XV.

ELECTION CONTESTS

11. TEODORO Q. PEÑA vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ALFREDO E. ABUEG
JR. G.R. No. 123037 March 21, 1997

FACTS:

Petitioner and the private respondent were contenders for the said Congressional Office in the
May 8, 1995 elections. On May 12, 1995, upon canvassing the votes cast, the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Palawan proclaimed the private respondent as the winner. On May 22, 1995, the instant
petition was filed with the HRET, wherein the petitioner, as protestant, averred that:

1. The elections in the precincts of the Second District of Palawan were tainted with massive
fraud, widespread vote-buying, intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities committed
before, during and after the voting, and during the counting of votes and the preparation of election
returns and certificates of canvass which affected the results of the election. Among the fraudulent acts
committed were the massive vote-buying and intimidation of voters, disenfranchisement of petitioner's
known supporters through systematic deletion of names from the lists of voters, allowing persons to
vote in excess of the number of registered voters, misappreciation, misreading and non-reading of
protestant's ballots and other irregularities.

2. According to the Statement of Votes by Precinct/Municipality/City, the protestee allegedly

obtained 52,967 votes, while the protestant allegedly obtained 46,023 votes, or a difference of 6,944
votes. A copy of said document is attached hereto as Annex "B".

3. Had the massive fraud, widespread intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities
not been committed, the result of the elections for Member of the House of Representatives would
have been different and the protestant would have garnered the highest number of votes for the Office
of Member of the House of Representatives in the Second District of Palawan, which was the true
expression of the will of the voters of the Province of Palawan.

4. The proclamation by the members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Palawan that the
protestee was allegedly the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for the Second
District of Palawan is contrary to law and to the true expression of the will of the voters of the Province
of Palawan. Private respondent-Protestee Abueg filed an Answer With Affirmative Defense,
Counterclaim and Counter-Protest3 on June 5, 1995, to which Peña filed a Reply on June 23, 1995.
Subsequent to the filing of his Answer, Abueg filed a Motion to Dismiss4 the Petition on June 22, 1995,
averring that the HRET has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition, the same being insufficient in
form and substance. In essence, the motion to dismiss anchors its challenge on the fact that the petition
failed to allege the precincts where the massive fraud and disenfranchisement of voters occurred, nor
did it point out how many votes would be gained by the protestant as a result of the same. Petitioner
filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss5 on July 10, 1995, attaching thereto a Summary of
Contested Precincts, naming 700 precincts where election irregularities allegedly occurred. In its
Resolution of October 12, 1995, the respondent HRET ruled that although it had jurisdiction over the
petition, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives, the said petition, however, fails to state a cause of action,
and is therefore, insufficient in form and substance, meriting its dismissal.

ISSUES:

I.THE PETITION AD CAUTELAM DATED 22 MAY 1995 STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AND IS SUFFICIENT IN
FORM AND SUBSTANCE.

II. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PETITION WAS INITIALLY DEFECTIVE BECAUSE IT FAILED TO SPECIFY
THE CONTESTED PRECINCTS, SAID DEFECT WAS CURED WHEN PETITIONER SUBMITTED A SUMMARY OF
THE CONTESTED PRECINCTS WHICH FORMS PART OF THE RECORD OF THE RESPONDENT HRET.

RULING:

We do not agree, In the first place, in requiring the private respondent to answer the petition,
the HRET was not ruling on the formal and substantive sufficiency of the petition. The order to require
an answer is but a matter of course, as under the Revised Rules of Procedure of the HRET, it is provided
that: RULE 22. Summons. — Upon the filing of the petition, the Clerk of the Tribunal shall forthwith issue
the corresponding summons to the protestee or respondent together with a copy of the petition,
requiring him within ten (10) days from receipt thereof to file his answer. As to the adequacy of the
protest, we agree with respondent HRET in ruling for the insufficiency of the same. A perusal of the
Petition Ad Cautelam, reveals that Petitioner makes no specific mention of the precincts where
widespread election, fraud and irregularities occured. This is a fatal omission, as it goes into the very
substance of the protest. Under Section 21 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of HRET, insufficiency in
form and substance of the petition constitutes a ground for the immediate dismissal of the Petition. The
prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form and substance means that the petition must be
more than merely rhetorical. If the allegations contained therein are unsupported by even the faintest
whisper of authority in fact and law, then there is no other course than to dismiss the petition,
otherwise, the assumption of an elected public official may, and will always be held up by petitions of
this sort by the losing candidate. Notably, the instant petition ad cautelam poses a more serious
inadequacy than a mere failure to specify the number of votes which would inure to the protestant, as
was the case in Gallares vs. Casenas, or the failure to impugn the validity of some of the ballots cast, as
in Yalung vs. Atienza, supra, both of which cases were decided in the 1920s. The defect in the instant
case arises from the failure to allege the contested precincts. Only a bare allegation of "massive fraud,
widespread intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities", without specification, and
substantiation, of where and how these occurrences took place, appears in the petition. We cannot
allow an election protest based on such flimsy averments to prosper, otherwise, the whole election
process will deteriorate into an endless stream of crabs pulling at each other, racing to disembank from
the water. On his second point of argument, Petitioner likewise fails to impress. The Court has already
ruled in Joker P. Arroyo vs. HRET, that substantial amendments to the protest may be allowed only
within the same period for filing the election protest, which, under Rule 16 of the HRET Rules of
Procedure is ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner. While it is conceded that statutes
providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical questions, the rule likewise stands, that
in an election protest, the protestant must stand or fall upon the issues he had raised in his original or
amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory period for filing of the protest. Admittedly, the
rule is well-established that the power to annul an election should be exercised with the greatest care as
it involves the free and fair expression of the popular will. It is only in extreme cases of fraud and under
circumstances which demonstrate to the fullest degree a fundamental and wanton disregard of the law
that elections are annulled, and then only when it becomes impossible to take any other step. This is as
it should be, for the democratic system is good for the many although abhorred by a few. In sum, this
Court's jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of electoral tribunals operates only upon a showing of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the tribunal. Only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the electoral tribunal's judgment. There is no such showing in the
present petition.
12. HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and OSCAR JARO, respondents
G.R. No. 157249 November 28, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioner Saquilayan and respondent Jaro were candidates for the Office of Municipal Mayor of
Imus, Cavite in the May 14, 2001 local elections. After the votes were canvassed, Saquilayan was
proclaimed the winner for having received 27,494 votes against Jaro’s 26,746 votes. On May 28, 2001,
Jaro instituted an Election Protest Case (EPC No. 01-02) before the RTC of Imus, Cavite contesting the
results in all 453 election precincts in the Municipality of Imus. Saquilayan filed his Answer with Motion
to Dismiss contending, among other things, that the election protest failed to state a cause of action.
The Motion to Dismiss was denied by the RTC in an Order dated July 31, 2001. Saquilayan questioned
the denial before the Comelec’s Second Division through a petition for certiorari and prohibition, which
was docketed as SPR No. 19-2001. On January 22, 2002, the Second Division ruled in favor of Saquilayan
and ordered the dismissal of the election protest. Jaro sought a reconsideration of the order of dismissal
and the case was elevated to the Comelec en banc. On February 26, 2003, the Comelec en banc issued
the questioned resolution granting Jaro’s Motion for Reconsideration. Saquilayan’s petition was
thereunder dismissed and EPC No. 01-02 was ordered to proceed. Aggrieved, Saquilayan filed the
present petition.

