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DRAFT
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Pipelines, Risers and Umbilicals Failures: A Literature Review
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13 Geovana Pereira Drumond, Ilson Paranhos Pasqualino, Bianca de Carvalho Pinheiro and Segen F. Estefen, Subsea Technology
14 Laboratory, COPPE – Federal University of Rio de Janeiro
15
16 ABSTRACT
17 The exploratory frontier of offshore oil and gas industry comes into deeper waters, with the 3,000 m water depth barrier hurdled in
18 the US Gulf of Mexico in 2003. At these water depths, the extremely high external pressures, low temperatures, long distance tie-
19 backs and high environmental loads due to waves, currents, and wind combined brings the employed equipment to its operational
20 limit. This paper presents a literature review on failure events experienced by the industry concerning pipelines, risers, and
21 umbilical cables, describing their causes, consequences, and severity. From the several failure modes reported up to now, it is
22 possible to select the ones that are more frequent and deserves attention from academia and industry.
23
24
25 impacts, internal and/or external corrosion, overstress,
26 1. INTRODUCTION
fatigue, structural wear, structural instability, material
27
Oil and gas exploration and production in deepwater degradation and fire/explosion (in surface segments).
28
is associated with the use of highly sophisticated equipment
29 Umbilical cables are responsible to control subsea
and increasing innovative technology. However, the failure of
30 equipment like Xmas trees, manifolds, pumps, separators,
31 this equipment can cause serious consequences, including
etc. Bryant (1990) identifies the failure modes of umbilical
32 material loss and environmental pollution. Critical accidents
cables as tension or compression, torsion, fatigue, wear and
33 can even cause the loss of human lives. Based on a
sheaving. These failures modes are discussed with particular
34 literature review, this paper aims to identify past typical
focus on sheaving, which is associated with the use of static
35 failures experienced in the industry concerning pipelines,
sheaves, such as curved plates during umbilical installation.
36 risers, and umbilicals, detailing the causes, consequences,
37 and severity of these failures. This work is motivated by the need of extensively
38 address studies about the safety of offshore operations in
Pipelines are the safest method to export liquid and
39 deepwater and ultra-deepwater scenarios, like pre-salt fields
gaseous petroleum products or chemicals (Roche, 2007).
40 in the Brazilian Santos Basin. The compiled information can
41 However, like any engineering structure, pipelines do
be used as a guide to initiate studies on structural integrity.
42 occasionally fail. The main failure modes experienced by
The possibility of contributing to the establishment of a
43 pipelines during production are identified as mechanical
national program of offshore safety in Brazil, with emphasis
44 damage (impact or accidental damage), external and/or
on technological advances that aim the prevention of
45 internal corrosion, construction defect, material or
accidents, is also a motivation for this research.
46 mechanical failure, natural hazards and fatigue.
47
Risers are oil and gas transfer lines of much 2. PIPELINE FAILURES
48
importance to offshore oil and gas production systems. They
49
comprise the dynamic segment of an exportation pipeline or According to the US Pipeline & Hazardous Materials
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51 a production flowline connecting seabed to the production Safety Administration (PHMSA, 2014), there were a few
52 unit at sea level. They are affected by mechanical stress, more than three hundred offshore pipeline incidents in the
53 environmental issues and individual conditions resulting from U.S. in the past ten years, seventy one involving
54 the geographic location where the production unit has been hydrocarbon releases (Aljaroudi et al, 2015).
55 installed. Risers can be classified as flexible or rigid. For
56 flexible risers, the major failures experienced are due to Pipeline failures are usually related to a breakdown in
57 fatigue, corrosion, torsion, burst, collapse and overbending. the system, for example, the loss of corrosion protection,
58 For rigid risers, the most common external threats are meaning a combination of ageing coating, aggressive
59 environment, and rapid corrosion growth that may lead to a
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3 failure. This type of failure is not simply a corrosion failure, failures by natural hazards at those fields. Anyway, corrosion
4 but a corrosion control system failure. Similar observations is always an issue of concern for both scenarios.
5 can be drawn for failures due to external interference, stress
Review and analysis of historical causes of pipeline
6 corrosion cracking, etc. (Cosham and Hopkins, 2002).
failures worldwide indicate that corrosion, especially internal
7
Based on four different databases that include only corrosion, is the most widely reported cause of failure of
8
9 accidents that led to loss of containment, De Stefani and offshore pipelines, followed by maritime activities (anchor or
10 Carr (2010) pointed out the following as the most probable trawling damage and vessel collisions), and natural forces
11 failure modes in pipelines: mechanical damage (which like storms and mudslides (Hokstad et al., 2010).
12 includes impact and any external damage), external or
Corrosion reduces the pipeline's strength and
13 internal corrosion, construction defect, mechanical or
capacity to endure operating pressure leading to two
14 material failure, and natural hazards. Stadie-Frohbös and
possible failure events: leakage or burst. Leakage failure
15 Lampe (2013) also studied offshore pipeline failures. Based
occurs when corrosion fully penetrates the pipeline wall
16 on existing codes as DNV-RP-F116 (2009) and historical
thickness, while burst failure occurs when operating pressure
17 records considering 22 offshore pipelines, the authors
exceeds the maximum allowable pressure at a defect point
18 concluded that beside the failure modes mentioned above,
(Aljaroudi et al, 2015). All internal and external corrosion
19 erosion, structural threats (fatigue and static overloads,
20 occurrences affecting pipelines used in the oil & gas industry
particularly at free spans) and unpredicted operation are also
21 are of electrochemical nature, i.e. they need the presence of
possible failure modes.
22 water in contact with steel and oxidizing species dissolved in
23 Based on pipeline and riser loss of containment water for feeding corrosion cells (Roche, 2007). At ultra-
24 (Parloc, 2003) and data from US Department of deepwater scenarios, thickness reduction can cause
25 Transportation, Stadie-Frohbös and Lampe (2013) collapse under external pressure rather than burst under
26 concluded that impact is the major cause of failures in internal pressure.
27 offshore pipelines in operation at North Sea, representing
Cathode protection (CP) and coatings are used to
28 56% of the total failures between 1971 and 2000. In the US,
protect offshore transportation pipelines. According to Roche
29 comparing all failures reported between 1995 and 2011, 31%
30 (2004), as long as coatings remain bonded to steel and
are caused by corrosion. These numbers and those of other
31 cathode protection is correctly applied, monitored and
failure causes are summarized in Figure 1.
32 maintained, no external corrosion risk exists. However, the
33 same author, in another paper published three years later,
34 stated that not even the risk of corrosion under unbonded
35 coating is a concern to offshore pipelines integrity. This is
36 probably due to the high conductivity and homogeneity of
37 seawater, which makes easier the access of CP current
38 underneath electrical shields (Roche, 2007).
39
40 According to Roche (2007), most of the leaks due to
41 internal corrosion have been explained by microbiologically
42 Induced corrosion (MIC) or by ingress of CO2 traces
43 combined with H2S. The first parameter determining
44 corrosion risks is the presence of water in contact with steel
45 surfaces. This contact is obvious for injection water lines. In
46 the case of oil pipelines, water may be in contact with steel
47 at the bottom of the pipe, settled by gravity, and on the flow
48 pattern, depending on the water content. For wet gas
49 Figure 1: Offshore pipeline failures (Stadie-Frohbös and pipelines, water is separate also at the pipeline bottom line,
50 but in some cases condensation may occur if the gas is hot
Lampe, 2013).
