EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-29755. January 31, 1969.]

DOMINGO N. SARCOS, as Mayor of Barobo , Surigao del Sur,

petitioner, vs. HON. RECAREDO CASTILLO, as Provincial
Governor of Surigao del Sur, and THE HON. PROVINCIAL
BOARD OF SURIGAO DEL SUR, respondents.

Sisenando Villaluz, Jr. for respondents.

Cristeto O. Cimagala for petitioner.

SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; DECENTRALIZATION

ACT OF 1967; PURPOSE. — The purpose of the Decentralization Act of 1967
is set forth in its declaration of policy. It is "to transform local governments
gradually into effective instruments through which the people can in a most
genuine fashion, govern themselves and work out their own destinies." in
consonance with such policy, its purpose is "to grant to local governments
greater freedom and ampler means to respond to the needs of their people
and promote their prosperity and happiness and to effect a more equitable
and systematic distribution of governmental powers and resources."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT ON MUNICIPALITIES, CITIES AND PROVINCES.
— It is undeniable that municipalities, as much as cities and provinces, are
by this act invested with "greater freedom and ampler means to respond to
the needs of their people and promote their prosperity and happiness."
3. D.; ID.; ID.; LOCAL ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION THEREOF BY PROVINCIAL BOARD; SECTION 5 OF
DECENTRALIZATION ACT; INTERPRETATION THEREOF. — Under the former
law then in force which stands repealed by virtue of the Decentralization Act,
the provincial governor, if the charge against a municipal official was one
affecting his official integrity, could order his preventive suspension. At
present, the law is anything but that. A reading of the pertinent paragraph
above quoted makes manifest that it is the provincial board to which such
power has been granted under conditions therein specified. The statutory
provision is worded differently. The principle, that the deliberate selection of
language other than that used in an earlier act is indicative that a change in
the law was intended, calls for application.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; POLICY OF ACT GIVEN EFFECT. — Any other view
than that it is the provincial board that has the power to order the preventive
suspension of a local municipal official, would be to betray lack of fidelity to
the purpose so manifest in the controlling legal provision. It is fundamental
that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect
should be given to it by the judiciary.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON. — The absence of power on the part of
provincial governors to suspend preventively a municipal mayor is
buttressed by the avoidance of undesirable consequences flowing from a
different doctrine. Time and time again, it has been stressed that while
democracy presupposes the right of the people to govern themselves in
elections that call for political parties contending for supremacy, once the
election is over the equally pressing and urgent concern for efficiency would
necessitate that purely partisan considerations be ignored, and if not entirely
possible, be restricted to a minimum.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY OF COURT TO APPLY RULE. — It could be
said, that to deny such a power to a provincial governor but at the same
time to affirm the existence thereof insofar as the provincial board is
concerned would not advance the cause of decentralization any. In answer,
it suffices to note that the Decentralization Act having so recognized such an
authority in the provincial board, the judiciary must perforce recognize its
existence. Until after the legislature decrees otherwise, the courts have no
alternative but to accord deference to such declared congressional policy.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SAFEGUARD AGAINST ABUSE BY PROVINCIAL
BOARD. — The provincial board being a collective body, the first, second and
third class provinces being composed of the provincial governor, the vice-
governor and three other members elected at large by the qualified electors
of the province, and that in the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh class
provinces having in addition to the provincial governor and the vice-governor
two other members likewise elected at large, there is a safeguard against
the temptation to utilize this power of preventive suspension for purely
partisan ends. What one person may feel free to do, fully conscious as he is
that the authority belongs to him alone, may not even be attempted when
such an individual shares such power with others who could possibly hold
dissenting views, At any rate, there is a break, which it is hoped would
suffice on most if not all occasions.
8. ONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PUBLIC OFFICIALS; RULE OF GRANT OF
AUTHORITY NECESSARY FOR VALID ACT; APPLICATION THEREOF REGARDING
AUTHORITY OF PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION. — The conclusion that under
Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967, it is the provincial board, and
not the provincial governor who has the authority to order the preventive
suspension of a municipal elective official, has reinforcement from a
fundamental postulate of constitutional law. Public officials possess powers,
not rights. There must be, therefore, a grant of authority whether express or
implied, to justify any action taken by them. In the absence thereof, what
they do as public officials lacks validity and, if challenged, must be set aside.
Here, clearly, no such authority is vested in the provincial governor. Instead,
the statutory scheme, complete on its face, would locate such power in the
provincial board.
9. D.; POLICY OF FULL AUTONOMY TO INHABITANTS OF LOCAL
UNITS. — It is implicit in our constitutional scheme that full autonomy be
accorded the inhabitants of the local units to govern themselves. Their
choice as to who should be their public officials must be respected. Those
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 elected must serve out their term. If they have to be removed at all, it should
be for cause in accordance with the procedure prescribed and by the specific
officials of higher category entrusted with such responsibility.
10. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF LAW
RELATING TO SUSPENSION AND REMOVAL. — Deference to the universal rule
of strict construction of law relating to suspension and removal, possessed of
intrinsic merit, calls for due care lest by inadvertence the power to suspend
preventively is given to officials other than those specifically mentioned in
the Act. For any other view would result in a dilution of the avowed purpose
to vest as great a degree of local autonomy as is possible to municipal
corporations. That would be to defeat and frustrate rather than to foster the
policy of the act.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J : p

