06-18 - 2021 - Motion To Recall The Remittitur or Modify The Opinion-anti-SLAPP Motion
06-18 - 2021 - Motion To Recall The Remittitur or Modify The Opinion-anti-SLAPP Motion
06-18 - 2021 - Motion To Recall The Remittitur or Modify The Opinion-anti-SLAPP Motion
Jaroslaw Waszczuk
2216 Katzakian Way
Lodi, CA 95242
Phone: 209-663-2977
Fax: 209-787-3131
E-mail: [email protected]
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CONCLUSION ………………………………………………………….39
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE………………………….……….41
PROOF OF SERVICE ………………………………………………….42
.......43
EXHIBITS 1-46..................................................................................
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Bryan v. Bank of America, 86 Cal.App.4th 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)…….13
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Cheveldave v. Tri Palms Unified Owners Ass’n, 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d 792
(Cal. Ct. App. 2018)……………………………………………… …..…35,36
Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341, fn. 3, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795 P.2d
1223.)…………………………………………………………………..……35
Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341, fn. 3, 272 Cal.Rptr.
767, 795 P.2d 1223……………….28
Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d
432, 51 P.3d 297……………………………………………………………….36
Lucido v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 341, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767, 795
P.2d1223.)………………………………………………………….………36,37
Panos v. Great Western Packing Co. (1943) 21 Cal.2d 636, 637, 134 P.2d
242………………………………………………………………………….….36
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64 S.Ct. 997, 88
L.Ed. 1250 (1944)………………………………………….…………….……38
Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580, 66 S.Ct.
1176, 1179, 90 L.Ed. 1447 (1946)………………………………………...…..38
(Cal. Ct.App.1988)…………………………………………...………………..38
Burton v. Sosinsky (1988) 203 Cal. App. 3d 562, 573 [250 Cal.Rptr.
33]………………………………………………………………….…………..38
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California Satellite Systems, Inc. v. Nichols (1985) 170 Cal. App. 3d
56, 70 [216 Cal.Rptr. 180]………………..30
Buchanan Home and Auto Supply Co v Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 544
F.Supp. 242, 244-245 (D SC, 1981………………………………………...….38
STATUTES
COURT RULES
MISCELLANEOUS AUTHORITIES
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3. 02/09/2015- Court Order granting an anti-SLAPP motion to
Defendants Mike Boyd, Stephen Chilcott, Danesha Nichols, Brent
Seifert, and Cindi Oropeza in Sacramento County Superior Court Case
No: 34-2013-4. 00155479-CU-WT-GDS Waszczuk vs. The Regents of
the University of California, Hon. David I. Brown.
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retainer stolen in 2014 from Waszczuk by his attorney Douglas
Stein. See Case : In re Stein, S245982 (Cal. Mar. 1, 2018)
24. 07/19/2019- Court Order sanctioning Waszczuk with $1300. Hon.
David I. Brown, Dept. 53, Re: Defendants’ 06/12/2019 motion to
compel for monetary and terminating sanctions
25. 07/19/2019- Court Reporter Transcript from the Court hearing with
Hon. David I. Brown, Dept . 53, Re: Defendants’ 06/12/2019 motion
to compel for monetary and terminating sanctions
26. 10/23/2019- Defendants’ Attorneys Daniel Bardzell and Nancy
Sheehan, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Defendants', Motion to Compel Responses to Judgment Debtor
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents, and for
monetary sanctions
27. 10/24/2019- Defendants’ Attorney Daniel Bardzell’s e-mail
correspondence, Re: Defendants’ (the Regents of the University of
California) settlement offer
28. 05/21/2015- Waszczuk’ Response to the Defendants’ Attorney
David Burkett’s e-mail inquiry, dated May 19, 2015—Settlement
Offer
29. 11/15/2019- Defendants’ Attorney Daniel Bardzell’s correspondence
demanding Waszczuk pay the Regents of the University of
California the anti-SLAPP motion legal fees and monetary
sanctions
30. 11/18/2019- Copy of Check No. 139 in the amount of $1300 issued
by Waszczuk to the Regents of the University of California, with
attached 07/19/2018 Court Order which sanctioned Waszczuk with
$1300, Hon. David I. Brown
31. 12/04/2019- Waszczuk’s Opposition to 10/23/2019, Defendants’
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Attorneys Daniel Bardzell and Nancy Sheehan’s Motion to Compel
Responses to Judgment Debtor Interrogatories and Request for
Production of Documents; and for monetary sanctions
32. 12/04/2019- Defendants’ new Attorneys Amanda Iler, Derek Hayes,
and Daniel Bardzell’s reply to 12/04/2019, Waszczuk’s Opposition to
10/23/2019- Defendants’ Attorneys Daniel Bardzell and Nancy
Sheehan’s Motion to Compel Responses to Judgment Debtor
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents, and for
monetary sanctions
33. 12/04/2019- Defendants’ new Attorneys Amanda Iler, Derek Hayes,
and Daniel Bardzell’s second reply to 12/04/2019, Waszczuk’s
Opposition to the 10/23/2019, Defendants’ Attorneys Daniel Bardzell
and Nancy Sheehan’s Motion to Compel Responses to Judgment
Debtor Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents, and
for monetary sanctions
34. 12/13/2019- Court Order Tentative Ruling sanctioning Waszczuk
with $1300, Hon. David I. Brown, Dept. 53, Re: 10/23/2019
Defendants’ Motion to Compel and for monetary sanctions
35. 12/17/2019- Court Order affirming 12/13/2019 Tentative Ruling,
Hon. David Brown, Dept. 53, Re: 10/23/2019 Defendants’ Motion to
Compel and for monetary sanctions
36. 12/27/2019- Waszczuk’s Notice of Objection to the 12/13/2019 and
12/17/2019 Court Orders, Hon. David I. Brown, Dept. 53, Re:
10/23/2019 Defendants’ Motion to Compel and for monetary
sanctions
37. 04/26/2021- Defendants’ Ex Parte Application for Leave to Extend
Page Limit for Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the
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Alternative, Summary Adjudication filed in violation of California
Rules of Court, Rule 3.1110 (b)(1) and under false pretenses.
38. 04/27/2021- Waszczuk’s meet and confer correspondence sent to
Defendants’ Attorney Amanda Goulding, Re: 04/26/2021,
Defendants’ Ex Parte Application for Leave to Extend Page Limit
for Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the
Alternative, Summary Adjudication
39. 04/12/2021- Application and Order for Appearance and Examination
of Irina Waszczuk filed by the new Defendants’ Attorney Olatomiwa
T. Aina in Department 43, Hon. Thadd Blizzard.
40. 04/27/21- Waszczuk’s meet and confer correspondence with
attachments sent to the Defendants’ Attorney Olatomiwa T. Aina,
Re: 04/26/2021, Re: Subpoena and Application and Order for
Appearance and Examination Case No. 34-2013-00155479,
Jaroslaw Waszczuk v. The Regents of the University of California
41. 05/14/2021- Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the
Alternative, Summary Adjudication relitigating dismissed COA’s
from Waszczuk SAC by Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, granted to
them on 04/14/2015
42. 09/25/2015- Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Defendant's Motion for Automatic Stay, filed pursuant to
C.C.P. §916(a), or in the Alternative, Motion for a Discretionary
Stay. Motion was filed by Defendants to block Waszczuk’s proposed
Third Amended Complaint (TAC). 43. 10/28/2015- Court Order
granting Defendants’ Motion for Automatic Stay, filed pursuant to
C.C.P. §916(a), or in the Alternative, Motion for a Discretionary
Stay. The Court Order blocked Waszczuk’s proposed TAC, which
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was never was submitted to and reviewed by the Court, Hon. David
I. Brown, Dept. 53.44. 09/03/2015- Copy of Waszczuk’s
proposed TAC sent to Defendants’ Attorney Douglas Ropel for
stipulation to file, and his 09/25/2015 negative response.
45. 09/30/2015- Waszczuk’s Request for Dismissal of four individual
defendants, Charles Witcher, Ann Maiden Rice, Dorin Daniliuc, and
Patrick Putney, from the Case No. 34-2013-00155479, Jaroslaw
Waszczuk v. The Regents of the University of California et al., filed on
10/01/2015.
46. 12/04/2013- Waszczuk’s initial Wrongful Termination with six
causes of action, which included: 5. Violation and Breach of the
2009 Settlement-Agreement, 6. Violation of UC Policy PPSM
(Employee Evaluation Policy). Complaint was docketed on December 4,
2013 in Sacramento County Superior Court as Jaroslaw Waszczuk v. The
Regents of the University of California Ann Madden Rice, Mike Boyd,
Stephen Chilcott, Charles Witcher, Danesha Nichols, Cindy Oropeza,
Brent Seifert, Patrick Putney, and Dorin Daniliuc.
INTRODUCTION
Under the California Rules of Court, rule 8.272(c), the plaintiff and
appellant, Jaroslaw Waszczuk (pronounced “Vashchook”), hereby moves to
recall the remittitur issued on January 16, 2018 (Exhibit 1) in the trial court
register of action (ROA 128) and to reinstate his appeal, or alternatively, to
modify the erroneous unpublished opinion issued by the Court on
October 10, 2017 (Exhibit 2) and remand the new decision with
instructions for the trial court to vacate or void the trial court’s April 14,
2015 order and judgment (Exhibit 3) (ROA 57, 80and81). The 04/14/2015
trial court order and judgment granted the special motion to strike (anti-
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SLAPP) pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16 five
individual defendants Mike Boyd, Danesha Nichols, Stephen Chilcott,
Cindy Oropeza and Brent Seifert (hereafter Defendants) striking from
Waszczuk’s Second Amended Complaint (SAC) the first four causes of
action (COAs) which were: 1.) intentional infliction of emotional distress,
2.) tortious interference with economic advantage, 3.) harassment, failure to
prevent harassment, discrimination, and retaliation under FEHA,
Government Code § 12940(a), and 4.) whistleblower/unlawful retaliation
California Government Code §§ 8547 et. seq .
Waszczuk cannot find a better authority than Bryan v. Bank of America, 86
Cal.App.4th 185 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) to justify filing a motion to recall the
remittitur more than two years after the remittitur was issued. In Bryan v.
Bank of America’s “Recall of the Remittitur” discussion, the Court
explained:
If the remittitur issues by inadvertence or mistake, or as a
result of fraud or imposition practiced on the appellate court,
the court has inherent power to recall it and thereby reassert
its jurisdiction over the cause. This remedy, though described
in procedural terms, is actually an exercise of an
extraordinary substantive power. Correction of the clerk’s
clerical or other mistakes in the remittitur is a very minor
aspect of the proceeding; its significant function is to permit
the court to set aside an erroneous judgment on appeal
obtained by improper means. In practical effect, therefore, the
motion or petition to recall the remittitur may operate as a
belated petition for rehearing on special grounds, without
any time limitations. [Citations.]” (Id. § 736, p. 765, italics
in original.)
The crux of and reason for this motion is not to attempt to relitigate
or delay the legal process which has been endlessly and maliciously
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delayed by the defendants and their attorneys in filing the anti-SLAPP
motion on 12/01/2014. Rather, this motion seeks to end the intentional and
unrelenting pattern of misconduct by the defendants and their attorneys in
disregard of the Court’s benevolence in granting them the anti-SLAPP
motion on April 14, 2014, as affirmed by the Court of Appeal, Third
Appellate District (3DCA) 10/10/2017 in an unpublished opinion known as
Waszczuk v. Regents of University of California C079524 (Cal. Ct. App.
Oct. 10, 2017).
The 3DCA 10/10/2017 is erroneous itself and needs to be remanded
to the trial court with instructions to vacate or void the April 14, 2015 court
order and judgment which granted the defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion.
After the remittitur was issued on January 16, 2018, the anti-SLAPP motion
defendants and the Regents of the University of California have been
maliciously relitigating the four stricken COAs of the anti-SLAPP motion
in an attempt to terminate the Waszczuk lawsuit against the UC Regents
and to extort money from Waszczuk and his wife.
Waszczuk does not see any other way to stop the defendants and their
attorneys’ despicable harassment, misconduct, malice, and abuse of the
system than to file this motion to recall remittitur and return the four
stricken COAs to the defendants because they have been begging for
almost two years to have them back.
The trial court has erred by granting the anti-SLAPP motion to the
defendants instead of allowing Waszczuk to cure the defective SAC in
December 2014 and in September 2015 by amendment and dismissing all
individual defendants. The defective SAC was filed on September 30, 2014
against Waszczuk’s will by his drug-addicted attorney, Douglas E. Stein,
on September 30, 2014. Stein was dismissed by Waszczuk on December
16, 2014 for stealing Waszczuk’s retainer and failing to object to the anti-
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SLAPP motion. Awarded by the 10/10/2017 3DCA unpublished opinion in
Waszczuk v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., C079524 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 10,
2017) Waszczuk’s attorney, Douglas E. Stein SBN 13248 was disbarred on
January 10, 2020 for gross professional misconduct in relation to In re
Stein, S245982 (Cal. Mar. 1, 2018) and other crimes not related to his
representation of Waszczuk.
http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/Licensee/Detail/131248
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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Before Waszczuk’s four causes of action were stricken by the Court
from the Second Amended Complaint, the Court had denied the plaintiff’s
Motion for Reconsideration (ROA 59) on 4/10/2015 and Waszczuk’s
motion to dismiss the defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion for violation of the
discovery stay by the defendants’ attorneys. (ROA 64) (CCP § 425.16 (g)
On September 10/10/17, the Court of Appeal, in an unpublished
opinion in Waszczuk v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., C079524 (Cal. Ct. App.
Oct. 10, 2017) affirmed the 4/14/2015 trial court judgment striking the first
four COAs from the Waszczuk’s SAC.
On November 9, 2017, the Court of Appeal denied Waszczuk’s
petition for rehearing filed on October 25, 2017. A petition for review
was filed with the California Supreme Court, Case No. S245879 and was
denied on January 10, 2018. The remittitur was issued by the Court of
Appeal on January 16, 2018.
STATEMENTS OF FACTS AFTER ISSUANCE OF THE
REMITTITUR ON JANUARY 16, 2018 BY THE COURT OF
APPEAL THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
I. DEFENDANTS’ VEXATIOUS, MALICIOUS, AND
NEFARIOUS RELITIGATING OF THE DISMISSED CAUSES
OF ACTION
Just after the remittitur was issued on January 16, 2018, the defendants,
empowered by the fraudulent 3DCA unpublished opinion in Waszczuk v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., C079524 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2017) caused the
stricken COAs by the anti-SLAPP motion became the subject of a frivolous
relitigating with the goal of terminating Waszczuk’s lawsuit against UC
Regents and dismissed COAs became a tool for defendants’ attorney’s
criminal activity in the court of law to extort money from Waszczuk and his
wife.
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On April 25, 2018, Attorney David Burkett sent Waszczuk the
request for production of documents (Set 1) (Exhibit 4), If the Court
examines Exhibit 3, requests 1–8 on pages 3–4, it will be clear that
Attorney Burkett’s demand for documents regarding COA No. 3 which was
stricken from Waszczuk’s SAC pertaining to harassment and failure to
prevent harassment, discrimination, and retaliation, was in violation of
Government Code § 12940 (A).
Request No. 9 was regarding COA No. 4 which was stricken from the SAC
and pertained to whistleblower/unlawful retaliation, in violation of
Government Code § 8547 et seq. Request 9 stated, “Please produce any
and all DOCUMENTS supporting YOUR contention that YOU were
subjected to retaliation for engaging in protected activities, in violation of
Government Code § 85547 et seq., exactly as it stated in stricken COA’s 4
from SAC ”
Waszczuk was forced by the defendant’s attorney’s frivolous and vexatious
motions and by the monetary sanction imposed by court order and threats
of a terminating sanction against UC Regents to produce thousands of
documents for the dismissed COAs.
On October 3, 2018, the defendants’ attorneys from Porter Scott,
David Burkett, and Daniel Bardzell, filed a motion to compel verified
responses to requests for production of documents (Set 1), for monetary and
terminating sanctions. The motion was deliberately filed in Department 54
(Exhibit 5) (ROA 163–180) and bypassed Judge Brown in Department 53
in a fraudulent attempt to obtain an order for monetary and terminating
sanction from Judge Christopher E. Krueger in Department 54. Judge
Krueger was unfamiliar with Waszczuk’s case, which had been pending for
four years, because he had never presided over it.
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The Defendants did not even mention the four remining COAs in their
motion, which should have been one of the motions key subjects. Attorneys
Burkett and Bardzell were caught, and their evil, deceptive plan failed to
persuade Judge Krueger to terminate Waszczuk’s lawsuit.
On October 11, 2018, Waszczuk informed the court clerk in
Department 54 about the misconduct of the attorneys for the defendants
(Exhibit 6).
On October 17, 2018, the defendants’ attorneys, Burkett and
Bardzell, refiled the motion with Department 53. Judge Brown scheduled a
hearing for November 14, 2018. However, in a surprising turn of events on
October 31, 2018, Judge Brown issued an order to Waszczuk with $520 in
monetary sanctions (Exhibit 7), ROA 166). The court order stated:
The notice of motion provides the incorrect time and location
for the hearing. This matter has been assigned to Department
53 for law and motion purposes, and Department 53 hears law
and motion matters at 2 p.m. Moving counsel is directed to
immediately provide notice to Plaintiff of the correct time and
location of the hearing.
On October 14, 2018, Judge Brown issued a second court order for
the same motion to compel monetary and terminating sanction,
admonishing Burkett and Bardzell as follows due to their despicable
violation of California Rules of Court -Rule 3.1110 (b) (1) (Exhibit 7,
ROA 178):
The Court must point out Defendant’s procedural errors that
have rendered an otherwise simple motion confusing and
created unnecessary work for the Court. Defendant initially
noticed this motion for October 31, 2018, but included the
incorrect law and motion department on the notice. It then
apparently filed the identical motion and noticed it for hearing
on November 13 and 14, in this department.
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The Court acknowledged Waszczuk’s November 12, 2018 correspondence
(ROA 178) that had been sent to the court by overnight mail, prior to the
scheduled November 14, 2018 hearing. Judge Brown noticed that
Defendants’ motion had been filed in the wrong department and that
Burkett and Bardzell slandered Waszczuk; thus, the Court admonished
them with the words in the duplicated October 31, 2018 court order, dated
November 14, 2018 (Exhibit 8, ROA 175, 176):
Further, while Defendant references Plaintiff’s “vexatious”
conduct in this action, that conduct has nothing to do with the
instant motion and, in any event, is not a basis for discovery
sanctions. Such ad hominem comments serve no useful
purpose in educating the court as to the party’s position
and distract more than they advocate. In short, they are
more cathartic than tactical.
However, in the two orders, dated October 31, 2018, and November
14, 2018, the Court failed to address Burkett and Bardzell’s evil attempt to
terminate the Waszczuk lawsuit by relitigating the COAs that had been
stricken through the anti-SLAPP motion.
On February 11, 2019, three days after Waszczuk met Defendants’
Attorney Daniel Bardzell in the cafeteria of Department 43, Bardzell and
Burkett filed another motion to compel, demanding monetary and
terminating sanction. The 2/08/2019 meeting between Waszczuk and
Bardzell in Department 43 was memorialized by the 2/08/2019 court order
(Exhibit 9) (ROA 189) and Waszczuk’s meet and confer letter which was
sent to Bardzell on 2/10/2019 (Exhibit 10).
The Defendants’ motion, which amounted to 396 pages of pleadings and
exhibits (Exhibit 11) (ROA 189–186), was almost identical to the motion
Attorneys Burkett and Bardzell deceptively filed in the wrong department
on October 3, 2018 in evil attempt to terminate Waszczuk’s lawsuit
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On March 11, 2019, Waszczuk filed the ex parte application for late
opposition to the defendants’ motion to compel monetary and terminating
sanctions (Exhibit 12)(ROA 198). Waszczuk requested that the Court
dismiss the defendants’ motion entirely for the reasons outlined on pages 2
and 3 of the ex parte application by informing the Court that the attorneys
from Porter Scott were tampering with the administration of justice to
injure Waszczuk and that the first four causes of action stricken from the
Waszczuk SAC by the anti-SLAPP motion granted to Defendants on April
14, 2015 must be completely excluded from the Defendants’ discovery
process.
By a March 13, 2019, court order (Exhibit 13, ROA 203), Judge
David I. Brown from Department 53 declined oral argument on
Waszczuk’s ex parte request. The Court also declined to dismiss the
defendants’ motion, which brought back into litigation the four dismissed
COAs stricken from Waszczuk ‘s SAC. Judge Brown did not impose
monetary and termination sanctions on Waszczuk, and in an order dated
3/13/20119, the Court ruled:
There has only been one previous discovery motion by
Defendant to compel responses. Plaintiff complied with that
order and provided responses, albeit some which Defendant
deemed insufficient in certain respects and, for that reason,
brought a motion to compel further responses. The Court will
not at this time find an abuse of the discovery process.
Contrary to the ruling, Judge Brown completely ignored fact that the
defendants relitigating the dismissed COAs, and, in the same manner as in
October and November 2018. Notorious Defendants Attorneys Burkett and
Bardzell, did not give up.
On March 20, 2019, just seven days after Judge Brown denied them
monetary and terminating sanctions, they filed another motion to compel
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for monetary and terminating sanctions. This was almost identical to their
previous motions (Exhibit 14, ROA 205–211). Again , Burkett and
Bardzell bluntly mixed apple and oranges (UC Regents with anti-SLAP
motion defendants ) in evil attempt to terminate Waszczuk lawsuit .
On April 12, 2019, Waszczuk filed his opposition to Bardzell and
Burkett’s motion (Exhibit 15) (ROA 209).
The motion was finalized by a tentative court order, which instead of
imposing sanction against Defendants and their attorneys for a frivolous
motion and for the malicious relitigating of dismissed COAs, the Court
reimposed sanctions on Waszczuk. Thus, Waszczuk requested the court
hearing in Department 53.
A different judge, The Hon. Steven H. Rodda, presided over the hearing on
April 26, 2019 in Department 53. Judge Rodda ruled by court order
(Exhibit 16, ROA 2011):
Terminating Sanctions
At the end of the hearing with Judge Rodda, Waszczuk asked the Court
what he was supposed to provide to the defendants’ attorneys, because they
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had already received everything. Judge Rodda responded, “You will have
to figure that out yourself” (court reporter’s transcript, page 8, Exhibit
17). Waszczuk figured out that the Defendants were trying to terminate
Waszczuk’s lawsuit by using dismissed COAs, which amounted to an
abuse of the court system and a bullying or blackmailing of the judges.
On June 12, 2019, Defendants Attorneys Burkett and Bardzell, filed
another motion for monetary and terminating sanctions, vexatiously and
maliciously using again the four dismissed COAs (Exhibit 18, ROA 213–
2019). Attached is Bardzell’s memorandum to support the frivolous
motion, which is almost identical to the previous motion. Waszczuk
opposed Defendants’ motion on July 5, 2019 (Exhibit 19)(ROA 2017). On
page 5 of his opposition, Waszczuk pointed out the following to the Court:
The Court does not need to read Defendants’ attorney Daniel
Bardzell’s Declaration or Memorandum of Point and
Authorities to find out how deceptive Porter Scott’s attorney
is. In his pleadings, Bardzell’s complete disregard of the
April 26, 2019, Court Order (Hon. Rodda) ROA 211, which
states in bold black letters that, “Regents are not a party to
the underlying discovery or this motion, and, therefore,
the Court will not grant terminating sanctions as to
Regents.”
It was quite clear to Waszczuk that something was going terribly wrong
with his case in Department 53 when he looked at the facts and saw that the
judges were noticing the malice and gross misconduct of the Defendants
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attorneys but were punishing Waszczuk with sanctions and letting the
attorneys harass him as much and as long as they wished.
Judge Brown, by his July 19, 2019 order, awarded $1,300 in sanctions
against the Defendants for their attorneys’ misconduct and fraud. During
that hearing on July 19, 2019, Judge Brown questioned Bardzell in his
statement, which can be found as follows on pages 5 and 6 of the RT
(Exhibit 25):
THE COURT: This is post judgment discovery. What are
you terminating? There’s already a judgment against Mr.
Waszczuk.
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The difference in the October 23, 2019 motion to the previous four motions was
that that Defendants’ Attorney Burkett was replaced with another Porter Scott
shareholder and attorney, Nancy Sheehan, who had been an employee at Porter
Scott for 34 years. Burkett was a leading attorney in the case Waszczuk v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., C079524 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2017) since January
23, 2015. Nancy Sheehan’s name was added to the pleadings at a time when
she was gravely ill with metastatic breast cancer; she died on November 23,
2019, exactly one month after another evil-spirited motion was filed by
Defendant’s attorney Bardzell.
(https://www.legacy.com/obituaries/sacbee/obituary.aspx?n=nancy-joan-
sheehanandpid=194994093).
Furthermore, what caught Waszczuk’s attention in the October 23, 2019
motion pleadings was that Porter Scott’s attorneys are “attorneys for
judgment creditors/former defendants,” in contrast with previous
pleadings in which the judgment creditors were not the former defendants.
On October 24, 2019, Waszczuk received an e-mail from Daniel
Bardzell who now representing “former Defendants” with a “settlement
offer.”
On October 31, 2019, Waszczuk briefly responded to Bardzell’s
offer assuming that David Burkett on his way out told Bardzell to send it.
David Burkett had sent a similar offer to Waszczuk in May 2015, and again
in August 2015 (Exhibit 28).
On November 12, 2019, another Porter Scott attorney and
shareholder, Derek Haynes was added to Jaroslaw Waszczuk v. The
Regents of the University of California, Case No. 34-2013-00155479 (ROA
228).
On November 15, 2019, Defendant’s attorney Bardzel in his weird
and threatening correspondence (Exhibit 29) informed Waszczuk that
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Porter Scott paralegal Marilyn Gamper was not permitted to cash out the
$520 from Waszczuk sent her on October 31, 2019 (legal fees awarded to
her by the 6/07/2018 court order in anti-SLAPP motion proceeding).
Waszczuk also paid $520 sanction awarded unjustly to the Defendants by
the Court on 10/31/2018. Check was cashed by Porter Scott’s attorneys.
Furthermore, Defendants’ Attorney Daniel Bardzell in his threatening scam
correspondence demanded from Waszczuk in bold letters that Waszczuk
must issue a check to pay all anti-SLAPP legal fees and costs payable to
the Regents of the University of California, the Defendant which is not
listed anti-SLAPP motion.
Defendants’ attorneys Bardzell and Burkett were informed that, on August
9, 2019, the State Bar of California Client Security Fund reimbursed
Waszczuk in amount of $14,500, stolen from him in December 2014, by his
attorney, Stein.
Bardzell and Burkett were also informed that on October 1, 2019,
Waszczuk received $25,000 from his wife to take care of Bardzell and
Burkett’s multiple extortion attempts, which began in 2015, using
Waszczuk’s wife as a blackmail tool to force Waszczuk to pay them the
anti-SLAPP legal fees.
Following Bardzell’s November 15, 2019 threatening letter, on November
18, 2019, Waszczuk issued a check in the amount of $1,300 to pay the
sanction imposed by the 7/19/2019 Court Order. However, in a short letter
dated November 21, 2019, Waszczuk asked Bardzell whether he would
prefer to reissue the $1,300-sanction check to the five former individual
defendants—Nichols, Chilcott, Seifert, Boyd, and Oropeza—instead of to
the Regents of UC. Furthermore, Waszczuk advised Bardzell that he should
ask Judge Brown to make sure that Nichols, Chilcott, Seifert, Boyd, and
Oropeza are the former defendants, as he claimed in his motion to
- 26 -
compel and for monetary sanctions filed on October 23, 2019, and in his
recent correspondence.
On December 4, 2019, Waszczuk filed his opposition to the Defendants’
October 23, 2019 further motion to extort money from Waszczuk or his
wife (Exhibit 31, ROA 235), emphasizing again that the Regents of UC
were not the defendants in the anti-SLAPP motion and, therefore, that they
were not entitled to any legal fees. This was clearly affirmed by two
different judges, The Hon. Rodda and The Hon. Brown, in different court
orders ( See: Exhibit 25, ROA 2011, and Exhibit 29, ROA 19).
Attorney Bardzell, and two new attorneys, Derek Hayes, and Amanda Iller,
filed two replies to Waszczuk’s December 4, 2019 opposition to their
motion. One reply was filed on the same day, December 4, 2019, entitled
“Reply to No Opposition” (Exhibit 32), and on December 6, 2019, they
filed a second reply to the opposition (Exhibit 33), (ROA 238).
On page 5, paragraph 4 of their December 6, 2019 reply, entitled
“Defendant Regents Is Entitled to Payment of Sanctions Awards,”
Porter Scott Attorney Amanda Iller, who was listed in the June 7, 2018
Court Order, demanded that legal fees be paid to the Regents of UC, in bold
letters stating.
Judgment Debtor has cited no legal authority for his position
that the REGENTS are not entitled to the sanction payment.
The REGENTS has paid for the defense of the Judgment
Creditors (Iler Deci. ¶ 6). “A monetary sanction may be
based not only on attorney’s fees and costs, but also on any
other reasonable expenses incurred.
- 27 -
Waszczuk did not understand what the Defendant’s Attorney Amanda Iller
was talking about after Waszczuk sent two sanctions checks to Porter Scott,
one on October 31, 2019 in the amount of $520, and a second check on
November 18. 2019 for $1300 and wanted to pay legal fees to the former
Defendants attorneys from Porter Scott law firm listed in the 6/07/2018
court order.After Waszczuk read the Court’s tentative decision, issued on
December 12, 2019, and, to his disbelief, found out that Judge Brown
slammed Waszczuk with additional monetary sanctions of $1,300,
Waszczuk called the court clerk and requested a hearing on December 13,
2019 at 2:00 p.m.
At the court hearing, the defendants were represented by Attorney Bardzell.
Judge Brown admonished Bardzell and ordered the return of the $1,300
paid on November 18, 2019 to Waszczuk, and explained again to Bardzell
that that the Regents of UC were not defendants in the anti-SLAPP motion.
On December 27, 2019, Waszczuk filed a Notice of Objection to the Court
Orders Dated December 13 and 17, 2019(Exhibit 34and35)(ROA 241
and242), and Plaintiff’s Request for Court Order Modification.
Waszczuk submitted his Notice of Objection and the Request for
Modification of the court order (Exhibit 36) (ROA 244) because nothing
was in the December 17, 2019 court order that had been argued or said at
the December 13, 2019 hearing.
In his Notice of Objection, Waszczuk focused on the issue of the
defendants in the anti-SLAPP motion. He asked the Court to clarify
whether Chilcott, Nichols, Oropeza, Seifert, and Boyd had been dismissed
by the anti-SLAPP motion or whether they were still the defendants in the
lawsuit.
- 28 -
II. NEW ATTORNEYS FOR THE DEFENDANTS FROM
PORTER SCOTT: LINDSAY A. GOULDING AND
OLATOMIWA T. AINA
Two new defendants Attorneys Goulding and Aina resumed their dirty
game with Waszczuk and with the new judge in Department 53.
one year and half after Waszczuk filed his Notice of Objection to the court
orders of December 14 and17, 2019, On April 26, 2021, Defendants’ Attorney
Lindsay A. Goulding, in violation of California Rules of Court Rule 3.1110 (a)
(1), served Waszczuk by e-mail an Ex-Parte Application for Leave to Extend
Page Limit for Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the
Alternative, Summary Adjudication in violation of California Rules of Court -
Rule 3.1110 (b) (1) without stating or marking on the pleading in which
Department the ex parte application would be filed or which judge would
handle the ex parte application. (Exhibit 37) (ROA 247–249)
Not letting the opposing party know which judge or department will make the
decision is gross professional misconduct and extrinsic fraud. “Extrinsic fraud
occurs when one party prevents the other from having his day in court.
Extrinsic fraud only arises when one party has in some way fraudulently been
prevented from presenting his or her claim or defense.” Sporn v. Home Depot
USA, Inc. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1300 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 780
Attorney Lindsay A. Goulding brought into her Ex Parte Application three
Stricken COAs by anti-SLAPP motion granted to the Defendants by the
Court on 4/14/2015 by the fraudulent and frivolous anti-SLAPP motion.
Lindsay Goulding’s deceptive Ex Parte Application should not have been
accepted and granted by the Court on the same day April 26, 2021 by the
Honorable Shama Hakim Mesiwala’s stamp, but in fact it was.
- 29 -
Waszczuk addressed the Attorney Amanda Goulding’s Ex Parte in the meet and
confer letter dated April 27, 2021, which was filed in the Court on April 28,
2021 (Exhibit 38) (ROA 250).
Simultaneously, another Porter Scott Attorney, Olatomiwa T. Aina, in
coordinated action with Amanda Goulding, served on Waszczuk a Subpoena
and Application and Order for Appearance and Examination filed in
Department 43 (Exhibit 39) (ROA 251-259) in attempt to break into
Waszczuk’s wife bank account and 401(k) plan to extort money from in a
similar manner to other Porter Scott attorneys attempts in 2019 who were not
awarded any legal fees in the anti-SLAPP motion and they were prohibited by
the Court to cash any check using the Regents of the University of California
name because Regents were not a party in the anti-SLAPP motion. Waszczuk
addressed the Olatomiwa T. Aina scam in the meet and confer letter dated April
27, 2021(Exhibit 40) (ROA 251).
On May 14, 20210 Defendants’ Attorneys Amanda Goulding and Olatomiwa
T. Aina filed in their scam to extort money from Waszczuk and his wife the 475
pages of documents with the defendant’s notice of motion and motion for
summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication (Exhibit 41)
(ROA 254-258). Seventy-five percent of the filed motion was the third and
fourth COAs stricken from Waszczuk’s SAC. Apparently, the defendants new
attorneys Goulding and Aina have high expectations that the new judge in
Department 53 would rule in their favor and that they would be able to extort
money from Waszczuk by relitigating the fraudulent anti-SLAPP motion COAs
by Motion for Summary Judgment .
Defendants attorneys perpetrated crime did not work as they anticipated with
Judge David I Brown from Dept. 53 in 2014-2019 and Judge Thadd A.
Blizzard from Dept. 43 and will not work this time with Judge Thadd A.
- 30 -
Blizzard from Dept. 43 and the new Judge Shama Hakim Mesiwala from Dept
53.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES AND
ARGUMENT
I. THE REMITTITUR MUST BE RECALLED AND THE
ERRONEOUS UNPUBLISHED OPINION FILED ON OCTOBER
10, 2017 in Waszczuk v. Regents of University. Of California
C079524 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2017) MUST BE MODIFIED
The false and harmful statement from page 3 of the opinion misled
Waszczuk into believing that five anti-SLAPP motion defendants, Nichols,
Seifert, Boyd, Oropeza and Chilcot were entirely dismissed from the
lawsuit and that the Regents of the University of California were the only
remaining defendants to the lawsuit.
“Plaintiff loses this appeal, but it is not the end of his lawsuit
for wrongful termination.” The trial court reminded plaintiff
at the hearing on the special motion to strike that the Regents
of the University of California (the Regents) were not
protected if they discriminated or retaliated against him and,
therefore, “[i]ndependent of the five individuals who are
before the Court on this motion, [plaintiff] still retains his
right to sue the Regents because they are still in the lawsuit
and he’s still the plaintiff.” In this context, we recite the brief
facts relevant to the issues plaintiff raises on appeal.”
- 35 -
of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.’ “ (Mycogen Corp. v.
Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 51 P.3d
297.)
Furthermore, the Court explained collateral estoppel has five requirements:
“First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigating must
be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second,
this issue must have been actually litigated in the former
proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in
the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former
proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party
against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in
privity with, the party to the former proceeding.” (Lucido v.
Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 341, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767,
795 P.2d 1223.)
Cheveldave v. Tri Palms Unified Owners Ass’n, 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d 792 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2018) is the authority that exactly applies to the Defendants
misconduct and abuse of the court system since remittitur was issued on
January 16, 2018. Defendants’ legal gangsterism in the court must be
stopped by the Court of Appeal which erroneously affirmed the trail court
judgment dated April 14, 2015.
In F.E.V. v. City of Anaheim, 15 Cal.App.5th 462 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017)
Court explained that the
“doctrine of res judicata rests upon the grounds that the party
to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has
litigated, or had an opportunity to litigate the same matter in a
former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should
not be permitted to litigate it again to the harassment and
vexation of his opponent. Public policy and the interest of
litigants alike require that there be an end to litigation.”
(Panos v. Great Western Packing Co. (1943) 21 Cal.2d 636,
637, 134 P.2d 242.)
- 36 -
inconsistent judgments, and protecting litigants from vexatious litigation.
(Lucido v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 343, 272 Cal.Rptr. 767,
795 P.2d 1223 ; Roos v. Red (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 870, 887, 30
Cal.Rptr.3d 446 ; Younan v. Caruso (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 401, 407, 59
Cal.Rptr.2d 103.)
The only way to stop the Defendants and their attorneys from further
relitigating of the already litigated and dismissed four causes of action is to
recall the remittitur, reinstate the appeal, modify the 10/10/2017
unpublished opinion and remand it to the trial court with instructions to
vacate the April 14, 2015 Court Order and Judgment.
As the attached exhibits show, the litigation tactics of the defendants and
their attorneys from Porter Scott and their egregious misconduct
incapacitated bullied judges in trial court Department 53 and prevented
them from restoring the order and meaning of law in Department 53 and
generally in the trial court in this case. The Court of Appeal must act to
restore order and justice in this case by recalling the remittitur and vacate
and void the harm done to Waszczuk and the integrity of the justice system.
The trial court orders and decisions were obtained by the powerful Regents
of the University of California by intimidation, bullying, blackmailing,
extortion and possible bribery and racketeering. The stakes must be a lot
bigger in this case as the Court noticed on page 2 in the preliminary
statement of the unpublished opinion dated 10/10/2017. (See Waszczuk ‘s
Declaration in Support of this motion to recall remittitur.)
In Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) the Court noted that the
alleged sanctionable conduct was that the defendants had “(1) attempted to
deprive the Court of jurisdiction by acts of fraud, nearly all of which were
- 37 -
performed outside the confines of this Court, (2) filed false and frivolous
pleadings, and (3) attempted, by other tactics of delay, oppression,
harassment and massive expense to reduce plaintiff to exhausted
compliance.” This is exactly what Defendants are doing in the courts in this
case.In Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64
S.Ct. 997, 88 L.Ed. 1250 (1944). See also Universal Oil Products Co. v.
Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580, 66 S.Ct. 1176, 1179, 90 L.Ed. 1447
(1946) Courts ruled :The “historic power of equity to set aside fraudulently
begotten judgments,” is necessary to the integrity of the courts, for
“tampering with the administration of justice in [this] manner... involves far
more than an injury to a single litigant.”
In Peat, Marwick, Mitchell Co. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal.App.3d 272
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988) California decision on the inherent authority of courts,
affirmed that judges are empowered to act when a party seeks to take unfair
advantage of “the integrity of the judicial system.” This decision directly
addressed the fact that a court’s inherent powers include the authority to
terminate a case for litigation.
Under the “unclean hands” doctrine, a party is barred from relief if engaged
in any unconscientious conduct directly related to the transaction or matter
before the court. Burton v. Sosinsky (1988) 203 Cal. App. 3d 562, 573 [250
Cal.Rptr. 33]; California Satellite Systems, Inc. v. Nichols (1985) 170 Cal.
App. 3d 56, 70 [216 Cal.Rptr. 180].
The authority to dismiss a lawsuit for litigant misconduct is a creature of
the “clean hands doctrine” and is applicable to both equitable and legal
damages claims. Buchanan Home and Auto Supply Co v Firestone Tire and
Rubber Co., 544 F.Supp. 242, 244-245 (D SC, 1981). See also Mas v Coca-
Cola Co., 163 F.2d 505, 507 (CA 4, 1947).
- 38 -
Waszczuk comes before the Court with clean hands; the defendants and
their attorneys do not. They have engaged in extreme and abusive litigation
misconduct. First, they took advantage of Waszczuk’s drug-addicted
attorney, Douglas Stein. in 2014 and his friendship with Judge David I.
Brown, and then they took advantage of Waszczuk’s self-representation
after he dismissed Stein for gross misconduct in December 2014. The Court
should not aid or reward Defendants for their egregious misconduct in the
Court of Law.
CONCLUSION
___________________________________
Jaroslaw Waszczuk, Plaintiff & Appellant
- 40 -
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Jaroslaw Waszczuk
_______________________
Plaintiff & Appellant , In Pro Per
- 41 -
Proof of Service by US Mail and TrueFiling
Re: Waszczuk v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., C079524 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 10,
2017)
Re: 3DCA Case : Jaroslaw Waszczuk v. The Regents of the University of
California- Case No.: 34-2013-00155479
_____________________________________________________
IRENA WASZCZUK
- 42 -
EXHIBITS
1-46
- 43 -
EXHIBIT # 1
EXHIBIT # 2
Filed 10/10/17 Waszczuk v. Regents of the University of California CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
1
shortcomings he cites. We need go no further than to answer the contentions he raises,
and in finding no merit in those claims, we affirm.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiff, a Polish immigrant, feels deeply aggrieved by the University of
California (the University), his lawyer, the defense lawyer, and the trial judge. A brief
excerpt from a letter he sent to the general counsel for the University reflects his
bitterness as well as his belief that there is much more at stake than his mere wrongful
termination lawsuit. He wrote: “The stake in this lawsuit must be a lot bigger and more
important than the life of a 63-year-old Polish refugee who escaped communist
oppression and was promised protection from oppression in his new country by the US
government. Instead of protection from oppression, the Polish refugee received treatment
from the University of California that has been a lot worse than the treatment he received
in the Polish communist prison, where the communist’s prison guard was more respectful
to the political prisoners than UC management to its own employees.” His experience
has left him emotionally distraught. At the end of a hearing in the trial court, he
announced he was done and was going to go outside of the courtroom and shoot himself.
While plaintiff’s pain is clear, his legal analysis is not. We have carefully
scrutinized his briefs and the record in a diligent attempt to decipher his legal theories.
Much remains a mystery. We must reiterate what the trial court admonished plaintiff.
“At the outset, the Court would note that a self-represented party is to be treated like any
other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants
and attorneys. (Williams v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 941,
944.) Thus, as is the case with attorneys, self-represented litigants must follow correct
rules of procedure. Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247; see also
Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984.” We add that plaintiff has an equal
responsibility to follow the California Rules of Court applicable to appeals, no matter
2
how sympathetic his claims may seem to himself or us. It is a responsibility he has
ignored to his peril.
Plaintiff’s most glaring and consistent violation of the rules is his failure to cite to
the record.1 He makes grandiose accusations against the University for illegally
generating and selling electric power and for tax evasion, but those allegations are not
supported by citations to the record and are not relevant to the special motion to strike.
Plaintiff fails to appreciate the limited scope of our review, which stands in stark contrast
to the wide-ranging allegations plaintiff lodges which are untethered to the second
amended complaint or the special motion to strike. We are compelled to ignore any
factual allegations that are not supported by citations to the record.
Plaintiff loses this appeal, but it is not the end of his lawsuit for wrongful
termination. The trial court reminded plaintiff at the hearing on the special motion to
strike that the Regents of the University of California (the Regents) were not protected if
they discriminated or retaliated against him and, therefore, “[i]ndependent of the five
individuals who are before the Court on this motion, [plaintiff] still retains his right to sue
the Regents because they are still in the lawsuit and he’s still the plaintiff.” In this
context, we recite the brief facts relevant to the issues plaintiff raises on appeal.
1 An “appellant must support all statements of fact in his briefs with citations to the
record [citation] and must confine his statement ‘to matters in the record on appeal.’
[Citation.]” (Pierotti v. Torian (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 17, 29.) “[I]t is counsel's duty to
point out portions of the record that support the position taken on appeal.” (Del Real v.
City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.) The Court of Appeal must not search
the record on behalf of an appellant or serve as “backup appellate counsel.” (Mansell v.
Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545-546.)
3
FACTS
Plaintiff worked in the University of California Davis Medical Center’s Plant
Operations and Maintenance Department for 13 years. He received many years of
favorable performance reviews. In 2007, however, he was given a disciplinary transfer
from the central plant to the HVAC/plumbing shop. He filed a grievance and ultimately
entered into a settlement agreement with the University whereby he agreed to the transfer
in exchange for a promotion to an exempt position with a more prestigious job title.
In 2011 the University again initiated an investigation of plaintiff based on
complaints that he had violated University policies by engaging in acts of ethnic
discrimination constituting hate incidents in the workplace. He was terminated in 2012.
He appealed the termination and ultimately filed a whistleblower retaliation complaint.
In this court, he fixates on his belief the University’s suspension, investigation, and
termination were nothing more than a “witch hunt” designed to remove him, preferably
by getting him to quit, and thereby enable the University to resume its alleged tax-free
illegal power sales. He asserts, again without citation to the record, the University
attempted to assassinate him.
Plaintiff filed his first complaint, in pro. per., in December 2013. The complaint
included six causes of action: wrongful termination; retaliation; the intentional infliction
of emotional distress; failure to prevent harassment, discrimination, or retaliation; breach
of the settlement agreement; and violation of the University’s Personnel Polices for Staff
Members (PPSM) 23. Plaintiff thereafter hired a lawyer, Douglas Stein, who filed a first
amended complaint on his behalf in June 2014. The first amended complaint set forth
eight causes of action, including a cause of action entitled “Breach of Written Contract.”
The written contract referred to the settlement agreement plaintiff reached with the
University to resolve his first grievance. The first amended complaint did not, however,
contain a cause of action for violation of PPSM 23.
4
In a meet and confer letter dated August 19, 2014, Michael Pott, representing the
Regents and the employees sued in their individual capacity, described a number of
deficiencies in the first amended complaint “that warrant the filing of a demurrer unless
they can be resolved by amendment.” Stein spent 10 hours reviewing the first amended
complaint and researching the law in light of the alleged deficiencies set forth in Pott’s
letter. By letter dated August 26, 2014, Stein agreed to amend the complaint in response
to those deficiencies he found legitimate and he explained why he rejected many others.
Stein prepared a second amended complaint with the same eight causes of action.
He signed the second amended complaint on September 8, 2014. Unbeknownst to him at
the time, his license to practice law was suspended on September 24, 2014, due to child
support issues that he resolved by October 7, 2014, but due to logistical aspects of the
process, the State Bar of California did not restore his license to an active status until
October 23, 2014. In the meantime, he filed the second amended complaint on
September 30, 2014.
On December 1, 2014, five defendants, Michael Boyd, Stephen Chilcott, Danesha
Nichols, Cindy Oropeza, and Brent Seifert (the individual defendants) filed a special
motion to strike the first four causes of action in the second amended complaint as a
strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) suit (hereafter referred to as the
anti-SLAPP motion). (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) Stein, then unaware that plaintiff had
fired him, filed an opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion on plaintiff’s behalf. Plaintiff
did fire Stein, proceeded in pro. per., and requested an extension of time to file his own
opposition. Plaintiff filed his opposition late and exceeded the page limit. Nevertheless,
the trial court considered the entirety of plaintiff’s opposition and granted his request to
disregard the opposition filed by Stein.
On December 17, 2014, Stein filed an ex parte application for relief from the
potential defective filing of the second amended complaint. Stein explained to the court
that his license had been temporarily suspended because he had mistakenly paid the
5
wrong amount of child support for two or three months, a mistake that was quickly
rectified once he learned of it. The trial court granted Stein’s application and ruled that
the second amended complaint filed on September 30, 2014, “is deemed validly filed.”
In ruling on the individual defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court
followed the requisite two-step process. First, the court examined the individual
defendants’ showing whether their acts were taken in furtherance of their constitutional
rights of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue. The court found the
individual defendants made a prima facie showing. The individual defendants’ speech,
the court ruled, was “made in connection with the processing, investigation, hearing and
deciding the workplace complaints filed by Plaintiff and others pursuant to University
policies.” Second, the court found that plaintiff did not sustain his burden of showing a
likelihood of prevailing on each of the elements of the four causes of action as well as
defeating the individual defendants’ affirmative defenses. The court, therefore, granted
the individual defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion.
Plaintiff appeals.
DISCUSSION
I
The Allegations
Plaintiff believes that his employer, defense counsel, the trial judge, and even his
own lawyer, are corrupt and colluded to destroy his life. These allegations, not the merits
of the anti-SLAPP motion, are at the heart of plaintiff’s appeal. He writes: “There is no
need for Waszczuk to base this appeal on the merit of the case which is important and
Clerk Transcript is speaking for itself, if the whole legal process in this case was
corrupted by the Defendants’ attorney, Michael Pott, and Waszczuk’s attorney, Douglas
Stein misconduct, and their actions against Waszczuk were approved by the Court on
September 22, 2014, and December 17, 2014.”
6
There is nothing we can decide in this appeal or write in this opinion that will
disabuse plaintiff of this fiercely held belief. He fails to understand that these very
serious allegations are not before us on appeal of the anti-SLAPP motion. We will
explain for his benefit what the record discloses to us—the utter absence of any evidence
to support even a colorable claim of misconduct by any of the lawyers or judicial officers
in this case. We will also briefly describe the procedural context in which the allegations
are made and the futility of pursuing his corruption theory against these individual
defendants. Despite the ferocity of plaintiff’s feelings to the contrary, the fact that the
second amended complaint did not contain what he hoped it would does not translate into
reversible error and the fact that his lawyer and defense counsel engaged in an interactive
process to avoid an unnecessary demurrer does not translate into corruption.
Let us begin with plaintiff’s focus on the second amended complaint. As best we
can decipher, his objection is twofold: (1) He is troubled that Stein did not pursue his
theories that the University breached the settlement agreement and failed to follow
internal policies by not providing him annual performance reviews for two years, and (2)
he accuses the trial court of improperly validating the filing when Stein’s license had
been temporarily suspended.
Both objections are irrelevant to the individual defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion,
which sought to strike only four of the eight causes of action stated in the second
amended complaint. Whether or not Stein would have expanded the second amended
complaint to include additional causes of action has no bearing on whether the four
causes of action were properly stricken. In any event, we are baffled by plaintiff’s
insistence that Stein refused to include a cause of action for breach of the settlement
agreement is belied by the language of the sixth cause of action for breach of a written
contract which appears to embody that very claim.
Plaintiff fails to cite any authority to support his claim that the trial court
improperly validated the filing of the second amended complaint. The claim lacks both
7
legal authority and evidentiary support in the record. Rather, Stein was forthright in his
disclosure to the court. When he filed the second amended complaint he was unaware
that his status with the State Bar had changed. The reason for his very brief suspension
was unrelated to his competency or ethics in the practice of law. Rather, as Stein
explained, he made an inadvertent error on the amount he paid in child support for two or
three months. His license to practice was reinstated within about two weeks of his
discovery of the suspension. On these facts, there is not the slightest hint of impropriety.
To the contrary, Stein was diligent and transparent—making an ex parte application to
assure the integrity of the document he inadvertently filed during the briefest of
suspensions for a minor transgression unrelated to his professional performance. He
should be commended, not chastised, for his fervent representation of plaintiff’s interests.
Yet plaintiff asserts that defense counsel colluded with Stein to file a second
amended complaint designed to rob him of meritorious claims. He also contends that
Stein bowed to defense counsel’s untoward pressure to amend the complaint and
subjected his pleadings to the anti-SLAPP motion. He adds the naked allegation that the
trial court acted improperly as well because the trial judge had known defense counsel for
a number of years. Plaintiff’s allegations are without evidentiary support.
The record discloses a cordial, thorough, and appropriate exchange between two
lawyers engaged in a meet and confer process designed to avoid an unnecessary
demurrer. The thoughtful letters exchanged by counsel described the legal issues
presented by the first amended complaint and the authorities upon which they relied to
support their positions. Stein relented on a few minor issues, but held steadfast as to the
viability of his theories. Plaintiff’s sheer speculation about the lawyers’ motives is totally
unsubstantiated; indeed, the record belies his accusations.
In summary, we conclude plaintiff’s accusations of misconduct, corruption, and
collusion between the lawyers and the trial court are unsubstantiated and unfounded. But
even more importantly, they are irrelevant to the sole issue properly before us on
8
appeal—whether the trial court erred by granting the five individual defendants’ anti-
SLAPP motion to strike four of the causes of action alleged against them. We turn,
therefore, to the only relevant issue presented.
II
The Merits
The anti-SLAPP statute provides: “A cause of action against a person arising
from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech
under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a
public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that
the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the
claim.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) We review an order granting an anti-
SLAPP motion de novo. (Daniel v. Wayans (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 367, 379.)
As explained above, the trial court engages in a two-step process in determining
whether to grant an anti-SLAPP motion. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State
University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061.) In this case, the trial court found the individual
defendants made a prima facie showing to satisfy the first prong and plaintiff did not
challenge this finding in his opening brief. Belatedly in reply, he contends that the
defendants did not “show any record or evidence that the Defendants Nichols, Chilcott,
Boyd, Seifert, and Oropeza, who brought the anti-SLAPP motion to strike Waszczuk’s
first four causes of action, were made in connection with the processing, investigation,
hearing, and deciding of the workplace complaints filed by Waszczuk.”
In short, the court acknowledged that University policies and procedures have the
force and effect of a state statute (Kim v. Regents of University of California (2000)
80 Cal.App.4th 160, 165); statutory procedures qualify as official proceedings authorized
by law as contemplated by Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (Vergos v. McNeal
(2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1399 (Vergos)); the constitutional right to petition includes
the act of seeking administrative action (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity
9
(1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115); and investigations and investigatory reports prepared in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by an official body, such as a
public entity’s internal investigations, are protected activities under the anti-SLAPP
statute (Miller v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1383). Because the
speech of the individual defendants who were subject to the anti-SLAPP motion was
“made in connection with the processing, investigation, hearing and deciding the
workplace complaints filed by Plaintiff and others pursuant to University policies,” the
court concluded the individual defendants satisfied their burden and shifted it to the
plaintiff to demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on the merits.
Plaintiff insists that Vergos, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 1387, cited by the trial court,
does not support the granting of the anti-SLAPP motion. We disagree. In Vergos, an
employee of the University named the manager who denied his administrative grievance
as a defendant in his sexual harassment lawsuit in her individual capacity. (Id. at
p. 1390.) The manager filed a special motion to strike contending that her statements and
communicative conduct in handling the employee’s grievances were protected by Code
of Civil Procedure section 425.16 because “they (1) were connected with an issue under
review by an official proceeding authorized by law, and (2) furthered the right to petition
of the plaintiff and similarly situated employees.” (Vergos, at p. 1394.) We agreed and
affirmed the judgment.
We pointed out that the manager’s only conduct targeted in the complaint involved
her hearing, processing, and deciding the employee’s grievances. (Vergos, supra,
146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1396.) Similarly, here the trial court’s finding parroted our
conclusion in Vergos. And the court reviewed the allegations against each of the five
individual defendants and reported their involvement as follows:
“The allegations of the SAC [second amended complaint] against Nichols attack
her protected participation in the official investigations. The SAC specifically alleges
Nichols’ communications regarding the investigation and her investigative conclusions.
10
Nichols was appointed to investigate Plaintiff’s whistleblower complaints, and was also
appointed to conduct an investigation into complaints of workplace violence filed by
Putney and Daniliuc. All were protected petitioning activities.
“The allegations against Boyd and Chilcott are limited to their receipt of emails
from Nichols relating to the investigations, and Chilcott’s sending of an email relating to
the investigation of Plaintiff. The emails are protected speech in connection with an
investigation process.
“The allegations against Oropeza and Seifert are based upon their investigation
into the emails plaintiff sent to Nichols in April 2012. Oropeza and Seifert conducted
their investigation pursuant to the University’s grievance protocol and reached
conclusions documented in a report.
“Boyd acted as Complaint Resolution Officer (“CRO”) at Step II of the
University’s PPSM 70 process, hearing and deciding Plaintiff’s appeal of his
termination.”
In sum, each of the individual defendants, like the manager in Vergos, were
involved in the investigation, hearing, processing, and/or deciding plaintiff’s and his co-
workers’ grievances. We conclude, as in Vergos, their conduct was within the protective
ambit of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Thus we must review the trial court’s
resolution of the second step in the analysis—whether plaintiff demonstrated a likelihood
of success on the merits.
Without citation to specific pages in the record or argument about the likelihood of
success of each element of the four causes of action or even a response to the trial court’s
thorough analysis, plaintiff invites us to review his 443-page opposition to the anti-
SLAPP motion and insists, again without analysis, that the evidence is “overwhelming.”
He falls miserably short of his duty on appeal to cite to the record, to present cogent
argument, and to support his argument with applicable legal authority. In this vacuum,
we turn to the trial court’s statement of decision wherein the court provides a brief and
11
apt rationale for finding plaintiff did not sustain his burden of showing a likelihood of
prevailing.
Plaintiff’s first cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress
fails because the tort requires a showing of outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of
human decency. The court found “[w]hat plaintiff has alleged, and what his evidence in
opposition appears to support, are complaints concerning personnel management by
defendants. Pleading of personnel management activity is ‘insufficient to support a claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress, even if improper motivation is alleged.’
(Janken v. [GM Hughes Electronic (1996)] 46 Cal.App.4th [55,] 80.)” We agree with the
trial court that none of the allegations against these individual defendants involved in the
investigation and resolution of the grievances constitutes the type of outrageous conduct
beyond the bounds of human decency necessary to prevail on a claim of the intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
Plaintiff is unable to surmount the basic principle of law that an employee or
former employee cannot sue a current or former supervisor or employee for interfering
with his or her prospective economic advantage by inducing the employer to terminate
the plaintiff’s employment. (Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 24; Shepperd v.
Freeman (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 339, 347.) On this basis, the trial court properly
concluded plaintiff failed to provide any countervailing authority or analysis as to why
the facts before the court show the likelihood of prevailing on his interference with
prospective economic advantage cause of action.
Plaintiff’s discrimination claim meets another definitive legal obstacle. Individual
defendants cannot be sued for discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing
Act (FEHA), nor can they be sued for failing to prevent discrimination, retaliation, and
12
harassment. (Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 663-664;2 Janken v. GM Hughes
Electronic, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 63.) Plaintiff has not shown any likelihood of
surmounting this obstacle.
Finally, the trial court found that plaintiff did not establish that the individual
defendants’ conduct was in retaliation for his whistleblowing. The court explained: “The
mere fact that Nichols, Oropeza and Seifert conducted investigations and reached
conclusions with which Plaintiff does not agree with does not establish their investigatory
findings are an act of retaliation. Nor can Boyd’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s grievance at
the Step II level of PPSM 70 review be deemed to be a retaliatory action. Finally, there is
no allegation that Chilcott took any particular action against Plaintiff that could be
deemed to be a retaliatory action.” In the absence of any evidence or analysis provided
by plaintiff, we have no basis for reaching a finding at odds with the trial court. Plaintiff
has not shown a likelihood of prevailing on a whistleblower retaliation cause of action.
(Gov. Code, § 8547.10.)
III
Plaintiff maintains he should have been allowed to amend his complaint for the
third time. As support he cites cases involving demurrers, not special motions to strike a
SLAPP. His authorities, therefore, are inapposite. The anti-SLAPP statute makes no
provision for amending the complaint once the court finds the targeted conduct is
protected speech. (Simmons v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1073.)
2 After Reno v. Baird, supra, 18 Cal.4th 640 was decided “the California Legislature
amended FEHA's harassment provision expressly holding individual employees liable for
their harassment.” (Scott v. Solano County Health & Soc. Orders Servs. Dep't (E.D. Cal.
2006) 459 F.Supp.2d 959, 966, citing Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j).) There is no
harassment claim targeted by the individual defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion.
13
DISPOSITION
The judgment striking the four causes of action against defendants Nichols,
Oropeza, Seifert, Boyd, and Chilcott is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs
on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
RAYE , P. J.
We concur:
NICHOLSON , J.
ROBIE , J.
14
EXHIBIT # 3
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
GORDON D SCHABER COURTHOUSE
MINUTE ORDER
DATE: 02/09/2015 TIME: 09:37:00 AM DEPT: 53
JUDICIAL OFFICER PRESIDING: David Brown
CLERK: K. Pratchen
REPORTER/ERM:
BAILIFF/COURT ATTENDANT:
EVENT TYPE: Motion to Strike (SLAPP) - Civil Law and Motion - MSA/MSJ/SLAPP
APPEARANCES
Nature of Proceeding: Ruling On Submitted Matter (Motion to Strike (SLAPP)) Taken Under
Submission 2/6/2015
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendants Michael Boyd, Stephen Chilcott, Danesha Nichols, Cindy Oropeza and Brent Seifert's
Special Motion to Strike the First through Fourth Causes of Action of Self-represented Plaintiff's Second
Amended Complaint is GRANTED.
This motion was continued to today's date to permit the self-represented plaintiff to file his own
opposition to the motion. Although no substitution of attorneys has yet been filed with the Court, the
court accepts the representation of plaintiff in his Dec. 29, 2014 Declaration in which declared that he
terminated Douglas Stein as his counsel of record on Dec. 16, 2014. A substitution of attorneys
signed by both former attorney and the plaintiff is still required to be filed with the Court by
plaintiff.
At the plaintiff's request, the Court has considered none of the papers filed by his former attorney
Douglas E. Stein in opposition to this motion. The Opposition papers filed by the self-represented
plaintiff were filed and served by US Mail on Jan. 23, 2015, instead of on Jan. 21, 2015, as ordered by
the Court. Further, the service was by US Mail, rather by personal delivery, facsimile transmission,
express mail, or other means reasonably calculated to ensure delivery to the other party or parties not
later than the close of the next business day after the time the opposing papers are filed, as required by
Code Civ. Proc. § 1005(b). Moving party has therefore been deprived of at least three business days in
which to prepare their reply.
Additionally plaintiff's opposing Memorandum of Points and Authorities exceeds the 15 page limit
provided in California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1113. Despite this failure to comply with the California
Rules of Court, the Court has read and considered the entire 34 page document. In future filings, absent
ex parte order permitting a longer memorandum, the self-represented plaintiff is admonished to abide by
the page limitations.
As noted, despite these failures to comply with the Court order and the applicable statutes, the Court has
considered plaintiff's opposition papers.
The Court declines to consider plaintiff's 17 page "Response to Defendant's Reply Brief" with attached
filed on Feb. 2, 2015, as there is no statutory right to such a supplemental brief.
Defendants' Evidentiary Objections are OVERRULED.
At the outset, the Court would note that a self-represented party is to be treated like any other party and
is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys. (Williams v.
Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1986) 186 Cal. App. 3d 941, 944) Thus, as is the case with attorneys,
self-represented litigants must follow correct rules of procedure. Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal. App. 4th
1229, 1246-1247; see also Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 975, 984.
Second Amended Complaint
Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint sets forth eight causes of action: the 1st for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, 2nd for tortious interference with economic advantage, 3rd for harassment, failure to
prevent harassment, discrimination and retaliation under FEHA, 4th for whistleblower/unlawful
retaliation, 5th for violation of Health & Safety Code, sec. 1278.5, 6th for breach of written contract, 7th
for wage and hour violations and 8th for rescission - unlawful contract.
Moving party defendants move to specially strike the 1st through 4th causes of action, only, as each
arises out of acts in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue
and plaintiff cannot establish a likelihood of success on the merits.
Anti-SLAPP procedure
The Court must follow a "two-step process for determining whether an action is a SLAPP." Navellier v.
Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88. First, whether the defendant has made a threshold prima facie
showing that the defendant's acts, of which the plaintiff complains, were ones taken in furtherance of the
defendant's constitutional rights of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue. If the court
finds that such a showing has been made, then the plaintiff will be required to demonstrate that "there is
a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." The defendant has the burden on the first issue,
the threshold issue; the plaintiff has the burden on the second issue. Kajima Engineering & Construction,
Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 921, 928. "Only a cause of action that satisfies both
prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute--i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even
minimal merit--is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute." Navellier v. Sletten (2002)29
Cal.4th 82, 89.
Petition or Free Speech
Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16 (e) provides: "As used in this section, "act in furtherance of a person's right of
petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public
issue" includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or
judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement
or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or
judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law,..."
The California legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, known as the anti-SLAPP
statute, to provide a procedural remedy to dispose of lawsuits and causes of action that are brought to
chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the government for
redress of grievances.(See Rusheen v Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055-1056. These provisions
apply to SLAPP suits brought against public entities and public employees. See San Ramon Valley Fire
Prot Dist v Contra Costa County Employees' Ret Ass'n (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 343, 353; see also City of
Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 69.
It is well established that the policies of Defendant University, including the Personnel Policies for Staff
Members ("PPSM") and UC Davis Policy and Procedure Manual ("PPM"), have the force and effect of
state statute. (Kim v. Regents of University of California (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 160, 165.)
Statutory procedures qualify as official proceedings authorized by law for section 425.16 purposes.
(Vergos v. McNeal (2007) 35 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1399.) The constitutional right to petition includes the
act of seeking administrative action. (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th
115.) Investigations and investigatory reports prepared in connection with an issue under consideration
or review by an official body, such as a public entity's internal investigations, are protected activities
under the anti-SLAPP statute. (See Miller v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 169 Cal App.4th 1373, 1383;
Hansen v California Dept of Corrections and Rehabilitiation (2008) 171 Cal.App.4th 1537, 1544; Briggs v.
Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal. 4th 1106.)
In this case, the speech by Chilcott, Boyd, Oropeza, Seifert, and Nichols that is at issue were made in
connection with the processing, investigation, hearing and deciding the workplace complaints filed by
Plaintiff and others pursuant to University policies.
The allegations of the SAC against Nichols attack her protected participation in the official investigations.
The SAC specifically alleges Nichols' communications regarding the investigation. (SAC, paras. 70 (l),
(o), (q), (s), (x), (AA)) and her investigative conclusions (SAC para. 70 (v), (KK)). Nichols was appointed
to investigate Plaintiffs whistleblower complaints, and was also appointed to conduct an investigation
into complaints of workplace violence filed by Putney and Daniliuc. All were protected petitioning
activities.
