Functional Safety Certificate Fmeda Report 3051s Electronic Remote Sensors Ers System en 88458

Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis
Project:
3051S Electronic Remote Sensors (ERS™) System
Company:
Rosemount
(an Emerson Process Management company)
Chanhassen, MN
USA
Contract Number: Q13/10-107

Report No.: ROS 10/04-83 R001
Version V2, Revision R4, November 14, 2014
Griff Francis / Greg Sauk
The document was prepared using best effort. The authors make no warranty of any kind and shall not be liable in any
event for incidental or consequential damages in connection with the application of the document.
© All rights reserved.
Management Summary
This report summarizes the results of the hardware assessment in the form of a Failure Modes,
Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis (FMEDA) of the 3051S Electronic Remote Sensors System. A
Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis is one of the steps to be taken to achieve
functional safety certification per IEC 61508 of a device. It is the FMEDA that will determine failure
rates. The FMEDA that is described in this report concerns only the hardware of the 3051S ERS
System. All requirements of IEC 61508 must be considered for full functional safety certification
purposes.
The 3051S ERS System is a two wire, 4 – 20 mA architecture that calculates differential pressure
electronically using two pressure sensors that are linked together with a digital cable. The sensor
system uses standard, well-proven sensor boards in combination with a microprocessor board that
performs diagnostics. It is programmed to send its output to a specified failure state, either high or
low, when an internal failure is detected.
It is assumed that the 4 – 20 mA output is used as a primary safety variable. No other output
variants are covered by this report.
Table 1 gives an overview of the different Primary and Secondary Sensor Models. A 3051S
Electronic Remote Sensors System consists of a Primary and a Secondary Sensor.
Table 1 Version Overview

Primary Sensor Models
Model Number Description
3051SAM_PA Absolute pressure, coplanar sensor, measurement sensor
3051SAL_PA Absolute pressure, coplanar sensor, level sensor
3051SAM_PD Differential pressure, coplanar sensor, measurement sensor
3051SAL_PD Differential pressure, coplanar sensor, level sensor
3051SAM_PG Gage pressure, coplanar sensor, measurement sensor
3051SAL_PG Gage pressure, coplanar sensor, level sensor
3051SAM_PE Absolute pressure, in-line sensor, measurement sensor
3051SAL_PE Absolute pressure, in-line sensor, level sensor
3051SAM_PT Gage pressure, in-line sensor, measurement sensor
3051SAL_PT Gage pressure, in-line sensor, level sensor
Secondary Sensor Models

Model Number Description
3051SAM_SA absolute pressure, coplanar sensor, measurement sensor
3051SAL_SA absolute pressure, coplanar sensor, level sensor
3051SAM_SD differential pressure, coplanar sensor, measurement sensor
3051SAL_SD differential pressure, coplanar sensor, level sensor
3051SAM_SG gage pressure, coplanar sensor, measurement sensor
3051SAL_SG gage pressure, coplanar sensor, level sensor
3051SAM_SE absolute pressure, in-line sensor, measurement sensor
3051SAL_SE absolute pressure, in-line sensor, level sensor
3051SAM_ST gage pressure, in-line sensor, measurement sensor
3051SAL_ST gage pressure, in-line sensor, level sensor
© exida ROS 10-04-083 R001 V2R4 FMEDA 3051S ERS.docx

T-001 V9,R1 www.exida.com Page 2 of 35
The 3051S ERS System is classified as a Type B 1 element according to IEC 61508, having a
hardware fault tolerance of 0.
The failure rate data used for this analysis meets the exida criteria for Route 2H. See Section 5.3.
Therefore the 3051S ERS System meets the hardware architectural constraints for up to up to SIL
2 at HFT=0 (or SIL 3 @ HFT=1) as a single device when the listed failure rates are used. If Route
2H is not applicable for the 3051S ERS System, the architectural constraints will need to be
evaluated per Route 1H.
The analysis shows that the 3051S ERS System has a Safe Failure Fraction greater than 90%
(assuming that the logic solver is programmed to detect over-scale and under-scale currents) and
therefore meets hardware architectural constraints for up to SIL 2.
The failure rates for the 3051S ERS System are listed in Table 2 – Table 4.
Table 2 Failure rates: Rosemount 3051SAM Models for ERS System (no seals) for Primary Sensor
with Coplanar Sensor and Secondary Sensor with Coplanar Sensor
Failure Category Failure Rate (FIT)

Fail Safe Undetected 319
Fail Dangerous Detected 897
Fail Detected (detected by internal diagnostics) 612
Fail High (detected by logic solver) 144
Fail Low (detected by logic solver) 141
Fail Dangerous Undetected 131
No Effect 475
Annunciation Undetected 30
External Leak 45
1
Type B element: “Complex” element (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see
7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2, ed2, 2010.
with Coplanar Sensor and Secondary Sensor with In-Line Sensor or Primary Sensor with In-Line
Sensor and Secondary Sensor with Coplanar Sensor

No Effect 442
External Leak 45
with In-Line Sensor and Secondary Sensor with In-Line Sensor

No Effect 409
External Leak 45

Table 5 Failure rates: Rosemount 3051SAL Models for ERS system for Primary Sensor with
Coplanar Sensor and Secondary Sensor with Coplanar Sensor (One direct mount seal for
each 3051SAL model)

No Effect 478
External Leak 50
Coplanar Sensor and Secondary Sensor with In-Line Sensor or Primary Sensor with In-Line
Sensor and Secondary Sensor with Coplanar Sensor (One direct mount seal for each
3051SAL model)

No Effect 445
External Leak 50

Table 7 Failure rates: Rosemount 3051SAL Models for ERS system for Primary Sensor with In-
Line Sensor and Secondary Sensor with In-Line Sensor (One direct mount seal for each
3051SAL model)

No Effect 412
External Leak 50
Table 8 Failure rates: Rosemount 3051SAL & 3051SAM (w/attached 1199 seal) Models for ERS system
for Primary Sensor with Coplanar Sensor and Secondary Sensor with Coplanar Sensor