ISSUE:

Is the COMELEC correct in deciding that the instant petition failed to state a cause of action
citing as a basis the Court’s ruling in Peña v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal?

RULING:

Yes. In said case, petitioner Teodoro Peña, the losing party in the congressional elections,
contested 700 out of 742 election precincts without specifying the precincts where the anomalies
allegedly occurred. Furthermore, Peña made only general allegations, to wit: 1. The elections in the
precincts of the Second District of Palawan were tainted with massive fraud, widespread vote-buying,
intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities committed before, during and after the
voting, and during the counting of votes and the preparation of election returns and certificates of
canvass which affected the results of the election. Among the fraudulent acts committed were the
massive vote-buying and intimidation of voters, disenfranchisement of petitioner’s known supporters
through systematic deletion of names from the list of voters, allowing persons to vote in excess of the
number of registered voters, misappreciation, misreading and non-reading of protestant’s ballots and
other irregularities. The Court in that case dismissed the election protest, holding that the failure to
make specific mention of the precincts where wide-spread election fraud and irregularities occurred,
and the bare allegations of massive fraud, widespread intimidation and terrorism, without specification
and substantiation of where and how these occurrences took place, render the protest fatally defective.
As explained by the Court: The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form and substance
means that the petition must be more than merely rhetorical. If the allegations contained therein are
unsupported by even the faintest whisper of authority in fact and law, then there is no other course
than to dismiss the petition, otherwise, the assumption of an elected official may, and always will, be
held up by petitions of this sort by a losing candidate. Therein petitioner Miguel argued that the general
allegations of fraud and irregularities were not sufficient to order the opening of ballot boxes and
counting of ballots. The Court, however, found the allegations embodied in the election protest to be
serious enough to necessitate the opening of the ballot boxes to resolve the issue of fraud and
irregularities in the election. The facts of the present petition are similar to those in Miguel rather than
to those in Peña. In Miguel, there was a controversy between two candidates for municipal mayor, while
Peña dealt with candidates for a congressional district office.1âwphi1 Also, one reason that led to the
dismissal of the election protest in Peña was the protestant’s failure to specify the 700 out of the 743
precincts where the alleged anomalies occurred. In both Miguel and the present petition, the
protestants questioned all the precincts in their respective municipalities. Furthermore, the Miguel case,
being the more recent decision, should prevail in case of a conflict, under the well-established doctrine
that a later judgment supersedes a prior one in case of an inconsistency.
13. FERDINAND THOMAS M. SOLLER, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF PINAMALAYAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO (Branch 42) and ANGEL M. SAULONG, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 139853. September 5, 2000.]

FACTS:

Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for mayor of the municipality of
Bansud, Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1998 elections. On May 14, 1998, the municipal board of
canvassers proclaimed petitioner Ferdinand Thomas Soller duly elected mayor. On May 19, 1998, private
respondent Angel Saulong filed with the COMELEC a ‘petition for annulment of the
proclamation/exclusion of election return. On May 25, 1998, private respondent filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, and an election protest against petitioner docketed as EC-
31-98. On June 15, 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counter-protest. Petitioner also moved to
dismiss private respondent’s protest on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, forum-shopping, and failure to
state cause of action. On July 3, 1998, COMELEC dismissed the pre-proclamation case filed by pr3ivate
Respondent. On October 1, 1998, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration but said motion was denied. Petitioner then filed with the COMELEC a petition for
certiorari contending that respondent RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion in not dismissing private respondent’s election protest. On August 31, 1999, the COMELEC
en banc dismissed petitioner’s suit. The election tribunal held that private respondent paid the required
filing fee. It also declared that the defect in the verification is a mere technical defect which should not
bar the determination of the merits of the case. The election tribunal stated that there was no forum
shopping to speak of.

ISSUE:

IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT RTC’S REFUSAL TO DISMISS THE ELECTION PROTEST BELOW ON

THE GROUNDS OF FORUM-SHOPPING AND FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR
REQUIRING A TRUTHFUL CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING DESPITE INCONTROVERTIBLE
EVIDENCE THEREOF.

RULING:

In Miranda v. Castillo, private respondents each paid per assessment the amount of P465.00 as
filing fees. Of this amount, P414.00 was allocated for the JDF, P10.00 for legal research fund, P5.00 for
victim compensation fee, and only the amount of P32.00 was regarded as filing fee. The Court
considered the amount as partial payment of the P300.00 filing fee under the COMELEC rules and
required payment of the deficiency in the amount of P268.00. But then again, the Court reiterated the
caveat that in view of Pahilan, Gatchalian, and Loyola cases we would no longer tolerate any mistake in
the payment of the full amount of filing fees for election cases filed after the promulgation of the Loyola
decision on March 27, 1997. Clearly then, errors in the payment of filing fees in election cases is no
longer excusable. And the dismissal of the present case for that reason is, in our view, called for besides,
there is another reason to dismiss private respondent’s election protest. We note that the verification of
aforesaid protest is defective. In the verification, private respondent merely stated that he caused the
preparation of his petition and he has read and understood all the allegations therein. Certainly, this is
insufficient as private respondent failed to state that the contents of his election protest are true and
correct of his personal knowledge. Since the petition lacks proper verification, it should be treated as an
unsigned pleading and must be dismissed. Further, we find that private respondent did not comply with
the required certification against forum shopping. Private respondent successively filed a "petition for
annulment of the proclamation/exclusion of election return" and an election protest. Yet, he did not
disclose in his election protest that he earlier filed a petition for annulment of proclamation/exclusion of
election returns. It could be argued that private respondent’s petition for annulment of
proclamation/exclusion of election returns was a pre-proclamation case. The issues raised in that
petition pertain to the preparation and appreciation of election returns and the proceedings of the
municipal board of canvassers. But note that such petition was filed after the proclamation of petitioner
as the winning candidate, thus, the petition was no longer viable, for pre-proclamation controversies
may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidates have been proclaimed. It
might even be claimed with some reason that private respondent, by resorting to the wrong remedy,
abandoned his pre-proclamation case earlier filed. Nonetheless, private respondent’s belief that he no
longer had a pending case before the COMELEC because he deemed it abandoned upon filing of his
protest is not a valid reason for non-disclosure of the pendency of said pre-proclamation case. Note that
the COMELEC dismissed private respondent’s preproclamation case only on July 3, 1998. Before the
dismissal, said case was legally still pending resolution. Similarly, the fact that private respondent’s
protest was not based on the same cause of action as his pre-proclamation case is not a valid excuse for
not complying with the required disclosure in the certification against forum shopping. The requirement
to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory. Failure to comply with this requirement cannot
be excused by the fact that a party is not guilty of forum shopping. The rule applies to any complaint,
petition, application or other initiatory pleading, regardless of whether the party filing it has actually
committed forum shopping. Every party filing any initiatory pleading is required to swear under oath
that he has not and will not commit forum shopping. Otherwise we would have an absurd situation, as
in this case, where the parties themselves would be the judge of whether their actions constitute a
violation of the rule, and compliance therewith would depend on their belief that they might or might
not have violated the requirement. Such interpretation of the requirement would defeat the very
purpose of the rule. 18 Taking into account all the foregoing circumstances in this case, we are
persuaded that respondent Regional Trial Court erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in failing
to dismiss private respondent’s election protest against petitioner. And to reiterate, respondent
COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to affirm the refusal of respondent trial court to dismiss private
respondent’s election protest
14. JOKER P. ARROYO, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) and
AUGUSTO L. SYJUCO, JR., respondents. G.R. No. 118597 July 14, 1995

FACTS:

After the May 11, 1992 elections, Arroyo was declared as the duly elected Congressman of the
lone district of Makati. Arroyo won by 13,559 votes over his opponent. His opponent Syjuco protested
the declaration before the HRET. Syjuco alleged that Arroyo won due to massive fraud hence he moved
for revision and recounting. HRET gave way but during the process some HRET employees and personnel
conducted some irregularities to ensure Syjuco’s win. After some paper battles between the two, Syjuco,
realizing that mere revision and recounting would not suffice to overthrow the more than 12,000 votes
lead of Arroyo over him, revised his complaint by including and introducing in his memorandum cum
addendum that his complaint is actually based on a broader and more equitable non-traditional
determination of the existence of the precinct-level document-based anomalies and that the revision he
initially sought is just incidental to such determination. The 3 justices members of the HRET ruled that
such amendment is already beyond the tribunal’s jurisdiction and the 6 representative members ruled
otherwise. Consequently, by a vote of 6-3, the HRET did not dismiss the protest filed by Syjuco and the
HRET later declared Syjuco as the winner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

RULING:

However guised or justified by Syjuco, this innovative theory he introduced for the first time in
his memorandum cum addendum indeed broadened the scope of the election protest beyond what he
originally sought-the mere revision of ballots. From his initial prayer for revision which lays primary, if
not exclusive emphasis on the physical recount and appreciation of ballots alone, private respondent’s
belated attempt to inject this theory at the memorandum stage calls for presentation of evidence
(consisting of thousands of documents) aside from, or other than, the ballots themselves. By having
done so, Syjuco in fact intended to completely abandon the process and results of the revision and
thereafter sought to rely on his brainchild process he fondly coined as “precinct-level document-based
evidence.” This is clearly substantial amendment of the election protest expressly proscribed by Rule 28
of the HRET internal rules.
15. P.E.T. Case No. 003 January 18, 2008 LOREN B. LEGARDA, protestant, vs. NOLI L. DE CASTRO,
protestee.

FACTS:

Loren B. Legarda filed an election protest against Noli L. de Castro before the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET). De Castro filed a motion for its outright dismissal but the PET confirmed its
jurisdiction over the protest. De Castro filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the PET resolution.
He argues that where the correctness of the number of votes is the issue, the best evidence are the
ballots; that the process of correcting the manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or election
returns is a function of the canvassing bodies; that once the canvassing bodies had done their functions,
no alteration or correction of manifest errors can be made; that since the authority of the Tribunal
involves an exercise of judicial power to determine the facts based on the evidence presented and to
apply the law based on the established facts, it cannot perform the ministerial function of canvassing
election returns; that the averments contained in the protest are mere conclusions of law which are
inadequate to form a valid cause of action; and that the allegations are not supported by facts. He also
contends that the Tribunal cannot correct the manifest errors on the statements of votes (SOV) and
certificates of canvass (COC).

ISSUES:

1. Can the PET correct the manifest errors in the SOV and COC?

2. Is there a need to resort to revision of ballots? 3. Was the election protest sufficient in form
and substance?

RULING:

1. The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the President and Vice-President is
expressly vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Included therein is the duty to
correct manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs.

2. We agree that the ballots are the best and most conclusive evidence in an election contest
where the correctness of the number of votes of each candidate is involved. However, we do not find
any reason to resort to revision in the first part of the protest, considering that the protestant concedes
the correctness of the ballot results, concerning the number of votes obtained by both protestant and
protestee, and reflected in the election returns. Protestant merely seeks the correction of manifest
errors, that is, errors in the process of different levels of transposition and addition of votes. Revision of
ballots in case of manifest errors, in these circumstances, might only cause unwarranted delay in the
proceedings.