51 at the top line when cooling from outside is significant
52 enough. Several types of corrosion may occur at locations
53 where water is in contact with steel as long as oxidizing
54 The difference between the two scenarios (US and
species are present. The most frequent species are CO2,
55 North Sea) may be explained by geographic reasons. At the
shallow waters of North Sea, the impact of a dropped object light organic acids, H2S and O2. Most often, corrosion pattern
56 is in the form of pits, craters or more uniform wall thinning.
57 is most probably than at US deepwaters, since the current
58 action can deviate the object from the undesirable target. On
59 the other hand, hurricanes are frequent at US, increasing the
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3 In India offshore facilities, premature leaks in subsea the lower pressure in the leeside wake (Point B in Figure 2).
4 water injection pipelines due to rupture were observed. In steady flow, the wake pressure is primarily governed by
5 Analysis of different operating parameters and water quality the pressure in the separation point (Point S in Figure 2),
6 indicated failure due to microbial induced internal corrosion. which slightly lower due to the small velocities in the wake
7 According to Samant and Singh (1998), this kind of corrosion compared to the outer flow. In S, the pressure is low since
8 was due to low flow velocities, insoluble corrosion products the outside flow is high. The scour process initiated by piping
9 suspended, iron oxide, iron sulfide, and bacteria present in was studied experimentally by Chiew (1990) and Sumer et
10 the water accumulated at the bottom of the pipe. Moreover, al. (2001), who concluded that the scour played a minor role
11 non-pigging of the pipeline might have allowed bacteria to for the onset. The onset of the scour beneath a pipeline
12 multiply rapidly and develop colonies and biofilm, which strongly depends on the initial embedment e into the seabed.
13 provides a hiding sites for bacteria and shielded them from An upper limit was found for the onset of scour when the
14 effective treatment by bactericides. Due to lack of frequent pipe is embedded in the bed. No onset was observed by
15 pigging and an effective microbiocidal treatment procedure,
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the uncontrolled growth of bacteria occurred. Consequently,
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microbial activities dominated and led to an acidic
18
environment that ultimately caused internal severe localized
19
20 corrosion (Samant and Singh, 1998).
21 Another pipeline failure case was reported by Rose
22 (1999) and was attributed to girth weld problems. At Point
23 Pedernales field, California, a complete and sudden failure of
24 a subsea pipeline caused the release of 163 barrels of crude
25 oil into the Pacific Ocean. A crack occurred at a girth weld Chiew (1990) when e/D exceeded 0.5, where D is the pipe
26 diameter.
between pipe body and the flange bell. After investigation
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and analysis of the failure, it was concluded that the crack
28 Figure 2: Vortex system around an embedded pipeline
initiated at the heat-affected zone leading to a complete
29 exposed to a current (Fredsøe, 2016).
30 separation of the flange bell. The examination revealed that
31 the heat-affected zone was brittle, possibly due to a lack of
32 preheating prior to welding. Therefore, numerous
In the onset of piping in waves, the scour process is
33 microcracks have developed, one of which being the failure
similar to that in the current-alone case, with some
34 initiation site (Rose, 1999).
particularities since the flow attack is bidirectional. As
35 Amend (2010) attributed to welds the responsibility for described by Sumer et al. (2001), the pressure gradient from
36 A to B (Figure 2) is a function of the Keulegan–Carpenter
more than 6% of significant pipeline failures. The author
37 number KC for waves, defined as
stated that pipeline girth welds are unlikely to fail unless
38
subjected to axial strains that far exceed the strains related
39 KC = 2a / D (1)
40 to internal pressure alone. Girth welds containing significant
41 workmanship flaws are likely to be resistant to failure at where a is the orbital amplitude. Variations in KC cause
42 stresses less than the pipe yield strength, unless the welds changes in the flow pattern: the time available for piping
43 do not match specification and/or are susceptible to brittle decreases as KC decreases, whereby the piping process
44 fracture initiation. occurs more slow in waves than in current. The vortex
45 shedding in the case of waves occurs on both sides of the
A vast review of published research on the pipeline-
46 pipe from the bidirectional near-bed oscillatory flow, which
seabed interaction under waves and/or currents is presented
47 makes the profile even flatter and more streamlined when
by Fredsøe (2016). This review comprises three issues:
48 compared to the current-alone case (Sumer and Fredsøe
scour, liquefaction, and lateral stability of pipelines.
49 1990).
50 The process of scour around a pipeline is dependent
51 Zang et al. (2010) observed from experiments that the
on the pipeline-seabed interaction, which is influenced by the
52 critical velocity for the onset of piping for current-waves
movement of the pipeline due to bending along the scour
53 combined motions was slightly larger and, when the current
process (Fredsøe, 2016). When the pipe is placed on or
54 velocity and the orbital motion were of the same size, the
slightly embedded a certain distance e from the seabed,
55 maximum critical velocity was attained. In the current-waves
piping may occur from the seepage flow in the seabed below
56 combined case, there is a transition from the current-alone
the pipe due to its submerged weight (Fredsøe, 2016). This
57 case, with scour depth just less than one pipe diameter, to
seepage flow is caused by the pressure difference between
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the upstream stagnation pressure (Point A in Figure 2) and
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3 the wave-dominated case, where the scour depth is Usually liquefaction caused by earthquake is the
4 dependent on KC. major cause for liquefaction of soil because of its large
5 amplitude in the oscillation and higher frequency (Fredsøe,
When the pipe does not change position with respect
6 2016). Waves can also cause liquefaction (Jeng, 2013 and
to the seabed, a tunnel scour is developed in the 2D case
7 Sumer, 2014).
from the increased flow velocity beneath the pipe. The final
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9 depth is reached when the flow velocity below the pipe
equals the undisturbed value. 3. RISER FAILURES
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11 The impact of the length of the scour hole on the Subsea risers are a type of flowline developed for the
12 pipeline deformation was studied by Leckie et al. (2015) and
13 vertical transportation of fluids or products from the seafloor
Draper et al. (2015). They found that for long holes, the pipe to production and drilling facilities above the water surface,
14 locally sags down into the hole, causing variations along the
15 as well as in the opposite way, from the facility to the
pipe, while for shorter holes, the pipe sinks more uniformly. seafloor for injection purposes. These conduits primarily
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17 The maximum length of a free span is determined by transport produced hydrocarbons, but also make the
18 the stiffness length ls of the pipe, which is the length required transportation of injection fluids, control fluids and gas lift.
19 for a pipeline to deflect one pipe diameter from its own Risers can be either rigid or flexible. During operations,
20 (submerged) weight Ws (per unit length), given by these structures are susceptible to dynamic loads that can
21 0.25
lead to failures. The possible failure modes and some real
22 ls ~ (128 DEI / Ws) (2) incidents for each type of riser will be thoroughly discussed
23 where EI is the bending stiffness of the pipe. next.
24
25 A scoured hole around a pipeline may further undergo Due to its importance to oil and gas production, a
26 sediment backfilling, which can be caused, for instance, by riser structural failure can lead to serious financial losses to
27 the touchdown of the pipe into the scoured hole. This backfill operator. It results in reduction or cessation of revenue by
28 process was observed experimentally by Sumer and committing the production development; it may also lead to
29 Fredsøe (2002). The development of scour holes along the spillage and pollution and may even endanger lives (Sen,
30 pipe affects the sinking velocity of the pipe into the bed: 2006).
31 faster spreading of the holes is related to faster pipe sinking. Cook et al. (2006) based their studies on BP’s
32 Fredsøe et al. (1988) suggested that the lateral development
33 deepwater floating production facilities located in the Gulf of
of the score hole ends when the sinking pipe touches the Mexico (GoM) and developed an integrity management
34 bottom of the scoured hole.
