SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 94736. June 26, 1998.]

MELECIO MACASIRAY, VIRGILIO GONZALES, and BENEDICTO

GONZALES, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and ROSALINA RIVERA VDA. DE
VILLANUEVA, respondents.

Crispulo S. Esguerra for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioners were charged with murder for the death of private

respondent's husband. In the course of the trial, the prosecution introduced in
evidence the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant Gonzales and the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation
wherein he affirmed the contents of his confession. The defense objected
thereto on the ground of inadmissibility for having been executed without
assistance of counsel. The trial court sustained the objection of the defense
which, nonetheless, presented appellant Gonzales for the sole purpose of
denying the contents of the confession and the transcript of stenographic
notes. It did not mark the confession as one of its exhibits. Aggrieved by the
ruling of the trial court, the prosecution elevated the issue to the Court of
Appeals which reversed the trial court. It ruled that failure of the defense to
move for the exclusion of the documents constitutes a waiver of their objection.
Hence, this recourse.
There is no waiver to admissibility of the documents where objections
were made during the stage of formal offer; that objection to the document
during their identification and marking is not equivalent to objection during
their formal offer; and that there is no need to impeach appellant where his
extrajudicial confession and the transcript of stenographic notes wherein he
admitted liability had been excluded in evidence. cIHCST

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; CONFESSION OBTAINED

WITHOUT ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, INADMISSIBLE. — There is no dispute that
the extrajudicial confession and the statements recorded in the transcript in
question were taken without the assistance of counsel. Petitioner Benedicto
Gonzales was informed of his constitutional rights in a very perfunctory
manner. No effort was made to drive home to him the seriousness of the
situation he was facing. He waived the assistance of counsel, but did so without
counsel's advice and assistance. Both his confession and his statement before
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 the fiscal were thus inadmissible under Art. IV, §20 of the 1973 Constitution.

2. ID.; ID.; OBJECTIONS THERETO MUST BE MADE AFTER FORMAL

OFFER. — Objection to evidence must be made after the evidence is formally
offered. In the case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the
witnesses of the party making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose
for which the evidence is being offered. It is only at this time, and not at any
other, that objection to the documentary evidence may be made. But the ruling
in that case does not detract from the fact that objections should be made at
the stage of formal offer. Objections to the admissibility of documents may be
raised during trial and the court may rule on them then, but, if this is not done,
the party should make the objections when the documentary evidence is
formally offered at the conclusion of the presentation of evidence for the other
party. The defense did not really have to ask Gonzales questions regarding his
confession inasmuch as the court had already declared both the confession and
the transcript of stenographic notes to be inadmissible in evidence, but
certainly the defense should not be penalized for exercising an abundance of
caution. In fact, the defense did not mark the confession as one of its exhibits,
which is proof of the fact that it did not adopt it as evidence. There is,
therefore, no basis for the appellate court's ruling that because the defense
adopted the confession by introducing it in evidence, the defense waived any
objection to the admission of the same in evidence.

3. ID.; ID.; OBJECTIONS MAY BE MADE DURING TRIAL. — It may be

mentioned in this connection that in one case, objection to the admissibility of
a confession on the ground that no meaningful warning of his constitutional
rights was given to the accused was raised as soon as the prosecution began
introducing the confession, and the trial judge sustained the objection and right
away excluded the confession. This Court, through Chief Justice Fernando,
upheld the action of the trial court over the dissent of Justice Aquino, who
argued that the trial court's ruling was premature, considering that the
confession was merely being identified. It was not yet being formally offered in
evidence. On the other hand, Justice Barredo, concurring, while agreeing that
objection to documentary evidence should be made at the time of formal offer,
nonetheless thought that to faithfully carry out the constitutional mandate,
objections based on the Miranda right to counsel at the stage of police
interrogation should be raised as early as possible and the ruling on such
objections made just as soon in order not to create prejudice in the judge, in
the event the confession is found inadmissible.

4. ID.; ID.; IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT BEFORE IT IS MARKED

DOES NOT CONSTITUTE FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE. — It has been held that
the identification of the document before it is marked as an exhibit does not
constitute the formal offer of the document as evidence for the party
presenting it. Objection to the identification and marking of the document is not
equivalent to objection to the document when it is formally offered in evidence.
What really matters is the objection to the document at the time it is formally
offered as an exhibit.
5. ID.; ID.; EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION; NEED NOT BE IMPEACHED
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 WHERE THE CONFESSION HAD BEEN EXCLUDED. — Private respondent justifies
the use of the confession and TSN on the ground that they are necessary for
the purpose of impeaching the credibility of Benedicto Gonzales and not for the
purpose of presenting them as evidence in chief. But as already stated, there
was really no need for Gonzales to deny the contents both of the confession
and the TSN since they had already been excluded in evidence. There was
therefore no use for impeaching his credibility.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J : p

Petitioners seek a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.