3. In the instant protest, protestant enumerated all the provinces, municipalities and cities
where she questions all the results in all the precincts therein. The protest here is sufficient in form and
substantively, serious enough on its face to pose a challenge to protestee's title to his office. The instant
protest consists of alleged ultimate facts, not mere conclusions of law, that need to be proven in due
time. Considering that we find the protest sufficient in form and substance, we must again stress that
nothing as yet has been proved as to the veracity of the allegations. The protest is only sufficient for the
Tribunal to proceed and give the protestant the opportunity to prove her case pursuant to Rule 61 of
the PET Rules. Although said rule only pertains to revision of ballots, nothing herein prevents the
Tribunal from allowing or including the correction of manifest errors, pursuant to the Tribunals rule-
making power under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
16. ISIDRO IDULZA and GODOFREDO CABANA, Petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and TERESITA
A. BOLLOZOS, REY L. MORTIZ, MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, JOJAC Q. ASUNCION and CIFERINO L. GARCIA, JR.,
Respondents. [G.R. NO. 160130. April 14, 2004]

FACTS:

An election protest was filed by three unsuccessful candidates for seats in the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Gingoog City, directed at three proclaimed candidates. The COMELEC found merit in the
protest and ordered the protestees to vacate their posts. In reviewing the COMELECs actions, the Court
is guided by two principles particular to election cases: the recognition of the COMELECs specialized role
in the supervision of elections, and the liberal construction of election laws to the end that the will of
the people may not be defeated by mere technical objections. On 17 May 2001, petitioners Isidro Idulza
(Idulza) and Godofredo Cabana (Cabana) were proclaimed as the seventh (7th) and eighth (8th) winning
candidates for the office of members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Gingoog City. Private
respondents Miguel Paderanga (Paderanga), Jojac Asuncion (Asuncion), and Ciferino L. Garcia, Jr.
(Garcia), all losing candidates for the same office, filed an election protest with the COMELEC on 25 May
2001, against the two petitioners therein and Besben Maquiso (Maquiso), who had placed ninth (9th) in
the canvass results. The election protest was docketed as COMELEC Case No. EPC 2001-3. After
conducting the revision of ballots, the COMELEC Second Division (Second Division) on 16 January 2003
promulgated a Resolution that settled the election protest at that point. It determined that the parties
garnered the following number of votes:

PROTESTANTS: Paderanga-17,260 Asuncion -16,567 Garcia -16,502

PROTESTEES: Maquiso -16,266 Cabana -16,266

At the same time, the Second Division determined that one Rey Y. Mortiz (Mortiz), who was not
a party to the election protest, had garnered more votes than the three protestants. Apparently, per the
Certificate of Canvass, Mortiz had placed tenth (10th) in the city council election, though he had not
been impleaded in the protest as he was a party-mate of the protestants.

ISSUE:

Petitioners assert that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in proclaiming Mortiz
and Bollozos, the former having no participation in the election protest, while the latter having filed her
motion for intervention beyond the period provided by law. They also question the manner of
appreciation by the COMELEC of the contested ballots. Finally, they applied for a Temporary Restraining
Order, which the Court has not granted.

RULING:

The appreciation of contested ballots and election documents involves a question of fact best
left to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections
all over the country. 9 The findings of fact of the COMELEC when supported by substantial evidence are
final and non-reviewable. 10 Petitioners want this Court to review the specific appreciation by the
Second Division of ballots cast in forty-eight (48) precincts in Gingoog City. The bar for this manner of
review is quite high, considering that the Court is not a trier of facts. Yet before this Court, petitioners
merely direct us to examine the contrary conclusions made by Commissioner Florentino Tuason in his
dissenting opinion, without particularly explaining why we should substitute the findings of one
commissioner in lieu of those of the COMELEC speaking as a collegial body. An examination of the
Tuason dissent reveals that it is predicated not on any broad question of law, but on the specific
application of principles of election law vis--vis particular ballots. His disagreement with the majority is
purely factual in basis, too detailed to the point of being pernickety. On the other hand, the thirty (30)
-page majority opinion is just as detailed in providing for the general principles applicable in appreciating
the ballots, and in explaining why each particular contested ballot was interpreted in the particular way
that it was. Petitioners are unable to point out why the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
in the appreciation of the contested ballots. Notwithstanding the dissenting opinion, the Second
Divisions factual findings, as affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc, are supported by substantial evidence
and thus beyond the ken of review by the Court. Thus, the Court is bound by the findings of the
COMELEC as to how many votes the parties had obtained in the city council election. The COMELEC had
also noted that Mortiz, who had originally placed tenth (10th), has become the seventh (7th) placer,
considering that his original vote total still surpassed that of the protestants. We are unable to see how
such declaration by the COMELEC could constitute grave abuse of discretion, even if Mortiz had not
been a party to the election protest. He was not a losing candidate elevated into victory, as he
apparently was already proclaimed a duly elected city councilor in May of 2001. 11 The petitioners were
dislodged from their respective seats because the private respondents garnered more votes than them.
Mortizs vote total remained unchanged despite the protest. His elevation to seventh (7th) place is but a
necessary consequence of the finding of the COMELEC that the petitioners had actually obtained less
number of votes than as reflected in the first canvass results. It would be patently ridiculous for the
Court or the COMELEC to hold that he should still be deemed as the tenth (10th) placer when the
amended vote totals reveal that he had garnered more votes than the new eighth (8th) placer.
Presumptively, the vote totals as amended after the revision more accurately reflect the true will of the
voters of Gingoog City, and the elevation of councilor Mortiz from tenth (10th) to seventh (7th) place is
in consonance with the electoral mandate.
17. Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012

FACTS:

Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973. He migrated to Australia in 1981
when he was eight years old and there acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age
35, he decided to return to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Four
days upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, hence, he was
issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. On
September 1, 2009 he renounced his Australian citizenship, executing a sworn renunciation of the same
in compliance with Republic Act (R.A.) 9225. From the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a residential
property in the same village where he lived. He applied for registration as a voter in the Municipality of
Ipil but respondent Erasmo, the Barangay Captain, opposed the said act. Election Registration Board
approved it and included Jalosjos’ name in the COMELEC voters list. Erasmo filed before the MTC a
petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos’ name from the official voters list. MTC denied Erasmo’s petition. He
appealed to RTC but RTC ruled same as MTC’s. On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province for the May 10, 2010 elections. Erasmo
filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Jalosjos’ COC on the ground that Jalosjos made material
misrepresentation in the same since he failed to comply with (1) the requirements of R.A. 9225 and (2)
the one-year residency requirement of the Local Government Code. COMELEC ruled against Jalosjos,
because it failed to comply with the 1-year residency ruequirement. Jalosjos won the elections

ISSUE: Whether Jalosjos failed to comply with the 1-year residency requirement

RULING: Yes. It is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his
birth. His domicile was changed from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of
eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his
domicile by operation of law and by choice. But, when he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to
live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his
domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to
that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by
the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving
that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay.
18. Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 204264, October 22, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the lone
district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos,
Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October
31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on the ground that the petitioner’s COC contained
material misrepresentations regarding the petitioner’s marital status, residency, date of birth and
citizenship. Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and filed in February 8, 2013 a
manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered evidence and amended last exhibit. On March 27,
2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling the petitioner’s COC on the basis that
petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on
May 14, 2013 the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit. On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13,
2013 elections and on June 5, 2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of House of
Representatives. She has yet to assume office at noon of June 30, 2013. On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC
en banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc
final and executory. Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a duly proclaimed
winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of
Representative. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible to run for
office

