The Asylum Case (Digest)

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56. THE ASYLUM CASE (COLOMBIA V.

PERU, 17 ILR 28, ICJ REPORTS


NOVEMBER 20, 1950)
FACTS:
On October 3rd, 1948, a military rebellion broke out in Peru and proceedings were instituted
against Haya de la Torre for the instigation and direction of that rebellion. Three months after the
rebellion, Torre fled to the Colombian Embassy in Lima, Peru.
He was sought out by the Peruvian authorities, but without success; and after asylum had been
granted to the refugee, the Colombian Ambassador in Lima requested a safe-conduct to enable
Haya de la Torre, whom he qualified as a political offender, to leave the country. This was
granted in accordance with Article 2(2) of the Havana Convention on Asylum of 1928.
Subsequently, the Ambassador also stated Colombia had qualified Torre as a political refugee in
accordance with Article 2 Montevideo Convention on Political Asylum of 1933 (note the term
refugee is not the same as the Refugee Convention of 1951).
The Government of Peru refused to accept the unilateral qualification and refused to grant safe
passage, claiming that Haya de la Torre had committed common crimes and was not entitled to
enjoy the benefits of asylum.
A diplomatic correspondence ensued which terminated in the signature, in Lima, on August 31st.
1949, of an Act by which the two Governments agreed to submit the case to the International
Court of Justice.
ISSUE/S:
1: Is Colombia competent, as the country that grants asylum, to unilaterally qualify the offence
for the purpose of asylum under treaty law and international law?
2: Is Peru, as the territorial State, bound to give a guarantee of safe passage?
3: Did Colombia violate Article 1 and 2(2) of the Convention on Asylum of 1928 (Havana
Convention) when it granted asylum and is the continued maintenance of asylum a violation of
the treaty?

HELD:
Colombia was not entitled to qualify unilaterally and in a manner binding upon Peru the nature
of the offence.
It declared that the Government of Peru was not bound to deliver a safe-conduct to the refugee.
The Court rejected by fifteen votes to one the Peruvian contention that Haya de la Torre was
accused of common crimes; the Court noted that the only count against Haya de la Torre was
that of military rebellion and military rebellion was not, in itself, a common crime.
1: The court stated that in the normal course of granting diplomatic asylum a diplomatic
representative has the competence to make a provisional qualification of the offence (for
example, as a political PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW A.Y. 2016-2017 Atty. Ryan
Mercader 2K 68 offence) and the territorial State has the right to give consent to this
qualification. In the Torre’s case, Colombia has asserted, as the State granting asylum, that it is
competent to qualify the nature of the offence in a unilateral and definitive manner that is
binding on Peru. The court had to decide if such a decision was binding on Peru either because
of treaty law (in particular the Havana Convention of 1928 and the Montevideo Convention of
1933), other principles of international law or by way of regional or local custom.
2: The court held that there was no legal obligation on Peru to grant safe passage either because
of the Havana Convention or customary law. In the case of the Havana Convention, a plain
reading of Article 2 results in an obligation on the territorial state (Peru) to grant safe passage
only after it requests the asylum granting State (Columbia) to send the person granted asylum
outside its national territory (Peru). In this case the Peruvian government had not asked that
Torre leave Peru. On the contrary, it contested the legality of asylum granted to him and refused
to grant safe conduct.
3: Article 1 of the Havana Convention states that “It is not permissible for States to grant
asylum… to persons accused or condemned for common crimes… (such persons) shall be
surrendered upon request of the local government.” In other words, the person-seeking asylum
must not be accused of a common crime (for example, murder would constitute a common
crime, while a political offence would not). The accusations that are relevant are those made
before the granting of asylum. Torre’s accusation related to a military rebellion, which the court
concluded was not a common crime and as such the granting of asylum complied with Article 1
of the Convention. Article 2 (2) of the Havana Convention states that “Asylum granted to
political offenders in legations, warships, military camps or military aircraft, shall be respected to
the extent in which allowed, as a right or through humanitarian toleration, by the usages, the
conventions or the laws of the country in which granted and in accordance with the following
provisions: First: Asylum may not be granted except in urgent cases and for the period of time
strictly indispensable for the person who has sought asylum to ensure in some other way his
safety.” An essential pre-requisite for the granting of asylum is the urgency or, in other words,
the presence of “an imminent or persistence of a danger for the person of the refugee”. The court
held that the facts of the case, including the 3 months that passed between the rebellion and the
time when asylum was sought, did not establish the urgency criteria in this case (pp. 20 -23). The
court held: “In principle, it is inconceivable that the Havana Convention could have intended the
term “urgent cases” to include the danger of regular prosecution to which the citizens of any
country lay themselves open by attacking the institutions of that country… In principle, asylum
cannot be opposed to the operation of justice.” In other words, Torre was accused of a crime but
he could not be tried in a court because Colombia granted him asylum. The court held that
“protection from the operation of regular legal proceedings” was not justified under diplomatic
asylum. Asylum may be granted on “humanitarian grounds to protect political prisoners against
the violent and disorderly action of irresponsible sections of the population.” (for example during
a mob attack where PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW A.Y. 2016-2017 Atty. Ryan Mercader
2K 69 the territorial State is unable to protect the offender). Torre was not in such a situation at
the time when he sought refuge in the Colombian Embassy at Lima

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