The Metallgesellschaft Case of Oil Futures

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The Metallgesellschaft Case of Oil Futures – 1995.

MG had entered into long term fixed price contracts with buyers in the United States for supply of oil
and oil products. Since crude prices have been notoriously volatile, MG decided to hedge its exposure to
the price of oil by buying oil futures, while sign the long term supply contracts. The hedge was not,
however, perfect. While the purchase in the futures market were relatively short term (there is no long
maturity futures contract), the sales extended over a period of years. It became necessary to keep
rolling over the futures contracts repeatedly. And, as the price of oil fell, large sums of money were
locked up by way of margins, and there were losses at the time of rollovers. Of course, as the oil prices
fell, the long term sale contracts were potentially more profitable and these profits would in due course,
compensate for the losses currently incurred in the futures market.

Meanwhile, the short term liquidity problem of the New York subsidiary of MG, which was the operating
company for the oil trade, became serious. While the parent company was supportive when the
temporary losses became large, MG’s bankers refused to lend money to continue the futures market
hedge operations. They decided to close the oil trade at a one-time cost of USD 1.1 billion. MG survived
the crisis but emerged from it n a much pruned form. Overall, the policy instituted as a conservative
hedge ultimately became too costly to continue and sustain.

The MG case led to a spate of suits and damage claims by the erstwhile management of MG. They
contended that the bankers –

a) Did not understand the hedging strategy adopted, which was basically sound and conservative,
b) Were overhasty in their drastic surgical operation, and
c) Damaged the reputation of the concerned executives and the interests of the shareholders.

These contentions were broadly supported by a group of weighty American academics, the most
prominent being Nobel Laureate Merton Miller. Others contended that there was no guarantee that the
long term contracts would have been honored by the buyers of oil, given the falling prices, and hence it
was best to cut the losses at some stage.

The two risk management lessons that emerged from the MG case are –

1) Imperfect hedges, in this case, with the maturity of the hedge significantly different from the
maturity of the exposure, can lead to huge cash flow demands for rolling over the hedges. And
this must be kept in mind while using imperfect hedges.
2) The other lesson to be borne in mind is the huge opportunity cost, which hedges the forward /
futures market can entail, particularly when the underlying exposure is long-term.

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