Project Eagle
Project Eagle
Project Eagle
FINAL REPORT
Information Center
DECEMBER 1975 Commerce City, Coforade
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3.REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
12/00/75
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
*■ Tß)Ä'MusTARDDEMILITARIZATION AT ROCKY MOUNTAIN ARSENAL, DENVER, COLORADO,
PROJECT EAGLE, PHASE I, FINAL REPORT
6. AUTHOR(S)
URSILLO, J.; MCKINNEY, A.; JURISON, A.
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
OF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACT
UNCLASSIFIED
NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18
ü. S. ARMY ROCKY MOUNTAIN ARSENAL
DENVER, COLORADO 80240
FINAL REPORT
Accesion For
NTIS CRA&I
PREPARED BY: DTIC TAB
Unannounced D
CPT J. A. URSILLO Justification
1LT A. L. McKINNEY
2LT A. G. JURISON
By.._
MR. L. M. LOJEK
MR. J. B. WICKS Distribution/
Availability Codes
Avail and/or
Dist Special
ti
INTRODUCTION
This report has been prepared in detail to record all pertinent facets of the Mustard
Demilitarization Program at Rocky Mountain Arsenal from the project's inception in
October 1969 to July 1974.
Figures, tables, and a List of References relating to the text are presented in the rear of each
section, as applicable.
•
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
PARA
SECTION 1
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
1_1
1.1 SUMMARY • • •
l
1.2 CONCLUSIONS .........................••••••■ ~l
SECTION 2
BACKGROUND
SECTION 3
INITIAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING
SECTION 4
FINAL SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING
SECTION 5
OPERATIONAL PHASE
5
5.1 TRAINING OF PERSONNEL ~l
5 l
5.2 AGENT OPERATIONS (1972) ~
5 8
5.3 AGENT OPERATIONS (1973) ~
5 30
5.4 AGENT OPERATIONS (1974) • • -
#
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
PARA PAGE
SECTION 6
PRODUCTION CONTROL PROCEDURES AND SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE
SECTION 7
BUDGET AND COST SUMMARY
7
i GENERAL 7-1
7.: ORIGINAL SCHEDULE-NO. I, OCTOBER 1969 7-1
" 5 SCHEDULE REVISION-NO. 2, MARCH 1970 7-2
"4 SCHEDULE REVISION-NO. 3, AUGUST 1970 7-2
75 SCHEDULE REVISION-NO. 4, OCTOBER 1970 7-3
7
.<; SCHEDULE REVISION-NO. 5, NOVEMBER 1970 7-4
SCHEDULE REVISION-NO. 6, JANUARY 1971 7-4
7
.8 SCHEDULE REVISION - NO. 7, APRIL 1971 7-6
".'•) SCHEDULE REVISION-NO. 8, JULY 1971 7-7
7.10 SCHEDULE REVISION-NO. 9, AUGUST 1971 7-8
7.11 SCHEDULE REVISION-NO. 10, SEPTEMBER 1971 7-8
7.12 SCHEDULE REVISION - NO. 11, NOVEMBER 1971 7-9
7.13 SCHEDULE REVISION - NO. 12, JANUARY 1972 7-10
7.14 SCHEDULE REVISION - NO. 13, JULY 1972 7-11
7.15 SCHEDULE REVISION-NO. 14, SEPTEMBER 1972 7-12
7.16 OPERATIONALPHASE 7-14
7.17 REVISED BUDGET ESTIMATE-DECEMBER 1973 7-15
7.18 SUMMARY OF SCHEDULES AND COSTS 7-15
7.19 FINAL REPORT COST SUMMARY 7-16
FINAL MUSTARD DEMIL COST REPORT - RMA 7-17
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
PARA PAGE
SECTION 8
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY CONSIDERATIONS
SECTION 9
PERSONNEL STRUCTURE AND SUPPORTING SERVICES AT RMA
SECTION 10
MUSTARD PLANT LAY AW AY
APPENDIX A
1972 SYSTEM TEST SERIES
APPENDIX B
FINAL PLANT CONFIGURATION DESCRIPTION
m
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
LIST OF FIGURES
FIG.NO. PAGE
LIST OF TABLES
IV
+
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
PAGE
TABLE NO.
#
SECTION 1
1.1 SUMMARY
This report covers the demilitarization of excess stocks of the toxic agent Mustard at
Rocky Mountain Arsenal (RMA) between October 1969 and July 1974. During this
period of time the Department of Army decided to abandon possible sea burial of
these excess stocks and develop a plan to demilitarize them at the site where they
were stored. A Program Manager was established to manage this and other chemical
demilitarization programs. Rocky Mountain Arsenal became the first installation
where disposal of chemical stocks was planned, and the Mustard stocks were the first
to be scheduled for disposal.
The initial plans for disposal of Mustard at RMA were developed in 1969 and
budgeting, planning, scheduling and award of construction contracts occurred. The
initial system for disposal and environmental control was labeled The Tailor System
after its developer. An extensive engineering program was conducted under the
direction of Edgewood Arsenal to define the design parameters that related to agent
destruction, control of the environment, atmospheric monitoring, etc.
The initial system was delivered in June 1971 and final testing was undertaken. The
final approval process continued to become increasingly complex because of
environmental considerations and the wide breadth of interest in the program, and
resulted in changing requirements the system was expected to meet. It became
apparent early in 1972 that the Tailor System, as originally constituted, could not
meet the desired production rates within the environmental constraints now defined.
For this reason the program was redirected to utilize other furnaces and additional
scrubbing equipment available in the Rocky Mountain Arsenal plants area. Once the
final tests were completed and approvals received, the production effort began in
August 1972 and continued at an improving production rate through the remainder
of the program. There was a continual upgrading of the plant production capability
and the pollution control equipment during the program. The burning of all liquid
agent was completed in November 1973 and the decontamination of all containers
completed by February 1974. Subsequently, a test program to support other
demilitarization programs (Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System) was
conducted so that with the final cleanup of the plant, the final completion of the
program was in August 1974.
This report details the experience gained in this program and summarizes schedule
and cost changes.
1.2 CONCLUSIONS
1-1
There was no water contamination emanating from this operation nor was there any
lessening of the air quality as a result of the operation.
While the disposal of scrap, iron oxide and ash from this operation posed no
problem, the final disposition of the salts remains to be determined; several courses
including its use to stabilize land fills, possible burial or ocean disposal, all remain
possible candidates for its final disposal.
1-2
SECTION 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 GENERAL
Two types of bulk mustard were involved in the disposal program at Rocky
Mountain Arsenal; they are identified as H and HD mustard. Type H mustard was
made by the Levinstein process, and contains as much as 30 percent impurities by
weight, which tend to settle out when stored. These impurities are chiefly sulfur,
organosulfurchlorides and polysulfides. Type HD mustard has been purified; it is
relatively free of organic impurities and is almost pure 2,2' dichlorodiethyl sulfide.
Iron oxide corrosion products occur in both types of mustard.
During the 1942-1944 period, mustard agent was producted at the above plants,
using the Levinstein process; this process is essentially the reaction of ethylene with
sulfur monochloride and yields mustard agent and free sulfur. The reaction can be
shown as:
/CH2-CH2C1
SoCh + 2 CH-» = CH2 >S +S
X
CH2-CH2C1
The sulfur, which initially combines with the mustard agent, separated out when
stored. Freshly prepared Levinstein mustard contained approximately 68 to 70
percent mustard agent. During storage, however, the Levinstein mustard (H) in
unprotected steel munitions or storage containers becomes markedly deteriorated
and unstable.2 With its polysulfide content, the Levenstein mustard attacked the steel;
.the loosely-held sulfur oxidized the iron to ferrous sulfide, which then dissolves in
the sulfonium salts that were present. 3
It was evident that the deleterious impurities of the Levinstein mustard should be
removed. The process for removal included washing with water, drying, and vacuum
distillation. The product, distilled mustard, or HD, contains about 92 to 95 percent
mustard agent, and is much more stable than the Levinstein mustard.
» 2-1
By 1944, the distilled mustard (HD) was classified as the standard agent, and the
Levenstein mustard (H) was reclassified as a substitute standard.4 "By standardizing
HD, existing stocks of deteriorated Levinstein H could be converted to the more
stable HD, immediately usable when drawn upon. Moreover, at the end of the war it
would be economically unsound to be saddled with large stores of unstable mustard.
To destroy the material would be wasteful, yet surveillance and gradual disposal of
deteriorating stores might cost even more. HD stocks, on the other hand, could be
retained in postwar reserves."5 This reasoning eventually led to the transfer of all
bulk Levinstein mustard stocks to Rocky Mountain Arsenal, where it was to be
distilled into HD during 1945 and 1946. The distilled mustard (HD) was to be put
into ton cylinders for stockpile retention.
During the 1947 to 1950 period, obsolete and deteriorating 155MM, 105MM and
75MM shells filled with undistilled Levinstein mustard (H) were demilitarized at
RMA. The agent drained from these shells was put into ton containers for storage
until it could be upgraded by distillation to HD; however, the upgrading did not
occur, because the course of other events limited the need for this agent.
13 DISPOSAL PLANNING
Late in 1968, a survey of toxic material storage in depots and storage areas revealed
-that disposal of certain munitions and bulk agents would purge the stockpile of
obsolete, excess, and unserviceable chemical munitions and/or bulk agent. Further,
an undesirable situation had developed at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, near Denver.
Colorado, where recent airport expansion, industrial development, and population
growth were encroaching on the west and south edges of the Arsenal. Political
considerations and the hazards of a possible accident led to the decision to remove
munitions and agents from the Denver area.6
One of the excess items in the stockpile was the ton containers filled with bulk
mustard (H and HD). The decision to dispose of these stocks in sea burial operations
was made in May 1969 with the US Navy conducting the operation. At that time,
twelve similar disposal actions had been accomplished, three of which involved
chemical materials: 19 June 1967, 19 June 1968, and 7 August 1968. The Navy
referred to this program of disposal at sea as Operation CHASE (Navy acronym for
"Cut Holes And Sink Em"). It was thought to be the fastest and safest way of
disposing the hazardous material.
#
2-2
The bulk mustard agent stockpile at RMA in 1969, is shown in Table 2-1. As a
result of a «evaluation of the mustard agent requirements at that time, the RMA
bulk mustard stockpile was determined to be excess and therefore designated for
disposal. 6
As objections to the Army's plans for sea disposal developed, objections were voiced
by several Congressmen, led by Rep. Richard D. McCarthy of New York. The
Congressmen were concerned with the hazards to the public during shipment of the
material to the East Coast dock sites and with the possible ecological impact of
contamination of the ocean that might affect marine life at the burial site. As a
result of these concerns, and with others relating to the nerve agents included in
Operation CHASE, the Department of Defense announced that the shipments would
be suspended, pending a review by the National Academy of Sciences.
The members of the NAS Ad Hoc Committee were selected to bring a broad range
of relevant scientific and engineering expertise to bear on this matter, including
chemistry, biology, toxicology, physiology, and oceanography, as well as practical
experience in manufacture, handling, transportation, and disposal of hazardous
materials, including explosives and chemical warfare agents.
# 2-3
Their discussion of the bulk mustard developed that:
''In the past, various chemical warfare agents have been repeatedly disposed of in the
oceans by the United States and other nations (see, for instance, House of Commons
Parliamentary Debates, Weekly Hansard, No. 484, 25 March- 31 March 1960). We
have no information regarding possible deleterious effects of these operations on the
ecosystem of the seas.
"Most of the one-ton containers of mustard would probably not rupture upon the
bottom impact of the sinking CHASE ship. However, their brass valves (forming an
electrochemical couple) would cause moderately rapid corrosion of the steel
containers, so that large numbers of cylindrical shapes of solid mustard weighing
about a ton each would eventually be exposed to sea water on the bottom.
Considering the very slow rate of solution of solid mustard in sea water at 3.5°C, the
rate of its hydrolysis (and hence detoxification), and the effects of dissolved
mustard on fresh-water fish, we believe that the ocean volume made lethal to fish
would, in all probability, be extremely small, although some pollution would
continue for years. We are concerned, however, about the effects of mustard on the
germ cells of fish and on unicellular and larval organisms, concerning which no
quantitative data were available. Thus, the effects of these large masses of mustard
on the oceanic ecosystem are not predictable.
"Mustard is readily combustible and, in the past, about 3,000 tons of it have been
destroyed by burning in a special furnace at the RMA.
"Some of the products of combustion are air pollutants of the same type as those
released in some industrial and electric-power-generating activities, namely hydrogen
chloride and sulfur dioxide, and none have properties of chemical warfare agents."
"The mustard scheduled for disposal in CHASE (and about 6,600 tons more in the
7,332 containers still to be disposed of, as mentioned previously) be burned in
government establishments where storage is safe and local air pollution from the
resulting SO~> and HC1 is not a serious problem. This procedure was successfully
followed at RMA in an incinerator having a heat dissipation capacity of about
17(10)6 BTU/hr. The products of combustion were dispersed into the air from a
2-4
200-foot chimney. Should maximum ground-level concentrations of pollutants
prove to be excessive, a simple liquid scrubber should be added to the existing
facilities and the effluent sent to the sealed lake. If for compelling reasons, the
disposal is at a site other than RMA, similar facilities are suggested, with thought
being given, during design, to long-term use to incinerate other materials."
2-5
REFERENCES
1
Letter to RMA, CMLET-C, Subject: (Project E7a-1 Job 9) "Recommendations on
Mustard", dated 3 Jan 1974.
2
Chemical Corps Board Study 6-52, "H vs HD vs TGH", 22 Jan 1953, approved 6 May
1953.
3
Letter to RMA, CMLET-C, "Recommendations on Mustard".
4
CWTC Item 1049, Standardization of Persistent Agent, HD, dated 10 June 1944 and
approved by item 1094, same subject, dated 7 Jul 1944.
5
Cml Corps Board Study 6-52, p. 1.
6
Letter to RMA, AMCMR-DS, subject: Disposition of U.S. Stockpile of Mustard Agent
and Munitions, dated 23 Feb 1969.
Statement by Mr. Charles L. Poor, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research
and Development) to the 91st Congress on 13 May 1969.
^"Report of the Disposal Hazards of Certain Chemical Warfare Agents and Munitions",
prepared by an Ad Hoc Advisory Committee of the National Academy of Sciences, 24 Jun
1969.
2-6
SECTION 3
The MUCOM Ad Hoc Committee determined that the preliminary procedures and
concepts considered by RMA for the detoxification of the bulk mustard agent were
not adequate to permit initiation of the disposal operations. Furthermore, the
Committee recommended postponement of the incineration until pollution baseline
and stack effluent data were obtained and permanent monitoring sites were
established.^
A. "The basic guiding principle will be absolute safety and security rather than
cost or time.
C. "There must be absolute assurance that toxic agent released from any possible
accident during the demilitarization, detoxification, incineration operations
will be totally contained.
3-1
D. "All aspects of the operation must be justifiable from a personnel safety,
security and community safeguard standpoint with sufficient hard data so as to
be incontrovertible in the event the procedures, facilities, and concepts of
operations are challenged in an objective evaluation of the program."3
The first program review meeting of Task Force Eagle was held 13 August 1969.
Task or problem areas were established and the primary responsibility for each of
them was assigned. The original problem areas and primary responsibilities
associated with the mustard disposal program were defined as:
These "problem areas" became agenda items for follow-up review meetings which
were held at approximate two-week intervals through 1971. The responsible
elements submitted written reports and outlined their progress and problems during
these regular meetings.
The major tasks facing the task group were (1) the preparation of a scope of work
for the incinerator/scrubber procurement, (2) the establishment of an air quality
baseline survey of RMA, and (3) the development of a detailed step-by-step mustard
disposal operation plan.
To accomplish the first major task, chemical process engineers at Edgewood Arsenal,
on 19 September 1969, provided the contracting officers with a scope of work
describing incinerator/scrubber requirements. On 29 September 1969, requests for
proposals were issued to sixty-two firms. After some difficulty concerning financial
responsibility, the proposal of Tailor & Company, Inc., was found responsive to the
technical requirements and a contract was awarded on 11 February 1960. The
contractor was required to design, fabricate and install an incinerator/scrubber
system, and a spent effluents drying system at RMA. The two systems were to
operate as one complete incineration system. The contract required that the
3-2
equipment be installed and that component and subsystem testing be completed by
9 September 1970. After several delays due to design modifications and equipment
delivery, the plant was considered complete and agent simulant tests were started in
June 1971.
Between June and December 1971, several test runs were conducted, first with
mustard simulant and then with live agent. For many reasons, the system never
operated in the desired manner. It should be noted that, after contract award, there
were two major categories of changes imposed on the incineration system. The first
category of changes resulted from the unanticipated and objectionable
corrosive/erosive effect of iron oxide mixed in the combustion products. The second
category of changes resulted from more stringent emission standards imposed on
RMA by Federal and State environmental regulations. The initial pilot tests
demonstrated that to convert mustard to harmless byproducts, within the restrictive
environmental standards, was a difficult technical challenge. Consequently, a special
process engineering team was established at Edgewood Arsenal. This team developed
formal process and equipment testing plans to determine the performance of
existing equipment and to study alternate equipment and process techniques. These
tests and their results are detailed in Appendix A.
The Tailor System did not survive the series of tests described in Appendix A. There
was no economic or schedule advantage in renovating the Tailor System: this led to
the decision to abandon the Tailor System process and instead dispose of the bulk
mustard in the ton container furnace system at RMA.
When the mustard disposal program was originally developed in 1969, a relatively
simple approval route was necessary. The usual Army approvals for toxic movement
and disposal plants had to be obtained for such items as a site plan, a safety
submission, and operating procedures. To this was added a comprehensive review of
the mustard disposal plan by the special MUCOM Ad Hoc Committee, to ensure that
the recommendations made by the National Academy of Sciences were followed.
The procedures for the demilitarization of mustard agent were developed and
outlined in the initial disposal plan, dated 5 October 1969. This plan was modified
by the second report of the Ad Hoc Committee, dated 6 to 8 October 1969 and
approved by the Department of the Army.
As this plan was being put into action, several new Federal laws and regulations were
enacted which complicated the approval route. The demilitarization of lethal
chemical and biological munitions and agents and the cleanup of facilities and
grounds supporting such operations became rigidly controlled by Public Laws
91-121,91-441 and 91-190.
The latter law, known as the National Environmental Policy Act, required filing an
environmental impact statement with the President's Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) (established by PL 91-190) and notification of Congress prior to
initiation of demilitarization operations. Furthermore, PL 91-121 and PL 91-441
required that all movements and demil plans involving lethal chemical agents be
3-3
reviewed by the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service, Department of
Health, Education and Welfare.
A national press conference concerning the mustard disposal program was held at
Rocky Mountain Arsenal on 20 July 1971, during which full-scale disposal
operations were announced as beginning in late August of that year. The initial
testing, however, revealed major system problems which required equipment
modifications. Full-scale operations were postponed as a result of these, and
subsequent pilot tests. The testing continued for approximately one year, during
which the mustard disposal process was revised to include bulk agent incineration in
the modified ton container furnaces. The tests were finally concluded with the
preproduction tests in June 1972.
The preproduction tests included the safety review survey and the plant emissions
tests, which were observed by Federal and State officials. A Senior Advisory Panel
also examined the revised process. This panel, composed of technical experts, was
established by Army Materiel Command (AMC) to review technical approaches and
engineering designs pertinent to all chemical demilitarization programs.
3-4
The revised plan and safety submission, as modified by the Ad Hoc Committee, was
then submitted to and approved by the Surgeon General of the U.S. Public Health
Service, HEW and to the Chairman of the DOD Explosive Safety Board. Since the
revised plan did not change any environmental considerations, personnel health
requirements or emission standards, the environmental impact statement already on
file with the Council of Environmental Quality was sufficient and no further
approvals were required before startup of the disposal operations at Rocky
Mountain Arsenal.
The Army Staff, specifically MUCOM, took the NAS recommendations and
developed a study dealing with the integrity of the membrane in Basin F. The
MUCOM study concluded that while there was no outward appearance, based on
monitoring of wells around the basin, of any leakage, the integrity of the membrane
must remain suspect. As a result of this study, Task Force Eagle was directed to
select alternate ways of disposing of the waste material other than Basin F. TFE
looked at several alternatives, such as:
3-5
REFERENCES
1
Message AMSMU-CG, 291530Z July 1969, subject: "Ad Hoc Committee on Review
of RMA Chemical Demil Procedures".
^Third Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of Rocky Mountain Arsenal
Demilitarization and Disposal Procedure for One-Ton Containers of Mustard Agent, dated
11-13 Jul 1972.
3-6
SECTION 4
4.1.1 ALTERNATES
Results obtained from the series of opeiational tests on the Tailor System indicated
that the system might not meet the 3-gallon per minute (GPM) design incineration
rate, within the emission requirements given in the Environmental Impact
Statement. A recommendation was forwarded on 24 November 1971 from Rocky
Mountain Arsenal to Edgewood Arsenal, * which called for initiation of action to
obtain an alternate method of bulk mustard disposal using agent nozzles in the
Building 538 ton container furnaces. This alternate approach was originally
envisioned as a stopgap measure to begin the mustard demilitarization operation
while the already extended Tailor System shakedown continued. The feasibility of a
maximum disposal rate of one gallon per minute was agreed to by Task Force Eagle
Mustard and Safety Representatives as well as US Army Environmental Hygiene
Agency, Air Pollution Engineering Division; however, the recommendation was not
favorably considered by the Director of Manufacturing Technology, Edgewood
Arsenal, MD- on 7 December 1971, because of the unproven capability of the ton
container furnace to burn mustard. It was recognized that it had sufficient merit to
be considered as an alternative method as a backup to the Tailor system.
A meeting to evaluate the status of the Tailor disposal system was held during the
week of 1 March 1972 and was attended by the Arsenal Commander.3 The purpose
of the meeting included consideration of alternate approaches including the ton
container furnaces as the mustard bulk incinerators. The Tailor Reactor appeared
capable of performing at the 3 GPM design rate; however, scrubber plugging
problems associated with production of iron salts prevented the entire system from
functioning as designed within the environmental constraints. A decision point for
possible consideration of the ton container furnace to replace the Tailor System was
established 15 April 1972 pending the results of a battery of additional tests. (The
detailed objectives and results of these tests are contained in the Edgewood Arsenal
Special Report by Mr. Lojfk dated June 1974).
When the approval to proceed with the concept of the ton container furnace bulk
incinerator was requested of US Army Materiel Command (AMC) by US Army
Munitions Command (MUCOM) on 29 March 1972, the request stated the opinion
of MUCOM that the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), previously approved
for the Tailor system, need not be restaffed. It was felt that the new procedure did
not represent a significant departure from the previously submitted EIS. The
adaption of this interim program change was acknowledged to require revision of the
approved Plan and Safety Submission. AMC approved the concept on 11 April 1972
4-1
pending the successful completion of the pilot studies described below. On 21 April
1972 the Department of the Army, Office Chief of Staff for Force Development
concurred in the concept of the interim reduced rate, pending procurement of a new
spray dryer and electrostatic precipitator, and agreed that the re-staffing of the EIS
was unnecessary. The approval was sent to CG, USAMUCOM on 28 April 1972,
along with the request for a revised plan and safety submission. The revised Safety
Submission and Plan was submitted to MUCOM in June 1972 for approval.
The use of the two ton container furnaces for bulk agent incineration was explored
in April and May 1972 and proved feasible. The spraying of agent through a furnace
nozzle proved more desirable than the "dribble" method also considered, since it
provided better combustion, less ash buildup in the furnace, and a higher feed rate
(1.1 GPM versus 0.8 GPM respectively). The furnace temperature at this time was
limited to 2100°F to prevent heat damage to the firebrick. Run A-10 was conducted
from 19 to 22 May 1972, feeding mustard to both furnaces simultaneously. The
maximum rate achieved was 2.0 GPM. The mustard emission limit of 0.03 gr/m3 was
not exceeded during the A-l through A-10 test runs. Runs A-l through A-9 were
made without the benefit of the leased dry electrostatic precipitator.
Test Runs P-4 through P-9 were conducted utilizing a one bay dry electrostatic
precipitator ("Dustmobile") leased from Precipitair Pollution Control, Longview,
Texas. This piece of equipment was connected to the Tailor System for test runs
during the 9 to 13 May 1972 period. Later for Runs P-4 through P-9, conducted
from 22 May to 2 June 1972, it was utilized with the effluent gases from the Ton
Container furnaces, operating at- 1 GPM mustard feed. There were problems
observed during operation of the "Dustmobile" in this mode. The primary problem
was accumulation of condensate within the precipitator, causing electrical shorting.
It was determined that the optimum operation of the precipitator was at a gas
velocity of 4.5 feet per second, or 80 percent of the total furnace effluent; this
entailed use of a bypass from the scrubber exit to the 200-foot stack to
accommodate the excess effluent and resulted in an obvious reddish plume at the
top of the 200-foot stack, as well as a reddish plume from the electrostatic
precipitator (ESP) stack. The opacity exceeded the State's limit and therefore was a
problem. It was temporarily helped by an agreement with the State of Colorado5
designating the Mustard Operation as "an experimental operation, best described as
an incinerator". This allowed operation for 142 operating days as a pilot phase,
where the plume opacity could be 40 percent rather than the 20 percent required.6
Since one of the conclusions of the P-4 through P-9 test runs was that an improved
dust collection system was required, the agreement with the State gave the necessary
latitude to allow operations to commence. At a 20 April 1972 meeting at Edgewood
Arsenal,7 it was decided to commence operations. At this meeting the decision to
abandon the Tailor system in favor of the ton container furnace disposal system was
essentially complete.
Approval to proceed with the concept of the ton container furnace bulk incinerator
was requested of CG, US Army Material Command by US Army Munitions
4-2
Command on 29 March 1972.^ This request stated the opinion of MUCOM that the
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) previously approved for the Tailor system
need not be restaffed since the new procedure did not represent a significant
deviation from this previously submitted EIS. The adaption of the interim program
change to the ton container furnaces was acknowledged to require revision of the
approved Plan and Safety Submission. The concept was approved on 11 April 1972
by US Army Material Command^ pending success of the pilot studies described
above. Department of Army, Office of Chief of Staff for Force Development
concurred in the concept of the interim reduced rate disposal procedure on 21 April,
1972,'" pending procurement of a new spray dryer and electrostatic precipitator.
Restaffing of the EIS was deemed unnecessary. The approval of the concept was
sent to CG, USAMUCOM on 28 April 1974,1 J along with the request for a revised
plan and safety submission. This revised Safety Submission and Plan was submitted
to MUCOM in June 1972 for approval.
Two preproduction test runs were conducted in June 1972.^ The first run, T-l, was
conducted from 14 to 20 June to ensure that the ton container furnace system was
ready for the simultaneous incineration of bulk mustard and the decontamination of
the resulting empty ton containers without generating excessive pollutant emissions.
Army Environmental Hygiene Agency (USAEHA) sampled the effluent gases from
scrubber and ESP for mustard, particulates, NOx, SOx, acid mist and total acidity at
various combinations of process conditions. Also the degree of split of the scrubber
effluent stream to the 200-foot stack was studied in order to achieve the minimum
overall plume opacity from the two exit stacks. Approximately 2,050 gallons of
liquid mustard were incinerated at an average feed of 0.85 GPM. Five ton containers
were burned with mustard residue weight ranging from 405 pounds to 705 pounds.
The results of stack sampling showed negligible SOx, very low levels of NOx, acid
mist and total acidity. Also mustard and particulate emissions were well within
allowable limits. 12 Plume opacity readings of both the 200-foot and ESP stacks
were marginally acceptable. A split of scrubber effluent of 80 percent to the
precipitator and 20 percent to the 200-foot stack was recommended.
The second preproduction checkout test was Run T-2 (26 to 30 June 1972).^ Its
primary objective was to demonstrate the reliability and safety of the Mustard
Demilitarization system, to verify the adequacy of the Standing Operating
Procedures and to demonstrate that all pollution emissions were within the
appropriate limits defined by the existing Colorado and Army Standards. USAEHA
again took part in the test. The west furnace was used to incinerate bulk mustard
introduced into the rear of the furnace through two atomizing nozzles. The east ton
container furnace was used to decontaminate ton containers. The nominal agent
feed rate was 1 GPM at a mixture of 2.5 parts H (Levinstein) mustard to 1 part HD
(Distilled) mustard. The Levinstein mustard contained the bulk of the sludge,
particulate matter and iron oxide.
4-3
Evaluation of effluent gas constituents was the same as in Run T-l. USAEHA
personnel determined that, with the exception of the plume opacity (5 percent
maximum), the emissions from the disposal operation did not violate the applicable
standards. As a result of these test runs, USAEHA recommended^ that pilot
production operations commence according to the revised detoxification plan. The
helpful approach taken by the State of Colorado greatly aided this recommendation.
A preoperational safety survey of the mustard facility was conducted at RMA during
the period 26 through 30 June 1972,4 in accordance with Edgewood Arsenal
Regulation SMUEA 385-7. The survey was made to evaluate the design and the
installation of the mustard facility, the procedures, and the operations as they
affected safety. The survey team was led by Mr. Leonard M. Lojek of the Edgewood
Arsenal Demil/Disposal Office and included Mr. Neil H. Baker of the EA Safety
Office, Mr. Bruce Chandler of the EA Product Assurance Office and CPT Hugh
Stringer, Assistant for Demilitarization Operations at RMA.
The team followed the RMA standing operating procedures as well as a safety
checklist and AMCR 385-1 (Safety Regulations for Chemical Agents H, HD, and
HT) in evaluating the plant. In their assessment, the team emphasized: the degree of
safety provided, the adequacy of the SOP for safety, and the effectiveness of
production techniques and quality controls relative to safety.
As a result of the survey, the team concluded that: no safety deficiencies were
serious enough to prevent production startup of the mustard disposal facility; the
minor deficiencies found were immediately correctable; and additional training of
the operation personnel was required to improve the understanding of their tasks
and their proficiency in performing them.
As a result of the above, the Commanding Officer of EA forwarded the results of the
preoperational safety survey and the USAEHA emission evaluation (described
above) to CG USAMUCOM on 17 July 1972,13 with the recommendation that the
survey report be approved and that pilot scale operations commence; the start of
full-scale operations was still dependent on receipt and installation of the new spray
dryer and electrostatic precipitator, and approval of the June 1972 revised Safety
Submission and Plan.
An examination of the revised process was also made by the Scientific Advisory
Panel, chaired by Dr. Paul Gross.^ This panel, composed of technical experts, was
established by US Army Materiel Command to review technical approaches and
engineering design pertinent to all chemical demilitarization programs.
4-4
Office, USAEHA, and the DOD Explosive Safety Board. The personnel of the
mustard disposal program team presented technical and management data relevant
to the revised plan.
One additional requirement that resulted from the 11 to 13 July meeting of the
MUCOM AD/HOC Committee was that the thaw room be challenged to insure agent
containment. The thaw room had been evaluated by USAEHA in February 1971
from an air flow standpoint, but live agent was not used. The decision to use
mustard agent resulted from the fact that no known simulant met the required
sensitivity levels, and no presently known substance, other than mustard vapor,
could give a reliable indication of the containment capability of the thaw room and
the scrubbing capability of the charcoal filters. The test was conducted on 26 July
1972. It indicated that the mustard thaw room had satisfactory vapor integrity with
the exception of the roof duct inclosure area. A further challenge was carried out
after room modifications, with satisfactory results. A preliminary report was
published by RMA Quality Assurance Office on 27 July 1972;^0 followed by a
message report to CG, USAMUCOM on 3 August 1972,21 in response to a message
query received on 1 August 1972,^2 with a final report being forwarded to DDESB
on 24 August 1972.23
4-5
REFERENCES
^FOUO Talking Paper, subject: Results of Meeting with Col. Stoner, CO, EA, week of
1 Mar 1972.
^EA Special Report EASP, titled "Bulk Mustard Demilitarization at Rocky Mountain
Arsenal April 1969 through September 1972", dated Jun 1974 by Mr. Leonard M. Lojek.
5
Letter from State of Colorado to RMA, dated 19 Jun 1972, signed by Dr. Wood.
ÖRMA Travel Report, dated 13 Apr 1972 by Capt. Stringer to Georgia Institute of
Technology.
7RMA Memo for Record, dated 24 Apr 1972 by Maj. E.S. Lipson, subject: "Rocky
Mountain Arsenal Demilitarization Programs".
8
MUCOM Letter, dated 29 Mar 1972 to AMC, subject: "Environmental Impact
Statement for Mustard Demil at Rocky Mountain Arsenal".
9
First Indenture to above, to HQDA (DAFD-CNS), dated 11 AprT972.
10
Second Indenture to above, to AMC (AMCMV-VM), dated 21 Apr 1972.
1
! Third Indenture to above, to MUCOM (AMSMU-MS-CH), dated 28 Apr 1972.
'^USAEHA Letter to EA, dated 7 Jul 1972, "Evaluation of Emissions from Bulk
Mustard Operations, Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Denver, Colorado".
13
EA Letter to MUCOM, dated 17 Jul 1972, subject: "Preoperational Survey of
Mustard Disposal Facilities at Rocky Mountain Arsenal".
14
"Third Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of Rocky Mountain Arsenal
Demilitarization and Disposal Procedure for One-Ton Containers of Mustard Agent", dated
11-13 Jul 1972.
l^HEW Letter to Assistant Secretary of Army, Mr. Mecum, dated 5 Sep 1972, no
subject.
16
DDESB Memo to Assistant Secretary of Army (I & L), dated 4 Aug 1972, subject:
"Revised Safety Submission and Plan for the Detoxification Mustard and Detoxification of
Empty Ton Containers at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado".
17
DA, DAFD-CNC Letter to AMC (AMCSA-BC), dated 11 Sep 1972, subject:
"Mustard Disposal at Rocky Mountain Arsenal".
4-6
18
MUCOM, TWX to DA (DAFD-CNS), dated 7 Aug 1972, subject: same as above.