Is the power of preventive suspension of a municipal mayor against

whom charges have been filed still vested in the provincial governor? That is
the novel question presented in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Such an authority he did possess under the former law. 1 Then came the
Decentralization Act of 1967, which took effect on September 12 of that
year. 2
What before could not be denied apparently no longer holds true. The
statutory provision now controlling yields a contrary impression. The
question must thus be answered in the negative. We hold that such a power
has been withheld from the provincial governor and may no longer be
exercised by him.
Petitioner, Domingo N. Sarcos, the duly elected Mayor of Barobo,
Surigao del Sur, running as an independent candidate but winning,
nonetheless, in the November 14, 1967 election, was charged with
misconduct and dishonesty in office by respondent Recaredo Castillo, the
Provincial Governor of Surigao del Sur. 3 The act constituting the alleged
dishonesty and misconduct in office consisted in petitioner allegedly "
[conniving] with certain private individuals to cut and fell [timber] and
[selling] the [timber] or logs so cut or felled, for their own use and benefit,
within the communal forest reserve of the municipality of Barobo, province
of Surigao del Sur, to the damage and prejudice of the public and of the
government; . . ." 4
In the answer of respondent Castillo as well as the other respondent,
the Provincial Board of Surigao del Sur, there was an admission of the fact
that as set forth in the petition, on October 4, 1968, such an administrative
complaint for such an alleged offense was indeed filed by respondent
Governor with respondent Provincial Board. What was sought to be stressed
in the answer, however, was that as early as April 18, 1968, a charge under
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 oath for abuse of official power in consenting to and authorizing the
violations of forestry laws was filed against petitioner by the Municipal
Council of Barobo, Surigao del Sur. He was then given the opportunity to
answer and explain within 72 hours, in an order of respondent Governor
dated May 21, 1968. The explanation offered by petitioner contained the
following: "These logs which I caused to be hauled sometime within the
month of January, 1968, were the same logs cut and tumbled down by the
persons above-mentioned within the communal forests of Barobo, Surigao
del Sur, and which were seized by the patrolmen of the undersigned. The
said logs were sold in order to raise funds for the purchase of the police
uniforms and arms." 5
It was on the basis of the above administrative complaint that
respondent Governor, according to the petition, ordered "the immediate
suspension [of petitioner] from his position as Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del
Sur; the same Administrative Order .. [containing] the immediate
designation of Vice-Mayor [Brigido L. Mercader] of the same town as Acting
[Mayor]." 6
Such administrative order for the preventive suspension of petitioner
was admitted by respondent Governor and sought to be justified thus: "
[Considering] that the acts charged against and admitted by the petitioner
`affects his official integrity', as such Municipal Mayor, by his having taken
the law into his own hands; . . ., there was an urgent necessity to order the
immediate `preventive suspension' of the petitioner, in accordance with the
provisions of Section 5, of Republic Act No. 5185, otherwise known as the
`Decentralization Act of 1967." 7
The decisive issue therefore, as set forth at the outset of this opinion, is
whether or not respondent Provincial Governor is vested with power to order
such preventive suspension under the Decentralization Act of 1967, more
specifically Section 5 thereof. For if no such authority exists, then whatever
be the alleged justification for preventive suspension cannot validate the
action taken by the Governor. To assert otherwise would be to negate the
rule of law.
What does Section 5 provide? It opens with the categorical declaration:
"Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the suspension and
removal of elective local officials shall be governed exclusively by the
provisions of this Section."
After setting forth in the next paragraph the grounds for suspension
and removal of elective local officials, namely, disloyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines, dishonesty, oppression, and misconduct in office, it
continues: "Written subscribed and sworn charges against any elective
provincial and city official shall be preferred before the President of the
Philippines; against any elective municipal official before the provincial
governor or the secretary of the provincial board concerned; and against any
elective barrio official before the municipal or city mayor or the municipal or
city secretary concerned."
Then comes the portion specifically dealing with preventive
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 suspension. This paragraph reads thus: "Within seven days after the charges
are preferred, the President, Governor, or Mayor, as the case may be, or his