35 study for a range of riser types: top-tensioned vertical risers,
36 When the pipe is located in a free span, it may vibrate steel catenary risers and flexible pipe risers. The following
37 as a result of waves and/or current (Sumer et al. 1989, Shen most probable external threats for risers were determined
38 et al., 2000, Zhao and Cheng, 2010), which causes an considering the deepwater environment in the GoM: impacts,
39 additional pulsating flow around the pipe, leading to an external corrosion, overstress, fatigue, wear, material
40 expansion of the scoured-bed profile. degradation and fire/explosion (in above-water sections).
41 Among these external threats, external corrosion is the most
42 A mechanism to stop the expansion of the scour hole frequent. Another author, Anunobi (2012), stated that
43 along the pipe is the increased embedment of the pipe in the external corrosion is responsible for 70% of reported riser
44 shoulders, which considerably reduces the scour below the failure incidents.
45 pipe in the free span (Fredsøe, 2016). Scour can be reduced
46 or totally avoided by installing flexible mattresses around it, 3.1 Rigid Risers
47 placed either above or beneath the pipe (Fredsøe, 2016). The most severe consequences of a riser failure are
48 The horizontal extent away from the pipe must be sufficient typically associated with production/export/injection risers.
49 large, so the edge scour at the outer periphery is sufficiently There are many riser configurations to these functions but
50 reduced to ensure the mat’s stability (Fredsøe, 2016). vertical top-tensioned rigid risers are historically most applied
51
Noncohesive soil in the seabed exposed to waves for production (Nazir et al., 2007). According to Hokstad et
52
may undergo liquefaction, when pipelines placed on the al. (2010), approximately 15% of risers for floating systems
53
54 seabed may sink if their submerged density is higher than worldwide are metallic risers. Inside this percentage, 75%
55 the liquefied soil density (Fredsøe, 2016). Similarly, buried are top tensioned risers (TTRs), which are considered a
56 pipelines may float to the bed surface when their submerged mature technology that has been used for production since
57 density is lower than that of the surrounding liquefied soil 1975 (MCS, 2009). This type of riser works as a conduit from
58 (Fredsøe, 2016). the seabed to the facility and allows workover activity when it
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3 is necessary. TTRs are subjected to fatigue loads due to Collapse
4 platform motions and ocean currents (Thethi et al., 2005).
Buckling with external
5 pressure
In 2009, the MCS Advanced Subsea Engineering
6 Buckling with internal
prepared an investigation into the causes and probabilities of
7 pressure
top-tensioned riser (TTR) failures due to workover and
8 Fracture
9 drilling operations. Existing single and dual casing production
risers with a surface blowout preventer were then analyzed Rupture
10
11 (MCS, 2009). For sidetrack and re-drilling operations, the
A top-tensioned riser case study in the GoM is
12 most critical riser failure modes outside of typical production
presented in the Recommended Practice DNV-RP-F206
13 hazards included drilling-induced vibration (DIV) fatigue, and
(2008), in which are shown examples of possible failure
14 riser wear from direct contact with the drill string. In both
mechanisms and their global failure modes. As system
15 failure modes, reduced thickness caused by production
failure modes can be listed: burst, collapse, buckling with
16 represents a major contributing factor for their occurrence. If
external and internal pressure, leakage, fracture due to
17 not noticed at the beginning, DIV can reduce drastically riser
fatigue and rupture due to overload. As major causes of
18 life or even lead to a complete failure of the riser.
19 failures can be listed: excessive pressure, excessive
20 Table 1: Examples of rigid riser failures: failure temperature, corrosion leading to critical material loss,
21 mechanism – initial cause – system failure modes (MCS, excessive tension, excessive bending moment, excessive
22 2009). fatigue loading, physical damage by accident or during
23 installation, and manufacturing defects. These failure
Failure Possible System Failure
24 Initial Cause mechanisms and failure modes are illustrated in Table 1.
Mechanism Modes
25 Burst
26
Collapse
27 Table 2: Initial cause, failure mechanism &failure
28 Buckling with external
modes (MCS, 2009).
External Cathodic protection pressure
29
corrosion failure Buckling with internal
30 SCR Sub- Initial Cause
Failure Possible
Pressure Mechanism Failure
31 Component (Root Cause)
Fracture Modes
32
33 Rupture Leakage,
Excessive
34 Burst internal
Crack initiation, burst,
35 high SCF, fatigue fracture,
pressure
36 Collapse rupture
37 Buckling with external
38 Internal Production tubing pressure Internal metal loss Leakage,
Process fluid
39 corrosion leak due to corrosion, fracture,
Buckling with internal out of design
crack collapse,
40 pressure burst
41 Fracture Riser pipe Burst,
42 External
Rupture collapse,
43 CP failure corrosion,
fracture,
44 Internal localized pitting
Sour fluid Fracture rupture
45 cracking
46 Accidental impact Collapse or buckling Marine VIV suppression Leakage,
47 growth device failure fracture
Pipe Excessive external
48 Collapse or buckling
deformation pressure Leakage,
49 VIV Fatigue
Bending moment Collapse or buckling fracture
50 Elastomer
51 Accidental impact Fracture Fracture,
cracking, flexible
Fatigue rupture due
52 Production tubing
Fracture
joint leakage,
to
53 leak Flexible improper
Ozone attack contact/wear
Joint rotational
54 Tensioner failure Rupture or buckling on elastomer
stiffness, high
between
55 floater and
Overload bending moment,
56 Excessive internal SCR
Burst crack initiation
57 pressure
58 Wear Workover or drilling Burst
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3 Elastomer reaching their original design service life of 15-25 years
Fracture,
4 cracking, flexible (Muren et al., 2016).
rupture due
joint leakage,
5 Pressure improper
to
contact/wear According to Dos Santos et al. (2010), the technology
6 cycling rotational
between qualification of flexible pipes was not capable to anticipate
7 stiffness, high
floater and
bending moment, the variety of failure mechanisms that followed the first years
8 SCR
9 crack initiation in use. The author attributes two main reasons for that: the
10 first is the high-patented environment surrounding the
11 flexible risers technology development, where algorithms
12 and degradation models are closed to the market, and the
13 second is the lack of high level independent design
Steel Catenary Risers (SCRs) are composed by a
14 verification. Here, high level regards the completeness of the
single wall rigid steel pipe and require minimal subsea
15 verification, with no judgment to its quality. Figure 3
equipment, which makes it cheaper than other configurations
16 exemplifies some of the failure modes that were described in
(Buberg, 2014). A SCR is a seemingly relatively simple
17 this section, summarized in Table 3.
18 system where the riser is in continuity with the flowline and is
made up from welding a number of steel pipe joints of Due to their complex layered configuration, flexible
19
20 standard length (Quintin et al., 2007). pipes are more vulnerable to damage and present high
21 number of failure modes. Moreover, the integrity
SCRs are not widely used but they are a very
22 management becomes more challenging because of each
attractive option for deepwater operations because these
23 layer is made of a different material. According to 4Subsea
risers have the advantage of being highly resistant to internal
24 (2013), in a report for PSA-Norway, several flexible risers fail
and external pressure. However, in terms of fatigue failure,
25 before reaching their intended lifetime, actually 25% of
these risers deserve careful evaluation of the fatigue life
26 offshore flexible risers in Norway were replaced without
since they are very sensitive to cyclic loadings (Sen, 2006).
27 meeting their design service life.