No Effect 479
External Leak 50

Table 9 Failure rates: Rosemount 3051SAL & 3051SAM (w/attached 1199 seal) Models for ERS system
for Primary Sensor with Coplanar Sensor and Secondary Sensor with In-Line Sensor or
Primary Sensor with In-Line Sensor and Secondary Sensor with Coplanar Sensor

No Effect 446
External Leak 50
Table 10 Failure rates: Rosemount 3051SAL & 3051SAM (w/attached 1199 seal) Models for ERS
system for Primary Sensor with In-Line Sensor and Secondary Sensor with In-Line Sensor

No Effect 413
External Leak 50
These failure rates are valid for the useful lifetime of the product, see Appendix A.
The failure rates listed in this report do not include failures due to wear-out of any components.
They reflect random failures and include failures due to external events, such as unexpected use,
see section 4.2.2.
Table 5 lists the failure rates for the 3051S ERS System according to IEC 61508, ed2, 2010.

Table 11 Failure rates according to IEC 61508 in FIT
Device λSD λSU 2 λDD λDU SFF 3

3051S ERS System, Primary
Sensor with Coplanar Sensor
- 319 897 131 90%
+ Secondary Sensor with
Coplanar Sensor
+ Secondary Sensor with In-
Line Sensor or Model 3051S
- 237 996 114 92%
ERS System, Primary Sensor
with In-Line Sensor +
Secondary Sensor with
Coplanar Sensor
Sensor with In-Line Sensor +
- 156 1095 97 93%
Secondary Sensor with In-Line
Sensor
A user of the 3051S ERS System can utilize these failure rates in a probabilistic model of a safety
instrumented function (SIF) to determine suitability in part for safety instrumented system (SIS)
usage in a particular safety integrity level (SIL). A full table of failure rates is presented in section
4.4 along with all assumptions.
2
It is important to realize that the No Effect failures are no longer included in the Safe Undetected failure
category according to IEC 61508, ed2, 2010.
3
Safe Failure Fraction, if needed, is to be calculated on an element level
Table of Contents
Management Summary ....................................................................................................... 2
1 Purpose and Scope ...................................................................................................... 10
2 Project Management .................................................................................................... 11
2.1 exida ............................................................................................................................... 11
2.2 Roles of the parties involved ............................................................................................ 11
2.3 Standards and literature used .......................................................................................... 11
2.4 Reference documents ..................................................................................................... 12
2.4.1 Documentation provided by Rosemount .................................................................. 12
2.4.2 Documentation generated by exida ........................................................................ 12
3 Product Description ...................................................................................................... 13
4 Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis .......................................................... 15
4.1 Failure categories description .......................................................................................... 15
4.2 Methodology – FMEDA, failure rates ............................................................................... 16
4.2.1 FMEDA ................................................................................................................... 16
4.2.2 Failure rates ............................................................................................................ 16
4.3 Assumptions .................................................................................................................... 17
4.4 Results ............................................................................................................................ 17
5 Using the FMEDA Results ............................................................................................ 24
5.1 Impulse line clogging ....................................................................................................... 24
5.2 PFDAVG calculation 3051S ERS System .......................................................................... 24
5.3 exida Route 2H Criteria.................................................................................................... 24
6 Terms and Definitions................................................................................................... 26
7 Status of the Document ................................................................................................ 27
7.1 Liability ............................................................................................................................ 27
7.2 Releases ......................................................................................................................... 27
7.3 Future enhancements...................................................................................................... 27
7.4 Release signatures .......................................................................................................... 28
Appendix A Lifetime of Critical Components................................................................ 29
Appendix B Proof Tests to Reveal Dangerous Undetected Faults .............................. 30
B.1 Comprehensive Proof Test .............................................................................................. 30
B.2 Proof Test Coverage ....................................................................................................... 30
Appendix C exida Environmental Profiles ................................................................... 31
Appendix D Determining Safety Integrity Level ............................................................ 32

1 Purpose and Scope
This document shall describe the results of the hardware assessment in the form of the Failure
Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis (FMEDA) carried out on the 3051S ERS System. From this,
failure rates and example PFDAVG values may be calculated.
The information in this report can be used to evaluate whether an element meets the average
Probability of Failure on Demand (PFDAVG) requirements and if applicable, the architectural
constraints / minimum hardware fault tolerance requirements per IEC 61508 / IEC 61511.
An FMEDA is part of the effort needed to achieve full certification per IEC 61508 or other relevant
functional safety standards.

2 Project Management
2.1 exida
exida is one of the world’s leading accredited Certification Bodies and knowledge companies
specializing in automation system safety and availability with over 300 years of cumulative
experience in functional safety. Founded by several of the world’s top reliability and safety experts
from assessment organizations and manufacturers, exida is a global company with offices around
the world. exida offers training, coaching, project oriented system consulting services, safety
lifecycle engineering tools, detailed product assurance, cyber-security and functional safety
certification, and a collection of on-line safety and reliability resources. exida maintains the largest
process equipment database of failure rates and failure modes with over 100 billion unit operating
hours.
2.2 Roles of the parties involved

Rosemount Manufacturer of the 3051S ERS System
exida Performed the hardware assessment
Rosemount contracted exida in May 2010 with the hardware assessment of the
above-mentioned device.
2.3 Standards and literature used

The services delivered by exida were performed based on the following standards / literature.
[N1] IEC 61508-2: ed2, 2010 Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable

Electronic Safety-Related Systems
[N2] Electrical Component exida LLC, Electrical Component Reliability Handbook,
Reliability Handbook, 3rd Third Edition, 2012, ISBN 978-1-934977-04-0
Edition, 2012
[N3] Mechanical Component exida LLC, Electrical & Mechanical Component Reliability
Reliability Handbook, 3rd Handbook, Third Edition, 2012, ISBN 978-1-934977-05-7
Edition, 2012
[N4] Safety Equipment Reliability exida LLC, Safety Equipment Reliability Handbook, Third
Handbook, 3rd Edition, 2007 Edition, 2007, ISBN 978-0-9727234-9-7
[N5] Goble, W.M. 2010 Control Systems Safety Evaluation and Reliability, 3rd
edition, ISA, ISBN 97B-1-934394-80-9. Reference on
FMEDA methods
[N6] IEC 60654-1:1993-02, Industrial-process measurement and control equipment –
second edition Operating conditions – Part 1: Climatic condition
[N7] O’Brien, C. & Bredemeyer, L., exida LLC., Final Elements & the IEC 61508 and IEC
2009 Functional Safety Standards, 2009, ISBN 978-1-9934977-
01-9

[N8] Scaling the Three Barriers, Scaling the Three Barriers, Recorded Web Seminar, June
Recorded Web Seminar, 2013, http://www.exida.com/Webinars/Recordings/SIF-
June 2013, Verification-Scaling-the-Three-Barriers
[N9] Meeting Architecture http://www.exida.com/Webinars/Recordings/Meeting-
Constraints in SIF Design, Architecture-Constraints-in-SIF-Design
Recorded Web Seminar,
March 2013
2.4 Reference documents
2.4.1 Documentation provided by Rosemount

[D1] 00825-0100-4804 Quick Installation Guide, Rosemount 3051S ERS System;
00825-0100-4804 Rev AB, January 2011
[D2] Preliminary 3051S PDS.pdf, Product Data Sheet, Rosemount 3051S Series; 00813-0100-
Rev MA, March 2010 4801 Rev SB, July 2014
[D3] 3051S User Manual, Rev Reference Manual, Rosemount 3051S Series; 00809-0100-
DA, February 2009 4804 Draft Rev AB, October 2014
[D4] ERS hw architecture.pptx 3051S ERS System Electrical Architecture
[D5] 03151_3750.pdf Schematic, Feature Board 3051S ERS System
[D6] 03151-1511.pdf Schematic, In-Line Sensor or Strain Gage Sensor
[D7] 03151-1514.pdf Schematic, Capacitive Sensor or Metal Cell Sensor
[D8] 03151-4270.pdf, Rev AB Schematic, Terminal Block, Dual Compartment, 3051S ERS
System
[D9] 03151-4280.pdf, Rev AB Schematic, Terminal Block, Single Compartment, 3051S ERS
System
2.4.2 Documentation generated by exida

[R1] 3051S ERS Feature Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis – 3051S ERS
Board100510.emf System Feature Board
[R2] 3051S ERS Single Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis – 3051S ERS
Terminal Board100518.emf System Single Terminal Board
[R3] 3051S ERS Dual Terminal Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis – 3051S ERS
Board100516.emf System Dual Terminal Board
[R4] CAN Mode SM Coplanar II Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis –3051S ERS
3051S Rev_AE.xls System Coplanar Board
[R5] CAN Mode SM inline 3051T Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis –3051S ERS
Rev_AR.xls System
[R6] 3051S_ERS_FMEDA Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis - Summary –
Summary r2.xls; 3051S ERS System

3 Product Description
The 3051S ERS System is a two wire, 4 – 20 mA architecture that calculates differential pressure
electronically using two pressure sensors (primary and secondary) that are linked together with a
digital cable. The sensor system uses standard, well-proven sensor boards in combination with a
microprocessor board that performs diagnostics. It is programmed to send its output to a specified
failure state, either high or low, when an internal failure is detected.
The bus between the current output microprocessor and the sensor microprocessor has been
extended outside the sensor housing to a second sensor microprocessor with its own housing.
This external bus is certified for the ERS system application within particular restrictions as
documented in the product installation manual.
It is assumed that the 4 – 20 mA output is used as a primary safety variable. No other output
variants are covered by this report.
Figure 1 3051S ERS System, Parts included in the FMEDA

Table 6 gives an overview of the different Primary and Secondary Sensor Models. A 3051S
Electronic Remote Sensors System consists of a Primary and a Secondary sensor.
Table 12 Version Overview

Primary Sensor Models
3051SAM_PA Absolute pressure, coplanar sensor, measurement sensor
3051SAL_PA Absolute pressure, coplanar sensor, level sensor
3051SAM_PD Differential pressure, coplanar sensor, measurement sensor
3051SAL_PD Differential pressure, coplanar sensor, level sensor
3051SAM_PG Gage pressure, coplanar sensor, measurement sensor
3051SAL_PG Gage pressure, coplanar sensor, level sensor
3051SAM_PE Absolute pressure, in-line sensor, measurement sensor
3051SAL_PE Absolute pressure, in-line sensor, level sensor
3051SAM_PT Gage pressure, in-line sensor, measurement sensor
3051SAL_PT Gage pressure, in-line sensor, level sensor
Secondary Sensor Models

3051SAM_SA absolute pressure, coplanar sensor, measurement sensor
3051SAL_SA absolute pressure, coplanar sensor, level sensor
3051SAM_SD differential pressure, coplanar sensor, measurement sensor
3051SAL_SD differential pressure, coplanar sensor, level sensor
3051SAM_SG gage pressure, coplanar sensor, measurement sensor
3051SAL_SG gage pressure, coplanar sensor, level sensor
3051SAM_SE absolute pressure, in-line sensor, measurement sensor
3051SAL_SE absolute pressure, in-line sensor, level sensor
3051SAM_ST gage pressure, in-line sensor, measurement sensor
3051SAL_ST gage pressure, in-line sensor, level sensor
The 3051S ERS System is classified as a Type B 4 device according to IEC 61508, having a
hardware fault tolerance of 0.
4
Type B element: “Complex” element (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see
7.4.4.1.3 of IEC 61508-2, ed2, 2010.
4 Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis
The Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis was performed based on the documentation
and is documented in 2.4.2.
When the effect of a certain failure mode could not be analyzed theoretically, the failure modes
were introduced on component level and the effects of these failure modes were examined on
system level. This resulted in failures that can be classified according to the following failure
categories.
4.1 Failure categories description

