DMart An Ace in Indian Retail Space

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DMart an ace in India’s retail space

Ankur Mittal, Anshul Jain and Tarun Dhingra

Introduction Ankur Mittal is based at the


Department of General
On February 17, 2020, in Thane (West), Mumbai, the financial capital of India, Mr Management, University of
Radhakishan Damani, owner and promoter of DMart, was heading for a meeting with his Petroleum and Energy
senior management team to discuss plans for the analyst and investor meeting scheduled Studies, Dehradun, India.
for the next day. Damani was going to address the meet and had planned to talk about the Anshul Jain is based at the
growth opportunities for the firm and the firm’s fundraising plans. Analysts would need to be Department of Accounting
convinced of the growth plans and the valuation at which the firm expected to raise funds. and Finance Area,
Management Development
The company had several growth options on the table. It could have attempted to increase Institute, Gurgaon, India.
business from the existing customers by offering new product assortments in terms of the Tarun Dhingra is based at
most popular or best-selling stock-keeping units (SKUs). It could also have expanded the Department of General
geographically by opening new stores within India and increase growth by entering states Management, University of
with higher retail spending. Petroleum and Energy
Studies, Dehradun, India.
Damani was wondering whether the company’s business model was adequately robust to
allow for scaling and expansion while retaining its competitive advantage. He had to
convince analysts about the company’s growth path and valuation.

Indian retail sector


Globally, India was the fifth-largest global destination in the retail space after the US, China
and Japan, Australia [1]. India was likely to become the third-largest consumer economy by
2025 according to a report published by Boston Consulting Group [2]. The Indian retail
sector emerged as one of the most dynamic and rapidly growing sectors because of the
entry of several new players in recent times, along with rising income levels, growing
aspirations, favorable demographics and easy availability of credit.
Organized retail was expected to grow at 25% Year on Year (YoY) by 2026 and the Indian
retail sector was expected to be valued at $1tn in FY2019–2020 [3]. A report by Federation
of Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry-Deloitte stated that the Indian retail sector was
projected to grow to around $1.75tn by 2026. At the time of writing this case, the Indian
organized retail market was nascent. Organized retail (9%) and online retail (4%)
constituted approximately 13% of the total retail sector and the unorganized retail market
represented the remaining 87% (Exhibit 1). Prominent chains in the organized retail space
were Big Bazaar (Future Retail), Spencer’s, V-Mart and DMart (Corporate name: Avenue
Supermarkets). They constituted approximately 9% of the total retail market in India.
Although food and grocery accounted for the largest share of organized retail revenue in Disclaimer. This case is written
India, these revenues accounted for only 3% of the overall retail food market. The organized solely for educational purposes
and is not intended to represent
retail market in India was growing at a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 20%– successful or unsuccessful
25% per year, a strong indicator of its future growth potential. managerial decision-making.
The authors may have
disguised names; financial and
A few retail giants have been listed below, and their financial performance data have been other recognizable information
shared in Exhibit 2. to protect confidentiality.

