Russian Nuclear Weapons 2021

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Russian nuclear weapons, 2021
Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda
To cite this article: Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda (2021) Russian nuclear weapons, 2021,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 77:2, 90-108, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2021.1885869
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https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rbul20
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS
2021, VOL. 77, NO. 2, 90–108
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2021.1885869
NUCLEAR NOTEBOOK
Russian nuclear weapons, 2021

Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda
ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Ballistic missiles; ballistic
Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists, and Matt Korda, a research associ missile submarines;
ate with the project. The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the Bulletin of the bombers; delivery systems;
nuclear weapons; Russia;
Atomic Scientists since 1987. This issue’s column examines Russia’s nuclear arsenal, which includes
Nuclear Notebook
a stockpile of nerarly 4,500 warheads. Of these, some 1,600 strategic warheads are deployed on
ballistic missiles and at heavy bomber bases, while an additional 985 strategic warheads, along
with 1,912 nonstrategic warheads, are held in reserve. The Russian arsenal is continuing broad
modernization intended to replace most Soviet-era weapons by the mid- to late 2020s. To see all
previous Nuclear Notebook columns, go to https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-risk/nuclear-weapons
/nuclear-notebook/.
Russia is in the middle of a decades-long modernization in turn, stimulate increased defense spending, nuclear
of its strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces to replace modernization programs, and political opposition to
Soviet-era weapons with newer systems. In further nuclear weapons reductions in Western Europe
December 2020, President Vladimir Putin reported and the United States.
that modern weapons and equipment now make up As of early 2021, we estimate that Russia has
86 percent of Russia’s nuclear triad (Russian a stockpile of nearly 4,500 nuclear warheads assigned
Federation 2020a), compared to the previous year’s for use by long-range strategic launchers and shorter-
82 percent (Russian Federation 2019). He additionally range tactical nuclear forces. This number is a little
noted that he expects that number to rise to 88.3 percent higher than last year due to the addition of the fourth
in 2021. As in previous years, Putin’s remarks empha Borei-class nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
sized the need for Russia’s nuclear forces to keep pace (SSBN) and an increase in non-strategic warheads. At
with Russia’s competitors: “It is absolutely unacceptable the same time, we have lowered the estimate for strate
to stand idle. The pace of change in all areas that are gic bomber weapons to better match the number of
critical for the Armed Forces is unusually fast today. It is operational bombers. Of the stockpiled warheads,
not even Formula 1 fast – it is supersonic fast. You stop approximately 1,600 strategic warheads are deployed:
for one second and you start falling behind immedi just over 800 on land-based ballistic missiles, about
ately” (Russian Federation 2020a). 624 on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and 200
Putin also noted his disappointment with the “dete at heavy bomber bases. Another 985 strategic warheads
rioration” of the US-Russia arms control regime, and are in storage, along with about 1,912 nonstrategic war
declared that the United States withdrew from the Anti- heads. In addition to the military stockpile for opera
Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear tional forces, a large number – approximately 1,760 – of
Forces Treaty, and the Open Skies Treaty under “con retired but still largely intact warheads await dismantle
trived pretexts.” He also addressed the “uncertainty” ment, for a total inventory of approximately 6,257
around New START: “We have repeatedly stated our warheads.1 (See Table 1.)
readiness to extend the treaty but there has been no Russia has significantly reduced the number of war
response” (Russian Federation 2020a). heads deployed on its ballistic missiles to meet the New
Russia’s nuclear modernization programs, combined START limit of no more than 1,550 deployed strategic
with an increase in the number and size of military warheads. Russia achieved the required reduction by the
exercises and occasional explicit nuclear threats against February 5, 2018 deadline, when it declared 1,444 stra
other countries, contribute to uncertainty about Russia’s tegic warheads attributed to 527 launchers (Russian
long-term intentions and growing international debate Federation Foreign Affairs Ministry 2018). The most
about the nature of its nuclear strategy. These concerns, recent data, declared on September 1, 2020, listed
CONTACT Hans M. Kristensen [email protected]

© 2021 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 91
Table 1. Russian nuclear forces, 2021.

