Saludaga vs. Far Eastern University, 553 SCRA 741, G.R. No. 179337 April 30, 2008

8/18/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 553
Where the accused were charged with separate crimes of

carnapping and murder, they cannot be convicted of the qualified
carnapping constitutive of the various crimes alleged in the two
informations without running afoul of the constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.
(People vs. Ubaldo, 342 SCRA 338 [2000])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 179337. April 30, 2008. *
JOSEPH SALUDAGA, petitioner, vs. FAR EASTERN

UNIVERSITY and EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS in his capacity as
President of FEU, respondents.
Colleges and Universities; Obligations and Contracts; Where a student

is enrolled in an educational institution, there is created a contractual
obligation between the two parties—the student is obliged to comply with
the rules and regulations of the school while the latter, as a learning
institution, is mandated to impart knowledge and equip its students with the
necessary skills to pursue higher education or a profession, as well as to
ensure and take adequate steps to maintain peace and order within the
campus.—It is undisputed that petitioner was enrolled as a sophomore law
student in respondent FEU. As such, there was created a contractual
obligation between the two parties. On petitioner’s part, he was obliged to
comply with the rules and regulations of the school. On the other hand,
respondent FEU, as a learning institution is mandated to impart knowledge
and equip its students with the necessary skills to pursue higher education or
a profession. At the same time, it is obliged to ensure and take adequate
steps to maintain peace and order within the campus. It is settled that in
culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the
failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief.
In the instant case, we find that, when
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017b58a4a2fcf4b161e6000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/18
742
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Saludaga vs. Far Eastern University
petitioner was shot inside the campus by no less the security guard who was
hired to maintain peace and secure the premises, there is a prima facie
showing that respondents failed to comply with its obligation to provide a
safe and secure environment to its students.
Same; Same; Security Guards; A learning institution should not be
allowed to completely relinquish or abdicate security matters in its premises
to the security agency it hired—to do so would result to contracting away its
inherent obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for its students.—
Respondents also failed to show that they undertook steps to ascertain and
confirm that the security guards assigned to them actually possess the
qualifications required in the Security Service Agreement. It was not proven
that they examined the clearances, psychiatric test results, 201 files, and
other vital documents enumerated in its contract with Galaxy. Total reliance
on the security agency about these matters or failure to check the papers
stating the qualifications of the guards is negligence on the part of
respondents. A learning institution should not be allowed to completely
relinquish or abdicate security matters in its premises to the security agency
it hired. To do so would result to contracting away its inherent obligation to
ensure a safe learning environment for its students.
Same; Same; Force Majeure; An act of God cannot be invoked to
protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible
adverse consequences of such a loss.—Respondents’ defense of force
majeure must fail. In order for force majeure to be considered, respondents
must show that no negligence or misconduct was committed that may have
occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person
who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences
of such a loss. One’s negligence may have concurred with an act of God in
producing damage and injury to another; nonetheless, showing that the
immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous
event would not exempt one from liability. When the effect is found to be
partly the result of a person’s participation—whether by active intervention,
neglect or failure to act—the whole occurrence is humanized and removed
from the rules applicable to acts of God.
Same; Same; Negligence; For breach of contract due to negligence in
providing a safe learning environment, an educational institution is liable to
petitioner for damages.—Article 1170 of the Civil
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VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 743

Code provides that those who are negligent in the performance of their
obligations are liable for damages. Accordingly, for breach of contract due
to negligence in providing a safe learning environment, respondent FEU is
liable to petitioner for damages. It is essential in the award of damages that
the claimant must have satisfactorily proven during the trial the existence of
the factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendant’s
acts. In the instant case, it was established that petitioner spent P35,298.25
for his hospitalization and other medical expenses. While the trial court
correctly imposed interest on said amount, however, the case at bar involves
an obligation arising from a contract and not a loan or forbearance of
money. As such, the proper rate of legal interest is six percent (6%) per
annum of the amount demanded. Such interest shall continue to run from the
filing of the complaint until the finality of this Decision. After this Decision
becomes final and executory, the applicable rate shall be twelve percent
(12%) per annum until its satisfaction.
Same; Same; Same; Damages; Trial courts must guard against the award of
exorbitant damages; they should exercise balanced, restrained and
measured objectivity to avoid suspicion that it was due to passion,
prejudice, or corruption on the part of the trial court.—As regards the
award of moral damages, there is no hard and fast rule in the determination
of what would be a fair amount of moral damages since each case must be
governed by its own peculiar circumstances. The testimony of petitioner
about his physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, and
moral shock resulting from the shooting incident justify the award of moral
damages. However, moral damages are in the category of an award designed
to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a
penalty on the wrongdoer. The award is not meant to enrich the complainant
at the expense of the defendant, but to enable the injured party to obtain
means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to obviate the moral
suffering he has undergone. It is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of
the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and should be proportionate to
the suffering inflicted. Trial courts must then guard against the award of
exorbitant damages; they should exercise balanced, restrained and measured
objectivity to avoid suspicion that it was due to passion, prejudice, or
corruption on the part of the trial court. We deem it just and reason-
744
able under the circumstances to award petitioner moral damages in the

