
including the role of oil and gas and their political and economic effects. Concerns about oil and gas
supplies generate a complex mix of competitive impulses and grounds for cooperation, in turn, leaving
analysts divided in their policy recommendations. Some attach primary importance to the security
implications of Europe’s dependence on Russian gas imports, heightened by Russia’s demonstrated
readiness to cut off gas and oil supplies in price disputes with neighbors. Others give pride of place to
the commercial side of the challenge and the search for ways of maximizing areas of cooperation, while
circumscribing areas of tension and competition.
Although Salzman does not make the point – because it is not made in the literature – if thought
of in security terms, nuclear security, European security, security in the post‐Soviet space, and energy
security constitute four of the twenty‐first century’s most significant security challenges for the United
States. And, in all four, Russia figures prominently. Hence, when one thinks seriously about what
constitutes the bedrock of the U.S.‐Russian relationship and should constitute the central focus of U.S.‐
Russia policy, the answers are to be found here. In her essay, Salzman underlines the intertwined nature
of these four security challenges, a reality that emerges clearly in the literature even when it is not
recognized explicitly.
The U.S. agenda with Russia extends well beyond these four key security dimensions, and
Salzman goes on to deal with the assessments and recommendations offered on U.S.‐Russian economic
ties; the often difficult issues of democracy, human rights, and the development of civil society; and
critical “transnational issues,” such as climate change, counterterrorism, and the refashioning of global
governance. These subjects, too, are interwoven. At various points, energy, trade and investment, and
even climate change intersect. So do counterterrorism, security in the post‐Soviet space, and global
governance. And, as Salzman’s analysis makes plain, each presents a complex pattern of converging and
diverging U.S. and Russian interests, requiring anything but a simple policy approach. Hence, the advice
contained in the literature points in multiple directions. To the degree that the administration’s actions
parallel some of this advice, like the advice, they also are tentative, fragmentary, and second‐order.
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In the end, what comes across most distinctly in Salzman’s report is how closely key features of
the Obama administration’s new Russia policy parallel the recommendations of the reports and essays
favoring a more ambitious engagement of Russia, a broadening of the agenda with it, and a readiness to
reconsider compromises previously rejected. This is not to suggest a direct causal link between what
analysts have recommended and what the administration has done. Many of these ideas were taking
shape simultaneously in both camps. Hence, the real effect appears to have been mutual reinforcement
rather than ideas in one group leading to the actions of the other. Nor is this to say that the more
reserved and, in some cases, sharply critical commentators included in Salzman’s review have fallen
silent. On the contrary, those who either viewed the scope of prospective cooperation with Russia as
limited or who, still more negatively, regard Russia as more of a threat than a potential partner remain
unconvinced that the Obama administration’s new approach will succeed. So, the debate continues, and
Salzman concludes her essay by noting that the uncertainties governing U.S.‐Russian relations are
unlikely to resolve it anytime soon.
One further characteristic of the body of work surveyed in this report stands out, and it
underscores the reason for the last of the activities in the Academy project on “Rethinking U.S. Policy
toward Russia.” Of the more than 120 sources Salzman consulted, scarcely more than a half dozen
involved university scholars, and none of those from the younger generation. That so little of the
booming policy‐relevant work on U.S.‐Russia relations is generated in academia reflects a broader
problem: the diminishing importance that the social sciences in the United States ascribe to scholarship
addressed squarely to the policy world. As a modest first step in response, the American Academy
teamed up with the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University and the
Harriman Institute at Columbia University to convene a younger group of scholars – both Russian
specialists and general international relations theorists – to address the large core issues in formulating
U.S.‐Russia policy: first, assessing the challenge Russia poses for U.S. policy; second, constructing an
effective U.S. response to this challenge; and third, dealing with the bureaucratic and political
impediments that arise in implementing policy. We then asked senior policy‐makers to evaluate this
work and offer suggestions for making it both more useful and more accessible to the policy‐making
community. The result is a new volume edited by Timothy Colton, Timothy Frye, and Robert Legvold,
entitled The Policy World Meets Academia: Designing U.S. Policy toward Russia, available at
http://www.amacad.org/publications/occasional.aspx.
None of the activities of the Academy project, including this essay, would have been possible
without the generous support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, a foundation that has been
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more central than any other in sponsoring work on Russia for many years. Nor could the project have
found a better or more appropriate home than in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, where it
profited immensely from the Academy’s special national standing and rich resources, including the
generous and energetic leadership of the Academy’s Chief Executive Officer and William T. Golden Chair,
Leslie Berlowitz, and her able staff. In particular, I want to thank Diane McCree for the skillful editorial
hand she applied to the manuscript. Finally, no one deserves more thanks than Rachel Salzman. Her
essay is but a small fraction of her contribution to the project. She more than anyone put her imprint on
every phase of the project, ensuring that schedules were met, details attended to, ideas shared, reports
compiled, and results disseminated. She has my deepest gratitude.
Robert Legvold
Cambridge, Massachusetts
May 19, 2010
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INTRODUCTION

Reporting on the outcome of the July 2009 summit in Moscow before the Subcommittee on Europe of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and
Eurasia Policy Celeste Wallander stated repeatedly that the United States was approaching Russia
“pragmatically.”1 Her fellow witness, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs
Philip Gordon, made the same assertion, speaking of a “desire to build a relationship based on respect
and mutual cooperation.”2 Neither witness glossed over the many obstacles and disagreements that
remain in the relationship nor in any way indicated that the much‐vaunted “reset of relations” would be
easy. Instead, both spoke consistently of the need to proceed carefully and with eyes wide open, but
with the firm conviction that rebuilding the U.S.‐Russian relationship is crucial to achieving larger U.S.
strategic objectives.
Pragmatism, then, is the watchword of U.S.‐Russian relations under President Barack Obama’s
administration. Although not hewing precisely to the traditional realist school of international relations,
with its strict assessment of balance of power imperatives, the president and his Russia team appear to
be pursuing a policy informed by Realpolitik. Moreover, it is not just the administration that is adopting
or advocating this approach. Since Russia’s war with Georgia in August 2008, widely agreed to have
been a watershed moment in the U.S.‐Russian relationship, a majority of experts and policy‐makers
have indicated a desire to reorient the relationship away from a focus on (presumed) shared values and
“reset” it on the basis of shared interests. 3 As Dmitri Trenin wrote not long before Obama took office,

1
Celeste A. Wallander, “July 6–8, 2009, Moscow Summit,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Europe, House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., July 28, 2009, 1,
http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/111/wal072809.pdf.
2
Philip H. Gordon, "The Reset Button Has Been Pushed: Kicking Off a New Era in U.S. – Russia Relations," testimony
before the Subcommittee on Europe, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., July 28, 2009, 1,
http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/111/gor072809.pdf.
3
See, for example, Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia, “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia,” a
joint project of the Nixon Center and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (Washington, D.C.:
March, 2009); Thomas Graham, “Resurgent Russia and U.S. Purpose,” Century Foundation report (New York:
Century Foundation, April 2009), http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/Graham.pdf; and Eugene B.
Rumer and Angela E. Stent, “Repairing U.S.‐Russian Relations: A Long Road Ahead,” April 2009, 4,
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docUploaded/Rumer_FinalBook.pdf. For dissenters, see, for example, Ariel Cohen, “How
the Obama Administration Should Engage Russia,” testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C., March 19, 2009, http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/CohenTestimony090319a.pdf;
Strobe Talbott, “Dangerous Leviathans,” Foreign Policy 172 (May/June 2009), esp. 26; and Lev Gudkov, Igor
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“Washington needs to think strategically about Moscow, not ideologically or theologically.”4 After more
than a decade of policy driven to varying degrees by values and democracy promotion, U.S. policy‐
makers have begun to advocate a more tempered, strategic approach to U.S.‐Russian relations.
Dramatic changes both in Russia and in the global context necessitate a complete reevaluation
of the U.S.‐Russian relationship. Russia has experienced an economic and political resurgence in the past
decade, the turmoil inflicted by the ongoing global financial crisis notwithstanding. This resurgence
makes Russia a different partner than it was in the immediate post–Cold War period or even at the turn
of the millennium. The world, too, has altered radically, with the emergence of catastrophic terrorism as
a global security threat, the nuclear renaissance, increasing concern over the effects of climate change,
the focus on energy security, and most recently the global financial crisis. The combination of these
changes renders many previous assumptions and recommendations about the U.S.‐Russian relationship
insufficient.
As scholars and experts seek to renew the U.S.‐Russian relationship, however, many are also
calling for a fundamental reframing and reorientation of the American position. Rather than asking only
how Russia can help the United States to achieve a particular objective, they have begun to focus on
how Russia fits into U.S. foreign policy more generally, as well on the enormous stakes on both sides in
building and maintaining good relations. As the Hart‐Hagel Bipartisan Commission on U.S. Policy toward
Russia notes, “An American commitment to improving U.S.‐Russian relations is neither a reward to be
offered for good international behavior by Moscow nor an endorsement of the Russian government’s
domestic conduct. Rather, it is an acknowledgement of the importance of Russian cooperation in
achieving essential American goals.”5 U.S. policy experts assert that the United States needs Russia not
because it “deserves” to be needed based on its history as a superpower, but for operational and long‐
standing reasons. As Under Secretary for Political Affairs William Burns affirmed at the World Russia
Forum in April 2009, “Russia matters.”6

Klyamkin, Georgy Satarov, and Lilia Shevtsova, “False Choices for Russia,” Washington Post, Tuesday, June 9, 2009,
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=23252&prog=zru.
4
Dmitri Trenin, “Thinking Strategically about Russia,” part of the series Foreign Policy for the Next President
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 2008), 5,
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/thinking_strategically_russia.pdf.
5
Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia, “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia,” i.
6
William J. Burns, “Remarks at World Russia Forum,” Washington, D.C., April 27, 2009, transcript available at:
http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2009a/122279.htm.
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One of the other hallmarks of the recent literature on U.S.‐Russian relations has been the
frequent suggestion to make Russia a more responsible, invested, and engaged global stakeholder.7
Rather than looking to engage Russia on specific issues (no matter how wide‐ranging), the United States
should seek some level of permanent engagement. Under this new paradigm, the United States and
Russia would cooperate on issues of mutual concern, addressing both bilateral and global problems. This
approach is evident not only in the new formulation of U.S. policy toward Russia, but also in how the
Obama administration conceives of foreign policy in general. In her July 2009 speech at the Council on
Foreign Relations (CFR), Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton spoke of tilting the balance away from
a multipolar world and toward a “multi‐partner world.”8 Instead of a world where great powers
maintain peace by hedging against one another, the Obama administration seeks to create a world
where major powers work with one another to advance global interests. As President Obama said in
Moscow, and repeated in his speech at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2009, “[T]he
pursuit of power is no longer a zero‐sum game—progress must be shared.”9
The opportunities for partnership and shared progress within the U.S.‐Russian relationship are
numerous, from the more obvious issues of nonproliferation and arms control to the newer or rising
problems of catastrophic terrorism and climate change. Further, as commentators increasingly note,
many of the areas of concern are inextricably interconnected. For example, the question of building
alternate pipelines routes to Europe is clearly part of energy security, but it could also reasonably be
classified as a problem of both European security and security in and around the Eurasian landmass.
Similarly, enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), perhaps the most divisive issue
in the U.S.‐Russian relationship throughout much of the post–Cold War era, is also an issue of European

7
See, for example, Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia, “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia,” 4,
on nuclear issues; and Gordon M. Hahn, “U.S.‐Russian Relations and the War against Jihadism,” Century
Foundation report (New York: Century Foundation, 2009), 17,
http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/hahn.pdf; and Talbott, “Dangerous Leviathans.”
8
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Foreign Policy Address at the Council on Foreign Relations,” Washington, D.C., July 15,
2009, transcript available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/july/126071.htm.
9
Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the New Economic School Graduation,” Gostiny Dvor, Moscow,
Russia, July 7, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/REMARKS‐BY‐THE‐PRESIDENT‐AT‐THE‐NEW‐
ECONOMIC‐SCHOOL‐GRADUATION/; and Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President to the United Nations General
Assembly,” United Nations Headquarters, New York, New York, September 23, 2009, transcript available at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks‐by‐the‐President‐to‐the‐United‐Nations‐General‐
Assembly/.
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security. But as NATO edges closer to Russia’s borders, it also touches on Eurasian security and access to
the energy‐rich Caspian Basin. Additionally, all of these issues linked to the broader problem of
interaction in and around the post‐Soviet space, the nexus of trouble within the U.S.‐Russian
relationship. Together, the persistent intersection and crosscutting nature of the various elements of
this relationship have recently led analysts to focus more on how individual issues within the
relationship animate one another, and to consider policies that are comprehensive, coherent, and
integrated across issue areas.
In addition, many experts argue that the United States and Russia should pursue a broad‐based,
strategic partnership, rather than the selective engagement others have supported.10 Advocates of
strategic partnership operate from an assumption that an extensive bilateral agenda is both possible
and preferable. The recommendation for broad engagement in most cases rests on a belief that Russia
should have a prominent position within U.S. foreign policy. By contrast, proponents of selective
engagement treat Russia as a potential partner but suggest that the relationship should be limited to
cooperation on specific, mutually beneficial objectives. Suggested areas of collaboration are normally
related to nonproliferation and security. Commentators leave open the possibility of an expanded
bilateral agenda, but they condition such expansion on the success of initial individual endeavors.
Moreover, they largely believe that a positive U.S.‐Russian relationship is not mandatory to achieve
most U.S. foreign policy aims. In particular, they emphasize that the entrenchment of Russia’s
“emergent authoritarian political system” would (or should) impede expanded U.S.‐Russian
cooperation.11 Although recent reports continue to express unease over Russia’s democracy and rule‐of‐
law deficit, the majority of observers are less willing to allow the “values gap” to derail potentially
productive cooperation on the myriad areas where the United States and Russia have compatible
interests.12
A brief look at four relatively recent and comprehensive reports offers useful insights into the
broad partnership and selective engagement approaches. They are “Russia’s Wrong Direction: What the
United States Can and Should Do,” a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) report of the Kemp‐Edwards

10
Robert Legvold, “The Russia File,” Foreign Affairs 88 (4) (July/August 2009): 81.
11
See, for example, Stephen Sestanovich, “Russia’s Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do,”
report of an independent task force, John Edwards and Jack Kemp, chairs; Stephen Sestanovich, project director
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006), 70.
12
Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia, “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia,” 2; Gordon, "The
Reset Button Has Been Pushed,” 1; and Graham, “Resurgent Russia and U.S. Purpose,” 15.
13
Commission, authored by Stephen Sestanovich (2006); “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward
Russia,” a Nixon Center report of the Hart‐Hagel Commission (March 2009); the final chapter of The
Russia Balance Sheet, a book by Anders Åslund and Andrew Kuchins (April 2009); and “After the ‘Reset’:
A Strategy and New Agenda for U.S. Russia Policy,” a Center for American Progress (CAP) report by
Samuel Charap with Laura Conley, Peter Juul, Andrew Light, and Julian Wong (July 2009). These reports
for the most part do not engage directly with one another: that is, they do not represent a cross section
of a broader debate on grand strategy within the literature. Each report, however, seeks to place its
recommendations within a broader strategic framework. These are, loosely, either selective
engagement or broad partnership.
The Sestanovich report, written at a time when goodwill in the U.S.‐Russian relationship was
fading, favors selective engagement. In the foreword to the report, Richard Haas writes, “The Task Force
recommends that the United States pursue ‘selective cooperation’ with Russia rather than seek a broad
‘partnership’ that is not now feasible.”13 The report’s position is that although there are areas where
Russian cooperation will be necessary or even indispensable, there are not enough to merit the United
States pursuing a broad strategy of engagement and cooperation. This conclusion is in many ways tied
to Russia’s behavior and policy choices. As Sestanovich explains in a Foreign Affairs article written after
the 2008 war in Georgia, “Suddenly, saying that Washington has to cooperate with Moscow when
possible and push back emphatically when necessary no longer seems a fully satisfactory formula.
Determining the right balance between cooperating and pushing back – between selective engagement
and selective containment – has become the main task of U.S. policy toward Russia.”14 Sestanovich’s
assessment indicates that for scholars already inclined toward selective engagement, the Georgian war
served only to reinforce that conviction. These scholars contend that, whether because of a “values gap”
or simply a mismatch in national and foreign policy priorities, broad engagement is unrealistic and
therefore should not be a stated objective.15 Their recommendations, therefore, do not seek to expand
the U.S.‐Russian relationship.
Among the four studies, the recommendations of the CAP report are most unlike those of the
CFR report. The authors of the CAP report propose a “progressive strategy,” or a comprehensive and

13
Richard Haass, “Foreword,” in Sestanovich, “Russia’s Wrong Direction,” xi.
14
Stephen Sestanovich, “What Has Moscow Done,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 6 (November/December 2008), 13–14.
15
Sestanovich, “Russia’s Wrong Direction,” 5.
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wide‐ranging U.S.‐Russian partnership.16 Charap and his coauthors maintain that, to prevent a return to
the nadir that marked the end of the George W. Bush years, the Obama administration “should adopt a
comprehensive strategy and broaden the agenda.”17 For example, the group recommends U.S.‐Russian
collaboration on improving energy efficiency and finding ways to cooperate in the post‐Soviet space,
rather than continuing to operate in zero‐sum terms.18 Further, whereas the CFR report considers
Russia’s democratic backsliding a reason to limit the relationship, the CAP report argues that this issue
would be better addressed within a wider, more ambitious and cooperative framework.19
The Hart‐Hagel report also advocates a broad relationship, but unlike the CAP report, which
takes a progressive approach, Hart‐Hagel assumes a realist position. The report frames its
recommendations explicitly in the language of advancing U.S. objectives, with little mention of U.S.
ideals: “Securing America’s vital national interests in the complex, interconnected, and interdependent
world of the twenty‐first century requires deep and meaningful cooperation with other governments. . .
. . And few nations could make more of a difference to our success than Russia. . . . Rapid and effective
action to strengthen U.S.‐Russian relations is critically important to advancing U.S. national interests.”20
The difference in conceptual framework comes through clearly in the recommendations the report
presents. For example, on the issue of interaction in and around the post‐Soviet space, Hart‐Hagel does
not envision U.S.‐Russian collaboration. The commissioners argue instead that the objective should be
to minimize friction, suggesting that even occasional clashes of interests need not produce conflict in
the relationship.21 Similarly, their discussion of energy cooperation looks to the economic value of
collaboration, not whether Russia manipulates energy flows for political gains.22
In The Russia Balance Sheet, Åslund and Kuchins place more emphasis on values than the Hart‐
Hagel report, and unlike Charap and his coauthors, they are less inclined to argue that there is “no

16
Samuel Charap with Laura Conley, Peter Juul, Andrew Light, and Julian Wong, “After the ‘Reset’: A Strategy and
New Agenda for U.S. Russia Policy,” report of the Center for American Progress (Washington, D.C.: Center for
American Progress, July 2009), 2.
17
Ibid., 3.
18
Ibid., 1–2.
19
Ibid., 3.
20
Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia, “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia,” i.
21
Ibid., 13.
22
Ibid., 12.
15
conflict between our ideals and our interests.”23 At the same time, Åslund and Kuchins argue that
Russian cooperation is crucial for achieving a wide range of core U.S. strategic objectives.24 For this
reason, despite misgivings about Russia’s conduct, they prefer a comprehensive relationship with a
broad agenda. As they explain, “Moscow may reject the comprehensive effort we suggest in order to
more effectively accommodate its interests and concerns. If so — and this should be clear by the end of
2009 — then the Obama administration must be prepared to quickly adjust its policies. However, we do
not advocate a ’hedging’ strategy from the outset, as that would undermine the administration’s ability
to convince the deeply skeptical leadership in Moscow of US sincerity.”25 Essentially, Åslund and Kuchins
maintain that the administration may revert to selective engagement out of necessity, but pursuing such
a policy from the outset will undercut the ability to achieve U.S. objectives. The authors therefore
recommend increasing economic cooperation between the United States and Russia and renewing
serious arms control negotiations; both pursuits will build trust and be of immediate benefit to the two
countries.26
As noted above, these four reports represent the two main views advanced by a majority of
scholars and policy‐makers. There are some observers, however, who fundamentally mistrust Russia’s
motives and advocate instead pursuing some form of neo‐containment.27 These experts, who take a
more conservative approach to Russia and the U.S.‐Russian relationship, seek to limit bilateral
cooperation to areas where it cannot be avoided (e.g., nuclear nonproliferation). In many instances,
Russia’s “slide into authoritarianism,” questionable human rights record, and growing activity in the
post‐Soviet space are all reasons for severely curtailing cooperation.
A good example of this perspective is “How the Obama Administration Should Engage Russia,”
testimony given by Ariel Cohen of the Heritage Foundation before the Senate Committee on Foreign