The following definitions for the failure of the device were considered in order to judge the failure
behavior of the 3051S ERS System,
Fail-Safe State Failure that deviates the process signal or the actual output by more
than 2% of span, drifts toward the user defined threshold (Trip Point)
and that leaves the output within active scale.
Fail Safe Failure that causes the device to go to the defined fail-safe state
without a demand from the process.
Fail Dangerous Failure that deviates the process signal or the actual output by more
than 2% of span, drifts away from the user defined threshold (Trip
Point) and that leaves the output within active scale.
Fail Dangerous Undetected Failure that is dangerous and that is not being diagnosed by
automatic diagnostics.
Fail Dangerous Detected Failure that is dangerous but is detected by automatic diagnostics.
Fail High Failure that causes the output signal to go to the over-range or high
alarm output current (> 21 mA).
Fail Low Failure that causes the output signal to go to the under-range or low
alarm output current(< 3.6 mA).
No Effect Failure of a component that is part of the safety function but that has
no effect on the safety function.
Annunciation Undetected Failure that does not directly impact safety but does impact the ability
to detect a future fault (such as a fault in a diagnostic circuit) and that
is not detected by internal diagnostics.
External Leakage Failure that causes process fluids to leak outside of the valve;
External Leakage is not considered part of the safety function and
therefore this failure rate is not included in the Safe Failure Fraction
calculation.
The failure categories listed above expand on the categories listed in IEC 61508 which are only
safe and dangerous, both detected and undetected. In IEC 61508, Edition 2010, the No Effect
failures cannot contribute to the failure rate of the safety function. Therefore they are not used for
the Safe Failure Fraction calculation needed when Route 2H failure data is not available.

Depending on the application, a Fail High or a Fail Low failure can either be safe or dangerous and
may be detected or undetected depending on the programming of the logic solver. Consequently,
during a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) verification assessment the Fail High and Fail Low failure
categories need to be classified as safe or dangerous, detected or undetected.
The Annunciation failures are provided for those who wish to do reliability modeling more detailed
than required by IEC61508. It is assumed that the probability model will correctly account for the
Annunciation failures. Otherwise the Annunciation Undetected failures have to be classified as
Dangerous Undetected failures according to IEC 61508 (worst-case assumption).
4.2 Methodology – FMEDA, failure rates
4.2.1 FMEDA
A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a systematic way to identify and evaluate the
effects of different component failure modes, to determine what could eliminate or reduce the
chance of failure, and to document the system in consideration.
A FMEDA (Failure Mode Effect and Diagnostic Analysis) is an FMEA extension. It combines
standard FMEA techniques with the extension to identify automatic diagnostic techniques and the
failure modes relevant to safety instrumented system design. It is a technique recommended to
generate failure rates for each important category (safe detected, safe undetected, dangerous
detected, dangerous undetected, fail high, fail low, etc.) in the safety models. The format for the
FMEDA is an extension of the standard FMEA format from MIL STD 1629A, Failure Modes and
Effects Analysis.
4.2.2 Failure rates

The failure rate data used by exida in this FMEDA is from the Electrical and Mechanical
Component Reliability Handbooks [N2] and [N3] which was derived using over 100 billion unit
operational hours of field failure data from multiple sources and failure data from various databases.
The rates were chosen in a way that is appropriate for safety integrity level verification calculations.
The rates were chosen to match exida Profile 2, see Appendix C. The exida profile chosen was
judged to be the best fit for the product and application information submitted by Rosemount. It is
expected that the actual number of field failures due to random events will be less than the number
predicted by these failure rates.
For hardware assessment according to IEC 61508 only random equipment failures are of interest.
It is assumed that the equipment has been properly selected for the application and is adequately
commissioned such that early life failures (infant mortality) may be excluded from the analysis.
Failures caused by external events should be considered as random failures. Examples of such
failures are loss of power, physical abuse, or problems due to intermittent instrument air quality.
The assumption is also made that the equipment is maintained per the requirements of IEC 61508
or IEC 61511 and therefore a preventative maintenance program is in place to replace equipment
before the end of its “useful life”. Corrosion, erosion, coil burnout etc. are considered age related
wearout failures, provided that materials and technologies applied are indeed suitable for the
application, in all modes of operation.

The user of these numbers is responsible for determining their applicability to any particular
environment. exida Environmental Profiles listing expected stress levels can be found in Appendix
C. Some industrial plant sites have high levels of stress. Under those conditions the failure rate
data is adjusted to a higher value to account for the specific conditions of the plant.
Accurate plant specific data may be used for this purpose. If a user has data collected from a good
proof test reporting system such as exida SILStatTM that indicates higher failure rates, the higher
numbers shall be used.
4.3 Assumptions
The following assumptions have been made during the Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic
Analysis of the 3051S ERS System.
• Only a single component failure will fail the entire 3051S ERS System
• Failure rates are constant, wear-out mechanisms are not included
• Propagation of failures is not relevant
• All components that are not part of the safety function and cannot influence the safety
function (feedback immune) are excluded
• The stress levels are average for an industrial environment and can be compared to the
exida Profile 2 with temperature limits within the manufacturer’s rating. Other environmental
characteristics are assumed to be within manufacturer’s rating.
• Practical fault insertion tests can demonstrate the correctness of the failure effects
assumed during the FMEDA and the diagnostic coverage provided by the online
diagnostics
• The HART protocol is only used for setup, calibration, and diagnostics purposes, not for
safety critical operation.
• The application program in the logic solver is constructed in such a way that Fail High and
Fail Low failures are detected regardless of the effect, safe or dangerous, on the safety
function.
• Materials are compatible with process conditions
• The device is installed per manufacturer’s instructions, including the wiring between the
primary and secondary sensors
• External power supply failure rates are not included
• Worst-case internal fault detection time is 1 hour
4.4 Results
Using reliability data extracted from the exida Electrical and Mechanical Component Reliability
Handbook the following failure rates resulted from the 3051S ERS System FMEDA.