DOI 10.1108/EEMCS-09-2020-0324 VOL. 11 NO. 1 , pp. 1-20, © Emerald Publishing Limited, ISSN 2045-0621 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j PAGE 1
Future Retail Limited (Big Bazaar) was an India-based company that was engaged in the
business of retailing a range of household and consumer products through department
stores of various formats. The company was primarily engaged in multi-brand retail. The
company operated approximately 20 compact hypermarkets and more than 210
supermarket “easy day” stores. Its retail formats primarily consisted of value business and
home business. In its value business, the company formats included the Big Bazaar
hypermarkets, Food Bazaar supermarkets, fbb fashion outlets, Food hall supermarkets and
Easy Day convenience stores. In its home business, the company operated Hometown, a
one-shop destination for home improvement and eZone, a consumer durable and
electronics chain.
Spencer’s Retail, which was originally established by Mr. John William Spencer, was a part
of the Indian retail landscape since 1863. It was acquired by the Indian RPG Group in 1989.
Since its inception, Spencer’s has been a consumer-centric brand, constantly innovating,
pioneering formats and evolving over time, while always prioritizing consumer needs and
satisfaction. It started as a grocery chain in 1920 and became the first supermarket chain in
1980. The company transformed into a hypermarket chain in 2001. Spencer’s operated
more than 200 stores across 35 cities in India as of 2020.
V-Mart Retail Limited retailed readymade garments and accessories. The company was
engaged in value retailing through its chain of stores across India. It offered products
across three verticals, namely, apparel, general merchandise (non-apparel and home mart)
and kirana (grocery) bazaar. It offered a range of apparel and accessories for men, women,
boys, girls and toddlers. Its general merchandise included footwear, home furnishing,
kitchenware, toys and games, bags and luggage and crockery. Its kirana bazaar included
fast moving consumer goods (FMCG) products, packaged food items, beauty and personal
care, home care and staple products. It operated more than 120 stores across
approximately 110 cities in more than 10 states and union territories.
Reliance Retail serving the food and grocery category Reliance Retail operates Reliance
Fresh, Reliance Smart and Reliance Market stores. Reliance Retail’s commitment to
“bettering the lives” has been embodied in its pursuit to make a difference on social socio-
economic issues in India. The initiative has brought millions of farmers and small producers
to the forefront of the retail revolution by collaborating with them for growth. Reliance Retail
has adopted a multi-prong strategy and operates a chain of neighborhood stores,
supermarkets, wholesale cash and carry stores, specialty stores and online stores and has
democratized access to a variety of products and services across diverse segments for
Indian consumers. Reliance Retail Ventures Limited, a subsidiary of Reliance Industries
Limited is the holding company of Reliance Retail Limited, which operates the retail
business. Reliance Retail reported a turnover of `130,566 crore for the financial year
2018–2019. Reliance Retail operates 10,901 stores across 6,700+ cities with a retail area of
over 24.5 million sqft.
DMart was established by Radhakishan Damani in 2002. It competes against established
players, such as Future Retail Ltd., V-Mart Retail Ltd., Trent Ltd., Shoppers Stop Ltd. and
Aditya Birla Fashion and Retail Ltd., in the listed retail space. DMart operates more than 200
stores across 12 states in India.

Establishing DMart
The journey started when Mr. Damani decided to test the waters by taking up a 5,000 sq ft
“Apna Bazar” franchise in Nerul in 1999. Damani was inspired by Sam Walton and the
Walmart superstores. He visited the US in 2001 to learn about Walmart’s operations. Upon
returning to India, Mr. Damani established Avenue Supermarts Co. in 2002. This company
started opening stores under the DMart brand. DMart started its journey with two stores in
the state of Maharashtra in 2002 and reached around 200 stores across 12 states in India

PAGE 2 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j VOL. 11 NO. 1


by FY20 [4]. DMart’s product portfolio comprising foods (51% share), non-food FMCG (21%
share) and general merchandise and apparel (28% share, includes apparel, plastic goods,
home furnishings and toys). The presence was skewed toward West India, with the states of
Maharashtra and Gujarat accounting for approximately 77% of DMart sales. DMart
operated largely on a land ownership model, which involved buying facilities or entering into
long-term leases (30 years+) as opposed to a rental model. The trailing 12 months revenue
from these 189 stores stood at `200bn in FY 2019 (Exhibit 3).
DMart was a privately held company until 2016. In March 2017, the company raised
`18.7bn through an initial public offering. The company was listed at a price of `604.4,
102% higher than the issue price of `299 [5]. On February 13, 2020, the company’s stock
price stood at `2,544, which was the lifetime high for the stock. The shares of the company
returned a compounded growth of almost 60% over three years or four times returns, to its
investors.
DMart was the most profitable grocery retailer in India, offering low prices to customers
through its 196 stores (7 million sq. ft. of retail space). Its relentless focus on providing the
lowest market prices has helped the company to achieve industry-leading sales per square
feet (2–4 x peers) with an approximately 25% return on the capital used.