duly authorized representative, as provided in the preceding paragraph, shall
notify the respondent of such charges. The President, Provincial Board and
City or Municipal Council, as the case may be, shall hear and investigate the
truth or falsity of the charges within ten days after receipt of such notice:
Provided, That no investigation shall commence or continue within ninety
days immediately prior to an election. The preventive suspension of the
respondent officer shall not extend beyond sixty days after the date of his
suspension. At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended officer shall be
reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings
against him until their completion, unless the delay in the decision of the
case is due to the fault, neglect or request of the suspended officer, in which
case, the time of delay shall not be counted in computing the time of
suspension: Provided, however, That if the suspended officer shall have been
found guilty as charged before the expiration of the thirty days, his
suspension, in the case of municipal and barrio officials, may continue until
the case is finally decided by the Provincial Board."
Considering that Section 5 leaves no doubt as to this particular
paragraph governing exclusively the suspension and removal of elective
local officials, it must be apparent why, as previously stated, respondent
Provincial Governor lacks the authority to order the preventive suspension of
petitioner.
1. Under the former law then in force which stands repealed by
virtue of the Decentralization Act, 8 the provincial governor, if the charge
against a municipal official was one affecting his official integrity, could
order his preventive suspension. 9 At present, the law is anything but that. A
reading of the pertinent paragraph above quoted makes manifest that it is
the provincial board to which such a power has been granted under
conditions therein specified. The statutory provision is worded differently.
The principle, that the deliberate selection of language other than that used
in an earlier act is indicative that a change in the law was intended, calls for
application. 10
2. This conclusion has reinforcement from the fundamental
postulate of constitutional law. Public officials possess powers, not rights.
There must be, therefore, a grant of authority whether express or implied, to
justify any action taken by them. In the absence thereof, what they do as
public officials lacks validity and, if challenged, must be set aside. To
paraphrase a leading American decision, 11 law is the only supreme power
under constitutional government, and every man who by accepting office
participates in its function is only the more strongly bound to submit to that
supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the
exercise of the authority which it gives.
Here, clearly, no such authority is vested in the provincial governor.
Instead, the statutory scheme, complete on its face, would locate such
power in the provincial board. There would be no support for the view, then,
that the action taken by the provincial governor in issuing the order of
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 preventive suspension in this case was in accordance with law.
3. Moreover, any other view would be to betray lack of fidelity to
the purpose so manifest in the controlling legal provision. It is fundamental
that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect
should be given to it by the judiciary. From Ty Sue v. Hord, 12 decided in
1909, it has been our constant holding that the choice between conflicting
theories falls on that which best accords with the letter of the law and with
its purpose. The next year, in an equally leading decision, United States v.
Toribio, 13 there was a caveat against a construction that would tend "to
defeat the purpose and object of the legislator." Then came the admonition
in Riera v. Palmaroli, 14 against the application so narrow "as to defeat the
manifest purpose of the legislator." This was repeated in the the latest case,
Commissioner of Customs v. Caltex, 15 in almost identical language.
So it is in the United States. 16 Thus, in an 1898 decision, the then
Justice, later Chief Justice, White minimized reliance on the subtle
signification of words and the niceties of verbal distinction stressing the
fundamental rule of carrying out the purpose and objective of legislation. 17
As succinctly put by the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Stone: "All statutes
must be construed in the light of their purpose." 18 The same thought has
been phrased differently. Thus: "The purpose of Congress is a dominant
factor in determining meaning." 19 For, to paraphrase Frankfurter, legislative
words are not inert but derive vitality from the obvious purposes at which
they are aimed. 20 The same jurist likewise had occasion to state: "Regard
for [its] purposes should infuse the construction of the legislation if it is to be
treated as a working instrument of government and not merely as a
collection of English words." 21 In the sixth annual Benjamin Nathan Cardozo
