Article

Balancing, Bandwagoning South Asian Survey

22(2) 189–209
or Hedging? Independent © 2018 ICSAC
SAGE Publications
Ceylon’s Reaction to sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0971523117753929
Regional Hegemony http://journals.sagepub.com/home/sas

Shakthi De Silva1

Abstract
The foreign policy of Ceylon under the premiership of D.S. Senanayake main-
tained a distinct alignment with its former coloniser Great Britain. The zenith
of this relationship was the defence agreement which came into effect upon
independence in 1948. Utilising the existing scholarship on neorealism and the
concept of security dilemma, analysis of the reasons behind this strategic align-
ment exposes the threat perception Ceylon faced from its regional hegemon,
India. This study surveys such threat perceptions faced by the island at the time
of independence and argues that this led to a balancing strategy with Britain. It
first locates Ceylon’s foreign policy employing the taxonomies of balancing, band-
wagoning and hedging and then examines how Ceylon’s extra-regional alignment
with the UK enabled her to eschew from a security dilemma with India.

Keywords
Balancing, bandwagoning, hedging, Ceylon, small states, Sri Lanka, foreign policy

Introduction
Prior to the 1972 Constitution, Sri Lanka was referred to as Ceylon—a name
inscribed by the British colonial government and used by a number of post-
independence Sri Lankan administrations. Literature dealing with Ceylon’s foreign
policy generally classifies the United National Party (UNP) period from 1948 to
1956 as ‘pro-West’ (Qureshi 1964, 355). Scholarly work focusing solely on D.S.
Senanayake’s (1948–52) tenure adopts this position based on Ceylon’s defence

1
Department of International Relations, University of Colombo, Colombo, Sri Lanka.

Corresponding author:
Shakthi De Silva, Department of International Relations, University of Colombo, Reid Avenue, Philip
Gunewardena Mawatha, Colombo 00700, Sri Lanka.
E-mail: [email protected] and http://www.cmb.ac.lk/
190 South Asian Survey 22(2)

agreement with the British in 1947—which subsequently came into effect in 1948
(De Silva, 2008, 554–625; Jayawardane, 2004, Xxxii; Karunadasa, 1997, 23;
Kodikara, 1982, 82; 2008, 44–46). Singer’s (1964) exhaustive analysis of the
Ceylonese political elite considers idiosyncratic variables as the source behind
Ceylon’s alignment with Britain. His pioneering work laid the foundation for a
considerable body of literature which claims that the alignment between Ceylon
and the UK—after the former obtained independence from the latter—was built
on the personal ties between the British administration and Ceylon’s Prime
Minister D.S. Senanayake (De Silva, 1966, 19; Jacob, 1973, 1–21; Jupp, 1968;
Kearney, 1964, 125; Kumarasingham, 2013, 242; Lenka and Pattanaik, 1979, 54;
Meyer, 1996; Nissanka, 1984, 13; Samaraweera, 1997, 338).
However, significant research gaps still exist in the body of academic literature
on this period. Sufficient attention has not been directed towards assessing an
alternative explanation behind Ceylon’s alignment with the British. Additionally,
Ceylon’s foreign policy has not been examined through the approaches of balanc-
ing, bandwagoning and hedging. The purpose of this article is to address these
conceptual gaps through a causal analysis.
Realism is widely considered the dominant paradigm in International
Security Studies (Chatterjee, 2014, 35; Glaser, 1996, 124). Prevailing insight in
international relations debates consider neorealism—realism’s most rigorous
variant—as ‘the powerful tool’ predicting weak states’ behaviour (Calenzo and
Muhindo, 2011, 148). I ground my argument on the theory of neorealism because
it considers structural factors as more likely to explain the foreign policy of
states (Jervis, 1978; Snyder, 1991; Waltz, 1979). This perspective offers a new
lens to observe the Indo-Ceylon–UK nexus as opposed to the previously studied
idiosyncratic approach. Through this exercise, it is expected that a structural
framework of foreign policymaking can be developed which would provide a
more holistic and deeper understanding of Ceylonese foreign policy behaviour
over this frame of time.
Neorealists point to sources of threats such as geographical proximity and
state’s perceived intentions. In this article, the potential threat from India—
Ceylon’s closest geographic regional power—is recognised as the principle struc-
tural factor which impinged the island’s foreign policymaking during the D.S.
Senanayake administration. The article’s research questions seek to uncover
whether Ceylon chose to balance against, hedge or bandwagon with India and
how Ceylon’s foreign policy alignment with the UK enabled her to evade from
creating a security dilemma with India.
The next section reviews the existing literature on small states, the concept of
security dilemma and the theory of neorealism. It serves as a foundation upon
which a clearer cognisance of the island can be gleaned. The third section pro-
vides an overview of the island, followed by an in-depth analysis of the threat
perception from India. The fifth section leads to an exploration of the island’s
foreign policy in relation to the taxonomies of balancing, bandwagoning and
hedging. The article concludes by underscoring how a security dilemma was cir-
cumnavigated in the process of formulating the island’s foreign policy.
Silva 191