The allegations against Boyd and Chilcott are limited to their receipt of emails from Nichols relating to
the investigations, and Chilcott's sending of an email relating to the investigation of Plaintiff (SAC, para.
70(m), (x), (AA).) The emails are protected speech in connection with an investigation process.
The allegations against Oropeza and Seifert are based upon their investigation into the emails plaintiff
sent to Nichols in April 2012. Oropeza and Seifert conducted their investigation pursuant to the
University's grievance protocol and reached conclusions documented in a report.
Boyd acted as Complaint Resolution Officer ("CRO") at Step II of the University's PPSM 70 process,
hearing and deciding Plaintiff's appeal of his termination. In Vergos, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at
1399-1400, the Court held that defendant reviewer was entitled to the protection of the anti-SLAPP
statute for denying the grievance. Specifically, in Vergos, a state university employee pursued an
internal grievance against his supervisor for sexual harassment. In an administrative proceeding
authorized by the Regents of the University of California, the hearing officer denied the grievance. The
employee then filed a civil rights suit against the hearing officer, alleging that her decision had failed to
protect him from future harassment. (Id. at pp. 1390-1392, 1396-1397.) The hearing officer filed a
special motion to strike, contending that her communications were made in connection with an issue
under consideration in an official proceeding. (See § 425.16, subd. (e)(2).) The trial court denied the
motion. The Court of Appeal reversed because "[t]he gravamen of plaintiff's [claim] is [the hearing
officer's] communicative conduct in denying plaintiff's grievances. The hearing, processing, and
deciding of the grievances (as alleged in the complaint) are meaningless without a communication of the
adverse results." (146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1397.) Thus, Vergos recognized that the anti-SLAPP statute
applies where liability is based on protected speech. (See Id. at pp. 1397-1399)
Moving parties have established that their speech and writings are protected as made in connection with
an issue under consideration or review by an official proceeding authorized by law. The burden
therefore shifts to plaintiff to show that he will prevail.
Probability That Plaintiff Will Prevail
Plaintiff must show a likelihood of prevailing on each of the elements of his causes of action, and must
also show a likelihood of defeating any applicable affirmative defenses. (Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994)
27 Cal.App.4th 809, 820, 824; see also Paul of Council v. Hanyecz (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1367,
overruled on other grounds in Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 68.)
The test to use to determine Plaintiffs probability of prevailing is similar to the standard applied to
evidentiary showings in motions for summary judgment, and the supporting facts must be demonstrated
by way of competent, admissible evidence. (Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th
628, 654-655.) The difference between summary judgment and anti-SLAPP is that the burden is on the
opposing party plaintiff to show the likelihood of prevailing.
In order to establish the necessary probability of prevailing, plaintiff was required both to plead claims
that were legally sufficient, and to make a prima facie showing, by admissible evidence, of facts that
would merit a favorable judgment on those claims, assuming plaintiff's evidence were credited. The court
does not, however, weigh the parties' evidence, in terms of either credibility or persuasiveness. Rather,
the defendant's evidence is considered with a view toward whether it defeats the plaintiff's showing as a
matter of law, such as by establishing a defense or the absence of a necessary element. 1-800
Contacts, Inc. v. Steinberg (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 568, 584-585.
1st For Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
An essential element of pleading a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is a showing of
outrageous conduct beyond the bounds of human decency. Managing personnel is not outrageous
conduct beyond the bounds of human decency, but rather conduct essential to the welfare and
prosperity of society. A simple pleading of personnel management activity is insufficient to support a
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, even if improper motivation is alleged. If personnel
management decisions are improperly motivated, the remedy is a suit against the employer for
discrimination. Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal. App. 4th 55, 80.
What plaintiff has alleged, and what his evidence in opposition appears to support, are complaints
concerning personnel management by defendants. Pleading of personnel management activity is
"insufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, even if improper motivation is
alleged." (Janken, supra.)
Plaintiff has failed to provide any legal authority or analysis as to why the facts before the court show the
likelihood of his prevailing on this cause of action.
2nd Tortious Interference with Economic Advantage
Plaintiff's claim tortious interference with economic advantage against Defendants. An employee or
former employee cannot sue a current or former supervisor or employee for interfering with his or her
prospective economic advantage by inducing the employer to terminate the plaintiff's employment.
(Shepperd v. Freeman (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 339, 347; Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 24.)
Plaintiff has failed to provide any legal authority or analysis as to why the facts before the court show the
In the third cause of action, Plaintiff alleges violation of FEHA, both Section 12940(a) which prohibits
discrimination and Section 12940(k) which addresses the failure to prevent discrimination.
These claims are not properly pleaded against the individual Defendants as individuals cannot be sued
for discrimination under the FEHA, nor can they be sued for failing to prevent discrimination, retaliation,
and harassment. (Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 663- 664; see, also Janken, supra, at p. 63.) In
Janken the Supreme Court noted the "fundamental distinction" between the way the FEHA treats
harassment, on the one hand--for which supervisors may be held personally liable, and discrimination on
the other hand--for which, Janken held, individuals are not personally responsible.
Plaintiff has failed to provide any legal authority or analysis as to why the facts before the court show the
likelihood of his prevailing on this cause of action.
4th for Whistleblower/Unlawful Retaliation
Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action brought pursuant to Gov. Code § 8547.10 for whistleblower retaliation.
Plaintiff has not established that moving defendants' conduct was in retaliation for plaintiff's
whistleblowing.
The mere fact that Nichols, Oropeza and Seifert conducted investigations and reached conclusions with
which Plaintiff does not agree with does not establish their investigatory findings are an act of retaliation.
Nor can Boyd's decision to deny Plaintiffs grievance at the Step II level of PPSM 70 review be deemed
to be a retaliatory action. Finally, there is no allegation that Chilcott took any particular action against
Plaintiff that could be deemed to be a retaliatory action.
Plaintiff has failed to provide any legal authority or analysis as to why the facts before the court show the
likelihood of his prevailing on this cause of action.
As a matter of law, Plaintiff has not shown that he can prevail on any of his four causes of action against
moving party defendants. Given the Court's determination the Court need not address the Regents'
other arguments based on Gov't Code 821.6. It bears noting, however, that immunity extends to
investigations even if there is a later decision not to institute administrative proceedings or to initiate a
prosecution. See Ingram v Flippo (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1293.
The anti-SLAPP motion is therefore granted as to moving defendants Michael Boyd, Stephen Chilcott,
Danesha Nichols, Cindy Oropeza and Brent Seifert only, as to the 1st through 4th causes of action, only.
COURT RULING
The matter was argued and submitted. The matter was taken under submission.
APPEARANCES
Nature of Proceeding: Ruling on Submitted Matter (Motion for Reconsideration of the 2/9/2015
Order) taken under submission on 4/10/15
TENTATIVE RULING
Self-represented Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Dated Feb. 9, 2015 Anti-SLAPP Motion
is DENIED.
A self-represented party is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater
consideration than other litigants and attorneys. (Williams v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1986) 186 Cal.
App. 3d 941, 944) Thus, as is the case with attorneys, self-represented litigants must follow correct rules
of procedure. Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal. App. 4th 1229, 1246-1247; see also Rappleyea v. Campbell
(1994) 8 Cal. 4th 975, 984.
Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was filed and served by US Mail on Feb. 20, 2015. No hearing date
appeared on the Motion papers. On Feb. 25, 2015, an Amended Notice of Motion reflecting the hearing
date of March 6, 2015 was filed and served by US Mail. That notice, counting backwards from March 6
to Feb. 20, allowed only 10 court days' notice instead of the required16 court days' notice, and allowed
none of the five additional calendar days for service by mail, as required by C.C.P., sec. 1005 and 12c.
The hearing date was continued to today's date at the request of the moving party.
Defendant's opposition to the motion for reconsideration objects to the untimely notice and further
asserts that moving party has failed to meet the requirements of a motion for reconsideration under
C.C.P., sec. 1008.
A motion for reconsideration must be made (i) within 10 days after service upon the party of written
notice of entry of the order and (ii) based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, and (iii) to
the same judge or court that made the order. C.C.P. section 1008(a). C.C.P. section 1008 is the
exclusive means for modifying, amending or revoking an order. That limitation is expressly jurisdictional.
Morite of California v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal. App. 4th 485, 490.
Moving party fails to base his motion for reconsideration upon any new or different facts, circumstances,
or law. Instead, plaintiff contends that the Court failed to read his opposition and attached exhibits to the
anti-SLAPP motion. Moving party contends that the Court should have accepted his supplemental brief,
which argues that the SLAPP motion violated an earlier stipulation between the parties to permit the
filing of a second amended complaint, that some unidentified new authority applies to the anti-SLAPP
motion in an unidentified manner and that the Court erred in its anti-SLAPP ruling.
None of these contentions is sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements that the motion for
reconsideration be "based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law."
A trial court has no jurisdiction to reconsider a prior order on the basis of different facts, circumstances
or law in the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the failure to present them earlier. Baldwin v.
Home Savings of America (1997) 59 Cal. App. 4th 1192, 1200. Further, if the plaintiff is not required to
explain the failure to earlier produce pertinent legal authority that was available, the ability of a party to
obtain reconsideration would expand in inverse relationship to his competence. Without a diligence
requirement the number of times a court could be required to reconsider its prior orders would be limited
only by the ability of the party to belatedly conjure a legal theory different from those previously rejected,
which is not much of a limitation. Baldwin v. Home Savings, supra, 59 Cal. App. 4th 1192, 1199.
The Court has read and considered plaintiff's objections to the formal order. The Court will sign the
formal order submitted on the anti-SLAPP motion.
COURT RULING
The matter was argued and submitted. The Court affirmed the tentative ruling.
Having taken the matter under submission on 4/10/2015, the Court now rules as follows:
Declaration of Mailing
I hereby certify that I am not a party to the within action and that I deposited a copy of this document in
sealed envelopes with first class postage prepaid, addressed to each party or the attorney of record in
the U.S. Mail at 720 Ninth Street, Sacramento, California.
Dated: April 14, 2015
E. Brown, Deputy Clerk _____s/ E. Brown_____
JAROSLAW WASZCZUK
2216 KATZAKIAN WAY
LODI, CA 95242
P O R T E R I S C O T T APR 1 4 •
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
David P. E. Burkett, SBN 241896
Douglas L. Ropel, SBN 300486
350 University Avenue, Suite 200
Sacramento, California 95825
TEL: 916.929.1481
FAX: 916.927.3706
dburkettfalporterscott.com
6
Attorney for Defendants
7
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
8 MICHAEL BOYD, STEPHEN CHILCOTT, DORIN DANILIUC, DANESHA NICHOLS,
CINDY OROPEZA. PATRICK PUTNEY, ANN MADDEN RICE,
9 BRENT SEIFERT, and CHARLES WITCHER
10
Exempt from Filing Fees Pursuant to Government Code § 6103
11
^ 12 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
13
H 3 S _ VD
^ tn m OO ^
o 2 P; 14
> U O; Os JAROSLAW ("JERRY") WASZCZUK, CASENO. 34-2013-00155479
15
: 0\ ON
Plaintiff, ' -feROPeSBDi- ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS BOYD, CHILCOTT,
3
17 NICHOLS, OROPEZA AND SEIFERT'S
SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE FIRST
18 THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY THROUGH FOURTH CAUSES OF
19 OF CALIFORNIA, UNIVERSIW OF ACTION OF PLAINTIFlP'S SECOND
GALIFORNL\ DAVIS HEALTH SYSTEM, AMENDED COMPLAINT
20 UC DAVIS MEDICAL CENTER, UC
DAVIS, ANN MADDEN RICE, MIKE DATE: February 6,2015
21 BOYD, STEPHEN CHILCOTT, CHARLES TIME: 2:00 P.M.
22 WITCHER DANESHA NICHOLS. CINDY DEPT: 53
OROPEZA, BRENT SEIFERT, PATRICK
23 PUTNEY. DORIN DANILIUC, and does I
through 50. inclusive. Complaint Filed: December 12,2013
24
Amended Complaint Filed: June 16,2014
25 Defendants SAC Filed: September 30,2014
26
///
27
28 ///
{01362378.OOCX} 1
(PROPOSED! ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS BOYD, CHILCOTT, NICHOLS, OROPEZA AND
SEIFERT'S SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE FIRST THROUGH FOURTH CAOSES OF ACTION OF
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
1 Defendants MIKE BOYD, STEPHEN CHILCOTT, DANESHA NICHOLS, CINDY
2 OROPEZA, and BRENT SEIFERT ("Defendants") filed a Special Motion to Strike four causes of
3 action, as pleaded against them, from PlaintifTs Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Code of
4 Civil Procedure section 425.16. Specifically, Defendants brought the Motion to strike Plaintiffs
5 causes of action against them for: (1) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (2) Tortious
6 Interference with Economic Advantage; (3) Discrimination and Failure to Prevent Harassment,
7 Discrimination, and Retaliation under Government Code section 12940, subdivisions (a) and (k);
S and (4) Whistleblower Retaliation under Govemment Code section 8547 et seq.
9 On Febmary 5, 2015, the Court issued a Tentative Ruling, which is incorporated as
10 Exhibit A, granting Defendants' Motion.,; Pursuant to PlaintifPs request, the Motion was heard
11 before the Honorable Judge David I. Brown on Febmary 6, 2015. After hearing from the parties
12 and taking the matter under submission, the Court affirmed its Tentative Ruling v^ith the issuance
o
o
a in 13 of a Minute Order on Febmary 9, 2015. The Court's Minute Order ruled as follows:
^ -3 (N
— \o
P eS IS» S
14 Defendants Michael Boyd, Stephen Chilcott, Danesha Nichols, Cindy
^is < o"
ai 1^
o.<=^.
!£ £
1c
1J V 'Oropeza and Brent Seifert's Special Motion to Strike the First thfough
Fourth Causes of Action of Self-represented Plaintiffs Second Amended
W >. c ^ >< 16 Complaint is GRANTED.
fell ^ 5: ,
211 17 This motion was continued to permit the self-represented plaintiff to file
o his own opposition to the motion. Although no substitution of attorneys
18 has yet beenfiledwith the Court, the Court accepts the representation of
I plaintiff in his Dec. 29, 2014 Declaration in which declared that he
19
terminated Douglas Stein as his counsel of record on Dec. 16, 2014. A
20 substitution of attorneys signed by both former attorney and the
plaintiff is still required to befiledwith the Court by piaintifT.
21
22 At the plaintiffs request, the Cpurt has considered none of the papers filed
by his former attomey Douglas E. Stein in opposition to this motion. The
23 Opposition papers filed by the self-represented plaintiff were filed and
served by US Mail on January 23, 2015, instead of on January 21,2015, as
24 ordered by the Court. Further, the service was by US Mail, rather by
25 personal delivery, facsimile transmission, express mail, or other means
reasonably calculated to ensure delivery to the other party or parties not
26 later than the close of the next business day after the time the opposing
papers are filed, as required by Code Civ. Proc. § 1005(b). Moving party
27 has therefore been deprived of at least three business days in which to
28 prepare their reply.
I0I362378.DOCX} 2_
jPROPOSEDj ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS BOYD, CHILCOTT, NICHOLS, OROPEZA AND
SEIFERT'S SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE FIRST THROUGH FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION OF
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
\
Additionally, plaintiff's opposing Memorandum of Points and Authorities
exceeds the 15 page limit provided in Califomia Rules of Court, Rule
2 3.1113. Despite this failure to comply with the Califomia Rules of Court, ^
the Court has read and considered the entire 34 page document. In future
3 filings, absent ex parte order pemiitting a longer memorandum, the self-
4 represented plaintiff is admonished to abide by the page limitations.
5 As noted, despite these failures to comply with the Court order and the
applicable statutes, the Court has considered plaintiffs opposition papers.
6 The Court declines to consider plaintiffs 17 page "Response to
7 Defendant's Reply Brief filed on Feb. 2, 2015, as there is no statutory
right to such a supplemental brief.
8 f
Defendants' Evidentiary Objections are OVERRULED.
9
10 At the outset, the Court would note that a self-represented party is to be
treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater
II consideration than other litigants and attomeys. (Williams v. Pacific
Mutual Ufe Ins. Co. (1986) 186 Cal. App. 3d 941, 944) Thus, as is the
12
o case with attomeys, self-represented litigants must follow correct rules of
o
Ol
a in 13 procedure. Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal. App. 4th 1229, 1246-1247; see
[ _
3 0 0 — >o also Rajjpleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 975, 984.
CO V% oo O
O 6' ' t 14
O 5 < >- Second Amended Complaint
Vi g S S
> VJ ^ o> 15
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o tu <
>6 «> 16 Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint sets forth eight causes of action:
o r- u. (1) intentionaL infliction of emotional distress; (2) tortious interference
17 with economic advantage; (3) harassment, failure to prevent harassment,
ex. discrimination and retaliation under FEHA; (4) whistleblower/unlawful
18
retaliation; (5) violation of Health & Safety Code section 1278.5; (6)
19 breach of written contract; (7) wage and hour violations; and (8) rescission
- unlawful contract.
20
21 Moving party defendants move to specially strike the 1st through 4th
causes of action, only, as each arises out of acts in furtherance of the right
22 of petition of free speech in connection with a public issue, and plaintiff
cannot establish a likelihood of success on the merits. '
23
24 Anti-SLAPP procedure
8 Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16 (e) provides: "As used in this section, "act in
furtherance of a person'srightof petition orfi-eespeech under the United
9 States or Califomia Constitution in connection with a public issue"
10 includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a
legislative, executive, or 'judicial proceeding, or any other official
11 proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing
made in coruiection with an issue under consideration or review by a
12 legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding(
o
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a in 13 authorized by law... ." ^
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P 00 ^ «S• f~
O u - " sP;
" 14 The Califomia legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16,
^
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5, S M
> W o\ Icnown as the anti-SLAPP statute, to provide a procedural remedy to
OC < o" ^ 2 15 dispose of lawsuits and causes of action that, are brought to chill the valid
.— o .
16 exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the
govemment for redress of grievances.(See Rusheen v Cohen (2006) 37
o 17 Cal.4th 1048, 1055-1056. These provisions apply to SLAPP suits brought
against public entities and public employees. See San Ramon Valley Fire
18 Prot Dist V Contra Costa County Employees' Ret Ass'n (2004) 125
19 Cal.App.4th 343, 353; see also City ofCotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.
4th 69.
20
21 It is well established that the policies of Defendant University, including
the Personnel Policies for Staff Members ("PPSM") and UC Davis Policy
22 and Procedure Manual ("PPM"), have the force and effect of state statute.
(Kim V. Regents of University of California (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 160,
23 165.) "1
24
Statutory procedures qualify as official proceedings authorized by law for
25 section 425.16 purposes. {Vergos v. McNeal (2007) 35 Cal.App.4th 1387,
1399.) The constitutional right to petition includes the act of seeking
26 administrative action. {Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity
27 (1999) 19 Cal.4th 115.) Investigations and investigatory reports prepared
in connection with an issue under consideration or review by an official
28 body, such as a public entity's internal investigations, are protected
<01362378.DOCX}
(PROPOSEDI ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS BOYD, CHILCOTT, NICHOLS, OROPEZA AND
SEIFERT'S SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE FIRST THROUGH FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION OF
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
activities under the anti-SLAPP statute. {See Miller v. City of Los Angeles
(2009) 169 Cal ARp.4th 1373, 1383; Hansen v California Dept of
Corrections and Rehabilitiation (2008) 171 Cal.App.4th 1537, 1544;
Briggs V. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal. 4th 1106.)
In this case, the speech by Chilcott, Boyd, Oropeza, Seifert, and Nichols
that is at issue were made in cormection with the processing, investigation,
hearing and deciding the" workplace complaints filed by Plaintiff and
others pursuant to University policies.
in
17 3"" for Discrimination
18 In the third cause of action, Plaintiff alleges violation of the FEHA, both
19 section 12940(a), which prohibits discrimination, and Section 12940(k)
which addresses the failure to prevent discrimination.
20
These claims are not properly pleaded against the individual Defendants as
21
individuals cannot be sued for discrimination Under the FEHA, nor can
22 they be sued for failing to prevent discrimination, retaliation, and
harassment. (Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 663-664; see, also
23 , Janken, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 63.) In .lanken the Supreme Court
noted the "ftindamental distinction" between the way the FEHA treats
24
harassment, on the one hand—for which supervisors may be held
25 personally liable, and discrimination on the other hand~for which, Janken
held, individuals are not personally responsible.
26
27 Plaintiffhas failed to provide any legal authority or analysis as to why the
facts before the court show the likelihood of his prevailing on this cause of
28 action.
(OI36237g.DOCX}
(PROPOSED} ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS BOYD, CHILCOTT, NICHOLS, OROPEZA AND
SEIFERT'S SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE FIRST THROUGH FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION OF
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
4'" for Whistleblower/Unlawful Retaliation
1
The mere fact that Nichols, Oropeza and Seifert conducted investigations
and reached conclusions with which Plaintiff does not agree v\dth does not
establish their investigatoryfindingsare an act of retaliation. Nor can
Boyd's decision to deny Plaintiffs grievance at the Step II level of PPSM
70 review be deemed to be a retaliatory action. Finally, there is no
allegation that Chilcott took any particular action against Plaintiff that
could be deemed to be a retaliatory action.
10
Plaintiff has failed to provide any legal authority or analysis as to why the
11 facts before the court show the likelihood of his prevailing on this cause of
action.
12
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13 As a matter of law. Plaintiff has not shown that he can prevail on any of
h
,
"5
- J, m
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~ ee 'o his four causes of action against moving party defendants. Given the
^ ( / } tn QO •
p u 2 P; 14 Court's determination the Court need not address the Regents' other
(J
> u o» o> arguments based on Govemment Code section 821.6. It bears noting,
oi < o" vb vo 15 however, that immtmity extends to investigations even if there is a later
16 decision not to institute administrative proceedings or to initiate a
prosecution. (See Ingram v Flippo (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1293.)
o 17
•n
The anti-SLAPP motion is therefore granted as to moving defendants
18
Michael Boyd, Stephen Chilcott, Danesha Nichols, Cindy Oropeza and
19 Brent Seifert only, as to thefirstthrough fourth causes of action.
25
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Special Motion to Strike the four causes of
26
action enumerated above, as pleaded against Defendants, from Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint is hereby GRANTED.
28
(OI36237g.DOCX) 8
(PROPOSED! ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS BOYD, CHILCOTT, NICHOLS, OROPEZA AND
SEIFERT'S SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE FIRST THROUGH FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION OF
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that judgment be, and hereby is, entered in favor of
Defendants MIKE BOYD, STEPHEN CHILCOTT, DANESHA NICHOLS, CINDY OROPEZA,
and BRENT SEIFERT, and against Plaintiff JAROSLAW WASZCZUK for the four causes of
action asserted against them in the Second Amended Complaint.
5 ^ IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants are awarded their costs and the attorney's
6 fees incurred in conjunction with the Special Motion to Strike pursuant to Code ofCivil Procedure
7 section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1). Defendants shall file a separate motion to determine the
8 amount to be awarded.
9 IT IS SO ORDERED.
10 Dated: ,2015
11
12 JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
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13
DAVID I. BROWN
_ vo
t e« S«• S
JS APPROVED AS TO FORM AND CONTENT.
14
e«: < o"vb vo 15
UJ >. c 9\ Ov Dated: February _,2015 By.
y < 16
o s? i Jaroslaw Waszczuk, In Pro Per
3 V)
o
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17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
<OI36237g.DOCX)
(PROPOSEDI ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS BOYD, CHILCOTT, NICHOLS, OROPEZA AND
SEIFERT'S SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE FIRST THROUGH FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION OF
•• • \
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
EXHIBIT # 5
1 P O R T E R I S C O T T
{01892012.DOCX}
DEFENDANT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
COMPEL VERIFIED RESPONSES
Defendant REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA (the "UNIVERSITY" or
"DEFENDANT") respectfully submits the following memorandum of points and authorities in
support of its motion to: (1) compel Plaintiff JAROSLAW ("JERRY") WASZCZUK's verified
4 responses to Requests for Production of Documents (Set One), Special Interrogatories (Set One),
5 Form Interrogatories - General (Set One), Form Interrogatories - Employment (Set One.); (2) deem
6 Defendant's Request for Admissions (Set One) admitted; (3) award monetary sanctions in the
amount of $5,200.00 to retum Defendant to the position it would have been had the subject
discovery responses been timely provided; (4) issue terminating sanctions against Plaintiff as a
result of Plaintiffs pattem of vexatious litigation tactics and failure to engage in the discovery
10 process; and (5) impose a deadline for Plaintiff to seek leave to file a Third Amended Complaint.
I.
11
INTRODUCTION
12 Defendant served Plaintiff with Requests for Production of Documents (Set One), Special
13 Interrogatories (Set One), Form Interrogatories - General (Set One), Form Interrogatories -
^ ^ ~
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14 Employment (Set One) and Requests for Admissions (Set One) on April 25, 2018. Responses were
> ^ ov ov
Oi < O 15 due on or before May 30, 2018. Defendant provided Plaintiff with an extension to June 20, 2018 to
U ^ C ov Ov
—
• " ..
16 provide responses to the requests. Plaintiff has completely failed to respond to any written
17 discovery and responses are overdue.
18 Defendant respectftilly requests the Court issue an Order to (1) compel Plaintiff to provide
19 verified responses to Defendant's Requests for Production of Documents (Set One), Special
20 Interrogatories (Set One), Form Interrogatories - General (Set One), Form Interrogatories -
21 Employment (Set One) and Request for Admissions (Set One); (2) deem Defendant's Request for
22 Admissions (Set One) admitted; (3) issue monetary sanctions against Plaintiff in the amount of
23 $5,200.00 for Defendant's fees and costs incurred in bringing this motion; and (4) issue the sanction
24 of termination of the present action as a result of Plaintiffs failure to provide responses to the
25 Defendant's written discovery despite receiving an extension of time to do so and in light of
26 Plaintiffs pattem of vexatious litigation tactics throughout the course of this litigation. Moreover, if
27 the Court is not willing, at this stage, to terminate the action, it should impose a reasonable deadline
28 of two weeks for Plaintiff to seek leave to file a Third Amended Complaint, if Plaintiff intends to
{01892012.DOCX} ' • 1
DEFENDANT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
COMPEL VERIFIED RESPONSES
1 further amend his complaint.
2 II.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
3
4 Defendant UNIVERSITY served Plaintiff with Requests for Production of Documents (Set
5 One), Special Interrogatories (Set One), Form Interrogatories - General (Set One), Eorm
6 Interrogatories - Employment (Set One), and Requests for Admissions (Set One) on April 25, 2018!
7 (See Declaration of Daniel Bardzell in Support of Motion to Compel ("Bardzell Decl."), ^ 2 and
8 Exhibit A.) By correspondence dated May 22, 2018, Plaintiff requested an extension of time to
9 respond to all such requests on the basis that he was sick. (See Bardzell Decl., 3 and Exhibit B.)
10 Defendants responded by email correspondence dated May 23, 2018 granting Plaintiff an extension
11 of time to respond until June 20, 2018. (See Bardzell Decl., Tl 4 and Exhibit C.) Plaintiff completely
12 failed to respond to any such request by June 20, 2018 and same are currently overdue. (See
o
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13 Bardzell Decl., H 4.)
L. •- r s
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14 On Septernber 24, 2018, counsel for Defendant served a meet and confer correspondence
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15 upon Plaintiff regarding the outstanding discovery responses wherein defense counsel indicated:
VD
OV OV
•b p-J X 16 [P]lease provide complete responses to all such outstanding requests no later than September 28,
UJ <
^•5 yf- u-
^ TO -
o
17 2018. If we do not have your complete responses by that date, we will file a niotion to compel
1^
18 responses and request monetary as well as terminating sanctions from the Court." (See Bardzell
19 Decl., H 5 and Exhibit D.)
20 By incoherent email correspondence also dated September 24, 2018, Plaintiff indicated, in
21
part:
22 Thank you for news about the Request for Production of Documents and Special
Interrogatories , I appreciate but I not sure yet what I am going to . I am waiting for
23 answers from the federal authorities in this matter.
I will let know . I mean time you can entertain yourself with my affirmative defense
24
of Judge Brett Kavanaugh. As Jeanine Pirro stated not so long ago , . UC Regent wife
25 Senator Feinstein's Unhinged Demon Rats attacking Judge Kavanaugh as I was
attacked and wasted by her husband and other unhinged UC demon , rats . Same
26 people only different is that I have no 1 penny on my account and I am for my SS
check on 28^*^ than I could buy ink for my printer and do eventually interrogatories.
27
(See Bardzell Decl., TI 6 and Exhibit E.)
28
{01892012.DOCX}
DEFENDANT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
COMPEL VERIFIED RESPONSES
Plaintiff failed to respond to any of the outstanding discovery requests by September 28,
2018 and same remain outstanding. (See Bardzell Decl., Tl 7.)
3 On October 1, 2018, Plaintiff submitted an email correspondence to Defendant stating: "I
4 am working on the Interrogatories and other papers. Pleas give one more week to finish. Attached is
a part of interrogatories to show you that I am working on ." (See Bardzell Decl., Tl 8 and Exhibit
F.) Included was a rambling apparent partial draft response to Defendant's Special Interrogatories,
Set One without a verification. (See id.)
The course of litigation in this matter is lengthy and complex. The following is a brief
summary: Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") on September 30,
10 2014. Among the several claims in the SAC are four causes of action against all named
11 Defendants': (1) intentional infiiction of emotional distress ("IIED"); (2) tortious interference with
12 economic advantage; (3) FEHA harassment and failure to prevent harassment, discrimination,
13 retaliation in violation of Govemment Code § 12940(a); and (4) whistleblower/unlawful retaliation
t 1 S3 _ VO
t/1 u~, 00 o in violation of Govemment Code §§ 8547 e/. ^e^.
O u =^ 2 14
.
1 <ag
> U ov Ov I ^
Each of these causes of action arises out of Plaintiffs employment with Defendant at the
Od •< o" ^ S '
c o^ 5^ University of Califomia at Davis Medical Center. In addition to Defendant UNIVERSITY^, these
17 causes of action were plead against Defendants ANN MADDEN RICE, MIKE BOYD, STEPHEN
On April 14, 2015, the Court issued an Order granting the Special Motion to Strike finding
that Plaintiff failed to establish a probability of prevailing on the causes of action pleaded against
the anti-SLAPP Defendants as required by section 425.16 and entering judgment in favor of the
anti-SLAPP Defendants. (See Bardzell Decl., Tl 10 and Exhibit G.)
Plaintiff subsequently filed a request for dismissal with prejudice of the four remaining
individual Defendants RICE, WITCHER, PUTNEY, and DANILIUC. (See Bardzell Decl., Tl 11 and
Exhibit H.) The UNIVERSITY is the only Defendant remaining in the case.
10
On May 11, 2015, the anti-SLAPP Defendants filed a Motion for Fees and Costs pursuant to
11
CCP § 425.16, subdivision (c) and the Court's Order dated April 14, 2015 on Defendant's Special
12
Motion to Strike. (See Bardzell Decl., Tl 12.) The motion sought recovery of approximately $33,000
13
• = S—OO VOo in fees and costs incurred by the anti-SLAPP Defendants in connection with the Special Motion to
, 1/5.. ov
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14
Strike.
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UJ <
a- c « f - Lu
. o 17 Costs in the amount of $22,284 against Plaintiff (See Bardzell Decl., Tl 13 and Exhibit I.)
m
18 Plaintiff has represented that he will seek leave of the court to file a Third Ame;nded
19 Complaint. (See Bardzell Decl., Exhibit B.) At the outset ofthe appeal of the anti-SLAPP motion-
20 well over a year ago - Plaintiff provided Defendants with a draft of his Third Amended Complaint.
21 It is nearly three hundred pages long and includes meritless allegations of a conspiracy to cover-up
22 illegal power sales that purportedly involves all levels of state government, the University of
23 Califomia system, and local jurisdictions, including the Sacramento Municipal Utility District. To
24 date. Plaintiff has not sought leave of the Court to file a Third Amended Complaint.
25 III.
PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ORDERED TO PROVIDE RESPONSES TO SPECIAL
26 INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE). FORM INTERROGATORIES - GENERAL (SET
ONE) AND FORM INTERROGATORIES - EMPLOYMENT (SET ONE)
27
A party to whom interrogatories have been propounded shall respond in writing under oath
28
{01892012.DOCX} .4
DEFENDANT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
COMPEL VERIFIED RESPONSES
1 separately to each interrogatory by any of the following: an answer containing the information
2 being sought to be discovered, an exercise of the party's option to produce writings, or an objection
3 to the particular interrogatory. (CCP § 2030.210(a).) If a party to whom interrogatories are directed
4 fails to serve a timely response, the party propounding the interrogatories may move for an order
5 compelling response to the interrogatories. (CCP § 2030.290(b).) The party also waives objections
6 to the interrogatories (including those based on privilege and work product) by failing to respond
7 by the deadline. (CCP § 2030.290(a).)
8 Unlike a motion to compel further responses, a motion to compel responses is not subject to
9 a 45-day time limit, and the propounding party does not have 'to demonstrate either good cause or
10 that it satisfied a meet-and-confer requirement. {Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific
11 Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal. App. 4"^ 390, 411.) A separate statement is not required
12 when no response has been provided to the request for discovery. (Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(b).)
o
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i i ir, 13 In our case. Defendant has not received plaintiffs verified responses to Special
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oo o 14 Interrogatories (Set One), Form Interrogatories - General (Set One), or Form Interrogatories -
-U "
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Di < d ov ov 15 Employment (Set One). These interrogatories were properly served on Plaintiff on April 25, 2018.
vb VD
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_) X 16 (Bardzell Decl., Tl 2 and Exhibit A.) Plaintiffs responses were due on or before May 30, 2018. By
H £:
o
17 correspondence dated May 22, 2018, Plaintiff requested an extension of time to respond to all such
18 requests on the basis that he was sick. (Bardzell Decl., Tl 3 and Exhibit B.) Defendant responded by
19 email correspondence dated May 23, 2018 granting Plaintiff an extension of time to respond to
20 June 20, 2018. (Bardzell Decl., Tl 4 and Exhibit C.) Plaintiff did not respond to this discovery by
21 June 20, 2018, has not offered a valid excuse for his failure to respond and all such responses
22 remain outstanding. Defendant requires these discovery responses in order to properly defend itself
23 in this case and to determine the validity of plaintiffs claims.
24 Accordingly, Defendant respectfully request an Order compelling Plaintiff to provide
25 verified responses to Defendant's Special Interrogatories (Set One), Form Interrogatories - General
26 (Set One), and Form Interrogatories - Employment (Set One) without objections.
27 ///
28 ///
{01892012.DOCX) 5
DEFENDANT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
COMPEL VERIFIED RESPONSES
IV.
PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ORDERED TO PROVIDE RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS (SET ONE)
If a party to whom a demand for inspection is directed fails to serve a timely response, the
party propounding the demand may move for an order compelling responses to the demand. (CCP
§ 2031.300(b).) In addition, a party who fails to respond waives any objections he otherwise could
have raised to the demand. (CCP § 2031.300(a).)
Defendant served Plaintiff with a Request for Production of Documents (Set One) on April
25, 2018. (Bardzell Decl., Tl 2 and Exhibit A.) Plaintiffs responses were due on or before May 30,
2018. Plaintiff requested and received an extension of time in which to respond yet failed to
10 respond by the extended deadline. (Bardzell Decl., Tl 4 and Exhibit C.) Plaintiffs responses remain
11 overdue and outstanding. (See id.)
12 Therefore, Defendant respectfully requests an Order compelling Plaintiff to provide
o
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13 responses to Defendant's Request for Production of Documents (Set One), without objections.
3 oo
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0-; < Q- VD ^ 1J DEFENDANT'S REOUEST FOR ADMISSIONS (SET ONE) SHOULD BE
DEEMED ADMITTED
5 g g --i X 16
o.|is< The party to whom requests for admission have been directed shall respond in writing under
o
17 oath separately to each request. (CCP § 2033.210(a).) Each response shall answer the substance of
18
the requested admission, or set forth an objection to the particular request. {Id.)
19
20 "If a party to whom requests for admission are directed fails to serve a timely response
[. . .] The party to whom the requests for admission are directed waives any objection to
21 the requests[. . . .] The requesting party may move for an order that the genuineness of
22 any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed
admitted, as well as for a monetary sanction[. . . . ] It is mandatory that the court impose
23 a monetary sanction [. . .] on the party or attorney, or both, whose failure to serve a
timely response to requests for admission necessitated this motion." (CCP §
24 2033.280(a-c).)
25 Defendant served Plaintiff with a Request for Admissions (Set One) including nineteen
26 requests on April 25, 2018. (Bardzell Decl., Tl 2 and Exhibit A.) Plaintiffs responses were due on
27 or before May 30, 2018. Plaintiff requested and received an extension of time in which to respond
28 yet failed to respond by the extended deadline. (Bardzell Decl., Tl 4 and Exhibit C.) Plaintiff s
{01892012.DOCX} 6
DEFENDANT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
COMPEL VERIFIED RESPONSES
1 responses remain overdue and outstanding. (See id.)
. 2 Therefore, Defendant respectfully requests an order that the tmth of all matters specified in
3 Defendant's Request for Admissions, Set One be deemed admitted pursuant to CCP § 2033.280.
4 VL
.5 MONETARY SANCTIONS SHOULD BE AWARDED
Code of Civil Procedure § 2023.030(a) provides, in relevant part, that:
6
7 The court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse
of the discovery process, or any attomey advising that conduct, or both pay the
8 reasonable expenses, including attoniey's fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that
9 conduct [. . .] If a monetary sanction is authorized by any provision of this title, the
court shall impose that sanction unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction
10 acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of
the sanction unjust;
11
12 CCP §§ 2030.290(c), 2031.300(c) and 2033.280(c) provide that a court shall impose a ,
13 monetary sanction on any party who unsuccessfully opposes a motion to compel responses to
r- 3 00 — VO
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O .. Ov -a- 14 interrogatories, request for production of documents or request for admissions.
— > v j a^ ov
< o" >o vd 15- Defendant has extended Plaintiff every opportunity to avoid court intervention in this
U ^ . S ov 5;
matter by providing Plaintiff with an extension of time to respond to all of the aforementioned
3
17 requests to which Plaintiff still failed to provide any response. Plaintiff has completely ignored
18 Defendant's discovery requests.
19 Plaintiffs attempt to evade his obligation to provide responses to discovery has made the
20 current motion necessary, despite being afforded opportunities to avoid the need for same.
21 To date. Defendants have incurred $3,900 in fees as a result of Plaintiff s failure to respond
22 to Requests for Production of Documents (Set One), Special Interrogatories (Set One), Form
23 Interrogatories - General (Set One), Form Interrogatories - Employment (Set One.) and Request for
24 Admissions (Set One.) (Bardzell Decl., Tl 15.) Defendant anticipates incurring an additional $1,300
25 to review Plaintiffs Opposition, prepare a reply and attend a hearing. (See id.) Therefore, sanctions
26 are proper. Moreover, even if Plaintiff serves responses upon notice of this motion in order to avoid
27 a court order. Defendant has nevertheless been forced to incur the expense of moving to compel
28 Plaintiffs compliance with his discovery obligations, despite efforts to achieve a cooperative
{01892012.DOCX} ' ' • 7 .
DEFENDANT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
COMPEL VERIFIED RESPONSES
1 result. As such, sanctions in the amount of $5,200 are appropriately awarded against Plaintiff for
2 the time and expense incurred by Defendant in filing this otherwise unnecessary motion.
VII.
TERMINATING SANCTIONS ARE ALSO APPROPRIATE
The Code of Civil Procedure provides that the Court may impose sanctions on any party
who engages in conduct that constitutes misuse ofthe discovery process. (CCP § 2023.030(a).)
•6
Misuses ofthe discovery process includes "failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method
7
of discovery" and "disobeying a court order to provide discovery." (CCP §§ 2023.010(d), (g).)
8
When a party fails to respond to an authorized method of discovery and/or fails to obey a court
9
order to provide discovery, the Court may impose monetary sanctions, terminating sanctions, or
10
both. (CCP § 2023.030(a), (d), (g).)
11
Courts have long held that terminating sanctions are appropriate where there is a willful
o.
12
o failure to comply with court orders, and should be issued where it appears that lesser sanctions
tN
f-^ •- 0 0^
13
L - 3 . VO
H CT) 1/-, OO O would not bring the offending party into compliance. {R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd.
o d-=^ 2: P; 14
> U ov ov ., (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 486, 496.) Terminating sanctions are especially appropriate where a party
< o" vd ^ 1J
W c o^ o^
f— • — " .. fails to respond to discovery requests and ignores court orders. {See Kahn v. Kahn (1977) 68
Cal.App.3d 372, 383.)
17
Terminating sanctions are appropriate in this case. Plaintiff has failed to provide any
18
verified responses to the Defendant's written discovery despite receiving an extension of time to do
19
so.
20
It is evident that Plaintiffs conduct is nothing more than a delaying tactic to prevent the
21
Defendant from engaging in basic discovery. Requiring Defendant to continue wasting time,
22
money, and Court resources to compel Plaintiff to litigate this case would be categorically unjust.
23
The aforementioned conduct has also prejudiced Defendant's ability to prepare for trial and will
24
interfere with the Court's ability ascertain the tmth in this case. It has thus become apparent that no
25
action will compel Plaintiff to comply with his discovery obligations, making terminating sanctions
26
appropriate.
27
Additionally, Plaintiffs pattem of vexatious litigation tactics throughout the course of this
28
{01892012.DOCX} 8
DEFENDANT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
COMPEL VERIFIED RESPONSES
litigation further indicates the need for terminating sanctions. Recently, Plaintiff engaged in
vexatious litigation tactics in connection with his opposition to Defendants' Motion for Fees and
Costs Pursuant to CCP § 425.16(c). The Court recognized Plaintiffs repeated improper filings in
its Tentative Ruling on Defendants' Motion for Fees and Costs dated June 7, 2018, affirmed and
adopted by its Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Fees and Costs Pursuant to CCP § 425.16(c)
dated June 29, 2018. (Bardzell Decl., Exhibit I.) The Court's Tentative Ruling, in part, provided:
"First the Court must note that the opposition memorandum exceeds the 15 page limit
set forth in California Rules of Court Rule 3.1113 and Plaintiff failed to obtain an order
8 pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1113(e) permitting an oversized meinorandum. The Court has
9 previously admonished Plaintiff for failing to comply with this mle."
[.-..]
10
Plaintiffs "notice of objection" to Defendants' supplemental declaration does nothing
11
more than repeat the issues discussed above related to his previous counsel and the'
12 alleged collusion with Defendants' counsel in addition to alleging that Defendants'
o
o counsel had attempted to provoke him into a physical confrontation. [. . .] There was no
tN
13 basis to file an'objection.'"
J 00 — VO
^ oo o
I/-J oo
O <J °^ 2 14 (Bardzell Decl., Exhibit I , Tentative Ruling on Defendants' Motion for Fees and Costs
> U ov ov _
cc; < o vd VD 1 J dated June 7, 2018, pg. 2-4.)
UJ ^ c 5; 5;
S g i -i X 16 Plaintiff has repeatedly filed multiple lengthy documents and pleadings and continues to
17 engage in tactics to delay the case and to force Defendant to expend additional funds in the defense
rn
18 of the action. Accordingly, Defendant requests that the Court grant terminating sanctions and issue
19 an Qrder dismissing the complaint against the remaining Defendant in its entirety, with prejudice.
20 VIH.
IF TERMINATING SANCTIONS ARE NOT GRANTED. THE COURT SHOULD
21 IMPOSE A DEADLINE FOR PLAINTIFF TO SEEK LEAVE TO F I L E A THIRD
22 AMENDED COMPLAINT, IF AT A L L
23
As discussed supra. Plaintiff has represented that he will seek leave of the court to file a
24
Third Amended Complaint. At the outset of the appeal of the anti-SLAPP motion- well over a year
25
ago - Plaintiff provided Defendants with a draft of his Third Amended Complaint. It is nearly three
26
hundred pages long and includes allegations of a conspiracy to cover-up illegal power sales that
27
involves all levels of state govemment, the University of Califomia system, and local jurisdictions,
28
including the Sacramento Municipal Utility District. To date, Plaintiff has not sought leave of the
(0I892012.DOCX} ^ 9
DEFENDANT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
COMPEL VERIFIED RESPONSES
1 Court to file a Third Amended Complaint. In light of Plaintiffs vexatious litigation tactics
2 identified supra, if the Court is not willing, at this stage, to terminate the action, it should impose a
3 reasonable deadline of two weeks from the issuance of an Order on the present Motion to Compel
4 for Plaintiff to seek leave to file a Third Amended Complaint. This would eliminate the specter of
5 additional voluminous and unnecessary pleading amendments from further delaying the case and
6 causing Defendant urmecessary fees and costs.
7 IX.
8 CONCLUSION
9 Defendant has made every effort to allow for the cooperative exchange of information,
10 however Plaintiff has failed to provide verified responses to Defendant's Requests for Production of
11 Documents (Set One), Special Interrogatories (Set One), Form Interrogatories - General (Set One),
12 Form Interrogatories - Ehiployment (Set One.) and Request for Admissions (Set One.) Defendant
o
o
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13 is left with no option other than to file the instant motion. As such, Defendant seeks an Order (1)
fN
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»o oo 14 compelling Plaintiff to provide verified responses, without objections, to Defendant's Requests for
O CJ ov
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15 Production of Documents (Set One), Special Interrogatories (Set One), Form Interrogatories -
5 ^ § -J X 16 General (Set One) and Form Interrogatories - Employment (Set One.); (2) deeming Defendant's
:D C/) 17 Request for Admissions, Set One admitted; (3) awarding sanctions in the amount of $5,200.00 to
o
18 return Defendant to the position it would have been had responses been timely provided; (4) issue
19 terminating sanctions against Plaintiff as a result of Plaintiff s pattern of vexatious litigation tactics
20 and failure to engage in the discovery process; and (5) altematively, if termination is not granted, to
21 impose a two week deadline for Plaintiff to seek leave to file a Third Amended Complaint, if at all.
22
Dated: October 3, 2018 PORTER SCOTT
23 A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
24
25 David P. E. Bhrkett
26 Daniel J. Bardzell
Attomeys for DefendEint
27
28
{01892012.DOCX} 10
DEFENDANT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
COMPEL VERIFIED RESPONSES
Waszczuk V. Regents ofthe University of California, et ai
1
Sacramento County Superior Court, Case No. 34-2013-00155479
2
PROOF OF SERVICE
3
4 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. My business
address is 350 University Avenue, Suite 200, Sacramento, California 95825.
5
On the date below, I served the following document:
6
7 DEFENDANT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
COMPEL VERIFIED RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS SET
8 ONE, SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES SET ONE, FORM INTERROGATORIES - GENERAL SET
ONE, FORM INTERROGATORIES - EMPLOYMENT SET ONE; TO DEEM REQUEST FOR
9 ADMISSIONS ADMITTED; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
10
BY MAIL: I placed the envelope for collection and mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I
11 am readily familiar with this business' practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing.
On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary
12 course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid.
o
o
BY PERSONAL SERVICE: I caused such document to be personally delivered to the person(s)
tN
13 addressed below. (1) For a party represented by an attomey, delivery was made to the attomey or at the
.,- ^ — VD
attomey's office by leaving the documents, in an envelope or package clearly labeled to identify the
•~ tN
t- 3 00 00 o
attomey being served, with a receptionist or an individual in charge of the office, between the hours of
o OV 1^ 14
u I)
ov t-: nine in the moming and five in the evening. (2) For a party, delivery was made to the party or by leaving
00 53
— g<
> tN f N
ov OV
15 the documents at the party's residence with some person not younger than 18 years of age between the
o '^S vd hours of eight in the moming and six in the evening.
f-
o: J X 16 BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY: I enclosed the documents in an envelope or package provided by an
o UJ < ovemight delivery carrier and addressed to the person(s) listed below. I placed the envelope or package
17 for collection and ovemight delivery at my office or a regularly utilized drop box of the ovemight
delivery carrier.
18 BY FAX TRANSMISSION: Based on an agreement of the parties to accept service by fax transmission,
I faxed the documents to the persons at the fax numbers listed below. No error was reported by the fax
19 machine that 1 used. A copy of the record of the fax transmission, which I printed out, is attached
BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE: Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept service
20 by electronic transmission, 1 caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the electronic notification
address listed below.
21
Jaroslaw Waszczuk
22
2216 Katzakian Way
23 Lodi, CA 95242
24 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Califomia that the
foregoing is tme and correct. Executed at Sacramento, Califomia on October 3, 2018.
25
26
Wendy Strasser
27
28
{0I892012.DOCX} II
DEFENDANT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
COMPEL VERIFIED RESPONSES
EXHIBIT # 6
EXHIBIT # 7
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
GORDON D SCHABER COURTHOUSE
MINUTE ORDER
DATE: 10/31/2018 TIME: 02:00:00 PM DEPT: 53
JUDICIAL OFFICER PRESIDING: David Brown
CLERK: E. Brown
REPORTER/ERM:
BAILIFF/COURT ATTENDANT: R. Mays, M. Oreschak
APPEARANCES
No later than November 21, 2018, Plaintiff Jarolsaw Waszczuk shall serve verified responses, without
objections, to Plaintiff's form and special interrogatories (sets one) and requests for production (set one).
The Court received a letter from Plaintiff purportedly attaching his answers to special interrogatories.
The Court simply notes that no responses to form interrogatories or request for production were
attached to the letter and in any event, service of responses after the motion was filed does not moot the
motion. Defendant is still entitled to an order. To be clear, a motion is "made" when it is filed and
served. (CCP § 1005.5.) However, to the extent that any responses served after the motion was filed
comply with the above order, they need not be re-served.
Defendant's request for sanctions in connection with the motion to compel responses is denied as the
motion was unopposed. Although California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1348 purports to authorize sanctions
if the motion is unopposed, the Court declines to do so, as the specific statutes governing this discovery
authorize sanctions only if the motion was unsuccessfully made or opposed. Any order imposing
sanctions under the C.R.C. must conform to the conditions of one or more of the statutes authorizing
sanctions. Trans-Action Commercial Investors, Ltd. v. Firmaterr, Inc. (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 352, 355.
However, repeated conduct of failing to comply with discovery obligations may lead the Court to find an
abuse of the discovery process and award sanctions on that basis. Laguna Auto Body v. Farmers
Insurance Exchange (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 481.
Defendant's unopposed motion to deem matters in the requests for admission admitted is granted,
unless Plaintiff Jarolsaw Waszczuk serves, "before the hearing on the motion," proposed
responses that are in substantial compliance with CCP § 2033.220. (CCP § 2033.280(c).)
Defendant's request for mandatory monetary sanctions is connection with the motion to deem matters
admitted is granted. (CCP § 2033.280(c).) However, the requested amount of $5,200 for this
straightforward discovery motion is plainly excessive. Plaintiff Jarolsaw Waszczuk shall pay to
Defendant a mandatory monetary sanction in the amount of $520 ($260/hr x 2 hrs). The monetary
sanction is to be paid on or before December 1, 2018. If the sanction is not paid by that date, Defendant
may prepare for the Court's signature a formal order granting the sanctions, which may be enforced by a
separate judgment. (Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608, 615.)
The Court denies Defendant's alternate requests for issue, evidentiary, and/or terminating sanctions at
this time. The sanctions the court may impose are such as are suitable and necessary to enable the
party seeking discovery to obtain the objects of the discovery he seeks but the court may not impose
sanctions which are designed not to accomplish the objects of the discovery but to impose punishment."
(Caryl Richards, Inc. v. Superior Court (1961) 188 Cal. App. 2d 300, 304.) "The penalty should be
appropriate to the dereliction, and should not exceed that which is required to protect the interests of the
party entitled to but denied discovery. (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal. App. 3d 771, 793) The
discovery sanction cannot put the propounding party in a better position than they would have been in if
they had received the discovery. (Puritan Insurance Co. v Superior Court (1985) 171 Cal. App.3d 877,
884.)
Here, given that this is the first order with respect to the subject discovery, the drastic remedy of
terminating sanctions would be punitive. Further, while Defendant references Plaintiff's "vexatious"
conduct in this action, that conduct has nothing to do with the instant motion and in any event, is not a
basis for discovery sanctions. Such ad hominem comments serve no useful purpose in educating the
court as to the party's position, and distract more than they advocate. In short, they are more cathartic
than tactical.
Finally, the Court declines Defendant's requests that the Court impose a deadline for Plaintiff to seek
leave to file a third amended complaint. Defendant indicates that Plaintiff has represented that he
intends to seek leave to file a third amended complaint which is represented as being nearly 300 pages
long. Plaintiff's decision to seek leave or not seek leave is his to make and the Court will not impose a
deadline as part of this discovery motion.
The notice of motion provides the incorrect time and location for the hearing. This matter has been
assigned to Department 53 for law and motion purposes and Department 53 hears law and motion
matters at 2 p.m. Moving counsel is directed to immediately provide notice to Plaintiff of the correct time
and location of the hearing.
The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further
notice is required.
COURT RULING
There being no request for oral argument, the Court affirmed the tentative ruling.
APPEARANCES
attached to the letter and in any event, service of responses after the motion was filed does not moot the
motion. Defendant is still entitled to an order. To be clear, a motion is "made" when it is filed and
served. (CCP § 1005.5.) However, to the extent that any responses served after the motion was filed
comply with the above order, they need not be re-served.
Defendant's request for sanctions in connection with the motion to compel responses is denied as the
motion was unopposed. Although California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1348 purports to authorize sanctions
if the motion is unopposed, the Court declines to do so, as the specific statutes governing this discovery
authorize sanctions only if the motion was unsuccessfully made or opposed. Any order imposing
sanctions under the C.R.C. must conform to the conditions of one or more of the statutes authorizing
sanctions. Trans-Action Commercial Investors, Ltd. v. Firmaterr, Inc. (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 352, 355.
However, repeated conduct of failing to comply with discovery obligations may lead the Court to find an
abuse of the discovery process and award sanctions on that basis. Laguna Auto Body v. Farmers
Insurance Exchange (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 481.
The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further
notice is required.
COURT RULING
There being no request for oral argument, the Court affirmed the tentative ruling.
CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED: Order for Appearance and Examination Jaroslaw "Jerry"
Waszczuk, 12/07/2018
APPEARANCES
Jaroslaw Waszczuk, self represented Plaintiff, present.
Dan Bardzell, counsel, present for Defendant(s).
Nature of Proceedings: Hearing on Order of Examination of Judgment Debtor
The above entitled cause came before this court for hearing on Order of Examination of Judgment
Debtor this date with the above indicated parties present.
Judgment Debtor, Jaroslaw Waszczuk was sworn and examined.
The examination was concluded and the parties were released.
From: [email protected]
Subject: FW: Case No. 34-2013-00155479, Jaroslaw Waszczuk v. The Regents of the University of California. -
SUMMARY OF OUR MEETING IN THE COURT CAFETERIA ON FEBRUARY 8, 2019
Attachments: 00000-IN PRO PER.pdf; 0000-20190208-COURT ORDER APPEARANCE .pdf; 001-20180718- LETTTER
TO CLERK.pdf; 002-20181113- JUDGE BROWN BROWN.pdf; 003-ADM-2-2009- SETTLEMENT-
AGREEMENT (29-40).pdf; 004- REIBURSEMENT- STATE BAR.pdf; 005-20140718 LT DES to Coombs
(2).pdf; 006-20190129- SUPREME COURT CUIAB FILED.pdf; 007-12-15-2018 US TAX COURT.pdf;
FREEDOM OF SPEECH (004).jpg
From: Jaroslaw Waszczuk <[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, February 10, 2019 3:58 PM
To: [email protected]; Wendy Strasser <[email protected]>; [email protected];
[email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; 'David Burkett'
<[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected];
[email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected];
[email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected];
[email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; whistleblower@judiciary‐rep.senate.gov;
[email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected];
[email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected];
[email protected]; [email protected].; [email protected];
[email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]
Subject: Case No. 34‐2013‐00155479, Jaroslaw Waszczuk v. The Regents of the University of California. ‐SUMMARY OF
OUR MEETING IN THE COURT CAFETERIA ON FEBRUARY 8, 2019
Sent by e-mail
1
Sacramento, CA 95825
Subject: Appearance and Examination on February 8, 2019 at 9:00 a.m. at Department 43. Hon. Thadd
A. Blizzard, Case No. 34-2013-00155479, Jaroslaw Waszczuk v. The Regents of the University of
California.
For the record, I would like to briefly summarize our meeting that took place on February 8,
2019 in the Sacramento County Superior Court Cafeteria on the sixth floor at 9:30 a.m.
I and my witness, William Buckans (UC Davis Medical Center employee), viewed the meeting
as unpleasant, provocative, and hostile. William and I noticed that you were very nervous and
uncomfortable during the meeting. At some point when you started bringing my wife and children into
the terror I have been experiencing for the last 12 years from the University of California Office of the
President (UCOP) mob, William, who was sitting at the next table, turned his chair toward you and
looked at you. You did not know that William was my former coworker from the UC Davis Medical
Center 27 MW cogeneration plant where I worked from June 1999 to April 2007. You were also
informed previously that two Porter Scott attorneys attempted to provoke me into physical
confrontation outside the court room in February 2015 and in August 2017.
From your redundant and provocative questions about my wife, children, landlord, and the
insurance on my rental house, it was not difficult to conclude that Janet Napolitano is looking to inflict
a different type of harm to me and my family than to enforce the unlawful judgment (see the Letter to
the Clerk filed on July 18, 2018 and the Letter to Judge Brown filed on November 16, 2018).
Your questions about insurance on the rental house clearly indicate that UCOP mob led by
Janet Napolitano is planning a raid on my home with involvement from the Lodi Police or San Joaquin
Sheriff’s Department to terrorize me and my family by ransacking my house to cause psychological
trauma. As you probably read in court documents, I have been terrorized and hunted like a Jew during
the holocaust by the UCOP mob since January 2007, and I don’t see it ending soon while I’m still
alive.
During our meeting on February 8, 2019, I provided you with the following documents as potential
assets:
1. A copy of the January 31, 2009 Settlement Agreement by UC Regents and myself plus the
calculated damages of approximately $1,000,000 caused by UC Regents due to breach and
violation of this Settlement Agreement (attached).
2. The March 1, 2018 copy of the California Supreme Court decision, which ordered that I be paid
back my stolen retainer money in the amount of $14,694.33 plus 10% interest that I paid to my
2
former attorney, Douglas Stein, for representation. Stein on Discipline Case No. S245982
(attached).
3. The unfinished case with Liberty Assurance Company of Boston, which is in conspiracy with
UC Regents that denied my short disability benefits in 2011. Minimum value $4,546 (attached).
4. The unfinished unemployment insurance benefits case pending in the California Supreme Court,
Waszczuk v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board 3DCA Case No. C079254,
Supreme Court Case No. – Value $25,000 if prevail.
5. Whistleblower case pending in the U.S. Tax Court, Waszczuk v. United States Commissioner of
Internal Revenue Services, Docket No. 023105. The IRS whistleblower case is about an
enormous amount of unlawful power sales by regents in conspiracy with Enron and the
California Independent System Operator and related to multimillion dollars in tax fraud. Fraud
was disclosed in August 2012 by UC Davis Assistant Vice Chancellor Dr. Shelton Duruisseau
in this interview with Sac Cultural Hub (attached). http://www.sacculturalhub.com/headlines/a-
look-back
“THE BLACKSMITH WAS GUILTY, BUT THE GYPSY WAS HANGED.” - Polish
proverb
In addition, after the meeting I forwarded to you my current bank statement from Rabobank and
an e-mail from Citibank with information about the account I have no access to. I believe that the
amount of $14,694.33 plus interest for five years should cover the judgment obtained by the Court by
David Burkett in violation of California Court Rules 3.1312 b, which states:
“That the prevailing party must, upon expiration of the five-day period provided for approval,
promptly transmit the proposed order to the court together with a summary of any responses of
the other parties or a statement that no responses were received pursuant to California Rule of
Court 3.1312(b).”
Defendants’ attorney David Burkett bluntly violated the California Rule of Court 3.1312(b) and did not
transmit to the Court the PLAINTIFF’S 90-page DISAPPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED ORDER
AND JUDGMENT GRANTING LEGAL FEES AND COSTS TO DEFENDANTS IN ANTI-SLAPP
MOTION C.C.P. 425.16 (c).
2018 David Burkett’s violation of Rule 3.1312(b) is a copycat scenario of the March 2015
PLAINTIFF’S DISAPPROVAL OF THE PROPOSED ORDER AND JUDGMENT GRANTING
DEFENDANTS’ ANTI-SLAPP MOTION C.C.P. 425.16 (ROA #73).
3
____________________________
Jaroslaw Waszczuk
Plaintiff in Pro Per
CC: Sacramento County Superior Court Judge Hon. Thadd Blizzard, sent by U.S. Priority Mail on
February 11, 2019.
California Senator Cathleen Galgiani
State Bar of California
Lodi Police Department (Fax)
San Joaquin County Sheriff Department (Fax )
California Governor Office Hon. Gavin Newsom (FAX)
Consulate General of Polish Republic of Poland
Attachment:
4
EXHIBIT # 11
1 P O R T E R I S C O T T
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
2
David P. E. Burkett, SBN 241896
3 Daniel J. Bardzell, SBN 313993
350 University Avenue, Suite 200 FILED/ENDORSED
4 Sacramento, California 95825
TEL: 916.929.1481 FEB I I 2019
•5 FAX: 916.927.3706
dburkett(a),pbrterscott.com By:
6 £• Medina
dbardzellfolporterscott.com ueputy ciert«
7
Attorney for Defendant
8 REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
9 Exempt From Filing Fees Pursuant to Government Code § 6103
10
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
11
12 JAROSLAW ("JERRY") WASZCZUK, CASE NO. 34-2013-00155479
o
o
13 Plaintiff, DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF
h
(—
=mS oo
- ^o POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
O .. o\ 14 SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION
> U OS
15 TO COMPEL FURTHER VERIFIED
oi < o" ^
THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY RESPONSES TO SPECIAL
glig^ 16 OF CALIFORNIA, UNIVERSITY OF INTERROGATORIES SET ONE, FORM
CALIFORNIA DAVIS HEALTH INTERROGATORIES - GENERAL SET
o 17 SYSTEM, UC DAVIS MEDICAL ONE, FORM INTERROGATORIES -
CENTER, UC DAVIS, ANN MADDEN EMPLOYMENT SET ONE; AND FOR
18
RICE, MIKE BOYD, STEPHEN MONETARY AND TERMINATING
19 CHILCOTT, CHARLES WITCHER, SANCTIONS
DANESHA NICHOLS, CINDY
20 OROPEZA, BRENT SEIFERT, Date: March 13,2019
21 PATRICK PUTNEY, DORIN Time: 2:00 p.m.
DANILIUC, and Does 1 through 50, Dept.: 53
22 inclusive,
Complaint Filed: December 4, 2013
23 Defendants. Amended Complaint Filed: June 16,2014
24 SAC Filed: September 30, 2014
25
26
27
28
(01965098.DOCX}
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER VERIFIED RESPONSES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
2
Page
3
4 I. INTRODUCTION 1
23
24
25
26
27
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{0196S098.DOCX}
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER VERIFIED RESPONSES
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
(0I965098.DOCX} iii
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER VERIFIED RESPONSES
Code ofCivil Procedure § 2030.220(a) 5
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21
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{0I96S098.DOCX}
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF POEVTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER VERIFIED RESPONSES
Defendant REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA (the "UNIVERSITY" or
"DEFENDANT") respectfully submits the following memorandum of points and authorities in
3 support of its motion to: (1) compel Plaintiff JAROSLAW ("JERRY") WASZCZUK to provide
4 further verified responses to Special Interrogatories (Set One), Form Interrogatories - General (Set
5 One), Form Interrogatories - Employment (Set One); (2) award monetary sanctions in the amount
6 of $5,460 to retum Defendant to the position it would have been had the subject discovery
7 responses been timely and completely provided; (3) issue terminating sanctions against Plaintiff as
8 a result of Plaintiffs repeated failure to engage in the discovery process.
9 1.
10 INTRODUCTION
11 Defendant served Plaintiff with Special Interrogatories (Set One), Form Interrogatories -
o
12 General (Set One), Form Interrogatories - Employment (Set One) on April 25, 2018'. Responses
o
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VD
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14 2018 to provide responses to the requests. Plaintiff then failed to provide responses to any of
<N rvi
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vb ^ 15 Defendant's requests, requiring Defendarit to file a Motion to Compel. The Court granted that
Ov 0\
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a. o 17 pay Defendant monetary sanctions by December 14, 2018 related to Plaintiffs failure to respond to
18 requests for admission.
19 After the initial Motion to Compel, Plaintiff ultimately served his responses to special
20 interrogatories on October 15, 2018 and responses to form interrogatories - general and form
21 interrogatories - employment on December 13, 2019. These responses were mostly incomplete.
22 Defendant has attempted to meet-and-confer with Plaintiff regarding these deficiencies, but
23 consistent with his practice throughout this litigation, Plaintiff has refused to sufficiently and
24 coherently respond. As a result. Defendant now respectfully requests a further Order compelling
25 Plaintiff to cure the deficiencies raised in this Motion. Defendant also requests sanctions, pursuant
26 to 2030.290(c), in the amount of $5,460 for the fees and costs incurred as a result of Plaintiffs
27 continued disregard for the discovery process.
28
' Additional discovery requests outside the scope of the present motion were also served by Defendant at that time.
{01965098.DOCX} 1 ^
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER VERIFIED RESPONSES
1 Defendant respectfully requests the Court issue an Order to (1) compel Plaintiff to provide
2 fiarther verified responses, without objection, to Defendant's Special Interrogatories (Set One),
3 Form Interrogatories - General (Set One), and Form Interrogatories - Employment (Set One); (2)
4 issue monetary sanctions against Plaintiff in the amount of $5,460 for Defendant's fees and costs
5 incurred in bringing this motion; and (3) issue the sanction of termination of the present action as a
6 result of Plaintiff s pattern of failing to comply with his discovery obligations. .