Type/name Russian designation Launchers Year deployed Warheads x yield (kilotons) Total warheads
Strategic offensive weapons
ICBMs
SS-18 M6 Satan RS-20V 46 1988 10 x 500/800 (MIRV) 460a
SS-19 M3 Stiletto RS-18 (UR-100NUTTH) 0 1980 6 x 400 (MIRV) 0b
SS-19 M4 ? (Avangard) 4 2019 1 x HGV 4
SS-25 Sickle RS-12M (Topol) 27 1988 1 x 800 27
SS-27 Mod 1 (mobile) RS-12M1 (Topol-M) 18 2006 1 x 800? 18
SS-27 Mod 1 (silo) RS-12M2 (Topol-M) 60 1997 1 x 800 60
SS-27 Mod 2 (mobile) RS-24 (Yars) 135 2010 4 x 100? (MIRV) 540c
SS-27 Mod 2 (silo) RS-24 (Yars) 20 2014 4 x 100? (MIRV) 80
SS-X-29 (silo) RS-28 (Sarmat) - (2022) 10 x 500? (MIRV) -
Subtotal 310 1,189d
SLBMs
SS-N-18 M1 Stingray RSM-50 1/16 1978 3 x 50 (MIRV) 48e
SS-N-23 M1 RSM-54 (Sineva) 6/96 2007 4 x 100 (MIRV)f 384g
SS-N-32 RSM-56 (Bulava) 4/64 2014 6 x 100 (MIRV) 384h
Subtotal 11/176i 816j
Bombers/weapons
Bear-H6/16 Tu-95MS6/MS16/MSM 55 1984/2015 6-16 x AS-15A ALCMs 448
or 14 x AS-23B ALCMs
Blackjack Tu-160/M 13 1987/2021 12 x AS-15B ALCMs or 132
AS-23B ALCM, bombs
Subtotal 68k 580l
Subtotal strategic offensive forces 554m 2,585n
Nonstrategic and defensive weapons
ABM/Air/Coastal defense
S-300/S-400 (SA-20/SA-21) 750 1992/2007 1 x low ~290
53T6 Gazelle 68 1986 1 x 10 68o
SSC-1B Sepal (Redut) 8p 1973 1 x 350 4
SSC-5 Stooge (SS-N-26) (K-300P/3M-55) 60 2015 (1 x 10)q 25
Land-based air
Bombers/fighters (Tu-22M3(M3M)/Su-24M/ ~300 1974-2018 ASMs, ALBM, bombs ~500
Su-34/MiG-31K)
Ground-based
SS-26 Stone SSM (9K720, Iskander-M) 144 2005 1 x 10-100 70r
SSC-7 Southpaw GLCM (R-500/9M728, Iskander-M)s
SSC-8 Screwdriver GLCM (9M729)t 20u 2017 1 x 10-100 20
Naval
Submarines/surface ships/air LACM, SLCM, ASW, SAM, ~935
DB, torpedoes
Subtotal nonstrategic and defensive forces 1,912v
TOTAL STOCKPILE 4,497
Deployed 1,600
Reserve 2,897
Retired warheads awaiting dismantlement 1,760
Total inventory 6,257
ABM = antiballistic missile; ALCM = air-launched cruise missile; AS = air-to-surface; ASM = air-to-surface missile; ASW = antisubmarine weapon; DB = depth
bomb; GLCM= ground-launched cruise missile; ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile; LACM = Land-Attack Cruise Missile; MIRV = multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicle; SAM = surface-to-air missile; SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile; SLCM = sea-launched cruise missile; SRAM = short-
range attack missile; SSM = surface-to-surface missile
a
It is possible that the SS-18s have been downbloaded from ten to six warheads each to meet the New START limit for deployed strategic warheads. It is also
possible that a fourth regiment at Dombarovsky is operational.
b
It is thought that all SS-19 ICBMs have been retired, although activities continue at some former regiments.
c
It is possible that the SS-27 Mod 2s now carry only three warheads each to meet the New START limit on deployed strategic warheads.
d
Only about 800 of these warheads are deployed. The rest are in storage for potential loading.
e
The Delta III-class SSBNs are in the process of being retired, with possibly only one remaining fully operational.
f
The Sineva is a modified SS-N-23 and probably carries four MIRVs. In 2006, US intelligence estimated that the missile could carry up to 10 warheads, but it
lowered the estimate to four in 2009.
g
At any given time, only 320 of these warheads are deployed on five operational Delta IV submarines, with the sixth boat in overhaul. Often two boats are out.
h
It is possible that Bulava SLBMs have been downloaded to carry only four warheads each for Russia to meet the New START limit on deployed strategic
warheads.
i
The first figure is the number of operational SSBNs; the second is the total number of missiles (launchers) on the SSBNs. Note that one or several SSBNs may be
in overhaul at any given time.
j
At any given time, one or two SSBNs are in overhaul and do not carry nuclear weapons, so not all 816 warheads are deployed - perhaps only around 624.
k
Only about 50 of the bombers are thought to be deployed.
l
The total bomber force can theroretically carry more than 800 nuclear weapons, but weapons are probably only assigned to deployed bombers. Bomber
weapons are not deployed on the aircraft under normal circumstances, but we estimate a couple hundred weapons are present at the two bomber bases,
with the remainder in central storage.
92 H. M. KRISTENSEN AND M. KORDA
m
This number of total deployed strategic launchers is higher than the 510 listed in the New START aggregate data as of September 1, 2020, because some
bombers are not counted as deployed. This is the total number of operational launchers (ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers) in service. Russia also has more than
250 non-deployed launchers, many of which are mothballed or in the process of being dismantled.
n
Only about 1,600 of these warheads are deployed on missiles and at bomber bases. New START counts fewer deployed warheads because it does not weapons
in storage on bomber bases and because at any given time, some SSBNs are not fully loaded.
o
We assume that the warheads for the Gazelle interceptors are kept in central storage under normal circumstances. All previous 32 Gorgon missiles have been
retired.
p
It is assumed that all SSC-1B units, except a single fixed site in Crimea, have been replaced by the K-300P by now.
q
The US National Air and Space Intelligence Center lists the ground-, sea-, and sub-launched 3M-55 as “nuclear possible.”
r
This estimate includes warheads for both SS-26 and SSC-7.
s
The US National Air and Space Intelligence Center lists the R-500/9M728 as “Conventional, Nuclear Possible.”
t
It is possible that the SSC-8 launchers are co-located with some of the Iskander brigades.
u
This figure assumes five SSC-8 battalions, each with four launchers. Each launcher has four missiles for a total of 80 missiles. It is assumed there is at least one
reload for at least 160 missiles.
v
All nonstrategic warheads are thought to be in central storage. The 1,912 listed make up the estimated nominal load for nuclear-capable delivery platforms.
Only some of these may be available for deployment by operational forces. It is possible there are more unreported nuclear-capable non-strategic systems.
Russia with 1,447 deployed warheads attributed to 510 the force – a strategy similar to the one the United States
strategic launchers (US State Department, Bureau of has relied on for several decades.
Arms Control, Verification and Compliance 2020a). Overall, Russia’s nuclear modernization effort will pre
These numbers differ from the estimates presented in sent the international arms control community with new
this Nuclear Notebook because the New START count challenges. Unless a new arms reduction agreement is
ing rules artificially attribute one warhead to each reached in the future to replace New START, the shrink
deployed bomber, even though Russian bombers do ing of Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal that has character
not carry nuclear weapons under normal circumstances, ized the past two decades will likely come to an end, with
and because this Nuclear Notebook counts weapons the force leveling out at around 530 launchers with
stored at bomber bases that can quickly be loaded onto roughly 2,500 assigned warheads. However, Russia’s
the aircraft. financial crisis represents a significant challenge to main
Russia (like the United States) could potentially taining this force level, as exemplified by delays in produc
upload several hundreds of extra warheads onto their tion of several major weapon systems such as the Sarmat
launchers, but is prevented from doing so by the New ICBM (SS-29) and the RS-26 Rubezh (SS-28), the cancel
START treaty limit, which has been extended for an lation of the once highly-touted Barguzin rail-based
additional five years to 2026. The treaty provides for ICBM, and delays to the strategic bomber replacement
important transparency of Russian (and U.S.) strategic program.
nuclear forces: As of December 2020, the United States Russia’s nuclear modernization program is moti
and Russia have completed a combined 328 on-site vated in part by Moscow’s strong desire to maintain
inspections and exchanged 21,293 notifications (US overall parity with the United States, but also by the
State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification Russian leadership’s apparent conviction that the US
and Compliance 2020b). Due to the ongoing Covid-19 ballistic missile defense system constitutes a real future
pandemic, there have been no on-site Type One or Type risk to the credibility of Russia’s retaliatory capability.
Two inspections since April 1st, 2020. Policy and strategy aside, the development of multiple
Due to New START limitations, Russia appears to have weapon systems also indicates the strong influence of
been forced to reduce the warhead loading on some of its the military-industrial complex on Russia’s nuclear
missiles to less than maximum capacity. We do not know posture planning.
the breakdown of the loading because Russia, unlike the
United States, does not publish an unclassified overview
of its strategic forces. However, the reduction may have What is Russia’s nuclear strategy?
involved scaling back the number of warheads on each The international debate about Russia’s nuclear strategy
SS-18 and SS-27 Mod 2 intercontinental ballistic missile has reached a new level of intensity, particularly after
(ICBM), as well as on each SS-N-32 submarine-launched the Trump administration published its Nuclear Posture
ballistic missile (SLBM). This demonstrates that New Review in February 2018. The Nuclear Posture Review
START places real constraints on Russia’s deployed stra claims that “Russian strategy and doctrine emphasize
tegic forces. The result appears to be an increased reliance the potential coercive and military uses of nuclear weap
on a strategic reserve of non-deployed warheads that can ons. It mistakenly assesses that the threat of nuclear
be loaded onto missiles in a crisis to increase the size of escalation or actual first use of nuclear weapons would
serve to ‘de-escalate’ a conflict on terms favorable to the aforementioned US claims of a Russian “escalate-to-
Russia” (US Defense Department 2018, 8). Specifically, deescalate” policy. The updated policy is also consistent
the document claims, “Moscow threatens and exercises with remarks that President Putin made to the Valdai