RULING:

Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representative Electoral
Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns
and qualification of the members of House of Representative. In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire
Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office, the law requires that she must have
accomplished the following 1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the
consul-general of the Philippine Consulate in the USA, and 2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of
her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. In the case at bar,
there is no showing that petitioner complied with the requirements. Petitioner’s oath of office as
Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with RA 9225. As
to the issue of residency, the court approved the ruling if the COMELEC that a Filipino citizen who
becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon reacquisition of
Filipino citizenship, he must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through
positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of
choice. In this case, there is no showing that the petitioner reacquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant
to RA 9225 so as to conclude that the petitioner renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she
has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner claim that she served as Provincial
Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to
prove her one-year residency for she has never recognized her domicile in Marinduque as she remains
to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has
not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. The instant petition was DISMISSED, finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.
19. Marcos v. Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 5, February 16, 2021

FACTS:

After the 16 May 2016 national and local elections, Maria Leonor G. Robredo emerged as the
winner in the vice presidential race having garnered the highest votes, with 14,418,817, followed by
Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. with 14,155,344 votes.28 With a margin of 263,473 votes, Robredo’s claim to
the position was questioned via an election protest by Marcos on the grounds of fraud, anomalies, and
irregularities.29 The protest (and counter-protest) proceeded with the revision of the pilot provinces of
Camarines Sur, Iloilo, and Negros Occidental chosen by Marcos “due to the unusually high number of
undervotes in [these] provinces.”30 During the revision of the ballots from Camarines Sur, in an ex parte
motion dated 05 April 2018, Robredo sought for the PET to direct the head revisors to apply the 25%
shading threshold purportedly set by the COMELEC in the revision, recount, and re-appreciation of
ballots.31 In the aforementioned 10 April 2018 PET Resolution, the Tribunal denied the motion and
ordered the re-application of the 50% shading threshold, to wit — The Court is not aware of any
COMELEC Resolution that states the applicability of a 25% threshold; and the Tribunal cannot treat the
Random Manual Audit Guidelines and Report as proof of the threshold used by the COMELEC. In fact,
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9164, which is COMELEC’s
procedure for the recount of ballots in election protests within its jurisdiction, does not mention a 25%
threshold. Prior to the amendment in Resolution No. 9164, Rule 15, Section 6 of Resolution No. 8804
states that any shading less than 50% shall not be considered a valid vote. The wording is[,] in fact[,] the
same as Section 43 (l) of the 2010 PET Rules. COMELEC Resolution No. 9164, however, removed the 50%
threshold[,] but did not impose a new threshold.32 The 10 April 2018 PET Resolution is presently the
subject of Robredo’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration wherein she alleged that, as early as 6
September 2016, the PET was informed by COMELEC, by way of a Letter to the then clerk of the tribunal,
Atty. Felipa B. Anama, of the 25% threshold used in the 9 May 2016 National and Local Elections.33 The
said adoption of the 25% shading threshold was adopted by COMELEC in Minute Resolution No. 16-
0600. 34 Robredo argues that both factual circumstances give PET a legal basis to “impose a 25%
threshold percentage in determining whether a vote is valid.”35

ISSUE:

An analysis of the 10 April 2018 PET Resolution shows that the PET does not question the
authority of the COMELEC to set the shading threshold percentage. Instead, the said Resolution is
anchored on (a) the purported absence of any action of COMELEC in setting a new threshold percentage
in lieu of the 50% threshold percentage, and (b) the insufficiency as evidence of the Random Manual
Audit Guidelines and Report to prove that the 25% threshold was in fact used by the COMELEC.36

RULING:

Arguing that the 10 April 2018 PET Resolution will be setting an unstable and potentially
disenfranchising precedent, the Author will explain that the said PET Resolution constitutes an ultra
vires act that encroaches on the authority of the COMELEC, which violates the equal protection clause
under the Constitution and is poised to massively disenfranchise voters. 1. The 10 April 2018 PET
Resolution is an Ultra Vires Act If affirmed, the 10 April 2018 PET resolution, by refusing to acknowledge
that the COMELEC has set 25% as the new shading threshold percentage, will constitute an ultra vires
act because it encroaches on the authority of the COMELEC not only to promulgate rules, but also on
the manner to promulgate such rules. a. Setting Shading Threshold is a Quasi-Legislative Function The
COMELEC is a constitutional body charged with the duty to enforce all laws “relative to the conduct of
elections;” it is duty-bound to see to it that the board of canvassers perform its proper functions.37 The
primary grant of power to the COMELEC is found in Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, thus —
Sec[tion] 2. The [COMELEC] shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall.

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Decisions, final orders, or rulings
of the [COMELEC] on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final,
executory, and not appealable.

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and registration of voters.

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of
the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to
other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens’ arms
of the [COMELEC]. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to
achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this
Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations,
coalitions, or candidates related to elections, constitute interference in national affairs, and, when
accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the [COMELEC], in
addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of
voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts
or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation
of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election
frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to, its directive,
order, or decision.

(9) Submit to the President and the Congress, a comprehensive report on the conduct of each election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.38 It is well-established in jurisprudence that there are three
classifications of the powers of the COMELEC: administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasijudicial.39 The
quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the power to “resolve controversies arising from the
enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all preproclamation controversies[ ] and all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications.”40 The Commission’s quasi-legislative
power “refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise
such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress.”41 Meanwhile, the
administrative function points “to the enforcement and administration of election laws. In the exercise
of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [(c)])
authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.”42 Of relevance in the discussion is the quasi-legislative or
the rule-making powers of the COMELEC originally emanating from Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 881, 43
and later on, in relation to the AES, Republic Act No. 8436, 44 as amended by Republic Act No. 9369. 45
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the PET and of other electoral tribunals, for that matter, is
confined only to contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of candidates. 46 The PET
was created under Article VII, Section 4 (7) of the 1987 Constitution47 and was considered as an
innovation. Prior to such express constitutional decree, there was Republic Act No. 179348 and BP Blg.
884. 49 The precursors of the present Constitution, on the one hand, did not contain similar provisions
and, instead, vested upon the legislature all phases of presidential and vicepresidential elections — from
the canvassing of election returns, to the proclamation of the president-elect and the vice-president
elect, and even the determination, by ordinary legislation, of whether such proclamations may be
contested.50 The Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and HRET, on the other hand, were created under
Article VI, Section 17, of the 1987 Constitution.51 The MTCs and RTCs, acting as electoral tribunals, also
receive their authority from Sections 251 and 252 of the BP Blg. 881. 52 The Supreme Court, in its 2010
decision for Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal,53 recognized that the PET, the SET, and HRET
are electoral tribunals and are each specifically and exclusively clothed with jurisdiction by the
Constitution to act respectively as the “‘sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications’ of the President and Vice-President, Senators, and Representatives.
XVI. ELECTION OFFENSES