19
RMA Letter to MUCOM (AMSMU-MS-CH), dated 28 Sep 1972, subject: "Response
to Recommendations of Senior Advisory Panel".
20
RMA, Quality Assurance Memo to CO, dated 27 Jul 1972, subject: "Special Test
SOP, Test of the Total Containment of the Thaw Room".
21
RMA, TWX, dated 2 Aug to MUCOM (AMSMU-MD-CH), subject: "Agent
Containment Trial - Mustard Thaw Room".
22
MUCOM, TWX, dated 1 Aug 1972 to RMA, subject: "Agent Containment
Trial - Mustard Thaw Room".
23
RMA (QA) Letter to DDESB, dated 24 Aug 1972, subject: "Agent Challenge of
Mustard Thaw Room, Building 537", w/ RMA Test Report inclosed.
4-7
SECTION 5
OPERATIONAL PHASE
Personnel training began on a one-shift basis on 18 July 1972. This training dealt
with the operation of the "Dustmobile" and was given over a four-day period. One
shift mustard incineration began on 27 July 19-72.1
The first shift Engineer trained his shift during the period 27 July to 4 August 1972.
This shift was subsequently sent to work in the clothing treatment plant, until
required to start shift work on mustard disposal. The second shift started training on
7 August 1972 on day shift, completing its five-day, on-the-job training on 11
August 1972. The training of the third shift began on 14 August 1972, and was
completed 18 August 1972. During the third shift training period the second shift
was placed on the swing shift disposing of trash in ton container halves. The training
of all three shifts consisted of on-the-job training in the Standing Operating
Procedures and in the equipment operation. The short duration (five days) of this
live agent training seems brief but it must be recognized that the work force cadre
had been involved in the Tailor System shakedown, and the simultaneous testing
operation of the ton container furnace system.
Phase I Demilitarization of Bulk Agent began in the west ton container furnace on a
three-shift basis at 0735 hours on Monday, 21 August 1972. The operation should
have begun at 0001 hours but was delayed due to an interference with mustard
monitoring when trash was being burned in the east ton container furnace.
Operational problems other than the monitoring interference which occurred during
this first 9 days of operation at 3 shifts were those that had surfaced during testing
of the west furnace disposal system. These problems were Dustmobile electrical
problems, agent spray nozzle plugging, and Moyno pump packing leaking. Some
time was lost due to transferring agent from one storage tank to another by vacuum.
This problem was to continue until installation of the submerged centrifugal agent
pump.
5-1
Statistics for August:
T.C.'s burned: 32
During the period 18 through 2k September 1972, the plant was not
operating due to a scheduled shutdown for installation of modifications
to the east container furnace recommended by the Gross Committee (AMC
Senior Advisory Panel). These modifications mainly concerned installa-
tion of additional burners in the east ton container furnace to be used
in handling heavy residue weight ton containers during the latter part
of Phase I and throughout Phase III (Burners 5, 5A and 6, 6A on Figure
B-6). The east furnace only was to be equipped with these burners.
Subsequent modification of the west furnace was later recommended and
rejected. Additional work performed during this scheduled shutdown was
installation of a Hastalloy B duct between the east quench and east
scrubber system. The previously installed steel duct had not resisted
the corrosive nature (HC1 and HoSO^) of the quenched flue gases. A
homcmixer (combination homogenizer and mixer) was installed on the east
mustard storage tank to aid in reducing the operationally harmful
effects of the particulate matter in the storage tanks originating from
the H type mustard impurities. In addition to the above work on the
storage tank, the rotor and stator on the west Moyno pump were replaced,
but with only limited improvement in pump pressure. Repeated pluggings
of drain lines on the unload booths were experienced during September.
(The pipe size was increased in the new booth to overcome this deficien-
cy. ) This may have been induced by a condition of the unload hoses dis-
covered much later dealing with constriction of the inside diameter of
the rubber hoses due to absorption of agent.
5-2
itself which was deteriorating internally due to erosion from the iron oxide
particles in the brine. These problems were to continue throughout the use
of the Tailor dryer and the operational downtime reduced only by frequent
regular repair and replacement. The nozzle was changed out every week as
dictated by inspection; sooner if problem symptoms began to appear (wet or
damp salt in the spray dryer bottom, wall plastering, temperature indicators,
etc.)
There were no major system modifications during September other than Gross
burner installation.
T.C.'s drained: 62 H 25 HD
T.C.'s burned: 83
B. The east furnace auxiliary air fan motor failed on 12 October causing
a shutdown of the east T.C. furnace. The fan was replaced.
5-3
C. During Saturday punch-list work on 21 October, the scrubber discharge fan was
inspected to determine the need for rebalancing since it had been vibrating. The
fan was found to be beyond repair, but would probably operate for some time.
The fan impeller was to be replaced with a spare as soon as one was available.
D. The west homomixer installed in September froze and broke the motor
coupling, rendering it inoperational.
The one system modification during October was replacing air-cooled agent spray
nozzles in the west furnace with a new design utilizing recirculating process water
for cooling. This occurred during the weekend shutdown on Saturday, 21 October.
In addition to this system modification, there were two operational modifications.
The first change was to increase the west furnace operating temperature from
2000°F to 2200°F in an effort to obtain more GPM from the system. There were no
problems incurred at the time due to this higher temperature. The second
operational change was a n odification of the procedure to be used when the Tracor
monitoring instruments in '.he monitoring station failed, as was frequently the case
this early in the program. The Chief Engineer instructed the plant operating staff to
continue operations dunng Tracor failures, providing that repairs proceeded
immediately and that the scrubber effluent bubblers remained within acceptable
limits. This procedure was incorporated in the Operation's Standing Operating
Procedure.
T.C.'s drained: 88 H 28 HD
i'.CYs turned: 78
Overall GPM through nozzles: 0.48 (based on total available operating time)
Mustard operations (Phase I) continued on a three-shift basis with bulk in the west
T.C. furnace and ton containers in the east T.C. furnace. Added to the routine
5-4
downtime causes previously noted, was the unreasonably cold weather experienced
during November. At 0305 hours on 2 November, a mustard unload hose ruptured
spraying the interior of unload booth No. 2 with agent and contaminating two
operators. This incident necessitated a change in the protective clothing requirement
for use during unloading operations. Prior to this date "Congo Red" coveralls and
gloves with slung mask had been deemed sufficient. The clothing required as of 2
November 1972 was changed to apron, gas mask, and congo red impregnated hood.
In addition it was directed that the rotation of the ton containers with unloading
hose attached was to be limited to a maximum of 45° either direction from the
vertical. Change-out of unload hoses was to occur once per month with a log entry
made to verify the action. Additionally, the Commander of RMA directed that every
mustard demilitarization chemical plant operator be required to demonstrate to his
shift engineer or foreman his job proficiency in the operations which he was per-
forming. The Safety Office representative was to ensure that this directive was carried
out. A logbook entry was made to verify that the demonstrations had taken place. An
exclusion area around the front of the unload booths was marked in yellow paint on
the floor with large, clearly legible notices that specified protective clothing was
required within the area designated.
There were two system modifications installed during November, and the inception
of another:
A. The Moyno pump on the east mustard storage tank was replaced with a
submerged centrifugal pump during the 6 to 13 November shutdown.
Performance of this pump during November was not considered adequate due
to vibration and packing leakage problems. The pump was replaced with a
duplicate on 24 November. Agent pressures and startup times for this pump
were superior to those obtained with the previously installed Moyno pump.
The Moyno on the west tank was retained, however, due to its capability for
pumping fuel oil to the bulk agent incinerator. This was considered a safety
feature, since mustard could not be inadvertantly pumped to the oil tank.
Centrifugal pump duration: approximately 18 calendar days.
5-5
C. The mustard incident on 2 November accelerated planning regarding
installation of two new unload booths which would employ guillotine-type
doors and place the operator and glove ports at the opposite end from the
door, facing a sealed booth wall, this type of door could not be incorporated
into the older unloading booths as a modification, since there was no room on
the end of the booth opposite the door for glove ports, the entire unload piping
setup would have to be relocated, and guillotine doors could not be fitted with
glove ports.
An operational modification was made during November which limited the gross
weight of ton containers placed in the east furnace to 1700 pounds or less. Using a
tare of 1400 to 1500 pounds, this resulted in a maximum residue weight limit of
300 pounds. This was imposed due to the obvious difficulties which the east furnace
had in coping with large residue weight ton containers.
T.C.'s drained: 49 H 18 HD
Overall GPM through nozzles: 0.30 (based on total available operating time)
Mustard operation (Phase I) continued on a three-shift basis with bulk agent in the
west ton container furnace and residue containers in the east ton container furnace.
In addition to nozzle plugging, spray dryer problems, unload line plugging, and the
other equipment difficulties noted during previous months, the east centrifugal
pump continued to cause concern due to vibration, and consequently was run only
for short periods of time. It was eventually removed on 22 December and replaced
with a spare pump which operated satisfactorily for the rest of the month. It should
be mentioned at this time that centrifugal pumps and homomixers removed from
storage tanks were bagged and incinerated in the east ton container furnace on a
specially modified section of a ton container bottom. On removal from the tank, the
pumps (or homomixer) were allowed to hang from a specially installed overhead
5-6
hoist for a period of time sufficient to permit maximum drainage into the tank. The
equipment was then encased in a vapor-tight, pre-prepared bag of fabric reinforced,
metallized Mylar material. This entire operation was conducted in Level A clothing
with the pump deck and Building 537 area declared and posted as a mask area. The
area remained a mask area until bubblers registered clean. The equipment was placed
in the furnace and incinerated while still in the bag. Originally, heavy plastic had
been used in place of the Mylar material, but was found to be undesirable because it
tore easily. The pump or mixer was incinerated until it no longer was observed to
burn, removed from the furnace, allowed to cool, and sampled with a blue band
tube for agent. If the results were positive, it was reburned; if negative, the pump
was taken out of the plant to the maintenance shop for disassembly and rebuilt,
after which it was reserved as a spare for the pump in the tank. It was only at this
point that a determination could be made regarding the cause of failure.
A short test was conducted on 5 December to judge the necessity of the afterburner
on the west ton container furnace. If these burners could be turned off without
exceeding agent emissions, then the agent flow would be increased to make up for
the temperature loss. The test was of 7-hour duration and the results were not
favorable, in that stack mustard bubblers showed the necessity of the afterburner for
complete destruction of the agent.
A cold weather drain-down of the brine system was implemented on the 8 December
shutdown since unseasonably cold weather continued to plague startups with frozen
brine and caustic lines. The problem was abated considerably by drawing all liquid
from as many pipes as possible and keeping those which could not be drained (such
as brine tank lines) running throughout the weekend shutdown period. Winterization
housing was begun on the east scrubber system during the 16 to 17 December
shutdown; however, the cold weather shutdown remained in effect even after the
building annex was completed.
Bubblers throughout the entire mustard area gave high agent concentration readings
from 1630 to 1848 hours on 19 December as a result of material released to the
atmosphere by Shell Chemical Company. This was the first recognition by
laboratory personnel that the DB 3 colorimetric analysis method for mustard was
subject to interference from substances other than mustard agent. As a result, Shell
was requested to supply a list of substances produced or emitted which could be
screened by Quality Assurance Laboratory personnel for interference with the DB 3
method. The list was supplied, screened, tested by Quality Assurance and, resulted
in a list of 10 interference producing compounds for future reference. This
interference also occurred with the Timalog rapid response monitors.
Modifications during December consisted of the initial work required to bring the
hydrazine furnace into the desired configuration to burn bulk agent. The furnace
was fired on natural gas to 2050°F on 18 December as part of the checkout of its
systems.
T.C.'s drained: 97 H 35 HD
5-7
Agent drained: 178,903 lbs
Overall GPM through nozzles: 0.63 (based on total available operating time)
The centrifugal pump which had been installed on 22 December had to be changed
out again on 6 January 1973 since it had developed a sudden loss in outlet pressure
despite indications of normal functioning. Upon decontamination, it was found that
a hole had been worn through the right-angle elbow where the pump outlet makes a
directional change from the horizontal volute to the vertical outlet line. It was
thought that continuous erosion caused by the abrasive nature of the mustard agent
impurities had caused the hole to develop. The pump had continued to operate as
designed, but the liquid (rather than being forced to the pump deck) was being
pumped back into the tank.
5-8
The scrubber exhaust fan, which had been replaced during the 6 to 13 November
1973 period, started to exhibit signs of deterioration during the early part of
January. Consequently, the impeller was rebalanced on 13 January during the
weekend maintenance period. However, on 19 January at 1100 hours, the impeller
disintegrated, resulting in major damage to the fan housing, mounting base, and
motor mounts. This disintegration was the result of a condition which had not
appeared during the early months of the pilot work on the system. The fan impeller,
which was constructed of 3/8-inch steel and coated with an epoxy material, was
observed to have become eroded and corroded over a short period of time. The
corrosion was indicated by the pitting of the metal after the epoxy coating had been
worn away. The erosion was probably the result of the continuous abrasion to which
the metal was subjected by the presence of brine carryover from the scrubber,
containing a high percentage of iron oxide particles. The fan housing was also
exhibiting signs of deterioration due to corrosion and erosion. This housing was
damaged in the impeller disintegration by pieces of the impeller piercing its plate,
and by the severe vibration experienced when the impeller became greatly
imbalanced. The fan impeller was replaced with a spare, as was the housing and
motor mounting. The housing was eventually rubber-coated to prevent erosion of
the housing. The rotor remained low carbon steel, since improved materials could
not be obtained on a timely basis.
As a result of the failure of the homomixer on both storage tanks, and in an attempt
to reduce the downtime associated with agent nozzle plugging, the Mustard Demil
Office instructed the operating staff to change the mixture of H and HD being
incinerated (currently at 2.5 parts H to 1.0 part HD by weight) to HD entirely. This
burning mixture was regulated by the number of containers of each type of agent
dumped in a given operating day. Since the H mustard left a considerable residue in
the ton container, this approach did not always yield the desired 2.5 to 1.0 ratio,
but it was a simple and effective way of regulating the mixture. The switch to HD
was made due to the recognized low residue content of the agent and it was felt that
this would decrease the nozzle plugging problem. It was in a large measure
successful, though the problem persisted until the introduction of the hydrazine
furnace in March 1973. It should be added at this point that the initial 2.5 to 1.0
mixture of agents fed to the burn nozzles was essentially the same as the ratio of H
to HD contained in the starting inventory of agent. The changeover to only HD was
made reluctantly and anticipated a successful introduction of the hydrazine furnace
with its larger agent nozzle which possessed less potential for plugging. The all-HD
burning also eased the scrubber fan problem by decreasing the amount of iron oxide
put through the system. This change did prove to be beneficial.
On a routine weekend inspection and cleanout of the scrubber, it was observed that
the residue on the bottom of the vessel contained approximately 5 each of 30-gallon
drums of glass Raschig rings. These rings had fallen through the holes eroded in the
top of each of the weirs of the stainless steel packing support plate. These holes were
patched from underneath and a steel I-beam support (which was judged to be
unstable) was removed. Additional supports were placed in the scrubber bottom and
a weekly visual inspection of this support plate instituted. Plans were immediately
made for fabrication of a replacement plate constructed of Hastalloy B to be
installed, when required.
5-9
System modifications during January were: (1) the completion of east furnace
scrubber nozzle setup preparatory to start of Phase II burn in both T.C. furnaces,
and (2) continuation of preparation of the hydrazine furnace for bulk agent use.
This took the form of rcbricking the furnace barrel and installation of a wall in the
furnace breeching separating the hydrazine furnace from the west ton container
furnace to ensure that men could work safety in the hydrazine furnace.
T.C.'s drained: 53 H 81 HD
T.C.'s burned: 94
Overall GPM through nozzles: 0.62 (based on total available operating time)
February was the beginning of intensive effort of system testing which was to
continue for some nine months, with only brief interruptions. To present the
chronology of operations, a brief summary of each test plan will be contained in this
section, where applicable. During October 1972, some work had been performed on
a test plan for evaluation of the burner modification to the east furnace
recommended by the Gross Committee. Five containers were incinerated according
to test plan without satisfactory results other than the conclusion that the
Dynasciences SO2 monitor sampling from the east furnace flue could possibly be
used in an attempt to shorten the burning time of lighter weight (less than 300
pounds residue) ton containers. The test plan for this "Dynasciences Test" was
prepared by the Mustard Demil Process Engineering section on 7 February, and after
approval by the Program Manager, the test was performed during the period 13 to
26 February utilizing 59 residue ton containers.
5-10
The scrubber exhaust fan continued to be inspected each weekend and appeared to
continue in generally good condition. A rebalance was required on 19 February,
however. The quench tank was becoming more of a problem in that there was a
continual buildup of salt on the walls of the vessel, particularly around the brine
spray nozzles. This salting up problem on the east quench was never satisfactorily
solved. A weekly washdown of the vessel was required as well as removal and
cleanout of the nozzle wells during operations.
During February, the system modifications consisted of the completion of the east
scrubber winterization building annex and the final shakedown of the hydrazine
furnace controls prior to its scheduled run-in during March 1973. A test plan for this
run-in was prepared on 12 February 1973 and forwarded to the Program Manager
for approval. When it was received, this approval was qualified in that the Operations
Management Division of the Program Manager's Office intended to give approval of
each phase of the test as the preceeding phase was completed. The initial "go-ahead"
was received on Test H-l by message on 22 February 1973.
Overall GPM through nozzles: 0.91 (based on total available operating time)
5—11
It appeared the monthly change-out also helped solve the line plugging. This is
reasonable, since one of the results of an Edgewood Arsenal test on mustard
absorption by the hoses was .that the hose inside the diameter became more
constricted with longer use of the hose.
The hydrazine furnace test plan developed during February was carried out during
March. Test H-l was performed on 7, 8 and 12 March with the stated objective of
learning the furnace characteristics and discovering problem areas before the
introduction of live agent. This test was accomplished after the breeching wall was
removed that separated the hydrazine furnace from the east scrubber system.
Second, initial problems which occurred were solved by modifications of the
furnace. Results of this test led to the conclusion that the next steps in the test, H-2
through H-5, involving live agent, could be carried out safely. The agent burning
tests were conducted on 12 and 19 through 23 March and resulted in certification of
agent burning of as much as 1.9 GPM of agent mixtures from zero H to all-HD with
no nozzle plugging. The normal operating temperature of the furnace breeching was
1800°F and was used as the controlling temperature. The use of the east ton
container furnace during hydrazine furnace bulk burning was feasible; however, the
high fire/low fire adjustments of the burners needed adjustment inasmuch as there
was considerable trouble maintaining the nominal 1000°F baseline temperature;
actual temperatures were observed to run considerably higher and erratically. On 26
March, the controlling temperature of the hydrazine furnace was changed to 1900°F
where it would stay until September 1973.
A new homomixer was installed in the west storage tank on 14 March; however, its
use was discontinued on 23 March when it went out of order. It was fairly well
determined that operation could be accomplished without the homogenizer.
Considerable trouble was experienced with the centrifuge mustard pump packing.
Continuous adjustments of the packing tightness had to be made to stop agent
leakage. The packing was eventually tightened to the point that the leakage was
stopped; no pump changeout was required.
The Bowen spray dryer was completed during March and received its first
operational checkout. Crew training began on day shift, 21 March and continued
during day shift until each of the three crews had been trained in the unit's
5-12
operation. The Contractor who had considerable testing and changing to do before
all system requirements were met, maintained a full-time engineer on site for the
first year of operation.
A test program for Phase II of the "Dynascience" ton container test was submitted
on 26 March 1973 with testing to begin during April 1973.
Overall GPM through nozzles: 1.00 (based on total available operating minutes)
5-13
The scrubber exhaust fan problem continued throughout April. Agent burning was
discontinued on 2 April (2320 hours) due to the bad condition of the fan. The fan
was removed on 3 April and taken to the maintenance shop to be rebuilt, in that no
spare impeller was available. This rebuild and reinstallation time took until 5 April,
at which time the agent burn was restarted. A total of 61 hours and 15 minutes of
agent burning time was lost during this downtime period. A further shutdown of
approximately 4 hours was incurred on 11 April to check and rebalance the fan
impeller. A spare impeller was received during the week of 10 April and was used to
replace the rebuilt impeller on 14 April during a weekend shutdown. Again, there
was no spare impeller on the Arsenal but fortunately, the new ESP was on schedule
with installation set for the first week in May. Examination of the new fan impeller
on 21 April indicated that the blades were beginning to pit and erode. These
impeller problems occurred despite a cutback on the hydrazine furnace burn rate on
5 April to conserve the fan blades. However, it was not realized that the majority of
the abrasive material came from scrubber brine carryover which contained a great
deal of iron oxide despite the decrease in this material's production.
The east centrifugal pump continued to give problems with packing leakage. This
problem was a carryover from March. The pump was eventually changed on 14 April
with a rebuilt unit. However, this replacement broke a motor coupling on 16 April
after 10 minutes' operation. Repairs were quickly made, and the pump was placed in
operation until 18 April, when a pinhole leak developed in the discharge line.
Attempts to weld this leak failed, and agent pumping operations were switched to
the west tank's Moyno pump. The centrifugal pump was replaced on Saturday, 21
April and continued to operate satisfactorily throughout the remainder of the
month.
During April, the first signs of another problem began to appear. Small leaks were
beginning to develop in the flanges of the Hastalloy B quench/scrubber duct. These
leaks were to continue to increase in size and number until the duct could be
replaced in November 1973. For the moment, patches were welded to the flange
leaks. This problem was accentuated by the use of stainless steel welding rod, rather
than using Hastelloy B rod with heliarc welding.
Weekly checks of the east scrubber bottom continued to be made. During the
inspection on 14 April, an I-beam support was observed to have eroded to the point
where it was no longer sound, and was replaced.
On 3 April, the Director of Mustard Demilitarization requested that the RMA Safety
Office seek approval to increase the minimum storage limit of the Building 537 thaw
room from 72 containers to 90 containers.2 This request was based on the need for
additional storage capability commensurate with the increased capability of the
hydrazine furnace and the anticipated beginning of Phase II with its 2 GPM bulk
agent rate. This recommendation was acted upon by RMA Safety during May 1973.
The ton container furnace tests, which were to have been carried out in April, were
postponed until after ESP installation due to the inability of the ton container
furnace system to regulate its temperature satisfactorily. Data from this section of
the test was discarded as being of little comparative value to the later data collected.
5-14
On 24 April, RMA received approval to proceed with acquisition of the west
scrubber system. This system was needed for the 2 GPM burn rate of mustard during
Phase II, and the heavy residue weight ton container burn during Phase III.
Overall GPM through nozzles: 1.03 (based on total available operating minutes)
Mustard demilitarization operations (Phase I) continued during May with bulk agent
in the hydrazine furnace and residue containers in the east container furnace.
The plant was shut down at 1130 hours, 3 May to tie in the new electrostatic
precipitator (ESP). Construction of the unit had been completed with the exception
of the duct between the scrubber outlet and the ESP inlet. During installation of this
duct, it was discovered that the wire mesh mist eliminator in the scrubber tower
which had previously been present above the packing had collapsed, due to
corrosion/erosion and was lying on the scrubber brine distribution plate below the
brine feed header, and was effectively channelling the flow of brine down through
5-15
the pack. The remainder of the mist eliminator were removed during this time
period. The shutdown for ESP tie-in lasted a total of 75 operating hours with the
plant being restarted on 8 May. Approximately 7 operating hours were consumed
with checkout of the new system. An evaluation of the dust collection properties of
the precipitator was to be performed by USAEHA during July 1973. The
responsibility for operations and normal maintenance of the ESP was formally
accepted on 9 May 1973. The ESP proved to be essentially a turnkey operation.
Due to poor scrubber performance during the initial running period with the ESP, it
was decided to acid-wash the east scrubber system on 23 May. On inspection of the
scrubber bottom, maintenance personnel observed that the packing support plate
and its supports had deteriorated to the extent that it could not be relied upon to
continue to support the packing. This condition was probably a combination of
corrosion of the original stainless steel support plate and accelerated erosion due to
the larger volumes of air being moved through the system by the new ESP
configuration. A decision was made to shut down the plant, and make use of
the long Memorial Day weekend to complete the installation of a new support
plate with as little loss of operating time as possible. This new support plate
had beed fabricated of Hastalloy B plate after the repairs were made to the stainless
steel support plate in January. The operation was carried out efficiently with a loss
of only 63 operating hours. The packing was removed via a manhole in the side of
the scrubber vessel. The packing rings were placed in 55-gallon drums and carried
outside of the winterization annex where the rings were spread on some scrap steel
mesh and washed with water. The cleansed rings were then replaced in the drums for
repacking the tower. Maintenance personnel removed the stainless steel packing
support and welded the Hastalloy plate in place, replacing all of the plate support
I-beams in the process. The packing was replaced by flooding the scrubber tower and
floating the packing into place through a manhole near the top of the scrubber
vessel. After all ducting and piping was reconnected, the system was started up and
worked perfectly. The plant was back in operation on 29 May.
There was no downtime experienced during May which was attributable to the bulk
mustard feed system.
5-16
with little deterioration being observed throughout the remainder of the program.
This revised structure sufticienlU' insulated the remaining sMictural steel to preclude
further damage.
Installation ot the new unload booth foundations began during May with
completion of the new booth scheduled for June 1973. Work was begun on the
fabrication in the maintenance shop of the quench tank and scrubber vessel for the
west scrubber system.
Ton container testing v> nieh was to have been resumed during May. was postponed
until the beginning of June due to the ESP checkout and the scrubber repairs.
The Bowen spray dryer was run on a 3-shift basis during May. Several serious
discrepancies still existed during the month. Installation of the thirteen-inch spray
disc had almost eliminated the problem associated with the plastering of the
chamber wall: however, the smaller size of the particles achieved was creating
problems with the ci mpac!or. Some drying interruption was experienced due to the
fact that the compactor '"eed screw and the compactor hopper feed conveyor belt
were not handling the salt as fast as it was being generated. The Bowen
representatives were requested to present, in writing, through the Corps of
Engineers, their plans for resolving these discrepancies. Additionally, a scheduled
stack particulate survey (set for July 1973) was to determine whether discrepancies
relating to particulate emissions were to be resolved as well.
5-17
Downtime, total for month: 7870 min
Overall GPM through nozzles: 1.07 (based on total available operating minutes)
Mustard operations during June 1973 proceeded into the revised Phase II schedule
which called for bulk agent incineration at 2 GPM in the hydrazine furnace and
residue containers in the east ton container furnace. Downtime problems
experienced during June were minimal with the plant (bulk burning operation)
operating 90.2 percent of the total available time. The only major problem
encountered was a failure of the scrubber discharge pump which allowed the
scrubber system to flood the quench/scrubber duct and rob the furnaces of draft.
During this draft loss, the lack of system airflow caused the preheater to overheat
the first bay of the ESP, resulting in some heat damage to low melting point
components of the electrical grid. The preheater was manually controlled and was
never judged to be a satisfactory piece of equipment either from dependability or
from a controllability standpoint. Due to the requirements of other portions of the
program, a redesign of the preheater configuration was not effected other than a
relocation which occurred in July 1973.
The ESP continued to operate in a most satisfactory manner with only minor
problems associated with insulator breakage and discharge control circuits. More
frequent cleaning (weekly) was placed in effect and helped to solve the insulator
breakage problem. Arcing on the surface of the insulators were causing breakage; the
air wash on the insulators did not prevent breakage. Control circuit modifications to
the control panel were made under warranty by General Electric Corp. A test of the
ESP stack by Lear-Siegler Incorporated, utilizing a stack-mounted optical
transmissometer indicated that at approximately 2 GPM of bulk agent burn, and
during a peak ton container burn, the stack was showing 5 percent opacity with only
two of the five bays of the precipitator functioning electrically. While this did not
constitute an acceptance test of the precipitator, it did indicate that the unit would
have no trouble in passing the AEHA evaluation which had been slipped to August
1973. Formal acceptance depended on a visual test by Colorado State Inspectors. A
problem which was not related to the operation of the ESP itself, surfaced during
June. This problem was associated with the condensation in the ESP stack of a
strongly acidic material which was periodically blown from the top of the stack. It
was not possible to arrive at a chemical composition of the material due to the salt
carryover from the scrubber. It was, however, decided that the material was
probably sulfuric acid which was condensing in the laminar flow (or plug flow)
vertical section of the stack where the gas stream impinged on the relatively cool
stack wall. The gas stream temperature was in excess of 350°F normally; however,
the wall temperature was approximately 250°F under normal ambient temperature
conditions. A work order was generated to insulate the stack to prevent this
condensation. Since the insulation would cover up the wind loading relief vanes,
which were installed as part of the original ESP equipment, the stack was guyed with
wire cable. When these modifications were subsequently performed, the condensate
problem was satisfactorily remedied.
5-18
Approval > > t;<e 100-ton container thaw room storage capacity limit was received
from MU. vj\i during the muiiih with approval by AMC having been received at
MUCOM on 20 June 1973 and from DDESB on 11 June 1973°A source sampling
:,urvey of the Bowen spray dryer was conducted dur ng June. The new
precompaction screw (third modification) provided by Bowen for the compactor
appeared to have resolved the compactor feed rate problem. A decrease in atomizing
disc speed proposed hy Bowen. designed to increase the particle size of the salt and
thus increase the effectiveness of the precompaction screw, was deemed not
necessary in light of Uie adequate performance of the new precompa, tion screw.
The guillotine door to the 200-foot stack was bricked shut on 17 June. Repeated
efforts to correct the leakage past this door had not resulted in elimination of the
200-foot stack plume resulting from the particulate matter being pulled straight
from the furnace breeching Hue gases. The basic problem related to the fact that
both a thermal barrier and a gas seal were tried to be incorporated in one door. It
appeared that a secondary door to act as a gas seal after the thermal barrier would
have worked.
Tests associated with the optimization of ton container furnace residence times were
completed during June The implementation of reduced residence time burning
procedures resulting from these tests had no initial impact on the burn rate of
containers since the implementation occurred on 28 June. An increase in burning
rate during the latter part of the month (see Table 6-5) can be attributed to the
latter stages of the testing program.
Construction work on the west quench/scrubber system was proceeding during June.
Installation of the shell of the new unload booth was completed during June.
Completion of required equipment and controls was proceeding. Approval of the
revised SOP for the new unload booth was received from HQ, USAMUCOM, on 12
June9 in response to a letter from RMA Safety Office providing the design and SOP
changes for review. This request for approval went through HQ, USAMC and
DDESB, as was normal.
5-19
Downtime, total for month: 2960 min
Overall GPM through nozzles: 1.70 (based on total available operating minutes)
The mustard disposal operation (Phase II) continued on a three-shift basis with bulk
agent in the hydrazine furnace and ton containers in the east container furnace.
Operations downtime problems continued at a minimum. The centrifugal
agent pump required replacement due to impeller wear. This long run proved the
increased effectiveness of the centrifugal pump over the Moyno pumps for bulk
mustard pumping. The mustard flow control valve at the hydrazine furnace was
exhibiting signs of plugging; consequently it was changed out at the same time.
The major downtime problem occurring during July was the plant shutdown on 24
July to decontaminate a major mustard spill in the thaw room. The spill had
occurred during the weekend shutdown period just prior to startup on Sunday night.
Approximately 1100 pounds of agent was spilled from a ton container when a
deteriorated plug on the end of the container opposite the valve leaked.
Decontamination required a total of 16 hours. There were no emissions to the
atmosphere and no personnel casualties were caused.
Preparations were made during July to start the ton container test plan for heavy
residue containers during August.
The new unload booth was completed and tested with a fuel oil-filled container by
31 July. Actual draining operations with this booth were to begin on 1 August.
The ton container cut and scrape operation apparatus was completed and tested
during July. Startup of this operation was to be postponed until a redesign of the
cut container handling equipment could be effected during August.
The Bowen spray dryer was operated on a three-shift basis throughout the month of
July. Salt conveyor belt problems continued to occur. Additionally, the stack
opacity continued to run above 20 percent. Bowen Engineering was in the process of
designing a high-energy venturi scrubber to aid in removal of the micro-sized
particles which were causing the problem.
5-20
Bulk agent burned' 464.139 lbs
Overall GPM through nozzles: 1.53 (based on total available operating minutes)
The mustard disposal operation (Phase II) continued on a three-shift basis in a highly
satisfactory manner. Bulk agent was incinerated in the hydrazine furnace and ton
containers in the east ton container furnace. Downtime problems for the month
included a reappearance of mustard flow control valve plugging. There were some
indications as well that the pipe leading to the mustard nozzle was plugging
periodically: repeated attempts to flush the lines with oil were unsuccessful. One
hypothesis of the reason for the plugging was that the increased effectiveness of the
new unloading booth was drawing more particulate into the storage tanks which
contributed to a buildup of solids in the tanks to the point where the agent pumps
were picking up more of this abrasive material than previously. The accuracy of this
hypothesis is borne out by the fact that the centrifugal agent pump which had been
replaced in July had to be replaced again on 29 August. The agent nozzle and feed
system were replaced to. remedy the plugging problem. Additionally, the amount of
HD dumped into the agent tanks was increased. These measures were successful to
some extent. It was necessary to raise the hydrazine furnace operating temperature
(from 1800°F to 1900°F) to increase agent gallonage from the furance to offset the
mustard feed difficulties. Homomixers were not in operation due to previous
failures, but it is doubtful whether.they would have had any effect other than
stirring up more solids from the bottom of the tanks.
Heavy ton container tests were conducted during August. The evaluation consisted
of an attempt to devise the most effective burner configuration for incinerating large
residue weight containers. Concurrent with this was the objective of developing the
criteria necessary for minimizing heavy container residence time in the furnace.
Posting of revised burning procedures during August resulted in a large increase in
the average weight of residue per container during that month and in subsequent
months. An effort was made starting 23 August to conserve light weight (1850
pounds or less gross weight before burning) containers for use in the west furnace
when it was expected to be operational at the completion of the bulk agent burn on,
or about, 1 October.
