104 (1998) 2 HKLRD: Hong Kong Law Reports & Digest
104 (1998) 2 HKLRD: Hong Kong Law Reports & Digest
104 (1998) 2 HKLRD: Hong Kong Law Reports & Digest
and
Pui Man Yau & Others Defendants
B
(Court of Final Appeal)
(FAMV No 11 of 1998)
C
Li CJ, Litton and Ching PJJ
7 July 1998
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A In May this year, whilst the trial was into its second month, the plaintiffs
caused five subpoenas duces tecum to be issued, directed to five government
departments, requiring a total of 32 files and their contents to be produced.
Those departments applied through counsel to have the subpoenas discharged
on the broad ground that their issue was contrary to established legal principles.
B
Yam J determined the matter against the departments concerned and by his
order of 12 May 1998 dismissed the application. The departments appealed to
the Court of Appeal against Yam J’s order. By its judgment dated 18 June
1998 the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered that the subpoenas
C be discharged. The plaintiffs then applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to
appeal to the Court of Final Appeal, on the ground that the appeal raised two
questions of great general or public importance. By its ruling of 26 June 1998
this application was dismissed.
The plaintiffs now renew their application before us, pursuant to s.23(1)(b)
D of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap.484).
Two points are taken by counsel for the plaintiffs. They concern (i) the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to entertain an interlocutory appeal against
Yam J’s order and (ii) if such jurisdiction exists, the correctness of the Court of
Appeal’s judgment in interfering with the trial judge’s management of the trial
E
process.
As to point (i) there can be no doubt that Yam J’s order of 12 May 1998 is
an “order” within the terms of s.13(2)(a) of the High Court Ordinance (Cap.4).
Whilst interlocutory appeals of this nature are to be strongly discouraged – a
F point which the Court of Appeal recognized – where a trial judge has erred in
principle it may be necessary for the Court of Appeal to intervene. Section
13(2)(a) of the High Court Ordinance (Cap.4) empowers the Court of Appeal
to do that.
This brings us to point (ii), whether the Court of Appeal has arguably erred
G in interfering on a matter of case management by the trial judge, to the extent
that the matter should be considered fully by the Court of Final Appeal. As to
this, there can be no doubt that the five government departments are strangers
to the litigation. What is sought by the subpoenas is wide ranging discovery
H relating to the contents of 32 files, without any attempt to identify what
documents within those files might be relevant to the issues to be tried. This is
clearly far too wide.
In our judgment the Court of Appeal was right to conclude that the trial
judge had erred in principle in allowing the subpoenas to stand; the reasons for
I so concluding are fully set out in the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 18 June
1998, and need not be repeated here.
The application is dismissed, with costs.