amount of P100,000.00.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Corporation Law; A corporation is invested

by law with a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons
composing it, such that, save for certain exceptions, corporate officers who
entered into contracts in behalf of the corporation cannot be held personally
liable for the liabilities of the latter.—We note that the trial court held
respondent De Jesus solidarily liable with respondent FEU. In Powton
Conglomerate, Inc. v. Agcolicol, 400 SCRA 523 (2003), we held that: [A]
corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from
those of the persons composing it, such that, save for certain exceptions,
corporate officers who entered into contracts in behalf of the corporation
cannot be held personally liable for the liabilities of the latter. Personal
liability of a corporate director, trustee or officer along (although not
necessarily) with the corporation may so validly attach, as a rule, only when
—(1) he assents to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when he is
guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or when there
is a conflict of interest resulting in damages to the corporation, its
stockholders or other persons; (2) he consents to the issuance of watered
down stocks or who, having knowledge thereof, does not forthwith file with
the corporate secretary his written objection thereto; (3) he agrees to hold
himself personally and solidarily liable with the corporation; or (4) he is
made by a specific provision of law personally answerable for his corporate
action. None of the foregoing exceptions was established in the instant case;
hence, respondent De Jesus should not be held solidarily liable with
respondent FEU.
Same; Labor Law; Security Guards; Where the security agency recruits,
hires and assigns the works of its watchmen or security guards to a client,
the employer of such guards or watchmen is such agency, and not the client,
since the latter has no hand in selecting the security guards—the duty to
observe the diligence of a good father of a family cannot be demanded from
the said client.—We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that
respondents cannot be held liable for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code because respondents are not the employers of Rosete. The latter was
employed by Galaxy. The instructions issued by respondents’ Security
Consultant to Galaxy and its security guards are ordinarily no more than re-
745
VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 745
quests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into by a

principal and a security agency. They cannot be construed as the element of
control as to treat respondents as the employers of Rosete. As held in
Mercury Drug Corporation v. Libunao, 434 SCRA 404 (2004): In Soliman,
Jr. v. Tuazon, 209 SCRA 47 (1992), we held that where the security agency
recruits, hires and assigns the works of its watchmen or security guards to a
client, the employer of such guards or watchmen is such agency, and not the
client, since the latter has no hand in selecting the security guards. Thus, the
duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family cannot be
demanded from the said client.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Third-Party Complaints; The third-
party complaint is a procedural device whereby a “third party” who is
neither a party nor privy to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff,
may be brought into the case with leave of court, by the defendant, who acts
as third-party plaintiff to enforce against such third-party defendant a right
for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of the
plaintiff’s claim.—We now come to respondents’ Third Party Claim against
Galaxy. In Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v.
Tempongko, 27 SCRA 418 (1969), we held that: The third-party complaint
is, therefore, a procedural device whereby a ‘third party’ who is neither a
party nor privy to the act or deed complained of by the plaintiff, may be
brought into the case with leave of court, by the defendant, who acts as
third-party plaintiff to enforce against such third-party defendant a right for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of the
plaintiff’s claim. The third-party complaint is actually independent of and
separate and distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint. Were it not for this
provision of the Rules of Court, it would have to be filed independently and
separately from the original complaint by the defendant against the third-
party. But the Rules permit defendant to bring in a third-party defendant or
so to speak, to litigate his separate cause of action in respect of plaintiff’s
claim against a third-party in the original and principal case with the object
of avoiding circuitry of action and unnecessary proliferation of law suits and
of disposing expeditiously in one litigation the entire subject matter arising
from one particular set of facts.
Same; Same; Same; Security Guards; For acts of negligence and for having
supplied an educational institution with an unquali-
746
fied security guard, which resulted in the latter’s breach of obligation to its
student, it is proper to hold the security agency liable to the client for such
damages equivalent to the amounts awarded to the student.—Respondents
and Galaxy were able to litigate their respective claims and defenses in the
course of the trial of petitioner’s complaint. Evidence duly supports the
findings of the trial court that Galaxy is negligent not only in the selection of
its employees but also in their supervision. Indeed, no administrative
sanction was imposed against Rosete despite the shooting incident;
moreover, he was even allowed to go on leave of absence which led
eventually to his disappearance. Galaxy also failed to monitor petitioner’s
condition or extend the necessary assistance, other than the P5,000.00
initially given to petitioner. Galaxy and Imperial failed to make good their
pledge to reimburse petitioner’s medical expenses. For these acts of