23
Charap et al., “After the ‘Reset,’” 2.
24
Anders Åslund and Andrew Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for
International Economics and Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 139.
25
Ibid., 161.
26
Ibid., 163.
27
See, for example, Ileana Ros‐Lehtinen (R‐Fla.), US Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “From
Competition to Collaboration: Strengthening the U.S.‐Russia Relationship,” 111th Cong., 1st. sess., serial no. 111–4,
February 25, 2009, 5, transcript available at: http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/111/47667.pdf.
16
Relations in March 2009.28 The thrust of Cohen’s argument is that Russia is a revanchist power with neo‐
imperial intentions, intent on undermining U.S. objectives and manipulating its energy resources for
political gain.29 This is not to say that Cohen denies that Russia could be a valuable strategic partner for
the United States, were it to conform more closely to Western political norms, or that he
underestimates the challenge Russia poses for U.S. foreign policy (a challenge that most experts
acknowledge).30 Rather, Cohen claims that pursuing extensive cooperation will be pointless, and even
harmful to U.S. interests, until Russia becomes a liberal democratic society.31 Other analysts argue that
waiting for that transformation will harm U.S. interests.32
Another useful example, for the bridge it creates between experts such as Cohen and
Sestanovich, is “The Button and the Bear,” by Leon Aron of the American Enterprise Institute.33 Aron
might be termed a “moderate‐conservative.”34 Like Cohen, he is skeptical of the long‐term prospects for
a dramatically improved bilateral relationship.35 Unlike Cohen, he places less emphasis on the values gap
between the United States and Russia and focuses instead on ways in which the Kremlin’s political
ideology precludes meaningful cooperation with the United States.36 The basis of his argument is that,
historically, “the substance and extent of U.S.‐Russian rapprochement depend first and foremost on the
ideology of the regime in the Kremlin and its vision of the country’s national interests.”37 In Aron’s view,
the way the current Kremlin leadership understands Russia’s national and strategic interests sets Russia
in opposition to the United States. Extensive U.S.‐Russian cooperation or partnership, therefore, will be

28
Cohen, “How the Obama Administration Should Engage Russia.”
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
See, for example, Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia, “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia.”
33
Leon Aron, “The Button and the Bear,” American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research [Why italicized?]
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, summer 2009), http://www.aei.org/docLib/20090701‐Aron‐RO‐
g.pdf.
34
Correspondence with Robert Legvold, March 17, 2010.
35
Aron, “The Button and the Bear,” 1.
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid., 8.
17
impossible without significant “ideological and political evolution in Moscow.”38 Although this is the
same basic assessment as Cohen’s, Aron reaches his conclusion through analysis of Russia’s domestic
political culture and imperatives, and therefore leaves a little more room for cooperation on tasks that
serve both countries’ national interest.39 As with Cohen, however, Aron’s perspective represents a more
conservative view than that taken by the majority of recent commentators.
The purpose of this paper is neither to promote an overall approach to the U.S.‐Russian
relationship nor to offer recommendations for how to manage it. Instead, the goal is to show the
existing range of views on how Russia should be assessed and approached. It is structured as a review
essay that looks at existing recommendations for dealing with key issues in the bilateral relationship,
such as strategic nuclear arms control; European security issues; economic issues; energy security;
questions of democracy and human rights; and transnational global concerns. This synthesis provides a
framework within which to consider the Obama administration’s evolving policy toward Russia by
comparing it both with the choices of past administrations and with expert recommendations. It is
therefore a road map of where U.S. policy is in the context of where it has been.
The reasoning for this paper is simple. U.S.‐Russian relations are, even in the most stable
periods, a moving target requiring close attention and careful management.40 This is by no means a
stable period; indeed, as one analyst argues, “the world now has entered a period of great upheaval of
uncertain duration, which will not pass until a new global equilibrium emerges.”41 While the world
heaves and settles, however, much can be gained from an examination of both recent and past
recommendations regarding the U.S.‐Russian relationship. As the Obama administration moves to
solidify its Russia policy, careful analysis of each facet of the relationship and its related
recommendations is a good starting place.

38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
40
Steven Pifer, “Reversing the Decline: An Agenda for U.S‐Russia Relations in 2009,” Policy Paper no. 10
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, January 2009), 3,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/01_us_russia_relations_pifer/01_us_russia_relations_p
ifer.pdf.
41
Graham, “Resurgent Russia and U.S. Purpose,” 4.
18
STRUCTURING THE RELATIONSHIP

In September 2008, a gathering of former ambassadors to Russia (and the Soviet Union) and the United
States outlined a proposed agenda for their countries’ bilateral relationship. The group concluded that
“the new administrations in Washington and Moscow must create an improved institutional framework
for consultations and negotiations and for implementation of the programs and initiatives this agenda
will require. Our experience suggests that such machinery will require attention and support from our
Presidents.”1 Although perhaps not a new observation, a distinguishing characteristic of many of the
reports published after the recent war in Georgia and the 2008 U.S. elections is the extent to which they
consider the problem of how to conduct the U.S.‐Russian relationship. Earlier writings speak broadly of
the need for presidential engagement, but the reports written in the waning days of the George W. Bush
administration and the early days of the Obama administration delve into far greater detail. This change
may be a reaction to a consensus that, under Bush, summitry replaced policy.2 Further, it is an explicit
recognition that “if we are to take any lessons from previous chapters in the history of U.S.‐Russian
relations, it is the absolute requirement to give their conduct priority, structure, and above all consistent
attention.”3 Therefore, an accurate representation of the recommendations from late 2008 to 2009
should begin with the emphasis they place on process as an indispensable component of good policy.
The Obama administration’s desire to de‐emphasize U.S.‐Russian presidential summits and
establish channels of communication at lower levels of government does not imply a wish to remove the
president from the equation: to the contrary, most observers agree that the U.S.‐Russian relationship
requires significant presidential leadership and support from Congress.4 In the past, however, a
presidential relationship without bureaucratic engagement has led to an overpersonalization of

1
Alexander Bessmertnykh, James Collins, Yuri Dubinin, Arthur Hartman, Jack Matlock, and Thomas Pickering, “U.S.‐
Russian Relations: The Longer View” (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September
23, 2008), 4–5, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/2008_ambassadorial_conference.pdf.
2
Åslund and Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet, 161.
3
James Collins, “”Keeping Up the Momentum with Moscow,” Web Commentary, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, July 28, 2009, LINK.
4
See, for example, Pifer, “Reversing the Decline,” 3; and Andrew C. Kuchins, “Prospects for Engagement with
Russia,” testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2009, 9,
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/KuchinsTestimony090319a.pdf.
19
relations.5 Many analysts therefore recommend that Obama select a senior administration official to act
as the point person on Russia and vest this individual with the imprimatur of the president.6 Ideally,
Russia policy would be coordinated under that official and run through an interagency group based in
the National Security Council (NSC).7 Running it through the NSC, which is seated at the White House,
ensures a higher level of presidential engagement. In addition, having more agencies invested in the
success of the endeavor (assuming they can be disciplined to coordinate aims and objectives with one
another) helps to create broad political support for initiatives. Obama has mostly followed this course of
action, though some observers fear that he, like his predecessors, is making the mistake of
overpersonalizing the relationship.8
Policy implementation, however, happens at the bureaucratic rather than the executive level.
The second part of structuring the U.S.‐Russia relationship, therefore, is establishing channels for lower‐
level officials to be in touch with their counterparts. The Hart‐Hagel Commission recommends that the
Obama administration ”[c]reate permanent bilateral forums in which sub‐cabinet‐level diplomats,
military and security officials, and economic officials could interact regularly and cooperate on concrete
projects while also developing a better understanding of decision making on each side by the other,
building mutual trust, and fostering working relationships.”9 The Obama administration has largely
followed these recommendations. During the July 2009 summit in Moscow, President Obama and
President Medvedev established the U.S.‐Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission, with the presidents
acting as cochairs and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov acting as

5
Graham, “Resurgent Russia and U.S. Purpose,” 18–19; and Samuel A. Greene and Dmitri Trenin, “(Re)Engaging
Russia in an Era of Uncertainty,” Policy Brief 86 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
December 2009), 5, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/engaging_russia.pdf.
6
Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia, “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia,” 4; Working Group
on United States Policy towards Russia, “Recommendations” (New York: Century Foundation, April 2009), 4,
http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/grouprec.pdf; Graham, “Resurgent Russia and U.S.
Purpose,”19; and Pifer, “Reversing the Decline,” 21.
7
Pifer, “Reversing the Decline,” 21.
8
Åslund and Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet, 161. On overpersonalizing, see, Jamie M. Fly and Gary Schmitt,
“Obama Is Making Bush’s Big Mistake on Russia” Foreign Policy Online, March 22, 2010,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/03/22/obama_is_making_bush_s_big_mistake_on_russia.
9
Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia, “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia,” 5.
20
commission coordinators.10 According to President Obama, the commission shall “serve as a new
foundation for this cooperation.” It comprises “working groups on development and the economy;
energy and the environment; nuclear energy and security; arms control and international security;
defense, foreign policy and counterterrorism; preventing and handling emergencies; civil society;
science and technology; space; health; education; and culture.”11 It will also expand to include new
topics and working groups as needed.12 Groups are charged to meet “regularly” and make reports to the
commission coordinators at least twice a year, and reports to the presidents at least once a year.13 As of
October 2009, the commission consisted of sixteen working groups, about half of which had met at least
once.14 According to the “Joint Statement by the U.S.‐Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission
Coordinators on Commission Progress,” released on December 31, 2009, the commission has expanded
to include a group on the environment, and all of the groups are moving forward.15

10
“Fact Sheet: U.S.‐Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/FACT‐
SHEET‐US‐Russia‐Bilateral‐Presidential‐Commission/.
11
Barack Obama, “Press Conference by President Obama and President Medvedev of Russia,” Kremlin, Moscow,
Russia, July 6, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Press‐Conference‐by‐President‐Obama‐and‐
President‐Medvedev‐of‐Russia/.
12
“Fact Sheet: U.S.‐Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission.”
13
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, “Bilateral Presidential Commission,” October 16, 2009,
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/130616.htm.
14
Phillip H. Gordon, “Remarks En Route to Moscow,” October 12, 2009,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/oct/130524.htm.
15
“Joint Statement by the U.S.‐Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission Coordinators on Commission Progress,”
Washington, D.C., December 31, 2009, http://moscow.usembassy.gov/st_123109.html.
21
NUCLEAR SECURITY

National security, particularly issues related to nuclear proliferation, will likely continue to be the central
pillar of the U.S.‐Russian relationship.1 Partly because of the looming expiration of the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START) on December 5, 2009, the Obama administration began negotiations on
nonproliferation and arms control agreements early in its tenure, something many observers and most
task forces recommended.2 In addition to the more obvious desire to prevent a treaty vacuum, the
administration and experts alike see traditional arms control negotiations as a means to begin repairing
the frayed relationship.3 As one analyst put it in the immediate aftermath of the Georgia crisis, the best
way to halt the deterioration in relations is to “grab onto the existing superstructure of the U.S.‐Russia
relationship.”4
From the beginning, the most urgent issue on the agenda was negotiating a replacement to
START. The joint statement released by President Obama and President Medvedev at their bilateral
meeting in London in April 2009 suggested a broad view of the new treaty.5 During the July 2009 summit
in Moscow, the two presidents announced a “joint understanding” for the START Follow‐on Treaty.6 The

1
Legvold, “The Russia File,” 78.
2
See, for example, Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia, “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia,” 4;
Pifer, “Reversing the Decline,” 12; Stephen Sestanovich, “Prospects for Engagement with Russia,” testimony before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., March 19, 2009,
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/SestanovichTestimony090319a.pdf. Arms control negotiations were not
a priority for the Bush administration.
3
See, for example, Pifer, “Reversing the Decline,” 13; Strobe Talbott, remarks during “Prospects for U.S.‐Russian
Arms Control,” at “Designing U.S. Policy toward Russia,” a conference at the Library of Congress, Washington D.C.,
March 27, 2009; Rose Gottemoeller, “Russian‐American Security Relations after Georgia,” in the series Foreign
Policy for the Next President (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October, 2008), 3,
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/russia_us_security_relations_after_georgia.pdf; and Åslund and
Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet, 153.
4
Gottemoeller, “Russian‐American Security Relations after Georgia,” 3.
5
“Joint Statement by Dmitriy A. Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, and Barack Obama, President of
the United States of America, Regarding Negotiations on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arm,” April 1,
2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint‐Statement‐by‐Dmitriy‐A‐Medvedev‐and‐Barack‐
Obama/. President Bush preferred to avoid negotiating legally binding treaties.
6
“Joint Understanding,” July 6, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/The‐Joint‐Understanding‐for‐
The‐START‐Follow‐On‐Treaty/.
22
new treaty, finalized in March 2010, “limits the number of operationally deployed nuclear warheads to
1,550 for each country.”7 It requires few significant reductions beyond those agreed to in the 2002
Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT), but many experts concur that the immediate
START follow‐on talks should mark only a beginning in new arms control negotiations and that a more
robust agreement should follow.8 Future negotiations should focus on downloading (reducing the
number of missiles a delivery vehicle can carry, e.g., putting concrete ballast in some of the missile
tubes of a nuclear submarine), deeper reductions in the number of weapons held by each country, and
conversion of strategic systems to conventional systems, among other topics.9 They should also include
discussions of how to achieve the “nuclear zero” goal that Obama and Medvedev have supported.10
The new treaty also “acknowledges a link” between offensive and defensive systems (ballistic
missile defense, or BMD), but it does not officially limit the development of missile defense systems.11
Throughout the process, missile defense was perhaps the most visibly contentious issue and almost
derailed the negotiations.12 Whereas the U.S. Senate maintained that it would not ratify a treaty that
limited missile defense, the Russian side maintained that it would not agree to one that did not address
missile defense.13 The Obama administration has committed “to continue to discuss the topic of missile
defense with Russia in a separate venue.”14 In addition, both Secretary Clinton and NATO Secretary‐
General Anders Fogh Rasmussen have supported cooperation with Russia on a joint missile defense

7
Steve Gutterman, “Obama, Medvedev to Sign Landmark Nuclear Arms Pact,” Washington Post, April 2, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2010/04/02/AR2010040200984.html.
8
Pifer, “Reversing the Decline,” 13; Sestanovich, “Prospects for Engagement with Russia,” 5; and Working Group
on United States Policy towards Russia, “Recommendations,” 1. On the need for a more robust second agreement,
see Pifer, “Reversing the Decline,” 13; and Gutterman, “Obama, Medvedev to Sign Landmark Nuclear Arms Pact.”
9
Pifer, “Reversing the Decline,” 13, 2.
10
11
Ibid.
12
Ellen Barry, “Putin Sounds Warning on Arms Talks,” New York Times, December 29, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/30/world/europe/30russia.html.
13
Josh Rogin, “All Quiet on the Nuclear Front,” The Cable, a blog on www.foreignpolicy.com, April 2, 2010,
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/02/all_quiet_on_the_nuclear_front,
14
Rose Gottemoeller, “The Long Road from Prague,” speech at Woolands Conference Center, Colonial
Williamsburg, Virginia, August 14, 2009, transcript available at: http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/127958.htm.
23
system.15 The two sides signed the new START treaty in Prague on April 8, 2010. The first formal
hearings on the treaty on the U.S. side took place on May 18, 2010.16 President Medvedev and
President Obama have agreed that “ratification [by the Senate and the Duma] should be
simultaneous.”17
Although START I contains a provision for an automatic five‐year extension, the United States
and Russia elected not to implement it.18 Instead, they have stated that the existing treaty will apply
“voluntarily” until the new treaty is ratified, an approach some experts recommended even before the
treaty’s expiry. Others find the assertion that the expired treaty is still in force “voluntarily” very
troublesome.19 Most observers, however, judged that finding a way to keep START I in force until a new
treaty is ratified was necessary because, although SORT does not expire until 2012, it relies on START for
its verification procedures, and it lost much of its underpinning upon the expiry of the earlier treaty.
The emphasis on the importance of the START follow‐on, though representative of the majority
of commentators and also of the actions of the Obama administration, has not been universal. Some
argued from the beginning that the administration should use the prospect of renegotiating START to
compel Russia to cooperate in addressing Iran’s nuclear ambitions.20 Others have argued that the
renewed focus on arms control serves only to perpetuate the Cold War relationship, given that both

15
“Remarks on Secretary Clinton's Meetings with Foreign Minister Lavrov,” Ritz Carlton Hotel, Moscow, Russia,
October 13, 2009, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/oct/130563.htm; and Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “The
Case for Western Missile Defence,” Guardian, March31, 2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/mar/31/missile‐defence‐nato‐russia.
16
“Kerry, Lugar Announce START Hearings,” Senatus: Daily Coverage of the United States Senate, May 12, 2010,
http://senatus.wordpress.com/2010/05/12/kerry‐lugar‐announce‐start‐hearings/.
17
Dmitri Medvedev, “Russia‐U.S. Relations and Russia’s Vision for International Affairs,” A speech at The Brookings
Institution, Washington, D.C., April 13, 2010, transcript available at:
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2010/0413_medvedev/20100413_medvedev.pdf.
18
On Russia, see “Russia Wants U.S. to Limit Nuclear Delivery Vehicles,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 3,
2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Wants_US_To_Limit_Nuclear_Delivery_Vehicles/1502761.html. On
the United States, see Pifer, “Reversing the Decline,” 13; and Rumer and Stent, “Repairing U.S.‐Russian Relations,”
29.
19
On this recommendation, see Pifer, “Beyond START,” 10. On disagreement, see Ariel Cohen, “A Nonstarter on
Arms Control,” Heritage Foundation, January 11, 2010,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Commentary/2010/01/A‐Nonstarter‐on‐Arms‐Control.
20
See Cohen, “How the Obama Administration Should Engage Russia,” 14. Regarding the verification vacuum after
START‘s expiration without a signed and ratified follow‐on, the SORT treaty is judged sufficient by itself.
24
countries had already begun to reduce unilaterally their stockpiles.21 Referring to events such as Russia’s
actions in the 2008 Georgian war, Senate Republicans stated, “It is not obvious that Russia’s actions
have really earned further nuclear reductions.”22 They also contended that Russia “needs” a new treaty
more than the United States.23 And when it appeared that the treaty would be concluded by the
deadline, some argued that it would be imprudent to sign any new arms control treaties until the
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) had been concluded.24 The administration maintained that the ongoing
NPR should not be a concern because, as a first step, the NPR working groups developed a nuclear force
structure and posture for use during the START negotiations.25 This information was used to determine
U.S. positions during the negotiations, and the NPR informed the negotiations as both processes
proceeded.26 After several delays, the NPR was released on April 6, 2010.27
Looking beyond arms control, some commentators have considered how the United States and
Russia can use their leverage in the nuclear sphere to broaden and strengthen the nuclear
nonproliferation regime itself. This includes reviving existing international treaties and negotiating new
ones, increasing security at nuclear facilities worldwide, and securing weapons‐grade fissile material in
third‐party countries.28 During the July 2009 summit, President Obama and President Medvedev
released a joint statement on nuclear cooperation that details a commitment to, among other things,
collaborating on research for proliferation‐proof nuclear technology, supporting the growth of safe
nuclear energy, and continuing programs such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.29

21
Douglass J. Feith and Abram N. Shulsky, “Why Revive the Cold War?” Wall Street Journal, August 4, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204313604574328430978849134.html#mod=rss_opinion_main.
22
U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee, “START Follow‐on Dos & Don’ts,” 7.
23
Ibid., 15.
24
Ibid., 6.
25
Gottemoeller, “Long Road from Prague.”
26
Ibid.
27
Barak Obama, “Statement by President Barack Obama on the Release of Nuclear Posture Review,” May 6, 2010,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the‐press‐office/statement‐president‐barack‐obama‐release‐nuclear‐posture‐review.
28
29
Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev, “Joint Statement by President Barack Obama of the United States of
America and President Dmitry Medvedev of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Cooperation,” July 6, 2009,
25
Both presidents also support the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty with verification
measures.30
In their joint statement, President Obama and President Medvedev also pledged to “work to
bring into force the bilateral Agreement for Cooperation in the Field of Nuclear Energy.”31 This refers to
the 123 Agreement on Civilian Nuclear Cooperation, signed by President George W. Bush and President
Vladimir Putin in May 2008, just before Medvedev assumed the Russian presidency. The Bush
administration submitted the 123 agreement to the U.S. Congress for ratification but withdrew it in the
wake of the 2008 Georgian war.32 If implemented, the 123 agreement would allow nuclear‐weapons
scientists to collaborate in creating proliferation‐proof nuclear energy facilities.33 Ratification of this
agreement and the ensuing cooperation would also help to reframe the nuclear relationship.34 In
addition, given the number of heretofore prohibited opportunities it would allow, the 123 agreement
would be a commercial boon to both nations and would help to bolster economic ties.35 The majority of
recent reports support ratification of the agreement.36 The primary argument against ratification is