DMart’s operating philosophy


The company operated self-owned stores, which allowed it to be a low- or no-debt
company, thus making it financially stronger. Further, the lack of rental cost helped it to
achieve high positive cash flows, which were used to open more stores. Despite the slow
expansion and growth of self-owned stores, the model offered its own advantages. Of all
the existing DMart stores to date, almost 80% were self-owned. The company’s rental costs
were only 0.4% of total sales compared to 7.3% for Kishore Biyani’s Future Retail [6]
(Exhibit 4).
DMart followed a cluster-based expansion approach (Exhibit 5). The company focused on
deepening its penetration in the areas in which it was already present before expanding to
newer regions. It continued to focus on its strategy of offering value retail to its customers by
using the everyday low cost/everyday low price (EDLC/EDLP) principle. EDLC/EDLP was a
pricing strategy used by DMart to offer consumers consistently low prices on products
without having to wait for sale events. DMart set a low price and maintained it over a long
time horizon, given that product costs remained unchanged. The time-tested practice of
EDLP differentiated DMart’s business model from that of its competitors, thereby creating a
moat for the company. DMart procured at the lowest possible price from its suppliers by
ensuring that it fulfilled its payables in a short time (8–10 days) and squeezed discounts
from suppliers for these better payment terms. Exhibit 6 compares the payables across the
industry.
Further, because of high volume procurement by DMart, manufacturers extended a volume
discount to it, which further reduced the procurement cost, thus sustaining and bolstering
the company’s low-cost business model. In addition, DMart also charged slotting fees from
manufacturers, which pit different brands against each other to claim the best placement
slot in the store. This further added to DMart’s revenues. The company stocked only the
fastest-selling SKUs of a given product to ensure that inventory churn was fast and the
company was not saddled with stocks of slow-moving SKUs. This accelerated inventory
churning, resulting in a better cash conversion cycle. This was reflected in the inventory
turnover numbers of the industry in Exhibit 7.
DMart operated on a low-interior-cost concept. The store interiors were sparsely decorated
and required low maintenance. DMart used storage space efficiently, placing more
products per square foot of space, thereby creating space for more merchandise. The
numbers of billing counters and staff were optimized for each store. This ensured the

VOL. 11 NO. 1 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j PAGE 3


deployment of a small staff that was highly productive, along with an optimal number of
machines, thereby reducing employee cost. These techniques allowed DMart to control its
operating expenses per store.
D-mart stores are operational in high traffic areas and across three formats including –
Hypermarkets, that are spread across 30,000–35,000 sqft, Express format, that is spread
over 7,000–10,000 sqft and the Super Centers, that are set up at over 1 lakh sqft [7].
India is a diverse country with various region-specific goods. DMart accepted this reality
and stocked its stores with area-specific products, along with national brands. DMart
pooled popular local brands in its stores, making it more convenient for the buyers to avoid
going to multiple local kirana shops. This helped the company to reduce competition from
local kirana stores, thus allowing it to gain market share.
Further, the company is also operating on the online platform, which is DMart Ready, which
is the name of DMart online service. Through this service, DMart opened several ready pick
up points at specific locations from where one can collect the orders online. One can collect
the order at any time during the time slot – free of charge! All favorite products can be
purchased online from the app or website, and customers can enjoy Dmart’s daily
discounts and savings [8].
DMart’s average sales/square feet of `35,647 (Exhibit 8) in FY 2019 were superior to those
of its domestic counterparts, such as Big Bazaar (`14,514) and Reliance Retail (grocery
sales of `25,751) [9]. Despite the heavy discounts offered, its margins were higher than
those of global players. The company’s earnings before interest tax depreciation and
amortization margin of 9% was higher than those of international retailers such as Walmart
(5.6%) and Tesco (2.3%). It was also higher than those of domestic competitors, such as
Spencer’s (0.08%) and Future Retail (4.5%) [10].
An equally important factor was that the brand was able to build on the trust it built with its
customers to increase sales. The company reported same-store-sales growth (SSSG) of
14.2% in FY18 compared to 13.4% for Future Retail’s Big Bazaar and 8.1% for Trent’s Star
Bazaar. Because of its high SSSG, DMart was able to offer groceries at prices that were
6%–12% lower than those of the competition. In FY19, the SSSG of DMart increased by
17.8% [11]. The company gross margin return on inventories (GMROI), which measures the
ability of the retailer to hit a target margin and a target turnover number. A good GMROI
(gross margin/inventory) of higher than 1 is advisable, which is increasing for DMart’s from
FY2016 (0.89) to FY 2019 (1.03), which means the firm is selling the merchandise for more
than what it costs the firm to acquire it and shows that the business has a good balance
between its sales, margin and cost of inventory.

