Last Chance For Victory: Line of Battle Series

The Gamers, Inc.
Line of Battle Series:

Last Chance for Victory
©2013. Multi-Man Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
Game and Series Designer: Dean Essig same thing), but it also means that playing the two-map version of the
Research Assistance: Eric Wittenberg, the cuts are not represented by some campaign, the Confederates can move
Earl Hess, John Heiser, Dave Powell, sort of 100 yard across expanse, between N29.14/N31.14 and S9.23 at
Jerry Axel either. I think the former is a mild the cost of 5 turns. (Optional: To add
Compilation Map Research and
price to pay to avoid the latter. some uncertainty to this timing—and
Original Sketch Map: Rick Barber
Proofing: Hans Korting recreate the historical march of the
Playtesting: c) The McPherson Quarry (vic 2nd Day—at the end of the 5 turns roll
Christopher Anthony, Jerry Axel, Curtis N27.25) has no effect on play itself, one die. On a 5 or 6, allow the force to
Baer, Daniel Broh-Kahn, Jeff Coyle, but the associated Vertical Slope enter. On any other roll, try again the
Francis Czawlytko, John Essig, Don hexside is impassable. Likewise, the next turn. Regardless of any roll, the
Evans, Mark Guttag, Hans Kishel, John seemingly minor McPherson’s Pond force enters 3 hours after it exited if it
Kisner, Joe Linder, John Long, Ben (N27.27) also provides a blocking has not already done so.)
Magnus, Rod Miller, Chip Pharr, Dave hexside.
Powell, Marty Schaubel, Ken Spuda, Jim
1.0c Hex Numbers. The grid is divided
Stravers, Dan Taylor
d) The White Triangular Mileage into two major sections (because of the
Markers indicate every 8 MPs along multiple map configurations that are
the major routes to ease counting possible), “North” and “South”. The
1.0 Common during play. various map possibilities lie atop this
grid in a way that reduces confusion as
Special Rules e) The symbols for the Lutheran best as possible. Note that the grid was
1.0a Breastworks. The Federal Theological Seminary and not extended all the way (1.xx through
player has 15 Breastwork markers Pennsylvania College buildings 124.xx) because of the limitations of
available. The Confederates have accurately depict the actual period the type space available.
none. (Yes, the Confederates did roof of these buildings. (To include
build some limited Breastworks not showing the dormers added after 1.0d The Turn Record Chart. To make
on Seminary Ridge). Federal the battle.) an accurate rendition of sunrise and
Breastwork markers can only be sunset times, the Turn Record Chart
built in hexes containing at least a bit f) The various cemetery plots and guides the player from using the 15-
of the Woods symbol. boundaries on the map have no effect Minute track (most day turns) to the
on play. hour track itself before going to the
1.0b Map Notes. 30-Minute track (most night turns).
g) The game comes with the four
a) Farmer names in parentheses maps covering the entirety of the For example: At 6:00 p.m. in the
are tenants, not landowners. Those main battle area (Maps A, B, C, and evening, the player continues to use
without parentheses actually own D) plus two maps that isolate the the 15 Min Track and marker. Once
their land. primary battle areas of the 1st Day you are about to start the 7:00 p.m.
and the 2nd/3rd Days. Combining turn, set aside the 15 Min Track
b) Vertical Slope hexsides are used to these two maps allows playing marker and use the Hour marker
indicate the location of the Railroad of the entire battle on a two map (only) for 7:00, 7:15, 7:30, 7:45, 8:00,
Cuts northwest of town. The point footprint. The map arrangement 8:15, and 8:30. The next turn after
there is that units cannot cross them chosen impacts both the set up 8:30 p.m. is 9:00 p.m. at which point,
(except in spots where other features and the Orders of Arrival that are the Hour marker will be in the 9:00
allow crossing). Technically, this used. Crimping the battle into just p.m. box and the marker used for the
means that a regiment cannot get the two maps does cause a large 15 Min Track earlier will go in the
stuck inside a RR Cut (but can be portion of the Confederate rear areas “:00” part of the 30 Min Track. Use
destroyed by being forced to retreat (needed for movement between the that track normally until the process
through one, which is effectively the two maps) to fall off map. When reverses itself at 3:30 a.m.
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Last Chance for Victory, LoB #2
The rules below restrain the player Recon in Force ends at 12:15 p.m., if
2.0 July 1st from making use of his hindsight to any Union unit moves west of xx.22
have the fight play out in a way Heth (inclusive), or if the Confederate
1863 could not have imagined necessary player “calls off” the attack (per LoB
For an assortment of reasons, the at the time. Once Lee (the player) 10.7a). When it ends, all Recon in
Battle of Gettysburg began in a arrives and gets a grasp of what is Force restrictions terminate and so
very specific way. Since neither going on, the leash will be loosened. does Heth’s “attack order.”
Army Commander (represented by
the player) is present, much of the 2.1a Confederate Skirmishers. 2.1d Lee. Lee has “Not so Sure”
opening is out of the player’s control. Heth’s Division deployed a line of Awareness. It is possible for his
Once the commanders do arrive, skirmishers that (slowly) pushed the Awareness to jump to “On Fire,” see
they must feel out the situation and cavalry videttes in front of them. 2.2h.
proceed with caution. As a result, a These are not shown literally, but Lee cannot issue any orders until
number of rules that either hamstring the units supplying them (three the turn after Ewell successfully
the player or give the player infantry regiments) representing makes his Command Roll (see 2.1e).
additional “powers” are needed to their main body reserves are used
fit the historical parameters. Yes, to indicate the rough location of the Urged to Action. Once able
this takes some of the early battle’s skirmish line. Do not confuse these to issue orders and Ewell’s
control away from the player, but ‘ghost’ skirmishers with any sort of order requires Rodes’ Division
at that point many circumstances actual Open Order unit. These three (ignoring Doles’ Brigade and the
were already in motion that the units ignore Command Radius until Sharpshooters) to attack southward
commander (player) could not Archer starts a turn on Map A (8:45 along and/or west of Oak/Seminary
foresee or modify. a.m.) (even if not all of Map A is in Ridge, Lee can make one order that
play); afterwards Command Radius is implemented immediately. Merely
For players wishing to remove applies to them normally. make a Command Roll for Lee. If
all or some of these conditions successful, generate one order to
(generating what has been termed 2.1b Deployment. No Confederate Hill’s Corps with instructions for
“Panzergruppe Hill”), they can unit can move east of the Herr Ridge the 3rd Corps divisions and Artillery
be lifted at will. The player should Road until all units of Arch/Heth and Battalions on hand at that moment
be forewarned that this freedom Dav/Heth (minus 11 Miss) begin a and they can begin to act on that
will allow events to happen at a turn in Line formation in that road’s order in the next game turn. This
far, far greater rate… probably hexes. From the beginning of the order need not be accepted by other
leading to a complete Federal defeat game until the Recon in Force period Leaders nor relayed down to any
by the morning of July 2nd at the ends (see 2.1c), no Confederate unit formation.
latest. (Unfortunately a feature of can switch to Column formation Lee can only do this once and
pretty much every Gettysburg title once in Line and no unit can move cannot do it on any turn after he
heretofore.) east of the Herr Ridge Road in issues any order using the normal
Column. Artillery, HQs, and Leaders system (in other words, if this rule
2.1 Confederate are unaffected by this rule. is to be used, it must be used for the
first order Lee gives).
First Day Rules 2.1c Recon in Force. The turn Heth’s
Sent with orders to avoid a general
units move east of the Herr Ridge Long Nights for Walter Taylor.
engagement and expecting to
Road Recon in Force automatically Lee cannot issue orders at night
meet only militia, Heth’s advance
begins. It constitutes an “attack on July 1st and until 8:00 a.m. on
was methodical and cautious.
order” with the following exceptions: the 2nd, and cannot issue orders (at
Planning on scattering the “militia”
a) There are no Fluke Stoppage midnight) on the night of July 2nd
with a little artillery fire, Heth
Rolls, b) Only Archer’s and Davis’ (see 2.2h).
had Pegram’s artillery lead the
brigades can attack and c) There is
column out of Cashtown. Meeting
no need to conduct Attack Recovery Historical Note: Lee was in no
the Federal cavalry, the infantry
because of these combats afterwards. position to issue orders on the
deployed a screen of skirmishers
No other orders are allowed night of July 1st as the situation and
who, slowly, pushed them back on
during this period. ground was too nebulous to make
their main defense line. Certainly,
any major decisions. He attempted to
Heth was not in a rush, he did not
During Recon in Force, Heth do so on the night of July 2nd, but was
know that a major engagement was
(marking the center of his Command unable to get a clear order out to his
about to begin, and he also had no
Radius) must remain directly on the corps commanders to ensure that the
idea how critical time had become.
Chambersburg Pike. desired operation occurred. This was
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the result of two problems, both of his 2.2a Who Ever Saw a Dead His first order, however, is “automatic”
own making: the corps commanders Cavalryman? Keep track of the losses to Wadsworth’s Division. At 9:30
were not ordered to HQ to obtain inflicted on the cavalry units (not a.m. the player merely jots down the
coordinated instructions and his staff Calef’s artillery) by counting only desired instructions for 1/1 and it is
was incapable of filling in the gap this losses from Opening Volley and the implemented that turn. Reynolds’
mistake created with clear orders. In Combat Table (Morale and Retreat automatic order cannot contain
a game sense, the easiest way to show through ZOC losses do not count). instructions to attack further west
these failings is to not allow Lee to than Willoughby Run.
issue orders during either night. If there are one or more losses, roll
one die at the very start of the Union Reynolds’ movement to the front
2.1e Ewell. Ewell can create one order player’s turn. If the roll is equal to is abstractly handled by the Order
on the 1st for any purpose. Ewell must or less than the number of losses, of Arrival. This is merely for its
be stacked with the recipient and make remove all the units of 1/Cav from informational value, if desired the
a successful Command Roll. Once he play. Calef’s Battery is unaffected by player can leave him with the troops.
does this, write up the desired order this roll.
and that order takes effect that same 2.2d Double Quick. The following units
turn. If he fails the roll, he can try 2.2b The Infantry Deploys. The first can take advantage of Double Quick:
again each turn until he succeeds. Note Union player turn that any unit of 1
that the order’s content affects Lee in Corps will switch to Line formation, Reynolds
2.1d. If this order applies to Rodes’ if the cavalry has not been removed Doubleday
Division, it can contain separate because of 2.2a, remove them from 1 Corps HQ
instructions for Rode’s detachment play as if they had failed the roll. Do 1/1 Division (but not the 7 Ind 2/1/1)
(3.2d). this when the Union player expects a 2/1 Division
unit to switch to Line formation and Hall’s Battery
2.1f Hill’s Restrictions. The lack of do it before any cavalry units move or 2/3/1 (only, not 1/3/1 or Rowley).
available recon and Hill’s seemingly fire. If the player does not remove the
out of commission status makes it cavalry, the infantry cannot deploy Just so there is no confusion,
so that Hill’s HQ is required to stay into Line that turn. Double Quick does not apply to
directly on the Chambersburg Pike Buford’s cavalry, Mr. Burns, or
until his HQ enters N26.27 (the top 2.2c Reynolds. Until Reynolds was other reinforcements. They all move
of West McPherson’s Ridge). Once able to assess the situation to Buford’s normally.
it enters that hex, it is no longer front, the march of 1st Corps forward
constrained by this rule. was relaxed. The infantry was not To use Double Quick, Reynolds must
expecting a major confrontation. have issued the automatic order (2.2c)
Remember, by default, this restricts That attitude changed soon enough. and the Road Column head must
the ability of Heth and Pender to Reynolds moved rapidly once he be at or north of the Peach Orchard
‘swing wide’ in their attack before this intercepted a messenger from Buford (S9.28) at the beginning of its move.
location is clear enough to allow the telling him of the urgent situation. If a particular Road Column has not
HQ to enter. He rode through Gettysburg, yet made it to S9.28, those units only
stopping at the George George (yes, move normally.
This is in addition to the requirement really…) house to obtain directions.
for Heth (himself) to stay on the Between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. When Double Quick can be used, the
Chambersburg Pike until the Recon in (accounts vary greatly), he met with following apply:
Force ends (2.1c), Buford (possibly at the Seminary, 1) The special movement rates are in
as popularly thought) and then hexes, not MPs, and road terrain costs
rode forward to observe the field. do not increase or decrease speed in
2.2 Federal First He began issuing orders at 10:00 any way.
Day Rules a.m., sending dispatches to Generals
Buford’s cavalry executed a masterful Meade, Howard, and Sickles. He then 2) If going through town, the
delaying action while falling back on returned to the Codori house, ordered Intersection Rule (LoB 1.7g) applies
their main defensive line. At that point, Wadsworth to get his men moving and normally and the column must go
they briefly defended the ridge before sent his staff back to clear the fences north on Washington Street and turn
allowing the 1st Corps infantry to take on a shortcut to the battlefield. west onto Chambersburg Street.
over the fight. Reynolds arrived and
agreed with Buford’s decision to hold Reynolds is unable to issue any orders 3) The column cannot divert off the
west of town and began hustling his until 9:30 a.m. When he does so, he Emmitsburg Road south of N61.35.
infantry into line. will be an acting army commander
with On Fire Awareness.

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4) While using Double Quick, units Just so it is clear, Reynolds’ death has participants and even longer with
move double (2x) their MA in hexes no effect on any orders that exist at following historians.
(not MPs.) that time.
Thereafter (seemingly to make up
No unit can use Double Quick to 2.2h Reynolds Picked the Ground: You for this ‘Lost Cause’ mentality), the
move into a hex adjacent to any Get to Defend it. John Reynolds forced pendulum swung hard the other way
enemy unit. No units can change out the hand of the Army of the Potomac and gave an image of Lee surrounded
of Column or Limbered formation by deciding to fight for time west by some who knew better, but that
before having ended Double of Seminary Ridge for the army to he was incapable of making rational
Quick. Units can use their hexes of concentrate. You must do so as well. decisions and when he did they
movement to collapse their Road (The easy gamer decision, based on went against wise counsel and were
Column when doing Double Quick hindsight, is to bolt for Cemetery Hill mistakes. This was done to ‘correct’
(merely move the head of the column while 1st Corps is intact. I’m not going (by tearing down, a popular modern
a little slower so that the following to let you do that.) way to handle revered persons of the
Road Column markers can catch up). past) the image of Lee as, what has
If the Confederates occupy any hex been called, “the Marble Man.”
When it Ends. Double Quick ends for along the road from N30.33 to N36.33
a unit the turn it switches to Line or (inclusive) at the end of any Union As is almost always the case, the truth
Unlimbered formation. It ends for Player Turn on or before 4:00 p.m. 1 is somewhere in the middle of these
leaders and HQs when they finish any July, the following occurs: extremes.
move north of N45.xx. On that turn,
move the unit (for its player turn) 1) Lee enters “On Fire” awareness for Several Confederate generals showed
without any Double Quick and move the remainder of the game. two faces during this battle. My notes
using normal MAs, movement rules 2) Early and Rodes do not flip to their extensively analyze the conclusions
& costs allowing firing and Charges. 0-rated sides. I came to on the sensitive subject
Once a unit stops using Double Quick, 3) Lee can issue orders at midnight of James Longstreet and the not so
it cannot use it again. Do this on a each day and is not restricted on the contentious issue of Richard Ewell.
unit-by-unit basis. morning of the 2nd. The others can be handled in brief
here.
2.2e The Iron Brigade Breaks Camp. There is no penalty for this happening
Iron/1/1 left camp after a short delay at 4:15 p.m. or later on July 1st. Lee was more cautious than usual
that allowed a gap to form between as he did not know the ground or the
them and Cutler’s Brigade. The enemy situation as well as he normally
Order of Arrival provides a die roll 3.0 did. Also, he (like most everyone else
to release them. Roll each turn at the in the Army of Northern Virginia)
beginning of the Union Player Turn
Confederate knew that this battle was the one
until they are released. Until released,
the Iron/1/1 units cannot move or
Special Rules to potentially win the war. Those
two situations combined to slow the
change formation. 3.1 All My Generals decision making process on July 2nd
One of the key features of the to await the results of the various
2.2f Our Man Burns. John Burns battle (long a point of contention reconnaissance teams he sent out
can only help morale, he has no for historians) was the suddenly in the pre-dawn hours. Others have
Command or Initiative value. He balky nature of the Confederate suggested that he was lethargic and
moves as a Leader, but has an high command—Lee, his corps “operating in a fog” due to either
MA of only 6. Burns can never lead commanders, and a number of a heart condition or the effects of
a Charge or assist a Closing Roll divisional leaders seemed suddenly Pennsylvanian food. I have to disagree
attempt. gripped with indecision that certainly with those assessments. There are
did not characterize them either options here to test those theories. I
2.2g Reynolds’ Death. Obviously, the before or after this particular battle. think you’ll find them in error as the
battle would have unfolded much Lee they portray cannot issue the
differently without Reynolds’ death. After the war, an effort was made orders he did in the time he used.
Also, no player will ever risk getting to blame the mistakes made on
this superb leader killed. So Reynolds specific leaders (anyone other than Rodes was visibly ill by the night
must die ‘on schedule’. Expect the Lee) which made for extensive (and of the 1st and bedridden enough by
Confederate player to exact a high rather pointless) blame and counter- the evening of the 2nd that he left his
price for the option that allows accusation arguments for the next division in the hands of its brigadiers
Reynolds to live (5.1a). forty or more years between the who took a vote and decided they
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The Gamers, Inc.
could not advance onto Cemetery 3.2b Corps Artillery Leaders.