limited nuclear first use, suggesting a mistaken expecta Club in October 2018, when he stated that “Our nuclear
tion that coercive nuclear threats or limited first use weapons doctrine does not provide for a pre-emptive
could paralyze the United States and NATO and thereby strike.” Rather, he went on, “our concept is based on
end a conflict on terms favorable to Russia.” This so- a reciprocal counter strike . . . This means that we are
called “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine “follows from prepared and will use nuclear weapons only when we
Moscow’s mistaken assumption of Western capitulation know for certain that some potential aggressor is attack
on terms favorable to Moscow” (US Defense ing Russia, our territory” (Russian Federation 2018a).
Department 2018, 30). This is additionally consistent with previous iterations
The former head of the US Strategic Command, Gen. of Russian nuclear policy, which has largely remained
John Hyten, reacted to “Russia’s destabilizing doctrine unchanged since President Putin came to power in 2000
on what some call escalate to deescalate” by saying: “I (Russian Federation 2014, 2010). Although some initial
really hate that discussion. I’ve looked at the Russian reports interpreted Putin’s 2018 Valdai Club comments
doctrine. I’ve looked at Russian writings. It’s not escalate to mean that Russia might be adopting a nuclear no-first
to deescalate, it’s escalate to win. Everybody needs to -use policy, this does not seem to be the case; his
understand that” (Hyten 2017). Some have suggested remarks were more likely meant to respond to the US
that Russian leaders are signaling a willingness to use Nuclear Posture Review’s claim that Russia has lowered
nuclear weapons even before an adversary retaliates its threshold for first use of nuclear weapons in a conflict
against a Russian conventional attack by “employing (Stowe-Thurston, Korda, and Kristensen 2018). Because
the threat of selective and limited use of nuclear weap Putin’s comments imply that Russia would only use
ons to forestall opposition to potential aggression” nuclear weapons in retaliation against an existential
(emphasis added) (Miller 2015). The implication is threat, independent analysts have challenged the
that Russia would potentially use nuclear weapons first Nuclear Posture Review’s characterization of the
to scare an adversary into not even defending itself. Russian strategy as overblown and a misreading of
Such characterizations conflict with Russia’s publicly Russia’s nuclear doctrine.2
stated policy. In June 2020, President Putin approved an Whatever Russia’s nuclear strategy is, Russian offi
update to the “Basic Principles of State Policy of the cials have made many statements about nuclear weap
Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,” which ons that appear to go beyond the published doctrine,
notes that “The Russian Federation considers nuclear threatening to potentially use them in situations that do
weapons exclusively as a means of deterrence.” The not meet the conditions described. For example, officials
policy lays out four conditions under which Russia explicitly threatened to use nuclear weapons against
could launch nuclear weapons: ballistic missile defense facilities, and in regional scenar
ios that do not threaten Russia’s survival or involve
(1) “arrival of reliable data on a launch of ballistic attacks with weapons of mass destruction (The Local
missiles attacking the territory of the Russian 2015).
Federation and/or its allies; Moreover, the fact that Russian military planners are
(2) use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons pursuing a broad range of upgraded and new versions of
of mass destruction by an adversary against the nuclear weapons suggests that the real doctrine goes
Russian Federation and/or its allies; beyond basic deterrence and toward regional war-
(3) attack by adversary against critical governmental fighting strategies, or even weapons aimed at causing
or military sites of the Russian Federation, dis terror. One widely-cited example involves the so-called
ruption of which would undermine nuclear Status-6 – known in Russia as “Poseidon” and in the
forces response actions; United States as “Kanyon” – a long-range nuclear-
(4) aggression against the Russian Federation with powered torpedo that a Russian government document
the use of conventional weapons when the very described as intended to create “areas of wide radio
existence of the state is in jeopardy” (Russian active contamination that would be unsuitable for mili
Federation Foreign Affairs Ministry 2020). tary, economic, or other activity for long periods of
time” (Podvig 2015). A diagram and description of the
The document’s emphasis on deterrence by punish proposed weapon, first revealed in a Russian television
ment, as well as the “defensive” nature of Russia’s broadcast, can still be seen on YouTube (YouTube
nuclear weapons is likely intended to be a response to 2015). The weapon, which is under development,
appears designed to attack harbors and cities to cause The SS-18 (RS-20 V or R-36 M2 Voevoda) is a silo-
widespread indiscriminate collateral damage in viola based, 10-warhead heavy ICBM first deployed in 1988.
tion of international law. It is reaching the end of its service life, with approxi
mately 46 SS-18s with up to 460 warheads remaining in
the 13th Missile Division at Dombarovsky and the 62nd
Intercontinental ballistic missiles Missile Division at Uzhur. We estimate the number of
warheads on each SS-18 has been reduced for Russia to
Russia’s Strategic Rocket Force currently deploys several meet the New START treaty limit for deployed strategic
variants of silo-based and mobile ICBMs. The silo-based warheads. The SS-18 is scheduled to begin retiring in the
ICBMs include the SS-18, SS-19, SS-27 Mod 1, SS-27 next one or two years, when the SS-29 (Sarmat or RS-28)
Mod 2, and the mobile ICBMs include the SS-25, SS-27 ICBM will begin to replace it at the Uzhur missile field.
Mod 1, and SS-27 Mod 2. In December 2020, Defense The silo-based, six-warhead SS-19 (RS-18 or UR-
Minister Sergei Shoigu declared that 95 percent of 100NUTTH) entered service in 1980 and might finally
Russia’s strategic missile forces are continuously ready have been retired and replaced by the silo-based SS-27
for combat use (Russian Federation 2020a). Mod 2 (RS-24). It is possible that the SS-19 has been
Based on what we can observe via satellite images, retired from combat duty, but two regiments that used
combined with information published under New to be armed with the missile still show significant activ
START by various US government sources, Russia ity. A small number of converted SS-19s are being
appears to have approximately 310 deployed ICBMs, deployed with two regiments of the 13th Missile
which we estimate can carry up to 1,189 warheads. (See Division at Dombarovsky as the SS-19 Mod 4 with the
Table 2.) The size of the force that we can observe, new Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles (see below).
however, is difficult to square with statements made by Russia continues to retire its SS-25 (RS-12 M or
Russian officials. Since 2016, and again most recently Topol) road-mobile missiles at a rate of one or two
in December 2019, the commander of the country’s regiments (nine to 18 missiles) each year, replacing
Strategic Rocket Forces, Col. Gen. Sergei Karakaev, has them with the SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24). There remains
stated that Russia had approximately 400 ICBMs on some uncertainty about how many SS-25s are fully
combat duty (TASS 2016; Andreyev and Zotov 2017; operational. Garrison upgrades used to involve signifi
Karakaev 2019). But since Russia declared 510 cant rebuilding, but satellite images indicate that Russia
deployed strategic launchers in total as of has started to upgrade the garrisons by simply replacing
September 2020, a force of 400 ICBMs would mean the SS-25s with the new SS-27 launchers and their
Russia only deployed 110 SLBMs and bombers, which service vehicles, which are maintained under camou
seems unlikely (US State Department, Bureau of Arms flage nets. We estimate that as few as 27 (possibly only
Control, Verification and Compliance 2020a). It is 18) SS-25s remain in the active force.
possible Karakaev is referring to all ICBMs in the The new ICBMs include two versions of the SS-27:
inventory, not just those that are deployed. the Mods 1 and 2. We estimate that these two versions
Modernization of the ICBM force also involves equip now carry more warheads than all the remaining SS-18s.
ping upgraded silos with new air-defense systems, and The SS-27 Mod 1 is a single-warhead missile, known in
the new Peresvet laser has been deployed with five Russia as Topol-M, that comes in either mobile (RS-
road-mobile ICBM divisions for the purpose of “cover 12 M1) or silo-based (RS-12 M2) variants. Deployment
ing up their maneuvering operations” (Russian of the SS-27 Mod 1 was completed in 2012 with a total of
Federation Defense Ministry 2019a). 78 missiles: 60 silo-based missiles with the 60th Missile
The ICBMs are organized under the Strategic Rocket Division in Tatishchevo, and 18 road-mobile missiles
Forces in three missile armies with a total of 11 divisions with the 54th Guards Missile Division at Teykovo.
consisting of approximately 39 missile regiments (see Russian officials indicated in 2019 that the Topol-M
Table 2). The 40th regiment in the 12th division at units eventually will be upgraded to RS-24 Yars as well.
Yurya is not nuclear-armed. The ICBM force has been The focus of the current and bigger phase of Russia’s
declining in number for three decades, and Russia modernization is the SS-27 Mod 2, known in Russia as
claims to be 81 percent of the way through the RS-24 (Yars), which is a modified SS-27 Mod 1 (or
a modernization program to replace all Soviet-era mis Topol-M) that can carry up to four multiple indepen
siles with newer types by the early 2020s on a less-than- dently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). During an
one-for-one basis (Krasnaya Zvezda 2020a). Currently, interview with Col. Gen. Sergei Karakaev in
the remaining Soviet-era ICBMs include the SS-18, the December 2020, the Russian Defense Ministry’s TV
SS-19, and the SS-25. channel declared that approximately 150 mobile and
Table 2. Estimated Status Of Russian ICBM Forces 2021.