Brief financials of DMart


The CAGR of DMart’s revenues was more than 30% in the years 2015–2019. Its share
traded at `2,492 in February 2020, which represented a 125x multiple of earnings. Other
supermarkets’ and retail chains’ shares traded at 25–50x multiples [12]. As of the
preparation of this report, the promoters of DMart held 80.21% of the outstanding stock.
According to Securities and Exchange Board of India (stock market regulator in India)
norms, the promoters were required to shed 5.21% of the holding and bring their ownership
down to 75% by the end of FY 2020. The government-borrowing rate was 6% and the
expected market risk premium was 7%. The company’s depreciation depletion and
amortization were 1.1% of revenue. For expansion, DMart used almost 4% of revenues for
capital expenditure and 4.1% of incremental revenues for its net working capital
requirements. The promoters were looking to trim their stake by around 2.48% by selling 20
million shares through the qualified institutional placement (QIP), which was expected to
fetch around `40bn and by 2.73% through the offer for sale route to take the total number of
public outstanding equity shares to 64.7 million.

PAGE 4 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j VOL. 11 NO. 1


Growth strategy of DMart
DMart explicitly stated that it was shifting its growth strategy to aggressive store expansion.
It opened 75% of its new stores in existing markets. Moving from a historical growth rate of
10 stores-per-year, DMart aimed to reach a growth rate of 28–30 stores-per-year [13]. The
company was also open to changing its own-and-operate model to a lease-and-operate
model if doing so would permit further growth in store count.
DMart launched “Avenue E-Commerce Ltd.,” an online shopping portal, to keep up with the
competition and the industry. However, competing in this space presented unique
challenges and new competitors such as Amazon. The reduction of corporate tax rates in
India in 2019 from an average of 33% in the previous year to 22% [14] was expected to
enhance DMart’s valuation. Damani wondered whether DMart will be able to keep up with
the changing market scenario and continue to exhibit a high growth rate as it has in the past
(Exhibit 9).
Keywords:
Strategic management/
The way forward planning,
Financial analysis/
Damani realized that he must offload 2.48% of his stake in his company through QIP. He
forecasting,
wondered how he will convince the new investors that his selected growth strategy justifies Asset management/
the valuation he was seeking. valuation

Notes
1. Retail Industry in India, June 2020 report by India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF) accessed on
September 30, 2020 from http://https://www.ibef.org/industry/retail-india.aspx
2. Report released by The Boston Consulting Group’s (BCG) Center for Customer Insight (CCI) on
March 21, 2017, accessed on December 21, 2019, from https://www.bcg.com/en-gr/press/
21march2017-new-indian-changing-consumer
3. Retail Industry in India, June 2020 report by IBEF accessed on June 30, 2020 from https://www.
ibef.org/industry/retail-india.aspx
4. Corporate Presentation Jan 2020 (PDF) January 16, 2020, accessed on 25 March 2020 from www.
bseindia.com/xml-data/corpfiling/AttachHis/f375e49d-d167-4ea7-94e7-0108f2ec15b0.pdf
5. Bumper Listing, accessed on February 28, 2020 from https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/
business/ipo/bumper-listing-d-mart-operator-avenue-supermarts-shares-debut-at-rs-610-up-104-
2243761.html
6. Retail sector: Avenue Supermarts emerges as top performer, by Jharna Mazumdar, Mumbai,
accessed on February 28, 2020 from https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/retail-sector-
avenue-supermarts-emerges-as-top-performer/1202380/
7. The Rise and Rise of D-Mart – Building Supermarts the Right way accessed on 25June 2020 from
https://www.nextbigbrand.in/the-rise-and-rise-of-d-mart-building-supermarts-the-right-way/
8. DMart Ready accessed on 27 November 2020 from https://www.dmart.in/service/faqs#::text=
DMart%20Ready%20is%20the%20name,bring%20DMart%20closer%20to%20you
9. FE Bureau 2019, accessed on February 28, 2020 from https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/
spencers-retail-lists-at-rs-224-apiece-on-bse/1455324/
10. India Equity ResearchjRetail by Edelweiss page 5, accessed on February 28, 2020 from https://
bsmedia.business-standard.com/_media/bs/data/market-reports/equity-brokertips/2019-04/15553
911950.08757000.pdf
11. Motilal Oswal Thematic retail, 2019, accessed on February 28, 2020 from https://www.
motilaloswalgroup.com/AnalystVideo/Pdf/1783091767RETAIL_THEMATIC-20190409-MOSL-SU-PG
244.pdf
12. Nishanth Vasudevan, ET Bureau, A-grader DMart moved to “T” segment to cool down punters.
13. D-Mart will Continue to add Stores as Rivals Catch Up, by Agam Vakil for BloombergQuint,
accessed on February 28, 2020 from www.bloombergquint.com/business/d-mart-will-continue-to-
undercut-rivals-even-as-it-loses-edge