Hill while Early’s men were being Alexander, J.T. Brown, and R. Walker 4.0 Federal
driven off of it. can post any battery, act as an Artillery
Leader and give Initiative orders to any Special Rules
Early (of all people) seems to have Artillery Battalion within their corps. 4.1 Command
become unnerved by the evening of 4.1a Meade. Meade has “Normal”
the 1st and was a consistent voice of 3.2c Sharpshooters in Rodes’ Division. Awareness but cannot issue any
caution in Ewell’s ear for the rest of SS/Rodes units can trace Command orders until the first twilight turn on
the battle (and Lee’s as well, if his Radius to Rodes, Blackford, or any the morning of July 2nd. Meade can
self-centered account is accurate). brigade leader in Rodes’ Division. If issue orders normally at midnight on
used for Command Radius, Blackford the night of July 2nd.
A.P. Hill was simply non-functioning must be in the Command Radius of
for the duration of the battle. any of Rodes’ other leaders. SS/Rodes 4.1b Acting Army Commanders.
Except for brief “Oh, and Hill was does not roll for Fluke Stoppage—they The senior Leader on the field
there, too” comments, it’s almost are tied to the orders of the Leader is the Acting Army Commander
possible to make an argument that to which they are tracing Command until Meade arrives. Acting Army
the man wasn’t even at the Battle of Radius. Commanders function exactly like a
Gettysburg. regular Army Commander in every
3.2d Rodes’ Divisional Detachment. way, except that they have no Army
3.1a Longstreet. Longstreet’s counter Doles’ Brigade was detached to cover HQ (and ignore any restrictions
has two sides, one 2-rated and the the area from the left flank of Rodes’ based on one).
other 0-rated. Use the 2-rated side Division and to Early’s right on the
when he is accepting any Move afternoon of the 1st. Doles joined into Seniority runs from Reynolds to
Order and the 0-rated side when the attack on 11th Corps with Early’s Slocum to Howard. Hancock does
accepting any Attack Order. Division. not rank Slocum or Howard. Meade,
of course, ranks everyone.
Should Longstreet become Army Doles can trace Command Radius back
Commander, he uses his 2-rated side to either Early or Rodes. Once Early No Acting Army Commander can
with a “Not so Sure” Awareness for or Rodes’ attacks end, Doles must issue orders at night.
the remainder of the battle. permanently return to using only Rodes
as his source of Command Radius. The Acting Army Commander
3.1b Rodes and Early. These men are cannot command his own corps at
given counters with two sides, one 3.2e Early’s Detachment. Smith’s the same time—promote the current
good and one not so good. The OOA Brigade of Early’s Division spends ranking divisional commander to
specifies which to use and when to most of the battle off the east map edge command the corps for the interim.
change them. guarding the Confederate left flank.
That brigade can be used as Early’s When Hancock arrives, he shares
3.2 Lower Reserve Brigade for Fluke Stoppage army command with Howard (so the
even while off map. Early’s situation Union has two Army Commanders
Confederate becomes “normal” once Smith enters for a time). Howard can only issue
Command play. orders to his own corps. When
3.2a Trimble. Trimble is a spare Slocum arrives, he becomes Acting
Division commander. When 3.3 Other Army Commander, Hancock returns
available, he can be used to to his corps (simply remove his
replace any Confederate Division Confederate Special counter from play), and Howard
commander who is killed, wounded, Rules reverts to just being a corps
or captured. When Trimble is in 3.3a Supply. All Confederate supply commander.
charge of a given division, do not trains are only available off map.
apply the modifier for original Measure “by Caisson” ranges to the 4.1c Slocum. Slocum commands
Divisional Leader wounded or killed given entry hexes. “By Battery” is the “Right Wing” (5th, 6th and 12th
on the Fluke Stoppage Table. The accomplished by exiting those hexes. Corps). He acts as a second army
player need merely announce that Expend the needed ammunition and commander with the ability to issue
Trimble is in command of the given then roll one die. The result is the orders to those corps. Meade can
division. Once assigned, Trimble number of turns in the future the ignore Slocum when making orders
cannot be re-assigned to another battery returns. Returning batteries directly to these corps; Slocum is
division later. must do so at the Entry Area from merely an additional commander the
which they exited. Union player can use to get orders
for this wing.

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4.1d Acting Army Commanders be ordered to do any actual attack (i.e. means the division is restricted to the
Awareness. Acting Army told to move into an area currently-or area at or within 6 hexes of N49.45
Commanders have the following soon to be-occupied by the enemy). until 4:00 p.m.
awareness: The order is merely to ‘move’ the
corps to the new location. It is not an 4.3f Tyler. Tyler is the commander of
On Fire: Reynolds and Hancock actual Move Order and there is no the Army of the Potomac’s Artillery
Normal: Howard formation requirement for any unit Reserve. He functions the same
Not so Sure: Slocum during it. as Henry Hunt (4.3a), except his
authority is limited to the Artillery
4.2 Looking for The order must be issued at the start Reserve Battalions and their batteries
of the Federal player’s Activity Phase (not the batteries belonging to
Glory and must be followed as of that phase. the corps) as well as the Arty Res
The Confederate player can “order” The Federal player cannot issue the Supply Train. As an historical aside,
the Federal player’s troops to affected Command new orders (or at some point on July 3rd, Tyler
do something especially stupid Skedaddle) for 2 hours (8 turns) succumbed to heat stroke and was
representing various Federal leaders counting that turn. no longer commanding the Artillery
doing what seems best for their own Reserve—as best I could determine,
needs rather than for the army’s. The this occurred after Pickett’s Charge
player can do this once on July 2nd.
4.3 Other Federal
began, hence he is still on the map in
Special Rules those scenarios.
At 8:00 a.m. on the 2nd, the 4.3a Henry Hunt. Hunt can act as
Confederate player selects the time an Artillery Leader for any Federal
the order will be issued. It can be any battery and post any battery, or 5.0 Optional
turn from that turn until dark on that Artillery battalion in the Federal army.
day. He need not decide what that Hunt does not need to give orders to Rules
order will be at that point. do this; he need merely stack with These options are all designed to
the battalion’s Leader and its HQ and tweak the historical parameters of
On that turn, do the following until posts the entire battalion as you would the game either to explore “what ifs”
you have a “winner”: a single battery. or if you feel my choices are all wet.
Just remember, a “major” variant
1) The Confederate player selects a 4.3b Supply. Several Corps never will shift the game greatly toward the
Union corps. have a Wagon arrive for them (1st, 3rd, side getting it. Mixing in numerous
2) The Union player rolls one die. 6th Corps). These must use the Army variations at once will generate
If the roll is equal to or less than the Arty Res ammunition supply. The unpredictable results, but you can
corps commander’s Command Value, exception is 1st Corps which can also tell the overall slant by the groupings
the corps is not selected. If the roll is use the 11th Corps Wagon. chosen. Have fun!
greater than the Command Value, the
rule affects that corps. 4.3c Lockwood’s Brigade. Technically, They are designed primarily
3) Repeat until a corps is selected or Lockwood’s Brigade in 12th Corps for campaign starts, but can be
the Union player runs out of corps. is assigned directly to the corps HQ implemented with any scenario.
In the case of the latter, no corps (a matter of rank in the convoluted
follows this rule. organization of the corps). Rather than 5.1 Major Union
force the player to jump through hoops
Try each corps only once and ignore for this, they are assigned to 1/12 here,
Variants
5.1a Reynolds’ Death. Ignore 2.2g.
any corps whose HQ is not yet on the which is where they will be after the
Reynolds does not die according to
map. battle and how they acted during it.
the Order of Arrival (if the player
gets him killed anyway, that’s his
The Leader in question is ordered to 4.3d Calef’s Battery. Calef’s Battery
problem).
move his HQ location to a location has an HQ to allow more freedom
12 hexes (or less) forward from his of movement early in the battle.
If this option is chosen, make the
current location as indicated by the This “Battery” HQ has an Artillery
following changes to the Union
Confederate player (if possible, use Battalion HQ’s Command Radius and
Order of Arrival:
a terrain feature to make the order acts as one for all purposes.
easier to follow).
4.3e The Army Reserve. v.Steinwehr’s
The Federal player, for his part, must Division (2/11) is placed into “army
follow the instructed movement as if reserve” when it first enters play. This
it was an order he issued. He cannot
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The Gamers, Inc.
a half to get on the road after getting Additionally, should the Union line
July 1st, 1863 word from Howard (and even then be holding north of town at 6:00 p.m.,
Turn Entry Area Units sent Geary ahead by himself so that allow the entries above, but with
3:00 p.m. - Hancock (do not have he, Slocum, would not be tagged with 12th Corps operating under orders to
him enter play at this the catastrophe he expected to land Move to fill in the right of the Union
point) in Howard’s lap). So, I’ll assume that defensive line, Smith’s Brigade is to
3:30 p.m. G 12 Corps (all) Reynolds would get word to Slocum move to rejoin Early’s Division (and
4:00 p.m. J 3 Corps (all) about an hour earlier than Howard not to Benner’s Hill).
did, and Slocum would take only an
hour to get going (as well as bringing 5.2 Major
his whole command). That brings him
Each corps is to report to the Acting Army into the game 1.5 hours earlier than Confederate
Commander for orders. Restrictions, Geary alone shows up historically. I Variants
such as those normally applying to 2nd did not change 2nd Corps other than to 5.2a Releasing Hill. Ignore 2.1b
Corps and the Artillery Reserve, are keep Hancock with his corps. (Deployment), 2.1c (Recon in Force),
not in effect. Howard arrives as a corps and 2.1f (Hill’s Restrictions). Also,
commander only. 5.1b All the Ducks in a Line. Ignore ignore the Order of Arrival restrictions
4.2 and no Union corps goes off solo. on Pettigrew and Brockenborough’s
Obviously, this is a massive adjustment brigades. This allows Hill to slam
to the historical timeline. The historical 5.1c Slocum the Incredible. After into the enemy as normally occurs in
rationale for the times are as follows: finally deciding to heed Howard’s Gettysburg games.
Sickles got first word that Reynolds request to come to the field, Slocum
thought he should come up via his aide wanted to take his corps and fall into 5.2b Lee’s Not Puzzled. Ignore all of
Henry Tramain between 11:30 a.m. and the Union defensive line north-east of 2.1d. Lee enters with “Not So Sure”
noon (Tramain left a very much alive Gettysburg (11th Corps’ right flank). Awareness (2.2h applies normally)
Reynolds with those instructions, so the As it turns out, only one division and is otherwise not restricted. This
change in the timeline in this option has (Ruger’s) made the cross march from dramatically frees Lee to act in the first
not had the ability to propagate to Sickles the Baltimore Pike to the Hanover 18 hours of the battle.
as yet). Sickles then became indecisive Road to execute this plan (Geary
about whether he should obey the order was intercepted and kept on the main 5.2c Longstreet: The way he
from Reynolds or the one he had just road). Finding Confederate cavalry remembers himself. Ignore 3.1a and
gotten from Meade so he did nothing blocking the route, Ruger was in play Longstreet as a 4-4 rated corps
(except try to clarify things) until he the process of deploying to attack commander.
got a new order (from Howard) a little Benner’s Hill when new orders arrived
after 3 p.m. Assuming that Reynolds for him to pull back and return to the 5.2d Lee has a real Staff. Ignore the
was still alive, and aware that Sickles army via the Baltimore Pike. Long Nights for Walter Taylor portion
needed a greater prodding, the only of 2.1d. Lee has a staff up to the task of
possibility is that an additional order This variant allows players to explore sending out coordinated orders at night
would have cleared up the problem at the rather unlikely event that Slocum (both the 1st and the 2nd). Other portions
some point between noon and 3 p.m. (a was willing to press the attack with of 2.1d remain in effect.
3 hour window). For argument’s sake, I his entire corps that evening (keep in
gave Reynolds credit for two of the three mind that this is the same general who 5.2e The Five Brigades. In the
hours and assumed that the direct order was less than thrilled at the idea of middle of May, 1863, torn between
to “come on” would have hastened 3rd showing up at Gettysburg and taking the competing needs of the proposed
Corps to come as an entirety. any of the blame for the fiasco away Pennsylvania invasion and possible
from Howard in the first place). action in the Western Theater, Jefferson
Slocum has a similar timeline. 12th Corps Davis denied Lee’s request to return
pulled into Two Taverns (4-5 miles away) Allow 12th Corps (all, minus 12 these five brigades to the Army of
a little before noon. He got his “please Corps Supply which enters the game Northern Virginia. They were five
come” order from Howard between normally) to enter play at Entry Area experienced brigades of great value
1:30 and 2 p.m., but did not begin to F at 6:30 p.m. on July 1st (ignore all not only in and of themselves, but
move until 3:00 p.m. The assumption other entries and times for 12th Corps). in the effect they would have had
then is that not only would Reynolds The corps has orders to Attack onto on the ANVa’s reorganization after
have thought to urge Slocum on sooner Benner’s Hill. Chancellorsville.
than Howard did, but that Reynolds had
enough rank horsepower to actually get At 6:00 p.m., have Smth/Early enter If these brigades are used in the game,
results. It took Slocum almost an hour and at Entry Area E to move to N37.60 to Heth’s Division will not exist (Heth
defend.