Literature Review

Defining Small States

A review of the existing literature on small states reveals the absence of a univer-
sal definition on what constitute a small state. Whilst some writers advance the
use of tangible criteria such as population size (Barston, 1973) or a mixture of
population size, land area and income (Sutton and Payne, 1993, 579–93), others
point to a state’s ‘area of interest’ as a suitable tool to classify a small state (Fox,
1959, 3). Alternatively, Rublovskis, Šešelgyte and Kaljurand believe that a heavy
dependence on a powerful state actor or on a strong defence organisation is the
chief characteristic of a small state (2013, 14). Keohane adds that a small state can
be defined by its limited capacity to directly threaten a great power and defend
itself against an attack by a great power (1969, 291–300). Reiterating a similar
point, Raeymaeker suggests that a small state is one that is ‘on the defensive, a
state that thirsts for security’ (1974, 18).
Rothstein postulates that small states identify their inability to achieve security
owing to their lack of capabilities and therefore rely on external assistance for
their security needs (1968, 29). While this may not hold in the context of many
small states at present, it was applicable in the case of decolonised small states at
the time of their independence. Central to the above definitions is an understand-
ing of the shortage of resources and capabilities that determine power and influ-
ence. Foremost among such variables are ‘size of population, territory, economy,
and military’ (Thorhallsson and Steinsson, in press; 3; also see Hey 2003; Rapaport
et al., 1971, 29).
Ceylon, an island in the Indian Ocean, located a mere 32 km away from
Mainland India, fits these definitions as a ‘small state’. Comprising just 65,610 sq.
km, it pales in comparison to its 3,287,263 sq. km neighbour. Be it absolute vari-
ables such as GNP, size of territory, population, military capability or relational
variables such as area of influence and sensitivity to the external environment, the
island was no match to its regional giant or even most of India’s constitutive fed-
eral states. As a result, Ceylon easily qualifies as a small state in comparison to
India. Given the above definitions on small states, what can we assume about the
nature of the island’s foreign policy? It can be advanced that small states are more
intent on ensuring their survival from threats stemming from the anarchic external
environment owing to their weak power potential. This prognosis is reinforced by
neorealism as argued below.

Small State Foreign Policy

Neorealism assumes that international constraints influence state behaviour:

In general, international pressures will override domestic interests, internal political

struggles, and the characteristics of particular states in foreign-policy decision making.
Given that the international system is anarchic and that states must consequently ensure
192 South Asian Survey 22(2)

their own security, the exigencies of the international environment will be paramount in
decision makers’ calculations. Accordingly, a state’s behaviour is viewed as a response
to the constraints and incentives of its aggregate power relative to others (i.e., the dis-
tribution of capabilities) or the degree of aggressive intent on the part of external actors
(i.e., the balance of threat). Neorealists assume that statesmen will respond rationally
to these preconditions and will choose that foreign-policy course which is most likely
to maximize security benefits and minimize security risks. (Elman, 1995, 171; also see
Glaser, 1996, 127; Singer, 1961, 77–92; Snyder, 1991, 21–23; Waltz, 1959)

Safeguarding political independence and territorial integrity from external threats

is the foremost concern for a foreign policy decision-maker (Sutton and Payne,
1993, 579). Neorealists argue that the external environment is the main ‘area of
focus’ in decision-making and as a result, fluxes in it have a significant impact on
foreign policymaking.
Scholarly work based on small states—including that of neorealists—specu-
lates that small states would be prone to balancing, bandwagoning or even hedg-
ing their security interests. Based on this, it can be conjectured that as a small
state, Ceylon faced four main options at the time of independence (1948):

1. implementing a foreign policy that did not lean towards any country and
was either isolationist in nature, or based on building friendly ties with all
nations to an equal degree (meeting Ceylon’s security requirements by
strengthening its defence forces without any external assistance—internal
balancing);
2. bandwagoning with India (aligning with the stronger potential adversary);
3. launching a foreign policy that would hedge between India and an extra-
regional power;
4. developing ties with a strong and established power that could mitigate the
uncertainty which the island experienced due to its close proximity to
India. A major caveat however is that such a policy could disrupt the
regional stability, if Ceylon attempted to emasculate or challenge India’s
power through a relationship with a stronger extra-regional adversary of
India. Hence, a form of balancing that does not threaten India (i.e., balanc-
ing with a power who is not an adversary of India) would be necessary.

Analysing all these policy options is vital in order to grasp the viability of each in
the context of Ceylon. A policy dilemma emerges, however, in identifying and
executing the most pragmatic option.
Before probing into the contours of the Indo-Ceylon–UK nexus and the nature
of Ceylon’s foreign policy, a brief exploration of what a security dilemma is and
what it entails is necessary. Security dilemma is a situation ‘whereby nations tak-
ing steps to enhance their own security infringe upon the security concerns of
their adversaries, thus triggering a spiral of distrust’ (Leffler, 1994, 16; also see
Waltz, 1979, 186; Wheeler and Booth, 1992, 30). ‘At the heart of the security
dilemma are two constraints:
Silva 193

1. the inherent difficulty in distinguishing between offensive and defensive

postures and
2. The inability of one state to bank on the fact that another states’ present
pacific intentions will remain so’ (Art and Jervis, 1996, 3).