negligence and for having supplied respondent FEU with an unqualified
security guard, which resulted to the latter’s breach of obligation to
petitioner, it is proper to hold Galaxy liable to respondent FEU for such
damages equivalent to the above-mentioned amounts awarded to petitioner.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Cacho & Chua Law Offices for petitioner.
Antonio H. Abad & Associates for respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assails the June 29, 2007 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87050, nullifying and setting aside the
November 10, 2004 Decision3 of the Regional
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 3-33.

2 Id., at pp. 38-62; penned by Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo and
concurred in by Associate Justices Arcangelita Romilla-Lontok and Romeo F. Barza.
3 Id., at pp. 67-75; penned by Judge Alejandro G. Bijasa.
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VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 747

Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 98-89483 and

dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner; as well as its August 23,
2007 Resolution4 denying the Motion for Reconsideration.5
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of
respondent Far Eastern University (FEU) when he was shot by
Alejandro Rosete (Rosete), one of the security guards on duty at the
school premises on August 18, 1996. Petitioner was rushed to FEU-
Dr. Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation (FEU-NRMF) due to the
wound he sustained.6 Meanwhile, Rosete was brought to the police
station where he explained that the shooting was accidental. He was
eventually released considering that no formal complaint was filed
against him.
Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint for damages against
respondents on the ground that they breached their obligation to
provide students with a safe and secure environment and an
atmosphere conducive to learning. Respondents, in turn, filed a
Third-Party Complaint7 against Galaxy Development and
Management Corporation (Galaxy), the agency contracted by

respondent FEU to provide security services within its premises and
Mariano D. Imperial (Imperial), Galaxy’s President, to indemnify
them for whatever would be adjudged in favor of petitioner, if any;
and to pay attorney’s fees and cost of the suit. On the other hand,
Galaxy and Imperial filed a Fourth-Party Complaint against AFP
General Insurance.8
On November 10, 2004, the trial court rendered a decision in
favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered

ordering:
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 64-65.

5 Id., at pp. 160-177.
6 Id., at p. 188.
7 Records, Vol. I, pp. 136-139.
8 Id., at pp. 287-290.
748

1. FEU and Edilberto de Jesus, in his capacity as president of

FEU to pay jointly and severally Joseph Saludaga the amount of
P35,298.25 for actual damages with 12% interest per annum from the
filing of the complaint until fully paid; moral damages of
P300,000.00, exemplary damages of P500,000.00, attorney’s fees of
P100,000.00 and cost of the suit;
2. Galaxy Management and Development Corp. and its
president, Col. Mariano Imperial to indemnify jointly and severally
3rd party plaintiffs (FEU and Edilberto de Jesus in his capacity as
President of FEU) for the above-mentioned amounts;
3. And the 4th party complaint is dismissed for lack of cause of
action. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.”9
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered

the assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which provides, viz.:
“WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated

November 10, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint
filed by Joseph Saludaga against appellant Far Eastern University and its
President in Civil Case No. 98-89483 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.”10
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied;

hence, the instant petition based on the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN MANNER

CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN RULING THAT:
5.1. THE SHOOTING INCIDENT IS A FORTUITOUS EVENT;
_______________
9 Rollo, pp. 74-75.