1. PADPAO vs COMELEC, G.R. NO 170530, July 5, 2010

FACTS:

Under Resolution No. 9981,4 the COMELEC set the election period for the May 2016 National
and Local Elections beginning on January 10, 2016 up to June 8, 2016 (120 days before and 30 days after
the election day). Petitioner assails the validity of Section 2(e), Rule III of Resolution No. 10015 insofar as
its application to PSAs is concerned. Petitioner asserts that the COMELEC does not have any authority to
promulgate rules regarding the bearing, carrying, or transporting of firearms by PSAs. Petitioner alleges
that PSAs should not be required to secure authority from the COMELEC as RA 5487 already grants to
PSAs and their security guards, watchmen, detectives, and security personnel the authority to possess,
bear, carry, and transport firearms, being necessary equipment for the conduct of its business and
practice of its personnel's profession. Petitioner maintains that the power to promulgate rules and
regulations with regard to said law is granted to the Philippine National Police (PNP), in consultation
with the PADPAO, under Section 17 of the said law: SEC. 17. Rules and Regulations by Chief, Philippine
Constabulary. - The Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, in consultation with the Philippine Association
of Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Incorporated and subject to the provisions of existing
laws, is hereby authorized to issue the rules and regulations necessary to carry out the purpose of this
Act. Petitioner also asserts that the COMELEC's powers are defined and limited to election related
matters under the 1987 Philippine Constitution. According to petitioner, nothing in the Constitution
gives to the COMELEC, even during election period, the power and authority to promulgate rules and
regulations relating to the bearing, carrying, and transporting of firearms by PSAs. According to
petitioner, in issuing Resolution No. 10015, the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether Resolution No. 10015 violates the non-impairment of contracts clause.

HELD:

No. The non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article III of the Constitution is limited in
application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner
changing the intention of the parties. There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a
contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws
remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. In this case, PSAs' contracts with their clients
are not affected in any manner by the requirement of having to obtain from the COMELEC written
authority to bear, carry, and transport firearms outside of their residence or place of work and in public
places, during election period. All that PSAs must do is to secure such authority. WHEREFORE, the
petition for certiorari with prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction/temporary restraining order are DENIED for lack of merit. The Court upholds Section 2(e),
Rule III of COMELEC Resolution No. 10015 as valid and constitutional. SO ORDERED.
2. AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL v. COMELEC, GR No. 126394, 1998-04-24

FACTS:

The Commission on Elections or COMELEC, acting as a National Canvassing Board for the May 8,
1995 elections, while canvassing the returns in the senatorial race, found a discrepancy between the
Provincial Certificate of Canvas for Ilocos Norte and its supporting Statement of Votes per precinct or
municipality for the province, such that the votes for candidates Juan Ponce Enrile, Franklin M. Drilon,
Ramon V. Mitra, as appearing in the Provincial Certificate of Canvass were more than the votes tallied as
appearing in the Statement of Votes, the COMELEC motu proprio ordered an investigation and referred
the matter to its Law Department. Petitioner charged respondents with violation of Section 27 of
Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 Any member of the board
of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases or decreases the votes received by
a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after proper verification and
hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes. The respondents filed their
respective counter-affidavits.[7] Subsequently, the parties filed their respective Memoranda.[8] In
Minute Resolution No. 96-1497 dated May 14, 1996, the COMELEC en banc resolved to file criminal as
well as administrative charges against respondent for violation of Section 27 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646
On August 13, 1996, the COMELEC en banc issued the assailed Minute Resolution No. 96-2333 where it
was resolved to dismiss the complaint "for lack of sufficient evidence to establish probable cause" and,
in the administrative case, "to reprimand respondents with stern warning that a repetition of the same
act in the future shall be dealt with accordingly."[ It is from the COMELEC's dismissal of his complaint
that petitioner files the instant petition for certiorari asserting that The COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion when they flip-flopped from their earlier issued Minute Resolution without giving
any substantial justification for the same, ordered the dismissal of the charges against all of the private
respondents for insufficiency of evidence arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion by the COMELEC
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUES:

"WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

REVERSING ITS EARLIER RESOLUTION BY DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
FO RVIOLATION OF SECTION 27(B) OF RA NO. 6646, ON THE GROUND OF 'LACK OF SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE." whether the COMELEC, in including that probable cause did
not exist to warrant prosecution of the respondents, committed grave abuse of discretion.

RULING:

When filed, the petition was denominated as a "petition for review on certiorari." Petitioner,
however, filed a Motion to Treat Petition as a Special Civil Action Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
where he pointed out that "the petition was filed within the 30-day period to file a petition for certiorari
from the Resolution of the COMELEC" and that the arguments raised therein make out the same
grounds for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari. We recognize that the COMELEC must be
accorded full discretion whether or not to initiate a criminal case, pursuant to its power to investigate
and prosecute election offenses. We note that when investigating and prosecuting election offenses, the
COMELEC is acting analogous to the Ombudsman with its investigatory and prosecutory powers. We
agree with the Solicitor General that the merit of respondents' defenses are best ventilated in the trial
proper than at the preliminary investigation. For a preliminary investigation is essentially inquisitorial
and is only the means to discover who may be charged with a crime, its function being merely to
determine probable cause. COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint
on the ground "lack of sufficient evidence to establish probable cause," curiously after it had previously
found probable cause on the basis of the same evidence. Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a
complaint initiated motu proprio by the Commission is presumed to be based on sufficient probable
cause for purposes of issuing subpoenas to the respondents. The finding of the existence or non-
existence of probable cause in the prosecution of criminal cases brought before it, rests in the discretion
of the COMELEC in the exercise of its Constitutional authority to investigate and, where appropriate,
prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses and malpractices. The Court would normally not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC.
However, in extreme situations, as in the case at bar, this Court will not hesitate to correct acts
committed by said body in grave abuse of discretion.
XVII. COMPUTERIZATION OF ELECTIONS