lecture delivered by him, entitled "Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes," he developed the theme further: "The generating consideration is
that legislation is more than composition. It is an active instrument of
government which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have
ends to be achieved. It is in this connection that Holmes said, `words are
flexible.' Again it was Holmes, the last judge to give quarter to loose thinking
or vague yearning, who said that `the general purpose is a more important
aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay
down.' And it was Holmes who chided courts for being `apt to err by sticking
too closely to the words of a law where those words import a policy that goes
beyond them.' Note, however, that he found the policy in `those words." 22
It may be noted parenthetically that earlier, the United States Supreme
Court was partial more to the term "objective" or "policy" rather than
"purpose." So it was in the first decision where this fundamental principle of
construction was relied upon, the opinion coming from Chief Justice Marshall.
Thus: "The two subjects were equally within the province of the legislature,
equally demanded their attention, and were brought together to their view.
If, then, the words making provision for each, fairly admit of an equally
extensive interpretation, and of one of which will effect the object that
seems to have been in contemplation, and which was certainly desirable,
they ought to receive that interpretation." 23
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 So, too, with his successor, Chief Justice Taney. Thus: "This
construction cannot be maintained. In expounding a statute, we must not be
guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the whole
law, and to its object and policy." 24 It should not escape attention that the
above excerpt was quoted with approval by the present Chief Justice Warren
as late as 1957. 25
What is the purpose of the Decentralization Act of 1967? It is set forth
in its declaration of policy. 26 It is "to transform local governments gradually
into effective instruments through which the people can in a most genuine
fashion, govern themselves and work out their own destinies." 27 In
consonance with such policy, its purpose is "to grant to local governments
greater freedom and ampler means to respond to the needs of their people
and promote their prosperity and happiness and to effect a more equitable
and systematic distribution of governmental powers and resources." 28
It is undeniable therefore that municipalities, as much as cities and
provinces, are by this act invested with "greater freedom and ampler means
to respond to the needs of their people and promote their prosperity and
happiness." It is implicit in our constitutional scheme that full autonomy be
accorded the inhabitants of the local units to govern themselves. Their
choice as to who should be their public officials must be respected. Those
elected must serve out their term. If they have to be removed at all, it should
be for cause in accordance with the procedure prescribed and by the specific
officials of higher category entrusted with such responsibility.
It is easily understandable why as held in a leading case, Lacson v.
Roque, 29 "strict construction of law relating to suspension and removal is
the universal rule." As was further emphasized by Justice Tuason who
penned the opinion: "When dealing with elective posts, the necessity for
restricted construction is greater." Deference to such a doctrine possessed of
intrinsic merit calls for due care lest by inadvertence the power to suspend
preventively is given to officials other than those specifically mentioned in
the act. For any other view would result in a dilution of the avowed purpose
to vest as great a degree of local autonomy as is possible to municipal
corporations. That would be to defeat and frustrate rather than to foster the
policy of the act.
4. Lastly, the construction here reached, as to the absence of power
on the part of provincial governors to suspend preventively a municipal
mayor is buttressed by the avoidance of undesirable consequences flowing
from a different doctrine. Time and time again, it has been stressed that
while democracy presupposes the right of the people to govern themselves
in elections that call for political parties contending for supremacy, once the
election is over the equally pressing and urgent concern for efficiency would
necessitate that purely partisan considerations be ignored, and if not entirely
possible, be restricted to a minimum.
The present litigation gives rise to the suspicion that politics did
intrude itself. Petitioner Municipal Mayor, an independent candidate, and
thus of a different political persuasion, appeared to have been placed at a
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 disadvantage. It would be a realistic assumption that there is the ever
present temptation on the part of provincial governors to utilize every
opportunity to favor those belonging to his party. At times, it may even
prove irresistible.
It is desirable therefore that such opportunity be limited. The statutory