‘Since no state can know that the power accumulation of others is defensively
motivated only, each must assume that it might be intended for attack’ (Snyder,
1984, 461; also see Glaser, 1997, 171; Mitzen, 2006, 354). Therefore ‘even if they
can be certain that the current intentions of other states are benign, they can (not)
neglect the possibility that the others will become aggressive in the future’ (Jervis,
1976, 76).
Security dilemmas are not uncommon to South Asia. Since decolonisation,
small states in the region have struggled to ensure their survival in the context of
their larger geographical neighbour—India (Buzan and Waever, 2003, 93–124;
Cooray, 1992, 313). Buzan (1993, 191) also proposes that security dilemmas are
sharper among proximate actors with shared histories of interaction. At the time
of independence, subsequent to the signing of the 1947 Ceylon–UK defence
agreement, Ceylon faced a real possibility of creating a security dilemma with
India. Although the island faced a threat perception from New Delhi, her choice
of signing a defence agreement with an extra-regional power should have created
an apprehension in neighbouring India.
Indeed, Indian policy circles were markedly perturbed when Pakistan joined
the Central Treaty Organization during the height of the Cold War. One would
assume that a similar action by the island would have generated discussion and
debate in India. This was not so. Instead, a defence alignment with a naval power
much stronger than India did not create presentiment in New Delhi. Why did
Ceylon’s act of formulating a defence agreement with the UK not spark a sense of
apprehension or creating a security dilemma on the part of India? And why was a
military alliance necessary in the first place? What justified a small state to enter
into a defence agreement with the world’s strongest naval power at the time?
These subsidiary questions, unexplored in existing literature, are also addressed in
this article.

Ceylon at Independence: An Overview

Ceylon obtained her independence from Britain in 1948, a year after India and
Pakistan. Her independence ‘struggle’ was a non-violent one, beginning and end-
ing primarily through constitutional reforms and formal requests made to the
British government (House of Representatives Debates, Vol. 1, Column 614; Jupp,
1978, 5). Separated by a 32 km Palk Strait, the small island was overshadowed by
its geographical neighbour. Kabir sketches India as 50 times larger in size and 40
times larger in population than the island (1996, 9). Outlining Ceylon’s weak
defence capabilities in comparison to its larger geographical neighbour, Patnaik
194 South Asian Survey 22(2)

notes that India’s ‘military capability is overwhelming compared to the small

poorly equipped defense force of Sri Lanka’ (2014, 30).
D.S. Senanayake’s reference to Ceylon’s weak defence capability and its
smallness as an island is lucidly evident in his address to the House of
Representatives on the Independence Bill. Speaking to the House two months
before independence, he opined:

The defence of its country is one of the most primary obligations of an independent
state and this is not the sort of world in which small nations can be secured without large
and expensive armed forces. We are in a specially dangerous position….frankly I can-
not accept the responsibility of minister of defence unless I am provided with the means
of defence…let us confess that our freedom depends on somebody or other undertaking
to help defend us. (House of Representatives Debates, Vol. 1, Column 441)

Singh’s research suggests that India possessed a 2.6 million strong military
force during the Second World War (2000, 4). Meanwhile Ceylon did not have
an effective army, navy or air force and passed its ‘Army Act’ in the House of
Representatives on October 1949—a year after independence (Muttukumaru
1987, 148; also see House of Representatives Debates Vol. 4, Column 128).,
Debating on the throne speech at the House of Representatives, Dudley
Senanayake declared: ‘I do not think it is contended by any hon. Member of this
house that the moment we attained our independence we had a ready and
equipped army, navy and air force….’ (House of Representatives Debates, Vol. 12,
Column 347).
During the 1948 fiscal year, Ceylon was in a position to spend only 0.2 per cent
of its GDP on defence (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 1998, 225–27) whereas India
in the same year allocated 24 per cent of its government expenditure on defence
(Muttukumaru, 1987, 144). Discussing the defence expenditure at a parliamentary
session in 1948, J.C.T Kotelawala bluntly criticised: ‘Is this army to defend
Ceylon from external aggression? ...my point is that this is not sufficient and with
this army no external aggression can be prevented’ (House of Representatives
Debates, Vol. 4, Column 118).
Mannan and Ahmed consider this ‘asymmetry between India and its south
Asian neighbours in terms of size, geopolitical location, resources, population,
economy, and military power (as placing) India in a position of advantage in the
region…(which) has created a feeling of insecurity among the small south Asian
neighbours’ (2002, 45; also see Embree, 1997). Hence, the geographic, demo-
graphic and military potential of India as compared to Ceylon appears to have
played a part in embedding a sense of insecurity in the island.
Gajameragedara suggests that

the UNP leadership looked upon the country’s defense policy largely from the point of
view of Indian dominance in the country’s immediate defense and strategic environ-
ment....This combined with a) the close community of interests they found with the
west and b) the then emerging cold war conflict led to the development of a close con-
nection with the west. (2011, 50)
Silva 195

Accordingly, an alignment with the British was established through:

1. a Defence Agreement with Great Britain (1947);

2. an External Affairs agreement with the British (1947);
3. a Public Officers Agreement (1947);
4. maintaining strong trade relations with the British; and
5. joining the British commonwealth in the immediate post-independence
phase.