7 II.
8 STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
9 The course of litigation in this matter is lengthy and complex. The following is a brief
10 summary: Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") on Septehiber 30,
11 2014. Among the several claims in the SAC are four causes of action against all named
12 Defendants^: (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"); (2) tortious interference with
B "n 13 economic advantage; (3) FEHA harassment and failure to prevent harassment, discriminafion,
h '= 00 - vo
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o u 2: P; 14 retaliation in violation of Government Code § 12940(a); and (4) whistleblower/unlawful retaliation
< § g 15
> ^ Ov Ov in violafion of Govemment Code §§ 8547 et seq.
< o" ^
o > i e < ^" Each of these causes of action arises out of Plaintiffs employment with Defendant at the
D 00
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17 University of Califomia at Davis Medical Center. In addition to Defendant UNIVERSITY^, these
18 causes of action were plead against Defendants ANN MADDEN RICE, MIKE BOYD, STEPHEN
19 CHILCOTT, CHARLES WITCHER, DANESHA NICHOLS, CINDY OROPEZA, BRENT
20 SEIFERT, PATRICK PUTNEY, and DORIN DANILIUC for their participation in investigafions
21 and disciplinary actions that ultimately resulted in Plainfiffs terminafion of employment with the
22 UNIVERSITY. The UNIVERSITY is the only Defendant remaining in the case.
23 Defendant UNIVERSITY served Plaintiff with Special Interrogatories (Set One), Form
24 Interrogatories - General (Set One), and Form Interrogatories - Employment (Set One) on April 25,
25 2018. (See Declarafion of Daniel Bardzell in Support of Mofion to Further Compel ("Bardzell
26 Decl."), 2 and Exhibit A.) By correspondence dated May 22, 2018, Plainfiff requested an
27
^ The First and Second Causes of Action in the Second Amended Complaint do not specifically identify Defendant UNIVERSITY
28 but do refer to employment with UC DAVIS within the cause of action.
^ S e e f n . 1.
{01965098.DOCX} 2
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER VERIFIED RESPONSES
extension offimeto respond to all such requests on the basis that he was sick. (See Bardzell Decl., |
3 and Exhibit B.) Defendant's counsel responded by email correspondence dated May 23, 2018
granfing Plaintiff an extension of fime to respond until June 20, 2018. (See Bardzell Decl., 4 and
Exhibit C.)
5 A. Plaintiff Ignores Defendant's Initial Meet-and-Confer Efforts
6 On September 24, 2018, counsel for Defendant served a meet and confer correspondence
7 upon Plaintiff regarding the outstanding discovery responses wherein defense counsel indicated:
8 [P]lease provide complete responses to all such outstanding requests no later than September 28,
9 2018. If we do not have your complete responses by that date, we will file a motion to compel
10 responses and request monetary as well as terminating sancfions from the Court." (See Bardzell
11 Decl., H 5 and Exhibit D.)
12
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fN
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Interrogatories . I appreciate but I not sure yet what I am going to . I am waiting for
V in C 14 answers from the federal authorities in this matter.
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15 I will let know . I mean fime you can entertain yourself with my affirmative defense
01 < 6 fN d
Ov OV of Judge Brett Kavanaugh. As Jeanine Pirro stated not so long ago , . UC Regent wife
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O ^ 2 as ov 16 Senator Feinstein's Unhinged Demon Rats attacking Judge Kavanaugh as I was
cu c attacked and wasted by her husband and other unhinged UC demon rats . Same
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17 people only different is that I have no 1 penny on my account and I am for my SS
18 check on 28^^ than I could buy ink for my printer and do eventually interrogatories.
(See Bardzell Decl., H 6 and Exhibit E.)
19
Plaintiff failed to respond to any of the outstanding discovery requests by September 28,
20
2018. (See Bardzell Decl., H 6.)
21
On October 1, 2018, Plainfiff submitted an email correspondence to Defendant stafing: " I
22
am working on the Interrogatories and other papers. Pleas give one more week to finish. Attached is
23
a part of interrogatories to show you that I am working on ." (See Bardzell Decl., TI 7 and Exhibit
24
F.) Included was a rambfing apparent partial draft response to Defendant's Special Interrogatories,
25
Set One without a verification. (See Bardzell Decl., Tl 8.)
26
B. Motion to Compel
27
Defendant was subsequently forced to file a Motion to Compel and needlessly incur the
28
{01965098.DOCX} 3 '
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER VERIFIED RESPONSES
1 associated fees and costs. (See Bardzell Decl., Tl 8.) On November 14, 2018, the Court issued its
2 tentative mling, which later became the ruling of the Court pursuant to Local Rule 1.06. (See
3 Bardzell Deck, Tl 9, and Exhibit G). There, the Court ordered Plaintiff to provide verified responses,
4 without objections, to Defendant's form and special interrogatories (sets one) and requests for
5 producfion (set one) no later than December 12, 2018. (See Bardzell Decl., Tl 9, and Exhibit G).
6 Additionally, the Court ordered Plaintiff to pay Defendant mandatory monetary sancfions in the
7 amount of $520 by December 14, 2018 for failure to provide responses to requests for admissions.
8 (See Bardzell Deck, TI 9, and Exhibit G.)
9 Plaintiff did subsequently provide responses to the special and form interrogatories, but they
10 were largely deficient as described in the present motion. (See Bardzell Deck, TI 11-12 and Exhibits
11 H and I.)
12 C. Plaintiff Again Ignores Defendant's Meet-and-Confer Efforts
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13 In light of Plaintiffs deficient responses to form and special interrogatories, defense
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oi < 0" vd vd 15 that Plaintiffs responses were deficient. (See Bardzell Decl., Tl 13 and Exhibit J.)
c 0! ON
Universi:
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Sacra
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17 which failed to address the interrogatory response deficiencies raised in Defendant's meet and
18 confer correspondence. (See Bardzell Deck, Tl 14 and Exhibits K.)
19 Plaintiff subsequently requested addifional time to respond to the meet and confer and the
20 parties agreed to extend the time for Defendant to file a mofion, if necessary, through Febmary 12,
21 2019. (See Bardzell Deck, Tl 15-17 and Exhibits L-N.)
22 By email dated January 25, 2019, Plainfiff further responded to Defendant's January 15,
23 2019 meet and confer correspondence by, in part, describing the interrogatories as harassing and
24 stating that Defendant should "File the mofion, and I , accordingly, will file the response to your
25 motion in court." (See Bardzell Deck, Tl 18 and Exhibits O.) As of the date of this Mofion, Plaintiff
26 has not provided amended responses. (See Bardzell Deck, TI 19.)
27 D. Plaintiff Failed to Pay Monetary Sanctions
28 In addition to Plaintiff willfially disregarding his discovery obligations, Plaintiff also
{01965098.DOCX) 4
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER VERIFIED RESPONSES
1 violated the Court's previous Order by failing to fttlly pay Defendant monetary sancfions. (See
2 Bardzell Deck, Tl 9-10.) As set forth above, in its prior Order, the Court directed Plaintiff to pay
3 monetary sancfions of $520 by December 14, 2018. (See Bardzell Deck, Tl 9 and Exhibit G.)
4 Plainfiff provided checks amounting to only a small portion of the amount owed. (See Bardzell
5 Deck, Tl 10.) Defendant has not cashed such checks. (See Bardzell Deck, TI 10.) Plainfiff failed to
6 pay the required sancfion by December 14, 2018 and, to-date, Plaintiff has provided checks
7 amounting to only a small portion of the sanctions ordered by the Court. (See Bardzell Deck, TI 10.)
8 in.
9 PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE), FORM
10 INTERROGATORIES - GENERAL (SET ONE) AND FORM INTERROGATORIES -
11 EMPLOYMENT (SET ONE) ARE EVASIVE. INCOHERENT AND INCOMPLETE
o
12 A party to whom interrogatories have been propounded shall respond in writing under oath
o
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— ^ 14 being sought to be discovered, an exercise of the party's opfion to produce writings, or an objection
ov I--
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oi < 6 vd vd 15 to the particular interrogatory. (CCP § 2030.210(a).) Code ofCivil Procedure §2030.220 requires
Ov Ov
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a. ta <
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17 Civil Procedure §2030.220 requires that parties produce all information "reasonably available" to
18 them in response to interrogatories. (CCP. §2030.220(a).) That obligation requires that parties
19- take all reasonable steps to investigate and obtain information responsive to the request. (CCP.
20 §2030.220(c).) If parties do not have sufficient informafion to respond to a request after making a
21 reasonable inquiry, they must state that fact in their response. (Id.) They should also detail the
22 efforts made to obtain the informafion. (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 782-783.)
23 Parties cannot claim a lack of personal knowledge when the informafion "can be obtained from
24 sources under his control." (Id.) A party may move to compel further responses if an answer is
25 "evasive or incomplete." (CCP. §2030.300(a).)
26 Here, Plaintiff provided evasive, incomplete and incoherent responses to Defendant's
27 Form Interrogatories - General, Set One; Form Interrogatories - Employment, Set One and Special
28 Interrogatories, Set One. (See generally Defendant's Separate Statement of Disputed Discovery
{01965098.DOCX} 5
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER VERIFIED RESPONSES
in Support of Motion to Compel ("Defendant's Separate Statemenf).)
Plaintiffs rambling and incoherent responses contain a myriad of deficiencies. Same are
set forth in greater detail in Defendant's Separate Statement. Plainfiffs responses to the form and
special interrogatories are generally deficient for the following reasons:
5 A. Plaintiff Improperly Cites External Documents
6 As set forth in greater detail in Defendant's Separate Statement, in response to
7 interrogatories, including, but not limited to, Special Interrogatories No. 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12,
8 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 30, 37; and Form Interrogatories 6.4, 206.1,-206.2, and
9 207.1, Plainfiffs response cites to voluminous extemal documents and/or url addresses without
10 any specific page/line references or summary. (See Defendant's Separate Statement and Bardzell
11 Decl., Exhibits H-I.) It is not proper to answer by cifing to an extemal document. (See Deyo supra,
12 84 Cal.App.3d at 783-784 ("[I]f a question does require the responding party to make reference to
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B 13 a pleading or document, the pleading or document should be idenfified and summarized so the
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o u =^ 2 P; answer is fially responsive to the question[.]" (cifing Califomia Civil Discovery Pracfice, Section
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< Q- vd ^ 1J 8.55 (C.E.B.1975); 4A Moore's Federal Pracfice (2d Ed. 1975), Secfion 33.25(1), pp. 33-131 to
w iv ^ 5:
33-132; State Road Dept. v. Florida East Coast Ry., 212 So.2d 315, 317(1) (Fla.App. 1968).)
3 Vi
17 (Further citafion omitted)). In instances where Plaintiff cites external documents, same are not
18 properly identified and summarized. (See Deyo, supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at 783-784.) Therefore,
19 these responses are improper and incomplete.
20 B. Plaintifrs Interrogatory Responses are Incomplete and In Some Instances He
21 Provided No Substantive Response Whatsoever
22 Plaintiff provided a multitude of incomplete responses, including numerous instances
23 where subparts are ignored. The following is a representafive sample of the such deficiencies: In
24 response to Form Interrogatories 6.4 and 6.5, respecfively, asking Plaintiff to idenfify
25 examinations or treatment related to his claims, and any medication, prescribed or not, as a result
26 of injuries that his' attributes to his claims, Plainfiff provides incomplete responses. (See
27 Defendant's Separate Statement and Bardzell Decl., Exhibit I.) Specifically, in response to
28 Interrogatory 6.4, Plaintiff fails to indicate the charges to date for health care services received.
{0i965098.DOCX} 6
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER VERIFIED RESPONSES
(See Defendant's Separate Statement and Bardzell Deck, Exhibit I.) In response to Form
2 Interrogatory 6.5, Plaintiff fails to respond to subparts including (c) the date his prescription(s)
3 were prescribed orfiamished;(d) the dates you began and stopped taking it; and (e) the cost to
4 date. (See Defendant's Separate Statement and Bardzell Deck, Exhibit I.)
5 Moreover, in response to Form Interrogatories 10.1-10.3, which generally seek information
6 regarding treating physicians and treatment before and after the claims arose, Plaintiff fails to
7 identify any treating physicians or what treatment was sought beyond the facial reference to heart
8 surgery. (See Defendant's Separate Statement and Bardzell Deck, Exhibit I.) The content of the
9 response plainly calls for additional responsive information such as identifying information for the
10 doctor who performed heart surgery on Plaintiff.
11 Additionally, in response to Special Interrogatory No. 21; 23; 26; 28; 29, Plaintiffs fails to
12 provide contact information for persons he identifies as having knowledge of various protected
o
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t- 3 g _ VD
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o u 2: ^ 14 Decl., Exhibit H.) Such incomplete responses interfere with Defendant's ability to prepare its
— > U ov
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H
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O Moreover, Plaintiff improperly combines numerous, responses into a single response
cu u.
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17 purportedly responsive to each. (See Defendant's Separate Statement and Bardzell Decl., Exhibit I,
18 Plainfiff s Response to Form Interrogatories 2012.1-2012.7.)
That information sought by the numerous aforementioned interrogatories is within
19
20 Plaintiffs control. As such, he was required to provide it and his responses are incomplete.
Plaintiff further provides no substantive response whatsoever to the following Form
21
22 Interrogatories - General, Set One: 6.7; 9.1; 12.1; 12.4; 13.1; 13.2; 50.2; 50.3; 50.4; and 50.5; Form
23 Interrogatories - Employment, Set One: 200.6; 202.1; 202.2; 203.1; 204.1; 204.2; 204.3; 204.4;
24 204.5; 207.2; 208.2; 210.6; 215.2; and Special Interrogatory No. 24.
25 C. Plaintiff Responded "I don't know" to Some Interrogatories Without Describing
28 know." (See Defendant's Separate Statement and Bardzell Deck, Exhibit I.) He fails to describe
{01965098.DOCX} 7
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER VERIFIED RESPONSES
1 what search he has done to provide a response. These responses are incomplete. Similarly, in
2 response to Form Interrogatory 206.3, Plaintiff simply responds "Waszczuk is not sure what 206.3
3 asking him for[.]"(See Defendant's Separate Statement and Bardzell Deck, Exhibit I.) That is also
4 non-responsive.
5 Code of Civil Procedure §2030.220 requires that parties produce all informafion
6 "reasonably available" to them in response to interrogatories. (CCP. §2030.220(a).) That
7 obligafion requires that parties take all reasonable steps to investigate and obtain information
8 responsive to the request. (CCP. §2030.220(c).) If parties do not have sufficient information to
9 respond after making a reasonable inquiry, they must state that fact in their response. (Id.)
10 Plaintiff should be able to respond to such interrogatories as to his personal knowledge. If
11 he does not know, he has an obligation to detail the efforts made to obtain that information. (Deyo
12 supra, 84 Cal.App.3d at 782-783.)
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13 Moreover, additional responses are unintelligible or otherwise incomplete, as described in
h '= So - VD
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Defendant's Separate Statement.
o o - 2 ; P; 14
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W ^v S 5; 5;
S Si g -> X 16 case and to determine the validity of plaintiffs claims. Accordingly, Defendant respectfully request
DV. 17
O an Order compelling Plaintiff to provide further verified responses to Defendant's Special
18 Interrogatories (Set One), Form Interrogatories - General (Set One), and Form Interrogatories -
19 Employment (Set One) without objecfions.
20 IV.
21 DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO MONETARY SANCTIONS
22 Code ofCivil Procedure § 2023.030(a) provides, in relevant part, that:
23
The court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse
24 of the discovery process, or any attomey advising that conduct, or both pay the
reasonable expenses, including attomey's fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that
25 conduct [. . .] If a monetary sanction is authorized by any provision of this tifie, the
26 court shall impose that sanction unless it finds that the one subject to the sancfion
acted with substanfial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition
27 of the sanction unjust.
28 CCP §§ 2030.290(c) provides that a court shall impose a monetary sanction on any party
{01965Q98.DOCX} 8
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER VERIFIED RESPONSES
who unsuccessfially opposes a motion to compel responses to interrogatories.
Pursuant to CCP §§ 2030.290(c), Defendant is enfified to an award of sancfions against
Plaintiff as a result of his failure to provide appropriate responses to Defendant's interrogatories.
Califomia Rules of Court, Rule 3.1348 authorizes an award of sanctions even when "the requested
5 discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed." (C.R.C, Rule 3.1348(a).)
6 Sanctions are also available when a party misuses the discovery process. (CCP.
7 §2023.030(a); "The '[f]ail[ure] to respond... to an authorized method of discovery' and '[mjaking
8 an evasive response to discovery' are defmed as '[mjisuses of the discovery process.'" (Saxena v.
9 Goffney (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 316, 333.)
10 The California Court of Appeal has previously addressed the increasing misuse of the
11 discovery process similar to Plaintiffs behavior:
o
12 "We are . . . aware the discovery process is subject to frequent abuse and, like a
o
B 13 cancerous growth, can destroy a meritorious cause or defense . . . Our observations
(-, ' 3 f N — vo
oo o of the day-to-day practice of law lead us to conclude this cancer is spreading and
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f N rvi
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Oi
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t- g °^ ^ over the sledge hammer."
O < g UJ < 16
cu
17 (Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 221 (quoting Mannino v.
18 Superior Court (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 776.))
19 Awarding sanctions is particularly appropriate in this case as this is the second time
20 Plainfiff has forced Defendant to file a Motion to Compel. Defendant filed a Motion on October
21 17, 2018 after Plaintiff completely failed respond to Defendant's discovery requests for over four
22 and a half months. Plainfiff refused to provide those responses unfil Defendant finally filed its first
23 Mofion to Compel. (Bardzell Deck, TITI 11-12.)
24 Recognizing that this Court is reluctant to award monetary sancfions unless a party
25 unsuccessfully opposes a discovery motion, Plaintiff appears to have strategically elected not to
26 oppose Defendant's prior Motion. As a result, the only sanctions this Court imposed were those
27 required under CCP. § 2033.280 relafing to Plaintiffs failure to provide responses to the
28 Requests for Admission. (See Bardzell Deck, TI 9 and Exhibit G.) That sancfions award was in the
{01965098.DOCX} 9
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER VERIFIED RESPONSES
amount of $520, which fell well short of fully reimbursing Defendant for all the fees it had to
needlessly incur in filing a Motion to Compel Plainfiffs other responses. Even then, Plainfiff
3 failed to pay the full amount the Court ordered. (See Bardzell Deck, TjlO.)
4 Although the Court denied Defendant's previous request for sancfions in connecfion with
5 the motion to compel responses to interrogatories and request for production, the Court further
6 indicated in its Order on Defendant's previous motion to compel that "repeated conduct of failing
7 to comply with discovery obligations may lead the Court to find an abuse of the discovery process
8 and award sancfions on that basis." (See Bardzell Deck, T119, Exhibit G.)
9 Now, here we are again. Plaintiff failed to adequately respond to discovery. Defendant
10 communicated with Plainfiff multiple fimes in hopes of resolving these issues short of filing a
11 Motion to Compel. Unfortunately, Plaintiff failed to provide any further response, thereby
12 successfully forcing Defendant to again incur fees in filing this Motion.
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13 This pattem is a clear abuse of the discovery process. Therefore, Defendant respectfully
3 0 0 — VD
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14 submits that sanctions are appropriate.
> U ov Ov . ^
a; < o" t Defendant has incurred $4,160 in fees associated with preparing the present motion. (See
W £^ c 5; o^
Bardzell Decl., TI 20.) Defense counsel anticipates incurring an additional $1,300 in fees in the
17 event Plaintiff opposes the Mofion and a hearing is necessary. (Bardzell Deck, TI 20.) As a result.
18 Defendant respectfully requests an award of sanctions in the amount of $5,460 for the fime and
19 expense incurred by Defendant in filing this otherwise unnecessary motion.
20 V.
21 TERMINATING SANCTIONS ARE ALSO APPROPRIATE
22 The Code of Civil Procedure provides that the Court may impose sanctions on any party
23 who engages in conduct that constitutes misuse of the discovery process. (CCP § 2023.030(a).)
24 Misuses of the discovery process includes "failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method
25 of discovery" and "disobeying a court order to provide discovery." (CCP §§ 2023.010(d), (g).)
26 When a party fails to respond to an authorized method of discovery and/or fails to obey a court
27 order to provide discovery, the Court may impose, among other relief, monetary sanctions and/or
28 terminating sancfions. (CCP § 2023.030(a), (d).)
{01965098.DOCX} 10
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER VERIFIED RESPONSES
1 Coitrts have long held that terminating sanctions are appropriate where there is a willful
2 failure to comply with court orders, and should be issued where it appears that lesser sancfions
would not bring the offending party into compliance. (R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd.
1
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 486, 496.) Terminating sanctions are especially appropriate where a party
5 fails to respond to discovery requests and ignores court orders. (See Kahn v. Kahn (1977) 68
6 Cal.App.3d 372, 383.)
7 Terminating sanctions are appropriate in this case. Defendant initially sought terminating
sanctions against Plaintiff in connection with its previous motion to compel discovery. The Court
denied this request, providing: The Court denies Defendant's alternate requests for issue,
10 evidentiary, and/or terminating sanctions at this fime. [. . .] Here, given that this is the first order
11
with respect to the subject discovery, the drastic remedy of terminafing sancfions would be
12
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o
punitive." (See Bardzell Deck, Exhibit G.)
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It is evident that Plaintiffs conduct is nothing more than a delaying tactic to prevent
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Defendant from engaging in basic discovery. Requiring Defendant to continue wasting time,
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W i> c 5 o^ money, and Court resources to compel Plaintiff to lifigate this case would be categorically unjust.
S gI X 16 The aforementioned conduct has also prejudiced Defendant's ability to prepare for trial and will
= " 17 interfere with the Court's ability ascertain the tmth in this case. Given that previous discovery
18 mofion practice failed to compel Plaintiff to comply with his discovery obligations, terminafing
20 Accordingly, Defendant requests that the Court grant terminafing sancfions and issue an
21 Order dismissing the complaint against the remaining Defendant in its entirety, with prejudice.
22 VI.
23 CONCLUSION
24 Defendant has made every effort to allow for the cooperative exchange of information,
25 however Plaintiff has failed to provide complete verified responses to Defendant's Special
26 Interrogatories (Set One), Form Interrogatories - General (Set One), and Form Interrogatories -
27 Employment (Set One.) Defendant is left with no opfion other than to file the instant motion. As
28 such, Defendant seeks an Order (1) compelling Plainfiff to provide further verified responses,
{01965098.DOCX} 11
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER VERIFIED RESPONSES
without objections, to Defendant's Special Interrogatories (Set One), Form Interrogatories - General
2 (Set One) and Form Interrogatories - Employment (Set One); (2) awarding sanctions in the amount
3 of $5,460 to retum Defendant to the position it would have been had complete responses been
4 timely provided; (3) issue terminafing sanctions against Plaintiff as a result of Plainfiffs repeated
5 failure to engage in the discovery process.
6
7
Dated February 11, 2019 PORTER SCOTT
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
10 By
David P. E. Burkett
11 Daniel J. Bardzell
Attomeys for Defendant
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{01965098.DOCX} 12
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER VERIFIED RESPONSES
Waszczuk V. Regents of the University of California, et al.
1
Sacramento County Superior Court, Case No. 34-2013-00155479
2
PROOF OF SERVICE
3
4 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. My business
address is 350 University Avenue, Suite 200, Sacramento, Califomia 95825.
5
On the date below, I served the following document:
6
7 DEFENDANT'S POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO COMPEL VERIFIED RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
8 OF DOCUMENTS SET ONE, SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES SET ONE, FORM
INTERROGATORIES - GENERAL SET ONE, FORM INTERROGATORIES -
9
EMPLOYMENT SET ONE; TO DEEM REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS ADMITTED; AND
10 FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
11 BY MAIL: I placed the envelope for collection and mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I
am readily familiar with this business' practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing.
o
12 On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary
o course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fiilly prepaid.
fN
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13 BY PERSONAL SERVICE: I caused such document to be personally delivered to the person(s)
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addressed below. (1) For a party represented by an attomey, delivery was made to the attomey or at the
O o" ov f ^ 14 attomey's office by leaving the documents, in an envelope or package clearly labeled to identify the
venu
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OV attomey being served, with a receptionist or an individual in charge of the office, between the hours of
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oi < d" vd vd 15 nine in the moming and five in the evening. (2) For a party, delivery was made to the party or by leaving
tu c ov ov
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PORTER I SCOTT EHOCRSED
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
2
David P. E. Burkett, SBN 241 896 201MM20 PM22
3 Daniel J. Bardzell, SBN 313993
350 University Avenue, Suite 200 U P F P11 OnN COURT OF CMIPONiA
COUNtY OF 5ACRAME0U
4 Sacramento, California 95825
TEL: 916.929.1481
5 FAX: 916.927.3706
dburkett(porterscott.com
6 dbardzeIlporterscott,com
7
Attorney for Defendant
8 REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
25
26
27
28
0I978654.DOCX)
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 Page
3
4 INTRODUCTION ..........................................
(01978654.DOCX) 1
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2
State Court Cases
3
Kahn v. Kahn
4
(1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 372, 383 10
5
R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd.
6 (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 486,496 ........................................................................................10
7
Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants
8 (2007) 148 Cal.App.4tl 390,411 ........................................................................................8
9 Statutes
10
C.C.P. § 708.020 ............................................................................................................................ 7
II.
C.C.P. § 708.030 ............................................................................................................................ 7
12
C
C
13 C.C.P. § 2016.070 .......................................................................................................................... 7
I-. •S —
H at C
Oci °'Z 14 C.C.P. § 2023.010(d) ...................................................................................................................... 9
cg
_>Oac
<d\á 6
ce 15 C.C.P. § 2023.010(g) ...................................................................................................................... 9
16
H C.C.P. § 2023.030(a) ................................................................................................................ 9, 10
0
tin
17
C.C.P. § 2030.010 ..........................................................................................................................
18
19 C.C.P. § 2030.210(a) ...................................................................................................................... 7
2 Defendants") respectfully submit the following memorandum of points and authorities in support
3 of their motion to: (1) compel Plaintiff JAROSLAW ("JERRY") WASZCZUK's verified
4 responses to Judgment Debtor Requests for Production of Documents (Set One) and Judgment
5 Debtor Interrogatories (Set One); (2) award monetary sanctions in the amount of $4,940 to return
6 Defendants to the position they would have been had the subject judgment debtor discovery
7 responses been timely provided; (3) issue terminating sanctions against Plaintiff as a result of
8 Plaintiff's pattern of failure to engage in the discovery process.
9 1.
10
Defendants served Plaintiff with Judgment Debtor Requests for Production of Documents
12 (Set One) and Judgment Debtor Interrogatories (Set One) on October 9, 2012. Responses were due
13 on or before November 13, 2018. Plaintiff has completely failed to provide any responses and
14 same are overdue.
15 Defendants respectfully request the Court issue an Order to (1) compel Plaintiff to provide
16 verified responses to Defendants' Judgment Debtor Requests for Production of Documents (Set
17 One) and Judgment Debtor Interrogatories (Set One); and (2) issue monetary sanctions against
18 Plaintiff in the amount of $4,940 for Defendants' fees and costs incurred in bringing this motion;
19 and (3) issue the sanction of termination of the present action as a result of Plaintiffs failure to
20 provide responses to the Defendants' judgment debtor discovery.
21 H.
22 STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
23 The course of litigation in this matter is lengthy and complex. The following is a brief
24 summary: Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") on September 30,
25 2014. Among the several claims in the SAC are four causes of action against all named
26 Defendants:' (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress ("lIED"); (2) tortious interference with
27 economic advantage; (3) FEHA harassment and failure to prevent harassment, discrimination,
28 'The First and Second Causes of Action in the Second Amended Complaint do not specifically identify Defendant UNIVERSITY
but do refer to employment with UC DAVIS within the cause of action.
(01978654.DOCX) i
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
1 retaliation in violation of Government Code § 12940(a); and (4) whistleblower/uniawful retaliation
2 in violation of Government Code §§ 8547 etseq,
3 Each of these causes of action arises out of Plaintiff's employment with Defendant
4 REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA ("UNIVERSITY") at the University of
5 California at Davis Medical Center. In addition to Defendant UNIVERSITY2, these causes of
6 action were pled against Defendants ANN MADDEN RICE, MIKE BOYD, STEPHEN
13 as pled against them. (See Declaration of Daniel Bardzell in Support of Motion to Compel
.r,OC
14 ("Bardzell Decl."), ¶ 2.) The anti-SLAPP Defendants contended that Plaintiff's causes of action
<6' 15 against them arose from protected activities pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure' § 425.16;
16 namely, their participation in the processing, investigation, hearing and deciding of complaints
0 17 filed by Plaintiff and others pursuant to the policies and procedures of the Defendant
Cr'
8 Special Interrogatories, Set One without a verification. (See Bardzell DecI., ¶ 12.)
9 B. Motion to Compel
10 On October 17, 2018, Defendant UNIVERSITY was forced to file a Motion to Compel and
11 needlessly incur the associated fees and costs. (See Bardzell DecI., ¶ 13.) On November 14, 2018,
12 the Court issued its tentative ruling, which later became the ruling of the Court pursuant to Local
13 Rule 1.06. (See Bardzell DecI., ¶ 14, and Exhibit H.) There, the Court ordered Plaintiff to provide
14 verified responses, without objections, to Defendant's form and special interrogatories (sets one)
15 and requests for production (set one) no later than December 12, 2018. (See id.) Additionally, the
16 Court ordered Plaintiff to pay Defendant UNIVERSITY mandatory monetary sanctions in the
17 amount of $520 by December 14, 2018 for failure to provide responses to requests for admissions.
18 (See id.)
19 Plaintiff did subsequently provide responses to the special and form interrogatories, but
20 they were largely deficient which necessitated the filing of a second motion to compel, as
21 described infra. (See Bardzell DecI., ¶ 15.)
22 C. Plaintiff Failed to Pay Monetary Sanctions
23 In addition to Plaintiff's willful disregard of his discovery obligations, Plaintiff also
24 violated the Court's previous Order by failing to fully pay Defendant UNIVERSITY monetary
25 sanctions. (See Bardzell DecI., 114-16.) As set forth above, in its prior Order, the Court directed
26 Plaintiff to pay monetary sanctions of $520 by December 14, 2018. (See Bardzell Deci., ¶ 14 and
27 Exhibit H.) Plaintiff failed to pay the required sanction by December 14, 2018 and, to-date,
28 Plaintiff has provided checks amounting to only a portion of the sanctions ordered by the Court.
(01978654.DOCX}
4
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
1 (See Bardzell Deci., 114; 16.) Defendant has not cashed such checks. (See Bardzell DecI., ¶ 16)
2 D. Plaintiff Again Ignores Defendant's Meet-and-Confer Efforts
3 In light of Plaintiffs deficient responses to form and special interrogatories, defense
4 counsel sent Plaintiffs counsel a meet and confer correspondence on January 15, 2019, advising
5 that Plaintiff's responses were deficient. (See Bardzell DecI., 117 and Exhibit I.)
6 Plaintiff responded on January 15, 2019 by a series of argumentative and disjointed emails
7 which failed to address the interrogatory response deficiencies raised in Defendant's meet and
8 confer correspondence. (See Bardzell Deel., ¶ 18 and Exhibits J.)
9 Plaintiff subsequently requested, and was granted, additional time to respond to-the meet
10 and confer and the parties agreed to extend the time for Defendant to file a motion, if necessary,
11 through February 12, 2019. (See Bardzell Dee!., 119 and Exhibit K.)
12 By email dated January 25, 2019, Plaintiff further responded to Defendant's January 15,
13 2019 meet and confer correspondence by, in part, describing the interrogatories as harassing and
14 stating that Defendant should "File the motion, and I, accordingly, will file the response to your
15 motion in court." (See Bardzell Dccl., ¶ 20 and Exhibit L.) Plaintiff has not provided amended
16 responses.
17 E. Second Motion to Compel
18 On February 11, 2019, Defendant UNIVERSITY was forced to file a second motion to
19 compel further verified responses to form and special interrogatories and for monetary, and
20 terminating sanctions. (See Bardzell DecI., ¶ 21.) On March 12, 2019, the Court issued its tentative
21 ruling, which later became the ruling of the Court pursuant to Local Rule 1.06. (See Bardzell
22 DecI., ¶ 21 and Exhibit M.) There, the Court ordered Plaintiff to provide further verified responses
23 to Defendant's form and special interrogatories (sets one) no later than April 3, 2019. (See id.)
24 Additionally, the Court denied Defendant's request for monetary sanctions as the motion was
25 unopposed and also denied Defendant's request for terminating sanctions. (See Ed.)
26 F. Plaintiff Further Ignores the anti-SLAPP Defendants' Meet-and-Confer Efforts
27
28 The anti-SLAPP Defendants served Plaintiff with Judgment Debtor Requests for
(01978654.DOCX)
11 responses by January 31, 2019 or we will file a motion to compel and seek sanctions." (See
12 Bardzell Deci., 123 and Exhibit 0.)
0
0
N
13 By email correspondence dated January 25, 2019, Plaintiff asserted, he never received a
In 0
0 t; 14 copy of the judgment debtor discovery requests and further provided: "Please send me the
15 aforementioned documents that were supposed to have been sent in October. 1 will look them over
u
o. to and respond to you with 30 days, or you may file the motion to compel if you wish." (See Bardzell
0
In
17 DecI., 124 and Exhibit P.) By email correspondence also dated January 25, 2019, the office of
C.'
18 counsel for Defendants provided Plaintiff with a further courtesy copy of Defendants' Judgment
19 Debtor Request for Production of Documents, Set One and Judgment Debtor Interrogatories, Set
20 One which were previously served on Plaintiff on October 9, 2018. (See Id.)
21 Plaintiff responded by email also dated January 25, 2019, stating: "Never got this before.
22 Have a nice weekend Ms. Strasser. I feel sorry for you that you are working for guy like Burkett or
23 Bardzell. Tell them to file motion." (See Bardzell Dccl., ¶ 25 and Exhibit Q.)
24 On February 22, 2019, counsel for Defendant served, a further meet and confer
25 correspondence upon Plaintiff, providing: "This letter serves as Defendants II. J further attempt to
26 meet and confer regarding Plaintiffs outstanding responses to Defendants' [judgment debtor'
27 discovery requests]. Plaintiff has provided no response whatsoever and responses are more than
28 three months overdue. Our previous attempts to meet and confer on this issue have been
101978654D0CX) 6
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
1 unsuccessful. If we do not receive complete responses by March 1, 2019, our next action will be to
2 file a motion to compel and seek sanctions." (See Bardzell Deci., 126 and Exhibit R.)
3 By email correspondence dated March 1, 2019, Plaintiff provided, in part: "I am not going
4 to quit my lawsuits voluntarily either regardless of what judges and justices from three different
5
California courts have done to me in the last four years. I did not provide the response by January
6 31, 2019 because the DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES - SET ONE TO PLAINTIFF [. . . and]
7
DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - SET ONE TO
8 PLAINTIFF [ ... ] were not sent to me on October 9, 2018 and I do not have any record of it[. . .
9
Porter Scott attorneys did not file a Motion to Compel as promised by the January 31, 2019 letter
10 nor did they formally resend the Interrogatories and Production for Documents to me with the new
11
date[. . .] If the Porter Scott attorneys want to file another Motion to Compel [. . .] I have no
12
control over it. I will not be surprised if the Motion is granted." (See Bardzell Deel., ¶ 27 and
13 Exhibit S.) Plaintiff further asserted that he provided some documents at the Judgment Debtor
14 examination in this matter. (See Id.)
15 III.
16 PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ORDERED TO PROVIDE RESPONSES TO
JUDGMENT DEBTOR REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS (SET ONE)
17 AND JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE)
18 A judgment creditor is allowed to use the following procedures provided for in the
19 Discovery Act to obtain discovery to assist in enforcing a judgment: (1) service of written
20 interrogatories to the judgment debtor under C.C.P. § 2030.010, et seq., and (2) service of a
21 document inspection demand to the judgment debtor under C.C.P. § 2031.010, et seq. (See C.C.P.
22 §§ 2016.070; 708.020; 708.030.)
23 A. Judgment Debtor Interrogatories (Set One)
24 A party to whom interrogatories have been propounded shall respond in writing under oath
25 separately to each interrogatory by any of the following: an answer containing the information
26 being sought to be discovered, an exercise of the party's option to produce writings, or an
27 objection to the particular interrogatory. (C.C.P. § 2030.210(a).) If a party to whom interrogatories
28 are directed fails to serve a timely response, the party propounding the interrogatories may move
{01978654.DOCX)
7
EMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
for an order compelling response to the interrogatories. (C.C.P. § 2030.290(b).) The party also
2 waives objections to the interrogatories (including those based on privilege and work product) by
3 failing to respond by the deadline. (C.C.P. § 2030.290(a).)
4 Unlike a motion to compel further responses, a motion to compel responses is not subject
5 to a 45-day time limit, and the propounding party does not have to demonstrate either good cause
6 or that it satisfied a meet-and-confer requirement. (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v, Pacific
7 Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal. App. 4th 390, 411.) A separate statement is not required
8 when no response has been provided to the request for discovery. (Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(b).)
9 In our case, Defendants have not received Plaintiffs verified responses to Judgment Debtor
10 Interrogatories (Set One). (See Bardzell DecI., ¶ 28.) These interrogatories were properly served on
11 Plaintiff on October 9, 2018. (See Bardzell Deci., ¶ 22 and Exhibit N.) Responses were due on or
12 before November 13, 2018. (See id.)
13 Defendants require these discovery responses in order to enforce their judgment.
14 Accordingly, Defendants respectfully request an Order compelling Plaintiff to provide verified
15 responses to Defendants' Judgment Debtor Interrogatories (Set One) without objections.
16 B. Judgment Debtor Requests for Production of Documents (Set One)
17 If a party to whom a demand for inspection is directed fails to serve a timely response, the
18 party propounding the demand may move for an order compelling responses to the demand.
19 (C.C.P. § 2031.300(b).) In addition, a party who fails to respond waives any objections he
20 otherwise could have raised to the demand. (C.C.P. § 2031.300(a).)
21 Defendants served Plaintiff with Judgment Debtor Requests for Production of Documents
22 (Set One) and Judgment Debtor Interrogatories (Set One) on October 9, 2018. (See Bardzell Decl.,
23 ¶ 22 and Exhibit N.) Responses were due on or before November 13, 2018. (See id.) Plaintiff's
24 responses remain overdue and outstanding. (See id.)
25 Therefore, Defendants respectfully request an Order compelling Plaintiff to provide
26 responses to Defendants' Judgment Debtor Request for Production of Documents (Set One),
27 without objections.
28 I/I
101978654.DOCX) 8
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION 1
COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
Iv.
2 MONETARY SANCTIONS SHOULD BE AWARDED
3 Code of Civil Procedure § 2023.030(a) provides, in relevant part, that:
4
The court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the
5 misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay
the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by anyone as a result of
6 that conduct [ ... ] If a monetary sanction is authorized by any provision of this
7 title, the court shall impose that sanction unless it finds that the one subject to the
sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the
8 imposition of the sanction unjust.
9 C.C.P. §§ 2030.290(c) and 2031.300(c) provide that a court shall impose a monetary
10 sanction on any party who unsuccessfully opposes a motion to compel responses to interrogatories
12 Defendants have extended Plaintiff every opportunity to avoid court intervention in this
13 matter by conducting extensive meet and confer efforts. Plaintiff has completely ignored
16 discovery has made the current motion necessary, despite being afforded opportunities to avoid the
18 To date, Defendants have incurred $3,640 in fees as a result of Plaintiff's failure to respond
19 to Judgment Debtor Requests for Production of Documents (Set One) and Judgment Debtor
20 Interrogatories (Set One). (See Bardzell DecI., ¶ 29.) Defendants anticipate incurring an additional
nI $1,300 to review Plaintiffs Opposition, prepare a reply and attend a hearing. (See Id.) Therefore,
22 sanctions are proper. Moreover, even if Plaintiff serves responses upon notice of this motion in
23 order to avoid a court order, Defendants have nevertheless been forced to incur the expense of
24 moving to compel Plaintiffs compliance with his discovery obligations, despite efforts to achieve
25 a cooperative result. As such, sanctions in the amount of $4,940 are appropriately awarded against
26 Plaintiff for the time and expense incurred by Defendants in filing this motion.
1
I-
I/I
28 I/I
0I978654.DOCX}
9
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
1 V
2 TERMINATING SANCTIONS ARE ALSO APPROPRIATE
3 The Code of Civil Procedure provides that the Court may impose sanctions on any party
4 who engages in conduct that constitutes misuse of the discovery process. (C.C.P. § 2023.030(a).)
5 Misuses of the discovery process includes "failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method
6 of discovery" and "disobeying a court order to provide discovery." (C.C.P. §§ 2023.010(d), (g).)
7 When a party fails to respond to an authorized method of discovery and/or fails to obey a court
8 order to provide discovery, the Court may impose monetary sanctions, terminating sanctions, or
9 both. (CCP § 2023.030(a), (d), (g).)
10 Courts have long held that terminating sanctions are appropriate where there is a willful
11 failure to comply with court orders, and should be issued where it appears that lesser sanctions
12 would not bring the offending party into compliance. (R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd
13 (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 486, 496.) Terminating sanctions are especially appropriate where a party
14 fails to respond to discovery requests and ignores court orders. (See Kahn v. Kahn (1977) 68
15 Cal.App.3d 372, 383.)
16 Terminating sanctions are appropriate in this case. Plaintiff has failed to provide any
17 verified responses to the Defendants' written judgment debtor. discovery despite extensive meet
18 and confer efforts by Defendants. Moreover, the Court has previously granted two motions to
19 compel discovery filed by Defendant UNIVERSITY in this case. (See Bardzell Decl., 114, 21 and
20 Exhibits i-i, M.) Plaintiff has plainly not been dissuaded from his pattern of failing to engage in the
21 discovery process.
22 It is evident that Plaintiffs conduct is nothing more than a delaying tactic to prevent the
23 Defendants from engaging in judgment debtor discovery. Requiring Defendants to continue
24 wasting time, money, and Court resources to compel Plaintiff to fulfill his obligations to
25 participate in the case, including judgment enforcement process, would be categorically unjust.
26 Plaintiffs demonstrated pattern of failing to provide discovery responses has prejudiced
27 Defendants' ability to prepare for trial, as well as enforce its judgment and will interfere with the
28 Court's ability to ascertain the truth in this case. It has thus become apparent that no action will
I 978654D0CX) 10
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FORMONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
compel Plaintiff to comply with his discovery obligations, making terminating sanctions
2 appropriate.
3 Accordingly, Defendant requests that the Court grant terminating sanctions and issue an
4 Order dismissing the complaint against the remaining Defendant in its entirety, with prejudice.
5 VI.
6 CONCLUSION
7 Defendants have made every effort to allow for the cooperative exchange of information,
8 however Plaintiff has failed to provide verified responses to Defendants' Judgment Debtor
9 Requests for Production of Documents (Set One) and Judgment Debtor Interrogatories (Set One).
10 Defendants are left with no option other than to file the instant motion. As such, Defendants seek
11 an Order (1) compelling Plaintiff to provide verified responses, without objections, to the anti-
12 SLAPP Defendants' Judgment Debtor Requests for Production of Documents (Set One) and
0
0
13 Judgment Debtor Interrogatories (Set One); (2) awarding sanctions in the amount of $4,940 to
H
H Ct 'fl
— O
14 return Defendants to the position they would have been had respobses been timely provided; (3)
<s'a 15 issue terminating sanctions against Plaintiff as a result of Plaintiffs continuing pattern of failure to
16 engage in the discovery process.
H
0 17
In
C,
Dated March 19, 2019 PORTER SCOTT
18 A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION I I
19
20 By MJO4b/t(2(
David P. E. Burkett
21 Daniel J. Bardzell
22 Attorneys for Defendant
23
24
25
26
27
28
{01978654D0CX} 11
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
Waszczuk v. Regents of the University of California, et at.
I
Sacramento County Superior Court, Case No. 34-2013-00155479
2
PROOF OF SERVICE
3
4 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. My
business address is 350 University Avenue, Suite 200, Sacramento, California 95825.
5
On the date below, I served the following document:
6
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
7 MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES
AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND
8 TERMINATING SANCTIONS
BY MAIL: I placed the envelope for collection and mailing, following our ordinary business
9 practices. I am readily familiar with this business' practice for collecting and processing
correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing,
10
it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed
envelope with postage hilly prepaid.
11
BY PERSONAL SERVICE: I caused such document to be personally delivered to the person(s)
addressed below. (I) For a party represented by an attorney, delivery was made to the attorney or at
12
C the attorney's office by leaving the documents, in an envelope or package clearly labeled to identify
0
13 the attorney being served, with a receptionist or an individual in charge of the office, between the hours
—'0 of nine in the morning and five in the evening. (2) For a party, delivery was made to the party or by
-'Cl) In coo
Os °'2 14 leaving the documents at the party's residence with some person not younger than 18 years of age
between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening.
-<cc'
U a. o
15 BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY: I enclosed the documents in an envelope or package provided by an
0' overnight delivery carrier and addressed to the person(s) listed below. I placed the envelope or package
16 for collection and overnight delivery at my office or a regularly utilized drop box of the overnight
delivery carrier. -
Cn BY FAX TRANSMISSION: Based on an agreement of the parties to accept service by fax
0 17
In transmission, I faxed the documents to the persons at the fax numbers listed below. No error was
18 reported by the fax machine that I used. A copy of the record of the fax transmission, which I printed
out, is attached
19 BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE: Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept
service by electronic transmission, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the electronic
20 notification address listed below.
21 Jaroslaw Waszczuk
27
tsser
28
{01978654.DOCX)
12
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
EXHIBIT # 16
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
GORDON D SCHABER COURTHOUSE
MINUTE ORDER
DATE: 04/26/2019 TIME: 02:00:00 PM DEPT: 53
JUDICIAL OFFICER PRESIDING: Steven H Rodda
CLERK: E. Brown
REPORTER/ERM: V. Green CSR# 10529
BAILIFF/COURT ATTENDANT: Navi, A., R. Mays
APPEARANCES
Jaroslaw Waszczuk, self represented Plaintiff, present.
Daniel Bardzell, counsel present for defendant
Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Compel Production of Documents
TENTATIVE RULING
Judgment Creditors Boyd, Chilcott, Nichols, Oropeza and Seifert's, ("Judgment Creditors") Motion to
Compel Responses to Judgment Debtor's Interrogatories and Judgment Debtor's Requests for
Production of Documents, for payment of Monetary Sanctions, and for Terminating Sanctions is ruled on
as follows:
On April 14, 2015, the Court granted Judgment Creditor's Special Motion to Strike plaintiff's causes of
action. The Court subsequently granted their Motion for Attorneys fees in the amount of $22,284. (Ex. C
to the Declaration of Daniel J. Bardzell)
Judgment Creditors served the instant post-judgment discovery (Ex. N) on October 9, 2018. Judgment
debtor/plaintiff failed to provide any responses to the discovery. Judgment Creditors sent a second copy
of the discovery to judgment debtor on January 25, 2019, after he contended that he never received the
first set served in October. No responses were served prior to filing this motion on March 20, 2019.
Judgment Debtor has filed an opposition contending that he has now served responses to the discovery,
attached as Exhibits 1 and 2. The points and authorities in opposition to the motion do not address the
relevant issues in this motion but consists almost entirely of matters irrelevant to the discovery at issue.
Judgment debtor opposes this "unwarranted motion to compel."
Judgment creditor's Reply contends that the discovery responses were not code compliant because
they contained objections and plaintiff has waived objections by not timely responding. The Court is not
reviewing the adequacy of the responses attached to the Opposition. However, moving parties are
entitled to a court order compelling code compliant responses to the discovery. Sinaiko Healthcare
Consulting, Inc. v Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 404.
Judgment Debtor is ordered to serve further verified responses to the Judgment Debtor
Interrogatories and Judgment Debtor Requests for Production, as set forth in the separate statement,
without objections, on or before May 8, 2019.
Judgment debtor is also ordered to pay reasonable monetary sanctions to moving parties in the
amount of $780 (3 hrs at the hourly rate of $260), plus the $60 filing fee, for a total fee award of
$840. This opposition was filed without substantial justification and therefore, moving parties
are entitled to monetary sanctions. The monetary sanctions must be paid on or before May 27,
2019. If those sanctions are not paid by that date, moving parties may prepare a formal order on
the two sanctions awards which may thereafter be entered as a separate judgment. See
Newland v Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608.
Terminating Sanctions
The motion for terminating sanctions is denied. The post judgment discovery at issue here was served
by judgment creditors, not Regents. Moving parties have already obtained a judgment of dismissal in
this case as well as an attorney fees award on the anti-SLAPP motion. Thus, it is unclear why they are
seeking a "terminating sanction" in this context.
Regents are not a party to the underlying discovery or this motion, and therefore the Court will not grant
a terminating sanctions as to Regents. To the extent plaintiff has not paid monetary sanctions to be paid
to Regents pursuant to prior court orders, Regents may prepare a formal order on that sanctions award
from the November 14, 2018 court order and then may enforce that award as a separate judgment
under Newland v Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608.
As stated above, Plaintiff is ordered to serve verified responses to the Judgment Debtor Interrogatories
and Judgment Debtor Requests for Production, without objections, on or before May 8, 2019. Monetary
sanctions are to be paid as specified above.
The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further
notice is required.
COURT RULING
After hearing oral argument the Court affirmed its tentative ruling with the following modification:
The order for monetary sanctions was vacated.
1 up is a separate proceeding.
2 As we stated in our motion papers with respect
3 to this motion, we are entitled to receive timely
4 verified responses to the written debtor discovery.
5 Plaintiff failed to provide that discovery by the
6 deadline. We met and conferred. He did not serve
7 responses at the time we filed the motion. He did file
8 late responses, noncompliant, after we filed the motion.
9 And so we stand by our request.
10 THE COURT: At the debtor's examination, did you
11 ask him all of the same questions set forth in the
12 discovery requests?
13 MR. BARDZELL: We covered significant ground
14 related to the documented categories that were also
15 requested in the written discovery.
16 THE COURT: So wouldn't that just duplicate what
17 you requested in the discovery requests?
18 MR. BARDZELL: Well, at the debtor's examination
19 a number of questions were asked about his wife's
20 assets, and in that respect he was unwilling to provide
21 that information. We also served the written discovery,
22 which he did not timely respond to.
23 Additionally, at the debtor's examination there
24 was no court reporter. There was a lack of under oath
25 testimony. It was an informal proceeding.
26 THE COURT: Well, the debtor is a formal
27 proceeding, right? That's my experience.
28 MR. BARDZELL: I don't recall. I was under the
2 A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
David P. E. Burkett, SBN 241896
3 Daniel J. Bardzell, SBN 313993
350 University Avenue, Suite 200
4 Sacramento, California 95825
TEL: 916.929.1481
5 FAX: 916.927.3706
[email protected]
6
dbardzelKolporterscott.com
7
Attomey for Defendant
8
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
9
Exempt From Filing Fees Pursuant to Government Code §6103
10
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
11
12
o JAROSLAW ("JERRY") WASZCZUK, CASE NO. 34-2013-00155479
o
B in
13
•3 a - ^14 Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
o
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00 o AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
O ON Ov
15 V. DEFENDANTS' FURTHER MOTION TO
< _ COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT
kQ
Oi.
•— IU . .
16 THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND
O CALIFORNIA, UNIVERSITY OF REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF
(X
17 CALIFORNIA DAVIS HEALTH SYSTEM, DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY
AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
18 UC DAVIS MEDICAL CENTER, UC
DAVIS, ANN MADDEN RICE, MIKE
19 BOYD, STEPHEN CHILCOTT, CHARLES Date: July 19, 2019
WITCHER, DANESHA NICHOLS, CINDY Time: 2:00 p.m.
20 OROPEZA, BRENT SEIFERT, PATRICK Dept.: 53
21 PUTNEY, DORIN DANILIUC, and Does 1
through 50, inclusive. Complaint Filed: December 4, 2013
22 Amended Complaint Filed: June 16, 2014
Defendants. SAC Filed: September 30, 2014
23
24
25
26
27
28
(02023105.DOCX} 1
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' FURTHER
MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
2 Page
3
4 I. INTRODUCTION
5 II. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY .1
6
A. Plaintiff Failed to Provide Timely Responses to Defendant University's
7 Form and Special Interrogatories, Request for Production of Documents
and Request for Admissions Necessitating Two Motions to.Compel
8 Regarding Such Requests 3
9
B. Plaintiff Ignores the anti-SLAPP Defendants' Meet-and-Confer Efforts
10 Related to the Judgment Debtor Requests for Production of Documents
(Set One) and Judgment Debtor Interrogatories (Set One) 4
11
12 C. Anti-SLAPP Defendants File a Motion to Compel Responses Judgment
o
o Debtor Requests for Production of Documents (Set One) and Judgment
(N
13 Debtor Interrogatories (Set One) and for Terminating Sanctions 5
3
24 VI. CONCLUSION : ; 13
25
26
27
28
{02023105.DOCX) 11
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' FURTHER
MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2 Page
State Court Cases
3
4 Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants
(2007) 148 Cal.App.4"^ 390, 411 8, 9
5
6 Kahn v. Kahn
(1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 372, 383 11
7
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
8 55 Cal.App.3d 77, 744 8
9
R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd.
10 (1999) 75 Cal.App.3d 372, 383 11
11 Zorro Inv. Co. v. Great Pacific Securities Corp.
12 (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 907, 914 8, 10
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o Code of Civil Procedure § 2023.010(d) ..11
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18
Code of Civil Procedure § 2023.010(g) ; 11
19
20 Code of Civil Procedure § 2023.030(a) .......11
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17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
{02023105.DOCX} IV
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' FURTHER
MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
1 Defendants BOYD, CHILCOTT, NICHOLS, OROPEZA, and SEIFERT ("anti-SLAPP
2 Defendants" or "Defendants") respectfully submit the following memorandimi of points and
3 authorities in support of their motion to: (1) compel Plaintiff JAROSLAW ("JERRY")
4 WASZCZUK's verified responses, without objections, to Judgment Debtor Requests for
Production of Documents (Set One) and Judgment Debtor Interrogatories (Set One); (2) award
monetary sanctions in the amount of $4,160.00 to retum Defendants to the position they would
have been had the subject judgment debtor discovery responses been timely provided; (3) issue
8 terminating sanctions against Plaintiff and in favor of Defendant REGENTS OF THE
9 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA ("UNIVERSITY") as a result of Plaintiff s pattem of failure to
10 engage in the discovery process.
11 I.
12 INTRODUCTION
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13 Anti-SLAPP Defendants served Plaintiff with Judgment Debtor Requests for Production of
t- 3 oo —
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0 u Documents (Set One) and Judgment Debtor Interrogatories (Set One) on October 9, 2018.
<• ON
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—> o ^ 5 15 Responses were due on or before November 13, 2018. Plaintiff has failed to provide verified and
ON ON
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^ 16 adequate responses and same are overdue.
Cu c ca u.
D Defendants respectfully request the Court issue an Order to (1) compel Plaintiff to provide
o
in 17
verified responses to the anti-SLAPP Defendants' Judgment Debtor Requests for Production of
18
Documents (Set One) and Judgment Debtor Interrogatories (Set One); (2) issue monetary sanctions
19 I
20 against Plaintiff in the amount of $4,160.00 for Defendants' fees and costs incurred in bringing this
21 motion; and (3) issue the sanction of termination of the present action as a result of Plaintiffs
.22 continuing pattem of failing to provide discovery responses.
IL
23
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
24
The course of litigation in this matter is lengthy and complex. The following is a brief
25
summary: Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") on September 30,
26
2014. Among the several claims in the SAC are four causes of action against all named
27
28
{02023105. DOCX}
1
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' FURTHER
MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
1 Defendants:' (1) intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"); (2) tortious interference with
2 economic advantage; (3) FEHA harassment and failure to prevent harassment, discrimination,
3 retaliation in violation of Govemment Code § 12940(a); and (4) whistleblower/unlawful retaliation
4 in violation of Govemment Code §§ 8547 et seq.
5 Each of these causes of action arises out of Plaintiffs employment with Defendant
6 UNIVERSITY at the University of Califomia at Davis Medical Center. In addition to Defendant
7 UNIVERSITY^ these causes of action were pled against Defendants ANN MADDEN RICE,
8 MIKE BOYD, STEPHEN CHILCOTT, CHARLES WITCHER, DANESHA NICHOLS, CINDY
9 OROPEZA, BRENT SEIFERT, PATRICK PUTNEY, and DORIN DANILIUC for their
10 participation in investigations and disciplinary actions that ultimately resulted in Plaintiffs
11 termination of employment with the UNIVERSITY. The UNIVERSITY is the only Defendant
12 remaining in the case.
o
o
fN 13 On December 1, 2014, anti-SLAPP Defendants filed a Special Motion to Strike Plaintiffs
Bm
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H (/2 14 causes of action as pled against them. (Declaration of Daniel Bardzell in Support of Further
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NO NO
15 Motion to Compel ("Bardzell Decl."), Tl 2.) The anti-SLAPP Defendants contended that Plaintiffs
U >:> cON ON
^ ^ E J ><
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16 causes of action against them arose from protected activities pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure-'
a. c H u.
D cn 17 § 425.16; namely, their participation in the processing, investiga:tion, hearing and deciding of
o
•n
18 complaints filed by Plaintiff and others pursuant to the policies and procedures of the Defendant
19 UNIVERSITY. (M)
20 On April 14, 2015, the Court issued an Order granting the Special Motion to Strike finding
21 that Plaintiff failed to establish a probability of prevailing on the causes of action pled against the
22 anti-SLAPP Defendants as required by section 425.16 and entering judgment in favor of the anti-
/ • '. ' .
23 SLAPP Defendants. (Id. at ^ 3 and Exhibit A.)
24 ///
25
26
27 ' The First and Second Causes of Action in the Second Amended Complaint do not specifically identify Defendant UNIVERSITY
but do refer to employment with UC DAVIS within the cause of action.
2 ld.,fn. 1. .
28
^ Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references in this Motion are to the Califomia Code of Civil
Procedure.
{02023105. DOCX} 2
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' FURTHER
MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
1 Plaintiff subsequently filed a request for dismissal with prejudice of the four remaining
2 individual Defendants RICE, WITCHER, PUTNEY, and DANILIUC. (Id. at H 4 and Exhibit B.)
3 The UNIVERSITY is the only Defendant remaining in the case.
4 On May 11, 2015, the anti-SLAPP Defendants filed a Motion for Fees and Costs pursuant
5 to CCP § 425.16, subdivision (c) and the Court's Order dated April 14, 2015 on Defendant's
6 Special Motion to Strike. (Id. at ^ 5.) The motion sought recovery of approximately $33,000 in fees
7 and costs incurred by the anti-SLAPP Defendants in cormection with the Special Motion to Strike.
8 (Id., Exhibit C.)
9 On June 29, 2018, the Court entered an Order granting Defendants' Motion for Fees and
10 Costs in the amoimt of $22,284 against Plaintiff (Id. at 6 and Exhibit C.)
11 A. Plaintiff Failed to Provide Timely Responses to Defendant UNIVERSITY'S Form and
Special Interrogatories, Request for Production of Documents, and Request for
12
o Admissions, Necessitating Two Motions to Compel Regarding Such Requests
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13 In the underlying lawsuit from which the anti-SLAPP Defendants have been dismissed,
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14 Plaintiff has engaged in a pattem of failing to adequately and timely respond to Defendant
ON t~~
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NO NO
15 UNIVERSITY'S discovery requests which has necessitated the filing of two motions to compel
oi < 6 ON ON
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16 discovery by Defendant UNIVERSITY on October 17, 2018 and Febmary 11, 2019, respectively.
O .2; !iH u.
D cn 17 (Bardzell Decl., H 7-12.) In its mling on Defendant UNIVERSITY'S October 17, 2018 motion to
18 compel, the Court ordered Plaintiff to provide verified responses, without objections, to
19 Defendant's form and special interrogatories (sets one) and requests for production (set one) no
20 later than December 12, 2018. (Id. at H 9 and Exhibit D.) Additionally, the Court ordered Plaintiff
21 to pay Defendant UNIVERSITY mandatory monetary sanctions in the amount of $520 by
22 December 14, 2018 for failure to provide responses to requests for admissions. (Id.)
23 Plaintiff violated the Court's order by failing to fully pay such monetary sanctions and by
24 providing only deficient responses to the special and form interrogatories which necessitated the
25 filing of a second motion to compel on Febmary 11, 2019. (Id. at T| 9-12.)
26 The Court granted Defendant UNIVERSITY'S second motion to compel and ordered
27 Plaintiff to provide further verified responses to Defendant's form and special interrogatories (sets
28 one) no later than April 3, 2019. (Id. at ^ 12 and Exhibit E.) Additionally, the Court denied
{02023105.DOCX} 3
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' FURTHER
MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
1 Defendant's request for monetary sanctions as the motion was imopposed and also denied
2 Defendant's request for terminating sanctions, (/of.)
3 B. Plaintiff Ignores the anti-SLAPP Defendants' Meet-and-Confer Efforts Related to the
Judgment Debtor Requests for Production of Documents (Set One) and Judgment
4 Debtor Interrogatories (Set One)
5
The anfi-SLAPP Defendants served Plaintiff with Judgment Debtor Requests for
6
Production of Documents (Set One) and Judgment Debtor Interrogatories (Set One) on October 9,
7
2018. (Bardzell Decl., 13 and Exhibit F.) Responses were due on or before November 13, 2018.
8
(Id. at 13.) Plaintiff has completely failed' to provide any verified responses and same are
9
overdue. (Id.)
10
On January 24, 2019, counsel for Defendants served a meet and confer correspondence
11
upon Plaintiff regarding,the outstanding judgment debtor discovery responses wherein defense
12
o
o counsel indicated: "This letter serves as Defendants [. . .] attempt to meet and confer regarding
fN
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13
>
H
'= 00 — NO
CO i n 00 p ^ ^
Plaintiffs outstanding responses to Defendants' Judgment Debtor Request for Production of
o « °^ 2 p; 14 Documents, Set One and Judgment Debtor Interrogatories, Set One which were served on you on
> U ON ON . _
ai, < o so ^ 1 J
October 9, 2018. Plaintiff has provided no response whatsoever. Please provide complete
S 1 -J X 16
a- ta-
c cau H u. responses by January 31, 2019 or we will file a motion to compel and seek sanctions." (Id. at ^ 14
3 cn
o
in 17 and Exhibit G.)
18 By email correspondence dated January 25, 2019, Plaintiff asserted he never received a
19 copy of the judgment debtor discovery requests and further provided: "Please send me the
20 aforementioned documents that were supposed to have been sent in October. I will look them over
21 and respond to you with 30 days, or you may file the motion to compel if you wish." (Id. at ^ 15
22 and Exhibit H.) By email correspondence also dated January 25, 2019, the office of coimsel for
23 Defendants provided Plaintiff with a further courtesy copy of Defendants' Judgment Debtor
24 Request for Production of Documents, Set One and Judgment Debtor Interrogatories, Set One
25
26
27
/ •. •
which were previously served on Plaintiff on October 9, 2018. (/i/.)
/// ".
28
{02023105. DOCX} A
10 file a motion to compel and seek sanctions." (Id. at ^ 17 and Exhibit J.)
11 By email correspondence dated March 1, 2019, Plaintiff provided, in part; " I am not going
12 to quit my lawsuits voluntarily either regardless of what judges and justices from three different
o
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in
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13 Califomia courts have done to me in the last four years. I did not provide the response by January
H 3 00 —
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O u ON 14 31, 2019 because the DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES - SET ONE TO PLAINTIFF [. . . and]
on g fN
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< ri fN S 15 DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS - SET ONE TO
o" ^ ON
5 ON
<U . .
6 -1 ^ 16 PLAINTIFF [. . .] were not sent to me on October 9, 2018 and I do not have any record of it[. . . .]
U.
1u
17 Porter Scott attomeys did not file a Motion to Compel as promised by the January 31, 2019 letter
18 nor did they formally resend the Interrogatories and Production for Documents to me with the new
19 date[. . .] If the Porter Scott attomeys want to file another Motion to Compel [. . .] I have no
20 control over it. I will not be surprised if the. Motion is granted." (Id. at T| 18 and Exhibit K.)
21 Plaintiff fiirther asserted that he provided some documents at the Judgment Debtor examination in
22 On May 31, 2019, counsel for Defendants served a meet and confer correspondence upon
23 Plaintiff regarding the outstanding judgment debtor discovery responses which indicated:
I will respond to your inquiry within a few days (most likely next week). [. . .] Your
threating letter stating "Please provide complete responses immediately or we will take
fiirther action, as needed" made me feel very uncomfortable. I received your May 31, 2019
threat of unspecified further action on the seventh anniversary of the ill-plaimed but
8 unsuccessfiil provocation to end my employment in the UC Davis Medical Center Trauma
Unit #11 by the specially assembled hit squad, which I nicknamed in the Court Documents
9
as the "Davis Death Squad." I hope that your new threat does not mean that the UCOP mob
10 led by Janet Napolitano gave the order to Porter Scott's special team to physically harm me
or my family members, taking into consideration previous Porter Scott attomeys'
11 provocations threats and 14 years of terror.
