NICOLAS SANCHEZ VS.

SEVERINA RIGOS
G.R. NO. L-25494
JUNE 14, 1972

Facts: Nicolas Sanchez and Severina Rigos executed an instrument entitled “Option to
Purchase” wherein Mrs. Rigos agreed, promised and committed to sell to Mr. Sanchez a parcel
of land for the amount of P1,510 within two years from the date of the instrument, with the
understanding that the said option shall be deemed terminated and elapsed if Mr. Sanchez shall
fail to exercise his right to buy the property within the stipulated period.

Mrs. Rigos agreed and committed to sell and Mr. Sanchez agreed and committed to buy. But
there is nothing in the contract to indicate that her agreement, promise and undertaking is
supported by a consideration distinct from the price stipulated for the sale of the land. Mr.
Sanchez has made several tenders of payment in the said amount within the period before any
withdrawal from the contract has been made by Mrs. Rigos, but were rejected nevertheless.

Issue: Whether or not an accepted unilateral promise to sell without consideration distinct from
the price be withdrawn arbitrarily?

Held: No. An accepted promise to sell is an offer to sell when accepted becomes a contract of
sale. Since there may be no valid contract without a cause or consideration, the promisor is not
bound by his promise and may, accordingly, withdraw it. Pending notice of its withdrawal, his
accepted promise partakes, however, of the nature of an offer to sell which, if accepted, results
in a perfected contract of sale.

This view has the advantage of avoiding a conflict between Articles 1324 – on the general
principles on contracts – and 1479 – on sales – of the Civil Code. Article 1324 states that when
the offeror has allowed the offeree a certain period to accept, the offer may be withdrawn at any
time before acceptance by communicating such withdrawal, except when the option is founded
upon consideration, as something paid or promised.

Furthermore, Article 1479 states that a promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price
certain is reciprocally demandable. An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a
determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the promissory if the promise is supported
by a consideration distinct from the price. The Court is of the considered opinion that it should,
as it hereby reiterates the doctrine laid down in the Atkins, Kroll and Co. case, and that, insofar
as inconsistent therewith, the view adhered to in the Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. case
should be deemed abandoned or modified.

TUAZON VS. DEL ROSARIO-SUAREZ

G.R. No. 168325
December 13, 2010

Facts: Petitioner and respondent entered into a Contract of Lease, wherein petitioner, Tuazon,
will occupy the parcel of land owned by respondent, Del Rosario-Suarez, for a period of three
years. During the effectivity of the lease, respondent sent a letter to the petitioner offering to sell
the parcel of land. She pegged the price at 37,541,000.00 and gave him two years from January
2, 1995 to decide on the said offer.

On June 19, 1997, four months after the expiration of the Contract of Lease, respondent sold
the land to Catalina Suarez-De Leon, et al. The new owners notified the petitioner to vacate the
premises on the grounds of non-payment of rentals and expiration of the Contract of Lease.
Petitioner claims that respondent violated his right to buy subject property under the principle of
right of first refusal by not giving him notice and the opportunity to by the property. Respondent
contended that the principle of right of first refusal is unavailing in this case. It is a contract of
option which was not perfected due to the failure of acceptance on the part of the respondent.

Issue: Whether or not a lessee loses his right to buy the property upon failure to accept an offer
or to purchase on time within the period stipulated.

Held: Yes. The case indeed involves an option contract and not a contract of a right of first
refusal. What is involved here is a separate and distinct offer made by Lourdes through a letter
dated January 2, 1995 wherein she is selling the leased property to Roberto for a definite price
and which gave the latter a definite period for acceptance. Roberto was not given a right of first
refusal. The letter-offer of Lourdes did not form part of the Lease Contract because it was made
more than six months after the commencement of the lease.

It is an option contract, the rules applicable are found in Articles 1324 and 1479 of the Civil
Code which provides that when the offerer has allowed the offeree a certain period to accept,
the offer may be withdrawn at any time before acceptance by communicating such withdrawal,
except when the option is founded upon a consideration, as something paid or promised.

Moreover, Art. 1479 states that a promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain
is reciprocally demandable.An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a determinate thing
for a price certain is binding upon the promissor if the promise is supported by a consideration
distinct from the price.

It is clear from the provision of Article 1324 that there is a great difference between the effect of
an option which is without a consideration from one which is founded upon a consideration. If
the option is without any consideration, the offeror may withdraw his offer by communicating
such withdrawal to the offeree at any time before acceptance; if it is founded upon a
consideration, the offeror cannot withdraw his offer before the lapse of the period agreed upon.