10 Id., at p. 61.
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VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 749

5.2. RESPONDENTS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES FOR

THE INJURY RESULTING FROM A GUNSHOT WOUND SUFFERED
BY THE PETITIONER FROM THE HANDS OF NO LESS THAN THEIR
OWN SECURITY GUARD IN VIOLATION OF THEIR BUILT-IN
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO PETITIONER, BEING THEIR LAW
STUDENT AT THAT TIME, TO PROVIDE HIM WITH A SAFE AND
SECURE EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT;
5.3. SECURITY GUARD, ALEJANDRO ROSETE, WHO SHOT
PETITIONER WHILE HE WAS WALKING ON HIS WAY TO THE LAW
LIBRARY OF RESPONDENT FEU IS NOT THEIR EMPLOYEE BY
VIRTUE OF THE CONTRACT FOR SECURITY SERVICES BETWEEN
GALAXY AND FEU NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT
PETITIONER, NOT BEING A PARTY TO IT, IS NOT BOUND BY THE
SAME UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY OF CONTRACTS;
and
5.4. RESPONDENT EXERCISED DUE DILIGENCE IN
SELECTING GALAXY AS THE AGENCY WHICH WOULD PROVIDE
SECURITY SERVICES WITHIN THE PREMISES OF RESPONDENT
FEU.11
Petitioner is suing respondents for damages based on the alleged

breach of student-school contract for a safe learning environment.
The pertinent portions of petitioner’s Complaint read:
6.0. At the time of plaintiff’s confinement, the defendants or any of

their representative did not bother to visit and inquire about his condition.
This abject indifference on the part of the defendants continued even after
plaintiff was discharged from the hospital when not even a word of
consolation was heard from them. Plaintiff waited for more than one (1)
year for the defendants to perform their moral obligation but the wait was
fruitless. This indifference and total lack of concern of defendants served to
exacerbate plaintiff’s miserable condition.
x x x x
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 13-14.
750

11.0. Defendants are responsible for ensuring the safety of its students
while the latter are within the University premises. And that should anything
untoward happens to any of its students while they are within the
University’s premises shall be the responsibility of the defendants. In this
case, defendants, despite being legally and morally bound, miserably failed
to protect plaintiff from injury and thereafter, to mitigate and compensate
plaintiff for said injury;
12.0. When plaintiff enrolled with defendant FEU, a contract was
entered into between them. Under this contract, defendants are supposed to
ensure that adequate steps are taken to provide an atmosphere conducive to
study and ensure the safety of the plaintiff while inside defendant FEU’s
premises. In the instant case, the latter breached this contract when
defendant allowed harm to befall upon the plaintiff when he was shot at by,
of all people, their security guard who was tasked to maintain peace inside
the campus.”12
In Philippine School of Business Administration v. Court of

Appeals,13 we held that:
“When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is

established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which
both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to
provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to
equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school’s
academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or “built-in”
obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or
assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge.
Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher
mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets
are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the
school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school
must ensure that
_______________
12 Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-6.

13 G.R. No. 84698, February 4, 1992, 205 SCRA 729.
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VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 751
adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus
premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.”14
It is undisputed that petitioner was enrolled as a sophomore law

student in respondent FEU. As such, there was created a contractual
obligation between the two parties. On petitioner’s part, he was
obliged to comply with the rules and regulations of the school. On
the other hand, respondent FEU, as a learning institution is
mandated to impart knowledge and equip its students with the
necessary skills to pursue higher education or a profession. At the
same time, it is obliged to ensure and take adequate steps to
maintain peace and order within the campus.
It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the
existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify,
prima facie, a corresponding right of relief.15 In the instant case, we
find that, when petitioner was shot inside the campus by no less the
security guard who was hired to maintain peace and secure the
premises, there is a prima facie showing that respondents failed to
comply with its obligation to provide a safe and secure environment
to its students.
In order to avoid liability, however, respondents aver that the
shooting incident was a fortuitous event because they could not have
reasonably foreseen nor avoided the accident caused by Rosete as he
was not their employee;16 and that they complied with their
obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for their students by
having exercised due diligence in selecting the security services of
Galaxy.
After a thorough review of the records, we find that respondents
failed to discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due
diligence in providing a safe learning environment for their students.
They failed to prove that they en-
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 733-734.