LoB-02 Rules.indd 7 10/17/13 2:12:10 PM

himself will not be used). Instead, Design Note: Why these? The battle
Robert Ransom commands a division 6.0 Campaign happened in the first place because
of R/Ran, Ev/Ran, Ck/Ran, Dav/ all the roads led to this location.
Heth and Pett/Heth. At the opening Victory Cemetery Hill dominated the town
of the battle, replace Heth’s own Last Chance for Victory is a game and its road nexus. Should the hill
arrival with R. Ransom and Ck/Ran about the battle itself. The fun comes fall to the Confederates, there is
enters in the place of Arch/Heth. Ev/ from trying to better your opponent little reason for the Union army to
Ran enters when Brock/Heth would and see what happens as a result on remain on this ground to fight—a
have. Brock/Heth and Arch/Heth the field. For most players, telling good case could be made that given
belong to (and enter with) Pender’s them that they will recognize it when the loss (and lack of recapture) of
Division. In later scenarios, do the they win is plenty—but a minority the hill controlling the roads, the
same replacements, but apply 50% will take that as a license to do Army of the Potomac would reform
losses to Ck/Ran. something pointless like building a elsewhere to continue the campaign.
fortress around a few hexes, ignoring The “roads being cut” portion exists
The additional brigades of Pickett all other concerns, and ruin the fun simply because the presence of an
(Corse and Jenkins) enter the turn for both sides. isolated Union fortress on Cemetery
after Armistead’s Brigade. If already Hill is not a realistic way to ‘win’
set up, arrange the two brigades with To avoid this type of play, what the battle—the Union player must
the rest of the division in any way follows is a guide to determining have a reason to control the lines of
that makes sense. Adding the two “victory” by basically giving both communication as well.
brigades to Pickett’s Charge is an sides reasons to do more than just
interesting experiment. Give it a try! build a fortress. These two conditions work hand in
hand for the Confederate player as
Note that it is a matter beyond the well. Sure he can allocate everything
5.3 Minor Variants scope of the game to state that your
5.3a Let the Cav Fight! Ignore 2.2a to take Cemetery Hill, but failing to
win in play will cause the war itself cut the roads too, because no effort
and 2.2b. Buford’s Cavalry stays in
to go one-way or another. That’s a was made, in combination with a
the battle until 12:00 noon on 2 July.
good subject for your post-game failure to ‘take that hill’ spells a
Remove them on that turn. They’ll
discussions with your opponent— Union win.
do a lot of fighting—which is well
what do the results of our game
beyond their capabilities.
mean in the greater context of the
war? What will happen next and
5.3b Free up Reynolds. Ignore 2.2c
why?
and allow Reynolds to act as an “On
Fire” Army Commander from the
So, to get you aimed in the right
very beginning of the game. There is
(opposite of your opponent’s)
a give and take to this one, you can
direction:
start earlier, but lose the automatic
order to Wadsworth.
The Confederates win if they have
5.3c Iron Brigade Skips Coffee.
Ignore 2.2e and allow the Iron
any Unlimbered Artillery at or
within 4 hexes of N48.46 (The M M P
Cemetery Gate House) at the end of
Brigade to freely join the rest of their Multi-Man Publishing
play. The strength, Morale State, or
division on the march north. This
Ammunition status of the artillery is
will get ugly for Heth.
not a concern.
5.3d The Killer Angels. Replace the
The Union wins if they avoid the
B-rated 20 Maine (3/1/5) with the
Confederate condition and there are
optional A-rated 20 Maine (3/1/5).
no Confederate infantry units in any
Won’t matter in the bigger picture,
hex of the Taneytown Road and the
but might be something some players
Baltimore Pike (south and east of
just will not accept.
Cemetery Hill).
Any other result is a draw.
LoB-02 Rules.indd 8 10/17/13 2:12:28 PM

The Gamers, Inc.
To paraphrase Robert Krick, James In short, the question of Longstreet’s

Historical Longstreet was assailed so violently rapidity of action when given orders
that eventually any criticism of him directly indicates the game’s leader
Notes was off limits. To blame “Old Pete” values his counter should wear, so his
is subject to an accusation of Lost “unit” behaves as it did on those fields.
As always the case, game designers Cause’ism (this is the catch-all phrase
find themselves with limited space for the effort to blame someone—
to write down some thoughts about Timeline: When did
anyone—other than Robert E. Lee for
their subject. They have neither the losing the war). Since this is such a all this happen?
room—nor the qualifications—to contentious subject (as well as being
give a worthy history of the battle in so important), I decided to put my The key to understanding what
question; books on the subjects usually thoughts to paper so you can make an happened between Lee and Longstreet
abound, and never more than on this informed judgment of the assessments can be found in the simple timing
topic. that underlie the ratings in the game. of events. This isn’t as easy as one
might think, given conflicting sources
I have no interest in filling space with Now keep in mind I write as a game and the period’s non-standard time
a 7th Grade Cliff Notes™ version designer, not a historian. A historian measurements. Still, the relative time
of the battle, but I do have some confronted with situation A at one of events can be determined to a great
commentary to give on some of the time, and situation B at a later time, extent.
highly controversial points to explain has the luxury of ignoring how to
my decisions on them. I hope you find connect the two if no sourcing exists. Let’s follow the story…
them interesting and useful. As a game designer, I can’t afford
those gaps. I must give the best On the evening of July 1st, Longstreet
Those that feel “I already know conjecture I can muster based on the joined Lee first on Herr Ridge and later
everything worth knowing about available research, even if doing this moved forward with him to Seminary
Gettysburg” have a comforting twists the gizzard of an academic Ridge. The two discussed options for
simple view of life; I shall not bother historian. Here, I’ll tell you why I did the coming day. Longstreet advocated
disturbing them. They must understand what I did and what conclusions I maneuver, but not the tactical
far more than I do. I most certainly do reached. maneuver around the Round Tops that
not know all the answers… and barely many suggest.
remember the time when I was young Invariably, Lee-Longstreet discussions
enough to believe I did. devolve into a recounting of who- Instead, he preferred a much larger
slandered-who in a magazine article in maneuver south and east, presumably
For those seeking additional 1879 and who made up some “facts” to the Pipe Creek area along the
understanding and know they ‘don’t in a speech in 1881, etc. Tracking Maryland-Pennsylvania border. This
have all the answers’ either, I present the back and forth after the war is would, in theory, place the Confederate
the following for contemplation and not germane to my purpose. I merely army between Meade’s Army of
consideration. need to determine what happened so the Potomac (the main Federal field
I can design a game as accurately as force in the Eastern Theater) and
I remain, Sir, your Ob’t Svt, possible. Laying blame is someone Washington.
Dean else’s job and concern.
Lee would have seen this option as
Lee and Longstreet That said, one post-war myth still impractical—mainly because of the
must be dispelled: there was no Army of Northern Virginia’s lines
“sunrise attack order” issued on the of communication back over South
Longstreet at night of July 1st, 1863. Enough said Mountain and the enormous trains
Gettysburg: The on that; it didn’t happen. Focusing on built up from the foraging effort in
an imaginary “sunrise attack order” Pennsylvania. Shifting this logistical
Third-Rail of the tail, possibly exposing it to Federal
merely distracts from the foot dragging
Civil War that did occur. operations, would be a very risky and
difficult undertaking. On top of this, he
After over 130 years of mud-slinging For my purposes, I must endeavor to would have understood that the Army
and name-calling, an analysis of the cut through the noise and determine of the Potomac was most assuredly
behavior of the senior Confederate the most accurate assessment of going to win any footrace to Pipe
command structure is not only Longstreet’s leadership performance at Creek.
difficult, but is subject to instant Gettysburg.
rejection. Failing to convince Lee to follow his
plan, Longstreet left at dark to meet the

LoB-02 Rules.indd 9 10/17/13 2:12:29 PM

van of his corps and bring it up for the Powell. Interestingly, Mr. Hyde deals the barracks were painted blue,” you
potential battle the next day. with the idea that Johnston reported the had better believe that blue paint will
Federal position as arrayed along the be slung quite soon. The dramatic
Longstreet linked up with his Emmitsburg Road. Hyde maintains that “I order you to” do such and such
corps late that night at Cashtown Johnston did not state it was so. What statement is more a creature of
after moving down the congested is of importance to us is the time of his Hollywood than anything else.
Chambersburg Pike. The head of return. As near as can be determined,
the 1st Corps column (Lafayette this was around 8:30 a.m. Furthermore, it is claimed that Lee
McLaws’ Division) reached Marsh had new corps commanders who
Creek (3 to 4 miles from Gettysburg) Around that time, Lee, Longstreet, were unfamiliar with such a delegated
around midnight, followed by Hood’s Hood, McLaws and Johnston were ordering style. Be that as it may,
Division around 2:00 a.m. Both all together on Seminary Ridge. neither Longstreet nor his divisional
bedded down briefly. McLaws arrayed Leaning over a map, Lee indicated to commanders can plausibly be lumped
his troops off the road while Hood McLaws where his division should in with the new guys.
stayed right along it. McLaws was go. Longstreet, meanwhile, paced
informed he would move out to finish back and forth nearby and then tried I believe that Lee’s “suggestion” was
the march at 4:00 a.m. and made to point out a different orientation for indeed an order and the subsequent
arrangements to get the division ready McLaws, only to be overruled by Lee. movements of units after this was
to do so. Before McLaws set out, he Longstreet tersely denied McLaws given show that all concerned knew so
received word that Hood (still on the permission, twice, to go recon his at the time—even Longstreet.
road) would lead the line of march and route (a wise move on Longstreet’s
that McLaws was to wait until Hood part—the last thing he needed was to Colonel E.P. Alexander (temporary
had passed. Presumably these orders lose an experienced Major General to head of Longstreet’s artillery) was
were from Longstreet. a Union cavalry patrol!). Lee asked given definitive orders to move the
McLaws if he thought he could move corps’ artillery to support the attack at
Hood’s Division reached Seminary to the jump off point unseen by the this time. Longstreet gave Alexander
Ridge and filed south of the pike enemy to which he answered he could. orders in Lee’s presence to scout the
into the area just west of the orchard McLaws, it seemed, was under the area around the Peach Orchard and
containing the army headquarters. mistaken assumption that Johnston had move his artillery over to the right.
McLaws followed Hood in and led his yet to conduct his recon and asked to If Lee was still there when the orders
column almost directly up to the army accompany him. were given, they must have been
HQ. issued before Lee left to see Ewell
Obviously, Lee violated the chain of around 9:00 a.m. Alexander isn’t sure
In the meantime, Lee awoke at command and some might suggest of the time, but he believes he moved
3:00 a.m. and dispatched three that this snub gives Longstreet license his battalion of artillery to Pitzer’s
reconnaissance parties made up from to react the way he did for the rest Schoolhouse and was waiting there for
his staff. Major Charles Venable of the battle. Justified or not, what the corps before 11:00 a.m.
was sent to examine the positions is important for my purposes is that —Alexander, pg 235-236
of Ewell’s Corps to determine the for the next two days Longstreet
possibilities there. Colonel Armistead did not function as even an average Meanwhile, A.P. Hill sent orders to one
Long (possibly with Brigadier General commander of his significance. of his divisions (R.H. Anderson arrayed
Pendleton, Chief of Artillery, tagging along Herr Ridge) to move forward and
along) was sent to look over the Suggestion or relieve the battered division currently
entire line’s artillery positions. Most serving as the right flank of that corps
famously, Captain Samuel Johnston, Order? on Seminary Ridge. Anderson was
engineer, was sent to explore the also given his attack orders for later in
Federal left. Some maintain that Lee’s statement the day. Sources vary as to the time of
to McLaws was a mere “suggestion” these orders, but it seems the division
All three teams headed out by about and not really an order. While, it is true might have started forward from the
4:00 a.m. that Lee’s command style was one of ridge as early as 7:00 a.m., but was
delegation and trusting the execution still moving into position around 11:00
How and why Johnston managed to details to his subordinates and staff, a.m. when its right brigade (Wilcox)
miss the Federal troops in and around anyone with a military background ran into Berdan’s Sharpshooters around
Little Round Top is not a concern here, understands that the commander’s Seminary Ridge. It is more likely that
but has been examined in Bill Hyde’s “wish,” “desire,” or “suggestion” is Anderson received orders later than
article in Gettysburg Magazine #29 an order and must be treated as such. 7:00 a.m., which places his orders in
and also an earlier article by Dave If the CO says “It would be nice if around the same 8:30 to 9:00 a.m.
timeframe as the others.
LoB-02 Rules.indd 10 10/17/13 2:12:29 PM

The Gamers, Inc.
McLaws’ Division had to still hoping to convince Lee to change moving to their assembly areas. It
countermarch back down the his mind. would seem Longstreet had not issued
Chambersburg Pike and then south the final execution orders.
along Herr Ridge Road to be in In my view, all these supporting
a position ready for the attack movements and orders confirm that “At 11:00 a.m., Lee finding his
movement. This movement was Longstreet knew and understood suggestions not being followed issued
followed by what was called a “long that he had orders to move his corps a direct order to get Longstreet to
delay” stopping the column near the to execute an attack in the Peach undertake the operation.”
intersection with the Fairfield Road. Orchard area that were received —Coddington, pg 378
This movement was completed on or between 8:30 and 9:30 a.m. A good
before 10 a.m., meaning orders from estimate being 9:00 a.m., about the Longstreet requested that he wait for
Longstreet for McLaws to do this time Lee left his headquarters. Law’s brigade (then an hour out) before
movement must have originated by 9 moving and Lee agreed. Sometime
a.m. at the latest. Foot Dragging? between noon and 1 p.m. the corps
finally began moving toward the assault
J. B. Polley, in his recollections in All that established, we must examine positions along the Emmitsburg Road.
Hood’s Texas Brigade, states that the time after the initial order’s issue.
Hood’s Division stopped behind Obviously, Longstreet set preliminary The elapsed time between the
Seminary Ridge for about an hour and movements into motion (something original order and the final beginning
a half. At which time, he reports the some have accused him of not doing), of execution is 3 to 4 hours. Lee
division moving about a mile or more but what happened then? authorized one hour of that to wait for
to the “south-east” into a valley where Law. McLaws and Hood needed at least
there was “water and fuel” so they It seems that Longstreet, fresh from an hour to move to the line of departure
could make breakfast. his first—and unspectacular—attempt for the flank march. If Longstreet is
—Polley, pg 154 at independent command (Suffolk) culpable for “foot dragging,” it would
fancied himself a better general and seem that his contribution was between
Obviously, the direction given is in strategist than Lee. Having argued the one and two hours.
error (else, they moved onto Cemetery night before against any sort of attack,
Ridge which is rather doubtful). Longstreet was still questioning Lee’s On face value, this delay is not
More likely they moved back over plan, and now his orders. He was excessive and can be explained as
McPherson’s Ridge into the valley of placing himself not as a subordinate, the possible result of the sluggish
Willoughby Run (water available from but as a second army commander who movement of Anderson’s Division
the run, fuel from Herbst Woods). As was in a position to veto plans he did forward to Seminary Ridge. However,
is the case for McLaws, orders were not approve. Longstreet chose to move the divisions
given to Hood to shift his division to well in back of the line (and then stop
this staging area at around the same Around 9:00 a.m. after issuing them) before beginning the flank
time as all the rest of this is happening. instructions to Longstreet and march (which was its own comedy
Orders, we can assume, originated McLaws, Lee went to see Richard of errors). Moving directly down the
from Longstreet. Ewell (commander of the 2nd Corps) valley west of Seminary Ridge would
and issue him the orders of how he have concealed the column (one of
Hood’s movement here seems to have was supposed to support the attack Lee’s specifications) and allowed the
been ‘cross-country’ which makes (actually, pretty much the same orders troops to get to their jump off points
sense if McLaws was also moving he gave Ewell the night before: he for the assault. The time saved by the
back and blocking the Chambersburg would demonstrate against the Union shorter march is important. Doing this,
Pike at that same time. right when he heard Longstreet’s Longstreet’s divisions would have been
attack against their left, and to ready to assault between noon and 1:00
Readers should take note that where translate that into a real attack if the p.m. (even with the “foot dragging”),
the 1st Corps divisions ended up opportunity presented itself). These not at some point in the rear ready to
they could either begin a circuitous orders dictated what Ewell was to do start a flank march that would use up
march to Warfield Ridge or launch for the rest of the day. Ewell executed another 3 hours (counting the time
a movement around the Federal left those orders as given. then still needed to deploy from march
to interpose between Meade and column into the assault formations).
Washington. Conjecture, to be sure, When Lee returned to his HQ a little
but the fact that they were sent there after 10:00 a.m., he found Longstreet Again, Anderson’s movement is a
and then halted while Longstreet still there. Alexander and the infantry major limitation here. While Longstreet
remained on Seminary Ridge to await divisions were—or had finished— could have shot his divisions southward
Lee’s return suggests Longstreet was along the back of the ridge, he would

