The Automotive Industry in Vietnam
The Automotive Industry in Vietnam
The Automotive Industry in Vietnam
Timothy J. Sturgeon
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
and
Draft
July 1998
TABLE OF CONTENTS: Click on blue text
1. INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................................................................... 1
BIBLIOGRAPHY .........................................................................................................................................................................42
APPENDIX ....................................................................................................................................................................................43
1. INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1991, the domestic automotive industry in Vietnam consisted mainly of Auto
Hoa Binh, a state-run manufacturer of military vehicles that first opened in Hanoi in 1951
during the war with the French. Some parts were supplied by other state-run enterprises,
located mostly in the Hanoi area, and others were imported. The tiny demand for passenger
vehicles in Vietnam was met through the import of fully assembled Soviet-built sedans. Other
state-run companies manufactured agricultural vehicles, freight trucks, and construction
vehicles, but these companies struggled to compete with imports from the Soviet Union and
China, and more recently with used trucks from Korea. A number of US military vehicles and
civilian passenger cars confiscated in 1975 are in use even today, mostly in the south and
central parts of the country.
In 1991 the Vietnamese automotive industry began to change dramatically. Auto Hoa
Binh formed a joint-venture partnership, called Vietnam Motors Corp. (VMC), with
Colombian Motors (Philippines) and Nichmen Corp. (Japan), two companies with a pre-
existing joint-venture to assemble passenger vehicle kits in the Philippines under license from
various automakers. Today, VMC assembles passenger vehicle kits supplied by Kia (Korea),
Mazda (Japan), BMW (Germany), and Subaru (Japan). In 1992, VMC was joined by Mekong
Corp., another joint-venture—this one backed mostly by financial capital from Korea—to
assemble sport-utility vehicle kits supplied by Mitsubishi (Japan), and a few passenger car kits
supplied by Fiat (Italy). Although the Vietnamese market for motor vehicles was and is very
small, these two assemblers—because they manufactured different vehicle types and had little
other competition—were able to remain fairly profitable (e.g between 1991 and 1996 VMC
earned about $7MUSD in profits).
In 1995 the Vietnamese government, seeking to both decrease consumer prices and
build up the automotive industry, issued three additional licenses for automotive assembly
joint-ventures. By 1996 Mitsubishi (Japan), Daewoo (Korea), and Daimler Benz (Germany)
had opened joint-venture enterprises in HCMC and Hanoi to assemble passenger vehicles,
light utility trucks, and passenger vans. After these plants had been established, the
Vietnamese Government shocked the industry by issuing eight more licenses. By the end of
1997 Isuzu, Hino, Daihatsu, Toyota (all from Japan and the latter three from the Toyota Group
of companies), and Ford (USA) had plants in operation, bringing the total number of vehicle
assembly plants in Vietnam to eleven. By early 1998, in the face of stiff competition and
sagging demand, Nissan (Japan) put the construction of its assembly plant in Da Nang on
2
hold, and Peugeot (France) and Chrysler (USA) had chosen not to act on their license
agreements.
While by any measure this surge of new activity can be seen as a truly remarkable turn
of events, it is less obvious that a viable automotive industry is emerging or that the
Vietnamese economy is gaining any substantial benefit. This report provides an overview of
the Vietnamese industry, probes the motivations behind the recent wave of assembly plant
investments, and offers a critique state policy toward the automotive industry. Where does
Vietnam fit within the global automotive industry? How viable is the automotive industry in
Vietnam and what are the prospects for future development? What steps should the
Vietnamese government take to spur the industry’s continued expansion. The paper is
organized as follows. Section Two provides a brief overview of the current state of the
automotive industry in Vietnam. Section Three provides a typology of that reveals the general
characteristics of the production locations that automakers must choose among. Section Four
discusses the macro-trends that are reshaping the world automotive industry, especially
globalization. Section Five situates the Vietnamese automotive industry within the ASEAN
and world contexts. Section Six discusses Vietnamese government policy toward the
automotive industry. Section Seven offers policy recommendations for building a more
competitive Vietnamese automotive industry.
3
There are a wide range of vehicle models being assembled in Vietnam, including
four small cars, three mid-sized cars, two luxury-sports cars, five 15-20 passenger vans,
4
three four-wheel-drive sport-utility vehicles, six light- to medium-duty utility trucks, and
two medium-duty freight trucks. The models are listed by assembler in Table 2. The only
gaps in Vietnam’s current domestically-assembled product mix are micro cars, large cars,
small vans, and pick-up trucks. Given Vietnam’s poor roads and low consumer incomes, it
is understandable why no automotive company is assembling micro cars or large cars, but
the absence of small van and pick-up truck models is less understandable, particularly
since these are the most popular models in other ASEAN countries, such as Thailand.
However, in can be easily said that Vietnam’s 26 domestically assembled automotive
models provide enough variety to keep competition and consumer choice high.
Company micro small midsize large station luxury small large sport pkup utility freight
car car car car wagon sport van van utility truck truck truck total
Daewoo X X X 3
Daihatsu X 1
Daimler Benz X X X 3
Ford/Mazda X X 2
Hino Motors X 1
Isuzu X X X 3
Mekong X X X X 4
Mitsubishi X X 2
Toyota X X X 3
VMC X X X X 4
total 0 4 3 0 1 2 0 5 3 0 6 2 26
Sources: April 1998 author fieldwork and Vietnam Economic Times, October, 1997.
Although the assembly plants currently employ less than 1,500 Vietnamese workers,
the recent investments can be said to be providing notable benefits to Vietnam.