1. ARCHBISHOP FERNANDO R. CAPALLA, OMAR SOLITARIO ALI and MARY ANNE L. SUSANO, Petitioners,
v. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. G.R. No. 201112 : October 23, 2012

FACTS:

Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM entered into a Contract for the Provision of an Automated
Election System for the May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local Elections (AES Contract) which is
a Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase (OTP) the goods listed therein consisting of the Precinct
Count Optical Scan (PCOS), both software and hardware. The parties agreed that the AES Contract shall
remain effective until the release of the performance security posted by the Comelec. The Comelec was
given until December 31, 2010 within which to exercise the option to purchase. The option was,
however, not exercised within said period. The parties later entered into an extension agreement giving
the Comelec until March 31, 2012 within which to exercise it. Herein petitioners, however, assailed the
validity of such agreement on the ground that the same requires another public bidding since it
substantially amended the terms of the contract. They also averred that such extension to exercise the
option will prejudice the governments interest. In the assailed June 13, 2012 decision of the Supreme
Court, the Court upheld the validity of the transaction. Hence, the petitioners moved for
reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the extension of the OTP in favor of Comelec is valid?

RULING:

The motions for reconsideration are denied. In our June 13, 2012 Decision, we decided in favor
of respondents and placed a stamp of validity on the assailed resolutions and transactions entered into.
Based on the AES Contract, we sustained the parties right to amend the same by extending the option
period. Considering that the performance security had not been released to Smartmatic-TIM, the
contract was still effective which can still be amended by the mutual agreement of the parties, such
amendment being reduced in writing. In this case, the contract is still effective because the performance
security has not been released. Thus, not only the option and warranty provisions survive but the entire
contract as well. In light of the contractual provisions, we, therefore, sustain the amendment of the
option period. The amendment of a previously bidded contract is not per se invalid. For it to be nullified,
the amendment must be substantial such that the other bidders were deprived of the terms and
opportunities granted to the winning bidder after it won the same and that it is prejudicial to public
interest. Here, the extension of the option period means that the Comelec had more time to determine
the propriety of exercising the option. With the extension, the Comelec could acquire the subject PCOS
machines under the same terms and conditions as earlier agreed upon. The end result is that the
Comelec acquired the subject PCOS machines with its meager budget and was able to utilize the rentals
paid for the 2010 elections as part of the purchase price. The motions for reconsideration are DENIED
for lack of merit.
2. BAGUMBAYAN-VNP MOVEMENT, INC., AND RICHARD J. GORDON, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF
OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES SIMILARLY SITUATED, Petitioners vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent G.R. No. 206719 April 10, 2019

FACTS:

On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8436, otherwise known as the Election
Modernization Act of 1997, which authorized the COMELEC to adopt an automated election system
(AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation of results of the national
and local elections.7 On January 23, 2007, R.A. No. 9369 was signed into law, amending among others
certain provisions of R.A. No. 8436, pertinently Section 10 of the latter, to read: SEC. 12. Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follows: SEC. 14. Examination and Testing of
Equipment or Device of the AES and Opening of the Source Code for Review. - The Commission shall
allow the political parties and candidates or their representatives, citizens' arm or their representatives
to examine and test the equipment or device to be used in the voting and counting on the day of the
electoral exercise, before voting start. Test ballots and test forms shall be provided by the Commission.
Immediately after the examination and testing of the equipment or device, parties and candidates or
their representatives, citizen's arms or their representatives, may submit a written comment to the
election officer who shall immediately transmit it to the Commission for appropriate action. The election
officer shall keep minutes of the testing, a copy of which shall be submitted to the Commission together
with the minute of voting. Once an AES technology is selected for implementation, the Commission shall
promptly make the source code of that technology available and open to any interested political parry
or groups which may conduct their own review thereof. (Underscoring and emphasis Ours) To facilitate
the review process as mandated by the law, the COMELEC promulgated Minute Resolution No. 10-
01388 on February 10, 2010, adopting the guidelines recommended by the COMELEC Advisory Council
and the Technical Evaluation Council (TEC). This resolution set the guidelines for the conduct of the
source code review, and was done a month before the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Years
later, this time for the 2013 National and Local elections, the TEC submitted to the COMELEC on
February 12, 20139 the former's resolution on the certification of the validity of AES for the 2013
elections. As required by Section 9 of R.A. No. 9369, SLI Global Solutions (SLI), certified and categorically
stated that "the AES, including its hardware and software components, are operating properly, securely,
and accurately, in accordance with the provisions of the Act,"10 and that the same could be used by the
voters, board of election inspectors (BEI), local and national boards of canvassers, as well as the
COMELEC in the aforementioned elections. On March 1, 2013,11 the COMELEC promulgated Resolution
No. 9651, the guidelines promulgated by COMELEC in order to fulfill its mandate to make the source
code available. According to Resolution No. 9651, several requirements12 must be submitted by
interested parties before they may be allowed to partake in the source code review. Subsequently, on
March 14, 2013, COMELEC likewise promulgated Resolution No. 9657, which stated that to afford the
COMELEC enough time to evaluate the request for source code review, and the credentials of the
reviewer, there is a need to set a deadline within which the request, together with the credentials of its
reviewer, should be filed, and where to file the same. Resolution No. 9657 resolved that the request for
the conduct of the source code review by the political parties and interested groups, together with the
credentials of the reviewer, shall be filed no later than April 1, 2013.13 As a result of the
aforementioned issuances, several parties, Parti do Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas Bayan, Pwersa ng
Masang Pilipino, the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting and the Liberal Party, in separate
letters to the COMELEC, requested for participation in the source code review.14 From April 10 to 24,
2013, these parties conducted the source code review for the Consolidated Canvassing System and
Elections Management System, but not for the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) source code, as the
same had not yet been released due to negotiations between the COMELEC, Dominion Voting Systems
(Dominion), and Smartmatic TIM (Smartmatic) over an issue involving a disagreement with the latter
two institutions. This disagreement started on September 6, 2012,15 when Smartmatic filed an action
with the Court of Chancery in the State of Delaware in the United States against Dominion, to which the
latter filed a counterclaim. According to COMELEC, this termination birthed two (2) consequences: first,
Smartmatic lost its access to the program systems of Dominion, which signified that any counting error
committed in the following elections could not be corrected; and second, Smartmatic failed to deliver to
the COMELEC the source code, pursuant to Section 14 of R.A. No. 8436, a failure that meant the said
source code would not be reviewable by any party or candidate participating in the 2013 elections. The
foregoing caused a delay in the availability of the source code, and thus, it was only on May 5, 2013
when a representative from SLI arrived in the Philippines with a copy of the PCOS source code that was
subjected to the trusted build.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the Writ of Mandamus (a) to compel COMELEC to
use digital signatures in the electronic transmission of electronic election returns; (b) to provide for vote
verification in the casting of votes, and provide for randomness in the selection of precincts for the
manual audit; and (c) to postpone the elections until such time that provisions for the use of digital
signatures, review of the source code, vote verification and randomness of manual audit are set in place.