ADELFA PROPERTIES INC. VS. CA

G.R. No. 111238
January 25, 1995

Facts: Private respondents were the co-owners of a parcel of land with their two brothers, Jose
and Dominador Jimenez. Jose and Dominador Jimenez sold the east portion of the lot to
petitioner accompanied by an extrajudicial partition of the property with the west portion allotted
to private respondents. After the sale, Petitioner and private respondents entered into an
“Exclusive Option to Purchase” in favor of the former over the west portion of the land. In the
said contract, petitioner paid 50,000.00 as option money, but the stipulation states that it would
form part of the purchase price. The owner’s duplicate of private respondents was lost so they
initiated reconstitution proceedings represented by petitioner’s lawyer. Pursuant to this, the
reconstituted title remained in the possession of the lawyer.

The nieces and nephews of the Jimenez’s filed an action to annul the sale of the east portion of
the land to petitioner. Pursuant to this, petitioner suspended the payment of the full purchase
price because of the vindicatory action filed by the niece and nephews which it duly informed
the private respondents.
The suit however was dismissed. After the dismissal, the petitioner sent a letter to private
respondents conveying its intention to pay the full price. However, the private respondents
ignored the offer since it already sold the said lot to another person. The private respondents
sought the recovery of the title of the land from the petitioner but the latter did not comply, the
former filed an action to recover the same.

The Petitioner alleged that they were justified to suspend the payment of the price since there
was a valid vindicatory action under Article 1590 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, private
respondents countered, saying that the contract was a mere option contract and thus Art 1590
is not applicable. The RTC ruled in favor of private respondents. The CA affirmed in toto.

Issue: Whether or not the contract was a mere option contract

Held: No. Although the title of the contract was “Exclusive Option to Purchase” the SC finds that
the real nature of the contract was a contract to sell. It did not clearly explain why it just said that
it was evident that the real intention of the parties was that the contract of sale will be only
executed upon the full payment of the price.

Moreover, pursuant to the finding of the SC that the contract was a contract to sell, it said that
Art 1590 was applicable and the suspension of payment made by petitioner was justified. It is
because the vindicatory action does not only cover the east portion of the land that was the
subject of the contract of sale between petitioner and Jose and Dominator. The niece and
nephews also sought their rights over the west part of the land.

Although the suspension of payment was justified, private respondents cannot anymore be
compelled to sell the land petitioner. This is because the mere conveyance of the intention to
pay is not a valid mode of payment. The petitioner was not able to consign the price to the court.
A tender of payment not accompanied by the payment of the purchase price does not extinguish
an obligation contemplated by the Civil Code.

LUIS AISIAN VS. BENJAMIN JALANDONI

G.R. No. L-34697
March 26, 1932

Facts: The parties agreed upon the sale of the land there in question, they had in mind chiefly
the area and quality of the land, the subject of the contract, as will be seen from the letter of
Asiain dated May 6, 1920, in which, among other things, Purchase of land of Mr. Luis Asiain and
his wife Maria Cadenas, by B. Jalandoni, containing 25 hectares more or less of land bounded
by property of the purchaser, with its corresponding crop, estimated at 2,000 piculs, the total
value of which is 55,000.00. The price is to be paid by paying 30 thousand at the signing of the
document, and 25 thousand within one year with interest at the rate of 10 per cent.” In
accordance with the foregoing memorandum the deed of sale was executed in the City of Iloilo,
the parties stipulating among other things, the following: 1) That Luis Asiain does hereby
promise and bind himself to sell to Benjamin Jalandoni a parcel of land of the hacienda “Maria”
of the aforesaid Luis Asiain, situated in the municipality of La Carlota, Province of Occidental
Negros, P.I.; and 2) That Benjamin Jalandoni does hereby promise and bind himself to
purchase the aforesaid parcel of land in the sum of 55,000 upon certain conditions specified in a
memorandum signed by the parties which is in the hands of Attorneys Padilla & Treñas.”

Jalandoni then took possession of the land, milled the cane at La Carlota Central, from which he
realized 800 piculs and 23 cates of the centrifugal sugar. And after he had secured from Asiain
the certificate of title, he had a surveyor measure the land, which was found to contain only 18
hectares, 54 centares, and 22 centares. Jalandoni had paid 30,000 leaving an unpaid balance
of 25,000 of the purchase price of 55,000 stipulated in the contract. Asiain sued to recover the
balance from Jalandoni.