Automakers are among the leading companies in the world in terms of revenues1 ,
technology, and advanced business practices . One example is work organization. Given
the complexity and labor intensive nature of automobile final assembly (especially trim
and finish), automakers have worked hard to find more efficient ways of using their line
production workers while driving vehicle defects down. Some of the approaches that have
proved successful are organizing workers into teams that are, at least in part, self-
managed; rotating workers between work stations; seeking regular input from workers on
how to improve production processes; and carefully tracking and reducing defects
according to sophisticated quality improvement systems. Field research conducted by the
1 The value of Ford’s vehicle sales in 1995 was $91B, four and one half times greater than Vietnam’s GDP
in the same year.
5
author in Vietnam in April, 1998, suggested that the majority of Vietnamese autoworkers
were being exposed to some advanced work organization and quality control practices.
For the companies where data was collected, Table Two lists the number of
employees in Vietnamese automotive assembly plants, the share of workers organized in
teams, the share of workers who rotate jobs, the average hourly assembly worker wage
(and its US purchasing power equivalent). The share of workers organized in teams is
generally high, although job rotation is much less common. The opportunities for workers
to learn in such leading-edge industrial settings are extremely rare in Vietnam. As foreign
companies increase their presence in Vietnam, having a group of Vietnamese workers and
managers experienced in high performance work practices will be essential, not only to
provide personnel for foreign-owned factories, but as entrepreneurs who start businesses
that conform to world standards of quality and performance.
Vietnamese autoworker wages, while low by ASEAN and world standards, are in
fact very high by Vietnamese standards. Autoworkers are paid, on average, greater than
three times the prevailing industrial wage in Vietnam. In terms of purchasing power,
Vietnamese autoworker wages on average can be said to be equivalent to $17.03USD per
hour (the average would drop to $11.47 without Ford, which has taken the approach of
hiring its future managers first and training them on the production line—the assumption
is that production workers will be hired when volumes increase, perhaps at lower wages).
Still, the benefits mentioned here are, so far, accruing to a very small group of
workers, and the overall impact on the Vietnamese economy remains extremely small.
Moreover, the industry is in very poor condition because of severe overcapacity and the
6
Table Three shows Vietnam’s automotive assembly plant capacity, output, and
utilization in 1998. It is clear that capacity utilization rates in Vietnam are extremely low.
The automakers visited in the field were manufacturing only a few vehicles each day.
Most plant and equipment lay idle, many workers had been laid off or had had their
working hours reduced. As a rule of thumb, it is difficult for an assembly plant to be
profitable when capacity utilization drops very far below 70%. With an average utilization
rate of approximately 11%, and a total country utilization rate of only 8%, assembly plants
in Vietnam can be assumed to be unprofitable at this time.
2 This is about the number of units that a large assembly plant would produce in one month, and the number
that General Motors would produce in North America in a single day.
7
Table 4. Share of Locally Produced Vehicle Value Sourced from Automaker Home
Country, Vietnam, and ASEAN, 1998
One automaker manager in Vietnam said that the cars assembled in Vietnam cost the
parent company twice what they cost in the home country (because of low plant and
equipment utilization rates; assembly costs were said to be five times that of the home
country). Although it is clear that some of this cost is being passed on to Vietnamese
consumers in the form of higher prices (e.g. a Toyota Corolla cost about $26,000 in
Vietnam, but only about $14,000 in the United States), it is also likely that automaker
parent companies are absorbing some of these operating losses.
Given the current state of the automotive industry in Vietnam, the goals of
government policy should be clear: to increase the market for domestically-produced
vehicles and to build up the automotive parts supply-base. While these goals will likely
prove difficult to reach even in the medium-term, it is important that immediate steps be
taken to improve the current situation. Specific policy recommendations are included in
Sections Six and Seven of the report. The following sections will help to situate the
Vietnamese automotive industry in its broader ASEAN and world contexts.
9
The reason that this typology helps us to understand the industry is because there are
different strategic goals behind automakers locating production in each type of market.
New plants in LEMA locations (often referred to as “transplants”) tend to be established
as a way to maintain or increase company market share in large existing markets. Because
of high operating costs, LEMA locations are chosen when automakers are sure of their
market, perhaps because it was previously established through successful exporting.
The principal strategic role of PLEMA locations such as Mexico, Spain, Portugal,
and East Europe are to provide automakers a proximate low-cost environment from which
to supply LEMAs. While such locations do not provide the same political or consumer
payoffs that LEMA locations do, they do provide trade benefits because they share, or are
10
expected to soon share, common markets with LEMA economies (e.g. NAFTA and the
EU).3
3 We have placed the Eastern European countries in the PLEMA category even though they do not yet share
a common market agreement with the EU, and contain assembly plants that are currently focused on
supplying local markets. There is widespread expectation that the EU will be broadened to include some
Eastern European countries in the near- to medium-term. When such a pact is made, we believe that many
of the plants in Eastern Europe will begin to supply Western Europe with finished vehicles.
11
Using the locational typology of LEMA, PLEMA, BEM allows us to see the
component parts of the globalization process more clearly, and to make comparisons
among them. Through the use of this typology foreign direct investment in BEM locations
such as Vietnam can be placed in the broader context of globalization. The typology
allows us to separate BEM locations, such as Vietnam, from PLEMA locations, such as
Mexico. While these two locational types are quite different, as Table 6 reveals, they are
often undifferentiated in discussions of globalization.
Table 7 shows 1991 automotive sector wages for specific countries in the BEM,
LEMA, and PLEMA categories. Even though BEM wages ($109/week) were lower, on
average, than wages in other types of production locations (LEMAs: $552/week), it is
important to note that BEM investments are not seen by automakers as a way to save on
labor costs. As already mentioned, the lack of nearby supply and the costs of parts
consolidation and shipping for CKD assembly far outweigh labor cost savings. PLEMA
locations ($181/week), on the other hand, do offer automakers significant cost savings
because they can rely on local and nearby LEMA supply bases for integrated
manufacturing in low cost locations, shipping finished vehicles short distances into LEMA
locations, all within low- or non-tariff trade blocs.