The new unload booth was in full operation by 14 August. Its superior draining
capabilities were almost immediately apparent; consequently, use of booth number
3 was discontinued. There were no significant difficulties with this new unload
booth configuration. Based on the success of the new unload booth (designated 1A)
RMA suggested at the program review of 15 August 1973 that the construction of
the second new unload booth which had been planned to be cancelled. No work
other than parts and shell procurement had been done. The Program Manager
concurred in this recommendation by letter on 24 August 1973.
An additional subject which was examined during August^ was the approach to
handling ton containers which for one reason or another could not be emptied
during the first drain attempt. The problem was to be remedied by a two-part
operation involving changeout of the normal container valves initially and
5-22
subsequent installation (in the toxic yard) of a plug adapter containing a standard
T.C. valve in a plug hole only if the initial valve changeout did not allow the
containers to be drained. Handling of containers with plug adapters was to be done
under increased safety criteria concurred in by the RMA Safety Office.12 This was
necessary since the adapter extended beyond the end of the container.
The test plan for shakedown of the west quench/scrubber system was submitted for
approval on 15 August.
The Quality Assurance monitoring station located at the base of the ESP stack was
completed and operational as of 13 August. Prior to this date, the effluent gas
stream monitoring had been performed with samples drawn from the scrubber outlet
duct. This particulate-laden, saturated gas stream had provided samples of a less than
ideal nature. Despite initial problems with sampling probes corrosion (due in part to
the acid condensation in the stack previously mentioned) the new location provided
a much cleaner sample which was essentially free from particulate and condensate
interference. The Dynasciences stack SO2 monitor in particular responded very well
to the upgraded sample quality.
The Bowen spray dryer continued to be operated throughout August and did not
cause any downtime to the incineration operation. Some difficulty continued to be
experienced with the salt conveyor belt and compactor. Stack emissions were still in
excess of the State of Colorado limits; however, installation of the venturi scrubber
was to occur after the completion of bulk agent incineration when the reduced brine
generation rate would allow use of the Tailor spray dryer to meet all requirements.
Operation of the ton container cut and scrape apparatus was not begun due to
modifications being made to the system.
The installation of the west quench/scrubber continued during August despite the
fact that the ultimate completion date would have to be slipped until early October.
5-23
Overall GPM through nozzles: 1.65 (based on total available operating minutes)
Downtime for September was minimal with a total of only 22 hours being recorded.
The hydrazine furnace alone operated 94 percent of the available time. Some
difficulty was experienced with the continuing mustard feed problems observed
during August. The hydrazine furnace stack-temperature set point was increased
from 1900°F to 1950°F on 12 September to increase agent GPM. It was necessary
to replace the centrifugal agent pump again on 10 September.
During September, the west ton container furnace was rebricked preparatory to its
startup at the completion of bulk burn. This rebricking was completed by contractor
personnel as was all of the previous furnace bricking work. A barrier was placed in
the west furnace Hue opening effectively isolating the furnace from the rest of the
furnace system. Contractor personnel worked in this sealed furnace with the door
open while the east furnace operation continued. All contractor personnel wore
"congo red" clothing while working inside the furnace. Bubbler readings taken prior
to the start of rebricking had indicated that the furnace was free of contamination.
Installation of a sprinkler system in Building 538 was also accomplished by
contractor personnel during this period.
As a result of the thaw room spill of 23 July, a directed action was made during the
15 August program review to install a remote alarm system for monitoring the thaw
room during weekend shutdown periods. The original approach suggested was a type
of wire communication from the thaw room Titralog directly to the RMA fire
station. This approach was examined by RMA 13 and found to be undesirable due to
lack of existing equipment and the cost of installing the required hardware between
the plant and the fire station. RMA recommended an alternate plan which involved
the use of a flashing light located outside Building 537 in a readily observable
location. This light was to be monitored by regular Security patrols passing the
plant. A flashing light indication of a Titralog alarm was to trigger a notification by
5-24
radio or telephone to the Fire Department who would enter the plant and visually
inspect the thaw room for a spill. If a spill was observed, the Fire Department was to
initiate the Arsenal Chemical Accident/Incident Control Plan (CAICP) which would
function normally for decontamination. In event that no spill could be located
visually, either a Quality Assurance or an Operations representative (or both) were
to be called to investigate. Since the Titralog was subject to interference from Shell
Company emissions, an investigation of the instrument by a QA man was desirable.
This alarm system was approved in concept by the Program Manager, and
implemented on 28 September 1973.^ Although no further leaks were detected
during the rest of the program, there were many instances of Titralog alarms caused
by emissions interference during which the system functioned as designed both
mechanically and in notification.
The Bowen spray dryer continued to operate without major downtime. Stack
emissions remained above standard; work on the venturi scrubber was not scheduled
to begin until installation of the west scrubber commenced.
Work continued on the west quench/scrubber system with completion scheduled for
mid-October. The test plan for equipment shakedown was approved during
September.
The container cut and scrape operation began in earnest in September. Ash
barrelling and storage procedures were finalized and implemented. The Quality
Assurance laboratory began its analysis of the ash material and started reporting
mustard content results to the Mustard Demilitarization Directorate. Problems experi-
enced with the cutting operation were that the torch flame was causing the ash to burn
and emit sulfur oxides and smoke particles. Personnel operating the cutting stage were
required to wear respirators and welder's goggles during operation of the torch. A
fume hood was being designed to inclose the cutting stage since it became apparent
that the water cascade paint booths did not have enough face air velocity to handle
the noxious fumes emitted from the smoldering ash. To cope with this, the cutting
operation was cut back until the installation of the paint booth extension could be
fabricated. A bubbler was moved into the area to monitor for mustard vapor and the
use of a water spray to quench the smoldering and cut down on emissions was
authorized by the Mustard Demilitarization Director. Full-scale operations would
begin during October with the installation of the paint booth fume hood extension.
5-25
Average residue wt. per T.C.: U3U E / lUl W
The ton container cut and scrape full-scale operation was resumed on 7 October
with the completion of the paint booth fume hood extension. This operation was
5-26
paced at the rate of 16 containers per shift or 48 containers per day and was a fill-in
operation which could be worked as personnel were available provided that the 48
per day minimum was met.
The Bowen spray dryer was shut down for modifications by Bowen. These
modifications consisted, in part, of installation of a high energy venturi scrubber and
a larger system driving fan to provide increased static pressure dictated by the high
pressure drop requirements of the venturi (approximately 20 inches). The Building
540 Bowen dryer was down throughout October. The Building 536 Tailor dryer was
operated during this month on an "as required" basis to draw down the brine
storage tank levels.
T.C.'s drained: 13 H 6 HD
5-27
The only major equipment malfunction occurring during November was the failure
of the motor coupling on the ESP exhaust fan on 18 November. This coupling
failure necessitated 24 hours downtime while a replacement could be found and
modified to repair the unit and resume operations. In the process of obtaining a
spare coupling, it was discovered that one had not been ordered by the Maintenance
Division. The Director of Mustard Demilitarization subsequently took over the
ordering of spare parts and maintaining a spare parts inventory.
T.C.'s drained: 0 H 4 HD
5-28
Average T.C.'s per day: 6.4 E / 9.7 W
Repair of the east quench to scrubber duct was completed during December. The
remainder of the west quench/scrubber system test plan was performed following
this reinstallation.
The Bowen spray dryer was operational on an "as required" basis throughout
December. Cold weather during the month began to show up inadequacies in the
spray dryer's winterization and heat tracing equipment. Frozen and cracked hoses,
frozen pipes and stuck linkages were common problems. The spray machine also
froze and its housing was cracked. This problem was caused by inadequate checkout
of the cooling fluid. This unit was replaced with a spare and the damaged unit sent
back to Bowen Corp. for rebuilding. Modifications to the spray dryer during
December included a wider fan impeller designed to bring the system total head and
volumetric air flow up to a level sufficient to enable the venturi to operate properly.
Effects of this modification in terms of opacity were, on initial observation, very
satisfactory. This was the second fan changeout.
Normal cleanout and inspection of the scrubber systems, ESP and furnaces were
performed in December as they had been for the duration of the program. An
additional weekly check was initiated when it was discovered that salt leaking past
the packing on the compactor feed screw gear box was destroying the gear lubricant.
On 8 December, this material was removed and the box repacked with lubricant. A
weekly check of this lubricant was directed and carried out.
5-29
The first part of the Chemical Agent and Munition Disposal System (CAMDS)
project testing was performed in the east furnace on 19 December. This consisted of
incinerating HD containers retaining 400, 800 and 1200 pounds of agent under
controlled burning conditions. Time used by this testing was 19.4 hours. Further
tests were scheduled for January 1974.
The Mustard Demilitarization Program, Phase III, continued in January in a very satis-
factory manner. Residue containers were incinerated in both the east and west con-
tainer furnaces. There were no modifications either in procedural or weight limit
aspects of the container burning operation. The ton container cut and scrape operation
was continuing at an adequate rate with the number of containers cut and the number
of containers incinerated approaching equality. Some difficulty continued with frozen
brine lines which were located outside the winterization annexes. If the program
were to last longer than March or April, serious consideration would have had to be
given to redesigning the entire heat tracing system of the plant during the summer
months.
CAMDS tests were conducted during January on burning agent and residue-filled
155 MM artillery projectiles. Empty projectiles filled with RMA agent and drained,
residue-filled rounds from Tooele AD (also filled with RMA agent) were incinerated
in the east furnace under controlled test conditions. A total of 13 operational hours
were consumed for both container furnaces by this testing.
The Bowen spray dryer operated adequately throughout January. Some difficulty
was experienced with the system drive fan balancing; this was corrected by Bowen.
5-30
On 27 January, an examination of the damper spool piece on the east scrubber
outlet duct revealed that the damper and spool piece had deteriorated to the point
where they were causing significant loss of negative pressure to the system as a
whole. A replacement spool piece was not available; therefore, the defective unit was
removed and both ends of the gap blocked with caps. It was intended to replace this
damper with a rebuilt or entirely new unit; this was not accomplished during the
remaining month of the program.
At 0155 hours on Friday, 25 January, there was an accident which damaged the
ESP. Two explosions occurred within the precipitator which caused minor damage
to several of the unit's components. Damage was limited to an estimated S2200 and
caused a maximum of 21 hours downtime to the facility. The plant was operational
again at 0150 hours on Monday, 28 January.
The CAMDS projectile tests continued throughout February with a total of 71.4
hours attributable to testing. Modifications for HD CAMDS container testing were
made to the east container furnace following the completion of stockpile container
burning. This CAMDS testing was conducted on the day shift only.
Destruction of the so-called "88" containers was authorized in February and began
immediately following the last of the nontest stockpile containers. The sampling of
these containers was carried out during January. The contents of these containers
were not specifically identified other than mustard content, organophosphate
presence or absence, and heavy metal content. A plan for disposal was forwarded to
the Program Manager who gave approval during February. These containers were
drained as normal mustard containers and the resulting bulk material incinerated
through the hydrazine furnace nozzle or bulk agent. Scrubbing of stack effluent was
conducted as normal. All of the "88" containers were cut and scraped. Barrelling of
ash, ESP residue, and salt from these containers was treated circumspectly since
some Five of the containers contained arsenic-bearing residue. Personnel protective
clothing and area restriction during barrel loading operation were required for safety
purposes.
5-31
Disposal of the "Lake A" ton containers was carried out during February. A report
on this operation has been submitted under separate cover.
During February, USAEHA conducted their source sampling survey of the mustard
spray dryer stack. Results indicated that the unit met both the opacity and the particu-
late emission rate standards of the State of Colorado when being fired with fuel oil or
natural gas and when operating at 30 GPM. A representative of the State Health
Department witnessed the USAEHA testing and concurred in the visual measurement
of stack opacity.
The "88" ton containers disposal program continued into March. The final container
was incinerated on 15 March. The final container of the RMA mustard stockpile was
incinerated with press coverage on 16 March. This event was communicated to the
Program Manager by message on 19 March 1974.'"
Downtime recorded during the bulk agent incineration phases of the schedule refers
to those problems which caused a cessation or curtailment of bulk incineration.
Stoppages of the east container furnace operation was not recorded as downtime
since, despite the fact that there was a daily container schedule, this operation did
not become a pacing operation until Phase III. At that point, all of the downtime
recorded was that which affected only both container furnaces simultaneously.
Downtime occurring for each furnace individually was only recorded for special
cases such as testing, and then only for study purposes.
The monthly downtime for the period August 1972 through February 1974 is
presented in Table 5 — 1.
5-32
5.6 ENGINEER TEST AND IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS
The initial work associated with the improvement of the demilitarization process by
shortening the ton container residence time was begun during January 1973 with the
assignment of a Chemical Process Engineer and a Data Analyst (both military) to the
Product Division (later Mustard Demil Directorate) of the Directorate of Industrial
Operation (later Chief Engineer's Office). A shotgun approach was taken at first to
observe the relationship, if any, between the critical operating parameters used
during the burning of residue ton containers. This shotgun approach utilized data as
recorded by the operators in the plant for each container incinerated from 21
August 1972 to the date of the study. Several of the most useful parameters were
defined as:
A. Residue Burned (RB) - The weight of residue actually burned out of the
container based on gross weights measured before and after incineration.
C. Residence Time - The time of residence of the ton container in the hot section
of the furnace.
The relationship developed by plotting these parameters against each other were:
A. That residue burned appeared to be a linear function of residence time with the
exception of container weights from 0 to 300 pounds. This indicated that a
significant improvement could be made by redefining the burning condition of
this residue weight group.
C. Correlations involving strict measurement data such as residue burned and peak
temperature were much better defined than those utilizing residence time
which was itself a function of the alertness and conscientiousness of the
individual operators of the furnace system.
D. The validity of a 1600 pound tare weight assumed for each container in future
studies was proved by the very closely grouped linear data plotted for residue
burned versus residue from taring.
The result of this study was the realization that to arrive at a better definition of the
critical burning parameters, a test should be conducted utilizing trained observers
scrutinizing the around-the-clock incineration of containers in the 0 to 300 pound
residue weight group.
5-33
5.6.2 THE DYNASCIENCES INSTRUMENT EVALUATION AND CONTAINER
RESIDENCE OPTIMIZATION TEST - PHASE I
The objectives of this test were (1) to determine whether or not the Dynasciences
(flue gas SO2 monitor) instrument could be effectively utilized to shorten the
residence time of ton containers and (2) to obtain an understanding of the
interrelationship of the process parameters, specifically: Dynasciences response,
observable burning phenomena, temperature, and pressure measurements. The test
plan for this study was prepared on 7 February 1973*7 and forwarded to the Program
Manager on 13 February 1973*8 aiong with a copy of the previously written test plan
for the evaluation of the Gross burner configuration. This test had been suspended
indefinitely in favor of the Dynasciences test and a slower approach to large residue
weight container burning.
The Dynasciences test plan Phase I was to have handled containers with as much as
900 pounds residue weight. This was cut back to 300 pounds maximum with the
investigation of larger residue weight burning to be postponed until May 1973. The
Phase I test was to handle H type containers initially. A detailed exposition of the
test as designed is contained in the referenced test plan. *°
The test was performed in the period 12 to 26 February on a 24-hour basis. Data
collectors were trained military personnel from the US Army Technical Escort
Center's Escort and Disposal Detachment located at RMA. Details of the test as
performed are contained in the test report published on 9 April 1973.
Following the recommendations and conclusion of the Phase I test, a plan was
constructed on 26 March 19742U which incorporated two parts:
5-34
B. Part II - to optimize H ton container burning time based on data from Phase I,
Phase II - Part I, and analysis of mustard content of the residual ash.
The testing was to utilize time to flameout (TFO) as the basis for optimization of
containers of less than 300 pounds residue. Details of the test plan are contained in
the referenced test plan document.
The testing operation was begun during April 1973, but had to be postponed due to
the erratic regulation of the ton container furnace temperature caused by the
introduction of the bulk agent-burning hydrazine furnace. The test was to have been
performed immediately after the ESP installation of 8 May but was superseded by a
test on the east scrubber and the scrubber packing replacement on 23 to 28 May.
The testing did resume, however, on 30 May and continued until 14 June on a
24-hour per day basis. The details of the performance of these tests are contained in
the test report published on 12 July 1973.^1
A. The residence time of each container in the 0 to 300 pounds residue weight
group could be shortened significantly as a result of the application of the
results of this test.
B. The reburn period for ton containers which tested positive after first
incineration could be safely shortened from the standard 75 minutes to a total
of 30 minutes. This was an outgrowth of a study conducted at the same time as
Phase II but not contained in the test plan.
Implementation of the results of this test occurred on 26 June 1973 with the
posting of a chart on the window of the T.C. charging cart,control platform. This
chart22 was based on the temperature rise experienced by burning off the agent and
residue contained in each ton container. This temperature rise was correlated with
the observed time of flameout. The selection of the data contained in the second
column, the time that the container was to be extracted from the hot section of the
furnace and moved to the cooling section, was based on the temperature rise versus
time to flameout plot with a safe-siding of the data. The use of this table was
supervised for the first week by process engineering observers operating on day shift.
Following this trial period, use of the chart was unsupervised, except by checks of
recorded data. It was necessary to remind the operating staff on several occasions to
adhere to the new burning procedure; however, in general the procedure was well
adhered to as evidenced by the more than significant increases in ton container
production observed in subsequent months.
The work described in the above paragraphs, while very significant, addressed
only part of the problem. A potentially difficult problem remained in the form
of incineration of ton containers of greater than 300 pounds of residue. A
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projection of the number of containers in each 100-pound weight increment had
been forwarded to the Program Manager on 2 July 1973. 2^
As a result of the above, a draft test plan for evaluating alternate methods of
incinerating ton container of residue weight 300 to 1000 pounds was written on 28
June. This test was revised on 20 July24 as a result of a meeting at Edgewood Arsenal
on 19 July. This revision incorporated information to be taken for the CAMDS
project as well as a provision for investigating the burning of containers beyond the
1000-pound maximum called for in the original test plan. There were two parts to
the test program:
The testing was conducted over the period 26 July through 14 August and was
performed on day shift only, because presence of the process engineer was required.
This requirement was due to the potentially hazardous nature of the testing. A draft
test report was written but never formally published; therefore, more detailed
information is not available in final form. In general, the test was performed as
follows:
A. Three burner configurations were explored for rapidity of burning within safe
limits.
B. After a burner configuration had been selected for rapidity, this configuration
was time-staged in an attempt to derive the quickest burning procedure.
The primary result of the heavy residue testing was that containers of as much as,
and exceeding 1000 pounds residue could be safely incinerated utilizing an
experimentally determined burning procedure which also optimized the residence
time. This procedure was reduced to the form of a chart and placed next to the
0-to-300-pound weight range burn chart on the T.C. charging cart window on 14
August. The procedure developed was:
B. Insertion of the ton container into the furnace was to be performed with only
top burner lighted.
5-36
C. After the furnace temperature had peaked, the burners were switched from top
to bottom and the operators were to wait until the container had flamed out
until moving it to the cooling section of the furnace.
This method was posted as a trial method and was refined on 28 August^ and again
reduced to a posted chart, replacing the 14 August chart. At the same time the
improved lightweight burning chart was posted in place of the earlier chart.26 The
heavy T.C. method was refined to allow for an 800° F insertion temperature as
opposed to 920° F. Bulk agent burn was to be continued throughout the T.C. peak
burn at the discretion of the shift engineer or foreman. Some additional definition
of which of the two or three temperature peaks normally observed was intended as
the peak was required. A further change was made during Phase III when the larger
draft afforded the T.C. furnaces by the cessation of bulk agent burn required that
the lower burners be turned on for 5 to 10 minutes at the insertion of a heavy
residue container to get it started quicker.
The installation of the upper burners in the west container furnace to duplicate the
east furnace was requested by the Program Manager on 26 September 1973. A work
order was generated for this project and the material put on procurement; however,
the program was completed before installation could be accomplished. In any event,
the west furnace's capabilities coupled with the installation of the west scrubber and
the cessation of bulk burning, were improved such that containers of much larger
residue weight than originally thought possible could be handled.
Drain studies were made throughout the program for the varying purposes associated
with schedule projections and T.C. burning studies. A summary drain study was
performed at the end of the bulk agent burning phase of the program in order to
review draining performance and provide an estimation of the number of containers
of specific residue weight groups remaining to be burned. This summary is shown on
Table 5-2.
Unload booth hoses were directed to be changed once a month as of 27 March 1973
as a result of the mustard incident of 2 November 1972, in which a hose ruptured. A
study of a hose used for one month was made in July 1973 and the evidence of
deterioration was such that changeout every two weeks was directed.27 A carbon-filled
teflon-lined, flexible steel hose was tried out and rejected as was a plain, teflon-lined,
flexible steel hose. Both were found to be unacceptable due to cracking and kinking
when bent at too sharp an angle. The butyl rubber hoses were retained and changed
out every two weeks, as prescribed, with no further problems. °
5-37
5.6.8 HYDRAZINE FURNACE TESTING, TEST H-l
Methods for upgrading the bulk agent burning capabilities of the disposal system
were continuously being explored. An RMA suggestion to modify the hydrazine
furnace to incinerate bulk agent was adopted and the required modifications carried
out. On 12 February, a test plan^9 was published which covered the startup of this
modified furnace. The burning of bulk agent was to be approached cautiously. Test
H-l was an optimization of burning conditions on fuel oil at approximately 0.5 to
1.0 GPM in an attempt to simulate the heat input of agent at 1.0 to 2 GPM (number
2 fuel oil has approximately twice the heat content per pound as pure agent).
Startup on fuel oil gave the opportunity of adjusting controls and learning the
furnace's idiosyncracies without being confronted with a potential contamination
problem. Details of the performance of this test are contained in the test report
published 19 March 1973.^0 Several minor problems dealing with the control system
were observed and corrected. A major problem which occurred was an overheating
of the noninsulated front face of the furnace. This overheating caused some buckling
and scorching of the steel front face of the furnace. This front face had been left
unbricked for access to the furnace barrel, and was not expected to overheat since a
greater amount of dilution air for cooling was expected to be drawn from the tank
pit ventilation duct and from dilution air ports on the front of the furnace. These
sources had to be maintained essentially shut, however, to provide as much furnace
draft as possible. The heating problem was solved by installation of a firebrick wall
around the combustion chamber; in effect capping the furnace barrel and insulating
the front furnace face from the majority of the heat in the furnace. Two 12-inch
diameter iron pipe dilution air intakes were installed on a diameter in this wall; thus
allowing whatever dilution air to circulate and keep the front furnace face cooler.
Test H-l proved the capability of the hydrazine furnace for agent incineration at the
1 GPM rate and indicated that a 2 GPM rate could conceivably be maintained with
little operational difficulty. Additionally, it was learned that ton containers of
moderate residue weight could be incinerated without stopping the agent flow
during peak residue burn.
As a follow-on to test H-l, tests H-2, H-3, and H^- were designed to:
5-38
The test plan for H-2 through H-5 was contained in the same document as H-l.
Testing occurred during the period 19 March through 2 April 1973. A detailed
presentation of the test results is contained in the test report published on 19 April
1973.31 Tests H-2 through H-4 were accomplished successfully with none of the
problems experienced during the early part of Test H-l. Mustard feed rates tested
during the first operational week varied from approximately 0.9 GPM to 1.6 GPM,
based on shift averages. Feed rates during the second operational week of the test
period ranged from 1.2 GPM to 1.9 GPM with an average of 1.6 GPM. Ton
containers were burned at the same time as bulk agent with no cessation of bulk
agent burning for either T.C. incineration or peak residue burn. The ratio of H to
HD mustard varied from 0 to 4.96 during the first week and reached a maximum of
13.6 during the second week. No nozzle plugging was experienced during this test
period. Subsequent operational ratios of H to HD approached the point of
essentially pure H type agent with no nozzle plugging and only minor flow control
valve plugging.
Successful completion of test H-4 allowed the furnace to be certified for agent
service and its operational use began immediately after the completion of H-4.
The agent nozzle was removed for inspection after approximately three continuous
weeks of operation; little deterioration was observed other than a slight enlargement
of the orifices in the head of the nozzle. These nozzles gave exceptional service
throughout their use on bulk agent. Flow control valves had to be changed out
approximately once a month due either to plugging or erosion of the valve seats.
The normal operating procedure and set points for the furnace were the result of
experience and material limitations. During 2 GPM burning, the flow rate of agent
was regulated by a combination of combustion air input, natural gas input, furnace
draft, and stack temperature. The furnace refractory material could withstand
3300°F; however, this high temperature capability was never utilized since the
breeching refractory could withstand only 2200°F. This material limitation became
the governing temperature of the furnace. Agent was fed in at as great a rate as
would not cause the 1900°F set point on stack temperature to be exceeded. This set
point was selected based on a 300°F safety factor on the maximum stack
temperature.
The agent burn rate was thus a function of the amount of cooling air that could be
forced into the furnace by the combustion air fan. The damper on this fan was
normally run barely opened in order not to overpower the furnace draft which was,
ultimately, the limiting factor on the furnace. A furnace negative pressure of 0.1
inches of water was normal at the 2 GPM burn rate; under furnace idling conditions,
with no agent, but just enough natural gas to maintain the normal furnace barrel
temperature at 2200 to 2300°F and the normal combustion chamber temperature at
2400 to 2500°F. A steady operating differential pressure of slightly more than 0.4
inches of water was possible when no T.C. furnaces operated.
5-39
Natural gas input was normally cut back to a pilot flame for reignition in event of a
problem which would snuff out the agent flame. This event did not occur; therefore,
it was not determined if the pilot flame was even necessary given the normal
incandescence of the combustion chamber refractory.
The operation of the west quench tank indicated that a breeching temperature of
2000 to 2200°F could have been authorized if these temperatures were required for
the combination of maximum burn rate and differential pressure,
A test was performed on the east quench/scrubber system immediately after the
installation of the new ESP. The test was designed not only to check out the
operating characteristics of the precipitator but to determine whether maximum air
flow rate through the newly configured system would cause either loading or
flooding of the packed column scrubber. The test was performed and it was
determined that the scrubber would not approach the loading point. However,
repacking the scrubber on 23 May 1973 caused a reevaluation of the data.
A test program was prepared on 15 August 1973 for the evaluation of the mustard
disposal system following installation of the west scrubber system.32 The purpose of
the testing was to determine the operating characteristics of the west
quench/scrubber, to evaluate the system air flow distribution, and to establish the
system capability under several possible furnace input configurations and bulk/ton
container burn sequences. Details of the test plan are contained in the referenced
document.
Tests S-l through S-5 were performed between 23 October and 12 November 1973.
The testing was interrupted by the shutdown of the east scrubber system on 10
November. All of the remaining portions of the test were eventually completed.
The results of the testing were that the west scrubber system was found superior to
the east system both in capacity and stability. The west quench could easily handle
the normal temperatures of the hydrazine furnace as well as the combustion
products from 2 GPM mustard burn. This was in conjunction with the operation of
both T.C. furnaces with simultaneous T.C. peak burns.
Details of the major problems with the Bowen spray dryer unit are contained in a
series of memoranda from the Director of Mustard Demil for the record.33 These
documents give the full history of the unit's modification to correct certain design
or equipment problems which occurred during the operation of the unit during the
period 9 March to 30 November 1973.
5-40
The first evaluation of the spray dryer bv USAEHA occurred during the period 7 to
20 June 1973.34 This source emission evaluation concluded that the visible and
particulate emissions were greater than the levels established by the air pollution
control regulations of the State of Colorado when the unit was operational at
production load conditions. Additionally, visible emissions were excessive when the
unit was operated at minimum load conditions. These results prompted the
modifications by Bowen which eventually eliminated the solution of the emissions
problem.
Data presented by Lear-Siegler Inc. (LSI) during their evaluation of 4 April and 5
June 35 support the ÜSAEHA test results. LSI utilized an optical transmissometer
which was stack-mounted and measured in-stack opacity.
Final Army acceptance testing occurred during 1 to 7 February 1974 when USAEHA
performed a second set of source emission tests on the spray dryer unit.36 The
conclusions of this survey were that when the unit was fired with fuel oil, the
opacity and particulate emission rate were less than the level of the State of
Colorado standards as long as design specifications were not greatly exceeded.
Preliminary ESP testing was performed informally after its installation in early May
1973. This testing consisted of an equipment shakedown and demonstrated the
satisfactory performance of the unit in terms of mechanical operation and visual
emissions.
USAEHA acceptance testing of the ESP occurred during the period 20 to 25 August
1973.37 Results of this testing indicated that the particulate emission rate met the
State of Colorado's standards. Stack opacity was observed to be less than 5 percent
which also met the State's standard. Those results were obtained with three out of
the five stages running.
Disposal of ton container ash and ESP residue was accomplished by dry land
dilution on Arsenal property during July and August 1974. This was material
collected from the ton container cut and scrape operation of September 1973 to
February 1974 had been barrelled and stored in warehouses on the Arsenal. This
storage occurred only after the ash had been sampled for agent content and cleared
by Quality Assurance. The ESP residue had been collected from the precipitator
5-41
stages during the weekly cleanout of the equipment. The drums of this material,
after sampling the residue for agent content; were placed in storage along with the
ton container ash. Previous (before 1 May 1973) disposal of this material was by
dumping in the RMA sanitary land fill by direction of the RMA Chief of Quality
Assurance. ->°
The initial study of the feasibility of ton container ash disposal was made in April
1973 as a result of the 1 to 2 March 19733^ program review meeting at RMA. The
original work on this project was patterned after the Beal Air Force Base, Ft. Detrick
and RMA land dilution projects for TX ash disposal. TX was a wheat rust that was
destroyed by burning. It was realized at this time, that a more detailed elemental
analysis of the ton container ash was required than was currently available. Arrange-
ments were made with Coors Spectro Chemical Laboratories, Golden, Colorado, to do
the analysis within several weeks time. A preliminary estimate of acreage required was
78.9 acres based on an assumed dilution rate and an estimated ash production. A
more accurate cost/time analysis was to be prepared and sent forward for approval.
Following receipt of the Coors ash analysis, preliminary calculations were made of
soil elemental content after ash dilution.^0 These calculations used the Coors results,
an assumed dilution rate of ash to soil, and the soil analysis from the TX ash dilution
project. The estimate of 79 acres previously arrived at remained valid. Further effort
on the dry land dilution project awaited a decision from the Program Manager to
proceed. If this decision was forthcoming, a plot would be selected and an elemental
analysis obtained on soil samples from this ground area.
Permission to proceed with the dry land dilution project was received from the
Program Manager on 1 August 1973.41 This communication authorized RMA to select
a site and obtain soil samples tor elemental analysis. The Program Manager also
directed that the iron and phosphorus content of the ash be determined by the RMA
Quality Assurance laboratory to supplement the data in the Coors elemental analysis
of the ash. Dilution criteria established in this letter were that the material was to be
uniformly mixed to a depth of six inches, and that the concentration of any element
in the soil was not to be increased by more than 0.05 percent or two parts per
million by weight. A high confidence cost/time estimate and plan were requested.
A reply to the 1 August letter from the Program Manager was prepared by RMA and
forwarded on 11 October 1973.42 The results of soil samples taken from the plot of
land selected, a portion of the northeastern-most square mile section of the Arsenal
property, were presented along with the iron and phosphorous results requested. A
recalculation of the after-dilution elemental concentration of the soil was presented.
Two elements, iron and sulfur, exceeded the 0.05 percent criterion established, but
these were determined by RMA to be nondetrimental constituents of the soil. A plot
size of 79 acres was still calculated but a safe-sided plot size of 120 acres was
recommended.
5-42
to be included in the same document. An additional requirement placed on RMA
was the study of the dry land disposal of the electrostatic precipitator residue and
preparation of a plan and EAS for the same.
The draft Plan and Environmental Assessment Statement for the Disposal of Ton
Container Ash and ESP Residue by Dry Land Dilution was prepared during March
and April 1974 and completed on 1 May 1974.43 This plan was approved by message
on 29 May44 and operations were authorized to begin. The plan called for dilution of
the ton container ash over a 120-acre plot in the previously selected southwest
corner of the northeastern-most square mile section of RMA. The material was to be
disposed of by spreading over the ground, plowing it in to a depth of 6 inches,
discing the area to mix the soil and ash, and finally sowing the area with a cover crop
after verification of the iron content of the resulting soil/ash mixture. The disposal
rate of this material was to be 1452 pounds per acre which gave a dilution rate of
one pound of ash per 1500 pounds of soil. The ESP residue was to be treated in a
similar manner on a 320-acre plot adjacent to the ash residue plot. The distribution
ratio of ESP residue was 2100 pounds per acre or one pound of residue per 1000
pounds of soil. These ratios were dictated by the necessity of meeting the 0.05
percent criteria established by the Program Manager in October 1973. Disposal of
the ash and residue was scheduled to take 30 working days based on a 10-acre per
day rate. Cover crop sowing would be simultaneous with ash distribution after an
initial content of the first ash container area done. Details of the plan are contained
in the referenced document.
The actual EAS sent forward by the Program Manager for approval was a shortened
version of that contained in the referenced Plan and EAS document.
The plots were surveyed and staked by RMA Facilities Civil Engineering Section
during June 1974. The staking was done by transit and comprised siting the four
corners of each of the two plots. The plots themselves were further subdivided into
10-acre increments by the Special Projects personnel carrying out the operation.
Actual ash disposal began on 8 Julv 1974 and was completed on 7 August 1974. A
total of 23 working days were consumed, yielding an average of 9.6 acres per day,
well within the estimated rate. The operation was not hampered by bad weather
since the summer was unusuallv dry. A total of 222,063 pounds was distributed by
actual weighing of each residue drum. The residue was mostly wet material as a
result of the water which had been used to eliminate noxious emissions during the
container cut and scrape operation. The ash drums were found to be badly
deteriorated for the most part. They were washed and turned into Property Disposal
for salvage.