The competent court declared the deed of sale void, absolved the defendant from paying
P25,000 and ordered the parties to return what they had received under the contract.Upon
appeal to the Supreme Court, the judgment was affirmed on the ground that both parties had
acted by a mutual mistake.

Issue: Whether or not the seller and buyer misrepresented each other or committed an error?

Held: The judgment was affirmed on the ground that both parties had acted by a mutual
mistake. The vendor undertook to deliver to the vendee a parcel of land some 25 hectares in
area and of such a quality as to be able to produce 2,000 piculs of centrifugal sugar. The
vendee, in turn, agreed to buy said parcel of land with the understanding that it contained that
area and was of the quality guaranteed by the vendor.

Inasmuch as the land had neither the area nor the quality the vendor had assured the vendee it
had, it is clear the latter was entitled to rescind the contract, upon the strength of the authorities
cited in the opinion of the court. We believe that Jalandoni was entitled to rescind that contract,
inasmuch as the vendor did not deliver a parcel of land of the area and quality stipulated in the
contract.

HEIRS OF WILLIAM SEVILLA VS. SEVILLA

G.R. No. 150179
April 30, 2003

Facts: On December 10, 1973, Filomena Almirol de Sevilla died intestate leaving 8 children,
namely: William, Peter, Leopoldo, Felipe, Rosa, Maria, Luzvilla and Jimmy, all surnamed
Sevilla. Filomena left the following properties; Parcel I, Parcel II, Parcel III, Parcel IV. Parcel I
was co-owned with Filomena’s siblings, Honorata and Felisa Almirol, meanwhile, the remaining
parcels were the conjugal properties of Filomena and her late-husband. During their lifetime,
Honorata and Felisa lived in the house of Filomena, together with and in the care of their
nephew, the respondent, Leopoldo Sevilla and his family. In 1982, Honorata died and
transmitted her ⅓ share over Parcel I to her heirs, Felisa Almirol and the heirs of Filomena, who
thereby acquired the property in the proportion of ½ share each. In 1985, Felisa executed a last
will and testament devising her ½ share over Parcel I to the spouses Leopoldo Sevilla and
Belen Leysen.
Additionally, in 1986, Felisa executed another document “Donation Inter Vivos” ceding to
Leopoldo Sevilla her share over Parcel I, it was accepted by Leopoldo in the same document. In
1986, Felisa and Peter Sevilla, in his behalf and in behalf of the heirs of Filomena, executed a
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, identifying and adjudicating the ⅓ share of Honorato to the heirs
of Filomena and to Felisa.
In 1990, the children of Filomena and the heirs of William, Jimmy and Maria Sevilla filed the
instant case against Leopoldo, Peter and Luzvilla Sevilla, for annulment of the Deed of Donation
and the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, Accounting, Damages, with prayer for Receivership and
for Partition of the properties of the late Filomena. In their complaint, the petitioners alleged that
the Deed of Donation was tainted with fraud since Felisa was of unsound mind and, that the
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was void since it was executed without their knowledge and
consent.
In 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered a decision upholding the validity of
the Deed of Donation and declaring the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition unenforceable. In 2000,
the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the Deed of Donation executed by Felisa in favor of Leopoldo Sevilla was
valid

Held: The deed of donation was valid. There is fraud when, through the insidious words or
machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract
which, without them, he would not have agreed to.
There is undue influence when a person takes advantage of his power over the will of another,
depriving the latter of a reasonable freedom of choice. There is a presumption of consent when
one enters into a contract. Fraud, committed in any of the mean enumerated, must be
established full, clear and convincing evidence by the party that alleges its existence. In the
present case at bar, the testimony of the notary public that notarized the Deed of Donation that
Felisa was of sound mind is controlling, especially since the petitioners did not even attempt to
overcome such a claim and only offered vague testimonies to prove their claim.

HEINZRICH THEIS VS. CA

G.R. No. 126013
February 12, 1997

Facts: Calsons Development Corporation is the owner of three adjacent parcels of land in
Tagaytay City. Adjacent to parcel no.3 is a vacant lot denominated as parcel no.4, which was
not owned by the CDC.CDC constructed a two-storey house on parcel no.3, while parcel no.1
and parcel no.2 remained idle. However, an erroneous survey indicated the interchange of
Transfer Certificate of Titles of the said properties, where parcel no.3 was erroneously located in
parcel no.1 and the two idle lands in parcel.4.