12
Big Emerging Markets 1991 Large Existing Market 1991 weekly Peripheral to LEMAs 1991 weekly
(BEMs) weekly Areas (LEMAs) wage (USD) (PLEMAs) wage (USD)
wage (USD)
Indonesia 20.50 S. Korea 273.00 Poland*** 51.90
India 34.80 Italy 471.90 Hungary*** 75.00
Vietnam* 41.82 Australia 480.00 Mexico* 166.57
Philippines 43.50 Finland** 512.20 Portugal 178.10
Colombia*** 53.80 Sweden 522.30 Spain 433.60
Thailand 76.40 United Kingdom 522.50
Malaysia 78.20 New Zealand** 564.40
Venezuela 96.30 Netherlands 564.70
Turkey 195.70 Canada 646.70
Argentina** 384.60 United States 682.10
France** 683.30
ASEAN Average 54.65 Germany 712.70
BEM AVERAGE 109.31 LEMA AVERAGE 552.98 PLEMA AVERAGE 181.03
* 1998 figures from author fieldwork. ** Transport Sector, 1991; *** Transport Sector, 1993; Source: OECD.
13
Globalization is only one of several strong trends driving change and adaptation in
the automotive industry. First, automakers are trying to improve their organizations,
particularly their manufacturing operations, by implementing the tenets of lean production
(Womack, et. al., 1990). Lean production includes lower inventories, just-in-time parts
deliveries, high performance work organization (teamwork, job rotation, etc.), and
continuous improvement programs for quality and productivity. Following the path of
continuous improvement requires a great deal of attention and monitoring. Second, the
proliferation of automotive traffic in developed countries has created a host of serious
environmental quality problems (e.g. air pollution, congestion, waste recycling). With
issue of the environmental impact of motorization looming over the industry, automakers
see an imperative to develop vehicles with low- or zero-emissions. Lastly, markets appear
to be further fragmenting, putting additional pressure on automaker’s design, distribution,
and marketing capacities. All of these forces, globalization, lean production,
environmental concerns, and market fragmentation are increasing development, process,
logistics, and market complexity in the industry. The following sections will focus on the
issue of globalization, one of the primary forces of change in the industry, and one that is
most relevant for BEM locations such as Vietnam.
New “offshore” vehicle assembly plant investments outside of home markets are
being driven by slow growth and market saturation in the industry. After growing steadily
during the mid-1980s, world-wide annual sales of new passenger cars were stagnant from
1989 to 1995. According to Wards, worldwide annual sales of passenger cars grew at an
average annual rate of nearly 3.7% from 1983 to 1989, and then turned negative with an
average annual rate of -.4% from 1990 to 1995 (see Table 9). Growth is slow in LEMAs
because market penetration is very high. As a general rule, we can say that a market with
fewer than three people per car is saturated (see Table 10).
Besides slow growth, automaker’s home markets have become much more
competitive. There has been an increase in the number of firms selling cars in mature
markets such as the United States, Germany, and Japan. Figure 1 presents an analysis of
passenger vehicle sales in the United States, Japan, and Germany according the Herfindahl
Index of Market Diversity. The index would be zero if market share was evenly
distributed among automakers. The index would be one if a single company had 100% of
15
national market share (monopoly industry structure). Thus, the lower the index the more
diverse the market. Figure 1 shows an across-the-board decrease in market concentration
in the United States, Japan, and Germany, revealing the heightened competitive pressure
that automakers have been experiencing in their home markets. Germany, as with most
European countries, has long had a diverse automotive market due to the interpenetration
of Europe’s car markets by European automakers as well as the active presence of
American firms. However, strong sales by Japanese automakers have brought the index
down further since the late 1980s. In the United States, inroads by Japanese automakers
increased the competitive pressure dramatically in the early 1980s. In Japan, increased
market diversity has come almost entirely from the success of smaller Japanese
automakers, and the declining dominance of Toyota and Nissan as they “hollow out”
domestic production by substituting exports with local production in Europe, North
America, and ASEAN.
Figure 1. Passenger Vehicle Sales in the USA, Japan, and Germany: Market
Concentration According the Herfindahl Index (1=monopoly)
0.28
0.26
0.24
0.22
0.20 USA
Japan
0.18 Germany
0.16
0.14
0.12
0.10
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Note: the data was not adjusted for new entrants or industry consolidation. Source: calculated from Wards
Decade of Data.
Slow growth, market saturation, and increased competition at home have lead
automakers to the obvious conclusion that future growth will occur in BEMs, particularly
in countries with the largest populations, such as China, Brazil, and India. Table 10
16
presents an international reverse ranking of market penetration, measured as people per car
in each country. The United States, Australia, and countries in Northwest Europe all had
more than one car on the road for every three people in 1993 (representing a saturated
market), while Vietnam, China, Pakistan, the Philippines, and India each had fewer than
one car on the road for every 100 people. Vietnam tops the list with 950 people for every
car in operation. It is this statistic, more than any other, that explains the recent wave in
vehicle assembly plant investments in Vietnam.
Table 10. Market Penetration by Reverse Ranking: People per Car by Country
The data presented in Table 11 is drawn from the International Motor Vehicle
Program’s Global Assembly Plant Database (based on data from Automotive Industries
and other sources), which contains general information on 521 assembly plants, a very
high percentage of the world’s total. Efforts to collect data on the plants is ongoing. At
the time of this writing inception dates have been collected for 37% of the plants in the
database. Since more inception dates have been collected for newer plants, these data are
more complete in the recent time periods (1980s and 1990s). The data on capacity has
been collected for 79% of the plants in the database, but only 62% of the plants for which
inception dates have been collected.