15 FGU Insurance Corporation v. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation, 435 Phil.
333, 341; 386 SCRA 312, 320 (2002).
16 Records, Vol. 1, pp. 76-86.
752

sured that the guards assigned in the campus met the requirements
stipulated in the Security Service Agreement. Indeed, certain
documents about Galaxy were presented during trial; however, no
evidence as to the qualifications of Rosete as a security guard for the
university was offered.
Respondents also failed to show that they undertook steps to
ascertain and confirm that the security guards assigned to them
actually possess the qualifications required in the Security Service
Agreement. It was not proven that they examined the clearances,
psychiatric test results, 201 files, and other vital documents
enumerated in its contract with Galaxy. Total reliance on the security
agency about these matters or failure to check the papers stating the
qualifications of the guards is negligence on the part of respondents.
A learning institution should not be allowed to completely relinquish
or abdicate security matters in its premises to the security agency it
hired. To do so would result to contracting away its inherent
obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for its students.
Consequently, respondents’ defense of force majeure must fail. In
order for force majeure to be considered, respondents must show
that no negligence or misconduct was committed that may have
occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a
person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse
consequences of such a loss. One’s negligence may have concurred
with an act of God in producing damage and injury to another;
nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the
damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from
liability. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a person’s
participation—whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to
act—the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules
applicable to acts of God.17
_______________
17 Mindex Resources Development v. Morillo, 428 Phil. 934, 944; 379 SCRA 144,
153 (2002).
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Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who are
negligent in the performance of their obligations are liable for
damages. Accordingly, for breach of contract due to negligence in
providing a safe learning environment, respondent FEU is liable to
petitioner for damages. It is essential in the award of damages that
the claimant must have satisfactorily proven during the trial the
existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal

connection to defendant’s acts.18
In the instant case, it was established that petitioner spent
P35,298.25 for his hospitalization and other medical expenses.19
While the trial court correctly imposed interest on said amount,
however, the case at bar involves an obligation arising from a
contract and not a loan or forbearance of money. As such, the proper
rate of legal interest is six percent (6%) per annum of the amount
demanded. Such interest shall continue to run from the filing of the
complaint until the finality of this Decision.20 After this Decision
becomes final and executory, the applicable rate shall be twelve
percent (12%) per annum until its satisfaction.
The other expenses being claimed by petitioner, such as
transportation expenses and those incurred in hiring a personal
assistant while recuperating were however not duly supported by
receipts.21 In the absence thereof, no actual damages may be
awarded. Nonetheless, temperate damages under Art. 2224 of the
Civil Code may be recovered where it has been shown that the
claimant suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot
be proved with certainty. Hence, the amount of P20,000.00 as
temperate damages is awarded to petitioner.
_______________
18 Roque, Jr. v. Torres, G.R. No. 157632, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 336, 348.
19 TSN, September 20, 1999, pp. 20-21; Records, Vol. I, pp. 316-322; Records,
Vol. II, p. 597.
20 Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, July 12,
1994, 234 SCRA 78, 95-97.
21 TSN, September 27, 1999, pp. 5, 9.
754

As regards the award of moral damages, there is no hard and fast

rule in the determination of what would be a fair amount of moral
damages since each case must be governed by its own peculiar
circumstances.22 The testimony of petitioner about his physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, and moral shock
resulting from the shooting incident23 justify the award of moral
damages. However, moral damages are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and
not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. The award is not meant to
enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant, but to enable
the injured party to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will
serve to obviate the moral suffering he has undergone. It is aimed at
the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual

status quo ante, and should be proportionate to the suffering
inflicted. Trial courts must then guard against the award of
exorbitant damages; they should exercise balanced, restrained and
measured objectivity to avoid suspicion that it was due to passion,
prejudice, or corruption on the part of the trial court.24 We deem it
just and reasonable under the circumstances to award petitioner
moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00.
Likewise, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses in the amount of
P50,000.00 as part of damages is reasonable in view of Article 2208
of the Civil Code.25 However, the award of
_______________
22 Roque v. Torres, supra note 18 at p. 349.

