G.R. No.

L-24693 July 31, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO CHIU,
petitioners-appellees,

vs.

THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.

VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee

FACTS:

 Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance no. 4760 against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila
who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila
and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances."
 That Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process
insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the
provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel,
motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other
quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and
in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the
sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age
and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any,
coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the
presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept and
bound together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be
open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is
unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for
being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against
self-incrimination;
 that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain
minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly
offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the
portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the
challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging
houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive character;
 the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic
cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments,
there is once again a transgression of the due process clause
 There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and
void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor
to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963
 Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts
 Lower court decided “the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore,
null and void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him
from enforcing the ordinance in question.
 Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

Is the ordinance a valid exercise of Police Power?

RULING:

YES. The ordinance is a valid exercise of Police power

  As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of
any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed
categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x .
 It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable,
unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here
 This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from
such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would
be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential,
insistent and the least limitable of powers,4 extending as it does "to all the great public needs."
 There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the
alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of
motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven
for prostitutes and thrill-seekers."
 As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing licenses for
revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the
amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure.26
The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation from another decision of significance: "It is
urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of their lawful
occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are
also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certain conditions is
permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business
or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a case, persons
licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power
embark in these occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that power.
 Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith.

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, Petitioners,

vs.

CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent

FACTS:

 This Petition under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the reversal of the Decision3 in C.A.-G.R.
S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An Ordinance
Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns,
Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" (the Ordinance).
 On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief
with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO with the RTC of Manila, Branch impleading as defendant, herein
respondent City of Manila (the City) represented by Mayor Lim.6 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes
motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
 White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC)
filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention7 on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects
their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.
 RTC granted the motion to intervene and the TRO but MTDC withdrew as plaintiff.
 RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void.
 Aggrieved, City filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court but referred to the CA.
 The City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local
Government Code which confers on cities, among other local government units, the power:
 o [To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.
 Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of
movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
 The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance. First, it held that
the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of
establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only
constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the Ordinance is satisfied
since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third,
the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general.
 Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Is the Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 unconstitutional because of invalid exercise of Police Power?

RULING:

Yes. Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 is unconstitutional.

 Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions
warrant.Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its
people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. These range from the
regulation of dance halls, movie theaters, gas stations and cockpits. The awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated
by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation’s legal system, its use has rarely been denied.
 The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex,
prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the
police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those
means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. The Bill of
Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political majorities animated by
his cynicism
 That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative
business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must
appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the
means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those
pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
 Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private
rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is
affected. However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise
enjoys the presumption of validity
 The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by
applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through
active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and
regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the
petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely
paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes
can in fact collect "wash rates" from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even
apartments.
 WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs
G.R. No. 135962 March 27, 2000

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.

FACTS:

 Respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open
Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996
 On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan
Avenue would be demolished.
 respondent instituted against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati City, Civil Case No. 96-001 for
injunction.
 Petition was granted and made permanent
 CA rendered a Decision on the merits of the case finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune
Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls
 Hence this case,

ISSUE:

HAS THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MMDA) THE MANDATE TO OPEN NEPTUNE
STREET TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC PURSUANT TO ITS REGULATORY AND POLICE POWERS?

RULING:

 Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state
endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic
management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the
general public. It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of
Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court. 8From the premise that it has police power, it is now urged that there is no need
for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public.
 Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the
legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. 10The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and
justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.
 It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or
body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the
President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units.
Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking
body
 Clearly, the scope of the MMDA's function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these is transport
and traffic management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to rationalize the
existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of
persons and goods. It also covers the mass transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the
administration of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the
institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under the service, the MMDA is expressly
authorized "to set the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic management
programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install and administer a single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and
penalties for all traffic violations.
 It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There
is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila
 Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no
provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions appropriate
funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself,
"development authority." 30 It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various
national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient
and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature
 Clearly then, the MMC under P.D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R.A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the
MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting through
their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its
proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. We desist from
ruling on the other issues as they are unnecessary.
 We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDA's noble efforts to solve the chaotic traffic condition in Metro
Manila. Everyday, traffic jams and traffic bottlenecks plague the metropolis. Even our once sprawling boulevards and
avenues are now crammed with cars while city streets are clogged with motorists and pedestrians. Traffic has become a social
malaise affecting our people's productivity and the efficient delivery of goods and services in the country. The MMDA was
created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are
limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision without any
legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.
 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
39549 are affirmed

G.R. No. L-63419 December 18, 1986

FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial

Region, Branch XX, Manila, and the HONORABLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Manila,
respondents.

G.R. No. L-66839-42 December 18, 1986

LUZVIMINDA F. LOBATON petitioner

FACTS:

 Petitioners assail the validity of BP 22, also known as the Bouncing Check Law. BP 22 punishes a person “who makes or
draws and issues any check on account for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank..”. It is aimed at putting a stop to the practice of issuing checks that are worthless which causes
injury to the public interest. Contentions on the law are that:
o 1) it offends constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt;
o 2) it impairs freedom of contract;
o 3) it contravenes the equal protection clause;
o 4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and
o 5) its enactment is flawed because the Interim Batasan violated the prohibition on amendments in the Third Reading

ISSUE:

Is BP 22 a valid exercise of Police power?

RULING:

 The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, not the non-payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The effects of issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large since putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation can pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of
 society and the public interest. Hence, the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of police power and is not in conflict with
the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
 There is no valid ground to sustain the contention the BP 22 impairs freedom of contract since contracts which contravene
public policy are not lawful. The statute does not deny the equal protection clause since it only penalizes the drawer of the
check and not the payee. Additonally, BP 22 does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative powers. Contrary to the
contention, the power to define the offense and to prescribe the penalty are not delegated to the payee. On the last contention,
the Interim Batasan investigated the matter and reported that the clause in question was an authorized amendment of the bill.
With all the foregoing reasons, the constitutionality of BP 22 is upheld

G.R. No. 189999 June 27, 2012

ANGELES UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, Petitioner,

vs.

CITY OF ANGELES, JULIET G. QUINSAAT, in her capacity as Treasurer of Angeles City and ENGR. DONATO N.
DIZON, in his

capacity as Acting Angeles City Building Official, Respondents

FACTS:

 Petitioner is an educational institution and was converted into a non-stock, non-profit education foundation under the
provisions of R.A. 6055
 Sometime in August 2005, petitioner filed with the Office of the City Building Official an application for a building permit
for the construction of an 11-storey building
 Said office issued a Building Permit Fee Assessment in the amount of P126,839.20 and P238,741.64 as Locational Clearance
Fee.
 Petitioner claimed that it is exempt from the payment of the building permit and locational clearance fees, citing legal
opinions rendered by the DOJ.
 Petitioner also reminded the respondents that they have previously issued building permits acknowledging such exemption
from payment of building permit fees on the construction of petitioner’s 4-storey AUF Information Technology Center
building
 Petitioner stresses that the tax exemption granted to educational stock corporations which have converted into non-profit
foundations was broadened to include any other charges imposed by the Government as one of the incentives for such
conversion.

ISSUE:

Is the petitioner exempt from payment of building permit fee and real property taxes.

RULING:

No. Petitioner is not exempted in the payment of building permit fee and real property tax because:

 Building fee is not a tax but an imposition pursuant to the regulatory powers of the LGUs to which petitioner is not exempted
from; and
 It is not exempted from property tax because it was being occupied by informal settler, it is not actually, directly and
exclusively used for educational purposes.
 R.A. No. 6055 granted tax exemptions to educational institutions like petitioner which converted to non-stock, non-profit
educational foundations. Section 8 of said law provides:
 SECTION 8. The Foundation shall be exempt from the payment of all taxes, import duties, assessments, and other charges
imposed by the Government on all income derived from or property, real or personal, used exclusively for the educational
activities of the Foundation.
 On February 19, 1977, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1096 was issued adopting the National Building Code of the
Philippines. The said Code requires every person, firm or corporation, including any agency or instrumentality of the
government to obtain a building permit for any construction, alteration or repair of any building or structure. Building permit
refers to “a document issued by the Building Official x x x to an owner/applicant to proceed with the construction,
 installation, addition, alteration, renovation, conversion, repair, moving, demolition or other work activity of a specific
project/building/structure or portions thereof after the accompanying principal plans, specifications and other pertinent
documents with the duly notarized application are found satisfactory and substantially conforming with the National Building
Code of the Philippines x x x and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).” Building permit fees refers to the basic
permit fee and other charges imposed under the National Building Code.

 Exempted from the payment of building permit fees are: (1) public buildings and (2) traditional indigenous family dwellings.
Not being expressly included in the enumeration of structures to which the building permit fees do not apply, petitioner’s
claim for exemption rests solely on its interpretation of the term “other charges imposed by the National Government” in the
tax exemption clause of R.A. No. 6055.

 That a building permit fee is a regulatory imposition is highlighted by the fact that in processing an application for a building
permit, the Building Official shall see to it that the applicant satisfies and conforms with approved standard requirements on
zoning and land use, lines and grades, structural design, sanitary and sewerage, environmental health, electrical and
mechanical safety as well as with other rules and regulations implementing the National Building Code. Thus, ancillary
permits such as electrical permit, sanitary permit and zoning clearance must also be secured and the corresponding fees paid
before a building permit may be issued. And as can be gleaned from the implementing rules and regulations of the National
Building Code, clearances from various government authorities exercising and enforcing regulatory functions affecting
buildings/structures, like local government units, may be further required before a building permit may be issued.

 A charge of a fixed sum which bears no relation at all to the cost of inspection and regulation may be held to be a tax rather
than an exercise of the police power. In this case, the Secretary of Public Works and Highways who is mandated to prescribe
and fix the amount of fees and other charges that the Building Official shall collect in connection with the performance of
regulatory functions, has promulgated and issued the Implementing Rules and Regulations which provide for the bases of
assessment of such fees, as follows:
o Character of occupancy or use of building
o Cost of construction “ 10,000/sq.m (A,B,C,D,E,G,H,I), 8,000 (F), 6,000 (J)
o Floor area
o Height

CHEVRON PHILIPPINES, INC. (Formerly CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC.), Petitioner,

vs.

BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and CLARK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents

Facts:

On June 28, 2002, the Board of Directors of respondent Clark Development Corporation (CDC) issued and approved
Policy Guidelines on the Movement of Petroleum Fuel to and from the Clark Special Economic Zone. In one of its
provisions, it levied royalty fees to suppliers delivering Coastal fuel from outside sources for Php0.50 per liter for those
delivering fuel to CSEZ locators not sanctioned by CDC and Php1.00 per litter for those bringing-in petroleum fuel from
outside sources. The policy guidelines were implemented effective July 27, 2002.

The petitioner Chevron Philippines Inc (formerly Caltex Philippines Inc) who is a fuel supplier to Nanox Philippines, a
locator inside the CSEZ, received a Statement of Account from CDC billing them to pay the royalty fees amounting to
Php115,000 for its fuel sales from Coastal depot to Nanox Philippines from August 1 to September 21, 2002.

Petitioner, contending that nothing in the law authorizes CDC to impose royalty fees based on a per unit measurement
of any commodity sold within the special economic zone, protested against the CDC and Bases Conversion Development
Authority (BCDA). They alleged that the royalty fees imposed had no reasonable relation to the probably expenses of
regulation and that the imposition on a per unit measurement of fuel sales was for a revenue generating purpose, thus,
akin to a “tax”.

BCDA denied the protest. The Office of the President dismissed the appeal as well for lack of merit.

Upon appeal, CA dismissed the case. CA held that in imposing the royalty fees, CDC was exercising its right to regulate
the flow of fuel into CSEZ under the vested exclusive right to distribute fuel within CSEZ pursuant to its Joint Venture
Agreement (JVA) with Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) and Coastal Subic Bay Terminal, Inc. (CSBTI) dated April
11, 1996. The appellate court also found that royalty fees were assessed on fuel delivered, not on the sale, by petitioner
and that the basis of such imposition was petitioner’s delivery receipts to Nanox Philippines. The fact that revenue is
incidentally also obtained does not make the imposition a tax as long as the primary purpose of such imposition is
regulation.

When elevated in SC, petitioner argued that: 1) CDC has no power to impose fees on sale of fuel inside CSEZ on the basis
of income generating functions and its right to market and distribute goods inside the CSEZ as this would amount to tax
which they have no power to impose, and that the imposed fee is not regulatory in nature but rather a revenue
generating measure; 2) even if the fees are regulatory in nature, it is unreasonable and are grossly in excess of
regulation costs.

Respondents contended that the purpose of royalty fees is to regulate the flow of fuel to and from the CSEZ and revenue
(if any) is just an incidental product. They viewed it as a valid exercise of police power since it is aimed at promoting the
general welfare of public; that being the CSEZ administrator, they are responsible for the safe distribution of fuel
products inside the CSEZ.

Issue:

Whether the act of CDC in imposing royalty fees can be considered as valid exercise of the police power.

Ruling:

Yes. SC held that CDC was within the limits of the police power of the State when it imposed royalty fees.

In distinguishing tax and regulation as a form of police power, the determining factor is the purpose of the implemented
measure. If the purpose is primarily to raise revenue, then it will be deemed a tax even though the measure results in
some form of regulation. On the other hand, if the purpose is primarily to regulate, then it is deemed a regulation and an
exercise of the police power of the state, even though incidentally, revenue is generated. Thus, in Gerochi v. Department
of Energy, 527 SCRA 696 (2007), the Court stated: The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two (2)
powers rests in the purpose for which the charge is made. If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and
regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is
incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax.

In relation to the regulatory purpose of the imposed fees, this Court in Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon
City, 172 SCRA 629 (1989), stated that “x x x the imposition questioned must relate to an occupation or activity that so
engages the public interest in health, morals, safety and development as to require regulation for the protection and
promotion of such public interest; the imposition must also bear a reasonable relation to the probable expenses of
regulation, taking into account not only the costs of direct regulation but also its incidental consequences as well.”

Administrative issuances have the force and effect of law. They benefit from the same presumption of validity and
constitutionality enjoyed by statutes. These two precepts place a heavy burden upon   any party assailing governmental
regulations. Petitioner’s plain allegations are simply not enough to overcome the presumption of validity and
reasonableness of the subject imposition.

Respondents submit that the increased administrative costs were triggered by security risks that have recently emerged,
such as terrorist strikes. The need for regulation is more evident in the light of 9/11 tragedy considering that what is
being moved from one location to another are highly combustible fuel products that could cause loss of lives and
damage to properties.

As to the issue of reasonableness of the amount of the fees, SC held that no evidence was adduced by the petitioner to
show that the fees imposed are unreasonable. Administrative issuances have the force and effect of law. They benefit
from the same presumption of validity and constitutionality enjoyed by statutes. These two precepts place a heavy
burden upon any party assailing governmental regulations. Petitioner’s plain allegations are simply not enough to
overcome the presumption of validity and reasonableness of the subject imposition.

SOUTHERN LUZON DRUG CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT,
THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE WELFARE OF DISABLED PERSONS, THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, and THE BUREAU
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Southern Luzon Drug Corporation filed a petition for prohibition against the DSWD, NCWDP (now National
Council on Disability Affairs or

NCDA), DOF and the BIR, which sought to prohibit the implementation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257,
otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003” and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442, which amends the
“Magna Carta for Disabled Persons,” particularly the granting of a 20% discount on the purchase of medicines by senior
citizens and persons with disability (PWD), respectively, and treating them as tax deduction.

RA 9257 amended some provisions of RA 7432. The new law retained the 20% discount on the purchase of medicines
but removed the annual income ceiling thereby qualifying all senior citizens to the privileges under the law. Further, R.A.
No. 9257 modified the tax treatment of the discount granted to senior citizens, from tax credit to tax deduction from
gross income, computed based on the net cost of goods sold or services rendered. Meanwhile, on March 24, 1992, R.A.
No. 7277 pertaining to the “Magna Carta for Disabled Persons” was enacted, codifying the rights and privileges of PWDs.

Thereafter, on April 30, 2007, R.A. No. 9442 was enacted, amending R.A. No. 7277. One of the salient amendments in
the law is the insertion of Chapter 8 in Title 2 thereof, which enumerates the other privileges and incentives of PWDs,
including the grant of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines. Similar to R.A. No. 9257, covered establishments shall
claim the discounts given to PWDs as tax deductions from the gross income, based on the net cost of goods sold or
services rendered.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the 20% Sales Discount for Senior Citizens and PWDs is a valid exercise of police power

RULING:

Yes. It is in the exercise of its police power that the Congress enacted R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442.

Generally, the office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against
proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal
or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is the remedy to prevent inferior courts,
corporations, boards, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been
vested by law. This is, however, not the lone office of an action for prohibition. In Diaz, et al. v. The Secretary of Finance,
et al., 654 SCRA 96 (2011), prohibition was also recognized as a proper remedy to prohibit or nullify acts of executive
officials that amount to usurpation of legislative authority. And, in a number of jurisprudence, prohibition was allowed
as a proper action to assail the constitutionality of a law or prohibit its implementation.

It is well to remember that “the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. It generally applies to cases involving
warring factual allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to [refer] to the trial courts at the first instance to
determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of the evidence of the parties. Cases which
depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately before appellate courts as they are not triers of
facts. Therefore, a strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the
appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions.” Moreover, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set
aside for special and important reasons, such as when dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy,
or demanded by the broader interest of justice. Thus, when based on the good judgment of the court, the urgency and
significance of the issues presented calls for its intervention, it should not hesitate to exercise its duty to resolve.

Verily, it is the bounden duty of the State to care for the elderly as they reach the point in their lives when the vigor of
their youth has diminished and resources have become scarce. Not much because of choice, they become needing of
support from the society for whom they presumably spent their productive days and for whose betterment they
exhausted their energy, know-how and experience to make our days better to live.

Providing aid for the disabled persons is an equally important State responsibility. Thus, the State is obliged to give full
support to the improvement of the total well-being of disabled persons and their integration into the mainstream of
society. This entails the creation of opportunities for them and according them privileges if only to balance the playing
field which had been unduly tilted against them because of their limitations. The duty to care for the elderly and the
disabled lies not only upon the State, but also on the community and even private entities. As to the State, the duty
emanates from its role as parens patriae which holds it under obligation to provide protection and look after the welfare
of its people especially those who cannot tend to themselves. Parens patriae means parent of his or her country, and
refers to the State in its role as “sovereign,” or the State in its capacity as a provider of protection to those unable to
care for themselves. In fulfilling this duty, the State may resort to the exercise of its inherent powers: police power,
eminent domain and power of taxation.

In Gerochi v. Department of Energy, 527 SCRA 696 (2007), the Court passed upon one of the inherent powers of the
state, the police power, where it emphasized, thus: [P]olice power is the power of the state to promote public welfare
by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most
demanding of the three fundamental powers of the State. The justification is found in the Latin maxim salus populi est
suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your
property as not to injure the property of others). As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually extends to all
public needs, police power grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the State, as parens patriae, gives effect
to a host of its regulatory powers. We have held that the power to “regulate” means the power to protect, foster,
promote, preserve, and control, with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility
and of its patrons. (Citations omitted) It is in the exercise of its police power that the Congress enacted R.A. Nos. 9257
and 9442, the laws mandating a 20% discount on purchases of medicines made by senior citizens and PWDs. It is also in
further exercise of this power that the legislature opted that the said discount be claimed as tax deduction, rather than
tax credit, by covered establishments.