Table 11. New Passenger Vehicle Assembly Plants by Type of Investment Location:
Home Country of Investing Automaker and Average 1996 Capacity, 1980-1998.
(draft version: inception dates collected for 193 (37%) of 521 plants)
Since the recent and planned assembly plant investments are being made in an
environment of declining capacity utilization, it likely that the industry will move into a
period of severe overcapacity in the near future. In a report by AUTOFACTS, the
automotive planning group of Coopers & Lybrand Consulting, it is estimated that excess
capacity will reach 21 million units by 1998, more than one and one half times the total
1996 passenger vehicle output of North America. By most estimates capacity utilization
today is about 75%, which is a relatively low point at which to see a boom in new
investment (in a “rational” environment one would predict that new investment would be
made when capacity utilization is high).
The sheer volume of recent and planned investment, and the willingness that we
found in recent headquarters interviews for automakers to endure negative returns on new
BEM investments, at least in the short-term, give the current capacity expansion all the
earmarks of a classic speculative over-extension, where supply far outpaces demand as
large groups of investors try to gain an early-mover advantage at the same time. In recent
headquarters interviews we found a corporate imperative to quickly establish “beach
19
heads” in emerging markets at nearly any cost. Such imperatives are only sharpened when
competitors make similar moves. What should decrease the attractiveness of a new
market, increased competition, is instead spurring automakers to redouble their efforts.
Such is the irony of speculative bubbles, when a “herd mentality” rules investment
decisions (see Section 4.4 for an extended discussion). If the threat of severe overcapacity
is real then, the relevant question becomes: what are automakers doing to reduce their
exposure to this risk? Since forgoing investments in BEMs is not seen as a viable option
by most automakers, what other measures that are being taken? The following section
provides some answers to this question.
Automakers are employing a variety of measures that may have the effect of
reducing the risk of over-investment. While some of these measures are explicitly
intended to hedge against excess capacity, others are being pursued for different reasons
but may have the complementary effect of reducing investment risk as well. In the former
category are the practices of developing common “global” platforms, deploying common
processes, and testing new markets with small but expandable plant designs. In the latter
category are the practices of centralizing control and development functions in core
locations, simplifying the final assembly process through modularization, and increasing
outsourcing to larger, more global suppliers. Taken together, these measures have the goal
of simplifying the process of developing, manufacturing, and selling automobiles.
While the many of the strategies discussed in this section may have the effect of
reducing the risk of over-investment, other trends in the industry are having the effect of
increasing such risks. For example, rising productivity from both lean production and
increased throughput from modularization can increase the effective capacity of new and
existing plants, exacerbating problems with excess capacity.
All the automakers we interviewed are, to some extent, creating global platforms to
improve internal (proprietary) product and process standardization. Cars based on global
platforms will then be tailored to fit local market conditions. Some automakers are
attempting to take the further step of standardizing production fixtures across all similar-
sized passenger vehicle platforms and models. The aim is to make assembly plants less
model-specific. The more “generic” manufacturing capacity is, the less vulnerable it is to
overcapacity problems. With enough standardization better selling models could be
substituted on the production lines of underutilized plants on short notice. Standardization
among manufacturing operations would also make the transfer of learning across a widely
dispersed organization more likely.
supply-base remains largely separate for now, although large American suppliers such as
Delphi, TRW, and Lear have moved aggressively to set up Asian manufacturing
operations.
Tier 1 suppliers are also embarking on a wave of new plant construction in emerging
markets, and, because they serve a variety of automakers, the largest and most global have
facilities located in more places than any one of their customers. Highly capable suppliers
with global operations reduce the size of the investments that their customers need to
make to manufacture in new markets. We call such suppliers “turnkey suppliers” because
they provide a wide range of services that allow automakers to take a “hands-off”
approach in the relationship. Besides design, turnkey suppliers purchase the parts needed
for the modules they assemble. In the context of a plant in a BEM location, where the
supply-base is likely to be poorly developed, turnkey suppliers take on a significant
amount of the responsibility for meeting local content goals, including the often difficult
tasks of finding and developing Tier 2 and Tier 3 suppliers, and managing the logistics for
the parts it must import.
Table A2 in the appendix provides a list of cities in the International Motor Vehicle
Program’s Global Assembly Plant Database where three or more assembly plants owned
by different automakers are located. The entire list, except for the PLEMA location of
Setubal, Portugal, consists of BEM locations, and the average plant output is very small
(25.5K units in 1995). The implication is that the new, smaller plants in BEMs are more
interdependent, and share the supply-base in their immediate surroundings to a degree
unheard of in LEMA locations. For example, not only do Chrysler, Ford, General Motors,
and Honda have plants in Valencia, Venezuela, but the suppliers Arvin, Bridgestone,
Bundy, Gates, Goodyear, and PPG have facilities there as well. Such “piggy-backing” of
new plants on existing production locations may well create strong agglomerative effects
in BEMs that will continue to attract new investment, allowing us to predict where the
future centers of automobile production will be.
Automakers are trying to simplify the final assembly process by increasing the
number and complexity of module sub-assemblies manufactured off the final assembly
line. With less complexity, line speed can be increased and the number of worker-hours
spent assembling each vehicle can be reduced. On a per-unit-capacity basis,
modularization allows final assembly lines to become smaller, simpler, and less expensive,
reducing the investments needed to enter new markets. When combined with the concepts
of common platforms and common production fixtures discussed above, the idea of
22
modularization and line simplification becomes part of a powerful global vision, where
different car models can be assembled in any plant in any location because the required
production equipment is the same. While modular final assembly can well be pursued as
an in-house production strategy, at most automakers the move to modules has been
intimately connected to increased outsourcing.