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint‐Statement‐by‐President‐Barack‐Obama‐of‐the‐United‐States‐
of‐America‐and‐President‐Dmitry‐Medvedev‐of‐the‐Russian‐Federation‐on‐Nuclear‐Cooperation/.
30
Dmitriy Medvedev and Barack Obama, “Joint Statement by President Dmitriy Medvedev of the Russian
Federation and President Barack Obama of the United States of America,” London, England, April 1, 2009,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint‐Statement‐by‐President‐Dmitriy‐Medvedev‐of‐the‐Russian‐
Federation‐and‐President‐Barack‐Obama‐of‐the‐United‐States‐of‐America/; and Pifer, “Reversing the Decline,” 13.
Pifer does not specify whether the treaty should have verification measures.
31
Ibid.
32
Tony Fratto, press briefing, Crawford Middle School, Crawford, Texas, August 25, 2008, transcript available at:
http://georgewbush‐whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/08/20080825‐5.html.
33
Robert Einhorn, Rose Gottemoeller, Fred McGoldrick, Daniel Poneman, and Jon Wolfsthal, “The U.S.‐Russia Civil
Nuclear Agreement: A Framework for Cooperation” (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, May 2008), 27,
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/reports/csis_us‐russia_08.pdf.
34
Ibid.
35
Åslund and Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet, 156–157, Samuel Charap and Andrew C. Kuchins, “Economic
Whiplash: An Opportunity to Bolster U.S.‐Russia Commercial Ties?” report of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2009), 10,
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090218_charap_econwhiplashrussia_web.pdf; and Sarah Carey, remarks
during “US Economic Relations and Energy,” at “Designing U.S. Policy toward Russia.” [What is this? Full cite?]
26
presumed leverage to compel Russian cooperation on addressing the Iranian nuclear challenge.37 The
administration resubmitted the agreement to Congress on May 11, 2010.38
In addition to the 123 agreement, many experts also recommend U.S. ratification of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was originally rejected by the Senate in October 1999 and
further stymied during the George W. Bush administration.39 Ratification of the agreement may have
little practical benefit, given that the United States ceased nuclear testing in 1992, but it would be an
important symbolic gesture demonstrating an overall U.S. commitment to nonproliferation.40 Two of the
main obstacles to U.S. ratification have been the question of verification (whether violations of the ban
can be detected) and a resistance to international treaties that regulate aspects of national defenses.41
From a technical standpoint, the issue of verification has been largely overcome, because, as Jessica
Mathews notes, “a global monitoring system has been built that can detect an explosion as small as one‐
tenth of a kiloton, and 10 times smaller in many critical regions.”42 Although opposition from some
senators continues to pose a considerable hurdle, many current and past officials from both Republican

36
See, for example, Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia, “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia,”
4; Charap and Kuchins, “Economic Whiplash,” 10; Graham, “Resurgent Russia and U.S. Purpose,” 21; and Pifer,
“Reversing the Decline,” 16. For a dissenter, see Cohen, “How the Obama Administration Should Engage Russia,”
13.
37
Cohen, “How the Obama Administration Should Engage Russia,” 13; Jack Spencer, “Russia 123 Agreement: Not
Ready for Primetime,” WebMemo no. 1926 (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, May 15, 2008), 1,
https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/13663/wm_1926.pdf?sequence=1.
38
Josh Rogin, “White House sends Russia civilian nuclear deal to Congress,” The Cable, a blog on
www.foreignpolicy.com, May 11, 2010,
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/11/white_house_pushes_congress_on_russia_civilian_nuclear_
deal.
39
Strobe Talbott, The Great Experiment: The Story of Ancient Empires, Modern States, and the Quest for a Global
Nation (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008), 338, 348.
40
On the symbolic nature of ratification, see ibid., 339; and Phillip Taubman, “Learning Not to Love the Bomb,”
New York Times, February 18, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/19/opinion/19taubman.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=russia&st=nyt.
41
Brent Scowcroft, Joseph Nye, Nicholas Burns, and Strobe Talbott, “U.S., Russia Must Lead on Arms Control,”
Politico, October 13, 2009, http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=4A084627‐18FE‐70B2‐
A8D8BD619BFFF486.
42
Jessica Mathews, “This Time, Ban the Test,” International Herald Tribune, October 21, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/opinion/22iht‐edmatthews.html.
27
and Democratic administrations now support ratification.43 Meanwhile the Obama administration has
made ratification of the CTBT a centerpiece of its agenda for moving toward a world free of nuclear
weapons.44 In September 2009, Secretary of State Clinton led the U.S. delegation to a conference on
CTBT at the UN General Assembly.45 Following a trip to Moscow, the secretary argued that “[b]ringing
the treaty into force will strengthen and reenergize the global nonproliferation regime and, in doing so,
enhance our own security.”46 Despite earlier promises, however, the administration is unlikely to make a
push on CTBT before securing ratification of the START follow‐on.
Beyond bringing treaties and agreements into force, another way to secure a global
commitment to nonproliferation is to use the influence of both the United States and Russia to
strengthen multinational bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an ambition
supported in the July 2009 joint statement.47 For example, the two countries could provide a joint team
of experts to help the IAEA respond to requests from countries seeking to comply with their obligation
to secure all nuclear weapons and materials (UN Resolution 1540).48 Strengthening the IAEA and further
integrating it into the U.S.‐Russia relationship has had the long‐standing support of international groups
such as the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission and bilateral commissions such as the joint
research group of the National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies and the Russian

43
See, for example, Robert Gates, “Gates: Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in the 21st Century,” speech at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., October 28, 2008, transcript available at:
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/1028_transcrip_gates_checked.pdf”; Mathews, “This Time, Ban the
Test”; and Scowcroft et al., “U.S., Russia Must Lead on Arms Control.”
44
Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009,
transcript available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks‐By‐President‐Barack‐Obama‐In‐
Prague‐As‐Delivered/.
45
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Speech in Advance of the United Nations General Assembly,” Brookings Institution,
Washington, D.C., September 18, 2009, 5, transcript available at :
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/09/129366.htm
46
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Strengthening the Pillars of Global Nonproliferation,” remarks at the United States
Institute of Peace, Renaissance Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C., October 21, 2009, transcript available at:
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/10/130806.htm.
47
Obama and Medvedev, “Joint Statement on Nuclear Cooperation.”
48
Sam Nunn, remarks during “Prospects for U.S.‐Russian Arms Control,” at “Designing U.S. Policy toward Russia,”;
Obama and Medvedev, “Joint Statement on Nuclear Cooperation.”
28
Academy of Sciences (RAS).49 In a 2005 joint report, the NRC‐RAS group suggested integrating
multinational organizations, such as the IAEA or the Group of Eight (G8), into the effort to manage the
nuclear regime. These organizations could be integrated via regularized meetings, bilateral or
multilateral initiatives, and workshops.50 The IAEA and other multinational bodies might also establish
universal standards regarding radioactive materials as a way to prevent the illegal transfer of hazardous
goods. Such efforts should look not just at the mechanics of transport but also to personnel
infrastructure (such as legal teams) and ways to coordinate existing export systems.51
Another way to strengthen the nonproliferation regime at the global level involves U.S.‐Russian
cooperation on an international spent‐fuel facility located within Russia’s borders. One such facility, in
Angarsk, is already operational and is overseen by the IAEA, but the United States has yet to formerly
endorse the project. An international spent‐fuel facility could help to supply third parties with nuclear
fuel while preventing them from developing reprocessing facilities that would allow them to extract
plutonium. Whether the United States becomes involved with the Angarsk facility or whether
Washington and Moscow agree to collaborate in constructing a new facility, developing an efficient and

49
“Appendix: Recommendations of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission,” in Hans Blix, Why Nuclear
Disarmament Matters, A Boston Review Book (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2008), 93. The Weapons of Mass
Destruction Commission is an independent body funded by the government of Sweden that strives “to identify
desirable and achievable directions for international cooperation [and] present realistic proposals aimed at the
greatest possible reduction of the dangers of weapons of mass destruction.” See
http://www.wmdcommission.org/; and National Research Council (U.S.). U.S. Committee on Strengthening U.S.‐
Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation, Strengthening U.S.‐Russian Cooperation on Nuclear
Nonproliferation: Recommendations for Action (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2005), 25,
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11302..
50
National Research Council, Strengthening U.S.‐Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation. Although this
report and its predecessor, Overcoming Impediments to U.S.‐Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation:
Report of a Joint Workshop, suggest that multilateral organizations should be more involved in the U.S.‐Russia
nuclear relationship, neither report offers specific recommendations. The earlier report, however, does provide
examples of existing programs that might be mimicked or strengthened, such as the G8 Global Partnership against
the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction or the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian
Federation. See National Research Council, U.S. Committee on Strengthening U.S.‐Russian Cooperation on Nuclear
Nonproliferation, Overcoming Impediments to U.S.‐Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation: Report of a
Joint Workshop (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2004), esp. 38–39,
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10928.
51
Brad McAllister, “Framing U.S.‐Russian Security Cooperation: Neorealist and Neoliberal Alternatives to
Navigating the New Security Terrain,” Demokratizatiya 15, no. 13 (June 2007), 289–290.
29
cost‐effective way of placing fissile material under more secure control is a primary objective.52 In
addition, some analysts endorse the Russian proposal to reprocess Iranian spent fuel in a joint Russian‐
Iranian facility within Russia.53 Regardless of the location, many recommend U.S.‐Russian collaboration
on developing civilian nuclear reactors.54 Ratification of the 123 agreement would facilitate that
collaboration.
Significant problems resulting from differing interpretations of proliferation have hampered the
fight against proliferation.55 The United States has generally maintained that even the potential of a
country becoming a nuclear power is unacceptable. In contrast, Russia has largely held that only an
immediate threat represents a violation of the nonproliferation regime.56 During the second Bush
administration, the gulf between these two interpretations widened because the United States replaced
a generic standard with a normative one, treating some cases of proliferation – notably Iran, Iraq, and
North Korea – as unacceptable violations, and others – such as India and Israel – as acceptable.
These differing interpretations notwithstanding, U.S. commentators have become increasingly
convinced that Russian cooperation is the best, and perhaps only, way to make strides against
proliferation. This is particularly true in problem states such as Iran and North Korea.57 Iran is especially
worrisome from the U.S. perspective, and during the Bush administration, officials moved the goal of

52
Richard Weitz, Russian‐American Security Cooperation after St. Petersburg: Challenges and Opportunities, part of
the series The U.S. and Russia: Regional Security Issues and Interests, by the Strategic Studies Institute
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government, 2007), 32–33.
53
Rumer and Stent, “Repairing U.S.‐Russian Relations,” 30. The Iranians have agreed in principle to export much of
their enriched uranium to Russia so that it can be converted to fuel. See Steven Erlanger and Mark Landler, “Iran
Agrees to Send Enriched Uranium to Russia,” New York Times, October 1, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/02/world/middleeast/02nuke.html?ref=world.
54
Pifer, “Beyond START,” 3; and Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia, “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy
toward Russia,” 4.
55
Rumer, Russian Foreign Policy beyond Putin, Adelphi Paper 390 (Oxford, England: Routledge for the Institute for
Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 37.
56
Thomas E. Graham, “The Friend of My Enemy,” National Interest 95 (May/June 2008), 38.
57
Related to North Korea, see James Clay Moltz, “U.S.‐Russian Relations and the North Korean Crisis,” Asian Survey
45, no. 5 (September/October 2005). For Iran, there are numerous sources, but see in particular Robert D.
Blackwill, “The Three R’s: Rivalry, Russia, ‘Ran,” National Interest 93 (January /February 2008); and Graham, “The
Friend of My Enemy.”
30
securing Russian cooperation on ending Iran’s nuclear program to the top of the bilateral agenda.58
Reports and studies released since Obama took office in January 2009 are no less committed than
earlier works to including Russia in efforts to resolve the Iranian conundrum, but these reports are less
sanguine than their predecessors about the amount of influence that Moscow wields over Tehran. In
addition, they exhibit a greater awareness (or the awareness is more readily acknowledged) that,
whatever its level of influence, Russia has a diverse set of interests with Iran that will likely prevent it
from ever exerting the amount of pressure the United States would prefer.59
Given these complications, many observers support the Obama administration’s efforts to
engage Iran directly, rather than rely on Russia’s questionable influence or intent for making progress.60
The Hart‐Hagel Commission advocates striving “to make Russia an American partner in dealing with Iran
and the broader problem of emerging nuclear powers.”61 Although this is not a groundbreaking
recommendation, the language is important: Hart‐Hagel frames the need to cooperate on Iran within
the larger context of curbing proliferation. This phrasing therefore appeals to the Russian generic
interpretation of proliferation.
In a departure from the public posture of his predecessor, President Obama has also rhetorically
recognized Iran’s right to nuclear energy. At a speech in Prague on April 5, 2009, Obama stated, “My
administration will seek engagement with Iran based on mutual interests and mutual respect. We
believe in dialogue. But in that dialogue we will present a clear choice. We want Iran to take its rightful
place in the community of nations, politically and economically. We will support Iran's right to peaceful
nuclear energy with rigorous inspections. That’s a path that the Islamic Republic can take. Or the
government can choose increased isolation, international pressure, and a potential nuclear arms race in

58
See, for example, Blackwill, “The Three R’s,” 68.
59
Pifer, “Reversing the Decline,” 14; and Rumer and Stent, “Repairing U.S.‐Russian Relations,” 29–30. For a Russian
perspective, see the interview with Viktor Kremeniuk, deputy director of the Institute of the USA and Canada at
the Russian Academy of Sciences, “Akhmadinezhad vyzhal iz konfrontatzii s Amerikoi vse, shto mozhno,” Gazeta,
June 25, 2009, Russian: http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2009/06/25_x_3215148.shtml, translation:
http://worldmeets.us/gazetaru000010.shtml.
60
See, for example, Pifer, “Reversing the Decline,” 14; and Julian Borger, “Nuclear Talks Lead to Rare Meeting
between US and Iran,” Guardian, October 1, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/01/iran‐nuclear‐
geneva‐talks.
61
31
the region that will increase insecurity for all.”62 Secretary of State Clinton reiterated Obama’s position
in her speech in advance of a meeting of the UN General Assembly in September 2009.63 The revelation
just before the opening of the September 2009 G20 meeting in Pittsburgh that Iran has a second covert
uranium enrichment plant, however, caused the administration to toughen its stance and veer away
from engagement.64 The announcement came at the same time as the UN Security Council approved,
with Russia’s support, a U.S.‐led resolution pushing for more ambitious efforts at working toward a
world without nuclear weapons. The resolution did not mention either Iran or North Korea by name, but
many experts view it as a positive step in the administration’s nuclear agenda.65 Although the
administration remains publicly committed to engaging Iran diplomatically, future steps, and the role
the United States will expect Russia to play, depend on the progress made in negotiations begun with
the P5 + 1 (i.e., the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) and the
European Union in Geneva on October 1, 2009.66 President Medvedev has signaled, somewhat tepidly,
that he might be amenable to harsher sanctions should these prove necessary.67 Others in the Russian
government have not reiterated that position, but Obama remains hopeful that he can gain Russian
support.68
Since the initial optimism of both Medvedev’s September 2009 statement and the first round of
talks in October 2009, progress has proceeded haltingly. After much delay and obfuscation of its plans,

62
Obama, “Remarks by President Barack Obama.”
63
Clinton, “Speech in Advance of the United Nations General Assembly,” 5.
64
Michael D. Shear and Karen DeYoung, “Iran Reveals Existence of Second Uranium Enrichment Plant,”
Washington Post, September 25, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐
dyn/content/article/2009/09/25/AR2009092500289.html?hpid=topnews.
65
Glenn Kessler, “U.N. Wrangling Spotlights Gaps between Nuclear Hopes, Reality,” Washington Post, September
25, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2009/09/24/AR2009092403708.html.
66
The meeting in Geneva also resulted in a “rare” bilateral meeting between U.S. and Iranian diplomats. See Glen
Kessler, “Iran, Major Powers Reach Agreement on Series of Points,” Washington Post, October 2, 2009,
67
Ibid.
68
Clifford J. Levy, “Warmer U.S.‐Russia Relations May Yield Little in Action toward Iran ,” New York Times,
September 27, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/28/world/middleeast/28russia.html?ref=europe; Peter
Baker, “Obama Plans Revival of Russian Nuclear Deal ,” New York Times, May 6, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/world/europe/07prexy.html?src=twt&twt=nytimesworld.
32
Iran turned down an agreement to send its fissile material to France or Russia for reprocessing. In
February 2010, the Islamic Republic announced that it would begin enriching uranium for use in a
medical reactor.69 That announcement led officials in several nations, including the United States and
Russia, to call for stricter international sanctions on Iran.70 In another positive sign that Russia may be
willing to support harsher sanctions, Russian officials have been quoted as saying that they would not
complete the sale of an S‐300 air defense system to Iran if “it leads to destabilisation in any region.”71
Thus far, however, their stated reason for not fulfilling the contract is that there are technical difficulties
with the system, but they do intend to complete the sale once those issues have been successfully
addressed.72 Ultimately, however, the future of this sale, as well as the prospect of increased U.S.‐
Russian collaboration in managing the Iranian challenge, will likely depend as much on the actions and
answers of the Islamic Republic to the standing offers as on stated positions of either the United States
or Russia.

69
Alan Cowell and Thom Shanker, “Iran Nuclear Plans Start New Calls for Sanctions,” New York Times, February 9,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/09/world/middleeast/09iran.html?scp=2&sq=iran%20nuclear%20&st=cse.
70
Ibid.
71
“Russia Links Iran Arms Sale to Regional Tensions,” Reuters, February 24, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2010/02/24/world/international‐uk‐russia‐iran‐lavrov.html.
72
Ibid.
33
NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

Throughout most of the post–Cold War era, U.S. leaders from both parties have argued that NATO
enlargement contributes to the goal of a “Europe whole and free,” that NATO is no longer an anti‐
Russian alliance, and that enlargement increases rather than imperils European security.1 The August
2008 war between Russia and Georgia, viewed by some observers as a warning from Russia over
Georgia’s Euro‐Atlantic aspirations (especially for a NATO membership action plan, or MAP), was a vivid
demonstration that this argument is no longer sufficient.2 More important, however, it underscored that
Europe will not be secure until Russia is made a stakeholder in that security.3 This fundamental
assumption underlies post‐August 2008 recommendations regarding European security, and it marks a
radical shift in approach. The notion that Russia dislikes NATO is hardly new; the near‐universal call to
speak seriously about the problem and search for a new European security architecture, though, is a
significant development.
The topic emerged on the international stage most prominently in June 2008, before the
Georgian war, when President Medvedev called for an international conference to reform European
security.4 He and other Russian officials have repeated that call numerous times since the war, but the
details remain murky. Russia seemingly seeks to remake Europe’s security architecture with legally
binding commitments, as opposed to the political commitments of, for example, the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).5 In November 2009, Medvedev circulated a draft European

1
See, for example, Strobe Talbott, “Why NATO Should Grow,” New York Review of Books 42, no. 13 (August 10,
1995), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1826; and Condoleezza Rice, “Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
Addresses U.S.‐Russia Relations at the German Marshall Fund,” Renaissance Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C.,
September 18, 2008, transcript available at: http://www.gmfus.org/event/rice‐russia.cfm.
2
Trenin, “Thinking Strategically,” 6.
3
Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia, “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia,” 10; Åslund and
Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet, 150; Gottemoeller, “Security Relations after Georgia,” 5; and Trenin, “Thinking
Strategically,” 6.
4
5
Sergei Lavrov in “A Conversation with Russia,” Brussels Forum 2009, Brussels, Belgium, March 21, 2009, transcript
available at: http://www.gmfus.org/brusselsforum/2009/transcripts.html. Some experts fear that this entails legal
limits on both how NATO deploys forces and further NATO enlargement.
34
security treaty, but reaction to the draft text has been largely negative.6 Nevertheless, there is now
widespread agreement on the need to engage on the issue.7 The idea has taken root among American,
Russian, and European analysts, and several track II projects are under way to address this question.8
In official circles, the OSCE is overseeing the Corfu Process, launched in June 2009 “to
tackle European security challenges with concrete steps to restore confidence.”9 The Obama
administration has endorsed the Corfu Process, and in a speech at L’Ecole Militaire in Paris on
January 29, 2010, Secretary of State Clinton spoke about the need to revisit standing security
arrangements.10 She stated, “The institutions that guarded Europe’s and North America’s
security during the 20th century were not designed with 21st century threats in mind. . . . Tanks,
bombers, and missiles are necessary but no longer sufficient to keep our people safe. . . . The
transatlantic partnership has been both a cornerstone of global security and a powerful force for