VOL. 11 NO. 1 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j PAGE 5


14. Corporate Tax Cut helps D-Mart Q3 Profit Jump 53%; Adds 20 Stores in FY20 so Far, FE
Online, January 12, 2020 7:58 PM, accessed on February 28, 2020 from www.financialexpress.
com/industry/corporate-tax-cut-helps-d-mart-q3-profit-jump-53-adds-20-stores-in-fy20-so-far/1820661/
15. Exchange rate $1 = `72 as on Feb 27, 2020.
16. Exchange rate $1 = `72 as on Feb 27, 2020.

PAGE 6 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j VOL. 11 NO. 1


Exhibit 1. Market share of organized retail in Indian retail sector from 20192030

Figure E1

Indian Retail Sector Share

10% Year Organized Retail Share

2019 10%
3%
2021 18% (Projected)
87%
2026 25% (Projected)

2030 40% (Projected)

Organised Retail Online Retail Un-Orgainsed Retail

Source: Prepared by Author from “Retail industry in India”


report by India Brand Equity Foundation

Exhibit 2. Comparative financial performance of retail giants as of March 2019

Table E1
Sales Operating Net profit Net profit Earning Debt to Market
Company (` million) profit margin (%) `million margin (%) per share RONW (%) ROCE (%) equity cap/sales

DMart 200,045.2 8.4 9,363.5 4.70 15 16.73 24.83 0.08 4.55


Spencer retail 12,885 7.18 125 4.33 7.66 18.72 8.26 0.41 1.28
Future retail 201,649 4.64 7,328.1 3.63 14.58 19.02 14.93 0.66 1.01
V-Mart retail 14,337 7.34 616.3 4.30 34.01 15.19 27.17 0 2.34
Source: Compiled by Author from company reports

VOL. 11 NO. 1 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j PAGE 7


Exhibit 3. DMart Income statement (Rs. Millions)

Table E2
Particulars MAR’19 MAR’18 MAR’17 MAR’16

Net sales/income from operations 200,045.20 150,332 118,977 85,837.6


Other income 483.5 878 285.6 179.4
Total income 200,529 151,210 119,263 86,017
Total expenditure 183,712.3 136,803.9 109,293.7 79,202.2
Operating profit 16,816.4 14,406.1 9,968.9 6,814.8
Interest - - - -
Gross profit/EBITDA 16,344.381 13,810.7 8,749 5,901.4
Depreciation 2,124.9 1,590 1,278.2 984.3
PBT 14,219.481 12,220.7 7,470.8 4,917.1
Tax 5,014.6 4,212.6 2,576.6 1,714.7
Net profit/(loss) 9,204.881 8,008.1 4,894.2 3,202.4
Minority interest after NP 0.8 0.2 0 0
Net profit after minority interest 9,205.681 8,007.9 4,894.2 3,202.4
Exceptional items 0 0 0 0
Profit after exceptional items 9,205.681 8,007.9 4,894.2 3,202.4
Equity share capital 6,240.8 6,240.8 6,240.8 5,615.4
Source: Prepared by Authors from company reports

Exhibit 4. DMart balance sheet (Rs. millions)