Of primary importance among the five was the defence agreement with the
UK. The agreement was signed in 1947 and came into effect upon independence
in 1948. It was signed by Henry Moore on behalf of the Government of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and D. S. Senanayake, on behalf of the Government
of Ceylon. The agreement guaranteed mutual military assistance for the security of
their territories, for defence against external aggression and for the protection of
essential communications. Although the agreement was on a mutual basis it
mainly served the security interests of Ceylon (House of Representatives Debates,
Vol. 12, Columns 343–44). It allowed the British to maintain naval and air bases
in Sri Lanka at Trincomalee and Katunayaka and guaranteed British support in the
event of an external attack on the territory of Ceylon.
As a small and relatively undeveloped state, Ceylon faced the momentous task
of configuring a foreign policy by its own stead. The lack of an armed force as
well as a ‘machinery for conducting external relations’ greatly impinged the island
and its foreign policy options (Karunadasa, 1997, 25–26; also see Muttukumaru
1987, 139–40). In this context, the defence agreement can be viewed as strength-
ening the military capabilities of Ceylon. The agreement defined its primary pur-
pose as ‘the defence against external aggression’, echoing the arguments made
above on small state foreign policy under the lens of neorealism. Through the
agreement, the British guaranteed military assistance as well as training to the
newly recruited Ceylonese military forces.
The next section explores in detail the potential security threats Ceylon faced
from India. It sets out to provide a framework to respond to the question: Why was
a defence agreement with the British necessary in the first place?

The Threat Perception from India

This section addresses the strategic logic underlying Ceylon’s need to counter-
poise India. It explores the actions and statements uttered by Indian leaders and
scholars, indicative of India’s desire to occupy the position of a ‘dominant power’
in South Asia. By outlining the threat perception faced by Ceylon owing to India’s
behaviour, this section proves the necessity for a military alliance with an extra-
regional power.
Meticulously compiled data shows that since antiquity, Ceylon’s close pres-
ence to the southern tip of India led to many foreign interventions (both peaceful
196 South Asian Survey 22(2)

and violent) from the subcontinent (De Silva, 2008, 18–141; Jayatilleka, 2015,
48–49; Kodikara, 1990, 9–33; Liyanagamage, 1993, 6–83). Phadnis claims that the

geographical contiguity of a small country with a big one, through which it had often
been conquered in the past, prompted Ceylonese leaders to balance their dependence—
political, military or economic—by developing cordial relations with another power as
large and powerful as India. (1963, 189; also see Dubey, 1989, 99–100; Kabir, 1996, 14)

To entirely rule out this history of Indian interventionism and invasion in our
analysis is to underrate the foreign policy calculus of the Ceylon administration.
The defence policy of colonial Britain was centralised on the Indian subconti-
nent and navigated all aspects of regional security issues from an Indo-centric
perspective. Consequently, the British administration in India had a sizeable
impact on the administration of other South Asian colonies. Advisors to Nehru,
such as Panikkar, were of the view that this type of Indo-centric foreign policy
must be sustained even after the granting of independence to small states of South
Asia (Panikkar, 1951, 84–93; 1960, 23). In his view, South Asian small states
should have limited autonomy in devising their foreign policies as, over time, they
should gravitate under the orbit of the regional hegemon (Harshe, 2007, 37;
Holmes and Yoshihara, 2008, 998; Josh, 1989, 41; Rose, 1982, 320). Panikkar’s
advice to Nehru was noted by Ceylonese statesmen at the time. Speaking to the
House of Representatives, Sir John Kotelawala testified: ‘what I am worried
about is that Mr. Panikkar has made several statements ….that India must have
Trincomalee (A Harbour in Ceylon) for her safety. I have also heard that Mr.
Panikkar is supposed to speak for Pandit Nehru…’ (House of Representatives
Debates, Vol. 20, Columns 51–52).
A year into Ceylon’s independence, Vaidya—an Indian naval expert—averred
India’s right to dictate terms to small states in the region, insisting that ‘the first
and primary consideration is that both Burma and Ceylon must form with India a
basic federation for mutual defence whether they like it or not’ (1949, 30).
Naturally the implementation of such a foreign policy by India would threaten the
national security of the island (Kodikara, 1965, 24; 1993, 10–15). Mendis, delin-
eating India’s foreign policy during this period, remarked that Panikkar identified
himself with the ‘British lake view of Indian security and proposed a defence
system which would be based on the same logistical principle’ (1983, 389; also
see Mendis, 1994). Such a policy dictates Indian dominance over the Indian
Ocean, entailing complete control over all maritime activity including Ceylon’s
maritime trade routes. These cases of Indian policy opinions at the time exhibit
the potential threat the island faced from its closest neighbour.
Wiggins pointed out the alarming possibility of an Indian occupation of key
strategic locations in Ceylon, attesting that ‘If Indian security was threatened from
the Indian Ocean or in a combined attack from the Nepal area and the sea, Indian
occupation of Trincomalee would be likely’ (1965, 377). Even British strategists
such as Olaf Caroe, on the eve of Indian independence, envisaged an inevitable
Indian pre-eminence, as the ‘central constellation from which others in the Indian
Ocean in the long run are likely to radiate’ (as cited in Scott, 2006, 99). As a result,
Silva 197