The issue of just compensation finds no relevance in the instant case as it had already been made clear in Carlos
Superdrug v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, 526 SCRA 130 (2007), that the power being exercised by
the State in the imposition of senior citizen discount was its police power. Unlike in the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, just compensation is not required in wielding police power. This is precisely because there is no taking involved,
but only an imposition of burden.

In the exercise of police power, “property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State.” Even then, the State’s claim of police power cannot be
arbitrary or unreasonable. After all, the overriding purpose of the exercise of the power is to promote general welfare,
public health and safety, among others. It is a measure, which by sheer necessity, the State exercises, even to the point
of interfering with personal liberties or property rights in order to advance common good. To warrant such interference,
two requisites must concur: (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State; and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the
object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In other words, the proper exercise of the
police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.

According to Republic of the Philippines v. Vda. de Castellvi, 58 SCRA 336 (1974), five circumstances must be present in
order to qualify “taking” as an exercise of eminent domain. First, the expropriator must enter a private property.
Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period. Third, the entry into the
property should be under warrant or color of legal authority. Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or
otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in
such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Covered establishments are also provided with a mechanism to recoup the amount of discounts they grant the senior
citizens and PWDs. It is provided in Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442 that establishments
may claim the discounts as “tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered.” Basically,
whatever amount was given as discount, covered establishments may claim an equal amount as an expense or tax
deduction. The trouble is that the petitioner, in protesting the change in the tax treatment of the discounts, apparently
seeks tax incentive and not merely a return of the amount given as discounts. It premised its interpretation of financial
losses in terms of the effect of the change in the tax treatment of the discount on its tax liability; hence, the claim that
the measure was confiscatory. However, as mentioned earlier in the discussion, loss of profits is not the inevitable result
of the change in tax treatment of the discounts; it is more appropriately a consequence of poor business decision.

Right to profits does not give the petitioner the cause of action to ask for just compensation, it being only an inchoate
right or one that has not fully developed and therefore cannot be claimed as one’s own. An inchoate right is a mere
expectation, which may or may not come into existence. It is contingent as it only comes “into existence on an event or
condition which may not happen or be performed until some other event may prevent their vesting.” Certainly, the
petitioner cannot claim confiscation or taking of something that has yet to exist. It cannot claim deprivation of profit
before the consummation of a sale and the purchase by a senior citizen or PWD. Right to profit is not an accrued right; it
is not fixed, absolute nor indefeasible. It does not come into being until the occurrence or realization of a condition
precedent. It is a mere “contingency that might never eventuate into a right. It stands for a mere possibility of profit but
nothing might ever be payable under it.” The inchoate nature of the right to profit precludes the possibility of
compensation because it lacks the quality or characteristic which is necessary before any act of taking or expropriation
can be effected. Moreover, there is no yardstick fitting to quantify a contingency or to determine compensation for a
mere possibility. Certainly, “taking” presupposes the existence of a subject that has a quantifiable or determinable value,
characteristics which a mere contingency does not possess.

Anent the question regarding the shift from tax credit to tax deduction, suffice it is to say that it is within the province of
Congress to do so in the exercise of its legislative power. It has the authority to choose the subject of legislation, outline
the effective measures to achieve its declared policies and even impose penalties in case of noncompliance. It has the
sole discretion to decide which policies to pursue and devise means to achieve them, and courts often do not interfere
in this exercise for as long as it does not transcend constitutional limitations. “In performing this duty, the legislature has
no guide but its judgment and discretion and the wisdom of experience.”

The legislature may also grant rights and impose additional burdens. It may also regulate industries, in the exercise of
police power, for the protection of the public. R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442 are akin to regulatory laws, the issuance of which
is within the ambit of police power. The minimum wage law, zoning ordinances, price control laws, laws regulating the
operation of motels and hotels, laws limiting the working hours to eight, and the like fall under this category. Indeed,
regulatory laws are within the category of police power measures from which affected persons or entities cannot claim
exclusion or compensation. For instance, private establishments cannot protest that the imposition of the minimum
wage is confiscatory since it eats up a considerable chunk of its profits or that the mandated remuneration is not
commensurate for the work done. The compulsory nature of the provision for minimum wages underlies the effort of
the State, as R.A. No. 6727 expresses it, to promote productivity-improvement and gain-sharing measures to ensure a
decent standard of living for the workers and their families; to guarantee the rights of labor to its just share in the fruits
of production; to enhance employment generation in the countryside through industry dispersal; and to allow business
and industry reasonable returns on investment, expansion and growth, and as the Constitution expresses it, to affirm
labor as a primary social economic force.

The imposition of price control on staple goods in R.A. No. 7581 is likewise a valid exercise of police power and affected
establishments cannot argue that the law was depriving them of supposed gains. The law seeks to ensure the availability
of basic necessities and prime commodities at reasonable prices at all times without denying legitimate business a fair
return on investment. It likewise aims to provide effective and sufficient protection to consumers against hoarding,
profiteering and cartels with respect to the supply, distribution, marketing and pricing of said goods, especially during
periods of calamity, emergency, widespread illegal price manipulation and other similar situations.

The regulatory power of the State does not authorize the destruction of the business. While a business may be
regulated, such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, i.e., the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and
its provision cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of
regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by
the exercise of police power. After all, regulation only signifies control or restraint, it does not mean suppression or
absolute prohibition.

“The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated
and regulated differently from another.” For a classification to be valid, (1) it must be based upon substantial
distinctions, (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law, (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.

To recognize all senior citizens as a group, without distinction as to income, is a valid classification. The Constitution itself
considered the elderly as a class of their own and deemed it a priority to address their needs. When the Constitution
declared its intention to prioritize the predicament of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children, it
did not make any reservation as to income, race, religion or any other personal circumstances. It was a blanket privilege
afforded the group of citizens in the enumeration in view of the vulnerability of their class. R.A. No. 9257 is an
implementation of the avowed policy of the Constitution to enact measures that protect and enhance the right of all the
people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities. Specifically, it caters to the welfare of all
senior citizens. The classification is based on age and therefore qualifies all who have attained the age of 60. Senior
citizens are a class of their own, who are in need and should be entitled to government support, and the fact that they
may still be earning for their own sustenance should not disqualify them from the privilege.

Our senior citizens were the laborers, professionals and overseas contract workers of the past. While some may be well
to do or may have the capacity to support their sustenance, the discretion to avail of the privileges of the law is up to
them. But to instantly tag them as undeserving of the privilege would be the height of ingratitude; it is an outright
discrimination. The same ratiocination may be said of the recognition of PWDs as a class in R.A. No. 9442 and in granting
them discounts. It needs no further explanation that PWDs have special needs which, for most, last their entire lifetime.
They constitute a class of their own, equally deserving of government support as our elderlies. While some of them
maybe willing to work and earn income for themselves, their disability deters them from living their full potential. Thus,
the need for assistance from the government to augment the reduced income or productivity brought about by their
physical or intellectual limitations. There is also no question that the grant of mandatory discount is germane to the
purpose of R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, that is, to adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development
and make essential goods and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost, with special priority
given to the elderlies and the disabled, among others. The privileges granted by the laws ease their concerns and allow
them to live more comfortably.

To confirm his disability, the person must obtain a medical certificate or assessment, as the case maybe, issued by a
licensed private or government physician, licensed teacher or head of a business establishment attesting to his
impairment. The issuing entity depends on whether the disability is apparent or non-apparent.

FERMIN MANAPAT, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondents.

FACTS

Sometime in the 1960s, RCAM allowed a number of individuals to occupy the Grace Park property on condition that they
would vacate the premises should the former push through with the plan to construct a school in the area. The plan,
however, did not materialize, thus, the occupants offered to purchase the portions they occupied. Later, as they could
not afford RCAM’s proposed price, the occupants, organizing themselves as exclusive members of the Eulogio Rodriguez,
Jr. Tenants Association, Inc., petitioned the Government for the acquisition of the said property, its subdivision into
home lots, and the resale of the subdivided lots to them at a low price.

Acting on the association’s petition, the Government, in 1963, through the Land Tenure Administration (LTA), later
succeeded by the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), negotiated for the acquisition of the property
from RCAM/PRC. But because of the high asking price of RCAM and the budgetary constraints of the Government, the
latter’s effort to purchase and/or to expropriate the property was discontinued. RCAM then decided to effect, on its
own, the subdivision of the property and the sale of the individual subdivided lots to the public.6 Petitioners Manapat
and Lim and respondents Loberanes, Quimque, Vega, Santos, Oracion and Mercado in these consolidated cases were
among those who purchased individual subdivided lots of Grace Park directly from RCAM and/or PRC.

A significant turn of events however happened in 1977 when the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1072,8 appropriating P1.2M out of the President’s Special Operations Funds to cover the additional
amount needed for the expropriation of Grace Park. The National Housing Authority (NHA), PHHC’s successor, then filed
several expropriation proceedings over the already subdivided lots for the purpose of developing Grace Park under the
Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) and subdividing it into small lots for distribution and resale at a low cost to the resi
dents of the area.9 The following cases were filed by the NHA with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City: C-
6225, C-6226, C-6227, C-6228, C-6229, C-6230, C-6231, C-6232, C6233, C-6234, C-6235, C-6236, C-6237, C-6238, C-6255
and C6435.

After due proceedings, the trial court rendered separate decisions dismissing the expropriation cases, with the
exceptions of Cases Nos. C-6233 and C-6236 in which it ordered the condemnation of the involved lots.11 On motion for
reconsideration by the NHA in Cases Nos. C-6227, C-6228, C-6230, C6234, C-6235, C-6238 and C-6255, the trial court
later amended its decision, set aside its dismissal of the said cases, ordered the condemnation of the involved lots and
fixed the amount of just compensation at P180.00 per square meter. In Cases Nos. C-6225, C-6229, C-6231, C-6232, C-
6237 and C6435, the RTC however denied NHA’s motion for reconsideration.

NHA eventually appealed to the CA the decisions in Cases Nos. C-6225, C-6229, C-6231, C-6232, C-6237 and C-6435 on
the issue of the necessity of the taking, and the amended ruling in Cases Nos. C-6227, C-6228, C-6230, C-6234, C-6235,
C-6238 and C-6255 on the issue of just compensation.13 The CA consolidated the appeals and docketed them as CA-G.R.
CV No. 10200-10212. NHA likewise filed with the CA an appeal from the decision in C-6226, which was docketed as
CAG.R. CV No. 27159.
On May 27, 1993, the appellate court rendered its Decision14 in CA-G.R. CV No. 10200-10212:

1)Reversing and setting aside the decisions of dismissal in Cases Nos. C-6225, C-6229, C-6231, C-6232, C-6237 and C-
6435; and in lieu thereof an order of condemnation is entered declaring that plaintiff-appellant NHA has a lawful right to
take the lots involved for the public use described in the complaints;

2)Affirming the decisions in Case Nos. C-6227, C-6228, C6234, C-6235, C-6238 and C-6255 insofar as said decision
granted the expropriation; declaring that plaintiff-appellant NHA has a lawful right to take the lots involved for the public
use stated in the complaint; but annulling and setting aside the just compensation fixed by the trial court at P180.00 per
square meter in the said cases;

3)Ordering the remand of all the appealed cases, except for Case No. C-6230, to the trial court for determination of the
just compensation to which defendants are entitled in accordance with Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court;

4)Finding the compromise agreement in Case No. C-6230, entitled, “NHA v. Aurora Dy dela Costa, et al.” in accordance
with law, and not contrary to morals or public policy, and rendering judgment in accordance therewith;

5)Ordering Remedios Macato to be joined as defendant with Julia C. Diaz in Case No. C-6227.

Rosemarie and Dolores Guanzon, two of the owners of the lots in C-6225, filed before this Court a petition for review on
certiorari of the aforesaid decision of the appellate court [Their petition was docketed as G.R. Nos. 110462-74]. On
September 5, 1994, we dismissed their petition for failure to sufficiently show that the CA had committed any reversible
error in the challenged decision.16 An Entry of Judgment was issued on February 2, 1995.

Likewise, Julia Diez and Remedios Macato, the owners of the lots in C-6227, assailed before us the afore-quoted CA
decision through a petition under Rule 45. On July 28, 1993, however, in G.R. No. 110770, we denied their Motion for
Extension of Time to file a petition for review on certiorari for their failure to submit an affidavit of service of the motion
as required by Circular No. 19-91.18 After denying their motion for reconsideration,19 we issued an Entry of Judgment
on August 27, 1993.20

Petitioner Manapat, the defendant-landowner in C-6229, also elevated the case before us via a petition for review on
certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 110478.21 We initially dismissed this petition for having been filed out of time,22 but we
reinstated it on motion for reconsideration.

The motions for reconsideration of movants Gonzalo Mercado, Cesario Vega and Juanito Santos (in Special Civil Action
No. 6435) and movants Maximo Loberanes and Eladio Quimque (in Special Civil Action No. 6231) are GRANTED. The
motion for reconsideration of movant Alejandro Oracion (in Special Civil Action No. 6435) is partially granted to the
extent of Three Hundred (300) square meters of Lot 22, Block 157. The decision of this Court promulgated May 27, 1993
is accordingly MODIFIED. Lot No. 26, Block No. 157 owned by Cesario Vega and Juanito Santos, and Lot No. 4, Block No.
157 owned by Maximo Loberanes and Eladio Quimque are declared exempt from expropriation and the corresponding
complaints for expropriation (sic) DISMISSED insofar as said lots are concerned. Lot No. 22, Block No. 157 owned by
movant Alejandro Oracion is declared exempt from expropriation to the extent of Three Hundred (300) square meters.
Only the remaining Ninety (90) square meters shall be the subject of expropriation, the portion to be determined by the
lower court in the manner most beneficial to the owner and consistent with the objective of PD 1072.

Aggrieved by the said March 2, 1994 CA Resolution specifically with regard to the exemption from expropriation of the
lots of Loberanes, Quimque, Mercado, Vega and Santos, and the partial exemption of the lot of Oracion, NHA moved for
the reconsideration of the same. In the subsequent July 25, 1994 Resolution,27 the appellate court denied NHA’s
motion, together with the belated motion of Vivencio S. de Guzman, the defendant-landowner in C-6255.

With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, NHA filed with this Court a Consolidated Petition for Review29 under
Rule 45, as aforesaid, assailing the March 2, 1994 and the July 25, 1994 Resolutions of the appellate court. NHA’s
petition was docketed as G.R. Nos. 116491-503 against respondents Loberanes and Quimque (in C-6231), Vega, Santos,
Oracion and Mercado (in C-6435).
In a separate development, the CA, on June 28, 1994, rendered its Decision30 in CA-G.R. CV No. 27159, reversing the
RTC’s ruling in C-6226.

Discontented with the appellate court’s ruling, petitioner Domingo Lim, one of the owners of the lots subject of C-6226,
elevated the case to us via a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 116176.

Issues:

Whether or not the court of appeals erred in holding that the issuance made in the exercise of legislative power,
specifying the lots to be expropriated and the purpose for which they are intended, removes from the judiciary the
determination of the necessity of the taking, there being no showing of abuse of discretion.

Whether or not the supervening event renders improper the disposition by the court of appeals for an order of
condemnation declaring that nha has a lawful right to take the lot of fermin manapat for supposed public use and for
remand of his case to the trial court for determination of just compensation.

Ruling:

The power of eminent domain is an inherent and indispensable power of the State; By virtue of its sovereign character,
the exercise of the power prevails over the non-impairment clause, and is clearly superior to the final and executory
judgment rendered by a court in an ejectment case; Section 9, Article III of the Constitution merely imposes a limit on
the government’s exercise of the power and provides a measure of protection to the individual’s right to property.—The
power of eminent domain is an inherent and indispensable power of the State. Also called the power of expropriation, it
is described as “the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government” that may be acquired for
some public purpose through a method “in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State.” By virtue of its sovereign
character, the exercise of the power prevails over the non-impairment clause, and is clearly superior to the final and
executory judgment rendered by a court in an ejectment case. Being inherent, the power need not be specifically
conferred on the government by the Constitution. Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, which mandates that “private
property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation,” merely imposes a limit on the government’s
exercise of the power and provides a measure of protection to the individual’s right to property.

Just like its two companion fundamental powers of the State, the power of eminent domain is exercised by the
Legislature. However, it may be delegated by Congress to the President, administrative bodies, local government units,
and even to private enterprises performing public services.

Over the years and in a plethora of cases, this Court has recognized the following requisites for the valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain: (1) the property taken must be private property; (2) there must be genuine necessity to take
the private property; (3) the taking must be for public use; (4) there must be payment of just compensation; and (5) the
taking must comply with due process of law.

It is well to recall that in Lagcao v. Judge Labra, 440 SCRA 279 (2004), we declared that the foundation of the right to
exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. As a rule, the
determination of whether there is genuine necessity for the exercise is a justiciable question. However, when the power
is exercised by the Legislature, the question of necessity is essentially a political question. Thus, in City of Manila v.
Chinese Community, 40 Phil. 349 (1919), we held: The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a particular improvement for public
use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well-settled that the utility of the
proposed improvement, the extent of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the
suitableness of the location selected and the consequent necessity of taking the land selected for its site, are all
questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute their
own views for those of the representatives of the people.

The Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP), being implemented for government by NHA, draws breath from policy mandates
found in the 1987 Constitution. It is an integral part of the government’s “socialized housing” program which, in
Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, we deemed compliant with the “public use” requirement, it being a program
clearly devoted to a “public purpose.” Justice Irene R. Cortes, speaking eloquently for the Court, said: “Socialized
housing” is defined as, “the construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower class members of our society,
including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities” (Pres. Decree No. 1224, par. 1). This
definition was later expanded to include among others: a) The construction and/or improvement of dwelling units for
the middle and lower income groups of the society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other
facilities; b) Slum clearance, relocation and resettlement of squatters and slum dwellers as well as the provision of
related facilities and services; c) Slum improvement which consists basically of allocating homelots to the dwellers in the
area or property involved, rearrangement and re-alignment of existing houses and other dwelling structures and the
construction and provision of basic community facilities and services, where there are none, such as roads, footpaths,
drainage, sewerage, water and power system, schools, barangay centers, community centers, clinics, open spaces,
parks, playgrounds and other recreational facilities; d) The provision of economic opportunities, including the
development of commercial and industrial estates and such other facilities to enhance the total community growth; and,
e) Such other activities undertaken in pursuance of the objective to provide and maintain housing for the greatest
number of people under Presidential Decree No. 757. (Pres. Decree No. 1259, sec. 1) x x x x

It need only be added, at this juncture, that the “public use” requisite for the valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. At present, it may not be amiss to state that
whatever is beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.