LoB-02 Rules.indd 11 10/17/13 2:12:29 PM

have done so in front of Anderson’s was discovered that the Peach Orchard in front and wanted to maintain that
advance (risking more confusion), was occupied by Union troops). None honor, Longstreet allowed this, and the
marching back allowed Anderson to of these decisions show the mark of countermarch began—wasting more
clear Herr Ridge and be “in front” an experienced corps commander time.
of Longstreet’s divisions as they giving his chief’s plan the maximum
proceeded south. However, the fact chance of success. Longstreet would Finally, approaching the Federal line at
that Longstreet (trying to protect his have been well aware of the jaded the Peach Orchard (sometime around
reputation for the next 40 years) never condition of Law’s men. He did not 3:00 p.m.), Longstreet brusquely rode
made the case that he was waiting for handle them in a way that showed that up to McLaws and again declined the
Anderson to pass is telling. understanding. If Hood made these division commander’s request to make
decisions (and he was experienced a reconnaissance. McLaws stated he
So, while we have a relatively minor enough to consider these matters didn’t know what was to his front.
time delay (1-2 hours), we also have himself), Longstreet would have Longstreet brushed this aside, saying
command choices (where to go, how both known and was in a position to there was nothing to his front and
to do it) that added another 3 hours. over-rule them to improve the corps’ demanded to know how McLaws was
The combined delay of 4-5 hours (not efficiency. going to deploy. McLaws laid out what
counting the authorized hour to wait he thought he would do (still feeling
for Law’s Brigade) is significant and Apparently upset by Lee jumping he was advancing blind). Longstreet
must be laid at Longstreet’s feet. the normal chain-of-command, to responded, “That suits me,” and rode
give instructions to McLaws, and off.
Sloppy Execution— still sulking about receiving a direct
order to accomplish a task he did Longstreet’s handling of the march,
Two Days Running not feel was right, Longstreet made his ordering (multiple times) McLaws
the unpardonable decision to place to blindly attack to his front, and his
Longstreet’s performance, recounted authority for the march of his corps refusal to attempt to find out the real
above, was indeed slow (regardless of in the hands of Captain Johnston situation once they arrived, were all
the exact reason). But relative speed (who was blissfully unaware of his egregious errors. Then, after forcing
is just one indicator of a leader’s new role as demi-corps commander). McLaws to gear up for a frontal assault
quality. Once a leader starts to follow Longstreet chose to ride in the middle on the fly, he stopped him and told
orders, the choices he makes in how of the column at the head of Hood’s McLaws to wait for Hood.
to accomplish the tasks assigned must Division. Longstreet’s post-war excuse
also be integrated into any assessment. was that since McLaws was under Longstreet hurried Hood’s men to the
There are a number of choices from Lee’s orders, he (Longstreet) was no right of McLaws’ position.
both the 2nd and 3rd of July that show longer responsible for the division’s
Longstreet ineffectively executing (or movements (but that a mere captain Once he extended his division to the
possibly even actively shirking) his was) defies belief. Johnston was right, Hood sent out scouts further
duties. sent as a guide, not as a commander. beyond his flank. Finding nothing
That somehow the experienced there, he requested permission four
Longstreet’s handling of Law’s Longstreet was confused about the times to extend his flank further right.
Brigade is flawed in a number of command relationship within his Longstreet denied all these requests
ways. Requesting permission to await corps (something he should have citing Lee’s orders. Hood finally
Law’s arrival is one thing, holding been experienced enough to clarify gave up the argument and proceeded
up the entire corps’ movement is with Lee before setting out) or (and to attack “under protest.” I’ll leave
another. Law could have just as easily seemingly more likely) the man was interpretation of this suddenly narrow-
linked up with his division on the pouting after having his viewpoint minded viewpoint regarding precisely
move to the attack position. Next turned down and his feelings bruised following the commanding general’s
is the decision to have Law on the indicate neither a particularly orders to Robert Krick who concluded
furthest right of Hood’s Division. excellent, nor energetic, leader. Longstreet was going to do Lee’s plan
Simply putting him on the right of the exactly the way Lee wanted it so as to
division instead of the left made their The now leaderless corps marched “teach the old man a lesson.”
march all the further by forcing them to a small ridge just south of Black
to continue their march for the extra Horse Tavern and stopped, unable Around 4:00 p.m., Hood launched
length of the entire division’s column. to determine how to proceed his assault and was promptly
Law’s exhausted men were then unobserved. Longstreet eventually wounded. Evander Law, now division
eventually placed in the lead wave of rode up to the head of the column commander, was not aware of his
the division, instead of in a supporting and ordered Hood to take the lead. increased responsibilities and allowed
role (as the plan was modified when it When McLaws objected that he was the division to disperse into multiple
directions.
LoB-02 Rules.indd 12 10/17/13 2:12:30 PM

The Gamers, Inc.
Longstreet, by this time, was over divisions with brigades from another. the eventual outcome of the attack.
with McLaws holding him back Ewell was ready to attack at dawn, But it does offer more insight into the
from attacking until the situation was but was pre-empted by a Federal performance he rendered at the battle.
right. It is unknown if he was aware counterattack.
that Hood’s Division was careening Coordination between the two
without a rudder. If he was, he Aware of his orders (yet later claiming corps was almost non-existent. The
made no effort to re-coordinate the he had none), Longstreet issued no instructions to the two sets of artillery
attack. Eventually, around 5 o’clock, instructions to bring Pickett’s Division were different. No objection was made
Longstreet unleashed McLaws’ men. forward, but instead ordered McLaws’ to the selection of the 3rd Corps units
Division to disengage (which being used—those chosen were picked
Personally brave, Longstreet advanced Longstreet later denied doing) and because they happened to be in that
partway with Kershaw’s Brigade, to sent out scouts to determine a way location and ignored other fresher
observe and be seen by the men. A around the Round Tops to strike at the units. Marching instructions were
corps commander’s effect on a battle Federal left. minimal and the right guides of the 3rd
in progress is limited. He could do Corps only discovered that the infantry
little besides direct reinforcements and There is speculation that Longstreet assault had begun when they noticed
provide a calm example. This he did. did bring Pickett forward in Pickett’s left racing out ahead of them.
preparation to execute a flank march,
Meanwhile, the troops and subordinate but then had to march Pickett back As far is known, no clear objective was
commanders under Hood and McLaws to the launch point for the later passed down to lower commanders.
ripped the Federal lines to shreds and attack—causing Pickett to complain The “clump of trees” being something
effectively destroyed one Federal corps about being “jerked around” (not Bachelder suggested to Alexander in
and savaged divisions of two others. his words…) that morning—but the 1880’s with an eye toward publicity
without Pickett’s official report, and advertising. Alexander’s confusion
Supporting this attack was Anderson’s and no mention of such a move by came about because Ziegler’s Grove
Division, 3rd Corps, next in line to the Longstreet, there is no way to ever (probably the real target trees) had
north. What—if any—coordination determine if such a movement was been felled and the copse—small trees
Longstreet did with Anderson (or A.P. ever made at all. at the time of the battle—had grown to
Hill, Anderson’s corps commander) full size. Regardless, both the “copse”
is unknown. Possibly influencing this Lee rode up at dawn to determine why and Ziegler’s Grove aligned directly
lack of coordination was Longstreet’s the attack had not begun and ordered with Pickett’s starting point and
cold relationship with Hill—they were Longstreet to cease preparations for a Cemetery Hill (key to the entire Union
barely on speaking terms (due to a spat flanking maneuver and to prepare for line). Some have speculated that the
regarding newspaper coverage during the attack that would become known actual target of the attack was that hill.
the Seven Days’ Battles the year as Pickett’s Charge.
before). Longstreet did, however, order But Longstreet’s most egregious
Wilcox’s Brigade (under Anderson) Lee’s plan for a coordinated pair error was shifting the responsibility
to “incline to the right” so as to avoid of attacks on both flanks at dawn to Alexander for determining the
observation by the enemy. was willfully ignored. Longstreet effectiveness of the artillery barrage
—Black to Bachelder, enthusiasts would point at this, given and the decision to send the infantry
Bachelder Papers, pg 1241 what happened later in the day, as an in. As with the day before, Longstreet
example of Longstreet providing Lee shirked his responsibility as a corps
On the night of July 2nd to 3rd, 1863, with a better alternative. These same commander and was willing to let
Longstreet failed to report to Lee fans miss the point that Longstreet’s someone else—both times of much
to discuss the day’s fighting and loose cannon behavior eliminated the lower rank—do the heavy lifting. This
get orders for the next day. As he planned coordinated attacks on the was unpardonable.
customarily did report back, this was Federal flanks and set the stage for the
especially odd behavior. Nonetheless single-direction action that happened Finally, when the time came to order
Lee’s orders to resume the attack later. the attack, Longstreet perched on his
(at dawn) were issued and somehow fence rail merely nodded his head to
made it to Longstreet’s HQ. Alexander Chastised for the second day in a Pickett and watched the attack go in.
reported to HQ late that night and was row, Longstreet was put in charge of He, again, made no effort to coordinate
told the attack would resume at dawn one of the most complex attacks ever movements or provide support from
and to arrange his guns accordingly. executed by the Army of Northern either infantry or artillery. Would it
He did the best he could in the dark. Virginia and the only one attempted have changed the result? No. But it
Ewell also received his instructions which crossed corps boundaries. He was his duty to do everything in his
and heavily reinforced one of his failed miserably. His failure would power to give it the best shot possible.
probably not have had any effect on

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All these examples show a something has not gone to suit him. was a “below average commander”
commander failing to effectively lead When anything has gone wrong, he at Gettysburg and I have rated him as
and control the magnificent troops does not say much, but merely looks such. I believe this is a fair assessment
under his command. grim. given the available evidence of his
—Goree, pg 60, emphasis performance.
An Assessment: added
Longstreet at Robert E. Lee

Only four days after the battle, 7 July
Gettysburg 1863, McLaws wrote to his wife: A common reaction to my analysis of
Longstreet’s performance above is to
As Longstreet said himself in a letter General Longstreet is to blame for think I’m making an apology for Lee’s
to his uncle dated 24 July 1863: not reconnoitering the ground and for as army commander. The creation (or
persisting in ordering the [2nd day’s] assailing) of The Marble Man is not
I consider it a part of my duty to assault when errors were discovered. germane to getting a proper perspective
express my views to the commanding During the engagement he was very of the leadership of either man at
general. If he approves and adopts excited, giving contrary orders to every this battle. Each had specific duties
them, it is well; if he does not, it is my one, and was exceedingly overbearing. and performed them as the historical
duty to adopt his views and to execute I consider him a humbug, a man of record indicates. As army commander,
his orders as faithfully as if they were small capacity, very obstinate, not at Lee is ultimately responsible for his
my own. all chivalrous, exceedingly conceited, subordinate’s actions. He obviously
and totally selfish. understood this and did all he could to
http://www.gdg.org/Research/People/ —Oeffinger, A Soldier’s General: The ensure that the battle’s outcome was
Longstreet/shlong1.html Civil War Letters of Major General seen as “all my fault” in his statements
Lafayette McLaws, pg 195-197 at the time, his official report, and
He certainly wasn’t hesitant to express his offer to resign his command soon
his views, but he did not execute Some try to claim that McLaws wrote afterwards.
orders as faithfully as if they were this to respond to potential public
his own. This occurred on both of the criticism of his own performance at All that is true, but simply because
days of Gettysburg where he and his the battle. They do, however, avoid Lee is responsible for the actions
troops were directly involved. telling us how a private letter to his of his army does not mean that his
wife only revealed after the war subordinates did not screw-up or fail in
As his aide Colonel Moxley Sorrel would accomplish this feat, or how their own responsibilities. Subordinates
stated in At the Right Hand of it is McLaws thought to dwell on in military organizations fail all the
Longstreet, speaking of the boss he newspaper coverage three days after time; commanders simply cannot make
loved at Gettysburg: this historic blood-letting. In my them mistake free. A good commander
humble opinion, he was venting his supervises within reason, corrects
[He] failed to conceal some anger. true feelings to the one person on earth when and where he can, and provides
There was apparent apathy in his he could trust to keep them private. The an operational vision, allocation of
movements. They lacked the fire and wounds were too open—too raw—for assets, and order framework that
point of his usual bearing on the nuanced public relations. allows the subordinate the best chance
battlefield. of success—even where actual success
—Sorrel, pg 167 Regardless of the stones cast upon isn’t physically possible, such as
him unfairly in later years (or for that during Pickett’s Charge.
Or the description by another staff matter, the half-truths he generated to
member, Captain T.J. Goree in defend himself), James Longstreet’s My demonstration of Longstreet’s
Longstreet’s Aide: The Civil War command performance at Gettysburg shortcomings has nothing to do with
Letters of Major Thomas J. Goree was sluggish and lacking the “fire” of excusing Lee from his command
(writing to his mother at a time before energetic execution (as Sorrel put it). responsibilities. It determines
the Battle of Gettysburg): Whether McLaws’ assessment was Longstreet’s abilities as shown in the
correct about the man over-all is for battle so that the game can match them.
…he is some days very sociable and others to debate, but in this designer’s No more, no less.
agreeable, then again for a few days opinion he accurately described the
he will confine himself mostly to his officer at the helm of 1st Corps, Army One feature that clouds assessing Lee
room or tent, without having much of Northern Virginia on the three days at the battle is his command style. He
to say to anyone, and is as grim as that matter here. was typically a hands-off commander
you please, though, when this is the who would give general instructions
case, he is either not very well or I can only conclude that Longstreet
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The Gamers, Inc.
and leave the execution and details was the general rule for these men, it. This became critical by the late
to his subordinates. A forerunner Henry Heth was a notable exception. afternoon of July 2nd. Taking a more
of mission-type order systems as direct charge of unfolding events such
promoted by the German General True staff training had not yet been that Anderson deployed his whole
Staff in the late 1800’s, but without developed, so none of them had such strength or that Pender was able to
the highly trained professional staff a background. There was nothing launch was absolutely critical. Such
officers and procedures needed to Lee could have done to implement actions on Lee’s part would have
implement it successfully. In many a true general staff of the sort the brought Ewell into the battle earlier
cases, this ad hoc decentralized Germans developed—such a thing did and perhaps allowed his army to carry
command structure accomplished not exist—nor could he draw on the Cemetery Hill.
what would not have been possible aristocratic staff tradition available in
otherwise as competent leaders Europe as a substitute. Some might say he should have done
on the ground can react faster to this on the afternoon of the 1st day.
changing circumstances, but the Lee’s staff was extremely limited and I’d suggest he did what he could, but
cost of such a command system is simply incapable of the job they were that the shortcomings that evening—
always an accepted level of imperfect tasked to do. Lee can be personally critical as they look to us—were
coordination and a greater risk of faulted for not supplementing his his first warnings that a change was
the subordinates making mistaken tiny staff with additional experienced needed. It’s unfair to expect him to
choices. officers. Such an expansion was peer into the future and “just realize”
proposed, but was not done because that the command system he had used
Any commander’s leadership style he wanted to keep good officers in so successfully so far was failing
must strike a balance between their combat commands. before something did fail. But all
centralized planning (generally the indications were there by the
sluggish and rigid, but with overall So, what is my assessment of Lee at time he was embroiled in extended
coordination maximized) and Gettysburg? arguments with his sullen senior corps
unbridled decentralization (rapid commander in the early hours of the
reaction to local circumstances First, I believe it severely short- 2nd day. By the time the assault in the
but with inherent confusion and circuits analysis when one afternoon began to fall apart, it may
only that coordination allowed by automatically assigns good and bad have been too late to recognize and
happenstance). Lee was far closer to to a commander’s style simply based implement the needed changes. That
the latter than the former. on a battle’s results. Lee’s hands-off still gave him a window of some hours
style is criticized because he lost, to determine that something was very
Furthermore, such decentralized while Meade’s ‘running about like wrong and to take steps to correct it.
execution requires both subordinate a wet hen’ (to quote the Duke of
leaders of training and quality levels Wellington) is lauded because he won. He was doubly at fault in that he did
high enough to handle independent What would have been the opinion of not make this adaption in time for the
responsibilities and adequately trained historians had the Confederates won? planned early morning attack on the
staff support so that confusion in order That’s right, Lee’s approach would 3rd day. It was probably too late at that
formatting and wording is minimized. be written of as genius and Meade a point for the change to have worked
For the Germans, their highly trained goat. Obviously, this type of analysis in terms of winning the battle, but
staff officers ensured a kind of ‘group simply cannot objectively examine the a better performance that morning
think’ that allowed them to coordinate merits of either style. would have resulted from the then
without communications because one embarrassingly needed additional
staff officer knew what his counterpart Both styles have their place and the command and control.
in the adjacent army would be best commanders mix them as the
advising his commander. situation requires. But such flexibility Lee finally determined that a tighter
is limited by both the commander’s hand on the reins was needed upon
Nearly all of Lee’s subordinates personality and the army’s character. finding Longstreet preparing for an
had training at both West Point (or unauthorized flank march rather than
other military academies, such as In this battle’s case, Lee’s hands- the attack that was ordered early on
VMI) and junior to mid-level officer off style came back to bite him July 3rd. At that point, Ewell’s Corps
experiences in the pre-war army. because one corps commander was was already embroiled in fighting.
They all had relatively extensive incapable of functioning (Hill) and Even then—despite being active with
combat experience at multiple levels another was seemingly unwilling to Longstreet through the morning in
of command. While some might be in function (Longstreet). Lee was unable establishing the assault plans—much
new—higher—positions, even they or unwilling to drastically change was left unprepared and, obviously,
had experience in the field. While that his style when the crisis demanded the additional direct control was