12 (Id. at H 24 and Exhibit O.)
o
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13 Plaintiff further responded by email dated June 8, 2019, stating in part:
E- 3 S - NO
O cn m 00 o 14
U 1) ON •*
— m As I stated in my April 12, 2019 Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Compel and
t/2 i < ON
Oi u fN s:^ 15 Terminate Sanctions filed by you on March 20, 2019, for the Defendants' Judgment
UJ
H > ( J ON ON Debtor Interrogatories Set One and Judgment Debtor Request for Production of
oi
O <^> —o" ^ — 16 Documents Set One, and during the April 26, 2019 Court hearing with Judge Steven
&- .3 uC ON ON
5 td
17 Rodda, I have no more information to give you other than what you have received already.
D cn
o In fact, I should not give you any information in this matter, but this is a separate subject
in 18 that I wiir address after you file another Mofion to Compel or any other mofion related to
this case.
19
20 (Id. at H 25 and Exhibit P.)
21 III.
PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE ORDERED TO PROVIDE RESPONSES TO
22 JUDGMENT DEBTOR REOUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS (SET ONE)
23 AND JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES (SET ONE)
24 A judgment creditor is allowed to use the following procedures provided for in the
25 Discovery Act to obtain discovery to assist in enforcing a judgment: (1) service of written
26 interrogatories to the judgment debtor imder CC-P- § 2030.010, et seq., and (2) service of a
27 document inspecfion demand to the judgment debtor under CCP. § 2031.010, et seq. (CCP. §§
28
2016.070; 708.020; 708.030.)
{02023105.DOCX} 7
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' FURTHER
MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
1 A. Judgment Debtor Interrogatories (Set One)
2 A party to whom interrogatories have been propounded shall respond in writing under oath
3 separately to each interrogatory by any of the following: an answer containing the informafion
4 being sought to be discovered, an exercise of the party's opfion to produce writings, or an
objection to the particular interrogatory. (CCP. § 2030.210(a).) If a party to whom interrogatories
are directed fails to serve a timely response, the party propounding the interrogatories may move
for an order compelling response to the interrogatories. (CCP. § 2030.290(b).) The party also
8 waives objections to the interrogatories (including those based on privilege and work product) by
10 Unlike a motion to compel further responses, a motion to compel responses is not subject
11 to a 45-day time limit, and the propoimding party does not have to demonstrate either good cause
12 or that it satisfied a meet-and-confer requirement. (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific
o
o
13 Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 411.) A separate statement is not required
f- 3 fOO
N
—
m OO
O u ON -Sl- when no response has been provided to the request for discovery. (Rules of Court, mle 3.1345(b).)
< • ON f N
—>
ON 2 15 In our case. Defendants have not received Plaintiffs verified responses to Judgment Debtor
fN
a; < 2" )B ON
S ON
oi I- LZ ^ 16 Interrogatories (Set One). (Bardzell Deck, t 22.) These interrogatories were properly served on
y r-
o
in 17 Plaintiff on October 9, 2018. (Id. at T| 13 and Exhibit F.) Responses were due on or before
18 November 13, 2018. (M)
19 Plaintiff served imverified, deficient and late responses to Judgment Debtor Interrogatories
20 (Set One) on April 15, 2019. (Id. at 20 and Exhibit L.) Interrogatory responses served without a
21 verification are tantamount to serving no responses as all. (Zorro Inv. Co. v. Great Pacific
22 Securities Corp. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 907, 914 ("Untimely or unswom statements are tantamovmt
23 to no response at all[.]") citing Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 55 Cal.App.3d
24 737, 744.).) Plaintiffs unswom responses are wholly insufficient and constitute a complete failure
25 to respond.
26 Plaintiffs late unverified interrogatory responses are not code-compliant discovery
27 responses. Plaintiff has waived any objections to^the requests by failing to timely respond to them.
28 (Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.290(a) [interrogatories] & 2031.300(a) [producfion
{02023105. DOCX} g
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' FURTHER
MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION QF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
1 requests].) Instead of serving responses without objections, the unverified responses contain
2 outright refusals to provide information regarding Plaintiffs wife's finances. (Bardzell Deck,
3 Exhibit L, "Response to Defendants' Judgment Debtor Rpgs #1".) Defendants are entitled to that
4 information to determine what assets Plaintiff has (whether individually or as community
5 property), so they can determine what can be collected, and how to collect it, to pay the judgments
6 that he owes in this case. Plaintiff refused that provide that information at the debtor's examination
7 (which is part of the reason why Defendants have had to file this motion not\yithstanding their
8 attempt to resolve the issues in this motion by taking discovery into Plaintiffs assets via the
9 debtor's examination). (Id.)
10 Defendants require these verified interrogatory responses in order to enforce their,
11 judgment. Accordingly, Defendants respectfiilly request a further Order compelling Plainfiff to
12 provide verified and code-compliant responses to anti-SLAPP Defendants' Judgment Debtor
o
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13 Interrogatories (Set One) without objections.
U- 3 fN
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14 B. Judgment Debtor Requests for Production of Documents (Set One)
fN
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ON I3N 15 If a party to whom a demand for inspection is directed fails to serve a timely response, the
NO NO
ON OS
b 3 J >< 16 party propounding the demand may move for an order compelling responses to the demand.
o > sLU
H
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ti.
D C/2
o
17 (CCP. § 2031.300(b).) The party to whom the demand for inspection is directed shall sign the
in
f^
18 response under oath unless the response contains only objections. (CCP. § 2031.250(1).) In
19 addition, a party who fails to respond waives any objecfions he otherwise could have raised to the
20 demand. (CCP. § 2031.300(a).)
21 As discussed supra, where, as here. Plaintiff has failed to provide any timely verified
22 responses, a motion to compel responses is not subject to a 45-day time limit, and the propoimding
23 party does not have to demonstrate either good cause or that it satisfied a meet-and-confer
24 requirement. (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at 411.) A separate
25 statement is not required when no response has been provided to the request for discovery. (Rules
26 ofCourt, mle 3.1345(b).)
27 Defendants served Plaintiff with Judgment Debtor Requests for Production of Documents
28 (Set One) on October 9, 2018. (Bardzell Deck, ^ 13 and Exhibit F.) Responses were due on or
{02023105.DOCX} 9
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' FURTHER
MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
1 before November 13, 2018. (Id.) Plaintiffs responses remain overdue and outstanding. (Id. at ^ 13,
2 22.) .
3 Plainfiff served unverified, late and deficient responses to Judgment Debtor Requests for
4 Production of Documents (Set One) on April 15, 2019. (Id. at ^ 20 and Exhibit L.) As discussed
5 supra, discovery responses served without a verification are tantamount to serving no responses as
6 all. (Zorro Inv. Co., supra, 69 Cal.App.3d at 914.) Moreover, for the same reasons set forth supra
7 regarding Plaintiffs judgment debtor interrogatory responses. Plaintiffs responses to Judgment
8 Debtor Requests for Production of Documents (Set One) are not code compliant. Plaintiff s
9 imswom responses to Judgment Debtor Requests for Production of Documents (Set One) are
10 wholly insufficient and constitute a complete failure to respond.
11 Therefore, Defendants respectfiilly request an Order compelling Plainfiff to provide
12 verified responses to Defendants' Judgment Debtor Request for Production of Documents (Set
B m
13 One), without objections.
[_ - 3 rNi
— NO
H cn 5S
O 00 o 14 IV.
U
1/3
i <— ON I^'
rs f N
CtJ < Q- ON ON
15 MONETARY SANCTIONS SHOULD BE AWARDED
W .5^ 3 NO NO
ON ON
{02023105. DOCX}
10
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' FURTHER
MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
1 Plaintiffs attempt to evade his obligation to provide responses to judgment debtor
2 discovery has made this second judgment debtor discovery motion necessary, despite being
3 afforded the opportunity to avoid the need for same.
4 To date. Defendants have incurred $2,860.00 in fees as a result of Plaintiffs failure to
5 respond to Judgment Debtor Requests for Production of Documents (Set One) and Judgment
6 Debtor Interrogatories (Set One) since the Court mled on Defendants' inifial mofion to compel
7 judgment debtor discovery. (Bardzell Deck, ^ 26.) Defendants anticipate incurring an additional
8 $1,300 to review Plaintiffs Opposifion, prepare a reply and attend a hearing. (Id.) Therefore,
9 sanctions are proper. Moreover, even i f Plaintiff serves verified responses upon notice of this
10 motion in order to avoid a court order. Defendants have nevertheless been forced to incur the
11 expense of moving to compel Plaintiffs compliance with his discovery obligations, despite efforts
12 to achieve a cooperative result. As such, sanctions in the amount of $4,160.00 are appropriately
o
o
fN 13 awarded against Plaintiff for thefimeand expense incurred by Defendants in filing this motion.
B m
— NO
L_ -3 fN
OO p
— m
14 V.
ON I-^
fN fN
H cn
o
ON ON
NO SO
15 TERMINATING SANCTIONS ARE ALSO APPROPRIATE
ON ON
oi u <
16 The Code of Civil Procedure provides that the Court may impose sanctions on any party
O
oi
a. <C cd
D cn 17 who engages in conduct that constitutes misuse of the discovery process. (CCP. § 2023.030(a).)
o
in
18 Misuses of the discovery process includes "failing to respond or to submit to an authorized method
19 of discovery" and "disobeying a court order to provide discovery." (CCP. §§ 2023.010(d), (g).)
20 When a party fails to respond to an authorized method of discovery and/or fails to obey a court
21 order to provide discovery, the Court may impose monetary sanctions, terminating sanctions, or
22 both. (CCP § 2023.030(a), (d), (g).)
23 Courts have long held that terminating sanctions are appropriate where there is a willful
24 failure to comply with court orders, and should be issued where it appears that lesser sanctions
25 would not bring the offending party into compliance. (R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd.
26 (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 486, 496.) Terminating sanctions are especially appropriate where a party
27 fails to respond to discovery requests and ignores court orders. (Kahn v. Kahn (1977) 68
28 Cal.App.3d372, 383.)
{02023105.DOCX} 11
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' FURTHER
MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
1 Terminating sanctions are appropriate in this case. Plaintiff has failed to provide any
2 verified responses to the Defendants' written judgment debtor discovery despite extensive meet
3 and confer efforts by Defendants. Moreover, the Court has previously granted a motion to compel
4 judgment debtor discovery filed by the anti-SLAPP Defendants in this case. (Bardzell Deck, ^ 21
5 and Exhibits M.) Plainfiff has completely ignored the Court's order regarding the prior judgment
6 debtor discovery motion. (Id. at ^ 22.) Plaintiff has plainly not been dissuaded from his pattem of
7 failing to engage in the discovery process.
8 Additionally, the Court has previously granted two motions to compel discovery filed by
9 Defendant UNIVERSITY in the underlying lawsuitfi"omwhich the judgment at issue arose. (Id. at
10 ^ 7-12 and Exhibits D-E.) Although these further discovery failures pertain to discovery requests
11 served by Defendant UNIVERSITY rather than the anti-SLAPP Defendants, such aggravafing
12 circumstances regarding discovery in the underlying lawsuit, when considered along with
o
o
fN
ii m
13 Plaintiffs pattern of failing to engage in the judgment enforcement discovery process, warrant the
"3 fN
t r2 00 — 5 14 remedy of terminating sanctions of the underlying lawsuit against Defendant UNIVERSITY.
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S fN fN
^ <I o<
>
" a
^ f:i'
ON ON . ^
Plainfiffs demonstrated pattem of failing to provide discovery responses has prejudiced
U ^^11).I 5^. ,5;
I- r ^
Defendants' ability to prepare for trial by necessitafing substantial expenditures of time and money
D cn
o 17 to compel Plaintiff to both (1) comply with his discovery obligations in the underlying lawsuit; and
18 (2) fulfill his judgment debtor discovery obligations to permit the anfi-SLAPP Defendants to
19 enforce their judgment.
20 Plaintiffs enduring lack of cooperation with the discovery process - despite a total of three
21 prior discovery motions - makes it apparent that no action will compel Plaintiff to comply with his
22 discovery obligations, making terminating sanctions appropriate.
23 Accordingly, Defendants request that the Court grant terminating sanctions and issue an
24 Order dismissing the complaint against the remaining Defendant UNIVERSITY in its enfirety,
25 with prejudice.
26 ///
27 ///
28 ///
{02023105.DOCX}
12
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' FURTHER
MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
1 VL
2 CONCLUSION
3 Defendants have made every effort to allow for the cooperative exchange of information,
4 however Plaintiff has failed to provide verified responses to the anti-SLAPP Defendants'
,5 Judgment Debtor Requests for Production of Documents (Set One) and Judgment Debtor
6 Interrogatories (Set One). Defendants are left with no option other than to file the instant motion.
7 As such. Defendants seek an Order (1) compelling Plaintiff to provide verified responses,'without
objections, to the anti-SLAPP Defendants' Judgment Debtor Requests for Production of
Documents (Set One) and Judgment Debtor Interrogatories (Set One); (2) awarding anti-SLAPP
10 Defendants sanctions in the amount of $4,160.00 to retum them to the position they would have
11 been had responses been timely provided; (3) issue terminating sancfions against Plaintiff in favor
12 of Defendant UNIVERSITY as a result of Plaintiff s continuing pattern of failing to engage iri the
o
o
I—1
am
3 fN _
13 discovery process.
r-* 3 00 NO
E- cn m oo p
o u =^ 2: P; 14
> N j ON ON .. ^ Dated: June 12, 2019 PORTER SCOTT
< O" ^ ^ 1^
•ijj 2^ c o^ A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
S g g -J X 16
By.
17 David P. E. Burkett
18 Daniel J. Bardzell
Attomeys for Defendant
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
{02023105. DOCX}
13
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' FURTHER
MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
Waszczuk V. Regents of the University of California, et al.
1
Sacramento County Superior Court, Case No. 34-2013-00155479
2
3 PROOF OF SERVICE
4 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this acfion. My
business address is 350 University Avenue, Suite 200, Sacramento, Califomia 95825.
5
6 On the date below, I served the following document:
10 BY MAIL: I placed the envelope for collection and mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I
am readily familiar with this business' practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing.
11 On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary
course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid.
12 BY PERSONAL SERVICE: I caused such document to be personally delivered to the person(s)
o
o addressed below. (1) For a party represented by an attomey, delivery was made to the attomey or at the
fN
^ in
13 attomey's office by leaving the documents, in an envelope or package clearly labeled to identify the
•3 S - NO attomey being served, with a receptionist or an individual in charge of the office, between the hours of nine
cn m 00 o
o «r <^ !^ 14 in the moming and five in the evening. (2) For a party, delivery was made to the party or by leaving the
u i <• Jri documents at the party's residence with some person not younger than 18 years of age between the hours
> NJ CJN
oi < o " NO NO
15 ON
of eight in the moming and six in the evening.
W C ON ON
H BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY: I enclosed the documents in an envelope or package provided by an
ai 16 ovemight delivery carrier and addressed to the person(s) listed below. I placed the envelope or package for
O
collection and ovemight delivery at my office or a regularly, utilized drop box of the ovemight delivery
c/o 17 carrier.
BY FAX TRANSMISSION: Based on an agreement of the parties to accept service by fax transmission, I
18 faxed the documents to the persons at the fax numbers listed below. No error was reported by the fax
machine that \ used. A copy of the record of the fax transmission, which I printed out, is attached
19
BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE: Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept service by
20 electronic transmission, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the electronic notification
address listed below. '
21
Jaroslaw Waszczuk
22 2216 Katzakian Way
Lodi, CA 95242
23
24
25 I declare under penalty of perjury imder the laws of the State of Califomia that the
26 foregoing is tme and correct. Executed at Sacramento, Califomia on Jime 12, 2019.
27
28 Wendy Strasser
{02023105.DOCX}
14
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' FURTHER
MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
EXHIBIT # 24
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
GORDON D SCHABER COURTHOUSE
MINUTE ORDER
DATE: 07/19/2019 TIME: 02:00:00 PM DEPT: 53
JUDICIAL OFFICER PRESIDING: David Brown
CLERK: D. Johnson-Mellado
REPORTER/ERM: L. Gallager # 8726
BAILIFF/COURT ATTENDANT: Alvi, N., R. Mays
APPEARANCES
Jaroslaw Waszczuk, self represented Plaintiff, present.
Dan Bardzell, Counsel for defendant
Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Compel Responses and Request for Production of Docs
TENTATIVE RULING
Judgment Creditors Boyd, Chilcott, Nichols, Oropeza and Seifert's, ("Judgment Creditors") Motion to
Compel Responses to Judgment Creditors' Interrogatories and Judgment Debtor's Requests for
Production of Documents, for payment of Monetary Sanctions, and for Terminating Sanctions is ruled on
as follows.
On April 14, 2015, the Court granted Judgment Creditor's Special Motion to Strike plaintiff's causes of
action and entered judgment in favor of Judgment Creditors. The Court subsequently granted Judgment
Creditors' Motion for Attorneys' fees in the amount of $22,284. (Bardzell Decl. ¶¶ 3, 6, Exhs. A, C.)
Judgment Creditors served the instant post-judgment discovery on October 9, 2018. (Bardzell Decl. ¶13,
Exh. F.) Judgment debtor/plaintiff failed to provide any responses to the discovery. Judgment Creditors
sent a second copy of the discovery to judgment debtor on January 25, 2019, after judgment
debtor/plaintiff contended he never received the first set served in October. (Bardzell Decl. ¶ 14, Exh. G.)
After receiving no responses, Judgment Creditors filed a motion to compel responses on March 20,
2019. On April 15, 2019, while the motion to compel was pending, judgment debtor/plaintiff served
unverified responses. (Bardzell Decl. ¶ 20, Exh. L.)
On April 26, 2019, the Court granted Judgment Creditors' motion to compel and ordered judgment
debtor/plaintiff to serve further verified responses, without objections, on or before May 8, 2019. (ROA
211.) While monetary sanctions were initially granted in the tentative ruling, after hearing at oral
argument, the Court vacated the order for monetary sanctions.
Judgment debtor/plaintiff has failed to comply with this Court order and provide any further responses.
(Bardzell Decl. ¶ 23.) Judgment Creditors have attempted to meet and confer with judgment
debtor/plaintiff, but have been unable to obtain compliance with the Court's discovery order.
Judgment Creditors now move to compel judgment debtor/plaintiff to serve further verified responses,
without objections, to Judgment Debtor Interrogatories and Judgment Debtor Requests for Production of
Documents. Judgment Creditors contend they have not received any verified responses from judgment
debtor/plaintiff and the unverified responses they have received are not code-compliant because they
contain an objection and refusal to provide the information, even though judgment debtor/plaintiff has
waived objections by not timely responding. Judgment Creditors contend the information sought is
relevant to enforce their judgment.
Judgment debtor/plaintiff has submitted points and authorities in opposition to the motion, but these do
not address the relevant issues in this motion, and consists almost entirely of matters irrelevant to the
discovery at issue.
Judgment debtor/plaintiff is again ordered to serve further verified responses to the Judgment
Debtor Interrogatories and Judgment Debtor Requests for Production, without objections, on or
before July 29, 2019.
The Court cautions judgment debtor/plaintiff that compliance with a facially valid court order is
mandatory. (See, e.g., In re Brambini (1923) 192 Cal. 19, 28-32; see also In re Berry (1968) 68
Cal.2d 137, 147.)
Judgment debtor/plaintiff is also ordered to pay reasonable monetary sanctions to moving parties in the
amount of $1,300 (5 hrs at the hourly rate of $260), plus the $60 filing fee, for a total fee award of
$1,360. This opposition was filed without substantial justification and therefore, moving parties are
entitled to monetary sanctions. The monetary sanctions must be paid on or before August 19, 2019. If
those sanctions are not paid by that date, moving parties may prepare a formal order on the two
sanctions awards which may thereafter be entered as a separate judgment. (See Newland v Superior
Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 608.)
Terminating Sanctions
The motion for terminating sanctions is denied. The post judgment discovery at issue here was served
by Judgment Creditors, not The Regents of the University of California ("Regents"). Moving parties have
already obtained a judgment of dismissal in this case as well as an attorneys' fees award on the
anti-SLAPP motion. Thus, it is unclear why they are seeking a "terminating sanction" in this context.
Regents are not a party to the underlying discovery or this motion, and therefore the Court will not grant
a terminating sanction as to Regents.
Conclusion
As stated above, judgment debtor/plaintiff is again ordered to serve verified responses to the
Judgment Debtor Interrogatories and Judgment Debtor Requests for Production, without
objections, on or before July 29, 2019. Monetary sanctions are to be paid as specified above.
The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further
notice is required.
COURT RULING
After hearing oral argument the Court affirmed its tentative ruling with the following modification:
The Court vacated $60 filing fee from the tentative ruling as listed below:
Judgment debtor/plaintiff is ordered to pay reasonable monetary sanctions to moving parties in the
amount of $1,300 (5 hrs at the hourly rate of $260), for a total fee award of $1,300.
·4· · · · · · · · · · · · · --oOo--
23
24
25
26· · · · · · · · · · · · · ·--oOo--
27
·1· ·of the anti-SLAPP defendants, but we're okay with the
·2· ·tentative ruling at this point.
·3· · · · · ·THE COURT:· So he is okay with it,
·4· ·Mr. Waszczuk, but you have to provide him answers
·5· ·without objections and sign them under penalty of
·6· ·perjury.
·7· · · · · ·MR. WASZCZUK:· I need to know what they want.
·8· · · · · ·THE COURT:· You answered them.· You didn't do
·9· ·a bad job.· I read all your answers.· Most of them were
10· ·pretty good.· I would have been happy with them if I
11· ·were Mr. Bardzell, but you didn't sign them, and there
12· ·were a couple objections that were pointed out to me.
13· · · · · ·MR. WASZCZUK:· I gave Mr. Bardzell everything
14· ·on February 8th.
15· · · · · ·THE COURT:· Did you sign the answers, Mr.
16· ·Waszczuk?
17· · · · · ·MR. WASZCZUK:· Your Honor, we were in court --
18· · · · · ·THE COURT:· I don't care whether you were in
19· ·court.· Did you sign the answers?
20· · · · · ·MR. WASZCZUK:· I believe so.
21· · · · · ·THE COURT:· Do you have Exhibit L?· Do you
22· ·have a copy of his motion in front of you?· It's
23· ·Exhibit L.· It should have a little tab at the bottom.
24· · · · · ·Please show him, Mr. Bardzell.
25· · · · · ·All right.· Exhibit L.· Go to the very end of
26· ·your response to the production of documents.· Go to
27· ·page 7.
28· · · · · ·Do you see where it says submitted on
·7· ·JULY 19, 2019, in the matter of the Waszczuk vs. The
14· ·proceedings.
19
20
21
23
24· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·--oOo--
25
26
27
28
signed 5:1,5
V
sir 5:1
sitting 3:20 vacate 3:14
SLAPP 11:5,6 vacating 3:17
social 11:18 verification 3:28 4:23
5:7
spouse 8:7
spouse's 8:14
24
25
26
27
28
{02II7245.DOCX}
REPLY TO UNTIMELY OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS;
AND FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS
1 I.
2 INTRODUCTION
3 Judgment Creditors/Defendants have now filed three Motions to Compel Judgment
4 Debtor/Plaintiff JAROSLAW ("JERRY") WASZCZUK to provide compliant responses to Judgment
5 Debtor Interrogatories and Judgment Debtor Request for Production of Documents. All such Motions
6 have been granted, yet Judgment Debtor/Plaintiff still refuses to provide those responses. His most-
7 recent responses are identical to those this Court found deficient in ruling on the prior Motion.
8 That forced Judgment Creditors/Defendants to file the instant Motion to Compel and Request for
9 Monetary Sanctions. Judgment Debtor/Plaintiff failed to file a timely Opposition to the Motion. As a
10 result. Judgment Creditors/Defendants filed a notice of non-opposition. Thereafter, Judgment
11 Debtor/Plaintiff filed an untimely Opposition. Judgment Creditors/Defendants submit the Court should
12 disregard that Opposition as untimely. However, even i f the Court considers the Opposition, Plaintiff
13 concedes in that document that he has "no arguments" other than those the Court already rejected in
14 granting the prior Motions to Cornpel.
15 Judgment Debtor/Plaintiffs current Opposition is instead replete with incoherent and nonsensical
16 assertions that counsel for Judgment Creditors is engaging in extortion. Although unclear, it appears
17 Judgment Debtor/Plaintiffs assertions focus on an underlying Order from this Court where the Court
18 awarded Defendants the attorney's fees they incurred in successfully pursuing an Anti-SLAPP Motion.
19 Judgment Debtor/Plaintiff argues that three other lawyers from defense counsel's firm worked on that
20 motion, not the current lawyers. Judgment Debtor's email correspondence attached as Exhibit 5 to his
21 Opposition also claims that any fees that are paid must be paid to the individual Defendants who
22 prevailed on the Anti-SLAPP Motion and not to Defendant REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
•23 CALIFORNIA (herein "REGENTS"), who paid for those fees.
24 Those arguments, however, are entirely irrelevant to the pending Motion, which merely argues
25 that Judgment Debtor/Plaintiff failed to provide adequate responses to discovery requests. Judgment
26 Debtor/Plaintiff does not dispute that issue, nor can he given the responses are identical to the ones the
27 Court previously found deficient.
28 For these reasons and the reasons set forth in Judgment Creditors' moving papers, Judgment
{02117245 DOCX) 2
REPLY TO UNTIMELY OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS;
AND FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS
1 Creditors' Motion should be granted. Judgment Creditors also respectfully request that the Court award
' 2 sanctions for Judgment Debtor's repeated abuse of the discovery process and disregard of previous court
3 orders. In addition. Judgment Creditors respectfully request the Court clarify that the REGENTS is
4 entitled to the payment of sanction awards as the REGENTS is incurring the costs associated with the
5 litigation against Judgment Debtor.
6 II.
7 JUDGMENT DEBTOR'S OPPOSITION SHOULD BE DISREGARDED BECAUSE IT WAS
8 UNTIMELY
9 Judgment Debtor's Opposition to the instant Motion was due on December 2, 2019. (Declaration of
10 Amanda L. Her [herein "Her Decl."], ^ 2.) On December 4, 2019, after no Opposition had been served or
11 even filed, Judgment Creditors filed a Reply to Plaintiffs Non-Opposition to Defendaiit's Motion to
12 Compel Responses to Judgment Debtor Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents; and
13 for Monetary Sanctions. (Her Decl., ^ 3; Exhibit A, Reply to Plaintiffs Non-Opposition) Shortly
14 thereafter, counsel for Judgment Creditors received notification that Judgment Debtor filed an
15 Opposition. Counsel for Judgment Debtor then downloaded the relevant documents from the Court's
16 website. (Her Deck, ^ 4.) The proof of service indicated Judgment Debtor served the Opposition by mail,
17 even further delaying Judgment Creditors' receipt of Judgment Debtor's already untimely response. (Her
18 Deck, t 5.)
19 In his Opposition, Judgment Debtor completely fails to acknowledge that he failed to file a
20 timely Opposition under Code of Civil Procedure section 1005(b). He does not offer any excuse, reason,
21 or authority for his actions. As such, the Judgment Creditors respectfully request that the Court exercise
22 its authority under Califomia Rules of Court, Rule 3.1300, refuse to consider Judgment Debtor's
23 untimely Opposition, and preclude Judgment Debtor from making any oral argument. (Bozzi v.
24 Nordstrom, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 755, 765 [the Court properly refiased to consider plaintiffs
25 untimely papers where plaintiff did not invoke any of the available procedures to obtain a court order
26 permitting late filing].)
27 Ill
28 III
{021I7245.DOCX} 3
REPLY TO UNTIMELY OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS;
AND FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS
1 III.
2 JUDGMENT CREDITORS' MOTION SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE JUDGMENT
3 DEBTOR DID NOT HAVE SUBSTANTIAL JUSTIFICATION FOR OPPOSING IT
4 Judgment Debtor offers no legal basis in his Opposition for his failure to, once again, provide
5 compliant discovery responses in a timely manner. In fact, he outright admits that he "has no fiirther
6 argument" beyond those arguments that the Court rejected in granting Judgment Creditors' earlier
7 Motions.
8 Rather than responding to the arguments Judgment Creditors set forth supporting their contention
9 that Judgment Debtor should be compelled to provide further discovery responses and that the Court
10 should award sanctions, Judgment Debtor instead makes conspiracy theory-type arguments about
11 counsel for Judgment Creditors extorting money from him.
12 As set forth in Judgment Creditors' moving papers, this is the third Motion Judgment Creditors
13 have been forced to file in attempting to collect the judgments owed in this case. This Court has now
14 ordered Judgment Debtor multiple times to serve fiarther verified responses to the Judgment Debtor
15 Interrogatories and Judgment Debtor Requests for Production without objection. {See Declaration of
16 Daniel Bardzell in Support of Further Motion to Compel [herein "Bardzell Decl."] 15, 21 and
17 Exhibits K and O attached thereto) He has not done so, choosing instead to serve verified versions of the
18 identical responses this Court previously deemed insufficient. Even more egregious is the fact that
19 Judgment Debtor acknowledged in an email that he does have responsive documents, but refused to
20 provide them except for in a face-to-face meeting.' (Bardzell Deck, t 28 and Exhibit V) Judgment
21 Creditors are not required to acquiesce to such a request. When counsel for Judgment Creditors
22 communicated as much to Judgment Debtor, he responded by urging Judgment Creditors to file the
23 instant motion—conduct that continues to violate this Court's orders. (Bardzell Decl. \ 30 and
24 Exhibit X)
25 Judgment Debtor should be sanctioned for opposing this Motion without substantial justification.
26 (Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.290(c) [interrogatories] & 2031.300(c) [production requests].)
27
28 ' Ttiis is just another effort in Plaintiffs long-line of efforts to intimidate and threaten defense counsel, the same type of
conduct that resulted in his termination from the University.
{02117245 DOCX) ; 4
REPLY TO UNTIMELY OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS;
AND FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS
1 He has offered no legal basis for his failure to timely respond, or even for his failure to respond to the
2 numerous meet and confer attempts that Judgment Creditors have engaged in, as detailed in the moving
3 papers. Judgment Debtor's brazen defiance of multiple Court orders to serve fijrther discovery responses
4 is an unquestionable misuse of the discovery process for which monetary sanctions should be awarded.
5 (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2023.010(g); 2023.030 (a).) Judgment Creditors request an award of $5,460.00 as
6 set forth in the moving papers.
7 IV.
8 DEFENDANT REGENTS IS ENTITLED TO PAYMENT OF SANCTIONS AWARDS
9 Judgment Debtor indicates in his Opposition and supporting exhibits that the REGENTS and
10 defense counsel are not entitled to the sanctions and fees awarded to date. (Opposition to Motion to
11 Compel Filed on October 23, 2019, pp. 4-5) In a November 21, 2019 email correspondence to counsel
12 for the REGENTS and Judgment Creditors, Judgment Debtor wrote, "As I advised you a few days ago,
13 the UC Regents should not cash the $1,300 check I sent to your office on November 18, 2019. The UC
14 Regents are not the party of the anti-SLAPP motion filed by Porter Scott's fomier attomey Michael Pott
15 on December 1, 2014." (Opposition, Exhibit 5.) Judgment Debtor goes on to offer to write individual
16 checks in the amount of $260.00 to each Judgment Creditor and insinuates he either has or will file a
17 complaint with the State Bar related to this issue.
18 Judgment Debtor has cited no legal authority for his position that the REGENTS are not entitled
19 to the sanction payment. The REGENTS has paid for the defense ofthe Judgment Creditors. (Her Decl. ^
20 6.) "A monetary sanction may be based not only on attomey's fees and costs, but also on any other
21 reasonable expenses incurred.'" {Argaman v, Ratan (1999) 73 Cal.App.4''^ 1173, 1179 [emphasis added].)
22 As the REGENTS has incurred the expense of the Special Motion to Strike and subsequent discovery
23 proceedings associated with collecting the judgment, the REGENTS is the proper recipient of the
24 sanction payments. Judgment Creditors respectfully request the Court clarify for Judgment Debtor that
25 the REGENTS is entitled to the payment of sanction awards so that Judgment Debtor does not continue
26 to use that as an excuse for not paying the amounts owed.
27
111 •
28
III
(02117245 DOCX) . ^5 ^
REPLY TO UNTIMELY OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS;
AND FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS
1 V. .
2 CONCLUSION
3 Based on the foregoing, Judgment Creditors respectfully submit that their Motion to Compel
4 Responses to Judgment Debtor Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents; and for
5 Monetary Sanctions should be granted.
6
7 Dated: December 6, 2019 PORTER SCOTT
A PRCIFESSIONA TION
8
9
10 )erek J. Haynes
^Amanda L. Her
11 Daniel J. Bardzell
Attomeys for Judgment Creditors/Former
12
Defendants
13
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15
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{02117245.DOCX}
REPLY TO UNTIMELY OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS;
AND FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS
Waszczuk V. Regents of the University of California, et al.
1
Sacramento County Superior Court, Case No. 34-2013-00155479
2
3 PROOF OF SERVICE
4 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. My business
address is 350 University Avenue, Suite 200, Sacramento, Califomia 95825.
.5
6 On the date below, I served the following document: REPLY TO UNTIMELY OPPOSITION
TO MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR INTERROGATORIES
7 AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; AND FOR MONETARY
SANCTIONS
8
BY MAIL: I placed the envelope for collection and mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I
9
am readily familiar with this business' practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing.
10 On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary
course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid.
11 BY PERSONAL SERVICE: I caused such document to be personally delivered to the person(s)
addressed below. (1) For a party represented by an attomey, delivery was made to the attomey or at the
12 attomey's office by leaving the documents, in an envelope or package clearly labeled to identify the
attomey being served, with a receptionist or an individual in charge of the office, between the hours of nine
13 in the moming and five in the evening. (2) For a party, delivery was made to the party or by leaving the
documents at the party's residence with some person not younger than 18 years of age between the hours
14 of eight in the moming and six in the evening.
BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY: I enclosed the documents in an envelope or package provided by an
15 ovemight delivery carrier and addressed to the person(s) listed below. I placed the envelope or package for
collection and ovemight delivery at my office or a regularly utilized drop box of the ovemight delivery
16 carrier.
BY FAX TRANSMISSION: Based on an agreement of the parties to accept service by fax transmission, I
17 faxed the documents to the persons at the fax numbers listed below. No error was reported by the fax
machine that I used. A copy of the record of the fax transmission, which I printed out, is attached
18 BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE: Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept service by
electronic transmission, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the electronic notification
19 address listed below.
20 JAROSLAW WASZCZUK
21 2216 KATZAKIAN WAY
LODI, CA 95242
22
23 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is
true and correct. Executed at Sacramento, California on December 6, 2019.
24
25
Cindy A<3bndinetti
26
27
28
(02117245.DOCX)
REPLY TO UNTIMELY OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS;
AND FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS
EXHIBIT # 34
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
GORDON D SCHABER COURTHOUSE
MINUTE ORDER
DATE: 12/13/2019 TIME: 02:00:00 PM DEPT: 53
JUDICIAL OFFICER PRESIDING: David Brown
CLERK: E. Brown
REPORTER/ERM:
BAILIFF/COURT ATTENDANT: R. Mays, Alvi, N.
APPEARANCES
Jaroslaw Waszczuk, self represented Plaintiff, present.
Daniel J. Bardzell, counsel present for judgment creditors
Nature of Proceeding: Motion to Compel Interrogatoriesand Production of Documents
TENTATIVE RULING
Judgment Creditors Boyd, Chilcott, Nichols, Oropeza, and Seifert (collectively, "Judgment Creditors")
move to compel further responses from Plaintiff/Judgment Debtor Jaroslaw (Jerry) Waszczuk to
requests for production, set one, and interrogatories, set one. Judgment Creditors also request
sanctions in the amount of $5,460. The motion is ruled upon as follows.
As outlined in the Court's prior order of July 19, 2019, on April 14, 2015, the Court granted Judgment
Creditors' special motion to strike Plaintiff's causes of action and entered judgment in favor of Judgment
Creditors. The Court subsequently granted Judgment Creditors' motion for attorneys' fees in the amount
of $22,284. (See ROA 219.)
Judgment Creditors served the underlying discovery on October 9, 2018. The Court previously granted
motions to compel related to the discovery on April 26, 2018, and July 19, 2019. In both rulings,
Judgment Debtor was ordered to provide further verified responses, without objections. The July 19,
2019 order also imposed sanctions against Plaintiff/Judgment Debtor in the amount of $1,300.
Judgment Debtor/Plaintiff attempted to provide further responses by email on the Court deadline of July
29, 2019. (Bardzell Decl. ¶ 22, Exh. P.) Counsel for Judgment Creditors sent correspondence on August
5, 2019, raising the issue of improper service and stating that the further responses "appear[ed] identical
to the responses . . . previously provided with the only difference being that you executed a verification."
(Id. ¶ 23, Exh. Q.) The parties continued to meet and confer. Judgment Debtor served verified responses
on September 6, 2019, which Judgment Creditor alleges again "appear identical to his previously
provided responses with the only difference being that he provided a properly executed verification for
each response." (Mot. at 8, citing Bardzell Decl. ¶ 26, Exh. T.) The parties continued to meet and confer
but no further responses have been received.
Judgment Creditors move to compel Judgment Debtor/Plaintiff to serve further Code-compliant verified
Conclusion
Judgment Debtor/Plaintiff is again ordered to serve Code-compliant further verified responses to the
Judgment Debtor Interrogatories, Set One, and Request for Production, Set One, without objections, on
or before December 23, 2019.
The Court yet again cautions Judgment Debtor/Plaintiff that compliance with a facially-valid
court order is mandatory. (See, e.g., In re Brambini (1923) 192 Cal. 19, 28-32; see also In re Berry
(1968) 68 Cal.2d 137, 147.)
Judgment Debtor/Plaintiff is also ordered to pay reasonable monetary sanctions to the moving parties in
the amount of $1,300 (5 hours at the hourly rate of $260), for the fees incurred since the Court's last
order compelling further responses to the same discovery. The opposition was filed without substantial
justification. The monetary sanctions are to be paid on or before January 13, 2019. If those sanctions
are not paid by that date, the moving parties may prepare a formal order on the sanction award, which
may thereafter entered as a separate judgment. (See Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th
608.)
The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further
notice is required.
COURT RULING
The matter was argued and submitted.
The Court takes this matter under submission.
APPEARANCES
Conclusion
Judgment Debtor/Plaintiff is again ordered to serve Code-compliant further verified responses to the
Judgment Debtor Interrogatories, Set One, and Request for Production, Set One, without objections, on
or before December 23, 2019.
The Court yet again cautions Judgment Debtor/Plaintiff that compliance with a facially-valid
court order is mandatory. (See, e.g., In re Brambini (1923) 192 Cal. 19, 28-32; see also In re Berry
(1968) 68 Cal.2d 137, 147.)
Judgment Debtor/Plaintiff is also ordered to pay reasonable monetary sanctions to the moving parties in
the amount of $1,300 (5 hours at the hourly rate of $260), for the fees incurred since the Court's last
order compelling further responses to the same discovery. The opposition was filed without substantial
justification. The monetary sanctions are to be paid on or before January 13, 2019. If those sanctions
are not paid by that date, the moving parties may prepare a formal order on the sanction award, which
may thereafter entered as a separate judgment. (See Newland v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th
608.)
The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further
notice is required.
COURT RULING
The matter was argued and submitted. The matter was taken under submission.
Having taken the matter under submission on 12/13/2019, the Court now rules as follows:
SUBMITTED MATTER RULING
The Court affirmed the tentative ruling.
JAROSLAW WASZCZUK
2216 KATZAKIAN WAY
LODI, CA 95242
DANIEL J. BARDZELL
PORTER SCOTT
350 UNIVERSITY AVE., SUITE 200
SACRAMENTO, CA 95825
6
Attomey for Defendant
7 REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
8 Exempt From Filing Fees Pursuant to Government Code § 6103
9
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SACRAIVIENTO
10
11 JAROSLAW ("JERRY") WASZCZUK, CASE NO. 34-2013-00155479
12
o Plaintiff, EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE
o
13 TO EXTEND PAGE LIMIT FOR
r- 3 00 —
0\
V. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
O V 14 SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE
O 2
15 THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY
pi. 2 S
CALIFORNL\, UNIVERSITY OF ADJUDICATION
hi ^ 16 CALIFORNL\ DAVIS HEALTH SYSTEM,
O
a. UC DAVIS MEDICAL CENTER, UC
3 t/>
17 DAVIS, ANN MADDEN RICE, MIKE
18 BOYD, STEPHEN CHILCOTT, CHARLES
WITCHER, DANESHA NICHOLS, CINDY
19 OROPEZA, BRENT SEIFERT, PATRICK
PUTNEY, DORIN DANE.IUC, and Does 1
20 through 50, inclusive. Complaint Filed: December 4, 2013
21 Amended Complaint Filed: June 16, 2014
Defendants. SAC Filed: September 30, 2014
22
LL,
23
24
25
26
27
28
{0241.19S2.DOCX} 1
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S EXPARTE FOR
LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT EXCEEDS 20 PAGES
1 I.
2 EX PARTE APPLICATION
3 Defendant THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA ("UNIVERSITY")
4 hereby submits this Ex Parte Application for permission to file a Memorandinn of Points and
5 Authorities in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the altemative. Summary
6 Adjudication in excess of twenty pages pursuant to Rules 3.1113(e) and 3.1200 et seq. of the
7 Califomia Rules of Court. Rule 3.1113(e) allows a party to apply to the court for permission to file a
8 longer memorandum if the argument cannot be made within the stated page limit. Due to the lengthy
9 facts, multiple causes of action, and complex legal issues in this case, it is necessary that Defendant's
10 Memorandtun of Points and Authorities exceed twenty pages to adequately address the factual and
11 legal issues presented by the motion.
12 IL
o
o
r-i
B >n 13 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES j
i _ •= rM
r " 3 00 — VO
r - I'l <n 00 o
O —. m 14 IN SUPPORT OF EXTENSION OF PAGE LIMIT
c^ 15
a: < d vd vd Defendant intends to move for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary
Ov Ov
-i >< 16
l i3e(/I Wf- u.< adjudication as the following causes of action: 1) harassment in violation of FEHA and failure to
17
o prevent harassment, discrimination, and retaliation in violation of Govemment Code § 12940(a); 2)
18
whistleblower/unlawful retaliation in violation of Govemment Code § 8547; 3) retaliation under
19
Health and Safety Code § 1278.5; 4) breach of written contract; 5) wage and hour misclassification;
20
and 6) rescission-unlawful contract. (Declaration of Lindsay A. Goulding in support of Defendant's
21
ExParte Motion for Leave to File Motion for Summary Judgment that Exceeds 20 Pages ("Goulding
22
Decl. 13.) The Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication will necessarily require a detailed
23
discussion of the nature of Plaintiffs employment relationship with Defendant, the alleged
24
harassment of Plaintiff fi-om 2006 to 2013, as well as the individual defenses applicable thereto.
25
26 (Id.) The circumstances surrounding die allegedly harassing conduct will also require a detailed
27 discussion regarding the nature of the conduct, the timing, and the speakers and recipients of the
28 alleged harassment. (Id.) Further, a lengthy legal analysis will be required to address Plaintiffs
{0241.1952.DOCX} 2
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S EXPARTE FOR
LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT EXCEEDS 20 PAGES
previous settlement agreement with Defendant. (Id.)
In order to address the lengthy facts, legal authority, and legal arguments regarding each of
3 Plaintiffs causes of action. Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of its
4 Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication will need to exceed twenty pages. Therefore,
5 Defendants respectfully request that the court, pursuant to Rules 3.113(e) and 3.1200 et seq. of the
6 Califomia Rules of Court, allow it to submit a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in excess of
7 twenty pages, but not to exceed forty pages. Defendant will make a good faith effort to keep the
8 motion as concise as possible.
9 III.
10 CONCLUSION
11 For the reasons set forth above. Defendant has demonsttated good cause for an expansion
12 of the page limit and move this Court to permit Defendant to submit a memorandum of up to 40
o
o
13 pages in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment.
f- 3 g — VO
i- i/i 00 o
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cC [--•
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vd 15 Dated April 22, 2021 PORTER SCOTT
O ov A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
- j >< 16
o •I "mf- u.<
3 t/i
o 17
in
18 By.
Lindsay A. Goulding
19 Attorneys for Defendant
20
21
22
23
24
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26
27
28
{02413952.DOCX}
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S EXPARTE FOR
LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT EXCEEDS 20 PAGES
Waszczuk V. Regents ofthe University of California, et al
1
Sacramento County Superior Court, Case No. 34-2013-00155479
2
3 PROOF OF SERVICE
4 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. My business
address is 350 University Avenue, Suite 200, Sacramento, Califomia 95825.
5
6 On the date below, I served the following document:
26
27
28 Virginia Yao
{0241.1952.DOCX}
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S EXPARTE FOR
LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT EXCEEDS 20 PAGES
L:: U„ r;:^J
o
1
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
2
Lindsay A. Goulding, SBN 227195
3 Olatomiwa T. Aina, SBN 325566
350 University Avenue, Suite 200
4 Sacramento, California 95825
TEL: 916.929.1481
5 FAX: 916.927.3706
6
Attorney for Defendant
7 REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
13 GOULDING IN SUPPORT OF
Sacramento, CA 95825
PORTER | SCOTT
FAX: 916.927.3706
TEL: 916.929.1481
{02413956.DOCX} 1
DECLARATION OF LINDSAY A. GOULDING IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S EXPARTE FOR LEAVE
TO FILE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT EXCEEDS 20 PAGES
1 2. The Second Amended Complaint alleges the following causes of action: 1)
2 intentional infliction of emotional distress; 2) tortious interference with economic advantage; 3)
3 harassment in violation of FEHA and failure to prevent harassment, discrimination, and retaliation
4 in violation of Government Code § 12940(a); 4) whistleblower/unlawful retaliation in violation of
5 Government Code § 8547; 5) retaliation under Health and Safety Code § 1278.5; 6) breach of written
6 contract; 7) wage and hour misclassification; and 8) rescission-unlawful contract.
7 3. Defendant intends to move for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary
8 adjudication as to the following causes of action: 3) harassment in violation of FEHA and failure to
9 prevent harassment, discrimination, and retaliation in violation of Government Code § 12940(a); 4)
10 whistleblower/unlawful retaliation in violation of Government Code § 8547; 5) retaliation under
11 Health and Safety Code § 1278.5; 4) breach of written contract; 6) wage and hour misclassification;
12 and 7) rescission-unlawful contract. The Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication will
350 University Avenue, Suite 200
13 necessarily require a detailed discussion of the nature of Plaintiff’s employment relationship with
Sacramento, CA 95825
PORTER | SCOTT
FAX: 916.927.3706
TEL: 916.929.1481
14 Defendant, the alleged harassment of Plaintiff from 2006 to 2013, as well as the individual defenses
15 applicable thereto. The circumstances surrounding the allegedly harassing conduct will also require
16 a detailed discussion as to the nature of the conduct, the timing, and the speakers and recipients of
17 the alleged harassment. Further, a lengthy legal analysis will be required to address Plaintiff’s
18 previous settlement agreement with Defendant.
19 4. In order to address the lengthy facts, legal authority, and legal arguments regarding
20 each of Plaintiff’s causes of action, Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support
21 of its Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication will need to exceed twenty pages.
22 5. I contacted Plaintiff to inform him of this Application via telephone and email on
23 April 26, 2021 at approximately 9:02 a.m. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy
24 of my email correspondence to Plaintiff regarding Defendant’s request to exceed the page limit.
25 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing
26 is true and correct. Executed this 26th day of April 2021, at Sacramento, California.
27 L
28
Lindsay A. Goulding
{02413956.DOCX} 2
DECLARATION OF LINDSAY A. GOULDING IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S EXPARTE FOR LEAVE
TO FILE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT EXCEEDS 20 PAGES
EXHIBIT
“A”
01054547.WPD
From: Virginia Yao
To: [email protected]
Cc: Lindsay A. Goulding; Tomi Aina
Subject: Waszczuk v. Regents
Date: Monday, April 26, 2021 8:59:00 AM
Attachments: image001.png
Virginia Yao
Legal Assistant to Lindsay A. Goulding
350 University Avenue | Suite 200 | Sacramento, CA 95825
T| 916.929.1481 x 331 F| 916.927.3706
www.porterscott.com
Waszczuk v. Regents of the University of California, et al.
1
Sacramento County Superior Court, Case No. 34-2013-00155479
2
PROOF OF SERVICE
3
4 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. My business
address is 350 University Avenue, Suite 200, Sacramento, California 95825.
5
6 On the date below, I served the following document:
13 served, with a receptionist or an individual in charge of the office, between the hours of nine in the morning
Sacramento, CA 95825
and five in the evening. (2) For a party, delivery was made to the party or by leaving the documents at the
PORTER | SCOTT
FAX: 916.927.3706
TEL: 916.929.1481
14 party’s residence with some person not younger than 18 years of age between the hours of eight in the
morning and six in the evening.
15 BY OVERNIGHT DELIVERY: I enclosed the documents in an envelope or package provided by an
overnight delivery carrier and addressed to the person(s) listed below. I placed the envelope or package for
16 collection and overnight delivery at my office or a regularly utilized drop box of the overnight delivery
carrier.
17 BY FAX TRANSMISSION: Based on an agreement of the parties to accept service by fax transmission, I
faxed the documents to the persons at the fax numbers listed below. No error was reported by the fax
18 machine that I used. A copy of the record of the fax transmission, which I printed out, is attached
XX BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE: Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept service by
19 electronic transmission, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the electronic notification address
listed below.
20
21 Jaroslaw Waszczuk
2216 Katzakian Way
22 Lodi, CA 95242
[email protected]
23
24 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing
is true and correct. Executed at Sacramento, California on April 26, 2021.
25
26 v
27 ___________________________________
Virginia Yao
28
{02413956.DOCX} 3
DECLARATION OF LINDSAY A. GOULDING IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S EXPARTE FOR LEAVE
TO FILE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT EXCEEDS 20 PAGES
1 P O R T E R I S C O T T
2 A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
Lindsay A. Goulding, SBN 227195
3 Olatomiwa T. Aina, SBN 325566 APR 2 7 2021
350 University Avenue, Suite 200
4 Sacramento, California 95825
TEL: 916.929.1481 Bv: D. JOHNSON-MELLADQ
5 FAX: 916.927.3706 DEPUTY CLERK
6
Attomey for Defendant
7 REGENTS OF THE UNrVERSITY OF CALIFORNL\
8 Exempt From Filing Fees Pursuant io Government Code § 6103
9
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
10
II
JAROSLAW ("JERRY") WASZCZUK, CASENO. 34-2013-00155479
12
o Plaintiff, tJatOPOOflPf^ ORDER ON
o
i i w-i
13 DEFENI^ffiST'S EX PARTE
— VO
00 o
14 APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO
— m
EXTEND PAGE LIMIT FOR
15 THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
. oi < 6
CALIFORNIA, UNIVERSITY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE
« 5; g 16 CALIFORNL\ DAVIS HEALTH SYSTEM, ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY
o ADJUDICATION
17 UC DAVIS MEDICAL CENTER, UC
C a
o
in DAVIS, ANN MADDEN RICE, MIKE
18 BOYD, STEPHEN CHE.COTT, CHARLES
WITCHER, DANESHA NICHOLS, CINDY
19 OROPEZA, BRENT SEIFERT, PATRICK Complaint Filed: December 4, 2013
20 PUTNEY, DORIN DANILIUC, and Does 1 Amended Complaint Filed: June 16, 2014
through 50, inclusive. SAC Filed: September 30, 2014
21
Defendants.
22
23
24 /
Dated:
APR 2 7 2021
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
SHAMA H. MESIWALA
10
11
12
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27
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{02414532.DOCX}
Re: Defendants Ex Parte Application for Leave to Extend Page Limit for Defendant's
Motion For Summary Judgment or, in The Alternative, Summary
Adjudication
Yesterday, I asked you in which Court Department you filed your Ex Parte
Application for Leave to Extend Page Limit because you did not mark on the front
page of your pleadings which Court Department or which Judge would would
-1-
Ex Parte Application
handle your application. You are obliged to inform the opposite party what you are
filing and when and where you are filing it. What you have done is very
unprofessional.
As you probably know from the Court file, in October 2018, your
predecessors in this case, two former Porter Scott attorneys, David Burkett and
Daniel Bardzell, with the evil intention of ending my wrongful termination lawsuit
against the Regents of the University of California, bypassed Judge David Brown
in Department 53 and filed, on October 3, 2018 in Department 54, their deceptive
DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO COMPEL
VERIFIED RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS SET ONE, SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES SET ONE, FORM
INTERROGATORIES GENERAL SET ONE, FORM INTERROGATORIES -
EMPLOYMENT SET ONE; TO DEEM REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS
ADMITTED; AND FOR MONETARY AND TERMINATING SANCTIONS
(ROA 150-153) in an attempt to obtain an Order from Judge Christopher E.
Krueger or a stamped Order with Judge Krueger’s name.
Burkett and Bardzell were caught, and their evil plan failed. If you look at
the Burkett and Bardzell’s Notice of Motion and Motion (ATTACHMENT #1) of
October 3, 2018 and your Ex Parte Application for Leave to Extend the Page Limit
(ATTACHMENT #2) filed on April 26, 2021, you will see that both Court
Documents were filed/endorsed by the same Deputy Clerk named E. Medina.
It seems to me that history is repeating itself and that Porter Scott’s new team of
Super Lawyers, Ms. Lindsay A. Goulding and Olatomiwa A. Aina, are rushing to
file a Motion for Summary Judgment in the same way that David Burkett and
-2-
Ex Parte Application
Daniel Bardzell rushed to file the Termination Sanctions in Department 54 instead
of Department 53 three years earlier.
-3-
Ex Parte Application
the FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION in the SAC (Page Nos. 55–57) and does not
require an Extension of the Page Limit because FORTH COA was also removed
from the SAC in 2015 by the Anti-SLAPP Motion, C.C.P. § 425.16, granted by the
Court to the Defendants, Danesha Nichols, Mike Boyd, Stephen Chilcott, and Brent
Seifert.
3) retaliation under Health and Safety Code § 1278.5
This is actually the FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION in the SAC (Page Nos. 55–
57) and does not require an Extension of the Page Limit because I have no intention
of pursuing this Cause of Action but I could change my mind in filing Third
Amended Complaint which was blocked in October 2015 to be file by Burkett ,
Bardzell and Judge David Brown’s Order
4) breach of written contract
This is actually the SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION in the SAC, and it is the
most important COA in the entire Second Amended Complaint besides the age
discrimination and witch hunt of March 2011–December 2012, which has caused
me losses of approximately $1,000,000 in wages and benefits between December
2012 and the present.
5) wage and hour misclassification
This is actually the SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION in the SAC. My
Attorney, Douglas Stein, did not understand or did not have any knowledge about
the University of California’s pay policies and employee classification. I was
perfectly happy with my classification and wages, but U.S Senator Feinstein’s
husband, Richard Blum, hunted me down for a different reason, which is pending
in the United States Court Of Appeals For The District Of Columbia Circuit
whistleblower case Jaroslaw Janusz Waszczuk v. Commissioner of Internal
-4-
Ex Parte Application
Revenue Services Case No. 20-1407
(https://www.scribd.com/document/495490868/Jaroslaw-Waszczuk-v-IRS-
Commissioner-UNITED-STATES-COURT-OF-APPEALS-FOR-THE-
DISTRICT-OF-COLUMBIA-CIRCUIT).
6) rescission – unlawful contract
This is actually the EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION in the SAC. Regardless
of whether the Settlement Agreement of January 2009 was lawful or unlawful, the
Settlement Agreement was violated and breached by UC Regents, my human rights
were violated, and I was disposed of at the age of 62 like a piece of garbage and
subjected to an assassination attempt on May 31, 2012 by the UC Davis Death
Squad.
I disagree with your statement that the Motion for Summary
Judgment/Adjudication will necessarily require a detailed discussion of the nature
of the Plaintiff’s employment relationship with Defendant.
I have all my employee performance reviews, which show that I was a good
employee and had a normal relationship with my employer. I was hunted down by
regents for a completely different reason than the one you are implying in your Ex
Parte Application.
I fail to understand why Porter Scott’s attorney is making attempts to bring back
into the lawsuit the Causes of Action dismissed from the SAC by the Anti-SLAPP
motion granted by the Court. Previously, David Burkett brought back the four dismissed
COAs into his requests for Production of Documents and Interrogatories. Now, you are
attempting to relitigate COAs that were already litigated for several years and are no
longer part of the Second Amended Complaint.
-5-
Ex Parte Application
In concluding this Meet and Confer letter, I would appreciate if you would clarify
with the Court the status of the four individuals Stephen Chilcott, Mike Boyd,
Danesha Nichols, and Brent Seifert. Please clarify whether these individuals are
still Defendants or whether they were dismissed by the anti-SLAPP motion in 2015
together with first four COAs. Porter Scott Attorneys once brought them back in
their pleading as Defendants and another time classed them as former Defendants,
stating that they are being represented by Porter Scott.
I noticed that in your April 26, 2021 Ex Parte Application for Leave to Extend
the Page Limit for the Defendant’s Motion For Summary Judgment or, in the
Alternative, Summary Adjudication, you did not mention Stephen Chilcott, Mike
Boyd, Danesha Nichols, and Brent Seifert at all, which is in contrast to Burkett
Bardzell’s and other Porter Scott’s lawyers pleadings of 2018–2020. I am quite sure
that Stephen Chilcott, Mike Boyd, Danesha Nichols, and Brent Seifert do not want to
hear about this lawsuit or about Porter Scott’s Attorneys anti-SLAPP motion dirty
money attached to violation of my human rights and endless harassment of 70 years
old wife . Your first show off in this case did not go well for you Ms. Goulding . You
are dirty and unprofessional lawyer as same as your Porter Scott’s predecessors with
J.D degree and licenses from the State Bar of California .
Sincerely,
Jaroslaw Waszczuk,
-6-
Ex Parte Application
Mailing List
-7-
Ex Parte Application
EXHIBIT # 39
AT-138/EJ-125
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT Ar?ORNEY; STATE BAR NO.:
FOR COURT USE ONLY
NAME: Lindsay A. Gouiding, SBN 227195
FIRM NAME: Porfer Scott
STREETADDRESS: 350 Uolverslty AvBHue
CITY: Sacramento STATE: CA ZIPCODE: 95825
TELEPHONENO.: (916)929-1481 FAXNO.: (916)927-3706 FILED / ENqfORSBD
E-MAIL ADDRESS: [email protected], [email protected]
ATTORNEY FOR (name): Defendants Boyd, Chilcott, Selfert, Oropeza, and Nivhols
SUPERIOR COURT OF CAUFORNIA, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO MAY - 7 2021
STREETADDRESS: 720 9th Street
MAILING ADDRESS: 720 9th Street
CITYAND ZIPCODE Sacramento 95814
BRANCH NAME:
By \ Deputy Clerk
This order must be served not less than 10 days before the date set for the examination.
IMPORTANT NOTICES ON REVERSE
APPLICATION FOR ORDER TO APPEAR FOR EXAMINATION
I X I Original judgment aeditor Q Assignee of record Plaintiff who has a right to attach order
applies for an order requiring (name): IRINA WASZCZUK
to appear and fumish Information to aid in enforcement of the money judgment or to answer conceming property or debt.
The person to be examined is
a. I I the judgment debtor.
b. I X I a third person (1) who has possession or control of property belonging to the judgment debtor or the defendant or (2) who
owes the judgment debtor or the defendant more than $250. An affidavit supporting this application under Code of Civii
Procedure section 491.110 or 708.120 is attached.
The person to be examined resides or has a place of business in this county or within 150 miles of the place of examination.
I I This court Is not the court in which the money judgment is entered or (attachment bnly) the court that issued the writ of
attachment. An affidavit supporting an application under Code of Civil Procedure section 491.150 or 708.160 is attached.
I I The judgment debtor has been examined within the past 120 days. An affidavit showing good cause for another examination
is attached.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws ofthe State of Califomia that the foregoing is true and correcL
Date: April 12 2021
83
. AT-138/EJ-125
' information for Judgment Creditor Regarding Service
If ybu want to be able to ask the court to enforce the order on the judgment debtor or any third party, you
nfiust have a copy of the order personally served on the judgment debtor by a sheriff, marshal, registered
process server, or the person appointed in item 3 of the order at least 10 calendar days before the date of
the hearing, and have a proof of service filed with the court.
IMPORTANT NOTICES ABOUT THE ORDER
If you claim that all or any portion of this property or debt is exempt from enforcement of the money
judgment, you must file your exemption claim in writing with the court and have a copy personally
served on the judgment creditor not later than three days before the date set for the examination.
You must appear at the time and place set for the examination to establish your claim of exemption
or your exemption may be waived.
Request for Accommodations. Assistive listening systems, computer-assisted real-time captioning, or sign
language interpreter services are available if you ask at least 5 days before your hearing. Contact the clerk's
office for Request for Accommodation (form MC-410). (Civil Code, § 54.8.)
AT-138;EJ-125[Rev January 1,2017] APPLICATION A N D O R D E R FOR Pafle20f2
6
Attomey for Defendant
7 REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
8 Exempt From Filing Fees Pursuant to Government Code § 6103
9
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SACRAIVIENTO
10
11 JAROSLAW ("JERRY") WASZCZUK, CASE NO. 34-2013-00155479
12
o Plaintiff, EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE
o
13 TO EXTEND PAGE LIMIT FOR
r- 3 00 —
0\
V. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
O V 14 SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE
O 2
15 THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY
pi. 2 S
CALIFORNL\, UNIVERSITY OF ADJUDICATION
hi ^ 16 CALIFORNL\ DAVIS HEALTH SYSTEM,
O
a. UC DAVIS MEDICAL CENTER, UC
3 t/>
17 DAVIS, ANN MADDEN RICE, MIKE
18 BOYD, STEPHEN CHILCOTT, CHARLES
WITCHER, DANESHA NICHOLS, CINDY
19 OROPEZA, BRENT SEIFERT, PATRICK
PUTNEY, DORIN DANE.IUC, and Does 1
20 through 50, inclusive. Complaint Filed: December 4, 2013
21 Amended Complaint Filed: June 16, 2014
Defendants. SAC Filed: September 30, 2014
22
LL,
23
24
25
26
27
28
{0241.19S2.DOCX} 1
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S EXPARTE FOR
LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT EXCEEDS 20 PAGES
L:: U„ r;:^J
o
1 I.
2 EX PARTE APPLICATION
3 Defendant THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA ("UNIVERSITY")
4 hereby submits this Ex Parte Application for permission to file a Memorandinn of Points and
5 Authorities in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the altemative. Summary
6 Adjudication in excess of twenty pages pursuant to Rules 3.1113(e) and 3.1200 et seq. of the
7 Califomia Rules of Court. Rule 3.1113(e) allows a party to apply to the court for permission to file a
8 longer memorandum if the argument cannot be made within the stated page limit. Due to the lengthy
9 facts, multiple causes of action, and complex legal issues in this case, it is necessary that Defendant's
10 Memorandtun of Points and Authorities exceed twenty pages to adequately address the factual and
11 legal issues presented by the motion.
12 IL
o
o
r-i
B >n 13 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES j
i _ •= rM
r " 3 00 — VO
r - I'l <n 00 o
O —. m 14 IN SUPPORT OF EXTENSION OF PAGE LIMIT
c^ 15
a: < d vd vd Defendant intends to move for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary
Ov Ov
-i >< 16
l i3e(/I Wf- u.< adjudication as the following causes of action: 1) harassment in violation of FEHA and failure to
17
o prevent harassment, discrimination, and retaliation in violation of Govemment Code § 12940(a); 2)
18
whistleblower/unlawful retaliation in violation of Govemment Code § 8547; 3) retaliation under
19
Health and Safety Code § 1278.5; 4) breach of written contract; 5) wage and hour misclassification;
20
and 6) rescission-unlawful contract. (Declaration of Lindsay A. Goulding in support of Defendant's
21
ExParte Motion for Leave to File Motion for Summary Judgment that Exceeds 20 Pages ("Goulding
22
Decl. 13.) The Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication will necessarily require a detailed
23
discussion of the nature of Plaintiffs employment relationship with Defendant, the alleged
24
harassment of Plaintiff fi-om 2006 to 2013, as well as the individual defenses applicable thereto.
25
26 (Id.) The circumstances surrounding die allegedly harassing conduct will also require a detailed
27 discussion regarding the nature of the conduct, the timing, and the speakers and recipients of the
28 alleged harassment. (Id.) Further, a lengthy legal analysis will be required to address Plaintiffs
{0241.1952.DOCX} 2
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S EXPARTE FOR
LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT EXCEEDS 20 PAGES
previous settlement agreement with Defendant. (Id.)
In order to address the lengthy facts, legal authority, and legal arguments regarding each of
3 Plaintiffs causes of action. Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of its
4 Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication will need to exceed twenty pages. Therefore,
5 Defendants respectfully request that the court, pursuant to Rules 3.113(e) and 3.1200 et seq. of the
6 Califomia Rules of Court, allow it to submit a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in excess of
7 twenty pages, but not to exceed forty pages. Defendant will make a good faith effort to keep the
8 motion as concise as possible.
9 III.
10 CONCLUSION
11 For the reasons set forth above. Defendant has demonsttated good cause for an expansion
12 of the page limit and move this Court to permit Defendant to submit a memorandum of up to 40
o
o
13 pages in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment.
f- 3 g — VO
i- i/i 00 o
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cC [--•
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vd 15 Dated April 22, 2021 PORTER SCOTT
O ov A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
- j >< 16
o •I "mf- u.<
3 t/i
o 17
in
18 By.
Lindsay A. Goulding
19 Attorneys for Defendant
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
{02413952.DOCX}
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S EXPARTE FOR
LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT EXCEEDS 20 PAGES
Waszczuk V. Regents ofthe University of California, et al
1
Sacramento County Superior Court, Case No. 34-2013-00155479
2
3 PROOF OF SERVICE
4 At the time of service, I was over 18 years of age and not a party to this action. My business
address is 350 University Avenue, Suite 200, Sacramento, Califomia 95825.