J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration , 31 SCRA 413 (1970), is instructive. In that case, this Court
adopted the dissenting opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Republic v. Baylosis, 96 Phil. 461 (1955), that the propriety of
exercising the power of eminent domain cannot be determined on a purely quantitative or area basis, given that the
Constitution speaks of lands, not of landed estates. Speaking through Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique M. Fernando,
the Court said: This is not to say of course that property rights are disregarded. This is merely to emphasize that the
philosophy of our Constitution embodying as it does what Justice Laurel referred to as its “nationalistic and socialist
traits discoverable upon even a sudden dip into a variety of [its] provisions” although not extending as far as the
“destruction or annihilation” of the rights to property, negates the postulate which at one time reigned supreme in
American constitutional law as to their well-nigh inviolable character. This is not so under our Constitution, which rejects
the doctrine of laissez faire with its abhorrence for the least interference with the autonomy supposed to be enjoyed by
the property owner. Laissez faire, as Justice Malcolm pointed out as far back as 1919, did not take too firm a foothold in
our jurisprudence. Our Constitution is much more explicit. There is no room for it for laissez faire.

The Court is not unaware of the condition now imposed by R.A. No. 7279 that, for purposes of urban development and
housing under the Act, where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be
exempted. “Small property owners” are owners of residential lands with an area not exceeding 300 sq. m. in highly
urbanized cities and 800 sq. m. in other urban areas and who do not own any other real property. Invoking this
limitation under the said law, the appellate court in the questioned rulings exempted from expropriation the lots owned
by Loberanes, Quimque, Mercado, Vega and Santos, and partially exempted the lot of Oracion. The CA’s ruling on this
point is incorrect. R.A. No. 7279 was enacted in 1992, almost two decades after the expropriation cases against the
property owners herein were instituted with the RTC in 1977. Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet, non
praeteritis. A new statute should affect the future, not the past. The law looks forward, not backward. Article 4 of the
Civil Code even explicitly declares, “(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.” In these
consolidated cases, the Court finds that the language of R.A. No. 7279 does not suggest that the Legislature has intended
its provisions to have any retroactive application. On the contrary, Section 49 of the said law indicates that it “shall take
effect upon its publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.” The law’s prospective
application being clearly stated, the Court cannot agree with the disposition of the appellate court that the subject lots
not exceeding 300 sq. m. are exempt from expropriation.

THE CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff and appellant, vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA ET AL., defendants and appellees.

FACTS:

The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into an
extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion
of the private cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.

Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were available. They
further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those
persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed.

The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in question.
Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no
right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal.

ISSUE

Whether or not the City of Manila can condemn private property for public use.

Ruling

Yes. When a municipal corporation attempts to expropriate private property and an objection is made thereto by the
owner, the courts have ample authority, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry, and to hear proof upon an -issue properly
presented, concerning the question whether or not the purpose of the appropriation is, in fact, for some public use. The
right of expropriation is not inherent power in a municipal corporation and before it can exercise the right some law
must exist conferring the power upon it. A municipal corporation in this jurisdiction cannot expropriate public property.
The land to be expropriated must be private, and the purpose of the expropriation must be public. If the court, upon
trial, finds that neither of said condition exists, or that either one of them fails, the right to expropriate does not exist. If
the property is taken in' the ostensible behalf of a public improvement which it can never by any possibility serve, it is
being taken for a use not public, and the owner's constitutional rights call for protection by the courts.

Upon the other hand, the Legislature may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a
particular improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well
settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the existence of the public necessity for its construction, the
expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected, and the consequent necessity of taking the lands
selected, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere or to
substitute their own views for those of the representatives of the people.

But when the law does not designate the property to be taken, nor how much may be taken, then the necessity of
taking private property is a question for the courts.
There is a wide distinction between a legislative declaration that a municipality is given authority to exercise the right of
eminent domain and a decision by the municipality that there exists a necessity for the exercise of that right in a
particular case.

Whether or not it was wise, advisable, or necessary to confer upon a municipality the power to exercise the right of
eminent domain, is a question with which the courts are not concerned. But whenever that right or authority is
exercised for the purpose of depriving citizens of their property, the courts are authorized, in this jurisdiction, to make
inquiry and to hear proof upon the necessity in a particular case, and not the general authority.

In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, the necessity and expediency of exercising
the right of eminent domain are questions essentially political and not judicial in their character.

The taking of private property for any use which is not required by the necessities or convenience of the inhabitants of a
state, is an unreasonable exercise of the right of eminent domain

That government can scarcely be deemed free where the rights of property are left solely dependent on the legislative
body without restraint. The fundamental maxims of free government seem to require that the rights of personal liberty
and private property should be held sacred. At least no court of justice would be warranted in assuming that the power
to violate and disregard them lurks in any general grant of legislative authority or ought to be implied from any general
expression of the people. The people ought not to be presumed to part with rights so vital to their security and well-
being without a very strong and direct expression of such intention.

The exercise of the right of eminent domain is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that
the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity and none is
guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the
legislature interferes with that right, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation.

The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a
public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede, and not follow, the taking of the property. The
general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the right to exercise it in a particular
case.

Where a cemetery is open to the public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses
under a general authority.

The city of Manila is not authorized to expropriate public property.

DIOSDADO LAGCAO, DOROTEO LAGCAO and URSULA LAGCAO, petitioners, vs. JUDGE GENEROSA G. LABRA, Branch
23, Regional Trial Court, Cebu, and the CITY OF CEBU, respondent.

Facts

In 1964, the Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. One of these lots was Lot 1029, situated in Capitol
Hills, Cebu City, with an area of 4,048 square meters. In 1965, petitioners purchased Lot 1029 on installment basis. But
then, in late 1965, the 210 lots, including Lot 1029, reverted to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province tried to
annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the City of Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the province for specific
performance and damages in the then Court of First Instance.
On July 9, 1986, the court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the Province of Cebu to execute the final deed
of sale in favor of petitioners and affirmed by the CA.

Petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1,
Cebu City, rendered a decision on April 1, 1998, ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the
MTCCs decision and issued a writ of execution and order of demolition.

However, when the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters[4]
to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City was still looking for a relocation
site for the squatters. The MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition. Unfortunately for petitioners, during the
suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized
housing site pursuant to RA 7279. Then, on June 30, 1999, the SP passed Ordinance No. 1772 which included Lot 1029
among the identified sites for socialized housing. On July, 19, 2000, Ordinance No. 1843[7] was enacted by the SP of
Cebu City authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029 which
was registered in the name of petitioners. This ordinance was approved by Mayor Garcia on August 2, 2000.

On August 29, 2000, petitioners filed with the RTC an action for declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for being
unconstitutional. The trial court rendered its decision on July 1, 2002 dismissing the complaint filed by petitioners whose
subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on August 26, 2002.

Issue

Whether or not the intended expropriation by the City of Cebu of a 4,048-square-meter parcel of land owned by
petitioners contravenes the Constitution and applicable laws.

Ruling

No. Under Section 48 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, local legislative power shall
be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the city. The legislative acts of the Sangguniang Panlungsod in the
exercise of its lawmaking authority are denominated ordinances. Local government units have no inherent power of
eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. By virtue of RA 7160, Congress
conferred upon local government units the power to expropriate.

There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws; and (2) private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Thus, the exercise by local government units of the
power of eminent domain is not absolute. In fact, Section 19 of RA 7160 itself explicitly states that such exercise must
comply with the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.

The due process clause cannot be trampled upon each time an ordinance orders the expropriation of a private
individual’s property. The courts cannot even adopt a hands-off policy simply because public use or public purpose is
invoked by an ordinance, or just compensation has been fixed and determined. In De Knecht vs. Bautista, we said: It is
obvious then that a land-owner is covered by the mantle of protection due process affords. It is a mandate of reason. It
frowns on arbitrariness, it is the antithesis of any governmental act that smacks of whim or caprice. It negates state
power to act in an oppressive manner. It is, as had been stressed so often, the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair
play. In that sense, it stands as a guaranty of justice. That is the standard that must be met by any governmental agency
in the exercise of whatever competence is entrusted to it. As was so emphatically stressed by the present Chief Justice,
“Acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny due process only under pain of nullity. x x x. The
foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of public character.
Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated.
Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation
proceedings may be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition are exhausted. Compliance with these
conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of private property against
what may be a tyrannical violation of due process when their property is forcibly taken from them allegedly for public
use.

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the city or municipality to enact but
must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. It must be in accordance with certain well-
established basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that an ordinance (1) must not contravene
the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not
prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2: WEEK 2 Case Digest

TOPIC: Criminal Proceedings

Art. III, Section 14

G.R. No. L-30104 July 25, 1973

HON. GREGORIO N. GARCIA City Court of Manila, and FRANCISCO LORENZANA, Petitioners,

vs.

HON. FELIX DOMINGO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, EDGARDO CALO and SIMEON CARBONNEL,
Respondents.

FACTS:

 In Branch I of the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge, there were commenced, all dated
January 16, 1968 eight criminal actions respondents Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Petitioner
Lorenzana.
(Filed case: Slight physical injury, maltreatment, light treat, slander and violation of Sec. 887 of the Revised
Ordinances of Manila [resisting an officer])

 The trial for the cases was jointly held on 14 trial dates. And all the fourteen trial dates fell on a Saturday. This
was arranged by the parties and the Court upon the insistence of respondents Calo and Carbonnel who, as
police officers under suspension because of the cases, desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible as,
Saturday as agreed upon as the invariable trial day for said 8 criminal cases.

 The trial of the cases in question was held with the conformity of the accused and their counsel in the chambers
of Judge Garcia.
  It is worthy to note that said respondents Calo and Carbonnel had not objected to any supposed irregularity of
the proceedings thus far;

 Then Carbonnel thru their counsel, filed with the Court of First Instance a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction alleging jurisdictional defects.

 The respondent judge acting on such petition forthwith issued a restraining order causing the deferment of the
promulgation of judgment. There was an order from him declaring that ‘the constitutional and statutory rights
of the accused had been violated, adversely affecting their right to a free and impartial trial noting that the trial
of these cases lasting several weeks were held exclusively in chambers and not in the court room open to the
public.

 What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties, and of the city court Judge, it
was in the latter’s air-conditioned chambers that the trial was held. Did that suffice to vitiate the proceedings as
violative of this right?

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Whether or not the trial conducted in the chambers of the Judge suffice to vitiate the proceedings as violative of the
right to Public trial.

RULING OF THE COURT:

No. The answer must be in the negative. There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to admit that the
size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a fact though is not
indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others.

Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial
being public if the accused could “have his friends, relatives and counsel present, not matter with what offense he may
be charged.” Then too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had been held in
chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the part of respondent policemen should erase any doubt as to
the weight to be accorded.
Thus, in one case, the trial of the accused was held in Bilibid prison. The accused, invoking his right to public trial,
assigned the procedure thus taken as error. The Supreme Court held that as it affirmatively appears on the record that
the accused offered no objection to the trial of his case in the place where it was held his right is deemed waived.

The crucial question of the meaning to be attached this provision remains. The Constitution guarantees an accused the
right to a public trial. What does it signify? Off hand it does seem fairly obvious that there is an instance where language
is to be given literal application. There is no ambiguity in the words employed. The trial must be public. It possesses that
character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do
so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the
parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded
further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety.

Where the trial takes place, as is quite usual, in a courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is posted no
problem, arises. It is the usual course of events that individuals desirous of being present are free to do so. There is the
well-recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as
“offensive to decency or public morals.”

XXXXXXXXXX

G.R. No. L-59318 May 16, 1983

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ROGELIO RAMOS y GAERLAN, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
  Accused Rogelio Ramos y Gaerlan is guilty for violation of Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 2(i), Article I
of the Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by P.D. No. 44 and further amended by P.D. No. 1675. (Section 4
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972)

 Evening of May 3. 1981, while P/Lt. E. Mediavillo and P/Sgt. A. Linga were on routine patrol along Taft Avenue,
they had seen and observed one MALCON OLEVERE y NAPA, acting suspiciously near the corner of Estrada
Street.

 The police officers, after Identifying themselves, stopped and frisked the suspect and found in his possession
dried marijuana leaves. The police officers thereafter placed Malcon Olevere under arrest. Upon investigation,
suspect Olevere declared that he bought the recovered marijuana leaves from one ROGELIO RAMOS y GAERLAN,
alias "Balanchoy".

 The following day, a police team with suspect Malcon Olevere y Napa proceeded to the residence of appellant
Rogelio Ramos y Gaerlan and arrested him. The police operatives immediately brought appellant to the Drugs
Enforcement Section Western Police Department Headquarters for investigation.
 During the custodial investigation, suspect Malcon Olevere executed a written sworn statement implicating the
accused-appellant Rogelio Ramos as the source of the marijuana leaves. Thereafter, the accused after having
been duly apprised of his constitutional rights, verbally admitted before Lt. E. Mediavillo and Sgt. A. Linga the
commission of the offense charged.

 However, upon arraignment, the accused-appellant Ramos entered a plea of not guilty to the information filed
by assistant fiscal Antonio J. Ballena.

 RTC RULING: Found the accused-appellant Ramos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in view
of the verbal admission given by the appellant himself and the evidence offered and admitted in court.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

1. Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused, more particularly the right to meet the witness against him
face to face and to cross-examine him has been violated.

2. Whether or not there is competent and/or admissible evidence in the record to justify the conviction of the accused-
appellant Ramos.

RULING OF THE COURT:

The court finds the petitioner's case meritorious.

The lower court erred in admitting as evidence the written sworn affidavit of Malcon Olevere. It can be gleaned from the
records that Malcon Olevere executed the written sworn statement declaring that appellant Ramos sold to him the
marijuana leaves for P10.00. This piece of evidence is a mere scrap of paper because Malcon Olevere was not produced
in court for cross-examination. An affidavit being taken ex-parte is often incomplete and inaccurate. Such kind of
evidence is considered hearsay. The constitutional right to meet witnesses face to face in order not to deprive persons
of their lives and properties without due process of law is well-protected in our jurisprudence.

For the court to admit the sworn statement of Malcon Olevere without giving the adverse party the right to cross-
examine him would easily facilitate the fabrication of evidence and the perpetration of fraud. The inadmissibility of this
sort of evidence is based, not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse party to cross-examine the
affiant, but also on the commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by
another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by
the one writing them

The Booking Sheet and the Dangerous Drug Report of chemist Felisa Vequilla which were presented as evidence by the
prosecution, established nothing to support the conviction of the appellant herein. For the same reason, that Malcon
Olevere was not presented as a witness and insofar as they impute to appellant the commission of the crime charged,
the adduced evidence are nothing but hearsay evidence. They cannot be regarded as competent evidence as to the
veracity of the contents therein.

Wherefore, the court hold and rule that the guilt of the accused has not been established beyond reasonable doubt and
he is, therefore, entitled to acquittal.

XXXXXXXXXX

G. R. No. 120350 October 13, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

FREDDIE YAMBOT y DELOS SANTOS, FRANCIS VERSOZA, ARNILO GAVIOLA y CARBAJAL, MARCIANO SAYASA, and
EDGARDO LINGAN, accused-appellants.

FACTS:

 Accused Freddie Yambot y delos Santos, Francis Versoza, Arnelo (sic) Gaviola y Carbajal, Marciano Sayasa and
Edgardo Lingan Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Kidnapping for Ransom as charged. (Victim:
Francisco Bernabe)
  Upon arraignment, appellant Freddie Yambot y delos Santos, assisted by Atty. Tiberio U. Prado; and appellant
Arnilo Gaviola, with the assistance of Atty. Froilan Zapanta, pleaded not guilty to the accusations against them.
Appellant Francis Versoza likewise entered a negative plea upon arraignment.

 On June 3, 1994, the prosecution amended the Information to include, among others, Renato Jamorawon and
appellant Marciano Sayasa (AKA Romy Sayasa). (Pleaded not guilty upon arraignment)

 On June 21, 1994, the trial court of origin, on motion of the prosecution, discharged accused Renato Jamorawon
to serve as a state witness.

 On May 22, 1995, after trial, the lower court handed down the judgment of conviction under automatic review.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Whether or not appellants Freddie Yambot and Francis Versoza were denied of due process of law.

RULING OF THE COURT:

YES. It appears that they were denied of due process of law.

Enshrined in the constitution is the paramount right of the accused to "xxx have a compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. xxx" Procedural due process cannot possibly be
satisfied without a "law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after
trial." The constitutional right of the accused to be heard on his defense is inviolate. No court of justice under our system
of government has the power to deprive him of that right.

In the case under consideration, appellants Yambot and Versoza were scheduled to present evidence on December 12,
14, 16, 19, 21 and 23, 1994. Thus, on December 7, 1994, subpoena was issued to appellants' witnesses Marie Maniego
of Sapang Jaen Nueva Ecija and police officer Joe Villena of Gapan Police Station, Gapan Nueva Ecija. Said subpoena,
however, was not served on Marie Maniego, who was unknown at the given address, while in the case of Joe Villena, he
received the subpoena only on December 9, 1994.

At the hearing on April 19, 1995, the trial court, on motion of Atty. Prado, reset the presentation of evidence for
appellants Yambot and Versoza to May 15, 22, and 26, 1995; and issued the corresponding subpoena for witnesses
Marie Maniego and Joe Villena, even as it reiterated its warning to declare a waiver of appellants' right to adduce
evidence.

On May 15, 1995, Atty. Prado pleaded for a resetting of the presentation of evidence on the ground that the
subpoenaed witnesses did not appear. Thereupon, the trial court issued a warrant of arrest against witness Joe Villena,
declaring him in contempt of court for repeated failure to appear before the court. Nevertheless, it ignored the plea of
appellants' counsel to present Joe Villena as witness and submitted the case for decision

From the foregoing, it can be gleaned uneeringly that the delay in the progress of the case under scrutiny is not entirely
attributable to appellants Yambot and Verzosa. The trial court should have granted said appellants' prayer for the
presentation of their witness. It is worthy to note that the trial court issued a warrant of arrest against witness Joe
Villena but denied the counsel of said appellants to present Joe Villena as a witness.

Conformably therewith, in People vs. Hipolito Diaz y De Guzman,48 the Court held:

"It is well settled that the right to be heard by himself and counsel is one of the constitutional rights granted to the
accused. Not only this but he likewise has the right to present evidence for his defense. Accordingly, denial of due
process can be successfully invoked where no valid waiver of rights has been made, as in the instant case.

Wherefore, appellants Freddie Yambot y delos Santos and Francis Versoza, the judgment of conviction against them is
SET ASIDE; and the trial court is hereby ordered to receive the evidence on their behalf and to render judgment on them
based on the evidence for the prosecution already adduced and that of Freddie Yambot and Francis Versoza.

XXXXXXXXXX

G.R. No. L-61356-57 September 30, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

FELICISIMO JARA, REYMUNDO VERGARA and ROBERTO BERNADAS, defendants-appellants.

FACTS:
  The three appellants were all sentenced to death in Criminal Case No. 2564 for robbery with homicide. In the
companion case of parricide, one was sentenced to another death penalty while the two other appellants
received sentenced ranging from 12 to 20 years of imprisonment.