Unaware of the mistake, CDC sold to the Theis parcel no.4 through the Deed of Sale.
Thereafter, the Theis did not immediately occupy and take possession of the two (2) idle parcels
of land because they went to Germany. They went back to the Philippines and look over the
vacant lots in Tagaytay to plan the construction of their house thereon. But they discovered that
parcel no. 4 was owned by another person. They also discovered that the lots actually sold to
them were parcel nos. 2 and 3, where a two-storey house was constructed. The Theis insisted
that they wanted parcel no. 4, but CDC argued that it could not have possibly sold the same to
them for it did not own parcel no. 4 in the first place.

To remedy the mistake, offered parcel nos. 1 and 2 as these two were precisely the two vacant
lots which private respondent owned and intended to sell when it entered into the transaction
with petitioners.

The Theis rejected the good faith offer and refused to yield to reason, and insisted on taking
parcel no. 3 upon which a two-storey house stands, in addition to parcel no. 2. Such refusal of
the Theis prompted CDC to make another offer, i.e., the return of an amount double the price
paid by the former. But they still refused and stubbornly insisted in their stand.
CDC filed an action for annulment of deed of sale and reconveyance of the properties subject
thereof. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of CDC on the ground of mistake in the
identification of the parcels of land intended to be the subject matter of said sale. The CA
affirmed the said decision in toto.

Issue: Whether or not a contract may be annulled where the consent of one of the contracting
parties was procured by mistake

Held: The Court holds that where consent is given through mistake, the validity of the
contractual relations between the parties is legally impaired. Hence, the contract can be
annulled.
Under Art. 1331, in order that mistake may invalidate consent, it should refer to the substance of
the thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally moved
one or both parties to enter into the contract.

In the case at bar, there is a lack of full and correct knowledge about the thing. The mistake
committed by the CDC in selling parcel no. 4 to the Theis falls within the said provision. Verily,
such mistake invalidated its consent and as such, annulment of the deed of sale is proper. CDC
obviously committed an honest mistake in selling parcel no. 4. As correctly noted by the Court of
Appeals, it is quite impossible for CDC to sell the lot in question as the same is not owned by it.
The good faith of the CDC is evident in the fact that when the mistake was discovered, it
immediately offered two other vacant lots to the Theis or to reimburse them with twice the
amount paid. That petitioners refused either option left the CDC with no other choice but to file
an action for the annulment of the deed of sale on the ground of mistake.

DUMASUG VS. MODELO

G.R. No. L-10462
March 16, 1916

Facts: Petitioner Andrea Dumasug alleged that respondent Felix Modelo persuaded her to sign
a document by falsely and maliciously making her believe that it contained an engagement on
petitioner`s obligation to pay a certain sum of money. Such obligation pertains to the advances
and expenses incurred by the respondent in protecting and aiding her in the proceeding of her
case wherein the petitioner was the plaintiff. Petitioner does not know how to write; hence, she
only affixed her mark as her signature believing in good faith that respondent herein was telling
her the truth.

Three months after the execution of such document, the respondent took possession of a
carabao and of two parcels of land owned by the petitioner on the ground that the latter had
conveyed such properties to him by an Absolute Sale in consideration to the expenses he
incurred in aiding the petitioner on the proceedings of her case. Petitioner herein seeks for the
recovery of the above properties.

Issue: Whether or not the instrument of purchase and sale of two parcels of land and a plow
carabao is null and void.

Held: In the case at bar, it was inconceivable that respondent herein incurs such big amount as
he allegedly spent in the proceedings of the lawsuit involving petitioner. The evidence discloses
that the only great expense which Andrea Dumasug could have incurred was the sum that as
fees she had to pay the attorney Andres Jayme for filing a demurrer in the Court of First
Instance. Said attorney testified that he received from Andrea Dumasug only P80 or P90, the
only large sum which the latter had to expend.

It is an evident that the document, by means of which defendant made himself the owner of the
properties in question is not the instrument of debt which Dumasug had signed, and if it is the
same one its contents were not duly and faithfully explained to plaintiff in the act of its execution.
In either case, the consent said to have been given by Dumasug in said document is null and
void, as it was given by mistake. This error invalidates the contract, because it goes to the very
substance of the thing which was the subject matter of said contract, for, had the maker thereof
truly understood the contents of said document, she would neither have accepted nor
authenticated it by her mark.

The consent given by plaintiff being null and void, the document is consequently also null, void,
and of no value or effect. Article 1303 of the Civil Code is therefore, applicable, which prescribes
that: “When the nullity of an obligation has been declared, the contracting parties shall restore to
each other the things which have been the object of the contract with their fruits, and the value
with its interest.”

