5

Maintaining
Governance Gains:
The National and Regional
Agendas
>> ISSUE BRIEF from the AUTHOR

Richard Joseph
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative,
Global Economy and Development, Brookings Institution
 The Growth-Governance
Puzzle in Africa
Richard Joseph
The disappointing growth performance of sub-Saharan Africa during the first
three decades of independence was called a puzzle.1 In 2016, it is the sustained
economic turnaround that remains puzzling. Although surveys of the statistical
data often paint a glowing picture, certain questions persist. Since Africa
was overly dependent on international aid flows and the export of mineral
commodities for decades, why did that scenario begin shifting? Second, since
the quality of growth remains deficient—in terms of its inclusiveness and ability
to create jobs—are the progress reports misleading?2

Steven Radelet is one of the undeterred optimists about economic progress

Africa today is seen in Africa and other less-developed areas.3 He continues to stress the critical
contribution made by good governance, including democratization, to such
through split screens:
progress. Africa today is seen through split screens: One depicts steady
One depicts steady progress while another shows communities struggling to meet basic needs and
progress while another coping with abysmal infrastructure. The largest countries in the continent—the
shows communities Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, and Sudan—remain in a time-warp
struggling to meet basic of highly predatory and dysfunctional governance. Popular disenchantment,
even in a country often praised for its democracy such as Ghana, is now aired
needs and coping with
in international forums.4 Meanwhile, authoritarian regimes in Ethiopia and
abysmal infrastructure. Rwanda exceed many of their democratic counterparts in growth and socio-
economic progress.

A revisionist argument, proposing “developmental patrimonialism,” also drew

attention. Its advocates claimed that liberal democracy and competitive politics
were perhaps obstacles to transformative growth in Africa. No sooner did its
key contentions come under challenge, however, than it was set aside for
“political settlements theory.”5 There is insufficient space to distill the wheat

1
Todd J. Moss, African Development: Making Sense of the Issues and Actors (2011).
2
John Page, “What Obama didn’t see on his trip to Africa”, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-
focus/posts/2015/07/28-obama-africa-page. Page contends, along with other economists, that many
constraints to industrialization persist in Africa and insufficient well-paying jobs are being generated.
3
The Great Surge: The Ascent of the Developing World (2015). Radelet resumes the arguments put
forward in his Emergent Africa: How 17 Countries Are Leading The Way (2010).
4
For example, at the Woodrow Wilson Center event, “Are Ghanaians Fed-up with Democracy?
Institutional Mistrust and Satisfaction with Democracy,” https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/are-
ghanaians-fed-democracy-institutional-mistrust-and-satisfaction-democracy.
5
R. Joseph, “Inclusive Growth and Developmental Governance: The Next African Frontiers,” in Célestin
Monga and Justin Yifu Lin, The Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics (2015). David Booth, “What
next for political settlements theory and African Development?” paper presented at the African Studies
Association annual meeting, November, 2015.

76
from the chaff of this formulation.6 What is evident is that there is no single
pathway—especially as regards political regimes—for launching growth
and development in contemporary Africa.7 Going from launch to economic
transformation, however, is another story.8

The work of Mushtaq Khan is helpful. While rejecting the developmental

claims associated with the “good governance agenda,” Khan contends that
the transition from a low-growth equilibrium to sustainable growth requires the
emergence of “growth-enhancing governance capacities.”9 What these are is
not clear. Pierre Englebert and Gailyn Portelance take up this question. They
found that theories connecting the turnaround to progress in democracy and
good governance set too high an institutional threshold. Interestingly, they
found, countries identified as “developers” attracted more foreign investment
than the “laggards.” What accounts, they ask, for this disparity given that
general governing capacities in the former seem so little changed? And why is
such investment seen in countries widely dissimilar in their political systems?