 All the accused pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. On motion by the prosecution and the defense, the
court a quo ordered a joint trial of the two cases which arose from one incident and where the witnesses are the
same.

 Felicisimo Jara denied the charge that he was the one who killed his wife, Luisa, together with her friend,
Amparo Bantigue. He interposed alibi as a defense and testified that at the time the killings took place at Alvin's
Canteen at Malvar Street, Puerto Princesa City, he was fast asleep with his grandchildren at his step-daughter's
house in Pineda Subdivision.

 The other accused, Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas retracted their respective extra-judicial
confessions admitting their participation in the crimes charged and Identifying their mastermind" as the accused
Jara during proceedings before the Inquest Fiscal. They contested the admissibility of the extra-judicial
confessions and the subsequent re- enactment of the crime on the ground that their participations in these
occasions were not free and voluntary and were without the benefit of counsel.

 The court below ruled that the extra-judicial confessions of the accused Bernadas and Vergara, together with
the proof of corpus delicti of the special crime of robbery with homicide established the guilt of the accused
beyond moral certainty.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

1. Whether or not there is sufficient evidence as borne by the records to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.

2. Whether or not the court erred in admitting the alleged extra-judicial confessions of accused-appellants reymundo
vergara and roberto bernadas which were taken thru force and without benefit of counsel.

RULING OF THE COURT:

There is no dispute that the confessions in these cases were obtained in the absence of counsel. According to the
records, there was a waiver by the accused-appellants of their right to counsel. However, the court constrained to
answer that the waiver is invalid.

Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection, the presumption is
always against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution must prove with strongly convincing evidence to the
satisfaction of this Court that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and
deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession.
That proof is missing in this case.
The records sustain the appellants' contention that their extrajudicial confessions bear clear earmarks of illegality and
improbability.

The Solicitor General gives the following arguments for voluntariness:

An extra-judicial confession is generally presumed to have been voluntarily executed (People v. Castañeda, 93 SCRA 56).
The confessant carries the burden of convincing the trial judge that his admissions are involuntary or untrue (People v.
Ramos, 94 SCRA 842).

The trial court in this case was not convinced that the extrajudicial confessions of appellants were made involuntarily.
Consider the following reasons for the court's refusal to lend credence to appellants' claim:

(1) Apart from appellants' self-serving claim no other evidence on record supports the allegation of involuntariness
(People v. Villa, 93 SCRA 716).

(2) On the contrary, several prosecution witnesses testified that the confessions were voluntarily given.

(3) Appellants' oral and written confessions given at various times to several investigating authorities, not to mention the
public re-enactment of the crime itself, did not vary and they revealed details only the assailants could have possibly
known (People v. Ty Sui Wong, 83 SCRA 125; People v. Bautista y Aquino, 92 SCRA 465).

(4) Appellants' confessions were corroborated by the existence of  corpus delicti established by independent evidence
(People v. Francisco, 93 SCRA 351).

(5) The claim of coercion cannot prevail over the testimony of the subscribing fiscal that said confession was voluntary
(People v. Caramonte, 94 SCRA 150).

Moreover, it is natural and to be expected that the police officers who secured the confessions in these cases should
testify that the statements were voluntarily given. However, the records show that the interrogations were conducted
incommunicado in a police-dominated atmosphere. When appellant Bernadas gave his confession, his companions in
the room were five police officers. The only people with Vergara when he confessed were also police investigators.

Also, there are other factors to be considered in these cases. Vergara and Barnadas had been detained for more than
two (2) weeks before they decided to give "voluntary" confessions. We doubt if it was two weeks of soul-searching and
introspection alone which led them to confess. There must have been other persuasions.
Apart from their extra-judicial confessions, no other evidence to implicate Bernadas and Vergara as perpetrators of the
killing was introduced by the prosecution. Since these confessions are inadmissible in evidence, the two appellants have
to be acquitted.

Wherefore, the accused Bernadas and Vergara are ACQUITTED of the crime of ROBBERY with HOMICIDE on the ground
of reasonable doubt.

Constitutional Law 2: WEEK 1

TOPIC: INTRODUCTION TO BILL OF RIGHTS

[G.R. NO. 160792 : August 25, 2005]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY ALEJANO, PN
(MARINES) CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN (MARINES) CAPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, PA
LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN CAPT. MILO MAESTRECAMPO, PA LT. SG ANTONIO TRILLANES
IV, PN HOMOBONO ADAZA, and ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO, Petitioners, 

vs. 

GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO REYES, and SEC. ROILO
GOLEZ, Respondents.

FACTS:

Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321-armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers, entered and
took control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (“Oakwood”), an upscale apartment complex, located in the
business district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in
its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration and called for the
resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members.

Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several
negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The
soldiers then returned to their barracks. On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive
to all the Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The
transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers’ involvement in the Oakwood
incident.

On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood incident. The government prosecutors
accused the soldiers of coup d’etat as defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines, as amended. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The trial court later issued the
Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (“Trillanes”) and Capt. Gerardo Gambala
to the Commanding Officers of ISAFP. On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service Commanders
to take into custody the military personnel under their command who took part in the Oakwood incident except the
detained junior officers who were to remain under the custody of ISAFP.

Petitioners filed a petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA, however the same was denied. The Court of
Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The appellate court pointed out that the detainees are already charged of
coup d’etat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees’
confinement is under a valid indictment, the legality of which the detainees and petitioners do not even question.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Whether or not the denial of the petition for Habeas Corpus is valid.

RULING OF THE COURT:

YES. For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination
of the propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the detention unlawful, then it should issue the writ
and release the detainees. In the present case, after hearing the case, the Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is
inapplicable. After actively participating in the hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners are estopped from
claiming that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of their petition.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to address the
detainees’ complaint against the regulations and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy of habeas corpus
has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a
person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the
release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.

The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal.

A mere allegation of a violation of one’s constitutional right is not sufficient. The courts will extend the scope of the writ
only if any of the following circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the
unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is
imposed and such sentence is void as to the excess.

AS TO DENIAL OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL: The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to the detainees,
giving petitioners sufficient time to confer with the detainees. The detainees’ right to counsel is not undermined by the
scheduled visits. Even in the hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano Commission, petitioners were given time to
confer with the detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves admit.23 Thus, at no point were the detainees denied their
right to counsel.

AS TO INHUMANE PUNISHMENT: The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security within the
ISAFP Detention Center. This measure intends to fortify the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from passing on
contraband and weapons from one cell to another. The boarded grills ensure security and prevent disorder and crime
within the facility. The diminished illumination and ventilation are but discomforts inherent in the fact of detention, and
do not constitute punishments on the detainees.

The limitation on the detainees’ physical contacts with visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response to valid
security concerns.

AS TO RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION: The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities
were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from
detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees’ personal courier and not as their counsel
when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were not confidential communication
between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters
are marked confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not
read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees.

NOTES:

 To invoke right to privacy in this case, the letter must be: (1) marked as confidential; or (2) must be a letter to or
from counsel of the detainee (privileged communication between attorney and client).
 G.R. No. L-5621 March 25, 1953
PHILIPPINE MOVIE PICTURES WORKERS' ASSOCIATION, Petitioner,
vs. 
PREMIERE PRODUCTIONS, INC., Respondent.

FACTS:

On October 2, 1951, respondent filed with the Court of Industrial Relations an urgent petition seeking authority
to lay-off 44 men working in three of its departments, the first batch to be laid off thirty (30) days after the filing of the
petition and the rest 45 days thereafter, in order that in the intervening period it may finish the filming of its pending
picture. The ground for the lay-off is the financial losses which respondent was allegedly suffering during the current
year.

Petitioner opposed the request alleging that the claim of financial losses has no basis in fact it being only an act
of retaliation on the part of respondent for the strike staged by the workers days before in an attempt to harass and
intimidate them and weaken and destroy the union to which they belong.

When the urgent petition was set for hearing, at the request of counsel for respondent, judge Roldan of the CIR,
held an ocular inspection of the studios and filming premises of respondent. He interrogated about 15 laborers who
were then present in the place. Judge Roldan allowed respondent to lay off the workers with respect to Unit No. 2 and
those assigned to the Ground Maintenance Department subject to the condition that, in the event that work is available
in the future, they should be reemployed. Thereafter, a subsequent hearing was held in connection with the workers
assigned to Unit No. 1 and on the strength of the evidence submitted by respondent, Judge Roldan again found the
petition justifiable and authorized their lay off in an order under the same condition as those contained in his previous
order.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Whether or not the CIR may authorize the layoff of workers on the basis of an ocular inspection without
receiving full evidence to determine the cause or motive of such layoff?
RULING OF THE COURT:

NO. Considering the merits of the controversy, the Court is of the opinion that the required due process has not
been followed. The court a quo merely acted on the strength of the ocular inspection it conducted in the premises of the
respondent company. The petition for lay-off was predicated on the lack of work and of the further fact that the
company was incurring financial losses. These allegations cannot be established by a mere inspection of the place of
labor specially when such inspection was conducted at the request of the interested party. As counsel for petitioner
says, such inspection could at best witness "the superficial fact of cessation of work but it could not be determinative of
the larger and more fundamental issue of lack of work due to lack of funds". This fundamental issue cannot be
determined without looking into the financial situation of the respondent company. In fact, this matter is now being
looked into by the court a quo in connection with the fourteen demands of the labor union, but before finishing its
inquiry it decided to grant the lay-off pending final determination of the main case. This action is in our opinion
premature and has worked injustice to the laborers.

WHEREFORE, the orders subject of the present petition for review are hereby set aside, and it is ordered that
the cause be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings giving to petitioner an opportunity to present its
evidence in support of its opposition to the urgent petition for lay-off of respondent company.
 G.R. No. L-20387 January 31, 1968

JESUS P. MORFE, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

AMELITO R. MUTUC, as Executive Secretary, ET AL., defendants-appellants

FACTS:

Congress enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to deter public officials and employees from
committing acts of dishonesty and improve the tone of morality in public service. One of the specific provisions of the
said act is that every public officer, either within thirty (30) days after its approval or after his assumption of office "and
within the month of January of every other year thereafter", as well as upon the termination of his position, shall
prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, "a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and
liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family
expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar."

Plaintiff Morfe, a judge of a CFI, contends that the periodical submission “within the month of January of
every other year thereafter” of their sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of due process as an
oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy implicit on
the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-
incrimination.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Whether or not the periodical submission of statement of assets and liabilities of an official is violative of the
constitutional rights.

RULING OF THE COURT:

NO. It does not violate any constitutional right.

When a government official accepts a public position, he is deemed to have voluntarily assumed the obligation
to give information about his personal affair, not only at the time of his assumption of office but during the time he
continues to discharge public trust. "The provision of law in question cannot be attacked on the ground that it impairs
plaintiff's normal and legitimate enjoyment of his life and liberty because said provision merely seeks to adopt a
reasonable measure of ensuring the interest or general welfare in honest and clean public service and is therefore a
legitimate exercise of the police power."

The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is
fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited
government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal
life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and
pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of
limited government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public
sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in other words, of the dignity and
integrity of the individual — has become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a
technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization — operate to narrow the area of privacy and
facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the
difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."

NOTES:

EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER AND THE DEFENSE PROVIDED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

 “Inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and
welfare of society” (Justice Malcolm)
 The power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of its domain (Justice Taney,
going beyond curtailment of rights)
 Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the extension of police power to regulatory action affecting persons
in public or private life can invoke the protection of due process.
 It has been held that due process may be relied upon by public official to protect the security of tenure which in
a limited sense is analogous to property. Therefore, he could also use due process to strike down what he
considers as an infringement of his liberty.
  Under the Constitution, the challenged provision is allowable as long as due process is observed.
 The standard for due process is REASONABLENESS. Test: Official action must not outrun the bounds of reason
and result in sheer oppression.
 “It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public
service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and
oppressive a requirement as that imposed upon public officials and employees to file such sworn statement of
assets and liabilities every two years after having done so upon assuming office…There was therefore no
unconstitutional exercise of police power.”

G.R. No. 162994 September 17, 2004

DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and PEDRO A. TECSON, petitioners,

vs.

GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as
medical representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson had undergone training and orientation.

Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study
and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or
affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies and should management find that such
relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly
provides these conditions; that otherwise, the management and the employee will explore the possibility of a “transfer
to another department in a non-counterchecking position” or preparation for employment outside the company after six
months.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
Subsequently, Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals (Astra), a
competitor of Glaxo. Bettsy was Astra’s Branch Coordinator in Albay. She supervised the district managers and medical
representatives of her company and prepared marketing strategies for Astra in that area. Even before they got married,
Tecson received several reminders from his District Manager regarding the conflict of interest which his relationship
with Bettsy might engender. Still, love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy in September 1998.
 Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to
reconsider its decision, but his request was denied. Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical
representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.

Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance machinery level, they submitted the matter for
voluntary arbitration, but Tecson declined the offer. On November 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring as valid Glaxo’s policy on relationships between its employees and
persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxo’s right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory.

Petitioner’s Contention: that Glaxo’s policy against employees marrying employees of competitor companies
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it creates invalid distinctions among employees on
account only of marriage. They claim that the policy restricts the employees’ right to marry; that Tecson was
constructively dismissed

GLAXO argues: that the company policy prohibiting its employees from having a relationship with and/or
marrying an employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of its management prerogatives and does not violate
the equal protection clause.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Whether or not Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying an employee from a competitor company is valid.

RULING OF THE COURT:

YES. Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other
confidential programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival companies in the highly
competitive pharmaceutical industry.

The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s
employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests
of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to protect its interests against the
possibility that a competitor company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.

That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on
investments and to expansion and growth.
 Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the protection of
labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that
management has rights which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of fair play.

NOTES:

EQUAL-PROTECTION: Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition against relationships between its employees and
those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own
choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that
may arise out of such relationships.

G.R. No. 164774 April 12, 2006

STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO & SEBASTIAN CHUA, Petitioners,

vs.

RONALDO D. SIMBOL, WILFREDA N. COMIA & LORNA E. ESTRELLA, Respondents.

FACTS:

Star Paper Corporation employed Ronaldo Simbol on Oct 1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of the
company, whom he married. Before marriage, Josephine Ongsitco the manager advised the couple that one of them
must resign if they decided to get married pursuant to a company policy to which Simbol complied. On February 5, 1997
Comia was hired by the company. She met Howard Comia, a co-employee, whom she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco
likewise reminded them the company policy, Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.Estrella was also hired on July 29, 1994.
She met Luisito Zuñiga also a co-worker. Petitioners stated that Zuñiga, a married man, got Estrella pregnant. The
company allegedly could have terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to resign on December 21, 1999.

Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and states that the company policy was decreed pursuant to what the
respondent corporation perceived as management prerogative. On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. In its assailed Decision dated August 3, 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC
decision.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

 Whether or not the questioned policy violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor
Code?

RULING OF THE COURT:

YES. The Court ruled on the side of the respondents. Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides:

“It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment
that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman
employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a
woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.”

It is significant to note that respondents were hired after they were found fit for the job, but were asked to
resign when they married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol to Alma Dayrit could be
detrimental to its business operations. It must be reasonable under the circumstances to qualify as a valid exercise of
management prerogative.

The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate
effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot
prejudice the employee’s right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons
working together in one company.

NOTES:

 There are 2 types of employment policies involving spouses: policies banning only spouses from working in the
same company (no-spouse employment policies), and those banning all immediate family members, including
spouses, from working in the same company (anti-nepotism employment policies).

 In challenging the anti-nepotism employment policies in the United States, complainants utilize two theories of
employment discrimination: the disparate treatment and the disparate impact. Under the disparate treatment
analysis, the plaintiff must prove that an employment policy is discriminatory on its face. No-spouse
employment policies requiring an employee of a particular sex to either quit, transfer, or be fired are facially
discriminatory. On the other hand, to establish disparate impact, the complainants must prove that a facially
neutral policy has a disproportionate effect on a particular class.

 To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors:
(1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved;
and,
 (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification
would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.

G.R. No. 110223 April 8, 1997

ARMY AND NAVY CLUB OF MANILA, INC., Petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO D. REYES, as Judge REGIONAL

TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 36 (formerly (Branch 17), HON. A. CAESAR
SANGCO, as Judge, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 17-MANILA and the CITY
OF MANILA, represented herein by MAYOR ALFREDO LIM, Respondents.

FACTS:

On January 1983 petitioner and herein respondent entered into a contract of lease for a parcel of land with an
area of 12,705.30 sq. m. located at South Boulevard corner Manila Bay, Manila. According to the contract agreed upon
by both parties, herein petitioner should construct a hotel on the land that was leased upon, wherein such construction
should commence within one year and should be completed within five years upon the turnover of the property. Such
improvements made upon the property should be turned over to the respondent after the lease contract expires.
Petitioner should also pay the respondent a sum total of 250,000 Php annually, that would be equally divided to twelve
months, such sum should be paid to respondent within the first five days of each month without demand. Parties also
agreed to an increase of up to ten percent of the rent for every two years. Petitioner also agreed to pay for the realty
taxes that would be imposed upon the land and it would be improvements and other necessary fees that would be
incurred.
 Petitioner however failed to construct a hotel on the land that was leased from petitioner and a building was
built instead which eventually became the known building of the Army Navy Club. Consequently. herein petitioner failed
to settle the rent that was agreed upon, along with the realty taxes imposed upon the land and its improvements from
1983 up to May 1989. Such rental fees have already totaled to an amount of 1,604,166.70, while the tax liabilities has
already reached 3,818,913.81. However, on June 29, 1992 the National Historical Commission the Army and Navy Club
as a historical landmark.

Thus, an ejectment case was filed with the MTC of Manila which ruled in favor of herein respondent. Petitioner
eventually filed for an appeal with the RTC of Manila which consequently affirmed the decision of the MTC. Herein
petitioner then filed an appeal with the CA, herein respondent court also affirmed the decision of the MTC and RTC of
Manila.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Whether or not the respondent court erred in not recognizing the declaration of the disputed property as a
historical landmark by the National Historical Commission in granting the ejectment suit filed by the respondent.

RULING OF THE COURT:

No. The court ruled that such recognition does not grant the petitioner a claim of ownership over the land. For
there is no law which states that such recognition awards possessory rights over to the petitioner. The law merely states
that it shall be the policy of state to preserve and protect the important cultural properties and National Cultural
Treasures of the nation and to safeguard their intrinsic value.

In addition, while the declaration that the Army and Navy Club is a historical landmark is not objectionable, the
recognition is, however, specious considering that there is no showing that the above procedure has been complied
with. The City of Manila even observed that the signatories thereto are officers and members of the Club making such
certification self-serving. It behooves us to think why the declaration was conferred only in 1992, three (3) years after
the action for ejectment was instituted. We can only surmise that this was merely an afterthought, an attempt to thwart
any legal action taken against the petitioner.