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nowhere near the level required to there is “easy” enough—put Hill on 1st and deployed on Knoxlyn
execute the replacement plan that some sort of sick leave and place the Ridge to await morning.
eventually became the fiasco of corps temporarily under the ranking 2) On arrival, McLaws turned
Pickett’s Charge. Major General. This would have been right on Herr Ridge and
R.H. Anderson, unless even more stopped his lead elements near
So, you have an outstanding military disruption is accepted by reaching into the Fairfield Road.
commander (no argument there, he other corps for officers. Anderson’s 3) Hood, arriving next, also turned
caused a larger army to withdraw performance was lackluster anyway, right on the Herr Ridge road
from the gates of his capital, and went so it may not be possible to salvage stopping north of McLaws.
on to beat back all comers with an Hill’s Corps. Dorsey Pender was just
army on a shoestring) faced with an promoted on May 27th, so he is not All three are wrong.
almost unthinkable problem: in the getting the job.
midst of what he knew was the battle First, Anderson’s bivouac site.
that might decide the war, he needed Longstreet’s churlish behavior is
to recognize that the situation required puzzling and probably caught Lee Upon approaching Gettysburg, I was
him to greatly change his heretofore by surprise. Replacing him on the directed to occupy the position in line
successful style of command to one ill field is not an option. Lee’s only real of battle which had just been vacated
suited and unaccustomed to himself, choice would be to ride herd on the by Pender’s Division, and to place one
his staff, and his subordinates. man throughout the battle to ensure brigade and a battery of artillery a
He needed to recognize this need, that 1st Corps acted as desired. In mile or more on the right of the line, in
determine the best way to adjust, and this, Lee made a mistake. He chose a direction at right angles with it and
implement that change in an effective to ride herd on Hill, instead, and was facing to the right.
manner in a matter of hours. And, he not willing to take the reins from him — R.H. Anderson’s OR Report vol
needed to do this knowing that his when Hill simply could not do the job. 27 part 2 [emphasis added]
subordinates’ freedom to act—a key Longstreet was left to his own devices
reason for his success so far—would with disastrous results. Anderson arrived in the late afternoon of
have to be sacrificed. the 1st. The only location that had just
That was Lee’s fault. been vacated by Pender at that time
Personally, I do not know that such was Herr Ridge. Pender’s Division did
a pivot is possible at the head of an R.H. Anderson, originally deploy on Knoxlyn Ridge,
organization as large and complex as but moved forward to Herr Ridge much
a 19th century army in the midst of a McLaws, and earlier in the day before being stopped
major battle. Hood’s Divisional by a direct order from A.P. Hill. Pender
stayed on Herr Ridge until the afternoon
Was Robert E. Lee responsible for the Arrivals assault began. To Anderson’s eyes, the
Army of Northern Virginia’s failure only place of note regarding Pender was
at the Battle of Gettysburg? Yes, as I used information in my Longstreet Herr Ridge.
commander, he was. Was it his fault? assessment that was unsnarled from
That’s a very different question. a confused narrative regarding the Harry Pfanz came to this same
Myriad failures generated the arrival of the above divisions. The conclusion in his monumental study of
Confederate loss on that field. Robert un-inquisitive might leap at the most the 2nd day:
E. Lee’s fault is that he was unable to common version available and not
stop enough of them to allow his army even notice the inconsistencies. The When Anderson’s Division reached the
to prevail overall. seemingly unimportant details of approaches to Gettysburg, Hill ordered
these movements helps to flesh out Anderson to deploy four of his brigades
The greatest failure crippling the a better narrative of what happened on Herr Ridge. Pender’s Division had
Army of Northern Virginia was the on the morning of July 2nd and point vacated this high ground a short time
effective collapse of the linkage to certain critical matters involving before when Hill sent it forward into the
between Lee’s will and the actions of Longstreet and the orders he was attack.
his divisions at the highest levels. given — Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second
Day, pg 21
Hill’s incapacitation should not have Conventional wisdom —statements
come as a great surprise; he was “ill” repeated often enough that they
regularly. Lee would have known become accepted as fact—goes as
early on the morning of July 1st that follows:
Little Powell was unable to function
properly. Egos aside, the solution 1) Anderson arrived on the
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The Gamers, Inc.
So what is the origin of the idea that As for McLaws’ approach march, we Contradicting this is:
Anderson spent the night on Knoxlyn have this sort of confusion coming
Ridge? First, we have two reports of from historians: At the head of McLaws’ Division
his distance to the rear: I arrived in front of Gettysburg,
…The division commander [McLaws] about one half hour after sunrise on
[Anderson’s Division was] some 2 had ridden in advance of his troops, the morning of 2d of July 1863. We
miles to the rear of the battleground. who were halted in a lengthy column debouched from the main road by a by-
— A.P. Hill’s OR Report along the Chambersburg Pike. road that traversed an open common
for a few hundred yards, and there
…about 2 or 3 miles from Gettysburg, …With the instructions given, McLaws halted, the head of the column having
where they remained until next returned to his command, which he reached the mouth of a lane which the
morning… had posted along Herr Ridge, roughly road entered at Hoss’ [sic, Haas] house.
— A.R. Wright’s OR Report a mile and a half west of Seminary —Joseph Kershaw, letter to Bachelder,
Ridge. 20 March 1876 Bachelder pg 453
Read the right way and from the right
starting point both of these reports …The time was approximately nine But note that Kershaw (commander
could be interpreted to mean Knoxlyn o’clock when McLaws headed back to of McLaws’ lead brigade) adds no
Ridge. Herr Ridge is a little less than 2 start his division for Herr Ridge. information between arriving in front
miles from Gettysburg’s town square. —All of these on pg 264 of General of Gettysburg and debouching from
Knoxlyn Ridge is around 3 miles James Longstreet by Jeffery Wert, the main road. He does not state where
from the same place. Measuring from in the order given above [emphasis “in front of Gettysburg” he arrived,
something like McPherson’s Ridge or added] nor does he include the direction of the
the “edge” of Gettysburg changes the debouchment. This was also written
meaning completely. Both of these But a very clear statement coming 13 years after the battle without the
reports are ambiguous because of the from the division commander himself: assistance of his own official report.
unexplained starting point.
The march was continued at a very He did say in his official report:
Furthermore, Bachelder placed the early hour, and my command reached
division on Knoxlyn Ridge on his the hill overlooking Gettysburg early We reached the hill overlooking
troop movement maps. I believe this in the morning. Just after I arrived Gettysburg, with only a slight detention
was the result of applying Anderson’s General Lee sent for me—as the head from the trains in the way, and moved
“just vacated” notation but not of my column was halted within a to the right of Third Corps, and were
ascribing the full meaning to the “just” hundred yards of where he was—and halted until about noon.
part of that statement. I went at once and reported. —Joseph Kershaw, OR Report
—Lafayette McLaws, “Gettysburg,”
Placing Anderson on Herr Ridge SHSP vol 7 pg 68 [emphasis added] So, here he arrives specifically at “the
has serious ramifications regarding hill overlooking Gettysburg” (again,
the arrival of the two divisions of 1st Since before McLaws’ Division that is Seminary Ridge). The rather
Corps. arrived, Lee was on or near the cribbed sentence construction of the
Seminary grounds on Seminary Ridge. linking “ands” leads me to believe he
McLaws is therefore stating that the was actually saying he 1) arrived at
van of his division stopped on the the hill overlooking Gettysburg, then
Chambersburg Pike just shy of the 2) moved to the right of Third Corps
army HQ on the west side of Seminary and then 3) halted until about noon. In
Ridge. Likewise, there is only one other words, he was describing three
“hill overlooking Gettysburg” in the sequential activities.
direction these troops are arriving
from, and that is Seminary Ridge. A bit of indirect evidence that McLaws
was accurate comes from the above
M M P discussion of Anderson’s location.

Having McLaws move in column down
Herr Ridge right after dawn would
Multi-Man Publishing commingle the two divisions in a way
that would cause great confusion.
Anderson would not have left the
ridge until several hours after McLaws
arrived. No experienced divisional

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commander would have set his movement (about an hour and a half
division on top of another in so later) cross-country about a mile or Richard Ewell
small an area. The risk would be too so to a valley with fuel and water
great. Additionally, no one in either works well. McLaws would have Second only to Longstreet in the post-
division reported the two divisions had to countermarch back up the war carnival of blame is Richard S.
having to work through each pike to turn down Herr Ridge while Ewell, the one-legged commander of
other that morning. Furthermore, Hood moved cross-country just 2nd Corps.
McLaws was following orders to south of the pike to occupy the area
report directly to Longstreet. No one just west of Willoughby Run near Here again, conventional wisdom
suggested—or ordered him—to put Herbst Woods. All of this happens wreaks havoc and prevents many
his division in battle-line a couple of while Anderson moves off Herr readers from seeing through its murk.
miles to the rear. Ridge to the southeast to relieve As conventional wisdom would have
Heth’s Division. This keeps all three it, a newly married, recently crippled,
So, we must have McLaws moving divisions from mixing. Richard Ewell took an unsteady
to Seminary Ridge first and later command of Jackson’s old corps and
moving to Herr Ridge to start the … Hood’s Division followed its was indecisive at best. The assumption
flank march. commander toward Gettysburg by being he lost “something” of his
way of the Chambersburg Pike and character and leadership with that leg
Lastly, the matter of Hood coming filed into the fields west of Seminary and marriage, becoming much more
on to Herr Ridge closer to the Ridge, where its men stacked tentative in his decisions.
Chambersburg Pike than McLaws. arms and fell out to rest. McLaws’
Division followed Hood’s, and its Upon taking the town of Gettysburg,
The conventional wisdom here is that van got as close as a hundred yards he was supposedly gripped both by
McLaws arrived and marched down to General Lee’s observation point this indecision and an order from Lee
Herr Ridge and Hood followed him before it halted. to “avoid a general engagement.”
so that he filled in the area between — Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Lastly, Lee’s use of the phrase “if
the rear of McLaws and the pike. Second Day, pg 110 possible” and “if practicable” in his
This is demonstrably wrong. It is orders to take Cemetery Hill the first
quite clear from a number of reports I believe Pfanz has the situation here night was “unfamiliar” to this new
that Hood actually marched toward described accurately. Both Hood and corps commander who was so used to
Gettysburg first that morning. It is McLaws were under orders to report Jackson’s authoritarian methods and
true that McLaws led the march from to Longstreet as quickly as feasible. orders.
Chambersburg, but the divisional Neither received any orders that
march order was changed in the morning to park on a ridge several The result, so goes conventional
pre-dawn hours such that Hood was miles away. The divisions would wisdom, is that he could not decide
in front. If the conventional wisdom have behaved as Pfanz notes. what to do and ended up failing to
were correct, Hood would have been decide what is obvious in hindsight—
the division furthest south on that That said, it requires some conjecture and the only chance to take Cemetery
ridge. to fill in the blanks regarding Hill faded away.
the movement from these initial
Worse than the problem with locations to the Herr Ridge jump off When I first began this project, I had no
McLaws and Anderson mixing on points at mid-day. Other than Polley, issues with that particular conventional
Herr Ridge, to follow the convoluted no one recorded any “preparatory” storyline (as opposed to Longstreet and
logic of the conventional wisdom, marching. However, given the Lee, where the activities of each officer
you have Hood arriving and stopping known locations, there is only one seemed at odds with conventional
at the northern end of Herr Ridge way to reconcile the matter. That is assessments). Ewell and his corps
(on top of part of Anderson) and what I have outlined earlier. These seemed passive and of limited import
then McLaws marching through the movements, and their sequencing, compared to the more interesting tales
middle of both of these divisions to is critical to understanding when of the battle involving the fighting on,
occupy the southern part of the ridge. Longstreet received his orders and south of, Cemetery Ridge into the
Now you have three divisions piled and what he did with his corps Round Tops. To be honest, few give the
on top of each other in a small space. afterwards. actions around Culp’s Hill more than a
passing look. I know I did not.
Polley’s description above placing
Hood in the field just south of the M M P That changed rapidly. As a friend
Chambersburg Pike on the west side stated: “Ewell becomes the one-eyed
Multi-Man Publishing
of Seminary Ridge and subsequent man in a room full of blind men.”
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The Gamers, Inc.
Let’s look at what actually happened. Walter Taylor, to go to General Ewell In both cases, described in great detail
and tell him “it was only necessary to later by both Taylor and Smith, the
First, the brand new “indecisive” press ‘those people’ in order to secure words “if practicable” or “if possible”
Ewell used his bold decisions and the possession of the heights south of are used but not the conventionally
daring to win the Second Battle of town” with an admonition to do so “if attributed admonition to “avoid a
Winchester in his first days as a practicable”. Taylor rode off to find general engagement”.
corps commander. The battle has Ewell in the town square (probably
been called “one of the most perfect right around 5:00 p.m.), delivered the The wording choices here are important.
pieces of work the Army of Northern order and believed it to be understood
Virginia ever did” (Maj. Robert and that it would be executed. The first one (practicable or possible)
Stites). If even partially true, this is is also one of the pillars upon which
high praise indeed. Taylor delivered Lee’s order just the “indecisive” and “not used to Lee’s
before Early and Rodes arrived to style” arguments rest. The phrase is used
With an order in his pocket from discuss the situation with Ewell (and to suggest that the order was optional,
Lee telling him to “avoid a general convince him they needed support dependent upon the result of some sort
engagement” and word from A.P. to accomplish anything). Early of reflection on its possibility. That
Hill regarding a concentration at suggested Ewell request help from interpretation rests on removing the
Gettysburg, Ewell decided on the Lee; Ewell liked the idea. With the phrase from its historical context. It
morning of 1 July 1863 to turn his corps leader endorsing the idea to was then a common condition applied
corps toward Gettysburg—instead stop, reform, and then attack when to discussions among gentlemen
of the safe bet, Cashtown, arguably support was provided, Rodes rode recognizing respect for the other’s
Lee’s preferred choice. back to his division and found them status. It was not unusual in Lee’s
in the process of stepping off on orders any more than the common—
Once on the ground, he observed their own hook to attack the hill. subordinating—valedictions used in
the positions of the Union defense He stopped them in their tracks. letters of the time.
lines and A.P. Hill’s troops, correctly Two of his brigade commanders,
identified the opportunity, ignored the O’Neal (who wanted to redeem Confusing the issue even more is
“no general engagement” restriction himself for his earlier mistakes) and the insertion of “avoiding a general
and immediately sent orders to both Doles (who had helped rip apart 11th engagement” into the argument. Neither
Rodes and Early on his own initiative Corps with little loss) were aghast man delivering these orders stated that
to attack. His corps proceeded to be and vehemently argued the case to this phrase was part of the message
the key element of the immensely continue. The increasingly ill Rodes relayed to Ewell.
successful Confederate attack that would not allow them.
day, where four divisions of the Rebel It’s origin? One phrase contained in
army virtually destroyed two Union Ewell sent an aide (James P. Smith) R.E. Lee’s official after action report.
corps (one of which being arguably to Lee requesting the desired support. The conventional wisdom goes that
the Army of the Potomac’s finest, Lee told Smith he would give what Ewell was throttled and confused by
while the other is typically written off support he could and issued orders that requirement. The argument is used
as its worst). for Hill’s artillery to deploy on (along with ‘if practicable’) to also
Seminary Ridge in order to fire upon illustrate the conventional image of a
Taking the town, both his divisional Cemetery Hill. These orders were confused, indecisive, and ‘in a mental
commanders expressed the viewpoint not implemented by Lee’s chief of fog’ Lee.
(which many believe was in error) artillery William Pendleton (who, not
that their troops were in no condition surprisingly, joined Early after the The problem is that these orders did not
to continue the assault onto Cemetery war in the witch-hunt to find someone contain this warning.
Hill without additional support. These else to blame for the loss). Pendleton
were both very aggressive officers; if placed the artillery, in park, behind It was in the orders Ewell had earlier
they had reason to believe going on Seminary Ridge and they were not that morning. Orders that Ewell—
without support was impossible, it deployed pursuant to Lee’s orders that correctly—ignored when he saw the
carried great weight. Ewell decided on day. incredible opportunity presenting
their best counsel to stop long enough itself from Oak Hill. That somehow
to re-organize. Lee then told Smith essentially the he managed to ignore that restriction
same order he sent to Ewell with (demonstrably in his hands) and opened
Meanwhile, A.P. Hill convinced Major Taylor: “to take Cemetery Hill a general engagement at 2:00 p.m. or so,
Lee that his corps was incapable if it were possible”. Smith returned to but was completely stymied by the same
of additional combat that day. Lee Ewell with these orders. idea (which evidence indicates was not
summoned a staff officer, Major reiterated) at 5:00 p.m. is illogical.