Dispersal of the ESP residue followed the ash operation immediately. An extra 22
acres over the 32-acre estimate were required for the residue dispersal. The operation
began on 8 August and terminated on 16 August 1974 consuming 7 operating days
for an average of 7.9 acres per day. A total of 63,158 pounds of residue were spread
over the ESP residue plot. This rate was 2.1 acres per day less than the estimated
rate; the entire operation was performed within the 30 estimated days, however.
This meeting of schedule was the result of highly effective work by the 12 enlisted
5-43
personnel assigned to t'ie proj ct. Vigorous supervision and leadership under adverse
conditions resulted in . utilization of manpower and machinery on a level far
beyond the already weL-demonstrated best efforts of the Special Projects Division.
B. Foreign materials such as rags and spray paint cans contained in the ash
jamming or damaging the h spreader.
Cover crop sowing proceeded as planned with the exception that a portion of the
acreage had to be sown with millet rather than sorghum due to the low commercial
supply of the latter. A portion of the crop germinated despite the almost drought
conditions occurring toward the end of the summer. The material which did
germinate did not bear fruit. Some of the material remaining as ungerminated seed
will sprout in the spring of 1975. The prolific growth of weeds resulting from the
spring rain will quickly cover the plowed area.
Permanent metal stakes with die stamped metal signs bearing the designation of the
project, the material disposed of, and the date were implanted on each of the four
corners of both plo;s Photographic records of the project, including aerial
photography, were mad - by the Edgewood Arsenal Technical Photographic Division,
Photographic Science Branch (SAREA-TS-P), to preserve a permanent record of the
location of the treated ;and area.
Ton container halves ./re sold as scrap steel by RMA Property Disposal. The
containers were carried from the disposal facility by truck to the Arsenal salvage
yard after verification of absence of agent in the ash of each lot of containers. To
give the laboratory personnel an adequate response time, the containers were held,
after cutting, for 48 hours in tin Building 538 storage yard.
All scrap metal suspected of contamination was incinerated -with the contaminated
trash in the container furnaces at the rate of one container per shift. The burning
vehicle was a ton container with the top 30 percent of its circumference (except for
the ends) cut off with a torch. It was modified with angle iron to accept the
centrifugal agent pump and the agent tank homomixers when these were replaced
and had to be thermally decontaminated. Duration in the furnace was a matter of
experience. A cooled-down ioad of metal or a deconned piece of equipment was
sampled with a blue band tube by a Quality Assurance inspector prior to release to
the Arsenal salvage yard. All such material was tagged as xxxxx decontaminated in
accordance with appropriate regulations.
5-44
Trash burning was limited to agent contaminated clothing, other agent contaminated
combustible materials and DS2 decontaminant cans. Replaced unload booth hoses
and rubber gloves were incinerated as well. Since each container of trash burned
represented a period of nonproductive time for the furnaces, considerable emphasis
was placed on strictly limiting the burning of trash to the materials described. All
other material was disposed of by the Arsenal Roads and Utilities personnel as
normal trash after being checked and tagged by a Quality Assurance representative.
The salt generated by the mustard disposal process was placed in drums and stored
in warehouses on RMA. Several attempts have been made to dispose of the salt by
sale or by use on the roads of the Arsenal during winter weather. This latter
approach was abandoned before it could be implemented as a result of a letter from
the State of Colorado Department of Health4^ on 24 August 1973 advising against
road use due to the high degree of solubility of the salt constituents and the sodium
sulfate noncompatibility with concrete. This communication was forwarded to the
Program Manager on 5 September 1973 by the Mustard Demil Directorate.4^
Various attempts to sell the material were made throughout the duration of the
program as listed by a memorandum for record furnished to the Program Manager
on 22 January 1974.4^ There were no affirmative replies received. The material
remains in storage at Rocky Mountain Arsenal as of this writing pending the results
of further work on disposal by the Program Manager's Office.
On this date, at approximately 0305 hours, the crew working on agent transfer
operations was transferring agent from a ton container to the mustard storage
tanks utilizing unload booths 1 and 2. An incident occurred when one of the
flexible rubber hoses in Booth No. 2 ruptured, spraying a fine aerosol of agent
around the baffle located between the unload booth door and the door seat
and also through the points where the remote handles of the unload booth
valves extended through the booth wall. This agent spray contaminated two
operators who were given immediate first aid and taken to the toxic exposure
aid station. The hose was determined to have ruptured as a result of a
combination of agent pressure and deterioration. Most of the liquid agent was
contained in the unload booth. A much larger agent spill was prevented by
prompt action of the remainder of the unloading crew in closing the container
5-45
valves. This incident resulted in a recommendation which was immediately
adapted which prescribed a monthly hose changeout. A further
recommendation was that the design of the unload booths be changed to
provide more operator safety. In the interim, more stringent protective clothing
requirements were implemented when booths No. 1 and No. 3 were used for
transfer operations. The use of booth No. 2 was discontinued indefinitely due
to the loose door fit and the cutout portion of the door seat baffle which had
originally allowed the agent to escape the booth. A subsequent modification
was also made to the plant's deluge shower system when heaters were installed
to bring the deluge water temperature to a more comfortable level.
5-46
incident were: (1) Use of a heavier fabric reinforced nylon material, sewn into
bags, for containment of agent pump or homomixers removed from the tanks,
and (2) the installation of a permanent hoist in place above the centrifugal
pump for ease of replacement.
On 25 April 1974, at 0800 hours, two maintenance men entered the disposal
facility to repair a broken underground tile pipe in the chemical sewer line
running from Building 742 to Basin A. One individual entered a manhole in the
Building 538 storage yard which gave access to the section of sewer line above
the damaged section. This individual placed a sandbag in the pipe section to
block water flow and facilitate repair work. There was no odor of mustard
agent noticed by either maintenance man. The maintenance man in the hole
was wearing a protective mask, rubber boots, rubber gloves and
nonimpregnated coveralls. While in the hole, he stirred up the four to five
inches of sludge in the bottom of the sewer' line. Upon leaving the sewer he
suspected contamination and placed his clothing in a plastic bag for analysis.
This analysis indicated positive agent contamination. The individual was
informed of this and did not seek medical aid despite the warning and the
observation of a reddening of the skin in the area above both knees; he
eventually went to the Toxic Aid Station at 2015 hours of the same day.
Neither of the maintenance men had informed the mustard demil shift
supervisors of their actions in the Building 538 yard sewer; thus, this lack of
appropriate protective clothing went unnoticed. Samples taken from the sewer
sludge indicated a high agent content. Approximately 800 pounds of STB were
5-47
dumped into the hole and agitated to attempt a superficial decontamination of
the area directly beneath the manhole. Complete decontamination of the sewer
line was beyond the resources of the Arsenal at the time, and the task was
therefore deferred until the Arsenal cleanup effort. There were no system
modifications as a result of this exposure since it occurred during the cleanup
phase. The incident is not related to the disposal program except to the extent
that it occurred within the disposal facility. The source of the agent was
unknown, but was suspected to have come from Building 742 during mustard
artillery projectile filling operations in the early 1950's.
The only major spill which occurred during the demilitarization program occurred
on 23 July 1973. At 0015 hours, during startup of the mustard facility, two
personnel performing first entry monitoring of the thaw room observed that
mustard had leaked around one of the valves of a ton container. All of the agent was
observed to be contained in the thaw room. The fire prevention division was called
to the plant and after investigating the situation, the assistant fire chief elected to
implement portions of the Chemical Accident/Incident Control Plan. Personnel to
implement this plan were called and arrived promptly. A hot line was set up outside
of Building 537. The leak was stopped by rotating the T.C. to a position which had
the leaking plug in the container's void space. The estimated 1100 pounds of agent
spilled on the floor and sprayed on the walls was decontaminated by crews working
in relays. STB slurry was used to decontaminate surface contamination. The bulk of
the agent was covered with STB and subsequently hosed into the thaw room
ventilating trench from which, after the addition of more bleach and after steam
sparging, the agent-containing solution was pumped to the Building 536 brine
storage tank. Caustic was added to the storage tank and to the trench. The brine
storage tank was recirculated until QA laboratory analytical results showed no agent
content in the brine. The material was then spray dried. The affected container was
taken to the unloading booth, drained, and removed to Building 538 for
incineration. A study of the plugs removed from the container after incineration
revealed that of the six container plugs, three were brass plugs which had
deteriorated to the point where the leaking plug had been held in place by two
threads. The other two brass plugs were not as badly deteriorated, but could still be
considered unsound. In general, decontamination procedures were correctly applied
in drying the agent spill. There were no exposures resulting from the cleanup
operation and the plant was back in operation at 1600 hours, on the same day. This
spill prompted the installation of the remote weekend alarm system which was
installed in September.
A. There was only one instance of equipment damage during the program which
was not associated with a routine equipment failure. This damage occurred on
Friday, 25 January 1974, when at 0155 hours, there were at least two distinct
explosions in the electrostatic precipitator. These explosions caused moderate
5-48
damage and resulted in a shutdown of the facility to repair the unit. Damage
was confined to a ruptured seam in the expansion joint between stages 2 and 3,
sheared catwalk bolts, popped insulation securing rivets, and cracked the
grating at the foot of stage 2's support columns. None of the damage was
structural in nature. A total of 17.75 hours of operation were lost due to
repairs. The plant was operational again for normal startup on 28 January
1974.
B. It was concluded from an examination of the data that the explosions were
probably caused by unburned mustard vapor, fuel oil, other combustibles
(perhaps natural gas from the preheater) or a combination of any or all which
had escaped the furnaces, passed through the west scrubber, and thence into
the precipitator where an arcing cycle prompted the incident. The preheater
had not been operating properly for some time, and had it been inactive during
the time of the incident, it was believed that the combustibles would have been
consumed in the flame.
5-49
REFERENCES
1
RMA, TWX to MUCOM, dated 27 Jul 1972, subject: "Incineration of Mustard".
2
RMA, (SMURM-O-P) Memo to Safety Office, dated 3 Apr 1973, subject:
"Justification for Additional Ton Containers in the Thaw Room".
*7RMA Test Plan titled, "Test Program for Evaluation of Dynasciences Instrument and
Optimization of Ton Container Residence Time", dated 7 Feb 1973.
5-50
18
SMURM-0-P, First Indenture to PM, dated 13 Feb 1973, "Mustard Demilitarization".
l^RMA Test Report titled: "Report on Test Program for Evaluation of Dynasciences
Instrument as applied to» Optimization of Ton Container Residence Time", dated 9 Apr
1973.
20
RMA Test Report, titled: "Test Program for Evaluation of Dynasciences Instrument
and Optimization of Ton Container Residence Time, Phase II", dated 26 Mar 1973.
21
RMA Report titled: "Report on Ton Container Incineration Optimization Test
Phase II: Parts I and II", dated 12 Jul 1973.
22
Ibid, p. 69.
23
RMA Letter to PM, dated 2 Jul 1973, subject: "Reply to Directed Action".
24
RMA Test Report titled: "Test Program for Evaluation of Alternative Methods of
Incinerating Ton Containers of Residue Weight 300 - 1000 Pounds", dated 20 Jul 1973.
25
RMA Instruction Sheet titled: "Instructions for Heavy T.C. Burning", dated 28 Aug
1973.
26
RMA Instruction Sheet titled: "Instructions for Burning Light T.C.'s", dated 28 Aug
1973.
27
SMURM-M Letter to PM, dated 18 Jul 1973, "Hoses for Unload Booth".
28
SMURM-QA-I & V DF to Mustard Director, dated 13 Jul 1973, "Inspection of
Mustard Transfer Hose after One Month's Usage".
29
RMA Test Plan titled: "Test Plan for Startup of Hydrazine Furnace to Burn Mustard
at 1 GPM", dated 12 Feb 1973.
30
RMA Test Report titled: "Report on Test H-l, Startup of Hydrazine Furnace on
Number 2 Fuel Oil", dated 19 Mar 1973.
31
RMA Test Report titled: "Report on Tests H-2, H-3 and H-4; Incineration of
Mustard in Modified Hydrazine Furnace", dated 19 Apr 1973.
32
RMA Test Plan titled: "Test Program for Evaluation of the Mustard Disposal System
Following Installation of the Redundant Scrubber", dated 15 Aug 1973.
33
RMA Memo for Record, titled: "Bowen Spray Dryer Status", dated 8 Mar 1973, 9
Mar 1973, 13 Mar 1973, 27 Mar 1973, 29 Mar 1973, 2 Apr 1973, 5 Apr 1973, 6 Apr 1973,
27 Apr 1973, 2 May 1973, 31 May 1973, 7 Jun 1973, 9 Jun 1973, 30 Nov 1973.
34
USAEHA-EA Letter to RMA, dated 14 Sep 1973, "Source Emission Evaluation of
the Mustard Spray Dryer".
5-51
35
Lear-Siegler Inc Letter to RMA, dated 13 Jul 1973, Opacity Test Results.
36
USAEHA-EA Letter to RMA, dated 26 Feb 1974, "Source Emission Evaluation of
the Mustard Spray Dryer".
37
USAEHA Letter to PM, dated 19 Nov 1973, titled: "Air Pollution Engineering
Source Sampling Survey No. 99-013-70/74, 20-28 Aug 1973".
38
SMURM-QA Memo for Record, dated 25 Dec 1973, "The Removal of Debris from
the Mustard Area".
39
SMURM-OP Letter to MUCOM, dated 27 Apr 1973, "Response to Directed
Action".
40
SMURM-M Letter to MUCOM, dated 19 Jun 1973, "Dry Land Dilution".
41
AMXDC-O Letter to RMA, dated 1 Aug 1973, "Dry Land Dilution".
42
AMXDC-0 Letter to RMA, dated 19 Oct 1973, "Dry Land Dilution".
43
RMA Plan titled: "Environmental Assessment and Plan of Operations for Disposal of
Ton Container Ash and ESP Residue by Dry Land Dilution", dated 1 May 1974.
^AMXDC-O to RMA message, dated 29 May 1974, "Disposal of TC Ash and ESP
Residue by Dry Land Dilution".
45
State of Colorado, Department of Health Letter to RMA, dated 24 Aug 1973,
"Disposal of Mustard Salts".
46
SARRM-M Letter to PM, dated 5 Sep 1973, "Disposal of Salts".
47
SARRM-M MFR, dated 22 Jan 1974, "Mustard Salt Disposal".
48
RMA, MFR, dated 31 Jan 1974, titled: "ESP Damage, 25 Jan 1974".
5-52
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SECTION 6
The Production Control system of data collection and processing was the result of a
continuing effort at process improvement. Although most of the Inventory Control
forms and data collection sheets had been long established due to the Tailor system
shakedown operation, a concerted effort to use the information thus acquired for
other than inventory control and progress reporting was not made until additional
engineering assistance was provided in January to February 1973. At this time
process engineering was begun to use the data to improve the demilitarization
operation; this effort was to continue throughout the program. Additionally, a
thorough revision of all plant data collection forms was made during May 1973.
A. To provide data sufficient to track the agent inventory in bulk and as container
units through the demilitarization process.
C. To allow the Mustard Demil staff to track the progress of the overall demil
operation versus the established schedules and to report to the Commander,
RMA, and the Program Manager for Demilitarization on the status of the demil
effort.
D. To order and deliver sufficient materials and spare parts to support the
demilitarization operation.
The system of Data Sheets and Production Reports developed during the Mustard
Demil Program comprised two distinct types of material: Plant-generated and
Mustard Demil/RMA command-generated.
6-1
switching of the instrument air dryers, vacuum pump seal water changeout and
pH, area bubbler results, record of incoming ton containers, mustard pump
pressures, mustard tank levels before and after agent dumping and transfer,
changeout of unload booth gloves, and changeout of unload booth rubber
hoses. This information was extracted from the logs daily for incorporation
into the Weekly Progress Report (Item 9, Table 6-2). The logbook also acted
as a written record of operations for documentation purposes should an
accident occur in the operational area so documented.
This logbook contained any operational entries which the Shift Engineers
desired to record. The book also served as a vehicle for the plant manager or
process engineer to pass on and/or rescind in writing changes to operational
conditions, whether equipment- or safety-related. An additional useful result of
the book's use was to maintain closer coordination among the three shift
engineers and to pass on for consideration suggestions for safety or operations
modifications. Data from this log was extracted for inclusion in the Weekly
Progress Report.
This form was used for inventory control purposes. In addition, considerable
work was done using the agent drain data to predict agent draining
characteristics of containers yet to be drained. The data from this form was
included on the inventory control form for T.C. unloading (Item 1, Table 6—2)
for permanent record. The earlier form was superseded by revision 1 which
combined two forms into one. The earlier mustard tank outage form (Item 6)
was withdrawn from use in favor of the subject form. Tank outage readings
were taken every hour in order to compute the number of gallons of agent
burned per hour. The difference (in inches) in tank levels observed over an hour
period was checked against a chart giving the volume of the storage tank as a
function of the level observed on a sight glass on the end of the horizontal
tank. Since no practicable flowmeter had been found during the program which
would perform accurately (if at all) the measurement of agent flow by tank
outage remained as a less efficient but workable method. Further study into
flowmeters for corrosive and particulate-laden fluids may resolve this particular
problem. The data computed from this portion of the unloading form was
used, along with the rest of the information on the form, to make up the shift
engineer's Daily Summary Report (Item 16).
This form was used by the Quality Assurance Inspection and Verification
Inspectors to track ton container lot/serial number data, weight data and blue
band tube test results. A card was filled out for each container during the
transfer operation and again during the residue incineration operation. An
additional card was filled in if the container was reburned due to residual
6-2
contamination after the initial burn (positive blue band test result). The cards
were sent weekly to Data Processing where the data was transcribed onto
punched cards and run on the computer. A weekly summary report (Item 18,
Table 6-2) by agent type and container serial number was presented to Quality
Assurance on a weekly basis.
This form was filled out by operating personnel on a daily basis. Information
recorded was weight and time data for each ton container incinerated. The
containers were identified by serial number, type of agent, and furnace used
(after 26 September 1973). Two residue weights were recorded: the "as
marked" weight marked on the ton container during the drain process and the
"actual" weight derived from a direct measurement before and after
incineration. The "as marked" residue weight went into the Production Control
Daily Progress report for inventory control and production vs. schedule use.
The "actual" residue weight went into the Daily T.C. Summary. Report filled
out by the shift engineer (after 26 September 1973). Since the variance
between the two weights could be significant, the "actual" weight was used for
process control and as a data base for improving the T.C. residue burning.
This logbook was kept by the operating personnel to record operational data.
Time and serial number entries were made in the log on each container
incinerated. Hydrazine furnace data such as downtime and mustard on/off
times were also recorded. Information extracted from this logbook was
incorporated in the Weekly Status Report (Item 9, Table 6-2).
These logbooks were used primarily for recording operational data out of the
realm of the usual collected data. Unusual occurrences, such as equipment
failures, were also recorded. The number and drum weight of residue removed
from the Electrostatic Precipitator each week was recorded in the ESP log.
Bubbler results, SO2 emission levels, tracor status and calibration were
recorded in the monitoring station logbook.
6-3
J. Daily Summary Report by Shift Engineer (Item 16)
Two types of forms were used as a Daily Summary Report by the Shift
Engineers. The first form used from the start of the program until December
1973 summarized the daily production to include: T.C.'s dumped, weight of
agent dumped, T.C.'s burned by shift and total, salt hauled, salt dumps
produced, number of T.C.'s required for thaw room, downtime minutes and
causes, caustic car status, and T.C.'s cut. After December 1973, the agent drain
and bulk agent burn data was dropped from the form and a section added for
T.C. cutting and ash barrelling. This form remained in the plant after being
filled in.
This form was completed by the Shift Engineer each morning and sent to the
Process Engineering Section. Poundage data was recorded on ''actual" weight
to be used in computing totals and averages for Production charts (see Table
6-2).
L. Hydrazine Furnace, East Quench, East Scrubber, West Scrubber, Bowen Spray
Dryer, and Electrostatic Precipitator Data Sheets (Items 18 through 22)
These data sheets were completed once each day. Readings were taken every
hour by operating personnel. Data recorded was process instrument data such
as pressures, temperatures, flow rates, liquid levels, specific quantities,
amperages, solution alkalinity, etc. The completed sheets were grouped by day
and stored in the plant for reference.
This form was completed by the Quality Assurance Inspection and Verification
Inspector on duty. Completion of this form certified that the containers had
been decontaminated by burning and were free from agent. The form
contained the serial numbers of cut ton containers and was completed prior to
their release from the plant but after the ash from the containers had been
analyzed for agent content and negative results received from the Quality
Assurance Laboratory. The original of this form went to RMA Property
Disposal with QA office and Mustard Derrrrl «ffice receiving file copies.
6-4
O. TonContainer Furnace Time/Temperature Charts (Item 25)
Continuous 24-hour trace of ton container furnace and flue temperatures was
maintained. Ton container data was entered for each container into the
furnace. Observation of time/temperature trace allowed process engineering to
check on compliance with established burning procedures by measuring
temperature peak height, values of inflection points, etc. Charts were kept in
the plant as part of each day's data sheet package.
This form was maintained in the Production Control section on a daily basis.
Ton container drain data as shown on the example was recorded for each
container, one sheet being used for each day's operation. The sheet served a
dual purpose in that as containers were recorded on the Ton Container
Decontamination Sheet (Item 2) the containers on the T.C.'s emptied sheet
were crossed off in an attempt to maintain a continuous track on containers
throughout the incineration process. Completed forms were collected and filed
in the Mustard Demil filing system.
This form was similar in use to the T.C. emptied daily progress report above.
This form was a carryover from the Production Division Manufacturing report;
its use was continued because it was a convenient form and there were large
stocks of blank forms remaining. Data reported on this form was drawn from
the reports and information sheets generated in the Mustard Plant. The primary
input was the early morning telephonic summary report from the Shift
Engineer to the Production Controller. This report form incorporated a variety
of data including agent drained data, agent burned data, ton container
incineration data, and downtime totals and reasons. The contents remained
flexible and varied with the progress of the program through its various phases.
Information from this report was used by the Shift Engineer to post the
Arsenal Commander's data book. This data book was maintained on a daily
basis for the use and information of the Commander.
1. Chart Type 1
This chart was prepared by the Production Controller each day. The
scheduled rate line was computed using the minimum required agent burn
6-5
(nozzle plus residue) based on a 100 percent operating day (no
downtime). This rate changed as the scheduled requirement changed. The
computation of the actual disposal rate was based on data from the daily
progress report (Item 3). The agent burned through the nozzle (in gallons)
was added to the "as marked" residue burned (converted to gallons using
a density of 10.0 LBS/GAL) and divided through by 1440 minutes per
operating day. After April 1973, the process engineering section began
using this chart to record a breakdown of the agent destroyed, numbers of
T.C.'s incinerated, downtime minutes, and downtime causes. This chart
was posted in the Mustard Demil office and was used to track production
and observe upward or downward production trends. Use of this chart was
discontinued at the completion of bulk agent incineration.
2. Chart Type 2
This chart was also prepared by the Production Controller each day. Bulk
agent destroyed was expressed in terms of pounds rather than GPM. The
residue destroyed was expressed in gallons destroyed, since it was
normally averaging 2000 pounds per day and compression of the vertical
axis to include up to 6000 pounds would also compress the bulk burn
portion of the chart and decrease its useful value to the process
engineering section. This chart was used during Phases I and II when bulk
agent incineration was of higher priority than residue incineration. Copies
of this chart were posted in the Plant Break trailer in order to keep the
operators apprised of the operation's progress and to foster a competitive .
spirit among the shift crews. The sections of each bar on the chart were
color-coded by shift; the bottom section was green for graveyard shift, the
second section red for days, the third blue for swing, and the top section
brown for total T.C. residue (not broken out by shift). The numbers in
each section also had significance. The use of the numbers 1, 2 or 3 at the
bottom of each section indicated the shift engineers in charge of the shift.
The three or four digit numbers indicated the exact amount of agent
destroyed in each shift expressed in pounds. This chart was updated and
posted daily. Use of this chart was discontinued on 25 September 1973,
due to the completion of Phase II.
This chart was a process engineering tool composed of a plot of the total
number of pounds of ton container residue burned each day vs. the calendar
date. This time trace was started on 1 May 1973, and continued until
approximately 30 December 1973, spanning the latter part of Phase I, all of
Phase II and the first three months of Phase III. The primary use of the chart
was to observe trends in the ton container residue destruction as a function of
time in order to control better the effectiveness of the T.C. decontamination
operation. Use of the chart was discontinued at the end of December 1973, due
to the concentration at that point on completion of schedule ahead of the
target date based on numbers of containers destroyed rather than on residue
6-6
burned. It should be noted that the chart actually contains two plots since the
container residue totals used were expressed as "actual" and "as marked" as
was discussed in Paragraph 6.3.1 (C). Since the "as marked" residue was the
inventory agent left over after draining, this residue weight was used to set
schedules and measure schedule completions. The "actual" residue weight was
used for engineering purposes since it was a direct measurement indicator of
the residue content of a container. It was a disadvantage that this data could
only be collected after a container had been burned, therefore, it became
necessary to make extensive use of projections of residue contained in
unburned containers based on a compiled distribution of residue weights of
containers already burned. Use of this technique was quite reliable and the
projections were periodically updated for use in calculating estimates of Phase
III termination. It eventually became possible, after considerable study, to
predict a container's residue weight prior to incineration with accuracy
sufficient to set approximate burn times and peak temperature. This chart was
displayed in the Mustard Demil Office in the belief that it would not only
provide updated information for casual visitors but also elicit comments and
observations from the office staff on implications of the charted data which
may or may not have been seen by the process engineering personnel.
This chart was a double plot of the average weight of residue burned per
container and the number of H mustard containers burned per calendar day.
The use of this chart was confined to process control. The data plotted was
computed by dividing the actual residue burned by the total number of ton
containers incinerated in a 24-hour period. As of 25 September 1973, the data
for the west ton container furnace was plotted in addition to the already
charted east furnace data. The plot of ton containers burned per day was
confined to H containers for simplicity. Use of both graphs gave the process
engineer the information necessary to make process control decisions.
This chart was similar in function to the preceding two in that it was a day by
day review of Phase II and part of Phase III from the ton container incineration
aspect. The chart was posted daily from the Production Control daily report
with both "as marked" and "actual" cumulative residue weights. Data was first
plotted on 1 June 1973, at the beginning of Phase II and discontinued on 5
October when the Phase III schedule emphasis shifted from residue poundage
to numbers of ton containers incinerated per day. It should be noted that the
cumulative totals plotted did not reflect the total residue burned since the
beginning of the program but only the total cumulative residue burned during
Phase II.
6-7
H. Ton Containers Cumulative Cut and Scraped (Item 8)
This chart was begun on 30 August 1973, continued until the end of the
program, and had its inception at approximately the point when it was
recognized that the most valuable schedule to follow during Phase III would be
numbers of containers rather than residue poundage. The data plotted
consisted (until mid-September 1973) of the cumulative total of ton containers
incinerated from the beginning of the program, to include Tailor system
testing. This actual rate was posted daily and contrasted with the schedules set
internally by the Mustard Demil Office. As Phase III approached its
termination, the chart was very useful in estimating completion date by
extrapolation. The ton container cut and scrape operation's progress was also
documented on this plot resulting in a great deal of ease in visualizing the
progression of these simultaneous operations which had to be as nearly
co-terminal as possible.
The weekly status report was compiled by the Production Control section and
sent by Disposition Form to the Chief Engineer of RMA. The report was
composed of a compilation of extracts from the operational logbooks taken
daily. Data from the Production Control Daily Report also went into its
preparation. The logbook extracts consisted of detailed information, by
operating day, on process conditions, and downtime. Normal checks and
routine performance of maintenance were also noted. The weekend
maintenance work was also documented. The report covered a calendar week as
opposed to the Thursday through Wednesday report week required by the
Program Manager's Office. Additionally, at the end of each month, this report
included a summary of major downtimes related to each problem area.
The RMA Chief Engineer submitted the Thursday through Wednesday Progress
Report by message to the Program Manager each Thursday. This report
contained the production summaries for the report week as well as cumulative
totals for the program. Additionally, a capsule write-up of major downtimes
and operational problems was included. This report was compiled from the
daily reports provided to the Chief Engineer.
This report was provided to the RMA Supply Division through the RMA Chief
Engineer at the end of every calendar month. The information contained in the
report was use of caustic expressed in tons of 50 percent solution. The tonnage
was derived from a computation involving the month ending inventory of all 50
percent caustic on hand, the receipts of 50 percent caustic during the month,
and the gallonage of 18 percent in the ready caustic storage tank (calculated
back to 50 percent and converted to tons). The primary purpose of this report
was to aid the Supply Division of Logistical Services in contrasting caustic
usage against Arsenal-wide inventories and expected receipts.
6-8
L. Program Progress Chart (Item 12)
This chart was an overall view of the status of the actual mustard destruction
vs. the various schedules applied by the Program Manager's Office. The data
plotted vs. calendar consisted of the total cumulative agent destroyed (bulk
plus "as marked" T.C. residue) expressed in gallons for the report week, based
on the amounts reported by the Chief Engineer in his Weekly Progress Report
Message (Item 10). The chart proved very useful in determining the status of
each phase of the program as it progressed and in estimating phase completion
by graphical extrapolation. This plot was made up in engineering drawing sheet
format and posted in the Mustard Demil Office for informational purposes. The
updated chart was also used for preparation of viewgraphs for briefings as
required.
This report was a monthly summary of normal production data and was
furnished by Disposition Form to the Work Measurement Office of the RMA
Comptroller by the Mustard Demil Production Controller.
The Commander of RMA held a Program Review and Analysis briefing each
quarter of the fiscal year. The contribution to this briefing of the Mustard
Demil office was in the form of a formal narrative briefing given from a
prepared text with viewgraphs and slides. The information presented was
composed of the status of the program during the quarter being briefed,
analyses of performance and downtime, milestones achieved, milestones
projected, and manpower utilization data. All texts were maintained by the
RMA Comptroller's Office for permanent filing.
This report was provided to Mustard Demil by the Work Measurement Office of
the RMA Comptroller and contained the calculated efficiency of each of the
Demil Program's operations vs. the established work measurement standards.
This report served as a useful tool by aiding the Program Director to assess his
operation's performance, take corrective action for low efficiency functions,
and monitor the charging of labor hours against an individual step in the demil
operation.
6-9
Q. Manhour and Cost Reports (Item 17)
R. ADPE Report No. 9005, H-HD Container and Burn Data (Item 18)
This report was a computer printout summary of the ton container data
contained on the Quality Assurance data cards (Item 5, Table 6-1) submitted
to Data Processing each week. The entire summary was updated each week
with the containers arranged by type of agent and by serial number. Additional
data consisted of dram, burn weight, and date information as well as lot
number and fill date information. This report served as the source document
for most of the container weight analyses done utilizing fill dates and lot
numbers.
The Punch List was prepared weekly by the Director of the Mustard Operations
Division to define the priority of maintenance tasks to be undertaken on the
weekend because of interference with operations. This document served as a
basis for determining the priority of efforts and skills of the work force
required, and provided a basis for material planning for weekend work.
6-10
Each week, a Xerox copy of all sheets defining required task for that particular
week were furnished to the Maintenance Foreman. He in turn assigned the
work, and each maintenance man signed off those tasks when completed. Once
completed, the sheets were returned to the maintenance scheduling office (for
each week) to be retained as verification of the completion of the preventive
maintenance tasks for that period.
The Production Control system eventually evolved for use during the Mustard
Demilitarization program as adequate to complete the program in a safe manner and
well ahead of schedule. There were, however, several shortcomings, all of which were
due primarily to a continual lack of sufficient full-time, permanent production
control and process engineering personnel. The program was at a disadvantage
throughout its course in that new studies and testing programs were continually
pressing to be accomplished while the personnel required to tabulate, store, and
routinely analyze the data so collected were not available. TDY personnel, although
immensely helpful, could not fulfill this requirement of permanency. If routine data
collection was hampered by this inadequacy, then it follows that the time and effort
required to reexamine, change, and implement a data collection and storage system
was not available.
The original program schedule assumed that the installation of the bulk agent
incinerator and the modification of the ton container burning system would be
completed by August 1970 with demilitarization operations completed by March
1971. Various technical and construction problems were encountered which resulted
in at least twelve different schedules being established; an in-depth treatment of
these schedule changes and the difficulties causing them is contained in the
Edgewood Arsenal report, and therefore will not be reiterated here. * Section 7
details these revisions from the Cost standpoint.
As described in previous sections, the alternate mustard disposal system, using the
ton container furnaces, was essentially committed by June 1972. The preliminary
6-11
schedule established at that time was based on certain assumptions regarding burn
rates and ton container drain weight:2 It called for startup on 1 July 1972 and a
burn rate of 1 GPM (0.7 GPM allowing for 30 percent operational downtime) which
was to be followed by an increase in bulk rate to 2 GPM predicated on the use of
both ton container furnaces and the new electrostatic precipitator and dryer in
procurement at that time. This schedule was to terminate during May 1974 after a
period of ton container burning to complete the destruction of the agent containers.
However, this schedule was slipped to a start date (3-shift) of 21 August 1972 which
resulted in a scheduled completion date for bulk agent of December 1973 to be
followed by 5 months of ton container burning to terminate in June 1974.3 During
the 2 GPM phase starting in June 1973, there were to be no ton containers burned
due to the projected use of both ton container furnaces for bulk agent disposal. This
schedule indicated a first inflection point as of 1 June 1973, with a higher burn, at
245,000 gallons of agent (including T.C. residue). The second inflection point was at
31 December 1973, to a lower burn rate, at 493,000 gallons of agent (excluding T.C.
residual burn). The terminal point of the schedule was 31 July 1974, at 608,000
gallons. This remained the same through 31 December 1972.
A. Use of the hydrazine furnace in Building 538. (This is the first official mention
of the hydrazine furnace in correspondence.)