Ceylon had genuine concerns regarding the maritime intentions of India at the
time of independence.
Added to this was the uncertainty of the intents of the Indian Prime Minister.
Bandyopadhyaya asserts that Nehru had a ‘monopolistic jurisdiction over foreign
affairs’ during his tenure (1991, 287). As the chief architect of India’s foreign
policy, Nehru possessed significant control over the external relations of India.
However, Nehru’s public statements did not assuage the threat perception from
India. For example, in 1944 (before the independence of Ceylon and India), he
commented: ‘the small state is doomed. It may survive as a cultural autonomous
area but not as an independent political unit’ (Nehru, 2002, 550). In the following
year, he added that Ceylon would be inevitably drawn into a closer union with
India ‘presumably as an autonomous unit of the Indian federation’ (as cited in
Kodikara, 1965, 25). Assertions such as this reflect India in the light of an aspirant
to regional hegemony. To quote Mearsheimer, ‘especially powerful states are strongly
inclined to seek regional hegemony’ (2001, 232), and Nehru’s declarations at the
time appear to have laid the foundation for such a foreign policy.
New Delhi’s action of taking over princely states such as Hyderabad (1948),
which wished to remain independent, exhibited the behaviour of an aggressive
regional power (Hilali, 2001, 36; Maxwell, 1974, 637–38; Thomson, 2013).
Moreover, India’s decision to militarily threaten Pakistan by amassing troops on
the Indian border in 1950 and 1951 also served to increase the unease among its
neighbouring small states (Werake, 1992, 264).
The chief of staff committee of the British government—in 1947—voiced
another pertinent threat perception of Ceylon in a report to the British govern-
ment. Remonstrating the fears of Ceylon flanked by a stronger regional power, the
report confirmed that ‘A threat to the territorial integrity of Ceylon is likely to
come only from India……The danger of India (particularly congress India) inter-
fering with Ceylonese internal politics…..is a real one’ (as cited in Bhasin, 2001,
xviii–xix).
India’s actions and intentions as mirrored by writers and scholars on this period
appear to validate India as the nascent regional hegemon of South Asia (Hafeez,
2013, 73; Pardesi 2005, 55; Siriweera and De Silva 2013, 95–98). In Ceylon’s
case ‘the perceptual or real threat has centered around India’s military capabilities
and its regional ambitions’ (Rais, 1993, 25; also see Nunes, 2006, 146–47). Such
impressions of insecurity established the necessity for a strong deterrence and
enhanced military power.
Affirming the threat perceptions of small states neighbouring India, Mankekar
evinces that ‘the first and foremost task before New Delhi is to direct its energies
to dissipating the prevailing distrust and suspicions of India among the smaller
neighbors, particularly Nepal, Ceylon, and even Bangladesh, who are all mortally
afraid of a possible Indian domination over them’ (1974, 21).
What needs to be grasped is that the threat perception from India need not be
definitive and imminent. While Nehru for the most part advocated a policy of
Panchsheel since the 1950s, neighbouring small states could not predispose them-
selves to complacency. Because of India’s power potential, its public posturing as
well as its actions to establish regional hegemony, neighbouring small states
198 South Asian Survey 22(2)

would be misguided to not safeguard their security from external threats. Sri
Lanka experienced this first-hand vis-a-vis the unrelenting Indian intervention
during President Jayewardene’s first and second term of office—including the
deployment of ‘Indian Peace Keeping Forces’ to the island in the late 1980s.
Indian Member of Parliament Subramaniam Swamy’s threat of invading the
island of Katchchativu, which is part of the sovereign territory of Sri Lanka, over
disputes relating to illegal fishing by Indian trawlers, was also a case in point
(Dixit, 1998, 262).
Despite valid reasons for a ‘profound suspicion of India’ (De Silva, 2008, 623),
D.S. Senanayake refrained from voicing his fears. In fact, little to no mention of
his suspicions can be observed in the parliamentary debates despite the zeitgeist
at the time. This begs the question: Why was Ceylon’s prime minster reserved in
voicing his thoughts about India when his fellow parliamentarians differed in
comportment?
There are two tenable explanations why Senanayake chose to refrain from
voicing his suspicion of India despite the latter’s visible aspiration for regional
hegemony. First it can be adduced that, had Senanayake expressed his qualms of
India, it would paint the Ceylon–UK defence agreement as explicitly targeting
New Delhi. It would have also created a security dilemma because India may
perceive an extra-regional power’s involvement in Ceylon as directed against her.
Had India sensed Ceylon coveting harm against New Delhi or adopting an aggres-
sive stance, Nehru would naturally implement a threatening military posture
against Ceylon, possibly deploying military regiments to South India close to the
island. This would intensify the distrust between them, a situation both countries
wished to avoid. In hindsight, one can reflect on the undue consternation caused
in New Delhi by the involvement of Israeli military services in training Sri Lankan
forces during the Jayewardene tenure when the Gandhi family (Indira, to a greater
extent than Rajiv) toed a socialist line. While the training given by Israeli services
was to tackle separatist terrorism in the island, their involvement itself was unpal-
atable for Rajiv Gandhi. It therefore made sense not to publicly designate India as
a potential military threat to the island and instead undertake action to enhance the
island’s defence through a military alignment.
Secondly, it enabled Ceylon to maintain an ‘arms-length’ relationship with
India although relations between D.S. Senanayake and Nehru bordered on asun-
der (House of Representative Debates, Vol. 1, Column 498; Gajameragedara
2011, 133). Over time, this relationship improved as membership of the
Commonwealth of Nations assured their equal status as sovereign nations. With
the advent of the Bandaranaike administration, increased bilateral summit meet-
ings between the Indian and Ceylonese heads of state allowed for an augmenta-
tion of ties with India, inducing a decline of the threat perception from the
subcontinent.
Even if one were to discount the actions and statements by India as relatively
non-threatening to Ceylon, a small state could never be certain that a pacific India
today would not be an aggressive power under a different leadership. Consequently,
the foreign policy trajectory of Ceylon was decidedly set on forging strong ties
with the British government to counter any potential threats from South Asia’s
Silva 199