Englebert and Portelance suggest that the answer may lie in “signaling”
between African regimes and potential investors, altering risk perceptions.
Such signaling could take the form of “minimal baby-steps” in bureaucracies
and institutions. Several leading Africa scholars responded to their analysis and
hypothesis, some with enthusiasm and others cautiously, but none rejected
them outright.10 The protagonists admitted that further research was needed
about “marginal changes” in economic governance that did not require political
restructuring. Such explorations of the growth-governance puzzle warrant
further attention.11 They should include more consideration of the influence in
Africa of the political economy models of Singapore and China.12

6
For a summary of the variety of notions embraced by “political settlement theory”, see http://www.
governanceanddevelopment.com/2012/09/what-on-earth-is-political-settlement.html
7
Célestin Monga and Justin Yifu Lin, “Solving the Mystery of African Governance,” http://www.
tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13563467.2012.732277.
8
For some of the many hurdles to be surmounted, see R. Joseph, K. Spence, and A. Agboluaje,
“Corporate Social Responsibility and Latecomer Industrialization in Nigeria”, in Charlotte Walker-Said
and John Kelly, Corporate Social Responsibility? Human Rights in the New Global Economy (2015).
9
Khan is a prolific writer. For a summary of, and reflections on, his views, see R. Joseph , “Industrial
Policies and Contemporary Africa: The Transition from Prebendal to Developmental Governance,” in
J.E. Stiglitz et al., The Industrial Policy Revolution II: Africa in the 21st Century (2013). 10 Pierre Englebert
and Gailyn Portelance, “The Growth-Governance Paradox in Africa,” https://africaplus.wordpress.
com/2015/01/06/the-growth-governance-paradox-in-africa/, and Jeffrey Herbst, Tim Kelsall, Goran
Hyden, and Nicolas van de Walle, “Good Growth and Good Governance in Africa: An Experts Forum,”
https://africaplus.wordpress.com/2015/02/18/good-growth-and-good-governance-in-africa-an-experts-
forum/#more-1090.
11
For diverse perspectives, see Akbar Noman, Good Growth and Governance in Africa: Rethinking
Development Strategies (2012).
12
The scale of China’s economic engagement with Africa, especially in trade and infrastructure, together
with its dismissal of the good governance agenda, should be squarely considered in any explanation
of “the great surge.”

77
 FIGURE 5.2. THE QUALITY OF AFRICAN GOVERNANCE IS IMPROVING, BUT SLOWLY

The quality of governance in sub-Saharan Africa varies wildly. Having a large economy such as Nigeria and South Africa
does not necessarily go hand-in-hand with maintaining good governance. For example, low-income countries like
Ghana also perform quite well on the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance. Similarly, when we look at the fastest-
growing economies, we also see a wide variation in governance scores. Balancing growth (especially inclusive growth)
with strong institutions is a key challenge for African governments both in 2016 and beyond.

OVERALL SCORE Sustainable Safety & Participation & Human

economic rule of law human rights development
opportunity
SOME GOOD EXAMPLES

KENYA 58.8 54.9 53.8 63.3 63.0

GHANA 67.3 51.3 70.6 76.1 71.5

BOTSWANA 74.2 66.1 82.7 68.7 79.5

NIGERIA
POWERHOUSES
THE ECONOMIC

44.9 37.0 41.8 48.8 52.0

SOUTH AFRICA 73.0 72.3 68.4 73.9 77.3

MOZAMBIQUE 52.3 45.4 54.0 59.9 49.8

RWANDA 60.7 63.5 62.0 46.3 71.0

THE FASTEST-GROWING ECONOMIES

DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC 33.9 31.4 28.3 32.4 43.4
OF THE CONGO

ETHIOPIA 48.6 46.9 55.1 35.7 56.7

TANZANIA 56.7 49.0 56.9 64.1 56.8

COTE D’IVOIRE 48.3 46.0 47.0 50.3 49.7

100 100 100 100 100

Source: The 2015 Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance. Available online here: http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/iiag/data-portal/.