The first alternative, hydrazine furnace, assumed a maximum spray drying capacity
of 40 GPM; 30 GPM from the proposed Bower dryer and 10 GPM from the Tailor
drying unit. It was assumed that a separate scrubber system would be needed for the
hydrazine furnace which would be tied into the projected electrostatic precipitator.
If this were done, it was estimated the cost would be approximately identical to the
original schedule with the result that the one month's calculated decrease in
schedule would be offset by the approximate costs. The assumed rate of burn under
this alternative was 3.5 to 4.0 GPM. The second alternative was dismissed almost
immediately due to the estimated cost involved in replicating the ton container
furnaces as well as the additional scrubber system thought required at the time.
Similarly, the Tailor System alternative was rejected due to the previous failure to
make it operational and the unknown elements required in refurbishing and retesting
it. Following an analysis of these alternatives, the decision was made to investigate
the use of the hydrazine furnace without the additional scrubber system. The testing
and operational introduction of the hydrazine furnace is discussed later in this
section.
6-12
On or about 3 January 1973, the demilitarization schedule was changed as a result
of a meeting at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, on 19 December 1972. Details of this
schedule are lacking, except for the end date of 9 June 1974, established for the
program and the fact that the minimum disposal rate was set at 920 gallons per day
(including ton container residue) and six ton containers per day in one furnace, both
of these pertaining to Phase I only. The basic correspondence establishing this
schedule^ is in existence; but the inclosures containing the schedule are not readily
available.
The mustard disposal schedule finalized on 9 April 1973,6 was the schedule
employed, with one further modification, throughout the remainder of the program.
The three phases remained as before; namely, Phase I (one GPM bulk plus ton
containers), Phase II (two GPM bulk only), and Phase III (ton containers only). The
9 April 1973 schedule redefined the inflection points at the beginning of each phase
based on the most current production data available at the time. This data had been
developed prior to any vigorous production engineering efforts being employed in
the program at RMA. The procedural schedule is shown in Figure 6—1. The end of
Phase I was established as 30 May 1973, at a final total agent gallonage of 245,000
gallons (Point No. 5). This was determined by virtue of a schedule of 4536 gallons
per week, 907 gallons bulk agent plus 6 ton containers per day. Phase II as set forth
in this schedule was to terminate at 516,604 gallons on 28 November 1973, (Point
No. 10). This phase required a minimum of 10,288 gallons per week or 2058 gallons
of bulk agent per day. The incineration of containers in Phase III was to proceed at
the rate of 12 containers per day, totaling 3500 pounds (350 gallons) of agent
residue until program termination on 9 June 1974, at 608,435 gallons (Point No.
13). Each phase total schedule was composed of a bulk agent burn and a ton
container burn schedules as shown in Figure 6-1. The gallonage figures were
calculated from the original inventory expressed in pounds (6,084,350 pounds)
using a factor of 10 pounds per gallon. In addition to establishing the above
schedule, the Program Manager directed on 9 April 1973, that RMA examine the
maximum disposal rates which could be achieved after installation of the new
electrostatic precipitator (ESP) expected to occur on or about 1 May 1973. This
directive was issued with the aim of examining a possible change to Phase II that
would allow for disposal of ton containers along with the nominal two GPM bulk
agent burn.
A directed action resulting from the 1 to 2 March 1973, Program Review Meeting at
RMA, was that RMA would analyze the impact of changing from the then current
five-day on, two-day off, schedule to a 10-day on, four-day off,schedule pending
acceptance of the Bowen spray dryer. On 10 April *1973, RMA replied to this
directed action.7 Anticipated advantages of the 10 to four-day schedule were stated
as the elimination of one startup and one shutdown cycle per two-week period, and
the availability of longer maintenance periods during the four-day shutdown. The
disadvantages considered were that due to the longer operating time of the
6-13
equipment between scheduled maintenance periods, more failures could be expected
and an anticipated increase in the rate of absenteeism was expected to result from
the imposition of this unpopular schedule. Decisive factors against the 10 to
four-day schedule were stated as the then current shortening of the startup and
shutdown periods and the completion of routine maintenance within the present
two days time. RMA recommended that the 10 to four-day schedule be reserved for
onetime use during longer scheduled shutdown periods for installation of new
equipment. The Program Manager concurred in this decision on 4 May 1973.°
The analysis of the maximum disposal rate attainable with different combinations of
the hydrazine furnace and ton container furnaces, with a view toward evaluating an
alternate disposal schedule for Phase II, was to be presented for consideration at the
23 to 24 May 1973 Program Review Meeting held at RMA. In compliance with this
directive, an alternative analysis was prepared by the RMA Mustard Demil Director
and Process Engineer." This analysis dealt with the maximum disposal rate observed
under various furnace combinations and the use of these rates to present alternative
schedules for Phase II involving simultaneous destruction of bulk agent and ton
containers in the east ton container furnace. RMA recommended that the alternate
schedule be approved based on (1) an overall schedule shortening and (2) allowing
time to optimize the burning conditions for light residue and heavy residue ton
containers. The Program Manager approved the change. On 15 July 1973, a letter^
authorized the simultaneous destruction, during Phase II, of ton containers and bulk
agent. A minimum destruction rate was set at 2000 gallons of bulk agent per day
and, rather than a ton container schedule by number of containers, a residue burn
rate of 175 gallons (nominal 1750 pounds per day) was defined. This resulted in a
total minimum schedule of 2175 gallons of agent per operating day. The schedule
began 1 June 1973. The ton container rate proved to be based on an underestimate
of the average residue weight per ton container. This necessitated a further schedule
change to upgrade the minimum residue poundage to be destroyed per day. The
2000-gallon per day minimum bulk agent burn represented a slight decrease in the
minimum bulk burn set by the original 9 April 1973 schedule; however, this was
more than offset by the residue to be incinerated.
6-14
Phase III, incineration of the remaining ton containers, began on 25 September
1973, utilizing both ton container furnaces. The previously established Program
Manager's schedule of 175 gallons (1750 pounds) of residue agent per day was
doubled to account for the use of two simultaneously burning furances. On 5
September 1973, the Program Manager directed RMA to present a high confidence
estimate of the date of Phase III completion. This estimate was prepared by 12
September 1973, by the Process Engineering Section.12 A detailed discussion of this
estimate will not be included here; the basis for calculation of the Phase III target
dates is contained in the referenced document. The dates presented were 16 April
1974, for 100 percent operating time (no downtime) and 19 June 1974, for 70
percent operating time (30 percent downtime). It was felt at the time that (1) the
dates were realistic, based on the confidence in the data used for calculation, and (2)
the actual completion date would approach the 16 April 1974 figure based on the
excellent equipment performance record established during Phase II of the program.
Additionally, it was felt that the efforts of the heavy ton container studies to
minimize container residence time could shorten the 16 April date. This was borne
out by actual performance.
The Phase III completion estimates were updated on 11 October 1973, based on the
results of the heavy ton container tests, and resulted in an optimistic date of 6
March 1974, and a pessimistic date of 28 March 1974, depending on the criteria
used for the calculations.
During discussions held within the Mustard Demil Directorate at the end of Phase II,
it was determined that the Program Manager's schedule of 3500 pounds of residue
burned in both ton container furnaces per day would be inadequate to complete
Phase III on the newly projected 16 April target date. This was based on a graphic
extrapolation of the actual production versus schedule production on a larger scale
version of Figure 6-1. It was decided to establish an internal RMA schedule for the
minimum required poundage to be burned daily as 6000 pounds (total for both ton
container furnaces). 13 This schedule was put into effect on 1 October 1973.
Additionally, a calculation of the number of ton containers per day required to
complete the schedule was made, and an additional internal operating schedule (for
office use only) was set at 11 ton containers per day. However, it became apparent
by 15 October that to schedule by poundage burned would not be as efficient as to
schedule by numbers of containers incinerated per day. Therefore, the poundage
requirement placed on the operations staff was dropped in favor of the 11-ton
container per day internal schedule.
6-15
Completion of the destruction of mustard agent ton containers at RMA occurred on
20 February 1974. thus predating all previous estimates. This completion excluded
the 1 1 CAMDS ton containers, however. The last of these containers was incinerated
in the CAMDS Test Program on 16 March 1974.
The internal RMA schedule for the ton container cut and scrape operation was
established on 27 September 1973^ to take effect on completion of a fume hood
around the apparatus. This was completed on 6 October 1973, and the schedule of
16 containers per shift (48 per 24-hour day) established. Use of this minimum
required production at the internal ton container incineration schedule of 11 per
day would yield nearly simultaneous completion of the two schedules. An
achievement date of 15 January 1974, was estimated dependent on continuation of
the actual, average incineration rate of 15 containers per day. Thsi date was defined
as the date on which the backlog of ton containers burned prior to startup of the cut
and scrape operation would be reduced to zero, and the cut and scrape operation
would be required to keep pace only with the containers burned on each operating
day.
The schedule finalized on 9 April 1973 was the schedule against which the actual
performance of the demilitarization operation was measured. Reference to Figure
6—1 gives an overview of each phase of the actual disposal operation contrasted with
the schedule.
6.6.1 PHASE I
Phase I of the program was to incorporate bulk agent incineration at one gallon per
minute with 30 percent operational downtime. This equated to 907 gallons of bulk
agent per day. The overall disposal rate, utilizing 30 percent downtime, was
scheduled to be approximately 0.7 GPM; however, the effective disposal rate was
expected to be 1.0 GPM utilizing the available operating time less the 30 percent
expected downtime. The end of Phase I was set at 30 May 1973 and was a calendar
date endpoint rather than a "gallons destroyed" endpoint.
The total bulk agent destroyed during Phase I (see Table 6—4) was approximately
161,488 gallons, which equates to an overall disposal rate "through the nozzle" of
0.61 GPM and an effective disposal rate of 0.81 GPM. This rate was somewhat less
than that expected of the system but would have been worse had the hydrazine
furnace not been brought onstream early, and had it not been as effective and
problem-free as it proved to be. The downtime problems experienced with the west
container furnace bulk burning system (see Table 5—1) specifically, limited flow
rate, and nozzle plugging problems, were, in large part, avoided by not replicating
the existing system in the east container furnace as had been planned. The agent
disposal rate in the hydrazine furnace had to be cut back toward the end of Phase I
to attempt a decrease in the rate of deterioration of the scrubber exhaust fans.
6-16
Ton container incineration during Phase I (see Table 6-5) was ahead of schedule on
the average. There were 1191 containers incinerated in 185 operating days with a
total of 234,676 pounds of residue destroyed. Averages for Phase I were 6.4
containers per day, 1269 pounds of residue per day, and 187 pounds of residue per
container. There were 5 months out of the 10 months of Phase I in which the
number of containers burned was less than the scheduled 6.0 per day. The increase
in he average number of containers per day during the February to May time period
was due in large part to the great number of containers of HD drained during
January, February, and March which were incinerated in preference to larger residue
containing H containers as can be seen in Table 6-5.
The overall effect of the disposal operation during Phase I was that by 30 May 1973,
the program was at a cumulative agent destroyed value which had not been forecast
to occur until the first week of July 1973. It is obvious from the actual agent
disposal curve on Figure 6-1 that the disposal had paralleled the scheduled
incineration rate until the beginning of February; however, the all-HD incineration
during February and the introduction of the hydrazine furnace during March had
the effect of making up the small schedule/actual deficit on or about 15 February
and of moving actual incineration well ahead of schedule to the extent of 50.736
gallons (507,350 pounds) approximately by the 30 May phase termination date. Ton
container residue incineration did not measureably add to this accelerated burning
rate despite the larger average number burned per day from February through May
since the average residue weight per container decreased considerably.
6.6.2 PHASE II
Phase II of the program was to incorporate bulk agent incineration at two gallons
per minute with 30 percent operational downtime in addition to ton container
incineration. This rate required a minimum agent burn per week of 10,875 to be
made up of 2000 gallons of bulk agent and 175 gallons (1750 pounds
approximately) of ton container residue per operating day. The termination point of
Phase II was to be 30 November 1973 according to the 9 April schedule; this was
moved up to 15 October on the revised Phase II schedule (15 June 1973). The
gallonage endpoint was to have been 516,000 gallons on 30 November but this was
adjusted to 488,000 gallons at the 15 October end date based on revised estimates of
the amount of bulk agent being drained from H type ton containers.
The total bulk agent destroyed during Phase II was approximately 194,213 gallons
over an 81-day operating period for an average of 2,397. The overall disposal rate
"through the nozzle" was 1.67 gallons per minute while the effective rate was 1.82.
The overall rate was approximately equal the 1.7 GPM rate scheduled using a zero
percent downtime available time calculation; however, the effective rate was
somewhat less than the 2.0 GPM rate expected with an estimated 30 percent
downtime, despite the fact that the actual downtime averaged 8.5 percent more than
the downtime of Phase II. Individual daily effective burn rates exceeded 2.5 GPM.
This daily rate was strongly influenced by the characteristics of the agent being
incinerated at that time, i.e., the amount of fuel oil in the agent and the varying
sulfur content. The average daily rate was at 2398 gallons, which excessed the
scheduled gallonage of 2000 per day.
6-17
Ton container incineration during Phase II (see Table 6—5) was considerably ahead
of the 1750 pounds per day schedule in that a total of 167,605 pounds
(approximately) of residue were incinerated in the 81 operating days of Phase III
(through 25 September 1973) resulting in an average daily residue destruction rate
of 2069 pounds, which, when converted to the basis of GPM, yielded an additional
0.16 GPM to the total agent destruction rate. The daily container incineration rate
on the average for Phase II was 8.2 containers per day which indicated an increase
over Phase I rates at comparable average residue weights. The data in Table 6-5,
which shows an average incineration rate for June and July of 10.3, was due to the
effects of the ton container furnace residence time optimization effort during June.
The average rate during August and September of 6.2 containers per day was the
result of the testing for, and implementation of, the heavy residue weight ton
container burning procedure as evidenced by the fact that the average residue weight
per container during this 39-day period was 341 pounds.
Phase III of the Program was intended to dispose of the residue ton containers which
had not been incinerated during Phases I and II. The scheduled rate established
(3500 pounds per day) in the original 9 April schedule was not applicable, and an
internal operating schedule was established based on the actual gallonage destroyed
at the end of Phase II and a selected completion date of 16 April (6000 pounds per
day). However, the internal RMA schedule was shortly changed to an 11-container
per day requirement to complete the Phase on 16 April.
The bulk agent burned during Phase III was confined to: (1) agent retained beyond
25 September 1973 in order to test the west scrubber system on bulk agent at the
completion of its installation during early November; (2) agent drained from
CAMDS ton containers not used in testing; and (3) agent drained from heavy ton
containers which had been redrained through a plug adapter. A total of 13,789
gallons were destroyed in this manner.
Ton container incineration during Phase III was resumed against two schedules
(Figures 6—1 and 6—2). The first consisted of the performance against the original
GPM schedule which projected the completion on 9 June 1973. The second schedule
applied was the internal RMA schedule of 11 ton containers per day, total for both
ton container furnaces. As can be seen from Figure 6—1, the actual performance of
the Phase III operation in terms of residue bumed stayed consistently ahead of the
6-18
two schedule projections made and phase endpoint estimate. Of the 5 months
comprising Phase III, only February 1974 failed to average more than 11 containers
per day; however, February had the largest average container residue weight averages
for east and west furnaces experienced throughout the program.
The overall effectiveness of the demilitarization operation during Phase III can be
gaged by the fact that when the last container of the mustard stockpile to be
incinerated (except for CAMDS test containers) was based on 20 February 1974, the
program was completed approximately 13 weeks ahead of the 9 June endpoint and
approximately 54 and 14 days ahead of RMA's internal schedule estimates of 6
March and 16 April, respectively. A total of 505,467 pounds of T.C. residue was
destroyed during the same period. (Reference Table 6-6.)
The ton container cut and scrape operation was started at the beginning of Phase III
and was co-terminaj with the demilitarization operation. A total of 3283 ton
containers were cut and scraped during Phase III. The remainder of the 3407 ton
containers had been either cut as trash receptacles or used to test the cutting
apparatus during construction and shakedown. The scraping operation generated
965 barrels of ash which was ultimately disposed of by dry land dilution.
Caustic usage during the Mustard Demilitarization Program is shown in Table 6—7. A
total of 4339 tons of caustic soda (100 percent NaOH) were used throughout the
program. Average caustic usage per pound of agent or residue burned was
approximately 1.37 pounds. The sodium hydroxide solution was purchased as 50
percent aqueous solution in railroad tank cars. These tank cars were unloaded at the
Mustard Facility at a caustic unloading station located at the north end of the
Building 538 storage yard. The 50 percent solution was diluted to 18 percent with
process water in the 1000-gallon upright caustic tanks located south of Building 538.
Caustic costs were approximately $100.00 per ton of 50 percent solution.
Accurate data on salt production during the program is not available due to the fact
that salt generated prior to the start of the Bowen spray dryer was, for the most
part, hauled in closed dump trucks to a warehouse where it was deposited on the
floor in bulk. No weight records were kept of this material. Using as a standard the
ratio of 2.3 pounds of salt produced per 1.0 pound of agent incinerated, which was
developed month-by-month from salt generation data available, a total of
approximately 14,000,000 pounds (7,000 tons) of salt was produced. Recognizing
losses that occurred early in the program, the number of barrels used for the salt
produced was 19,072 drums. It is estimated that an additional 1500 to 2000 tons of
bulk salt is stored, uncompacted, in warehouses. Other ratios developed over the
course of the program which relate to the spray drying operation are that
approximately:
A. 1.84 gallons of brine at 1.15 specific gravity was produced by the incineration
of 1 pound of agent.
6-19
B. One gallon of agent per minute equaled 19.5 gallons of brine per minute at
1.15 specific gravity.
C. One gallon of brine at 1.15 specific gravity yielded 1.25 pounds of salt.
There were approximately 965 barrels (222,063 pounds) of ton container ash
generated by the cut and scrape operation. This material was stored in a warehouse
until its ultimate disposal by dry land dilution. This poundage was "wet" weight in
that the material was weighed after it had been barrelled and after it had been
soaked with water to stop the smoldering caused by the cutting operation. Only
second-hand drums were utilized to store this material. Each drum was stencilled
with its lot number and sequential number.
There were a total of approximately 421 drums (63,158 pounds) of iron oxide
residue removed from the ESP between 1 May 1973 and 20 February 1974. All iron
oxide generated prior to that time had been disposed of in the RMA sanitary land
fill at the direction of the Chief of the RMA Quality Assurance Office. The material
collected from the ESP after 1 May 1973 was stored in a warehouse and ultimately
disposed of by dry land dilution.
The total number of ton containers incinerated during Project Eagle I, excluding
Tailor System shakedown, was 3407; 2423 in the east furnace and 900 in the west
furnace. The remainder of the 3407 stockpile containers were incinerated during the
testing of the Building 538 ton container decontamination system as part of the
earlier Tailor incineration system.
6-20
The combined ton container/hydrazine furnace demil system went ahead of
established schedules on or about 15 February 1973 and remained ahead of not only
the externally established schedule, but far ahead of more stringent internal
schedules for the next 370 days with a final completion which occurred 13 weeks
prior to its estimated end but 35 months behind the original Project Eagle schedule
which called for a March 1971 completion date.
6-21
REFERENCES
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PRODUCT DIVISION
DAILY PRODUCTION REPORT
TON CONTAINERS EMPTIED
DATE:
ITEM 1
SMURM Form C- '3 ;i Se? 72)
6-U3
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GALS
RESIDUE
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1 - NORSTEDT.
SEFTIMSER
2 . SAVIS
3 - CHABTREE
6-U5
MUSTARD BURNED - GPM SEPT. 1973
ITEM 4B
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I-
SARRM-M Weekly Status Report
Chief Lngineer Dir of Mustard Derail 2S Feb 74
JBWicks/ds/206
2. Mustard Derail:
2/1S/74
2/1J/74
c. Switching of the air dryers 2nd checks of the thaw room and tank pit
were made daily en each shift during the week.
c. Fired Building 540 dryer on gas at CoO, shut off gas at 0350 due to
being unable to -et brine to tne urycr. Foam the control valve stuck due to paint.
Valve was freed up, fired up dryer and dried Lrinc froa 1100 until 1250 when dryer
was simt do'..n duo co fan vibration and the sj3tea drained.
ITEM 9
Sheet 1 of 5
6-U9
SARRM-M (25 Feb 74)
üUüJüCT: Weekly Status Report
h. Four residue ton containers were burned in the east ton container
furnace and four residue ton containers in the wost ton container furnace.
Two burned residue ton containers were rcburncd.
k. Ninety six druas of salt, twenty druns of ash, and four druns
of residue were hauled.
2/20/74
q. Building 536 dryer was shut down at 0335 and started drying brino
again at 14i3.
s. Five residue ton containers were burned in the cast ton container
rurnace and three residue ton containers in tne wost ton container furnace.
One bumcu residue ton container was reuumc-u. Two of the 33 ton containers
were burned in the west ton container furnace.
ITEM 9
Sheet 2 of 5
6-50
SARRM-M (25 Feb 74)
SUBJECT: Weekly Status Report
2/21/74
w. Shut down the east ton container furnace for the balance of
the week to make codifications to the furnace for CAMDS tests.
y. Dried brine in Building 540 dryer from 1220 until 1500 using
natural gas. Shut down due to main fan vibration and drained the systea.
2/22/74
eo. Shut down the west ton container furnace at 0140 for work on
modifications to tnc east ton container furnace.
hh. Twelve burned residue ton containers of the 33 were cut and
scraped.
ii. Six of the burned mustard program ton containers were cut and
scraped.
ITEM 9
Sheet 3 of 5
6-5.
bÄi'JyvM (2S Fob 74)
SudJLCT: Weekly Status Koport
2/23/74
3. hyirazisc:
4. Personnel:
iWiiaistrative ö
«•iistaru L;;:ii 3a
Loaned 1
ITEM 9
Sheet 4 of 5
6-S2
SARRl-l-M (25 Fcb 74)
SUBJECT: Keokly Status Report
/SCkZi A. URSIUO
(S\tl, OIID
Director
bustard D«nilitariration
CF:
ßlvig 522
Product Control
ITEM 9
Sheet 5 of 5
6-53
SARRM-M Weekly Status Report
Chief Engineer Dir of Mustard Demil 25 Feb 74
JBWicks/ds/206
2. Mustard Demil:
2/18/74
2/iy/74
c. Switching of the air dryers and cnecks of the thaw room and tank pit
were made daily on each shift during the week.
e. Fired Building 540 dryer on gas at 0830, shut off gas at 0850 due to
being unable to get brine to the dryer. Found the control valve stuck due to paint.
Valve was freed up, fired up dryer and dried brine from 1100 until 1230 when dryer
was shut down due to fan vibration and the system drained.
ITEM 10
Sheet 1 of5
6-5^
SARKM-M (25 Fob 74)
SUbJliCT: Weekly Status Report
h. Four residue ton containers were burned in the east ton container
furnace and four residue ton containers in the west ton container furnace.
Two burned residue ton containers were roburned.
k. Ninety six drums of salt, twenty drums of ash, and four drums
of residue were hauled.
2/20/74
q. Building 556 dryer was shut down at 0935 and started drying brine
again at 14^5.
s. Five residue ton containers were burned in the east ton cuntainer
furnace and three residue ton containers in the west ton container furnace.
One burned residue ton container was reburned. Two of the 88 ton containers
were burned in the west ton container furnace.
ITEM 10
Sheet 2 of 5
6-55
SARRM-M (25 Feb 74)
SUBJECT: Weekly Status Report
2/21/74
w. Shut down the east ton container furnace for the balance of
the week to make modifications to the furnace for CAMDS tests.
y. Dried brine in Building 540 dryer from 1220 until 1500 using
natural gas. Shut down due to main fan vibration and drained the system.
2/22/74
ee. Shut down the west ton container furnace at 0140 for work on
modifications to the east ton container furnace.
hh. Twelve burned residue ton containers of the 38 were cut and
scraped.
ii. Six of the burned mustard program ton containers were cut and
scraped.
ITEM 10
Sheet 3 of 5
6-56
SARRM-N (25 Feb 74)
SUBJECT; weekly Status Report
2/23/74
3. liydrasine:
a. daily chocks of the facility Mere made.
4. Personnel:
Mustard Demii strength remains at 43 with the following assignments:
Atisiinistrative b
/festard Deail 34
Loaned 1
ITEM 10
Sheet 4 of 5
#
6-57
SARRM-M (2S Feb 74)
SU3JECT: Heekly Suttu* Report
/ 'JOHN A. URSULA
L IM, ORÜ
Director
Kustard Deoilitarization
CF:
Slug S22
Product Control
ITEM 10
Sheet 5 of 5
6-58
m
_
^
SARRü-M Sodiun Hydroxide Usa^e for ;Jovcmber 1973
* Ti.P.ü Chief Engineer Dir of rSustard Denil 13 Dec 73
TO Supply uivioion >JEsquibel/ds/2Q6
.'Sustard D-r.il Office aas calculated fron Supply Division inventories the following
usage of Sodiun Hydroxide, FSN-6310-A35-OOOD:
\>sģ7h^
JACK ß. WICKS
Deputy Director
Mustard Demilitarization
CF:
CoKvcrollor
ITEM 11
6-59
soNnod aawana anaisaa 3Au.\nnwno
£ *J
£<><
DEPAtTMf NT OP TMf AIMV
HtAOOUAtTfM MOnr MOUNTAIN AMINM
oiNvo. COUMAOO MMO
(1) The bulk burning of mustard agent (phase II) was completed on
25 September 1973, in a highly successful manner and two months ahead
of the planned schedule. A total of 511,540 gallons of mustard agent
had been incinerated at the end of the month. This included both the
mustard burned through the nozzles, and that burned as residue in the
emptied ton containers. .The total number of ton containers burned at
the end of September amounted to 2,019 containers; this does not in-
clude the ton containers which were added into the program during the
original test operations, and which have also been burned.
ITEM 14
Sheet 1 of 4
6-6l
SARRM-CE DATE OF REPORT: 3 October 1973
ROCKY MOUNTAIN ARSENAL DEMILITARIZATION REPORT
was less than 22 hours down time experienced during the month.
DOWNTIME TABULATION
(5) During September, up to the time the bulk burn was completed,
the burning rate averaged 1.82 gallons per minute of available time
(1,440 minutes per day), including all down time. The burning rate
during the actual operating time amounted to 1.96 gallons per minute.
(6) During the month a total of 106 ton containers were burned,
averaging approximately 6 containers per day. The average weight of
residue burned in the ton containers amounted to approximately 400
pounds per container. The west furnace was rebricked during September
and the punch repaired. A new container support pedestal was installed,
and after proper curing the second furnace was placed in operation dur-
ing the 4-12 shift on 26 September 1973.
(8) At the close of the month there was a total of 1,388 ton con-
tainers yet to be burned, including the 34 containers mentioned in
paragraph (7) above. It is estimated that the average weight of these
containers will amount to 600 pounds per container.
ITEM 14
Sheet 2 of 4
6-62
SARRM-CE DATE OF REPORT: 3 October 1973
ROCKY MOUNTAIN ARSENAL DEMILITARIZATION REPORT
(b) The test clan submitted tor the new scrubber/quench system was
approved during September.
c
• Next Month's Milestones of Key Events:
Chief Engineer
ITEM 14
Sheet 3 of 4
6-63
SARRM-CE DATE OF REPORTi 3 October 1973
ROCKY MOUNTAIN ARSENAL DEMILITARIZATION REPORT
DISTRIBUTION:
ITEM 14
Sheet 4 of 4
6-6k
NO. OF PAGES
REQUEST rOR AND RESULTS OF TESTS
SECTION A-REQUEST FOR TEST
TO: (Include ZIP Code) 2 FROM: (Include ZIP Code)
See attached
14 SHIPMENT METHOD I 5. DA TE SAMPLED AND SUBMITTED BY
I 3 PURCHASED FROM OR SOURCE
LT URSILLO
See attached 31 Jan 74 Dir Mustard Demil
: 6. REMARKS AND/OR SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS AND/OR WAIVERS.
See attached
JanTEST
74PERFORMED 1 P«H 74 REQUIREMENTS
RESULTS OF TEST SAMPLE RESULT
See attached
1 Feb 74
EDDIE R. JONES
Ch, QEAD, QAO jc: -/J^T^^"f^n^J-
n-^j^?
ITEM 19
' ' tM" J_rH
DD ;°™ 1222 REPLACES DD FORM 1122
Sheet 1 of 2
IS OBSOLETE
6-65
Page -J- of pages
12211 J— J £7. i r
±2^3
f,43c yy-r /£<'
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REMARKS:
6-66
EFFECTIVE: 1 April 1973 thru 14 April 1973
ITEM 20
6-67
MUSTARD PUNCH LIST
SMURM-O-P Week Ending 30 Dec 72
1. Replace the gate valve on the mustard transfer line and the gate valve
on the suction line of the moyno pump (one above the floor with plug, cock-
type valve.
2. Remove pressure regulator on moyno pump and blank tank and line openings.
3. Replace moyno rotor and stator with new units and repack pump.
5. Replace unloading and vent hoses in north and south unloading booths.
10. Install mustard piping, nozzles and controls in East furnace to burn
mustard in East furnace at the same time as burning mustard in the West
furnace.
16. Close down opening through the back of the East furnace at the upper
view glass to the same size as the exposed view glass area and clean glasses.
ITEM 21 (Sheet 1 of 2)
6-68.
SMURM-O-P (27 Dec 72)
SUBJECT: MUSTARD PUNCH LIST (Week Ending 30 Dec 72)
19. Replace grating along east wall of tank pit with deck plate.
20. Fabricate a conplete set of spare nozzles for quench tank and duct.
21. Install pressure gage on gas line to East and West furnace. Place gage
in plug where lower burner was removed. Gage to read in inches of water -
zero to approximately 30 inches. Complete prior to start-up on Friday, 29
December.
22. Install new valves on sample line at scrubber pump. Complete prior to
start-up on Friday, 29 December.
ITEM 21 (Sheet 2 of 2)
6-69
MACHINE DATA
SQ49
MOV eo
MOVED TOTAL
ACCESSOR IES
ITEM DESC R'PT tON PR O P. NO.
m^k
ITFM 01 (Ckiiii* 1 n* *M
PL 07447 ■
6-70
PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE WORK ORDER esa - i « EM r.fl Ell - ria 8049
1,2,3,4
Bldg. 53S Adjacent to Hydrozene Furnace
SEMI- j
ANNUA L ANNUA LI 1 QUARTERLY BI-MONTHLY 12 MONTH LY 26 MONIHL»
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6-73
GPM THROUGH
EFFECTIVE
NOZZLE
gal/min
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OVERALL
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ACTUAL
TOTAL
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TIME
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TOTAL
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AVAILABLE
OPERATING
O o
TOTAL
minutes
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TIME
00 SO 00 00 fiU *J
SO^ en SO CN NO-
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INCINERATED
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H
INCINERATED
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S
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CN en en — en s.
«s
DAYS
4
4
19
3
22
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
22
5
5
5
5
5
22
5
5
5
3
1
21
OPERATING
1 - 4 May 73
1 - 2 Feb 73
1 - 2 Mar 73
2 - 6 Apr 73
PERIOD
2-5 Jan 73
May Totals
Feb Totals
Mar Totals
Apr Totals
Jan Totals
15-19
22-26
12-16
26-28
26-30
16-20
20-23
12-16
19-23
23-27
14-18
21-25
29 - 31
29-31
8- 12
9- 13
7- 11
5-9
5-9
30
6-?U
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TOTAL TOTAL
AVAILABLE TOTAL ACTUAL OVERALL EFFECTIVE
BULK AGENT BULK AGENT OPERATING DOWN OPERATING GPM THROUGH GPM THROUGH
TIME TIME NOZZLE NOZZLE
C
TIME
o
INCINERATED INCINERATED
minutes minutes gal/min gal/min
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1 Jun 73 1
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11-15 5
18-22 5
25-29 5
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10-14 5 121,600
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24-25 2 53,730
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6-83
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6-Qk
SECTION 7
7.1 GENERAL
Because of the number of schedule revisions and the complexity of the cost growth
factors inherent in each revision, this narrative section will be related to Table 7-1,
"RMA Demil-Bulk Mustard Disposal Program Schedules". Each schedule and
schedule revision narrative will describe the basic causative factors for the revision
and will be followed by a narrative entitled "Cost Impact" which will relate to Table
7-1 and identify the increases by the following categories of cost: Engineering
Support, Facilities, Training and Operations, and Surety Guards.
7.2.1 SCHEDULE
The original program schedule assumed the turnkey installation of a bulk mustard
agent incinerator and the minor rehabilitation of the other existing disposal facilities
at Rocky Mountain Arsenal. Plant setup was to be accomplished by August 1970
and the disposal operations were to be completed by March 1971.
The original cost estimate of $2.94 million for the disposal of the bulk mustard at
Rocky Mountain Arsenal was made in October 1969, indicating that the disposal
operations would begin in August 1970 and finish seven months later. The project
was to pivot about a turnkey type disposal system wherein the contractor was to
supply, install, test, and turn over to the Government an operational mustard
incineration system.
Facilities 886,000
T. 94,000
Training and Operations Q 1714 000 1,808,000
TOTAL $2,940,000
7-1
7.3 SCHEDULE REVISION - NO. 2, MARCH 1970
The award of the incinerator contract supped from 15 January to 11 February 1970
when the low bidder was declared "unresponsible financially." Small Business
Administration investigation, however, finally led to the contract award to the low
bidder, John Tailor and Co., Inc. As a result, a new startup date of 1 October 1970
was established, which delayed program completion until May 1971 (No. 2).
The following cost impacts are identifiable with this schedule revision:
A. Engineering Support
The original estimate ($160,000) was increased $50,000 for the development
of a scrubbing system for the exhaust gas from the ton container furnace
system.