5
6 On the date below, I served the following document:
26
27
28 Virginia Yao
{0241.1952.DOCX}
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S EXPARTE FOR
LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT EXCEEDS 20 PAGES
1 P O R T E R I S C O T T
2 A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
Lindsay A. Goulding, SBN 227195
3 Olatomiwa T. Aina, SBN 325566 APR 2 7 2021
350 University Avenue, Suite 200
4 Sacramento, California 95825
TEL: 916.929.1481 Bv: D. JOHNSON-MELLADQ
5 FAX: 916.927.3706 DEPUTY CLERK
6
Attomey for Defendant
7 REGENTS OF THE UNrVERSITY OF CALIFORNL\
8 Exempt From Filing Fees Pursuant io Government Code § 6103
9
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
10
II
JAROSLAW ("JERRY") WASZCZUK, CASENO. 34-2013-00155479
12
o Plaintiff, tJatOPOOflPf^ ORDER ON
o
i i w-i
13 DEFENI^ffiST'S EX PARTE
— VO
00 o
14 APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO
— m
EXTEND PAGE LIMIT FOR
15 THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
. oi < 6
CALIFORNIA, UNIVERSITY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE
« 5; g 16 CALIFORNL\ DAVIS HEALTH SYSTEM, ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY
o ADJUDICATION
17 UC DAVIS MEDICAL CENTER, UC
C a
o
in DAVIS, ANN MADDEN RICE, MIKE
18 BOYD, STEPHEN CHE.COTT, CHARLES
WITCHER, DANESHA NICHOLS, CINDY
19 OROPEZA, BRENT SEIFERT, PATRICK Complaint Filed: December 4, 2013
20 PUTNEY, DORIN DANILIUC, and Does 1 Amended Complaint Filed: June 16, 2014
through 50, inclusive. SAC Filed: September 30, 2014
21
Defendants.
22
23
24 /
Dated:
APR 2 7 2021
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
SHAMA H. MESIWALA
10
11
12
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{02414532.DOCX}
Subject: Subpoena and Application and Order for Appearance and Examination
Case no. 34-2013-00155479, Jaroslaw Waszczuk v. The Regents of the
University of California, Ann Madden Rice, Mike Boyd, Stephen
Chilcott, Charles Witcher, Danesha Nichols, Cindy Oropeza, Brent
Seifert, Patrick Putney, and Dorin Daniliuc
I am requesting that you clarify with the Court why, on April 22, 2021, at
approximately 2:00 P.M., I was served, at my residence in Lodi, CA, the following
Court documents:
-1-
Subpoena and Application and Order for Appearance and Examination
and Trial or Hearing and Declaration Issued to IRINA WASZCZUK
Olatomiwa T. Aina on April 22, 2021. (ATTACHMENT 1)
• APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR APPEARANCE AND
EXAMINATION with Court Hearing Date May 7, 2021 at 9:00 A.M. in
Department 43. (ATTACHMENT 2)
• DECLARATION OF OLATOMIWA T. AINA IN SUPPORT OF
JUDGMENT CREDITOR'S APPLICATION FOR APPEARANCE AND
EXAMINATION OF IRINA WASZCZUK. (ATTACHMENT 3)
The above documents were filed in court and served to me on April 22, 2021 with the
name IRINA WASZCZUK. The person IRINA does not live at 2216 Katzakian Way,
Lodi, CA 95242.
For the above reason alone, I am advising you to properly fill out and resubmit
the documents to the Court. Also, for your information, my legal Polish name is
JANUSZ JAROSŁAW, and my wife’s legal Polish name is IRENA WASZCZUK. We
are both Polish refugees and citizens of the Republic of Poland who have been living
in exile in the USA since November 1982 (ATTACHMENT 4). In 1982, we escaped
communist oppression only to be ruthlessly and endlessly oppressed and harassed by
the National -Socialists at the University of California and their servants from the law
firm Porter Scott Attorneys.
-2-
Subpoena and Application and Order for Appearance and Examination
https://www.scribd.com/document/494446114/Solidarity-Anti-Communist-Movement-
Poland-1980-1982
My wife is not working at Nordstrom since March 2020, because she was laid
off and Nordstrom in Sacramento Arden Mall was permanently closed permanently
shortly after . She was employed for 31 years by Nordstrom as a seamstress-fitter.
My wife and I are both on Medicare Insurance and Social Security. If you need any
documents from Nordstrom, you will have to subpoena them directly from Nordstrom.
https://www.legacy.com/obituaries/sacbee/obituary.aspx?n=nancy-joan-
sheehan&pid=194994093
-3-
Subpoena and Application and Order for Appearance and Examination
Nancy Sheehan’s premature death saddened me because my wife’s sister died a
few years ago of metastatic breast cancer in Poland, and Nancy Sheehan’s e-mail
address on your Declaration reminded me of what my wife Irena was going through
after her sister’s death.
In addition to the wrong addressee name filed on April 22, 2021, the Application
and Order for Appearance and Examination violates the statutory 45 days’ notice
requirement for filing the Application and Order Appearance and Examination.
There are two separate periods to consider when choosing your hearing date:
• Your hearing date must be at least 45 days after the date you file your papers.
• The Judgment Debtor must be served at least 10 days prior to the hearing
date California Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) § 708.110(d).
Accordingly, your Court hearing date (counting 45 days from April 22, 2021) should
be set on Friday, June 11, 2021 due to Orders of Examination currently being heard in
Department 43 on Fridays at 9:00 A.M.
-4-
Subpoena and Application and Order for Appearance and Examination
Not following the statutory notice requirements in filing the Application and
Order for Appearance and Examination will lead to the same result as the filing of
the Application and Order for Appearance and Examination submitted on October
24, 2018 by your predecessor, Daniel Bardzell, who did not comply with the
statutory notice requirements. The Application and Order submitted by Bardzell
was signed by the Judge from Department 37, Hon. Jennifer Blackwell, on
November 7, 2018, and the debtor’s examination had to be rescheduled, which
delayed the legal process (ATTACHMENT 6).
Since Porter Scott Attorneys’ Daniel Bardzell was teamed with Nancy
Sheehan in October 2019, in their pleadings, Porter Scott Attorneys is making
reference to Defendants Mike Boyd, Stephen Chilcott, Danesha Nichols, Cindy
Oropeza, and Brent Seifert as Former Defendants (ROA No.222- 245). I
addressed this issue with the Court in my PLAINTIFF JAROSLAW
WASZCZUK’S NOTICE OF OBJECTION TO THE COURT ORDER DATED
DECEMBER13 & 17, 2019 AND PLAINTIFF REQUEST FOR COURT
ORDERS MODIFCATION – RE: OPPOSITION TO JUDGMENT CREDITORS’
-5-
Subpoena and Application and Order for Appearance and Examination
FURTHER MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
AND MONETARY SANCTIONS filed December 27, 2019 (ROA No. 244)
(ATTACHMENT 7).
Prior to October 23, 2019, Mike Boyd, Stephen Chilcott, Danesha Nichols,
and Cindy Oropeza are Defendants. See Daniel Bardzell’s November 13, 2018
letter to Clerk of the Court (Attachment 6), in which Bardzell requested that
December 14, 2018 Examination of Plaintiff Jaroslaw Waszczuk be taken off
calendar due to a violation of the statutory 45 days’ notice requirement.
One year later, the Defendants Mike Boyd, Stephen Chilcott, Danesha
Nichols, Cindy Oropeza, and Brent Seifert became Former Defendants. Porter
Scott Attorneys have had more than one year since my last Court filing dated
December 27, 2019 to clarify with the Court why Defendants Mike Boyd, Stephen
Chilcott, Danesha Nichols, Cindy Oropeza, and Brent Seifert suddenly became
Former Defendants in October 2019.
CONCLUSION
Legal documents, especially the Application and Order for Appearance and
Examination and the Civil Subpoena (Duces Tecum) for Personal Appearance and
Production of Documents, must be filed properly and with the proper legal name.
Otherwise, they are null and void. Because you are from Louisiana and a newly
licensed attorney by the State Bar of California, I would like to advise you to
familiarize yourself with this case, which has been pending in the Sacramento
County Superior Court since December 2, 2013, before you submit faulty
documents to the Court Clerk and send them to my residence.
-6-
Subpoena and Application and Order for Appearance and Examination
This case is interconnected with the pending United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit whistleblower case Jaroslaw Janusz Waszczuk v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Services Case No.: 20-1407, which I have to attend
to in addition to responding to Porter Scott Attorneys’ negligence and deception.
https://www.scribd.com/document/495490868/Jaroslaw-Waszczuk-v-IRS-
Commissioner-UNITED-STATES-COURT-OF-APPEALS-FOR-THE-
DISTRICT-OF-COLUMBIA-CIRCUIT
As an attorney, you are an officer of the court who took an oath to uphold the
law. I assume you take responsibility as seriously as anyone else; you must adhere to
those rules and even report attorneys or people you see violating the rules. As a State
Bar Member, you are obligated, at the risk of serious consequences imposed by the
State Bar, to protect and preserve the courtrooms and the validity of any matter filed
with the clerk.
My former attorney Douglas Edward Stein (SB #131248) who was coerced
with a $300,000 bribe from former Porter Scott Attorneys Michael Pott, Douglas
Ropel, and David Burkett (Read: White Collar Criminals from the University of
California) to conspire with them against me and was used by them to harm me, was
disbarred by the State Bar for his crimes against me and his other clients
(ATTACHMENT 8).
https://www.scribd.com/document/504977994/20190320-State-Bar-Audit-
Request-for-Review
-7-
Subpoena and Application and Order for Appearance and Examination
https://www.scribd.com/document/504978933/20190329-Request-for-Review-
Additional-Information-and-Documents-Vanessa-Holton-Rachel-Grunberg
https://www.scribd.com/document/504979363/20190409-Request-to-Expedite-
Reimbursement-of-the-Theft-State-Bar-CEO-Leah-T-Wilson
https://www.scribd.com/document/504979845/20190515-Leah-Wilson-State-Bar-
Ceo-Reimbursement
In 2019, I recovered the money stolen from me by Douglas Stein and the
money stolen in 2011 by the University of California gangsters, namely my Short
Term Disability Insurance Benefits. I am still working on recovering the money
stolen from me in 2014, namely my Unemployment Insurance Benefits. However ,
because of the COVID 19 pandemic is not an easy task to deal with state of
federal agencies .
I must attend the court hearing with my wife because her level of English is
insufficient for her to be questioned by lawyers without proper translation and/or
question interpretation.
-8-
Subpoena and Application and Order for Appearance and Examination
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at your
convenience.
Sincerely,
Jaroslaw Waszczuk
-9-
Subpoena and Application and Order for Appearance and Examination
Mailing List
- 10 -
Subpoena and Application and Order for Appearance and Examination
L _
s
£525? V_
gig M 7’ 32 2&7L/ M g‘fwf’fjff AT-138_/E._J-125
ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY: STATE BAR N05 FOR COURT use ONLY
NAME:
Lindsay A. Goulding, SBN 227195
FIRM NAME: Porter Scott
STREET ADDRESS: 350
University Avenue
CITY: Sacramento CA Zip CODE: 95825
STATE:
BRANCH NAME:
PLAINTIFF JAROSLAWWASZCZUK
DEFENDANTREGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITYOF CALIFORNIA, et al.
3. This order may be served by a sheriff, marshal, registered process server, or the following specially appointed person (name):
Date:
JUDGE
This order must be served not less than 10 days before the date set for the examination.
IMPORTANT NOTICES ON REVERSE
‘
1
owes the judgment debtor or the defendant more than $250. An affidavit supporting this application under Code of Civil
Procedure section 491.110 or 708.120 is attached.
6. The person to be examined resides or has a place of business in this county or within 150 miles of the place of examination.
7. I: This court is not the court in which the money judgment is entered or (attachment only) the court that issued the writ of
attachment. An affidavit supporting an application under Code of Civil Procedure section 491.150 or 708.160 is attached.
8. I: Thejudgment debtor has been examined within the past 120 days. An affidavit showing good cause for another examination
is attached.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Date: April 12 2021
}
\
.
ommmiwa T, Aina
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME) (SIGNATURE OF DECLARANT)
l
(Attachment—Enforcement of Judgment)
AT-138/EJ-125
”
Information for Judgment Creditor Regarding Service
'
If you want to be able to ask the court to enforce the order on the judgment debtor or any third party, you
must have a copy of the order personally served on the judgment debtor by a sheriff, marshal, registered
process server, or the person appointed in item 3 of the order at least 10 calendar days before the date of
the hearin and have a roof of service filed with the court.
,
(1) NOTICE TO PERSON SERVED If you fail to appear at the time and place specified in this order,
you may be subject to arrest and punishmentfor contempt of court, and the court may make an
order requiring you to pay the reasonable attorneyfees incurred by the judgmentcreditor in this
proceeding.
(2) NOTICE TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR The person in whose favor the judgmentwas entered in this
action claims that the person to be examined under this order has possession or control of property
that is yours or owes you a debt. This property or debt is as follows (describe the property or debt):
Community property of Plaintiff/JudgmentDebtor
Irina Waszczuk's employmentwages
2000 Mercedes 320
Any and all communityproperty owned by Plaintiff and Irina Waszczuk
If you claim that all or any portion of this property or debt is exempt from enforcement of the money
judgment,you must file your exemption claim in writing with the court and have a copy personally
served on the judgmentcreditor not later than three days before the date set for the examination.
You must appear at the time and place set for the examination to establish your claim of exemption
or your exemption may be waived.
APPEARANCE OF A CORPORATION,PARTNERSHIP,
;
ASSOCIATION,TRUST, OR OTHERORGANIZATION
It is your duty to designate one or more of the following to appear and be examined: officers,
directors, managing agents, or other persons who are familiar with your property and debts.
Request for Accommodations. Assistive listening systems, computer-assisted real—time captioning, or sign
language interpreter services are availableif you ask at least 5 days before your hearing. Contact the clerk’s
office for Request for Accommodation (form MC-410). (Civil Code, § 54.8.)
'
Page2of 2
AT-138lEJ-125[Rev.January1,2017] APPLICATIONAND ORDER FOR
APPEARANCEAND EXAMINATION
(Attachment—Enforcement of Judgment)
‘
MC-025
SHORT TITLE: CASE NUMBER:
_
ATTACHMENT (Number): 2
( This Attachment may be used with any Judicial Council form.)
14. All DOCUMENTS relating to any money or property held in trust for YOU.
15. All DOCUMENTS relating to any money or property held in trust for YOUR spouse.
16. All DOCUMENTS relating to any transfer of over $500 made to or from YOU from October 4, 2015 to
present.
17. All DOCUMENTS relating to any transfer of over $500 made to or from YOUR spouse from October 4,
2015 to present.
18. All DOCUMENTS relating to any COMMUNITY PROPERTY held by YOUR spouse.
21. All DOCUMENTS relating to any payroll stubs indicating earnings from any employment you have
engaged in from 2016 to the present.
(If the item that this Attachment concerns is made under penalty of perjury, all statements in this Page 2 of 2
Attachment are made under penalty of perjury.)
(A dd p ages as required)
.
Fantttfazsfl4529sant“ ATTACHMENT
M0025(Rev. July 1. 20091 to Judicial Council Form
Q
. , e
'
MC-025
SHORT TITLE: CASE NUMBER
_
ATTACHMENT (Number): 2
(This Attachment may be used with any Judicial Council form.)
1. A11 DOCUMENTS sufficient to IDENTIFY YOUR current residence, including but not limited to
DOCUMENTS identifying YOUR ADDRESS, how long YOU have lived there, whether YOU own or rent
the residence, and the amount of YOUR rent or monthly mortgage payment.
All DOCUMENTS relating to any real estate in which YOU have an ownership interest, and any income
2.
YOU derive therefrom, whether directly or indirectly, including but not limited to real property deeds
3. All DOCUMENTS relating to any real estate in which YOUR spouse has an ownership interest, and any
income YOU or YOUR spouse derive therefrom, whether directly or indirectly, including but not limited to
real property deeds.
4. All DOCUMENTS relating to any business entity in which YOU have an ownership interest.
5. All DOCUMENTS relating to any business entity in which YOUR spouse has an ownership interest.
6. All DOCUMENTS relating to any property in which YOU have an ownership interest, including but not
limited to (i) all checking and savings accounts; (ii) jewelry; (iii) motor vehicles or watercraft; (iv) debts or
notes owed by another to YOU; (v) stocks, bonds, and other securities; and (vi) life insurance policies.
7. All DOCUMENTS relating to any property in which YOUR spouse has an ownership interest, including but
not limited to (i) all checking and savings accounts; (ii) jewelry; (iii) motor vehicles or watercraft (including
but not limited to vehicle ownership certificates); (iv) debts or notes owed by another to YOUR spouse; (v)
stocks, bonds, and other securities; and (vi) life insurance policies.
8. All DOCUMENTS relating to any safe or safety deposit box YOU or your spouse own or use and the
contents therein.
9. All federal and state corporate tax returns YOU have filed from 2012 to the present. -
10. All DOCUMENTS relating to any of YOUR property held by third parties. ~
11. All DOCUMENTS relating to any of YOUR spouse's property held by third parties.
12. All DOCUMENTS relating to any benefits YOU have received or currently receive, including by not
limited to any pension, disability compensation, or retirement pay.
13. All DOCUMENTS relating to any vested future interest YOU have in any property or in the payment of
any money.
(If the item that this Attachment concerns is made under penalty of perjury, all statements in this Page 1 of 2
Attachment are made under penalty of perjury.)
(Add pages as required)
‘
APPEARANCES
Nature of Proceeding: Ruling on Submitted Matter (Motion for Automatic Stay) taken under
submission on 10/26/2015
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendants Regents of the University of California, Michael Boyd, Stephen Chilcott, Dorin Daniliuc,
Danehsa Nichols, Cindy Oropeza, Patrick Putney, Ann Madden Rice, Brent Seifert and Charles
Witcher's motion for an automatic stay pursuant to CCP § 916(a), or in the alternative for a discretionary
stay is ruled upon as follows.
In the instant matter, Plaintiff asserts four causes of action against the above ten defendants for IIED,
tortious interference with economic advantage, FEHA harassment and failure to prevent, and
whistleblower retaliation in violation of Government Code §§ 8547 et seq. Plaintiff alleges four additional
causes of action for Violation of Labor Code § 1278.5, breach of contract, wage and hour violations and
rescission against Regents. The Court granted Defendants Boyd, Chilcott, Nichols, Oropez, and
Seifert's ("Dismissed Defendants") anti-SLAPP motion and ultimately entered judgment dismissing them
from the action. Plaintiff has appealed the judgment. Defendants Regents, Rice, Witcher, Putney and
Daniliuc ("Remaining Defendants") remain in the lawsuit on the first four causes of action. Regents
remains on the other four causes of action. Remaining Defendants seek a stay of the action pending the
appeal arguing that the proceedings are subject to an automatic stay pursuant to CCP § 916(a) or
alternatively that a discretionary stay is warranted.
The perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed
from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment
or order, but the trial court may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected
by the judgment or order. Code Civ Proc § 916 (a); see also Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino
(2005) 35 Cal. 4th 180.
To be clear, CCP § 916(a) stays all further trial court proceedings "upon the matters embraced in" or
"affected" by the appeal. "In determining whether a proceeding is embraced in or affected by the
appeal, we must consider the appeal and its possible outcome in relation to the proceeding and its
possible results. '[W]hether a matter is 'embraced' in or 'affected' by a judgment [or order] within the
meaning of [section 916] depends on whether postjudgment [or postorder] proceedings on the matter
would have any effect on the 'effectiveness' of the appeal.'" (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 189 [citations omitted].) "If so, the proceedings are stayed; if not, the
proceedings are permitted." (Id.) "A trial court proceeding also affects the effectiveness of an appeal if
the possible outcomes on an appeal and the actual or possible results of the proceeding are
irreconcilable." (Id. at 190.) "The purpose of the automatic stay rule is 'to protect the appellate court's
jurisdiction by preserving the status quo until the appeal is decided. The rule prevents the trial court
from rendering an appeal futile by altering the appealed judgment or order by conducting other
proceedings that may affect it." (Dowling v. Zimmerman (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1428.)
Here the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff's appeal from the order and judgment following the
Dismissed Defendants' successful anti-SLAPP motion automatically stays the entirety of the
proceedings with respect to the Remaining Defendants who themselves did not bring an anti-SLAPP
motion. No Court has held that an appeal from an order granting, as opposed to denying, an
anti-SLAPP motion divests the trial court of jurisdiction, especially as to matters related to other
defendants. Indeed, Varian held that an appeal from the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion automatically
stayed further trial court proceedings on the merits, but made clear that such an appeal does not stay
proceedings related to causes of action that were not affected by the motion. (Varian, supra, 35 Cal.4th
at 195, fn. 8 ["Such an appeal does not, however, stay proceedings relating to causes of action not
affected by the motion"].)
While it is true that Plaintiff asserted the first four causes of action against the Dismissed Defendants
and the Remaining Defendants based on allegations that each of them participated in a coordinated
campaign of unlawful conduct, only the Dismissed Defendants brought the anti-SLAPP motion.
Remaining Defendants were not parties to that motion. Remaining Defendants cite no authority for the
proposition that an automatic stay is mandated based on an appeal of the granting of other defendants'
anti-SLAPP motion simply because all are named in the same cause of action. Importantly, the conduct
of the Remaining Defendants was not at issue in the anti-SLAPP motion. They fail to articulate how a
possible outcome on appeal (e.g. a reversal of the order granting the anti-SLAPP motion and entering
judgment in the Dismissed Defendants' favor) is irreconcilable with the possible results on the same four
causes of action in these proceedings, specifically given that the conduct of the Remaining Defendants
was not addressed in those motions. Remaining Defendants complain that Plaintiff is a prolific motion
filer and there is a danger that Plaintiff will file numerous motions that will be heard and decided in the
Dismissed Defendants' absence and that if the judgment were reversed the Dismissed Defendants could
be inserted back into a case that may be significantly different. They point to the fact that Plaintiff
apparently intends to seek to file a voluminous Third Amended Complaint. But, speculation aside, this
fails to show how anything that could take place in these proceedings would render the appeal futile or
how the possible results on appeal and in these proceedings are irreconcilable. This is especially true
since Plaintiff has since dismissed Defendants Rice, Witcher, Putney and Daniliuc from the lawsuit and
the Regents is the only one of the five Remaining Defendants left in the action. Remaining Defendants
fail to articulate, for example, how it would be irreconcilable for them to be found liable on Plaintiff's
claims at trial even if the appeal affirmed the anti-SLAPP order and judgment of dismissal as to the
Dismissed Defendants.
In any event, even if it could arguably be said that there was a possibility of irreconcilable results
between the first four causes of action against the Remaining Defendants and the appeal which involved
the first four causes of action against the Dismissed Defendants, there are four other causes of action
asserted against the Regents which were not the subject of the Dismissed Defendant's anti-SLAPP
motion. Those causes of action were not implicated in any way in the anti-SLAPP motion and any
appeal related to the anti-SLAPP motion could not result in a stay of those causes of action. (Varian,
supra, 35 Cal.4th at 195, fn. 8 ["Such an appeal does not, however, stay proceedings relating to causes
of action not affected by the motion"].) Yet, Remaining Defendants seek a stay of the entire action
pursuant to CCP § 916. They did not simply seek a stay of the first four causes of action.
However, the Court does agree that a discretionary stay of the proceedings pending resolution of
Plaintiff's appeal is appropriate. "Trial courts generally have the inherent power to stay proceedings in
the interests of justice and to promote judicial efficiency." (Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo (1995) 33
Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489.) In fact "it may be in the interests of justice to stay a trial until another party's
appeal is decided..." (Id.) This is such a case. Here the Court finds that the interests of justice support
a stay. The Court is mindful of the inefficient use of judicial resources if a stay is not issued, specifically,
in the event the judgment is reversed. Consequently, Plaintiffs would then be entitled to try the matter
again as to those defendants who should have been at the first trial. The potential inefficiencies in this
approach are too numerous to mention. Indeed, the four causes of action that are the subject of the
appeal are also asserted against the Remaining Defendants and the allegations as to all the Defendants
appear factually intertwined and likely would involve much of the same evidence and issues. There is
thus a very real possibility that in the event Dismissed Defendants were returned to this action if the
judgment on appeal is reversed, any motions and/or discovery that were conducted in their absence
would need to be repeated. In addition, while there are four other causes of action asserted against the
Regents which were not the subject of the appeal, those causes of action also likely involve similar
evidence and witnesses and allowing piecemeal litigation would not be in the interests of justice. A stay
would promote judicial efficiency.
Plaintiff's opposition fails to present any persuasive argument against a stay. Rather Plaintiff presents
arguments going to the ultimate merits of the lawsuit and apparently the appeal. Plaintiff also indicates
that he intends to file a third amended complaint in which he intends to eliminate all individual
Defendants and simply leave his two causes of action for breach of contract and violation of Health &
Safety Code § 1278.5. The Court finds that this simply confirms the propriety of a stay under the
circumstances. Indeed, if the action is not stayed and Plaintiff were permitted to file the TAC and the
judgment against the Dismissed Defendants reversed, this could lead to extreme confusion regarding
the status of the case. That is, if the judgment against the Dismissed Defendants on the second
amended complaint is reversed the Dismissed Defendants would be returned to the action. However,
the TAC referred to by Plaintiff appears to no longer include any of the causes of action asserted against
them but Plaintiff is not contending that he has abandoned his appeal. The parties and the Court would
then need to sort out what the operative pleading would be. In the interim, the parties would have
litigated only the two causes of action against the Regents in the TAC and would then have to essentially
begin again with the four causes of action against the Dismissed Defendants. A stay is appropriate in
the interests of justice and to promote judicial efficiency.
As a result, Remaining Defendants' request for a discretionary stay is granted. This action is stayed in
its entirety pending the resolution of Plaintiff's appeal.
Defendants' request for judicial notice is granted.
This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC rule 3.1312 or other notice
is required.
COURT RULING
The matter was argued and submitted. The matter was taken under submission.
Declaration of Mailing
I hereby certify that I am not a party to the within action and that I deposited a copy of this document in
sealed envelopes with first class postage prepaid, addressed to each party or the attorney of record in
the U.S. Mail at 720 Ninth Street, Sacramento, California.
JAROSLAW WASZCZUK
2216 KATZAKIAN WAY
LODI, CA 95242
DOUGLAS L. ROPEL
PORTER SCOTT
350 UNIVERSITY AVE., SUITE 200
SACRAMENTO, CA 95825
7 DRAFT
8
25
I. PREAMBLE & NATURE OF THE CASE
26 A. The shocking facts of this case would continue to frustrate and anger
27 Plaintiff and for sure will surprise the Court and Jury after they learn from Plaintiff’s wrongful
28
28
28
3 California, from June 1999 as a cogeneration power plant operator and associate development
4 engineer. Plaintiff’s employment was wrongfully and without a valid cause terminated by the
5 Defendant in December 2012 after 13 years of service and at the age of 61.
6 22. Besides regular duties at the UC Davis Medical Center, Plaintiff occasionally
7 provided representation or assistance for non-union employees and, on two occasions, for union-
8 represented employees in their complaints filed under the provision of UC Davis Policy PPSM
9 70 and the UC Davis Whistleblowing Retaliation Protection Policy PPM 380-17.
10 23. Plaintiff, in the course of his employment with the UC Davis Medical Center,
11 noticed, observed, and experienced by representing other employees, many publications, and his
12 own experiences that the Defendant created two different climates and images of the University
13 of California campuses.
14 The perfect image of the University of California is the exceptional and
15 outstanding education system that is globally recognized.
16 The Different Image of the University of California
17 24. As early as 2000, a climate and culture existed at the employer’s medical center in
18 Sacramento and its university campus in Davis that subjected staff to a hostile work environment,
19 including but not limited to, sustained abuse, bullying, discrimination, retaliation for
20 whistleblowing, harassment of all kinds, intimidation, favoritism, nepotism, health and safety
21 violations, falsification of documentation, fear of retaliation for reporting misconduct, and research
22 misconduct.
23 25. As early as 2000, the employer published rules, procedures, and policies that
24 express, claim, and state that the employer is committed to a culturally diverse and otherwise
25 lawful and healthy environment. The employer’s rules, procedures, and written material espouse
26 cultural diversity, promotion of a safe workplace, no tolerance for bullying or abuse, no tolerance
27 for exclusion or discrimination, and open disclosure without retribution for reporting report waste,
9 29. The other not-so-perfect image of the University of California that is far less
2 lawsuit filed on behalf of 3,200 female employees that alleged that the controversial ranking
3 system for most of the lab's administrators, clerical staff and technicians was discriminatory, and
that they were working longer hours for less pay
4
34. In July 2004 a $1.3 million settlement has been reached in the discrimination
5
lawsuit filed by former medical intern David Dixon who alleged that he was dismissed from
6
UCLA's family medicine residency program in 1994 because he is black.
7
8
35. A class action lawsuit was brought against Los Alamos National Laboratory,
9
claiming that the University of California, which ran the laboratory from 1943 until 2006,
10 discriminated against women and Hispanics in pay, promotions, and educational opportunities.
11 As part of a settlement reached in mid 2007, a federal judge ordered a $16.4 million payout.
12 36. In 2007 Karen Moe Humphreys, a former Olympic gold medal swimmer who
14 against the university. The suit claimed that Humphreys, who worked at UC Berkeley from 1978
15 until she was laid off in 2004, allegedly lost her job in retaliation for complaining about the
16 treatment of women by the university's athletic department. The university denied Humphreys'
17 allegations. It also denied her claim that her layoff was unlawful, though it did agree to pay more
18 than $3.5 million to settle the gender discrimination lawsuit she brought against them. As part of
19 the agreement, Humphreys will be reinstated and then retire in January 2008 when she reaches
21 37. The imposed penalty $82,500 and proposed imposition of civil penalty in the
22 amount of $220,000 by the U.S. Department of Labor was for the establishment of an
24 Laboratory.
25 38. In September 2005, the U.S. Department of Agriculture charged the university
26 with 61 violations of the Animal Welfare Act. The lawsuit claimed UC San Francisco
27 researchers kept animals in dirty cages and over bred them as well as improperly anesthetized
28
3 39. A lawsuit was filed in 2006 by the Coalition for Limiting University Expansion
4 and later joined by the city of Santa Cruz against the University of California, Santa Cruz. The
5 lawsuit accused the campus and its contractor of violating the federal Clean Water Act by
6 allowing water polluted with sediment to migrate from several construction sites into nearby
7 creeks, ponds and groundwater. In a settlement reached, the city and university agreed to revive a
8 stalled project to reduce sediment runoff into the city's Pogonip park, 640 acres of open space
9 below the campus, and ultimately into the San Lorenzo River. UCSC, under the agreement, will
10 pay $110,000 to restore damaged gullies in the Pogonip, UCSC's building company Devcon
11 Construction will contribute engineering and construction services valued at $40,000, and the
12 city will chip in $90,000.
13 40. Michael Burch worked as a wrestling coach for the University of California Davis
14 from 1995 through 2001. In April 2001, Arezou Mansourian and Chris Ng were removed from
15 the team. Burch publicly supported the two female wrestlers when they filed a claim with the
16 Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights. One month later, Burch was informed that he
17 would no longer be retained. He filed a wrongful termination lawsuit claiming the school failed
18 to renew his contract because of his outspoken support for the two female wrestlers. In 2005, the
19 Supreme Court found that the Title IX law protected whistleblowers from adverse action of
20 employers. Michael Burch will receive $725,000 from the University of California to settle the
21 retaliation lawsuit.
22 41. Further, the U.S. Department of Labor proposed the imposition of a civil penalty
23 in the amount of $159,375 for radiological contamination committed by the University of
24 California-operated Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory;
25 42. Anneliese Yuenger died in 1999 at age 82; her family donated her body to the
26 university's medical school. A month later, Yuenger's ashes were returned to the family in a
27 plastic bag. An investigation revealed the ashes came from miscellaneous body parts burned
28
10 44. In February 2001, the Sacramento News and Review (SN&R) article entitled
11 “Standing Up to Bullies” quoted University of California, Davis, employee Jackie Quigg’s letter
12 she sent to an SN&R editor: “I felt bullied, belittled, discriminated powerless and angry.” Jackie
13 Quigg wrote of her experience of working for 13 years in the Ophthalmology Department at the
14 UC.
15 Plaintiff commented with words from Jackie Quigg’s experience in his
16 letter to an SN&R editor dated: February 10, 2001
17 “ Th e ab u sive b e ha v io r mu st b e witn e sse d an d we ll d oc u me n ted
18 in order for this to work. The other issue is that coworkers may be hesitant to
19 testify in court against an employer, the same employer who provides them a
20 paycheck. The fear of a backlash against those who testify is real.
21
Unfortunately, this great dependency for this paycheck will inhibit justice from
22
ever being served and the employer knows this. The power of employer
23
intimidation with no recourse on the part of the employee is in and of itself, the
24
very foundation for an abusive UC employer-employee work relationship. I
25
would like to ask Ms. Quigg if this situation still exists or was it resolved. I
26
need to know because it is hard to believe that anybody could cope with this
27
abuse and humiliation for 13 years. Is this is a true story?”
28
15 Center is still unresolved and never was investigated. Todd Georlich’s suicide ten years after UC
16 Davis employee Donna McDaniel tragically took her life is the path of destruction chosen by a
19 30. UC San Francisco employee Mary Efferen wrote of her "observations and
20 experiences of faculty-staff interactions that were textbook examples of how to humiliate
21 individuals in front of group.
22 31. The University of California, which has contributed so much to the education and
23 the wealth of the state of California and the global community, is a pathologically dysfunctional
24 institution run by arrogant and ruthless administrators," wrote former UC Davis graduate student
25 Leuren Moret.
26 32. The U.S. Department of Labor imposed a civil penalty in the amount of
27 $1,707,000 by the U.S. Department of Energy for multiple violations of law and federal
28 regulations in the Los Alamos National Laboratory. There was also a $9,350 penalty for violation
18 UC Davis Medical Center under the supervision of UC Davis Vice Chancellor Claire Pomeroy
20 39. In 2011, credit cards embezzlement in the UC Davis Medical Center was
21 uncovered and reported by two UC Davis employees and confirmed by auditor William
Prindible, who conducted an audit. The two employees who reported the credit card
22
embezzlement and 60-year-old auditor, Prindible, were fired from the job and the white-collar
23
UC Davis Medical Center criminals who committed the crime are still being employed by the
24
UC Davis Medical Center. The Prindible’s case ended in a January 2015 settlement in federal
25
court, Plaintiff is unaware of the amount of the sum that was paid to the victimized William
26
Prindible (Federal Court Case No. 2:13-cv-02256-KJM-EFB). On May 30, 2012 ,the University
27
of California administration has unsuccessfully attempted to provoke and kill t Plaintiff or end
28
28
5 46. On October 2, 1989 Plaintiff was hired as a Power Plant Technician by the Power
6 Operating Company (POC) subsidiary of Power System Engineering Company (PSE, Inc.) from
7 Houston, Texas as an Operating Technician of the San Joaquin Cogeneration Power Plant
8 located in Lathrop, CA.
9
47. In 1990 the PSE, Inc. was acquired by the DOW Chemical Company’s subsidiary,
10
Destec Energy, Inc. and later by Dynegy Corporation, which was the competitor of Enron
11
Corporation in electric power generation in the USA.
12
48. The San Joaquin Cogeneration Power Plant was producing 50 MW of electricity
13
per hour and processing water to make high quality steam. The plant is selling electricity to the
14
Pacific Gas and Electric Company by contract and steam to the Auto Glass Manufacturer, Libby
15
Owens Ford, in Lathrop, CA.
16
49. The San Joaquin Cogeneration Power Plant was powered by the LM 5000
17
General Electric aeroderivative gas turbines.
18
19 The aeroderivative gas turbines are used in a variety of applications: - electrical power both for
20 utility baseload and peaking applications in both simple-cycle (gas turbine only) and combined-
21 cycle configurations. Simple-cycle refers to a gas turbine used alone; combined-cycle refers to an
22 application where the exhaust from the gas turbine is used to power a steam turbine to maximize
23 overall system efficiency - in-plant and independent power production and cogeneration (the
24 production of two forms of energy, usually steam and electricity from a single fuel source) in an
25 industrial or institutional facility - mechanical drive requirements, such as compressors, pumps
26 and other loads - marine propulsion of naval and commercial vessels. Industries that use
27 aeroderivative gas turbines include petroleum production, refining and pipeline operations,
28
16 order to be a Qualified Cogenerate. The company management was forcing its own employees to
17 release a huge amount of steam into the atmosphere, which was through the PG&E meter to
18 cheat the PURPA requirements instead of utilizing the thermal energy as was required by law. In
19 1994 the company’s senior management was advised by the San Joaquin Plant Manager to
20 resolve the existing problem with the PURPA violation. In retaliation, the mentioned plant
22 53. In 1989 the former State of California Chief of Department of Standard Labor
23 Enforcement (DLSE) or State of California Labor Commissioner Jose Milan was allowed to
24 govern the wages and working conditions for the San Joaquin cogeneration power plant in
25 Lathrop and other Dynegy’s cogeneration plants in California using the wrong Industrial Welfare
26 Commission Order (IWC), which was IWC order 4-89 O instead of IWC order 1-89; thus 119
27 Dynegy employees were defrauded of a significant amount of overtime, to which they were
28
15 years of 1991-1995.
16 57. After the 401K plan retirement fraud disclosure, Plaintiff asked his supervisor
17 about the unpaid overtime mandated by the Welfare Commission Order IWC 1-89 Part of unpaid
18 overtime shall be contributed to employees’ Retirement and Savings Plan 401K plus the
19 employer match contribution in the ratio dollar to dollar up to six percent of employee’s gross
20 annual income. Plaintiff did not have any intention to pursue the overtime issue but just asked
21 the question.
22 The overtime issue would never have surfaced if Plaintiff’s employer would have posted in the
23 Plant’s control room the IWC order 4-89 instead of IWC order 1-89.
24
58. The San Joaquin Cogeneration Plant Manager panicked and alerted the
25
Headquarters, and then IWC order 1-49 was posted on the information board next to IWC order
26
1-89. Shortly after, Plaintiff’s employer hired the prestigious law firm Pillsbury Madison &
27
Sutro LLP and Plaintiff received a letter from Sutro’s lawyer about the IWC order applicability
28
15 Office overturned his superior’s—the State Labor Commissioner Jose Milan’s—earlier decision
16 to permit Plaintiff’s employer to govern working conditions and pay by IWC order 4-89 instead
17 of IWC 1-89.
18 61. Right after the labor commissioner issued the decision in Plaintiff’s favor,
19 Plaintiff’s employer in retaliation suspended Plaintiff for almost two months without pay and
20 right away appealed the Labor Commissioner Decision in San Joaquin County Superior Court.
21 The Superior Court in Trial de Novo ruled in favor of Plaintiff’s employer.
22 62. Plaintiff appealed the IWC order 1-89 unfavorable the Superior Court Judgment
23 in the State of California Court of Appeal 3th Appellate District by representing himself in Pro
24
Per. The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court Judgment and Plaintiff received his unpaid
25
overtime. The other 119 of Plaintiff’s coworkers recovered partially unpaid overtime through the
26
settlement-agreement that Plaintiff’s employer signed with the Division of Labor Standard
27
Enforcement.
28
16
17 Plaintiff’s Employment with Genentech Inc., from November 1998 to June 1999
18
19 67. After almost one year of unemployment in November 1998, Plaintiff was hired as
20 Utility Operator by Genentech, Inc. located in the City of South San Francisco.
21 68. Genentech, Inc. was the best employer Plaintiff ever worked for in the United
22 States, taking into consideration benefits and treatment of employees by company management.
23 69. The almost 100 miles distance to Plaintiff’s residence in Lodi to South San
24
Francisco and Plaintiff’s wife’s employment in Nordstrom Inc., Sacramento were deciding
25
factors that led Plaintiff to apply for the Cogeneration Plant Operator position with the UC Davis
26
Medical Center in Sacramento, which was only 32 miles away from Lodi, CA.
27
70. Also the Cogeneration Plant Operator position was a factor to apply for the job
28
4 Plaintiff’s Job Description and Employment in UC Davis Medical Center Cogeneration Power
Plant Named “Central Plant “
5
7
71. Defendant hired Plaintiff on June 28, 1999 as a non-exempt senior power
8 plant mechanic or cogeneration power plant operator (hereinafter “plant operator”) to maintain
9 and operate the newly built, state-of-the-art 27 megawatt cogeneration power plant at UC Davis
11 72. Besides operating and maintaining the cogeneration facility, Plaintiff was
12 responsible for monitoring and dispatching critical alarms on the day shift at the UC Davis
13 Medical Center via the computerized Metasys system, which was also programmed to
14 continuously monitor and record how much electricity, steam, hot water, and chilled water was
15 being generated by the central plant. The Metasys system was also designed to start up and shut
16 down heating and air conditioning equipment (HVAC), as well as to adjust temperatures in the
17
administration and hospital patients’ rooms per request from working personnel at the UC Davis
18
Medical Center.
19
73. The UC Davis Medical Center’s cogeneration power plant, named the
20
“Central Plant,” includes a General Electric LM 2500—a 23 MW jet combustion gas turbine; a
21
heat recovery steam generator (HRSG)—a 4 MW back pressure steam turbine with capacity to
22
produce 89,000,00 pounds of steam per hour; four auxiliary steam boilers with 25,000-pound-
23
per-hour capacities for steam from each boiler; three centrifugal chillers; and three absorption
24
chillers that can produce 13,400 tons of chilled water per hour. The Central Plant also has five 2-
25
MW emergency diesel generators and other auxiliary heavy industrial-type machinery, including
26
27 a cooling tower, pumps, an ammonia injection system, a water demineralizer, a condenser, and a
28 chemical-injecting system.
15 subject to these reporting requirements. Facilities that emit 25,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide
16 or its equivalent (MTCO2e) are required to report their annual emissions to the USEPA, and both
17 the Davis and Sacramento campuses have facilities that emit over 25,000 MTCO2e.
18 78. The 10 MW of electricity not produced and not sold during the summer
19 peak equals millions of dollars of lost revenue over 17 years of the Central Plant’s operations.
20 However if 10 MW extra of electricity was produced and was sold during the summer than
21 peak equals millions of dollars in extra revenue over 17 years of the Central Plant’s operations ;
22 79. Prior to building the cogeneration plant, the UC Davis Medical Center
23 Campus sourced electricity from the local publically owned utility, Sacramento Municipal Utility
24
District (SMUD). The oversized cogeneration plant right before energy deregulation in California,
25
and during that turbulent period, the UC Davis Medical Center took advantage of the opportunity to
26
generate and sell power to SMUD. When the power market deregulation took place cogeneration
27
facility was selling power at for the on the open market for higher bid via California Independent
28
10
80. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Public
11
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) mandate that any cogeneration facility
12
certified and recognized by law as “the qualified cogeneration facility” must meet special
13
requirements in the ratio between electric energy production and thermal energy production.
14
A cogeneration facility is a generating facility that:
15
“sequentially produces electricity and another form of useful thermal energy
16
(such as heat or steam) in a way that is more efficient than the separate
17
production of both forms of energy. For example, in addition to the production
18
22 facilities might provide hot water for domestic heating or other useful
15 employer against Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Plaintiff’s previous employer was very
16 safety oriented and strictly enforced safety rules. It had outstanding safety rules and safety
17 training for employees. Plaintiff was hazmat certified and a first responder, and knew CPR.
18 Plaintiff had no problem adapting to UC Davis Medical Center, where safety rules and
19 regulations were disregarded and ignored by management and safety trainings were unknown
20 and viewed as unnecessary burdens and hassles.
21 84. UC Davis Medical Center’s state-of-the-art cogeneration facility, which
22 cost $70 million to build, was commissioned with many serious safety problems and hazards,
23 endangering working personnel and raising Plaintiff’s concern about his safety and that of his
24
coworkers, many of whom had little or no working experiences in power plant environments.
25
The State of California Law and International Law which Classified Cogeneration Power
26 Plants as a Manufacture and Industrial Facility
27 85. By State of California Industrial Welfare Commission Order #1, all power
28
18 to previous lines, with the relevant formulas shown. You must respond to all of
20
UC Davis Health System Executive Director Stephen Chilcott’s salary was increased from
22 94. UC Davis Medical Center Plant Operation and Maintenance Manager Charles
23 Witcher, who is responsible for maintenance and operation of the cogeneration plant by his title
24 and position, received $64,000.00 in salary increase from his promotion to this position in 2007
25 to 2014. (Charles Witcher has a high school education only and has no qualification for this
26 position.)
27 95. UC Davis Medical Center Plant Operation and Maintenance Manager Charles
28
16 98. Contrary to the UC Davis Medical Center, Central Plant, the UC San Diego
17 Cogeneration Plant, which is owned and operated by the Defendant (like the UC Davis Medical
18 Center Central), has no problem selling surplus energy on the spot market. The UC San Diego
19
Cogeneration Plant filed self-certification with FERC on May 24, 2000 according to FERC’s
20
Docket No. QF 00-63-001.
21
99. In addition to the above, the UC San Diego Cogeneration Qualified
22
Facility in 2010 received a $2 million grant from the U.S. Department of Energy and installed
23
the world’s first microgrid master controller and related optimizer application. The Smart Grid
24
25 functions as a virtual power plant, scheduling energy self-generation, electricity imports, and
26 electric and thermal storage while factoring in the demand load and the variable price of
27
electricity to buy or sell.
28
9 energy sources.
11 Practices, the UC became a registered Electric Service Provider (ESP). As an ESP, the university
12 is able to self-supply electricity to its direct-access accounts. The self-supply electricity began
13 being generated in 2015. The 2014 UC Report of Sustainable Practices is, for the most part,
14 misleading and fraudulent in regard to green-gas emission on the campuses, especially the UC
15 Berkeley campus, and it is related to the operation of the cogeneration facility not owned or
17 103. The question is as follows: Why is the Defendant, who registered as an ESP,
18 unable to operate the UC Davis Medical, Center Plant at full capacity and provide the energy to
19 other UC campuses, especially the UC Davis campus, or sell the energy on the spot market via
20 ISO?
21 104. Instead of hunting down the Plaintiff like an animal since 2006 for no reason
22 with a criminally minded attempt to assassinate the Plaintiff on May 31, 2012 and destroy the
23 Plaintiff’s life and his livelihood, the Defendant should take care of business and get a contract
24 for the sale of power from the UC Davis Medical Center, Central Plant. The Defendant should
25
also take care of those who attacked Plaintiff and misinformed the Defendant for the own
26
personal financial gain that Plaintiff will harm University business in relation to the UC Davis
27
28
7 was commissioned in 1998 as a state- of-the-art facility, but for some reason was unfinished. As
8 a result, Central Plant equipment was unsafe to operate and posed life-threatening danger to
9 personnel. A power plant’s working environment is dangerous by nature, and if safety rules and
10 regulations are not followed, it will lead to disastrous consequences. Plaintiff came to Central
11 Plant from a very safety-oriented company and was shocked when, in 2000, Central Plant’s
12 manager said in front of other employees, “Somebody give this Polack a bad evaluation and
13 fire him,” after Plaintiff suggested some safety improvements. Plaintiff’s coworker Eduardo
14 Espinosa was so terrified by the Central Plant manager’s statement that he wrote a letter to UC
15 Vice President Judith Boyette and complained than quit his job. A Cal/OSHA intervention was
16 needed to convince the UCDMC Plant Operation and Maintenance (PO&M) Department
17 Management to improve the safety and fix some problems with unsafe equipment that should
18 have been fixed without Cal/OSHA intervention.
19 106. The arrogance of the PO&M Department Management was unbelievable
20 and unacceptable. The Cal/OSHA intervention fixed some minor problems, but major safety
21 problems in Central Plant went unnoticed or deliberately ignored by the Cal/OSHA inspector,
22 and there is not any record that Central Plant personnel were interviewed. The most dangerous
23 place was the oily cement floor underneath the cooling tower, which drained oil to the
24 Sacramento River via storm drain, but was unnoticed by the inspecting Cal/OSHA personnel.
25 Coincidently, when the Cal/OSHA inspection took place, Plaintiff was on his days off from
26 work.
27 107. In 2000, Plaintiff wrote in his Brief to Cal/OSHA:
28
5 and direct supervisor to correct some problems with safety in the plant.”
7 “The UCDMC like the other divisions of the UC System enjoys liberty and independence from
8 the State of California legislature and state agencies which enforcing wages and working
9 condition in private sector. This status was affirmed not only by the Government Codes but also
10 on many occasions by the Appellate Courts of the State of California. It is great that students and
11 professors, researchers and scientists have such unrestricted autonomy to freely work for the
12 good of people. The University of California has great prestige in this State as well in the nation.
13
However, it looks like the ordinary workers in this entity who provides services every day for
14
these great researchers, professors, students, and scientists keep them warm at winter time and
15
cool at summer time, these who keep this whole system running without failure have been
16
somehow forgotten and they are object of abuse, discrimination as well are being exposed to
17
unsafe working environment which is a subject of this response. It is unknown for me why the
18
workers are being treated this way in this high education prestigious school. I was very
19
concerned and worried seeing supervisors’ memos where he was calling his subordinates damn
20
or stupid or threatening others to fire them on spot in the place where employment is not at will.
21
Intimidation, ignorance, negligence, threats, power trip, unprofessional remarks toward
22
23 subordinates, lack of personal culture of the superiors replaced common sense, proper training,
24 normal working environment and human dignity and rights. The safety rules and laws were
25 replaced by intimidation, letters of warning, and suspension from work. Where is this
27 109. Also, in 2000, four workers from the UCDMC Access Unit were
28 suspended for circulating a petition asking to discuss items related to workload, safety,
3 to work. Plaintiff was also asked to help these workers in regard to the despicable UCDMC
4 Management retaliation.
5 110. After Cal/OSHA issued the citation for negligence and safety violations in
6 the plant, UC Davis Plant Operation and Maintenance Department (PO&M) Manager Toni
7 Moddessette demoted Cogeneration Plant Superintendent Tom Kavanauch and replaced him
8 with Dan James, who was brought to the plant from the UC San Francisco Medical Center. The
9 situation in the plant changed for the better up until the present, but it has changed quickly for
10 the worse due to current plant manager Steve McGrath’s group of colleagues who came from his
11 previous plant near Jackson, CA. Two Central Plant operators, William Buckans and Rick
12 Tunello, became the target of constant harassment and were bullied by newly hired individuals
13 from the Jackson area. Shortly after they were hired, plant manager Dane James was coerced by
14 these individuals from Jackson to join them in attacks against Rick Tunello and William
15 Buckans. For some reason, these folks did not like Rick Tunello and William Buckans and were
16 pitting the Plant manager against them; trying to convince Dan James to fire Tunello and
17 Buckans.
18
111. In August 2003, Plaintiff’s coworker, Mike Murphy (who quit job in 2005), and
19 Plaintiff, received from the central plant maintenance supervisor Tom Kavanaugh a Preventive
20 Maintenance Work Order that required us to pressure wash all dirt and oil underneath the
21 Cooling Tower. We refused to pressure wash the oil to the storm drain. We took pictures using
22 Mike Murphy’s Sony Digital Camera and we told Tom Kavanaugh that we did not pressure wash
23 the oil to the storm drain. Several times Plaintiff approached an employee from the UC Davis
24 Medical Center’s Environmental Health and Safety Department (EH&S) who was visiting the
25 Central Plant frequently to sign Hazardous Work Permits (after a long time Plaintiff forgot his
26 name). The EH&S employee was not very anxious to discuss the oil problem under the Cooling
27 Tower and his response was, “Well if we get caught than we pay the price.”
28
3 112. Some of the worst safety problems and environmental hazards in the
4 UCDMC state-of-the-art Central Plant were twenty-two (22) defective-by-design cooling tower
5 gearboxes.
6 113.. The defective cooling tower gearboxes were massively leaking machine
7 oil underneath the cooling tower and creating serious safety problems for the personnel working
8 underneath the cooling tower; in addition, the leaking machine oil created an enormous
9 environmental hazard. Every week, as usual, the Central Plant maintenance supervisor issued a
10 preventive maintenance work order to refill the cooling tower’s leaking gearboxes. The machine
11 leaked approximately 10 gallons of oil per week for seven (7) years, and the cooling tower floor
12 was washed out with water to the storm drain (river) or to the soil around the cooling tower when
13 the new cooling tower was under construction. Once a month or every three months, the Central
14 Plant maintenance supervisor (the same supervisor who said to Plaintiff that “Somebody
15 [should] give this Polack a bad evaluation and fire him”) also issued a preventive
16 maintenance work order to use a pressure washer to wash out the covered-by-oil gearboxes and
17 cooling tower underneath the floor and discharge everything to the City of Sacramento storm
19
114. It would cost $5,000/unit to replace the defective units, according to the
20 whistleblowing investigation report which copy of Plaintiff received in 2007 from UC Davis
21 Public Record Act Office. It was merely $110,000 and only 1/3 of the annual salary of UC
22 Davis Associate Vice Chancellor Shelton Duraisseau Ph.D whose idea was to build the 70
24 urgent safety and environment problem was a dilution, covering up the criminal activities and
25 retaliating against anybody who mentioned this problem. This safety and environment hazard
26 also created unbelievable hostility and an intolerable working environment. The working
27 environment of the Central Plant became very hostile and violent after the present Central Plant
28 manager brought a group of employees from his previous plant near Jackson, CA. The manager
15 cooling tower fans, and Buckans fell on the cement floor because of the oily and slippery surface
16 underneath the cooling tower. As a result of this accident, Buckans was taken by ambulance to
17 the UCDMC emergency room with severe back pain. The accident was reported to the Central
18 Plant manager. However, the accident did not encourage management to take care of oil leaks
19 underneath the cooling tower, and every day, Central Plant operators were risking injury under
20 the cooling tower due to the daily routine duty of checking the oil level in leaking oil gear boxes
22 After the above-mentioned accident, William Buckans asked plant managers and the
23 maintenance superintendent to apply a nonskid material to the work area where Buckans was
24 injured to prevent another—perhaps more serious—accident and injury. Buckans was absolutely
25 devastated when both supervisors said no to his request. It was unspeakable and unbelievable
26 that his superiors would force their subordinates to work in an extremely unsafe environment
27 without any hesitation. Beside his accident, three other workers got hurt working under the
28 cooling tower. The Central Plant manager, instead of taking care of safety problems, notoriously
15 The Whistleblowing Complaint with UC Davis Vice Chancellor Office UC Davis Policy &
16 Procedure Section 380-17, August 2005
17 117. In August 2005, Plaintiff’s coworker William Buckans asked Plaintiff help
18
him with a Whistleblowing Complaint in regard to safety and environmental hazard caused by
19
leaking machine oil in the cooling tower gear boxes pursuant to UC Davis Policy and Procedure
20
Section 380-17. Plaintiff helped Buckans to write a letter to University of California Human
21
Resources Vice President Judith Boyette, which was sent on August 7, 2005, with the actual
22
whistleblower complaint and some evidence.
23
24 118. The UC Davis Management quickly made determination that Plaintiff was
25 helping his coworker William Buckans with his whistleblowing complaint. In an August 7, 2005
26 Improper Activities Report cover letter submitted to the University of California Human
27 resources Vice –President Judith Boyette, William Buckans made reference to UC Vice
28 President Judith Boyette’s employment with a Sutro Madison law firm of which Plaintiff was
9 work for three months. When Plaintiff was ready to come back to the plant after a few
10 months of illness, the plant manager Dan James was trying to block Plaintiff’s return under
11 the false pretenses that Plaintiff did not provide him or the main office with the requested
12 FEMLA documents for his short disability. When Plaintiff provided him with proof that
13 Plaintiff had provided all documents to the plant manager and to the main office, Plaintiff
14 was told that the documents were lost and that he needed to provide new documents signed
15 by a physician.
16 124. In March 2006, Plaintiff was neither aware nor imagined that the attempt of the
17 plant manager, Dan James, to block Plaintiff’s return to the plant after short-term disability
18
related to Plaintiff’s open heart surgery was a broader preemptive move. The Defendant’ action
19
against Plaintiff to remove Plaintiff from the central plant or fire Plaintiff from the job was for a
20
completely different reason than Plaintiff thought for many years thereafter. Plaintiff believed
21
22 that helping his coworker, William Buckans, with his whistle-blowing complaint about the
23 Defendant’ misconduct in unlawfully discharging machine oil into the Scaramanto River via a
24
city storm drain for seven years was the was the main reason why the Defendant sought to
25
remove Plaintiff from the central plant in an attempt to terminate Plaintiff’s employment.
26
125. In March 2006, it was most likely that Plant Manager Dan James did not know the
27
28 real reason why he was ordered to attack Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s coworker, Buckans.
2 the Defendant would carry out ill and despicable plan and abruptly remove Plaintiff from the
3 central plant and reassign him to a different shop with threats of termination of employment
4
although he was the most experienced power plant operator.
5
127. Plaintiff does not remember exactly how this ended, but after Plaintiff came back
6
7 to work after short term disability than he then learned that his coworker William Buckans had
8 become a target of physical threats by other employees from Jackson 5 group. The situation in
9 the plant became so volatile that every morning’s operational meeting was like a war zone. One
10
of the Jackson 5 employees, Steve McGrath, was promoted to Central Plant maintenance
11
supervisor, which emboldened the Jackson group of employees to attack Plaintiff, William
12
13 Buckans and rick Tunello during the shift-turnover morning meetings. In September 2006.
14 Plaintiff coworker Rick Tunello was wrongly accused of missing a medical freezer alarm and
15
was served with unjustified suspension without pay. Plaintiff quickly found out that Rick Tunello
16
was groundlessly accused and was able to help Rick reverse the suspension decision, but Rick
17
Tunello was so fed up with being endlessly harassed and bullied by Jackson 5 group and plant
18
19 manager that he quit the job. This fact that Plaintiff helped Tunello turned the Plant Manager
20 and his Jackson allies entirely against Plaintiff , and they were furious that Plaintiff defended
21
Rick Tunello, whom they hated so badly and wanted fired him for reasons that were undescribed
22
and not understandable to Plaintiff and others workers.. They just hated him. Plaintiff’s loud and
23
24 clear complaint finally forced the Central Plant manager to advise his allies to stop attacks
25 against Plaintiff and Buckans. William Buckans was fed up with the attacks and in September
26 2006 reported the Central Plant manager Dan James for entertaining himself by viewing porn in
27
his cubicle on company time not knowing that reporting Dan James did not make any
28
2 brought him to Central Plant. The two high school educated individuals Charles Witcher and
3 Steve McGrath were already on the Stephen Chilcott’s and Director Robert Taylor’s list as a
4
replacements for Tony Moddessette’s and Dan James’ positions. .
5
7
128. The Human Resources attorney Stephen Chilcott, who was deployed to
8
UC Davis Medical in 2005 to carry out Defendant plan to remove Plaintiff and William
9
Buckans from the Plant conducted the investigation of Central Plant manager Dan James porn
10
activities in his cubicle on company time.
11
129. Shortly after the porn activities complaint was lodged against the central
12
plant manager, Plant Operation and Maintenance (PO&M) Department Manager Tony
13
Moddessette became a scapegoat and was forced to resign and Charles Witcher was assigned as
14
the interim PO&M department manager. The difference between Moddessette and Witcher was
15
16 education. Moddessette had an MBA and Witcher, who was high school educated, could not
17 write a simple memo without help from HR or his secretary, but was willing to do harm to others
18 without asking questions. Also, Witcher was no challenge for Director Robert Taylor. Plaintiff
19 believes that Moddessette refused to participate in hunting down Plaintiff and Buckans right after
20 Buckans filed his whistleblowing complaint in August 2005 and that this also was one of the
21 reasons why he had to end his employment with the UC Davis Medical Center.
22
23 The December 2006-March 2007 “WITCH HUNT” Aimed At Plaintiff and William Buckans
24
130. On November 26, 2006, Stephen Chilcott sent an e-mail to William
25
Buckans entitled “Hostile Work Environment” and informed Buckans that he had concluded
26
investigation without any information about the findings. On December 4, 2006, just eight days
27
after Stephen Chilcott concluded his investigation, the especially assigned “witch hunter” from
28
15 Chilcott and other attackers. Even Plant Manager Dan James and Plant Superintendent Tom
16 Kavanaugh refrained themselves from attacking Plaintiff and Buckans during the orchestrated
17 Kangaroo Court pseudo-investigation conducted by assigned witch hunter Bettye Andreos from
18 the UCDMC Equal Opportunity Committee. The fabricated accusations were based on the
19 supposed statements taken from fraudulently hired employees, nicknamed the Jackson 5.
20 Plaintiff walked out of the second interview conducted by a appointed Communist “Stalin-type”
21 prosecutor and judge Bettye Andreos, who had no clue what she is doing but was instructed to
22 prosecute Plaintiff and Buckans and end their employment with UC Davis Medical Center.
23 Plaintiff expressed his feelings about Bettie Andresos’ interrogation skills very loudly on his way
24
out from the Pathology Building on February 27, 2007. Also, he expressed his view about this
25
investigation about physical threats toward William Buckans during a meeting with HR Labor
26
Relations Supervisor Mike Garcia.
27
The March 8, 2007 “Investigation Report
28
16 consistently uses hate and biased-based comments when engaged with co-
17 workers. There is no evidence that I was able to obtain that indicates Central
18 Plant management was assertive in addressing the issue of hate and biased-
22
135. As a result of reporting safety hazards and seven years of unlawful
23
massive machine oil discharge to the Sacramento River via city storm drain from the UC Davis
24
Medical Center Central Plant, on March 22, 2007, William Buckans received a Letter of
25
26 Expectation.
27 136. The Letter of Expectation Buckans received was made up out of the blue,
28 and the Letter of Suspension and Notice of Reassignment was the shorter version of the March 8,
15 Center .
16 139. For his successful mission in 2007 to remove Plaintiff from the Central Plant,
17 Chilcott was promoted to USCDHS HR labor relations supervisor; in 2008 Chilcott replaced
18 USDHS HR Labor Relation Manager Michael Sheesley and, at the end of 2009, Chilcott
26 The Retaliatory Unlawful Suspension and Reassignment to the UC Davis Medical Center
HVAC Shop
27
28
15 administration.
16 144. The scenario of attacking employees with this manifesto is simple. The
17 “accusation of racism, bigotry, violence”; then, Policy 1616 and Policy 380-15; then, the witch
18 hunt began with a witch hunter assigned by UC Davis administration executives . In charge of
19 In the event this intended action is taken, you will have the right to request
20 review of the action under Personnel Policies for Staff Members 70,
21 Complaint Resolution. If you wish to request review of the final action, you
22 must do so in writing as explained in the above policy, using the appropriate
23 complaint form. Your written request for review must be received in the
24
Employee & Labor Relations Office no later than 30 calendar days from the
25
date of the letter of suspension.”
26
147. Director Robert Taylor was one of the individuals who carry out
27
retaliation against Plaintiff and Buckans in December 2006 –March 2007. . On March 30, 2007,
28
7 The 2007 Complaint - Step I and Step II under the UC Davis Personnel Policies for
Staff Members PPSM 70,
8
10 148. The University of California Personnel Policies for Staff Members PPSM
11 70, Complaint Resolution, or Administrative Remedies are main subject in the Palmer v.
12 Regents of the University of California, 107 Cal.App.4th 899, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 (Cal.App.
13 Dist.2 04/08/2003) and Janet Campbell v. Regents of the University of California (Supra
14 S113275).
15 149. On April 19, 2007, Plaintiff filed Step I Complaint under PPSM 70 from
16 Witcher’s and Taylor’s decisions. Again, Director Robert Taylor was assigned as the Reviewer
17
for the Step I Complaint under PPSM 70 and denied Plaintiff’s Step I Complaint on May 10,
18
2007.
19
150. On April 20, 2007, after one month of administrative leave Plaintiff
20
reported himself to UCDMC Plumbing/HVAC Shop per Charles Witcher’s April 16, 2007,
21
Letter of Suspension and Notice of Reassignment. Plaintiff in HVAC shop was assign to monitor
22
and dispatch critical alarms on the day shift in UC Davis Medical Center via the computer
23
Metasys System. The Plumbing/HVAC shop Manager was Patrick Putney with Senior
24
Development Engineer and Shop supervisor was Dorin Daniliuc.
25
UCDMC Plant Operation & Maintenance Interim Manager Charles Witcher in his March 23,
26
27
2007
14
oppressive employment practices,*fn2 evaluations serve the important
18 vehicle for informing the employee of what management expects, how the
19 employee measures up, and what he or she needs to do to obtain wage
20 increases, promotions or other recognition. Thus, the primary recipient and
21 beneficiary of the communication is the employee.”
22
153. Plaintiff 2006/2007 Evaluation stated:
23
8
Jerry was very instrumental in the setup of the computer and office area for the
9
Building Automation Monitoring. He has shown a strong knowledge of
10
computer software and hardware. He has been able to solve many computer
11
problems and install software programs when needed.
12
13
His overall job performance is outstanding. He is always willing to accept
14
extra work and is very dependable.”
15
16
The Annual Employee Evaluation period in UC Davis is from July 1 to June 30 next year and
17
had three grade levels: “Exceeds Expectation,” “Meets Expectation,” “Does Not Meet
18
Expectation.” Meets Expectation it was what an employee gets because of pay raises related to
19
evaluations. Plaintiff also received his normal wage increase due to receiving “Meets
20
Expectation” annual review.
21
After several time extensions and unsuccessful attempts to mediate the conflict through the HR
22
Mediation Office, on August 31, 2007, Plaintiff submitted to HR a Labor Relation Step II Appeal
23
from Director Taylor I Step Decision HR Case No: 03-PPS-013-06107. According to the UC
24
PPSM 70-Step II Review by Complaint Resolution Officer, the Complaint Resolution Officer
25
26 must convene a Step II meeting within 20 calendar days of the appeal to Step II. According to
27 HR Labor Relation Supervisor Mike Garcia, HR had an enormous problem finding anyone to act
28 as Complaint Resolution Officer to conduct a Step II hearing, which was required to include an
4
154. On November 13, 2007, HR Labor Relation Supervisor Mike Garcia
5
assigned UCDMC Director Mike Boyd as Step II Compliant Resolution Officer (CRO) to hear
6
Plaintiff’s case of unlawful suspension and reassignment. Mike Garcia wrote in his letter to Mike
7
Boyd who was listed in FAC and SAC as an individual Defendant.