28 In their study, Kimiaei et al. (2010) stated that two critical
fatigue areas could be highlighted in a SCR: the vessel The need to study flexible pipes is obvious due to the
29
30 hang-off point and the touchdown point, where the highest knowledge and technology gaps that need to be overcome to
31 bending moment is observed. According to Sen (2008), the meet integrity requirements. In order to fill these gaps, it is
32 main contributors to fatigue damage are: (i) first order vessel essential that manufacturers, operators and regulatory
33 motion, (ii) slow-drift, (iii) vortex induced vibration (VIV) and agencies cooperate with each other. In 2009, a Joint Industry
34 (iv) fatigue during transportation. Project (JIP) was started by Oil and Gas UK and led by
35 SureFlex, including oil and gas operators, a flexible pipe
A case study of a steel catenary riser in West Africa is
36 manufacturer and a regulatory authority. The aim was to
presented in the Recommended Practice DNV-RP-F206
37 collect data about flexible pipe usage, degradation and
38 (2008), and the results for initial cause, mechanism and
incidents. Recently, Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority
39 failure modes are outlined in Table 2.
(PSA) started to manage the Corrosion and Damage
40 3.2 Flexible Risers Database (CODAM) in order to report incidents and injuries
41 of offshore structures and pipeline systems on the
42 As an alternative for conventional rigid steel pipes,
Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). Through exchanged
43 flexible risers have been used over the last 30 years
information, standards and guidelines for safe fabrication
44 (Simonsen, 2014). The use of these structures allowed
and operation of flexible pipe systems can be improved.
45 production in areas where rigid pipes were not an
46 economically viable choice. Approximately 85% of risers
47 designed for floating systems are flexible risers (Hokstad et
48 al., 2010). Flexible pipes are crucial for subsea activities
49 worldwide and mainly for Norwegian oil and gas production
50 facilities, since 1986 (Leira et al., 2015). There are two types
51 of flexible pipes available, bonded and unbonded. As the
52 unbonded pipes are largely used by oil and gas industry,
53 they will be the focus of this review.
54 (a) (b) (c)
55 There are more than 3,500 dynamic unbonded
56 flexible risers in operation worldwide. The average riser age
57 is more than 10 years and a great number of risers are soon
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3 Rupture of tensile Fatigue alone is not the
armour wires most occurring failure
4 mode due to a very high
Rupture of pressure
5 safety factor. In
Fatigue failure armour wires
combination with
6 Aging of polymer layers
erosion, corrosion and
7 Cracking of carcass or other factors the fatigue
armour wires life is severely reduced.
8 (d) (e)
9 No reported failures.
Figure 3: Failure modes of flexible risers: (a) carcass Risk when sand bore
10 Internal erosion of
Erosion fluids contain sand,
collapse; (b) rupture of external sheath due to blocked carcass
11 especially in high
vent tubes; (c) torsion at riser top due to ruptured velocity gas pipelines
12
armour wires; (d) tensile armor wire rupture due to Rupture of tensile
13 armour wires
14 fatigue; (e) birdcaging (Simonsen, 2014).
Rupture of pressure Large problem linked to
15 Corrosion armour wires the frequent damage of
16 outer sheath.
Corrosion of internal
17 carcass
18
19 Table 3: Summary of most common failure modes
(Simonsen, 2014).
20
Based on API RP 17B, Simonsen (2014) raised nine
21 Failure mode Failure mechanisms Occurrence
most probable failure modes that can occur in flexible pipes:
22 Excessive tension
23 collapse, burst, tensile rupture, compressive rupture,
24 External pressure overbending, torsional rupture, fatigue, erosion and
25 Residual pressure in corrosion. These failure modes will be explained next.
annulus Large problem, multiple
26 reports both in CODAM Collapse
Collapse Fabrication,
27 transportation, and SureFlex JIP.
28 installation error Problem worldwide. Common failure mechanisms that could cause
29 Aging of polymer carcass collapse of a flexible riser are excessive force or
30 (shrinking) pressure, fabrication anomalies, erosion, carcass corrosion,
31 Ovalization and installation damage (Simonsen, 2014). Focusing on
32 Rupture of tensile flexible pipes used in production activities, the main risk they
33 Burst of the outer sheath
armour wires
is a common problem.
are subject is the sand content in the produced fluids. The
34 Rupture of pressure Rupture of tensile wires sand can cause erosion on the innermost pipe layer
Burst armour wires
35 may be a problem for
(carcass) – and by this way, its collapse resistance
deepwater
36 Residual pressure in
developments. decreases. This situation is more likely to happen in gas
annulus
37 production pipes.
38 Excessive tensile force
39 Not a frequent failure Clevelario et al. (2010) developed a numerical model
Large dynamic
40 movement
mode. High risk for to predict flexible pipe collapse resistance when subjected to
Tensile failure corroded wires in
41 deepwater curvature. The authors aim to assess and quantify the
42 Corrosion combined developments. effects of curvature on the flexible pipe collapse resistance in
with high tensile loads
43 the ultradeep water of Brazilian pre-salt. According to the
44 Radial buckling authors, the flexible pipe bending configuration is amongst
45 Radial buckling (bird- the factors that can affect its suitability to service in extreme
46 Compressive caging) has been water depths (~2500m) since it creates a dissymmetry
failure Upheaval buckling reported several times
47 worldwide. between both the compressed and extended pipe areas. The
48 carcass and pressure armour gaps in these areas vary and
49 Excessive bending Problem at end of reduce the overall pipe collapse resistance. However,
50 force pipelines and TDP for
Overbending risers. Several
according to Clevelario et al. (2010), some simple design
51 Installation error
occurrences due to solutions can be incorporated into flexible pipes to improve
52 Ancillary equipment sloppiness in the 90's.
its overall collapse resistance and compensate for any
53 Large dynamic
54 possible reduction caused by bending. The reader is
movement Not a frequent failure
55 Torsional Large environmental mode. Risers in harsh
encouraged to read Clevelario et al. (2010) for more
56 failure forces weather conditions are information about these design solutions.
Rupture of tensile most vulnerable.
57 armour wires Based on data from CODAM, collapse is the most
58 common incident in the NCS, being more susceptible to
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3 happen in double annulus risers. Statoil had several The temperature increase due to production fluids
4 incidents of such risers, with carcass collapse observed in flow causes pipe expansion. Moreover, the presence of soil
5 three different double annulus risers at Njord A, Visund and friction or constrained ends results in compression forces
6 Snorre B fields (Simonsen, 2014). that can lead to buckling and overbending (Simonsen, 2014).
7
Burst A failure mechanism called radial buckling or bird-
8
9 caging can happen when a flexible pipe experiences large
Burst is mainly caused by rupture of tensile and/or
10 compressive loads, causing wire disordering. This
pressure armors due to excessive internal pressure. The
11 mechanism is usually avoided when the outer sheath is
rupture of the external sheath can also causes loss of pipe
12 “intact” and buckling resistance is high. It is no longer a
integrity. Other defects and failures, as fabrication
13 common phenomenon because new pipes use to have a
imperfections, internal corrosion and erosion, or external
14 high strength Kevlar® tape preventing bird-caging. This
abrasion, can also lead to burst by pipe weakening
15 failure mode is more likely to happen in static flowlines. For a
(Simonsen, 2014).
16 properly designed flexible riser, with or without an intact
17 Many incidents in flexible risers due to burst are outer sheath, it should not be an issue (Muren, 2007).
18 described in CODAM. Simonsen (2014) emphasized two However, a later study done by SureFlex (Simonsen, 2014),
19 events where rupture of external sheath led to burst. The first stated that in 2010, 5% of flexible pipes incidents around the
20 one was a rupture in the external sheath caused by a leak, world were classified as bird-caging, which indicates that this
21 which promoted an increase in internal pressure inside the failure mode should also be addressed.
22 annulus and ended in burst of the external sheath. In the
23 other case, the rupture of the external sheath occurred
24 because the annulus vent system was not working correctly.