B. Surety Guards
The following cost impacts are identifiable with this schedule revision:
A. Engineering Support
The need to expand the technical knowledge base required that $489,000 be
provided for the following engineering studies: a study on mustard incineration
7-2
and the composition of gases and thermal degradation of HD, a determination
of conditions required to insure the safety and containment operations that
lead to innocuous salts, and evaluation and selection of alarm systems,
Levinstein residue disposal studies, and an emission limits study for the
Surgeon General's approval.
B. Facilities
The $496,000 increase shown in October 1970 was caused by the following:
the extension of the schedule necessitated by the slippage in delivery of the
incinerator because of the truckers strike, the need for additional operators for
the third cubicle to unload Levinstein mustard, and the establishment of a new
system for payment of environmental differentials to Wage Board employees
(WB, WL and WS) for exposure to various degrees of hazards.
D. Surety Guards
The increase of $ 17,000 from the January 1970 estimate was due primarily to
Program extension.
October 1969
Original October 1970
Budget Budget Variance
A further schedule slippage was necessitated by late receipt of the instrument and
motor control panels as reflected in schedule No. 4.
7-3
7.5.1 COST IMPACT
A new Budget was not prepared for this schedule revision because the minimal
schedule slippage was not deemed significant.
The installation of the equipment was further delayed by the contractor and he
became delinquent on 24 October 1970. Also, a requirement for an environmental
impact statement (EIS) was placed on Rocky Mountain Arsenal, and Department of
Army approval was required before disposal operations could begin. This delayed
startup until 31 March 1971 (No. 5).
A new budget was not developed for the schedule revision made in November 1970
because the extent of contractor delays were not fully known at that time; no
assessment could be made of the resource requirements for drafting the EIS
required.
A slippage in the date of the EIS approval postponed the startup date of operations
in schedule Number 6 until June 1971.
The following cost impacts are identifiable with this schedule revision:
A. Engineering Support
B. Facilities
7-4
salt conveyor, relocation of heating units due to new equipment installation
which was not envisioned in the original design, and the extension of the stack
to conduct emission level tests combined to increase costs by $50,000. Also,
the relocation of the caustic unloading system required longer lines with steam
tracing and insulation and resulted in additional costs of $17,000. The addition
of a detector for low level concentration of mustard resulted from the more
stringent requirements generated during the emission level review by the
Surgeon General adding $17,000 in costs. The high residue found in the
Levinstein mustard containers led to the inclusion of a scrubber system for the
off-pses produced during the burnout of the emptied ton container in the two
furnaces, and a decision was made to punch the ton containers to increase the
safety to personnel by eliminating the manual removal of plugs and valves. The
scrubber and punch systems required $95,000 not covered in the original
estimate. These costs were offset by a reduction of $25,000 for filter units,
bringing the total to $243,000.
D. Surety Guards
A $30,000 increase in the January 1971 estimate resulted from a change in the
basis for cost distribution of the Surety Guard force, from a monthly weighted
average tonnage to a "time spent" in support of demil, depot and production
items in storage. The total increase in budget for surety guards in schedule No.
6 was $57,000.
Budget Budget
20 October 1969 15 January 1971 Variance
7-5
7.8 SCHEDULE REVISION - NO. 7, APRIL 1971
The following cost impacts are identifiable with this schedule revision:
A. Engineering Support
B. Facilities
The April 1971 increase of $238,000 was due to the additional time required
to renovate the existing scrubbing tower, install new packing, move electric
power lines, install detector housing, and fabricate and install a second ton
container punch. The modification of the mustard feed line and duct work in
Building 536 to improve the safety of the interface between the contractor's
incinerator and the government's transfer line was not anticipated. The outside
work including outdoor lighting, blacktop repair, were previously
underestimated. The extension of stack and temporary scaffolds to conduct
AEHA gas pollution tests also increased facility costs.
7-6
increased $65,000 for material used in training the operators during simulant
and live agent runs. $6,000 was budgeted for normal operating supplies, and
$157,000 was added due to the increased unit price of caustic (from $80.90 to
$109.22 per ton). These material costs were slightly offset by a reduction of
$41,000 in the purchase of gloves needed for the glove ports in the unloading
booths.
D. Surety Guards
The surety guard budget was originally developed to support 10 guards through
15 March 1971. A total of 39 surety guards were required at Rocky Mountain
Arsenal to comply with the provisions of AR 190-3 in providing the type of
security required for bulk agents and toxic munitions. As long as any of these
agents and munitions remained at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, these guards were
required. Financing the cost of this guard force outside of the general overhead
cost distribution was made at the direction of HQ, MUCOM in order to
maintain a more acceptable relationship of the work force directly identifiable
to specific jobs as opposed to those assigned to general post overhead
functions. This reapportionment of Surety Guard costs added to the increased
force requirements resulted in a $57,000 growth in this portion of the budget.
7-7
7.9.2 COST IMPACT
Another month was lost (No. 9) when operators began having difficulty maintaining
a negative pressure within the incinerator/scrubber system. Excessive particulate
emissions and salt buildup on the exhaust fans in the ton container furnace system
compounded the delay.
There was no cost impact reflected in the budget by this schedule revision because
of the minor schedule extension of the completion date of one month (from April
1972 to May 1972).
The following cost impacts are identifiable with this schedule revision:
A. Engineering Support
B. Facilities
The facility cost estimate reached $1,876,000 by 1 September 1971. The cost
increase of $262,000 was due to: additional work to renovate the ton container
furnace scrubber system, including the relocation of fan and rebuilding of
ductwork; modification of the mustard feed system on the incinerator to
provide better containment of mustard agent; relocation of two burners on the
furnaces to more effectively incinerate gases leaving the furnaces; the more
7-8
extensive testing program than originally envisioned due to difficulties
encountered during the original test programs.
D. Surety Guards
The increase of $4,000 was a minor adjustment in the proration of surety costs.
The startup and completion dates of schedule 11 remained compatible with those
dates shown for schedule 10 even though pilot testing indicated that the contractor
installed system was not capable of operation within acceptable emission parameters
from the incinerator stack.
A. Engineering Support
Continued program delays were caused by the alarm levels of the mustard
emissions from the incinerator stack. Associated engineering support efforts of
personnel from both Edgewood Arsenal and Rocky Mountain Arsenal was
required to correct the problem and resulted in a $103,000 increase in the
November 1971 estimate.
7-9
B. Facilities
No increase in facilities costs were factored into this budget submission as the
final assessment was being made of the Tailor System and no definite decision
had, as yet, been made which would require additional or substitute
demilitarization facilities.
The undesirable alarm level emissions during the initial pilot run required a
repeated run in November 1971 which cost $ 199,000 more than estimated.
D. Surety Guards
A program review at the end of November led to the reorganization of the technical
and operational efforts. Extensive pilot operations were started and the initial runs
clearly indicated that significant work remained before operations could be initiated.
The operation startup planned for December was indefinitely postponed,
automatically extending the overall schedule until additional pilot testing was
completed (No. 12).
The following cost impacts are identifiable with this schedule revision:
A. Engineering Support
7-10
Another program extension of seven months was caused by the increased pilot
and test operations. Plant modifications greatly increased the engineer support
requirements. Edgewood Arsenal increased effort amounted to $70,000
(January 1972).
B. Facilities
D. Surety Guards
The program extension projected by schedule number 12 resulted in an
increased cost of $70,000 for surety guard support.
By June 1972, the Tailor incinerator/scrubber system was abandoned and mustard
incineration in the ton container furnace system was established. Schedule No. 13
was proposed, which showed that the startup of operations could be scheduled on or
before 1 July 1972 at a reduced rate of 1 GPM. Installation of a larger capacity
electrostatic precipitator and dryer would double the rate, but postpone the ton
container decontamination operations until the completion of the bulk agent
7-11
disposal. The new completion date of May 1971* extended the Mustard
Demilitarization Program schedule completion date by lit months.
A. Engineering Support
When the Tailor System proved inadequate, a greatly expanded engineering
team was formed, many engineering tests were conducted, and finally the
ton container was converted to the primary mustard incineration system.
But this change from the Tailor System to the ton container furnace
system required that Rocky Mountain Arsenal provide additional engineering
support effort at a cost of $97,000 which involved the use of facilities
engineers and draftsmen to document specific work requirements, write
definitive work orders, and develop supporting engineering drawings and
bills of material. Also, the Edgewood Arsenal support costs for the two-
month plant setup period and the total 21-month operational .phase were
increased by $6ll*,000 bringing the July 1972 estimate for engineering
support to more than $2 million.
B. Facilities
The facility cost estimate reached $2,81*0,000 by July 1972 as a result of
trying to modify the Tailor System to permit mustard incineration within
the environmental constraints. When the Tailor System proved unsatisfactory,
the Ton Container System was converted from a method of disposing the ton
container residue into a primary system for disposing both the bulk agent as
well as the residue. A total of $150,000 was added to the program to buy
an electrostatic precipitator; $60,000 was added to the program as a result
of converting the ton container system to burn bulk mustard; $33*+,000 was
added to'the program to accomplish the plant setup modifications resulting
from many weeks of testing both the Tailor and Ton Container Systems between
the period 1 January 1972 and 31 July 1972.
l.lh.3 COST GROWTH (000)
October 1969 July 1973
Budget Budget Variance
Engineering Support l60 1910 1750
Facilities 886 281*0 1951*
Training & Operations 1808 1*865 3057
Security Guards 86
_____ 332 21*6
Total 291*0 99*+7 7007
7.15 SCHEDULE REVISION NO. Ik SEPTEMBER 1972
7.15.1 SCHEDULE IMPACT
The September 1973 schedule reflected a month delay in gaining final approval
of the revised safety submission. Actual startup of operations began the
week of 6 August 1972 at a bulk agent feed rate of 1 GPM and simultaneous
burning of ton containers. After the installation of the new precipitator,
both furnaces were to be used for bulk agent incineration at a rate of 2 GPM.
The emptied ton containers were to be set aside until the completion of the
bulk agent disposal. A five-month ton container decontamination was scheduled
to commence in December 1973. A two-month cleanup increment was added to the
schedule which predicted the completion date of the program in August 197^.
7-12
7.15.2 COST IMPACT
The following cost impacts are identifiable with this schedule revision:
A. Engineering Support
The July 1972 engineering support costs were reevaluated and subsequently
reduced by $297,000, resulting in the September 1972 estimate for total
engineering support cost of $ 1, 6l3,000.
B. Facilities
D. Surety Gaurds
7—13
7.16 OPERATIONAL PHASE
While no further schedule revisions were made, a revised budget estimate was
developed in January 1973 to update fund requirements.
A. Engineering Support
B. Facilities
No change.
Increased overhead rates are the cause of the $327,000 increase projected in
the January 1973 budget for Training and Operations.
D. Surety Guards
7-14
7.17 REVISED BUDGET ESTIMATE - DECEMBER 1973
The 10 December 1973 budget estimate was the final budget submittal for the
Mustard Demilitarization Program. Because of better than forecasted production
rates, the most significant decrease was in training and operations, with minor
decreases in funds required for surety guards and engineering support. The
December 1973 budget reflected a $32,000 decreased engineer support requirement
which resulted in the final engineering support estimate of $I,600.00. The
successful test program for burning high residue weight ton containers permitted this
reduction in the estimate. These three decreases were offset by procurement and
installation of an electrostatic precipitator and a new quench/scrubber not
envisioned in the January 1973 budget. The increase of $959,000 resulted in a
facilities line item total of $3,998,000 in the December 1973 budget. The table
below depicts the cost impact of the final Mustard budget in comparison to the
January 1973 budget.
The original cost estimate of $2.9 million for the disposal of the bulk mustard at
Rocky Mountain Arsenal was made in October 1969, indicating the disposal
operations would begin in August 1970 and finish seven months later. However, the
mustard disposal operations, rescheduled to take 21 months, were actually started in
August 1972 and the total cost of the program was projected to be $16.9 million.
This cost growth of $13.9 million was attributed to interrelated administrative
delays (poor contractor delivery, and Environmental Impact Statement approval),
more stringent technical requirements imposed by regulatory agencies, technical
problems, failures to meet technical capabilities expected of initial designs, and
higher than anticipated wearout of equipment due to the erosive/corrosive
environment caused the increases in the costs, which are broken down into four
major parts: engineering support, facilities, training/operations and surety guards.
The original total cost estimate of $2,940,000 included: an engineering support cost
of $160,000; a facilities rehabilitation and installation cost of $886,000; a training
cost of $94,000; an operations cost of $1,714,000 and a surety guard cost of
7-15
$86,000. This cost anticipated a turnkey type disposal system wherein the
contractor was to supply, install, test, and turn over to the Government an
operational mustard incineration system. The contractor failed to do this and
additional effort by the Government was required to perform process development,
set up a plant, test it, and establish the disposal program parameters. In addition the
final disposal rates were less than anticipated, parts costs were higher, environmental
requirements were more stringent, etc.; all of which increased costs. An analysis of
the schedule revisions and cost increases which resulted in each of the cost areas
indicates that the political and public pressures to complete the program preempted
the normal and preferred prototype plant operation which should have preceded the
startup of the operational phase. This bypassing of the prototype testing phase of
this program contributed significantly to the cost growths.
The final costing of all program expenditures is tabulated below and evidences a
program savings from the December 1973 Budget of $1,671,000.
Final Budget
December 1973 Final Cost Variance
7-16
FINAL MUSTARD DEMIL COST REPORT - RMA
Cost Summary
A. Facilities $3,988
COE $ 11
PBA 396
EA 684
RMA 2,897
EA 1,201
RMA 504
C. CB Surety 616
RMA 616
EA 39
RMA 8,835
B. Precipitators 537
Labor Cost 33
Manhours-4,310
Overhead 80
Other 424
7-17
C. Scrubbers $ 650
Labor Cost 18
Manhours - 2,420
Overhead 46
Other 41
Labor Cost 10
Manhours- 1,225
Overhead 24
Other 14
Labor Cost 10
Manhours- 1,360
Overhead 26
Other 16
Labor Cost 10
Manhours- 1,365
Overhead 25
Other 6
Labor Cost 35
Manhours - 4,697
Overhead 17
Other 57
Labor Cost 56
Manhours - 7,464
Overhead 140
Other 39
7-18
Exterior Mod. & Misc. Facilities Work $ 288
Labor Cost $ 19
Manhours - 3,634
Overhead 51
Other 218
Labor Cost 39
Material 0
Overhead 56
Utilities 0
Other 0
Labor Manhours 3,850
Period from 1 Mar 74
to 30 Jun 74
6. Report Writing 12
Labor Cost 12
Material 0
Overhead 0
Utilities 0
Other 0
Electricity 173
Gas 85
Water 75
Steam 73
Compressed Air 30
7-21
SECTION 8
An automatic alarm system monitors the SO2 level and wind direction. An SO2 level
of 0.05 ppm or greater for 10 minutes, with the prevailing wind direction coming
from the plant to the respective station, would cause an alarm condition which is
transmitted to the QA Laboratory, Building 313, by dual channel FM telemetry
system. Each of the nine stations is a converted air-conditioned camper trailer and
contains the following monitoring equipment:
B. Hi-Vol samplers for suspended particulates. All particulates greater than 0.3
microns are collected on preweighed fiber glass filter paper which is transported
to the laboratory to be weighed. The weight of particulates per cubic meters of
air is calculated and recorded.
D. Acid mist and chlorides sequential sampler to draw in four, six-hourly samples
daily. The actual analysis on the filters is performed in the laboratory on
Technicon bench units for acid mist (HC1) and chlorides.
E. Wind equipment. Component parts include wind direction and wind speed. The
wind speed and direction are both continuously recorded on Easterline Angus
8-1
recorders. Additionally, the wind direction from all nine stations is displayed in
the QA laboratory as part of the SO2 system."
8.1.3 REPORTS
Reports covering all the data generated at the ambient air perimeter stations during
the mustard demilitarization program were forwarded to the Colorado Department
of Health, Air-pollution Control Division and to USAEHA on a weekly and monthly
basis for review and analysis. A final report, Air Pollution Engineering Study No.
99-013-70/75, Analysis of Impact of Mustard Disposal Operations on Ambient Air
Quality at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Denver, Colorado, January 1970 to February
1974 was generated by the USAEHA at the completion of the H demilitarization
program which concluded that when data were compared with appropriate ambient
air quality standards and with data collected in the Denver Metropolitan area by the
US Environmental Health Protection Agency, no significant impact on ambient air
quality occurred.
B. Sulfur dioxide (as SO2): An annual arithmetic mean of 0.02 PPM; 24-hour
maximum value of 0.1 PPM, not to be exceeded more than once in any
twelve-month period; three-hour maximum value of 0.5 PPM, not to be
exceeded once per year, and one-hour maximum value of 0.28 PPM, not to be
exceeded more than once in any one-month period.2.3
C. Acid mist (reported as HC1): Average value of 0.015 PPM, not to be exceeded.
The basic inplant monitoring included ambient air monitoring and process
operations analyses.
8-2
8.2.1 EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES
The inpl'ant air monitoring rapid response (within 30 to 60 seconds) system for
mustard detection was the Titrilog II instruments made by Process Analyzers, Inc. of
Houston, Texas. These instruments were continuous bromine titration devices in
which the mustard molecule was oxidized by the bromine, and an attempt made to
maintain the bromine level constant. When additional bromine was required to
maintain the bromine balance, this was converted to maintain the signal which is
recorded on a Rustrak recorder, and the signal was fed to an audible and visual
alarm. The thaw room, where the mustard ton containers were kept to bring the
TC's up to temperature for unloading, was continuously monitored by the Titrilog
system, and the mustard feed line inclosure at the hydrazine furnace was
continuously monitored. The Titrilog II continuously monitored and the alarm
responded if the mustard concentration exceeded 0.8 mg/m3. In event the Titrilog II
instrument monitoring the thaw room sounded an alarm, operations inside the thaw
room ceased. Personnel did not reenter the area unless clad in Level A clothing. This
restriction remained in effect until a subsequent bubbler analysis indicated agent
concentration less than 0.01 mg/m3.
For inplant low-level detection of ambient air, a bubbler system was employed
which was capable of detecting 0.004 mg/m3 of mustard in the air, with a two-hour
sampling time. This system drew 18 liters/MIN and passed the sampled air through
10 ML of dibutylphthalate. The mustard was dissolved in the solvent and then
transported to the QA Laboratory for analysis. The analysis was performed using an
automated technicon by the DB-3 method. DB-3[4-(P-Nitrobenzyl pyridine)]
reagent, when mixed with mustard (with a base added) turned a characteristic blue
color. The intensity of this blue color was proportional to the quantity of mustard
present. The maximum allowable dosage for eye exposure was 2 mg-min/m3, and for
skin or respiratory exposure was 5 mg-min/m3. In event a bubbler analysis greater
than 0.005 mg/m3 was detected, the QA Laboratory immediately notified the Shift
Supervisor. Personnel working in the particular area where the bubbler sample was
obtained immediately masked and continued to wear the mask until a subsequent
bubbler was received indicating a reading of less than 0.005 mg/m3. Warning signs
were posted, indicating that protective masks were to be worn by all personnel in
the area.
When the bubbler analysis greater than 0.009 mg/m3 was received, the Shift
Engineer determined the length of time personnel may remain in the area without
changing the Level A protective clothing. The length of time was determined by
dividing the maximum allowable dosage with the bubbler analysis. For example, if a
bubbler sample was analyzed and the result was .015 mg/m3 personnel could remain
in the area for five hours and 33 minutes.
5 mg-min/m3 ,,, . .
, = 333 minutes
.015 mg/m-'
8-3
When a bubbler analysis of 0.3 mg/m3 was received, the particular operations were
shut down immediately; and personnel wearing Level A protective clothing
performed a complete survey to determine the cause of trouble. The operations did
not resume until a satisfactory bubbler analysis was received.
Permissable "H"
Area (Room Air) Sample Period Concentration
Included under process operation analyses for the mustard demil programs were
analyses of the following: (a) brine in the scrubber solution: (b) brine in the storage
tanks; (c) spray dried salt from the spray dryer; (d) ash residue from the burned
mustard ton containers: (e) glycol from the trace system on the H transfer line; (f)
ash from the electrostatic precipitator; (g) water from the thaw room sump and
unload room trench.
(a) The brine in the scrubber was analyzed by the QA Laboratory for pH, specific
gravity and H content in Mg/ml on an hourly basis during mustard and TC
incineration.
(b) The brine in the holding tajiks was sampled on a weekly basis by the QA
Laboratory for pH, specific gravity and H content in Mg/ml. Maximum H
content .25 Mg/ml.
(c) A sample was taken on each shift of the spray dried salt and analyzed by the
QA Laboratory for H content, maximum permissible content 0.5 jug/g.
Periodically, additional tests were performed for alkalinity, %Na2C03 and
%Na2HC03.
(d) After each H ton container was incinerated and cut in half, a sample of the
residual ash was taken and analyzed by the QA Laboratory for the absence of
H. The residual ash from the individual TC's was consolidated into numbered
55-gallon drums. Samples were forwarded to Spectro Chemical Laboratory for
heavy metals analysis, carbon, sulfur and Fe203 content.2 (Figure 8-3)
8-4
(e) Liquid samples of the glycol in the H transfer line were taken on a weekly basis
and analyzed for H content, pH and specific gravity in the QA Laboratory.
(g) The water from the thaw room sump and unload room trench was analyzed by
the QA Laboratory for pH, specific gravity and H content on a monthly basis.
Additionally, samples were forwarded to Spectro Chemical Laboratories for
heavy metals analysis of the water and analysis of the suspended solids.4
(Figure 8-5)
Additional process controls and analysis included the Ml8 Detection Kit, blue band
monitoring of the incinerated ton containers for the presence of mustard and
sampling of each tank car of caustic for percentage of caustic.
To ensure that mustard emissions stayed within calculated limits, two detector
systems were provided in the stacks where the incineration products are discharged.
A detailed survey of both Department of Defense and private industry revealed that
no fast response mustard detector system at the required sensitivities was available.
Therefore, two separate detection systems were chosen. The first is a quick response
(4-minutes) automatic alarm system, which would sound an alarm if the mustard
stack effluent concentratin reached 0.5 mg/m3. The second system monitored the
stack to measure average concentrations 0.030 mg/m3 over a 60-minute cycle
period. If either system indicated mustard emissions, operations were immediately
curtailed in accordance with Special Operating Procedures.
The monitoring station designed and run by the RMA Quality assurance Office was
self-contained and housed the equipment and instrumentation to monitor the high
and low mustard concentrations in the stack gas, as well as sulfur dioxide. The low
level mustard monitor consisted of glass beaded absorption bubblers with
dibutylphthalate solvent which was kept in a constant low temperature bath.
Analysis of the bubbler contents for mustard agent was performed in the main QA
Laboratory. Building 313. The rapid response, high-level mustard monitor consisted
of two automatic sampling tracor gas chromatographs (GC), set up in parallel. This
system is much more complex than an ordinary GC, due to the fact that it had to
sample the stack gas and analyze for mustard in the presence of SOo in a relatively
short period of time. A dual column system was used in which a majority of the
constituents, other than mustard, were completely separated in the analytical
column. The actual detector unit was connected to a strip chart recorder to provide
a historical record of H content in the stack effluent. If the H concentrate exceeded
1 PPM, a klaxon horn alarm was activated. The GC system was calibrated once per
hour with a known quantity of mustard agent dissolved in hexane.
8-5
The continuous SO2 monitoring was performed by a Dynascience stack system
which was a portable compact unit capable of pulling and conditioning hot stack
gases preparatory to the analysis of the pollutant. There is a condenser unit within
the sampler conditioner to remove the water vapor from the effluent stream; the
actual SO2 sensor was in a unique membrane/electrolyte/electrode combination
which undergoes electro-oxidation-reduction when exposed to SO2. The generated
current was amplified, and the output of the amplifier was displayed on a meter,
recorded on a strip chart and fed into an alarm system. The detection level for SO2
was 5 PPM, and the alarm level was set at 470 PPM.
All the daily stack readings were forwarded to the US Army Environmental
Health Agency on a weekly basis for review and analysis.
8-6
REFERENCES
iThe Environmental Impact Statement for the Disposal of the Chemical Warfare Agent
Mustard, Rocky Mountain Arsenal.
^Colorado Air Quality Control Regulations and Ambient Air Quality Control
Standards, Colorado Air Pollution Control Commission; Colorado Department of Health, 9
Dec 197L
4
Letter, USAEHA-EA, RMA, 16 Jun 1969, subject: Air Pollution Potential from the
Incineration of Mustard, and inclosure.
8-7
MUSTARD PLANT COMPLEX
a A. LAB
/LABORATORY
Antimony (Sb) < 0.005 Germanium (Ge) < 0.005 Silver (Ag) < 0.001
Arsenic (As) < 0.01 Indium (In) < 0.005 Strontium (Sr) < 0.001
Barium (Ba) < 0.001 Iron (Fe) 0.008 Tin (Sn) < O.OO5
Beryllium (Be) < 0.001 Lead (Pb) < O.OO3 Titanium (Ti) '< 0.003
Bismuth (Bi) < 0.003 Magnesium (Mg) 0.001 Vanadium (V) < 0.003
Boron (B) < 0.001 Manganese (Mn) < 0.001 Zinc (Zn) < O.O3
Cadmium (Cd) < 0.01 Mercury (Hg) Zirconium (Zr) < 0.005
Calcium (Ca) 0.01 Molybdenum (Mo) < 0.005 Sodium (Na) 28.73+.05
Chromium (Cr) < 0.001 Nickel (Ni) < 0.01 Cesium (Cs) < 0.001
I I Results based on
I I Qualitative < - Less than I I Atomic Absorption
□ X-Ray
CUSTOMER
rORM HO. CSL-2 6-73
/'LABORATORY
TO: . Rocky Mountain Arsenal NUMBER 90975
Procurement Division
. Bid«. 618 DATE
5-16-7^
Denver, CO 802l(O CUSTOMER
ORDER NO.
Attention: Ray Ernst
MATERIAL Ash Residue
SAMPLE Drum No. 1 Bldg. 5I4-O
VNUMBER Time 0905 J
Bismuth (Bi) < 0.005 Magnesium (Mg) < 0.001 Vanadium (V) < 0.003
Boron (B) < 0.001 Manganese (Mn) 0.2 Zinc (Zn) < 0.03
Arsenic
Cadmium (Cd) Mercury (Hg) Zirconium (Zr) < 0.005
Interferenc«
Calcium (Ca) < 0.01 Molybdenum (Mo) 0.01 Sodium (Na) 0.003
Chromium (Cr) 0.003 Nickel (Ni) < 0.01 Cesium (Cs) < 0.001
Cobalt (Ca) < 0.01 Niobium (Nb) Lithium (Li) 0.001
Iron
Copper (Cu) 0.1 Phosphorus (P) ] nterference Potassium (K) 0.003
I I Results based on
D X-Ray
/^LABORATORY ^
Rocky Mountain Arsenal NUMBER 90975
TO:
DATE 5-16-71*-
CUSTOMER
CROER NO. .— .
)
MATERIAL Ash Residue
SAMPLE
-~
V NUMBER /
f LABORATORY \
NUMBER 99636
TOt . Rocky Mountain Arsenal
DATE 1-18-7^
CUSTOMER
ORDER NO.
D X-Ray
...,.,. CUSTOMER
/^LABORATORY \
JO; .Rocky Mountain Arsenal NUMBER 99636
Procurement Division, Bldg. 6l8
.Denver, CO 802lt-0 . DATE 1-18-7^
CUSTOMER
.Attention: Ray Ernst ORDER NO.
Aluminum (Al) <o.3 Gallium (Ga) < 0.2 Silicon (Si) 10.0 Rubidium (Rb) < 0.03
Antimony (Sb) < 0.2 Gormanium (Go) < 0.2 Silver (Ag) < 0.03 Chloride 105 + 5
Arsenic (As) <o.3 Indium (In) < 0.2 Strontium (Sr) < 0.03 . Solids 90+2
Barium (Ba) 0.03 Iron (Fe) 0.03 Tin (Sn) < 0.2
Beryllium (Be) < 0.03 Load (Pb) < 0.1 Titanium (Ti) < 0.1
Bismuth (Bi) < 0.1 Magntsium (Mg) 3.0 Vanadium (V) < 0.1
Boron (B) 2.0 Mangan«** (Mn) < 0.03 Zinc (Zn) < 1.0
Cadmium (Cd) < 0.3 Mercury (Hg) Zirconium (Zr) < 0.3
Calcium (Ca) 2.0 Molybdenum (Mo) < 0.2 Sodium (Na) 850 + 10
Chromium (Cr) < 0.03 Nickel (Ni) < 0.3 Cesium (Cs) < 0.03
Copper (Cu) < 0.03 Phosphorus (P) 60.0 Potassium (K) 20.0
I I Results based on
I I Qualitative < Less than W\ Atomic Absorption
D X-Ray
CHEMICAL ANALYSIS*
Mercury 1.03/ig/g(ppm)
Cadmium 1.60/ig/g(ppm)
Copper 5.30/ig/g(ppm)
Zinc 3.50/ig/g(ppm)
Lead <5/ig/g(ppm)
Chromium <25Mg/g(ppm)
Manganese <.03Mg/g(ppm)
Silver <2.5Mg/g(ppm)
Molybdenum <.l Mg/g(ppm)
Sodium 250Mg/g(ppm)
Potassium .7Mg/g(ppm)
Soluble Fe 147(Mg/g)(ppm)
Insoluble Fe 2315 0ig/g)(ppm)
NaCl 44.3%
Na2S03 23.6%
NaHC03 5.9% •
Na2S04 15.7%
Na2C03 11.9%
Fe203 Jl% „
•
8-14
SECTION 9
The basic organization of RMA is shown in skeleton form on Figure 9-1. The following
general information relates only to the conduct of the Mustard Demilitarization
Program and is intended to provide general information on the types of services, and
in some cases, the number of personnel dedicated to this operation. It should be
recognized that there are also administrative organizations beyond those indicated
which provided supporting services (such as the Fire Department, Personnel Office,
Communications Office, etc.) and an administrative superstructure for the
organizations or functions indicated below were gröatly involved in the Mustard
Operation and are not specifically mentioned (such as the Chief Engineer, Director
of Facilities, Director of Logistic Services, Chemical Accident Incident Control
Officer, etc.). There are also the usual other supporting services available at an
ongoing arsenal, plant, or depot that obviously supported the Mustard Program that
are not mentioned (such as road maintenance, administrative supply issuance, testing
of the aquifer by engineering, water quality testing by QA, etc.). The following is
intended to aid others performing similar demilitarization operations in assuring that
they have considered the services or number of people to perform the service
indicated below.
The Product Division was the operating element for the plant. A typical biweekly
roster of personnel in the Product Division for Mustard Operation is inclosed
(Table 6-2, Item 20). This indicates the size of the MustardPlant operating force. The
basic structure in the plant to man a shift was a Shift Engineer (GS-12), two
Foremen (WS-8), four Leaders (WL-8) and 15 Operators. The rationale for the four
leaders related to four separate work areas because of geographic considerations, and
because of differing kinds of work. The two foremen related to the span of control,
with each foreman responsible for two work areas; the shift engineer was the
principal onsite technical supervisor. He was furnished with an emergency call list;
through it, he had available all the resources of the Arsenal; i.e., he could call for any
additional or specialized maintenance support to keep the plant running; he could
call for supply support on a 24-hour basis; etc. He also could initiate the emergency
disaster control plan (through a call to the Fire Department). Finally, the
management structure, through the Commanding Officer, was available to the shift
engineer on a 24-hour basis, since the cost impact of any shutdown was considerable
and warranted extraordinary action.
The operating personnel were for the most part Chemical Plant Operators (WB-10),
Chemical Plant Operator Helpers (WB-7) and Chemical Plant Operator Trainees
(WB-5). Besides manning the equipment in the plant, the operating force was
utilized for plant maintenance to the extent of painting and cleanup and assisting
9-1
the maintenance force in performing any major maintenance task. They were
involved in the disaster control plans of the Arsenal; each shift provided an
emergency decontamination team. The operating force included the within-plant
janitorial and clothing issue services, because of the clearances required (medical,
safety, security); the operating force did have a number of qualified truck drivers,
forklift operators, etc., to man equipment within the plant.
The requirements for the personnel in the plant; i.e., to be an operator with
unlimited access in the plant, required a confidential security clearance, meeting
medical work standards developed for each job, and meeting the Suitability and
Reliability Regulatory Requirements that relate to a satisfactory psychological
history, a satisfactory personnel history, a satisfactory police history, etc., as defined
by an Arsenal (and Army) regulation. The operators also had to be trained to assure
his safety in the plant; he had to be certified (and periodically recertified) to assure
his ability to perform his job, had to observe the "buddy-system" in the plant as a
safety/surety requirement.
All the wageboard jobs in the plant were considered an 8 percent hazard differential
pay job and all jobs were covered by SOP's.*
The plant maintenance element is best described in two parts: first, the in-plant shift
maintenance force; and second, the remainder of the maintenance support for the
plant.
First, the in-plant shift maintenance force, for the major portion of the program,
consisted of an area maintenance foreman and four personnel per shift. One of the
four was a working leader, and the four usually consisted of two millwrights, one
electrician and one instrument man. Those in-plant personnel performed the
immediate emergency repair tasks with the help of operational personnel. They, of
course, were extensively supported by the remainder of the maintenance
organization. The in-plant force did perform the preventive maintenance for the
plant in accordance with an organized preventive maintenance schedule. They also,
to the extent of available time, performed the longer term repair, rebuild, or
modernization tasks (assigned maintenance by work order) in addition to the
emergency repair tasks and preventive maintenance.
The second portion of the maintenance effort related to a complete, craft shop
organization on the Arsenal, capable of building or rebuilding almost any of the
plant or the associated equipment. This included an extensive machine shop,
electrical shop, instrument shop, sheet metal, carpentry, painting, etc. The shop
personnel had the special clearances required to allow their utilization, if necessary,
in the plant. Without this capability to perform furnace rebuilding, welding and fan
balancing, etc., the plant performance would have severely impaired. Later in the
program, the shop elements were consolidated into a separate mustard maintenance
organizational element in the Facilities Maintenance Division.