Table E3
Particulars Mar’19 Mar’18 Mar’17 Mar’16

Liabilities
Share capital 6,240.8 6,240.8 6,240.8 5,615.4
Reserves and surplus 49,704 40,186.3 32,129.8 9,503.2
Net worth 55,944.8 46,427.1 38,370.6 15,118.6
Secured loan 1,783.7 2,532.5 11,035.8 10,219.6
Unsecured loan 2,464.5 0 0 0
Total liabilities 60,193 48,959.6 49,406.4 25,338.2
Assets
Gross block 47,960.5 36,267.6 27,681.2 21,607.9
(-) Acc. depreciation 5,618.2 3,705.7 2,192.2 953.5
Net block 42,342.3 32,561.8 25,489 20,654.4
Capital work in progress 3,765.5 1,470.5 1,528.9 953.4
Investments 2,120 1,812 366.2 160
Inventories 15,762.2 11,470.4 9,331.6 6,602
Sundry debtors 7,55.2 333.6 210 83.8
Cash and bank 2,135.5 5,564.6 18,813.1 325.9
Loans and advances 3,095 2,911.8 2,282.7 2,035.9
Total current assets 21,747.9 20,280.3 30,637.4 9,047.6
Current liabilities 9,656 7,046.5 8,533.4 5,423.3
Provisions 126.7 118.5 81.6 53.8
Total current liabilities 9,782.7 7,165 8,615 5,477.1
Net current assets 11,965.2 13,115.3 22,022.3 3,570.5
Misc. expenses 0 0 0 0
Total assets (A + B + C + D + E) 60,193 48,959.7 49,406.5 25,338.2
Source: Prepared by Authors from company reports

PAGE 8 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j VOL. 11 NO. 1


Exhibit 5. Retail Industry rental cost as % of sales for FY 2019

Figure E2

16.00% 13.70%
12%
14.00%

12.00%

10.00% 7.30%

8.00% 4.70% 5.10%


6.00%

4.00%
0.40%
2.00%

0.00%
Dmart Vmart Spencer Future Retail Trent Aditya Birla
Retail Fashion

Source: Prepared by Author from company reports

Exhibit 6. DMart cluster-based store addition over the years

Table E4
State/UT FY 2003 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019

Maharashtra 1 34 40 46 50 58 60 62 70
Gujrat – 14 14 17 22 26 29 30 34
Telangana – 4 5 7 9 13 14 19 21
Karnataka – 3 3 5 5 6 11 12 16
Andhra Pradesh – – – – 1 3 6 10 11
Madhya Pradesh – – – – 2 4 5 9 9
NCR – – – – – – 1 1 1
Daman – – – – – – 1 1 1
Rajasthan – – – – – – 3 5 5
Tamil Nadu – – – – – – 1 3 4
Punjab – – – – – – – 3 4
Source: Prepared by Authors from Company Annual Reports, Investor Presentations, Red Herring Prospectus

VOL. 11 NO. 1 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j PAGE 9


Exhibit 7. Payable days and inventory days in organized retail industry in India
(FY19 data)

Figure E3

140 127
120

100
81 84 81
80
62
60 54 53
46
40 39
40 29

20 8
0
Dmart Trent Vmart Spencer Retail Future Retail Aditya
Fashion Retail

Payable Days Invesntory Days

Source: Prepared by Author from company reports

Exhibit 8. Indian organized retail industry inventory turnover ratio (FY 201519
average)

Figure E4

Inventory Turnover Rao


16 14.8
14
12 10.8
10
8
6
3.98
4
2
0
DMart Future Retail Walmart

Source: Prepared by Author from company reports

PAGE 10 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j VOL. 11 NO. 1


Exhibit 9. DMart revenue per unit retail business area

Figure E5

50 47 16
44
45 42 14.1 14
39
40 37 12.7
36 35 12
35 33 11.3
31
28 9.9 10
30
26
23 8.5
25 8
7.1
20
5.9 6
15 4.9
4.1 4
10 3.3
2.7
2.1 2
5

0 0

Revenue per Sq.Ft.(Rs.'000) Area(Mn.Sq. Ft.)

Source: Prepared by Author from company reports

Exhibit 10. Historical performance of DMart

Table E5
DMart past performance ratio’s
Years One year Three years Five years

Revenue growth 33.07% 32.58% 33.68%


Profit after tax 12.80% 41.01% 40.91%
Return on equity 17.45% 17.92% 18.56%
Market return 13%
Beta 0.6626
Perpetual growth rate for DMart 7%
Source: Compiled by Authors from Company Annual Reports

Corresponding author
Ankur Mittal can be contacted at: [email protected]

VOL. 11 NO. 1 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIES j PAGE 11

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