25 In this case, diffused gases built up the pressure until it
26 Overbending
became larger than the burst resistance of the external
27
sheath. This is a well-known problem and according to According to Simonsen (2014), the overbending
28
Simonsen (2014), past years studies were developed in failure mode in risers is more likely to happen at the touch-
29
30 order to guarantee well-functioning of the vent system and down point (TPD).
31 gas monitoring in flexible pipes.
Overbending can affect almost all the layers of a
32 Tensile Rupture flexible pipe. Simonsen (2014) stated that loads induced by
33 overbending can affect the pipe in different ways: collapse
34 Considering that tensile armor wires are already
due to compression forces may occur at the carcass and
35 designed to support loads higher than normal service loads,
internal pressure sheath; rupture of internal or external
36 tensile forces should be a problem only when they are
pressure sheath due to tension forces induced by
37 excessive and act together with any factor that reduces the
overbending; cracking of the outer sheath, and unlocking of
38 wire resistance, as corrosion or anomalies. According to
carcass and pressure armor layers due to pipe strength
39 CODAM and SureFlex incident reports (Simonsen, 2014),
40 reduction if the bending stress is excessive.
tensile rupture is not a common occurrence, just
41 representing a low percentage of observed failures. Although overbending affects many layers of a
42 Simonsen (2014) concluded that tensile failure is a threat to flexible pipe, only one incident concerning this failure mode
43 pipe integrity just when it is combined with corrosion, was reported in the Norwegian sector. In this case, the
44 abrasion, or any other factor that changes the resistance of failure happened during installation. This failure mode used
45 the flexible pipe. to be a current UK problem in the 90’s, but it is not frequent
46
anymore (Simonsen, 2014).
47 Compressive Rupture
48 Torsional Rupture
Ribeiro et al. (2003) used a three-dimensional finite
49
50 element model to predict the local mechanical behavior of As the tensile armour wires are configured in a helical
51 flexible risers under compression. The authors concluded pattern they are subjected to tension or compression as the
52 that the axial compression stiffness is much lower than the riser is twisted. Excessive tension loads due to twisting may
53 tension one; the tensile armours and the plastic sheaths are lead to rupture of one or several wires. According to
54 responsible for this behaviour; the wires of the tensile Simonsen (2014), torsional force in either direction on the
55 armours not only move radially, but also laterally resulting in flexible pipe may pose problems. If the force is in the same
56 high bending stresses in these wires, and finaly, that direction as the helical pattern of the wires, they will tighten
57 compression in flexible risers also generate gaps between and the collapse of the carcass and/or internal pressure
58 layers. sheath may occur. If the torsional force acts in the other
59
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3 direction, the wires may be subjected to excessive Authors like Corrignan et al. (2009) and Kershaw et
4 compression force causing radial buckling or unlocking of the al. (2014), agree that the flexible riser external sheath has a
5 armour wires. Thereby, torsional rupture is a flexible riser higher risk of damage between the wave zone and the
6 failure mode to be aware of because it can lead to other topsides hang-off, potentially resulting in tensile armor
7 failures modes, like structure collapse. However, it is not corrosion or corrosion-fatigue. Nielsen et al. (2008) attribute
8 reported as the main cause of incidents. Risers operating in to vessel motion and wave loading as the riser fatigue
9 hard environmental situations (wind, waves and current) are drivers. Saunders and O’Sullivan (2007) pointed out that
10 more vulnerable to torsional failure. external sheath damage is the major cause of flexible risers
11 failures, representing around 37% of the damage population
12 Fatigue
in 2007, as can be seen in Figure 4.
13 Flexible pipes experience fatigue failure due to
14 In their work, Nielsen et al. (2008) stated that
cumulated cyclic stresses in different layers. The fatigue
15 corrosion-fatigue properties are highly reduced in connection
challenges for deepwater risers are mainly concentrated at
16 with sour service. The armour wires can be subjected to a
top due to bending combined with high tension, and at
17 corrosive environment in case of partly or entirely water filled
seabed touch down area due to bending combined with high
18 annulus, that changes significantly along its length due to the
pressure loads. This is also driven by the fact that almost all
19 hydrostatic pressure head. Consequently, the fatigue
20 deepwater risers are in a free standing configuration (Nielsen
assessment may require that different S-N curves be applied
21 et al., 2008). The Norwegian offshore sector in the North Sea
along riser sections reflecting the different partial pressures
22 has done a research about fatigue failure in flexible pipes
of the permeated constituents (Nielsen et al., 2008).
23 and it was observed that, in average, flexible risers were in
24 service just 50% of its intended lifetime (Muren, 2007).
25 Lemos and Vaz (2005) stated the most important
26
failure modes of unbonded flexible risers associated to
27
fatigue as:
28
29 • Fatigue associated with the wear of the tensile armors;
30 • Pure fatigue of the tensile armors;
31 • Fatigue associated with the wear of the pressure armors;
32 • Corrosion fatigue;
33 • Fatigue of the polymeric layer; and
34 • Fatigue in the armors at the end fittings.
35
36 In deep water environments, the fatigue failure of
37 tension wires near the end connection is an occurrence to be
38 aware of (Simonsen, 2014). There is a significant change in
39 stiffness between the riser and the connector in the region
40 close to the end fitting. This structural discontinuity strongly Figure 4: Chart showing the most significant causes of
41 influences the fatigue processes in the tensile axial wires at flexible pipe damage in 2002 and 2007 (Saunders and
42 and embedded in the connector. Progressive fatigue failure, O’Sullivan, 2007).
43 possible accelerated by corrosion, can occur (McCarthy and
44 Buttle, 2012). Clements et al. (2006) concentrates their studies on
45 the processes of understanding the materials under
46 The majority of the reported cases of damage to corrosion fatigue conditions and the development of material
47 flexible risers describe damage located in the top section of design curves. According to the authors, although fatigue
48 the riser, close to the bend. These include external sheath and corrosion fatigue testing of flexible pipe armour wires
49 damage, corrosion and/or fatigue induced damage to the has been well documented over the years, little has been
50 tensile armors, and torsional instability associated to tensile published to describe the effect of different test protocols and
51 armor rupture (Elmam and Alvim, 2008). Damage to the test set-ups. The armour wire fatigue capacity based upon
52 outer sheath, which may lead to flooded annulus and, representative S-N curves and the Palmgren-Miner linear
53 consequently, corrosion of the tensile and pressure armor damage hypothesis is normally applied when accumulated
54 wires, degradation of the polymer layers, increase of fatigue fatigue damage (Nielsen et al., 2008) is calculated. Clements
55 damage and decrease of the service life of a pipe. et al. (2006) reported the resulting S-N curves from different
56
Experimental tests and numerical models have been done in test protocols and how these increase or reduce
57
order to allow a better prediction of fatigue life of armor conservatism in service life analysis.
58
wires.
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3 According to Simonsen (2014), due to intense efforts mostly when seawater and oxygen can flow into the annulus
4 in researches and technologies, the number of incidents due due to a breach in the outer sheath. Breach normally occurs
5 to fatigue failures in flexible pipes is decreasing. In Norway during transportation and installation of a flexible pipe, when
6 for example, there is no register of fatigue failure of tensile damage used to be neglected. This problem is highly
7 wires for latest years. However, when operations occur in appearing in statistics and needs to be studied.