provision then should be given such a construction that would be productive
of such a result. That is what we do in this case. To paraphrase Justice
Tuason, we test a doctrine by its consequences.
It could be said, of course, that to deny such a power to a provincial
governor but at the same time to affirm the existence thereof insofar as the
provincial board is concerned would not advance the cause of
decentralization any. In answer, it suffices to note that the Decentralization
Act having so recognized such an authority in the provincial board, the
judiciary must perforce recognize its existence. Until after the legislature
decrees otherwise, the courts have no alternative but to accord deference to
such declared congressional policy. It may also be stated that the provincial
board being a collective body, the first, second and third class provinces
being composed of the provincial governor, the vice-governor and three
other members elected at large by the qualified electors of the province, and
that in the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh class provinces having in addition
to the provincial governor and the vice-governor two other members likewise
elected at large, 30 there is a safeguard against the temptation to utilize this
power of preventive suspension for purely partisan ends. What one person
may feel free to do, fully conscious as he is that the authority belongs to him
alone, may not even be attempted when such an individual shares such
power with others who could possibly hold dissenting views. At any rate,
there is a brake, which it is hoped would suffice on most if not all occasions.
Such a restraining influence is indeed needed for the undeniable facts
of the contemporary political scene bear witness to efforts, at times
disguised, at other times quite blatant, on the part of local officials to make
use of their positions to gain partisan advantage. Harassment of those
belonging to opposing factions or groups is not unknown. Unfortunately, no
stigma seems to attach to what really amounts to a misuse of official power.
The truism that a public office is a public trust, implicit in which is the
recognition that public advantage and not private benefit should be the test
of one's conduct, seems to have been ignored all too often. The construction
of any statute therefore, even assuming that it is tainted by ambiguity,
which would reduce the opportunity of any public official to make use of his
position for partisan ends, has much to recommend it.
5. We hold, therefore, that under Section 5 of the Decentralization
Act of 1967, the power of preventive suspension is not lodged in the
provincial governor. To rule otherwise would be at war with the plain
purpose of the law and likewise fraught with consequences far from
desirable. We close with this appropriate excerpt from an opinion of Justice
Holmes rendered on circuit duty: "The Legislature has the power to decide
what the policy of the law shall be, and if it has intimated its will, however
indirectly, that will should be recognized and obeyed. The major premise of
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 the conclusion expressed in a statute, the change of policy that induces the
enactment, may not be set out in terms, but it is not an adequate discharge
of duty for the courts to say: We see what you are driving at, but you have
not said it, and therefore, we shall go on as before." 31
WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for are granted, the preventive
suspension of petitioner by respondent Castillo annulled and set aside with
the result that his immediate reinstatement to his position as Municipal
Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, is ordered, without prejudice to any further
proceedings to be taken by respondent Provincial Board in connection with
the charge of misconduct and dishonesty in office against petitioner,
respondent Provincial Board being strictly enjoined in the disposition of such
administrative complaint to act strictly in accordance with the applicable
law. Without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Ruiz Castro, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1.Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code provides: "Supervisory authority
of provincial governor over municipal officers. — The provincial governor
shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal
officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime
involving moral turpitude. For minor delinquency, he may reprimand the
offender; and if more severe punishment seems to be desirable, he shall
submit written charges touching the matter to the provincial board,
furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by
registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the
municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge
be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Where
suspension is thus affected, the written charges against the officer shall be
filed with the board within five days." Cf. Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175
(1958) and Ochate v. Deling, 105 Phil. 384 (1959)