8
“The Office of Labor Relations received the enclosed complaint filed in
9
10
accordance with Personnel Policies for Staff Members (PPSM), Complaint
11 Resolution 70 (CR 70). Jaroslaw Plaintiff’s complaint was reviewed at the Step
13 Taylor. Jaroslaw Plaintiff was not satisfied with the Step I Response and has
14 filed a timely appeal to Step II. “In accordance with CR 70 and UCD
15 Procedure 70.2, you have been appointed as the Complaint Resolution Officer
16 (CRO) for the Step II review of the above referenced matter. In accordance
17 with CR 70 and UCD Procedure 70.2, you have been appointed as the
18 Complaint Resolution Officer (CRO) for the Step II review of the above
19 referenced matter. As the CRO, you are charged with convening a Step Il
20
meeting. Please convene a Step II meeting on or before December 3, 2007.”
21
22 155. Mike Boyd in the period of 1998 to 2014 held the title of UC Davis
23 Medical Center Executive Director, Facilities Planning, Design and Construction. By his duty, he
24 was directly involved in construction of the Central Plant, commissioned in 1998. Director Boyd
25 is solely responsible, together with colleague UCDMC Director Robert Taylor, Director Shelton
26 Duruisseau PhD, UCDMC Plant Operation and Maintenance (PO&M) Manager and Defendant
27 Charles Witcher, and UCDMC PO&M Principal Engineer Mike Lewis for unlawful—under state
28
21 money from contractors. Dennis Curry was Plaintiff’s superior from 2007 to 2012.
23 (Defendant in this case), who operated his private HVAC business and his church business on
24 university time, disclosed to Plaintiff that he was given his supervisor position in UCDMC
25 HVAC shop by UCDMC Director Robert Taylor and Director Shelton Duruisseau Ph .D in
26 exchange for installing and maintaining heating and air-conditioning equipment in their private
27 residences. It was reported to UC Davis Chief Compliance Officer Wendy Delmendo in July
28
17 Connie Melendy, Assistant Vice Provost from the UC Davis Academic Personnel Offices
19 162. The coordinator on the UC Davis Medical Center site was the newly
20 promoted HR Labor Relation Manager and attorney at law listed defendant in FAC and SAC
15 of business and bring the revenue back, regardless of the fact that the UC Davis Central Plant
17 165. To prepare himself for the arbitration hearing, Plaintiff reviewed the
18 University of California and UC Davis policies and was trying to find the University of
19 California policy that could allow management to remove and reassign an employee to the
20 different shop against that employee’s will and as a disciplinary measure.
21 166. The Personnel Policies for Staff Members (PPSM) 62 Corrective Action
22 Policy had no such option.
23 167. Plaintiff found only the Principles of Reassignment for the UC Davis
24
Medical Center on the UC Davis Website, which had nothing to do with disciplining employees,
25
but forgot to present it during the arbitration.
26
168. Plaintiff submitted by e-mail the mentioned UCDMC Principles of
27
Reassignment to Hearing Officer Ms. Connie Melendy on November 9, 2008.
28
15 desires.”
16 171. The Step III –Arbitration decision did not leave any doubt for Plaintiff that the
17 assigned University Hearing Officer would rule against Plaintiff if Plaintiff had not, by pure luck,
18 found the UC Davis Principles of Reassignment and sent it to Ms. Connie Melendy after the
19 Arbitration hearing. UC Arbitrator had no choice but to rule against the University and order the
20 University to let Plaintiff return to the central plant. To justify her decision against the University
21 and in favor of Plaintiff, Ms. Melendy, on pages 9 and 10 of her decision, explained in detail the
22 UC Davis Personnel Policies for Staff Members (PPSM) 62. Corrective Action —
23 Professional and Support Staff. These policies were well known prior to the arbitration for
24
witch hunter Bettye Andreos, Charles Witcher, Director Shelton Duruisseau, Director
25
Robert Taylor and Director Steven Chilcott, who hunted down Plaintiff and his coworker
26
William Buckans, and caused Plaintiff enormous humiliation, stress, anxiety, fear of losing
27
his employment and financial loss.
28
16 “Jerry can be counted on to make the right operational decisions regarding the
17 plant, and to keep his supervisor informed of the operational status of the plant
19 success of the Medical Center.” (Performance reviews from 2000, 2001, 2003,
20 2004, 2005, 2006)
21 There are no comments regarding threatening behavior or inappropriate
22 language in any of the annual evaluations from the time of Mr. Waszczuk’s
23 first evaluation in 2000 and including the 2006 evaluation that was written
24
prior to the suspension and reassignment. The University presented no
25
evidence to show that there were verbal or written discussions or performance
26
appraisals intended to caution or warn Mr. Waszczuk about inappropriate
27
behavior prior to the October 2007 evaluation (University Exhibit 13), which is
28
10 The Settlement –Agreement with the Regents of the University of California, Signed in
February 2009
11
12
172. After prevailing in the arbitration process, Plaintiff did not go back to the Central
13
Plant where his position was already replaced and where a group of employees from the Jackson
14
area who were hired fraudulently were helping Directors Shelton Durrisuseau, Robert Taylor,
15
Mike Boyd, and Charles Witcher to hunt down Plaintiff and William Buckans, which did not
16
18 173. Further, UC Davis assigned arbitrator Connie Melendy; in her 2008 decision,
19 besides the slanderous and untrue accusation aimed at Plaintiff, she suggested and strongly advised
20 Plaintiff to consider very thoughtfully and seriously, whether the environment of the
21 HVAC/Plumbing Shop, with its current supervisor and colleagues, would be more conducive to
22 Plaintiff’s future success. Under the best of circumstances, it is difficult to return to a worksite
23 where there is “animosity,” as Connie Melendy described, instead referring to it as a hostile work
24 environment that caused later the suicide one of the Central Plant Operator Todd Goerlich .
25 In April 2007 Todd Goerlich was hired as a Plaintiff’s replacement.
26
174. Plaintiff seriously considered the Arbitrator, Connie Melendy’s, suggestions to stay
27
permanently in the HVAC shop and never expected that two and one-half years after Plaintiff
28
15 included $ 13, 500 one time extra pay Plaintiff received 2009 Settlement –Agreement) ; in 2010
16 it was $80,500 in comparison with Plaintiff’s annual earnings of $70,000 ; in 2011—after the 2010
17 blackmail pay-raise of 12% (a six steps pay-up pay raise and an additional step in May 2011),
18 Chris Gangl’s annual earnings jumped to $100,000; in comparison with Plaintiff’s annual earnings
19 of $ 63,300; in 2012, Gang’s earnings was $97,300 in comparison with Plaintiff’s annual earnings
20 of 70,000;( the last year of Plainiff’s employment) in 2013, it was $98,700; and in 2014, it was
21 $104,000.
22 178. This was the reason why in March 2011, Plaintiff sent a letter to UC Davis Medical
23 Center Plant Operation and Maintenance Department Head Charles Witcher and asked respectfully
24
for Charles Witcher to increase Plaintiff’s base salary accordingly, in one step (not six steps )
25
from Middle Step of $71,640/year to the 3rd Step of $80,922/year.
26
179. Plaintiff had no intention to pursue his request if denied because of the Settlement-
27
Agreement, which stated that Plaintiff was to be provided wages of $70,000/year. It was an error
28
15 182. The other issue was that some Central Plant operators were hired 10 years after
16 Plaintiff was hired, and they received in December 2010 the 12% wage increase, and in May 2011,
17 the additional pay raise. Not one UC Davis skilled trade nonunion employee in December 2010
18 was dreaming to receive one penny in wage increase because of the strict budget constraint and
19 furlough of UC campuses. Some of employees were employed for more than 20 or 30 years and
20 were not considered for any wage increase in 2010.
21 183. Besides the $70.000.00 per year salary, Plaintiff received in the Settlement-
22 Agreement a small compensation in the amount of $13,500.00 for lost wages due to the witch hunt,
23 which resulted in suspension without pay and refinement in March 2007.
24
Shortly after Plaintiff signed the February 2009 Settlement-Agreement, the Regents of the
25
University of California UC Davis HR Assistant Director Dawn Capp, UC Davis attorney in
26
arbitration, lost her job. Most likely, Ms. Capp was fired or forced to quit a few months after
27
arbitration. The Hearing Officer, Ms. Connie Melendy, disappeared from the UC Davis landscape
28
6 185. At the time when Plaintiff signed the Settlement-Agreement, February 2009,
7 Plaintiff understood that the Defendant, if alleged of any violation of the Settlement-Agreement
8 by Plaintiff, would inform Plaintiff if Plaintiff had breached or violated the signed Settlement-
9 Agreement. Then, if Plaintiff disagreed, then the Defendant had the right to enforce the agreement
10 in a court of law. This was how Plaintiff understood this employee–employer contract. The
11 Defendant never alleged in one word anywhere that Plaintiff violated the signed Settlement-
12 Agreement, but freely slandered and defamed Plaintiff in at least six pseudo-investigation reports,
13 multi-investigatory leave letters, the April 2012 notice of intent to suspend without pay, the
14 September 2012 notice of intent to terminate Plaintiff’s employment, and the December 2012 letter
15
of employment termination.
16
The Working Environment In The UC Davis Medical Center Plumbing/HVAC
17
187. By title Associate Development Engineer title , Plaintiff basically became
18
Assistant for Plumbing/HVAC Shop Manager Patrick Putney who held the title of Senior
19
20
Development Engineer. Patrick Putney, who is also listed as the Defendant in this FAC and
21 SAC got very upset for reasons unknown to Plaintiff when he got news that Plaintiff settled the
22 case and became an exempt employee in his shop. Putney complained about to HR and started
23 pitting Shop Supervisor Dorin Daniliuc against Plaintiff .Daniliuc was given his supervisor job
24 in Plumbing job by Directors Robert Taylor and Shelton Durusseau in exchange for HVAC
25 service Daniluc provided to them in in their private residences by his private HVAC business
26 188. Everything settled down, and Plaintiff became very n isolated employee in
27 a small glass cage and was monitoring and dispatching UC Davis Medical Center critical alarms,
28
15 employees. Putney was trapping pigeons on the UCDMC roofs, bringing his kids to the shop for
16 babysitting and schooling, and selling soda from his private vending machine that he brought to
17 the shop.
18 Plaintiff later described his new working environment as a gypsy village in Eastern Europe,
19 which closely resembled the one portrayed by Sasha Cohen in the movie Borat.
20 190.. Dorin Daniliuc, who was and still is Patrick Putney’s assistant,
21 concentrated most of his attention on his private HVAC business, which he operated on company
22 time via cell phone; he would often disappear for most of the day with his business-equipped
23 van. Daniliuc was also bringing some foreign workers (Romanian nationals) to the shop to repair
24
his private vehicles. Daniliuc did not care much about what people thought about his unrelated
25
employment activities in the workplace. Daniliuc installed and maintained HVAC equipment for
26
two important UCDMC directors in their private residences, which apparently assured him of his
27
importance; his understanding was, “It’s nobody’s business what I am doing on company time.”
28
13
The December 2010 secret 12% Pay Increase for UCDMC Central Plant Operators,
14
192. Plaintiff’s employment with the UC Davis Medical Center would have
15
lasted longer, and most likely Plaintiff would retire from University at age of 66 without any
16
problems. In March 2011 Plaintiff was 60 years old and it was Plaintiff goal to retire from
17
18
University six years later. . It did not happen and Plaintiff’s employment was converted by the
20 193. In September 2010, one of the UCDMC Central Plant Operators, Jeff
21 Lancaster, discovered on the Sacramento Bee Webpage (Salary for Public Employees in
22 California) that Plaintiff’s 2009 annual salary was $82,295.00, not knowing that Plaintiff’s 2009
23 salary was a combination of Plaintiff’s $70,000.00 base salary and $13,500.00 extra pay per
24 February 2009 Settlement –Agreement for Plaintiff’s lost wages due to Plaintiff’s unlawful
25 reassignment from the Central Plant to the Plumbing/HVAC Shop in March 2007.
26 194. Jeff Lancaster was one of the few from the Central Plant who in
27 2005/2007 was used by UCDMC directors, Shelton Duruisseau, Robert Taylor, Mike Boyd and
28
15 and fried of the Central Plant manager Steve McGrath from his previous employment. A few
16 years back, Steve McGrath’s first wife committed suicide; now, his friend and former coworker
17 After the Todd Georlich suicide traumatized Central Plant Manager Steve McGrath tried
18 unsuccessfully to get a job in the UCDMC Carpenter shop and later in the HVAC shop.
19 198. Jeff Lancaster agitated another three individuals, Chris Gangl, Timothy
20 Cooper and Greg Russ to write and sign a petition and demanding a $4.00/hour pay raise,
21 pointing at Plaintiff’s salary and stating in the petition that Plaintiff was paid $15,000.00 more
22 per year than Central Plant Operators. Beside Plaintiff’s wages, these individuals were very
23 dissatisfied that their help and sacrifices for directors. Shelton Duruisseau, Robert Taylor and
24
Mike Boyd did not do and good because Plaintiff and Buckans was not fired from their jobs in
25
2005-2007 due to a witch hunt, They constantly bragged about and bullied and harassed William
26
Buckans after Plaintiff left the Central Plant in 2007.
27
199. Plaintiff received the copy of the undated black –mail petition signed by
28
15 conducted by the UC Davis Chancellor’s office related to massive machine oil discharge to the
17 202. However, Dennis Curry did not ignore Plaintiff’s discovery about the
18 blackmail pay increase petition and alerted Charles Witcher or Director Taylor a and the petition
19 for pay raise was rewritten and signed by 11 central Plant Operators .
20 203. The memo, letter, or petition, dated September 20, 2010, signed by 11
21 “Central Plant Operators” was addressed to CHARLES WITCHER, Manager of
22 PO&M,Department identified the subject matter as “…the monitoring of the Johnson Controls
23 Metasys Software program and dispatching of emergency and same day service calls to the Central
24 Plant during graveyard and weekend shifts.” In other words, the subject was the fact that the
25 Central Plant Operators covered shifts that Plaintiff did not work.
26 204. The memo, letter, or petition continued “…the Metasys and dispatching has
27 become a full time job to monitor and respond too (sic)...several years ago, we reached a point
28
16 207. The Central Plant Operation and the petition was just a black-mail
17 petition to get pay raise for something completely different than inability to operate the plant.
18 UCDMC Directors, Robert Taylor, Shelton Duruisseau Ph, D. Mike Boyd, Charles Witcher and
19 Stephen Chilcott did not have much choice. They bent to the petition demands and pay raise
20 most likely got approval from the UC Davis Chancellor’s office or the University of California
21 Office of the President due to the strict budget constraints and furlough on the campuses and the
budget crisis in the whole state, including State of California Courts.
22
23 208. The 12% pay raise for all Central Plant Operators was provided to all
24 Central Plant Operators. Some of them were hired a short time before the blackmail petition was
25 submitted, and it was unthinkable for anybody to get a 12% or six steps up pay raise as a non-
26 exempt union or non-union and even exempt University of California employee working only
27 for one or two years for University.
28
10 The Attorney Danesha Nichol’s Deployment From The UC Davis Campus to UC Davis
11 Medical Center Human Resources Department in October 2010
12
210. After Plaintiff’s conversation with Dennis Curry, UC Davis Health
13
System HR Executive Director Stephen Chilcott (defendant) requested that the UC Davis
14
Chancellor’s office deployed .Danesha Nichols, the listed Defendant in FAC and SAC to UC
15
Davis Medical Center to monitor the situation with the pay raise demanded by blackmail petition
16
for the Central Plant Operators.
17
211. Danesha Nichols was the UC Davis HR attorney who in 2007/2008 was
18
involved in Plaintiff’s Step III Appeal arbitration process against UC Davis Medical Center
19 management, and she was very familiar with the crime that was committed in the Central Plant
20 in the period of time spanning from 1998 to 2009 and Nichols was familiar with Plaintiff’s file .
21 212. Danesha Nichols arrived at UC Davis Medical in October 2010 with the
22 title of Investigation Coordinator in similar circumstances as Stephen Chilcott in 2005 and she
23 reported directly to Director Stephen Chilcott.
24 213. As Plaintiff stated previously, the UC Davis Medical Center’s newly built
25 in 1998 Cogeneration Power Plant/Central Plant was a pride and legacy left behind for former
26
UC Davis Chancellor Larry Vanderhoef and Shelton Duruisseau Ph.D., who was appointed to
27
the Medical Board of California, Division of Medical Quality, by Governor Arnold
28
15
215. Mike Lewis was Project Manager for Central Plant construction, start-up, and
16
commissioning. Mr. Lewis was the person who, by his title, position, and duty, was most responsible;
17
“he was obligated” to stop machine oil discharge from the leaking Cooling Tower gear boxes from
18
dispensing into the river and soil to prevent contamination of the natural environment. Mike Lewis, as
19
Principal Engineer, grossly neglected his duty and did not take any preventive measure to stop the oil
20
leak and discharge into the natural environment. Mike Lewis had no problem noticing William
21
Buckans’s feet elevated on the console and viewed it as disrespectful to him but was completely
22
23
unable to notice William Buckan’s accident underneath the cooling tower’s oily surface. Mike Lewis
24 also did not observe—for 7 years—the badly designed cooling tower gear boxes and unlawful massive
25 machine oil discharge into the nearby river and soil surrounding the cooling tower. Apparently, he was
26 ordered to do nothing about by Director Taylor or Director Shelton Duruisseau Ph.D or Director
27 Boyd.
28
2
216. Five days after the Principal Engineer Mike Lewis issued his dramatic
3
memo about the incoming investigation to find perpetrator Central Plant Operator, Todd
4
Goerlich committed suicide. Then, the rest of the Central Plant Operators received a 12% pay
5
raise despite strict UC budget constraints and furlough in UC Campuses and no power sale
6
contract . Thereafter, everything got quiet. Nobody was questioned by an HR investigator or the
7
UC Davis Police Department about locker burglary. No more comments were made by any
8
Central Plant supervisors about Jeff Lancaster’s burglarized locker, no more dramatic memos
9
from the Principal were issued and Todd Georlich’s tragic death was quickly forgotten.
10
11
The Secret 12 % Pay Raise For Central Plant Operators –March 2011
12
13 217. Around March 5, 2011, Plaintiff somehow got into a conversation with
14 the operator from the central plant William Buckans about the December 2010 12% pay raise,
15 and Plaintiff received from Buckans a copy of the UCDMC Plant Operation and the letter from
16 maintenance manager Charles Witcher dated December 20, 2010, which confirmed a 12% pay
17 raise for the central plant operators.
18 218. The December 2010 12% pay raise that was secretly provided to central
19
plant operators was discriminatory to other non-union employees of the UC Davis Medical
20
Center who did not get one penny in wage increase in the last three years due to strict budget
21
constraints in the whole University of California system. The disclosure about the secret pay
22
raise for small groups of employees became a subject of discussion among workers at the other
23
shops in the UC Davis Medical Center. Plaintiff confronted his shop manager Patrick Putney and
24
Plaintiff asked Putney why the HVAC shop staff did not get a pay raise. Putney’s response was
25
that he knew about the pay raise, but was told to be silent about it to avoid any turmoil among
26
the other shops’ workers. Following the discussion with Patrick Putney, Plaintiff wrote an eight-
27
page letter to the department manager about the central plant operators’ December 2010 pay
28
4
The Restricted Access to the UC Davis Medical Center Central Plant
5 in March 2011
6
219. Consequently, right after Plaintiff asked his supervisors about the secret
7 12% pay raise for the Central Plant Operators, Department Principal Engineer Mike Lewis
8 issued a memo dated March 11, 2011, instructing Central Plant crew to do the following:
9
10 “Please inform all Central-Plant personnel that access to the Central Plant is
12 University. All operators not on duty and other personnel with no direct reason
13 to be in the Central Plant shall not be granted access to the Central Plant. If
14 illegal access is gained to the Central Plant please call 4-2555 for a non-
15 emergency event or 911 for an emergency.
16 “If an employee not on duty or other individuals with no direct need to gain
17 access to the Central Plant request access to the Central Plant please contact
18 Charles Witcher, Mike Lewis, or Dennis Curry for direction. Thank you.”
19
That was a shocking memo. Never before had access to the Central Plant been restricted for off-
20
shift personnel.
21
The March 13, 2011, Plaintiff letter addressed to UCDMC Plant Operation and Maintenance
22
Manager Charles Witcher
23
24
25
220. A few days after Mike Lewis issued the memo about access to the Central
26 Plant, Plaintiff on March 14, 2011, sent a letter to Charles Witcher and asked him respectfully
27 for a one-step salary increase; Plaintiff also brought to Witcher’s attention safety and hygiene
28
20 It is appears that Cogen Operators wages under Title Code 8094 for Non —
21 Represented were increased from level 5. to level 11.0. (Six levels up)
22
I would not write this letter but money talk and stirring people mind and saying
23
more simply I just feel discriminated in this share of goods.
24
At the best of my ability to write, I will try to explain why I feel discriminated
25
and left behind like an orphan in abandoned orphanage.
26
27
28
8 vacation absence the Metasys Operation is still unresolved issue for somebody
9 inside the department and he is trying to fix something that is not broken.
10
My other thought was that Central Plant Operators submitted complaint and
11
they are asking to remove the Metasys Operation from the Central Plant
12
Shortly after, in September 2010, I received by copy of the undated but signed
13
petition by four Central Plant operators in regards to Metasys Operation
14
15 After I read the petition and attached to the petition the wages disclosure
16 printed from the Sacramento Bee website, the first my thought was that the
17 petition is a follow up to their earlier complaint which I thought they submitted
18 in August during my vacation absence. The petition itself alleged that Metasys
19
System operation has became full time job to monitor and it was my
20
understanding from the petition that the $ 4.00 /hour wage increase for them
21
would magically convert the full time Metasys Operation job to relaxing
22
leisure in nice resort.
23
24
Furthermore , the individuals who signed the petition alleging (without
27 On top of this, petitioners are raising issue of three managers for twelve person
28
10 I did not want to engage myself in any conflict or discussion with these
11 individuals who are attacking my wages and my duty and I did pass the copy
12 of the petition to Mr. Dennis Curry.
13
Thereafter I forgot about it and concluded this event as a "NEVER ENDING
14
TRAUMA IN THE CENTRAL PLANT " taking in consideration that the same
15
group of individuals viciously and recklessly attacked me and other people in
16
the past, caused me enormous stress, suspension, my departure from the
17
Central Plant and loss of thousands of dollars in my earning"
18
19 At the end of December 2010 I got e-mail from William about his pay raise
20 and I thought that he is joking and I wrote him back that I got five thousand
21 dollars raise, than he sent me congratulation etc. I did not believe him in spite
22 of State financial crisis, furlough, budget constraints and UC President memos
23 about the cuts and possibility of big lay off in IJC system. Basically, I ignored
24
William information and was no further discussion about the pay raise in the
25
Central Plant.
26
The other subject in December 2010 in discussion was the tragic death of the
27
Central Plant employee who took his own life. Just day or two before it
28
10 Lancaster burglarized locker and supposedly stolen photos from the Jeff's
20 action.All lockers will have their locks replaced with new and the master file
22 or how they will be notified.In light of the professional attitude and excellent
24 If whoever was responsible for this would put the same effort into being a team
25 player and working with others on the Central Plant staff, the work
26 environment in the Central Plant could be that much better.In my entire career
27 that consists of work at facilities both in the United States and abroad I have
28
20
mention again his raise and again I thought that he is trying to "pull my legs"
21 and is joking. and in light of budget cuts e.tc I did not believe what is William
22 telling me until he sent me copy of your memo which stated that he got the pay
23 raise.
15 I wrote the introduction and I summarized the latest events in the Central in
17 The petitioners have the right to say in the petition whatever they want about
18 my job but I know how to operate the Central Plant and could go and do it if
4 Beside the Metasys Alarms I am doing other stuff requested by Patrick Putney
5
and I have well documented what I am doing beside the Metasys Operation.
6
Some days I am very busy and "dizzy" from the alarms but I don't have any
7
major problem to handle the job.
8
I don't take brakes with exception to lunch and I would like to have both
9
brakes integrated into lunch and take one hour lunch instead of two 15 minutes
10
brakes and 1/2 hour lunch. This would allow me to leave the shop to eat lunch
11
outside in cafeteria or walk around the campus to relax and get my blood
12
circulation normal
13
In conclusion I am respectfully asking and I would appreciate if my salary will
14
15 accordingly to next level under Title Code 7182 for Non —Represented
17 Sincerely
18 Jaroslaw Waszczuk
19
20 221. Plaintiff learned that prior to Todd Goerlich’s suicide, Goerlich frequently
21 complained to his friend Dereck Cole and his girlfriend that he had been harassed and bullied in
22 the Central Plant “by a person named Jeff.” That corresponds with William Buckans’s
23 observation how badly Todd Goerlich disliked Jeff Lancaster and, in particular, how different
24
and unapproachable Todd became when he worked a shift with Jeff Lancaster.
25
Dereck Cole was a newly hired HVAC Technician in a shop where Plaintiff worked. Cole was
26
hired just one month after Todd Georlich committed suicide, and Todd Georlich was the person
27
who provided the recommendation for Dereck Cole to be hired as an HVAC Technician by UC
28
15 223. The news about the pay raise got around, and in fear of turmoil, the UC
16 Davis Chancellor’s Office or UC Office of the President ordered a 2% pay raise to all UC Davis
17 Medical Center non-union employees, including to Central Plant Operators who had already
18 received a 12% pay raise. Normally, employees would receive a pay raise on July 1st if it were
19 approved after the Annual Performance Review to be given to employees for the 2010/2011
20 year. Plaintiff received the pay raise in May 2011 as well, and his salary increased from
21 $70,000.00 to $71,600 per year.
22 The April 2011 Retaliation
23 224. Instead of any response to my letter from Charles Witcher in April 2011,
24
Plaintiff’s manager, Patrick Putney, blatantly blamed him for missing and not dispatching a
25
hospital refrigerator critical alarm that resulted in a complaint against him by the hospital
26
pharmacy personnel. In a heated discussion, Putney humiliated Plaintiff in front of his teenage
27
daughter, whom he had brought to the shop on that day. Plaintiff told Putney that he didn’t miss
28
15 be perfect with these false alarms and not to miss the real one. Missing critical alarms and not
16 dispatching it could lead to enormous losses or even patient death in UC Davis Medical Center
17 Hospital.
19 critical alarm appeared to be a result of his and his assistant Dorin Daniliuc’s negligence to repair
20 the relevant refrigerator. After the alarm and complaint, it was discovered that the refrigerator was
21 due for repair, had an open work order, and the repair was not done. When Plaintiff proved that it
22 was their fault and that they had neglected their duty, they began to disrespect Plaintiff, showing
23 hostility towards Plaintiff; Plaintiff became the subject of vicious attacks, including and not limited
24
to stalking, intimidation, sabotaging Plaintiff’s job, provocations for physical confrontation and
25
unfounded accusations from these two individuals of being violent.
26
227. In May and June 2011, Patrick Putney turned off the lights in his office and
27
positioned himself in the chair toward Plaintiff and stalked Plaintiff for hours every day. Once in
28
15 suspended for a missing refrigerator alarm without pay. Plaintiff’s intervention in the case, and
16 proof that it not was not Tunello’s fault, reversed Dennis Curry’s conviction.
17 229. The behavior and vicious attacks of Patrick Putney, Dorin Daniluc, Dennis
18 Curry and Charles Witcher aimed at Plaintiff in March, April, May, June and July of 2011
12 May 2011
13
232. In May 2011, Plaintiff held two separate meetings with Department Head ,
14
Charles Witcher, to clarify the issue with the missing refrigerator alarm, to discuss the unusual and
15
psychotic behavior of Patrick Putney toward me, which was not limited to stalking Plaintiff from
16
17 his dark office, suddenly opening his dark office door from the inside and screaming “What are
18 you doing?” Thereafter, within minutes Dennis Curry showing up in the shop and talking to
19 Plaintiff like Plaintiff did something wrong, they both laughed in Patrick Putney’s Office. .
20 233. In May 2011 Patrick Putney held meetings with the crew and in a
21 threatening manner told everybody how good he is at firing people from the job if they not behave
22 up to his standards. One of the new shop employees, Dereck Cole, became so frightened that he
23 asked Putney if he was aiming his threats at him. One year later, Dereck Cole became another
24 victim of Patrick’s Putney, Dennis Curry, and Charles Witcher’s schemes and yet another
25 candidate to look for new employment. He was unspeakably victimized and asked me to represent
26
him with his complaints against Patrick Putney and Charles Witcher. Another Patrick Putney
27
victim is 72-year-old HVAC technician Richard Pawlaczyk. The Richard Pawlaczyk’s case was
28
15 appear that this will be the case. Patrick is still working very hard to get on my
18 humiliated and ridiculed me in front of his teenage stepdaughter. His kids often
19 stay in his office and do their school homework there. I have never had
20 anything against his bringing his kids to work, but in the situation of the heated
21 argument, he went overboard. After the incident, we returned to work on
22 Monday, and I tried to smooth out everything. I even offered him breakfast,
23 but my attempt to make peace with him did not work, and the situation still
24
does not look good.
25
Shortly afterward, Patrick in a retaliatory manner requested that I find all of the
26
"unreliable alarms" in the Metasys . Without discussion, I found these unreliable
27
alarms for him. It took me almost a week to complete the task, after which Patrick
28
15 He clearly intended to intimidate me, speaking the following words: "Do you
16 understand what this policy is for?" I thanked him the next day for providing
17 me with the Metasys policy three years after I had joined the HVAC shop and
19 decided to provide him with the link to the UC Davis Medical Center
20 (UCDMC) Parking and Transportation Services Office and to advise him to
21 pay for his parking permit. For the past three years, he had parked for free on
22 the UCDMC premises by hiding his car inside the shop and playing a little
23 "catch me if you can” game with the parking cops. On top of this, I decided to
24
make this comment to him "What kind of managerial example is he setting for
25
his crew by showing that it is okay to cheat and steal from the employer while
26
at the same time having the ambition to became assistant PO&M [plant
27
operation and maintenance] manager after Dennis Curry retires?”
28
15 almost two years using Putney’s name and password, which was, of course, a
17 The previous incident and today's incident show clearly that Patrick has no
18 remorse about hunting me down. From my perspective, I do not have a choice but
15 236. Plaintiff thought that the 2009 Settlement-Agreement that Plaintiff signed
16 with the Defendant, the Regents of the University of California, would protect Plaintiff from the
18 237.. The March 13, 2011, letter from Plaintiff to UC Davis Medical Center
19 Plant Operation and Maintenance Department (PO&M) Manager Charles Witcher raised red
20 flags, and the PO&M Department Management received an order from above that Plaintiff had
21 to be cut off from any source of detailed information provided to him by the Metasys Monitoring
22 System about the Central Plant and be removed from the premises at any means. The UC Davis
23 Medical Center PO&M Department Manager was the one of four UC Davis employees who
24
signed the 2009 Settlement –Agreement and Witcher was perfectly aware that unwarranted
25
attack against Plaintiff violates the signed Settlement –Agreement
26
June 2011
27
28 238. Due to continuous harassment and sabotaging the Plaintiff’s job, the
15 July 2011
16
240. On July 8, 2011, Plaintiff held a meeting with HR Labor Relation
17
Consultant Gina Harwood about the harassment and retaliation Plaintiff was experiencing. During
18
the meeting, Harwood deliberately failed to disclose the fact that the false and fabricated complaint
19
was filed by Plaintiff’s two supervisors, Patrick Putney and Dorin Daniliuc. A few days later,
20
Plaintiff was officially informed that the complaint has been filed against him and that an HR
21
investigator had been assigned to investigate the allegation. The assigned HR Investigator was HR
22
attorney Danesha Nichols, who was deployed from the UC Davis campus to UC Davis Medical
23
Center in October 2010 after Central Plant Operators submitted a black mail petition for pay raise.
24
241. Danesha Nichols was very familiar with the previous attack against Plaintiff
25
26 in 2006/2007 due to her involvement in Plaintiff’s arbitration process against the Defendant in
27 2008, which resulted in Plaintiff’s February 2009 Settlement-Agreement with the UC Regents.
28 Nichols aggressively and as soon as possible tried to schedule an interrogation meeting with
15 Compliance Director, Wendy Delemendo, contacted Plaintiff and tried to convince Plaintiff to
16 file the complaint under the UC Whistle Blowing Policy. Plaintiff refused due to his and his
17 coworker’s experience in 2006/2007 when he helped his coworker William Buckans with the
18 Whistle Blowing case related to massive machine oil discharge via a storm drain to the Sacramento
19 River.
20 244. On July 29, 2011, Plaintiff responded to Delmendo’s whistleblowing
21 complaint invitation by letter with many questions about HVAC shop supervisor Dorin Daniliuc’s
22 relationship with two UC Davis Medical Center directors, Robert Taylor and Shelton Duruisseau
23 The Daniliuc’ relation with these two directors was to provide them HVAC services in their
24
private residences in exchange for Daniluc’s supervisory position in the HVAC shop. The
25
questions were never answered by UC Davis Chief Compliance Officer Wendy Delmendo or any
26
of five investigation reports written by Danesha Nichols in December 2011 and February 2012.
27
245. Plaintiff also asked Executive Director Mike Boyd, who is a listed
28
15 order and was not allowed access to any computer with Internet. He should not have been
17 248. This individual was a frequent guest in the HVAC shop, and his presence
18 was tolerated by Patrick Putney and Dorin Daniliuc because Bill Rabidaux had a special
16 251. Only Stephen Chilcott as the HR Executive Director had the power to
17 order not to provide Plaintiff with his annual evaluation and deprive him of administrative
19 252.. In July and August 2011, UC Davis Health System HR Executive Director
20 Stephen Chilcott, in conspiracy with Director Michael Boyd and HR Workers Compensation
21 Manager Hugh Parker (Chilcott’s subordinate), made an attempt to remove Plaintiff from the
22 premises through the false and fraudulent Workers Compensation Claim. Plaintiff refused to file
23 a false claim, but a claim was filed on Plaintiff’s behalf anyway.
24
253. It is possible that UCDMC HR Workers’ Compensation Manager Hugh
25
Parker forged Plaintiff’s signature and filed the Workers’ Compensation claim on Plaintiff’s behalf,
26
taking into consideration that on May 31, 2012, Hugh Parker coordinated ill-minded but
27
unsuccessful provocation to kill Plaintiff or end his employment in UCDMC Trauma Unit #11 by
28
15 my office for a one-hour lunch. This was a trigger point for my decision to
16 ask my doctor for a medical leave. The person who apparently fried my
17 hard drive with higher voltage knew what he was doing and how to do it. I
18 did not find any external physical damage to my hard drive but, after I
19 removed the cover, I found that the circuit board and motor had been
20 burned.
21 I am almost certain of who and why it was done, but I did not catch anybody by
22 hand. Therefore, I can only write and whine about this event. I did not take any
23 chances by remaining in my office any longer and getting electrocuted like my HD.”
24
255. It happened after over three months of nonstop attacks against Plaintiff including,
25
and not limited to, stalking and sabotaging Plaintiff’s job as orchestrated by the UC Davis Health
26
System HR department, the UC Davis chief counsel, and the UC Davis chief compliance office
27
28
7 August 2011
8
257. In July 2011, Plaintiff asked many times and begged for the harassment to stop, as
9
well as the sabotaging of Plaintiff’s duties and job, so as not to escalate the conflict. Plaintiff’s
10
appeals did not work, and Plaintiff had to evacuate himself from the job site due to enormous
11
emotional distress caused by PO&M, the HR department management, and HR investigators.
12
Plaintiff’s physician placed Plaintiff on work-related stress sick leave until September 1, 2011. By
13
going on work-related stress sick leave, Plaintiff was hoping that, during his absence from work,
14
everything would settle down and Plaintiff would be able to continue his employment. Plaintiff
15
was also hoping that the UCDM HR assigned investigator, Attorney Danesha Nichols, would
16
17 interview all Plaintiff’s coworkers from the shop and would clarify the issues of the false and
18 fabricated accusations against Plaintiff. Plaintiff forgot or did not know in August 2011 that
19 Danesha Nichols was involved in the previous Plaintiff’s case together with Stephen Chilcott and
20 that Danesha Nichols was deployed in October 2010 to UC Davis Medical Center to monitor the
21 situation with the black –mail pay raise for the central plant operators.
22 258. Plaintiff’s coworker, Kenny Diede, was slandered and defaced on his annual
23 evaluation by Patrick Putney for reporting a twice-convicted child pornography felon for
24 accessing company computers. Later on, Plaintiff represented Kenny Diede in his complaints
25 pursuant to UC Davis Complaint Resolution Policy PPSM 70 and Whistleblowing Retaliation
26
Policy to keep his job with UC Davis Medical Center.
27
259. The August 2, 2011 was Plaintiff’s last physical presence and last working
28
15 262. Plaintiff became very upset, stressed, and angry that could not go back to
16 work. Plaintiff got feeling that he would never get his job back, knowing that it was already
17 awarded to Bill Rabidaux, the father of the twice-convicted child pornography felon. Bill
18 Rabidoux should be punished, together with shop supervisors, for his participation in covering up
19 the parole violation of his sick-minded relative, instead of having the job granted to Plaintiff by
20 the Settlement-Agreement with the UC Regents. Also, Plaintiff would like to mention that when
21 Plaintiff was leaving the shop on August 2, 2011, Plaintiff had not had any problems with any of
22 his coworkers throughout the course of Plaintiff’s employment in the HVAC shop for four years.
23
24 September 2011
25
263. The UC Davis Medical Center PO&M Department Manager Charles
26
Witcher’s letter, dated August 31, 2011, placing Plaintiff on investigatory leave was an
27
unsuccessful attempt to force Plaintiff to quit his job or to participate in the investigation against
28
15 Nichols’s report that was issued as a cause to terminate Plaintiff on September 23, 2011, was
16 destroyed and was not available to Plaintiff to obtain from Nichols. Nichols most likely lied to
17 Public Record Act personnel because Nichols provided the copy of the Report to HR Workers
18 Compensation Office Manager Hugh Parker who was coordinator in May 2012 to end Plaintiff’s
16 I am not your and Mr. Chillcot’s hostage and you both have to end this hostage
11
270. Plaintiff was so stressed out and already was using antidepressant and
12
nitroglycerine, and escalation of the conflict by Defendant forced Plaintiff to seek a doctor and
13
psychologist’s help to cope with the enormous emotional stress and anxiety in relation to
14
15 employment situation.
16 272. On September 22, 2011, Plaintiff’s physician placed Plaintiff on the work
19 former Central Plant coworker William Buckans that Bill Rabidaux (father of the child porn
20 felon who was accessing UCDMC computers in the HVAC shop) announced to others that
21 Plaintiff was fired from job and that
22 274. Plaintiff was not going back and anticipated that this was going to happen.
23 Apparently, Plaintiff physician who placed Plaintiff on stress-related sick leave stopped the
24
execution. Plaintiff did not think that Bill Roubideaux lied or made up that my employment
25
termination took place. The Roubideaux’s special relationship with Dennis Curry and Patrick
26
Putney made Plaintiff believed that Dennis Curry or Patrick Putney leaked the information about
27
Plaintiff’s employment termination before the termination letter was sent to Plaintiff .
28
15 stop the constant assault, harassment and vicious vendetta against me for last
26
278. On October 4, 2011, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the State Bar of
27
California against UC Davis Medical Center’s two Human Resources Department Attorneys,
28
7 Witcher, and others, Plaintiff thought that maybe someone had filed the false complaint with the
8 UC Davis Police Department and accused me of violence and discrimination and other crimes
10 280. To clear this issue, on October 6, Plaintiff asked UC Davis Police Cpt.
11 Joyce Souza from the Professional Standard Unit to search my Police Record and check if any
12 record with my name was there.
13 Plaintiff, in his eight-page e-mail entitled “Request for Information in regards to the
14 unfounded accusation against me from UCDMC HR Attorneys and other individuals,”
15
pasted multiple examples of the despicable, unfounded, and defacing Plaintiff accusations. .
16
In his e-mail to UC Davis Police Cpt. Joy Souza with cc. to UC Davis Police Lt. John Pike (the
17
same Lt. John Pike who was pepper spraying protesting students on November 18, 2011 on the
18
UC Davis Campus).
19
281. Plaintiff wrote to Cpt. Joyce Souza on October 5, 2011 in his eight pages
20
e-mail letter:
21
“Dear Captain Souza:
22
I have been working for 12 years in the UC Davis Medical Center Plant
23
Operation and Maintenance, Sacramento Department. In last few months I
24
15 response, wrote:
19 283. Plaintiff noticed that Captain Joyce Souza cc’d her e-mail response to her
20 superior, UC Davis Police Chief Annette Spicuzza, and UC Davis Chief Compliance Officer
21 Wendy Delmendo, who assigned, in July 2011, UC Davis attorney Danesha Nichols to conduct a
10 did not pay much attention to Mr. Dark’s proposition because his job in the HVAC shop as
11 Assistant Development Engineer fit Plaintiff perfectly and Plaintiff had no restrictions or
12 limitations to do the job with Plaintiff’s health and condition, with the exception of the stalking
13 and harassing by Plaintiff’s supervisors who made his life miserable and work conditions
14 intolerable.
15 286. On October 10, 2011, the UC Davis Medical Center HR investigator and attorney
16 Danesha Nichols sent to HVAC shop employee Kenneth Diede a threating and intimidating e-mail
17 message. Kenneth Diede was the employee who in July 2011 was reported to be a twice-convicted
18 child pornography felon on parole who had illegally accessed the HVAC shop computer and was
19
prohibited by court order to have or touch any commuter, especially one with Internet. Danesha
20
Nichols covered up the child porn criminal activities issue in her pseudo-investigation reports.
21
287. On October 11, 2011, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant with
22
the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for Harassment, Retaliation, and ongoing
23
conspiracy against Plaintiff in the University of California Davis Medical Center.
24
288. On October 25, 2011, Plaintiff sent a request to the UC Davis Public
25
record Act office and requested documents related to the UCDMC CENTRAL PLANT - JEFF
26
LANCASTER'S BURGALIZED LOCKER ON DECEMBER 17, 2010 AND PAY RAISE FOR
27
UCDMC CENTRAL PLANT OPERATORS ON DECEMBER 20, 2010.
28
16
the organization and operation of the campus. With the investigation by Ms.
27 letter
28 “Christopher Simon
16 my record and it would be difficult not to mention again what did happen .
18 send the
20 Risk Committee and the California State Assembly Members,and The Regents
21 Of The University of California entitled: "I FEEL LIKE A HUNTED JEW
22 DURING THE HOLOCAUST"
23 if, after my respectful request on July 13, 2011, I sent to UC Davis Medical
24 Center HR Executive Director Mr. Stephen Chilcott to intervene in the case.
25
Director Chilcott's subordinate, Investigation-Coordinator, Danesha Nichols,
26
would start her investigation or at least she start her investigation, after I sent a
27
lengthy letter dated July 31, 2011 to UC Davis Chief Compliance Officer Mrs.
28
17 another psychopath supervisor like Patrick Putney who victimized not only
19 My Psychologist Dr. Bernhoft wrote on the form for Liberty Mutual Insurance
20 Company: “Stress issues are due not to being back to work " and " Client
21 should be allowed to return to work ASAP" (attached)
22 If UC won't let me go back to work as soon as possible than I respectfully
23 requesting answer ASAP what is the other option because I don't know. I have
24
to pay my bills and mortgage and FMLA protection ends after 90 days . I don't
25
need additional stress and more pills with my health condition.
26
I appreciate your prompt response in this matter and I am awaiting for
27
resolution to end this employer hostility against me .
28
9
291. In November 2011, Plaintiff spent most of his time dealing with the
10 Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston, which deprived Plaintiff of legitimate short-term
11 disability benefits. After Plaintiff used all his sick leave days and vacation days, Plaintiff was
12 basically left without income. The FMLA 90-day protection also ran out. UCDMC HR Labor
13 Relations Consultant Gina Harwood, for reasons unknown to Plaintiff, on November 14, 2011,
14 offered to Plaintiff an additional 12 weeks of supplemental FMLA time protection, which
15 Plaintiff declined. The short-term disability benefits had been denied to Plaintiff, so it was
16 nonsense to accept the FMLA protection extension to stay employed without the income.
17 292. In the response letter, dated November 23, 2011, to Gina Harwood,
18
Plaintiff wrote:
19
“At this point, I am not considering to file for an extension of my
20
medical leave under the Supplemental FMLA University Policy 2.210.
21
I am under enormous stress and pressure, and I have had enough. I was left
22
without a paycheck, so an extension of medical leave won’t help with at all.
23
The Settlement-Agreement I signed with the UC Regents in 2009 and my civil
24
rights were grossly violated by the University of California.
25
Contacting the benefits office regarding my current situation to discuss the
26
effect of my health and welfare benefits makes no sense to me.
27
28
The University is fully responsible and legally liable for my current health
15 Carmichael; fire from the job Lt. John Pike, who was ordered and used to casually and very visibly pepper
16 spray students; and force to retire UC Davis Captain Joyce Souza. Just after the premediated pepper spray
17 attack, Lt. Matt Carmichael, who on November 18, 2011, was in the UC Davis Medical Center, instantly,
18 as most likely planned, was assigned as the interim UC Davis chief of police. In May 2012, the new UC
19 Davis chief of police participated with Lt. James Barbour in the operation to provoke and kill or end
20 Plaintiff’s employment in the UC Davis Medical Center Trauma Unit #11.
21
295. On November 14, 2011, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the State of California
22
23
Department of Insurance against the Liberty Assurance Company of Boston for denying to
24 Plaintiff short-term disability benefits. The Liberty Assurance Company of Boston, without
25 conducting any reasonable investigation concerning its obligations under the contract,
26 breached its contract, without good or sufficient cause, for reasons extraneous to the contract
27 and for the purpose of frustrating Plaintiff’s enjoyment of the benefits of the contract.
28
16 anniversary of the student massacre at Athens Polytechnic by the Greek fascist military junta that
17 killed 25 people and injured over 1,000. In 1973, Linda Katehi was a student at Athens
18 Polytechnic.
19 298. A few days later, on November 23, 2011, UC Davis Vice Chancellor Claire
20 Pomeroy, who was in charge of UC Davis Medical Center School of Medicine, cried out in her e-mail
21 how the community was deeply shaken and disturbed by the pepper spraying of protesting students:
22
“Our university community is shaken by the deeply disturbing images we have
23
seen over the past few days. The video of the police action against peaceful
24
students stands in stark contrast to our deeply held commitments to freedom of
25
expression and to our UC Davis principles of community”
26
27 299. Plaintiff responded to Vice Chancellor Pomeroy’s outcry with the following words:
28
3 Can you do something about the National Socialism doctrine oriented and
4 entirely corrupted management in the UC Davis Medical Center, Plant
5 Operation and Maintenance and Human Resources Departments? The
6
Principles of Community does not exist in UCDMC and it is the empty slogan.
7
Your commitment to freedom of expression is also empty slogan as well. You
8
and others are receiving my letters for quite long and you and others don’t care
9
what the “UCDMC Gestapo” doing to me and how systematically is
10
destroying my and others livelihood and life. I am sending a few letters again
11
to you with hope that I will be heartened to see Ms. Pomeroy will order to
12
conduct a true investigation against the corrupted individuals in both
13
departments and restore a normal work environment in the UCDMC PO&M
14
Department.
15
16
Best regards and good luck with your commitment to freedom of expression.
17 JerryWaszczuk
19
300. Shortly after Plaintiff sent his message to Vice Chancellor Pomeroy cc’d to many
20
other University of California decision makers, Vice Chancellor Pomeroy was forced to resign due to
21
illegal medical experiments conducted under Pomeroy’s supervision for years by two UC Davis Medical
22
Center Dutch neurosurgeons, Dr. J. Paul Muizelaar and Dr. Rudolph J. Schrot, which caused
23 several patients’ deaths. So far, Plaintiff, with his words about the UC Davis Medical Center
24 National Socialism doctrine, was taking into consideration inhumane, illegal medical
25 experiments on humans in the Nazi concentration camp Auschwitz conducted on camp inmates
26 by the notorious Dr. Joseph Mengele.
27 301. On November 23, 2011, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
28
6 in his emails. Mr. Witcher also added a threat about the dismissal of Plaintiff’s employment if he
7 continued to communicate with others about the investigation and about hunting Plaintiff down.
8 Plaintiff responded to Mr. Witcher’s accusations and his denial of Plaintiff’s e-mail access with a
10 reference to his previous UCDMC managers’ statements from the Central Plant. One manager
11 threatened Plaintiff with the words, “Somebody give this Pollack a bad evaluation and fire
12 him,” and another, in anger, was threatening Plaintiff that he would “Send the Gestapo on my
13 ass.”
14 303. Apparently, the UC Davis Medical Center Plant Operation and
15
Maintenance Department Manager Charles Witcher; his superior, Director Mike Boyd; and HR
16
Executive Director Stephen Chilcott forgot that Charles Witcher signed a February 2009
17
Settlement-Agreement with Plaintiff on behalf of the regents of the University of California, and
18
if Charles Witcher felt that Plaintiff violated any paragraph of the Settlement-Agreement, then
19
Charles Witcher was to inform the UC Davis Medical Center Legal Department and UC Davis
20
Chief Counsel Steven Drown, who also signed the Settlement-Agreement, to enforce the signed
21
Settlement-Agreement according to California law without threatening, humiliating, harassing
22
and discriminating against Plaintiff.
23
304. The conclusion of this chapter is that the Defendant with Liberty
24
25 Assurance Company of Boston, by their malicious conspiracy against Plaintiff, left Plaintiff
26 without any source of income, which they thought would be a very convincing argument to make
27 Plaintiff quit his job. When it was done, UC Davis Medical Center HR Benefits Manager John
28 Peklar contacted Plaintiff by phone and was trying to convince Plaintiff to make an appointment
6 305. In December 2011, Defendant again forgot that in February 2009 they
8 agreed to employ Plaintiff indefinitely. The agreement was to be enforced by the California
9 Court according to the state of California’s laws if violated by any party which signed the
10 settlement- agreement.
11 306. On December 5, 2011, Plaintiff’s superior Charles Witcher, to Plaintiff’s
12 disbelief, sent to Plaintiff another threatening letter during Plaintiff’s sick leave due to work-
13 related stress, in which Witcher ordered Plaintiff to go to an investigatory interview with
14 Danesha Nichols on December 12, 2011. Four years after this, Plaintiff is still in disbelief that it
15
actually happened, but taking into consideration that Plaintiff’s employment almost ended in UC
16
Davis Medical Center Trauma Unit #11 due to an unsuccessful provocation crafted by the same
17
management on May 30, 2012, then anything is possible at University of California.
18
307. To add another example, if one of workers for whom Plaintiff was
19
providing representation can be despicably attacked by the same UC Davis management during
20
his mother’s funeral, then employment at UC Davis Medical Center is full of surprises.
21
308. Plaintiff ignored Charles Witcher’s letter and his irresponsible threats to
22
dismiss Plaintiff from his employment during his stress-related sick leave. Removing Plaintiff
23
from sick leave unconditionally without Plaintiff’s physician’s permission and place Plaintiff on
24
26 309. Plaintiff was without income; the situation could not get any worse, and
27 Witcher’s threating letter was nothing else but ill-minded harassment and an attempt to
28 intimidate Plaintiff and to make Plaintiff to quit his job voluntarily and wave his legal rights
15 313. Besides the above, Plaintiff informed Gina Harwood that Plaintiff was
16 willing to have a meeting with HR Investigator Danesha Nichols if she was willing to meet
17 Plaintiff on the same day that Plaintiff would be retrieving his personal file and his belongings
18 from his office. Gina Harwood responded that she set up the meeting with Danesha Nichols on
19 December 22, 2011, and that all Plaintiff’s belongings would be delivered to the HR building in
20 the morning and available for pick up at the time of Plaintiff’s appointment with Danesha
21 Nichols.
22 314. Gina Harwood also informed Plaintiff that the computers containing the
23 hard drives Plaintiff made reference to were deployed outside of the HVAC shop due to the
24
sensitive nature of the systems on those computers and the department being concerned about
25
removing the hard drives at that time. Also, Gina Harwood asked Plaintiff to provide receipts
26
showing the purchase of these hard drives, and the university would reimburse him for the cost.
27
315. Plaintiff installed his private hard drives in the company computers as a
28
15 were already decommissioned and provide them to the crew for work orders and time cards.
16 Plaintiff cleaned, repaired and reprogrammed the old computers and provided them to HVAC
17 shop crew members to make their everyday job a lot easier and more efficient.
18 318. Besides the above, Plaintiff informed Gina Harwood that Plaintiff was
19 willing to have a meeting with HR Investigator Danesha Nichols if she was willing to meet
20 Plaintiff on the same day that he would be retrieving his personal file and his belongings from
21 his office.
22 319. Gina Harwood did set up an appointment with Danesha Nichols on
23 December 22, 2011.
24
320. When on December 22, 2011, Plaintiff arrived for the meeting with
25
Danesha in the UC Davis Medical Center HR building, a UC Davis police cruiser with officers
26
inside was on standby next to the building and Danesha Nichols had the assistance of a male
27
person who disclosed to Plaintiff during the conversation that he had previously worked as a
28
16 323. The Defendant’ reckless and unwarranted attacks against Plaintiff in 2011
17 and gross violation of the 2009 settlement-agreement, along with harassment, retaliation,
18 enormous stress and anxiety, and the fear of losing employment, caused Plaintiff financial losses
19 in relation to his employment, which amounted to the approximate sum of $21,000.00, taking
20 into consideration accrued sick leave and vacation hours, which Plaintiff was forced to use due to
21 stress-related sick leave caused by the Defendant and the Defendant’ conspiracy with Liberty
22 Assurance Company of Boston, which resulted in Plaintiff’s short-term disability being denied.
23
January 2012
24
25
324. On or about January 10, 2012, Plaintiff noticed on his pay stub for the pay
26
period with an end date of 12/24/2011, that Plaintiff’s title had been changed without his
27
knowledge, and for an unknown reason, from Associate Development Engineer to Programmer I,
28
15 326. If, in January 2012, Plaintiff would have known that the Defendant’ goal
16 was to separate Plaintiff from Metasys System and from any data and information related to the
17 UC Davis Medical Central Plant operation, then Plaintiff would most likely have taken a
18 different approach to the problem. Plaintiff would have attempted to renegotiate the signed
19 February 2009 Settlement-Agreement with the Defendant, regardless of the psychological terror,
20 harassment and despicable attacks on Plaintiff’s character and integrity that the Defendant
21 committed.
22 327. Plaintiff had no clue as to why this was done or who did it, but the
23 Defendant ignored the fact that according to the February 2009, the Settlement-Agreement,
24
Plaintiff’s position and work place cannot be changed without Plaintiff’s consent or a Court
25
Order.
26
328. On January 18 , 2012, Plaintiff noticed by looking at his pay stub dated
27
January 18, 2012, that Plaintiff had been de-enrolled by the Defendant from the medical, dental
28
15 Disability Insurance with the Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston and Plaintiff
16 advised John Peklar that he make sure that that premium for this insurance will not be
18 331. On January 25, 2012, Plaintiff sent a letter to the UC Office President
19 liaison Mike Waldman, who was responsible for administrating the supplemental short-term
20 disability benefits, to intervene with Liberty Assurance Company Boston to pay Plaintiff’s
21 legitimate benefits, which were denied in November and December 2012. Plaintiff did not get
22 any response from Mr. Waldman.
23 332. At the end of January 2012, Plaintiff learned that his long-time physician,
24
who placed Plaintiff on stress-related sick leave for fourth months, wouldn’t provide any longer
25
medical service for Plaintiff and that Plaintiff’s psychologist’s residence in Lodi was raided by
26
the State of California Department of Social Services.
27
28 February 2012
16 of California.
17 336. Plaintiff in good faith also forwarded to Cindy Oropeza the latest e-mail
18 correspondence with Danesha Nichols, the investigator UC Davis Medical Center assigned to the
19 case, which stated that, if Plaintiff’s employer is looking for an informal resolution of the
20 problem, then Plaintiff would prefer not to see or read Danesha Nichols’ investigation findings
21 and the Defendant’ action based on Danesha Nichols’ findings. It would save Plaintiff’s and
22 others’ time and, if Plaintiff read the findings, would turn the ongoing conflict in a new direction
23 and open up a new, unpleasant dispute. Plaintiff also stated that he is very tired and very stressed
24 out from dealing with this conflict. Cindy Oropeza responded that UC Davis Medical Center’s
25
HR Labor Relation Manager will contact Plaintiff shortly and will set a meeting with Plaintiff to
26
discuss the possibility of resolving the conflict informally.
27
337. . Plaintiff’s meeting with HR Labor Relations Manager, Mike Garcia, took
28
14 340. Plaintiff does not know why Plaintiff was asked to meet with Mike Garcia,
15 but Plaintiff believed that the Right to Sue Letter dated January 26, 2012, which Plaintiff
16 received from the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Right Division and of which a carbon copy
17 was sent to the UC Davis Medical Center was one of the reason for explore possibility of
18 informal resolution.
19
341. In February 2012 and for a long time thereafter, Plaintiff had no intention
20
to sue the Defendant; instead, Plaintiff was hoping that the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
21
Commission (EEOC) would help him deal with his ongoing employment dispute with the
22
Defendant. However, when Plaintiff filed a complaint with U.S. EEOC against Defendant and
23
24
subsequently went to the EEOC’s San Francisco Office for an interview, Plaintiff was dismayed
25 to find that the EEOC intake officer was terrified of filing a complaint against the University of
26 California and dealing with UC attorneys. Plaintiff had no choice but to ask for a Right to Sue
27 Letter. Plaintiff could not find an attorney and was trying to get an extension of the Right to Sue
28 Letter but his extension request was denied by the EEOC Director. Thereafter, Plaintiff was
10 negative remarks in the reports about him. Plaintiff, since February 2009, was working for
12 Engineer and had reminded the Defendant in almost every correspondence with them since April
13 2011 that they were breaching and violating the Settlement – Agreement they had signed with
14 Plaintiff.
15 344. In addition to the above, Plaintiff learned in February 2012 that HR Labor
16 Relation Manager Mike Garcia replaced HR Consultant Gina Harwood with experienced
17 attorney Jill Vandeviver to handle Plaintiff’s and Plaintiff’s coworkers’ complaints from the
18 same Department in which Plaintiff worked.
19
345. Besides the above, Plaintiff’s two coworkers, Kenny Diede from the
20
HVAC Shop and William Buckans from the Central Plant, asked Plaintiff to represent them in
21
their complaints pursuant to UC Davis Complaint Resolution Policy PPSM 70. Plaintiff agreed
22
to represent Kenny Diede and William Buckans with their complaints Step II appeals.
23
24
March 2012
25
14 348. Plaintiff’s second letter to the UC Davis chief counsel, dated July 24, 2011,
17 349. In response to Plaintiff’s complaints to the UC Davis chief counsel about the
18 2009 Settlement-Agreement violation by the Defendant, on July 26, 2011, UC Davis Chief
19 Compliance Officer Wendi Delmendo sent Plaintiff an invitation to file a whistleblowing complaint.
21 Davis Chief Compliance Officer Wendi Delmendo’s invitation and advised her that none of the
22 violations she outlined in her letter were qualified to file a claim against under the “UC
23 Whistleblower” policy.
24 351. Furthermore, the mentioned violations should have been be corrected
25 immediately by UC Davis Medical Center senior management through the administrative
26 process. The violations were so obvious and known by the general employee population in the
27 UC Davis Medical Center PO&M Department. All Plaintiff letters were forwarded to UC Davis
28
28
18 stating that he understood that Plaintiff is representing William Buckans and Kenny Diede
19 through the PPSM 70 complaint appeal process. However, since Plaintiff was on paid
20 investigatory leave, Plaintiff would not be permitted to attend any procedural meetings with
21 (CRO) related to both of Plaintiff’s clients’ (as he stated) complaints until a decision was made
22 in the matter related to the allegations made against Plaintiff. Furthermore, Humberto Garcia
23 stated that the university was amenable to placing both the William Buckans and Kenny Diede
24 complaints in abeyance until a decision was made in the matter referenced above and that
25 Plaintiff may elect to submit his arguments to the CRO in writing or Plaintiff’s clients (as he
26 stated) may elect to be represented by someone else.
27
28 357. Plaintiff met Humberto Garcia on February 14, 2012 in the UC Davis
14
358. Today, Plaintiff looks at Humberto Garcia’s e-mail letter dated March 21,
15
2012, differently than Plaintiff looked at it in March 2012. Today, Plaintiff looks at Humberto
16
Garcia’s e-mail letter, , as a letter that may have saved Plaintiff’s life, taking into consideration
17
who was in charge of the UC Davis Police Department in March 2012 and why Mathew
18
Carmichael was assigned as interim UC Davis Police Chief by UC Davis Administration.
19
Humberto Garcia and HR attorney and Humberto Garcia assistant Jill Vanderviver, did not
20
survive long after February 2012 attempt to resolve informally with Plaintiff ongoing dispute.
21
22 359. In addition to the above, on March 19, 2012, Plaintiff sent a letter to
23 University of California Senior Vice President Chief Compliance and Audit Officer Sheryl Vacca
24 and asked her for an independent investigation. Also, Plaintiff requested under the Public Record
25 Act provision all the documents related to Danesha Nichols and Wendi Delmendo’s pseudo-
27 April 2012
15 would contact Plaintiff when the administrative review has been completed without any specifics
17
18 April 2012- The Complaint with U.S Department of Labor , OFCCP Office
19
15 denied in November and December 2011 to Plaintiff. . Further, Plaintiff’s complaint against
16 Liberty had been pending with the state insurance commissioner’s office since November 2011.
17 UC Davis HR Benefits Manager John Peklar was the person who disenrolled Plaintiff from
18 medical insurance in December 2011 without Plaintiff’s knowledge. Since Plaintiff did not want
19 to risk being left without medical insurance, he enrolled himself and his wife in medical
20 insurance with Nordstrom Corporation, where Plaintiff’s spouse has been employed since 1990,
21 paying an extra $200/month.
22
April 2012 – Letter Of Intent to Suspend with 10 Days without Pay
23
24
366. Instead of a response from the Defendant in regard to the informal
25
resolution initiated by the Defendant in February 2012, Plaintiff, on April 13, 2012, received
26
from the Defendant a Letter of Intent to Suspend signed by the UC Davis Medical Center Plant
27
Operation and Maintenance Department Head Charles Witcher—the same Charles Witcher who,
28
15 Specifically, the Defendant’ lies accused Plaintiff that his behavior was in violation of UCDHS
16 Policy 1616 — Violence and Hate Incidents in the Workplace and UC Davis Policy and
18 lies in the letter implied that Plaintiff failed to adhere to specific instructions during the
19 investigation to refrain from engaging in email communications with witnesses, which interfered
20 with the investigation, as outlined in the report.
21 368. Furthermore, the unfounded allegations in the Letter of Intent to Suspend
22 were made that on March 8, 2011, April 21, 2011, and May 5, 20011, Plaintiff engaged in
23 behavior that violated UCDHS Policy 1616—Violence and Hate Incidents in the Workplace. It
24
was alleged that Plaintiff’s behavior was disruptive and intimidating to Dorin Daniliuc when he
25
allegedly pointed his finger in his face and used profanity on March 8, 2011. Further, on April
26
21, 2011, Plaintiff allegedly became disruptive and intimidating toward Patrick Putney during a
27
discussion regarding the Putney and Daniliuc ’s work performance as Plaintiff understood the
28
15 State of California Court of Law, not by slanderous pseudo-investigation reports that financially
17 370. At the end of the letter, Plaintiff was instructed that Plaintiff has the right
18 to respond, either orally or in writing, to the notice of intent to suspend. Plaintiff’s response must
19 be received by the Skelly Reviewer, Michael Pansius (916-734-6572), within eight (8) calendar
20 days from the date of issuance of this letter.
21 371. The assigned Skelly Reviewer, Michael Pansius, was the subordinate of
22 UC Davis Medical Center Director Mike Boyd from the facilities construction and design
23 department.
24
372. In July 2011, Director Mike Boyd took charge of the UC Davis Medical
25
Center Plant Operation and Maintenance Department and became Charles Witcher’s superior.
26
373. Director Mike Boyd took charge of the UC Davis Medical Center Plant
27
Operation and Maintenance Department after his partner in crime, Director Robert Taylor, left
28
16 financial losses in 2011 and Plaintiff lost all accrued vacation and sick leave hours. Plaintiff’s
17 total financial losses in 2011 amounted to approximately $21, 000, due to the inhumane
19
376. On April 15, 2012, Plaintiff requested from Defendant all available
20
documents related to the UC Davis Medical Center HR investigator pseudo-investigation. The
21
requested documents that were included were all generated by Danesha Nichols’ investigatory
22
reports.
23
24
377. On April 20, 2012, Plaintiff responded to the Defendant’s Letter Intent to
25 Suspend signed by Charles Witcher and, in his 26-page response, demanded from the assigned
26 Skelly reviewer, who did not know Skelly law, to entirely disregard and dismiss all lies and
2 378. In great disappointment over the investigatory reports and the unwarranted
3 attack on Plaintiff with the Letter of Intent to Suspend, on April 27, 2012, Plaintiff sent a short
4 email to Danesha Nichols expressing his feelings about her reports. Plaintiff attached to the e-
5
mail a video clip/slide show entitled “Welcome to Romania.” It shows post-communist
6
devastated Romania and some scenes in the slide show had lot in common with the landscape in
7
the HVAC shop supervised by Dorin Daniliuc and Patrick Putney.. Later, the “Welcome to
8
Romania” slide show was exploited and repeatedly used to attack Plaintiff and as cause and
9
pretext to terminate Plaintiff’s employment.