8 sour environment, like Brazil and West Africa, fatigue failures
Other Failure Modes
9 in tensile armors are still occurring. Although it is a
10 complicated failure mode, considering that it affects all Besides the nine failure modes previously described
11 different layers of a flexible pipe, its occurrence can be (based on the API RP 17B), seven other different failure
12 avoided with a high safety factor, assuming that its modes were studied by SeaFlex and were reported by
13 mechanisms are not influenced by any other factor that could Muren (2007). These failure modes include: hydrogen
14 decrease the fatigue strength, like corrosion. embrittlement, impacts, pigging accidents, ageing, wear,
15 vibrations in gas pipes and annulus threat environment.
16 Erosion
However, facing that flexible pipe is a current and common
17
According to Simonsen (2014), erosion alone is not a topic of many early and recent studies, these additional
18
potential cause of loss of pipe integrity. However, happening failure modes will not be deeply covered in this report. For
19
20 concomitantly with corrosion, thinning of the carcass may more data about failure in flexible pipes, some studies can
21 cause rupture or collapse of a pipe. In this case, erosion be suggested. Hokstad et al. (2010) performed a wide study
22 “destroys” the corrosion protecting layer turning the carcass about subsea equipment with focus on common failures
23 more susceptible to fail. Erosion can happen due to the experienced by each layer of a flexible pipe. Braga et al.
24 presence of particles in produced fluids and also by the (2011) addressed the use of continuous vibration
25 development of hydrates. The particles collide with the measurements to detect rupture of wires in the tensile armor
26 internal wall of the carcass reducing the thickness of the layers of flexible risers. Leira et al. (2015), proposed integrity
27 steel layer. The erosion is more likely to happen in gas assessment and qualification of lifetime extension based on
28 production pipes, where the solid fragments flow with higher a specific case study, and also repair solutions for outer
29 velocity. It is noticed that there is no report exposing failures sheath damage, facing the fact that it is one of the most
30 in flexible pipes exclusively caused by erosion. common failures in flexible pipes. Shen and Jukes (2015)
31 discussed key factors impacting on the stress and fatigue
32 According to Helgaker et al. (2016), erosion in smooth
damage of unbonded flexible risers and the potential failure
33 pipes can be determined with industry-standard erosion-
modes at a HPHT deepwater environment. 4Subsea (2013)
34 prediction methodologies. However, these models are
reported a study about unbonded flexible pipes where some
35 usually valid for smooth pipes only, with limited information
incidents observed by PSA from CODAM database were
36 available on erosion in flexible pipes. The work of Parsi et al.
analyzed considering their causes, possible solutions and
37 (2014) describes key factors influencing erosion and reviews
mitigation actions.
38 available erosion equations. The authors discuss solid-
39 particle erosion modeling for oil and gas wells and pipelines. Some works about vibration in gas pipes can be also
40 These models are used to limit the maximum production flow emphasized. Swindell et al. (2007) addressed the technical
41 rates and avoid excessive erosion damage. issues associated with high amplitude pressure pulsations
42 generated by gas flow through flexible risers. Zheng et al.
43 Oka et al. (2005) and Oka and Yoshida (2005)
(2012) showed that the influence of chaotic response on the
44 developed an equation for estimating erosion damage
resulting fatigue damage can be as significant as that of
45 caused by solid particle impact. Arabnejad et al. (2015)
higher harmonic components. Finally, Belfroid et al. (2009)
46 proposed a semi-mechanistic model for the erosion of
studied the flow induced pressure pulsations (FIP) from
47 different target materials due to solid particles. These models
shackle-type carcass. According to them, when gas passes
48 can be used to predict erosion wear caused by sand
through the flexible riser, vortex shedding occurs at each of
49 production in oil-and-gas components.
the internal corrugations, generating pressure pulsations,
50
51 Corrosion which induce vibration forces and excite mechanical natural
52 frequencies, leading to pipe fatigue.
In the same work of Simonsen (2014), the author
53 stated that corrosion alone is not a typical cause of failure in
54 flexible pipes. However, when in combination with high static 4. UMBILICAL CABLE FAILURES
55 or fatigue loads, it can cause loss of pipe integrity. The
56
contact of the seawater saturated with oxygen with the steel In general, subsea umbilicals consist of an
57
layers induces oxidation and it is a common reason for arrangement of high collapse resistance (HCR) hoses to
58
corrosion. The author concluded that corrosion happens chemical injection, thermoplastic hoses to hydraulic control
59
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3 of valves, electrical cables (signal, control or power supply), Figure 5 illustrates the cross-section of a braid,
4 tensile armors and a polymer layers. When a subsea showing the difference between a low packing and a high
5 component fail, operators have two options: to perform an packing braid. The braid presented a less acute angle to the
6 underwater repair or bring equipment up to the surface to liner in case 2 than in case 1, and besides lowering its
7 repair it. In the case of umbilical cables, depending on the efficiency and capacity of load resistance, it can also induce
8 damage extension, it is often necessary to stop production, compressive failure in the braid fibers.
9 remove the whole umbilical, and replace it, resulting in high
10 costs to the company. The failure in umbilical cables can
11 occur during manufacture, installation and service. Bryant
12 (1990) describes the most common failure mechanisms for
13 such equipment. The author divides umbilical cable failures
14 according to their driving mechanisms: tension or
15 compression, torsion, fatigue, wear and sheaving. In general, Case 1 Case 2
16
tension and compression loads are within the umbilical Figure 5: Comparison between low and high packing in
17
working limits of and are predominantly supported by armor aramid braid (Bryant, 1990).
18
and other system reinforcements. The failures caused by
19
20 tension or compression can be avoided by preventing the
21 umbilical minimum bend radius and remaining it within the Sheaving damage can be described as damage
22 manufacturers recommendations for tensile loading, both resulting from pulling of an umbilical around a sheave
23 when the umbilical is straight and bent. (Bryant, 1990), generating a very rapid change of curvature
24 close to the sheave. If an umbilical is bent with constant
As a rule, umbilical cables have low torsional stiffness
25 and therefore are susceptible to damage resulting from
curvature along the length, the core will be somewhere on
26 the convex (tensile) side and somewhere on the concave
excessive application of torsional loads. According to Bryant
27 (compression) side of the umbilical. The core components
(1990), the risk of torsion damage is higher during umbilical
28 will of course tend to move from the compression to the
installation. Such damage may occur at the point
29 tensile part of the core. If the umbilical is also axially loaded,
30 immediately below the final sheave on a laying vessel as the
there will be a pressure and a friction force between the
31 vessel makes a turn. The mechanism involves the
different components (Waloen et al., 1993).
32 contribution of umbilical weight forcing the twist, induced by
33 the vessel maneuver, in relation to the point where friction Benjaminsen et al. (1992) tried to determine the
34 prevents umbilical rotation, i.e., as it leaves the sheave. The stresses and fatigue life of an axially loaded electrical
35 result of torsion damage will be either 'bird-caging' or umbilical running back and forth over a sheave. The authors
36 'necking' of amour wires and/or helical components. Many of did cyclic bending fatigue tests to investigate the influence of
37 the problems associated with laying umbilicals are related to factors affecting fatigue life (lubrication, sheave diameter,
38 torsion effects as looping. These effects can be minimized by axial load, conductor type etc); bend stiffness tests to
39 always keeping umbilicals under tension and with the aid of measure the force required to bend umbilical samples over a
40 torque balanced armor (Bryant, 1990). range of sheaves, in order to evaluate its bend stiffness; core
41 movement tests to study relative sliding of core components
42 Another very common damage in umbilicals is fretting
during bending over a sheave; and deflection tests, to study
43 damage because of continuous bending and load cycling. To
the effect of differential contraction and elongation of internal
44 avoid such damage, it is recommended the use of high
elements as the umbilical goes on and off a sheave. Those
45 abrasion resistance jackets to cover the most sensitive
experimental tests were important to gather physical data for
46 materials, such as Kevlar®. In addition, to ensure that its
the development of an analytical procedure to calculate
47 internal components are maintained in relative position to
48 each other, it is necessary to provide fillers, which ensure the internal stresses in an umbilical being bent over a sheave,
49 which was reported in Benjaminsen et.al. (1992).