23 TSN, September 20, 1999, pp. 10, 12-13; September 27, 1999, pp. 3, 5-9.
24 ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 499, 529-
530; 301 SCRA 572, 602 (1999).
25 Civil Code, Art. 2208:
In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation,
other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:
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VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 755

exemplary damages is deleted considering the absence of proof that

respondents acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner.
We note that the trial court held respondent De Jesus solidarily
liable with respondent FEU. In Powton Conglomerate, Inc. v.
Agcolicol,26 we held that:
“[A] corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct

from those of the persons composing it, such that, save for certain
exceptions, corporate officers who entered into contracts in behalf of the
corporation cannot be held personally liable for the liabilities of the latter.
Personal liability of a corporate director, trustee or officer along (although
not necessarily) with the corporation may so validly attach, as a rule, only
when—(1) he assents to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when
he is guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or when
there is a conflict of interest resulting in damages to the corporation, its
stockholders or other persons; (2) he consents to the issuance of watered
down stocks or who, having knowledge thereof, does not forthwith file with
the corporate secretary his written objection thereto; (3) he agrees to hold
himself personally and solidarily liable with the corporation; or (4) he is
made by a specific provision of law personally answerable for his corporate

action.”27
None of the foregoing exceptions was established in the instant

case; hence, respondent De Jesus should not be held solidarily liable
with respondent FEU.
Incidentally, although the main cause of action in the instant case
is the breach of the school-student contract, petitioner, in the
alternative, also holds respondents vicariously liable under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, which provides:
_______________
(2) when the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
26 448 Phil. 643; 400 SCRA 523 (2003).
27 Id., at p. 656; pp. 531-532.
756

“Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not

only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
x x x x
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
x x x x
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage.”
We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that

respondents cannot be held liable for damages under Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code because respondents are not the employers of Rosete.
The latter was employed by Galaxy. The instructions issued by
respondents’ Security Consultant to Galaxy and its security guards
are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the
contract for services entered into by a principal and a security
agency. They cannot be construed as the element of control as to
treat respondents as the employers of Rosete.28
As held in Mercury Drug Corporation v. Libunao:29
“In Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon,30 we held that where the security agency
recruits, hires and assigns the works of its watchmen or security guards to a
client, the employer of such guards or watchmen is such agency, and not the
client, since the latter has no hand in selecting the security guards. Thus, the
duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family cannot be
demanded from the said client:
… [I]t is settled in our jurisdiction that where the security agency,
as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or
security guards, the agency is the employer of
_______________
28 Records, Vol. I, pp. 43-55 (FEU) and pp. 56-68 (Galaxy).

29 G.R. No. 144458, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 404.
30 G.R. No. 66207, May 18, 1992, 209 SCRA 47.
757
VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 757

such guards or watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts

committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency,
and not to the clients or customers of such agency. As a general rule,
a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting
who among the pool of security guards or watchmen employed by
the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the
ordinary course of events, be demanded from the client whose
premises or property are protected by the security guards.
x x x x
The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the
security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client
responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and liable for
their wrongful acts or omissions.”31
We now come to respondents’ Third Party Claim against Galaxy.

In Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v.
Tempongko,32 we held that:
“The third-party complaint is, therefore, a procedural device whereby a

‘third party’ who is neither a party nor privy to the act or deed complained
of by the plaintiff, may be brought into the case with leave of court, by the
defendant, who acts as third-party plaintiff to enforce against such third-
party defendant a right for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other
relief, in respect of the plaintiff’s claim. The third-party complaint is
actually independent of and separate and distinct from the plaintiff’s
complaint. Were it not for this provision of the Rules of Court, it would have
to be filed independently and separately from the original complaint by the
defendant against the third-party. But the Rules permit defendant to bring in
a third-party defendant or so to speak, to litigate his separate cause of action
in respect of plaintiff’s claim against a third-party in the original and
principal case with the object of avoiding circuitry of action and

unnecessary proliferation of law suits and of
_______________
31 Mercury Drug Corporation v. Libunao, supra at pp. 414-418.

32 137 Phil. 239; 27 SCRA 418 (1969).
758

disposing expeditiously in one litigation the entire subject matter arising

from one particular set of facts.”33
Respondents and Galaxy were able to litigate their respective