regional hegemon. But was this foreign policy manoeuvre a case of balancing,
bandwagoning or hedging?

Balancing, Bandwagoning or Hedging

Hedging is a concept which recently emerged in international relations theory. It
is an act of ‘insuring oneself against the risk of loss by making transactions on the
opposite side so as to roughly compensate for possible loss on the first’ (Cheng-
Chwee and Rozman, 2015, 1). Adopting a hedge reduces one’s dependence on and
vulnerability to others by cultivating alternative partners. Small states which
engage in hedging pursue a contradictory set of policies which guarantee that the
state does not take one side or the other. As a result, a state would pursue ‘multiple
counteracting acts so that regardless of the eventual outcome, the contradictory
acts will serve to cancel out the effects of each other, thereby avoiding the risks of
complete exposure and protecting the actor’s long-term interests’ (Cheng-Chwee
and Rozman, 2015, 3). A state would then have a fall-back position in case the
relationship with one power failed to materialise in the expected manner (Salman
and Geeraerts, 2015, 6–8).
Building on the recent wave of scholarship, Chen-Chwee’s comprehensive
study on hedging identifies five different types on a spectrum/continuum analysis
(2008, 165–70). They are indirect balancing, dominance denial, economic prag-
matism, binding engagement and limited bandwagoning.

1. Economic pragmatism refers to a ‘policy wherein a state seeks to maximise

economic gains from its direct trade and investment links’ with great powers
regardless of any political problems between them’ (Chen-Chwee, 2008,
167). Through socioeconomic linkages it intends to cement closer engage-
ment between the states’ bureaucracies.
2. Binding engagement refers to a hedging policy which leads to close interac-
tion with great powers, aimed at altering their policy choices through regu-
larised diplomatic activities so that revisionist tendencies are neutralised. It
also involves binding the great power in various ‘institutionalized bi lateral
and multilateral platforms’ (Cheng-Chwee, Idris and Nor, 2012, 319).
3. Limited bandwagoning refers to political partnerships that are ‘manifested
in (a) policy coordination of selective issues; and (b) voluntary deference’
given to the larger partner (Chen-Chwee, 2008, 168).
4. Dominance denial underscores a hedging modus operandi that is solely
political in nature and not based on military aspects of hedging.
5. Indirect balancing is a policy ‘wherein a state makes military efforts with
great powers to cope with diffused uncertainties’ (Chen-Chwee, 2008, 170).

The adoption of specific types/tools of hedging ‘as well as the significance of

each selected tool—depends on a state’s security perception of the partner to
which the strategy is to be applied’ (Hiep, 2013, 336). Ceylon however fails to
exhibit any of these forms of hedging during the tenure of D.S. Senanayake.
200 South Asian Survey 22(2)

‘Enhanced socio-political’ engagement with India was limited, negating the prop-
osition of economic pragmatism (see De Silva, 1966: Table III-I: 76–79 for more
information on Ceylon’s economic linkages). Likewise, Ceylon did not alter
India’s foreign policy ambitions through diplomatic channels in bilateral or mul-
tilateral platforms, disproving the existence of a binding engagement hedging
policy. Limited bandwagoning also fails to explain Ceylon’s foreign policy as the
island did not initiate any political policy coordination with India under
Senanayake’s tenure. Ceylon’s defence alignment with the UK is emblematic of a
military alliance, which counters the argument of dominance denial. Additionally,
the primary security threat to Ceylon was from her closer regional power—
India—and not from ‘diffused uncertainties’ by the then Cold War superpowers.
Had Ceylon engaged in hedging its security interests, it would have maintained
a defence agreement with the UK and offset that with a defence agreement with
India. At the very least, the need for hedging the 1947 defence agreement with the
UK would have influenced Ceylon to adopt a treaty of friendship with India simi-
lar to the 1950 Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship as well as the 1949
Indo-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship. Ceylon did neither. Therefore, this comprehen-
sive analysis verifies that a hedging policy option was not followed by Ceylon
under Senanayake.
Literature that deals with the theory of neorealism generally considers small
states to bandwagon with threatening great powers rather than balancing against
them (Handel, 1990, 261–62; Jervis, 1978; Keohane, 1969, 291–310).
Bandwagoning involves the initiation of a relationship/alignment with the
more powerful and aggressive state (Elman, 1995, 177; Walt, 1990, 17). According
to Walt, a weak small state would be influenced to institute an alignment with the
source of danger (1996). To Levy, ‘Weaker states in the proximity of stronger
states do what is necessary to survive, bandwagoning with the strong instead of
balancing against them’ (1989, 231). Moreover, ‘the propensity of small states to
bandwagon should increase with a threatening power’s proximity and offensive
military capabilities and increase also with the distance of the small state’s defen-
sive alliance partners’ (Gvalia et al., 2013, 104). Consequently, the conventional
wisdom of neorealism would propose that the best option for Ceylon at the time
of independence was to bandwagon with India—the more threatening and closer
geographical power. Instead, Ceylon chose to initiate an alignment with the UK.
D.S. Senanayake’s declaration in parliament, ‘we are therefore in closer contact
today with the British people than with any other’ (House of Representatives
Debates, Vol. 4, Column 106), attests to this close relationship. Therefore, band-
wagoning also fails to explain Ceylon’s foreign policy at the time.
This leaves the option of balancing. If Ceylon was to balance the threat of
India, the key questions for her at the time of independence were: What type of an
extra-regional power should Ceylon align with if it wishes to counter a potential
threat from India? What degree of balancing should be adopted with such an
extra-regional power?
Walt defines balancing as ‘allying with others against a prevailing threat’
(1990, 108). A state would balance a threatening power (in Ceylon’s case, India)
Silva 201