El Banco Espanol vs. Palanca

FACTS:
Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt which amounted to 218,
294. 10 Php while his property was worth 75, 000 Php more than what he owed. Due to his failure to pay, El Banco
executed an instrument to mortgage the former's property. However, Engracio left for Amoy, China and eventually died
there. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to
give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendant's last
known address but it was not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication
in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The decision was
likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the highest bidder and the same was
confirmed by the court. However, about seven years after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente
Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, wherein he requested the court to set aside the order
of default and the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. On the ground that the order of
default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant or over the subject of the action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter or the action.

Ruling:

Where the defendant in a mortgage foreclosure lives out of the Islands and refuses to appear or otherwise submit
himself to the authority of the court, the jurisdiction of the latter is limited to the mortgaged property, with respect to
which the jurisdiction of the court is based upon the fact that the property is located within the district and that the
court, under the provisions of law applicable in such cases, is vested with the power to subject the property to the
obligation created by the mortgage. In such case personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant is nonessential
and in fact cannot be acquired.

The failure of the clerk to send notice by mail to the nonresident defendant in a foreclosure proceeding, as required by
an order of the court, does not defeat the jurisdiction of the court over the mortgaged property.

In an action to foreclose a mortgage against a nonresident defendant who fails to submit himself to the jurisdiction of
the court, no adjudication can be made which involves a determination of a personal liability of either party arising out
of the contract of mortgage.

In a foreclosure proceeding against a nonresident owner it is necessary for the court, as in all cases of foreclosure, to
ascertain the amount due, as prescribed in section 256 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and to make an order requiring
the defendant to pay the money into court. This step is a necessary precursor of the order of sale. The mere fact that the
court thus ascertains the amount of the debt and orders the defendant to pay it into court does not constitute the
entering of a judgment against him as upon a personal liability.

As applied to judicial proceedings, due process of law implies that there must be a court or tribunal clothed with power
to hear and determine the matter before it, that jurisdiction shall have been lawfully acquired, that the defendant shall
have an opportunity to be heard, and that judgment shall be rendered upon lawful hearing.

In an action to foreclose a mortgage against a nonresident, some notification of the proceedings must be given to the
defendant. Under statutes generally prevailing, this notification commonly takes the form of publication in a newspaper
of general circulation and the sending of notice, by mail, by which means the owner is admonished that his property is
the subject of judicial proceedings. The provisions of law providing for notice of this character must be complied with.

In a foreclosure proceeding against a nonresident defendant, the court is required to make an order for the clerk to mail
a copy of the summons and complaint to the defendant at his last place of residence if known. In the present case an
order was made directing the clerk to mail the required copy to the defendant at Amoy China. No evidence appeared of
record showing that such notice had in fact been mailed by the clerk; but publication was regularly made in a periodical
as the law requires. Held: That the making of the order by the court constituted a compliance with the law, in so far as
necessary to constitute due process of law, and that if the clerk failed to send the notice, his dereliction in the
performance of his duty was an irregularity which did not constitute an infringment of the provision of the Philippine Bill
declaring that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.

A defendant who seeks to vacate a judgment in a foreclosure proceeding on the ground of irregularity in the sending of
notice by post, or failure to send such notice pursuant to an order of the court, must show that as a result of such
irregularity he suffered some prejudice of which the law can take account.

In a mortgage foreclosure proceeding the property was bought in at the public sale by the plaintiff, the mortgagee, at a
price much below the upset value agreed upon in the mortgage. Held: That if any liability was incurred by the plaintiff by
purchasing at a price below that which had been agreed upon as the upset price, such liability was of a personal nature
and could not be the subject of adjudication in a foreclosure against a nonresident defendant who did not come in and
submit to the jurisdiction of the court. Such act of the plaintiff was, therefore, not such a prejudice to the defendant as
would justify the opening of the judgment of foreclosure.

A party who seeks to open a final judgment with a view to a renewal of the litigation should show that he has acted with
diligence; and unexplained delay in seeking relief is a circumstance to be considered as affecting the application
adversely.

Upon an application made by the representative of a deceased nonresident to vacate a judgment in a foreclosure
proceeding, it is held that, under the circumstances of the particular case, knowledge of the proceedings, or of their
result, should be imputed to him, upon the legal presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary
habits of life, and that as a consequence his failure to apply for relief within the year and a half during which he survived
the foreclosure proceedings was a circumstance adversely affecting the application for relief.

An application which proposes to disturb judicial proceedings long closed cannot be considered with favor, unless based
upon grounds Which appeal to the conscience of the court. Public policy requires that judicial proceedings be upheld.
The maxim here applicable is Non quieta movere.

Where the court makes an order for the clerk to mail notice of a foreclosure proceeding to a nonresident defendant it
will be presumed in the absence of affirmative proof to the contrary that the duty was performed.

After jurisdiction has once been acquired, every act of a court of general jurisdiction is presumed to have been rightly
done. This rule is applied to every judgment rendered in the various stages of the proceedings; and if the record is silent
with respect to any fact which should have been established before the court could have rightly acted, it will be
presumed that such fact was properly brought to its knowledge.

Where the officer makes a return concerning the manner in which service was effected, and this service appears to have
been insufficient, it cannot be presumed that other legal service was effected by the same officer or other authorized
person. This rule, however, is not applicable to the case where an affidavit relative to mailing notice to a nonresident,
instead of being made by the proper officer, is made by one acting without legal authority.

Where a judgment is not void on its face, a motion to vacate the judgment with a view to a continuation of the litigation,
can be maintained in a Court of First Instance only in accordance with section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
sets a time limit of six months from the date when the judgment is entered. After the expiration of this period the party
who seeks relief against a judgment alleged to be void for some defect not apparent on its f face must have recourse to
an appropriate original proceeding.

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.

Facts:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the
employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano,
Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers
and members of the petitioner Union. PBMEO decided to stage a mass demonstration in front of Malacañang to express
their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.

Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969,
in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to
2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M.,
respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.

The Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO after learning about the planned
mass demonstration. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed
out by the union that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in factual exercise of the laborers
inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of
grievances.

The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their business which
may result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their
jobs if they pushed through with the rally.

A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be allowed to
participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be
dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually
dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The lower court decided in favour of Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty
of bargaining in bad faith. The PBMEO’s motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial
Relations for being filed two days late.

Issue/s:

Whether the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA 2. Whether the company is guilty of unfair labor practice
for dismissing its employees.

Ruling:

In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the central core
as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must be
"protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person."

The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of opportunism,
the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have
no patience with general principles." The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to "withdraw subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles
to be applied by the courts..."

The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the immunities reserved
by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more
than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but also to
benefit the majority who refuse to listen.
And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not
safe unless the liberties of all are protected.

The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to
man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens
can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights
so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the
imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.

While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized.
Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of
sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space
to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost
thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then
the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the
tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs—political, economic or otherwise.

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are
essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such "priority gives these liberties the
sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."

The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational
relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose—that the law is neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory nor oppressive—would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other
hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely, existence of a
grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the
main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs.
Ferrer. It should be noted that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in
N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our
right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed," even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-
of-interest test. Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand,
viz.—whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is
necessary to avoid the danger.

Tested against the foregoing principles, the conclusion of the Court of Industrial Relations that the petitioners by their
"concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of Work," are guilty of bargaining in bad faith and hence
violated the collective bargaining agreement cannot be sustained. The demonstration held by petitioners on March 4,
1969 before Malacanang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private
respondent firm. Said demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of expression in general
and of their right of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental
agency, the Chief Executive, against the police officers of the municipality of Pasig.

As a matter of fact, it was the duty of herein respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members from
the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest of herein respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and to
take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as a
consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks to enhance its productivity as well as profits.

As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights—freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances—over property rights has been sustained. Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted
boon—at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our
enlightened civilization—becomes Our Duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so
that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police
officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches
unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore
inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of
petition.

The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by any court,
for such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom of expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be
an illegal picketing or strike.

The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the demonstration and that
they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. should report for work in order
that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed to appreciate the sine qua non of an effective
demonstration especially by a labor union, namely, the complete unity of the Union members as well as their total
presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum persuasive force that will gain for them not only
public sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediate action on the part of the corresponding government
agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom
of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the
demonstration is diminished. ... At any rate, the Union notified the company two days in advance of their projected
demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might
sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union requested it to excuse
only the day shift employees who will join the demonstration. ... There was a lack of human understanding or
compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request... And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass
demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the
employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.

Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass
demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight petitioners from the service
constituted an unconstitutional restraint on their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of petition
for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to
Section 3 of R.A. No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of R.A. 875 guarantees to the
employees the right "to engage in concerted activities for xxx mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as
an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed in Section Three." xxx The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning
and regular shifts should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore state, "a
potent means of inhibiting speech."

While the respondent Court found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the
complainant company," the said court did not make any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This
significant circumstance can only means that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage.

Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being
and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article
XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor xxx". Respondent Court as an agency of the State
is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working
man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under
the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the
causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization
for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most
unfortunate that said court failed to implement this policy.xxx

It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the
instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the
constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged
against them and in their defense to the said charge. In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms
sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny application of a CIR rule which impinges on
such human rights.

It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a particular
case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice requires." Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in
Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo reiterated this principle and added that "Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cope
with all situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice..." If
we can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders more imperative the
suspension of a CIR rule that classes with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with resolute concern by the specific
guarantees outlined in the organic law.

Having violated the basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and
the questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity.

The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the CIR rules with reference to the case at bar, is also authorized by
Section 20 of C.A. 103, the CIR charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms."

Shell Company of the Phil., Ltd. vs. Enage

Facts:

Petitioner Shell Company of the Philippines,1 and petitioners Numeriano Jacolo, Ernesto Dedel and Jacinto Monoy2
were defendants in an action for damages filed in the Court of First Instance of Agusan in the branch presided by
respondent Judge with the other respondents Francisca Timosa and Chiveniano Go as plaintiffs. The two decisions in
favor of private respondents, respectively issued on August 26, 1968 and September 30, 1968, are now assailed as
having been rendered without hearing petitioners in defiance of and contrary to the due process clause of the Con-
stitution.3 The case for petitioner Shell Company of the Philippines appears to be invulnerable, for at no time was their
counsel of record, after the filing of its answer, subsequently notified of the proceedings had. The stand of petitioners
Numeriano Jacolo, Ernesto Dedel and Jacinto Monoy, while, on its face, not impressed with the same degree of
conclusiveness, gains strength from what appears to be the arbitrary actuation of respondent Judge in refusing a
postponement thus resulting in a decision against parties who should be, but were not heard, again in disregard of the
due process mandate.

The two decisions in favor of private respondents, respectively issued on August 26, 1968 and September 30, 1968, are
now assailed as having been rendered without hearing petitioners in defiance of and contrary to the due process clause
of the Con-stitution.3 The case for petitioner Shell Company of the Philippines appears to be invulnerable, for at no time
was their counsel of record, after the filing of its answer, subsequently notified of the proceedings had. The stand of
petitioners Numeriano Jacolo, Ernesto Dedel and Jacinto Monoy, while, on its face, not impressed with the same degree
of conclusiveness, gains strength from what appears to be the arbitrary actuation of respondent Judge in refusing a
postponement thus resulting in a decision against parties who should be, but were not heard, again in disregard of the
due process mandate.

Petitioners are concerned, their contention as to the denial of due process is premised on an order of respondent Judge
of July 8, 1968 which considered the two cases against them as submitted for decision, notwithstanding the fact that
they had not as yet presented their evidence. The reason they could not do so, according to their petition, was that no
notification was made that the hearing would be held on such a date. This allegation is denied in the answer of
respondents. What is not denied, however, is the succeeding paragraph of their petition. It reads thus: “On the said
fateful day, July 8, 1968, Atty. Lydio J. Cataluna of the Mercado & Cataluña Law Office, counsel for defendants-
petitioners, appeared and manifested in court that he had just separated from the law firm handling the cases for
defendants-petitioners and that the records of the cases were with Atty. Eduardo Deza Mercado who was left in the law
office bearing his name; and that the defendants-petitioners were not notified of the hearing for that day; hence, their
absence. Atty. Cataluña accordingly moved to have the hearing postponed to another date, as he intended to withdraw
from the case.” What is equally indisputable is that then and there, respondent Judge considered the matter submitted,
resulting, as in the case of petitioner Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd., in two decisions against petitioners Jacolo,
Dedel and Monoy, are assailed.

Issue: Whether or not there was violation of due process made by the decision of the respondent judge.

Ruling:

After the filing of the civil cases for damages by the plaintiffs-respondents summons was served on the defendant-
petitioner Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd. at Cebu City. Within the reglementary period, it filed its answer with
counterclaim through its counsel, Attorney Alfred P. Deen of the Deen Law Offices at the Deen Building, Cebu City. The
other petitioners, as defendants, were represented by the law firm of Deen, Mercado and Cataluña of Butuan City. The
counsel surnamed Deen of such law firm is not Attorney Alfred P. Deen, who appears for Shell, but Attorney Nicolas
Deen. That must have been the cause of the mistake, for thereafter, only such law firm in Butuan City was served with
court notices. It does not admit of doubt, then, that all subsequent proceedings in the above cases, insofar as petitioner
Shell Company is concerned, took place without such counsel of record at Cebu City being notified. As far as the other
petitioners-appellants are concerned, their contention as to the denial of due process is premised on an order of
respondent Judge of July 8, 1968 which considered the two cases against them as submitted for decision,
notwithstanding the fact that they had not as yet presented their evidence.

The reason they could not do so, according to their petition was that no notification was made that the hearing would
be held on such a date. This allegation is denied in the answer of respondents. What is not denied, however, is the
succeeding paragraph of their petition. It reads thus: “On the said fateful day, July 8, 1968, Atty. Lydio J. Cataluña of the
Mercado & Cataluña Law Office, counsel for defendants-petitioners, appeared and manifested in court that he had just
rendered from the law firm handling the cases for defendants-petitioners and that the records of the cases were with
Atty. Eduardo Deza Mercado who was left in the law office bearing his name, and that the defendants-petitioners were
not notified of the hearing for that day; hence, their absence. Atty. Cataluña accordingly moved to withdraw from the
case.” What is equally indisputable is that then and there, respondent Judge considered the matter submitted, resulting,
as in the case of petitioner Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd., in two decisions against petitioners Jacolo, Dedel and
Monoy, now assailed. HELD: The impress of a denial of the fundamental right of due process is thus apparent. The
jurisdictional defect is quite marked. The decisions of respondent Judge now sought to be nullified thus suffer from
congenital infirmity.

To satisfy the constitutional guarantee of due process, (1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power
to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant
or over the property which is the subject of the proceedings; (3) That defendant must be given opportunity to be heard;
and (4) Judgment must be rendered after lawful hearing.

In cases like the present, where a party litigant, without malice, fault, or inexcusable neglect, is not prepared for the trial
of a case, the court exceeds the discretion conferred upon it by law in denying to said litigant a reasonable opportunity
to prepare for the trial and to obtain due process of law and proper protection under the law (Cing Hong So vs. Tan Boon
Kong, 53 Phil. 437). In the instant case, the High Court, noting that the trial was scheduled and postponed several times
on account of lack of court sessions for reasons unexplained, said that “In such case, the respondent Judge should not
have been too harsh in holding the lapse of literal observance of the rule of procedure as to deny defendants substantial
justice.”

Liberality should be exercised in granting postponements of trial to obtain presence of material evidence and to prevent
a miscarriage of justice.

The instant case arose from a levy of execution filed by the petitioner Shell Company to satisfy a final judgment for
P82,785.97 against the couple Go See Gawa and Eustaquia Sastre. It was returned unsatisfied as their personal and real
property and “been transferred to third persons.” Nevertheless, the rights of Eustaquia Sastre as a licensee of a certain
lumberyard in Butuan City was levied upon. Thereafter, one Francisca Timosa, a relative, and one Chiveniano Go, son of
Go See Gawa, filed the above suits for damages alleging losses suffered for such levy. On the evidence offered by them,
the petitioners as seen, not having been heard, the former was awarded damages in the sum of P420,400 and P123,640
on a vehicle valued at P5,000.00, HELD: It would thus appeal that respondent Judge was called upon to exercise utmost
caution and circumspection before rendering what in effect was an ex parte judgment. Certainly, these were actions that
demanded full hearing. Without it, there could have resulted, a travesty on justice.

UNITED STATES VS. LING SU FAN.

Facts:

Thls defendant was accused of the offense of "exporting from the Philippine Islands Pliilippine silver coins," in a
complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of tlie city of Manila.

The petitioner was freight clerk, supercargo, comprador, and person in charge of all shipments of freight'on board the
steamship Taming, which said steamship Taming was then and there about to depart from the port of Manila, Philippine
Islands, to the port of Hongkong; that the said Ling Su Fan did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously place,
conceal, and hide the sum of twenty thousand six hundred (20,600) pesos in Philippine silver coins, coined by authority
of the act of Congress approved March 2, 1903, in his stateroom on board the said steamship Taming witb. the intent of
exporting the said Philippine silver coins from the Philippine Islands to the port of Hongkong, and did then and there
attempt to export the said Philippine silver coins from the Philippine Islands to the said port of Hongkong.

Upon these foregoing findings of fact and observations the lower court found the defendant Ling Su Fan, guilty of the
offense charged in the complaint, and sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of sixty days and to pay a fine of
P200.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner’s rights for due process have been violated.

Ruling:

No. That part of the contention of the appellant which refers to the Constitution of the United States can have no
important bearing upon the present case, for the reason that paragraph 1 of section 5 of the said act of Congress dated
July 1, 1902, is almost exactly in the same phraseology as a portion of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, and therefore, decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in construing said fourteenth
amendment, may be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining what was intended by Congress in enacting said
paragraph 1 of section 5, and what laws the Philippine Commission may make under its provisions.
Paragraph 1 of section 5 of the said act of Congress is as follows:

That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws.

It will be noted that this amendment does not prohibit the enactment of laws by the legislative department of the
Philippine Government, depriving persons, of life, liberty, or property. It simply provides that laws shall not be enacted
which shall deprive persons of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The question, then, is presented, Is
the act under which the defendant is prosecuted here and under which it is sought to deprive him of the money which it
is alleged he attempted to illegally export, in accordance with due process of law?

The Congress of the United States, on the 2d day of March, 1903, passed an act entitled "An act to establish a standard
value and to provide for a coinage system in the Philippine Islands." Section 6 of said act is as follows:

SEC. 6. That the coinage authorized by this act shall be subject to the conditions and limitations of the provisions of the
act of July first, nineteen hundred and two, entitled "An act temporarily to provide for the administration of the affairs
of civil government in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes," except as herein otherwise provided; and the
Government of the Philippine Islands may adopt such measures as it may deem proper, not inconsistent with said act of
July first, nineteen hundred and two, to maintain the value of the silver Philippine peso at the rate of one gold peso, and
in order to maintain such parity between said silver Philippine pesos and the gold pesos herein provided for . . .