10
379. Danesha Nichols attempted to bully and intimidate Plaintiff, and she
11
received a proper response from Waszczuk. Waszczuk reported Nichols and Chilcott to the State
12
Bar in October 2011and 2013 and reported Nichols to UC Davis Police (Captain Souza and Lt.
13
Pike). If the UC Davis investigator was to investigate Nichols for anything, it would be Central
14
15 Plant Operator Todd Georlich’s suicide, which occurred on December 22, 2010; Central Plant
16 Operator Jeff Lancaster’s locker burglary; the secret 12% pay raise for central plant operators in
17 December 2010, based on blackmail petition; Daniliuc’s involvement in his private enterprise on
18 company time, as well the fact that he was employed by two UCDMC Directors—Robert Taylor
19 and Shelton Duruisseau—in their private residences in exchange for giving him a supervisor
20 position and access to free HVAC parts and equipment and presence in the HVAC shop, though
21 he was a twice-convicted child pornography felon who illegally was accessing the UCDMC
22 HVAC shop computer during his probation or parole time.
23 380. Danesha Nichols swept under the rug the child pornography felony matter
24
in her report instead of turning porn felon into authorities and obtaining a restraining order.
25
Instead, in her reports Nichols made Plaintiff look five times worse than , a twice-convicted child
26
pornography felon; thus, Nichols grossly violated law by not reporting a felon on probation to
27
authorities and grossly violating the 2009 Settlement–Agreement that Plaintiff signed with the
28
7 May 2012
May 2012- Defendant Preparation for the May 31, 2012 Provocation to Kill Plaintiff
8
9
381. In April and May 2012, Plaintiff did not know or was aware that the
10
Defendant were negotiating the new power sale contract with the Sacramento Municipal Utility
11
12 District (SMUD) and the UC Davis Medical Center Central Plant cogeneration facility. The
13 Defendant got very inpatient with Plaintiff’s continued presence on the Defendant’ payroll list.
14 382 .The psychological terror, abuse, harassment, and retaliation that Plaintiff
15 was subjected to for almost one year, which was orchestrated and carried out by the Defendant’
16 lawyers, managers, and psychologists at the UC Davis Medical Center HR Department with the
17 full support of the UC Davis Chancellor Office and the University of California Office of the
18 President did not work to force Plaintiff to quit voluntarily The decision was made to eliminate
19 Plaintiff by provocation and by means of a bullet from the pistol of UC Davis Police Lt. James
20 Barbour who was assigned by Defendant to carry out assassination on May 31, 2012.
21 383. On May 1, 2012, Plaintiff did not know how close Plaintiff was to being
22 killed or his employment ending in the UC Davis Medical Center Trauma Unit # 11 due to the
23 ill-crafted provocation of an especially assembled team, which Plaintiff later nicknamed in
24
documents “UC Davis Death Squad.”
25
384. The first stage of preparation to provoke and eliminate Plaintiff was the
26
February 14, 2012, fruitless meeting with Humberto Garcia from the UC Davis HR Department,
27
which was intended to informally resolve conflict or let Plaintiff return to work after six months
28
15 387. The fourth preparation step to provoke and eliminate Plaintiff was the April
16 13, 2012, Letter of Intent to Suspend Plaintiff without pay for 10 days during Plaintiff‘s already
17 nine (9) months forced absence from work. The letter of intent to suspend did not even say or
18 Arizona. Mr. Lohse is a member of the State Bars of California and Arizona.
21 391. Plaintiff was very impressed with Director John Lohse professional career
22 and achievements. However, in the situation Plaintiff found himself in with respect to his
23 employment, Plaintiff was convinced that Director Lohse was coordinating unknown actions
24 against Plaintiff and that Director Lohse perfectly fit the profile of framing Plaintiff. Plaintiff
25 expressed his thoughts in a response letter to Director John Lohse dated May 14, 2012. After
26 Plaintiff responded to Mr. Lohse’s letter and sent to his office a few other documents related to
28
6
393. On May 11, 2012, Charles Witcher was ordered to serve Plaintiff a 10-
7
day suspension without pay from May 16, 2012, to May 30, 2012. The letter was based on
8
unspecified and fabricated accusations and allegations that were never witnessed by anybody.
9
Plaintiff’s stress levels and blood pressure went up, and nitroglycerine and Lorazepam were very
10
helpful.
11
May 11, 2012
12
13
Jaroslaw Waszczuk
524 Swallow Lane
14 Lodi, CA 95240
15
RE: Letter of Suspension
16
The purpose of this letter is to inform you that I am suspending you for a
17
period of ten (10) working days without pay, commencing May 16, 2012
18
through May 30, 2012. The reason for this action is your continued
19
inappropriate behavior in the workplace. Specifically, your behavior is in
20
violation of UCDHS Policy 1616 — Violence and Hate Incidents in the
21
Workplace and UC Davis Policy and Procedure 380-15 Staff Complaints of
22
Discrimination. Additionally, your failure to adhere to specific instructions
23
during the investigation to refrain from engaging in email communications
24
25
with witnesses interfered with the investigation as outlined in the report.
26 The suspension will begin on Wednesday, May 16, 2012 and end on
27 Wednesday, May 30, 2012. You are expected to report to work at 8 a.m.
17 Employee & Employee & Labor Relations office no later than thirty (30)
19 Charles Witcher
20 Manager, Plant Operations and Maintenance
Attachments: Proof of Service
21 Skelly Decision
22
cc' [Department File]
[UCDHS Employee & Labor Relations w/attachment]
23 [UCDHS HR Records w/attachment]
24
25 394. In Charles Witcher’s Letter of Suspension, dated May 11, 2012, Plaintiff
26 was instructed to report to Charles Witcher’s office on May 31, 2012, at 8:00 a.m. Plaintiff was
27 not aware that just a day before, Charles Witcher had been instructed by Brent Seifert, Cindy
28
8 May 2012 – The Defendant Attack Aimed at Plaintiff Coworkers , Kenny Diede
and William Buckans
9
10
397. In further preparation to send Plaintiff to the trauma unit, on May 18 and
11
23, 2012, PO&M Manager Charles Witcher, Patrick Putney, Dennis Curry, and Mike Lewis, in a
12
retaliatory manner, attacked the two coworkers Plaintiff was representing in complaints against
13
some of the above-mentioned individuals. Within one week, Kenny Diede and William Buckans
14
were served with despicable Letters of Expectation, which were based on phony, unfounded, and
15
fabricated accusations.
16
17 May 2012- Plaintiff Protest Letter Entitled “ The Retaliation Isn’t Wise’
18 398. On May 24, 2012, Plaintiff issued a 13-page protest letter entitled, “The
19 Retaliation Isn’t Wise,” against management’s vicious attack on Kenny Diede and William
20 Buckans and sent it to the perpetrators and senior management and administration at UC Davis
12
401. May 30, 2012, was Plaintiff’s 61st birthday and on May 30, 2012, Plaintiff
13
did not know that the HR Workers Compensation Manager was a coordinator of the assembled
14
15 “UC Davis Death Squad” and planning to end Plaintiff’s employment with the University of
16 California on May 31, 2012 (the next day) at the UC Davis Medical Center Trauma Unit. Plaintiff
17 also did not know on his 61st birthday that the host of the stress management class Marjorie
18 Trogdon Shock was also a member of the assembled “UC Davis Death Squad,” the goal of which
19 was to end Plaintiff’s employment at the UC Davis Trauma unit # 11 because Defendant signed
20 power sale contract for UCDMC Central Plant with Scaramanto Municipal Utility Distict
21 on May 29, 2012.
22 402. On May 31, 2012, per Defendant’ suspension letter dated May 11, 2012,
23 Plaintiff was scheduled to return to work after 10 months of absence and report to Charles
24
Witcher’s office in Bldg. 68.
25
403. Plaintiff had heard from his coworkers that the carpenter shop was
26
building two extra offices on the first level of Building 68, and Plaintiff was hoping that
27
Defendant would eventually move Plaintiff from the HVAC shop to Bldg. 68 and that the
28
4 404. On May 31, 2012, I drove to work and parked my car next to HVAC shop
5
as usual with a valid parking permit. Before Plaintiff reported to the Department Head Charles
6
Witcher’s office, Plaintiff went to the Marriott Hotel across from the HVAC shop to eat
7
breakfast in the cafeteria. I met my two coworkers, who joined me for breakfast.
8
405. Plaintiff was not expecting to be placed on investigatory leave again,
9
which Plaintiff hated, and Plaintiff wanted to go back to work after such a long period of absence
10
regardless of the fact that Plaintiff had been subjected by Defendant to more than one year of
11
psychological terror, harassment, retaliation, significant loss of income, and multiple threats of
12
employment termination. Plaintiff could expect anything but never expected that that highly
13
regarded University of California would assemble a “Death Squad” to resolve the dispute with
14
15 the employee by using the police force to end the employee’s career with the university at the
16 trauma unit.
17 406. On May 30, 2012, just one day before the ill-planned provocation, HR
18 Supervisor Brent Seifer sent an e-mail to HR Executive Director Stephen Chilcott stating that
19 Plaintiff’s superior Charles Witcher understands that Jerry (Plaintiff) will report to his office
20 tomorrow at 8 am. As soon as Jerry (Plaintiff) arrived, Charles would be issuing the
21 investigatory leave letter and directing him to meet with me.
22 407. On May 31, 2012, Plaintiff arrived at 8:00 a.m. at the Department Head
23 Charles Witcher’s office, and Charles Witcher handed Plaintiff a letter and sent him to the HR
24
Building Tycon III for an interview with HR Supervisor Brent Seifert. Maybe if Plaintiff had read
25
Charles Witcher’s letter in his office and found out that the Defendant were placing Plaintiff again
26
on investigatory leave and not letting him return to work after 10 days suspension, Plaintiff would
27
probably not have appreciated such actions. If Plaintiff had known that Defendant had maliciously
28
10
408. Plaintiff did not read the letter in Charles’ office and went straight to the
11
Human Resources Tycon Building for the meeting with Brent Seifert. HR Supervisor Brent Seifert
12
looked at Plaintiff upon his arrival like he wanted to ask Plaintiff what Plaintiff was doing in the
13
HR building meeting. At the end of the meeting—which was about phony, new, unfounded, made-
14
15 up, and out-of-the-blue accusations against Plaintiff and life in Romania, of which Brent Seifer
16 did not even know where it was located, Plaintiff asked Brent Seifert, “What’s next?” In response,
17 Brent Seifert said, “Didn’t you read the letter Witcher gave you? You are on investigatory leave
19 409. Plaintiff looked at the letter he received from Witcher, said ok, then left the
20 HR Building and Plaintiff went home. Plaintiff did not like the investigatory leave and Plaintiff
21 expressed his feelings thereafter in a letter entitled “I feel again like a Hunted Jew during the
22 Holocaust.” This is how the HR “Death Squad’s” plot to send Plaintiff the UC Davis Medical
23 Center # 11 failed.
24
410. Plaintiff on May 31, 2012, knew that something was wrong but Plaintiff
25
did not know any details about the malicious plan of the UC Davis Death Squad, “Kill Waszczuk,”
26
nor the unsuccessful provocation, until Plaintiff received relevant documents under the Public
27
Record Act Provision of November 2011. The documents are very clear as to what Defendant had
28
3 JUNE 2012
4 June 1,2012- Hugh Parker’s E-Mail to the Members of the ” UC Davis Death Squad”
5
6
411. On June 1, 2012, one day after falling ill and the maliciously crafted
7
provocation by the assembled UC Davis Death Squad, the coordinator of the provocation, HR
8
Workers Compensation Manager Hugh Parker, sent e-mail message to the other members of the
9
assembled UC Davis Death Squad members stating that
10
“Mr. Waszczuk (Plaintiff) had returned to work yesterday from his
11
suspension and was placed back on investigatory leave the same day. At
12
issue are writings sent by Mr. Waszczuk (Plaintiff) while on leave. Mr.
13
Waszczuk (Plaintiff) did not display any anger when told he was being
14
16 412.. The Hugh Parker e-mail statement read: “At issue are writings sent by Mr.
17 Waszczuk (Plaintiff) while on leave. Mr. Waszczuk (Plaintiff) did not display any anger when
18 told he was being place on investigatory leave.” This translates to the following: that Plaintiff,
19 after almost one year of absence due to the Defendant’ psychological terror aimed at Plaintiff,
20 including threatening Plaintiff’s employment and livelihood by means of multiple investigatory
21 leave letters, which Plaintiff received from the Defendant as ill-planned provocations, should be
22 triggered to become angry and violent so that the UC Davis renegade Police Lt James Barbour,
23 bribed by means of a $35,000 wage increase by UC Davis Medical Center Trauma Unit # 11,
24
will do the job to eliminate Plaintiff from the UC Davis Medical Center landscape forever.
25
Apparently, UC Davis assembled Death Squad members underestimated Plaintiff and mistook
26
Plaintiff for somebody whose employment they had ended with UC Davis in this way.
27
28
15 among the eleven names of the assembled UC Davis Death Squad, but Stephen Chilcott’s name
16 appeared in the email dated May 30, 2012, which was sent by HR Supervisor Brent Seifert to
17 Stephen Chilcott in preparation for the ill-minded provocation and Plaintiff’s execution by UC
18 Davis Police.
15 granted to him by the 2009 Settlement-Agreement signed with the UC Regents, which HR
16 Director Stephen Chilcott grossly solicited and supervised then violated and disregarded.
18 and the Locally Designated Official (LDO), with full knowledge of wrongdoing, conspired in a
19 premeditated fashion with other Defendant and UC Davis Chief Compliance Officer Wendi
20 Delmendo to cover the others’ crimes and gross misconduct, deliberate interference, and
21 retaliation against Plaintiff for reporting management misconduct and violation of state and
22 federal law and established University of California Policies and Procedures.
23 420. HR Executive Director Stephen Chilcott, with malice and disregard for
24
state and federal law, conspired and dedicated himself to ending Plaintiff’s employment, doing
25
whatever it would take, and conspired with others, known and unknown, to kill Plaintiff or end
26
Plaintiff’s employment on May 31, 2012, in UC Davis Trauma Unit # 11, thus violating not only
27
Plaintiff’s civil rights but also, despicably, Plaintiff’s human rights to work and live.
28
18 subordinate.
15 which information was leaked out regarding the attempt to terminate Plaintiff, and Plaintiff did
16 not report to the UCDMC HR Building on this day. The Danesha Nichols Report for termination
19 with HR Labor Relation Manager Mike Garcia for informal conflict resolution. Plaintiff, in good
20 faith, held the meeting with Garcia and presented his proposition to resolve the conflict. Instead
21 of a counter offer or proposition to resolve, Plaintiff was suspended in May 2012 for 10 days
22 without pay, his two coworkers to whom Plaintiff provided representation came under vicious
23 attack, Garcia was replaced by a new HR Labor Relation Manager, and Garcia’s assistant Jill
24
Vandeviver was fired. Oropeza’s name is listed in a group of UC Davis employees who were
25
members of a specially assembled team nicknamed in the documents by Plaintiff “The UC Davis
26
Death Squad.”
27
428. On May 31, 2012, Plaintiff became the subject of an ill-crafted but
28
17 Plaintiff met Neil Speth in 2005 through the course of his employment at the UCDMC Central
18 Plant. Dr. Neil Speth almost killed Plaintiff in 2005 by forcing Plaintiff to take a spirometer test
19 against Plaintiff’s will. As a result of Dr. Speth’s irresponsible actions, Plaintiff landed
20 unconscious in the UCDMC ER. Plaintiff informed Dr. Speth at the relevant time that because of
21 Plaintiff’s medical condition, Plaintiff could not take a spirometer test. Plaintiff intended to take
22 legal action against Dr. Speth, but a few months later, Plaintiff had open-heart surgery and dropped
23 the idea to take Dr. Speth to court.
24
432. Plaintiff is not sure what kind of assignment Hugh Parker, the coordinator
25
of the HR Death Squad action against Plaintiff, gave to Dr. Speth for May 31, 2012, but it is
26
apparent that Dr. Speth had an assignment to ensure that Plaintiff stop breathing in the Trauma
27
Unit after the Lt. James Barbour’s response to UC Davis Death Squad Coordinator Hugh Parker’s
28
12
435. CAROL KIRSHNIT, Ph.D, and MARJORE TROGODON SHOCK,
13
LCSW—Members of the UC DAVIS MEDICAL CENETR HR Academic and Staff Assistance
14
15 Program.
16 436. Carol Kirshnit is a licensed clinical psychologist and the coordinator of the
17 Academic and Staff Assistance Program at UC Davis Health System, and Marjorie Trogodon
18 Shock is a licensed clinical social worker with over 20 years of clinical experience.
19 Plaintiff believes that Carol Kirshnit, Ph.D, was the person who, as a doctor of psychology,
20 professionally advised her Superior HR Executive Director Stephen Chilcott and the UC
21 Davis Death Squad coordinator Hugh Parker as to whether Plaintiff was properly primed
22 and aroused to be provoked and killed on May 31, 2012, and whether Plaintiff’s
23 employment would end in the UC Davis Medical Center Trauma Unit .
24
437. Marjorie Trogodon Shock was the person who, on May 30, 2012,
25
together with the Death Squad Coordinator, removed Plaintiff from the stress management class.
26
Apparently, Shock was perfectly aware and informed about the ill-crafted provocation of May
27
31, 2012, to kill Plaintiff. Plaintiff believes that her participation in the plot was to comfort
28
10 Plaintiff’s employment termination and that Parker would become a coordinator of the UC Davis
11 Death Squad and of the maliciously crafted provocation to kill Plaintiff on May 31, 2012, or end
12 Plaintiff’s employment at the UC Davis Medical Center. Plaintiff hopes that Hugh Parker
13 sooner or later, together with the co-conspirators, will get what he deserves according to
20 assembled UC Davis Death Squad. In May 2012 and thereafter, Lindsey was looking for any
21 reason she could use to terminate Plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff looked at Lindsey’s job
22 history and credentials on the Web and it appears that Lindsey never advanced in his attorney
23 legal career beyond the position of associate attorney in four different law firms from January
24 2003 to May 2012. The working record also shows that Lindsey never worked in a Human
25 Resources department at any private enterprise or public employment, did not have any
26 supervisory or managerial experience, and had not directly handled any labor issues prior to
27 being hired by UC Davis Medical Center in 2012.
28
17 Center, it creates an unbelievably chilling picture of what the “HR Death Squad Members,”
18 including Karen Kouertas, had in their sick minds in relation to the meticulously and maliciously
19 crafted provocation of May 31, 2012, to eliminate Plaintiff from UC Davis Medical Center
20 landscape.
21 445. In July 2013, Plaintiff made an attempt to find out through the State of
22 California Board of Registered Nurses the capacity of Karen Kouretas’s involvement in the
23
activity of the assembled UC Davis Death Squad.
24
446. It is very important for the Board of Registered Nursing to know that the
25
board is issuing licenses not only to nurses who work very hard to take care of sick and ill people
26
but also to nurses, like Karen Kouretas, who collaborate and associate themselves with a group
27
of people whose goals are to provoke, kill, and deliver their victims to her unit for unspecified
28
16 Davis Compliance Office due to borrowing from contractors who were working in UC Davis
18 450. Dennis Curry was removed from the premises just two weeks before he
22
451. On June 12, 2012, Plaintiff sent a 24-page letter to the UC Davis Medical
23
Center Compliance & Privacy Investigator Gina Guillaume-Holleman. The letter was entitled:
24
“THE SUMMARY OF THE FEW UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN UC DAVIS
25
8
June13, 2012 – The Investigatory Leave Extension
9
452. On June 13, 2012, UC Davis Medical Center Plant Operation and
10
Maintenance Department Head Charles Witcher sent an email letter to Plaintiff stating that
11
Plaintiff’s investigatory leave was being extended from June 14, 2012, through June 27, 2012.
12
Furthermore, the e-mail stated that Plaintiff was thereby relieved from all work duties for the
13
duration of this investigation. This duration was intended to allow additional time to collect
14
15 relevant information and determine the facts surrounding e-mails that Plaintiff sent, which were
16 believed to contain discriminatory content. Plaintiff would remain on pay status during that time.
17 During this leave, Plaintiff would not be allowed to have access to the work place. Plaintiff
18 would remain available during business hours should it be required that Plaintiff participate
19 in this investigation. There was no word in Witcher’s e-mail that Plaintiff violated the 2009
20 Settlement-Agreement signed by Plaintiff with the UC Regents.
21 June 14, 2012-The State of California’s Insurance Commissioner Office Decision
22
23 453. On June 14, 2012, two weeks after the unsuccessful provocation to end
24
Plaintiff’s employment at the UC Davis Medical Center Trauma Unit # 11, Plaintiff received a
25
decision from the State of California’s Insurance Commissioner Office in regard to the complaint
26
Plaintiff filed in November 2011 against the Liberty Assurance Company of Boston, which, in
27
conspiracy with the Defendant, denied Plaintiff Short Term Disability Benefits. The decision,
28
15 Campus or UC Davis Medical Center) from the period of November 1, 2011, to the present time.
16 455. Furthermore, in his letter to Captain Joyce Souza, Plaintiff stated that
17 based on multiple correspondences that Plaintiff forwarded to Captain Souza’s office, Captain
18 Souza was most likely aware that Plaintiff had not been working since August 2, 2011. Plaintiff
19 spent eight months of this period on administrative leave and investigatory leave plus 10 days of
20 suspension without pay as a retaliation. Plaintiff elaborated in his letter to Captain Souza that it is
21 not difficult for anyone to figure out that the eight months on administrative and investigatory
22 leave indicate that something went terribly wrong or is going to go terribly wrong for a long time
23 in the UC Davis Medical Center Plant Operation and Maintenance Department and Human
24
Resources Department.
25
The UC Davis Pepper Spray Incident investigation took only five months to issue the final
26
report. (From November 2011 to March 2012) and Plaintiff’s case has been going since
27
March 13, 2011.
28
15 were filed under Policy PPSM 70 and to whom Plaintiff was providing representation. Gina
16 Harwood was removed by Humberto Garcia in January or February 2012 to handle Plaintiff and
17 his coworkers’ complaints, which were assigned to HR consultant Jill Noel Vanderviver.
19 about Humberto Garcia and Jill Noel Vandeviver’s departure from UC Davis Medical Center with
20 a 10-page letter.
21 June 27, 2012 – The Investigatory Leave Extension
22 459. On June 27, 2012, Plaintiff called UC Davis Medical Center Plant
23 Operation Manager Charles Witcher and asked him about Plaintiff’s status because the last
24
investigatory leave letter had expired on June 27, 2012. Thereafter, Charles Witcher sent Plaintiff
25
another routine two-weeks extension, stating that the letter confirmed that Plaintiff’s
26
investigatory leave was being extended from June 28, 2012, through July 11, 2012. Plaintiff was
27
hereby relieved from all work duties for the duration of this investigation. This would allow
28
10 enjoyed being UC Davis Medical Center management’s prisoner, sentenced to one year of home
11 arrest for unknown causes, Plaintiff responded to Witcher’s investigatory extension letter as
12 follows:
13 “Do you have any clue who is being investigated and why this investigation is
14 causing me this Investigatory Leave for such a long time?
15
Did you receive any threats against me and are you keeping me out of the
16
Medical Center for my safety or is it for a different reason?
17
I am just curious because it is weird and makes me very nervous that I am still
18
on the UC Payroll for so long and I can’t work. I am getting all kinds of
19
information and it makes me wonder what is going on behind the scenes of
20
your Investigatory Leave. I am not sure if all the information I am receiving is
21
true but, almost always, rumors and gossip contain 5% of the truth.
22
Today, I received information about the Director Taylor and Mike Pansius’
23
24
retirement. A few weeks ago, I heard about Dennis Curry’s suspension or
25 administrative leave just before his retirement. Last Friday, I received official
26 information about Mike Garcia and Jill Noel Vandeviver’s departure from the
28 Today, my Investigatory leave was forgotten. It was a very hard decision for
15 and I only built my positive opinion of Corey from the HVAC and PM shops
17 Do you know who is in charge of the HR Labor Relations after Mike Garcia
18 left? I thought a few my months back that Jill Noel Vandeviver was going to
19 replace Mike with her very aggressive introduction to the ongoing matters
20 related to myself, Kenny Diede, and William Buckans, as well as associated
21 PO&M personnel. It is my understanding that an Investigatory Leave Letter
22 has to be approved by HR Labor Relation Chief.
23 Also, there is an issue with my employee evaluation for 2010/2011. I am still a
24
UC employee and would appreciate it if you provide me with the evaluation
25
for 2010/2011. At least for the period I was in the shop and was working until
26
August 2, 2011. The time for 2011/2012 evaluations is approaching, and I am
27
not sure how I should be evaluated when I am not working and due to a
28
6
July 3, 2012—HR Consultant Gina Harwood’s Letter Entitled
7 “Jerry Waszezuk Timeline/Summary”
8
9
461. On July 3, 2012, notoriously deceptive UC Davis Medical Center HR
10
Consultant Gina Harwood sent an e-mail to her supervisor, Brent Seifert, with the attached letter
11
(“Jerry Waszczuk Timeline /Summary”) described by Gina Harwood as “thrown together really
12
quick.” Besides, the mentioned summary was full of slanderous lies and unfounded, made-up
13
accusations about Plaintiff, which she began generating in 2011 and is repeating with demeaning
14
lies about Plaintiff in this summary. Gina Harwood also complained to Brent Seifert about
15
dismissed in June the HR Labor Relation Consultant, Jill Noel Vandrviver . HR consultant Jill
16
17
Noel Vandrviver was dismissed together with the HR Labor Relation Manger, Humberto Garcia
18 in June 2012. Gina Harwood was removed in January or February 2012, from handling Plaintiff
20 management misconduct, retaliation and harassment. It was most likely that Gina Harwood
21 contributed much of her effort to make Humberto Garcia and Jill Noel Vanedviver dismissed
22 from their jobs in retaliation for being removed from the assignment.
23 462. In her July, 2012, full-of-lies defacing-the-Plaintiff summary, Gina Harwood wrote:
24 Jerry Waszczuk Timeline/Summary
25 “Jaroslaw Waszczuk is an employee in the HVAC Shop as an Associate
26 Development Engineer, he has been employed for 13 years. He is responsible
27
for monitoring the Metasys system which monitors alarms throughout the
28
15 received a complaint letter from Mr. Waszczuk with. Multiple allegations, this
16 all took place at the end of May beginning of June. Mr. Waszczuk stated that
17 Mr. Witcher was handling his complaint. Ms. Harwood asked to meet with Mr.
18 Waszczuk as a follow up to his complaint, meeting took place the second week
19 of July. Prior to the meeting, Patrick Putney filed a violence in the workplace
20 incident related to the April and May incidents. Ms. Waszczuk made several
21 allegations in his email and during the meeting related to misuse of University
22 resources by his supervisors, Ms. Harwood sent the information to Wendi
23 Delmendo for review and Danesha Nichols was appointed to investigate the
24
allegations from Mr. Waszczuk and the Violence in the Workplace complaints.
25
During the investigation, Mr. Waszczuk was placed on investigatory leave. He
26
began a letter/email writing campaign to multiple UC employees. The email
27
communications were inflammatory and contained discriminatory comments
28
15 denied to file. He applied for Liberty Mutual and his claim was denied,
25
463. The Summary itself as no so much interesting but interesting is why HR
26
Labor Relation Supervisor Brent Seifert requested the summary on Plaintiff from Gina Harwood.
27
Brent Seifert listed in Hugh Parker’s e-mail chat dated June 1, 2012 about May 31, 2012 ill crafted
28
15 without knowing why and in contrary and in light of the widely publicized in media November
16 18 , 2011 pepper spray attack ordered by UC Davis Chancellor Linda Katehi and investigation of
17 this incident which concluded within five months . Plaintiff did not understand for what crime his
18 being kept hostage for one year on investigatory leave and why he is being investigated.
19 466. Beside the letters to Captain Souza and Compliance Investigator Gina
20 Gauilaumme –Holleman Plaitiff on June 27, 2012 sent letter to his Department Head Charles
21 Witcher and demanded answer why Plaintiff is kept on investigatory leave and why he is not
22 being permitted to go back to work and do his duty . Plaintiff never received response from Charles
23 Witcher to his inquiry.
24
July 3, 2012 – The Plaintiff’s , Kenny Diede ‘s and William Buckan’s Complaints under UC
25 Davis Policy Complaint Resolution Policy PPMS 70
26 467. On July 3, 2012 Plaintiff and his two coworkers Kenny Diede and William
27 Buckans received from HR Consultant Gina Harwood Decisions in Step I Complaints Plaintiff
28
15 Defendant for serving Plaintiff every two weeks for almost one year letters of Investigatory
16 Leave and denying Plaintiff right to work It was done in violation of UC Davis Policy PPSM 63
18 322. The other Plaintiff complaint Step I under UC Davis Policy PPSM 70 was still pending
15 interview revelation and his disclosure about conspiracy to frame Plaintiff because in July 2012
16 Plaintiff did not know at that time anything about May 31, 2012 provocation to kill him or end
18 476. Plaintiff suspected that something was wrong but did have any evidence to
19 proof anything bedside that he was removed from stress management class on May 30, 2012 and
20 was served with Investigatory Leave letter on May 31, 2012 and was not permitted to work by
21 Defendant.
22 477. Few days later mark Montoya called Plaintiff and confirmed what Kenny
23 Diede told Plaintiff about his interview with Gina Gaulliuaume –Hollmann’on July 18, 2012.
24
325. On July 23, Plaintiff decided for the record to write few additional words to Gina
25
Gaulliuaume –Hollmann’as follow;
26
“Dear Ms. Guillame -Holleman:
27
For the record and in addition to my previous e-mail I would like to inform
28
15 reason was behind for their statements but I don't care much it because I never
16 had any problem with any of my coworkers in the HVAC shop during my
17 employment from March 2007- to August 2, 2012 and will not have any
19 I will not make big deal about my" photo and your question “Apparently you
20 was instructed by somebody to find cause for my employment termination. I
21 like to mention that at first I got outraged about your interview with my
22 coworker but after the interviewed person called me about than I told my to
23 myself: . Why I have to stress myself for something I have no control over
24
until the whole case go to court. "
25
You as an employee of UCDMC Compliance office shall follow Canons of
26
Ethic during the interview. By showing my photo and trying makes me like
27
most wanted at large bandit is not going to help my employer in any way but
28
16 reminder.
17 Jerry”
July 25, 2012 – HR Director Stephen Chilcott’s e-mail
18 to HR Labor Relation Manager Travis Lindsey
19
9
481. On August 1, 2012, Defendant sent Plaintiff another two-week extension of
10
the Investigatory Leave. This time the Plant Operation and Maintenance Manager Charles Witcher,
11
who routinely signed the investigatory leave letter, which was at this point close to the one-year
12
anniversary of the first investigatory leave letter that Witcher signed on September 1, 2011.
13
14
August 2, 2012 – The UC Davis Chief Compliance Officer Wendy Delmendo’s e-mail
15 to Kenney Diede
17 Delmendo sent an e-mail to the Plaintiff’s coworker Kenney Diede, attempting to drag Kenny
18 Diede into a deceptive and useless whistleblowing complaint, just as she had attempted to do
19 with Plaintiff in July 2011. Plaintiff was almost killed on May 31, 2012, due to Wendy
20 Delmendo’s effort and dedication to destroy the UC Davis employees life’s and livelihoods
21 instead of providing help to them .
22 483. In her August 2, 2012, email letter to Kenny Diede (whom Plaintiff was
23 successfully representing in his complaints against management misconduct under the UC Davis
24 Policy PPSM 70), Wendy Delmendo wrote:
25
“I recently learned that you have filed a grievance in which you allege you
26
have been subject to retaliation. I am writing to inform you that your allegation
27
of retaliation may also be eligible for review under the University’s
28
15 misconduct, harassment, retaliation, abuse of power, violation of state and federal law, and
16 Delmendo openly participating in Plaintiff’s employment termination in 2012 and almost getting
19 decline Wendy Delmendo’s deceptive and misleading offer with the following words in
20 response:
21 Dear Ms. Delmendo:
22 I appreciate your concern. However, I am not sure what you are referring to in
23 your letter in regard to my complaints.
24
For your information, I filed two complaints against my manager Patrick
25
Putney’s vendetta and retaliation. (I believe that you are very familiar with this
26
person’s name). I am not only a victim of Patrick’s Putney behavior. My two
27
complaints against Patrick Putney are pending and problems probably would
28
17 questions.
19 E-Mail: [email protected] “
20 487. In addition to the UC Davis Chief Compliance Officer Title, on February 2, 2014,
21 Wendy Delmendo accrued the “Lead Discrimination Officer” title per order of the University of
22 California President Janet Napolitano after an enormous discrimination scandal on the University
23 of California, Los Angeles campus.
24
The Lead Discrimination Officer title fits Wendy Delmendo perfectly. She advanced herself in
25
her skill in how to discriminate and hurt employees while advising UC Davis administration
26
without leaving a trace of discrimination and harassment.
27
28
15 Plaintiff’s coworker William Buckans, to whom Plaintiff was providing representation, received
17 August 9, 2012 – The Letter of Expectation served to HVAC Technician Dereck Cole .
18
490. Following the UC Davis Chief Compliance Officer Wendi Delmendo’s
19
invitation to her whistleblowing “Russian Roulette” game and Gina Harwood’s letter prohibiting
20
Plaintiff from working and representing his coworkers, Defendant attacked another coworker of
21
Plaintiff called Dereck Cole.
22
24 Dereck Cole was attacked by means of a maliciously crafted Letter of Expectation that gave
25 Plaintiff goose bumps. The letter of expectation by UC Davis Policy PPSM 62 should not even
26 be considered disciplinary action and should be served to employees as a tool for performance
27 and behavior improvement.
28
15 work place prior to taking his own life. In March 2011, Plaintiff brought this information to the
16 Defendant’ attention.
17 494. Todd Goerlich, who replaced Plaintiff in April 2007, was Dereck Cole’s
18 best friend since high school and he left behind a one-year-old child.
19 495. Shortly after this, Dereck Cole was attacked and turned to Plaintiff for help.
20 Plaintiff agreed to represent him in his complaint under UC Davis Policy PPSM 70, regardless of
21 the fact that Plaintiff had little time and was very busy with his own defenses and those of his two
22 coworkers against harassment and the Defendant’ retaliation. Plaintiff had to sacrifice a lot to take
23 on and handle another retaliation and harassment case against the vicious, unscrupulous, malicious,
24
and vindictive UC Davis management and administration.
25
August 16, 2012-The Extension of the Investigatory Leave
26 (August 16, 2012-September 28, 2012)
27 496. On August 16, 2012, the Defendant sent Plaintiff another extension of the
28
16 498. This long extension of investigatory leave passed the one-year anniversary
17 of the September 1, 2011, first investigatory leave letter, which the Defendant had served
18 Plaintiff. Plaintiff became very concerned that something more drastic was going on with
19 Plaintiff’s employment due to the vicious attack against Plaintiff’s coworker Dereck Cole, as
20 well as Wendy Delmendo and Gina Harwood’s letters to Plaintiff’s coworker, Kenny Diede, and
21 the endless pseudo-investigations conducted by the assigned Defendant, two of “UC Davis Death
22 Squad’s” members, Brent Seifert and Cindy Oropeza, from the UC Davis Medical Center HR
23 Department.
24
499. Plaintiff was not mistaken that that something more drastic was going on
25
and finally uncovered it after Plaintiff, in November 2011, received a bulk e-mail
26
correspondence exchange between the perpetrators, who were plaining another provocation to
27
deliver Plaintiff to the UC Davis Medical Center # 11 to silence Plaintiff forever. Plaintiff was
28
10
13 501. On August 28, 2012, Plaintiff sent a letter to Compliance and Privacy
Program Investigator Gina Guillaume-Holleman about the unfair overtime distribution in the
14
HVAC shop with following information and concerns.
15
16 “I am sending you the copy of the letter of expectation issued for HVAC
15 plumber.”
16
502. The subject of the unfair overtime distribution was one of the HVAC shop
17
technicians, George Ursu, who is the friend the HVAC shop supervisors Dorin Daniliuc. It was
18
most likely that the excessive overtime was a fraud and George Ursu never worked most of the
19
20
overtime but got paid the same as Dorin Daniliuc, who was officially working full time, though
21 he actually employed himself in his private HVAC business and private church more than 50
23 503. After the complaint was made by Dereck Cole, George Urusus’s overtime
24
dropped $10,000 in 2013, and after Dereck Cole, in retaliatory action against him, was removed
25
from the HVAC shop, George Urus’s overtime bounced back with $11,000 in 2014.
26
27
August 28, 2012–E-mail from UC Davis Health System HR Workers' Compensation,
28 Ergonomics, Disability Manager Hugh Parker
15 August 28, 2012, Plaintiff did not know who replaced Humberto Garcia, and HR Consultant
16 Gina Harwood was unresponsive when Plaintiff asked her who her manager was after she sent
17 information to Plaintiff on June 22, 2012 that Humberto Garcia and Jill Noel Vandeviver were
19 506. On August 28, 2012, Plaintiff did know that Hugh Parker was the
20 coordinator and conductor for the assembled group of UC Davis employees, nicknamed by
21 Plaintiff in the documents as “The UC Davis Death Squad,” which on May 31, 2012, in the ill-
22 planned provocation, attempted to kill or end Plaintiff’s employment at the UC Davis Medical
23 Center Trauma Unit #11. From the Public Act Records documents, Plaintiff learned about Hugh
24
Parker’s special assignment that had coordinated an assault on Plaintiff to terminate his
25
employment through ill-minded and orchestrated provocation on May 31, 2012.
26
507. In July and August 2011, Plaintiff exchanged with Hugh Parker his
27
opinion about the UC Davis Medical Center fraudulently using the Workers Compensation
28
15 509. In May 2012, Plaintiff learned from the Public Record Act documents he
16 received that Hugh Parker had requested the investigation report on Plaintiff from HR
17 Investigator Danesha Nichols, which was fabricated for the purpose of the ill-planned
19 The information about the planned attempt to terminate Plaintiff’s employment was leaked and
20 the plan failed. HR Investigator Danesha Nichol’s report, which Hugh Parker requested from her,
21 was destroyed according to the UC Davis Public Record Office, and a copy was never provided
22 to Plaintiff.
23 Plaintiff is not certain”, but it appears that September 23, 2011 was the Defendant’s first
24
attempt to provoke the physical confrontation from Plaintiff, physically hurt him, and then
25
dismiss him with accusations that he was violent.
26
510. Plaintiff’s opinion is based on the fact that, two days prior to September
27
23, 2011, he received a letter from his Department Head Charles Witcher stating that he would
28
8
511. On August 29, 2012, Plaintiff received a letter from the Compliance and
9
Privacy Program Investigator Gina Guillaume-Holleman.
10
512. By means of this letter, Plaintiff was notified that the UCD Davis Health
11
System (UCDHS) Compliance Department had completed its investigation of allegations and
12
was advising of possible policy violations regarding a PO&M manager who allegedly accepted
13
money from vendor(s) for personal use and a PO&M supervisor allegedly using a paintball gun
14
on university premises. Both matters had been investigated and no proof of violations was
15
provided by Plaintiff or obtained during the investigation.
16
18 18, 2012, interviewed one of Plaintiff’s coworkers from the UCDHS HVAC shop, Mark Montoya.
19 During the interview, Gina Guillaume-Holleman showed Mark Montoya Plaintiff’s photo and
20 asked him whether Plaintiff was a threat to him and, thereafter, she made an attempt to solicit Mark
21 Montoya to sign an affidavit that Plaintiff was dangerous. Outraged by her demand, Mark Montoya
22 left the interview and went to the HVAC shop and mentioned what had happened to one of
23 Plaintiff’s other coworkers, who called Plaintiff and disclosed the information about Mark
24 Montoya’s interview. A few days later, Mark Montoya personally confirmed the information about
25 Gina Guillaume-Holleman’s demand.
26
514. At the end of August 2012, Plaintiff was not worried about any investigation
27
but was worried about his own status due to the almost year-and-a-half-long, ongoing, vicious,
28
12 SEPTEMBER 2012
13 September 4, 2012—Kenneth Diede’s Letter to Department Head Charles Witcher.
14
516. On September 4, 2012, Plaintiff’s coworker from the HVAC shop to
15
whom Plaintiff was providing representation under the UC Davis Policy PPSM 70, submitted a
16
17 complaint letter against HVAC shop manager and supervisor Patrick Putney and Dorin Daniliuc.
18 These two individuals attacked Kenneth once again and converted his 2012 annual employee
20 517. Since July 2011, Patrick Putney and Dorin Daniliuc had been making
21 Kenneth Diede’s life miserable and his working conditions intolerable after Kenneth Diede
22 reported twice-convicted child pornography felon, Sean Robideaux , who was illegally
23 surfing the web on the HVAC shop commuters with Patrick Putney’s knowledge and permission.
24 Being on parole for his second child pornography strike Sean Robideaux , was not allowed to
25 touch a computer connected to the Internet per federal court order (Case: 2: 6 –cr- 00418-LKK,
26
The United States of America v. Sean Christopher Robideaux, United States District Court, Eastern
27
District of California, Indictment Violation(S) 18 U.S.C § 2252 () (4)(B) –Possession of Visual
28
9
September 9, 2012—Plaintiff Letter to Brent Seifert—UC Davis Medical Center HR Labor
10 Relation Supervisor and Principal Labor Relation Consultant
11
519. For over one year, the Defendant subjected Plaintiff to malicious
12
13
psychological terror, persecution, civil and human rights violations, enormous stress and worries
14 as a result of losing his home and, most likely, his employment at the age of 61 and a slim
16 520. Due to unknown means regarding the ways in which the Defendant intended to do
17 Plaintiff further harm on September 9, 2012, Plaintiff sent a letter to UC Davis Medical Center HR
18 Labor Relation Supervisor Brent Seifert with an inquiry to update Plaintiff about his bogus
19 investigation against Plaintiff to which he was assigned in May 2012. Plaintiff wrote the following
20 in his September 9, 2012, letter: The original letter was edited by the Professional Proof Reader
21 for the purpose to avoid confusion about merit in the letter-Original upon request)
22
“Dear Mr. Seifert:
23
25 status of the phony investigation you have been conducting since May 31,
26 2012. I am not sure if you remember that you have been assigned to investigate
27 to determine the facts surrounding the e-mails I supposedly sent that were
28
7 resources department with probable help from the former FBI Agent
11
When I read it on the Association of Workplace Investigators web page, I
12
choked and said to myself, “This guy with such an impressive background
13
career and connections that he is a perfect guy to frame me.”
14
15 The May 31, 2012, provocation followed Witcher’s and the HR department’s
16 cowardly and ill-crafted action that placed me on ten days’ suspension without
17 pay after Danesha Nichols’ phony investigation and my five-month
18 administrative/investigatory leave.
19
It is not coincidental that the Mr. Lohse got involved to help cover up the UC
20
21
Davis and UC Davis Medical Center management’s corrupted and unlawful
22 activities, which are happening in every pointed place and involving UC Davis
23 “chiefs and Indians” including, but not limited to, HR Chief Stephen Chilcott;
25 Teresa Porter; internal audits chief and UC Davis police officers such as Lt.
26 James Barbour, who once gave me special advice with former U.S. President
27 Ronald Reagan regarding the U.S. Marines. UC Davis Chief Compliance
28
7 leave letter and launch another phony investigation against him. If he will snap
8 and get hostile, then Lt. Barbour will take care of him and he will be done.
9
What a mistake. Jerry Waszczuk never became hostile and never snapped.
10
Instead, Jerry Waszczuk used his pen and computer to defend himself and
11
others abused and harassed by vicious, vindictive, corrupt, and criminally
12
minded UCDMC chiefs.
13
21 The meeting that you improvised was about the country of Romania,
22
Romanians, and Reggae. I have summarized the meeting in the letter I wrote to
23
you the day after we met and there is no need to elaborate further about it.
24
25 The reason why I am writing to you is to determine the status of this “after
26 unsuccessful provocation” and phony investigation for which you had been set
28
7 sell my house and if it does not go through, then I will let the house be
11 will pay the bill for this reckless harassment and assault on me and I will
12 pay for a new house of my choice.”
13
521. The September 9, 2012, Plaintiff’s letter to Brent Seifert was the first time that
14
Plaintiff informed the Defendant of Plaintiff’s awareness that the May 31, 2012, reckless Defendant
15
action against Plaintiff was nothing but the Defendant’ malicious and ill-crafted provocation to harm
16
Plaintiff.
17
522. On September 9, 2012, Plaintiff did not have any evidence or documents proving
18
that for the May 31, 2012, provocation, the Defendant assembled a special team nicknamed in
19
Plaintiff’s document “The UC Davis Death Squad” to kill Plaintiff or end his employment in the UC
20
Davis Medical Center Trauma Unit # 11. Plaintiff based his opinion on observed event facts,
21
information from his coworkers, the Defendant’ reckless attacks in May 2012 aimed at Plaintiff and
22
his coworkers to whom Plaintiff was providing representation, and by removing Plaintiff from the
23
stress management class one day before the provocation on May 30, 2012.
24 “
September 12, 2012—The e-mail entitled “Review of the Waszczuk Investigation”
25
26 523. On September 12, 2012, at 9:36 PM, the UC Office of General Counsel
27 Senior Legal Counsel Mia Belk sent an e-mail to UC Davis Medical Center HR Labor Relation
28
15 Delmendo, UC Davis Health System Chief Counsel Anna Orlowski and UC Davis Health System
16 Chief Compliance Officer Teresa Porter and to let them know that the HR department was
19 Lindsey to make suggested revisions and finalize the documents and letter of intent to terminate
20 the issue as soon as possible. In addition to the letter of intent to terminate, HR Executive Director
21 Stephen Chilcott instructed Travis Lindsey to discuss the assignments of the Skelly officer with
22 Plaintiff’s superior, UC Davis Medical Center Executive Director Mike Boyd.
23 527 The UCDHS HR Executive Director Stephen Chilcott’s confidential
24
communication response is interesting because it shows that HR Equal Employment Opportunity
25
and Diversity Manager Cindi Oropeza was not copied on Stephen Chilcott’s e-mail. Cindi Oropeza
26
was assigned with Brent Seifert to fabricate a bogus report as the cause for Plaintiff’s termination
27
of employment.
28
17
“This is in response to your faxes dated 9/25/2011 and 9/30/2011 to Vice
18
President Duckett in which you raised several concerns about management
19
actions at UC Davis Medical Center. I understand that these issues are
20
currently being investigated by the UC Davis Compliance Officer, Wendi
21
Delmendo.The Office of the President provides oversight to the ten Campus
22
University of California system, while the Chancellor of each campus has
23
responsibility for the organization and operation of the campus. With the
24
investigation by Ms. Delmendo currently in progress, it would be
25
28 this investigation. We are confident that your serious concerns are being
8
Director Christopher Simon letter.
9 532. UC Senior Counsel Mia Belk disappeared from the University of California
10 landscape two months after she issued her confidential review of Waszczuk’s investigation. Mia
11 Belk was not the only individual who disappeared from the University of California landscape
19 September 13, 2012—The UC Davis Death Squad Preparation for Plaintiff’s Final Departure
from the University of California. (By documents received from UC Davis Public Record Act
20 Office)
21
534. Following the September 12, 2012, University of California Office of the
22
General Counsel’s decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment the UCDHS HR Executive
23
Director Stephen Chilcott sent on September 13, 2012, the information about Plaintiff’s planned
24
employment termination to the UC Davis police and assembled a group of UC Davis
25
representatives (nicknamed in Plaintiff’s documents as the UC Davis Death Squad, due to an ill-
26
crafted provocation by the Defendant on May 31, 2012, to kill Plaintiff or end his employment in
27
the UC Davis Medical Center Trauma Unit.
28
13
536. On September 14, 2012, UC Davis Death Squad Coordinator Hugh
14 Parker’s secretary, Sonia Guerrero-Rodriguez, sent an e-mail invitation for a meeting to other
15 UC Davis Death Squad members with the following subject in the e-mail: “Threat Assessment -
16 J. Waszczuk.” The message read, “Please provide me with the best time and date, from the
17 options below, to discuss the item in subject. I’d like to send out a meeting invitation as soon as
18 possible.” The message was ended with Muriel Strode’s quote “Do not follow where the path
19 may lead. Go instead where there is no path and leave a trail.”
20 537. Sonia Guerrero-Rodriguez sent her message to the following member
21 members of the UC Davis Death Squad: Brent Seifert, the UCDMC Labor Relations Supervisor;
22 UC Davis Police Lt. James Barbour; UCDMC HR Equal Employment Opportunity and Diversity
23
Manager Cindi Oropeza;UC Davis Health System Counsel David Levine; UC Davis Risk
24
Management Department employee Debra Schmidt; UC Davis Medical Center Emergency
25
Preparedness Coordinator Glynis Foulk; Manager of Workers’ Compensation, Ergonomics, and
26
Disability Hugh Parker, who wanted to see Plaintiff in July 2011 on workers compensation leave
27
and, in May and September 2012, wanted to see Plaintiff disabled in UC Davis Medical Center
28
15 Program; Neil Speth, D.O., the medical director of UCDMC HR Employee Health Services; and
16 Travis Lindsay, the new UCDMC HR labor relation manager who replaced MikeGarcia in May
17 2012.
18 539. The proposed dates for the UC Davis Death Squad’s meeting were
19 September 18, 2012, from 10 to 11 AM; September 20, 2012, from 1 to 2 PM, and September 21,
20 2012, from 9 to 10 AM.
21 540. UC Davis Police Lt. James Barbour responded that he was available for the
22 meeting on Tuesday, September 18, 2012. Plaintiff does not know when the meeting took place
23 because 21 pages of e-mail chat between UC Davis Death Squad Members that Plaintiff received
24
from the UC Davis Public Record Act Office were blacked out in same manner as the e-mail chat
25
of this group for the May 31, 2012, provocation to send Plaintiff to the UC Davis Medical Trauma
26
Unit.
27
541. The presence and participation in this group including the UC Davis
28
9 542. Plaintiff, who was subjected to psychological terror by the Defendant, was
10 put under extreme stress after being forced again to leave the premises for the month-and-a-half-
11 long investigatory leave, which was issued and served to Plaintiff on August 16, 2012.
12 543. On September 23, 2012, Plaintiff wrote an open letter to his
13 Department Head, UC Davis Medical Center Plant Operation and Maintenance Manager Charles
14 Witcher, entitled
15 A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE LATEST COMPLAINTS UNDER THE PPSM 70 AGAINST
16
STEVE McGRATH AND PATRICK PUTNEY. (OPEN LETTER).
17
Plaintiff wrote the letter just two days before Witcher was ordered by HR Executive Director
18
Stephen Chilcott to sign the Notice to Intent to Dismiss (Plaintiff) for Serious Misconduct.
19
544. Aside from Plaintiff’s latest complaints about coworkers, made under UC Davis
20
Policy Complaint Resolution Policy PPSM70, the, Plaintiff elaborated about the previous
21
Department Head, Tony Moddessette, who was forced to leave in 2006 and was replaced by
22
Charles Witcher. This happened shortly before Plaintiff and his coworker William Buckans were
23
subject to the vicious attack and persecution orchestrated by the Defendant, which resulted in
24
Plaintiff’s suspension in March 2007 and his abrupt removal from the UC Davis Medical Center
25
26 Cogeneration Power Plant (“Central Plant”), where Plaintiff had been employed since June 1999.
27 Plaintiff’s suspension and reassignment in March 2007 was affirmed by Charles Witcher, who
28 was then the interim manager of the Plant Operation and Maintenance Department. While
15 and Maintenance Department. At the time, there were problems within the
17 issues.
18 Moddessette was “rough and tough” and sometimes was unpleasant, but he did
19 not ever hesitate to come to the Central Plant, sit at the center of the control
20 room, and have an open discussion about the problems within in the plant.
21 Tony Moddessette did not hesitate to tell me, “Jerry, I don’t give a f...k what
22 you say,” but he would listen and fix the problems.
23 Tony Moddessette had no problem reversing the Plant Manager’s unjustified
24
decision to issue a written warning to one of the Central Plant operators. He
25
also did not hesitate to tell Jeff Lancaster that he was not hired to wash his
26
personal cars on company time.
27
Tony Moddessette did not hesitate to remove Tom Kavanaugh from his Central
28
15 hospital/campus and was not a place to illegally park his personal vehicle,
17 Unlike Tony Moddessette, Charles Witcher never told HVAC Shop Supervisor
18 Dorin Daniliuc that he had to work 8 hours every day, that company time
19 should not be used to run a private business, or that he should not bring his
20 personal auto mechanics in and use the UCDMC shop for his private HVAC
21 business.
22 Unlike Tony Moddessette, Charles Witcher immediately began to torment
23 others after taking over the department from Tony Moddessette in 2006. Six
24
years later, Witcher’s persecution continues.
25
The last six years speak for themselves. Those who have engaged in this
26
persecution must love to watch other people suffer and live in misery.
27
THE COMPLAINTS
28
16 Dan James and Tony Moddessette were Vietnam War veterans. I have a lot of
17 respect for their sacrifices and their choice to risk their lives for the greatest
18 country on Earth.
19 Apparently Steve McGrath and Mike Lewis did not think or did not care that
20 harassing, bullying, and constantly retaliating against William for years in an
21 effort to make him quit his job would bring Dan James back into the mess that
22 they have created and participated since 2006.
23 You probably don’t know that William Buckans and Rick Tunello had a very
24
good relationship with Dan James because of their common life experiences.
25
However Dan James was quickly overpowered by the Jackson clique, and he
26
turned on Rick and William because the Jackson clique hated them. You
27
probably don’t know that William Buckans had a very good relationship with
28
15 I would like to mention that, not so long ago, Hugh Parker from HR sent me an
16 email and wrote that he is not interested in labor relations issues. Mr. Parker
18 is strictly related to him. He will soon be dealing again with the labor relations
18 as I can with the limited resources I have after being banned and isolated from
24
546. As Plaintiff anticipated that something would happen to him during the
25
one-and-a-half month investigatory leave and the lack of response from HR Labor Relations
26
Supervisor Brent Seifert’s investigation, on September 26, 2012, Plaintiff received by overnight
27
mail the Notice of Intent to Dismiss for Serious Misconduct dated September 25, 2012. It was
28
8 Maintenance. The reason for this action is your failure to adhere to UC Davis
10 1616, Violence and Hate Incidents in the Workplace and the Principles of
11 Community.
12
On or about April 27, 2012, you sent an e-mail to Danesha Nichols,
13
UCDHS Investigations Coordinator stating your disagreement with an
14
investigation report she had issued dated February 9, 2012. The report found
15
that it was more likely than not that you had violated UCDHS Policy 1616
16
(Violence and Hate Incidents in the Workplace) ("1616"), UC Davis Policy
17
21 13, 2012, informing you that I intended to suspend you without pay for ten
22 days. Attached to your April 27, 2012 e-mail was a video slideshow entitled
23 "Welcome to Romania". Based on the subject matter and content of the
24 communication, an investigation was requested to determine if the
25 communication violated University policies and procedures. During this time
26 you were placed on investigatory leave-.
27
Brent Seifert, Employee and Labor Relations Supervisor and Cindy Oropeza,
28
8 language (see attached e-mails). The following are excerpts from these e-mail
9 communications:
10
May 10, 2012 - "Somebody will give this Pollack bad evaluation and fire him
11
or will send Gestapo on his Ass"
12
13 June 6, 2012 - "because you will go straight to Hell for what you have done to
21
environment culture in the HVAC shop is closely akin to the culture of Eastern
25
Mr. Seifert and Ms. Oropeza concluded their investigation and issued a report
26
dated September 20, 2012, which is attached to this Notice. The investigation
27
report substantiated that you sent disruptive and intimidating e-mail
28
8 expectations that you abide by all UC policies and procedures, show respect
9 and remain professional at all times in the workplace, and follow the direct
10 orders given to you by a supervisor. After the Skelly process was completed
11 you were issued a Letter of Suspension on May 11, 2012 outlining the
12 expectations noted above. Additionally, you were provided the pertinent text
13 from UCDHS policy 1616 and UC Davis P&P Chapter 380-15 as part of the
14 investigation report issued by Ms. Nichols, and attached to the Letter of Intent
15 to Suspend.
16
Despite my repeated efforts to address your inappropriate and discriminatory
17
20 classifications. Your failure to follow direct orders and the expectations set for
21 you is unacceptable and will not be tolerated. Your actions imply that you
22 believe you are above the rules and I cannot subject staff and your co-workers
23 to your continued discriminatory comments. Your blatant disregard for the
24 policies and procedures of this University, combined with your failure to
25 follow directives has left me with no alternative but to dismiss you from
26 University employment.You have the right to respond to this notice of intent to
27
dismiss for Serious Misconduct either orally or in writing. Your response must
28
8
Relation Supervisor Brent Seifert and let him know that Plaintiff was aware that May 31, 2012,
9 was the date of the maliciously and ill-crafted provocation by the Defendant, somebody had the
10 idea to lure Plaintiff to the premises and hand Plaintiff the Notice of Intent to Dismiss with such
11 outrageous and sickening accusations in an attempt to provoke Plaintiff and expose him to the
15
548. Instead of luring Plaintiff to the premises, the UC Davis Death Squad decided that
16
the UC Davis Police would issue a poster bearing Plaintiff’s photo and the verbiage “PERSON
17
NOT AUTHORIZED ON PROPERTY,” which was similar to the “FBI’s Most Wanted”
18
signage.
19
21
“Jaroslaw Waszczuk is currently on administrative leave from
22
employment with the UC Davis Med Center. Mr. Waszczuk is not
23
authorized to be on UC Davis property without a legal reason or a medical
24
emergency.
25
26 Mr. Waszczuk is described as an older white male with brown and gray
5
550. The UC Davis Police poster that said “PERSON NOT AUTHORIZED
6
ON PROPERTY” and included Plaintiff’s photo and description was distributed around the UC
7
Davis Medical Center Campus and most likely was sent to managers and UC Davis employees
8
by electronic mail. UC Davis Police did not inform Plaintiff that he was not authorized on UC
9
Davis premises, and Plaintiff did not know what UC Davis Police would do if Plaintiff
10
12 551. Plaintiff spent over one year on investigatory leave, under which he was
13 prohibited from being on the UC Davis premises, and Plaintiff never intended to go uninvited to
14 UC Davis Medical Center when he was on investigatory leave. Plaintiff did not understand why
15 Davis Public Record Act office for documents related to another of the Defendant’ acts of
16 psychological terror, which Plaintiff had been subjected to for over one year.
17
19
20 558. The Defendant war-like hysteria and propaganda did not end with
21 placing the “Persona Non Grata” poster complete with Plaintiff’s photo and description around
22 UC Davis Medical Center.
23 559. On September 26, 2012, the UC Davis Health System HR Executive
24
Director Stephen Chilcott, who directly communicated the operation to the UC Office of the
25
President, sent an e-mail entitled “Confidential – Jerry Waszczuk (Plaintiff)” to the HR Labor
26
Relations Department Manager Travis Lindsey to ask the UC Davis Police department to offer to
27
speak to any of the supervisors or employees of the Plant Operation and Maintenance
28
15 562. UC Davis Police Lt. James Barbour was reassigned from the UC Davis
16 Campus to the UC Davis Medical Center, which represented an enormous demotion and
17 involved a decrease to his salary, after the November 18, 2011, pepper spray attack against
18 protesting students on the UC Davis Campus. Documents show that Lt. James Barbour got
19 sucked into the action against Plaintiff by the “UC Davis Death Squad,” most likely not knowing
20 what the case was about. Apparently, he was promised that his salary would be restored to its
21 normal level. By reading the Public Record Acts documents, one can see that Lt Barbour was
22 dedicated to attacking Plaintiff in 2012 by any means.
23 September 26, 2012 – The Confidential Investigation Report
24
563. On September 26, 2012, Plaintiff received the Confidential Investigation
25
26 Report from the Defendant; it was attached to a Notice of Intent to Dismiss for Serious
27 Misconduct.
28
8
Report and December 2011 and February 2012 Danesha Nichol’s reports. The only difference
9 was that Romanians were used in the reports instead of Jews to make Plaintiff look like a KKK
12 the report, responded to Cindi Oropeza and Brent Seifert with an open letter dated September 28,
13 2012.
14 567. In addition to the open letter response, Plaintiff sent an inquiry to the UC
15 Davis Public Record Act office for all documents related to the Defendant’ Notice of Intent to
16 Terminate Plaintiff.
17 OCTOBER 2012
18
19
October 1, 2012—Open Letter to the UC Davis Police Chief
20
21
568. Plaintiff was outraged by the UC Davis Police Department’s humiliating and
22
disparaging “PERSON NOT AUTHORIZED ON THE PROPERTY” poster, which was
23
issued and distributed around UC Davis campus on September 26, 2012.
24
569. On October 1, 2012, Plaintiff wrote an open letter to new UC Davis Police Chief
25
Matt Carmichael, who replaced Annette Spicuzza and to Chancellor Katehi, who ordered the
26
firing of his colleague, Lt. John Pike, in August 2012.
27
28 570. In September 2011, Plaintiff asked a UC Davis Police captain Joyce Souza for
15 few more current photos of myself. My photo on the UC Davis Police Warrant
16 is outdated and was taken probably 10 years ago, prior to my 2006 open heart
17 surgery and left eye surgery. HR has a newer photo, which was taken when I
19 development engineer.
20 I have no doubt that the UC Davis Police bulletin with my outdated photo was
21 issued to humiliate me, as it sounds like an arrest warrant. This is an
22 outrageous abuse of authority by the UC Davis Medical Center Plant Operation
23 and Maintenance Department (UCDMC PO&M), the HR Department and the
24
UC Davis Police Department. Such management actions were taken to cause
25
Waszczuk severe emotional distress, and they were done with a willful and
26
conscious disregard of both the law and UC policies.
27
The conduct of UCDMC management and the UC Davis Police Department
28
15 573. The Defendant have not mentioned in any previous document this
17 humiliated Plaintiff.
16 stability. This is an additional reason to provide me with the time extension for
18 I believe that you are aware that I am already on nine different prescription
19 medicines.
20 I am assuming that you have read my last open letter to Mrs. Oropeza and that
21 you or Brent Seifert will question Dorin Daniliuc about his (and others’) lies,
22 which were inserted into the report.
23
24
Sincerely,
25
Jerry “
26
27
576. In addition to Plaintiff’s response to Charles Witcher’s extension, on October 3,
28
13 October 1, 2012
14
RE: Workers’ Compensation Stress/Psychiatric related claim
15
Dear Mr. Waszczuk:
16
17 In an e-mail we received dated 10/01/2012 you indicate that you have suffered
18 “severe emotional distress” from your employment at the UC Davis Health
19
System. As such, if you wish to pursue a psychiatric injury claim, related
20
to your employment at UC Davis Health System, please fill out the
21
enclosed DWC-1 Form and return to our office at:
22
24
Workers’ Compensation Dept.
25
26
27 Sincerely,
28 Michael Tyler
15 582. On May 30, 2012, Hugh Parker removed Plaintiff from stress management
16 class instead of encouraging Plaintiff to attend such classes, despite knowing what Plaintiff was
18 583. On May 30, 2012, Plaintiff did not know that Hugh Parker was a
19 coordinator for the Defendant’ specially assembled group of UC Davis employees, which
20 Plaintiff nicknamed the “UC Davis Death Squad” in the officially generated document
21 584. On May 31, 2012, and in September 2012, Hugh Parker (as conductor of
22 the aforementioned group) coordinated a malicious but unsuccessful provocation involving UC
23 Davis Chief of Police Matt Carmichael and Lt. James Barbour to ambush and kill Plaintiff or
24
otherwise end his employment at the UC Davis Medical Center Trauma Unit #11.
25
585. Plaintiff rejected the Defendant’ offer to file a false workers’
26
compensation claim. Apparently the Defendant attempted to escape enormous legal liability
27
using frequent workers’ compensation claims to further attack and distract Plaintiff from the real
28
6
586. One month after the Notice of Intent to Terminate was issued, on October 22, 2012,
7
Plaintiff received an interesting letter from HR Consultant Gina Harwood, who replaced Jill Noel
8
Vandviver on June 22, 2012. Gina Harwood’s letter stated:
9
Re: Service as PPSM Complaint Representative
10
Dear Mr. Waszczuk:
11 This letter is to inform you that due to the completion of the investigation, you
12 are no longer on investigatory leave. Your leave status has changed to
13 administrative leave with pay while the personnel action is pending.
14 Due to the change in your status, you will be permitted to serve as the
15 representative in complaint meetings for Kenneth Diede, William Buckans
16 and Dereck Cole. The following complaints will be removed from abeyance
15 Davis Police Department issued and distributed the poster with Plaintiff’s photo and
17 589. In a letter to Gina Harwood dated October 17, 2012, Plaintiff asked Gina
18 Harwood specific questions that she, as the Defendant’ representative, failed to answer in her
15 September 26, 2012. Gina Harwood knew that Plaintiff had, in February 2009, signed the
16 Settlement-Agreement with the Regents of the University of California. Gina Harwood and other
17 perpetrators knew that the UC Davis Police poster was an indefensible breach of the Settlement-
18 Agreement signed by the Defendant and Plaintiff. The Defendant’ poster went beyond
19 disparaging Plaintiff. It was an act of malice beyond of human decency aimed at Plaintiff, and it
20 alone can be the subject of litigation against the Defendant.