Locations Divisions Regiments (Coordinates) Missiles* Status
Barnaul 35th MD 307th MR (53.3128, 84.5080) (9 SS-27 Mod 2 TEL) Upgrading
479th GMR (53.7709, 83.9580) 9 SS-27 Mod 2 TEL Activea
480th MR (53.3054, 84.1459) (9 SS-27 Mod 2 TEL) Upgrading
867th GMR (53.2255, 84.6706) 9 SS-25 TEL Active
Dombarovsky 13th MDb 368th MR (51.0934, 59.8446) 6 SS-18 Silos Active
494th MR (51.0628, 60.2119) 6 SS-18 Silos Active
767th MR (51.2411, 60.6069) 6 SS-18 Silos Active
621st MR (51.0618, 59.6081) 4 SS-19 Mod 4 silosc Active/upgrading
Irkutsk 29th GMD 92nd GMR (52.5085, 104.3933) 9 SS-27 Mod 2 TEL Active
344th GMR (52.6694, 104.5199) 9 SS-27 Mod 2 TEL Active
Kozelsk 28th GMD 74th MR (53.7982, 35.8039) 10 SS-27 Mod 2 silos Active
168th MR (54.0278, 35.4589) 10 SS-27 Mod 2 silos Active
214th MR (53.7641, 35.4866) (10 former SS-19 silos) Upgrade starts in 2021
Novosibirsk 39th GMD 357th GMR (55.3270, 82.9417) 9 SS-27 Mod 2 TELe Active
382nd GMR (55.3181, 83.1676)d 9 SS-27 Mod 2 TEL Active
Nizhny Tagil 42nd MD 308th MR (58.2298, 60.6773) 9 SS-27 Mod 2 TEL Active
433rd MR (58.1015, 60.3592) 9 SS-27 Mod 2 TEL Active
804th MR (58.1372, 60.5366) 9 SS-27 Mod 2 TEL Active
Tatishchevo 60th MDf 31st MR (51.8792, 45.3368) 10 SS-27 Mod 1 silos Active
122nd MR (52.1589, 45.6404) 10 SS-27 Mod 1 silos Active
322nd MR (52.0449, 45.4458) 10 SS-27 Mod 1 silos Active
Teykovo 54th GMD 235th GMR (56.7041, 40.4403) 9 SS-27 Mod 1 TEL Active
321st MR (56.9324, 40.5440) 9 SS-27 Mod 1 TEL Active
773rd MR (56.9167, 40.3087) 9 SS-27 Mod 2 TEL Active
Uzhur 62nd MDg 229th MR (55.2453, 89.9194) 6 SS-18 silos Active
269th MR (55.2077, 90.2526) 6 SS-18 silos Active
302nd MR (55.1147, 89.6311) 6 SS-18 silos Active
735th MR (55.2720, 89.5783) 10 SS-18 silos Active
Vypolsovo 7th GMD 41st MR (57.8620, 33.6500) (9 SS-27 Mod 2 TEL) Upgradingh
510th GMR (57.7889, 33.8660) 9 SS-25 TEL Active
Yoshkar-Ola 14th MD 290th MR (56.8328, 48.2370)i 9 SS-27 Mod 2 TEL Active
697th MR (56.5601, 48.2144) 9 SS-27 Mod 2 TEL Active
779th MR (56.5821, 48.1550)j 9 SS-27 Mod 2 TEL Active
11 Divisionsk 39 regiments 310 ICBMsl
GMD = Guards Missile Division; GMR = Guards Missile Regiment; MD = Missile Division; MR = Missile Regiment; TEL = Transporter Erector Launcher.
* Uses US/NATO missile designations. SS-18 (RS-20 V), SS-19 (RS-18), SS-25 (Topol), SS-27 Mod 1 (Topol-M), SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24).
a
RMOD reported in Dec 2019 that a “ceremony of interception on combat duty of the first regiment” had taken place.
b
It is possible that the 175th Missile Regiment (51.2708, 60.2992) is also active, but it is not thought to be armed. The unit is a potential candidate for the second
SS-19 Mod 4 regiment.
c
A total of 12 silos (two regiments) are planned to be operational by 2027.
d
The 328th regiment is based at this temporary open-air location until its permanent garrison (55.3181, 83.1676) is completed.
e
Described by Russian Ministry of Defense as Yars-S.
f
It is possible that one or two SS-19 regiments are active, but they are not thought to be armed. They are potential candidates for upgrade to the SS-19 Mod 4
(Avangard) in the future.
g
The 62nd MD at Uzhur is scheduled to receive the SS-29 (Sarmat) in the near future. Some former SS-18 silos will also be converted to the SS-19 Mod 4
(Avangard).
h
During 2019, “preparatory work” began for upgrading to SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24).
i
It is potentially possible that the 290th regiment will move south to the new garrison (56.5658, 48.4515) that is under construction closer to the supply base and
other garrisons of the division.
j
The 779 MR garrison is being rebuilt. Until completion, the launchers and support vehicles are temporarily based near the supply base (56.5587, 48.0558).
k
A 12th division at Yurya has one SS-25 regiment that does not carry warheads but serves as a back-up ICBM launch code transmitter.
l
Upgrading regiments sometimes go on experimental combat alert with only a few launchers ready.
silo-based Yars had been deployed by the Strategic scheduled upgrade at Irkutsk, which was announced in
Rocket Force (Zvezda 2020). SS-27 Mod 2 upgrades September 2020 (Russian Federation 2020a; TASS
now appear to be complete at the 39th Guards Missile 2020a). Although these divisions now all have been
Division at Novosibirsk, the 42nd Missile Division at equipped with the SS-27 Mod 2, many of the garrisons
Nizhny Tagil, the 14th Missile Division at Yoshkar-Ola, are not equipped to accommodate all the vehicles
and the 29th Guards Missile Division at Irkutsk. required to support the launchers and will continue to
According to Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, three undergo construction for several years.
missile regiments were equipped with SS-27 Mod 2 The next mobile ICBM divisions to be upgraded are
ICBMs in 2020, including the completion of the the 35th Missile Division at Barnaul and the 7th Missile
Division at Vypolsovo. The first regiment at Barnaul stated that the military in 2021 will “begin [to] re-equipthe
(the 479th Guards Missile Regiment) went on prelimin next regiment of the Kozelsk missile formation,” appar
ary combat alert duty with the Yars in September 2019 ently the third regiment of the 28th Guards Missile
and full combat duty in December 2019 (Russian Division (TASS 2020o). This is probably the 214th regi
Federation Defense Ministry 2019c). The Barnaul divi ment. Given the time it took to complete the upgrades of
sion formally accepted its second Yars regiment (the the first two regiments at Kozelsk, it seems unlikely that the
480th Missile Regiment) in December 2020 (RIA Yars upgrade can be completed by 2024.
Novosti 2020). The Strategic Rocket Force is expected Final development and deployment of a compact SS-
to put 13 additional Yars and Avangard systems on alert 27 version, known as Rubezh (Yars-M or RS-26),
in 2021 (Russian Federation 2020a); it is expected that appears to have been delayed at least until the next
a portion of these Yars systems will be used to upgrade armament program in the late 2020s (TASS 2018a).
the third Barnaul regiment, with upgrades to the fourth A rail-based version known as Barguzin appears to
regiment following a year or two later (Podvig 2020a). have been canceled.
The Vypolsovo division started early preparations for Russia is also developing the heavy SS-29, or
the upgrade in 2019 (Tikhonov 2019), and it is possible Sarmat (RS-28), which will begin replacing the SS-
that one of its two regiments has already stood down its 18 (RS-20 V) at Uzhur in 2021 or 2022. Three
SS-25 launchers. Col. Gen. Karakaev confirmed in ejection tests were conducted in December 2017,
December 2020 that neither the Barnaul nor March 2018, and May 2018 at the Plesetsk Space
Vypolsovo division had completed their scheduled Center, involving cold launch and test firing of the
upgrade to the SS-27 Mod 2 by the end of the year Sarmat’s first stage and booster engine. These tests
(Krasnaya Zvezda 2020). Satellite images confirm this were originally scheduled for 2016 but were delayed
status. because of difficulties that appeared during the mis
Col. Gen. Karakaev confirmed in December 2020 sile’s strength tests. The closing test stages, which
that the 28th Guards Missile Division at Kozelsk will include a test launch with the 62nd Missile
remains one of only three divisions that have not yet Division at Uzhur, was supposed to be completed
completed their scheduled upgrade to the SS-27 Mod 2 by the end of 2020; however, this has been delayed,
(Krasnaya Zvezda 2020). However, work at Kozelsk likely due to the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. In
proceeds: The first regiment (the 74th Missile December 2020, Defense Minister Shoigu suggested
Regiment) officially began combat duty with its full that Sarmat flight tests would take place during the
complement of 10 missiles in November 2018, after summer of 2021 at the new Severo-Yeniseysky prov
initially being declared operational (likely with just six ing ground (Russian Federation 2020a). Following
missiles) in 2015 (Russian Federation Defense Ministry the success of these tests, Sarmat will officially be
2018b). Satellite pictures show that upgrades are well handed over to the military and serial production
underway, and possibly complete, at all the silos of will begin. As of March 2020, Sarmat’s industrial
a second regiment (the 168th Missile Regiment). production line has apparently completed all the
According to Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, two addi necessary upgrades to prepare for serial production,
tional SS-27 Mod 2 missiles were loaded into their silos which is expected to begin in 2021, barring any
at Kozelsk in September 2020 (Russian Federation unforeseen delays (TASS 2020c; Safronov and
Defense Ministry 2020b), and by the end of 2020, Col. Nikolsky 2019).
Gen. Karakaev declared that “the reequipment of the There are many rumors about the SS-29, which some
missile regiment in the Kozelsk missile formation for in the media have dubbed the “Son of Satan” because it
the silo version of this complex has been completed . . . ” is a follow-on to the SS-18, which the United States and
(TASS 2020o). Apart from the missiles themselves, the NATO designated “Satan” – presumably to reflect its
upgrade involves extensive modification of external extraordinary destructive capability. Rumors that the
fences, internal roads, and facilities. Each site is also SS-29 could carry 15 or more MIRV warheads, though,
receiving a new fixed air-defense system, probably to seem exaggerated. We expect that it will carry about the
defend the silo against cruise missiles and drones. same number as the SS-18 plus penetration aids. It is
The Russian Defense Ministry says the completion of all possible that a small number will be equipped to carry
preparatory infrastructure for Yars bases across the coun the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, which are cur
try is scheduled for completion by 2021 (TASS 2019a), rently being installed on a limited number of SS-19 Mod
although full completion is likely to take longer than that. 4 boosters at Dombarovsky. If the SS-29 replaces all
The entirety of the Yars upgrade is expected to be com current SS-18s, it will be installed in a total of 46 silos
pleted by 2024 (TASS 2020a). Yet Col. Gen. Karakaev also of the three regiments at the Dombarovsky missile field
and four regiments at the Uzhur missile field (six regi Roscosmos director general Dimitry Rogozin sug
ments of six missiles, and one regiment of 10 missiles). gested in July 2019 that going forward all retired
In December 2020, Col. Gen. Sergei Karakaev Russian missiles should be “salvaged by launch,”
announced that the first Sarmat missiles would be “put meaning that they would be recycled for civilian pur
on alert” at Uzhur sometime in 2022 (Krasnaya Zvezda poses like space launches or asteroid deflection. This
2020). concept has already seen success with the Dnepr space
The new Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle is launch vehicle, which was based on the retiring SS-18,
designed to evade missile defenses and is initially but could soon be scaled up to include other types of
being fitted atop modified SS-19 missiles (SS-19 retiring ICBMs like the SS-19s and SS-25s (Sputnik
Mod 4) at Dombarovsky and possibly later on SS-29 2019).
missiles at Uzhur. Russia is currently deploying the new According to the Russian Defense Ministry, between
weapon at a rate of two per year: the first two missiles at 2012 and 2020 the Strategic Rocket Force conducted ten
Dombarovsky began combat duty on December 27th, Yars launches and five Avangard launches (Russian
2019, followed by another two in December 2020 (TASS Federation Defense Ministry 2020c, 13). Between 2019
2019i; Russian Federation Defense Ministry 2020a). The and 2021, the Strategic Rocket Force is expected to con