Other approaches to investment risk reduction and market testing are complete-
knock-down (CKD) kit assembly plants, with kits coming from “consolidation centers”
that draw on existing plants and suppliers; consignment-style contract- and license-
manufacturing, where kits are assembled by third party contract and license assemblers
(e.g. the Astra Group in Indonesia and Steyr in Austria); and jointly operated plants, where
capacity is shared among two or more automakers (e.g. Fiat and Peugeot in Argentina and
Ecuador). New CKD plants and consignment-style contract manufacturing arrangements,
because they draw on existing facilities, can actually alleviate overcapacity problems at
home.
The lowest risk approach to entering new markets is to test them by importing
finished vehicles, but besides increasing prices dramatically, this approach is too slow
when competing with firms that are making investments to “build-where-they-sell.”.
Some automakers are trying to reduce their investment risk in new markets by building
plants that can manufacture a range of products (to test market acceptance of various
models before increasing model-specific investments), and that can be scaled up from low-
to high-volume production in the face of increasing demand. This means that initial
investments are for smaller, simpler plants (see Table 11, bottom row). Labor intensity,
and therefore capital investment requirements, can initially be very low (in BEMs, low
labor costs make this an even more attractive approach); dependence on suppliers and
existing plants for module subassembly and module kits can be initially high; and capital-
intensive processes (e.g. stamping, body welding, and body painting) can initially be done
at existing plants and components shipped to new ones.
Globalization Best
Practices?
- Recognize unique market requirements
- Develop vehicles that can be tailored to various markets
- Manufacture locally
- Build smaller plants that are flexible and expandable
- Hire very selectively and build workforce loyalty
- Attract existing suppliers to new plant locations
- Transfer what is learned in one place to others
- Move personnel from location to location
The notion that emerging markets, particularly in Asia, were to be the locus of rapid
economic growth in the medium term has been widespread, driving a huge wave of new
investment into Asia. It is now well known that this boom ended abruptly in the summer
of 1997, when many of the ASEAN economies, overheated by the rapid influx of foreign
24
capital without sound investments, began to implode. It is likely that the FDI figures for
1998 and 1999 will be much lower than what was estimated by United Nations for 1996;
they will likely have fallen back to 1991 levels or below. This kind of boom-bust cycle,
lasting about eight years, and dropping suddenly from its peak, has all the earmarks of a
gigantic region-wide speculative cycle of over-investment, where distant investors under
sway of the herd mentality keep pouring money into a region where opportunities for
profitable ventures have long been taken up by others who invested early on. It is also
likely that China’s crisis has been smaller, even in the face of massive FDI inflows,
because its economy is large and dynamic enough to more adequately utilize the incoming
capital.4
Figure 2. FDI Inward Flows to China, ASEAN, and Other Asian Host Economies,
1987-1996, ($M)
45,000
40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
PRC
20,000 ASEAN
Other Asia
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
'87 '88 '89 '90 '91 '92 '93 '94 '95 '96E
The lesson of the Asian economic crisis is that FDI alone is not enough to drive
economic development. To gain significant economic benefits from FDI for
manufacturing, host country economies must be dynamic enough to utilize investments in
4 Not all over-investment comes in the form of inward FDI. While over-investment does hurt host
economies when assets are radically devalued during the bust cycle, financial damage is also dome to
outward investors (and sometime their home economies). Unprudent doemstic investment too can create a
boom-bust cycle. For example, over-investment in Korea (both in the form of domestic investment and
outward FDI) has come largely from domestic financial institutions and industrial groups (FDI in Korea has
been very small). Still, the financial crisis in Korea has been very severe.
25
a way that they become profitable in the short term. The host economy must rise to meet
the new investments with a healthy, literate workforce and a set of “proto-suppliers”
willing to learn from their new customers. Of course, because it is relatively fixed, a
portion of the devalued capital investments stays in place after the boom where it can act
as low cost “fuel” for the next round of growth (Harvey, 1985). However, some of the
most important benefits of capital investments, especially in the manufacturing sector, are
the “soft” activities associated with them: advanced management and work organization
practices, technology development and transfer, employee training, linkages with distant
economic entities, etc. The economic benefits associated with these activities are lost to
the host country when foreign partners withdraw from the scene. By itself, devalued plant
and equipment for the assembly of automobiles would do the Vietnamese economy little
good if foreign firms were to withdraw from their Vietnamese partnerships.
26
Table 13 shows that the Vietnamese operations of the foreign automakers account
for an extremely small percentage of total firm production capacity. Vietnamese
production volumes typically account for less than one percent of total firm output. For
example, except for its luxury and sport car factories in England (Jaguar and Aston
Martin), Ford’s plant west of Hanoi is the company’s smallest capacity plant (then next
smallest is its van plant in Asambuja, Portugal, that was operating at 36% of its 25,000
unit capacity in 1995). It is clear that most automakers have invested in Vietnam as part
of a long-run strategy to participate in the growth of BEM and “transition” economies.
Table 13. Vietnamese Motor Vehicle Production and Capacity Compared to World
Production and Capacity.
managers as rapidly as possible. Lessons from mistakes made in the past, such as
ignorance of local market conditions, trends, and tastes, are being kept in mind during the
product development process. Common “global platforms” can be used with a wide
variety of vehicle models, and model characteristics can be modified, or “localized,” to fit
the requirements of specific markets.
Until the recent economic crisis in Asia, the ASEAN automobile industry was
considered to be one of the most dynamic in the world. After a slight slump in 1991, sales
and production grew strongly from 1992 until the crisis began in the summer of 1997.