6
“European Security Treaty,” unofficial translation, http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2009/11/223072.shtml. On
negative reactions, see, for example, “Russia Unveils Proposal for European Security Treaty,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, November 30, 2009,
http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Unveils_Proposal_For_European_Security_Treaty/1891161.html.
7
See, for example, Dmitri Trenin, “Comment on the Draft Treaty on European Security Proposed by Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev,” Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow, Russia, November 30, 2009,
http://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/media/83465.htm.
8
For American sources, see Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia, “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward
Russia,” 10; Graham, “Resurgent Russia and U.S. Purpose,” 24; and Rumer and Stent, “Repairing U.S.‐Russian
Relations,” 1. For a Russian perspective, see Trenin, “Thinking Strategically,” 6. In terms of projects and events, see,
for example, “Towards a New European Security Architecture?” Institute for International Strategic Studies in
partnership with the Valdai International Discussion Club and the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy, London,
England, December 8–9, 2009, http://www.iiss.org/programmes/russia‐and‐eurasia/conferences/conferences‐
2009/towards‐a‐new‐european‐security‐architecture/; and the ongoing project at Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace “The Euro‐Atlantic Security Initiative” (www.cargnegieendowment.org/easi). The author works
on the Carnegie Endowment project.
9
“’Corfu Process' Launched to Take European Security Dialogue Forward, Says OSCE Chairperson,” press release,
Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Corfu, Greece, June 28, 2009,
http://www.osce.org/cio/item_1_38493.html. For Clinton’s speech, see Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on the
Future of European Security,” L’Ecole MIlitaire, Paris, France, January 29, 2010,
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/136273.htm.
10
On endorsing the Corfu Process, see James Steinberg, in “Statement by Deputy Secretary of State James
Steinberg, Press Availability of Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg and Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs
Dora Bakoyannis,” OSCE Conference, Corfu, Greece, June 28, 2009,
http://athens.usembassy.gov/steinberg_corfu.html.
35
global progress. Now we are called to address some of the great challenges in human history.
And to meet them, we are required to modernize and strengthen our partnership.”11 In line with
OSCE principles, Clinton spoke of a comprehensive definition of security – one that encompasses
not only nuclear weapons and conventional arms but also climate change, human security, and
the security of energy supplies. More important, she also spoke of security that is “indivisible.”12
As Clinton explained, “Security in Europe must be indivisible. For too long, the public discourse
around Europe’s security has been fixed on geographical and political divides. Some have looked
at the continent even now and seen Western and Eastern Europe, old and new Europe, NATO
and non‐NATO Europe, EU and non‐EU Europe. The reality is that there are not many Europes;
there is only one Europe. And it is a Europe that includes the United States as its partner. And it
is a Europe that includes Russia.”13 In this speech, the most detailed statement by a member of
the Obama administration on this issue, Clinton stated unequivocally that security is no longer
zero‐sum, and that the problem of European security will not be solved until Russia feels
invested in, not alienated from, the existing system.
Revising Europe’s security architecture is a long‐term goal, however, so analysts also give
considerable thought to short‐term action that might lessen escalating tensions. As with the
recommendations regarding arms control, the idea of “seizing the superstructure” of the relationship
again applies. As regards European security, this means bringing Russia back into compliance with the
Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and strengthening the NATO‐Russia Council.
Russia suspended its adherence to CFE in late 2007, after nearly a decade of conflict with NATO
over ratification of the Adapted CFE and the Istanbul Commitments.14 Reviving the treaty, however,
could serve an important function at both a policy and a technical level.15 On a policy level, revived CFE
negotiations would complement the ongoing Corfu Process on developing a new European security
architecture, because a majority of the key players in Euro‐Atlantic security are also signatories to the

11
Clinton, “Remarks on the Future of European Security.”
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Charap et al., “After the ‘Reset,’” 25–26. The Istanbul Commitments were stipulations for bringing the 1999
Adapted CFE into force. These stipulations include Russia’s withdrawal of “treaty‐limited weapons and military
forces” from Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and from Transdniestr in Moldova. For more, see ibid.
15
Ibid., 25–26. On policy, specifically, see Gottemoeller, “Security Relations after Georgia,” 5.
36
treaty.16 On a technical level, the purpose of CFE is to ensure a strategic balance among European
powers.17 In light of the violence in the South Caucasus and accusations from both Russia and Georgia
that the other side is amassing troops at the disputed border, preventing future buildups of forces is
crucial to European security.18 One suggestion is a revival of the Parallel Actions plan, first proposed by
the United States in the fall of 2007.19 Under this arrangement, NATO countries would ratify the
Adapted CFE, and Russia would simultaneously fulfill the Istanbul Commitments.20
Some experts have also suggested pursuing the Parallel Actions plan with modifications. For
example, to provide “additional inducements” for Moscow to cooperate, “the allies could declare lower
territorial and national ceilings,” and the Baltic states could indicate their future national and territorial
ceilings.21 These declarations would have political effect only until the Adapted Treaty entered into
force.22 Alternatively, the United States could try to persuade the allies to continue on the Parallel
Actions course while agreeing to begin negotiations on flank limitations, a primary concern for Russia.23
Finally, the allies could instead provisionally apply the Adapted CFE Treaty for a set period of time (six to
eighteen months), to encourage Russia to resume implementation. This course of action would require
certain preconditions, including Russian implementation of the Adapted Treaty for the same period, a
pledge from Moscow “to engage on the package of measures for Georgia,” and Russia’s agreement to
“resume talks on a multilateral mandate for its ‘peacekeepers’ in Moldova.”24 All of these proposals seek

16
Charap et al., “After the ‘Reset,’” 27; and Gottemoeller, “Security Relations after Georgia,” 5.
17
18
Ibid., 26.
19
Charap et al., “After the ‘Reset,’” 26; and Pifer, “Reversing the Decline,” 19.
20
Charap et al., “After the ‘Reset,’” 26. This arrangement will require additional negotiations that take into account
the changed European security landscape. Therefore, NATO should work on Russian withdrawal from Moldova
first, given that the issue of Russian troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia will be far more complicated and will
likely necessitate resort to the Geneva process or similar multilateral options. See ibid.
21
Anne Witkowsky, Sherman Garnett, and Jeff McCausland, “Salvaging the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
Treaty: Options for Washington,” Brookings Arms Control Series Paper 2 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,
March 2010), 2.

22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
37
to reestablish what was once the cornerstone of European security, while remaining cognizant of the
changed European security context.25
The other short‐term suggestion is to expand the purview of the NATO‐Russia Council. On a
macro level, there is hope that “[g]reater creativity in the NATO‐Russia channel could, over the longer
term, reshape how Moscow views the Alliance and European security.”26 On a more operational level, as
one Russian analyst argued, the NATO‐Russia Council “is the place to engage the Russians in serious
discussions, both formal and informal, on the issues of common concern. It needs to be an all‐weather
operation.”27 NATO Secretary‐General Rasmussen has stated that maintaining communication
throughout stressful periods in the relationship, such as the Georgia war, is crucial to building
confidence and eventually rebuilding damaged relations.28 Whether Russia will ever revise its view of
NATO is unclear, but the idea of, at least in the interim, increasing transparency and using the Russia‐
NATO Council to further cooperation on mutual interests is widely supported.29 Potential areas of
cooperation include counterpiracy operations, counterterrorism, missile defense, conflict prevention,
and arms control.30 The goal, while new arrangements are being debated, is to create “normal relations”
between Russia and NATO.31
The Obama administration has signaled its intent to use the NATO‐Russia Council as a
forum for resolving problems. During a speech on February 22, 2010, Secretary of State Clinton

25
Ibid., 1.
26
27
Dmitri Trenin, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept – A Few Thoughts Related to Russia,” remarks at the Conference
at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, July 7, 2009, 1, transcript available at:
http://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/media/12168trenin_strategic_concept_memo.pdf.
28
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “NATO and Russia: A New Beginning,” speech by the NATO secretary‐general, Carnegie
Endowment, Brussels, Belgium, September 18, 2009, transcript available at:
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/NATO_Rasmussen.pdf.
29
See, for example, Working Group on United States Policy towards Russia, “Recommendations,” 3; Hahn, “U.S.‐
Russian Relations and the War against Jihadism,” 17; and Trenin, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept,” 2.
30
On counterterrorism and countertrafficking, see Hahn, “U.S.‐Russian Relations and the War against Jihadism,”
17. On counterpiracy, see Pifer, “Reversing the Decline,” 18. On conflict prevention, arms control, and missile
defense, see Trenin, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept,” 2.
31
James F. Collins, “Opportunities for the U.S.‐Russia Relationship,” speech to the Tucson Committee on Foreign
Relations, Tucson, Arizona, March 12, 2009, transcript available at:
38
asserted, “We intend to use the NATO‐Russia Council as a forum for frank discussions about
areas where we disagree. We will use it to press Russia to live up to its commitments on Georgia
and to reiterate our commitment to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states. We will
use it to challenge the assertion put forward in Russia’s new military doctrine that NATO’s
enlargement and its global actions constitute a military danger to Russia. We will also use the
Council to advocate on behalf of human rights and individual liberty – these are principles and
values that Russia committed to uphold when it accepted the NATO‐Russia Founding Act.”32
In addition to emphasizing the importance of looking to the NRC to diffuse tensions,
Clinton spoke of using it to further NATO‐Russia cooperation in areas of joint concern. She
explained, “At the same time, we should use the Council to advance our common interests,
including the indivisibility of our common security .…[W]e have agreed to cooperate in training
counternarcotics officers from Afghanistan and Central Asia. And Russia is now allowing NATO
to transit non‐lethal goods across its territory in support of our ISAF [International Security
Assistance Force] operations. And we hope to extend that cooperation to other fields, again,
most notably in the area of missile defense.”33 This outline – using the NRC both to address
differences and to further cooperation – is in line with the recommendations of many American
and Russian scholars, as well as with statements of Secretary‐General Rasmussen.34 Whether
these statements have translated into a rejuvenation of the NATO‐Russia Council’s work,
however, is unclear.
With regard to the issue of how to handle Georgia and Ukraine, many commentators suggest
that the European Union should offer both states a clear path to EU membership.35 NATO membership
has traditionally preceded EU membership, but the latter seems a less contentious issue for the

32
Hillary Clinton, “Remarks at the NATO Strategic Concept Seminar,” Ritz‐Carleton Hotel, Washington, D.C.,
February 22, 2010, transcript available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/02/137118.htm.
33
Ibid.
34
See, for example, Hahn, “U.S.‐Russian Relations and the War against Jihadism”; Pifer, “Reversing the Decline”;
Rasmussen, “NATO and Russia: A New Beginning”; and Trenin, “NATO’s New Strategic Concept.” Rasmussen has
also suggested that the NRC could serve as a venue for expanded discussion about the future of European security.
See Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “NATO‐Russia: Partners for the Future,” Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow, Russia,
December 17, 2009, transcript available at:
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/1217_transcript_rasmussen_moscow.pdf.
35
Rumer and Stent, “Repairing U.S.‐Russian Relations,” 2; and Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia, “The Right
Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia,” 3.
39
Russians.36 Given its stricter rules for accession, the EU need not suggest that inclusion is imminent, but
defining a road to accession while maintaining a “special relationship” (without a formal MAP) between
the two countries and NATO might alleviate tensions.37 There has also been a suggestion to “Finlandize”
Ukraine (i.e., to find a way to institutionalize Ukraine’s neutrality while giving it appropriate security
guarantees) at least provisionally until firmer arrangements are reached.38 For the moment, the newly
designed Annual Membership Program (ANP) appears to be serving the role of a MAP with Georgia as
regards the country’s development goals. In practical terms, significant domestic political instability and
ongoing border disputes in both Georgia and Ukraine currently render both countries ineligible for
NATO membership.39 In addition, following the February 2010 election of Victor Yanukovych as
Ukraine’s new president, and the subsequent dissolution of the Orange Coalition, Ukraine’s future
intentions toward both NATO and the EU are in flux, and pressure on the enlargement issue
momentarily relieved.
Putting EU accession ahead of a MAP, as well as the creation of the ANP alternative, could
provide a respite in tensions. It does not, however, resolve the larger question of Georgia’s and
Ukraine’s ultimate wishes to join NATO.40 If Russia continues to view NATO primarily as an adversary and
a security threat, the question of NATO’s standing “open door policy” will remain an obstacle in the U.S.‐
Russian relationship.41 Commentators present different recommendations for how to address this
problem. On the Russian side, Dmitri Trenin argues that “NATO’s expansion has reached safe limits, and

36
Rumer and Stent, “Repairing U.S.‐Russian Relations,” 28.
37
38
Graham, “Resurgent Russia and U.S. Purpose,” 25. The idea of “Finlandizing” Ukraine was deemed “odious” by
another analyst, who argued that “Ukraine should have a say in its own future.” See David J. Kramer, “The Russia
Challenge: Prospects for U.S.‐Russian Relations,” Wider Europe policy brief, German Marshall Fund, June 9, 2009,
5, http://www.gmfus.org//doc/Kramer_Russia_Final2.pdf.
39
40
Georgia is of more concern because most polls indicate that a majority of Ukrainians are opposed to NATO
membership.
41
In an interview with a French paper in February 2010, President Medvedev declared, “The issue is that NATO's
endless enlargement, by absorbing countries that were once part of the Soviet Union, or who are our immediate
neighbors, is of course creating problems because NATO is after all, a military bloc.” Medvedev was indicating that
the rapprochement between the United States and Russia in recent months has in no way alleviated Russia’s
objection to continued NATO enlargement. For more, see Conor Sweeney, “Medvedev Objects to ‘Endless’ NATO
Expansion,” Reuters, February 25, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61O2OQ20100225.

40
any move in the direction of Ukraine and Georgia is fraught with real danger.”42 In his view, the open
door must be closed and remain closed. American analysts, by contrast, are hesitant to make such
decisive statements, though some suggest ways around making a decision either way. For example, the
Hart‐Hagel Commission argues that while Georgia and Ukraine must be free to works toward NATO
membership, so too is NATO free to decide that it is not in the interest of the security of the alliance to
offer admission to all applicants.43 Others remain committed to the idea of the open door, maintaining
that Russia cannot have a de facto veto over intra‐alliance decisions.44 The Obama administration has
emphasized its support of both Georgia’s and Ukraine’s aspirations to join NATO, provided its members
agree and the countries meet accession requirements.45
Until the Obama administration decided to pursue an alternative missile defense installation in
September 2009, another significant area of contention between Russia and the United States regarding
European security was missile defense.46 Even before the change in direction was announced, support
for TMD in the Obama administration was much lower than it had been under the Bush administration.
In July 2009, Assistant Secretary of State Gordon indicated that the Obama administration would pursue
missile defense in Europe only if the technology proved effective and the threat proved definitively.47

42
43
44
Pifer, “Reversing the Decline,” 17. One twist on the open door policy, which had faded but is again ascendant in
some quarters, is a call for NATO to extend a membership offer to Russia. See, for example, Charles A. Kupchan,
"Russia in NATO," working paper of the Euro‐Atlantic Security Initiative, February 2010.
45
On Georgia, see, for example, Philip H. Gordon, "Georgia: One Year after the August War," testimony before
Subcommittee for Europe, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, August 4, 2009, 6,
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/GordonTestimony090804p.pdf; and Alexander Vershbow, “Georgia:
One Year after the August War," testimony before Subcommittee for Europe, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C., August 4, 2009, 6, http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2009/VershbowTestimony090804p.pdf.
On Ukraine, see Joseph Biden, “Remarks by Vice President Biden in Ukraine,” Ukraine House, Kyiv, Ukraine, July 22,
2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks‐By‐Vice‐President‐Biden‐In‐Ukraine/.
46
Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on Strengthening Missile Defense in Europe,” Diplomatic Reception
Room, White House, Washington, D.C., September 17, 2009,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks‐by‐the‐President‐on‐Strengthening‐Missile‐Defense‐in‐
Europe/.
47
Gordon, response during question‐and‐answer portion of “The Reset Button Has Been Pushed: Kicking Off a New
Era in U.S. – Russia Relations,” Subcommittee on Europe, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C.,
July 28, 2009, webcast available at:
http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/schedule.asp?showdate=7/28/2009&adj=7/6/2009. Even before the
41
Although the decision not to push ahead with the sites in Poland and the Czech Republic was expected
to improve U.S.‐Russian relations, in announcing the decision, Obama and other government officials
stated that the change in course resulted from updated intelligence about Iranian missile capabilities
rather than Russian objections to the planned system.48 Based on a new threat assessment of Iran’s
short‐range and medium‐range missile capabilities, the administration now intends to pursue “a four‐
phased, adaptive approach for missile defense in Europe.”49 The plan relies on “distributed interceptor
and sensor architecture” that obviates the need for the fixed radar system in the Czech Republic, and it
uses alternate interceptor technology that does not necessitate the fielding of ground‐based
interceptors originally slated for Poland.50 Instead, the new system will first deploy the sea‐based Aegis
Weapon System and other mobile components. Later stages may include land‐based elements, but the
second phase is not set to begin until around 2015.51 As noted in the previous section, the
administration is simultaneously exploring missile defense cooperation with Russia, an idea that
Secretary‐General Rasmussen has also supported.52
The Obama administration’s decision to suspend work on the current missile defense system in
Europe generated some criticism. Citing conversations with Russian officials, Ariel Cohen argues that the
“decision to abandon ballistic missile defense in Central Europe will encourage Iranian truculence and

decision to alter the system was made, the case for delay or redirection was also helped somewhat by a joint U.S.‐
Russian threat assessment report released by the EastWest Institute. The report concluded that the planned
systems do not offer the protection they claim, and no system has ever demonstrated the technical capabilities
necessary to protect against the perceived Iranian threat. See “Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Potential: A Joint Threat
Assessment by U.S. and Russian Technical Experts” (New York: EastWest Institute, May 2009), esp. 13–14,
http://docs.ewi.info/JTA.pdf.
48
Peter Baker, “Obama Offered Deal to Russia in Secret Letter,” New York Times, Tuesday, March 3, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/washington/03prexy.html?ref=washington; Obama, “Remarks by the
President on Strengthening Missile Defense in Europe”; and Clinton, “Speech in Advance of the United Nations
General Assembly,” 2.
49
“Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy: A ‘Phased, Adaptive Approach’ for Missile Defense in Europe,”
September 17, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/FACT‐SHEET‐US‐Missile‐Defense‐Policy‐A‐
Phased‐Adaptive‐Approach‐for‐Missile‐Defense‐in‐Europe/.
50
Ibid.
51
“Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy.”
52
“NATO and Russia: A New Beginning,”
42
will not generate Russian good will or support for the US on Iran sanctions.”53 Conservative leaders in
Congress as well as numerous experts on Central and Eastern Europe have made similar arguments,
contending that the decision amounts to an “abandonment” of the region.54 Perhaps to allay these
fears, the Obama administration offered Poland and the Czech Republic roles in the new plan for missile
defense, and both have agreed to cooperate on the system.55 Overall, the majority of the criticism has
focused on the decision not to pursue the system as a question of relations with Russia and Europe
rather than as one of how best to counter a potential Iranian missile strike, the yardstick the
administration professes to have used.56 Some criticism also addressed how the administration made
the announcement, which came on September 17, the anniversary of the Soviet Army’s invasion of
Poland during World War II. Although they found the timing insensitive, these critics agree with the
decision to suspend missile defense in Central Europe.57

53
Ariel Cohen, “Obama’s Rookie Blunder on Missile Defense Concessions,” The Foundry, blog of the Heritage
Foundation, September 18, 2009, http://blog.heritage.org/2009/09/18/obama%E2%80%99s‐rookie‐blunder‐on‐
missile‐defense‐concessions/.
54
See, for example, A. Wes Mitchell, “The Perils of Losing Mitteleuropa,” RealClearWorld, September 22, 2009,
http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2009/09/22/the_perils_of_losing_mitteleuropa_97183.html; and Office
of Senator Lindsey Graham, “Graham Opposes Obama Administration on Missile Defense,” Washington, D.C.,
September 17, 2009,
http://lgraham.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressRoom.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=c8dc3ceb‐
802a‐23ad‐41ec‐66ecfab42d9f,
55
Walter Pincus, “Poland, Czech Republic May Get Roles in Missile Defense,” Washington Post, October 1, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2009/10/01/AR2009100104217.html; Gareth Jones,
“Poland Ready to Take Part in Obama Missile Defense,” Washington Post, October 21, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp‐dyn/content/article/2009/10/21/AR2009102100345.html; and Karen
Travers, “Biden Announces Cooperation from Czech Republic on Missile Defense,” ABC News (Political Punch Blog),
October 23, 2009, http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/10/biden‐announces‐cooperation‐from‐czech‐
republic‐on‐missile‐defense.html.
56
On criticism, see David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “New Missile Shield Strategy Scales Back Reagan’s Vision,”
New York Times, September 17, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/world/europe/18assess.html?scp=7&sq=Sanger&st=cse. On the
administration’s method of evaluation, see Michael McFaul, in “Press Briefing by Gary Samore, National Security
Council Coordinator for Arms Control and Nonproliferation; Ambassador Alex Wolff, Deputy Permanent
Representative to the United Nations; and Mike McFaul, Senior Director for Russian Affairs on Thursday’s UN
Security Council Meeting and the President’s Meeting today with President Medvedev of Russia.” [Where? When?]
57
See, for example, Gerald Posner, “How Obama Flubbed His Message,” Daily Beast, September 18, 2009,
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs‐and‐stories/2009‐09‐18/how‐obama‐flubbed‐his‐missile‐message/.
43
Medvedev has evinced cautious optimism about Obama’s decision to suspend missile defense in
Europe, but other Russian officials believe that phases 3 and 4 of the new system will be equally
unacceptable.58 Further complicating the situation, in February 2010, the Obama administration
announced that Romania had agreed to host missile interceptors for the new system, a development
that sparked considerable concern in Russia.59 As noted in the previous section, the controversy over
missile defense was also one of the primary hindrances in concluding the START follow‐on negotiations.
Misunderstandings about the resolution of the issue in the treaty now feature in U.S. arguments against
ratification.60 Ultimately, much will likely hinge on both the progress made during the ongoing
multilateral negotiations with Iran and on the bilateral negotiations regarding cooperation on a joint
missile defense system. The situation will also be influenced by what progress, if any, is made on
reforming European security more generally either through official channels or through ongoing track II
efforts.