78
 A provisional synthesis of these analytical strands can be ventured. Governing
regimes seek, above all, perpetuation. To survive, “islands” of bureaucratic
efficiency in the security sector could be replicated in the management of
economic affairs. Two iconic regimes, led by Jerry Rawlings in Ghana and
Yoweri Museveni in Uganda, hewed a path in the late 1980s that has been
seen, in varying degrees, in other African countries. Both regimes recognized
the pay-off from economic liberalization, especially enhanced aid flows. These
were soon bolstered by private capital. In brief, these socialist-leaning regimes
signaled that they were “open for business.” Moreover, instead of regarding
private investment as threatening to their survival, a different lesson was
quickly learned: Political and economic liberalization could be managed to
grow economies, reward affiliates, and fend off or palliate opposition.13

Private sector growth in post-Cold War Africa did require some governance and
institutional changes but seldom the creation of fully open political systems.
Joseph Stiglitz and his collaborators hypothesize that a facilitative state able
to manage resources above the recycling of prebends is a sine qua non for
implementing industrial policies.14 Such a state would nurture institutions
that operate efficiently and predictably and enjoy relative autonomy from
“competitive clientelism.”

No reasonably democratic government in Africa, for example Kenya, has

No reasonably seen a rupture from corrupt and clientelistic modes of resource distribution.
There are many contenders, however, for such a breakthrough, especially
democratic government
among Nigeria’s 36 states.15 Fostering the creation of facilitative states should
in Africa has seen a be on the agenda of every development agency, domestic and external, in
rupture from corrupt Africa in 2016 and beyond.16 Salutary signaling through strategic institutional
and clientelistic reforms can attract nimble investors. However, transformative growth that
modes of resource requires robust capital flows, greatly improved infrastructure, enhanced
labor skills, diversified exports, and the revolutionizing of agriculture, is still
distribution. There
more a theoretical construct than a lived reality in much of the continent. In
are many contenders, 2016, what has been largely a debate in academic circles about the quality of
however, for such a growth must be made accessible to more African citizens through informed
breakthrough. public debates.17

13
In Ghana a further step was made of allowing the opposition to take control of the government without
the Rawlings faction losing its capacity to regain power at the polls. Museveni has never taken this risk.
14
On prebends and prebendalism, see Wale Adebanwi and Ebenezer Obadare, ed., Democracy and
Prebendalism in Nigeria: Critical Interpretations (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) , and R. Joseph, “Industrial
Policies and Contemporary Africa,” in J. Stiglitz et al., op cit.
15
Côte d’Ivoire, which was long a front-runner in developmental governance under semi-authoritarian
auspices, has the opportunity to be a breakthrough nation in a pluralist democracy.
16
On “facilitative state”, see Justin Yifu Lin, The Quest for Prosperity: How Developing Economies Can Take Off (2012).
17
A surprisingly large audience, for example, attended a discussion of these ideas in Accra, Ghana, in March
2014: https://africaplus.wordpress.com/2014/04/03/africas-third-liberation-transitions-to-inclusive-growth-
and-developmental-governance/

79
FIGURE 5.1. REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES MEMBERSHIPS

Africa has many different and overlapping regional organizations, which aim to facilitate trade and eliminate economic bottlenecks.
However, coordination across various RECs sometimes presents challenges due to their differing laws, standards, and regulations.
These economic entities aim to create a continent-wide free trade areas, a goal that requires patient negotiations, complex
compromises, and strong political will.

Regional economic community Regional economic community

AMU Arab Maghreb Union ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States
CEN-SAD Community of Sahel-Saharan States ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
COMESA Common Market for East and Southern Africa IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
EAC East African Community SADC Southern African Development Community

Source: Mo Ibrahim Foundation, Facts and Figures: Regional Integration, Uniting to Compete, 2014.
Note: Though there are several other important regional groups such as WAEMU and SACU, this image only represents the eight “building blocks” of the African
Economic Community.