Estimates were generated at automakers and consulting firms that ASEAN automotive
sales in ASEAN would soar to several billion units each year by the year 2000. For its
part, the Vietnamese government estimated the local market to reach 180,000 units by the
turn of the century. (Vietnam Economic Times, October 1997). Investments by American
28
automakers and first tier suppliers flooded in as these firms tried to gain a foothold against
the market dominance of Japanese automakers and suppliers, who had been investing in
ASEAN production capacity since the early 1970s, and especially since 1985 (when the
valuation of the yen caused exports from Japan to become extremely expensive), and held
about 90% market share. Along with other big emerging Asian markets, such as China
and India, automotive sector investment activity was booming in ASEAN, culminating in
Thailand’s highly publicized victory over the Philippines for a new General Motors
assembly plant (GM has since put plans for this 150,000 unit annual capacity plant on
hold).
Still, most of what ASEAN had to offer automakers was the promise of future
profits. As of 1995, the most recent year for which estimates are available, vehicle
production in ASEAN accounted for only 4.2% of world production (see Table 15). As
the economic crisis has only deepened over the past year, much of this promise has
evaporated. ASEAN automobile sales have plummeted, coming to a near standstill in the
hardest hit countries, such as Indonesia. Many plants have been temporarily idled and
workers have been laid off. In July, 1998, Mazda (Japan) permanently closed one of three
assembly plants in Thailand. Some Japanese firms have tried to utilize at least part of their
ASEAN production capacity by exporting vehicles to Japan, but poor economic conditions
there suggest that this approach will not provide much relief.
Table 15. ASEAN Motor Vehicle Production and Capacity Compared to World
Production and Capacity.
What the Asian economic crisis means for the Vietnamese automotive industry
remains to be seen, but it is safe to say that, given the radically altered regional investment
climate, the next steps that Vietnamese policy-makers need to take—maintaining the
presence of the strongest automakers and attracting first-tier suppliers—will be much more
difficult to accomplish than the initial efforts to attract automakers have been.
29
Vietnam should take an active role in ASEAN efforts to pool resources and enhance
the region’s competitiveness. While a nationalistic tendency to create “complete”
industries in Vietnam is understandable given the nation’s hard-won struggle for
30
independence, and may have fit well with the geopolitics of earlier times, it will only be
through international integration and cooperation that economic development will progress
rapidly in Vietnam, especially given the lack of modern industrial techniques currently in
use (see Section 7 for related policy recommendations).
31
In 1986 the Vietnamese state began—with its “doi moi” program of economic
renovation—to experiment with policies intended to begin the process of deregulating and
opening domestic markets to international competition. Liberalization measures have
included curbing price controls and state subsidies, officially allowing private businesses
to operate, liberalizing trade flows, and reducing foreign exchange controls. This process
of opening the economy to the outside was accelerated in 1988 when the government
began to actively seek FDI. FDI inflows remained very small until 1993, however, when
the United States dropped its objections to loans to Vietnam for infrastructure projects
from multilateral lending agencies (e.g. the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank). When the United States officially dropped its economic embargo against Vietnam
in February, 1994, FDI from American companies began to flow in. Vietnam’s share of
FDI inflows to Asia remains small, mainly because of poor infrastructure, relatively
unattractive government policies and practices, and a state that is regarded as having a
lingering wariness of free markets and private business (Mason, 1998).
Figure 3. Share of FDI Inward Flows, 1987-1996, Selected Asian Host Economies
100%
90%
80%
70% Taiwan
Vietnam
60% Thailand
Hong Kong
India
50%
ROK
Malaysia
40% Indonesia
Singapore
30% PRC
20%
10%
0%
'87 '88 '89 '90 '91 92 93 94 95 96E
Source: UN Conference on Trade and Development; Division on Transnational Corporations and Development;
World Investment Report, Annex Table 1: FDI inflows, various years, New York and Geneva
32
Local partners have only contributed land, and sometimes buildings, to JVs with
automakers. If the automotive industry is to grow, successful automakers will be required
to invest in additional plant and equipment. Most automotive joint ventures already have
more than enough land for expansion, so the question becomes: but what will local
partners contribute in future rounds of investment? Is the local partner’s share in the JV to
drop when foreign partners increase their investment? If so, what will be the fate of the
joint venture over the long term?
The localization policy for the automotive industry is less aggressive than in other
ASEAN countries, such as Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. For final assembly of
vehicles, current policy in Vietnam calls for 5% local content by the fifth year of operation
and 30% local content by the tenth year of operation. (The rules for motorbike
localization are more aggressive, calling for 5%-10% local content by the second year of
operation and 60% by the sixth year.) By contrast, the localization policy in Thailand calls
for 60% local content by the fifth year. While the intent of the current localization policy,
like the FDI policy, is to encourage the establishment of the automotive supply-base in
Vietnam, policy-makers at the Ministry of Planning and Investment recognize that
33
localization policies are far too general. First, current policy fails to specify what kind of
parts and accessories should be localized before others; the local content ratios remain
very generally stated. Second, no attempt is currently being made to coordinate
investments in parts and accessories with those already made for vehicle assembly. Third,
little progress has been made to design localization policies to fit the regional perspective
that most automotive parts suppliers view their operations in ASEAN.
Table 16. Tariff and Tax Rates in Vietnam for Various Levels of Automotive
Integration
The current mix of import tariffs and consumption taxes does raise the sale price of
imported vehicles relative to domestically produced vehicles (compare Table 16 with
Table 17 below). On average, imported vehicles sell for 289% of USA sale prices, while
domestically produced vehicles sell for 163% of USA prices. As Table 18 suggests,
Vietnamese prices for imported used cars sell for the same premium as imported new cars.