with Coplanar Sensor and Secondary Sensor with Coplanar Sensor

No Effect 475
External Leak 45
with Coplanar Sensor and Secondary Sensor with In-Line Sensor or Primary Sensor with In-Line
Sensor and Secondary Sensor with Coplanar Sensor

No Effect 442
External Leak 45

with In-Line Sensor and Secondary Sensor with In-Line Sensor

No Effect 409
External Leak 45
Coplanar Sensor and Secondary Sensor with Coplanar Sensor (One direct mount seal for
each 3051SAL model)

No Effect 478
External Leak 50

Coplanar Sensor and Secondary Sensor with In-Line Sensor or Primary Sensor with In-Line
Sensor and Secondary Sensor with Coplanar Sensor (One direct mount seal for each
3051SAL model)

No Effect 445
External Leak 50
Table 18 Failure rates: Rosemount 3051SAL Models for ERS system for Primary Sensor with In-
Line Sensor and Secondary Sensor with In-Line Sensor (One direct mount seal for each
3051SAL model)

No Effect 412
External Leak 50

system for Primary Sensor with Coplanar Sensor and Secondary Sensor with Coplanar
Sensor

No Effect 479
External Leak 50
system for Primary Sensor with Coplanar Sensor and Secondary Sensor with In-Line Sensor
or Primary Sensor with In-Line Sensor and Secondary Sensor with Coplanar Sensor

No Effect 446
External Leak 50

system for Primary Sensor with In-Line Sensor and Secondary Sensor with In-Line Sensor

No Effect 413
External Leak 50
These failure rates are valid for the useful lifetime of the product, see Appendix A.
According to IEC 61508 the architectural constraints of an element must be determined. This can
be done by following the 1H approach according to 7.4.4.2 of IEC 61508 or the 2H approach
according to 7.4.4.3 of IEC 61508 (See Section 5.3).
The 1H approach involves calculating the Safe Failure Fraction for the entire element.
The 2H approach involves assessment of the reliability data for the entire element according to
7.4.4.3.3 of IEC 61508.
The failure rate data used for this analysis meets the exida criteria for Route 2H. Therefore the
3051S ERS System meets the hardware architectural constraints for up to SIL 2 at HFT=0 (or SIL
3 @ HFT=1) as a single device when the listed failure rates are used.
If Route 2H is not applicable for the 3051S ERS System, the architectural constraints will need to
be evaluated per Route 1H.
Table 22 lists the failure rates for the 3051S ERS System according to IEC 61508.

Table 22 Failure rates according to IEC 61508 in FIT
Device λSD λSU 5 λDD λDU SFF 6

- 319 897 131 90%
+ Secondary Sensor with
Coplanar Sensor
+ Secondary Sensor with In-
Line Sensor or Model 3051S
- 237 996 114 92%
ERS System, Primary Sensor
with In-Line Sensor +
Secondary Sensor with
Coplanar Sensor
Sensor with In-Line Sensor +
- 156 1095 97 93%
Secondary Sensor with In-Line
Sensor
5
It is important to realize that the No Effect failures are no longer included in the Safe Undetected failure
category according to IEC 61508, ed2, 2010.
6
Safe Failure Fraction, if needed, is to be calculated on an element level
5 Using the FMEDA Results
The following section(s) describe how to apply the results of the FMEDA.
5.1 Impulse line clogging

The sensor can be connected to the process using impulse lines; depending on the application, the
analysis needs to account for clogging of the impulse lines. The 3051S ERS System failure rates
that are displayed in section 4.4 are failure rates that reflect the situation where the sensor is used
in clean service. Clean service indicates that failure rates due to clogging of the impulse line are
not counted. For applications other than clean service, the user must estimate the failure rate for
the clogged impulse line and add this failure rate to the 3051S ERS System failure rates.
5.2 PFDAVG calculation 3051S ERS System

Using the failure rate data displayed in section 4.4, and the failure rate data for the associated
element devices, an average the Probability of Failure on Demand (PFDavg) calculation can be
performed for the element.
Probability of Failure on Demand (PFDavg) calculation uses several parameters, many of which are
determined by the particular application and the operational policies of each site. Some parameters
are product specific and the responsibility of the manufacturer. Those manufacturer specific
parameters are given in this third party report.
Probability of Failure on Demand (PFDavg) calculation is the responsibility of the owner/operator of
a process and is often delegated to the SIF designer. Product manufacturers can only provide a
PFDavg by making many assumptions about the application and operational policies of a site.
Therefore use of these numbers requires complete knowledge of the assumptions and a match
with the actual application and site.
Probability of Failure on Demand (PFDavg) calculation is best accomplished with exida’s
exSILentia tool. See Appendix D for a complete description of how to determine the Safety Integrity
Level for an element. The mission time used for the calculation depends on the PFDavg target and
the useful life of the product. The failure rates and the proof test coverage for the element are
required to perform the PFDavg calculation. The proof test coverage for the suggested proof test
and the dangerous failure rate after proof test for the 3051S ERS System are listed in Table 25.
5.3 exida Route 2H Criteria

IEC 61508, ed2, 2010 describes the Route 2H alternative to Route 1H architectural constraints. The
standard states:
"based on data collected in accordance with published standards (e.g., IEC 60300-3-2: or ISO
14224); and, be evaluated according to
• the amount of field feedback; and
• the exercise of expert judgment; and when needed
• the undertake of specific tests,
in order to estimate the average and the uncertainty level (e.g., the 90% confidence interval or the
probability distribution) of each reliability parameter (e.g., failure rate) used in the calculations."
exida has interpreted this to mean not just a simple 90% confidence level in the uncertainty
analysis, but a high confidence level in the entire data collection process. As IEC 61508, ed2, 2010
does not give detailed criteria for Route 2H, exida has established the following:
1. field unit operational hours of 100,000,000 per each component; and
2. a device and all of its components have been installed in the field for one year or more; and
3. operational hours are counted only when the data collection process has been audited for
correctness and completeness; and
4. failure definitions, especially "random" vs. "systematic" are checked by exida; and
5. every component used in an FMEDA meets the above criteria.
This set of requirements is chosen to assure high integrity failure data suitable for safety integrity
verification.