regiment is expected to receive the next two missiles – duct nine additional ICBM test launches: two Sarmats,
thus achieving a full complement of six missiles – by the three Yars, and four Topols, although it is possible that
end of 2021 (TASS 2020b). A second regiment of six the latest scheduled tests will be postponed due to the
missiles will reportedly be added by the end of 2027, to ongoing Covid-19 pandemic (Pravda 2019). The
coincide with the completion of the current state arma Strategic Rocket Force often test-launches its missiles to
ment program (TASS 2018b). The sites that have the Sary-Shagan test site in Kazakhstan. However, given
already been equipped with Avangard at the 621st that Kazakhstan ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of
Missile Regiment still appear to be upgrading with Nuclear Weapons in August 2019, it is unclear whether
new and different security perimeters, in addition to the country will continue to allow Russia to use its test
new buildings for crew and guards. Two more silos are site at Sary-Shagan for its ICBM launches once the treaty
also being upgraded, presumably for the next two enters into force in January 2021. Article 4(2) of the treaty
Avangard missiles. Similar to the new silos at Kozelsk, notes that each state party must ensure “the elimination
the modified Dombarovsky silos appear to have some or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related
form of air defense system. facilities.” This would necessarily include Sary-Shagan,
While the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review anticipated which is clearly connected to Russia’s nuclear weapons
that Russian missile forces will increase over time, the complex (United Nations 2017). This means that upon
evidence for this still is not clear. The US National Air entry into force, Kazakhstan will face a tough decision
and Space Intelligence Center predicted in 2017 that over whether to fully comply with the treaty and risk
“the number of missiles in the Russian ICBM force souring relations with Russia, or whether to dilute its
will continue to decrease because of arms control agree compliance. This potential compliance issue could be
ments, aging missiles, and resource constraints” (US Air the reason why Russia is building a new proving ground
Force 2017, 26). With the ongoing modernization, the for its Sarmat tests at Severo-Yeniseysky, a decision
force level will likely level out as the modernization which was announced in December 2020 (Russian
program is completed. Federation 2020a).
After previous uncertainty about whether Russia’s Russia is also developing a nuclear-powered,
new strategic systems would fit into the counting rules ground-launched nuclear-armed cruise missile,
under New START, the deputy director of the Russian known as 9M730 Burevestnik (NATO’s designation
Foreign Ministry’s nonproliferation and arms control is SSC-X-9 Skyfall). This missile has faced serious
department stated in November 2019 that both Sarmat setbacks: according to US military intelligence, it
and Avangard could be “easily included” in the treaty. has failed nearly a dozen times since its testing
Regarding Sarmat, he said that it would enter the treaty period began in June 2016 (Panda 2019a). In
“as a new type of ICBM, for which there is a special November 2017, a failed test resulted in the missile
procedure, from the creation of a prototype to its being lost at sea, which required a substantial recov
authorization for service.” He further noted that ery effort (Macias 2018). A similar recovery effort in
Avangard “will enter the treaty very smoothly” because August 2019 resulted in an explosion that killed five
“it is an optional warhead for an ICBM of the corre scientists and two soldiers at Nenoksa; the explo
sponding type, to which the treaty applies, too” (TASS sion’s connection to Skyfall was confirmed by US
2019h). State Department officials in October 2019
(DiNanno 2019). Due to these setbacks, it is possible The Delta IIIs and Delta IVs will eventually be
that the Burevestnik program has been put on pause; replaced by the new class of Borei (Project 955/A)
there were no tests of the system in 2020 and, unlike SSBNs. Each boat is armed with 16 SS-N-32 (Bulava)
other elements of Russia’s nuclear forces, it was not SLBMs that can carry up to six warheads each. It is
mentioned in Defense Minister Shoigu’s year-end possible that the missile payload has been lowered to
remarks. four warheads each to meet the New START treaty
According to Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, over limit on deployed strategic warheads. In May 2018, one
950 structures and facilities have been built for the of the new boats, Yuri Dolgoruki (K-535), salvo-fired four
strategic missile forces as of December 2020. He further Bulavas as part of a test launch (Russian Federation
noted that launch facilities in Kozelsk, Yasnoye, Uzhur, Defence Ministry 2018a). In December 2020, another
Novosibirsk, and Yoshkar-Ola will be prioritized for Borei, Vladimir Monomakh (K-551), salvo-fired four
completion next year (Russian Federation 2020a). Bulavas during a test launch from the Sea of Okhotsk—
the 35th-38th tests of the Bulava SLBM, and the first
Bulava launch from a Pacific Fleet submarine (Russian
Submarines and submarine-launched ballistic Federation Defense Ministry 2020d; Podvig 2020b). Four
missiles Boreis are currently in service, with another four in
various stages of construction, and two more to be pur
The Russian Navy operates 11 nuclear-powered chased, for a total of 10 Borei SSBNs. The first boat, Yuri
nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) of Dolgoruki, is based at Yagelnaya in the Northern Fleet.
three classes: six Delta IV (Project 667BRDM), one The second boat, Alexander Nevsky (K-550), arrived at its
Delta III (Project 667BRD), and four Borei (Project home base at Rybachiy near Petropavlovsk in
955), one of which is an improved Borei-A (Project September 2015, where it was joined by the third Borei,
955A).3 Each submarine can carry 16 SLBMs, and each Vladimir Monomakh (K-551), in September 2016.
SLBM can carry several MIRVs, for a combined max The first of the improved Borei-A/II (Project 955A)
imum loading of approximately 816 warheads. Only SSBNs, and the fourth Borei submarine in total, Knyaz
some of these submarines are operational, and the war Vladimir (K-549), faced delays following its laying down
head loading on some of the missiles may have been in July 2020, but left dry dock in November 2017 to begin
reduced as part of New START implementation, how sea trials (Podvig 2018a). Despite previous rumors that the
ever, so the total number of warheads carried is lower, improved Borei class would have 20 missile tubes, satellite
possibly around 624. images taken of the first unit in 2018 showed only 16 tubes
Until the mid 2020s, the mainstay of Russia’s nuclear (Kristensen 2018). In October 2019, the Knyaz Vladimir
submarine force will continue to be the six third- successfully completed a long-awaited test-launch of the
generation Delta IVs built between 1985 and 1992, Bulava SLBM from a submerged position in the White Sea,
each equipped with 16 SLBMs. All Delta IVs are part a significant milestone during its second round of sea trials
of the Northern Fleet and based at Yagelnaya Bay (Gady 2019). The new boat was scheduled to join the
(Gadzhiyevo) on the Kola Peninsula. Russia has Northern Fleet in December 2019 (TASS 2019b); however,
upgraded the Delta IVs to carry modified SS-N-23 delivery was delayed due to “certain shortcomings” discov
SLBMs, known as Sinevas, each of which carries up to ered during sea trials (TASS 2019j). On June 12, 2020, the
four warheads. A modified Sineva, known as Layner (or Knyaz Vladimir was finally accepted into the Navy
Liner), may carry a modified payload. Normally four to (Russian Federation Defense Ministry 2020e).
five of the six Delta IVs are operational at any given The fifth Borei – Knyaz Oleg – underwent hull pres
time, with the other one or two in various stages of sure tests in November 2016 and was originally sched
maintenance. uled for delivery in 2018 but was delayed for several
Two Delta III nuclear submarines (K-223 Podolsk years before finally being launched in July 2020 (TASS
and K-433 Svyatoy Georgiy Pobedonosets) were report 2020j). The keel of the sixth boat – Generalissimus
edly decommissioned in early 2018, leaving one Delta Suvorov – was laid down in December 2014 for possible
III – Ryazan (K-44) – operational with Russia’s Pacific completion in 2018 but has also been delayed. Despite
Fleet on the Kamchatka Peninsula (Podvig 2018b). The these delays, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu declared in
remaining submarine is still visible in satellite images December 2020 that the Navy is expected to receive both
but doesn’t appear to sail much, although one. A missile the Knyaz Oleg and the Generalissimus Suvorov in 2021,
launch in 2019 was partially aborted (Reuters 2019). The equipped with Bulava SLBMs (Russian Federation
Delta III is equipped with 16 SS-N-18 M1 Stingray 2020a). The keel for the seventh boat – Emperor
(RSM-50) SLBMs with three warheads each. Alexander III – was laid down in December 2015 for
scheduled delivery in 2019 but has also been delayed. cruise missile and upgraded versions are being equipped
The keel for the eighth Borei SSBN – Knyaz Pozharsky – to carry the new AS-23B (Kh-102) nuclear cruise mis
was laid in December 2016 for potential delivery sile. Two versions of the Tu-95 are thought to exist: Tu-
between 2021 and 2023 (Russian Federation Defense 95H6, which can carry up to six missiles internally, and
Ministry 2016). Russia has decided to build two more Tu-95H16, which was built to carry missiles both
Borei-As: the first keel was originally scheduled to be internally and on wing-mounted pylons for a total of
laid on May 9, 2020, but has been delayed until 2021 16 missiles. The Tu-95 modernization program is
(RIA Novosti 2019b; TASS 2020j). These two SSBNs equipping the Tu-95s to carry eight AS-23B missiles
would likely be delivered in 2026 and 2027, respectively, externally for a maximum of 14 missiles per aircraft.
bringing the total fleet up to ten boats. Eventually, five The Tu-160s are also being modernized to carry up to 12
SSBNs will be assigned to the Northern Fleet, and five AS-23B internally. The new AS-23B being added during
will be assigned to the Pacific (TASS 2018c). bomber modernization will likely replace the AS-15.
In December 2020, Russia conducted its annual It is unclear how many nuclear weapons are
nuclear force readiness exercise, during which a Delta- assigned to the heavy bombers. Each Tu-160 can
IV SSBN launched a Sineva SLBM from the Barents Sea carry up to 40,000 kilograms of ordnance, including
(Russian Federation Defense Ministry 2020f). This year’s 12 nuclear AS-15B air-launched cruise missiles. The
exercise appears to have been more successful than the Tu-95MS can carry six to 16 cruise missiles, depend
previous year’s, during which the Delta-III class Ryazan ing on configuration. Combined, the bombers could
SSBN only fired one of its two planned Sineva SLBMs potentially carry over 800 weapons, but we estimate
from a submerged position, due to unexpected informa weapons only exist for deployed bombers for a total
tion regarding the “technical condition of the missile,” of approximately 580 bomber weapons. The Tu-160
according to the Russian Defense Ministry (Interfax may also have a secondary mission with nuclear grav
2019). Additionally, launches of 3 M-54 Kalibr cruise ity bombs, but it seems unlikely that the old and slow
missiles during the 2019 exercise reportedly did not pro Tu-95 would stand much of a chance against modern
ceed as planned, and required the use of backup launch air defense systems.4 According to Defense Minister