9-2
9.1.3 QUALITY ASSURANCE ELEMENT (PRODUCT AND ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSURANCE DIVISION)
The Quality Assurance Element was organized into two divisions, one that related to
the QA Laboratory and the other the Verification Inspectors.
The laboratory element manned the in-plant, stack monitoring, equipment; they
serviced all the bubbler stations and Titralog Alarm stations within the plant. They
performed the analysis of bubblers at the Central QA Laboratory (a typical daily
report is inclosed); they analyzed samples of brine, salts, ash, caustic, etc., required
to support the operation. The number of laboratory personnel in the Mustard Plant
(physical science technicians) was six. The number of personnel in the laboratory
required to support these analyses in direct support of the Mustard Operation was
eight. In a typical month, there were 912 bubblers and 469 brine samples. The
Laboratory Support included five personnel to man the perimeter air monitoring
stations and the associated analyses. (There also was a military unit of eight
personnel attached to RMA from White Sands to support the perimeter air
monitoring stations. They perform servicing the stations, maintenance of wind
equipment, data compilation, etc.)
The I & V (Verification) inspectors, in direct support of the Mustard Plant, included
two inspectors for each shift. They performed the required verification of the
accomplishment of various tasks, extracted samples, such as sump water ash, etc.,
and inspected all material leaving the plant to ensure that it was not contaminated.
The verification inspectors' tasks were in the "Records Check List" (Figure
9-2) and the "Verification Check Lists" by building (Figure 9-3). The I &
V inspector kept a separate record of each mustard ton container, certified
to the weight of mustard emptied, ash recovered, etc., and as such, were an integral
part of the procedure for certification of destruction (a supply function). These
I & V inspectors also performed verification of clothing laundering and impregnation
in support of the Mustard Operation.
9.1.4 SAFETY
The Safety Office had one safety technician assigned to the Mustard Operation on
each shift. This technician visited the plant areas on a random basis to perform
safety-oriented inspections. The technician was involved in a formal monthly
inspection of the mustard activity, in total, and participated in the monthly safety
meetings of plant personnel. The Safety Office also provided safety training to all
in-plant personnel and participated in the biannual employee orientations of all
personnel with mustard clearances, to aid in agent-related symptom recognition, first
aid, protective clothing requirements, proper mask fitting, implementation of the
buddy-system, etc.; these briefings were accomplished in conjunction with the
medical and security elements. The Safety Office administered the annual recall of
each mask.
9-3
9.1.5 MEDICAL
9.1.6 SECURITY
In addition to the normal security tasks, the guards manning the mustard gate were
required to check all personnel leaving the plant for indications of possible
exposures. All operators were required to wear the "Congo Red" impregnated, outer
coveralls. This garment turns blue on contact with mustard (or with an acid or
grease).
The Mustard Plant was a "no smoking" area (for the most part) and no food was
allowed in the plant. The security forces were involved in enforcing these
regulations. All equipment leaving the plant was required to have a QA tag to ensure
that it had been inspected for possible contamination. The guard assured that these
tags were affixed to all items leaving the plant.
The major Logistic Service functions performing direct support to the Mustard
Operation were the Laundry (then a part of Industrial Operations Directorate),
9-4
Procurement Division, and Supply Division (in both its receiving warehousing
function, and its toxic area storage function).
The laundry required six to nine people in direct support of the Mustard Operation
to launder the coveralls, underwear, M5 rubber suits, rubber aprons, masks, gloves,
socks, and boots required in the plant and laboratory. This included the
impregnation of under clothing with chemical protective components and applying
the "Congo Red" to those coveralls requiring it. These operations were covered by
SOP's. All operators were required to wear coveralls and to change clothing daily.
M3 rubber suits were individually assigned and were not necessarily laundered after
each use.
The receiving and warehousing supply function was responsible for maintaining
accountability records for the toxic material during the destruction program; they
were responsible for storing and maintaining stockage levels (reordering) spare parts,
performing the incoming receiving inspection, on spares and material to support the
operation; they also manned the parts crib. Approximately 10 personnel were
involved in performing the functions in direct support of the Mustard Program; three
supply clerks, one shipping and receiving clerk, one typist, three warehousemen, one
forklift/truck operator and one working leader. This, of course, was aside from the
normal functions of supply (including protective clothing).
The toxic yard handlers involved five people. These personnel performed the daily
visual inspection of all stocks, inspected material to be furnished to the plant,
changed out defective valves, plugs, etc. They installed bonnets on the ton
containers, cleaned them, loaded them on two specially modified trucks and
participated in a convoy to the plant. They assisted in unloading the T.C.'s and also
hauled away and stored the residues and salts generated by the plant. These
operations were covered by SOP's. 2 A typical convoy to the plant included a
decontamination vehicle manned by the toxic yard crew, two special trucks with
three ton containers each and a security vehicle, which maintained radio contact in
case of a problem. The carrier vehicles had special racks to contain a possible spill.
The toxic yard crew was the primary decontamination team on the Arsenal. As such,
they were a principal participant in the Arsenal's disaster control plan; and had
decontaminating trucks and a specially equipped emergency bus, to provide
decontaminant monitoring equipment and clothing in event of a problem.
In addition to the Facilities Maintenance support already described above, one other
essential supporting service was engineering.
9-5
The engineering staff included the complete gamut; electrical and mechanical, civil,
and chemical engineering. The engineering staff was responsible for the design of
much of the equipment in the plant and in preparing specifications for much of the
. rest for procurement. They provided procurement support and inspected the
installation of any equipment, material, etc., for acceptance by the Army. The
engineering staff provided and maintained a complete technical data package for the
Mustard Plant.
The use of military personnel in support of mustard areas (aside from those involved
in the management structure of the Arsenal) were in the following areas:
A. To service the air monitoring stations; a meteorological unit from White Sands
is assigned for this purpose.
C. Technical Escort: a unit was available at RMA and while they were not as
widely used in the Mustard Program as in other programs, they did provide
some escort services and they were frequently used to support engineering tests
in the plant. They were available as data takers on a 24-hour schedule and were
available to compile and analyze data in support of these tests.
D. Special Services Branch: The Special Services Branch did support the Mustard
Program in performing the land dilution operation of the ton container ash and
the electrostatic precipitator iron oxide residue.
Although extensively mentioned elsewhere in the report for the obvious planning,
budgeting, funding and cost analysis support, the Comptroller's Office also provided
automatic data processing support to the Mustard Program. The two principle
9-6
reports they aided in compiling were: a) the main working document on the
accountability of ton containers destroyed and the agent weight destroyed, and b)
inputting all the perimeter air monitoring data to the Bureau of Standards
Computer that performed the extensive summary and analysis of the Arsenal's
perimeter air monitoring data.
9.2.1 FEDERAL
Within the Government there was considerable essential support provided by many
* government agencies to operate this program. The principle activities and their areas
of contribution were:
9.2.2 STATE
The State participated in the approval process; the major element involved was the
State Air Pollution Control Division.
9.2.3 PRIVATE
Although there was relatively little outside companies' involvement in the program,
there were some key contributions in construction and services; among these were
the following:
9-7
9.3 PUBLIC INFORMATION
It was in this context that resulted in the decision to dispose of mustard locally at
RMA. At the time of this decision, RMA had neither a public information plan nor
did it have a full-time Public Information Officer.
As mentioned previously in this report, there was a press conference held at the
beginning of the program to announce the anticipated start of production. Due to
technical problems and changing environmental requirements, the program's actual
startup was delayed considerably, and began in August 1972. Because of the late
start, there was again much questioning of the credibility of the Army concerning
the actual intent to complete the demilitarization program. This was also heightened
by the fact that total stocks of items (or quantities of material) to be demilitarized
was classified and therefore not releasable to the public.
During the course of the Mustard Demilitarization Program all of the stocks at RMA
were declared excess and the information concerning quantities released.
Also during the. course of the Mustard Program, Mr. Tom Pettit of NBC was given
authorization to film a segment for his informative program. This segment included
film from the Mustard Plant on this operation. The publicity resulting from this TV
program was somewhat unfavorable to the Army.
RMA did acquire a full-time Public Information Officer on 11 September 1972. For the
major portion of the Mustard Demilitarization Program, there was little interest in
operation relating to the Mustard Program in the local (or national) news media.
There was interest early in 1973 concerning the possible transfer of excess stocks of
other munitions (GB) to other locations, which was eventually abandoned; and there
was a great amount of concern, with the potential impact of demilitarization
schedules (because of time-phasing in relation to airport construction) on the use of
9-8
an additional, new north-south runway at Stapleton International Airport. This
largely revolved around a decision of the DOD Explosive Safety Board to
recommend against use of the new runway until demilitarization operations had
completed destruction of toxic munitions and material. This publicity resulted in
the establishment of specific, simultaneous, schedules for the remaining
demilitarization programs at RMA announced by the Secretary of the Army.
Most of the above activities did not relate to the Mustard Program, in that there was
very little interest in the Mustard Operation at the Arsenal, at least in part because
there was no adverse impacts on the surrounding community.
There was a steady flow of important visitors to the Mustard Operation as indicated
in the attached listing (Table 9—1) of more important personages who visited the
plant. Often there was press coverage of these visits, and for the most part,
favorable. Also, there was considerable interest in the GB demilitarization plans
during the Mustard Program, and some interest in the Arsenal as a water polluter
because of possible pollution from old settling basins, and manufacturing operations.
On the whole, the Mustard Program was "low-keyed" deliberately.
The completion of the program was covered by the press, and the coverage was
generally favorable to the Army; excerpts from area newspapers are presented
herein.
9-9
REFERENCES
l
SOP No. SMURM-O-P-6, dated 28 May 1971.
2
SOP No. SMURM-L-S, SD-7-70, dated 18 Jun 1971.
9-10
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9-11
RECORD CHECK LIST
1
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SCHEDULE
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. MUSTARD DEMIL PROGRAM "UAL ASSURANCE OFFICE
CH»»»CTE«I5TIC
»»STEP CHECK UST ITC» . .ÜL.RECDRDLÄSEÄ
9. DESCfl I PT IOS FREO FORM PLANT LAB CLOG 111
12 Dryer Brine (Bldi 536) & Scrubber Brine (Bldg 530) HrW DDT 222
Contin ■Kficorcijr
13 Dynascienee SO? Monitor ilous Charts! X !
14 Titr3log H Monitor
lb'vracor H ; ionitor
12. S»SE PC-IC: T^T; It in ;i-p 1 c«'. l*~l '.". C».i l>
»EE«U
a»-*e£*LT
HONTn'.r
REVISION
,liio» »0.
8. Dire UL...» jir.iir.-»f .•".'I -.1-"-.."-
,). IMITHLS
±LL
För 01 S '.'
AMC " I I 80
9-13
VERIFICATION CHECK LIST
a. Sampled one each hour of operation & sent to QA Lab for Analysis.
Limit H «< .25 ug/ml
-■:.■•'■■•.
•A .--.wo.
• . : •■ -:
■ • ' ■ :
' •' - ■•
f//b/?L •V £ ?
:■■■..:. . > •■■> , :-. .••..
AMC 81
a. Room bubblers - changed every 2 hrs & sent to OA Lab for analysis
a. Air flow resistance test - prefilter (daily by RMA). Limit: 2" wat r nax
■Bolt « .00635
d. Freon penetration test of charcoal filter: (1143 Tester
U-
c. mi T n;i g-^i
• «ft iEMrvr i u
AHC 1181
5d (cont 'd) performed by Edgewood Arsenal personnel after each filter change
3
Limit 1 ppm
Equipment calibration check, Slug 537 (visual) Test & Measuring eotrpment.
a. Proper function during use & current calibration label & date.
H content in liquid effluent (wash down trench water, etc.) H Limits »<£.25 uc v-i
a. Sample each occurance & send to QA Lab for analysis.
Ton container weight (actual weights).
a. Record actual before S after transfer weights on ton cont. data card.
Filtration system (East filters)
Pressure limit:
a. Air How resistancq test prsflTtcr (daily by R?1A) ?" nf v/atnr max.
b. Air flow resistance test particulars filfpr
(daily by R?1A)
1
/A2-?i ■ 1—1.1-
AMC 1181
a. Verify that they are_changed once a month (record date in loa book).
Unload booth - long gauntlet butyl rubber gloves:
a. Verify that they are changed each ting a booth has been used 24 hours.
13-
;\ . . j i On t.0.
C. IMIIllS
•>■'-• >■
3*rC
™c ..;;:•.,"«■
a. Liquid sample taken once a week and sent to QEAD Lab for analysis: H ccntr.',-■-.
pH and specific gravity.
6. Caustic Sampling (RR Tank Cars)
a. Each tank car is sampled and the samples are sent to the HSA3 Lab to verify
the percent caustic (503) - VS.
H content in air (Room Air)
13-
:(
c . INITIALS
ZG-T.
C s * -- ~"
AMC;«J"4JI8I
a. Insure all data has been recorded on ton container data cards.
b. Fon/ard reports to ADP and QA Office as applicable.
12 Flue Gas-Dynascience Inst. (Reference QA Report 1-73)
a. Each Tuesday verify compliance with par 1 of report in regard to calibrat.ic;
of the "on line" unit.
-(
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.5 e r. 0»T£ CO",. VvMtiS, .9 ' «;PS£iEn r»i i ■.
AMC
,:;:%,««»
12 (cont i) d. Tiie f'onday following the first weekend of each month, verify compliance
13 •
H
s (..: OR 1;. SIGNATURE. , .1 "i's;;KC;A;I
9-20
VERIFICATION CHECK LIST
DESCRIPTION OP CHARACTERISTICS
a. Put sample data on label (lot no., container ',io. & Drum ,'.'o.)
Collect control sarnie: Take residue from each half of container and place
part of sample in sample bottle, and place remainder in split sample device.
via runner).
a. After receint of negative results from laboratory analy*^, fiw. vpllnw "X'
u.
r»v - 5.
/fco?7*
e. INITIALS
Z&T.
f0
AMC 5 JIN»".H 1131
9-21
'1
VERIFICATION CHECK LIST 1
UMCR J1V3C9I
c. Initiate DD Form 1222 & send sample to lab for analysis to determine H
1
. 1
" i
1i
AMC2^6JI8I
24 Oct 72 The Honorable Henry L.T. Koren, Assistant Secretary of the Army,
accompanied by Colonel George E. Bland
20 Feb 73 MG R.B. Smith, Commanding General for Reserve Forces, US Sixth Army,
accompanied by 8 officers and civilians
2 May 73 COL Pierre Ricaud and COL Andre Le Blanc of the French Ministry of
Defense
4 Oct 73 Mr. Walter K. Koch, Civilian Aide to the Secretary of the Army
9-23
28 & 29 Mr. William J. Donahoe, Freedom of Information Officer, Chief of
Oct 73 Information, Department of the Army
30 Oct to Dr. Louis Medin, Assistant Director for Environmental and Sciences, Office
1 Nov 73 of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
14 Mar 74 MG H.D. Smith. Deputy Commanding General for Logistical Support, AMC
9-24
PROMISE UNKEPT .<& ^ 73. ps/o^en /O$T
• 11 4» A 1 \W •■ J'
Mayor Says Arsenal Fail ed
Mayor BUI McNichols coun- SOME GAS KEPT
terattacked against the Rocky But in August of that year, he
Mountain Arsenal with a charge said, it was announced that
* Wednesday that the arsenal has some would be kept on hand.
Shortly after that, Gov. John
failed to live up to a three-year- Love said he would ask that all
old promise to dispose of mus- nerve gas be removed, Mc-
tard gas and nerve gas stored Nichols continued.
there:— -— ~ Later that same month, the
Denver and the arsenal are mayor said, the Army an-
engaged in a controversy ovei1 nounced that $14 million would
a new, 12,000-foot aircraft run- be spent to detoxify the mus-
way being built into former ar- tard gas, which had to be done
senal ground. The Department before the nerve gas was
of the Army, which controls the handled.
arsenal, has refused the city's So far as he is aware, Mc-
request for a fly-over easement Nichols said, detoxification
for airplanes taking off to the hasn't started yet, either on the
.north from Stapleton Interna- mustard gas or the nerve gas.
tional Airport. The Army, he said, made a
The mayor has termed the study of the situation in 1969,
•
9-25
Army Decision On Gas Bombs
Due in August
By ANDY ROGERS 7 ->"*V /i
Denver Post Staff Writer
Army officials expect to decide by early In his letter to Haskell, Callaway noted
August whether to move toxic gas from several factors in the current delay in
the Rocky Mountain Arsenal on Denver's disposing of the excess nerve-gas agents.
northern boundary. Stringent environmental requirements on
Army Secretary Howard Callaway, in a both the state and federal level along with
letter to Sen. Floyd Haskell, D-Colo., said certtractual and technical difficulties in
Friday that storage of the gas near a the disposal process have caused delays
major city "is no longer acceptable, no
in the program, the secretary All of those materials, he
matter how small the risk may be."
said. said, are being stored above
Callaway said "action must be taken to
eliminate even the remotest possibility of As a result, the disposal ground, except for the Navy
accident as soon as possible" at the arse- which was to be completed this GB nerve gas. That agent is
nal storage site. year is now scheduled for 1976 contained in underground stor-
The secretary said the Army "is justifi- or 1977, he continued. age tanks.
ably open to some criticism" for not mov- The inventory of nerve 1976 COMPLETION
ing the dangerous stockpile earlier. agents, all slated for detoxifica- Because of several factors
tion, include 1,476 tons of mus that have caused delays in
Reveals Gas Inventory tard agent, 1,039 tons of phos- Army plans to destroy the sur-
In his unusually candid statement,' gene and 2,089 tons of GB nerve plus stock, it will be at least
Callaway revealed the arsenal's inventory agent. The GB nerve agent is 1976 before the. surplus is
pfmustard^asj^^Äte and J^^SJ^JJ^ contained in M34 Air Force eliminated, Callaway reported.
fllffllf^rocTcpnetotaling 4,6ü^onso? cluster bombs while the other That puts the Army's gas-de-
agent—is scheduled to be destroyed. agents are in containerized struction plan, announced three
He declined, however, to say how much form. years ago, nearly four years
agent will be kept in the arsenal's "deter- Callaway also told Haskell behind schedule.
rent" stockpile. That information is clas- that several bombs that have The delays, he said, were
sified, he explained. developed "pinhole" leaks aren't caused by failure of contractors
It is the "deterrent" stock the Army is considered dangerous by Army to meet delivery schedules of
considering moving from the Denver area, safety experts. equipment needed to destroy the
Callaway said in the letter. A decision is He said casings of four Hon- agent and by complicated pro-
expected "within the next 30 days," he est John warheads have leaks, cedures required by new en-
said. and 222 Honest John bomblets vironmental protection laws.
Storage of the gases at the arsenal, just for warheads have developed Callaway's statements were
north of Stapleton International Airport, leaks. All of those items have in reply to a letter to the Army
has been the subject of controversy for been sealed in airtight contain- which Haskell sent last month.
several years. ers to prevent leakage into the
atmosphere, he said.
Critics Fear Crash POSSIBILITY REMOTE
Critics have warned of doom should a About 3,000 M34 clusters have
large aircraft crash in the arsenal's toxic- indicated internal bomblet leak-
gas storage area, while Army officials age, Callaway wrote to the
have consistently denied the likelihood of senator, but "no agent is escap-
such a disaster. ing from the outer casings of
Several authorities, including Colorado the clusters, and the possibility
Gov. John Love, have questioned the need of outside leakage is very re-
to maintain a surplus supply of nerve gas mote."
at any location and have hinted that all Callaway said the surplus
supplies ought to be destroyed. stockpile includes T^^nz^dt
However, disposal of nerve-gas agents jjliliiiifJM^gf, 2.08^rons^^I
in the oceans has been banned, and laws nerve gas and 1,039 tons of phos-
make transportation of the dangerous gene.
agents across the country extremely dif-
ficult.
9-26
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Q-27
Army's Arsenal Intent
Steadfast, With One Slip
9-28
until the stock of hazardous ma- Last week It was reported in SIZE NOT GIVEN
terials on arsenal property was Washington that there existed a The size of the stockpile, an
"significantly reduced." "live possibility" that the gas Army spokesman said, is re-
This brought protests that still would be moved from the ar- vealed only to those with a
are continuing but the big out- senal to the Pueblo, Colo., Army "need to know." It wasn't men-
burst came after the announce- JäiflOt. tioned in the last arsenal in-
ment June 6 by the arsenal that UTAH SITE ventory sent to the health de-
a "classified" amount of nerve Armstrong had previously sug- partment, and the department
gas. would be retained at the gested that the gas be moved has asked that it be informed of
arsenal after 4.2 million pounds to the Army Depot at Tooele, the amount for planning pur-
of the agent was destroyed in Utah, where a quantity of the poses,
the demilitarization project was gas now is stored. The arsenal has recommend-
completed late in 1976. First hint that Pueblo was be- jed to Washington headquarters
CALLAWAY BOMBARDED ing considered came from Sen. that the information be supplied.
Congressmen again cried Wallace F. Bennett, R-Utah, The arsenal was built in 1943
"foul" and Howard H. Callaway, who suggested the Colorado site for the manufacture of toxic
secretary of the Army, was as' a "less risky and less com- (products and incendiary muni-
bombarded with demands to re plicated" operation than mov- tions for World War II. In 1950
move the agent because of its ing the material to Tooele. ja $40 million addition was made,
potential hazard to Denver and While the deterrent stockpile land four years later The Denver
environs. has. been the major-target for I Post revealed that the new facil-
Gov. John Love, who in 1970 arsenal critics, the delay in ■ity was manufacturing GB —
expressed surprise that the starting the detoxification of 21,- j nerve gas.
Army planned to keep a stock- 115 M34 cluster bombs contain- i Its mission completed, the GB
pile at the arsenal, again ex- ing nerve gas has been fre- facility was shut down in 1957
quently noted. and put on standby status.
pressed surprise and demanded
The process, now more than ; "We haven't made GB since
that the agents be removed.
two years behind schedule, has 1957, we're not making it now,"
Brotzman said he was never
been delayed, the Army says, an arsenal spokesman said. "We
"informed of any Army change
for two principal reasons: de- - are not filling any weapons with
in plans after he was told in
signing and manufacturing the it. All of the GB here is in
1970 that all toxic material
highly complex equipment ("al- weapons or in bulk containers."
would be destroyed or removed
most beyond the state of the TIMING OF PROTESTS
from the arsenal."
Sen. Floyd Haskell. D-Colo., art") and compliance with Protests by politicians about
stringent environmental protec- the arsenal's mission and its
said he was "appalled" andj
tion and safety regulations. products during the years ap-
threatened to request an investi-j COST SKYROCKETS
gation by the General Account-! pear to be at random periods,
Cost of the program has although more intense when an
ing Office (GAO) unless he got zoomed from $9 million in 1969
a "prompt report" from-the| election is pending.
to more than, $33 million now. To some observers, however,
Army. j The Army also has been ac- criticism of the arsenal seems
SEARCH FOR OPTIONS , cused of being "less than can- to coincide with Denver's expan-
Rep. William Armstrong, R-l did" and "evasive" in answer- sion plans for Stapleton Interna-
Colo., whose new 5th district ing queries from congressmen tional Airport. >
now includes the arsenal, was and the news media. The serv- An Army officer, admittedly!
told by Callaway that the Army biased, said "Whenever Denveri
ice received several blasts of
was "looking for options" in needs more land for its airport, |
'criticism when it was revealed
the move to solve the nprvp gas someone pulls the chain and)
that the lethal VX agent and
"problem." These options. Cal- another biological agent, wheat politicians start blasting the ar-j
laway said, included burying the stem rust, were also stored on senal." ;
nerw gas in steel and concrete arsenal grounds. Following are the highlights
vaults on arsenal grounds or to The materials, which no long- in the arsenal history, as re-'
moving it to a remote site some- er are at the installation, are vealed in Post files, beginning in j
where else in the United States. classified, a spokesman said, 1963:
The next communication from j "and we make no announce- i%3—Business boomed in pre-
Callaway came July 6 in a let- ments about classified mater- paring weapons for chemical
ter to Haskell promising a de- ials. warfare as the administration
cision early in August on what "Besides," he said, "nobody discarded the concept of "mas-
will be done with the deterrent ever asked." sive retaliation" with nuclear I
stockpile. The Colorado Health Depart- weapons. . . . Wildlife lovers
Storage of the nerve gas near ment is concerned because the protested that ducks were being j
a major city "is no longer ac- Army refuses to reveal the killed by dieldrin contained in
ceptable, no matter how small quantity of the deterrent stock- waste water in industrial lakes
the risk may be," Callaway pile. The department needs to used by Shell Chemical Co., a
said, and "action must be taken know, a spokesman said, to tenant on arsenal land. ... Ar-
to eliminate even the remotest adequately prepare a conting- senal gave 474 acres of land to
possibility of accident as soon ency plan in evene of a catas- the city, which promptly asked
as possible." trophe. for an additional 805 acres.
9-30
1964—City buys 805 acres for 1970 — Announcement that as a deterrent stockpile . . .
$1.8 million. entire stock of VX gas had been Burning of mustard gas sche-
1965—Arsenal employe, Julian destroyed was first hint the duled to start . . . Request
Sanchez, 31, died following ex- agent was on arsenal grounds received for strip of land, three
posure to chemical fumes. " . . "Announcement that the miles long and 3,000 feet wide,
1966-67—Arsenal well probed 1,604,132 M-125 bomblets (each for relocation of Denver
as earthquake cause. containing 2.6 pounds of nerve railroad yards . . . Ten acres j
1968—An election year and gas) had no propellant charge of land given to Denver for new I
the arsenal is a live target for but each contained a half pound water pumping station. i
politicians. Pressured for "as- of tetryl for an explosive 1972—Arsenal was named as
sessments" and "studies" of its charge; 76 bomblets make up one of six federal facilities in
inventory and operations, arse- one M-34 bomb; 21,107 M-34 Colorado storing "ultrahazar-
nal officials announced that bombs on hand . . . Army said dous" materials . . . Contract
some stocks would be destroyed reported plan to ship nerve gas for $1.5 million awarded as last I
but that a "small amount" of from other U.S. sites to Denver major step in setting up system
nerve gas would be kept to jyas "never considered" . . „, to destroy nerve gas bombs . . .
"continue its mission in support Mustard gas inventory an- Destruction of "biological
of national defense." . . . The nounced as 2.457 one-ton con- agent"—wheat stem rust-
12.045-foot-deep well, used for tainers (420.000 gallons) of completed.
disposal of waste water andi Levenstein type and 951 one-ton 1973—Arsenal officials hosted !
suspected for three years pf| containers (164,000 gallons) of news media on tour (in June) '■■
causing earth tremors in the! distilled type . . . Announ- of nerve gas detoxification fa-!
area and of polluting subsur-j cement that M-34 bombs con- cility; announced the $33 million
face water, was being pumped tained 463,622 gallons of nerve project would start Oct. 1 with
dry. . . . Army announced it gas agent and 882,273 pounds of destruction of 18 bombs daily
planned to remove "most" of tetryl bursters . . . Announce- by force of 33 men; that 2,588
the nerve gas and bury the gallons of the nerve gas hadj
ment (Aug. 20) that a supply of
remainder to make it safe from been destroyed during a test i
nerve gas will be retained as
earthquakes and plane crashes. run in mid-April . . . Announce-1
part of the deterrent stockpile
... It was suggested that the ment made that a classified!
. . . Project Chase, Army said,
gas be moved to Tooele, Utah, amount of nerve gas would
would dispose of only the
and Denver officials talked of remain at the arsenal as partj
"surplus and obsolete" nerve
obtaining all of the arsenal of a deterrent stockpile . . . An-1
gas weapons . . . Natianal
property for airport expansion. nounced that two-year delay in I
Academy of Sciences reported
. . . Adams County officials destroying nerve gas was due |
that 2.200 "leaky" M-S4 bombs
voiced opposition to expansion to the necessity for "absolute |
had been disposed of at the ar-
of the airport in their direction safety and security," the "con-|
senal "over a period of years"
and the Army said it had no in- cern" about pollution and be-i
. . . Colorado Gov. John Love
tention of vacating the proper- cause of the magnitude of the:
"surprised" to learn that a de-
ty. task of designing and manufac-
terrent stockpile would be kept
NIXON PLEDGE turing "first of a kind" equip-
at the arsenal aod said he
1969 — President Nixon de- ment . . . Department of
would see about getting it
nounced germ warfare, promised Defense Explosives Safety ■<
moved out of the state . . .
to destroy biological warfare Board denies Denver request!
Rep. Don Brotzman. R-Colo.,
weapons and renounced first for easements involving arsenal j
said he received a letter from land and air space in connec-;
use of chemical weapons by the the Army assuring him that the tion with construction of newj
United States. This brought re- entire stock of nerve gas woufd 12,000-foot-long runway. . . State
newed demands that the arse-
be removed from the arsenal or health department requested
nal be closed. . . . Arsenal
disposed of at the arsenal . . . "full accounting" of inventory
gave 651 acres of land to
Army said destruction of mus- at arsenal, noting that invento-
Denver for new runway. . . .
tard gas would begin in October! ry given the department in 1972
Well is pumped dry. . . t-
and demilitarization of M-34J didn't mention deterrent stock .
Preparations were made to
bombs would begin in spring of . . Army headquarters said
burn World War I mustard gas
1971 . . . "Biological agents": Denver may be given ease-
supply and to start tne "demin-
reported to be stored at arse-| ments for new runway in late
tarization" of nerve gas bombs
nal. I summer of 1976 . . . Secretary
in February 1970. . . . Depart-
.PROGRAM LAGS I of the Army said (July 6) that
ment of Transportation stopped
I 1971 — Demilitarization pro-; announcement would be made
shipment of phosgene gas,
I gram lags because of foulup ini "within 30 days" about what
leaving 1,294 cylinders of the
"administrative machinery," would be done with the deter-
agent at the arsenal. . . . Plans
cost estimate up from $9 rent stockpile of nerve gas at
to sink it in the Atlantic Ocean
million to $17.6 million . . . An- the arsenal.
were dropped following recom-
nouncement made that 250-acre
mendation of a National Aca-
demy of Sciences committee. "toxic yard" area will contain
i one-ton containers of nerve gas
9-31
Mustard Gas Burning
Continues at Arsenal
DENVER (AP) - Officials at
the Rocky Mountain Arsenal
northeast of Denver reported
Wednesday that about a fourth
of the 584,000 gallons of mus-
tard gas stored there has been
destroyed.
The burning of the gas was
started last August and will be
completed in August 1974, ac-
cording to Maj. Andrew Blasco,
deputy commander at the arse-
nal..
Destruction of 500,000 gallons
of deadly nerve gas stored at
the arsenal is scheduled to be-
gin in October and be com-
pleted in about three years.
No date has been set for the
start of the disposal of the high-,
ly toxic phosgene gas. The
Army is exploring the possi-
bility of simultaneous disposal
of the phosgene and nerve gas,
Blasco said.
The destrouction of the gases
is in compliance with President
Richard Nixon's November
19*9 order requiring elimina-
tion of all obsolete chemical-
filled munitions and all biologi-
cal warfare stockpiles except
those required for national de-
fense purposes. Blasco said.
9-32
r
AREA WATER IN 1955-56 THI DE-N.VER POST Shi , 25.1974
Monday,Feb.
9-33
9-3U
FOURTH OF STOCK
1
Arsenal Burns
Mustard Gas
About one quarter of the 3,408 I Detoxification of the mustard
mustard gas container stored I gas, a highly irritating blister-
at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal ing agent, involves draining the
northeast of Denver since the ! gas from their one-ton contain-
1940s has been detoxified, a I ers and burning the gas in a
spolesman at the arsenal said furnace, Blasco explained.
Wednesday. After burning, the gases result-
Burning of the mustard gas, ing from the burning are
which was started late last ■'scrubbed" with sodium hy-
August, will be completed in droxide, which takes gaseous
August 1974, according to Maj. impurities out of the air, he
Andrew Blasco, deputy com- said.
mander at the arsenal. This scrubbed air then goes
Destruction of the 584,000 into a device which settles out
gallons of mustard gas original- any paniculate (iron oxide) in
ly was to have started in Oc- the form of a powder or dust
tober 1970, but was delayed by which is collected and stored so
the necessity to obtain environ- it doesn't get into the air, Blas-
mental impact statements from co said.
federal and state agencies. Blasco described the detox-
Also, Blasco said, the initial ification process as "a very
system for the detoxification controlled operation," in which
didn't work satisfactorily early safety is the overriding consid-
in 1971, and a new system had eration. There have been no in-
to be designed. cidents in the burning of the
The long-delayed disposal of mustard gas, he added.
500,000 gallons of deadly GB
As the detoxification pro-
nerve gas contained in 21,000
gresses, the arsenal staff is
aerial cluster bombs stored at
working closeiy with officials of
the arsenal is scheduled to
the Colorado Health Depart-
begin in October and be
at the arsenal on the detoxifica-
completed in about three years,
ment who were briefed Tuesday
Blasco said.
tion system, Blasco said.
There's no specific date set
for the start of disposal of 1,294 The last military use of mus-
containers of phosgene gas, tard gas by the United States
another highly toxic chemical was during World War I, and
agent stored at the arsenal, the gas manufactured at the ar-
Blasco said. Originally, this dis- senal during the 1940s never
posal was to have started after has been used, Army officials
completion of the nerve gas dis- have said.
posal, which would be in 1976, The detoxification of the
Blasco noted. However, he said, gases is in compliance with
the Army is exploring the possi- President Nixon's November
bility of simultaneous disposal 1969 edict requiring the destruc-
of the two gases, but at dif- tion of all obsolete chemical-
ferent locations on the arsenal filled munitions and all biologi-
grounds. cal warfare stockpiles, except
those required for national
defense research purposes, Bla-
sco noted.