by aligning with another regional power or with an extra-regional power. Waltz

notes that in essence, ‘balancing is a strategy for survival’ (2000, 38). Outlining
the foreign policy of small states in the anarchic international setting, Rais argues
that ‘it would be a wise and natural course for the weaker in any regional system
to look towards powers that would support its quest for security’ (1993, 24; also
see Schweller 1994, 74).
Scholars have now extended the concept of balancing to include the intention,
type and degree of a balancing foreign policy. The goals of balancing ‘could be
classified as either positive or negative.

1. Positive balancing aims to strengthen the state capacities and to consoli-

date its position in the international community, while a
2. Negative balancing strategy seeks to undermine the rival’s influence and to
reduce its capabilities’ (He 2012 as cited in Salman and Geeraerts 2015, 4).

The type of balancing foreign policy includes:

1. measures that aim to mitigate the threat of a rising power by establishing a

formal relationship with another country (external balancing) and
2. a type of balancing that restrains the potential rising power by bolstering
the states’ own military build-up (internal balancing).

Finally, based on the degree of balancing:

1. A state might focus on military and economic forms of balancing (hard

balancing) (see Brooks and Wohlforth, 2005, 2008; Levy and Thompson,
2005).
2. A state might create an alignment with regional or extra-regional countries
to curb a hegemon through soft forms of alignment such as cultural link-
ages, common values and so on (soft balancing) (see Nye, 1990, 2004).

Based on the nature of the defence agreement with Britain and the threat per-
ceptions from India (discussed in sections III and IV, respectively), it can be
adduced that the island initiated hard, external, positive balancing against the lat-
ter. A hard, external balancing guaranteed the military support of the UK in the
event of an attack on Ceylon. Added to that, a positive form of balancing strength-
ened the island’s military capacity, consolidating its security through a defence
agreement which also acted as a potent deterrent. Consequently, the locus of the
islands’ balancing foreign policy was the Ceylon–UK defence agreement.
Senanayake’s reticence to charge India as a regional hegemon permitted
Ceylon to classify the defence agreement with the UK as a guarantee of defence
and not as exclusively challenging India. And as the section below elucidates,
Ceylon’s foreign policy decision of aligning with the UK also served the interests
of Ceylon to eschew a security dilemma with India despite Ceylon’s threat per-
ceptions from the mainland.
202 South Asian Survey 22(2)