systems in order to fire (Sidorkova and Kanaev 2019). Sergei Shoigu, Russian strategic bombers performed
The Russian Navy is also developing the Status-6 50 flights on preset routes in 2020 (Russian
Poseidon mentioned above – a nuclear-powered, very Federation 2020a). Most of the nuclear weapons
long range, nuclear-armed torpedo. Underwater trials assigned to the bombers are thought to be in central
began in December 2018. The weapon is scheduled for storage, with only a couple hundred deployed at the
delivery in 2027 and will be carried by specially config two bomber bases.5 Modernization of the nuclear
ured Oscar submarines (TASS 2018g). The first of these weapons storage bunker at Engels Air Base continues.
special submarines – the Project 09852 K-329 Belgorod The aging Tu-160s and most of the Tu-95MSs have
– was launched in April 2019 and was originally sched also been undergoing various minor upgrades for
uled for delivery to the Navy by the end of 2020; how several years. The first seven upgraded Tu-160s and
ever, it appears that this delivery will be delayed until Tu-95MSs returned to service in 2014, another nine
2021 (TASS 2020d). The Belgorod will become Russia’s followed in 2016, and five more were added in 2018.
largest submarine and reportedly will be capable of Only a few dozen of the Tu-95MSs – perhaps around
carrying up to six Poseidon torpedoes (TASS 2019f). 44 – will be modernized, while at least 10 Tu-160s
The second special submarine – Project 09851 were slated to be modernized by 2019, although there
Khabarovsk – might be launched in the first half of has been some delay. Two additional Tu-160s and five
2021, after its initial June 2020 launch date was post Tu-95MS bombers were reportedly upgraded in 2020
poned. Khabarovsk will reportedly also carry up to six (Russian Federation 2020a).
Poseidon torpedoes (TASS 2020e). In addition to these minor upgrades, Russia is con
ducting a significant modernization campaign for its
aging Tu-160 force; however, there is some confusion
Strategic bombers
with regards to the nomenclature of the upgraded
Russia operates two types of nuclear-capable heavy planes, with various news outlets using Tu-160, Tu-
bombers: the Tu-160 Blackjack and the Tu-95MS Bear 160M, Tu-160M1, and Tu-160M2 designations inter
H. We estimate that there are 60 to 70 bombers in the changeably. It appears that there are two distinct mod
inventory, of which perhaps only 50 are counted as ernization programs for the Tu-160 taking place
deployed under New START. Both bomber types can simultaneously: one program involving a “deep moder
carry the nuclear AS-15 Kent (Kh-55) air-launched nization” of existing Tu-160 airframes to incorporate
a next-generation engine, as well as new avionics, navi 2020g). It is possible that the eventual target of 50 new
gation, and radar systems, and another program invol Tu-160M2 bombers might be exaggerated, but if it is
ving the incorporation of similar next-generation accurate, it would probably result in the retirement of
systems onto completely new airframes (Krasnaya most, if not all, of the remaining Tu-95MSs, which are
Zvezda 2020b; Butowski 2016; TASS 2018h). expected to be retired no later than 2035.
The first public flight of the Tu-160M (sometimes The Tu-160M2, meanwhile, is only a temporary
referred to as Tu-160M1) prototype was conducted in bridge to the next-generation bomber known as
January 2018 at the Gorbunov Aviation Factory in PAK-DA, the development of which has been under
Kazan, during a visit by President Putin. Immediately way for several years. The Russian government
after the visit, a 160 billion ruble contract (approxi signed a contract with manufacturer Tupolev in
mately 2.13 USD billion in US dollars) was signed for 2013 to construct the PAK-DA at the Kazan factory.
the modernization of ten “deeply modernized” Tu- Research and development work on the PAK-DA has
160M aircraft using existing airframes by 2027 reportedly been completed, and the aircraft is
(Russian Federation 2018b). expected to share many systems with the Tu-160M2
This contract appears to be separate from the Tu- (TASS 2019l). Construction of the first aircraft’s
160M2 project, which will require serial production of cockpit reportedly began in the spring of 2020, and
completely new airframes in order to accommodate the final assembly is expected in 2021 in advance of
50-aircraft order made by the Russian Aerospace Force flight trials (TASS 2020i). Preliminary tests of the
(VKS). During Putin’s 2018 factory visit in Kazan, he PAK-DA are scheduled for April 2023 (to be com
described the requirement for the new aircraft: “The pleted by fall 2025), and state tests are scheduled for
older version of this plane was discontinued in 1993. February 2026. Initial production is expected to
In 2015, we decided to modernize it and resume pro begin in 2027, with serial production beginning in
duction. This, in fact, is a completely different aircraft, 2028 or 2029 (Izvestia 2020; TASS 2019c). However,
including avionics and everything else. [. . .] It may look it is unclear whether the Russian aviation industry
the same, but the engine, the flight range and the capa has enough capacity to develop and produce two
city are different” (Russian Federation 2018b). strategic bombers at the same time.
Both the Tu-160M and Tu-160M2 aircraft will
reportedly include a new engine – the NK-32-02 – that
is said to increase the aircraft’s range by approximately
Nonstrategic nuclear weapons
1,000 kilometers, or about 621 miles (TASS 2017). The
Tu-160M’s first flight with its older NK-32 engine was Russia is updating many of its shorter-range, so-called
conducted in February 2020, and the aircraft’s first flight “nonstrategic” nuclear weapons, and introducing new
with its next-generation engine took place in types. This effort is less clear and comprehensive than
November 2020, although the United Aircraft the strategic forces modernization plan, but also involves
Corporation declined to show pictures of the phasing out Soviet-era weapons and replacing them with
November test flight due to classification concerns, newer but fewer arms. New systems are being added,
instead electing to couple its announcement with pic leading the Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture
tures of an older version of the plane (United Aircraft Review to accuse Russia of “increasing the total number
Corporation 2020). A second Tu-160M, converted from of [nonstrategic nuclear] weapons in its arsenal, while
an older Tu-160 airframe, began ground tests at the significantly improving its delivery capabilities” (US
Gorbunov factory in December 2020 (TASS 2020h). In Defense Department 2018, 9). In the longer term, though,
January 2019, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu the emergence of more advanced conventional weapons
announced that the first Tu-160M aircraft would be could potentially result in reduction or retirement of
delivered to the VKS in 2021; however, state tests of some existing nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
the modernized aircraft have still not taken place as of Nonetheless, the Russian military continues to attri
December 2020, so this scheduled delivery may be bute importance to nonstrategic nuclear weapons for
delayed until late 2021 or possibly 2022 (Russian use by naval, tactical air, and air- and missile-defense
Federation Defense Ministry 2019b; Russian forces, as well as on short-range ballistic missiles. Part of
Federation 2020a). the rationale is that nonstrategic nuclear weapons are
The Tu-160M2 – which is also expected to include needed to offset the superior conventional forces of
a communications suite drawn from the fifth- NATO and particularly the United States. Russia also
generation Su-57 fighter – is expected to make its mai appears to be motivated by a desire to counter China’s
den flight in the fourth quarter of 2021 (TASS 2020f, large and increasingly capable conventional forces in the
Far East, and by the fact that having a sizable inventory modernizing its long-standing nuclear-armed ballistic
of nonstrategic nuclear weapons helps Moscow keep missile defense system and designing a new ballistic
overall nuclear parity with the combined nuclear forces missile defense interceptor (US Defense Department
2018, 9).
of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.
After the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review was pub These paragraphs constitute the first substantial official
lished, inaccurate and exaggerated information was dis US public statement on the status and composition of
tributed in Washington by defense sources that the Russian nonstrategic nuclear arsenal in more than
attributed nuclear capability to several Russian systems two decades, even though the paragraphs also raise
that had either been retired or were not, in fact, nuclear. questions about assumptions and counting rules. Most
Moreover, although the Nuclear Posture Review claims of the nonstrategic weapon systems are dual-capable,
Russia has increased its nonstrategic nuclear weapons which means not all platforms may be assigned nuclear
over the past decade, the inventory has in fact declined missions, and not all operations are nuclear. Moreover,
significantly – by about one-third – during that period many of the delivery platforms are in various stages of
(Kristensen 2019). overhaul and would not be able to launch nuclear weap
We estimate that Russia today has approximately ons at this time.
1,910 nonstrategic nuclear warheads assigned for deliv
ery by air, naval, ground, and various defensive forces.6
Sea-based nonstrategic nuclear weapons
This is a slight increase compared with the previous
Nuclear Notebook on Russian forces. It is possible that As far as we can ascertain, the biggest user of nonstra
there are more nuclear-capable systems and that this tegic nuclear weapons in the Russian military is the
inventory is growing but there is little public informa navy, which we estimate has roughly 930 warheads for
tion available. This estimate, and the categories of use by land-attack cruise missiles, anti-ship cruise mis
Russian weapons that we have been describing in the siles, anti-submarine rockets, anti-aircraft missiles, tor
Nuclear Notebook for years, were confirmed by the pedoes, and depth charges. These weapons may be used
Nuclear Posture Review, which said: by submarines, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers,
frigates, corvettes, and naval aircraft.
Russia is modernizing an active stockpile of up to 2,000 Major naval modernization programs focus on the
nonstrategic nuclear weapons, including those employ
able by ships, planes, and ground forces. These include
next class of nuclear attack submarines, known in
air-to-surface missiles, short range ballistic missiles, Russia as Project 885/M or Yasen/-M. The program is
gravity bombs, and depth charges for medium-range progressing very slowly. The first of these boats, known
bombers, tactical bombers, and naval aviation, as well as as Severodvinsk, entered service in 2015 and is thought
anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-aircraft missiles and to be equipped with a nuclear version of the Kalibr land-
torpedoes for surface ships and submarines, a nuclear
attack sea-launched cruise missile (the SS-N-30A)
ground-launched cruise missile in violation of the 1987
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and (Gertz 2015). It can also launch the SS-N-26 (3M-55)
Moscow’s antiballistic missile system (US Defense anti-ship/land-attack cruise missile, which the US
Department 2018, 53). National Air and Space Intelligence Center says is
“nuclear possible” (US Air Force 2017, 37).
The Nuclear Posture Review also said: The second boat, and the lead ship of the improved
Yasen-M class – known as Kazan – was originally
Russia possesses significant advantages in its nuclear