58
“Russia Still Suspicious of U.S. Missile Defense Plans ,” Reuters, September 29, 2009,
http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Still_Suspicious_Of_US_Antimissile_Plans/1839430.html.
59
Vladimir Isachenkov, “Russia Fumes at US Missile Defense Plan,” Associated Press, February 26, 2010,
http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/E/EU_RUSSIA_US_MISSILE_DEFENSE?SITE=NYMID&SECTION=HOME&TEMP
LATE=DEFAULT.
60
John McCain and Jon Kyl, “Statement by Senators John McCain and Jon Kyl on START Treaty,” April 8, 2010,
http://mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressOffice.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=df90e762‐
ac97‐607d‐3378‐0870f4da6d28&Region_id=&Issue_id=.
44
POST‐SOVIET SPACE

The United States’ policy toward the post‐Soviet space is arguably at the core of U.S.‐Russian conflict.
Many observers argue that it is the main reason for the lack of progress on other items on the bilateral
agenda.1 Not only is it explicitly related to Russia’s dislike of NATO enlargement and larger issues of
European security, but it hinders counterterrorism cooperation and bears directly on energy security
both in the region and in Western and Central Europe. Further, the factors causing this tension – notably
the inability of the United States to define its priorities in the region and Russia’s desire to maintain its
traditional sphere of influence – exist in a macrocosm within the overall U.S.‐Russian relationship. The
core challenge for the Obama administration is pursuing a constructive, independent policy toward the
regional states without further damaging the U.S.‐Russian relationship.
Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia was a turning point in this regard, if only because it graphically
demonstrated the difficulty of the United States in balancing these competing policy tracks. The
challenge for the United States has two parts. First, Russia sees foreign relations, particularly in its
former republics and satellites, in zero‐sum terms.2 It reacts almost reflexively to Western activity in
former Soviet states, viewing all such forays – including initiatives such as NATO’s Partnership for Peace,
the European Union European Neighborhood Policy, and the new Eastern Partnership – as further
evidence of Western attempts to encircle Russia. Thus, as one analyst has put it, “Alone among the great
powers, Russia presents us with the challenge of trying to get it to conceive its interests in a
fundamentally different, less confrontational way.”3 The argument, essentially, is that until Russia
believes that Western activity in its border states is not inherently inimical to its national interests, little
progress will be possible. Efforts to reorient the Russian view are complicated by Russia’s historical ties

1
Participant at Stent‐Rumer Working Group Meeting, Washington, D.C., August 25, 2008; Roderic Lyne, Strobe
Talbott, and Koji Watanabe, “Engaging with Russia: The Next Phase,” Triangle Papers, no. 59 (Washington, D.C.,
Paris, and Tokyo: The Trilateral Commission, 2006), 172,
http://www.trilateral.org/library/stacks/Engaging_With_Russia.pdf; Thomas Graham and Arnold Horelick, report
of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Working Group, U.S.‐Russian Relations at the Turn of the
Century. Reports of the Working Groups organized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Washington D.C. and the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Moscow (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, 2000), 39.
2
Charap et al., “After the “Reset,’” 37.
3
Sestanovich, “Prospects for Engagement with Russia,” 7.
45
to the area and its conception that control of these border lands is crucial both to its national security
and to global prestige as a great power.4
The second part of the problem is that, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has
pursued a largely Russo‐centric policy in the post‐Soviet space. The driving argument, particularly in the
years immediately following the Soviet Union’s collapse, was that given Russia’s size and historical role
as the region’s anchor, a stable, democratic Russia was the only way to achieve stability throughout the
area.5 Although efforts were made to promote a market economy in the so‐called New Independent
States in the earlier post–Cold War period, the dominant belief was that if Russia succeeded in its
democratization and marketization efforts, so too would the other regional states.6 Commentators
cautioned against pursuing a policy with Russia that alienated these other states, but at the same time,
they advised easing Russia’s concerns over its recent loss of empire.7 Nearly two decades later, the
correct balance between supporting the sovereignty of post‐Soviet states and respecting reasonable
Russian activity in the region has yet to be found.
One of the primary difficulties the Obama administration faces in determining its regional and
country‐specific priorities is that the United States and the West, in general, have tended to view most
of the states of the former Soviet Union through the prism of their relations with Russia.8 In so doing,
the West has encountered two problems. First, it perpetuates the idea of the West versus Russia,
because almost invariably those states that were closer politically or economically to Russia were
considered less amenable to Western overtures (and vice versa). Second, an approach that defines
supposedly sovereign states with regard to their relationship to another country acknowledges at some
level a Russian sphere of influence, despite repeated Western objections to its validity. It is this conflict

4
Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Spheres of Interest, Not Influence,” Washington Quarterly 3, no. 4 (October 2009), 4,
http://www.twq.com/09october/docs/09oct_Trenin.pdf
5
Dimitri K. Simes, “America and the Post‐Soviet Republics,” Foreign Affairs 71, no. 3 (Summer 1992), 77.
6
Eugene Rumer, “The United States and Central Asia,” in Eugene Rumer, Dmitri Trenin, and Huasheng Zhao,
Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing, intro. Rajan Menon (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2007),
22.
7
See, for example, Simes, “America and the Post‐Soviet Republics,” 87–88; and Paul Kubicek, “Russian Foreign
Policy and the West,” Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 4 (Winter 1999–2000), 568.
8
Robert Legvold, “The United States, the European Union, NATO, and the Economics of Ukrainian and Belarusian
Security,” in Robert Legvold and Celeste A. Wallander, eds., Swords and Sustenance: The Economics of Security in
Belarus and Ukraine (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), 194.
46
that makes the post‐Soviet space the nexus of both conceptual and operational difficulties within the
bilateral relationship: conceptual, because the United States and Russia seem unable to move past their
differing visions of the other’s intentions, and operational because without well‐defined U.S. policies or
mutual understanding about the former Soviet states, many immediate objectives are unattainable.
As mentioned above, the main point of friction is the question of a Russian sphere of influence,
which Medvedev describes more obliquely as “a zone of privileged interests.” The U.S. concern is that
Russia expects an unfettered droit de regard in the region, something that the United States cannot
accept.9 This lack of recognition, however, does not mean that Western analysts seek to encumber all
Russian activity in the region. To the contrary, a raft of reports released in the past decade profess that
the West has no problem with “legitimate” Russian interests in the post‐Soviet space.10 The friction
arises because few policy‐makers are willing to elaborate beyond this broad statement. Part of the
problem is distinguishing between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” interests (or even in using similarly
value‐laden terminology). For example, disentangling legitimate and illegitimate Russian investment in
the region, in the form of pipelines in Ukraine or military bases in Central Asia, is not a straightforward
task. Further, to the extent that they are not coercive, lingering attachments between Russia and its
neighbors could form the basis of new relations, which in turn could diffuse the volatile issue of Western
activity in the post‐Soviet states.
Therefore, if Russia can be convinced that the border states need not choose between positive
relations with Moscow and positive relations with Washington, much of the rancor would disappear. To
that end, some experts suggest that U.S. policy toward Russia should include efforts to improve relations
between Moscow and its neighbors. One option might be to encourage post‐Soviet states to approach
the West together with Russia, instead of seeking protection from Russia, a tactic that Ukraine
occasionally employed before the 2004 Orange Revolution (and may again following the election of
Yanukovych) and that the leaders of some Central Asian and Caucasus states have practiced.11 The

9
Biden, “Remarks by Vice President Biden in Ukraine.”
10
See, for example, Graham and Horelick, CEIP Report, Turn of the Century, 40; Lyne, Talbott, and Koji, “Engaging
with Russia,” 172; and Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia, “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward
Russia,” 13.
11
Legvold, “The United States, the European Union, NATO, and the Economics of Ukrainian and Belarusian
Security,” 223; David L. Stern, “Kazakhstan Seeks to Balance East and West,” New York Times, October 5, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/06/world/asia/06rice.html; Sabrina Tavernise, “A Northern Neighbor Growls
and Azerbaijan Reassesses Its Options,” New York Times, October 22. 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/23/world/europe/23azeri.html; and Phillip P. Pan, “New Ukrainian President
47
challenge “is a seeming conviction that Russian interests and those of other states, especially the U.S.
and its European allies, are inevitably in conflict.” The goal, therefore, is to convince Russia to move past
that conviction, so that active engagement with the West is not automatically understood as a move
against Russia.12
This interconnectedness of issues is also closely related to the question of European security.
Some observers argue that eliminating (or ameliorating) the problem of U.S.‐Russian interaction in the
post‐Soviet space will be impossible without also solving the problem of Euro‐Atlantic security.13 Part of
the reason for Moscow’s heightened sensitivity over U.S. engagement in Russia’s former satellites is that
Russia is not part of the current security architecture on the continent. Given this situation, the efforts
of Russia’s neighbors to join this system are easily interpreted as hostile. Therefore, until leaders are
able to agree on a more inclusive, more modern, and more durable structure to govern European
security, Russia will continue to be suspicious of Western overtures toward its neighboring states.
On a more specific level, free‐trade agreements between Russia and the surrounding states
could help to improve the situation.14 Such agreements would further economic integration of the
region, thereby bolstering interdependence and political stability. At the same time, they would
encourage transparency. The formalization of trade agreements could obviate the need for opaque
foreign direct investment designed to increase Russian leverage without reciprocal benefit for the other
nation. Some current Russian financial activity in the neighboring states, however, is designed to
reinforce Russian regional hegemony and undermine state sovereignty.15
The United States cannot unilaterally mend relations between Russia and the former Soviet
republics. To the extent possible, therefore, it should try to avoid becoming embroiled in regional
debates where no (or only minor) U.S. interests are involved. In addition, it should remain aware that
“its interests are not identical to those of Russia’s neighbors and avoid becoming their instrument in

Could Disappoint Supporters in the Kremlin,” Washington Post, March 1, 2010,
12
Sestanovich, “Prospects for Engagement with Russia,” 7.
13
Robert Legvold, “A New European Security Architecture: Getting from Here to There,” [paper ?] prepared for the
Brussels Forum, Brussels, Belgium, March 26–28, 2010, 1.
14
Carey, “US Economic Relations and Energy.”
15
Trenin, “Russia’s Sphere of Interests,” 10–11.
48
dealing with Russia.”16 It does not serve U.S. interests for the United States to be pitted against Russia by
smaller states pursuing balance of power politics. One analyst has suggested that the United States stop
supporting explicitly anti‐Russian activity in the region, such as GUAM (a loose coalition of Georgia,
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) or incendiary statements by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili.17
More broadly, the United States will have to determine its priorities in the region and pursue its policy
accordingly, a prescription that applies to every facet of the U.S.‐Russian relationship.18
None of these efforts, however, address the core dispute: How can the United States and Russia
continued to be involved in the region without further damaging their bilateral relationship? The only
long‐term answer is to develop a serious, sustained strategic dialogue about each side’s regional
interests and intentions,19 a dialogue that “gets at the deep underpinnings of the U.S.‐Russian
relationship,” where no topic is out of bounds.20 As with the broader recommendations regarding how
to structure the relationship, this dialogue would involve senior advisors on both sides with immediate
access to their countries’ presidents and a willingness to think creatively about how to solve, or at least
manage, this dilemma.
There is, of course, another side to this issue, and that is the relationship between the United
States and the regional states themselves. Russia’s neighbors, particularly Georgia and Ukraine, have
evinced significant concern that that the “Russian reset” will come at their expense. Members of the
Obama administration have repeatedly stressed that this is not the case, a position reiterated in
speeches delivered by President Obama in Moscow and Vice President Biden in Kyiv and Tbilisi.21 To
reassure these countries, some analysts recommend that the administration help Georgia and Ukraine
meet the development requirements for NATO membership without formal MAPs.22 Others suggest that

16
17
18
Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia, “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia,” ii–iii.
19
20
Ibid., 89.
21
Obama, “Remarks at the New Economic School”; Biden, “Remarks by Vice President Biden in Ukraine”; and
Joseph Biden, “Remarks by the Vice President to the Georgian Parliament,” Parliament Hall, Tbilisi, Georgia, July
23, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks‐By‐The‐Vice‐President‐To‐The‐Georgian‐
Parliament/.
22
Pifer, “Reversing the Decline,” 17. As noted in the previous section, NATO’s ANP somewhat addresses this issue.
49
the administration implement the Charters on Strategic Partnership, signed with Georgia and Ukraine in
the twilight of the Bush administration.23 The Obama administration has taken this step in the case of
Georgia and continues its rhetorical support for Georgia’s territorial integrity and desire to join NATO.24
Some observers caution, however, that U.S. initiatives undertaken with the regional states should be
managed so as to least offend Russia.25 Although the number of ideas on how to accomplish this is small,
the most prominent is to maintain absolute transparency with both the Russian government and the
governments of the neighboring states about U.S. dealings in the region.26
History suggests that there is a functional relationship between tensions over activity in the
post‐Soviet space and tensions within the overall U.S.‐Russian relationship. As a case in point, one of the
reasons the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia spurred such harsh rhetoric and reactions from
American politicians was that the U.S.‐Russian relationship itself was in tatters. Nearly two years later,
the relationship has improved, thus lessening the extent to which ongoing disagreement over activity in
the region is likely to derail broad‐spectrum cooperation. For example, the flashpoints of MAPs for
Georgia and Ukraine and missile defense in Central Europe either have been moved to the back burner
or have been eliminated, opening up space to make progress on other objectives.27 Recognizing how
different aspects of the bilateral relationship impinge on one another is important, especially with
regard to issues concerning the post‐Soviet space. As one group of analysts have cautioned, “The United
States cannot treat these issues in isolation from its Russia policy.”28
Interaction in the post‐Soviet space could well be termed the Gordian knot of the U.S.‐Russian
relationship. Although the situation has been somewhat diffused or overtaken by other world events, it
has not been resolved. Until it is, determining how the United States can conduct a positive and
independent policy with the post‐Soviet states in a way that does not undermine Washington’s
relationship with Moscow will remain a primary, and pressing, challenge.

23
Cohen, “How the Obama Administration Should Engage Russia,” 15.
24
Biden, “Remarks by the Vice President to the Georgian Parliament.” The administration emphasizes, however,
that it supports only peaceful means of attracting the breakaway provinces back under Georgian control.
25
26
Working Group on United States Policy towards Russia, “Recommendations,” 3; and Pifer, “Reversing the
Decline,” 17.
27
Trenin, “Russia’s Spheres of Interest,” 3.
28
50
ENERGY SECURITY

Russia’s cut‐off of gas to Ukraine in January 2009 over price disputes was a reminder that Europe needs
to reevaluate and reform its energy policy.29 The reason Russia gave for the cut‐off was that Ukraine had
failed to pay its debt and would not agree to pay market prices. The reality, however, may have been
more complicated. Although there was a clear commercial element, many observers also saw strong
political motivations. Russia’s action was the latest in a string of gas cut‐offs that many experts believe is
evidence of Russia using energy as a political weapon.30 For example, Russia’s July 2008 stoppage of fuel
to the Czech Republic was largely viewed as a response to the signing of the missile defense
agreement.31 Similarly, the January 2009 gas war between Russia and Ukraine, which left much of
Central and Eastern Europe without heat during one of the coldest winters in recent memory, was
believed by some to have been at least partially motivated by a Russian desire both to warn Ukraine of
the repercussions of pursuing NATO membership and to weaken the already divided leadership.32 These
annual gas wars have been so disruptive that they have led some experts to worry that Russia’s energy
manipulation could eventually necessitate the invocation of Article V of the NATO charter.33

29
30
See, for example, ibid., 157; Charap et al., “After the ‘Reset,’” 18–19; and Cohen, “How the Obama
Administration Should Engage Russia,” 9.
31
Judy Dempsey, “Russia Further Cuts Its Oil Deliveries to Czech Republic,” International Herald Tribune, July 30,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/30/world/europe/30iht‐czech.4.14893867.html. The effect was
mitigated somewhat by the Czech Republic’s decision in the 1990s to diversify its oil sources. See ibid.
32
Ariel Cohen, “Russia’s Gas War,” Washington Times, Tuesday, January 13, 2009,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jan/13/russias‐gas‐war/; and Adrian Karatnycky, “The Gas War
May Rehabilitate Ukraine's Yushchenko,” Wall Street Journal Europe, January 20, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123240746998495659.html.
33
Article V states, “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack
occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self‐defence recognised by Article 51 of the
Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” See http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm. The only
time it has been invoked was after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
51
Those who fear the negative consequences of invoking Article V believe that NATO must find
another way to confront the problem.34 Others disagree. None, however, doubt the seriousness of the
issue. These analysts note, though, that on an operational level, Russian manipulation of energy supplies
is more of an immediate concern for Europe. Therefore, the United States should not be the primary
Western interlocutor on this issue.35 As Eugene Rumer and Angela Stent argue, “The United States
cannot be more worried about Europe’s dependence on Russian gas than Europe itself.”36 In remarks
outlining the Obama administration’s Eurasian energy policy in January 2010, Ambassador Richard
Morningstar, special envoy for Eurasian energy, made much the same point.37 These admonitions are
complicated, however, by Europe’s internal divisions on the issue. Europe has no common energy policy,
and the widening rift between Western Europe, on one side, and Central and Eastern Europe, on the
other, in how they view relations with Russia is becoming an ever more intractable obstacle to
stabilizing energy politics in the region.38
The basic conflict arises from Russia’s desire to monopolize energy flows in the region for both
political and economic reasons, while the West supports multiple supply routes.39 As with the question

34
Richard G. Lugar, “Lugar Calls for European Leaders to Act on Energy Security,” press release, August 28, 2008,
http://lugar.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=302415&. Lugar reiterated this point during a speech at the Atlantic Council
of the United States on September 28, 2009. See James Joyner, “Lugar: Energy Cutoff Equivalent to Armed
Invasion,” New Atlanticist Policy and Analysis Blog, September 28, 2009,
http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/lugar‐energy‐cutoff‐equivalent‐armed‐invasion.
35
Åslund and Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet, 157; and Rumer and Stent, “Repairing U.S.‐Russian Relations,” 30.
36
37
Richard L. Morningstar, “2010 Outlook for Eurasian Energy,” remarks at the Center for American Progress,
Washington, D.C., January 28, transcript available at:
http://www.americanprogress.org/events/2010/01/av/morningstar_remarks.pdf. Morningstar, however, did
speak of the administration’s support for diversify energy corridors in the region, provided any new pipelines are
viable.
38
For an interesting exposition of growing rifts within Europe over “the Russia question,” and concurrent trouble
between the United States and parts of Europe, see Valdas Adamkus, Martin Butora, Emil Constantinescu, Pavol
Demes, Lubos Dobrovsky, Matyas Eorsi, Istvan Gyarmati, Vaclav Havel, Rastislav Kacer, Sandra Kalniete, Karel
Schwarzenberg, Michal Kovac, Ivan Krastev, Alexander Kwasniewski, Mart Laar, Kadri Liik, Janos Martonyi. Janusz
Onyszkiewicz, Adam Rotfeld, Vaira Vike‐Freiberga, Alexandr Vondra, Lech Walesa, “An Open Letter to the Obama
Administration from Central and Eastern Europe,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, from Gazeta Wyborcza, July
16, 2009, http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1778449.html.
39
Trenin, “Russia’s Sphere of Interests,” 15–16.
52
of foreign activity in the post‐Soviet space, there is a fundamental geopolitical conflict that will be hard
to overcome completely. Further, the problem of energy security is intertwined with other threads of
the relationship, including nuclear security (in the drive to find environmentally friendly energy sources);
transnational/global issues, including climate change and the future of the Arctic; and interaction in and
around the post‐Soviet space (transit countries). The overarching imperative, therefore, is to avoid
exacerbating other tensions while managing and minimizing the various competing interests. On the
issue of energy security, the aim is to create a system where suppliers and transit countries make
decisions based on commercial rather than political calculations.
Many observers contend that the United States’ chief geostrategic interest with regard to
energy security in the region is to prevent a Russian monopoly on regional energy flows; they suggest
that the best way to avoid this outcome is by helping Europe to diversify its energy supply, primarily by
supporting the construction of pipelines that bypass Russian territory.40 Examples include the already
operational Baku‐Tbilisi‐Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and the still‐unrealized Nabucco pipeline.41 BTC has
proven successful, but Nabucco has been beleaguered by a lack of suppliers. On July 13, 2009, Austria,
Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Turkey signed an intergovernmental agreement on the Nabucco
pipeline, which was undercut somewhat by Turkey’s agreement the following month to host the
competing South Stream pipeline in its territorial waters.42 Nabucco and South Stream would follow
similar paths and compete for suppliers; the primary political difference is that Nabucco bypasses
Russian territory, whereas South Stream, which will run under the Black Sea, bypasses Ukrainian
territory. The troubles that Nabucco and South Stream have encountered in gaining commitments from
supplier countries illustrate the danger of supporting pipelines whose construction is politically rather