G.R. SP No. 16106, 1 reversing the ruling of the Regional Trial Court and
ordering the admission in evidence of petitioner Benedicto Gonzales'
extrajudicial confession and the transcript of the proceedings of the preliminary
investigation of the case, during which Benedicto allegedly made statements
affirming the contents of his extrajudicial confession.
cdasia

The facts are as follows:

Petitioners Melecio Macasiray, Virgilio Gonzales, and Benedicto Gonzales
are the accused in Criminal Case No. 33(86) of the Regional Trial Court of San
Jose City, presided over by Judge Pedro C. Ladignon. The case is for the murder
of Johnny Villanueva, husband of private respondent Rosalina Rivera Villanueva,
on February 9, 1986.
It appears that in the course of the trial of the case, the prosecution
introduced in evidence, as Exhibit B, an extrajudicial confession executed by
petitioner Benedicto Gonzales on March 27, 1986, in which he admitted
participation in the crime and implicated petitioners Melecio Macasiray and
Virgilio Gonzales, his co-accused. Also presented in evidence, as Exhibit D, was
the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation
of the case on April 8, 1986 before the fiscal's office. This transcript contained
statements allegedly given by Benedicto in answer to questions of the fiscal, in
which he affirmed the contents of his extrajudicial confession.

When the extrajudicial confession was offered at the conclusion of the

presentation of evidence for the prosecution, petitioners objected to its
admissibility on the ground that it was given without the assistance of counsel.
The transcript of the preliminary investigation proceeding was similarly
objected to on the same ground. In its order dated April 14, 1988, the trial court
sustained the objections and declared the two documents to be inadmissible.
It appears that when it was the turn of the defense to present evidence,
Gonzales was asked about his extrajudicial confession (Exh. B). On cross-
examination, he was questioned not only about his extrajudicial confession but
also about answers allegedly given by him during the preliminary investigation
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 and recorded in the transcript of the proceeding. As he denied the contents of
both documents, the prosecution presented them as rebuttal evidence,
allegedly to impeach the credibility of Gonzales. Petitioners once more objected
and the trial court again denied admission to the documents. (Order, dated Oct.
17, 1988)

Private respondent then sought the nullification of the trial court's orders
and succeeded. The Court of Appeals declared the two documents admissible in
evidence and ordered the trial court to admit them. Hence, this petition for
review of the appellate court's decision.
There is no dispute that the extrajudicial confession and the statements
recorded in the transcript in question were taken without the assistance of
counsel. Petitioner Benedicto Gonzales was informed of his constitutional rights
in a very perfunctory manner. No effort was made to drive home to him the
seriousness of the situation he was facing. 2 He waived the assistance of
counsel, but did so without counsel's advice and assistance. 3 Both his
confession and his statement before the fiscal were thus inadmissible under
Art. IV, §20 of the 1973 Constitution. The question is whether petitioners
waived objection to the admissibility of the documents, either by failing to
object to their introduction during the trial or by using them in evidence. In
declaring them to be admissible, the Court of Appeals said:
The documents in question (Annexes A and B to Petition), which
were denied admission by respondent Judge, were marked for
identification as "Exh. B" with sub-markings and "Exh. D" with sub-
markings on "10-11-86" (or October 22, 1986) as appear on their face.
Those markings show that the documents were introduced during the
prosecution's evidence-in-chief; and, necessarily, they were testified on
by a prosecution witness (not clear from the record who). The fact that
the prosecution proposed to formally offer them in evidence at the
close of trial implies that when the documents were first introduced
through the prosecution witness at the trial, the defense did not object
to their introduction. To prevent the introduction of such kind of
evidence , the practice is for the defense to move for its exclusion at
any time before commencement of trial. Such failure of the defense
may therefore be taken as a waiver of their objection — and the waiver
was made at the trial by said accused who was in fact assisted by
counsel.
Thus, because of such failure to object, the prosecution
succeeded to introduce the subject documents and cause them to be
marked for identification as Exhibits B and D. . .
. . . During the defense turn to present their evidence-in-chief,
they called said accused to the witness stand, then through him
introduced the question-and-answer statement (Exh. B) that had
previously been denied admission by respondent Judge, and on direct
examination asked him to testify on said statement; of course, accused
denied the contents in that statement. In other words, not only did the
defense waive their objection to the introduction of this statement
when first introduced during the prosecution's evidence-in-chief as well
as when introduced through the testimony of Cpl. Renato Bautista
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 given during the prosecution evidence-in-rebuttal, the defense
themselves — including the counsel for accused — introduced such
statement as part of their evidence-in-chief . Hence, respondent Judge
committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying admission of this
statement (Exh. B) when the prosecution again proposed to formally
offer it as their evidence after the defense had rested.
llcd

With respect to the transcript (Exh. D), however, the defense did
not introduce it as part of their evidence-in-chief. Although the
prosecution introduced this exhibit during the cross-examination on
which said accused was confronted during the latter's cross-
examination, the same cannot serve as an independent evidence for
the prosecution. The exhibit may be admitted as prosecution evidence
only for the purpose of impeachment, i.e. as a means to test the
credibility of said accused and/or his testimony. Therefore, respondent
Judge should not have rejected such transcript (Exh. D) when formally
offered by the prosecution for that limited purpose of impeachment. In
denying this exhibit admission, respondent Judge also committed a
grave abuse of discretion.
In fine, the introduction and admission of the two documents in
question per se was not violative of Sec. 20 Art. IV of the 1973
Constitution nor of Sec. 12, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution. As stated
above, with respect to the sworn statement (Exh. B), this was
introduced by the defense themselves at the trial as their evidence-in-
chief; hence, in effect this became part of their evidence. As regards
the transcript taken during the preliminary investigation of the
complaint against said accused and his co-accused (Exh. D), this too
was deemed admitted, not by a positive act of the defense but by their
default for failure to object to its introduction at the trial during the
cross-examination of said accused who was assisted by counsel.
(Emphasis added)

We think the Court of Appeals erred.