weapons production capacity and in nonstrategic scheduled to join the Northern Fleet in late 2019
nuclear forces over the US and allies. It is also building (TASS 2018d); however, the boat was delayed due to
a large, diverse, and modern set of nonstrategic sys the poor results of its dockside trials, which indicated
tems that are dual-capable (may be armed with that “some of the ship’s auxiliary sub-assemblies and
nuclear or conventional weapons). These theater- mechanisms do not meet the requirements of the spe
and tactical-range systems are not accountable under
the New START Treaty and Russia’s nonstrategic
cifications set by the Defense Ministry” (TASS 2019d).
nuclear weapons modernization is increasing the The Kazan underwent sea trials in late 2020, successfully
total number of such weapons in its arsenal, while hitting a target over 1,000 kilometers away with a Kalibr
significantly improving its delivery capabilities. This cruise missile (TASS 2020k). State trials are expected to
includes the production, possession, and flight testing be completed by the end of 2020, meaning that the
of a ground-launched cruise missile in violation of the
Kazan will likely become operational in 2021
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Moscow
believes these systems may provide useful options for (Krasnaya Zvezda 2020c). The Severodvinsk is report
escalation advantage. Finally, despite Moscow’s fre edly 10 to 12 meters longer than the Kazan and can
quent criticism of US missile defense, Russia is also therefore accommodate 40 Kalibr missiles, eight more
than the Kazan (Gady 2018). Six more Yasen-M boats also has various types of other guided bombs, air-to-
are planned – with two boats to be laid down in 2021 for surface missiles, and air-to-air missiles with nuclear
completion by 2027 – although the CEO of the United capability, in which case the air force’s inventory of
Shipbuilding Corporation acknowledged that program warheads – and thus also Russia’s total number of non
delays were likely due to unexpected “design flaws” strategic warheads – could be greater.
(RIA Novosti 2019a). The Yasen-class submarines will Russia has also developed a new long-range dual-
also be able to deliver the SS-N-26 cruise missile, SS- capable air-launched ballistic missile known as the Kh-
N-16 (Veter) nuclear anti-submarine rockets, as well as 47 M2 Kinzhal. The missile, which appears similar to
nuclear torpedoes. the ground-launched SS-26 short-range ballistic missile
Other upgrades of naval nonstrategic nuclear platforms used on the Iskander system, allegedly has a range of up
include those planned for the Sierra class (Project 945), the to 2,000 kilometers (about 1,243 miles) and is launched
Oscar II class (Project 949A), and the Akula class (Project from the center-pylon of specially modified MiG-31 K
971). While the conventional version of the Kalibr is being (Foxhound) air interceptors. The Kinzhal could poten
fielded on a wide range of submarines and ships, the tially be used against targets on both land and sea and
nuclear version will likely replace the current SS-N-21 has reportedly been deployed on experimental combat
nuclear land-attack cruise missile on select attack submar duty in the Southern Military District since
ines. There is also speculation that Russia might consider December 2017 (TASS 2018e). The Kinzhal was publicly
building a new type of cruise missile submarine based on demonstrated for the first time in an airshow in
the Borei SSBN design, which would be called Borei-K. August 2019, although it is unclear if the missile was
The Borei-Ks could potentially carry nuclear-armed cruise actually fired during the competition (TASS 2019g).
missiles instead of ballistic missiles, and if they were Additionally, the Russian Aerospace Force reportedly
approved then they would be scheduled for delivery after received its first batch of Su-57 (PAK-FA) fighter jets in
2027 (TASS 2019e). late 2020 (TASS 2020m). Four more are scheduled for
delivery in 2021, and the delivery of 22 aircraft are
scheduled by the end of 2024. The full contract is
expected to comprise 76 planes for delivery by the end
Air-based nonstrategic nuclear weapons
of 2028 (TASS 2020n). The US Defense Department
The Russian Air Force is the military’s second-largest says that the Su-57s are nuclear-capable (US Defense
user of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, with roughly 500 Department 2018). They will reportedly also be
such weapons assigned for delivery by Tu-22 M3 equipped with hypersonic “missiles with characteristics
(Backfire) intermediate-range bombers, Su-24 M similar to that of the Kinzhal” (TASS 2018f)
(Fencer-D) fighter-bombers, the new Su-34 (Fullback)
fighter bomber, and the MiG-31 K. All types can deliver
nuclear gravity bombs. A total of four regiments are Nonstrategic nuclear weapons in missile
now equipped with the new Su-34, which is replacing defense
the Su-24, with a total of 125 aircraft delivered so far. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review also asserted that
The new Su-57 (PAK-FA) that is in development (called Russia continues to use nuclear warheads in its air and
Felon by NATO) was listed as nuclear-capable by the missile defense forces. The missile defense forces use the
2018 Nuclear Posture Review (US Defense Department Gazelle interceptor, but the Nuclear Posture Review did
2018), but it is not yet fully operational. The Tu-22 M3 not identify which air defense system has dual-
can also deliver Kh-22 (AS-4 Kitchen) air-launched capability or how many are assigned nuclear warheads.
cruise missiles. An upgraded missile known as Kh-32 The US Defense Intelligence Agency said in its
is in development to replace the Kh-22. The Tu-22 M3 March 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment that,
and Su-24 M are also being upgraded, and the new Tu- “Russia may also have warheads for surface-to-air and
22 M3M – which reportedly contains 80 percent entirely other aerospace defense missile systems” (Ashley 2018).
new avionics and shares a communications suite with The S-300 is gradually being replaced by the S-400
the new Su-57 fighter – conducted its maiden flight in system with SA-21 interceptors, and US government
December 2018 (United Aircraft Corporation 2018; sources privately indicate that both the S-300 (SA-20)
TASS 2020g). The second prototype of the upgraded and S-400 (SA-21) are dual-capable. An upgrade of the
Tu-22M3M conducted its first flight in March 2020, nuclear-tipped A-135 anti-ballistic missile defense sys
and has since conducted four additional flight tests— tem around Moscow is underway, and it will be known
one of which tested the plane’s resilience at supersonic as A-235; however, it remains unclear whether the
speeds (TASS 2020l). It is possible the Russian Air Force A-235 system will use either nuclear or conventional
warheads, or perhaps instead rely on kinetic hit-to-kill missile is identified as the 9M729 (SSC-8) (US State
technology (Red Star 2017). Department 2019a). Former National Intelligence
Russian officials said over a decade ago that about Director Dan Coats said Russia initially tested the
40 percent of the country’s 1991 stockpile of air defense 9M729 to prohibited ranges from a fixed launcher,
nuclear warheads remained. Alexei Arbatov, then then tested it to permitted ranges from a mobile
a member of the Russian Federation State Duma defense launcher (Office of the Director National
committee, wrote in 1999 that the 1991 inventory Intelligence 2018). The first two battalions were
included 3,000 air defense warheads (Arbatov 1999). deployed in late 2017 (Gordon 2017), and US intelli
Many of those were probably from systems that had gence sources have since indicated that Russia has
been retired, and US intelligence officials estimated deployed four battalions in the Western, Southern,
that the number had declined to around 2,500 by the Central, and Eastern Military Districts with nearly
late 1980s (Cochran et al. 1989), in which case the 1991 100 missiles (including spares) (Gordon 2019). Each
inventory might have been closer to 2,000 air defense battalion is thought to include four launchers, each
warheads. In 1992, Russia promised to destroy half of its with four missiles, for a total of 64 missiles plus
nuclear air defense warheads, but Russian officials said spares across all four battalions. We estimate the
in 2007 that 60 percent had been destroyed (Pravda four battalions are co-located with the Iskander
2007). sites at Elanskiy, Kapustin Yar (possibly moved to
If those officials were correct, the number of a permanent base by now, possibly in the Far East),
nuclear warheads for Russian air defense forces Mozdok, and Shuya. It is possible, but unknown, if
might have been 800 to 1,000 a decade ago. more battalions have been deployed.
Assuming that the inventory has shrunk further Gen. Paul Selva, former vice chairman of the Joint
since 2007 (due to the improving capabilities of Chiefs of Staff, however, told Congress in 2017 that
conventional air-defense interceptors and continued the 9M729 deployment at that time did not give
retirement of excess warheads), we estimate that Russia a military advantage: “Given the location of
nearly 290 nuclear warheads remain for air defense the specific missiles and deployment, they don’t gain
forces today, plus an additional roughly 90 for the any advantage in Europe” (Brissett 2017). After hav
Moscow A-135 missile defense system and coastal ing denied the existence of a 9M729 missile, the
defense units, for a total inventory of about 380 Russian military in January 2019 displayed what it
warheads. However, it must be emphasized that this said was a launcher, missile canisters, and schematics
estimate comes with considerable uncertainty. of a missile named 9M729, but claimed its range was
less than 500 kilometers, or about 311 miles (TASS
2019k). However, a US intelligence report on the
display subsequently concluded that the event was
Ground-based nonstrategic nuclear weapons
a hoax: Neither the missile, nor its launch vehicle,
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced in nor the schematics shown were what Russia claimed
December 2019 that the upgrade of all army missile them to be (Panda 2019b). The Trump administra
brigades to the SS-26 (Iskander) short-range ballistic tion in February 2019 formally announced the
missile had been completed (Russian Federation United States would withdraw from the
2019). This includes at least 12 brigades: four in Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty effective
the Western Military District; two in the Southern in six months (US State Department 2019b). On
Military District; two in the Central Military District, August 2, 2019, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
and at least four in the Eastern Military District. Forces Treaty officially died.
Each SS-26 launcher can carry up to two missiles It is unknown if Russia has added 9M729 battalions
with a range of at least 350 km. We estimate there beyond the four reported in December 2018. There is
are roughly 70 warheads for short-range ballistic no public confirmation that it has, but in
missiles. There are also unconfirmed rumors that February 2019, only a few weeks after Russia acknowl
the SSC-7 (9M728 or R-500) ground-launched cruise edged the existence of the 9M729 but claimed its range
missile may have nuclear capability. was legal, the press service of Russia’s Western Military
The US government also says Russia has devel District reported it had carried out “electronic
oped and deployed a dual-capable ground-launched launches” of the 9M279 in the Leningrad region (RIA
cruise missile in violation of the now demised Novosti 2019c). This could indicate the 9M729 has
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The been added to a fifth brigade: the 26th Missile
Brigade outside Luga about 125 km south of Disclosure statement