80
VIEWPOINT

AFRICA’S ROAD IN 2016:

PROGRESS IN GOVERNANCE NEEDS
TO BE SUSTAINED
Mo Ibrahim
Founder and Chair, Mo Ibrahim Foundation

Launched last October, the 2015 Ibrahim Index (Mauritius, Cabo Verde, Botswana, Seychelles, and
of African Governance (IIAG) reveals that Ghana). Meanwhile, half of the 10 largest improvers
overall governance progress in Africa is stalling. during these last four years are countries that already
Even though the Participation & Human Rights rank in the upper rungs of the index. If they manage
and Human Development categories continue to sustain this trend, they may well become the next
to improve, these advances are outweighed leading performers of the continent—Tunisia (8th
by deteriorations in Safety & Rule of Law and in 2015 IIAG), Senegal (9th), Rwanda (11th), Kenya
Sustainable Economic Opportunity. Over the last (14th), and Morocco (16th).
four years, only six countries out of 54 were able
to achieve progress in all four components of the 2015 was a milestone year for Africa. The new
index—Côte d’Ivoire, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, Sustainable Development Goals are meant to
Somalia, and Zimbabwe. If we drill down a little guide the African development agenda for the
further, to the sub-category level, gains achieved next 15 years, and the decisions from COP21
in Participation, Infrastructure, or Health are of will of course contribute to shaping the African
course heartening, and do indeed register the continent’s response to climate change. But
commitment of all stakeholders—Africans and this will not be enough. More crucial will be our
partners alike. However, the drops registered by shared ability to manage what represents the four
National Security, Rural Sector, and, most of all, key challenges of 2016 that are so closely related
Business Environment, are cause for concern. to good governance and strong leadership: the
commodity crisis, for a continent whose economic
We also need to acknowledge that Africa is not growth still remains far too much export-led and
a country. The scores and trends seen in the 54 job-poor; the migration surge, which only reveals
individual countries on the continent are diverse, the worsening demographic divide and imbalance
with now more than a 70-point gap between the between youth’s expectations and prospects both
top-ranking country, Mauritius, and the bottom- at the economic and political levels; the growing
ranking one, Somalia. Moreover, the 2015 IIAG threat of religious and ethnic divides; and the
results also point to a shifting landscape, with ability to integrate a 54-country patchy continent,
diverging results. Over the last four years, half of which for me is the only cross-cutting response
the top 10 performing countries since 2000 have that can sustainably address these interconnected
registered a decline of their governance performance issues.
 %
53.1
36.8%
31.5%

4%
.
36
29

12.7%
19.
.4
%

4%
.1%

%
31

9.5
36
.0%
6.1
% 6%
23.
43.6
%

3.0%

26.5%
e 9.2%
Côte d’Ivoir

8.9%
42.0%

% 14.2
13.8 %

10.
9%
tar
Qa

21
.8% .9
43
12

%
.0
%
9.5
%
0.0

.7%
42
5.6%

19.7
20.5%

%
25.0%
%
.8
63

82
Where in Africa are
the women leaders?
The proportion of women in legislatures in Africa differs wildly, with Rwanda, the
Seychelles, Senegal, and South Africa in the top 10 in the world, and the Comoros
and the economic powerhouse of Nigeria near the very bottom. At the same time,
many countries are beating out developed ones. In fact, 24 African countries rank
ahead of the United States, and 42 rank ahead of Japan. While progress in Africa
has stalled since 2010, 2016 will still see a number of women in African politics.