In pursuance to the authority granted in said section 6, to wit, "the Government of the Philippine Islands may adopt such
measures as it may deem proper, ... to maintain the value of the silver Philippine peso at the rate of one gold peso ..."
the Civil Commission enacted Act No. 1411, dated November 17, 1905, which act was entitled "An act for the purpose of
maintaining the parity of the Philippine currency in accordance with the provisions of sections one and six of the act of
Congress approved March second, nineteen hundred and three, by prohibiting the exportation from the Philippine
Islands of Philippine silver coins, and for other purposes."

Under the question above suggested it becomes important to determine what Congress intended by the phrase "due
process of law." This phrase has been discussed a great many times by the Supreme Court of the United States, as well
as by writers upon questions of constitutional law. This same idea, is couched in different language in the different
constitutions of the different States of the Union. In some, the phrase is "the law of the land." In others, "due course of
law". These different phrases, however, have been given practically the same definition by the different courts which
have attempted an explanation of them. The phrase "due process of law" was defined by Judge Story, in his work on
Constitutional Law, as "the law in its regular course of administration through the courts of justice."

"Due process of law" is process or proceedings according to the law of the land. "Due process of law" is not that the law
shall be according to the wishes of all the inhabitants of the state, but simply —

First. That there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the
Government;

Second. That this law shall be reasonable in its operation;

Third. That it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and

Fourth. That it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class.

When a person is deprived of his life or liberty or property, therefore, under a law prescribed by the proper lawmaking
body of the state and such law is within the power of said department to make and is reasonable, and is then enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed, and is applicable alike to all the citizens or to all citizens of a
particular class within the state, such person is not deprived of his property or of his life, or of his liberty without due
process of law. When life, liberty, and property are in question there must be in every instance judicial proceedings, and
that the requirement implies a written accusation and hearing before an impartial tribunal with proper jurisdiction, an
opportunity to defend and a conviction and a judgment before punishment can be inflicted, depriving one of his life,
liberty or property.

In support of the statements of Wong Tai the defendant presented an insurance policy or a duplicate copy of an
insurance policy alleged to have been issued by a certain Japanese insurance company doing business in the city of
Hongkong. No proof was offered however to show that said duplicate copy of an insurance policy had actually been
issued by said company. The prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila objected to the introduction of the said duplicate
policy upon the ground that it had not been sufficiently identified. This objection was overruled. No evidence was
presented to show that said company ever, as a matter of fact, issued the policy. In the absence of proof showing that
the document had been issued by the proper authorities, the same should not have been admitted in evidence. The
duplicate policy did not prove itself. It was dated on the 4th day of December, 1906. In support of the testimony of
Wong Tai, the defendant also presented Juan On Hieng as a witness. This witness testified that he had an arrangement
with Wong Tai to exchange with him at a certain rate Spanish silver coin and Mexican silver coin for Philippine silver
pesos, and that he had an arrangement with a certain Filipino in Manila from whom he was to purchase said Spanish and
Mexican coin. He could not remember, however, the name of the Filipino from whom he was to purchase said coins;
neither could he describe him, nor could he tell where the said Filipino resided. We do not believe the statements of
these witnesses notwithstanding the fact that they seem to corroborate the statements of the defendant. Courts should
not lightly regard the statements of witnesses under oath, but nevertheless when the testimony of witnesses seems to
be unreasonable from every standpoint it should be weighed with care, when it comes loaded with the temptations of
private interests and the impressions of personal penalties; if the defendant had not been guilty of attempting to violate
the law, there would have been no occasion for him to have stated at the time the money was found in his room what
were the true facts, and then there would have been no difference between his statements then and the statements he
made at the time of the trial. These conflicting statements lend much suspicion to the veracity of the defendant as well
as to the truth of the statements of the witnesses called in his behalf. The evidence also shows that Philippine silver coin
was worth, at the time the coins in question were shipped, about 9 percent more in bullion than they were as money.

DOCTRINE: The issue of the propriety of summary judgment was painstakingly discussed and settled in our July 15, 2003
decision: A summary judgment is one granted upon motion of a party for an expeditious settlement of the case, it
appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no important questions or issues of
fact posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A motion for summary judgment is
premised on the assumption that the issues presented need not be tried either because these are patently devoid of
substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact. It is a method sanctioned by the Rules of Court for
the prompt disposition of a civil action where there exists no serious controversy. Summary judgment is a procedural
devise for the prompt disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any
material fact.

Due process of law has two aspects: substantive and procedural due process. In order that a particular act may not be
impugned as violative of the due process clause, there must be compliance with both substantive and the procedural
requirements thereof.

A careful study of the provisions of RA 1379 readily discloses that the forfeiture proceedings in the Sandiganbayan did
not violate the substantive rights of respondent Marcoses. These proceedings are civil in nature, contrary to the claim of
the Marcoses that it is penal in character.

In Almeda, Sr., et al. vs. Perez, et al., we suggested a test to determine whether the proceeding for forfeiture is civil or
criminal: “. . . Forfeiture proceedings may be either civil or criminal in nature, and may be  in rem or in personam. If they
are under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the criminal case they are
criminal in nature, although they may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is
meant to be criminal in its nature it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding does not involve the
conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged the proceeding is of a civil nature; and under statutes which
specifically so provide, where the act or omission for which the forfeiture is imposed is not also a misdemeanor, such
forfeiture may be sued for and recovered in a civil action.” (37 CJS, Forfeiture, Sec. 5, pp. 1516) In the case of  Republic
vs. Sandiganbayan and Macario Asistio, Jr., this Court categorically declared that: The rule is settled that forfeiture
proceedings are actions in rem and therefore civil in nature.

Respondent Marcoses erroneously understood “hearing” to be synonymous with “trial.” The words “hearing” and “trial”
have different meanings and connotations. Trial may refer to the reception of evidence and other processes. It embraces
the period for the introduction of evidence by both parties. Hearing, as known in law, is not confined to trial but
embraces the several stages of litigation, including the pre-trial stage. A hearing does not necessarily mean presentation
of evidence. It does not necessarily imply the presentation of oral or documentary evidence in open court but that the
parties are afforded the opportunity to be heard.

Due process, a constitutional precept, does not therefore’ always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding.
The essence of due process is found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit one’s evidence in support of
his defense. What the law prohibits is not merely the absence of previous notice but the absence thereof  and the lack of
opportunity to be heard. This opportunity was made completely available to respondents who participated in all stages
of the litigation.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 152154, NOVEMBER 18, 2003.

FACTS:
Petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner sought the declaration of the
aggregate amount of US$356 million (now estimated to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in
escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by the following five account groups, using
various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks. Moreover, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and
US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple’s salaries, other lawful income as well as income from
legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG. Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement
and the Supplemental Agreements were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol
Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and
distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under their conditions contained therein.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Swiss funds can be forfeited in favour of the Republic, on the basis of the Marcoses’s lawful income.

RULING:
Yes. R.A. No. 1379 raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully acquired, hence subject to forfeiture,
if its amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful income of the public officer
who owns it.

The following facts must be established in order that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits may be effected: (1)
ownership by the public officer of money or property acquired during his incumbency, whether it be in his name or
otherwise, and (2) the extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds , i. e., is grossly disproportionate
to, the legitimate income of the public officer.

Herein, the spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officials during the time material to the present case was
never in dispute. The spouses accumulated salary of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of the
Marcoses since they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net
worth could be determined.
Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive “any other emolument from
the Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities”. Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E.
Marcos as President could “not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other
source.” Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for determining
the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds. The Republic did not fail to establish a  prima
facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss deposits. The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and are deposited in
escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of 31 January 2002,
plus interest, were forfeited in favor of the Republic.

DOCTRINE: As a rule, a client is bound by his counsel’s conduct, negligence and mistake in handling a case. To allow a
client to disown his counsel’s conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the
mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. But the rule admits of exceptions. In several rulings, the Court held the client not
concluded by the negligence, incompetence or mistake of the counsel. For instance, in Suarez v. Court of Appeals, 220
SCRA 274 (1993), the Court set aside the judgment and mandated the trial court to reopen the case for the reception of
the evidence for the defense after finding that the negligence of the therein petitioner’s counsel had deprived her of the
right to present and prove her defense. Also, in Legarda v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 418 (1991), the Court ordered
restored to the petitioner her property that had been sold at public auction in satisfaction of a default judgment
resulting from the failure of her counsel to file an answer and from counsel’s lack of vigilance in protecting her interests
in subsequent proceedings before the trial court and the CA. Lastly, in Amil v. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 317 (1999), the
Court declared that an exception to the rule that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel is when the negligence
of the counsel is so gross that the client was deprived of his day in court, thereby also depriving the client of his property
without due process of law.

In Leyte v. Cusi, 152 SCRA 496 (1987),  the Court has admonished against precipitate orders of default because such
orders have the effect of denying a litigant the chance to be heard. Indeed, we have reminded trial courts that although
there are instances when a party may be properly defaulted, such instances should be the exception rather than the rule
and should be allowed only in clear cases of a litigant’s obstinate refusal or inordinate neglect to comply with the orders
of the court. Without such a showing, the litigant must be given every reasonable opportunity to present his side and to
refute the evidence of the adverse party in deference to due process of law.

We held in Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 319 SCRA 456 (1999), that when the incompetence, ignorance or
inexperience of counsel is so great and the result is so serious that the client, who otherwise has a good cause, is
prejudiced and denied his day in court, the client deserves another chance to present his case; hence, the litigation may
be reopened for that purpose. Also, when an unsuccessful party has been prevented from fully and fairly presenting his
case because of his attorney’s professional delinquency or infidelity the litigation may be reopened to allow the party to
present his side. Lastly, where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in
the client’s being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment
may be set aside on such ground.

Court litigation is primarily a search for truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules that gives to both parties the
fullest opportunity to adduce proof is the best way to ferret out such truth. Thus, a court may suspend its own rules or
except a case from them in order to serve the ends of justice; or, it may altogether disregard the rules in a proper case.
To cling to the general rule of having the ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty of the counsel bind the client is
only to condone rather than to rectify a serious injustice to a party whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust
his cause to his counsel.

MORTEL vs. KERR, G.R. NO. 156296, NOVEMBER 12, 2012.

FACTS:
On July 19, 2000, respondent Salvador E. Kerr instituted a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against Dennis Q.
Mortel who duly filed an answer on August 11, 2000 through Atty. Leonuel N. Mas of the Public Attorney’s Office. The
pre-trial was re-set four times for various reasons, but on the fifth setting on December 7, 2000, Mortel and Atty. Mas
were not around when the case was called. On motion of Kerr’s counsel, the RTC declared Mortel as in default and
allowed Kerr to present evidence ex parte. On December 28, 2000, Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak filed a notice of appearance
in behalf of Mortel, but the RTC did not act on the notice of appearance. On February 28, 2001, the RTC rendered
judgment in favor of Kerr. On March 23, 2001, Atty. Mas filed his withdrawal of appearance. On April 5, 2001, the RTC
denied Mortel’s motion for new trial, noting that Atty. Mas’ withdrawal as counsel of Mortel had been filed only on
March 23, 2001 and approved by the RTC on March 26, 2001. It held that considering that the records of the case
showed that Atty. Mas had received the decision on March 1, 2001, the motion for new trial had been filed out of time
on March 20, 2001. On May 4, 2001, Mortel, this time through Atty. Tumulak, filed a verified petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. On August 20, 2001, the RTC denied the verified petition for relief had
been filed beyond the reglementary period of 60 days based on a reckoning of the start of the period from March 1,
2001, the date when Atty. Mas received the notice and copy of the Order. On November 14, 2001, Mortel moved for the
reconsideration of the denial of his petition for relief from judgment. On December 6, 2001, the RTC granted the
withdrawal of Atty. Lacambra and Atty. Mas as counsels for Mortel, and finally recognized Atty. Tumulak as the only
counsel. On January 16, 2002, the RTC treated Mortel’s motion for reconsideration as a mere scrap of paper and ordered
it stricken from the records for failure of the counsel to serve a notice of hearing with the motion for reconsideration.
Mortel filed an urgent motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the RTC’s order of January 16, 2002. On June 17, 2002, the
RTC denied the urgent motion for consideration and granted Kerr’s ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession. Subsequently, the RTC issued a writ of execution on June 20, 2002. On August 26, 2002, Mortel, through
Atty. Tumulak, filed in the CA a petition for review on certiorari. On September 5, 2002, the CA issued a resolution
dismissing Mortel’s petition for review for failing to state the specific material dates showing that the petition had been
filed within the reglementary period. On October 14, 2002, Mortel sought the reconsideration of the denial of his
petition for review. On November 18, 2002, the CA denied Mortel’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit because
the defects of the petition of review were not corrected, and for availing himself of the remedy of petition for review
when he should have filed a petition for certiorari instead. Atty. Tumulak received the denial by the CA on December 5,
2002. Mortel, through Atty. Tumulak, filed in the CA on December 20, 2002 an urgent motion for extension of time to
appeal to the SC. On December 23, 2002, Mortel, by himself, sought an extension of time to file a petition for review on
certiorari. On January 27, 2003, the Court granted Mortel’s motion for extension with a warning that no further
extension would be given. On January 22, 2003, Mortel, still by himself, filed his petition for review on certiorari assailing
the CA’s dismissal of his petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the negligence of Mortel’s previous counsels should bind him and if Mortel was deprived of his property
without due process of law.

RULING:
No, when an unsuccessful party has been prevented from fully and fairly presenting his case because of his attorney’s
professional delinquency or infidelity the litigation may be reopened to allow the party to present his side. Where
counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the client’s being held liable for
damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment may be set aside on such ground.

The negligence and mistakes committed by the several counsels were so gross and palpable that they denied due
process to Mortel and could have cost him his valuable asset. They thereby prevented him from presenting his side,
which was potentially highly unfair and unjust to him on account of his defense being plausible and seemingly
meritorious.

DOCTRINE: The constitutional right to representation by counsel does not mean that the accused may avoid trial by
neglecting or refusing to secure assistance of counsel and by refusing to participate in his trial; The court may deny an
accused’s application to discharge his counsel where it appears that such application is not made in good faith but is
made for purposes of delay.

Section 14, Article III of our Constitution catalogues the essentials of due process in a criminal prosecution. —Section 14,
Article III of our Constitution catalogues the essentials of due process in a criminal prosecution, thus: “SEC. 14. (1) No
person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence
of the accused provided that he has been notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.”

The constitutional right to representation by counsel does not mean that the accused may avoid trial by neglecting or
refusing to secure assistance of counsel and by refusing to participate in his trial; The court may deny an accused’s
application to discharge his counsel where it appears that such application is not made in good faith but is made for
purposes of delay.—In the present case, appellants requested either one (1) month or three (3) weeks to look for new
counsel. Such periods are unreasonable. Appellants could have hired new lawyers at a shorter time had they wanted to.
They should have been diligent in procuring new counsel. Constitutional guaranty of right to representation by counsel
does not mean that accused may avoid trial by neglecting or refusing to secure assistance of counsel and by refusing to
participate in his trial. It has been held that where the accused declined the court’s offer to appoint counsel and elected
to defend himself, the denial of his motion made toward the end of the trial for a continuance so that he could obtain
counsel of his own choice was not an infringement of his constitutional rights. While the accused has the right to
discharge or change his counsel at any time, this right is to some extent subject to supervision by the trial court,
particularly after the trial has commenced. The court may deny accused’s application to discharge his counsel where it
appears that such application is not made in good faith but is made for purposes of delay.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LARRAÑAGA, G.R. NO. 138874-75, FEBRUARY 3, 2004.

FACTS:
On the night of July 16, 1997, victims Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong failed to come home on the expected time. Two
days after, a young woman was found dead at the foot of a cliff. Her pants were torn, her
t-shirt was raised up to her breast and her bra was pulled down. Her face and necl were covered with masking tape and
attached to her left wrist was a handcuff. The woman was identified as Marijoy. After almost ten months, accused
Davidson Rusia surfaced and admitted before the police having participated in the abduction of the sisters. He identified
appellants Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño, Ariel Balansag, James Anthony Uy,
and James Andrew Uy as co-perpetrators in the crime. Rusia provided the following before the trial court:

1) That at 10:30 in the evening of July 16, 1997, he met Rowen and Josman and told him to ride with them in a white car.
Following them were Larrañaga, James Anthony and James Andrew who were in a red car. Josman stopped the white car
in front of the waiting shed where the sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline were standing and forced them to ride the car.
Rusia taped their mouths while Rowen handcuffed them jointly.

2) That after stopping by a safe house, the group thereafter headed to the South Bus Terminal where they met Alberto
and Ariel, and hired the white van driven by the former. They traveled towards south of Cebu City, leaving the red car at
the South Bus Terminal.

3) That after parking their vehicles near a precipice, they drank and had a pot session. Later, they started to rape Marijoy
inside the vehicle, and thereafter raped Jaqueline.

4) That Josman instructed Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy to the cliff and push her into the ravine.

The claims of Rusia were supported by other witnesses. He was discharged as an accused and became a state witness.
Still, the body of Jacqueline was never found. The trial court found the other appellants guilty of two crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalties of two (2) reclusion
perpetua. The appellants assailed the said decision, arguing inter alia, that court erred in finding that there was
conspiracy. James Anthony was also claimed to be only 16 years old when the crimes were committed.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not there was conspiracy?
2) Whether or not the trial court erred in characterizing the crime?
3) Whether or not the trial court erred imposing the correct penalty?

HELD:
1) Yes. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or may be
inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such point to a joint design and community of interest. The
appellant’s actions showed that they had the same objective to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters. The Court affirmed
the trial court’s finding that the appellants indeed conspired in the commission of the crimes charged.

2) Yes. The rule is that when the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting crime
is called a special complex crime. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of R.A. 7659, provides
that in the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention, or is raped or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall he imposed. Thus, the
resulting crime will change from complex crime to special complex crime. In the present case, the victims were raped
and subjected to dehumanizing acts. Thus, the Court held that all the appellants were guilty of the special complex crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape in the case where Marijoy is the victim; and simple
kidnapping and serious illegal detention in the case of Jacqueline.

3) Yes. Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by reason of minority, the imposable penalty to the offender is
one degree lower than the statutory penalty. James Anthony was only 16 years old when the crimes were committed. As
penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape is death, the
correct penalty to be imposed should be reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and
serious illegal detention is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower from the said penalty is reclusion temporal.
There being no aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on him should be reclusion temporal
in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve
(12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as maximum. With regard to the rest of the appellants, the statutory penalty as provided above should
be imposed. Therefore, trial court erred in merely imposing “two (2) reclusion perpetua”.

DOCTRINE: The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of
the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a
fair and impartial trial. When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence tells us that the right of the accused
must be preferred to win.

Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted
above its individual settings nor made an object of public’s attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not
by any outside force or influence but only by evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm
ambiance is demanded.

Witnesses and judges may very well be men and women of fortitude, able to thrive in hardy climate, with every reason
to presume firmness; of mind and resolute endurance, but it must also be conceded that “television can work profound
changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on.” Even while it may be difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure
that media can bring to bear on them directly and through the shaping of public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that,
indeed, it does so in so many ways and in varying degrees. The conscious or unconscious effect that such a coverage may
have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not
at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it. It might be farcical to build around them an impregnable
armor against the influence of the most powerful media of public opinion. To say that actual prejudice should first be
present would leave to near nirvana the subtle threats to justice that a disturbance of the mind so indispensable to the
calm and deliberate dispensation of justice can create. The effect of television may escape the ordinary means of proof,
but it is not far-fetched for it to gradually erode our basal conception of a trial such as we know it now.
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or
liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly
condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous
with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available
seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should
have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the
openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be
totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.