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Hanging their opinion strictly on Cemetery Hill. Lee met with Ewell and Ewell must have also felt that
one phrase in Lee’s report, historians and his division commanders around holding Johnson in his current
ignore the personal accounts of the 6:30 p.m. to discuss the corps’ position (just south of the Hanover
two men who actually carried the options. Lee did not repeat his order Road) would be necessary.
orders. regarding the capture of Cemetery
Hill (they must have convinced him, That being the state of affairs, he
“Why is it, then, in Lee’s report?” too, that it was not possible), but he made two decisions students of
they’ll say. Lee, and his military did instruct them to capture Culp’s the battle will forever question.
secretary Charles Marshall, carefully Hill with Johnson’s newly arriving First, he called off the attack on
crafted the report to protect his division. Ewell issued orders to Cemetery Hill (to which Lee
subordinates from public blame Johnson to do so. belatedly concurred). Second, he
for the defeat. Lee struck out entire held Johnson’s Division in place
sections Marshall felt were vital Three events conspired to make that to guard against the possibility
to the understanding of the battle operation misfire, too. of a Union attack in the morning.
(Pickett’s entire official report was Without hindsight, both are arguably
ordered destroyed). Every word was First, upon returning to his reasonable and prudent.
chosen with great deliberation. Lee headquarters, Lee changed his mind
attempted to ensure that he alone was and sent Ewell orders to prepare Whether the hyper-aggressive
deemed at fault. to pull his corps back to the west Jackson would have done so in
to be in line with the rest of the Ewell’s place is irrelevant (except
The assignment of the phrase into army on Seminary Ridge. Ewell that in a similar condition at
those later orders is not supported went to army headquarters to argue Chancellorsville, Jackson did halt
by the evidence and ridiculous in the idea and Lee reversed himself an advance to reform his troops).
light of the day’s events. To state countermanding the second set of What we do know is that since the
that he first committed to a general orders. morning of July 1st, Ewell made
engagement, but was then suddenly four key decisions: he turned toward
frozen by that earlier admonition Second, Ewell’s orders to Johnson Gettysburg rather than continue on
after a major victory is laughable. specified to attack the hill only if to Cashtown, he attacked with Rodes
His other actions that day are at the hill was “unoccupied.” Johnson, and Early, he decided not to attack
odds with the conventional wisdom, who was apparently unaware that Cemetery Hill, and held Johnson
but I’m not expecting any ‘serious Ewell’s staff had already done a back from moving up onto Culp’s
historian’ to agree—yet oddly, they recon and found it deserted, sent out Hill.
are not troubled by the contradictory his own recon. It found a few troops
bigger picture. there (the 7th Indiana Regiment No one with the benefit of hindsight
and the crippled remains of the can excuse the latter two decisions.
Still, regardless of his earlier Iron Brigade), so it was decidedly However, regarding mistakes at
boldness and in spite of two orders “occupied.” the time, Lee reportedly once said
to do so, it is also true that Ewell did “Young man, why did you not tell
not actually attack. This led to the third problem. On me at the time? After the battle, even
their way back, Johnson’s recon a man as dull as I can see what I
One can only speculate that the team managed to capture a dispatch should have done.”
advice of his generals, his own rider with an order from Slocum to
appreciation of the need for support, Sykes detailing the movements for The two earlier decisions were not
and his direct observation of the the Union 5th Corps. This corps was only the correct ones, but each was
enemy was enough to convince stopped for the night a few miles the aggressive choice and was made
a veteran combat leader that his from Ewell’s left flank. With a Union rapidly. They created the impressive
command could not precede at that force presumably marching right Confederate victory on the battle’s
time. In the game, I believe we can into his flank in a few hours (as well first day.
discover whether or not his decision as another unaccounted corps, the
was the right one, but we also 12th, known to be somewhere on So, what became of Ewell in the
have to assume he made the best the field), Ewell could be risking remaining two days of the battle?
decision he could given the available the entire army’s flank if he pressed
information and his own experience. on to the south without strongly The next morning he again
guarding that approach route. There convinced Lee that it was not in the
That night’s tale of 2nd Corps was only one brigade of Early’s army’s best interest to maneuver
command breakdowns continued Division facing that way. Early his corps out of its position on the
after the decision to not storm reinforced it with another brigade left flank. He then obtained orders
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The Gamers, Inc.
(around 9:00 a.m.) that he followed These facts lead me to take a closer
the rest of the day with his corps. After A Tale of Two look as to what was happening as
executing the required “demonstration” Ammo Dumps it was obvious that games were not
(by artillery fires), he ordered his giving the players the historical feel.
corps to attack when the opportunity In beginning work on this game,
seemed available. His troops briefly I started digging into the known Hunt’s own report is the source of the
captured East Cemetery Hill and also information on the artillery confusion as he (correctly) relates that
lodged a threat to the Baltimore Pike. ammunition reserves of both armies. of the 270 rounds available per gun in
The latter forced the Federals to plan a This was primarily done to fulfill the the army, about 100 were fired (only
counterattack to press it back the next series’ needs for accurate artillery 37% of the total in the largest battle
morning. ammunition data. I figured that ever to occur on North American soil).
this would be a relatively easy job, He also relates that there was
On that day, he is at fault for not making especially when compared to the
Early attack with more of his division. detective work needed for None …a fear that the ammunition
Also, Rodes (laid up sick in Gettysburg) but Heroes. Heck, it’s Gettysburg, would give out. This fear
did not prepare his division properly. It one of the most documented battles was caused by the large and
took so long to deploy out of the town in history. Surely in the reams of unreasonable demands made by
that it could not attack. Arguably, both information collected on every aspect corps commanders who had left
were the purview of the division, not of this critical battle, someone must their own trains or a portion
corps commander, but like Longstreet, have taken an in-depth look at the of them behind, contrary to
Ewell is ultimately responsible for what supply of ammunition to the big guns. the orders of the commanding
his corps does (or does not) do. He also general. [Emphasis added]
did not find useful employment for two Not so, in fact the topic required the
of his artillery battalions (Carter and peeling back of many layers of the The Army Artillery Reserve train
Nelson), but as players will discover in historical onion… and not a little of 70 wagons led to the field by Lt.
the game, there just isn’t a great deal educated guess work. Cornelius Gillett who was diligent
of good ground for artillery in the 2nd enough to make a full report of his
Corps sector. He did, however, follow Most games have always assumed activities relates that 7,325 rounds of
his orders that day as issued and each of that the Union army was swimming the 19,189 he issued at the battle went
his division commanders attempted to in ammunition while the Confederates to 2nd, 3rd and 11th Corps (the remainder
execute those orders. This was not the had a modest but reasonable stock were issued to the guns of the Artillery
case in either of the other two corps of pile. The result was that while the Reserve).
the Army of Northern Virginia. Confederates might have to pay
passing attention to ammunition, the These two bits of evidence waved the
On the night of the July 2nd, Ewell was Union was pretty much able to ignore red flag in front of me as to what might
issued orders to attack the next dawn. the issue entirely. This, of course, be going on. Who left their wagons
He prepared that night by heavily colored the behavior of players in all behind, and what else was going on
reinforcing Johnson’s Division. He also those games. here?
shifted both of the ‘forgotten’ artillery
battalions to more useful locations. The At odds with this “standard wargame” First, we have Gillett going to refill
corps was preparing to attack when the feel is the heated arguments the reserve wagons on the 3rd. That
Union attack preempted it. The battle between Henry Hunt and Winfield means there was a major accumulation
raged there for a few hours, during Hancock regarding the conservation of ammunition some distance
which Longstreet was reigned back in of ammunition and the general behind the battle. This turns out to
for not following his orders. This set the impression that batteries were running be Westminster, MD some 15 miles
stage for the fiasco that was Pickett’s very low by the third day. SE of Gettysburg. Westminster was
Charge. turned into the army’s main supply
This would never be the case in a hub and the terminus of the railroad
In the end, except for the pair of game, as few of them ever got as far leading to it. The army’s Supply Train
decisions on July 1st (which may have as the third day (the Confederates parked there and with it much of
been the best choices at the time) and generally shoot their bolt on the the ammunition reserve (everything
a failure to ensure Rodes and Early second and the players pack it in beyond what the corps wagons carried
executed their attacks on July 2nd in afterwards). and Gillett’s wagons took to the battle).
concert with the forces available,
Richard Ewell did his job within reason However, the Army Artillery Reserve Second, we have the three corps who
and even with a bit of independent flair Ammunition train (Hunt’s private needed to replenish their own reserves.
on the first day. stash) was depleted and sent back to The first two were easy. Hancock (2nd
the rear to refill on July 3rd.