RULING:

As for those subjects not related to the source code review, the Court finds that Mandamus
does not lie as regards the other claims of the petitioners, specifically to compel the COMELEC to use
digital signatures in the electronic transmission of electronic election returns, to provide for vote
verification in the casting of votes, and provide for randomness in the selection of precincts for the
manual audit, and to postpone the elections until such time that provisions for the use of digital
signatures, review of the source code, vote verification and randomness of manual audit are set in place.
Petitioners Tan Dem, et al., maintain in their submitted petition that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in approving and proceeding with the conduct of automated elections for the year
2013, without the digital signatures allegedly required by R.A. No. 9369 in order to authenticate and
consider the electronic election returns as "official election results" to be "used as the basis for the
canvassing of votes and the proclamation of a candidate,"49 and proceeding without the security
safeguards, particularly the lack of the source code review by interested groups, the lack of vote
verification, and the lack of randomness in the manual audit.50 As to the issue on the digital signatures,
Tan Dem, et al. state that the COMELEC removed the requirement of digital signatures, in supposed
violation of the automated election laws. The petitioners disagree that the "machine signature" of a
PCOS machine may be the functional equivalent of the aforementioned "digital signature."51 First,
property such as a PCOS machine cannot be a valid substitute because, as property, it cannot assume
the identity of a person, only the latter able to acquire rights and to be the object of legal relations.52
Likewise, the COMELEC was alleged to have disabled the vote verification of the PCOS machines that
would have shown the actual votes as aptly scanned and read. Instead, the PCOS machines merely
displayed the statement "Congratulations. Your vote has been registered." According to Tan Dem, et al.,
these statements only confirm that the voting process was finished, but not necessarily that the votes
were actually read and recorded, as the votes were never displayed for confirmation. Finally, Tan Dem,
et al. accuse the COMELEC of failing to comply with the Random Manual Audit (RMA) as laid down in
COMELEC Resolution No. 8837 and COMELEC Resolution No. 9595, for the May 2010 and May 2013
elections, respectively. The COMELEC purportedly ordered that the precincts of audits be selected and
disclosed at least six hours before the close of polls during the May 2010 elections, while ordering the
selection and disclosure of the subject precincts, at least four days and two days before the close of polls
during the May 2013 elections. This allegedly rendered the RMA highly questionable as it diluted the
intended probability of the audit, as well as made the selection of the subject precincts predictable.53
On the other hand, the COMELEC advocates that it duly complied with the requirements for the use of
digital signatures, the verification system, the conduct of the source code, and the RMA, and thus,
Mandamus will not lie in this case.54 As to the contention of Tan Dem, et al. that digital signatures were
not used in the transmission of electronic returns, the COMEL.EC advocates the view that it had already
been held and decided by the Court that the machines used in the elections are capable of producing
digitally-signed transmissions, as clarified in Archbishop Capalla, et al. v. COMELEC. 55 As for the
allegations of Tan Dem, et al. that the COMELEC disabled the vote verification function of the PCOS
machines to only show "Congratulations. Your vote has been registered," instead of showing the actual
votes scanned and read. COMELEC counters that there is nothing in the law that requires the actual
votes scanned and read to be shown after the voter has registered his or her vote, and to compel
COMELEC to adopt a procedure not mandated by the law is beyond the realm of Mandamus. 56 Finally,
as for the allegation that there was a complete lack of randomness in the manual audit, COMELEC states
that Tan Dem, et al. misconstrue the law, and that the term "random" pertains to the randomness of the
selection of the precincts subject of the audit, not that the audit was to be done secretly or by
surprise.57 As was the case in the discussion of the source code, the Court likewise notes the recent
promulgation of Resolution No. 10458, or the General Instructions for the conduct of Random Manual
Audit relative to the 13 May 2019 Automated National and Local Elections and subsequent elections
thereafter, on December 5, 2018, Resolution No. 10460, or the General Instructions on the constitution,
composition and appointment of the Electoral Board; use of the Vote Counting Machines; the process of
testing and sealing of the Vote Counting Machines; and the voting, counting and transmission of election
results, on December 6, 2018, and Resolution No. 10487, or the VCM Operation procedures for (A) Final
Testing and Sealing (FTS) (B) Election Day and (C) Transmission of Election Results in connection with the
13 May 2019 National and Local Elections, on January 23, 2019. The latter Resolution No. 10487, in
particular, supplanted Resolution No. 10460. The promulgation of these means that the previous cause
of action, as regards the conduct of the COMELEC, removes the justiciable controversy existing in the
consolidated petition, especially as it is these resolutions that now govern the conduct of the specific
items being assailed. Regardless, even if the petitioners' contentions that the COMELEC erred are taken
into consideration, the same is without merit. The Court rules that the electronic transmission through
the method promulgated by the COMELEC, as well as the authentication of the results, are valid under
the law. According to A.M. No. 01-7-01 -SC,58 or the Rules on Electronic Evidence, promulgated by the
Court59 and alluded to with regard to the above mentioned authentication process, a "digital signature"
refers to an electronic signature consisting of a transformation of an electronic document or an
electronic data message using an asymmetric or public cryptosystem such that a person having the
initial untransformed electronic document and the signer's public key can accurately determine: (i)
whether the transformation was created using the private key that corresponds to the signer's public
key; and (ii) whether the initial electronic document had been altered after the transformation was
made, and that for purposes of the Rules, a digital signature is considered an electronic signature. An
electronic signature is likewise defined as "any distinctive mark, characteristic and/or sound in electronic
form representing the identity of a person and attached to or logically associated with the electronic
data message or electronic document or any methodology or procedure employed or adopted by a
person and executed or adopted by such person with the intention of authenticating, signing or
approving an electronic data message or electronic document.