G.R. Nos.

153524-25 January 31, 2005

RODOLFO SORIA and EDIMAR BISTA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ANIANO DESIERTO in his capacity as Head of the Office of the
Ombudsman, HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO in his capacity as Deputy
Ombudsman for Military, P/INS. JEFFREY T. GOROSPE, SPO2
ROLANDO G. REGACHO, SPO1 ALFREDO B. ALVIAR, JR., PO3 JAIME
D. LAZARO, PO2 FLORANTE B. CARDENAS, PO1 JOSEPH A. BENAZA,
SPO1 FRANKLIN D. CABAYA and SPO4 PEDRO PAREL, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Yet again, we are tasked to substitute our judgment for that of the Office of
the Ombudsman in its finding of lack of probable cause made during
preliminary investigation. And, yet again, we reaffirm the time-honored
practice of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations by
our prosecutory bodies absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion on
their part.

Petitioners, thru a special civil action for certiorari,1 contend precisely that
the public respondents herein – officers of the Office of the Ombudsman –
gravely abused their discretion in dismissing the complaint for violation of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (Delay in the delivery of detained
persons) against private respondents herein, members of the Philippine
National Police stationed at the Municipality of Santa, Ilocos Sur.

From the respective pleadings2 of the parties, the following facts appear to
be indubitable:

1. On or about 8:30 in the evening of 13 May 2001 (a Sunday and

the day before the 14 May 2001 Elections3 ), petitioners were arrested
without a warrant by respondents police officers for alleged illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition;

2. Petitioner Soria was arrested for alleged illegal possession of .38

cal. revolver (a crime which carries with it the penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period) and for violation of Article 261 par.
(f) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to the Commission on
Election Resolution No. 3328 (which carries the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than one [1] year but not more than six [6]
years);

3. Petitioner Bista was arrested for alleged illegal possession of sub-

machine pistol UZI, cal. 9mm and a .22 cal. revolver with ammunition;

4. Immediately after their arrest, petitioners were detained at the Santa,

Ilocos Sur, Police Station. It was at the Santa Police Station that
petitioner Bista was identified by one of the police officers to have a
standing warrant of arrest for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6
issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 12272;

5. The next day, at about 4:30 p.m. of 14 May 2001 (Monday and
election day), petitioners were brought to the residence of Provincial
Prosecutor Jessica Viloria in San Juan, Ilocos Sur, before whom a
"Joint-Affidavit" against them was subscribed and sworn to by the
arresting officers. From there, the arresting officers brought the
petitioners to the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office in Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
and there at about 6:00 p.m. the "Joint-Affidavit" was filed and
docketed;

6. At about 6:30 in the evening of the same day, 14 May 2001,

petitioner Soria was released upon the order of Prosecutor Viloria to
undergo the requisite preliminary investigation, while petitioner Bista
was brought back and continued to be detained at the Santa Police
Station. From the time of petitioner Soria’s detention up to the time of
his release, twenty-two (22) hours had already elapsed;

7. On 15 May 2001, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, petitioner Bista

was brought before the MTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where the case for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 was pending. Petitioner Bista
posted bail and an Order of Temporary Release was issued thereafter;

8. At this point in time, no order of release was issued in connection

with petitioner Bista’s arrest for alleged illegal possession of
firearms. At 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day (15 May 2001),
an information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 4413-S, was filed against petitioner
Bista with the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur.
 At 5:00 in the afternoon, informations for Illegal Possession of Firearms
and Ammunition and violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus
Election Code in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 3328, docketed
as Criminal Cases No. 2269-N and No. 2268-N, respectively, were filed
in the Regional Trial Court at Narvacan, Ilocos Sur;

9. On 08 June 2001, petitioner Bista was released upon filing of bail

bonds in Criminal Cases No. 2268-N and No. 4413-S. He was
detained for 26 days.

10. On 15 August 2001, petitioners filed with the Office of the

Ombudsman for Military Affairs a complaint-affidavit for violation of Art.
125 of the Revised Penal Code against herein private respondents.

11. After considering the parties’ respective submissions, the Office of

the Ombudsman rendered the first assailed Joint Resolution dated 31
January 2002 dismissing the complaint for violation of Art. 125 of the
Revised Penal Code for lack of merit; and

12. On 04 March 2002, petitioners then filed their motion for

reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit in the second
assailed Resolution dated 25 March 2002.

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code states:

Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities. - The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be
imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for
some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for
crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent;
and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or
capital penalties, or their equivalent.

In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his
detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer
at any time with his attorney or counsel.

It is not under dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Soria was
arrested without warrant are punishable by correctional penalties or their
equivalent, thus, criminal complaints or information should be filed with the
proper judicial authorities within 18 hours of his arrest. Neither is it in dispute
that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Bista was arrested are punishable
by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent, thus, he could only be
detained for 36 hours without criminal complaints or information having been
filed with the proper judicial authorities.

The sole bone of contention revolves around the proper application of the
12-18-36 periods. With respect specifically to the detention of petitioner Soria
which lasted for 22 hours, it is alleged that public respondents gravely erred
in construing Article 1254 as excluding Sundays, holidays and election days
in the computation of the periods prescribed within which public officers
should deliver arrested persons to the proper judicial authorities as the law
never makes such exception. Statutory construction has it that if a statute is
clear and unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
any attempts at interpretation.5 Public respondents, on the other hand, relied
on the cases of Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,6 and Sayo v. Chief of Police of
Manila7 and on commentaries8 of jurists to bolster their position that
Sundays, holidays and election days are excluded in the computation of the
periods provided in Article 125,9 hence, the arresting officers delivered
petitioners well within the allowable time.