21 October 30, 2012-The UC Davis Medical Center HVAC Shop Supervisors Patrick Putney and
Dorin Daniluc’s Attempt to Provoke Dereck Cole for Physical Confrontation
22
23
592. Just two days after Plaintiff wrote a letter to Director Boyd about UC Davis
24
management’s despicable retaliation and vendetta against HVAC shop technician Dereck Cole
25
26 on October 30, 2012, two of Dereck Cole’s supervisors, Patrick Putney and Dorin Daniliuc,
27 approached him in the hospital cafeteria during his break and verbally assaulted him in front of a
28 surveillance camera with clear intention to provoke him into physical confrontation and end
16 Respectfully,
17 Dereck
18 595. After meeting with Lindsey, Dereck Cole was removed from the HVAC shop and
19 reassigned to the preventive maintenance shop. The surveillance footage from the hospital
20 cafeteria should be checked, and appropriate disciplinary action should be taken against Patrick
21 Putney and Dorin Daniliuc. Dereck Cole was a victim of two UC Davis medical supervisors
22 supported by Department Head Charles Witcher, HR Labor Relations staff, corrupt UC Davis
23 Chief of Police Matt Carmichael, and his lieutenant James Barbour. If Dereck Cole had called
24
UC Davis police right after incident in the cafeteria, then he would most likely be accused and
25
investigated instead of Patrick Putney and Dorin Daniliuc.
26
597. Plaintiff represented Dereck Cole in his complaints against these two supervisors
27
in a retaliation complaint pursuant to UC Davis Policy PPSM 70. Right after the confrontation in
28
8
NOVEMBER 2012
9
November 2, 2012 – Public Record Act Request
10
11
599. On November 2, 2012, Plaintiff received a response from the UC Davis Public
12
Record Act (PRA) office to his request for PRA documents related to the Defendant’s Notice
13
Intent to Dismiss for Serious Misconduct dated September 25, 2012.
14
15 600. Plaintiff briefly reviewed the received PRA documents and several pages of e-
16 mail correspondence dated June 1, 2012, which were sent by the UC Davis Health System
18 David Levine, Debra Schmidt, Marjorie Trogodon Shock, Neil Speth, Carol Kirshnit, Karen
19 Kouretas, Cindy Oropeza, Glynis Foulk, James Barbour, and Travis Lindsay.
20 601. On the first page of the e-mail with subject “Jaroslaw ‘Jerry’ Waszczuk –PO&M
21 employee,” Hugh Parker wrote:
22
23 “Mr. Waszczuk returned to work yesterday from his suspension and was
placed back on investigatory leave the same day. At issue are writings sent by
24 Mr. Waszczuk while on leave. Mr. Waszczuk did not display any anger when
told he was being place on investigatory leave.”
25
26 602. After Plaintiff read Hugh Parker’s e-mail message, checked Hugh Parker’s
27 recipients, and found out who these people were, Plaintiff got goosebumps realizing that this e-
28
7
604. Plaintiff combined Karen Kouretas’s name with Neil Speth, James
8
Barbour, Glynis Foulk, and David Levine with what happened to Plaintiff on May 30, 2012 and
9
what Plaintiff wrote in his letter dated September 9, 2012 to Brent Seifert and the UC Davis
10
Police. On September 26, 2012, a defaming “Persona Non Grata” poster with Plaintiff’s photo
11
and description surfaced. Plaintiff had no any doubt that May 31, 2012 was a maliciously crafted
12
provocation to kill Plaintiff or end his employment in UC Davis Medical Center Trauma Unit
13
No. # 11.
14
15 605. Plaintiff already covered this subject in the Statements of Facts, June
16 2012 chapter.
17
19
28
7 August 2, 2011, with exceptions of the few hours to interview with ‘Danesha
9 Garcia in February 2012, and maybe 2 hours during the interview with Brent
10 Seifert on May 31, 2012. Total reimbursement should equal approx., $768.00;
18 have receipts for the disks. I don’t, but I need my HDs back or need to be
19 reimbursed approx.$150.00.
20 Sincerely,
21 Jaroslaw Waszczuk
22
607. The Defendant never reimbursed Plaintiff for the parking permit or the
23
two hard drives.
24
November 12, 2012- The Brief for Oral Response Submitted by Plaintiff to Assigned Skelly
25 Reviewer. UC Davis Associate Vice Chancellor Allen Tollefson
26
6 Dated September 25, 2012 by “The UC Davis Medical Center ‘HR Death
7 Squad’”
8
Dear Vice Chancellor Tollefson:
9
18 It clearly appears from the bulk of the e-mail correspondence that certain
27 The assigned executor to carry out the plot to send me to my death or send me
28 to the UCDMC trauma unit to meet Karen Kouretas was the UC Police Lt.
10 I am hoping that eventually the FBI and district attorney will step in and break
18 609. The letter to Allen Tollefson was the first time Plaintiff nicknamed the assembled
19 Defendant group “HR Death Squad,” which in criminally minded, unsuccessful provocation
20 attempted to end Plaintiff’s employment at UC Davis Medical Center Trauma Unit # 11. Later,
21 Plaintiff changed the nickname from “HR Death Squad” to the “UC Davis Death Squad” due to
22 the involvement of the UC Davis police in the ill-planned assaults on Plaintiff.
23 610. On November 13, 2012, Skelly Reviewer Allen Tollefson responded to Plaintiff’s
24
letter and scheduled the meeting with Plaintiff on November 16, 2012 on the UC Davis campus.
25
611. On November 16, 2012, Plaintiff attended the meeting with assigned Skelly
26
Reviewer and UC Associate Vice Chancellor Allen Tollefson to discuss Plaintiff’s unwarranted
27
and without-valid-cause employment termination.
28
15 back. Plaintiff was unaware on November 16, 2012 and a long time after the meeting that
16 Plaintiff’s fate was already decided a long time before the meeting with Allen Tollefson’ by the
17 Regents of the University of California the UC Office of the President,(UCOP) and the UC
18 Office of the General Counsel for a completely different reason. Plaintiff thought he was being
19 hunted down like an animal or subhuman by the UC Davis administration’s designated thugs.
20 614. On November 18, 2012, Plaintiff sent to Skelly Reviewer Allen Tollefson the
21 meeting summary letter entitled “Our Meeting on November 16, 2012. -The Notice Intent to
22 Dismiss Dated September 25, 2012 BY “The UC Davis Medical Center “’HR Death
23 Squad.’”
24 (Note: to avoid any confusion or misunderstanding, Plaintiff’s letter to Allen
Tollefson was corrected by a professional proofreader.)
25
Re: Our Meeting on November 16, 2012.
26
The Notice of Intent to Dismiss dated September 25, 2012.
27
Dear Vice Chancellor Tollefson:
28
16 25, 2012. The notice not say too much besides some quotes taken out of
17 context from my letters that I wrote due to the vicious and unscrupulous
18 war against me, which has lasted over one year and is still going.
19
The very powerful forces from the UCDMC Human Resources Department
20
and the UC Davis campus, as well as the involvement of the director of the
21
investigation sent from the UC Office of the President against me in May
22
2012, make me believe that the reason or reasons to harm me were not
23
my reporting of Patrick Putney’s chickens, roosters, goats, sheep and
24
other animals for sale in the UCDMC HVAC shop. I do not believe
25
27 employer out of the parking fee for four years by hiding his car inside
7 writing in the letter dated March 13, 2011, referring to the central plant
8 operator Todd Georlich’s tragic suicide that took place in December 2010
9 as well as the secret and fraudulent 12% pay raise the central plant
11
The other reason that I was thinking it could be is the child pornography
12
issue reported in August 2011 by my coworker Kenny Diede in his
13
2010/2011 employee evaluation complaint under the PPSM 70. The
14
complaint is still unresolved. Kenny Diede became a subject of retaliation
15
by Patrick Putney with Charles Witcher’s support and approval. I am
16
representing Kenny with his complaints under PPSM70. It is very bizarre
17
19 Nichols in her investigation report, but the graphic video clip about the
9
Although stress and anger affect everyone, anger can be problematic if people
10
use it to gain control and express it unprofessionally.”
11
12 I received information about the class on May 23, 2012, from my former
13 central plant coworker William Buckans, who on the same day received a letter
19 I showed up to class on time with my two colleagues. Before the class had
20 begun, Hugh Parker, with the help of Licensed Clinical Social Worker Mrs.
21 Marjorie Trogdon Shock, kicked me out of the class.
22
It was quite a surprise to me because I was constantly being accused that I
23
24
am angry, hostile etc. Such a class would be appropriate for a person who
26
If I knew that Mr. Hugh Parker, along with Mrs. Trogdon Shock and the
27
other members of the “HR Death Squad,” had planned to send Jerry to the
28
8
“Mr. Waszczuk returned to work yesterday from his suspension and was
9 placed back on investigatory leave the same day. At issue are writings sent by
Mr. Waszczuk while on leave. Mr. Waszczuk did not display any anger when
10 told he was being place on investigatory leave.
11
Hugh R. Parker, Manager”
12
13
Could you imagine what would or could have happened if Mr. Parker,
14
along with Mrs. Shock, would not have “shocked” me and did not kick me
15
16
out from the “Class on Stress Management” on May 30, 2012?
28
19 The interviews did not happen until October 10, 2012 after I sent the letter
20 to the members of UC Davis Ethics and Compliance Risk Committee.
21
In addition to, I am forwarding to you an e-mail which I sent l to UC Davis
22
24 Nichols’ false accusations against me, which alleged that I am violent and
26 kind of phony report to the police and that Danesha Nichols was in
9 minds by believing that they could set me up and make me seem violent
18 fraud.
19 It seems to me that Mr. Chilcott was trying to train his crew on how to deal
20
with “rebellious” workers, knowing that I would not give up so quickly, and he
21
was trying to find out how long I would resist the attacks and his blitzkrieg.
22
23 Maybe it was a bit of everything and at some point got so out of control and
24 had so many people involved for no reason; now, somebody must pay the cost
9 Jaroslaw Waszczuk
10 Enclosed:
15 mail mailing list; Letter dated September 9, 2012 to Brent Seifert with
16 request for investigation status update. In that letter, on the pages 2 and
19 many people from the HR department, UCDPD police, trauma unit, and
20 UCDMC counsel until Waszczuk received documents under the Public
21 Record Act Provision in October 2012; Letter dated September 23, 2012
22 (Two days before the notice intent to terminate issued by Charles
23 Witcher on September 25, 2012 followed by the “Most Unwanted” Lt.
24
James Barbour’s warrant); October 4, 2012 e-mail from Michael Tyler as
25
an acknowledgment that I decline the offer for the workers-compensation
26
claim. I don’t file fraudulent claims.
27
CC: To Whom It May Concern
28
15 was replaced by Gina Harwood. Plaintiff was searching for clue as to what triggered the
16 Defendant’ brutal and merciless action against Plaintiff. In his letter to Jill Noel Vandeviver,
17 Plaintiff wrote:
(Note: to avoid any confusion or misunderstanding, Plaintiff’s e-mail to Jill Noel
18 Vandeviver was corrected by a professional proofreader.)
19
Re: Brief for Oral Response -Notice Intent to Dismiss. - UCDMC “HR Death
20
Squad”
21
Good Morning Ms. Vandeviver:
22
I am writing a few words to you because it appears that my employer, UC
23
Davis Medical Center made an attempt to frame me, provoke me, and kill me
24
25 or send me to the trauma unit in bad shape in May of 2012. Somehow, it did
26 not work out for the UCDMC “HR Death Squad.” I perfectly described the
28 2012, not knowing anything about it until I got a PRA request almost one
15 617. In November 2012, Jill Noel Vandeviver worked for the State of
17
18 DECEMBER 2012
9 The purpose of this letter is to inform you that I am dismissing you from your
11 at UC Davis Health System effective December 7, 2012. The reason for this
28 with a benefits counselor to determine the effect of this action on your benefits.
7
619. The Skelly Reviewer , UC Davis Associate Vice Chancellor Allen
8 Tollefson’s decision dated December 3, 2012 and Charles Witcher’s Letter of Termination were
10 performance review (evaluations) were mentioned. Neither decision mentioned the February
11 2009 Settlement-Agreement Plaintiff signed with the regents of the University of California,
12 which guaranteed Plaintiff a job with the University as the Associate Development Engineer.
13
“December 3, 2012
14 Travis Lindsey
Manager
15 Employee & Labor Relations
University of California, Davis, Health System
16
Re: Letter of Intent to Dismiss--Jaroslaw Waszczuk
17
27
actions were taken out of context and that he has the right to voice his opinion
28 about the wrong doings of the Department. Mr. Waszczuk has a very negative
16
“In Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal. 3d 194, the California
17 Supreme Court ruled that:
18
‘as part of constitutionally guaranteed due process, public employees are
19 entitled to certain procedural safeguards before discipline, which is
sufficiently severe to constitute a deprivation of a liberty or property right is
20 imposed on them. The constitutionally protected liberty interests requiring
Skelly protections arise whenever the allegations against an employee are
21 sufficiently onerous to seriously impact the employee’s ability to find future
work in his/her chosen career.’”
22
23
621. Skelly Reviewer Allan Tollefson held a meeting with UCDHS HR Labor
24
Relation Manager Travis Lindsey on September 24, 2012 and was coached on what decision
25
was expected from him in Plaintiff’s case.
26
622. Just before Plaintiff’s loss of employment, Plaintiff lost his house on a short sale
27
28
and rented a house so as not to deal with a mortgage company during his unemployment.
3 623. On December 18, 2012, Plaintiff sent an e-mail inquiry to USDHS HR Labor
4 Relation Consultant Gina Harwood for clearance to enter the HR building on December 20,
5
2012 to take care of his remaining benefits upon termination of employment:
6
Subject: Meeting with Janette Manuel in the Ticon III Bldg. on 12/20/2012 at 9:00
7
Hi Gina:
8
Would you please provide me clearance with UCDPD to go to Ticon III
9
Bldg. on 12/20/2012 at 9:00 a.m. for a meeting with Janette Manuel?It
10
came to my attention that the UCDPD “Most Unwanted” police warrant
11
with my photos is still hanging in the HVAC shop and probably in other
12
UCDMC places. I don’t want be shot by in the back by Lt. James
13
Barbour’s forces for entering the Ticon III Bldg. to discuss my benefits
14
17 Jerry
28
7 Agreement signed with Plaintiff and in disregard of Plaintiff’s outstanding working record ,
8 slandered and defamed Plaintiff with the Employment Development Department, thus causing
10 627. By the reckless, despicable and inhumane Defendant’ continuous attack aimed at
11 Plaintiff, the Defendant caused Plaintiff additional enormous stress, anxiety and financial harm
12 in the period when Plaintiff was not eligible yet for earlier Social Security Benefits and was
13 awaiting to cash out his University Retirement money and transfer it to an IRA account.
14 628. Plaintiff’s unemployment insurance benefits case is pending in the State of
15 California Court of Appeal 3rd Appellate District, Case Caption Waszczuk v. California
16
Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board No. C079254, the County of Sacramento Superior
17
Court Case No. 34201380001699CUWMGDS.
18
JANUARY 2013
19
20 January 3, 2013- Plaintiff’s Step I Complaint Pursuant to the UC Davis Complaint Resolution
Policy PPSM 70.
21
22 629. On January 3, 2013, Plaintiff filed the Step I Complaint pursuant to the UC Davis
23 Complaint Resolution Policy PPSM 70. The Step I complaint was the initial appeal from the
24 Defendant’ decision terminating Plaintiff’s employment on December 7, 2012.
25 630. The termination letter stated that Plaintiff has rights to request review of the
26 Defendant’ employment action under Personnel Policies for Staff Members 70 - Complaint
27
Resolution.
28
15 634. Plaintiff’s mind was and still is constantly and unstoppably occupied by the
16 Defendant’ criminally minded May 31, 2012 provocation. Undoubtedly it was the Defendant’
17 goal to kill Plaintiff or end his employment in the UC Davis Medical Center Trauma Unit # 11.
18 Plaintiff is still obsessively thinking about and can’t get it out of his mind because the Defendant
19 never in one word in any document address their own disgraceful, despicable and criminally
20 minded action against their own employee, who provided service for the Defendant for 13 years
21 and almost ended his employment in death.
22 635. Plaintiff expressed and emphasized his feelings about the Defendant’ way to
23 resolve the labor dispute with Plaintiff in the cover letter to the Step I Complaint Plaintiff sent to
24
UCDHS HR Labor Relation Consultant Gina Harwood on January 2, 2013.
25
636. Together with a cover letter, Plaintiff sent to Gina Harwood a copy of the
26
February 2009 Settlement–Agreement, the copy of Plaintiff’s Brief for Oral Arguments sent by
27
Plaintiff to Skelly Reviewer, UC Davis Associate Vice Chancellor Allen Tollefson, on
28
7
Re: The Letter of Termination Dated December 5, 2012- Request
8 for Review under PPSM 70.
10
The Letter of Termination issued by Mr. Witcher states:
11
“You have the right to request review of this action under Personnel Policies
12
for Staff Members 70 - Complaint Resolution. If you wish to request review of
13
this action, you must do so in writing, using the appropriate complaint form. A
14
written request must be received in the UCDHS Employee & Labor Relations
15
office no later than thirty (30) calendar days from the date of this letter.”
16
I did not have any intention to follow the Letter of Termination advice and file
17
a request for review with the HR Labor Relation Office, which has caused the
18
termination of my employment with University of California after 13 years of
19
20 service.
21 I was sure that filing a request for review under PPSM 70 would be
23 page brief for the Oral Response to The Notice Intent to Dismiss dated
17 Three of the cases that I reviewed caught my attention, and this is why I have
18 decided to file a request for review under the PPSM 70. I have to be certain
19 that I would not be precluded to file the wrongful termination lawsuit or else I
20 will be defeated like the two Plaintiffs in Janet Campbell v. Regents Of The
21 University of California S113275; Ct.App.1/1 A097560; San Francisco Super.
22 CT. No. 312736 and Patricia M. Palmer v. Regents Of The University of
23 California 2nd App. Div.7 B154868; Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No.BC
24
187036.
25
The third case is the newest wrongful termination lawsuit, which is interesting
26
because of the astronomical jury verdict for Plaintiff. The Ani Chopourian v.
27
Catholic Healthcare West wrongful termination case in Federal Court included
28
16 The date of May 31, 2012 constantly occupies my mind with unanswered
19 Would I have survived or would have been disabled for the rest of my life if I
20 survived? If I was taken to the UCD Trauma Unit, would my IV be filled with
21 toxic doses of drugs that could have contraindicated the medicines I am
22 currently taking, since the UCD wouldn’t know my medical history? Would I
23 become part of a deadly and illegal medical experiment? Ani Chopourian is
24
not asking herself these questions. I do not wish anybody to have his/her mind
25
occupied by such trauma that the UC Davis Medical Center Human Resources
26
Department caused me. “Sometimes I think that I should have never asked for
27
the documents that I received under the Public Record Act because of how
28
15 and human and employee rights; they are also abusing the power given to them
16 by the UC System
18 in the Letter of Suspension. The May 31, 2012 death trap, the Notice Intent to
15 and planned deadly assault on Waszczuk May 31, 2012. Without a doubt, it
19 Sincerely,
Jaroslaw Waszczuk
20
CC: UC President Mark Yudof, UC Regents, UC Davis Chancellor Lynda Katehi,
21 and UC Davis Vice Chancellor Ralph Hextler.
22
23
January 3, 2013 –Addendum to the Wrongful Termination Complaint PPSM 70 Step I Appeal
24
638. In the Step I Complaint and the addendum to the complaint, Plaintiff
25
alleged as follows.
26
16 government or law enforcement agency; Labor Code Section 1102.5 and Right
17 of state employees to blow whistle Gov. Code Sections 10543.
18 ADDENDUM TO THE WRONGFUL TERMINATION COMPLAINT
19 De sc r i be y o ur c o m p la i n t i n de ta i l , i nc l u d i ng t he fo l lo w i ng
fiv e po i n ts . Atta c h a d di tio na l s he e t s if ne e de d .
20
3. How did the management act violate policy or procedure?
21
23 violation of law and is pure and undisputable retaliation against Waszczuk for
8 The UCDMC management by firing Waszczuk from his job breached and
9
violated the 2009 Settlement-Agreement between Waszczuk and the Regents
10
of the UC. As early as of July 2011. Waszczuk submitted two letters of
11
complaint to the UC Davis campus Chief Counsel Mr. Steven A. Drown and
12
asked him to advise violators of the signed Settlement-Agreement to stop
13
assaulting Waszczuk and to restore order in Waszczuk’ workplace. The letters
14
dated July 17 and 24, 2011 are self-explanatory, and no reason exists to
15
elaborate further about my employment malice in relation to the settlement –
16
agreement. It is only appropriate to mention that Mr. Drown as the UC Davis
17
chief counsel signed the mentioned agreement on behalf of the UC Regents.
18
19 Mr. Drown was obligated to act to prevent further violation of the agreement,
21 Police’s assaulting Waszczuk with a deadly weapon on May 31, 2012, as well
28 for our employees. Supervisors are always expected to have "just cause" when
15 I will leave to my attorney the further interpretation of the UCDHS just cause,
16 to lead.
17 I am so traumatized when I think about the UCDMC trauma unit, which was
19 However, today I am less surprised about Mr. Chillcot’s war game, after the
20 newspapers and television (TV) news have announced that under the
21 supervision of humanitarian off the Year, Mrs. Claire Pomeroy and UCDMC
22 CEO Mrs. Ann Madden Rice, the UCDMC created an oasis for neurosurgeons
23 whose activities were closely akin to Dr. Mengele’s from the Auschwitz Death
24
Camp—characterized by ill-minded illegal medical experiments. The only
25
difference was that Dr. Mengele was declared a war criminal and sentenced to
26
death in absentia. The two UCDMC “Mengeles” were fired from their jobs,
27
and Mrs. Pomeroy resigned from her position under false pretenses. Mrs. Rice
28
17 I am not sure what more should I write in this final complaint under PPSM 70.
18 I am so traumatized and stressed out, but thanks to God, I escaped the May 31,
15 investigator has ignored and covered up the entire issue in her report.
18 Waszczuk believes that the father of the convicted child pornography felon
19 was promised to have Mr. Waszczuk’s job and position a long time before
20 April 2011. This was yet another reason to retaliate against and harass
21 Waszczuk as well as to later terminate his employment.
22 6. Resolution Requested
23
24
Waszczuk is requesting in good faith the following resolution to end the
25
conflict without further costly litigations.
26
After receiving and reviewing my request/complaint, the UC immediately
27
shall restore my employment in the spirit of the signed 2009 Settlement-
28
21 January 19, 2013- UC Davis PPSM Step II Decisions in the unwarranted Letters of
Expectation Plaintiff’s coworkers William Buckans, Kenny Diede and Dereck Cole were
22 attacked by UC Davis Management in May and August 2012.
23 640. On or around January 19, Plaintiff received from UCDHS HR Labor
24 Relation the Step II Appeal- decisions for the complaints Plaintiff filed on his three coworkers,
25 Kenneth Diede, William Buckans and Dereck Cole were served in May and August 2012.
26 Plaintiff provided representation for the mentioned coworkers pursuant to UC Davis Compliant
27 Resolution Policy PPSM 70.
28
15 violation of law, for which disclosure would have more serious consequences.
16 February 2013
17
26 complaint. The complaint alleges that your dismissal from employment was a
27 violation of University policy and did not follow the just cause standard. The
16
645. The actual three-page Step I Appeal Review was signed by USDHS
17
18 Manager of Facilities Design and Construction Thomas Rush, whom Plaintiff never heard of or
19 met. Normally Step I Appeal is reviewed by the Department Head, which was Charles Witcher,
20 who signed the termination letter. In such a situation, HR, by writing the review, had to insert a
22 646. Thomas Rush was a subordinate and colleague of the USDHS Facilities
23 Design and Construction Executive Director Mike Boyd, who in July 2011 also became Director
24 for the UC Davis Medical Center Plant Operation and Maintenance Department and became the
25 direct superior of Charles Witcher and indirectly Plaintiff superior. It was no coincidence that
26 Thomas Rush’s name was selected for Step I review. It is the second time Mike Boyd’s
27
subordinate was assigned to review Plaintiff’s appeal. First was Michael Pansious in May 2012,
28
15 attorney. The Thomas Rush decision is even worth to be pasted into this amended complaint.
16
18
19 648. On February 28, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Step II Appeal from the December 7, 2012
20 Employment Termination Pursuant to UC Davis Policy PPSM 70 asking $10,000,000 for the
21 unthinkable psychological tortures that Plaintiff experienced from the Defendant in one year and
22 a half of inhumane prosecution and attempts to provoke and kill Plaintiff. In his 19 –page
23 appeal , Plaintiff just vented out his stress and anger knowing that any appeal will not do Plaintiff
24
any good after the Defendant attempted to provoke and kill Plaintiff and UC Davis Police issued
25
and distributed around UC Davis Campuses the “Most Unwanted Persona Non Grata” poster
26
with Plaintiff’s photo and description on it.
27
649. In conclusion of the Step II Appeal request, Plaintiff wrote:
28
7
MARCH 2015
8
9
March 7, 2013 – Plaintiff’s Whistleblowing Retaliation and Interference Complaint with UC
10
Davis Vice Chancellor and Provost Office
11
13 Interference Complaint with the UC Davis Vice Chancellor’s Office due to Plaintiff’s protected
6
651. Plaintiff with his Whistleblowing Retaliation and Interference complaint
7
form submitted to the UC Davis Vice Chancellor’s office a 35-page brief, 1500 pages of
8
supportive documents and a cover letter, which stated:
9 ‘March 7, 2013
The Honorable Ralph J. Hexter
10 Provost and Executive Vice Chancellor
Mrak Hall, Fifth Floor
11 University of California, Davis
One Shields Avenue
12 Davis, CA 95616
13 Re: Retaliation and Interference Complaint
14 Dear Vice Chancellor Hexter,Enclosed is a copy of my Retaliation and
15 Interference Complaint against certain individuals who are managing the UC
16 Davis Medical Center in Sacramento, California, where I was employed for
17 over thirteen years and where my employment was abruptly and without valid
18
and legitimate reason terminated on December 7, 2012.
19
In addition to the managing officers at the UC Davis Medical Center, who are
20
included in the complaint, UC Davis Chief of Police Matt Carmichael and his
21
subordinate, Lieutenant James Barbour, are included in the complaint for
22
alleged act(s) of provocation and conspiracy with other individuals listed in the
23
complaint in an attempt to murder me on May 31, 2012 or send me to the UC
24
Davis Medical Center Trauma Unit in a state of extreme harm.
25
It is very disturbing—even unthinkable—that UC Davis leaders should
26
use the UC Davis Police Department to resolve labor disputes with
27
12 was transferred from the UC Davis Vice Chancellor’s and Provost office to the UC Office of the
13 President (UCOP) Ethics, Compliance and Audit Services.
14 653. The UC Office of the President Principal Investigator Judith Rosenberg was assigned
15 to investigate Plaintiff’s Whistleblowing Retaliation and Interference Complaint.
16 654. The investigation was presided over by two UC Senior Vice Presidents, Sheryl
17
Vacca and Daniel Dooley.
18
655. Plaintiff met UCOP Investigator Judith Rosenberg twice. Plaintiff’s coworker
19
William Buckans witnessed the meetings. Investigator Judith Rosenberg was not very anxious to
20
investigate and she showed her feelings about. The UCOP Principal Investigator probably knew
21
that the Regents, Office of the President and UC Office of the General Counsel were responsible
22
for Plaintiff’s termination without knowing the cause.
23
656. One year later in June 2014, Judith Rosenberg issued her investigation Report,
24
which had nothing to do with any investigation. Judith Rosenberg repeated the defaming and
25
defacing statements made about Plaintiff by three previous investigators, Danesha Nichols, Brent
26
27 Seifert and Cindi Oropeza who portrayed Plaintiff far worse, as a two time convicted child
28 pornography felon who was illegally accessing UC Davis Medical Center HVAC shop
17 Rosenberg found that you had made protected disclosures under the
11 661. The question is whether the UC Senior Vice President, who was overseeing Judith
12 Rosenberg, was aware of all the details of the case and why Plaintiff became a subject of such a
13 vicious retaliation from the Defendant, which lasted for more than a year and half and was
14 continued by the Defendant after Plaintiff’s termination through the State of California
15
Employment Development Department and the California Unemployment Insurance Appeal
16
Board than in State of California Sacramento of Sacramento Superior Court Department 23 with
17
Presiding Judge Hon. Shaleyanne Chang.
18
662. The University of California Office of the President (UCOP) Principal
19
Investigator Judith concluded her pseudo-investigation in Plaintiff’s Whistleblowing Retaliation
20
and Interference Complaint on June 23, 2013, which was a year and four months since Plaintiff
21
filed the complaint on April 7, 2013 with UC Davis Provost and Vice Chancellor Office.
22
663. Judith Rosenberg’s Confidential Investigation Report issued on June 23, 2014
23
was more or less a summary of the previous several fabricated reports as a cause for Plaintiff’s
24
25 May 2012 ten-day suspension without pay and employment termination on December 7, 2012.
26 664. Judith Rosenberg’s investigation report has nothing to do with any investigation
27 and was basically based on slanderous and libelous fabrication issued by UC Davis Health
28 System HR-assigned investigators, Danesha Nichols, Brent Seifert and Cindi Oropeza.
16 misleading way the February 2009 Settlement-Agreement that Plaintiff signed with the Regents
19 and experienced attorney at law, was perfectly aware what the 2009 Settlement-Agreement was
20 about and how grossly and unscrupulously it was violated by the Defendant.
21 670. Judith Rosenberg was perfectly aware that the Defendant defamed,
22 defaced and libeled Plaintiff by issuing, two months before he was terminated, the “PERSON
23 NOT AUTHORIZED ON PROPERTY” poster. Plaintiff’s photo and description were also
24
included on the poster, which was distributed around the UC Davis Medical Center Campus and,
25
most likely, sent to managers and UC Davis employees by electronic mail. Plaintiff was still a
26
University employee and received treatment like a “Most Wanted” criminal by the FBI.
27
671. Plaintiff is not certain whether Judith Rosenberg was aware or knew prior
28
15 the President and the University of California Office of the General Counsel or that the very
16 narrow group of the University officials knew what this case was about.
17 674. The 2009 Settlement-Agreement Plaintiff signed with the Regents of the
18 University of California was not mentioned in by UC Senior Vice President Daniel Dooley in his
19 decision.
20 675. UC Senior Vice President Daniel Dooley resigned or was forced to resign from
21 his $400,000 job with the University of California shortly after he signed the decision in
22 Plaintiff’s Whistleblowing Retaliation Complaint.
23 676. UC Senior Vice President Daniel Dooley from November 2011-April 2012 was a
24
member of the Task Force Team, which investigated a pepper spray attack ordered by UC Davis
25
Chancellor Katehi against protesting students on November 18, 2011. The Task Force Team, of
26
which UC Senior Vice President Daniel Dooley was a member, caused unemployment for UC
27
Davis Police Captain Joy Souza , Lt. John Pike and UC Davis Police Chief Annette Spicuzza
28
7 April 3, 2013 – The letter to UC Davis Health System Executive Director Mike Boyd
Termination of Plaintiff’s Employment – PPSM 70 Step II Appeal Hearing on April 2, 2013
8
677. On April 2, 2013, the Step II Appeal hearing took place in Plaintiff’s employment
9
termination pursuant to the UC Davis Policy PPSM 70 with the presiding Complainant
10
Resolution Officer at the hearing, UC Davis Health System Executive Director Mike Boyd, who
11
was Plaintiff’s indirect superior and, by the position and title, was responsible for Plaintiff’s
12
employment termination.
13
678. Plaintiff followed the instruction in the Letter of Termination dated December 5,
14
2012 and filed the complaint pursuant to the UC Davis Policy PPSM 70.
15
16 679. In 2013, Plaintiff was uncertain whether he should pursue his employment
17 termination complaint under the UC Davis Policy PPSM 70 or file the lawsuit to enforce the
18 February 2009 Settlement-Agreement that the Defendant i.e., the Regents of the University of
20 700. Plaintiff, by filing the complaints pursuant to UC Davis Policy PPSM, had little
21 hope that his employment and position, provided to him by the 2009 Settlement-Agreement,
22 would be eventually restored without litigation or knowing that the decision to terminate him
23 came from the Defendant’ Headquarters in Oakland, CA and was carried out by Director Boyd
24 and others.
25
701. Plaintiff summarized the April 2, 2013 Step II Appeal Hearing as follows:
26 April 3, 2013
9 statements that were outlined in the Notice Intent to Dismiss for Serious
10 Misconduct.
13 employer during the pending internal appeals under the PPSM 70appeals.
14 The abovementioned appeal with the California Insurance Appeal Board is
15 similar to my PPSM Step II Appeal, but is more focused and specifically
16 addresses the out-of-context statement written in Charles Witcher’s Notice
17 Intent to Dismiss dated September 25, 2012.
18
Together with this letter, I am sending you a copy of my Appeal Brief and the
19
relevant exhibits I submitted to the California Insurance Appeal Board.
20
I hope that the enclosed documents and your careful review of Oropeza and
21
Seifert’s Investigatory Report, which is based on lies, false statements and
22
fabricated accusations by a handful of people, will help you understand that
23
this case will not end with your hearing or in arbitration but, instead, will
24
ultimately be pursued in a court of law and justice will be served.
25
Besides the above, I am respectfully asking you for help on behalf of my
26
HVAC shop coworker, Kenny Diede, whose life and working conditions in the
27
16 Best Regards,
Jaroslaw Waszczuk
17 CC: HR, Charles Witcher , Vice Chancellor Ralph Hexter, Kenny Diede .
18
MAY 2013
19 May 2, 2013 – UC Davis Health System Executive Director Mike Boyd’s – PPSM 70 Step II
Appeal Decision In Plaintiff’s Employment Termination Complaint
20
702. On May 2, 2013, UC Davis Health System Executive Director Mike Boyd
21
issued a decision in Plaintiff’s Step II Appeal employment termination complaint as follows
22
703. Plaintiff’s hope that Director Boyd, with his executive power, would find
23
a different solution was broken like a soap bubble”?
24
May 5, 2013 – Plaintiff’s Response to Director Boyd’s Step II Decision
25
26
10 Mr. Boyd:
On April 2, 2013, we held a meeting on the UC Davis Campus. On the same-day, UC
11
12 Davis Chief Compliance Officer Wendy Delmendo wrote me a letter and informed me
13 that she had accepted my complaint under the university’s Whistleblower Protection
14 Policy.
15
18 Page No. 1
19
Boyd: “During the meeting, Mr. Waszczuk asserted that the
termination was an act of retaliation that is linked to complaints he
20 made about his supervisors and management staff within PO&M when
working at the Central Plant from 1999 to 2007 and more recent
21 allegations and concerns that he raised in 2010 and 2011. This assertion is
consistent with similar assertions he made in his Step I Appeal and in the
22 documentation provided in the Step II Appeal submittal. He also maintains
that the disciplinary actions have been taken represent a breach of the
23 2009 Settlement-Agreement between him and the University.”
11 During our discussion, I pointed out to you the following fragment from
12 Seifert and Oropeza’s report, in order to help you understand how Seifert and
13 Oropeza crafted cause for you to terminate my employment.
14
19 After I read you this fragment from Oropeza and Seifert’s report, I asked you
20 the following question in relation to Putney’s lies:
21
“Mr. Boyd, you were born in and have lived your entire life in the USA,
22
right?” You answered, “yes.” I then asked you, “Do you know or did you
23
ever hear any ethnic slurs in this country directed against Romanians,
24
similar to nigger, Pollack, wetback, or other such slurs?” You responded
25
26
that you didn’t know, and that you never heard any slurs directed
28 Putney whether he or Daniliuc know any ethnic slurs about Romanians, not to
12
UC Davis’ Policy PPSM 70.
13 706. On December 5, 2013, exactly one year after the Defendant terminated
14 Plaintiff’s employment, Plaintiff held a meeting with Boyd in the UC Davis Medical Center.
15 Boyd was assigned as the Compliant Resolution Officer (CRO) Step II Reviewer in the Case No.
16 03-PPS-011-12/13. During the meeting, Plaintiff was representing HVAC Technician Dereck
17 Cole in his complaint under UC Davis Policy PPSM 70 for his 2011/2012 “Does Not Meet
18 Expectation Employee Performance Review (Evaluation).” The “Does Not Meet Expectation
19 Evaluation” was basically the last step for the employee to be terminated if he did not improve
20 his performance and behavior and achieve the goals for the next evaluation period, as outlined by
21
the supervisors or managers in the employee evaluations.
22
23 707. Mike Boyd, as Executive Director and Complaint Resolution Officer, and
24 as Plaintiff’s superior, knew that the Employee Performance Reviews (evaluations), mandated by
25 UC Davis Policy PPSM 23, are the most important documents to make a decision in any adverse
15 provide him with evaluations for the last two years of his employment mandated by UC Davis
16 Policy PPSM 23, thus maliciously depriving Plaintiff of the UC Davis administrative remedies
17 under UC Davis Policy PPSM 23 and violating his employment and civil rights to be treated
19
22
YEAR COMMENT SUPERVISOR
23
1999-00 “…performance very good” Kavanagh
24 “has become a very knowledgeable and effective central, plant
operator” --
25 “very conscientious and thorough” --
“can be counted on to make the right operational decisions” --
26 “valuable employee” --
“committed to the future success of the Medical Center” --
27 VERY GOOD often exceeded expectations and standards --
9 712. On May 7, 2013, Plaintiff obtained the Right To Sue Notice from the State
10 of California Department of Fair Employment and Housing DFHH Matter: 112740-49836-R
11 after losing hope that the wrongful termination and discrimination that the Defendant caused him
12 could be resolved without litigation.
13 DECEMBER 2013
14 December 4, 2013 – Plaintiff’s Wrongful Termination Complaint Against the Defendant with
the State of California County of Sacramento Superior Court
15
16
713. On December 4, 2013, Plaintiff in Pro Per filed in State of California,
17
County of Sacramento Superior Court the Wrongful Termination Complaint.
18
714. On December 2, 2013, Plaintiff simultaneously filed in the State of
19
California, County of Sacramento Superior Court a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus,
20
Administrative Mandamus (CCP § 1085;1094.5) to order the California Unemployment
21
Insurance Appeal Board (CUIAB) and/or The Employment Development Department (EDD) to
22
calculate and provide unemployment benefits to Plaintiff or a remand for a rehearing to award
23
such benefits related to Plaintiff’s December 7, 2012, employment termination.
24
715. Defendant in further despicable violation and breach of the February
25
2009Settlement-Agreement, with an evil spirit, defaced and defamed Plaintiff with the State of
26
California Employment Development Department for the purpose of denying Plaintiff ‘s
27
unemployment benefits after terminating Plaintiff’s employment.
28
13
718. On March 11, 2014, Plaintiff sent a letter to the University of California
14
Office of the President (UCOP) Principal Investigator Judith Rosenberg, who had been handling
15
Plaintiff’s whistleblowing retaliation complaint since June 2013. Plaintiff filed the
16
whistleblowing retaliation complaint with the UC Davis Provost and Vice Chancellor’s Office on
17
19 719. The purpose of Plaintiff’s March 11, 2014, 10-page-long letter to Judith
20 Rosenberg was to summarize Plaintiffs’ meeting with her, which took place in Defendants’
22 720. In his letter to Judith Rosenberg, Plaintiff mentioned the interview the UC
23 Davis Assistant Vice Chancellor Dr. Shelton Du ru issea u ga ve to Sacramento African-
24 American magazine Sub Cultural Hub. The interview was conducted by Donna Michelle Ramos
25 on August 6, 2012, and was entitled “A Look Back.”
26 721. Dr. Shelton Du ru isseau wa s o ne o f De fe nda n ts and p e rpe tra tors
27
who pa rtic ip a ted in the d esp ica b le re ta lia to ry p re em p tive ac tion a ga in st Pla intiff
28
6 threw a retirement party in his Eldorado Hill residence. The two guests of
7 honor at the party were Mayor of Sacramento Mr. Kevin Johnson and Mr.
9 Taylor. Besides the lavish retirement party, Dr. Duruisseau gave an interview
14 While reading the “A look back” interview with Dr. Duruisseau, a few
15
statements caught my attention. The first statement that caught my attention
16
was:
17
24
25
26 I am very skeptical about Dr. Duraisseau’s statement that the Central Plant sold
27
enough energy in its first four years of operation to cover the cost of building
28
18 DeRusso, and Principal Engineer from Brown and Caldwell James L. Bartlett.
19
20 Apparently, in 1998 Dr. Duraisseau and Project Manager Mr. Mike Lewis had
21 no clue what a cogeneration facility stands for and what criteria such a facility
22 must meet to be in compliance with federal law (FERC).
23
24
By reading the 2012 “A look back” interview and seeing Dr. Duraisseau’s
25
name on the plaque in the Central Plant, it is not difficult to conclude that the
26
Central Plant for him and others was like a sacred and untouchable place built
27
for future generations to remember “great” UC Davis leaders. However, the
28
15 Vice Chancellor Dr. Shelton Du ru isse au ’s in te rv ie w, she had no p rob lem figu rin g ou t
16 why in Ma rc h 20 07 Pla in tiff was remo ve d fro m the Cen tra l Pla nt why De fe nda n ts
17 sign ed Se ttlem en t-Ag ree men t with Plain tiff in Feb ru ary 200 9 , an d why Pla intiff
19 m illio ns of do lla rs o f reve nue fro m the produ c tion and sa le of ele c trica l e ne rg y
20 b y the UC Dav is Me d ica l Cen tra l Pla n t was th e issu e an d b ig p ro b lem
21 724. Plaintiff is familiar with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s
22 (FERC’s) regulation and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) because
23 prior to his employment with UC Davis Medical Center, Plaintiff worked for a private corporation
24
with a similar cogeneration facility that did not meet FERC and PURPA requirements to be
25
certified as a “qualified cogeneration facility.” Plaintiff’s previous employer committed enormous
26
fraud against Pacific Gas and Electric Company ratepayers and settled out of court for $100
27
million. The $100 million fraud occurred after only six years of unlawful cogeneration facility
28
8
726. Besides the letter to the UCOP Investigator, on March 17, 2014, Plaintiff
9
sent a six-page letter to Sac Cultural Hub Senior Staff Writer/News Reporter Donna Michelle
10
Ramos about her August 6, 2012, interview with UC Davis Assistant Vice Chancellor Dr.
11
Shelton Du ru isseau .
12
13 “A few days ago, I wrote letters to two UC Office of the Presidents’ officials,
14 Principal Investigator Ms. Judith Rosenberg and UC Senior Vice President
15
Dan Dooley, and I mentioned your interview with Mr. Shelton Duruisseau in
16
my letter because Mr. Shelton Duruisseau made a statement about the UC
17
Davis Medical Center Central Plant where I was employed for several years. I
18
am enclosing both letters for context.”
19
727. Even after the reading Dr. Shelton Du ruisse au ’s u n in te ntiona l
20
c on fe ssion du rin g the in te rv ie w a bou t th e en ormo us p ro fit th e Ce ntra l Plan t
21
g ene ra ted and after writing a Ma rc h 11 , 2014 , le tte r to UCOP In ve stiga to r Jud ith
22
Ro se nbe rg , Pla in tiff d id no t th in k tha t th e De fen da nts’ v ic ious re ta lia tion
23
strik es ag ainst Pla in tiff wa s a pree mp tiv e we ll-orche stra te d De fend an ts ac tio n
24
25 re la ted in direc tly o r to the $ 100 ,0 00 ,0 00 fraud co mm itte d by Pla in tiff’s prev iou s
27 728. Plaintiff during his employment with UC Davis Medical Center was not
28 interested in ever looking into the issue of whether or not the Central Plant was being operated
15 autonomy and independence from the state and federal laws and regulations.
16 732. Even if Plaintiff would have thought about the Central Plant’s PURPA
17 qualification, Plaintiff was not willing to spend his own $10,000 and lose his job again at his
18 age for the purpose of filing a complaint with FERC in an attempt to nullify the Central Plant
19 certification issued by FERC and obtained by Defendants in the self-certification process (if
20 any). Also, it would never would crossed Plaintiff’s mind that Defendants committed fraud
21 against another entity in the same manner that Plaintiff’s previous employer did because Central
22 Plant was built to provide utility for UC Davis Medical Center and that surplus energy should be
23 sold because electric energy cannot to be stored like the other product.
24
733. The previous Plaintiff’s employer committed an enormous $100,000,000
25
fraud against Pacific Gas and Electric Company ratepayers in 1989–1996, violating the PURPA
26
mandated requirements for operating a cogeneration facility.
27
734. The March 11, 2014, letter to the UCOP Principal Investigator Judith
28
15 improve situation and Plaintiff was threatened with employment termination when Plaintiff
18 736. After Plaintiff wrote the letter to UCOP Investigator Judith Rosenberg on
19 March 11, 2014, and Sac Cultural Hub Senior Staff Writer/News Reporter Donna Michelle
20 Ramos on March 17, 2014, Defendants reacted sharply and went viral to divert Plaintiff’s
21 attention from the huge profits generated by the Central Plant from electrical energy sale
22 disclosed which was disclosed by UC Davis Assistant Vice Chancellor Dr. Shelton Du ru isseau
23 in h is in te rvie w with Do nna Ramo s.
24
737. On March 20, 2014 Plaintiff received e-mail correspondence from UC
25
Davis Health System Human Resource (HR) Labor Relations Manager Travis Lindsey. More
26
than two years after Plaintiff’s employment termination, attempted to advise Plaintiff of where
27
Plaintiff should send information about Defendants and where not to send it. Plaintiff responded
28
15 737. In March 2014, Plaintiff was also not aware of the fact that on February
16 24, 2014, the attorney in the unrelated Plaintiff’s wrongful termination case pending in the same
17 Sacramento Superior Court (Janet Keyzer v. The Regents of the University of California, Case
19 against Judge Shelleyanne Chang in which Attorney Mary -Alice Coleman declared that:
20
“The Honorable Shelleyanne W. L. Chang, the Judge before whom the
21
trial in the aforesaid matter is pending or to whom the aforesaid trial is
22
assigned, is prejudiced against me or Plaintiff so that Plaintiff cannot or I
23
believe that Plaintiff cannot have a fair and impartial hearing before this
24
25 Judge.”
28 738. Hon. Shelleyanne Chang has been the subject of a Peremptory Challenge
15 attitude toward Plaintiff and his witnesses could best be described with her statement after
16 Plaintiff made a statement about his coworker’s suicide, caused by Defendants’ hostile working
17 environment. ALJ Marilyn Tays responded: “All right, I guess he is not here.” When Plaintiff
18 heard this, I had no doubt where ALJ Marilyn Tays was going with her hearing.
8
745. Following the March 2014 Hon. Shelleyanne Chang reassignment, Travis
9
Lindsey’s email correspondence, and Plaintiff’s letters to UCOP Investigator
10
Judith Rosenberg ,the California Deputy Attorney General Ashante L. Norton, who represents
11
CUIAB as a Legal Counsel , filed on April 1, 2014, a frivolous Notice of Demurrer in Plaintiff’s
12
Writ of Mandamus case to distract Plaintiff and made Plaintiff forget about UC Davis Assistant
13
Vice Chancellor Dr. Shelton Du ru isse au ’s in te rv ie w with Donn a Ram os.
14
15 746. On April 17, 2014, Defendants as the Real Party in Interest in the Writ of
16 Mandamus case filed in the court a Joinder supporting CUIAB’s legal counsel Notice of
17 Demurer. Defendants’ Joinder supporting CUIAB Demurer would perhaps not been strange to
18 Plaintiff if the four top-notch attorneys from the UC Office of the General Counsel had not
19 appeared on Joinder pleading, including Charles F. Robinson, UCOP General Counsel; Karen J.
20 Petrulakis, UCOP Chief Deputy General Counsel; Cynthia A. Vroom, UCOP Senior Counsel;
21 and Margaret L Wu, UCOP Managing Counsel.
22 747. Writ of Mandamus for the unemployment insurance benefits is not the
23 million-dollar case that required the involvement of the four top-notch legal counsels from the
24
UC Office of the General Counsel, especially the UC General Counsel Charles F. Robinson,
25
reports directly to UC Regents.
26
748. In addition to the above, in January 2015, Plaintiff filed an Objection to
27
the Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP Motion and included the Assistant Vice Chancellor Dr. Shelton
28
15 Governors members and the members of the Board of University of California Reagents are
16 nominated by the governor of California and confirmed by the State of California Senate.
17 751. In 1999–2003 ISO was the distributor of electric power sold by UC Davis
18 Medical Center Central Plant on the open market. Plaintiff was employed in the UC Davis
19 Medical Center Central Plant by Defendants from June 1999 to March 2007.
20 752. The UC Davis Medical Center Central Plant in 1999–2003 was selling
21 power at the highest bids on the spot in the market via ISO exactly in same way as Enron or
22 former Plaintiff employer Dynegy, manipulating power and causing a rolling shortage of energy
24 753. Defendant were manipulating the electric power sale on a small scale in
25 comparison to Enron or Dynegy, but even selling 15 MW was enough to provide electricity for
26 15,000 people. In 2002, the former Plaintiff employer Dynegy and 10 other energy suppliers that
27 contributed to California’s energy crisis and rolling blackouts were fined with small fines in the
28
10 employee performance review (evaluation) for 2006–2007, and Plaintiff’s evaluation looked
11 nothing like what happened in 2006–2007 in contrary to the suspension and reassignment March
13 755. In January 2007, Charles Robinson joined the University as the General
14 Counsel, and he knew all of the secrets about the UC Davis Medical Center 27 MW cogeneration
15 facility’s electric power production, distribution, and sale via California Independent System
16 Operator (ISO).
V. CONCLUSION
17
18
19 756. The reason for Defendant’ despicable conspiracy against Plaintiff did not
20 cross Plaintiff’s mind until June 2015 during Plaintiff’s preparation to file Plaintiff’s Opposition
21 to the Defendant’ Legal Fees and Cost in relation to Defendant’ Anti- Strategic Lawsuit Against
23 757. Plaintiff did not had a clue that Plaintiff’s victory in 2008 arbitration
24 against Defendant —which ended with the 2009 Settlement-Agreement that Plaintiff signed with
25 Defendant—was signed by Defendant in evil spirit and bad faith. The arbitration and the
26 Settlement –Agreement was just a short and unexpected delay for the Defendant before the
27 Defendant exercised and launched a second preemptive retaliatory strike against Plaintiff to end
28 Plaintiff’s employment with the University of California which orchestrated by UC Davis Health
20 772. Plaintiff in November 2008 did not realize that the prevailing, in
21 arbitration, and signing the Settlement – Agreement in February 2009 in good faith with the
22 Defendant was only a short time before Defendants would carry out their evil-spirited plan to
23 terminate the Plaintiff’s employment. The Plaintiff outlined and described the extreme,
24 outrageous, atrocious, and utterly intolerable conduct of the Defendants in paragraphs and
25 subparagraphs 1 through 144.
26 773. The Defendant, the Regents of the University of California, by and through its
27 own employees, agents, and officers, kept Plaintiff out of the workplace for over one year for no apparent
28
18 DISPARAGEMENT neither the Plaintiff nor the Defendants were to disparage each other. Plaintiff at all
19 times expressed his good faith beliefs in the truth. When, in reality, Plaintiff was a valuable employee,
20 who had the best interests of the hospital always in mind, the Defendants not only disparaged Plaintiff
21 but made Plaintiff look like the most-wanted criminal.
22 777. In September 2012, two month before Plaintiff’s employment termination, the
23 Defendant ordered own officers, agents, and UC Davis Police to issue a poster similar to the FBI’s “Most
24 Wanted” criminals posters with Plaintiff’s photo and description on. The issued UC Davis Police
25 poster was distributed around UC Davis Campuses without informing Plaintiff about it. The Defendants
26 wrongfully terminated Plaintiff’s employment on December 7, 2012.
27 778. The written Settlement - Agreement contains an implied covenant of good
28
27
783. The Plaintiff loss of 2011 base salaries earnings were $8,328.40 plus 10% daily
28
16 785. The Plaintiff’s loss due to breach of contract in 2012 involved base salary
17 earnings of $8,882.00 plus 10% daily compound interest for the time period until the Defendants pay to
18 Plaintiff the requested amount.
19 44.28 hours at a rate of $34.31/hour were accrued or would have been accrued in sick leave if
20 the Defendants had not breached the contract and if Plaintiff had been employed by the Defendants.
21 44.28 hour x $34.1 = $1,519.20 plus 10% daily compound interest for the time period until the
22 Defendants pay Plaintiff the requested amount.
23 THEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that Defendants pay total due to Plaintiff for
24 2012 in sum of $10,401.20 plus 10% daily compound interest for the time period until the Defendants
25 pay to Plaintiff the requested amount.
26
27 The Plaintiff’s Employment Termination by the Defendant Five Years prior to the Plaintiff’s
28
2 786. The Plaintiff’s base salary earning from January 1, 2013, to December 31, 2017,
3 would be $358,200 if the Defendants had not breached the contract, and Plaintiff would have earned the
4 above amount until Plaintiff retired at the age of 66 and a half on December 31, 2017, as Plaintiff planned
5 to do.
6 787. The Plaintiff’s earning would be higher if Plaintiff were to receive pay raises in
7 this period or if the Defendants would reclassify Plaintiff’s annual salary. The Middle Salary Grade for
8 Associate Development Engineer pursuant to the UC Davis Title Code 7182 has been changed
9 effective July 1, 2014 from $ 71,640.00 to $76,600.00 annually.
10 $71,640 base annual salary x 5 years = $358,200. Plaintiff would earn this if
11 employed by the Defendants plus 10% daily compound interest for the time period until the Defendants
12 pay the requested amount.
13 THEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that Defendants pay total due to Plaintiff in sum of
14 $358,200 plus 10% daily compound interest
15 788. The 221.4 hours of accrued sick leave and 886.2 hours of accrued vacation
16 at a pay rate of $34.31 = $38,001.00. Plaintiff would earn this if employed by the Defendant plus
17 10% daily compound interest for the time period until the Defendants pay the requested amount.
18 THEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that Defendants pay total due to Plaintiff in sum of
19 $38.001 plus 10% daily compound interest
20
23
789. Defendants breached the signed contract with Plaintiff and unlawfully
24
terminated Plaintiff on December 7, 2012 at the age of 61 and a half. The Plaintiff, at age 61 and
25
a half, was not eligible to receive even the earlier Social Security income benefits for which
26
Plaintiff could apply in May 2013. For the full Social Security income benefit would have work
27
until year 2017.
28
9 and terminated the 61-and-a-half-year-old Plaintiff without the possibility of the Plaintiff being
10 hired by any employer at his age, thus depriving Plaintiff of any income until Plaintiff received
11
earlier retirement Social Security income benefit at age of 62 or the University Retirement
12
Benefits.
13
23 792. By Breaching contract and violating the Skelly Law, the Defendants
24 terminated Plaintiff without the possibility of finding other employment at his age and with his
25 health. They denied Plaintiff’s unemployment insurance benefits, thus Plaintiff was left without
26 any income, health insurance, or life insurance.
27 793. n such a situation, Plaintiff was forced to cash out a lump sum from his
28
3 798. In 2011, Defendants grossly and despicably breached the contract and
4 performed inhumane harassment of the Plaintiff in an attempt to terminate Plaintiff or force him
5 to quit. The Defendant, through town agents and officers, de-enrolled Plaintiff from the Medical
6 and Dental Health Insurance benefits and denied Plaintiff’s Short Term Disability Insurance
7 benefits when Plaintiff was on stress-related sick leave caused by the Defendants’ agents and
8 officers.
9 799. When Plaintiff noticed in January 2012 that the Defendants had de-enrolled
10 Plaintiff from the Health and Dental Insurance and changed Plaintiff’s position without the
11 Plaintiff’s knowledge from an Associate Development Engineer to Programmer I (Demotion),
12 Plaintiff thought that Plaintiff would be terminated soon and so Plaintiff’s spouse enrolled Plaintiff
13 in her employer Nordstrom’s Corporation Health and Dental Insurance Benefits in January 2012.
14 Thanks to Plaintiff’s wife’s employer, Plaintiff has Health and Dental Insurance coverage
15 including medicine.
16 800. The Defendants re-enrolled Plaintiff into the Health and Dental Plan in
17 January 2012 but Plaintiff did not de-enroll himself from his spouse’s employer health insurance
18 and dental plan because he would be not able to re-enroll if Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s
19 employment, which occurred in December 2012.
20 801. Since February 2012, Plaintiff maintained his health and dental insurance
21 with his spouse’s employer Nordstrom Corporation, and this insurance would be maintained until
22 Plaintiff’s spouse’s retirement in September 2017. This increased the Plaintiff’s spouse’s monthly
23 premium for health and dental insurance from $94.00/month to $382.00/month. The difference
24 in premium, which is $288/month.
25 THEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that Plaintiff , shall be compensated by the Defendants
26 from February 2012 to September 2017 until Plaintiff’s wife retires from Nordstrom at age 66,
27 which is 56 months x 288= $16,128.00 total sum due to Plaintiff
28
4 802. For 13 years of employment with the University of California, Plaintiff was
5 paying premiums every paycheck to the amount of $149.90 for Supplemental Life Insurance, A&D,
6 and Dependents Life Insurance, totaling $23,384 in premiums alone for 13 years. Plaintiff was
7 insured by Supplemental Life Insurance to the amount of $280,000, by Accidental Death and
8 Dismemberment Insurance to the amount of $500,000, and by Dependents Life Insurance to the
9 amount of $100,000.
10 803. The Defendants erased the above-mentioned Plaintiff’s benefits due to their
11 reckless violation of a signed contract with Plaintiff and unlawfully terminating Plaintiff’s
12 employment on December 7, 2012, at the of age 61 and a half, knowing that the Plaintiff had had
13 open-heart surgery and other health problems and that Plaintiff, at his age and health, would either
14 not be able to obtain Life Insurance, Accidental Death and Dismemberment, and Dependents Life
15 Insurance at all or, if so, that the premiums would be so high that Plaintiff wouldn’t even be able
16 to dream about having Life Insurance.
17 804. Due to their breach and violation of the signed February 2009 contract with
18 Plaintiff, the Defendants are liable for paying his spouse the mentioned benefits if Plaintiff dies.
19 THEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that Defendants pay the mentioned benefits to his
20 spouse if the Plaintiff dies.
21 805. The other option is that Plaintiff will find an insurance company that would be
22 willing to provide these benefits to Plaintiff and Defendant will pay the premiums until the
23
Plaintiff dies. EXAMPLE: Banner Life Insurance Company-
24
Semi-Annually: 4,720.05Quarterly:2,406.30Monthly (EFT):809.81
25
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28 819. To be sure, Defendant, and Defendant’s agents sand officers knew Plaintiff is, and
16 The Violation and Breach of Settlement –Agreement by the and Defendant’s Discrimination
against Plaintiff Base on his Mental and Medical Condition
17
18
829. Defendant and Defendant’s agents and officers by breeching and violating the
19
2009 Settlement –Agreement, further discriminated against Plaintiff based on his mental
20
disability and medical condition as described herein.
21
22 830. Defendant and its agents, managers and employees, by violating and breaching the
23 signed Settlement –Agreement with Plaintiff violated California Government Code §12940, by failing
24 to adequately supervise, control, discipline, and/or otherwise penalize the conduct, acts, and failures to
25 act as described herein. As such, Defendant and the Individual Defendant failed to fulfill their statutory
26 duty to take all reasonable and necessary steps to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation from
28 831.. Despite Plaintiffs complaints about violation and breach of 2009 Settlement Agreement
28
3
839. Defendant and Defendant’s agents and officers purposely and with evil spirit
4
violated and breached the signed 2009 Settlement –Agreement with Plaintiff as part and parcel
5
6 of their ongoing, continuing, and repeated retaliation, harassment, for the purpose to cover up
7 and conceal their misconduct, violation of state and federal law ,engaged in a course of action
8
that constituted not be released from liability under § No. 7 and § No 8. of the settlement –
9
agreement to be sue for and Defendant is liable for violation of not limited to the Immigration
10
Reform and Control Act; the Family Medical Leave Act and the Higher Education Employer-
11
12 Employee Relations Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil
13 Rights Act of 1991, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, the Americans with
14
Disabilities Act, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act), the
15
law of contract and tort; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.
16
28
11 843. The California Legislature enacted Health & Safety Code Section 1278.5 because
12 “… it is the public policy of the State of California to encourage patients, nurses, members of the
13 medical staff, and other health care workers to notify government entities of suspected unsafe
14 patient care and conditions. The Legislature encourages this reporting in order to protect patients
15 and in order to assist those accreditation and government entities charged with ensuring that health
16 care is safe. The Legislature finds and declares that whistleblower protections apply primarily to
17 issues relating to the care, services, and conditions of a facility and are not intended to conflict
18 with existing provisions in state and federal law relating to employee and employer relations…”
19 (Emphasis Added)
20 844. Section 1278.5(b) (1) provides “No health facility shall discriminate or retaliate, in
21 any manner, against any patient, employee, member of the medical staff, or any other health care
22 worker of the health facility because that person has…Presented a grievance, complaint, or report
23 to the facility, to an entity or agency responsible for accrediting or evaluating the facility, or the
24 medical staff of the facility, or to any other governmental entity…” (Emphasis Added)
25 845. Section 1278.5(d)(1) states (d) (1) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that
26 discriminatory action was taken by the health facility, or by the entity that owns or operates that
27 health facility, or that owns or operates any other health facility, in retaliation against an employee,
28
10 By: _________________________
11
12 Jaroslaw Waszczuk
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PROOF OF SERVICE
1. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to this cause. My residence or business address is:
2.1 >^ I I am a resident of or employed in the county where the mailing occurred. I served a copy of the Notice of Entry of
Dismissal and Request for Dismissal by mailing them, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid, as follows:
a. I I I deposited the envelope with the United States Postal Sen/ice.
1} I I I placed the envelope for collection and processing for mailing following this business's ordinary practice with
which I am readily familiar. On the same day conrespondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited
in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service,
c. Date of deposit: 9/30/2015 d. Place of deposit (city and state): L o d i , C A 9 5 2 4 0
e. Addressed as follows (name and address):
Douglas Repel ,350 University AvejSuite 200; Sacramento 95825
3 I I I served a copy of the Notice of Entry of Dismissal and Request for Dismissal by personally delivering copies as shown below:
a. Name of person served:
b. Address at which person served:
c. On (dafe); d. At (time):
I served a copy of the Notice of Entry of Dismissal and Request for Dismissal by electronically sen/ing copies as shown below
(complete if electronic service is used based on a court order or agreement of the parties):
a. Name of person served:
b. Electronic service address of person served:
c. On (date): d. At(f/me).-
e. Electronic service address from which I served the documents:
I I Proof of electronic service is attached.
5- I—I Proof of service on additional parties is attached.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Date: September 3 0 , 2 0 1 5
Irena Waszczuk ^
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME) (SIGNATURE OF DECLARANT) Page 1 of 1
Form Adopted for Mandatory Use Code of Civil Procedure, § 581 et seq.;
Judicial Council of Califomia NOTICE OF ENTRY OF DISMISSAL Cal. Rules of Court, mle 3.1390
CIV-120 [Rev. January 1,2012] www.courts.ca.gov
AND PROOF OF SERVICE
CIV-110
ATTORNEY OR PARTY wn>IOUT ATTORNEY (Wame, State Bar number, and address)
FOR COURT USE ONLY
Jaroslaw Waszczuk ; IN PR'O PER
2216 Katzakian Way , Lodi CA 95242
TELEPHONE NO: ( 2 0 9 ) 6 6 3 - 2 9 7 7 FMt^O. (Optional): (209)370-8281
E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional):[email protected]
ATTORNEY FOR (Wame;: Jaroslaw
Waszczuk
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO
STREET ADDRESS: ^ 2 0 9 t h S t r e e t OCT - 1 2015
MAILING ADDRESS 720 9th street
CITY AND ZIP CODE: Sacramento, CA 95814
BRANCH NAME: Civil By R. CASTILLO
Deputy Clerk
PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: Jaroslaw Waszczuk; IN PRO PER
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: The Regents of the University of California
REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL CASE NUMBER: 34-2013-00155479
A conformed copy will not be returned by the clerk unless a method of return is provided with the document.
This form may not be used for dismissal of a derivative action or a class action or of any party or cause of action in a
class action. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 3.760 and 3.770.)
1. TO THE CLERK: Please dismiss this action as follows:
a. (1) I • I With prejudice (2) j j Without prejudice
b. (1) CZHJ Complaint
Complaint (2) £13 Petition
(3)1 ] Cross-complaint filed by (name): on (date):
(4) I I Cross-complaint filed by (name): on (date):
(5) I I Entire action of all parties and all causes of action
(6) I • ! Other (specify):* Defendants : Charles Witcher, Ann Madden Rice, Dorin Daniliuc , Patrick Putney
2. (Complete in all cases except family law cases.)
The court I I did I «^ I did not waive court fees and costs for a party in this cas|. (This infonnation m^jylfe obtained from
the clerk. If court fees and costs were waived, the declaration on the back off/?/;
Date: September 30, 2015
J^rpglavy Wqsai?uk . . . . .
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF I I ATTORNEY j • | PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY) '(SIGNATURE)
*lf dismissal requested is of specified parties only of specified causes of action Attomey or party without attorney for:
only, or of specified cross-complaints only, so state and identify the parties, I I Plaintiff/Petitioner I *^ I Defendant/Respondent
causes of action, or cross-complaints to be dismissed.
Cross-Complainant
3. TO THE CLERK: Consent to the above dismissal is hereby given.'
Date: 9/30/2015
Jaroslaw Waszczuk
(TYPE OR PRINT NAME OF j | ATTORNEY | • | PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY)
' If a cross-complaint - or Response (Family Law) seeking affirmative Attomey or party without attorney for:
relief - is on file, ttie attomey for cross-complainant (respondent) must
sign this consent if required by Code of Civil Procedure section 581 (I) I I Plaintiff/Petitioner I I Defendant/Respondent
orO).
I I Cross-Complainant
(To beafmpleted by clerk) _
4. I Ir I Dismissal entered as requested on (dafej: ULI ~ I tUID
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the information above is true afidicorrect.