These data suggest that—without the new consumption tax—locally produced vehicles
have a significant advantage in the market over imported vehicles, making an import ban
34
unnecessary (on the other hand illegally imported used vehicles can significantly undercut
prices). The larger problem that these data point to is the stunting of the local market by
the high prices of motor vehicles in Vietnam in general. As already mentioned, the key to
reducing vehicle prices in Vietnam, and thus increasing the market, is to foster the
development of a local supply-base.
Table 16. 1997-1998 New Imported Vehicle Prices, Vietnam and the United States
(US dollars)
Table 17. 1997-1998 New Locally Produced Vehicle Prices, Vietnam and the United
States (US dollars)
Table 18. 1997-1998 Price for Used Toyota Camry Imported to Vietnam Compared
with USA Prices (US dollars)
In order for rapid economic development to take place in Vietnam, the Vietnamese
state must take the difficult step of quickly and aggressively embracing international
industrial cooperation and investment. There is simply no other way to upgrade
Vietnam’s production base to world standards in terms of price, quality, and delivery. The
managerial and technical know-how required exists in companies based in countries
outside of Vietnam. If the Vietnamese economy is to improve, the lessons learned on the
outside must quickly be absorbed. One of the most important of these lessons has been the
importance of low prices, high quality, timely delivery, and attentive service. Advanced
production, logistics, and transportation technologies are deployed specifically to achieve
such goals. Today, leading manufacturing companies have global operations, set low
worldwide prices, measure defects in parts-per-million, guarantee worldwide delivery in a
matter of days, and stand behind their products for years. Another important lesson is that
global economic structures are growing in importance relative to national economic
structures. International finance, trade, and investment flows are growing far faster than
national economies, indicating that the world is becoming more economically
interconnected over time.
There are good examples of industrial upgrading strategies that use borrowed
technology to create a upgrade a protected domestic industry that sells locally at first and
then grows through export. Such an “export-led” development strategy was successfully
pursued by Japan, Korea, and to a lesser extent, by Taiwan. The level of inward FDI in
these countries has been extremely low, which is extraordinary given their large size and
the high volumes of outward FDI. However, countries that have grown more recently,
such as Singapore, China, and Thailand have pursued industrial upgrading strategies based
36
largely on attracting FDI (in this case exports are driven by foreign investors, a fact that
mitigates the political risk associated with exporting).
So, such “network-led” strategies have also been successful. Which path should
Vietnam take, export- or network-led development? Compared to export-led strategies,
network-led development carries a greater risk of speculative over-extension (as pointed
out in Section 4.4). On the other hand, it is likely that network-led strategies can result in
more rapid development than export-led development. A network-led strategy makes
particular sense in a world economy that is increasingly interconnected and hostile toward
the protection of local markets. Looking to past successes for models for current action,
while a rational course of action, does not always result in the best policy given
contemporary circumstances. Current intelligence on industry and market should be
gathered. Two very different countries which have faired the Asian economic crisis quite
well are Singapore and China. Perhaps it is to the policies driving the growth of these
countries, rather than to hose of Japan or Korea, that Vietnamese policy-makers should
turn for models of economic development (on the other hand, it is important to note that
despite the similarities between China and Vietnam, China’s vastly larger potential market
provides a uniquely powerful magnet for FDI).
Similarly, ASEAN and WTO will certainly react negatively to unclear and unstable
policies regarding tariff and non-tariff barriers.
If the automotive industry is to develop, the basis for all aspects of “motorization”
must be vastly improved. Roads, bridges, highways, petrol distribution, vehicle sales and
service, local government apparatus to regulate the use of vehicles (e.g. traffic police,
vehicle registration), and driver training programs must all be in place to support the use
37
of motor vehicles in Vietnam and thus the growth of the domestic automotive industry.
Today, such infrastructure is poorly developed and what does exist does not function very
well. A motorization policy for Vietnam will need to include a broad array of programs,
laws, government agencies, and commercial enterprises, and overall coordination of the
policy must be undertaken at the top levels of government. The specific recommendations
in this section address some of the most pressing issues, but fall far short of a
comprehensive motorization policy.
Even with one of the lowest market penetration ratios in the world in terms of people
per car (950, see Table 10), Vietnam’s road, street, and highway infrastructure is in such
poor condition that it is already reaching the limits of its carrying capacity. Traffic flow
problems are already acute in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, and the roads and highways
connecting the country’s larger cities. The problems stem from a lack of adequate
roadways, traffic control technology, and driver training. Vietnam’s infrastructure
suffered from lack of investment during wartime and under the US embargo, which
blocked multi-lateral funding for large projects. Infrastructure problems, along with low
incomes, help to explain the popularity of motorbikes in Vietnam, because motorbikes
require less in the way of roadways, traffic control, and driver training.
The design of such infrastructure is of great importance for Vietnam. Not only does
such infrastructure structure the location of future economic activity, but the choices made
at the outset can set the urban character of the country (the urban and suburban sprawl of
Los Angeles is due in large part to the dominance of passenger vehicles as a transport
mode). Although motor vehicles are by far the most popular modern mode of personal
transportation—mainly because people want the flexibility that passenger cars provide at
the destination-end of their trips, well designed mass transit systems, such as busses and
trains, have been used very successfully in many places. It is not too early for Vietnam to
consider and plan for alternatives to automobiles. The most successful urban transit
systems are mixed-mode systems that creatively blend mass transit systems with private
38
motor vehicles, bicycle paths, and pedestrian walkways. Copenhagen provides a good
example.
Internet shopping is an even more recent trend in automotive distribution. Web sites
run by mega-dealers, automakers, or specialized brokers can be created to take customer
orders on-line and transfer them to the local factory, where the vehicles is “made to order”
to the exact specification desired by the customer (e.g. vehicle color and options). Most
consumers still want to initially drive a vehicle similar to the one they will own, so
Internet shopping cannot wholly take the place of dealerships where customers can take
test drives, but computer-based shopping can be an informative first—or last—step for
consumers.