most symmetrical configuration as possible. According to
50 Bryant (1990), the braid of a hydraulic hose is sensitive to Ricketts et al. (1995) focused their studies in fatigue
51 fretting damage since it is semi-mobile. The hose tests of an electrohydraulic umbilical passing through a
52 manufacturer must ensure that the amount of yarn on the sheave aiming to establish the effect of axial load, hose
53 braid layer is sufficient to withstand the loads generated by pressure, sheave diameter and wrap angle on the measured
54 internal pressure and, at the same time, such amount of life. Among the results obtained, the effects of sheave
55 yarns does not result in tightly packed yarn, which is diameter and wrap angle can be highlithed. Even though the
56 susceptible to fretting damage. electrical unit was central, and hence close to the neutral
57
axis, for a bending diameter reduction of 33%, the measured
58
59 reduction in the electical conductor fatigue life was 96%. The
60 11
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3 effect of wrap angle was also marked, with a reduction from
4 180 to 90 degrees leading to a life increase superior to
5 100%.
6
According to Bryant (1990), the majority of umbilical
7
damage is associated with the use of static sheaves such as
8
9 curved plates. High sheaving loads can result in removal of
10 protective jackets and, consequently, in corrosion problems.
11 In addition, sheaving under high loads can also result in high
12 stress concentration in internal components of the umbilical,
13 leading to failure. A particular interesting failure mechanism
14 can be observed in hydraulic hoses, related to sheaving
15 under tensile loads.
16
As represented in Figure 6, the stages of sheaving
17 Figure 6: Hydraulic hose failure by sheaving (Bryant,
failure in hydraulic hoses comprise a transition between a 1990).
18
perfect circular hose (1), an oval hose (2), and a point (3) at
19
20 which the lower surface turns in on itself. At this point, the
inwardly pointing material will be 'chased' along the axis of The minimum radial compression required in
21
22 the umbilical as it is pulled along over the sheave. In some tensioners is function of the load being transferred, the lower
23 cases, this type of damage is recoverable by re-inflating the dynamic friction coefficient between the external coating and
24 hose, but the material life will certainly be reduced. In other tensioner shoe structure, the length of the tensioner and the
25 cases, the heart-shaped geometry is so pronounced that it number of tensioners which will be effectively employed. The
26 resists inflation and subsequent bursts will occur due to the maximum radial compression specified (design crushing
27 separation of the braid from the liner. load) is dependent on the active traction, because this could
28 end up stretching the wires of the armour and inducing the
Rabelo (2013) suggested that to avoid damage in
29 effect of crushing (squeeze) in the inner layers. Dieumegard
30 hydraulic hoses, it is necessary to keep the hoses
and Fellows (2003) describe the design and installation of a
31 pressurized by hydraulic fluid when the umbilical passes
deepwater metallic tube umbilical and give reference to the
32 through pulleys and tensioners during installation. Umbilical
total length of tensioner required to install it under several
33 cables are installed by launching vessels (pipe laying
water depths and umbilical weights. As shown on Figure 8,
34 support vessels, PLSVs). Figure 7 illustrates a PLSV used
the total length of tensioner required to install an umbilical in
35 for the installation of umbilical cables. These vessels receive
ultra deepwater can be significant.
36 reeled umbilical cables and release them through tensioners.
37 The minimum radial compression on the tensioners is that
38 required to maintain the set suspended when it is released.
39 This minimum grip should be ensured by the tensioner
40 throughout the operation of release, and for that, a nominal
41 value is set (required crushing load). The maximum value
42 (maximum crushing load) is twice the difference between the
43 nominal radial compression and minimum radial
44 compression. According to Batrony et al. (2012), it is
45 important that these crush load limits are defined realistically
46 and derived using verifiably accurate methods. This requires
47 Figure 7: Pipe laying support vessel (PLSV) and
fundamental understanding of the internal components its tensioner (Rabelo, 2013).
48
failure modes subject to crush loading and analysis tools,
49
which are calibrated against actual test data. Batrony et al.
50
51 (2012) presented a preliminary study comparing
52 experimental results with FEA simulations on a sample steel
53 tube umbilical under crush loading.
54
55
56
57
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3 These hoses have low resistance to collapse, and this failure
4 mode appears as the main cause of umbilical failures
5 experienced. The collapse is manifested by gradual increase
6 of ovalization in hose section. After some loading cycles,
7 such crease leads the hose to burst. Figure 10 illustrates the
8 failure of a hydraulic hose.
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18 (a) (b)
19
20 Figure 8: Tensioner Length versus water depth and
21 umbilical weight (Dieumegard and Fellows, 2003).
22
23
Umbilical sections are submitted to radial
24
compression when passing through tensioners and
25
launching wheel and these loadings can cause significant
26 (d)
bending in the internal components of the umbilical. In
27
28 addition, the tensile armor submits the functional elements to
29 mechanical pressure, inducing ovalizations in the umbilical
30 hoses. Rabelo (2013) concludes that it is essential to launch
31 the umbilical cable with the hydraulic hoses completely full of
32 hydraulic fluid to avoid hose failure.
33 Rabelo (2013) describes a study of Petrobras about
34
the main causes of failures in umbilicals installed in
35 (c) (e)
production wells. This study compiled installation and
36
inspection reports of the company, publications of other Figure 9: Umbilical failures: (a) cracks in the outer
37
38 operators, and consultation to umbilicals manufacturers in jacket; (b) ripples; (c) kinks; (d) offset of the external
39 order to catalog the major non-compliances that occurred in sheath in HDPE, and (e) tensile armour wire break
40 this equipment. Major catalogued failures include: (Rabelo, 2013).
41 (a) Cracks in the outer jacket: nucleation and propagation
42 of cracks in high density polyethylene (HDPE);
43
44 (b) Ripples: loss of functionality of internal components due
45 to non-uniform stress distribution during the passage
46 through PLSV tensioners;
47
48 (c) Kinks: umbilical twist generating balancing loss;
49 (d) Offset of the external sheath in HDPE: offset of the Figure 10: Hydraulic hose failed in operation (Rabelo,
50 outer jacket allowing exposure of the tensile armour;
51 2013)
52 (e) Tensile armour wire break: break of the wire in the
Due to the hydraulic hoses limitation to external
53 welding region. pressure (from 150 to 200 psi), it was established as
54 prerequisite and design premise that the umbilical installation
These failures illustrated in Figure 9 occurred
55 in any depth must be made under internally pressurized
because of manufacturing defects, handling or design fitness
56 hoses and no air inside. The presence of air (or other
to supplier manufacturing facilities. According to Rabelo
57
(2013), the problems caused by handling, installation and compressible fluid) allows the development of creases and
58
operation are closely linked to hydraulic hoses failures. deformation (ovality) that result in hose failure.
59
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3 Rabelo (2013) reported a true case of umbilical cable one, in which the electrical cables were free to move before
4 hydraulic hose failure. It corresponds to a GTX-443 injection they come in contact with the inner sheath. With the new
5 well, in water depths of 1181 m, connecting the platform P- cross-section arrange, the hoses were made free to move,
6 93 by a five functions electro-hydraulic umbilical, containing which caused a reduction of about 53% in the maximum
7 five hydraulic hoses of 3/8''. The leakage of the hydraulic stress. Additionally, the stresses became better distributed
8 fluid driven in four of the five hoses was identified after valve and symmetric, in contrast to the older arrange, where some
9 control loss. One of these hoses was dissected and the regions of stress concentration were observed.