HEMEDES VS.. CA
316 SCRA 347

FACTS:  Jose Hemedes executed a document entitled “Donation Inter Vivos With Resolutory
Conditions” conveying ownership a parcel of land, together with all its improvements, in favor of
his third wife, Justa Kauapin, subject to the resolutory condition that upon the latter’s death or
remarriage, the title to the property donated shall revert to any of the children, or heirs, of the
DONOR expressly designated by the DONEE.
Pursuant to said condition, Justa Kausapin executed a “Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered
Real Property by Reversion” conveying to Maxima Hemedes the subject property.

Maxima Hemedes and her husband Raul Rodriguez constituted a real estate mortgage over the
subject property in favor of R & B Insurance to serve as security for a loan which they obtained.
R & B Insurance extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage since Maxima Hemedes failed to pay
the loan even.  The land was sold at a public auction with R & B Insurance as the highest
bidder. A new title was subsequently issued in favor the R&B. The annotation of usufruct in
favor of Justa Kausapin was maintained in the new title.

Despite the earlier conveyance of the subject land in favor of Maxima Hemedes, Justa Kausapin
executed a “Kasunduan” whereby she transferred the same land to her stepson Enrique D.
Hemedes, pursuant to the resolutory condition in the deed of donation executed in her favor by
her late husband Jose Hemedes.  Enrique D. Hemedes obtained two declarations of real
property, when the assessed value of the property was raised.  Also, he has been paying the
realty taxes on the property from the time Justa Kausapin conveyed the property to him.  In the
cadastral survey, the property was assigned in the name of Enrique Hemedes.  Enrique
Hemedes is also the named owner of the property in the records of the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform office at Calamba, Laguna.

Enriques D. Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty and Construction Corporation
(Dominium). Dominium leased the property to its sister corporation Asia Brewery, Inc. (Asia
Brewery) who made constructions therein.  Upon learning of Asia Brewery’s constructions, R &
B Insurance sent it a letter informing the former of its ownership of the property. A conference
was held between R & B Insurance and Asia Brewery but they failed to arrive at an amicable
settlement. Maxima Hemedes also wrote a letter addressed to Asia Brewery asserting that she
is the rightful owner of the subject property and denying the execution of any real estate
mortgage in favor of R&B.

Dominium and Enrique D. Hemedes filed a complaint with the CFI for the annulment of TCT
issued in favor of R & B Insurance and/or the reconveyance to Dominium of the subject property
alleging that Dominion was the absolute owner of the land. The trial court ruled in favor of
Dominium and Enrique Hemedes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the donation in favor of Enrique Hemedes was valid?

HELD: NO. Enrique D. Hemedes and his transferee, Dominium, did not acquire any rights over
the subject property.  Justa Kausapin sought to transfer to her stepson exactly what she had
earlier transferred to Maxima Hemedes – the ownership of the subject property pursuant to the
first condition stipulated in the deed of donation executed by her husband.  Thus, the donation
in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes is null and void for the purported object thereof did not exist at
the time of the transfer, having already been transferred to his sister. Similarly, the sale of the
subject property by Enrique D. Hemedes to Dominium is also a nullity for the latter cannot
acquire more rights than its predecessor-in-interest and is definitely not an innocent purchaser
for value since Enrique D. Hemedes did not present any certificate of title upon which it relied.

The declarations of real property by Enrique D. Hemedes, his payment of realty taxes, and his
being designated as owner of the subject property in the cadastral survey of Cabuyao, Laguna
and in the records of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform office in Calamba, Laguna cannot defeat a
certificate of title, which is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in
favor of the person whose name appears therein. Particularly, with regard to tax declarations
and tax receipts, this Court has held on several occasions that the same do not by themselves
conclusively prove title to land

KATIPUNAN VS. KATIPUNAN, JR.

375 SCRA 199

Facts: Braulio Katipunan, Jr. owns a 203 square meter lot and a five-door apartment in San
Miguel, Manila and is registered under his name in the Registry of Deeds in Manila. Braulio,
herein respondent, was assisted by his brother, petitioner – Miguel Katipunan, into entering a
Deed of Absolute Sale with brothers Edgardo Balguma, Leopoldo Balguma, Jr., represented by
Atty. Leopoldo Balguma, Sr. – for the subject property for a consideration of 187,000.00

Respondent filed a complaint for the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale and averred that
the petitioners convinced him to work abroad and that through insidious words and
machinations, they made him sign a document that he thought was a contract of employment.
This document turned out to be the Deed of Absolute Sale. He also claimed that he did not
receive the consideration stated in the contract. He argued that the petitioners, with evident bad
faith, conspired with one another in taking advantage of his ignorance. The RTC dismissed this
complaint on grounds that the respondent failed to prove his causes of action since he admitted
that he obtained loans from the Balgumas, he signed the Deed of Absolute sale and he
acknowledged selling the property and that he stopped collecting rentals.