6 Terms and Definitions
Automatic Diagnostics Tests performed online internally by the device or, if specified,
externally by another device without manual intervention.
exida criteria A conservative approach to arriving at failure rates suitable for use in
hardware evaluations utilizing the 2H Route in IEC 61508-2.
FIT Failure In Time (1x10-9 failures per hour)
FMEDA Failure Mode Effect and Diagnostic Analysis
HFT Hardware Fault Tolerance
Low demand mode Mode, where the demand interval for operation made on a safety-
related system is greater than twice the proof test interval.
PFDAVG Average Probability of Failure on Demand
PVST Partial Valve Stroke Test - It is assumed that Partial Valve Stroke
Testing, when performed, is automatically performed at least an
order of magnitude more frequently than the proof test; therefore the
test can be assumed an automatic diagnostic. Because of the
automatic diagnostic assumption the Partial Valve Stroke Testing
also has an impact on the Safe Failure Fraction.
SFF Safe Failure Fraction, summarizes the fraction of failures which lead
to a safe state plus the fraction of failures which will be detected by
automatic diagnostic measures and lead to a defined safety action.
SIF Safety Instrumented Function
SIL Safety Integrity Level
SIS Safety Instrumented System – Implementation of one or more Safety
Instrumented Functions. A SIS is composed of any combination of
sensor(s), logic solver(s), and final element(s).
Type A element “Non-Complex” element (using discrete components); for details see
7.4.4.1.2 of IEC 61508-2
Type B element “Complex” element (using complex components such as micro
controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.4.1.3 of IEC
61508-2
Severe service Condition that exists when material through the valve has abrasive
particles, as opposed to Clean Service where these particles are
absent.

7 Status of the Document
7.1 Liability
exida prepares FMEDA reports based on methods advocated in International standards. Failure
rates are obtained from a collection of industrial databases. exida accepts no liability whatsoever
for the use of these numbers or for the correctness of the standards on which the general
calculation methods are based.
Due to future potential changes in the standards, best available information and best practices, the
current FMEDA results presented in this report may not be fully consistent with results that would
be presented for the identical product at some future time. As a leader in the functional safety
market place, exida is actively involved in evolving best practices prior to official release of
updated standards so that our reports effectively anticipate any known changes. In addition, most
changes are anticipated to be incremental in nature and results reported within the previous three
year period should be sufficient for current usage without significant question.
Most products also tend to undergo incremental changes over time. If an exida FMEDA has not
been updated within the last three years and the exact results are critical to the SIL verification you
may wish to contact the product vendor to verify the current validity of the results.
7.2 Releases
Version History: V2, R4: Updated per customer comments; TES November 14, 2014.
V2, R3: Updated per customer comments; TES October 23, 2014.
V2, R2: Updated per customer comments; TES October 16, 2014.
V2, R1: Updated FMEDA to IEC 61508, 2010; TES October 1, 2014.
V1, R1: Released to Rosemount; June 1, 2010
V0, R1: Draft; 19 May 2010
Author(s): Griff Francis
Review: V0, R1: Dr. William M. Goble, 1 June 2010
Release Status: RELEASE to Rosemount
7.3 Future enhancements

At request of client.

7.4 Release signatures
Dr. William M. Goble, CFSE Principal Partner
Griff Francis, CFSE Senior Safety Engineer
Greg Sauk, CFSE, Safety Engineer

Appendix A Lifetime of Critical Components
According to section 7.4.9.5 of IEC 61508-2, a useful lifetime, based on experience, should be
assumed.
Although a constant failure rate is assumed by the probabilistic estimation method (see section
4.2.2) this only applies provided that the useful lifetime 7 of components is not exceeded. Beyond
their useful lifetime the result of the probabilistic calculation method is therefore meaningless, as
the probability of failure significantly increases with time. The useful lifetime is highly dependent on
the subsystem itself and its operating conditions.
This assumption of a constant failure rate is based on the bathtub curve. Therefore it is obvious
that the PFDAVG calculation is only valid for components that have this constant domain and that
the validity of the calculation is limited to the useful lifetime of each component.
Table 23shows which components are contributing to the dangerous undetected failure rate and
therefore to the PFDAVG calculation and what their estimated useful lifetime is.
Table 23 Useful lifetime of components contributing to dangerous undetected failure rate
Component Useful Life

Capacitor (electrolytic) - Tantalum electrolytic, solid electrolyte Approx. 500,000 hours
It is the responsibility of the end user to maintain and operate the 3051S ERS System per
manufacturer’s instructions. Furthermore regular inspection should show that all components are
clean and free from damage.
As there are no aluminum electrolytic capacitors used, the limiting factors with regard to the useful
lifetime of the system are the tantalum electrolytic capacitors. The tantalum electrolytic capacitors
have an estimated useful lifetime of about 50 years.
When plant experience indicates a shorter useful lifetime than indicated in this appendix, the
number based on plant experience should be used.
7
Useful lifetime is a reliability engineering term that describes the operational time interval where the failure
rate of a device is relatively constant. It is not a term which covers product obsolescence, warranty, or other
commercial issues.
Appendix B Proof Tests to Reveal Dangerous Undetected Faults
According to section 7.4.5.2 f) of IEC 61508-2 proof tests shall be undertaken to reveal dangerous
faults which are undetected by automatic diagnostic tests. This means that it is necessary to
specify how dangerous undetected faults which have been noted during the Failure Modes, Effects,
and Diagnostic Analysis can be detected during proof testing.
B.1 Comprehensive Proof Test

The suggested proof test described in Table 24 will detect 87% of possible DU failures in the
3051S ERS System.
Table 24 Suggested Proof Test
Step Action
1. Bypass the safety function and take appropriate action to avoid a false trip
2. Use HART communications to retrieve any diagnostics and take appropriate action.
3. Send a HART command to the sensor to go to the high alarm current output and verify
that the analog current reaches that value 8.
4. Send a HART command to the sensor to go to the low alarm current output and verify
that the analog current reaches that value 9.
5. Perform a two-point calibration 10 of the sensor over the full working range.
6. Remove the bypass and otherwise restore normal operation
B.2 Proof Test Coverage