First. Objection to evidence must be made after the evidence is formally
offered. 4 In the case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the
witnesses of the party making the offer have testified, 5 specifying the purpose
for which the evidence is being offered. 6 It is only at this time, and not at any
other, that objection to the documentary evidence may be made.
In this case, petitioners objected to the admissibility of the documents
when they were formally offered. Contrary to the ruling of the appellate court,
petitioners did not waive objection to admissibility of the said documents by
their failure to object when these were marked, identified, and then introduced
during the trial. That was not the proper time to make the objection. "Objection
to the documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered,
not earlier." 7 Thus, it has been held that the identification of the document
before it is marked as an exhibit does not constitute the formal offer of the
document as evidence for the party presenting it. Objection to the identification
and marking of the document is not equivalent to objection to the document
when it is formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the objection to
the document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit. 8
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 It may be mentioned in this connection that in one case, 9 objection to the
admissibility of a confession on the ground that no meaningful warning of his
constitutional rights was given to the accused was raised as soon as the
prosecution began introducing the confession, and the trial judge sustained the
objection and right away excluded the confession. This Court, through Chief
Justice Fernando, upheld the action of the trial court over the dissent of Justice
Aquino, who argued that the trial court's ruling was premature, considering that
the confession was merely being identified. It was not yet being formally
offered in evidence. 10 On the other hand, Justice Barredo, concurring, while
agreeing that objection to documentary evidence should be made at the time
of formal offer, nonetheless thought that to faithfully carry out the
constitutional mandate, objections based on the Miranda right to counsel at the
stage of police interrogation should be raised as early as possible and the
ruling on such objections made just as soon in order not to create prejudice in
the judge, in the event the confession is found inadmissible. 11
But the ruling in that case does not detract from the fact that objections
should be made at the stage of formal offer. Objections to the admissibility of
documents may be raised during trial and the court may rule on them then,
but, if this is not done, the party should make the objections when the
documentary evidence is formally offered at the conclusion of the presentation
of evidence for the other party.
Indeed, before it was offered in evidence, the confession in this case
cannot even be considered as evidence to which the accused should object.
Second . Nor is it correct to say that the confession was introduced in
evidence by Benedicto Gonzales himself when it was his turn to present
evidence for the defense. What happened is that despite the fact that in its
order of April 14, 1988 the court sustained the objection to the admissibility of
the confession and the statements given by Benedicto Gonzales at the
preliminary investigation, the defense nonetheless asked him questions
regarding his confession in reference to his denial of liability. It was thus not for
the purpose of using as evidence the confession and the alleged statements in
the preliminary investigation but precisely for the purpose of denying their
contents that Gonzales was asked questions. Gonzales denied he ever gave the
answers attributed to him in the TSN allegedly taken during the preliminary
investigation.
The defense did not really have to ask Gonzales questions regarding his
confession inasmuch as the court had already declared both the confession and
the transcript of stenographic notes to be inadmissible in evidence, but
certainly the defense should not be penalized for exercising an abundance of
caution. In fact, the defense did not mark the confession as one of its exhibits,
which is proof of the fact that it did not adopt it as evidence. There is,
therefore, no basis for the appellate court's ruling that because the defense
adopted the confession by introducing it in evidence, the defense waived any
objection to the admission of the same in evidence.
Third. Private respondent justifies the use of the confession and TSN on
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 the ground that they are necessary for the purpose of impeaching the
credibility of Benedicto Gonzales and not for the purpose of presenting them as
evidence in chief. But as already stated, there was really no need for Gonzales
to deny the contents both of the confession and the TSN since they had already
been excluded in evidence. There was therefore no use for impeaching his
credibility.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET

ASIDE and the orders dated April 14, 1988 and October 17, 1988 of the
Regional Trial Court of San Jose City are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED. cdasia

Regalado, Melo, Puno and Martinez, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Per Justice Jesus M. Elbinias and concurred in by Justice Pedro A. Ramirez
and Justice Regina G. Ordoñez Benitez.
2. People v. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2 (1980); People v. Ochavido, 132 SCRA 304
(1986); People v. Nicandro, 141 SCRA 289 (1986); People v. Duhan, 142
SCRA 100 (1986).
3. People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465 (1985); People v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219 (1986).
4. RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, §36.
5. Id., Rule 132, §35.
6. Id., Rule 132, §34.
7. Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, 186 SCRA 385, 389 (1990). Reiterated in
Quebral v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 353 (1996).
8. Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, ibid.
9. People v. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2 (1980).
10. Id., at 21.
11. Id., at 16.

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