9-35
SECTION 10
Early in FY74 it became apparent that the Mustard demilitarization program would
be completed ahead of schedule. In October 1973, the Program Manager,
anticipating early completion, directed that the Mustard disposal plant be placed in
layaway condition at the conclusion of Phase III. This was necessary since the plant
would be used to decontaminate empty GB ton containers. Also it was possible that
some equipment would be relocated to other facilities. To comply with the layaway
directive, RMA prepared a "Plan and Cost Estimate for Site Cleanup and Equipment
Layaway" in January 1974.1 This plan presented detailed decontamination
procedures and listed specific areas and equipment requiring decontamination.
On 7 March, the Plant Cleanup and layaway program was started by instituting
general cleanup and painting procedures. On 15 March, the CAMDS program
was officially completed, personnel strength dropped from 41 to 13, and
decontamination procedures were started. For the remainder of the month, the
mustard storage tanks were flushed with fuel oil and 83 ton containers of trash
and contaminated material were burned.
B. April 1974
Flushing of the two mustard storage tanks with fuel oil was completed and the
fuel oil-mustard mixture was burned. The storage tanks were then flushed with
a supertropical bleach (STB) and water mixture for approximately one week.
The water was spray dried. After flushing with STB, the tanks were drained to
the central sump and the mixing units were removed and decontaminated by
burning. In addition to the mustard storage tanks, the following equipment was
cleaned and/or decontaminated:
1. Heat exchanger
2. Quench tower and scrubber duct
3. Brine storage tank (Building 538)
4. Dryer systems (Buildings 536 and 540)
5. Electrostatic precipitator
6. Unload booths washed
10-1
In the last week, both ton container furnaces were cleaned and repaired.
Throughout the month, GB and CG contamination tests were run concurrently
with plant cleanup and layaway procedures. Also, 68 ton containers of trash
and contaminated material were burned.
C. 3 May 1974
The interior of both Building 537 storage tanks were painted with Rustoleum
and the tank pit walls were cleaned and painted with Rustoleum. The sewers at
Building 536 were flushed and approximately 10 ton containers of sludge from
the sewer were removed and decontaminated by burning. Building 536 brine
tank and the east scrubber system were cleaned. The vacuum system was
cleaned and decontaminated with caustic. The mustard transfer lines, which
were flushed in April, were removed, cut into small sections, and
decontaminated by burning. Decontamination tests using GB filled munitions
were conducted intermittently throughout the month.
Although Building 742 was not used for mustard demilitarization, it was
contaminated during the manufacture of mustard filled munitions.
Decontamination of metal from Building 742 was started in the third week of
May with one-shift operation and increased to three-shift operation during the
last week. In all, 107 ton containers of metal were decontaminated by burning
and approximately 65 ton containers of trash were burned.
D. June 1974
E. July 1974
The last ton container of contaminated metal from Building 742 and 6 ton
containers of trash from the decontamination facility were burned in July.
Although general cleaning and painting was accomplished throughout the
facility, the major effort was expended on the unload booths. All four booths,
the ton container carts, the scale pits, and drain systems were thoroughly
washed and decontaminated. After decontamination by caustic wash and
heating, the ton container carts were painted and all four booths were scraped
and painted both inside and out.
10-2
10.2 SUMMARY
The Plant Cleanup and Layaway Program was considered completed in July, 1974.
Although some areas and equipment were known to be contaminated (cement and
buried piping and equipment), no further decontamination was performed. First,
because the contamination presented negligible hazard to operating personnel, and
secondly, because the procedures required were impractical (for concrete) or the
contamination was inaccessible. Also, the plant was not placed in complete layaway
condition since it was scheduled for use in the Phosgene Demilitarization program
and plant modifications were scheduled to start within two months to support the
Phosgene Program.
10-3
REFERENCES
^'Plan and Cost Estimate for Site Cleanup and Equipment Layaway", Rocky
Mountain Arsenal, 4 Jan 1974.
10-4
APPENDIX A
Al GENERAL
The test plans developed by the special process engineering team at Edgewood
Arsenal were divided into six series as follows:
R Series - Incinerator/Reactor
D Series - Spray Dryer
F Series - Ton Container Burn
A Series - Bulk Mustard Burn
P Series - Electrostatic Precipitator
T Series - Preproduction Operations
The objectives, procedures, and conclusions of each test series are briefly described
in the following paragraphs. For detailed test procedures and results, refer to
Edgewood Arsenal Special Report, dated June 1974, Bulk Mustard Demilitarization
at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, April 1969 through September 1972 - Lojek.
The first series of tests (Runs R-l through R-4) was conducted in December 1971,
to evaluate reactor performance. The reactor was operated at variable temperatures
with variable air flow rates, mustard feed rates and feed stock composition. These
tests showed that mustard emission limits were controllable and that particulate
emission limits were not. The second series of tests (Runs R-5 through R-9) was
conducted in January and February 1972 to establish reactor temperature profiles
and to evaluate scrubber performance. The reactor was operated at lower
temperatures and the scrubber brine pH was varied. These tests showed that lower
temperatures reduced particulate emissions but increased mustard emissions. Also,
scrubber performance improved at lower brine pH. The third and fourth series of
tests (Runs R-10 and R-l 1, R-12 through R-14) were conducted in February 1972
to evaluate performance of the wet electrostatic precipitator. The
incinerator/reactor was operated under various parameters. The desired efficiency of
95 percent was-never obtained so further testing was discontinued. However, these
tests did determine an optimum feed stock composition and scrubber brine pH. At
that point, a Worthington ionizer was~installed and the reactor failsafe mechanism
was modified. The last series of tests (Runs R-l 5 through R-l 7) was conducted to
evaluate new and modified equipment. Again, the incinerator/reactor was operated
under various parameters. Tests of the ionizer were inconclusive and the failsafe
mechanism substantially reduced mustard emissions during process upsets.
During the first R series of tests, excessive plastering was observed on the fluid bed
and walls of the spray dryer. A lampshade device was installed on the nozzle to
A-l
counteract this effect. The first series of tests (Runs D-l through D-5) was
conducted in January 1972 to evaluate spray dryer modifications. During the tests,
the nozzle location was changed. These tests showed that the plastering effect was
reduced but not completely solved; consequently, further modifications were
incorporated. A second series of tests (Runs D-6 through D-7) was conducted in
February 1972 to evaluate equipment modification. These tests showed that the
modifications were not completely effective and that the dryer could not even
process 14 GPM of brine (design rate was 20 GPM). The final series of tests (Runs
D-8A through D-8D) was conducted to optimize the brine feed rate. These tests
established an optimum brine feed rate of 9 GPM which was sufficient for a mustard
feed rate of 1 GPM.
The ton container furnace was tested simultaneously with the reactor and spray
dryer. The first series of tests (Runs F-l through F-7) was conducted to establish the
operating parameters required to effectively decontaminate emptied ton containers.
The type and quantity of furnace air additions were varied during these runs. It was
shown that burn time could be reduced by air lancing the ton containers. No
relationship could be established between the ash mustard concentration and
original residue weight. Also, the upper limit of residue could not be established
since particulate emissions could not be correlated with residue weight and (as in R
series tests) the particulate emissions exceeded standards. The second series of tests
(Runs F-8 through F-ll) was conducted to further establish operating parameters.
Satisfactory ton container decontamination was obtained by increasing the scrubber
exhaust air flow rate and by operating the furnace at 1000°F. Also, salt buildup was
eliminated by maintaining brine specific gravity at 1.02. As a result of these tests,
several equipment modifications were incorporated and a third series of tests (Runs
F-l2 and F-l 3) was conducted to evaluate these modifications. These tests showed
the equipment modifications to be successful; however, an upper residue limit was
still not established since the particulate emission standard could not be met. The
final series of tests (Runs F-14 through F-l7) was conducted to determine
acceptable operating parameters. During these tests, operating techniques and
equipment performance were emphasized. The particulate emissions were
substantially reduced but they still exceeded emission standards. It was apparent
that further equipment modifications/additions were required; thus, it was decided
to use an electrostatic precipitator (dry) to eliminate the particulate emission
problem.
The first series of tests (Runs A-l through A-9) was conducted in April and May
1972, to determine the feasibility of burning liquid mustard in the ton container
furnaces. Two methods of incineration were tried; first, liquid mustard was sprayed
through two nozzles at varying rates; second, liquid mustard was pumped or
dribbled into an open ton container in the furnace. Furnace temperature was
maintained at less than 2100°F for both methods. Tests showed the spray method
A-2
to be preferable since higher feed rates could be achieved. However, particulate
emission standards were still not achieved. The second series of tests (Run A-10) was
conducted in May 1972 to obtain further data. The spray method was used in both
furnaces and furnace temperature was maintained at less than 2000° F. Good
combustion was obtained at a 2.0 GPM feed rate.
In May 1972, a pilot dry electrostatic precipitator was rented to study the effect of
such a unit in reducing the Tailor System particulate emission. The first series of
tests (Runs P-l through P-3) was conducted in May 1972, to develop criteria which
would permit design of a full scale unit. These tests showed that the precipitator
could reduce particulate emissions and could operate with a minimum amount of
maintenance. However, more testing was required to optimize operating
temperatures. The pilot precipitator was relocated to the ton container furnaces and
the second series of tests (Runs P-4 through P-9) was conducted in May and June
1972, to obtain additional design data. During this period, no operational difficulties
were encountered and the continuous operation did not adversly effect the
efficiency of particulate removal. This confirmed the results of these series of tests.
Other subsystem tests were conducted simultaneously with the precipitator tests to
determine corrosion rates and scrubber flow rates. The most important conclusion
of these tests was that an additional dryer system was required.
Two preproduction tests were conducted in June 1972. The first test (Run T-l) was
conducted to ensure that the ton container furnace system was ready for the
simultaneous incineration of liquid mustard and the decontamination of empty ton
containers without exceeding emission standards. The results of stack sampling
showed negligible SOx emissions and very low levels of NOx, acid mist, and total
acidity. However, opacity readings of the plume from the 200-foot stack and the
electrostatic precipitator were marginal. The second test (Run T-2) was conducted
to demonstrate the reliability and safety of the mustard demilitarization system, to
verify the Standing Operating Procedures, and to demonstrate compliance with
emission standards. The result of this test was the recommendation by USAEHA
that pilot production operation commence according to the revised detoxification
plan.
A-3
APPENDIX B
B.l GENERAL
This Appendix describes the Mustard Disposal Facility prior to its last major
modification (installation of the West Scrubber System, on or about 10 November
1972).
The disposal operation was performed in Buildings 522, 527, 536, 537, 538, and
540 which are located in the Plants Area (Figure B-l). The disposal area is 15,750
feet from the nearest public road and public railway. It is 10,000 feet from the
nearest Arsenal boundary (south). Other facilities and activities adjacent to the
disposal area include the commercial operations of Shell Company, Arsenal support
facilities, and various tenant storage areas. This site location for mustard disposal
was approved by USAMUCOM on 23 September 1969.
Six buildings in the Plants Area were utilized for the mustard disposal operations:
Building 536 contained the Tailor mustard incinerator/scrubber/spray dryer system;
Building 537 contained the thaw room, the container unloading equipment and the
( mustard storage and pumping equipment; Building 538 contained the bulk agent
V- incinerator, the ton container decontamination furnaces and a maintenance shop;
Building 540 contained the container cutting and ash scraping operation, the spray
dryer controls, the salt compacting and barrelling operation; Building 522B
contained the personnel change house and potential largescale decontamination
station; and Building 527 was used as an emergency personnel decontamination
station, a protective clothing issue point, and contained lavatory facilities. The
general layout of these buildings and their relative location to each other are shown
in Figure B-2.
The Plants Area was designated as a "Controlled Area" in accordance with Army
Regulation AR-190-3. The Plants Area was enclosed with a security fence and
guarded or locked gates in accordance with applicable Security and Surety
Regulations. The security fence contained a personnel/vehicle entry gate; two
additional vehicle entry gates; and two railroad access gates.
This building is used as the change house for the personnel of the Mustard Demil
Program. The building is interconnected with Building 522 and 541. Building 522B
is constructed of concrete foundation and floors and concrete block walls, steel
supported gypsum, rigid insulation, and a 5-ply built-up roofing. The building has
B-l
two administrative offices, two large change rooms, and rest rooms and showers.
Additionally, it has a supply room (primarily for clothing issue) which is readily
adaptable to this program's requirement without major alterations. The building is
located south and slightly west of Building 538 and is the nearest facility to the
Mustard Plant suitable for use as a change house.
This building is a quonset hut located approximately 150 feet south of Building 538.
The building plan and location are shown in Figure B-3. This is an all-steel building
20 feet wide and 48 feet 5 inches long, set on concrete footings and floor. The
building is wired for electric lighting only. An emergency change room and shower
have been added to this building (as shown on the drawing) which are isolated from
the out-of-area lavatory facilities. A temporary house trailer is located adjacent to
Building 527 to provide a rest break and lunch room area. The quonset hut also
contains a supply room for clothing and protective equipment issue. The building is
primarily used as a change room for the M3 (complete rubber) suits.
Although originally designed for the storage of crude H mustard, this building has
been used in the past for the storage of acid and caustic. It also was used in 1971 to
house the Tailor mustard incinerator/scrubber/spray dryer system for the original
detoxification program. The building is of cinder block construction, painted to
make it impervious to moisture, with the exception of the south wall which has a
removable siding. The removable sidewall construction is provided so that tankage
and equipment can be moved readily in and out of the building. There is a total of
4,000 square feet of floor space in the building; however, there are two ceiling
elevations in the building, one section about 15 feet high and the other section 26
feet high. The floor space is approximately the same in both areas, i.e., 2,000 square
feet each. Only one large storage tank (20,000 gallons) on the east side of the
building remains as part of the previously installed storage equipment. This tank was
used to store 50 percent caustic solution and was located inside the heated building
to avoid freezing. A control room is located in the southwest corner. The Tailor
system is shown (in schematic form) in Figure B—4. Since the system did not meet
expectations as a practical Mustard Disposal System and ' was abandoned in
mid-1972, much of the instrumentation, heat exchangers, fans, monitoring
equipment, tanks and pumps were used to upgrade the remainder of the plant. The
only portion which remains in its original configuration is the spray dryer and its
related equipment. This dryer was used to spray dry scrubber brine until the Bowen
Spray dryer became operational. It was also used to pilot the compacting operation.
The Tailor spray dryer is capable of drying 10 to 12 gallons per minute of brine feed
with proper weekly cleanout and maintenance. It has a bag house to collect the salts,
which proved very efficient with no opacity problems. The building has floor
drainage to the liquid waste collection system (sump). All of the decontaminated
liquid wastes from Buildings 536, 537, 538, and 540 are collected in the liquid
wastes sump near the northeast corner of Building 536 and are subsequently
transferred either to the brine storage tanks for spray drying or to the chemical
sewer system.
B-2
B.3.4 BUILDING 537 - BULK MUSTARD DRAINING, STORING AND PUMPING
This building was known as the "thaw house". It is also constructed of cinder block
coated to prevent absorption, and has about 16,000 square feet floor space. It has a
painted concrete floor. It was used with very little alteration. The unloading dock is
located at the southwest corner of the building where the mustard containers from
the toxic storage yard were unloaded from the modified transport trucks. An
overhead monorail crane was used for transferring the containers from the truck to
the center thaw room (the -only one of the three thaw rooms that was used during
the program for the thawing operation). The center thaw room is approximately 140
feet long (east/west axis) by 20 feet wide by 14 feet high and has a capacity of 100
containers. The building has a series of bridge cranes that allow the ton containers to
be moved to any part of the building. Overhead rolling doors at each end of the
thaw room allowed the room to be closed off to contain the heat. The ventilating
system picked up air through the grates in the concrete exhaust duct in the floor and
exhausted the air via a fan and charcoal filters to the atmosphere. Slight negative
pressure was thus maintained in the thaw room. Heat was provided by circulating a
pre-set portion of the ventilating air stream over steam coils located in the roof
plenum chamber. A thermostatically controlled room temperature of 90° to 140°F
could thus be maintained. The normal division of the air stream was set at 10
percent exhaust to the atmosphere and 90 percent recirculation. However, in the
event of a spill the system was immediately put on emergency ventilation which
routed 100 percent of the ventilating stream to the filters; thereby, rapidly reducing
the room temperature to ambient and increasing the comfort of personnel in
protective clothing who must enter the room to decontaminate. The room was
equipped with drainage to the liquid waste sewer. An adjustable dam was installed in
the drainage ditch to contain liquid wastes and spills until they could be
decontaminated prior to release to the common sump.
The east end of Building 537 contains the three original mustard unloading booths
and one second-generation booth installed in August 1973. In these booths, warmed
ton containers from the thaw room were drained of mustard by vacuum. The three
older model unloading booths were modifications of the booths originally installed
in the building. Each of these booths contained a platform scale for weighing the
containers. The agent container rested on a hydraulically powered unload cart which
had the capability of moving the container into and out of the booth, rotating it
360° either clockwise or counterclockwise, and tilting either end. The booth door
was an integral part of the cart. Both cart and door rested on the platform scale
when they were fully inserted into the booth. The operators worked through glove
ports on the booth door. The butyl rubber gloves in the glove ports were changed
once per day during unloading operations. Protective clothing specified by SOP for
operator use consisted of "congo red" treated coveralls, a mask with hood, rubber
apron and "congo red" treated gloves. Section 5 of this report provides a description
of the "congo red" treated clothing. The ton container was unloaded through two
high pressure, fiber reinforced, butyl rubber hoses connected to its valves; these
hoses were changed every two weeks. The unloading procedure is contained in the
Mustard SOP. Each booth was valved for compressed air and container venting (to
the ventilation trench). In addition, all booths were equipped with pressurized DS2
decontaminant supply and process water for decontamination and wash-down.
B-3
The second generation booth (number 1A) was designed at RMA based on safety
recommendations resulting from a design defect in the original three booths. The
primary difference between the two types of booth was that on Booth 1A the
operator worked through glove ports located at the opposite end of the booth from
the door, thereby decreasing the risk of exposure and eliminating the need for
rubber protective clothing. The door was a guillotine type with an inflatable rubber
seal as opposed to the movable, baffle-type seal on the other booth doors. The
inflation mechanism for the seal was interlocked with the booth lighting to prevent
unloading operations when the door was not sealed. An additional improvement was
the use of load cells built into the unload cart. The load cells replaced the platform
scale and made the sealable door possible since the door became a separate piece of
equipment not connected to the cart and scale as in the other model booth. The
draining capability of the booth was improved by increasing the diameter of the
agent piping between the booth valving manifold to the storage tanks. The
effectiveness of Booth 1A was excellent. All of the booths were continually kept
under negative pressure, via a concrete ventilation duct, by a ventilating fan outside
the building. This ventilation system was equipped with particulate and charcoal
filters similar to those used in the thaw room ventilation system. The concrete duct
also served as a dump for the booths, which contained a dam, to allow wash water to
be sampled and decontaminated, before being dumped to the central sump.
Located beneath and to the rear of the booths were two horizontal 2600-gallon
tanks (designated as the East and West Tanks) for receiving mustard from the ton
containers. Normally, the West Tank was used as the drained agent receptable and its
contents were periodically transferred by vacuum to the East Tank for pumping to
the incinerator. Positioned over the mustard storage tanks were the two mustard
transfer pumps to transfer the incinerator feed. The West Tank was equipped with a
submerged centrifugal pump which was installed in 1972 to replace the previously
installed Moyno positive displacement pump. The submerged centrifugal pump's
operating life under maximum operating conditions was as short as three weeks and
as long as three months; the operating duration was strongly dependent on the type
of failure which occurred. The East Tank was equipped with the original Moyno
positive displacement pump. While not entirely suitable for this application, the
Moyno pump did have the advantage of being easily changed. Additionally, it had
the capability, due to its suction head (negative pressure) operation, of pumping fuel
oil to the furnaces from an outside storage tank while insuring that no mustard
could inadvertently be pumped to the oil tank. The two pumps and tanks were
interconnected so that either pump could supply the furnaces while the other was
recirculating the tank contents or being used to transfer contents from one tank to
the other. The tanks were also interconnected by the vacuum system for the purpose
of transferring agent from tank to tank by vacuum.
The vacuum pumps provided negative pressure to the tanks for the unloading
operation. The negative tank pressure was used to draw the agent from the ton
container in the unload booth. The dropout pot or condensate collection vessel was
a glass lined tank of approximately 100 gallon capacity located in the vacuum line
between the storage tanks and the vacuum pumps. This piece of equipment plus a
B-4
"U" shaped riser approximately 40 feet in height precluded gross contamination of
the vacuum pumps. These pumps (Nash Hytor) had a water seal. The water was
actually a dilute caustic solution of pH 11 to 14. This slight amount of caustic was
used to prevent the seal water from becoming acid due to mustard vapor hydrolysis.
Both tanks were equipped with sight glasses which were read every hour during bulk
incineration. The tank drainage thus measured (which was somewhat inaccurate due
to the viscosity of the agent), provided the only reliable method of determining the
incineration rate at the furnace.
Both tanks were equipped with a homogenizer intended to grind up the solid
sulphur particles. These homogenizers were of limited value, particularly after the
strategy of emptying ton containers into one tank, allowing it to settle, and then
transferring by vacuum to the other tank was adopted.
The tank pit was ventilated directly to the bulk incinerator via a 24-inch dampered
circular duct. The pit environment was maintained at approximately 90°F by a
forced air heater in order to maintain the mustard in the tanks fluid. Drainage in the
unloading area also went to the liquid waste sewer.
Building 538 is a steel frame building with corrugated asbestos siding. The building
housed the bulk agent incinerator, the two ton container decontamination furnaces
and a small maintenance shop (see Figure B-2).
The furnace was modified in January and February 1973 to be suitable for
burning bulk agent. It was inserted on line during March 1973 and thereafter
assumed the role of the west ton container furnace which had up until that
time been used to incinerate the bulk agent.
The furnace was fed by the mustard pumps as described previously. The agent
was carried at 60 to 80 PSIG pressure in the inner pipe of a double-walled line.
The annulus was filled with circulating, hot (90°F) ethylene glycol, both to
help keep the mustard hot and fluid, and to aid in detecting leaks in the inner
pipe. The mustard feed passed through an air-operated, quick-acting, on-off
solenoid valve (interlocked with the control panel) and an air-operated,
manually-controlled regulating valve. The agent spray nozzle was an oil nozzle
manufactured by John Zink, Co. Atomizing air was introduced into the agent
prior to the mustard leaving the nozzle through ten, radial, 1/8-inch orifices.
The orifices were angled at approximately 60° from the horizontal thus
B-5
providing a conical agent spray pattern. A ring gas burner surrounded the
nozzle. This burner could supply heat to the furnace for warmup or idling but
was normally cut back to little more than a pilot flame during operation since
the mustard agent flame was self-sustaining and the burn rate was highly
dependent upon maximum furnace temperature limits.
Both the agent nozzle and ring gas burner were located in the combustion
chamber, which was a cylindrical, brick lined chamber situated immediately
next to the furnace, entered the furnace axially through the nozzle end of the
combustion chamber. Dilution air entered the furnace through several small
adjustable ports located on the front face of the furnace barrel.
Operating conditions and production rates of the bulk incinerator are detailed
in Section 5 of this report.
Immediately adjacent to the bulk incinerator are the two ton container
furnaces (East and West). These furnaces were constructed in 1944 for the
purpose of decontaminating 55 gallon drums of mustard agent.
The furnaces are long, rectangular-arched, fireboxes with their long axis
oriented north to south (see Figure B-6). The air-operated guillotine type
doors were located on the north end. The flue for each furnace was positioned
above the firebox with its opening immediately behind and above the door.
The south end of each flue joined the central hot gas breeching.
The west furnace had eight Maxon natural gas burners placed as in Figure B—6.
The east furnace had fourteen of the same type burners also shown in Figure
B-6.
The drained ton containers were stored temporarily at the Building 538 storage
yard, east of the building. The containers to be burned contained a residue heel
averaging approximately 100 pounds for the HD and 600 pounds for the H
type of mustard. Each container was brought to the weighing station in
Building 538 where its serial number and Quality Assurance data were
recorded. (See Section 6 for record keeping procedures). The ton container
gross weight was also recorded at this time. The container was placed on an
electrically-driven charging cart which was then positioned under the punching
station at the door of either furnace. The container was punched at both ends
on the top centerline. The punch consisted of an hydraulic ram with a wedge
shaped hardened steel head. The furnace door remained open during punching
B-6
operations in order to utilize the furnace draft to remove any fumes from the
punching operation. In addition the punch head was surrounded by a metal
shroud which descended with the punch and sealed (by means of a rubber
gasket) onto the container. The shroud was vented to the furnace flue by
means of a stovepipe duct.
Incineration of the container took place in the south end of the furnace (see
Figure B—6). Furnace temperature, burner configuration, furnace stay time and
location of the ton container in the furnace were all matters of considerable
study throughout the program; furnace conditions are discussed in Section 5 of
this report.
Immediately south of Building 538 are two annexes, southeast and southwest,
housing the East and West Quench/Scrubber Systems respectively. The location and
physical arrangement of these systems is shown in Figure B-2.
The East Quench/Scrubber System is the older of the two scrubber systems. It
was installed in 1971 to serve as the air pollution abatement system for the ton
container decontamination furnaces.
B-7
(2) East Scrubbing Tower
The input to the scrubber bottom from the Quench tank was allowed to
accumulate to a maximum depth at which a level switch activated a
discharge pump, draining the scrubber bottom to pre-set and
automatically controlled minimum depth. This discharge brine was
pumped to a 20,000 gallon holding tank from which it was drawn to
supply the quench and to feed the spray dryer.
The scrubber was originally equipped with a York stainless steel wire mesh
mist eliminator which was removed in May 1973 after they proved
unsatisfactory, primarily because of plugging. The rest of the program was
finished without a mist eliminator in the scrubber. The scrubbed flue gas
exited the top center of the scrubber and was drawn toward the
electrostatic precipitator via a 30-inch (OD) mild steel duct.
B-8
B. West Quench/Scrubber System
The West Quench/Scrubber System was constructed during the summer and
early fall of 1973. Construction, except for the winterizing enclosure, was
complete at the end of October 1973. The system was designed and built at
RMA based on the requirement for additional scrubber capacity to support the
second and third phases of the demil program which entailed higher production
rates than those experienced during Phase One. The west system was identical
to the East Quench/Scrubber in principle of operation. The two systems
differed, however, in details of construction and instrumentation representing
second generation improvements (Figure B—8).
The West Quench Tank is similar to the East Quench Tank with the
exception of the following:
b. Five rings of eight nozzles per ring are utilized as opposed to the four
rings previously used on the East Quench. These five rings proved
adequate to maintain the quench outlet temperature at the desired
point. Water could be added to either the top ring of nozzles or all
nozzles but not to each ring individually. This arrangement was
adequate in that emergency cooling could be achieved with all
nozzles switched to water if the quench brine pump pressure was lost
for some reason.
B-9
O.D. and 29-feet-3-inches in height. The tower is approximately 2
feet larger in diameter than the east scrubber but of approximately
the same height. The packing consists of nine feet of 1-inch-by-1-inch
pyrex glass Raschig rings topped by one-and-one-half feet of
1-1/2-inch by 1-1/2-inch ceramic Raschig rings. The packing support
and brine distribution system are enlarged versions of those used in
the east scrubber. One significant change from the east scrubber was
the caustic control system. The system on the west scrubber was to
utilize an automatic pH sensor/controller which sampled the
scrubbing brine just beneath the packing. Makeup caustic, if any, was
added to the brine recirculating line at the point where the line
entered the top of the tower as opposed to the pump inlet on the
east system. This system due to nondelivery of parts, was not
operational until March 1974. Therefore, manual control was used
and proved to be an adequate substitute during operations.
d. The scrubbed flue gas from the west scrubber exited via a 30-inch
(OD) mild steel duct.
The two 30-inch scrubber gas outlet ducts meet at a "Y" shaped duct section
just upstream of the ESP inlet (see Figure B-2). Built into each arm of the "Y"
is one control damper designed and fabricated at RMA. The dampers are
constructed of mild steel and can be locked into selected positions. Use of
these dampers enabled the scrubber systems to be used independently or in
parallel by setting the appropriate control damper. Each damper section is
equipped with a sealant packed slip joint to allow for expansion and
contraction of the long runs of scrubber gas exit duct. Sampling points for
velocity traverses and air monitoring test equipment are provided a short
distance upstream of the damper sections on each duct. In addition, since this
"Y" joint is elevated approximately 50 feet, a large, free standing, work
platform was constructed to facilitate flue gas sampling and preheater
maintenance.
B. ESP Preheater
A natural gas fired preheater burner is installed at the base of the "Y" section
and is positioned so that the flame of the unit is oriented down the vertical
section of the ESP inlet duct (see Figure B—9). The preheater supply unit
incorporating air and gas controls, mixing section, pilot gas system, ignition
B-10
equipment and a flame detector with alarm are installed in a small
prefabricated shed placed on the roof of the Building 538 southeast annex,
next to the East Scrubber Tower. The air/gas ratio was adjusted manually to
maintain the desired ESP inlet temperature. This preheater served as an after
burner and mist eliminator. The flue gas exiting the scrubber passed through
the flame of the preheater causing incineration of any fuel or agent which may
have passed, unabsorbed, through the scrubbers. In addition, due to the lack of
mist eliminators in the scrubber and the fact that the scrubber exit gas was
water saturated the preheater was employed to dry the flue gas stream prior to
its entry into the ESP. The preheater was sufficiently upstream to allow
evaporation of any entrained moisture or condensate.
The ESP was tested for acceptance by the U.S. Army Environmental Hygiene
Agency in August 1973. The unit met the applicable Colorado emission
standards with three of the five stages operating.
The system driving fan was fabricated by Buffalo Forge Company, Buffalo,
New York, Type 75R-SWSI. This fan supplied the draft for the entire mustard
disposal system and exhausted and scrubbed dust cleaned flue gas to the
atmosphere via a 55-foot insulated stack. The stack was insulated to prevent
condensation.
B-ll
time determined by the Chief of QA dependent on the operational situation.
Analysis of the bubbler contents for mustard agent was performed in the main QA
Laboratory. The high level mustard monitor consists of two automatic sampling
Tracor gas chromatographs set up in parallel. Considerable modification of the
sampling lines was required to enable the instruments to sample the mustard without
interference from sulfur dioxide or trioxide in the stack gas. Sulfur dioxide was
monitored with a Dynascience Corporation continuous SO 2 detection instrument
reading out directly in ppm. Heated probes for all instruments were inserted into the
ESP exhaust stack for sampling.
B.3.9 BUILDING 540 - TON CONTAINER CUT AND SCRAPE OPERATION, BOWEN
SPRAY DRYER
Agent-free containers were brought into Building 540 where they were placed
on their sides on the T.C. cutting platform. The T.C. cutting platform is a piece
of equipment designed and built at RMA. It incorporates four rollers on which
the T.C. rests; the rollers on one side of the container are connected to a
variable speed electric drive which rotates the container on its longitudinal axis
in either direction. The container was cut in half along its circumference by a
fixed position oxy-acetylene torch fed from a bottled gas manifold outside the
building. The container halves were "removed one at a time from the cutting
platform and taken to the ash barrelling station. The dust and fumes generated
by the operation were removed from the work area by the exhaust action of a
paint booth with a shroud extension to partially enclose the T.C. cutting
platform. The ash residue (primarily iron carbide, oxides and sulfur) remaining
after agent incineration was removed by manual scraping with hoe-like tools
locally fabricated and shaped to the container's curvature. The ash was placed
in used 55 gallon drums. A sample of the ash from each container was taken
and analyzed in the QA Laboratory for agent. The serial number of each
container was recorded and a lot number assigned to each drum of material
(approximately four to five T.C.'s per drum). The drums were palletized and
held with the T.C. halves for 48 hours (pending laboratory verification that
they were free of agent), and trucked to a warehouse for storage to await
ultimate disposal by dry-land dilution on Arsenal property. The ton container
halves were hauled to the Property Disposal Yard where they were sold as
scrap, under a contract arrangement.
The Bowen Spray Dryer was designed and constructed by Bowen Engineering
Inc., North Branch, New Jersey. The unit was used to spray dry the brine resulting
from the scrubbing operation previously described. The principle of operation
B-12
involved atomizing the brine feed in a hot gas environment, collecting the
product, compacting and barrelling the product, and removing the fine
particulates from the gas stream prior to exhaust to the atmosphere.
Atomization occurred via a Bowen Spray Machine which utilized a horizontal
spinning disc onto which the brine was fed. An air heater system, gas or oil
fired, provided the 800°F to 1150°F inlet air to the drying chamber. This
drying chamber was an inverted cylindrical-conical chamber, 24 feet in
diameter. Dried product and hot air were extracted from the bottom of the
chamber at 275°F and passed through cyclone separators which removed the
majority of the product from the air stream. Fines were removed from the gas
stream by a venturi scrubber and wet cyclonic scrubber in series downstream of
the main fan. The main fan was driven by a 500 HP motor and maintained the
system to the fan under a negative pressure. The volume of air was 40,000
CFM, the system pressure drop was approximately 40 inches of water. The air
from the dryer is exhausted into the atmosphere, saturated at approximately
150°F. Product removed from the cyclone was fed to a compactor and
drumming station where the salt was placed in 55 gallon drums, sealed,
weighed, dated and palletized. The pallets of drums were placed in a warehouse
pending final disposition instructions.
Protective clothing and specialized equipment for each operation, together with
first aid, accident reporting instructions, foreman's responsibilities, etc., are
contained in the SOP's.
There is a complete technical data package for the mustard facility. Ref. 'Tech
Data Package - List of Drawings" dated 14 May 1975.
G. Maintenance Manuals
B-13
FIGURE B-1. PLANT AREA GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF
ROCKY MOUNTAIN ARSENAL
B-14
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