PEREZ v. ESTRADA, A.M. NO. 01-4-03-SC, JUNE 29, 2001.

FACTS:
On March 13, 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly franchised and
authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter requesting the Supreme Court to allow
live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph
E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order “to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an
unprecedented case in our history.” The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 5 April 2001 to the
Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On 17 April 2001, the Secretary
of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not media coverage be allowed to air Estrada’s trial to the public.

RULING:
No. In Estes v. Texas, US SC held that television coverage of judicial proceedings involves an inherent denial of due
process rights of the criminal defendant: “Witnesses might be frightened, play to the cameras, become nervous. They
are then subject to extraordinary out-of-court influences that might affect their testimony. Telecasting increases the trial
judge’s responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the defendant. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental
harassment and subjects him to excessive public exposure and distracts him from an effective presentation of his
defense. Finally, the television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused
and his case in the eyes of the public.”

The right of people to information does not prescribe that TV cameras be installed in the courtroom. This right might be
fulfilled by less distracting, degrading and more judicial means. In a criminal case, a life is at stake, and the due process
rights of the accused shall take precedence over the people’s right to information. The accused has the right to a public
trial, and the exercise pf such a right is his to make, because it is his life and liberty that is in the balance. A public trial is
not the same as a publicized trial.

IBP: “TV coverage can negate the rule on the exclusion of the witness interested to ensure a fair trial, could allow the
‘hooting throng’ to arrogate upon themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused, will not subserve the ends of
justice, but will only pander to the desire of publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers.”

Court is not unmindful of the recent technological advances but to chance forthwith the life and liberty of any person in
a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed
are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.
ART. III SEC. 14

A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001

RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE
PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR

SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO, and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,oppositors

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners' request for permission to televise and broadcast live
the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as one of the
petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict between the right of the people to public information and the freedom of
the press, on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash between these rights, it
must be resolved in favor of the right of the people and the press because the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to
information; and that live media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit
of selfish interests.

On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV and radio coverage of his
trial on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his experience with the impeachment trial,
live media coverage will only pave the way for so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations aimed at
pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the people to
information may be served through other means less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there can be a live media coverage of Former Pres. Estrada’s Plunder case

HELD:

The SC answered in negative.

The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important issue and, after due deliberation, finds no reason to alter or in
any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real time broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the former president. By a vote of
nine (9) to six (6) of its member, the Court denies the motion for reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.

In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices, has resolved to order the audio-visual
recording of the trial for documentary purposes.

Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance of preserving the
records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The recordings will not be for live
or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall
have promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains. The master film shall be deposited in the National Museum
and the Records Management and Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law

There are several reasons for such televised recording.

 First, the hearings are of historic significance. They are an affirmation of our commitment to the rule that "the King is under
no man, but he is under God and the law." (Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.)
 Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a fundamental right to know how
their government is conducted. This right can be enhanced by audio visual presentation.
 Third, audio-visual presentation is essential for the education and civic training of the people.
 Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual records of the hearings for documentary purposes. The recordings will be
useful in preserving the essence of the proceedings in a way that the cold print cannot quite do because it cannot capture the
sights and sounds of events. They will be primarily for the use of appellate courts in the event a review of the proceedings,
 rulings, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts of stenographic
notes taken during the trial can be checked by reference to the tapes.

On the other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for broadcast, concerns that those taking part in the proceedings will be playing
to the cameras and will thus be distracted from the proper performance of their roles -- whether as counsel, witnesses, court personnel,
or judges -- will be allayed. The possibility that parallel trials before the bar of justice and the bar of public opinion may jeopardize, or
even prevent, the just determination of the cases can be minimized.

The possibility that judgment will be rendered by the popular tribunal before the court of justice can render its own will be avoided. At
the same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness of the trial -- which, it may be assumed, is the concern of those opposed to,
as much as of those in favor of, televised trials - will be addressed since the tapes will not be released for public showing until after the
decision of the cases by the Sandiganbayan. By delaying the release of the tapes, much of the problem posed by real time TV and
radio broadcast will be avoided.

Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such documentary. In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. V. Capulong, this
Court set aside a lower court's injunction restraining the filming of "Four Day Revolution," a documentary film depicting, among other
things, the role of then Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in the 1986 EDSA people power. This Court held: "A limited
intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the
information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public character”.

WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording (NOT LIVE BROADCAST) of the trial of former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the following conditions: (a) the trial shall
be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule
119, §21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement of
TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made
for documentary purposes only and shall be made without comment except such annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be
necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the
cases against the former President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of the
prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the
supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f)
simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in the
National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.

G.R. No. L-58284 November 19, 1981

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, BERNABE BUSCAYNO, JOSE
MA. SISON and JULIET SISON, petitioners,
vs.
MILITARY COMMISSIONS NOS. 1, 2, 6 and 25, GENERAL FABIAN VER, GENERAL FIDEL RAMOS,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL VIRGILIO SALDAJENO, CAPTAIN MELCHOR A. ACOSTA and REVIEW BOARD OF
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

FACTS:

Bernabe Buscayno alias Commander Dante and Jose Ma. Sison alias Amado Guerrero, alleged subversives classified as
"PKP/HMB/CPP/MAMAO and Traditional Armed Group personalities", were wanted by the authorities since 1971.

In Department Order No. 610 Undersecretary of National Defense Efren I. Plana fixed P150,000 and P50,000 as the prizes to be paid
to any person who kills, captures or causes the killing, capture or surrender of Buscayno and Sison, respectively, or who
furnishes information directly leading to and which is the proximate result of their killing or capture.

Buscayno's case — Even before Buscayno's arrest, he and Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. (arrested on September 23, 1972) were charged
before Military Commission No. 2 in an amended charge sheet dated August 14, 1973 with subversion or violation of the Anti-
Subversion Law, Republic Act No. 1700.

Aquino, Buscayno, Peter Ilocano and Puriok, as conspirators, were also charged with murder before Military Commission No. 2 in a
charge sheet dated August 7, 1973. It was alleged that during the last days of November to December 2, 1967 they took Cecilio Sumat
a barrio captain of Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac, from his house and killed him in Barrio San Miguel, Tarlac, Tarlac
In Criminal Case No. MC-1-92, Buscayno, with ninety-one other persons including Sison and his wife, Juliet de Lima, Saturnino
Ocampo and Mila Astorga-Garcia, were charged with rebellion before Military Commission No. 1 in a charge sheet dated March 18,
1977.

It was alleged that on or about February 4, 1972 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto the ninety-two accused as officers and
leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines and its military arm, the New People's Army, and as conspirators rose publicly and
took up arms against the government in Navotas, Rizal and elsewhere in the Philippines for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance to said government or its laws the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof or of its armed forces by organizing the
Karagatan Fishing Corporation and operating the M/V Karagatan a fishing vessel, to procure firearms and ammunition for the CPP
and NPA as in fact war materials and armanents were landed at Digoyo Point, Palanan, Isabela on July 2, 1972 from Communist
China and were used against the army.

The second specification in Criminal Case No. MC-1-92 is that Buscayno, Sison and others during the period from August, 1973 to
February, 1974 committed rebellion in Manila, Baguio, La Union, Pangasinan, Bulacan and elsewhere in the Philippines by acquiring,
purchasing and operating vessels, motor vehicles, beach houses, lots and other real and personal properties for use in distributing
firearms and ammunition for the CPP and NPA to be utilized in resisting the army and overthrowing the government.

Buscayno was arrested on August 26. 1976 in Barrio Sto. Rosario, Mexico, Pampanga by operatives of the armed forces. He was
detained in the Constabulary Security Unit at Camp Crame. When the trial counsel informed Buscayno that his presence at the
hearing on September 15, 1976 before Military Commission No. 2 was necessary, Buscayno in a letter dated September 7, 1976
addressed to the President of the Commission declared that he had no intention of appearing before the tribunal; that he did not
need a lawyer; that he would not contest the tribunal's jurisdiction and that any reference by the prosecution witnesses to
Buscayno alias Commander Dante would be to him and to no other person.

At Buscayno's arraignment in the subversion and murder cases, he waived his right to be present and to have counsel. He said that
he was not challenging any member of the tribunal. He just wanted to have a record of the trial. He pleaded not guilty. After the
prosecution had finished the presentation of its evidence, Buscayno was asked whether he wanted to present evidence. He
answered in writing that he did not want to present evidence. On October 25, 1977, lawyer David filed in this Court in behalf of
Buscayno a petition for habeas corpus and prohibition.

This Court in its decision dated January 15, 1981 dismissed Buscayno's petition (L-47185, 102 SCRA 7). We reiterated the rule that a
military tribunal has jurisdiction to try civilians and that the proceeding in a commission is not violative of procedural due
process and would not be vitiated by partiality.

Buscayno did not present any evidence. The Commission considered the cases re-submitted for decision. On May 4, 1981, the
Commission denied Buscayno's motion for the reconsideration of the ruling that his case was already submitted for decision. It
reaffirmed its 1977 decision imposing on Buscayno the penalty of death by firing squad.

Cases against Sison and spouses. — They were arrested on November 10, 1977 by virtue of arrest, search and seizure orders
issued by the Secretary of National Defense. As already stated in connection with the Buscayno case, the Sison spouses and ninety-
one other persons including Buscayno and Victor Corpus were charged with rebellion on two counts before Special Military
Commission No. 1.Even before her arrest, Juliet Sison, with fifty-five other persons including Victor Corpus, was charged with
subversion before Military Commission No. 6
Juliet Sison was pinpointed as a ranking leader of the Kabataang Makabayan operating in the Bicol region, helping her husband Jose
as KM chairman and editing the periodical Ang Bayan in Isabela.

The Sison spouses, together with the Buscayno spouses, Peter Mutuc, Edgar Pilapil, Eduardo Lingat, Joaquin Rivera, Leonila
Lumbang and Juanito Canlas, filed in this Court a petition for habeas corpus, prohibition and mandamus (L-49579). That petition
was dismissed.

The instant case. — On October 2, 1981, Buscayno and the Sison spouses filed the instant omnibus catchall petition for habeas
corpus, prohibition and mandamus couched in repetitious, involuted and obfuscatory verbiage.

They prayed that the decision of Military Commission No. 2 dated May -1. 1981, convicting Buscayno of subversion and murder and
sentencing him to death by firing squad, be declared void because he was denied his constitutional right to present evidence and
that he be released from detention.

They also prayed that the charges of rebellion and subversion be dismissed for being in contravention of the rule on double jeopardy,
that Military Commissions Nos. 1, 6 and 25 be enjoined from proceeding with the trial of the petitioners and that the petitioners be
released. They also prayed that they be granted bail.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not the petitioners were illegally detained

 2.) Whether or not Buscayno was denied his constitutional right to present evidence

HELD:

1.) No. find that they have not been illegally deprived of their liberty and that there is no justification to order their release (Habeas
Corpus)
Proclamation No. 2045 explicitly provides that persons, like petitioners who are under detention for rebellion and the capital
offense of subversion, cannot enjoy the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Because the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended as to them, they are not entitled to bail.

2.) Generally, this Court does not exercise over military commissions the supervisory jurisdiction which it possesses over civil trial
courts whose interlocutory rulings and decisions may be reviewed by this Court. So, the issue as to whether Buscayno was
denied his constitutional right to present evidence should first be passed upon by the reviewing military authority and not by
this Court. The propriety of the perpetuation proceedings in the rebellion case and the conduct of the trial in the Commission
cannot at this stage be passed upon by this Court. We have definitively ruled that the petitioners can be tried by the military
commissions and that their cases are within the jurisdiction and competence of military tribunals.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. No costs.

G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980

PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Raul M. Gonzales for petitioners
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, in their own behalf and all
others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain
provisions of Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.

The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy
for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter
and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo
Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.

Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to
the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:

Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and disqualification
mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section
1 hereof.

Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is
entitled under the law, and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks
to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.

Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is
based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation."

ISSUE:

Is the Sec.4 of BP 52 violative of the constitution and be declared as null & void?

HELD:

No. The first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid.
It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies. Petitioner Dumlao assails
the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal
protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC from implementing said provision. Yet,
Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been
filed before the COMELEC. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is being asked to review on
Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to
be rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction

Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a wellsettled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be
determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a
determination of the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented."

We have already stated that, by the standards set forth in People vs. Vera, the present is not an "appropriate case" for either petitioner
Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and Salapantan. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving
the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that this suit be dismissed.

Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him personally is belied by the fact that several
petitions for the disqualification of other candidates for local positions based on the challenged provision have already been filed with
the COMELEC (as listed in p. 15, respondent's Comment). This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's contention of intentional or purposeful
discrimination.

The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and
real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service,
employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject
to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can
also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65
year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to
disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new
blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the
retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of
mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged
provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection neither does it permit of such denial. Persons similarly situated are
sinlilarly treated.

The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of the presumption of validity that attaches
to a challenged statute, of the well-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality,"
and that Courts will not set aside a statute as constitutionally defective "except in a clear case." (People vs. Vera, supra). We are
constrained to hold that this is one such clear case G.R. No. L-52245.

Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation,
according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of
innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him
before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction
is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them
would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed
against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries
with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code). And
although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present
danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering
contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him. Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty
be aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings
between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a
legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.
G.R. No. 173612 March 26, 2008

DOMINADOR MALANA and RODEL TIAGA, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

TINGA, J.:

FACTS:

The petitioners Dominador and Rodel, together with their acquitted co-accused Elenito, were charged with the crime of murder and
multiple frustrated murder before the RTC. The charges stemmed from an incident that left Betty dead, and her daughter Suzette and
granddaughter injured. The appellants pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. Vicente, the husband of deceased Betty, testified that
appellants had been threatening to liquidate him and his family, due to their belief that he was in the practice of witchcraft by which he
had caused the deaths of Rodels parents-in-law.

Appellants proffered the defenses of denial and alibi. The RTC found Dominador and Rodel guilty of two (2) separate crimes of murder
and frustrated murder, and acquitted Elenito on the ground of reasonable doubt.

The trial court gave credence to the eyewitness accounts of Vicente and Suzette who positively identified the appellants as two of the
three perpetrators of the crime. However, the trial court acquitted Elenito as he was not positively identified by Suzette as the third man
and his physical appearance does not fit the description of the tall fat man seen by Suzette. The CA affirmed the guilt of appellants.

ISSUE:

What is the “Equipoise” rule? When can this be invoked?

HELD:

This rule provides that where the evidence of the parties in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of
innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is, therefore, no equipoise if the evidence is not evenly balanced. Said
rule is not applicable in the case before us because the evidence here presented is not equally weighty. The equipoise rule cannot be
invoked where the evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming.

Against the direct, positive and convincing evidence for the prosecution, appellants could only offer denials and uncorroborated alibi. It
is elementary that alibi and denial are outweighed by positive identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive
on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are
negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. The prosecution witnesses positively identified appellants as two of
the perpetrators of the crime. It is incumbent upon appellants to prove that they were at another place when the felony was committed,
and that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. This they failed to
prove.

Ultimately, the Court also said that there is no merit in appellants assiduous assertion that they should be acquitted under the equipoise
rule in view of what to them are doubts as to their guilt.

Joey P. Marquez vs. Sandiganbayan

656 Phil. 177 Jan 31, 2011

Mendoza, J.,

Facts:
Joey Marquez, in his capacity as the mayor of Paranaque and Ofelia Caunan, Head of the Genera Service of the
City was charged with anti-graft charges before the Ombudsman after the COA found irregularities in the City’s
procurement of several thousand rounds of ammunitions. Both of them insisted propriety of the transactions and
raised the pendency of they appeal with COA through a Joint Counter-Affidavit.
Before arraignment, Marquez claimed that he discovered forgery of signatures in the disbursement documents
and sought to be reinvestigated. He also called out the NBI to aid the investigation. This was denied by the Office
of the Special Prosecutor. At trial, the prosecution presented evidence and witnesses while Marquez insisted on his
claim of forged signatures on the documents and filed for a Motion to Refer Prosecution’s Evidence for
Examination. The OSP opposed the motion claiming that such a move was only designed to delay the proceedings
and argued that Marquez does not raise the defense of forgery earlier and insisted on its propriety when he filed
his Joint Counter-Affidavit. In his reply, Marquez claimed that he never admitted that the signatures on the
disbursement document were his and he did not intend to delay the proceedings. His motion was denied and his
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. He brought the case to the SC alleging that he was not given the
right to present evidence.
Issue:
• • Whether or not Marquez’s right to present evidence was violated.

Ruling:

Yes, it was violated.

One of the most vital and precious rights accorded to an accused by the Constitution is due process, which
includes a fair and impartial trial and a reasonable opportunity to present one's defense. Under Section 14, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution, it is provided that:
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However,
after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (emphasis supplied)
In this connection, it is well settled that due process in criminal proceedings requires that (a) the court or tribunal
trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that
jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to
be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
While the Constitution does not specify the nature of this opportunity, by necessary implication, it means that the
accused should be allowed reasonable freedom to present his defense if the courts are to give form and substance
to this guaranty. Should the trial court fail to... accord an accused reasonable opportunity to submit evidence in his
defense, the exercise by the Court of its certiorari jurisdiction is warranted as this amounts to a denial of due
process.

US vs. J. Valentine Karelsen

3 Phil. 223 Jan 21, 1904
Johnson, J.,

Facts:
Karelsen, as the postmaster was charged with embezzlement of money amounting to $1000 in gold dollars. The
accused filed a demurrer to the said complaint claiming that the complaint against him does not contain a
description of said funds in such a manner an intelligent person can identify. At arraignment, he pleaded not guilty,
he was tried and was found to be guilty. On appeal, he reiterated his stance that the complaint against him does
not contain the description of the money embezzled by piece of denomination and such, he was not properly
informed of the charge against him. He claimed further that due process of law was violated.

Issue:
• • Whether or not Karelsen’s right to be informed was violated.

Held:
No, his right to be informed of the charge against him was not violated.
Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with
reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the
complaint must contain a specific legation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the
crime charged. If personal property is the subject of the offense, it must be described with certainty, and
in those cases in which its value is material the value must be stated. Personal property can usually be
described by the name by which it is generally known. The complaint generally would be bad if in such a
case a total value only was alleged. These rules do not require that a minute description of the property
shall be given—they do not require an impossibility. In embezzlement where the offense is committed by
a person, in the course of a long, continuous employment as a clerk, cashier, or postmaster, who is daily
receiving and disbursing large sums of money, a description of the pieces or denominations of the
money is absolutely impossible. In such a case, if his accounts are correctly kept, the only description which
can be made is by a general statement of the amount which his books disclose.
In the present case the books of the accused showed that he had the sum of $1,046.64, gold, United States
currency, belonging to the Post-Office Department on the 1st day of April, 1903. He is charged with embezzling
"$1,000, gold, legal money of the United States." This allegation is in substance in the terms of his own accounts,
and we fail to see how he can in any way misunderstand the allegation or be confused in making his defense
under it.