40
Åslund and Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet, 158; Charap et al., “After the ‘Reset,’” 19; and Cohen, “How the
Obama Administration Should Engage Russia,” 15.
41
The Nabucco pipeline will bring gas from the Caspian and the Middle East to European markets. It will begin both
at the Iranian/Turkish border and the Georgian/Turkish border, and will travel through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania,
and Hungary before terminating in Austria. For more see http://www.nabucco‐pipeline.com/project/project‐
description‐pipeline‐route/project‐description.html.
42
Ian Kelly, “Signing Ceremony for the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Nabucco Pipeline,” Department of
State, Washington, D.C., July 13, 2009, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/july/125968.htm; and Lybov
Pronina and Ali Berat Meric, “Turkey Offers Route for Gazprom’s South Stream Gas Pipeline, Bloomberg, August 6,
2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601100&sid=a.TM4QijmIMk.
53
than economically motivated. For that reason, some commentators qualify their recommendation by
demanding that these projects be “commercially viable.”43
Although diversification of pipelines out of the Caspian Basin may help to ensure that Europe
does not experience yearly gas crises, this strategy does not solve the problem of Russia as an unreliable
supplier (or Ukraine or Belarus as unreliable transit countries). Further, as some analysts note, Russia
will likely always be the dominant local supplier, so Europe must find ways to manage this reality.44
Antagonizing Russia, as some of these projects seem to do, one group argues, is unproductive.45 There
seems to be wide agreement that the global community needs to find a better way to regulate energy
supply guaranteeing the interests of consumers, transit countries, and suppliers alike.46 As a first step,
the United States might consider acceding to the Energy Charter and entering negotiations, in concert
with Europe, to find ways to make this agreement more acceptable to the Russians.47 Alternatively, the
major parties could design and negotiate an organization modeled on the World Trade Organization
(WTO) that would govern energy issues.48 This organization would replace the beleaguered Energy
Charter Treaty.49 On a more general level, Europe, the United States, and Russia could try to depoliticize
the issue by framing it as one of economic rather than political security.50
Indeed, although many analysts focus on the political side of the issue, energy also presents a
significant economic and commercial opportunity. Russian downstream investment in Europe or the
United States could serve as a financial boon to all involved and would also serve as an important
political stabilizer.51 Another option, suggests Thomas Graham, is “to develop ways American, European,
and Russian firms can cooperate in the exploration and development of upstream resources in Russia,

43
44
45
46
Ibid., 4.
47
48
49
Ibid.
50
Thomas Graham, in Thomas Graham and Eugene Rumer, “Rethinking U.S.‐Russian Relations,” [speech delivered
at the?] World Affairs Council, Kane Hall, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, April 23, 2009.
51
54
the construction of pipelines, and the final distribution to customers in Europe.”52 The recent decline in
oil prices might make the Russian government more amenable to cooperation in this area than it was
during the years of high oil prices.53 Further, the huge expenditures that Russia needs to maintain or
increase current levels of production, especially in older fields, may force the Russian government “to
reconsider its nationalistic energy policy” and allow increased foreign investment.54 Indeed, in the face
of the first budget deficit in several years, Prime Minister Putin has indicated a willingness to privatize
some businesses and allow increased foreign investment, though it is unclear whether this liberalization
will extend to energy companies.55
The Bilateral Presidential Commission includes two working groups related to energy: one on
nuclear energy and nuclear security, chaired by the head of Rosatom, Sergei Kiriyenko, and Deputy
Secretary of Energy Daniel Poneman, and the other on energy and environment, chaired by Minister of
Energy Sergei Shmatko and Secretary of Energy Steven Chu.56 The Nuclear Security Working Group met
for the first time in September 2009, and discussed ways to increase cooperation on civil nuclear
technologies.57 The cochairs of the Energy and Environment Working Group met in October 2009, and
cooperation has been ongoing.58 The two working groups will also address questions of energy
efficiency, as some experts have recommended.59 Others, however, note that discussions on energy
cooperation would be more effective if they were reconstituted as a trilateral dialogue with the United

52
53
Ibid.
54
Åslund and Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet, 157‐158.
55
Alexander Kolyander and William Mauldin, “Putin Signals Push for Privatization,” Wall Street Journal, September
29, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125424308492749839.html?mod=googlenews_wsj.
56
57
“DOE Deputy Secretary and Rosatom Director Visit Y‐12, Oak Ridge National Laboratory during First Meeting of
U.S.‐Russian Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security Working Group,“ September 29, 2009,
http://www.energy.gov/8083.htm.
58
Morningstar, “2010 Outlook for Eurasian Energy.”
59
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov,” Osobnyak Guest House,
Moscow, Russia, October 13, 2009, transcript available at:
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/10/130505.htm; and Charap et al., “After the ‘Reset.’” 27.
55
States, the EU, and Russia.60 Another suggestion is to create a forum that incorporates voices from East
Asia as well.61

60
61
56
TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Trade and investment are rising items on the U.S.‐Russian agenda, both for their financial benefits and
for their politically stabilizing side effects. During the 2009 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum
(SPIEF), U.S. Ambassador to Russia John Beyrle argued that, although governments are limited in what
they can do to moderate the amplitude of cycles (both positive and negative) in the U.S.‐Russian
relationship, strong business relationships act as an effective “shock absorber.”1 Indeed, many
commentators argue that deeper economic cooperation is the best way to gain leverage in the
relationship and would be effective in preventing, or at least managing, mounting tensions such as those
that led to the 2008 Georgia war. As became apparent in the immediate aftermath of the war, the
United States has few levers to convince Russia to pause and reconsider its actions. Politicians and
business leaders believe that a stronger bilateral business relationship would have built in constraints
limiting reckless behavior.2 During his talk at the SPIEF, Beyrle indicated that the Obama administration
is committed to building trade and economic ties between the two countries and to further embed
Russia into the global economy, goals that are increasingly supported by many observers.3
The global financial crisis currently dominates discussion of the bilateral business relationship,
particularly with regard to its potential long‐term implications. The extent of the crisis in Russia has
demonstrated to observers and Russian officials alike that Russia’s economy is already significantly
integrated into the global system. Despite Putin’s early proclamation that Russia would be “an island of
stability” amid the global economic turmoil, its economy has been one of the worst hit.4 At one point,

1
John Beyrle, in “Economic Cooperation as a Basis for ‘Resetting’ Russia‐US Relations,” St. Petersburg International
Economic Forum, St. Petersburg, Russia, June 4, 2009, video available at: http://www.forumspb.com/eng/tv/4/.
2
See, for example, U.S.‐Russia Business Council, “Recommendations to the Obama Administration,” 1; and
“Economic Cooperation as a Basis for ‘Resetting’ Russia‐US Relations.”
3
Beyrle, in “Economic Cooperation as a Basis for ‘Resetting’ Russia‐US Relations.” For other support, see, for
example, Åslund and Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet, 155–157; U.S.‐Russia Business Council,
“Recommendations to the Obama Administration; Charap and Kuchins, “Economic Whiplash,” 1; and Commission
on U.S. Policy toward Russia, “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia,” 11.
4
Lee Spears and Lyubov Pronina, “Putin and Wen, ‘Cocky’ No More, Pay Davos Price for Recession,” Bloomberg,
January 28, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&sid=aefIextaHsIc&refer=europe; “IMF
Revises Up Global Forecast to Near 4% for 2010,” IMF Survey Online, January 26, 2010,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/NEW012610B.htm; and Andrew E. Kramer, “In Russia, Data
Signals a Leveling Off of the Decline,” New York Times, August 11, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/12/business/economy/12ruble.html.
57
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasted barely 1 percent growth for Russia in 2010 (though
that has been raised to 3.6 percent), and Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin has posited that growth
will not reach precrisis levels for the next four or five years.5 According to the IMF, the Russian economy
contracted by approximately 9.0 percent in 2009 – the first such contraction in seven years.6 In some
ways, this constellation of events brought about a more confrontational Russian stance: for example, in
his speech at the World Policy Forum in Evian, France, in October 2008, President Medvedev blamed the
United States for causing the crisis.7 In March 2009, he suggested revisiting the dollar’s place as the
world’s sole reserve currency.8 Such statements would seem to indicate that the financial crisis has
made Russia less amenable to increased economic cooperation with the United States.
Some analysts have suggested, however, that the crisis represents a unique opportunity to
greatly expand U.S.‐Russian commercial ties.9 They argue that because both the United States and
Russia have been brought so low by the economic downturn, a possibility exists to reframe the
economic relationship “in positive and cooperative terms.”10 Further, although Russia has not fully
retreated from some of its more controversial foreign policy positions, history indicates that it is more
willing to cooperate during times of economic downturn.11 Therefore, the U.S. government should
actively support initiatives that would strengthen the bilateral commercial relationship. Potential

5
Dmitry Zhdannikov, “Russian GDP Fall Deepens in Q2 to Worst on Record,” Reuters, August 11, 2009,
http://in.reuters.com/article/economicNews/idINIndia‐41690420090811?sp=true.
6
“World Economic Outlook Update,” January 26, 2010,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/update/01/pdf/0110.pdf.
7
Anna Arutunyan, “Medvedev’s Plan,” Moscow News, no. 40, October 10, 2008,
http://mnweekly.ru/news/20081010/55350645.html.
8
Gleb Briyanski, “China Backs Talks on Dollar as Reserve‐Russian Source,” Reuters, March 19, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/usDollarRpt/idUSLJ93633020090319. World Bank President Robert Zoellick noted
that the United States would be remiss “to take for granted the dollar's place as the world's predominant reserve
currency.” He suggested that going forward there will be other options to challenge the dollar’s preeminence. For
more, see Robert Zoellick, “After the Crisis?” speech given at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International
Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., September 28, 2009, transcript available at: http://www.sais‐
jhu.edu/news‐and‐events/pdf/Zoellick‐SAIS‐092809.pdf.
9
Charap and Kuchins, “Economic Whiplash,” 1; and Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia, “The Right Direction
for U.S. Policy toward Russia,” 10–11.
10
11
Charap and Kuchins, “Economic Whiplash,” 4.
58
measures include increasing support for the Russia‐based activities of bodies such as the Export‐Import
Bank, the Trade and Development Agency, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.12 Exploring
enterprise funds or small loan programs to spur private‐sector lending to U.S. companies interested in
operating in Russia may also prove useful.13
One major concern about increasing bilateral economic integration is the lack of transparency
within Russian businesses. To help solve this problem, many commentators favor student exchanges – in
particular the placement of young Russians in MBA programs in the United States. These authors hope
that Russian students in such programs would bring the U.S. business practices to which they are
exposed back home. Along the same lines as educational exchanges, American business leaders have
suggested more flexible Russian immigration polices to allow Americans to work in Russia.14 This
recommendation is connected to the belief that Russia needs to invest more heavily in its human capital
and educational infrastructure before the Russian workforce can meet all the needs of American
companies. While Russia is building its workforce, it would be helpful for American companies
interested in doing business in Russia to be able to bring in more of their own workers.15
To increase the level of foreign direct investment in the two nations, Russia and the United
States should negotiate, sign, and ratify a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT).16 BITs can help to spur
bilateral cooperation by providing safeguards and assurances to companies on their investments,
including limits on expropriation; a guarantee of prompt and proper compensation in the event of
expropriation; protection of investments even in countries where investor rights are not protected; and
the right to submit a dispute with a government to international arbitration rather than having to
pursue the case in that country’s domestic courts.17 These protections mitigate the risk of foreign
investment. The United States and Russia signed a BIT in 1992, but the Russian Duma did not ratify it.

12
Ibid., 10.
13
Ibid.
14
Mary А. Laschinger, president, International Paper EMEA, in “Economic Cooperation as a Basis for ‘Resetting’
Russia‐US Relations.”
15
Ibid.
16
17
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “Bilateral Investment Treaties,” http://www.ustr.gov/trade‐
agreements/bilateral‐investment‐treaties.
59
The text of the 2008 Sochi Framework, however, indicates that Russia would be amenable to signing a
new BIT.18
The Bilateral Presidential Commission created at the July 2009 summit includes the Business
Development and Economic Relations Working Group (BDERWG), chaired by Minister of Economic
Development Elvira Nabiullina and Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke.19 The group met for the first time
in February 2010 in Washington.20 In March 2010, it released a detailed work plan that pledges, among
other things, cooperation on energy efficiency, modernization, and the development of small and
medium‐sized businesses.21 Indicating again the interconnectedness of issues on the bilateral agenda,
the BDERWG has promised to coordinate its activities in the sphere of energy efficiency with the energy
working groups that are also part of the Bilateral Presidential Commission.22 The work plan sets out an
ambitious agenda; the question, as with the broader strategic framework the Obama administration has
attempted to craft, is how dedicated the group leaders will be in fulfilling these commitments.
Beyond the bilateral relationship, many observers encourage promoting Russia’s integration
into the world economy and strengthening bilateral economic relations because they believe that
“economic integration is likely to facilitate reform.”23 Despite continued unease about corruption and
state involvement in business, Russia offers a rich market for investors, and its current laws governing
investment and other business fundamentals generally meet international standards.24 Further, as
individual Russian businesses attempt to internationalize and list on global exchanges, they will be
forced to adopt more transparent practices.25 Therefore, many analysts argue that by Russia being
subject to the rules and regulations of organizations such as the WTO, an already encouraging situation

18
19
20
“Joint Statement by the U.S.‐Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission Coordinators on Commission Progress.”
21
See “Work Plan for U.S.‐Russia Business Development and Economic Relations Working Group,”
https://www.usrbc.org/goverment/presidential_commission/.
22
Ibid.
23
24
25
Discussion at Stent‐Rumer Working Group, Washington, D.C., June 23, 2008.
60
will in all likelihood improve.26 Not everyone agrees, however, with the assessment that the legal
framework is sufficient or encouraging.27
American commentators, however, widely support Russian entry into the WTO. In the wake of
the 2008 Georgia crisis, the question of Russia’s accession to the WTO was put on hold, but in early June
2009 both European Union Trade Commissioner Catherine Ashton and Economic Minister Elvira
Nabiullina expressed greater optimism that a deal might be completed by the end of 2009.28 Yet shortly
after the trilateral talks with Russian, U.S., and EU trade representatives in June 2009, Russia announced
that it intended to withdraw its WTO bid in favor of a three‐party bid with Belarus and Kazakhstan (at
the time, Russia was in the process of forming a customs union with these two nations).29 Some
observers have suggested that, at its core, Russia’s declaration was an expression of its frustration with
the sixteen‐year‐long WTO accession negotiations, particularly given that Medvedev retreated from the
idea of the joint bid at the 2009 G8 summit in L’Aquila, Italy. He suggested instead that Russia, Belarus,
and Kazakhstan should “coordinate,” but join the WTO individually.30 Russia still contends that it is
seeking “to pursue autonomous, yet simultaneous, accession” to the WTO with Belarus and Kazakhstan,
but it has since formalized the abovementioned union with a unified customs tariff.31 The way forward is
unclear, but if Russia does decide to pursue WTO accession as a customs union, it will delay its entry for

26
27
Anne Garrels, “In Russia, Business World Still Lacks Transparency,” National Public Radio, September 29, 2009,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113303596.
28
“EU, Moscow Say Russia Should Join WTO This Year,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, June 4, 2009,
http://www.rferl.org/content/EU_Moscow_Say_Russia_Should_Joint_WTO_This_Year/1747149.html.
29
Ira Iosebashvili, “Putin Ditches Unilateral WTO Bid,” Moscow Times, June 10, 2009. Alexander Shokhin, president
of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, alluded to this customs union during the St. Petersburg
International Economic Forum, saying that it would be best for all if the rules of the union were based on the rules
of the WTO, but this would happen only if Russia were already in the WTO. For more, see “Economic Cooperation
as a Basis for ‘Resetting’ Russia‐US Relations.”
30
Iosebashvili, “Putin Ditches Unilateral WTO Bid”; and “Russia's Medvedev Says Joint WTO Bid ‘Problematic,’”
Associated Press, July 10, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D99BLH1O2.htm.
31
James Collins and Bennett Stancil, “Russia and World Trade: Out in the Cold,” International Economic Bulletin,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2010,
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=24760.
61
many years, further deferring the benefits that both the United States and Russia could reap from
Russian WTO membership.32
Some commentators argue that Russia should be encouraged to seek membership in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).33 The advantage of OECD
membership is that, unlike the WTO, which deals strictly with trade, OECD members must also commit
to substantive governmental reforms.34 The technical requirements for accession (regarding issues such
as corruption and transparency) are both stringent and hard to reverse once enacted.35 According to the
OECD bylaws, WTO membership must precede OECD membership. Some observers have suggested,
however, that if Russia met the technical requirements for OECD accession, the United States and other
OECD member states could consider waiving that requirement.36
Numerous other partnerships could also facilitate Russia’s integration into the global economy.
For example, Russia should have a better delineated economic relationship with the EU.37 In addition, as
global financial systems are reevaluated in the face of the ongoing economic crisis, some experts argue
that the United States should ensure that Russia is part of any effort to redesign the global financial
system.38
Perhaps the biggest irritant to progress on the economic agenda is the Jackson‐Vanik
amendment, which is attached to the Trade Act of 1974. Congress passed the amendment so that the
United States could impose sanctions in response to Soviet constraints on Jewish immigration.39 It has
granted Russia a waiver every year since 1994, but the amendment’s continued formal application

32
Ibid.
33
34
“World Trade Organization,” 1–2, http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/inbre.pdf; and “The OECD:
Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development,” 8,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/33/34011915.pdf.
35
36
Ibid., 34.
37
38
See, for example, Working Group on United States Policy towards Russia, “Recommendations,” 3; Charap and
Kuchins, “Economic Whiplash,” 14; and Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia, “The Right Direction for U.S.
Policy toward Russia,” 4.
39
Charap et al., “After the Reset,” 44.
62
prohibits the granting of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to that country. Once Russia
becomes a member of the WTO, the United States will have to graduate Russia, but traditionally
graduation is delayed until a country has formally acceded to the WTO.40 At this point, however, the
amendment has become a significant point of irritation between the two countries. Further, although
some remain reluctant to graduate Russia, given ongoing concerns about democracy and human rights
abuses in the country, others assert that discussing human rights in connection with Jackson‐Vanik is no
longer useful.41 The majority of commentators argue that the United States should, without fanfare,
graduate Russia from the Jackson‐Vanik amendment and grant Russia PNTR without waiting for its
accession to the WTO.42 Doing so will require strong leadership from the White House, because many in
Congress are unwilling to repeal the amendment without a reciprocal concession from the Kremlin.43
In addition to government actions, treaties, and initiatives, business leaders are quick to point
out that extensive private‐sector involvement is critical to strengthening the U.S.‐Russian economic
relationship. Public‐private partnership in U.S.‐Russian relations has proved especially effective.44 In a
meeting of business leaders during the July 2009 summit, President Obama emphasized this point. He
stated that “government can promote this cooperation. We can help to get out of the way. And we will.
But ultimately, individual entrepreneurs and businesses have to advance the agenda.”45 The president

40
Ibid.
41
On reluctance, see, for example, Rep. Thomas Lantos of California, “Statement of the Hon. Tom Lantos, a
Representative in Congress from the State of California,” To Explore Permanent Normal Trade Relations for Russia:
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives,
107th Congress, 2nd sess., serial no. 107‐64, April 11, 2002, 15; and Julie Ginsburg, “Reassessing the Jackson‐Vanik
Amendment,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 2, 2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/19734/#p5. On
inapplicability in the modern context, see Charap et al., “After the Reset,” 45.
42
See, for example, U.S.‐Russia Business Council, “Recommendations to the Obama Administration,” 4; Charap et
al., “After the Reset,” 44; Ginsburg, “Reassessing the Jackson‐Vanik Amendment,”; Legvold, “The Russia File,” 86;
and Pifer, “Reversing the Decline,” 16–17.
43
44
Jean Philippe Courtois, president, Microsoft International, in “Economic Cooperation as a Basis for ‘Resetting’
Russia‐US Relations.”
45
Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at Parallel Business Summit,” Manezh Exhibition Hall, Moscow,
Russia, July 7, 2009, transcript available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks‐By‐The‐
President‐At‐Parallel‐Business‐Summit/.
63
also advocated increasing bilateral trade and easing restrictions so that American and Russian
companies may more easily invest in each other’s country.46
Not all commentators are convinced of the wisdom of bolstering bilateral trade and investment.
Concerns over Russian business practices and the extent of state involvement in industry lead some of
these individuals to suggest that the West should limit how Russian companies purchase and invest
outside their country.47 Others suggest that, although U.S. business should be free to invest in Russia,
Russian businesses remain so corrupt and have such a high‐level of state involvement that the U.S.
government should not actively promote bilateral ties or ease restrictions on investment by either
party.48 Still others suggest that Russia should have faced economic repercussions for its actions in
Georgia during the 2008 war.49 As noted in a previous section, the Bush administration did withdraw the
potentially lucrative 123 agreement from Congress in response to the war, though the withdrawal was
motivated by an expectation of the agreement’s failure in Congress rather than by economic
considerations.
The U.S. reaction to the Georgia war illustrates how economic cooperation has been viewed
throughout much of the post–Cold War era. Over the years, despite the seeming consensus on its many
benefits for both the United States and Russia, economic cooperation has frequently been the most apt
to be manipulated to serve other objectives.50 More broadly, however, economic cooperation has been
subordinate to (rather than viewed as connected with) agenda items such as arms control. Neither
country, two experts argue, seems fully cognizant of the diverse benefits of increased bilateral trade or
is willing to make the compromises necessary to increase trade and investment.51 As a result, bilateral
trade has remained anemic. If, however, both governments and their countries’ private sectors