10 combination of external and internal pressure was identified
11 Recently, Drumond et al. (2016) studied the failure of
as the most probable failure reason. According to Rabelo
12 umbilicals hydraulic hoses due to pressure loads and
(2013), the main findings about the hoses failure were:
13 proposed an alternative material for the manufacture of the
rupture of the polyurethane outer jacket; burst aspect in the
14 hose inner layer. The authors based their work on the
aramid layer; extensive crease along sample length; Nylon
15 comparison between the material currently used (Polyamide
11 liner showing yellow coloration. Figure 11 shows a
16 11) and a fluorinated elastomer, Viton®. To compare the
dissected hose and illustrates the failure aspect by burst.
17 mechanical behavior of both materials, uniaxial tensile tests
18 as well as nonlinear FE simulations were performed. The
19 numerical results obtained showed that both Polyamide 11
20 and Viton® did not fail under external pressure. However,
21 Polyamide 11 concentrates high plastic deformations after
22 collapse, which can lead to localized hose rupture under
23 internal pressure. For Viton®, it was found that the material
24 concentrates deformations during collapse but they are
25 recovered when internal pressure is applied. To propose the
(a) (b)
26
replacement of Polyamide 11 by Viton®, it was showed that
27
the latter has chemical compatible with the hydraulic fluid.
28
Then, ageing tests under temperature were conducted to
29
30 check if the polymer loose mass, swell and preserve its
31 mechanical properties (Drumond et al., 2016) after ageing. It
32 was found that the changes in mechanical properties were
33 not severe, as well as the swelling and mass loss effects.
34 A previous work (Legallais et al., 1993) reported
35 another failure mode on umbilicals hydraulic hoses: the
36 (c) ability of some fluids and gases to permeate the hose layers.
37
Figure 11: Burst failure aspect: (a) hose cross-section Despite of being small, permeation rate at large distances
38
showing a crease; (b) aramid layer rupture; and (c) liner leads to loss of significant fluid volume. Legallais et al.
39
40 burst in the crease region (Rabelo, 2013). (1993) based their research on a fluid commonly injected in
41 wells, the methanol. A new material based on cross-linked
Almeida et al. (2013) also conducted a study on polyethylene was developed in order to replace Polyamide
42 hydraulic hoses failure due to pressure loads. The authors
43 11 or thermoplastic polyester inner layer of hydraulic hoses.
proposed a new arrange to umbilical internal components
44 For these materials, methanol permeation rates vary with
aiming to reduce the applied tensile load on hoses. To this 2
temperature from 150 to 5 g/m (mm.dia) for Polyester, and
45
end, numerical FE analyses as well experimental tests were 2
from 190 to 13 g.m /(mm.dia) for Polyamide 11. Legallais et
46
conducted. According to this study, due to the helical al. (1993) have developed a specific degree of cross-linked
47
48 configuration of the tensile armour, part of the applied load is high density polyethylene, named Ducoflex®. Such material
49 transferred as pressure on the intermediate layers, which
is applicable to methanol injection (or other fluids) and can
50 can lead to the crushing of the internal components of the
replace Polyamide 11 or thermoplastic polyester at
51 umbilical (electrical cables, hydraulic hoses etc.). temperatures up to 90 C.
o

52 From the numerical results, the authors realized that

53 the hoses were the components with higher tension levels 5. CONCLUSIONS
54
during dynamic tests. They suggested modifications of the
55 This paper aims at reporting a literature review on
umbilical cross-section to reduce tensile levels, by changing
56 failure events experienced by the oil and gas industry
the mobility of internal components (hydraulic hoses and
57 concerning pipelines, risers, and umbilical cables.
58 electrical cables). The simulation of the new cross-section
59 arrange demonstrated that it behaves inversely to the older
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3 Pipelines are structures widely used in oil and gas external sheath, and tensile armour wire break. These failure
4 production facilities and occasionally may fail leading to modes are widely covered by the industry, with a lot of
5 hydrocarbons releases. In the past ten years, three hundred studies and projects aiming to mitigate or solve the related
6 offshore pipeline incidents happened, and seventy one of problems.
7 them involved hydrocarbon releases (Aljaroudi et al., 2015).
Although the readers may be concerned about the
8 These numbers are relevant and pointed out the need of
9 failure mechanisms of the reported structures, it is not
deeper studies about the causes of these structural failures.
10 possible to explore them in a single article. Here the aim is to
Some of the researches described focused on the pipelines
11 bring a general view of the documented failures, so that the
failure modes. Taking into account the failure events
12 reader can go in deep from the mentioned references.
reported, impact is indicated as the most frequent cause of
13 failure modes, representing 56% of the incidents in North From the analyzed structures, some key factors
14 Sea. Another relevant failure mode is associated with should be highlighted in view of the reported failures. Water
15 internal corrosion, which represents 31% of the incidents in depth, structure complexity and the environmental
16
the US. Internal corrosion is mostly explained by conditions.
17
microbiologically induced corrosion (MIC) or by ingress of
18 The increasing water depth potentially makes the
CO2 traces combined with H2S. Facing these statistics,
19 installation and operation of such structures more dangerous
20 further studies and analysis addressing impact and corrosion
since the involved loads are increased, i.e., axial tension,
21 failures in pipelines are strongly recommended for future
external pressure, bending and torsion. Most of the reported
22 studies.
failures are directly related to conditions of extreme loads or
23 Rigid risers can be split into top tensioned risers combinations of them.
24 (TTR) and steel catenary risers (SCR). The main failure
25 Structural complexity also increase the mechanical
incidents to the former occur in workover/drilling operations.
26 response modes and so far the failure possibilities. It is clear
The main failure modes associated are drilling induced
27 that the multi-layered pipes and cables present much more
vibration fatigue and riser wear due to contact with the drill
28 failure mechanisms than single wall structures. Certainly
string. Even though steel catenary risers are not widely used,
29 there are hundreds of publications addressing these different
30 they are a very attractive option for deeper waters. However,
failure mechanism and the readers are encouraged to
31 they are very sensitive to cyclic loadings and consequently,
access them.
32 susceptible to fatigue failure. There are two critical fatigue
33 areas in these structures: the vessel hang-off point and the Finally, the environmental conditions are always
34 touchdown point, where the bending moment is the highest. harmful for such engineering structures. They are corrosive
35 It can be noticed from literature review, that few studies (chemically aggressive), dynamical (causing fatigue) and
36 about failure in rigid risers were accomplished. sometimes extreme within severe weather conditions.
37 Because of this, the design, installation and operation of
According to Hokstad et al. (2010), approximately
38 pipelines, risers and umbilicals will be always a challenging
85% of floating systems risers are of flexible pipe type. This
39 task.
40 is a huge number, which deserves high attention to possible
41 failures modes, considering their wide application by
6. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
42 industry. After a comprehensive literature review, some
43 failure modes were identified: collapse, burst, tensile rupture, The authors would like to acknowledge the financial
44 compressive rupture, overbending, torsional rupture, fatigue, support from QPI Brasil Petróleo Ltda (ANP R&D Program)
45 erosion and corrosion. Although flexible risers may fail in during research activities carried out at the Subsea
46 different ways, collapse due to external pressure was Technology Laboratory – COPPE, Federal University of Rio
47 reported as the most frequent failure mode. Failure cases de Janeiro, under the research project “Safety of Subsea
48 involving tensile armors rupture and burst were also E&P Operations” (PENO-19367).
49 reported.
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