The Proof Test Coverage for the various product configurations is given in Table 13.
Table 25 Proof Test Coverage – 3051S ERS System
Device Comprehensive
3051S ERS System 87%
8
This tests for compliance voltage problems such as a low loop power supply voltage or increased wiring
resistance. This also tests for other possible failures.
9
This tests for possible quiescent current related failures.
10
If the two-point calibration is performed with electrical instrumentation, this proof test will not detect any
failures of the sensor
Appendix C exida Environmental Profiles
Table 26 exida Environmental Profiles
exida Profile 1 2 3 4 5 6
Description Cabinet Low General Subsea Offshore N/A
(Electrical) mounted/ Power Field
Climate Field Mounted
Controlled Mounted
no self- self-heating
heating
Description Cabinet General General Subsea Offshore Process
(Mechanical) mounted/ Field Field Wetted
Climate Mounted Mounted
Controlled
IEC 60654-1 Profile B2 C3 C3 N/A C3 N/A
also also also
applicable applicable applicable
for D1 for D1 for D1
Average Ambient
30 C 25 C 25 C 5C 25 C 25 C
Temperature
Average Internal Process
60 C 30 C 45 C 5C 45 C
Temperature Fluid Temp.
Daily Temperature
5C 25 C 25 C 0C 25 C N/A
Excursion (pk-pk)
Seasonal Temperature
Excursion 5C 40 C 40 C 2C 40 C N/A
(winter average vs.
summer average)
Exposed to Elements /
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weather Conditions
Humidity 11 0-95%
0-100% 0-100% 0-100% 0-100%
Non- N/A
Condensing Condensing Condensing Condensing
Condensing
Shock 12 10 g 15 g 15 g 15 g 15 g N/A
Vibration 13 2g 3g 3g 3g 3g N/A
Chemical Corrosion 14 Compatible
G2 G3 G3 G3 G3
Material
15
Surge
Line-Line 0.5 kV 0.5 kV 0.5 kV 0.5 kV 0.5 kV
N/A
Line-Ground 1 kV 1 kV 1 kV 1 kV 1 kV
EMI Susceptibility 16
80 MHz to 1.4 GHz 10 V/m 10 V/m 10 V/m 10 V/m 10 V/m
1.4 GHz to 2.0 GHz 3 V/m 3 V/m 3 V/m 3 V/m 3 V/m N/A
2.0Ghz to 2.7 GHz 1 V/m 1 V/m 1 V/m 1 V/m 1 V/m
ESD (Air) 17 6 kV 6 kV 6 kV 6 kV 6 kV N/A
11
Humidity rating per IEC 60068-2-3
12
Shock rating per IEC 60068-2-6
13
Vibration rating per IEC 60770-1
14
Chemical Corrosion rating per ISA 71.04
15
Surge rating per IEC 61000-4-5
16
EMI Susceptibility rating per IEC 6100-4-3
17
ESD (Air) rating per IEC 61000-4-2
Appendix D Determining Safety Integrity Level
The information in this appendix is intended to provide the method of determining the Safety
Integrity Level (SIL) of a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF). The numbers used in the examples
are not for the product described in this report.
Three things must be checked when verifying that a given Safety Instrumented Function (SIF)
design meets a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) [N5] and [N8].
These are:
A. Systematic Capability or Prior Use Justification for each device meets the SIL level of the SIF;
B. Architecture Constraints (minimum redundancy requirements) are met; and
C. a PFDavg calculation result is within the range of numbers given for the SIL level.
A. Systematic Capability (SC) is defined in IEC61508:2010. The SC rating is a measure of design

quality based upon the methods and techniques used to design and development a product. All
devices in a SIF must have a SC rating equal or greater than the SIL level of the SIF. For example,
a SIF is designed to meet SIL 3 with three pressure transmitters in a 2oo3 voting scheme. The
transmitters have an SC2 rating. The design does not meet SIL 3. Alternatively, IEC 61511 allows
the end user to perform a "Prior Use" justification. The end user evaluates the equipment to a given
SIL level, documents the evaluation and takes responsibility for the justification.
B. Architecture constraints require certain minimum levels of redundancy. Different tables show
different levels of redundancy for each SIL level. A table is chosen and redundancy is incorporated
into the design [N9].
C. Probability of Failure on Demand (PFDavg) calculation uses several parameters, many of which
are determined by the particular application and the operational policies of each site. Some
parameters are product specific and the responsibility of the manufacturer. Those manufacturer
specific parameters are given in this third party report.
A Probability of Failure on Demand (PFDavg) must be done based on a number of variables

including:
1. Failure rates of each product in the design including failure modes and any diagnostic
coverage from automatic diagnostics (an attribute of the product given by this FMEDA report);
2. Redundancy of devices including common cause failures (an attribute of the SIF design);
3. Proof Test Intervals (assignable by end user practices);
4. Mean Time to Restore (an attribute of end user practices);
5. Proof Test Effectiveness; (an attribute of the proof test method used by the end user with an
example given by this report);
6. Mission Time (an attribute of end user practices);
7. Proof Testing with process online or shutdown (an attribute of end user practices);
8. Proof Test Duration (an attribute of end user practices); and
9. Operational/Maintenance Capability (an attribute of end user practices).
The product manufacturer is responsible for the first variable. Most manufacturers use the exida
FMEDA technique which is based on over 100 billion hours of field failure data in the process
industries to predict these failure rates as seen in this report. A system designer chooses the
second variable. All other variables are the responsibility of the end user site. The exSILentia®
SILVerTM software considers all these variables and provides an effective means to calculate
PFDavg for any given set of variables.