46
Ibid.
47
Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2008), 209.
48
Kramer, “The Russia Challenge,”8.
49
50
Jeff Procak, “Advancing a Constructive Agenda for US‐Russia Relations: Insights and Recommendations from
Leading Experts,” [paper? speech?] EastWest Institute, [city/state?] April 2007, 8. Procak and many others note, in
particular, the success of ethnic lobbying groups in persuading Congress to use trade discrimination as a stick. See
ibid., 8–9.
51
Charap and Kuchins, “Economic Whiplash,” 8; and Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia, “The Right Direction
for U.S. Policy toward Russia,” 11.
64
capitalize on the opportunities provided by the recent downturn, commercial ties could conceivably help
to stabilize and enrich the relationship.52

52
65
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the main argument for supporting efforts to build democracy in
Russia continues to be that Russian democracy is a national security concern for the United States.1 Over
the years, the United States has vacillated not only in the level of its interventionist policies toward
Russia, but also in the level of its rhetorical condemnation of perceived democratic abuses in Russia.
Reports released toward the end of 2008 and in the early months of the Obama administration advocate
continued support of Russian democracy, while avoiding lecturing or intervening directly in Russian
domestic affairs.
Critics of democracy‐building efforts in Russia often accuse the United States of employing a
double standard. Steven Pifer writes, “[I]f Washington publicly takes Moscow to task on democracy
while ignoring similar (or worse) problems in Central Asia or in oil‐rich friends in the Middle East, it
should not be surprised if the Kremlin concludes that the goal is embarrassing Russia rather than
promoting democratic norms.”2 Others concur with the Russian allegation that Russia is held to a higher
standard than other nations.3 The issue was further complicated during the Bush years, as the United
States’ human rights and democracy record was damaged in the face of Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and
other departures from the democratic norm.4 As a result of the United States’ own shortcomings, U.S.
condemnations of Russian behavior were believed to have lost their moral underpinning and were
therefore more easily challenged.5 Indeed, studies have shown that U.S. behavior, rather than funding
or rhetoric, “has far more weight in terms of its ability to bolster or undermine democracy, human rights
and the rule of law in other countries.”6 The point, say many experts, is that the United States will have

1
Bill Clinton, “Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Annapolis,” Annapolis, Maryland, April 1,
1993, transcript available at:
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2889/is_n13_v29/ai_14081142/print?tag=artBody;col1; and Sarah E.
Mendelson, “U.S. Russian Relations and the Democracy and Rule of Law Deficit,” report of the Century Foundation
(New York: Century Foundation, 2009), 10, http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/US‐
RussianRelationsandtheDemocracyandRuleofLawDeficit.pdf.
2
3
4
Mendelson, “U.S.‐Russian Relations and the Democracy and Rule of Law Deficit,” 3; and Charap et al., “After the
‘Reset,’” 34.
5
Mendelson, “U.S.‐Russian Relations and the Democracy and Rule of Law Deficit,”4.
66
to adjust its practices if it is to regain its soft power, before it can press the issue directly with Russia (or
elsewhere).7
Inconsistencies in U.S. actions toward Russia in this regard may not be the only impediment.
Sestanovich argues that, while U.S. officials have “good reasons to make the issue of democracy a less
contentious part of U.S.‐Russian relations,” Russian officials have actually benefited from the discord
over U.S. efforts to promote democracy.8 Sestanovich contends that President Putin used the
unpopularity of the Bush “Freedom Agenda” to build an internal consensus against foreign intervention
in Russian domestic affairs, a tactic that has proved useful in consolidating the “Power Vertical” and
cementing Putin’s popularity.9 Therefore, Russian domestic political imperatives may dictate that the
Kremlin continue to make democracy and civil society a rallying point against increased rapprochement
with the United States.10
Despite the problems posed by both the United States’ tarnished image and Russian domestic
politics, most analysts agree that some form of democracy promotion is likely to continue to play a role
in U.S. foreign policy, given the significance of American values to the country's self‐identity.11 That said,
commentators suggest that the Obama administration will have to find a new way to address this
constellation of issues with the Russians, without denying basic U.S. values,.12 On a procedural level,
many of these individuals recommend that Obama seek a “balance between public and private
diplomacy.”13 Although public statements may sometimes prove necessary, raising U.S. concerns during
private discussions would be less poisonous to the relationship.14 The Working Group on Civil Society at
the Bilateral Presidential Commission, chaired by First Deputy Chief of Staff, Presidential Administration,

6
Ibid., 13.
7
Ibid., 4.
8
Sestanovich, “What Has Moscow Done?” 23.
9
Ibid., 22.
10
Ibid., 23.
11
See, for example, Graham, “Resurgent Russia and U.S. Purpose,” 30; and Rumer and Stent, “Repairing U.S.‐
Russia Relations,” 30–31.
12
Rumer and Stent, “Repairing U.S.‐Russian Relations,” 31; and Pifer, “Reversing the Decline,” 2.
13
14
Pifer, “Reversing the Decline,” 19; and Charap et al., “After the ‘Reset,’” 36.
67
Vladislav Surkov and Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russia at the National
Security Council Michael McFaul,15 held its second meeting on January 27, 2010, in Washington, D.C.
Participants at the meeting focused on how civil society can help to combat state corruption.16 Future
topics include prison reform and migration.17
In addition to recommending that the United States develop different tactics to express concern
about specific issues, experts suggest adjusting the tone of discussions about Russian democracy and
human rights. Instead of lecturing, civil society leaders and government officials should engage Russia on
topics of mutual concern surrounding the development of democracy.18 They should focus on issues
such as corruption, immigration, terrorism, and other challenges facing both nations.19 The goal is to
share experiences about how to handle these threats to democratic societies.20 Additionally, lawmakers
can raise issues of democracy and humans rights within the context of international treaties that Russia
has signed or through international institutions.21 By embedding discussions of U.S. concerns within
international norms and principles, the United States can avoid the appearance of double standards and
focus instead on commitments Russia has made on these issues. The U.S. Senate–Federation Council
working group, chaired by Senator Ben Nelson (D‐Neb.) and Chairman of the International Affairs
Committee, Federation Council, Mikhail Margelov – in addition to the parliamentary exchange between
Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Howard Berman (D‐Calif.) and Chairman of the

15
16
“Joint Statement by the U.S.‐Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission Coordinators on Commission Progress”;
and Heather Maher, “Interview: McFaul on U.S., Russian Stereotypes and His Controversial Co‐Chair,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, January 28, 2010,
http://www.rferl.org/content/Interview_Michael_McFaul_On_The_Surkov_Controversy_And_The_Importance_Of
_Engagement/1942014.html.
17
Maher, “Interview: McFaul on U.S., Russian Stereotypes and His Controversial Co‐Chair.”
18
Graham, “Resurgent Russia and U.S. Purpose,” 30; James F. Collins and Robert Legvold, “Rethinking U.S.‐Russia
Relations,” talk at the Southern Center for International Studies, Atlanta, Georgia, May 21, 2009, video available at:
http://www.pba.org/afn/event.php?forumEventId=2624; and Legvold, “The Russia File,” 93.
19
20
For an example of this in action, see Preliminary Priorities, Recommendations, and Action Plans, U.S.‐Russia Civil
Society Summit, Moscow, Russia, July 6–7, 2009, esp. p. 1,
http://csis.org/files/publication/090707_Civil_Society_Summit_Preliminary_Report.pdf.
21
Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia, “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia,” 5; and Charap et
al., “After the ‘Reset,’” 37.
68
State Duma International Affairs Committee Konstantin Kosachev, – are other available forums for
dialogue on this subject.22
In his democracy agenda, President Obama has stressed his readiness for open dialogue and
respect for others' sovereignty. During the Civil Society Summit, which occurred parallel to the Moscow
summit in July 2009, the president stated, “No community is the same and every country will follow its
own path. So let me be very clear: Russia's future is up to the Russian people. Not every choice that's
good for the United States is going to be good for Russia. Not every model of organization or
development or democracy may be easily transplantable from one country to the next. But let me also
say that we can learn from each other – and I do think there’s some universal principles. So I commend
you for this summit, designed not to lecture, but to listen, as was already pointed out; not teach or
impose solutions, but to learn from each other, from the bottom up.”23 The president also stressed the
importance of strengthening links between American and Russian societies through “cooperation in
confronting common challenges.”24 He underlined the United States’ commitment to what he termed
“universal values,” but was careful to avoid any impression of meddling in Russia’s internal affairs.
During his speech at the New Economic School on July 7, the president also spoke of U.S. shortcomings
and efforts to improve, further evidence of a new democracy policy based on mutual dialogue and
engagement.
One of the cornerstones of the reorientation in American democracy policy is an emphasis on
multilevel, multidimensional engagement of Russian society. As Obama said at the Civil Society Summit,
“The fresh starts have to be between more than just two Presidents. They have to be between our two
peoples, our two societies. They have to be more than just common security – the Cold War weapons
we dismantle. It must be about our common opportunity – the future of progress and prosperity that
we build together.”25 These ambitions have translated into a renewed emphasis on professional

22
On Nelson/Margelov, see “Bilateral Relations: Time to Start a New Chapter,” Russia: Beyond the Headlines, April
27, 2009, http://rbth.ru/articles/2009/04/27/270409_bilateral.html. On Berman/Kosachev, see Roxana Tiron,
“Berman Urges U.S.‐Russia Cooperation in Moscow,” The Hill, October 14, 2008,
http://www.hcfa.house.gov/110/press101408a.pdf.
23
Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at Parallel Civil Society Summit,” Metropol Hotel, Moscow, Russia,
July 7, 2009, transcript available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks‐By‐The‐President‐At‐
Parallel‐Civil‐Society‐Summit/.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
69
exchanges and direct, sustained contact between civil society and nongovernmental organizations in the
United States and Russia, as recommended by many experts.26 To further this effort, the Bilateral
Presidential Commission has created the Working Group on Educational and Cultural Exchanges, chaired
by Special Presidential Representative for International Culture Cooperation Mikhail Shvydkoy and
Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Judith McHale.27 The working group met
for the first time in December 2009 and “agreed to develop new educational and research initiatives in
science, language acquisition, teacher education, and professional development; to organize events in
both countries celebrating the cultural traditions, accomplishments, and aspirations of our two peoples;
and to initiate a pilot exchange of young nonprofessional student athletes in several team sports,
starting with basketball and hockey.”28 In March 2010, the group coordinated a meeting of business
leaders in technology and innovation.29 In May 2010, the group coordinated a youth basketball
exchange.30
Supporting Russian initiatives to improve democracy and related issues is also critical. Most
prominent among these is President Medvedev’s professed desire to strengthen the rule of law and
lower the incidence of corruption in his country. During his speech at the Civil Society Summit, Obama
endorsed these efforts.31 Continuing in that vein, some analysts suggest that “[T]he United States should
see if there is interest in the Russian government for technical assistance to advance the anticorruption
and rule‐of‐law agenda.”32 Similarly, the United States should let Russian needs rather than the U.S.
political agenda dictate how “democracy assistance” funds are allocated.33 Allowing Russian experts to

26
Åslund and Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet, 159; Collins and Legvold, “Rethinking U.S.‐Russia Relations”;
Charap et al., “After the ‘Reset,’” 35; and “Community Development Working Group: Recommendations and
Action Plan,” in Preliminary Priorities, Recommendations, and Action Plans.
27
28
29
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov,” Moscow, Russia, March 19,
2010, transcript available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/03/138671.htm.
30
Office of the Spokesperson, “U.S.‐Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission's Youth Basketball Exchange,”
Washington D.C, May 14, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/05/141849.htm.
31
Obama, “Remarks by the President at Parallel Civil Society Summit.”
32
33
Mendelson, “U.S.‐Russian Relations and the Democracy and Rule of Law Deficit,” 17.
70
determine how the money would best be used should not only lessen the appearance of
interventionism but should also increase the impact of each dollar spent.34
Some observers suggest that one of the most effective starting places is in the area of public
health. Russia is undergoing a national health crisis. It has one of highest infection rates of HIV/AIDS
outside Africa and some of the lowest life expectancies in the developed world – life expectancy for
males is below sixty years of age, and drug use is growing at an alarming rate.35 The Public Health
Working Group at the Civil Society Summit recommended “joint research into effective social marketing
techniques” that could help to inform Russians about health risks such as excessive alcohol
consumption, tobacco use, and dietary salt intake.36 The working group also suggested improving the
free flow of critical health‐care data (“information liquidity”) within and across health‐care institutions in
the United States and Russia, increasing exchanges of medical professionals, and sharing experiences
and best practices.37 A discussion group organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) made similar recommendations and suggested “an annual U.S.‐Russia forum on reform of national
health systems, with a special focus on financing, cost controls, and evaluation mechanisms.”38 A joint
Brookings Institution and CSIS delegation from 2005 proposed similar ideas; the group also
recommended that the United States significantly increase its support of nongovernmental
organizations that focus on high‐risk groups, including intravenous drug users, sex workers, and young
people. The group also suggested that the United States allocate more funding for scientific researchers
working to develop vaccines.39

34
Ibid., 18.
35
Rumer and Stent, “Repairing U.S.‐Russia Relations,” 15; and Megan K. Stack, “Heroin Addiction Spreads Like
Wildfire in Russia,” Los Angeles Times, September 25, 2009, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la‐
fg‐russia‐heroin25‐2009sep25,0,2349140.story.
36
“Public Health Working Group: Summary of Discussions,” in Preliminary Priorities, Recommendations, and Action
Plans. On the issue of alcohol consumption, President Medvedev launched a large public campaign in August 2009
to curb drinking. For more information, see Simon Shuster, “Russia's Medvedev Launches a New War on Drinking,”
Time Magazine, August 23, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1917974,00.html.
37
Ibid.
38
“The US and Russia: Confronting Common Challenges Strategic Collaboration on Health,” Center for Strategic
and International Studies, Washington, D.C., (?) May 12, 2009,
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/events/090512_ruseura_russiahealth.pdf.
39
J. Stephen Morrison and Celeste A. Wallander, Russia and HIV/AIDS: Opportunities for Leadership and
Cooperation, report of the CSIS Task Force on HIV/AIDS Brookings/CSIS Joint Delegation to Russia, February 20–26,
71
U.S.‐Russian cooperation on improving public health could be furthered under the auspices of
the memorandum of understanding on health that Obama and Medvedev signed during the July 2009
summit. In the memorandum, the two presidents agree to collaborate to improve public health and
medical science through the Bilateral Presidential Commission Working Group on Health.40 In December
2009, the Working Group on Health “launched cooperation on combating infectious and non‐infectious
disease, promoting healthy lifestyles and maternal and child health.”41 In addition, “the U.S. National
Institutes of Health, National Academies of Science and the Institute of Medicine signed a Statement of
Intent with the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences to increase collaboration through academic
conferences, exchanges and research in these priority areas.”42
Over the years, there has been frequent criticism regarding the lack of clear metrics by which to
judge Russian progress. Writing in 2009, for example, Sarah Mendelson suggested looking into Russian
efforts to close the cases of the murders of Paul Klebnikov, Anna Politkovskaya, Stanislav Markelov, and
Anastasia Baburova;43 assessing the independence of the judiciary; analyzing the presence of Kremlin
critics on television; examining concerns over freedom of assembly; and reviewing the treatment of
nongovernmental organizations.44 She noted that “the noninterference by Russian authorities in the
planning” of the Civil Society Summit was in itself a positive sign.45 Mendelson’s suggestion picked up on
a similar recommendation made in 2004 by Michael McFaul, who suggested forming a blue ribbon
bipartisan commission to assess the state of democracy in Russia. He noted in his recommendation that
establishing metrics on Russian democratic progress could be useful in later assessments of progress on

2005 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2005), 15,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2005/05russia_fixauthorname/200505russia_taskforce.pdf.
40
“Fact Sheet: Moscow Summit, July 6‐8,” Office of the Press Secretary, July 6, 2009,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/FACT‐SHEET‐Moscow‐Summit‐July‐6‐8/.
41
42
Ibid.
43
Klebnikov and Politkovskaya were journalists who were known to be fierce critics of the Russian leadership.
Markelov was a human rights attorney. Baburova, also a journalist who worked for the same paper as
Politkovskaya and was walking with Markelov, was killed when she tried to intervene in his attack.
44
Mendelson, “U.S.‐Russian Relations and the Democracy and Rule of Law Deficit,” 17.
45
Ibid.
72
the same issues in Afghanistan and Iraq.46 McFaul’s recommendation in many ways comes back to the
aforementioned issue of policy consistency: the condemnation of Russian democratic abuses but not
those in the surrounding states sends a garbled message, while the evolution toward or away from
democratic progress in Russia has broader implications for democracy building in U.S. policy elsewhere.
Abandoning democracy promotion in Russia and the post‐Soviet space affects how the U.S. commitment
to democracy is understood in other parts of the world.
Finally, no matter the tactic or tone, engagement on issues of democratic development and civil
society will not be easy. Part of the problem, beyond what Sestanovich notes has been the Russian
leadership’s manipulation of the democracy issue, the legacy of the Boris Yeltsin era and its negative
effect on the Russian public’s view of democracy promotion.47 More recently, Russians have had to deal
with the social havoc wrought by the ongoing financial crisis. For years it seemed as though the Russian
people had accepted a de facto social contract with their government, sacrificing political freedoms for
economic stability.48 As the extent of the financial crisis has become clear, however, that bargain is
beginning to unravel.49 The strikes in the factory town of Pikalevo and the hunger strikes of KrasAir flight
attendants have strengthened the impression that without the financial stability promised by Putin’s
system, society is no longer willing to uphold its end of the bargain.50 If the Russian government decides
that the crisis is not manageable, U.S. efforts to reengage Russia on issues of democratic development
would likely suffer, because the government’s priority may shift to stabilization rather than
liberalization.51

46
Michael McFaul, “Russia’s Transition to Democracy and U.S.‐Russia Relations: Unfinished Business,” Center for
American Progress, January 2004, 8, http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/russia_mcfaul.pdf.
47
48
Andrew E. Kramer, “Political Aide Says Kremlin May Need to Ease Control,” New York Times, February 9, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/business/worldbusiness/10ruble.html.
49
Ibid; and Graham, “Resurgent Russia and U.S. Purpose,” 9.
50
Ellen Barry, “Putin Plays Sheriff for Cowboy Capitalists,” New York Times, June 5, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/05/world/europe/05russia.html?ref=europe; and “Russian Flight Attendants
Continue Hunger Strike,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 21, 2009,
http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Flight_Attendants_Continue_Hunger_Strike/1736404.html.
51
Robert Legvold, “U.S.‐Russian Relations: Looking to the Future under Obama,” roundtable at the Chicago Council
on Global Affairs, Chicago, Illinois, March 12, 2009, audio available at:
http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/podcast_details.php?podcast_id=144.
73
Ultimately, as President Obama said during his speech at the 2009 Civil Society Summit, the U.S.
approach is guided by the principle that “Russia’s future is up to the Russian people.” Russia is still a
society in deep transition, and the full transformation to capitalism and liberal democracy, if and when it
happens, will take generations.52 This reality dictates a larger degree of “strategic patience” than the
United States has perhaps exercised in the past.53 Therefore, as analysts have recommended, the
Obama administration appears to have decided that the safest and most productive course of action is
to stay involved, while remaining responsive to Russian opinion about U.S. assistance and allow allowing
Russian initiatives to take precedence.