2.Republic Act No. 5185.

3.Petition, I, par. 1, and Annex A.
4.Ibid, II, par. 2.
5.Answer, pars. 1 to 3.
6.Petition, par. 3.

7.Answer, par. 5.
8.Section 25.
9.Section 2188, Rev. Adm. Code. Cf. Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175 (1958) and
Ochate v. Deline, 105 Phil. 384 (1959)
10.Brewster v. Gage, 280 US 327 (1930)

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com

 11.United States v. Lee (1882) 106 US 196. According to Justice Miller: "No man in
this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set
the law at defiance, with impunity. All the officers of the Government; from
the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it."
(p. 220)
12.12 Phil. 485.
13.15 Phil. 85.
14.40 Phil. 105 (1919)

15.106 Phil. 829 (1959). Cf. Philippine Sugar Centrals Agency v. Collector of
Customs, 51 Phil. 131 (1927); Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141 (1931); Co
Chiong v. Cuaderno, 53 Phil. 242 (1949); Sibulo v. Altar, 53 Phil. 513 (1949);
Araneta v. Dinglasan, 54 Phil. 368 (1949)
16.Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1 (1825); Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. 646
(1836), United States v. Heirs of Boisdoire, 8 How. 113 (1850); Marriott v.
Bruse, 9 How. 619 (1850); Griffith v. Bogert, 18 How. 158 (1856); Re Yerger,
8 Wall. 85 (1869); Platt v. Union R. R. Co., 99 US 48 (1879), United States v.
Saunders, 120 US 126 (1887); Bate Refrigerator Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 US 1
(1857); Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 US 412 (1898); First Nat. Bank v. Chapman, 173
US 205 (1899); Reid v. Colorado, 187 US 137 (1902); Amer. Tobacco Corp. v.
Werckmeister, 207 US 284 (1907); Lo Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 US 460
(1912); United States v. Sischo, 262 US 165 (1923); St. Louis and O'Fallon
Ry. Co. v. United States, 279 US 461 (1931); Brewster v. Gage, 280 US 327
(1932); Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 US 294
(1933); Royal Indemnity Co. v. Amer. Bond & M. Co., 209 US 165 (1933);
People v. Shell Co., 320 US 253 (1937); Nardone v. United States, 308 US
338 (1939); Griffiths v. Helvering, 308 US 355 (1939); Haggar Co. v.
Helvering, 308 US 389 (1940); Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 US 517
(1940); United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 US 600 (1941); United States v.
Dotterweich, 320 US 277 (1943); Colgate Palmolive Products Co. v. United
States, 330 US 422 (1943); Markham v. Cabell, 326 US 404 (1945); Chatwin
v. United States, 326 US 455 (1946); United States v. CIO, 335 US 106
(1945); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 US 33 (1950); 62 Cases of Jam v.
United States, 340 US 593 (1951); Johansen v. United States, 343 US 427
(1952); Cox v. Roth, 348 US 207 (1955); United States v. Shirey, 359 US 255
(1959); Richards v. United States, 369 US (1962)
17.Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 US 412 (1898)
18.Haggar Company v. Helvering, 308 US 389, 394 (1940)
19.United States v. CIO, 335 US 106, 112 (1948)

20.Griffiths v. Helvering, 308 US 355 (1939)

21.United States v. Dotterweich, 320 US 277, 280 (1943)

22.47 Col. Law Rev. 527, 538 (1947).
23.Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, (1825)

24.United States v. The Heirs of Boisdoire, 8 How. 113, 122 (1850)

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 25.NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 US 282 (1957)
26.Section v. Republic Act No. 5185.
27.Ibid.
28.Ibid.
29.92 Phil. 456 (1953)

30.Section 5, Republic Act No. 2264.

31.Johnson v. United States, 163 Fed. 30, 32 (C. C. A. 1st, 1908)

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com