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Corps) reports that to move faster And what of the Confederates? These units were being used as
to the field he only brought half Everyone recognizes that the Army ammunition reserves. Should a
of his trains. Sickles (3rd Corps) of Northern Virginia was nowhere battalion at the front become depleted,
specifically decided to send his trains near as well supplied as the Union, these battalions were available to fill
to Westminster and did not bring any so games showed them with some in the gap while the empties went to
to the field. smaller number than the extreme over- the rear. Effectively, the army saw
abundance given the Union. the battalions as “expended” when
But what of 11th Corps? Here the plot they were used up. Some could be
thickens. Major Osborn (11th Corps As usual, Confederate information replenished from corps stocks (such
Artillery Commander) did bring his is sketchier. Alexander estimates as what Alexander accomplished
trains, but relates that his stock was that each gun had 100 rounds in its between July 2nd and 3rd), but when that
depleted, not by his own guns, but chests and another 100 in the trains. ammo was gone, it was over. Literally,
by issuing ammunition to 1st Corps Given the poor quality of Confederate Longstreet’s assault on July 3rd was the
“who were without their trains.” ammunition, this equates to a smaller last gasp the army had at Gettysburg.
number of actual fire-able rounds. There wasn’t enough left to “try again”
While I have not been able to Furthermore, an actual inventory of and still support the retreat back to
find a “smoking gun” relating to the Army’s Ammunition Reserve has Virginia.
the movements of the 1st Corps recently been discovered from 29 June
Artillery Reserve train, I believe 1863 that shows the ANVa trains only
it is reasonable to assume that in had enough ammunition to resupply Designer’s
the movement to get to the field on one artillery battalion (typically 4
the morning of the 1st, Reynolds batteries). This is an extremely small Notes
either left his train behind at amount for an army of this size. The
Emmitsburg (in the loving hands of remainder was kept in the corps reserve I’ll refrain from the obligatory “why
Dan Sickles, who then presumably trains. a new Gettysburg game?” section and
sent it to Westminster with his merely jot up my thoughts about the
own ammunition), or sent it to Looking deeper, I found that not only design issues I worked on. For the
Westminster himself following the were the amounts extremely small, but grognard, those sections should answer
instructions from Army HQ to send the army and corps trains were slow the “why” question. I figure it’s ‘all
all the baggage trains to that location. in getting to the battle and established new’ to the uninitiated, so I’m covered
Either way, 1st Corps arrived at the in the 3rd Corps hospital complex west at both ends. For the great middle,
scene without additional ammunition of Marsh Creek (in other words, off enjoy!
for its batteries in the critical first map). Some trains moved to the area
hours of the battle. near Black Horse Tavern to support The Morning of July
the action on the 2nd day, but even they
Splitting the 270 rounds per gun into were some distance away from the 1st
the 120 typically with the gun and actual battle zone (Union trains, on
its caissons (12 ldr) and what Cole the other hand, were consolidated into Of repeated concern in testing was the
(Civil War Artillery at Gettysburg) an enormous “Grand Park” near the exact manner in which the morning’s
relates as the “bulk of the army’s Granite Schoolhouse directly in the rear initial battle was to take place. Being a
ammunition” at Westminster. If we of the fish-hook line). meeting engagement, timing was—and
assume “bulk” is at least 51%, then is—critical. Even a modest force
that equates to 137 rounds per gun. The result is that Confederate batteries arriving at the scene of the action mere
This leaves only 13 rounds per gun were essentially forced to use what turns out of sequence could lead to
for the corps trains (given that the they had on-hand. This led to another repercussions from which a side might
“lost” corps trains count toward the feature of the battle that looks very never recover. Furthermore, the wildly
51%, this is 13 rounds for all the odd until the paucity of ammunition is changing balance of forces led players
guns on the field, not just the corps considered. On all days of the battle, to very clear decisions on what they
with their wagons). you can see entire Confederate artillery would do. (We did this in testing, so
battalions left in the rear taking no part, you wouldn’t have to!)
The result is slim and spotty at all, in the fight. Examples include
ammunition reserves that may have both Heth and Pender’s divisional Timing
proven fatal had not Hunt’s reserve artillery (which pretty much spent July
been available. As it was, the army 1st twiddling their thumbs around Marsh Just getting units to the field (for
was forced to ration fires on July 3rd, Creek) and the Washington Artillery the Union, especially) required the
leading to the extended lull before Battalion which spent most of July 2nd coordination of a NASA launch. I
the opening fires of the afternoon around Willoughby Run. deliberately chose to avoid “design
Confederate assault.
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The Gamers, Inc.
for effect” here (which would simply Seminary Ridge. Being late was
place units along the road at a point not an option here (as will become Carrots
where X turns later they would, by more apparent when we look at the
normal movement, end up in the fight Carrots section). The Iron Brigade’s Once the basic timing was under
at the right time). breaking camp has a bit more control, it rapidly became apparent
variability and this adds significant in testing that the situation rode on a
Instead, I wanted to show things like tension to the defense and gives the knife-edge. When all of Wadsworth’s
the details of the 1st Corps approach Confederates some useful goals as Division was up, Archer and Davis
march that are typically glossed over. we shall soon see. really must pull back to Herr Ridge
I knew that Cutler had left camp and await the rest of the army (as
(south of Marsh Creek) and was One thing that took time to get my they eventually did historically).
moving north of the Iron Brigade’s arms around was the fact the cavalry Players quickly began to decide to
camps at 8:30 a.m., that they would didn’t fight a tooth and nail action avoid a fight until then, anyway, to
march to the Peach Orchard road with the Confederate advance (I’d the point of not seeing a reason to
junction to await orders while like to, again, thank The Killer attack at all. Meanwhile, the Union
Reynolds went forward to investigate Angels clouding the image for me). had absolutely no interest in holding
the situation. Furthermore, a gap the ridges forward of town—the
developed between Cutler and the Games typically show the cavalry player knew he’d eventually be back
Iron Brigade as the latter took until getting shredded by massed infantry on Cemetery Hill and figured he’d
around 9:00 a.m. to break camp and attacks and leveling entire regiments do better with an intact 1st Corps than
get on the road (letting them catch of Rebs using their ‘carbine buzz- not. Both players were seemingly
up was one reason put forward for saws’. Neither of these is accurate coming to the joint conclusion that
the division’s Peach Orchard halt). (the real action accounted for 2 they’d skip any morning fight and
Following those events worked well SPs of loss on each side). Instead, agree to start the battle “some time
enough, except that the units literally the cavalry fight was limited to the this afternoon” back on Cemetery
double-timed from the halt locations important functions of slowing the Hill.
to the battle. The time from when Rebel march (from Marsh Creek)
Reynolds’ release until they got to and (critically) forcing Heth to The Confederates needed a reason
the location for the first infantry fire deploy. Restricting Confederate to attack and the Federals needed a
exchange was just too short. Also, use of Column formation forward reason to defend.
Reynolds’ entire ride forward, visit of Herr Ridge and forcing them to
with Buford, and return happened deploy on line with both brigades Typically, this is handled (at least
very rapidly (too rapidly to do it before advancing show the important from the Confederate side… I’m not
literally in the game). Lastly, this is effects of the cavalry fight. sure designers have really given the
one of three instances I found where Union player much of any reason
the normal workings of the Command Without them, the Confederates to defend forward) by letting all of
System would take too long to get the a-historically ‘ignore’ the cavalry Heth and the rest of Hill’s Corps slip
job done. screen and bludgeon right into the the reigns and go berserk. Jerry Axel
cavalry’s main defensive line. That’s dubbed this effect “Panzergruppe
I addressed the “march speed” issue a situation Heth was in no position to Hill.” Obviously, this “fixes” one
with the Double Quick rule, Reynolds offer—and Buford could not afford game design problem by ditching
with the OOA’s ‘transporter’ to try to resist. Makes for nice novels historical reality and taking a quick
functions, and the command issue and movies, though. run into fantasy. Players deserve
with the instant order to Wadsworth. better than that.
There is a price to be paid in rules Once Heth begins his advance, the
weight, but I feel the pay-off in seeing two Zeroes (Davis and Archer) made Instead, I chose to have Cutler show
what actually happened is worth it the remaining advance happen at up pretty much right on time, but
this time. the right speed (averaging 4 MPs allowed some possible delay to affect
per turn) so they would get to where the arrival of the Iron Brigade. What
Timing was critical for the arrival of they needed to be on time to meet this—combined with the variations
the two Union infantry brigades and the Union infantry (with a bit of in the speed of Heth’s Zeroes—does
some variability between them makes variability in both directions to make is Cutler may have a few turns to
things interesting. Cutler had to be things interesting). deal with Heth alone before being
in position in time for the 1st shot fully supported. That gives Davis
(roughly 10:15 a.m.) or the cavalry and Archer a brief window of
would not be able to withstand the opportunity to beat Cutler up a little
Rebel attack long enough to cover before being scared off by ‘them
Black Hatted Fellers’.

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Damaging half of Wadsworth’s coming to move forward into the

Division has great value to the fight (the question being where to 11th Corps
Confederates, so they have a good go, not if they would). By the time
reason to attack early on. Giving the Reynolds came back and sent his As the favorite whipping boys of
Federals a reason to defend needed staff to drop fence rails, the division the Army of the Potomac, I feel 11th
its own carrot. was already ready to go and only Corps has been unfairly shown in
needed to hear the word. They had earlier games. 11th Corps was poorly
Reynolds and Buford chose the gotten ready for the order long handled and used as a scapegoat to
ground northwest of town to defend before it came. deflect blame for the disaster of the
specifically so they could fall back first day’s fight. To show this, games
before needing to defend the key While Lee was observing the field usually show them with morale
high ground of Cemetery Hill. and getting a feel for the situation, levels that make players wonder why
Unlike the game player, they did Heth asked, at least twice, if he they just didn’t all desert the army
not have a printed order of arrival could attack. Upon seeing Rodes’ before they ever got to Gettysburg.
in front of them and dozens of attack along Oak Ridge, Lee sent
histories to look at to know when Heth back to his division to await I rated them up a notch in morale… a
reinforcements would arrive. orders. Those orders came in under level I thought they had earned.
They needed to hold for as long as 30 minutes. Since the end of the
possible—and hopefully that would morning’s attacks, Heth had been In earlier test versions, there was
be long enough. You need to sweat getting his division ready to go an additional ‘Looking for Glory’
that time, just like they did. again. As with Wadsworth, Heth had application on the afternoon of
gotten ready for the order before it the 1st day as well (simulating
I gave the Federals two reasons came. Similarly, Pender’s Division Barlow’s unhinging Schurz’s line by
to “hold forward”. First, keeping was on hold after actually starting advancing to a knoll that now has
the Hill’s Corps HQ off the top of an attack earlier in the morning (and his name on it). This was found to
West McPherson’s Ridge severely being stopped in its tracks by Hill’s be unnecessary as von Steinwehr’s
constrains Hill’s freedom of action staff). They were ready as well. Both Division had to be assigned to
(limiting any wide maneuvers the divisions moved out without delay. Cemetery Hill as army reserve. This
player might want to pull off). was a two-headed problem. If von
Second, allowing the Rebels to Rodes appeared on the northern end Steinwehr was allowed to move
make lodgments on the top of of the field to behold a spectacle forward early, ‘looking for glory’ or
Seminary Ridge too early affects he (and his men) had never seen not, 11th Corps was just too much for
Lee’s “attitude” about the fight and before… the wide open flank of a Doles and Early to take on.
generates a “momentum of victory”. Union battle-line spread out for all to
Good reasons to hold on for dear life. see. He began deploying his division. Even with von Steinwehr in reserve,
Ewell arrived briefly thereafter and the “Looking For Glory” proved
also recognized the opportunity. He to be less than useful in unhinging
Order Short- issued the orders for Rodes to attack 11th Corps to the point where Early
Circuits and sent an order to Early coming and Doles could take them on with
down from the northeast to do so as anything like the historical losses.
I mentioned above that the order well. Both divisions launched on the Also, “Looking for Glory” in
from Reynolds to Wadsworth fly (successfully on Early’s part, not this case generated its own set of
could not follow the normal order as much for Rodes). I coded Early’s potential abuses—aside from the
process due to the time involved. orders into the Order of Arrival (so fact that pushing Barlow to his knoll
This situation also occurs with Lee to avoid giving the player excessive really didn’t mess up the corps’ line
in his orders to Hill’s Corps in the flexibility). The player is given as much as you might think.
afternoon, and then Ewell’s order some freedom with Rodes, with the
to Rodes. All of these could not downside of some choices in how it In the end, I had to pull the corps’
follow the normal order process as affects Lee. morale ratings back just a touch
that would take too long… and all of (but still better than they are usually
them were the result of very special shown), leaving von Steinwehr back
circumstances. These circumstances in reserve, and eliminating the extra
are also very similar to one another. “Looking for Glory” to get the right
balance of power in the historical
Reynolds left Wadsworth to see fight.
what the situation was, but everyone
involved knew that orders were
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The Gamers, Inc.
the player’s Gettysburg start out small Repeated testing showed that the
What does all this (where case b is strongest), but retain historical results are very difficult to
do? The ‘Script’ inertia throughout (a, c, and d are achieve. This confirmed to me that the
Accusation always involved). relatively excellent morale ratings you
find in the Confederates (especially
Some take one look at the timing So, as the old saw goes: “You are in Longstreet’s Corps) and the more
mechanics I’ve presented above and in command!” But, you are “in mundane ones in the Army of the
think I’m trying to force the game to command” where some events are Potomac are in fact accurate for the
follow the history… that there is no already underway, some people are model and must exist in order to perform
room left to deviate and so on. not dependable, and you are running close to historical levels—and even then,
mid-19th century armies with the doing what they did is no easy task.
They seem to think the game will follow capabilities and limitations of mid-19th
a script. century armies. If you, like I, want to
see how your own Gettysburg turns The 20th Maine
I have to point out that since the game is out—this is your chance.
Fabled in story starting with the writings
not actually restricted the way they think of both their commander Joshua
it is, I can only assume that they are How on Earth did Chamberlain and Oliver Norton’s The
reacting to what they think these rules Attack and Defense of Little Round Top,
do. An image untainted by actual play. they pull this off?
the 20th Maine’s defense of the flank of
One thing that struck me (and some Little Round Top achieved an almost
What does happen is that the deviations religious fervor among fans of Michael
to the historical “script” start small others) in the research for this game
was the sheer effectiveness of the Shaara’s The Killer Angels (and the
and grow as time passes (as one would resulting movie, Gettysburg).
expect). The rules exist so that the Confederate attack on the afternoon
deviations from the historical timeline of July 2nd. You can see what I mean
by setting up the situation at 3:45 The combination of its place on the line
do not start out too large (swamping all (the end—at one point in time, anyway),
further inputs). p.m. and playing to the 7:00 p.m.
turn. Then compare what you’ve the post-war build up of Little Round Top
accomplished versus the historical set as the point where the battle was decided,
I feel players neither want the game and Shaara’s book, highlighted this one—
to ‘show’ Gettysburg (like a movie) to up for 7:00 p.m. My guess is you’ll
be struck, as I was, with just how good, but not spectacular—regiment to a
them, nor do they want something that lime light no other formation in the Civil
bares no resemblance to what really much those two and a half divisions
accomplished. I really think that they War obtained. I have taken the possibly
went on. Naturally, they (and I) want unpopular course of evaluating the unit
to be put into the driver’s seat so we managed to do something just outside
the envelope of what is possible given based on what it actually did, and not on
can run Gettysburg and see how we some popularized appeal.
do within realistic limits. At either of the game system (a good place for the
the extremes (script vs. letting them system to be, since it is not designed
to model outliers as “normal”). The The 20th Maine ended up at the end of
have laser cannons or some such), I the line because of the order of march
can’t tell how well I’d do at Gettysburg comparison is well worth your time
and consideration as it will shed a taken by Vincent’s Brigade to get there.
as I’d either see Gettysburg just as it They were not “selected” for this position
was, or Gettysburg as done without the new understanding on how hard the
fighting in that zone was and just because of any superior abilities. Once
boundaries of reality. there, they spent around an hour fending
how precarious the Union line was
becoming when night fell. off the attacks of one unsupported
So, putting the player in charge of the Confederate regiment—the exhausted
actual battle (as best we can do with 15th Alabama. After marching 28 miles
cardboard and dice, anyway) means Playing forward, into the dark,
from the 7:00 p.m. set up is also from Chambersburg, rushing into the far
that the player will be operating a) in right of the Rebel battle-line, leading the
the historical environment (no AK- informative, as those exceptional
circumstances are already in play. attack for Hood’s Division, and climbing
47s), b) under some decisions made up and over Big Round Top, the 15th
before he arrived at this point, c) in an There is a reason Hancock had to
send Willard’s Brigade and the 1st Alabama put in an attack that caused it to
environment where some things are have only about 19% losses and inflicted
simply out of his control, and d) there Minnesota on their death-ride attacks.
The Union left was in trouble. Sure, a little over 30% on the defender.
are “actors” under him who are still
wanting to operate as well (or poorly) as parts of 12th and 6th Corps were
arriving on the scene, but the crisis At that point Chamberlain charged with
their historical counterparts did. his regiment (which was about out of
they were sent to deal with had moved
further north—out of their immediate ammunition) as a desperate measure. This
As a result of those four conditions, action inflicted another 83 losses on the
deviations from the script Gettysburg to reach.