On the other hand, the CA gave credit to the testimony of Dr. Ana Marie Revilla, a psychiatrist at
the UP-PGH, as an expert witness – explaining that the respondent is slow in comprehension
and has a very low IQ. They ruled that the contract entered into by respondent and petitioners
was voidable pursuant to the provisions of Article 1390 of the NCC. The petitioners filed a MFR
but was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the contract entered into by Braulio Katipunan, Jr. and Atty Leopoldo
Balguma, Jr. is voidable.

Held: The contract entered into by respondent and petitioners was voidable pursuant to the
provisions of Article 1390 of the New Civil Code.

A contract of sale is born from the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is
the object of the contract and upon the price. This meeting of the minds speaks of the intent of
the parties in entering into the contract respecting the subject matter and the consideration
thereof. Thus, the elements of a contract of sale are consent, object, and price in money or its
equivalent. Under Article 1330 of the Civil Code, consent may be vitiated by any of the following:
(a) mistake, (2) violence, (3) intimidation, (4) undue influence, and (5) fraud. The presence of
any of these vices renders the contract voidable.

The circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract manifest a vitiated consent on the
part of respondent. Undue influence was exerted upon him by his brother Miguel and Inocencio
Valdez and Atty. Balguma. It was his brother Miguel who negotiated with Atty. Balguma.
However, they did not explain to him the nature and contents of the document. Worse, they
deprived him of a reasonable freedom of choice. It bears stressing that he reached only grade
three. Thus, it was impossible for him to understand the contents of the contract written in
English and embellished in legal jargon.

LEONARDO VS. CA
G.R. No. 125485
September 13, 2004

Facts: Restituta Leonardo is the only legitimate child of the late Sps. Tomasina Paul and
Balbino Leonardo. Private respondents Teodoro, Victor, Corazon, Piedad, et. al, all surnamed
Sebastian, are the illegitimate children of Tomasina with Jose Sebastian after she separated
from Balbino Leonardo. In 1988, private respondent Corazon Sebastian with her niece and a
certain Bitang, came to Restituta’s house to persuade her to sign a deed of extrajudicial partition
of the estate of Tomasina Paul and Jose Sebastian. Before signing the document, Restituta
allegedly insisted that they wait for her husband Jose Ramos so he could translate the
document which was written in English.

Later, she proceeded to sign the document even without her husband and without reading the
document, on the assurance of private respondent Corazon that she will get her share as a
legitimate daughter. Petitioner then asked private respondent Corazon and her companions to
wait for her husband so he could read the document. When petitioner’s husband arrived,
however, private respondent Corazon and her companions had left without leaving a copy of the
document. It was only when petitioner hired a lawyer that they were able to secure a copy and
read the contents thereof.

Petitioner refuted private respondents’ claim that they were the legitimate children and sole
heirs of Jose Sebastian and Tomasina Paul since the latter were never married to each other,
thus, the extrajudicial partition was therefore unlawful and illegal. Petitioner also claimed that
her consent was vitiated because she was deceived into signing the extrajudicial settlement.
She further denied having appeared before a Judge of MTC of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan to
acknowledge the execution of the extrajudicial partition.

Issue: Whether or not the consent given by petitioner to the extrajudicial settlement of the
estate was given voluntarily.

Held: Contracts where consent is given by mistake or because of violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud are voidable. These circumstances are defects of the will, the existence of
which impairs the freedom, intelligence, spontaneity, and voluntariness of the party in giving
consent to the agreement. In determining whether consent is vitiated, Courts are given a wide
latitude in weighing the facts considering the age, physical infirmity, intelligence, relationship
and the conduct of the parties at the time of making the contract and subsequent thereto,
irrespective of whether the contract is in a public or private writing.

In this case, private respondents failed to offer any evidence to prove that the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate was explained in a language known to the petitioner, i.e., the
Pangasinan dialect. Clearly, petitioner, who only finished Grade 3, was not in a position to give
her free, voluntary and spontaneous consent without having the document, which was in
English, explained to her in the Pangasinan dialect.