People of the Phils. vs. Ronnie Quitlong , Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto
354 Phil. 372 Jul 10, 1998
Vitug, J.,

Facts:

Quitlong et al. was charged with the killing of Jonathan Calpito after an argument with a fishball vendor. The
accused offered no alibi but interposed a defense of denial, basically arguing that they were at the scene of the
crime but they were not involved in the commission thereof as they were merely in the place as the scene was a
public space after all. The Quitlong brothers pointed Jesus Mendoza as the real suspect which was allegedly
witnessed by other sidewalk vendors who testified in court. The accused was found guilty of conspiracy to commit
murder. The Quitlong brothers claimed that the Honorable Lower Court gravely abused its discretion and/or acted
in excess of jurisdiction when it held that they were acting in conspiracy when the same was not alleged in the
information or complaint.

Issues:

Held:

Article III, Section 14, of the Constitution mandates that no person shall be held answerable for a
criminal offense without due process of law and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall first
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.The right to be informed of any such
indictment is likewise explicit in procedural rules. The practice and object of informing an accused in
writing of the charges against him has been explained as early as the 1904 decision of the Court in U.S.
vs. Karelsen; viz: First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection
against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so
that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. In
order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. The complaint
must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime
charged. An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of his accusation is not violated, must state the name of the accused; the
designation given to the offense by the statute; a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time and date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense has been committed. In embodying the essential
elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on
the culpability and liability of the accused so that the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense.
One such fact or circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused persons is that of conspiracy. Quite
unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to during trial, may be
corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal
liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of
the nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the commission of the
crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony
becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others.

Manuel Mateo Jr., Roberto Martinez, Enrique Concepcion et. al vs. Hon. Onofre Villaluz
GR. No. L-34756-59 Mar 31, 1973
Fernando, J.,

Facts:

The American Express bank was robbed and in the ensuing incident, an American serviceman was killed.
Petitioners were charged with criminal actions in connection to this. One of them, Rolando Reyes seemingly
executed an extra-judicial statement. Rolando Reyes, was tried separately from and in the absence of petitioners;
so that the proceedings against him did not constitute evidence against petitioner. While petitioner Martinez'
Motion and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss remained unresolved, the prosecution filed a 'Motion to Present
Additional Evidence respondent

Judge granted the prosecution's 'Motion to Present Additional Evidence' ruling that 'it is well settled jurisprudence
in this jurisdiction and elsewhere that it is within the sound discretion of the court whether or not to allow the
presentation of additional evidence after the parties have rested their case... the prosecution called Rolando Reyes
as an additional witness and in the course of his testimony, marked an extrajudicial statement purportedly
executed by him on

Rolando Reyes repudiated it, stated that he had executed it because he had been threatened by a government
agent

Ruling:

Respondent judge should inhibit himself since it has become apparent that his further continuance in Case 4871
would not be in the best interest of justice, which he is bound to serve. Petitioners are thus entitled to the relief
sought. Respondent Judge could not be totally immune to what apparently was asserted before him in such
extrajudicial statement. Moreover, it is unlikely that he was not in the slightest bit offended by the affiant's
turnabout with his later declaration that there was intimidation by a government agent exerted on him. That was
hardly flattering to respondent Judge. It is not only that. His sense of fairness under the circumstances could easily
be blunted. The absence of the requisite due process element is thus noticeable. There is this circumstance even more
telling. It was he who attested to its due execution on October 1, 1971 wherein Rolando Reyes admitted his participation
in the crime and in addition implicated petitioners. At that time, their motion for dismissal of the charges against them
was pending; its resolution was deferred by respondent Judge until after the prosecution had presented and rested its
evidence against affiant, who was himself indicted and tried for the same... offense, but in a separate proceeding. It
cannot be doubted then that respondent Judge in effect ruled that such extra-judicial statement was executed freely.
With its repudiation on the ground that it was not so at all, coercion having come into the picture, there is apparent the
situation of a judge having to pass on a question that by implication had already been answered by him. Such a fact
became rather obvious. For respondent Judge was called upon to review a matter on which he had previously given his
opinion. It is this inroad in one's objectivity that is sought to be avoided by the law on disqualification. The misgivings
then as to the requirement of due process for "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" not being met are more than
justified.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2: WEEK 2 Case Digest

TOPIC: Criminal Proceedings

Art. III, Section 14

G.R. No. L-30104 July 25, 1973

HON. GREGORIO N. GARCIA City Court of Manila, and FRANCISCO LORENZANA, Petitioners,

vs.

HON. FELIX DOMINGO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, EDGARDO CALO and SIMEON CARBONNEL,
Respondents.

FACTS:

 In Branch I of the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge, there were commenced, all dated
January 16, 1968 eight criminal actions respondents Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Petitioner
Lorenzana.
(Filed case: Slight physical injury, maltreatment, light treat, slander and violation of Sec. 887 of the Revised
Ordinances of Manila [resisting an officer])

 The trial for the cases was jointly held on 14 trial dates. And all the fourteen trial dates fell on a Saturday. This
was arranged by the parties and the Court upon the insistence of respondents Calo and Carbonnel who, as
police officers under suspension because of the cases, desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible as,
Saturday as agreed upon as the invariable trial day for said 8 criminal cases.

 The trial of the cases in question was held with the conformity of the accused and their counsel in the chambers
of Judge Garcia.

 It is worthy to note that said respondents Calo and Carbonnel had not objected to any supposed irregularity of
the proceedings thus far;

 Then Carbonnel thru their counsel, filed with the Court of First Instance a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction alleging jurisdictional defects.

 The respondent judge acting on such petition forthwith issued a restraining order causing the deferment of the
promulgation of judgment. There was an order from him declaring that ‘the constitutional and statutory rights
of the accused had been violated, adversely affecting their right to a free and impartial trial noting that the trial
 of these cases lasting several weeks were held exclusively in chambers and not in the court room open to the
public.

 What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties, and of the city court Judge, it
was in the latter’s air-conditioned chambers that the trial was held. Did that suffice to vitiate the proceedings as
violative of this right?

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Whether or not the trial conducted in the chambers of the Judge suffice to vitiate the proceedings as violative of the
right to Public trial.

RULING OF THE COURT:

No. The answer must be in the negative. There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to admit that the
size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a fact though is not
indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others.

Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial
being public if the accused could “have his friends, relatives and counsel present, not matter with what offense he may
be charged.” Then too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had been held in
chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the part of respondent policemen should erase any doubt as to
the weight to be accorded.

Thus, in one case, the trial of the accused was held in Bilibid prison. The accused, invoking his right to public trial,
assigned the procedure thus taken as error. The Supreme Court held that as it affirmatively appears on the record that
the accused offered no objection to the trial of his case in the place where it was held his right is deemed waived.

The crucial question of the meaning to be attached this provision remains. The Constitution guarantees an accused the
right to a public trial. What does it signify? Off hand it does seem fairly obvious that there is an instance where language
is to be given literal application. There is no ambiguity in the words employed. The trial must be public. It possesses that
character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do
so. There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the
parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded
further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety.
Where the trial takes place, as is quite usual, in a courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is posted no
problem, arises. It is the usual course of events that individuals desirous of being present are free to do so. There is the
well-recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as
“offensive to decency or public morals.”

XXXXXXXXXX

G.R. No. L-59318 May 16, 1983

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ROGELIO RAMOS y GAERLAN, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

 Accused Rogelio Ramos y Gaerlan is guilty for violation of Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 2(i), Article I
of the Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by P.D. No. 44 and further amended by P.D. No. 1675. (Section 4
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972)

 Evening of May 3. 1981, while P/Lt. E. Mediavillo and P/Sgt. A. Linga were on routine patrol along Taft Avenue,
they had seen and observed one MALCON OLEVERE y NAPA, acting suspiciously near the corner of Estrada
Street.

 The police officers, after Identifying themselves, stopped and frisked the suspect and found in his possession
dried marijuana leaves. The police officers thereafter placed Malcon Olevere under arrest. Upon investigation,
suspect Olevere declared that he bought the recovered marijuana leaves from one ROGELIO RAMOS y GAERLAN,
alias "Balanchoy".
  The following day, a police team with suspect Malcon Olevere y Napa proceeded to the residence of appellant
Rogelio Ramos y Gaerlan and arrested him. The police operatives immediately brought appellant to the Drugs
Enforcement Section Western Police Department Headquarters for investigation.
 During the custodial investigation, suspect Malcon Olevere executed a written sworn statement implicating the
accused-appellant Rogelio Ramos as the source of the marijuana leaves. Thereafter, the accused after having
been duly apprised of his constitutional rights, verbally admitted before Lt. E. Mediavillo and Sgt. A. Linga the
commission of the offense charged.

 However, upon arraignment, the accused-appellant Ramos entered a plea of not guilty to the information filed
by assistant fiscal Antonio J. Ballena.

 RTC RULING: Found the accused-appellant Ramos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in view
of the verbal admission given by the appellant himself and the evidence offered and admitted in court.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

1. Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused, more particularly the right to meet the witness against him
face to face and to cross-examine him has been violated.

2. Whether or not there is competent and/or admissible evidence in the record to justify the conviction of the accused-
appellant Ramos.

RULING OF THE COURT:

The court finds the petitioner's case meritorious.

The lower court erred in admitting as evidence the written sworn affidavit of Malcon Olevere. It can be gleaned from the
records that Malcon Olevere executed the written sworn statement declaring that appellant Ramos sold to him the
marijuana leaves for P10.00. This piece of evidence is a mere scrap of paper because Malcon Olevere was not produced
in court for cross-examination. An affidavit being taken ex-parte is often incomplete and inaccurate. Such kind of
evidence is considered hearsay. The constitutional right to meet witnesses face to face in order not to deprive persons
of their lives and properties without due process of law is well-protected in our jurisprudence.

For the court to admit the sworn statement of Malcon Olevere without giving the adverse party the right to cross-
examine him would easily facilitate the fabrication of evidence and the perpetration of fraud. The inadmissibility of this
sort of evidence is based, not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse party to cross-examine the
affiant, but also on the commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by
another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by
the one writing them
The Booking Sheet and the Dangerous Drug Report of chemist Felisa Vequilla which were presented as evidence by the
prosecution, established nothing to support the conviction of the appellant herein. For the same reason, that Malcon
Olevere was not presented as a witness and insofar as they impute to appellant the commission of the crime charged,
the adduced evidence are nothing but hearsay evidence. They cannot be regarded as competent evidence as to the
veracity of the contents therein.

Wherefore, the court hold and rule that the guilt of the accused has not been established beyond reasonable doubt and
he is, therefore, entitled to acquittal.

XXXXXXXXXX

G. R. No. 120350 October 13, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

FREDDIE YAMBOT y DELOS SANTOS, FRANCIS VERSOZA, ARNILO GAVIOLA y CARBAJAL, MARCIANO SAYASA, and
EDGARDO LINGAN, accused-appellants.

FACTS:

 Accused Freddie Yambot y delos Santos, Francis Versoza, Arnelo (sic) Gaviola y Carbajal, Marciano Sayasa and
Edgardo Lingan Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Kidnapping for Ransom as charged. (Victim:
Francisco Bernabe)

 Upon arraignment, appellant Freddie Yambot y delos Santos, assisted by Atty. Tiberio U. Prado; and appellant
Arnilo Gaviola, with the assistance of Atty. Froilan Zapanta, pleaded not guilty to the accusations against them.
Appellant Francis Versoza likewise entered a negative plea upon arraignment.

 On June 3, 1994, the prosecution amended the Information to include, among others, Renato Jamorawon and
appellant Marciano Sayasa (AKA Romy Sayasa). (Pleaded not guilty upon arraignment)

 On June 21, 1994, the trial court of origin, on motion of the prosecution, discharged accused Renato Jamorawon
to serve as a state witness.

 On May 22, 1995, after trial, the lower court handed down the judgment of conviction under automatic review.
ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Whether or not appellants Freddie Yambot and Francis Versoza were denied of due process of law.

RULING OF THE COURT:

YES. It appears that they were denied of due process of law.

Enshrined in the constitution is the paramount right of the accused to "xxx have a compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. xxx" Procedural due process cannot possibly be
satisfied without a "law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after
trial." The constitutional right of the accused to be heard on his defense is inviolate. No court of justice under our system
of government has the power to deprive him of that right.

In the case under consideration, appellants Yambot and Versoza were scheduled to present evidence on December 12,
14, 16, 19, 21 and 23, 1994. Thus, on December 7, 1994, subpoena was issued to appellants' witnesses Marie Maniego
of Sapang Jaen Nueva Ecija and police officer Joe Villena of Gapan Police Station, Gapan Nueva Ecija. Said subpoena,
however, was not served on Marie Maniego, who was unknown at the given address, while in the case of Joe Villena, he
received the subpoena only on December 9, 1994.

At the hearing on April 19, 1995, the trial court, on motion of Atty. Prado, reset the presentation of evidence for
appellants Yambot and Versoza to May 15, 22, and 26, 1995; and issued the corresponding subpoena for witnesses
Marie Maniego and Joe Villena, even as it reiterated its warning to declare a waiver of appellants' right to adduce
evidence.

On May 15, 1995, Atty. Prado pleaded for a resetting of the presentation of evidence on the ground that the
subpoenaed witnesses did not appear. Thereupon, the trial court issued a warrant of arrest against witness Joe Villena,
declaring him in contempt of court for repeated failure to appear before the court. Nevertheless, it ignored the plea of
appellants' counsel to present Joe Villena as witness and submitted the case for decision

From the foregoing, it can be gleaned uneeringly that the delay in the progress of the case under scrutiny is not entirely
attributable to appellants Yambot and Verzosa. The trial court should have granted said appellants' prayer for the
presentation of their witness. It is worthy to note that the trial court issued a warrant of arrest against witness Joe
Villena but denied the counsel of said appellants to present Joe Villena as a witness.

Conformably therewith, in People vs. Hipolito Diaz y De Guzman,48 the Court held:
"It is well settled that the right to be heard by himself and counsel is one of the constitutional rights granted to the
accused. Not only this but he likewise has the right to present evidence for his defense. Accordingly, denial of due
process can be successfully invoked where no valid waiver of rights has been made, as in the instant case.

Wherefore, appellants Freddie Yambot y delos Santos and Francis Versoza, the judgment of conviction against them is
SET ASIDE; and the trial court is hereby ordered to receive the evidence on their behalf and to render judgment on them
based on the evidence for the prosecution already adduced and that of Freddie Yambot and Francis Versoza.

XXXXXXXXXX

G.R. No. L-61356-57 September 30, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

FELICISIMO JARA, REYMUNDO VERGARA and ROBERTO BERNADAS, defendants-appellants.

FACTS:

 The three appellants were all sentenced to death in Criminal Case No. 2564 for robbery with homicide. In the
companion case of parricide, one was sentenced to another death penalty while the two other appellants
received sentenced ranging from 12 to 20 years of imprisonment.

 All the accused pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. On motion by the prosecution and the defense, the
court a quo ordered a joint trial of the two cases which arose from one incident and where the witnesses are the
same.

 Felicisimo Jara denied the charge that he was the one who killed his wife, Luisa, together with her friend,
Amparo Bantigue. He interposed alibi as a defense and testified that at the time the killings took place at Alvin's
Canteen at Malvar Street, Puerto Princesa City, he was fast asleep with his grandchildren at his step-daughter's
house in Pineda Subdivision.
  The other accused, Reymundo Vergara and Roberto Bernadas retracted their respective extra-judicial
confessions admitting their participation in the crimes charged and Identifying their mastermind" as the accused
Jara during proceedings before the Inquest Fiscal. They contested the admissibility of the extra-judicial
confessions and the subsequent re- enactment of the crime on the ground that their participations in these
occasions were not free and voluntary and were without the benefit of counsel.

 The court below ruled that the extra-judicial confessions of the accused Bernadas and Vergara, together with
the proof of corpus delicti of the special crime of robbery with homicide established the guilt of the accused
beyond moral certainty.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

1. Whether or not there is sufficient evidence as borne by the records to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.

2. Whether or not the court erred in admitting the alleged extra-judicial confessions of accused-appellants reymundo
vergara and roberto bernadas which were taken thru force and without benefit of counsel.

RULING OF THE COURT:

There is no dispute that the confessions in these cases were obtained in the absence of counsel. According to the
records, there was a waiver by the accused-appellants of their right to counsel. However, the court constrained to
answer that the waiver is invalid.

Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection, the presumption is
always against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution must prove with strongly convincing evidence to the
satisfaction of this Court that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and
deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession.
That proof is missing in this case.

The records sustain the appellants' contention that their extrajudicial confessions bear clear earmarks of illegality and
improbability.

The Solicitor General gives the following arguments for voluntariness:

An extra-judicial confession is generally presumed to have been voluntarily executed (People v. Castañeda, 93 SCRA 56).
The confessant carries the burden of convincing the trial judge that his admissions are involuntary or untrue (People v.
Ramos, 94 SCRA 842).
The trial court in this case was not convinced that the extrajudicial confessions of appellants were made involuntarily.
Consider the following reasons for the court's refusal to lend credence to appellants' claim:

(1) Apart from appellants' self-serving claim no other evidence on record supports the allegation of involuntariness
(People v. Villa, 93 SCRA 716).

(2) On the contrary, several prosecution witnesses testified that the confessions were voluntarily given.

(3) Appellants' oral and written confessions given at various times to several investigating authorities, not to mention the
public re-enactment of the crime itself, did not vary and they revealed details only the assailants could have possibly
known (People v. Ty Sui Wong, 83 SCRA 125; People v. Bautista y Aquino, 92 SCRA 465).

(4) Appellants' confessions were corroborated by the existence of  corpus delicti established by independent evidence
(People v. Francisco, 93 SCRA 351).

(5) The claim of coercion cannot prevail over the testimony of the subscribing fiscal that said confession was voluntary
(People v. Caramonte, 94 SCRA 150).

Moreover, it is natural and to be expected that the police officers who secured the confessions in these cases should
testify that the statements were voluntarily given. However, the records show that the interrogations were conducted
incommunicado in a police-dominated atmosphere. When appellant Bernadas gave his confession, his companions in
the room were five police officers. The only people with Vergara when he confessed were also police investigators.

Also, there are other factors to be considered in these cases. Vergara and Barnadas had been detained for more than
two (2) weeks before they decided to give "voluntary" confessions. We doubt if it was two weeks of soul-searching and
introspection alone which led them to confess. There must have been other persuasions.

Apart from their extra-judicial confessions, no other evidence to implicate Bernadas and Vergara as perpetrators of the
killing was introduced by the prosecution. Since these confessions are inadmissible in evidence, the two appellants have
to be acquitted.

Wherefore, the accused Bernadas and Vergara are ACQUITTED of the crime of ROBBERY with HOMICIDE on the ground
of reasonable doubt.