Simplified equations often account for only for first three variables. The equations published in IEC
61508-6, Annex B.3.2 [N1] cover only the first four variables. IEC61508-6 is only an informative
portion of the standard and as such gives only concepts, examples and guidance based on the
idealistic assumptions stated. These assumptions often result in optimistic PFDavg calculations
and have indicated SIL levels higher than reality. Therefore idealistic equations should not be used
for actual SIF design verification.
All the variables listed above are important. As an example consider a high level protection SIF.
The proposed design has a single SIL 3 certified level transmitter, a SIL 3 certified safety logic
solver, and a single remote actuated valve consisting of a certified solenoid valve, certified scotch
yoke actuator and a certified ball valve. Note that the numbers chosen are only an example and
not the product described in this report.
Using exSILentia with the following variables selected to represent results from simplified
equations:
• Mission Time = 5 years
• Proof Test Interval = 1 year for the sensor and final element, 5 years for the logic solver
• Proof Test Coverage = 100% (ideal and unrealistic but commonly assumed)
• Proof Test done with process offline
This results in a PFDavg of 6.82E-03 which meets SIL 2 with a risk reduction factor of 147. The
subsystem PFDavg contributions are Sensor PFDavg = 5.55E-04, Logic Solver PFDavg = 9.55E-
06, and Final Element PFDavg = 6.26E-03. See Figure 2.
Figure 2: exSILentia results for idealistic variables.

If the Proof Test Internal for the sensor and final element is increased in one year increments, the
results are shown in Figure 3.
3.50E-02
3.00E-02
2.50E-02
PFDavg 2.00E-02
Series1
Sensor
1.50E-02
Final
Series2
1.00E-02 Element
5.00E-03
0.00E+00
1 2 3 4 5
Proof Test Interval (Years)
Figure 3 PFDavg versus Proof Test Interval.

If a set of realistic variables for the same SIF are entered into the exSILentia software including:
• Mission Time = 25 years

• Proof Test Interval = 1 year for the sensor and final element, 5 years for the logic solver
• Proof Test Coverage = 90% for the sensor and 70% for the final element
• Proof Test Duration = 2 hours with process online.
• MTTR = 48 hours
• Maintenance Capability = Medium for sensor and final element, Good for logic solver
with all other variables remaining the same, the PFDavg for the SIF equals 5.76E-02 which barely
meets SIL 1 with a risk reduction factor of 17. The subsystem PFDavg contributions are Sensor
PFDavg = 2.77E-03, Logic Solver PFDavg = 1.14E-05, and Final Element PFDavg = 5.49E-02
(Figure 4).

Figure 4: exSILentia results with realistic variables
It is clear that PFDavg results can change an entire SIL level or more when all critical variables are
not used.


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Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis

Contract Number: Q13/10-107

Table 1 Version Overview

Secondary Sensor Models

© exida ROS 10-04-083 R001 V2R4 FMEDA 3051S ERS.docx

Failure Category Failure Rate (FIT)

Failure Category Failure Rate (FIT)

Failure Category Failure Rate (FIT)

© exida ROS 10-04-083 R001 V2R4 FMEDA 3051S ERS.docx

Failure Category Failure Rate (FIT)

Failure Category Failure Rate (FIT)

© exida ROS 10-04-083 R001 V2R4 FMEDA 3051S ERS.docx

Failure Category Failure Rate (FIT)

Failure Category Failure Rate (FIT)

© exida ROS 10-04-083 R001 V2R4 FMEDA 3051S ERS.docx

Failure Category Failure Rate (FIT)

Failure Category Failure Rate (FIT)

© exida ROS 10-04-083 R001 V2R4 FMEDA 3051S ERS.docx

Device λSD λSU 2 λDD λDU SFF 3

© exida ROS 10-04-083 R001 V2R4 FMEDA 3051S ERS.docx

© exida ROS 10-04-083 R001 V2R4 FMEDA 3051S ERS.docx

2.2 Roles of the parties involved

2.3 Standards and literature used

[N1] IEC 61508-2: ed2, 2010 Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable

© exida ROS 10-04-083 R001 V2R4 FMEDA 3051S ERS.docx

2.4 Reference documents

2.4.1 Documentation provided by Rosemount

2.4.2 Documentation generated by exida

© exida ROS 10-04-083 R001 V2R4 FMEDA 3051S ERS.docx

Figure 1 3051S ERS System, Parts included in the FMEDA

© exida ROS 10-04-083 R001 V2R4 FMEDA 3051S ERS.docx

Table 12 Version Overview

Secondary Sensor Models

4.1 Failure categories description

© exida ROS 10-04-083 R001 V2R4 FMEDA 3051S ERS.docx

4.2 Methodology – FMEDA, failure rates

4.2.2 Failure rates

© exida ROS 10-04-083 R001 V2R4 FMEDA 3051S ERS.docx

© exida ROS 10-04-083 R001 V2R4 FMEDA 3051S ERS.docx

Failure Category Failure Rate (FIT)

Failure Category Failure Rate (FIT)

© exida ROS 10-04-083 R001 V2R4 FMEDA 3051S ERS.docx

Failure Category Failure Rate (FIT)

Failure Category Failure Rate (FIT)

© exida ROS 10-04-083 R001 V2R4 FMEDA 3051S ERS.docx

Failure Category Failure Rate (FIT)

Failure Category Failure Rate (FIT)

© exida ROS 10-04-083 R001 V2R4 FMEDA 3051S ERS.docx

Failure Category Failure Rate (FIT)

Failure Category Failure Rate (FIT)

© exida ROS 10-04-083 R001 V2R4 FMEDA 3051S ERS.docx

Failure Category Failure Rate (FIT)

© exida ROS 10-04-083 R001 V2R4 FMEDA 3051S ERS.docx

Device λSD λSU 5 λDD λDU SFF 6

5.1 Impulse line clogging

5.2 PFDAVG calculation 3051S ERS System

5.3 exida Route 2H Criteria

© exida ROS 10-04-083 R001 V2R4 FMEDA 3051S ERS.docx

© exida ROS 10-04-083 R001 V2R4 FMEDA 3051S ERS.docx