Eluding a Security Dilemma: The Choice of the UK

As explained elsewhere, a security dilemma is a state of affairs where one state’s
‘security-enhancing’ actions lead to a sense of vulnerability among other states,
influencing them to then take up corresponding military enhancements in
response. This concluding component argues that Ceylon’s choice of the extra-
regional power to balance with enabled her to eschew from a security dilemma
with India. I maintain that Ceylon succeeded in this task because India was not
apprehensive of the military alignment between the UK and Ceylon.
Scholarship on Ceylon’s foreign policy contends that Ceylon established a
close relationship with the UK due to the personal friendship that existed
between the UNP administration and the British government (Jacob, 1973,
1–21; Kearney, 1964, 125; Kumarasingham, 2013, 242; Nissanka, 1984, 13;
Samaraweera, 1997, 338). Such analysts insist that the UNP, because of its ‘pro-
Western and comprador character entered into a defence arrangement with the
British in 1947’ (Lenka and Pattanaik, 1979, 54). While I do not discount the
personal political ties that existed between the two governments, I maintain that
this criterion does not provide substantive reason as to why Ceylon chose the
UK as an extra regional partner.
There were many reasons behind Ceylon’s choice of the UK as a partner to
align with. ‘In the economic sphere, Sri Lanka was dependent for tea export on
London. Most of the tea of Sri Lanka was sold through the London tea auction’
(Patnaik, 2014, 59). This linkage with London also had an impact on Sri Lanka’s
relationship with Britain.
Moreover, Ceylon’s dependence on maritime trade for the sustenance of its
economy required the protection of its maritime trade routes (House of
Representatives Debates, Vol. 1, Column 648, Vol. 3, Column 1039; Melegoda,
2000, 79; Warnapala, 1992, 149). If India was to continue the maritime dominance
initiated by the colonial UK, Ceylon would naturally have to turn towards a strong
maritime power, that being the British (Jackson, 2011, 150; Kent, 1994, 155–65).
D.S. Senanayake was also under the impression that few states had ‘sufficient
interest’ to defend Ceylon at its own expense and among them the most powerful
maritime power was the UK (Hulugalle, 1975, 201).
Undoubtedly the principal advantage of aligning with Britain was the ability it
provided Ceylon to eschew from establishing a security dilemma with India. But
how was this achieved?
Keerawella alludes to the Indian weapon and armament imports from the UK
as suggestive of the rapport between the two governments. Not only does he admit
that India was ready to maintain ties with Britain even after independence but also
that New Delhi was prepared to entreat the assistance of Britain to supply it with
the necessary resources for its own defence (Keerawella, 1992, 428). Likewise,
Appadorai (1949) reiterates the certitude which existed between the two countries
in the post-independence phase, disclosing India’s dependence on Britain for the
bulk of her essential military stores. The Indian Congress President Dr Pattabhi
Sitaramaya declared in 1949 that
Silva 203

It cannot be that Ceylon is in friendship with a group with which India is not in friend-
ship…and in light of this, one can determine that this led India to accept Sri Lanka’s
defence arrangement with Britain as New Delhi did not have any conflicts with London.
(Patnaik, 2014, 63)

As a result, the non-adversarial ties between India and the UK allowed Ceylon
to frame the defence agreement with Britain as directed at strengthening the
island’s security. While the alignment with the UK dissipated her fears of any
potential unfavourable designs by India it also enabled her to escape from trigger-
ing a security dilemma with India. Thus, Ceylon was able to pragmatically bal-
ance against South Asia’s hegemon through an alignment with the UK.

Conclusion
This article reviewed Ceylon’s foreign policy in light of its 1947 defence agree-
ment with the UK. Based on the theory of neorealism, I argued that small states
were mostly concerned about threats emanating from their external environment.
The article argued that the threat perception from India played a part in tethering
the small state of Ceylon to Britain soon after decolonisation. It contextualised
Ceylon’s foreign policy alignment with the British based on the taxonomies of
balancing, bandwagoning and hedging. It came to the conclusion that a balancing
foreign policy was laid out, partly owing to Ceylon’s threat perception from its
regional hegemon as well as due to the absence of closer congenial ties between
the Nehru and Senanayake administrations.
The article also underscored how a relationship with Britain enabled Ceylon to
avoid creating a security dilemma with India. Additionally, a security dilemma
was skirted by framing the defence agreement as aimed at increasing the defence
capabilities of Ceylon and not as seeking to challenge the nascent regional
hegemon. Thus, Ceylon’s formal security arrangement with the British enabled
her to balance the potential threat from New Delhi, concomitantly circumventing
a security dilemma with the latter.
The 1947 defence agreement was never formally abrogated although S.W.R.D.
Bandaranaike requested the removal of British bases from Ceylon in 1956. De
Silva contends that Bandaranaike ‘moved out of range of Britain’s defence
umbrella just at the time when the protection it offered was becoming insubstan-
tial’ (1999, 364–65). While Bandaranaike shared UNP’s suspicions of India’s pro-
spective designs on the island, he was also ‘more readier than the UNP prime
ministers to work with Nehru in international and regional affairs and more will-
ing to follow his lead’ (De Silva, 2008, 637). This relationship—which in time
blossomed under Mrs Bandaranaike and Mrs Gandhi—is demonstrative of the
defence agreement’s ineffectuality once relations between the two governments
were on a stronger footing.
Presently, the personal goodwill and rapport between the Sri Lankan head of
state and the Indian prime minister showcases the degree to which security dilemmas
204 South Asian Survey 22(2)

can be averted when trust between the heads of states are firm (Manoharan, 2014).
While the previous presidential terms of Premadasa and Rajapakse (in Sri Lanka)
were points of departure in relation to the growing Indo-Sri Lankan relationship,
the extant leadership in both countries is increasingly determined to forge closer
congenial ties with one another. This has enabled India to formulate a
‘Neighbourhood First Policy’ and actualise it in relation to Sri Lanka, even as
China’s influence is gradually spreading to the Indian Ocean. The island’s leader-
ship senses no threat perception from India and instead—as the Sri Lankan Prime
Minster Ranil Wickremesinghe has repeatedly stated—boosting bilateral ties with
India on the economic and political fronts are presently among the key items of
the present government’s agenda.

Acknowledgements
The author would like to extend his gratitude to Professor Jayadeva Uyangoda for his
encouragement and constructive criticism on an earlier version of this article. Appreciation
is also due to the anonymous reviewers of the South Asian Survey and its editor for all their
guidance and help. Any Mistakes are mine alone.

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