LoB-02 Rules.indd 25 10/17/13 2:12:33 PM

15th Alabama (mainly captured POWs). dispersed and reaching a head with a losses and loss recovery, they were
popular historical novel and movie. simply removed from the order of battle
In the end, the 20th Maine inflicted fewer to fight in some future action. Leaving
losses by firepower (95) on a larger (by All this said, and the results of my them in as “dead” units would allow the
about 100 men) attacker (and ran out of analysis in the game as the standard player to rebuild them as well as have
ammunition in the process) than were rating of this unit, I know that some them wandering around on the map
inflicted upon it (120) while defending. will have opinions so at odds with that (a-historically) with a SP (or two) when
And they did this, while relatively fresh thinking that they might be unable to they were actually on their way back to
compared to their enemy. These are not move past this one unit and look at the Washington to refit. I merely removed
the marks I expect of a unit achieving many other lessons I tried to convey. I them from play in scenarios occurring
the even temporary status of ‘elite’ in the can understand this point of view. For after they were relieved.
game system. them, the optional version of the 20th
Maine is provided. In my view, the Jenkins’ cavalry has been ignored.
Now, contrast this performance with an game has bigger fish to fry and I don’t Jenkins, himself, received a serious head
undisputable A, the 16th Maine. Here, want this one decision to get in the way wound by shrapnel near Blocher’s Knoll
you have a regiment that marched off to of players experiencing the whole. on July 2nd. Nobody informed the next
its own destruction fully realizing it was in line (Colonel Milton Ferguson who
being sacrificed to make good the escape was commanding the 16th Va Cavalry
of the rest of its brigade. They attacked Some Odds and Ends acting as provost at Lee’s HQ) and the
into swarming Confederate brigades so activity of this, rather useless, brigade
they could hold some ground to the last Students of the battle will note that is a complete mystery until they show
man. Zimmerman’s Battery (Pegram’s up with Stuart on July 3rd at the East
Artillery Battalion, A.P. Hill’s Corps) Cavalry Field. As such, the brigade
In a game sense, the entire action of the arrives with only three 3-inch Rifles in has been ignored in the game (exactly
20th Maine is in a location where the the game while most sources agree that modeling its historical usefulness). To
terrain makes them “behave” as an A the battery had four 3-inch Rifles. This avoid confusion, the 17th Va Regiment
(due to the modifier). Psychologically, is because one gun snapped its axle (riding as a screen for the advance of
players see an A-rated regiment and wheeling into position on Lohr’s Ridge Early’s Division to the field and a unit
start thinking offensively. This is as (just west of the game map) and was of this brigade) has been nominally
they should and correctly models the rendered inoperable. assigned to 2nd Corps and is later
approach players should take with other removed from play. It spent the 1st in
A-rated units (such as the 16th Maine Given the new rules regarding artillery reserve for Early’s Division and then
above, the 1st Minnesota, and 111th Morale Losses and Loss Recovery, I was broken up to round up and guard
New York). But that is not how anyone was able to insert the temporary losses prisoners.
viewed the use of the 20th Maine. to artillery units (guns abandoned
and later recovered) as actual losses. Meanwhile, the 35th Virginia Cavalry
In this last point, one might wonder Before, their loss would be ignored as Battalion was also detached to Ewell’s
about the A-rated regiments in Greene’s the guns were later retrieved and the Corps and screened the approach of
Brigade; they were strictly defensive in only losses recorded were those that Rode’s Division to the field. They were
nature. They are indeed violating that were permanent. The “soft” losses immediately assigned to screening the
provision, but one must remember that allowed me to better reflect the damage army’s left flank and did some service
Greene’s Brigade held off the better part to the battery in terms of caissons lost in scouting Meade’s right during the
of Johnson’s Division and did so with an and horses killed. This works well, remainder of the battle. They were never
open (and infiltrated) right flank. What as quite a few batteries were out of used en-masse once they had arrived.
they did was most assuredly “A-rated action because of such losses, but
quality”. actual destroyed guns were fairly rare. Sitting to the rear of Cemetery Ridge
Refitting during the night was a major (N58.41) is undoubtedly the only
So, why is the 20th Maine’s location operation for the batteries at the battle, “Chicken Bake” hex that will be in this
one of the most visited and asked about it will be for you as well. series. In the early afternoon of July
places at Gettysburg today? This in 3rd, a rather “old and stringy” bird was
spite of the heroic sacrifice of many Similarly, I had a number of batteries on roasted up for the brass of 2nd Corps
other Union regiments (who have gone the Union side (Heckman and Walton and (it seems) much of the high-ranking
forgotten) and the fact that “Buster” come to mind) that were literally officers in the area at the time. Joshua
never existed. Why? Because of the “sent to the rear” after sustaining Chamberlain, who had not had a meal in
myth-building that surrounded both such damage that they were no longer days, reported to Hancock at this time
Little Round Top and “the end of the considered usable. Above and beyond and wrote of the torture of smelling
line” beginning as soon as the smoke the damage modeled in the system’s the roasting bird, but was not offered a
LoB-02 Rules.indd 26 10/17/13 2:12:33 PM

The Gamers, Inc.
bite to eat. Thanks to the efforts (as

probably the only people in history On the Shoulders of Giants…
who bothered to try) of Jerry Axel
and Rick Barber, I’ve identified the Obviously, many of you will compare LCV to its RSS forerunner, This Hallowed
location of this chicken bake with Ground.
reasonable certainty. This was based
on where Gibbon walked and crested THG (1998) was, and is, Dave Powell’s definitive opus on the Battle of Gettysburg.
the ridge to observe the cannonade (he It was the culmination of a lifetime of study and the hard work of a designer who
was at the bake when it started) and brought the battle to life in the earlier CWB games on the topic. It is the ultimate
the needs of the officers to locate their statement of Dave’s well-considered viewpoint on the battle.
meal in a position not filled by some
unit or another. LCV is designed to be complementary to that great work. I had not previously had
the opportunity to express my viewpoint on the topic. The need for a LoB specific
treatment of the battle gave me that opportunity. Like Dave, Gettysburg was one of
Many Thanks are my first two ACW loves (the other being, as most already know, Antietam).
due…
If you happen to own both games (and are the envy of many, mind you!), I hope
This game was a labor of love for you will find the places where Dave and I have differing visions as a jump-off point
many years now. I had enormous for your own contemplation and study of this fantastic subject. Our viewpoints are
help along the way from the usual neither mutually exclusive nor competitive—rather they show the differing ways one
suspects, but I do want to identify two can approach a given subject. I hope you find that examination fruitful, entertaining,
in particular. and enlightening.
First, there is the indubitable Rod Seniority List

“Iceman” Miller, who time and
again waded into campaign games of Army of the Potomac
Unit Commander Rank Date of Rank
LCV testing until his fingers bled. He Army Meade MG 29 Nov 62
was instrumental in bringing forth the
Left Wing Reynolds MG 29 Nov 62
polish and sheen of the game specific
systems as well as the new version Right Wing Slocum MG 4 July 62
2.0 LoB series rules. He took time he
1st Corps Doubleday MG 29 Nov 62
really didn’t have to repeatedly test, to
analyze, and to suggest streamlining 1/1 Division Wadsworth BG 9 Aug 61
and improvements on matters large Meredith BG 6 Oct 62
Cutler BG 29 Nov 62
and small. More than a few times, he
reached into his pocket to spring for 2/1 Division Robinson BG 28 Apr 62
plane tickets and travel expenses to Paul BG 5 Sept 62
Baxter BG 12 Mar 63
come play the game. Thank you, Rod,
I couldn’t have done this without you. 3/1 Division Rowley BG 29 Nov 62
Stannard BG 11 Mar 63
Biddle Col —
Second, is (of course) my favorite Stone Col —
partner in crime, Jerry Axel. Jerry
was, yet again, 100% indispensible 2nd Corps Hancock MG 29 Nov 62
in arranging for trips to the field, 1/2 Division Caldwell BG 28 Apr 62
dropping everything on a moment’s Zook BG 29 Nov 62
notice to come play, set up, or do Cross Col —
Kelly Col —
whatever bizarre task the designer Brooke Col —
came up with in his usual state of
delirium. Jerry was my loyal go-to 2/2 Division Gibbon BG 2 May 62
Harrow BG 29 Nov 62
guy… always willing to say “Sure, I’ll Webb BG 23 Jun 63
drive three hours to come and look at Hall Col —
those counters. Just let me finish this
3/2 Division Hays BG 29 Sept 62
coffee. Want me to pick up anything Carroll Col —
on the way?” You are one of a kind, Smyth Col —
Jerry, it even makes up for Shakes the Willard Col —
Clown. Well, almost.

LoB-02 Rules.indd 27 10/17/13 2:12:33 PM

Unit Commander Rank Date of Rank Unit Commander Rank Date of Rank
3rd Corps Sickels MG 29 Nov 62 3 Cav Division Kilpatrick BG 13 Jun 63
Farnsworth BG 29 Jun 63
1/3 Division Birney MG 20 May 63 Merritt BG 29 Jun 63
Ward BG 4 Oct 62
Graham BG 29 Nov 62
de Trobriand Col — Army of Northern Virginia
Unit Commander Rank Date of Rank
2/3 Division Humphreys BG 28 Apr 62 Army R.E. Lee Gen 14 Jun 61
Carr BG 30 Mar 63 Trimble MG 17 Jan 63
Burling Col — Stuart MG 25 July 62
Brewster Col —
1st Corps Longstreet LTG 9 Oct 62
5 Corps
th
Sykes MG 29 Nov 62
Pickett Div Pickett MG 10 Oct 62
1/5 Division Barnes BG 29 Nov 62 Garnett BG 14 Nov 61
Tilton Col — Armistead BG 1 Apr 62
Sweitzer Col — Kemper BG 3 Jun 62
Vincent Col —
Hood Div Hood MG 10 Oct 62
2/5 Division Ayres BG 29 Nov 62 Law BG 3 Oct 62
Weed BG 6 Jun 63 G.T. Anderson BG 1 Nov 62
Day Col — Robertson BG 1 Nov 62
Burbank Col — Benning BG 17 Jan 63
3/5 Division Crawford BG 25 Apr 62 McLaws Div McLaws MG 23 May 62

McCandless Col — Kershaw BG 13 Feb 62
Fisher Col — Semmes BG 11 Mar 62
Barksdale BG 12 Aug 62
6th Corps Sedgwick MG 4 July 62 Wofford BG 17 Jan 63
1/6 Division Wright BG 14 Sept 61 2nd Corps Ewell LTG 23 May 63

Russell BG 29 Nov 62
Torbert BG 29 Nov 62 Rodes Div Rodes MG 2 May 63
Bartlett BG 30 Mar 63 Daniel BG 1 Sept 62
Doles BG 1 Nov 62
2/6 Division Howe BG 11 Jun 62 Iverson BG 1 Nov 62
Neill BG 29 Nov 62 Ramseur BG 1 Nov 62
Grant Col — O’Neal Col —
Blackford Maj —
3/6 Division Newton MG 30 Mar 63
Wheaton BG 29 Nov 62 Johnson Div Johnson MG 28 Feb 63
Shaler BG 26 May 63 Steuart BG 6 Mar 62
Eustis Col — J.M. Jones BG 15 May 63
Nevin Col — Walker BG 15 May 63
Williams LTC —
11th Corps Howard MG 29 Nov 62
Early Div Early MG 17 Jan 63
1/11 Division Barlow BG 19 Sept 62 Hays BG 25 July 62
Ames BG 20 May 63 Smith BG 31 Jan 63
v. Gilsa Col — Gordon BG 7 May 63
Avery Col —
2/11 Division v.Steinwehr BG 12 Oct 61
Coster Col — 3rd Corps A.P. Hill LTG 24 May 63
Smith Col —
Anderson Div R.H. Anderson MG 14 July 62
3/11 Division Schurz MG 14 Mar 63 Wilcox BG 21 Oct 61
Schimmelfng BG 29 Nov 62 Mahone BG 16 Nov 61
Krzynwski Col — Wright BG 3 Jun 62
Posey BG 1 Nov 62
12th Corps Williams BG 17 May 61 Lang Col —
1/12 Division Ruger BG 29 Nov 62 Heth Div Heth MG 24 May 63

Lockwood BG 8 Aug 61 Pettigrew BG 26 Feb 62
McDougall Col — Archer BG 3 Jun 62
Colgrove Col — Davis BG 15 Sept 62
Brcknbrgh Col —
2/12 Division Geary BG 25 Apr 62
Greene BG 28 Apr 62 Pender Div Pender MG 27 May 63
Candy Col — Lane BG 1 Nov 62
Cobham Col — Thomas BG 1 Nov 62
Scales BG 13 Jun 63
1 Cav Division Buford BG 27 July 62 Perrin Col —
Gamble Col —
Devin Col —
LoB-02 Rules.indd 28 10/17/13 2:12:34 PM

Last Chance For Victory: Line of Battle Series

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Last Chance For Victory: Line of Battle Series

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The Gamers, Inc.

Line of Battle Series:

Multi-Man Publishing, Inc. 403 Headquarters Drive, Suite 7, Millersville MD 21108

LoB-02 Rules.indd 1 10/17/13 2:12:09 PM

LoB-02 Rules.indd 2 10/17/13 2:12:09 PM

Multi-Man Publishing, Inc. 403 Headquarters Drive, Suite 7, Millersville MD 21108

LoB-02 Rules.indd 3 10/17/13 2:12:09 PM

LoB-02 Rules.indd 4 10/17/13 2:12:09 PM

could not advance onto Cemetery 3.2b Corps Artillery Leaders.

Multi-Man Publishing, Inc. 403 Headquarters Drive, Suite 7, Millersville MD 21108

LoB-02 Rules.indd 5 10/17/13 2:12:10 PM

LoB-02 Rules.indd 6 10/17/13 2:12:10 PM

Multi-Man Publishing, Inc. 403 Headquarters Drive, Suite 7, Millersville MD 21108

LoB-02 Rules.indd 7 10/17/13 2:12:10 PM

Any other result is a draw.

LoB-02 Rules.indd 8 10/17/13 2:12:28 PM

To paraphrase Robert Krick, James In short, the question of Longstreet’s

Multi-Man Publishing, Inc. 403 Headquarters Drive, Suite 7, Millersville MD 21108

LoB-02 Rules.indd 9 10/17/13 2:12:29 PM

LoB-02 Rules.indd 10 10/17/13 2:12:29 PM

Multi-Man Publishing, Inc. 403 Headquarters Drive, Suite 7, Millersville MD 21108

LoB-02 Rules.indd 11 10/17/13 2:12:29 PM

LoB-02 Rules.indd 12 10/17/13 2:12:30 PM

Multi-Man Publishing, Inc. 403 Headquarters Drive, Suite 7, Millersville MD 21108

LoB-02 Rules.indd 13 10/17/13 2:12:30 PM

Longstreet at Robert E. Lee

LoB-02 Rules.indd 14 10/17/13 2:12:30 PM

Multi-Man Publishing, Inc. 403 Headquarters Drive, Suite 7, Millersville MD 21108

LoB-02 Rules.indd 15 10/17/13 2:12:30 PM

LoB-02 Rules.indd 16 10/17/13 2:12:31 PM

M M P discussion of Anderson’s location.

Multi-Man Publishing, Inc. 403 Headquarters Drive, Suite 7, Millersville MD 21108

LoB-02 Rules.indd 17 10/17/13 2:12:31 PM

LoB-02 Rules.indd 18 10/17/13 2:12:31 PM

Multi-Man Publishing, Inc. 403 Headquarters Drive, Suite 7, Millersville MD 21108

LoB-02 Rules.indd 19 10/17/13 2:12:31 PM

LoB-02 Rules.indd 20 10/17/13 2:12:32 PM

Multi-Man Publishing, Inc. 403 Headquarters Drive, Suite 7, Millersville MD 21108

LoB-02 Rules.indd 21 10/17/13 2:12:32 PM

LoB-02 Rules.indd 22 10/17/13 2:12:32 PM

Multi-Man Publishing, Inc. 403 Headquarters Drive, Suite 7, Millersville MD 21108

LoB-02 Rules.indd 23 10/17/13 2:12:32 PM

Damaging half of Wadsworth’s coming to move forward into the

LoB-02 Rules.indd 24 10/17/13 2:12:33 PM

Multi-Man Publishing, Inc. 403 Headquarters Drive, Suite 7, Millersville MD 21108

LoB-02 Rules.indd 25 10/17/13 2:12:33 PM

LoB-02 Rules.indd 26 10/17/13 2:12:33 PM

bite to eat. Thanks to the efforts (as

First, there is the indubitable Rod Seniority List

Multi-Man Publishing, Inc. 403 Headquarters Drive, Suite 7, Millersville MD 21108

LoB-02 Rules.indd 27 10/17/13 2:12:33 PM

3/5 Division Crawford BG 25 Apr 62 McLaws Div McLaws MG 23 May 62

1/6 Division Wright BG 14 Sept 61 2nd Corps Ewell LTG 23 May 63

1/12 Division Ruger BG 29 Nov 62 Heth Div Heth MG 24 May 63

LoB-02 Rules.indd 28 10/17/13 2:12:34 PM

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