Very little infrastructure currently exists in Vietnam for after-sales service, such as
repair shops and wholesale and retail parts outlets. All automakers currently active in
Vietnam, to some degree, are trying to address this problem by establishing service centers
in Vietnam’s major metropoles and stocking replacement parts at their factories. For
example, Toyota has established nine “authorized service centers” in Vietnam, some as
locally-owned franchises that use Toyota-trained technicians and Toyota-recommended
equipment, some that are wholly-owned by Toyota, and some that are at dealerships. It
would be far more efficient if these functions were taken over by third-party companies
that could repair and sell parts for a several automaker’s brands. In other countries, such
third party “international auto repair shops” and “international parts outlets” are quite
common, although exclusive brand dealerships usually do have on-site repair facilities and
parts sales as well. To improve the infrastructure for repair, shops with the capability
service a range of vehicle brands should be encouraged, perhaps differentiated by type of
vehicle, such as commercial and passenger.
39
It is possible, perhaps even likely given the Asian economic crisis, that some
automakers currently operating in Vietnam will withdraw. All automakers and licence
manufacturers in Vietnam are committed to staying in Vietnam for the long term.
However, lack of profitability in Vietnam leaves the existing plants extremely vulnerable
to divestment, especially during a crisis, which can trigger leadership and ownership
changes that can quickly change a company’s plans. The recent announcement that
Daimler-Benz intends to acquire Chrysler is evidence that mergers and acquisitions can
take place among even the largest firms. In many ways, it would be better if some
automakers did withdraw from Vietnam. Competition to improve consumer prices and
choice can always be made by allowing imports of CBUs. Fewer automakers would mean
better utilization of plant and equipment and more efficient economies of scale for the
remaining firms. It is likely that the Vietnamese government will need to make no efforts
to reduce the number of automakers active in the country. Some attrition will likely occur.
The far greater danger is that too many automakers will withdraw, reducing the attractive
force for FDI from first tier suppliers.
It is imperative that steps be taken—by the automakers and the Vietnamese state—to
increase the market for domestically manufactured vehicles and to increase local parts
supply. It seems that the need to develop the supply-base is well understood by
Vietnamese policy-makers. However, the current efforts appear to lack specific plans to
tackle the problem. Because of the small size of the Vietnamese market, only those
suppliers that require labor-intensive assembly and can export to other locations have an
immediate incentive to locate plants in Vietnam.
Unfortunately, there are few automotive components that still have a high labor
content. Wire harnesses are the premier remaining labor intensive automotive component.
Because they do not need to be sequenced with vehicle production, wire harness assembly
is usually consolidated in low labor cost locations such as Mexico and the Philippines. In
fact, two of the three foreign suppliers active in Vietnam, Yakazi (Japan), and Sumitomo
(Japan), are engaged in the assembly of wire harnesses for the local and export markets
(the third foreign supplier, Takata (Japan), is assembling utility truck seats for the local
market). Although wire harnesses are a “natural” specialty for Vietnam, competition in
ASEAN is fierce for such facilities from countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and
even Myanmar. Seats, which still do have a relatively high labor content, sometimes need
to be assembled close to final assembly plants in order to match the sequence of seat
40
colors with the vehicle body colors in production (this need is less for commercial
vehicles).
One local content rules are and trade policies are set to provide the maximum
incentive for firms to locate production in Vietnam, a two track strategy should be pursued
to build the supply-base as follows:
Within five to seven years, the ASEAN Free Trade Association (AFTA), of which
Vietnam is a participant, will begin the transition to 0% tariffs for inter-ASEAN trade.
This should signal a two-track policy response from Vietnam. First, local content rules
aimed at building the supply-base should become more aggressive during the pre-AFT A
period. The opportunity to use localization rules to build the industry is short-lived, and
Vietnam should take maximum advantage of that opportunity. At the same time, the
complementarity schemes that will underlie AFTA, such as AICO, should be a central
preoccupation for Vietnamese policy-makers. Vietnam should actively participate in
AICO and AFTA negotiations in preparation for the less restrictive trade regime that is
coming. Vietnam should decide on several specializations with the ASEAN automotive
component supply-base and aggressively pursue capabilities and FDI in those areas.
Automotive electronics (which could overlap with other electronics sectors), seats, wire
harnesses, batteries, and fuel tanks are all reasonable candidates for specialization.
41
8. CONCLUDING SUMMARY
The central recommendations of this report are for the government, in cooperation
with the automakers, to invest in infrastructure and other programs to facilitate
motorization, seek investment from foreign first tier suppliers, and assist in the creation of
the local second-tier supply-base. Specific first tier suppliers should be actively recruited
and offered generous incentives to locate production in Vietnam. These firms should be
chosen in cooperation with existing automakers, who should be encouraged to share local
suppliers to the extent possible to increase supplier scale economies. Promising local
firms should be encouraged to become second tier and material suppliers to the new first
tier suppliers who come in. Requirements for foreign investors to have local partners
should be dropped, and those foreign firm in existing joint ventures should be provided
with an exit strategy. In the short window available before AFTA implementation, trade
barriers for CBU’s should be set as high as possible given current agreements, and
localization requirements should be increased. At the same time, import tariffs and
consumption taxes on locally manufactured vehicles should be dropped as near to zero as
possible. Finally, Vietnam should aggressively pursue regional cooperation schemes, such
as AICO, to lay the groundwork for AFTA implementation.
42
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Mason, Mark 1988. "Foreign Direct Investment in Vietnam: Government Policies and
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Kuznets, S. 1966. Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and Spread. New Haven:
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APPENDIX