In addition to the foregoing arguments and with respect specifically to

petitioner Bista, petitioners maintain that the filing of the information in court
against petitioner Bista did not justify his continuous detention. The
information was filed at 4:30 p.m. of 15 May 2001 but the orders for his
release were issued by the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of
Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on 08 June 2001. They argued that based on law
and jurisprudence, if no charge is filed by the prosecutor within the period
fixed by law, the arresting officer must release the detainee lest he be
charged with violation of Article 125.10 Public respondents countered that the
duty of the arresting officers ended upon the filing of the informations with
the proper judicial authorities following the rulings in Agbay v. Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military ,11 and People v. Acosta.12

From a study of the opposing views advanced by the parties, it is evident

that public respondents did not abuse their discretion in dismissing for lack
of probable cause the complaint against private respondents.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to
an excess or lack of jurisdiction.1awphi1.nét The abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.13

No grave abuse of discretion, as defined, can be attributed to herein public

respondents. Their disposition of petitioners’ complaint for violation of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be said to have been conjured out of
thin air as it was properly backed up by law and jurisprudence. Public
respondents ratiocinated thus:

As aptly pointed out by the respondents insofar as the complaint of Rodolfo

Soria is concerned, based on applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election
day or a special holiday, should not be included in the computation of the
period prescribed by law for the filing of complaint/information in courts in
cases of warrantless arrests, it being a "no-office day." (Medina vs. Orosco,
125 Phil. 313.) In the instant case, while it appears that the complaints
against Soria for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal
Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on May 15, 200[1] at 4:30 p.m., he
had already been released the day before or on May 14, 2001 at about 6:30
p.m. by the respondents, as directed by Prov. Prosecutor Jessica [Viloria].
Hence, there could be no arbitrary detention or violation of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code to speak of.14

Indeed, we did hold in Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,15 that —

. . . The arresting officer’s duty under the law was either to deliver him to the
proper judicial authorities within 18 hours, or thereafter release him. The fact
however is that he was not released. From the time of petitioner’s arrest at
12:00 o’clock p.m. on November 7 to 3:40 p.m. on November 10 when the
information against him for murder actually was in court, over 75 hours have
elapsed.

But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday;
November 8 was declared an official holiday; and November 9 (election day)
was also an official holiday. In these three no-office days, it was not an easy
matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and stenographer, draft the information
and search for the Judge to have him act thereon, and get the clerk of court
to open the courthouse, docket the case and have the order of commitment
prepared. And then, where to locate and the uncertainty of locating those
officers and employees could very well compound the fiscal’s difficulties.
These are considerations sufficient enough to deter us from declaring that
Arthur Medina was arbitrarily detained. For, he was brought to court on the
very first office day following arrest.

And, in Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila16 --

. . . Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer

detaining a person for more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of arrest and other
circumstances, such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for
the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the necessary information,
must be taken into consideration.

As to the issue concerning the duty of the arresting officer after the
information has already been filed in Court, public respondents acted well
within their discretion in ruling thus:

In the same vein, the complaint of Edimar Bista against the respondents for
Violation of Article 125, will not prosper because the running of the thirty-six
(36)-hour period prescribed by law for the filing of the complaint against him
from the time of his arrest was tolled by one day (election day). Moreover,
he has a standing warrant of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only
on May 15, 2001, at about 2:00 p.m. that he was able to post bail and secure
an Order of Release. Obviously, however, he could only be released if he
has no other pending criminal case requiring his continuous detention.

The criminal Informations against Bista for Violations of Article 125, RPC and
COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and
Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, on May 15, 2001 (Annexes
"G" and "I", Complaint-Affidavit of Edimar Bista) but he was released from
detention only on June 8, 2001, on orders of the RTC and MTC of Narvacan,
Ilocos Sur (Annexes "J" and "K", Complaint-Affidavit). Was there a delay in
the delivery of detained person to the proper judicial authorities under the
circumstances? The answer is in the negative. The complaints against him
was (sic) seasonably filed in the court of justice within the thirty-six (36)-hour
period prescribed by law as discussed above. The duty of the detaining
officers is deemed complied with upon the filing of the complaints. Further
action, like issuance of a Release Order, then rests upon the judicial authority
(People v. Acosta [CA] 54 O.G. 4739).17

The above disposition is in keeping with Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for

the Military,18 wherein we ordained that –

. . . Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial
Court, the intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act, the
detained person is informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his
application with the court, he may be released on bail. Petitioner himself
acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order his release when he applied
for and was granted his release upon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose
underlying Article 125 has been duly served with the filing of the complaint
with the MCTC. We agree with the position of the Ombudsman that such
filing of the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in
said Article.

All things considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, we have no

choice but to defer to the Office of the Ombudsman’s determination that the
facts on hand do not make out a case for violation of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code.l^vvphi1.net

As we have underscored in numerous decisions --

We have consistently refrained from interfering with the investigatory and

prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman absent any compelling reason. This
policy is based on constitutional, statutory and practical considerations. We
are mindful that the Constitution and RA 6770 endowed the Office of the
Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial powers,
virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention, in order to
insulate it from outside pressure and improper influence. Moreover, a
preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits
of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so
that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of
law, to order an acquittal. Hence, if the Ombudsman, using professional
judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such
findings, unless clothed with grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the
functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office
of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it. In much the
same way, the courts will be swamped with cases if they will have to review
the exercise of discretion on the part of fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each
time the latter decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by
a private complainant.19 (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition dated 27 May 2002 is

hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Joint Resolution dated 31 January
2002 and the Order dated 25 March 2002 of the Office of the Ombudsman
are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.