Global Country % Women Global Country % Women

Ranking Ranking
1 Rwanda 63.8% 83 Togo 17.6%
4 Seychelles 43.8% 87 Morocco 17.0%
6 Senegal 42.7% 88 Malawi 16.7%
8 South Africa  41.9% 91 Libya 16.0%
11 Namibia 41.3% 95 Chad 14.9%
13 Mozambique 39.6% 97 Gabon 14.2%
15 Ethiopia 38.8% 98 Somalia 13.8%
19 Angola 36.8% 99 Guinea-Bissau 13.7%
22 Burundi 36.4% 101 Burkina Faso 13.3%
24 Tanzania 36.0% 101 Niger 13.3%
25 Uganda 35.0% 105 Djibouti 12.7%
29 Algeria 31.6% 105 Zambia 12.7%
30 Zimbabwe 31.5% 107 Sierra Leone 12.4%
32 Tunisia 31.3% 110 Mauritius 11.6%
33 Cameroon 31.1% 113 Liberia 11.0%
36 Sudan 30.5% 114 Ghana 10.9%
46 South Sudan 26.5% 119 Botswana 9.5%
51 Mauritania 25.2% 120 The Gambia 9.4%
52 Lesotho 25.0% 121 Côte d'Ivoire 9.2%
56 Equatorial Guinea 24.0% 122 DRC 8.9%
63 Eritrea 22.0% 123 Mali 8.8%
64 Guinea 21.9% 127 Congo, Rep. 7.4%
67 Cabo Verde 20.8% 128 Benin 7.2%
70 Madagascar 20.5% 130 Swaziland 6.2%
75 Kenya 19.7% 133 Nigeria 5.6%
80 São Tomé & 18.2% 138 Comoros 3.0%
Príncipe

African countries
Non-African countries

Source: This data was compiled by the Inter-Parliamentary Union on the basis of information provided by
National Parliaments by September 1, 2015.
Note: The visual gives a comparison among select African and non-African countries while table shows the
variation among African countries.

83
 COTE D’IVOIRE

CABO
VERDE

NIGER
Runoff
GHANA CHAD

BENIN
Runoff

THE GAMBIA

SAO TOME & PRINCIPE UGANDA

GABON

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
OF THE CONGO (DRC)

ZAMBIA

Presidential

General

Legislative / Parliamentary

84
 Presidential
and legislative
elections in
Africa in 2016
Election Date Country Election Type
January 31, 2016 Central African Republic General (runoff elections)
February Cabo Verde Legislative/Parliamentary
SOMALIA February 18, 2016 Uganda General
February 21, 2016 Comoros Presidential
February 21, 2016 Niger General
February 28, 2016 Benin Presidential
RWANDA March 13, 2016 Benin Presidential (runoff elections)
March 20, 2016 Niger Presidential (runoff elections)
April Chad Presidential
April Djibouti Presidential
April 10, 2016 Comoros Presidential (runoff elections)
July São Tomé & Príncipe Presidential
August Cabo Verde Presidential
August Republic of the Congo Presidential
September Zambia General
COMOROS November Equatorial Guinea Presidential
November 27, 2016 Democratic Republic General
of the Congo
December Côte d’Ivoire Legislative/Parliamentary
December Sudan Legislative/Parliamentary
December The Gambia Presidential
December 7, 2016 Ghana General
TBD Chad Legislative/Parliamentary
TBD Gabon General
TBD Mauritania Legislative/Parliamentary
TBD Rwanda Legislative/Parliamentary
TBD Somalia General

Source: NDI Global Elections Calendar https://www.ndi.org/electionscalendar as of December 11, 2015.

85
VIEWPOINT

THE NILE RIVER: WHICH WAY FORWARD?

John Mukum Mbaku
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Africa Growth Initiative, Global Economy and Development, Brookings Institution