St. Petersburg. And in December 2019, Izvestia
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
reported that the Russian military planned to add
a fourth battalion to each Iskander brigade (Izvestia
2019). It remains to be seen if this means 9M729
Funding
launchers will be added to all of Russia’s 12 Iskander
brigades; however, in October 2020 Putin declared his This research was carried out with grants from the John
willingness to impose a moratorium on future 9M729 D. and Katherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the New Land
Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Prospect Hill
deployments in European territory, “but only provided
Foundation.
that NATO countries take reciprocal steps that pre
clude the deployment in Europe of the weapons earlier
prohibited under the INF Treaty” (Russian Federation Notes on contributors
2020b).
Hans M. Kristensen is the director of the Nuclear Information
Project with the Federation of American Scientists in
Notes Washington, DC. His work focuses on researching and writ
ing about the status of nuclear weapons and the policies that
1. We estimate that Russia stores its nuclear weapons at direct them. Kristensen is a coauthor of the world nuclear
approximately 40 permanent storage sites across the forces overview in the SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford University
country, including about 10 national-level central sto Press) and a frequent adviser to the news media on nuclear
rage sites (Kristensen and Norris 2014, 2–9). Essential weapons policy and operations. He has coauthored Nuclear
references for following Russian strategic nuclear forces Notebook since 2001. Inquiries should be directed to FAS,
include the general New START aggregate data that the 1112 16th Street NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC, 20036 USA;
US and Russian governments release biannually; BBC +1 (202) 546–3300.
Monitoring; Pavel Podvig’s website on Russian strategic
nuclear forces (Podvig n.d.); and the Russia profile main Matt Korda is a research associate for the Nuclear
tained by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Information Project at the Federation of American
Studies (2018) on the Nuclear Threat Initiative website. Scientists, where he coauthors the Nuclear Notebook with
2. For examples of such analyses, see Sokov (2020); Oliker Hans Kristensen. Previously, he worked for the Arms
(2018); Tertrais (2018); Oliker and Baklitskiy (2018); Control, Disarmament, and WMD Non-Proliferation Centre
Bruusgaard (2016, 2017). at NATO headquarters in Brussels. He received his MA in
3. Three Typhoon-class (Project 941) submarines also International Peace and Security from the Department of War
remain afloat. One has been converted to a missile test Studies at King’s College London, where he subsequently
platform. None of these submarines carries nuclear worked as a Research Assistant on nuclear deterrence and
weapons. strategic stability. Matt’s research interests and recent publi
4. One normally well-informed source says there are no cations focus on nuclear deterrence and disarmament, pro
nuclear gravity bombs for the Tu-95MS and Tu-160 gressive foreign policy, and the nexus between nuclear
aircraft (Podvig 2005). weapons, climate change, and injustice.
5. Russia is also adding conventional cruise missiles to its
bomber fleet, a capability that was showcased in
September 2015 when Tu-160 and Tu-95MS bombers
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What is the estimated size of Russia's current nuclear stockpile?

What modernization programs is Russia currently undertaking for its nuclear forces?

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rbul20

Russian nuclear weapons, 2021

Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2021.1885869

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Russian nuclear weapons, 2021

CONTACT Hans M. Kristensen [email protected]

Table 1. Russian nuclear forces, 2021.

Table 2. Estimated Status Of Russian ICBM Forces 2021.

Brigade outside Luga about 125 km south of Disclosure statement

http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_ Reuters. 2019. “Russia Nuclear Submarine Aborts Ballistic

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