52
53
Kuchins, “Prospects for Engagement with Russia,” 7.
74
TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES

The current watchwords of international politics seem to be multipolar, multipartner, and multilateral.
There is a consensus that the world has grown too interdependent and too interconnected (two other
popular descriptors) to allow problems to be solved unilaterally. Further, the biggest problems in the
international arena – for example, climate change, catastrophic terrorism, and the world financial crisis
– are not the problems of any one nation.1 Instead, they are shared obstacles that can best be tackled
through global partnership. Part of a redesigned U.S.‐Russian relationship, therefore, involves not only
how the two countries can work together on areas of mutual interest, but also how they can confront
global challenges together, with or without other major powers.
Near the top of the transnational agenda is climate change. Russia is the world’s third‐largest
emitter of carbon dioxide, one of the leading contributors to global warming.2 As mentioned in the
“Energy Security” and “Trade and Investment” sections, the Obama administration has expressed
interest in cooperating with Russia on developing renewable energy sources (including nuclear energy,
as under the 123 agreement), increasing energy efficiency, and combating emissions.3 On renewable
energy research, some experts recommend using the ongoing U.S.‐Chinese collaboration on reaching
energy efficiency benchmarks as a model for a similar initiative with Russia.4 As noted in a 2005 study,
the United States and Russia have complementary technical expertise that could make cooperation
hugely beneficial: the United States specializes in environmental simulation and digital mapping, and
Russia is skilled in translating physical and chemical concepts into large‐scale engineering projects.5
Pooling this knowledge could further cooperation in combating climate change.6

1
Susan Rice, “A New Course in the World, A New Approach at the UN,” remarks at New York University’s Center
for Global Affairs, New York, New York, August 12, 2009, transcript available at:
http://www.realclearworld.com/printpage/?url=http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2009/08/13/a_new_cou
rse_in_the_world_a_new_approach_at_the_un__97050.html; and Obama, “Remarks of President Obama to the
United Nations General Assembly.”
2
3
On combating emissions, see Burns, “Remarks at World Russia Forum.”
4
5
National Research Council, Strengthening U.S.‐Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation, 30.
6
Ibid.
75
Climate change has also raised questions about control of the Arctic and access to the region’s
hydrocarbons. Preliminary reports suggest that the Arctic contains as much as 25 percent of the world’s
remaining undiscovered oil and gas reserves.7 The Arctic has become a growing area of dispute, and
Russia has angered some by laying claim to a significant portion of its seabed, arguing that the
submarine Lomonosov Ridge is contiguous with the Siberian continental shelf and therefore an
extension of Russian territory.8 Some observers recommend that the United States ratify (or
renegotiate) the Law of the Sea Treaty (UNCLOS) and take the lead in addressing this problem.9
Secretary of State Clinton has asserted that she will work to convince the Senate to ratify UNCLOS.10
Because this treaty does not cover all contingencies of the problem, others suggest negotiating an
international Arctic‐specific treaty, in addition to ratifying UNCLOS.11 Still others suggest that the United
States should update its icebreaker fleet.12 Those who fear Russian dominance in the Arctic region
recommend that the United States conduct a new survey of strategic resources and coordinate policies
with NATO and the United States’ Nordic allies.13 Others suggest joint U.S.‐Russian exploration of the
region’s resources or joint management of new shipping routes that emerge as the ice melts.14 Indeed, if
control of Arctic resources is incorporated into cooperation in combating climate change and further
broadening scientific and economic cooperation, competition between the United States and Russia
might be avoided and a cooperative approach to the region adopted.15

7
Scott G. Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming,” Foreign
Affairs 87, no. 2 (March/April 2008), 67.
8
Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown, 74”; and “Russia Plays Down Talk of Arctic Resource Conflict,” Reuters, June 10,
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSLA1051234.
9
Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown,” 75; and Åslund and Kuchins, The Russia Balance Sheet, 158.
10
11
Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown,”, 75.
12
Ibid.; Charap et al., “After the ‘Reset,’” 41; and Cohen, “How the Obama Administration Should Engage Russia,”
16.
13
14
On scientific cooperation, see Charap et al., “After the ‘Reset,’” 41. On shipping routes, see Borgerson, “Arctic
Meltdown,” 76.
15
Burns, “Remarks at World Russia Forum”; Robert Legvold, “Strategic Assessment” (The Goal: A Vision of U.S.‐
Russia Relations Four or Ten Years from Now),
mhtml:http://www.amacad.org/russia/6goal.mht!6goal_files/slide0024.htm.
76
Catastrophic terrorism is another major transnational issue where U.S.‐Russian cooperation
could be enormously beneficial. One of the more common recommendations is to explore expanded
intelligence sharing. A similar initiative was successful immediately after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, and it could be revived in the context of the July 2009 summit agreement on
military‐to‐military cooperation.16 Moscow’s decision not to suspend its agreement with NATO allowing
transit across Russia to Afghanistan, despite Russian suspension of other components of NATO‐Russia
cooperation in the wake of its war in Georgia, suggests that Russia still views collaboration in
Afghanistan as serving a vital security interest.17
The July 2009 U.S.‐Russian agreement to allow air transport of military equipment and
personnel to Afghanistan is a recent example of promising cooperation on this front.18 As the text of the
agreement notes, “The Russian Federation’s decision to open these valuable transit routes supplements
its already robust airlift support and provision of commodities to Coalition efforts in Afghanistan, and
further illustrates that Russia is a valuable member of the international coalition supporting the security,
stability, and reconstruction of Afghanistan.”19 In practical terms, the agreement promises to save the
U.S. military time and money; it also helps to diversify available transportation routes.20 The agreement
permits as many as 4,500 flights yearly; the first airlift took place on October 8, 2009.21 As of March

16
For more on the military cooperation agreement, see “United States‐Russia Military to Military Relations,” July 6,
2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/United‐States‐Russia‐Military‐to‐Military‐Relations/.
17
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, “Speech at the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI),” Brussels, Belgium, September 18,
2008, transcript available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2008/s080918a.html.
18
“United States‐Russia Military Transit Agreement,” July 6, 2009,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/FACT‐SHEET‐United‐States‐Russia‐Military‐Transit‐Agreement/.
Such cooperative gestures are undermined, however, by Moscow’s presumed involvement in Kyrgyz President
Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s decision to evict the United States from the Manas Air Base in February 2009. The Manas Air
Base is hugely important to the effort in Afghanistan and, though it will ultimately remain open, the drawn‐out
affair cast a pall over some of Russia’s other, more accommodating actions.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.; Jeff Schogol, “U.S. Sends First Lethal Cargo to Afghanistan through Russian Airspace,” “Stripes Central,” in
Stars and Stripes, October 8, 2009, http://blogs.stripes.com/blogs/stripes‐central/us‐sends‐first‐lethal‐cargo‐
afghanistan‐through‐russian‐airspace.
77
2010, there had been 111 flights carrying more than 15,000 soldiers.22 By April 2010, the number of
troops transported had jumped to 20,000, with an average of two flights daily. The agreement allows for
up to 12 flights per day and 4,500 per year.23
In addition to renewing and expanding military cooperation, analysts recommend that NATO
work with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Cooperative Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO), two regional security groupings in which Russia is a leading member.24 Developing
formal ties with these organizations (especially the SCO, given China’s membership) will institutionalize
the relationship between the United States and regional states. Additionally, it could legitimate some
U.S. activity in the post‐Soviet space and prove beneficial to U.S. and NATO efforts in Afghanistan.25 As
an opening step, the United States can seek “dialogue partner” status in the SCO and structure
cooperation around the SCO’s Regional Anti‐Terrorist Structure.26 The United States reportedly
investigated requesting observer status in 2006 but was discouraged by the Kremlin. Changes in
leadership in both nations, however, as well as the newly created “dialogue partner” option, make
quietly revisiting the issue worthwhile.27 Alternatively, the NATO‐Russia Council and the OSCE could
serve as venues to further counterterrorism cooperation among international actors.28
Reflecting recommendations that the United States and Russia improve their bilateral
counterterrorism efforts, the Presidential Commission created the Counterterrorism Working Group,
chaired by Daniel Benjamin, coordinator for counterterrorism and Anatoly Safonov, special
representative for cooperation on counterterrorism.29 The group met in November 2009 and “agreed to

22
Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov,” Moscow, Russia, March 18,
2010, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/03/138531.htm.
23
“20,000 US troops transited through Russia for Afghanistan,” AFP, April 14, 2010,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iYXz9HahKUgNoJ6aWcjuBrQhWiNA.
24
On SCO, see Charap et al., “After the ‘Reset,’” 38–39; on CSTO and SCO, see Hahn, “U.S.‐Russian Relations and
the War against Jihadism,” 20; and Legvold, “The Russia File,” 88.
25
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
Hahn, “U.S.‐Russian Relations and the War against Jihadism,”17.
29
“U.S.‐Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission,” https://www.usrbc.org/goverment/presidential_commission/.
On recommendations, see, for example, Hahn, “U.S.‐Russian Relations and the War against Jihadism,”17.
78
work together in the multilateral arena to strengthen international counterterrorism norms and
increase capacity building; counter the ideological dimension of violent extremism; improve our
transportation security; and discuss Afghanistan in the counterterrorism context.”30 Since that initial
meeting, bilateral cooperation has apparently proceeded well. The Counterterrorism Working Group
also contributes to the broader goal of institutionalizing Russia’s role in fighting catastrophic terrorism
and increasing its status as a global stakeholder.
The idea of U.S.‐Russian cooperation on counterterrorism has been popular for much of the past
decade, particularly in relation to scientific collaboration on how to prevent biological and radiological
attacks. For example, in 2002, members of a task force exploring ways to expand the Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) program suggested that the United States and Russia introduce a global health
monitoring system able to detect outbreaks of infectious disease. Such a system would both serve a
clear operational purpose and, in its attention to the threat of biological attack, would help reinforce the
Biological Weapons Convention.31 The National Academy of Science and the Russian Academy of
Sciences have conducted several joint workshops on counterterrorism and released four reports on the
subject, most recently a 2009 report on the 2007 meeting dealing with “potential attacks involving
biological agents, transportation networks, and energy systems.”32 A 2006 report on combating urban
terrorism in the United States and Russia proposed that the two countries begin “reciprocal observation
of and participation in simulations of terrorist attacks.” The group suggested that both sides have much
to learn from the other’s direct experience in dealing with the practical aspects of the terrorist threat.
The report also recommends collaborating to develop sensors and other technical means of monitoring
at‐risk facilities.33 The 2005 joint task force recommended forming a bilateral technical working group

30
31
Working Group on U.S.‐Russian Nonproliferation Cooperation, “Beyond Nunn‐Lugar,” in Henry D. Sokolski and
Thomas Riisager, eds., Beyond Nunn‐Lugar: Curbing the Next Wave of Weapons Proliferation Threats from Russia
(Washington, D.C.: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, April 2002), 5,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub131.pdf.
32
Glenn E. Schweitzer, rapporteur, “Countering Terrorism Biological Agents, Transportation Networks, and Energy
Systems: Summary of a U.S.‐Russian Workshop,” Committee on Counterterrorism Challenges for Russia and the
United States, Office for Central Europe and Eurasia, National Academies of Sciences, in cooperation with the
Russian Academy of Sciences (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2009), vii,
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12490&page=1.
33
Glenn E. Schweitzer and A. Chelsea Sharber, eds., Countering Urban Terrorism in Russia and the United States:
Proceedings of a Workshop , Committee on Counterterrorism, Challenges for Russia and the United States, Office
79
dedicated to combating radiological terrorism.34 As the NRC‐RAS series of reports suggest, and Glenn
Schweitzer, director of Eurasian Programs at the National Academies, argues, “[U]nlocking laboratory
doors can be an important step in building confidence between both individuals and governments.”35
Research to prevent different forms of potential terrorist attacks could therefore have more wide‐
reaching effects on the U.S.‐Russian relationship than simply the benefit of eliminating a common
threat.36
Counterterrorism and global warming are the most obvious (and perhaps most critical)
individual transnational issues for the bilateral agenda. As stressed in many of the reports, however,
numerous other issues also merit serious attention and could prove fruitful areas for collaboration.
These include managing the rise of other global powers so that they become fully integrated into the
international system and working to stem trafficking in humans, as well as drugs and other illicit
materials.37 Russian influence would also be helpful in efforts to stabilize the broader Middle East – not
just the aforementioned issues of Afghanistan and Iran, but also, for example, the Israeli‐Palestinian
quagmire. Utilizing Russia’s relationship with Syria could be helpful in recruiting other regional powers in
finding a successful, durable solution to the conflict.38 Russian leaders have said repeatedly that they
want engagement in multilateral efforts to be “a key part of their foreign policy approach.”39 Including
discussions of these issues on the bilateral agenda would both strengthen the relationship and provide
necessary global leadership in addressing these problems.40

for Central Europe and Eurasia, National Research Council, in cooperation with the Russian Academy of Sciences
(Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2006), 4, http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11698.
34
National Research Council, Strengthening U.S.‐Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation, 6. In 2007 the
National Research Council published a report entitled “U.S.‐Russian Collaboration in Combating Radiological
Terrorism,” available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11801#toc.
35
Glenn Schweitzer, “Reset Cooperation with Russia,” Science, 324 (June 12, 2009), 1365.
36
37
Legvold, “Strategic Assessment” (The Goal: A Vision of U.S.‐Russia Relations Four or Ten Tears from Now), 79.
38
Robert Legvold, “Strategic Assessment” (U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities and Russia's Place in Them),
mhtml:http://www.amacad.org/russia/2priorities.mht!2priorities_files/frame.htm. This will necessitate
discussions on Russian arms sales to Syria and Iran. See Graham, “Resurgent Russia and U.S. Purpose,” 27–28.
39
40
Ibid.
80
Finally, there is the task of reforming global governance and the international financial
infrastructure. This subject was mentioned earlier in the discussion of European security and economic
cooperation, but it is worth reiterating in this context as well. The United States will remain the
preeminent world power for some time to come. But conditions are changing, and international
institutions such as the United Nations are proving insufficient in managing the crises of a globalized and
interdependent world.41 Even as Russia sorts through the domestic repercussions and implications of
the financial crisis, it will continue to have the capacity to act as either a global partner or a global
spoiler in efforts to reach a new international equilibrium. Therefore, as many observers have argued,
efforts “to reform international financial and security institutions will be optimized only if Russia is given
a chance to contribute constructively.”42 Russia has made plain that it wishes to play an active role in
these negotiations; most analysts agree that the United States should support that aim.

41
42
81
CONCLUSION

During the 2009 Moscow summit, President Obama gave what was billed as the “third major foreign
policy address” of his presidency at the graduation ceremony of the New Economic School in Moscow.1
In the speech, the president stated that “America wants a strong, peaceful, and prosperous Russia.”2 He
emphasized his belief in the possibility of robust cooperation between the two countries and outlined a
wide‐ranging agenda, including efforts such as working toward nuclear nonproliferation, combating
climate change, fighting violent extremism, and increasing economic cooperation. The speech did not
ignore the more explosive issues – Obama reiterated the United States’ support for Georgia’s territorial
integrity, the right of all states to choose their own security arrangements, and democracy. Yet, he
seemed careful to avoid the appearance of lecturing, and he softened his criticisms by noting that even
the United States has work to do to reach the democratic ideal.3 This was the first major presidential
address on U.S.‐Russian relations since President Clinton’s April 1993 speech in advance of his summit in
Vancouver, Canada, with Boris Yeltsin, and it underscores the Obama administration’s commitment to
“getting Russia right.”
The success of the 2009 Moscow Summit seemed to demonstrate that the Obama
administration had successfully "hit the reset button." The United States and Russia appeared to have
embarked on a substantive and ambitious agenda.4 Perhaps even more important, the Obama
administration had begun emphasizing the need to place cooperation with Russia within a larger
framework. For example, in response to a question about what compelled President Medvedev to
change his stance on sanctions toward Iran at the 2009 UN General Assembly meeting , Michael McFaul
attributed the shift in part to administration efforts “to develop a strategic relationship with Russia.”
The current approach, he said, rests on placing interests within the broader context. McFaul stressed

1
Jonathan Weisman, Gregory L. White, and Alan Cullison, “U.S. Hardens Its Stance ahead of Summit with Russia,”
Wall Street Journal, July 3, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124648454414282621.html. The previous two
addresses were the speech on nuclear disarmament in Prague in April 2009 and the speech on U.S.‐Muslim
relations in Cairo in June 2009.
2
Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the New Economic School Graduation.”
3
Ibid.
4
James Collins, “Obama and the Moscow Summit: A Job Well Done,” Web Commentary, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace (July 9, 2009),
82
that “we have common interests that are not just this thing for that thing, but a bigger framework.”5 The
administration realizes that considering cooperation on discrete issues in isolation from an
understanding of the relationship as whole or broader U.S. objectives ultimately cripples any attempt at
collaboration. The early priority the administration gave to the relationship with Russia also
demonstrates a clear conviction that, as the September 2008 gathering of former ambassadors argued,
the relationship will continue to need support and “should not be left hostage to political inertia.”6
More than a year after Vice President Biden declared that it was “time to hit the reset button,”
however, political inertia is a growing concern. Considering the arduous course of the START
negotiations, the as‐yet‐unresolved issue of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and continuing (if lessened)
friction over the neighborhood and security arrangements, there are those who feel that Obama should
decrease his emphasis on the U.S.‐Russian relationship, and instead devote more intention to what are
perceived as more important problems. Negative reviews of the “reset” now appear more frequently, in
part because despite a measurable improvement in atmospherics, the administration has few concrete
achievements to show for its efforts.7 Even those who contend that the remarkable improvement in the
tenor of the relationship is in and of itself a considerable achievement note that without swift progress
on a host of agenda items, including prominent issues such as repealing the Jackson‐Vanik amendment
as well as ratifying the new START and the CTBT, serious trouble lies ahead.8

5
Michael McFaul, in “Press Briefing by Gary Samore, National Security Council Coordinator for Arms Control and
Nonproliferation; Ambassador Alex Wolff, Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations; and Mike
McFaul, Senior Director for Russian Affairs on Thursday’s UN Security Council Meeting and the President’s Meeting
today with President Medvedev of Russia.”
6
Bessmertnykh et al., “U.S.‐Russian Relations: The Longer View,” 5.
7
See, for example, Nikolas Gvosdev, “Ditch the Reset,” National Interest Online, January 12, 2010,
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22756; and Ariel Cohen, “Obama’s Russia Policy: A Disappointing
First Year,” The Foundry, blog of the Heritage Foundation, January 19, 2010,
http://blog.heritage.org/2010/01/19/obamas‐russia‐policy‐a‐disappointing‐first‐year/. There is also some debate
as to what can rightly be termed an achievement. For example, administration officials state that the problems
with the lethal transit agreement resulted technical difficulties and not Russian obstructionism. Those who are
more hawkish on Russia, however, tend not to believe this explanation.
8
Robert Legvold, during Thomas Graham and Robert Legvold, “A Conversation on Evolving U.S. Policy toward
Russia,” American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, Massachusetts, January 28, 2010; audio available at:
http://www.amacad.org/events/recent.aspx.
83
Long‐term success will depend on the ability of President Obama and President Medvedev to
compel their governments to follow through on their commitments.9 It will further rest, however, on the
Obama administration’s ability to communicate to the American public the extremely high stakes the
United States has in strengthening the relationship and in being able to prioritize its interests and
objectives along the way.10 At this point, achieving the long‐cited goal of a Russia fully ensconced in the
Euro‐Atlantic framework seems remote, not least because that framework itself may be shifting to
accommodate a more multipolar (or multipartner) world. This does not mean that a strong strategic
partnership, such as that the administration seems to envision, is no longer conceivable. It does suggest
that such a partnership is unlikely to be built around the idea of Russia as a Westernizing country with
traditional Western values and objectives. It further suggests that, as security structures and
international relationships are reformed and reconstituted, it will likely be pressing shared interests that
serve as the immediate impetus for improving relations.
Whether the U.S.‐Russian relationship ultimately evolves to rest on shared values, or proceeds
as a delicate balance of cooperation and competition based on convergent interests, it is a relationship
that will require careful tending and dedicated attention.11 In addition, it will require a deep, nuanced
understanding of the relationship as a whole, and not just the disembodied pieces. As emerges from
much of the recent work on U.S.‐Russian relations, only after identifying how structural and specific
problems relate to and impinge upon one another can the United States define a coherent policy
adequate to this complex and profoundly important relationship.

9
10
The Commission for U.S. Policy toward Russia, “The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia,” ii.
11
84
BIBLIOGRPAHY

Task Force Reports

U.S.‐Russian Relations at the Turn of the Century, reports of the Working Groups organized by
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., and the Council on Foreign
and Defense Policy, Moscow. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2000.

Working Group on U.S.‐Russian Nonproliferation Cooperation, “Beyond Nunn‐Lugar: Curbing the
Next Wave of Weapons Proliferation Threats from Russia,” in Henry D. Sokolski and Thomas
Riisagar, eds., Beyond Nunn‐Lugar: Curbing the Next Wave of Weapons Proliferation Threats
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Rachel S. Salzman worked as Program Assistant for the “Designing U.S. Policy toward Russia”
project at the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, and is currently Program Manager for the
Euro‐Atlantic Security Initiative at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She holds a B.A.
in European History from the University of Pennsylvania and an M.Phil in Russian Studies from
the University of Cambridge.

100

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