The Nile River is one of the world’s most important equity in the allocation of water resources. While at
watercourses. It provides sustenance to more than least six upstream states have signed the CFA, Egypt
400 million people spread throughout 11 countries. and Sudan have indicated that they would not sign
Of these countries, none is identified as closely with unless it is amended to guarantee both countries the
the river as Egypt: Not only does most of Egypt’s water rights that they acquired through the 1929 and
population live on the relatively narrow strip of 1959 bilateral treaties. If this is done, the basin would
fertile land that straddles both banks of the river and be left with what is essentially an anachronistic,
the Nile delta, the country gets virtually all of its fresh untenable, and non-viable legal regime.
water from this source. Given the importance of the
Nile to all the riparian states, it is critical that they Yet progress is being made: On March 23, 2015,
adopt a viable legal regime that enhances equity in Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan signed an agreement in
the allocation of the river’s waters and allows them to Khartoum to resolve various issues arising from the
coexist peacefully. Blue Nile’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project.
However, the agreement only recognized Ethiopia’s
Over the years, Egypt has exploited the waters of the right to build a dam on the Blue Nile, involved only
Nile River, effectively developing a relatively strong three of the 11 riparian states, and didn’t address the
export sector dominated by cotton and achieving the broader and more contentious issue of sharing the
highest level of economic development among the waters of the Nile equitably and reasonably among
Nile River basin countries. Egypt’s access to the waters all. That problem remains unresolved.
of the Nile has been made possible by two bilateral
treaties—the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the So, what is the way forward and what is likely to
1959 bilateral agreement between Egypt and Sudan. happen in 2016? Building on the momentum from
Both treaties gave Egypt and Sudan rights to virtually the Khartoum agreement, Egypt and Sudan should
all of the river’s waters, granted them veto power over join the upstream states in adopting the current CFA,
dams and other construction projects on the river or since it reflects equity and fairness in the management
its tributaries, and left no allocation for the upstream of the watercourse. While the Egyptians have a right
riparian states. The upstream states, led by Ethiopia, to be concerned about their future access to the
have denounced both treaties and argue that they are waters of the Nile River, they must appreciate the
not bound by them. frustrations of the states, especially Ethiopia, whose
highlands provide more than 80 percent of the water
A new legal regime called the Cooperative that flows into the Nile River. The CFA in its present
Framework Agreement (CFA) has been developed form is reasonable and provides a much stronger
by the riparian states. The CFA is expected to provide foundation than the 1929 and 1959 agreements
a more cooperative and regional approach to the for meeting the water needs of the basin’s relevant
management of the Nile and its resources and create stakeholders in 2016 and beyond.
EVENTS TO WATCH

UGANDAN ELECTIONS:
A CHALLENGE TO MUSEVENI’S 30-YEAR RULE?
FEBRUARY 2016
In February 2016, Ugandans will hold presidential Democratic Alliance (TDA) after having lost the
and parliamentary elections, which will either NRM nomination. Both candidates are expected
draw to a close incumbent President Yoweri to face tough competition from Kizza Besigye,
Museveni’s 30-year rule or reinforce it. President the nominee of Uganda’s largest opposition
Museveni will run as the candidate for the ruling party, the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC).
National Resistance Movement (NRM) party, While Mbabazi and Besigye attempted to build
while his main challenger, former prime minister a coalition to unite behind a single strong
and political ally, Amama Mbabazi, will run challenger to Museveni in late 2015, they have
as an independent under the auspices of The been unable to compromise.

AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION

CHAIRPERSON ELECTION
MID-2016
In mid-2016, elections for the African Union South Africa, and although AU Commission chairs
(AU) Commission’s chairperson will take place are allowed to run for a second term, Chairperson
to determine who will lead the AU’s secretariat— Dlamini-Zuma has made no indication of whether
which performs the executive functions of the she will run again. If she does not, convention
organization—for the next four years. The current dictates that the chairpersonship will shift from an
chairperson is Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma from anglophone to a francophone representative.

DRC ELECTIONS: CONCERNS OF THIRD-TERMISM?

NOVEMBER 2016
The electoral landscape in the Democratic Republic who is mandated to leave office at the end of his
of the Congo faces considerable uncertainty in second term in December 2016, but according
2016, as both parliamentary and presidential to the constitution, can remain in power until a
elections are meant to be held by November 2016, new president is elected. Two top officials of the
but disagreements over the voter list, timetable, Independent National Electoral Commission
and security issues threaten to derail the proposed resigned in late 2015, raising concerns that President
timeline. Some observers consider these “setbacks” Kabila may attempt to extend his term or amend the
to be a stalling tactic of President Joseph Kabila, constitution to allow him to run for a third term.