claims and defenses in the course of the trial of petitioner’s
complaint. Evidence duly supports the findings of the trial court that
Galaxy is negligent not only in the selection of its employees but
also in their supervision. Indeed, no administrative sanction was
imposed against Rosete despite the shooting incident; moreover, he
was even allowed to go on leave of absence which led eventually to
his disappearance.34 Galaxy also failed to monitor petitioner’s
condition or extend the necessary assistance, other than the
P5,000.00 initially given to petitioner. Galaxy and Imperial failed to
make good their pledge to reimburse petitioner’s medical expenses.
For these acts of negligence and for having supplied respondent
FEU with an unqualified security guard, which resulted to the
latter’s breach of obligation to petitioner, it is proper to hold Galaxy
liable to respondent FEU for such damages equivalent to the above-
mentioned amounts awarded to petitioner.
Unlike respondent De Jesus, we deem Imperial to be solidarily
liable with Galaxy for being grossly negligent in directing the affairs
of the security agency. It was Imperial who assured petitioner that
his medical expenses will be shouldered by Galaxy but said
representations were not fulfilled because they presumed that
petitioner and his family were no longer interested in filing a formal
complaint against them.35
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 29, 2007
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87050
nullifying the Decision of the trial court and dismissing the
complaint as well as the August 23, 2007 Resolution denying the
Motion for Reconsideration are REVERSED and SET
_______________
33 Id., at pp. 243-244; pp. 422-423.

34 Rollo, p. 74.
35 Records, Vol. I, p. 330.
759
VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 759

ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch

2, in Civil Case No. 98-89483 finding respondent FEU liable for
damages for breach of its obligation to provide students with a safe
and secure learning atmosphere, is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
“a. respondent Far Eastern University (FEU) is ORDERED to

pay petitioner actual damages in the amount of P35,298.25, plus 6%
interest per annum from the filing of the complaint until the finality
of this Decision. After this decision becomes final and executory, the
applicable rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum until its
satisfaction;
b. respondent FEU is also ORDERED to pay petitioner
temperate damages in the amount of P20,000.00; moral damages in
the amount of P100,000.00; and attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses in the amount of P50,000.00;
c. the award of exemplary damages is DELETED.”
The Complaint against respondent Edilberto C. De Jesus is

DISMISSED. The counterclaims of respondents are likewise
DISMISSED.
Galaxy Development and Management Corporation (Galaxy) and
its president, Mariano D. Imperial are ORDERED to jointly and
severally pay respondent FEU damages equivalent to the above-
mentioned amounts awarded to petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, Nachura and Reyes, JJ.,

concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.
Notes.—A school principal is tasked to see to the maintenance of

the school grounds and safety of the children within the school and
its premises. (Capili vs. Cardaña, 506 SCRA 569 [2006])
760

The term “chartered institution” includes the state universities

and colleges and the monetary authority of the State. (Gumaru vs.
Quirino State College, 525 SCRA 412 [2007])
——o0o——
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Saludaga vs. Far Eastern University, 553 SCRA 741, G.R. No. 179337 April 30, 2008

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8/18/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 553

Where the accused were charged with separate crimes of

G.R. No. 179337. April 30, 2008. *

JOSEPH SALUDAGA, petitioner, vs. FAR EASTERN

Colleges and Universities; Obligations and Contracts; Where a student

742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Saludaga vs. Far Eastern University

VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 743

Saludaga vs. Far Eastern University

744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Saludaga vs. Far Eastern University

able under the circumstances to award petitioner moral damages in the

Same; Same; Same; Same; Corporation Law; A corporation is invested

VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 745

Saludaga vs. Far Eastern University

quests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into by a

746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Saludaga vs. Far Eastern University

pledge to reimburse petitioner’s medical expenses. For these acts of

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

1 Rollo, pp. 3-33.

VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 747

Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 98-89483 and

Management Corporation (Galaxy), the agency contracted by

“WHEREFORE, from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered

4 Id., at pp. 64-65.

748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

1. FEU and Edilberto de Jesus, in his capacity as president of

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered

“WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied;

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN MANNER

9 Rollo, pp. 74-75.

VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 749

5.2. RESPONDENTS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES FOR

Petitioner is suing respondents for damages based on the alleged

6.0. At the time of plaintiff’s confinement, the defendants or any of

11 Id., at pp. 13-14.

750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In Philippine School of Business Administration v. Court of

“When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is

12 Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-6.

It is undisputed that petitioner was enrolled as a sophomore law

14 Id., at pp. 733-734.

752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 753

existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal

754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

As regards the award of moral damages, there is no hard and fast

the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual

22 Roque v. Torres, supra note 18 at p. 349.

VOL. 553, APRIL 30, 2008 755

exemplary damages is deleted considering the absence of proof that

“[A] corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct

made by a specific provision of law personally answerable for his corporate

None of the foregoing exceptions was established in the instant

756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not

We agree with the findings of the Court of Appeals that