15 - Commissioner of Custom v. Court of Appeals
15 - Commissioner of Custom v. Court of Appeals
15 - Commissioner of Custom v. Court of Appeals
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Hector C . Fule and
Solicitor Santiago M. Kapunan for petitioner.
Syquia & Aguilan for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
20. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPER RELIEF FROM INTERLOCUTORY ORDER. — A petition for
certiorari is the proper procedure for obtaining a relief from, or review of, an
interlocutory order.
21. ID.; RULES OF COURT; LIBERAL INTERPRETATION; PETITION NOT
DEFECTIVE EVEN IF COPIES OF SUBJECT ORDERS NOT CERTIFIED. — The contention
that the instant petition for certiorari is defective in that the copies of the orders
subject thereof were not certi ed, has no merit. The Rules of Court should be liberally
construed, for they are intended to secure a method by which the issues may be
properly laid before the court. When these issues are already clear before the court the
deficiency in the observance of the rules should not be given undue importance.
DECISION
ZALDIVAR , J : p
Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, to annul and set aside two
resolutions of respondent Court of Tax Appeals in CTA Case No. 2206, the rst dated
March 24, 1911, ordering petitioner Commissioner of Customs to release under bond
to respondent Eusebio Dichoco the shipment of 438 packages of foodstuffs; and the
second, dated April 19, 1971, denying the motion of petitioner for reconsideration of
the order of March 24, 1971 and giving him three days within which to comply with said
order.
A shipment of 438 packages of foodstuffs, declared in the name of respondent
Eusebio Dichoco, hereinafter referred to as private respondent, under Entry No. 109924
(70) arrived on December 16, 1970 at the Port of Manila on board the S/S "St. Isidro".
The shipment was covered by a "Customs No-Dollar Declaration", dated December 15,
1970. Against this shipment the Collector of Customs of Manila issued, on December
28, 1970, in S. I. Case No. 12055, a warrant of seizure and detention for violation of
Section 2530 (f) of the Tariff and Customs Code, in relation to Central Bank Circulars
Nos. 247, 289, 294, and 295 and section 102 (k) of the said Code. On the same date,
private respondent requested the release of the shipment upon the posting of a cash
bond, which request, although favorably recommended by the Collector of Customs,
was denied by the Commissioner of Customs. However, the proper taxes and duties
amounting to P25,998.00 were imposed on the shipment and paid by private
respondent. After hearing, the Collector of Customs issued his decision, on January 19,
1971, decreeing the seizure and forfeiture of the shipment "for the simple reason that
claimants failed to comply with the regulations, that is, with the Central Bank circulars
requiring the production of release certi cates for importations similar to the subject
articles." On appeal, the Commissioner of Customs a rmed the decision on January
21, 1971.
On January 27, 1971 private respondent led before respondent court a "petition
for review, with a motion for release of goods under bond", upon the grounds that the
decision appealed from was not supported by substantial evidence and that the goods
seized did not constitute prohibited importation as contemplated in Sections 2530 (f)
and 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code. In his answer led before respondent
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court, the Commissioner of Customs alleged that "the goods having been imported
without the release certi cate required by the Central Bank", are "subject to forfeiture"
and the goods being of "prohibited importation," may not be released under bond
pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 2301 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
The respondent Court, in its resolution of February 3, 1971, granted the motion to
release the goods subject to the condition that a cash bond in the sum of P43,854.59
be led by private respondent with the Bureau of Customs. The bond having been led,
respondent Court issued an order, dated February 9, 1971, directing petitioner to
release the shipment. Petitioner led on March 2, 1971 a motion for reconsideration
upon the ground that the importation in question, classi ed as non-essential consumer
goods, is banned by Central Bank Circulars No. 289, dated February 21, 1970, No. 294
of March 10, 1970, and No. 295 of March 20, 1970, and "acquired the status of
prohibited importation or importation contrary to law" and can not be released under
bond. Private respondent led his opposition dated March 4, 1971. Respondent court
in its resolution dated March 8, 1971, granted the motion for reconsideration, declaring
that "Section 2301 of the Tariff and Customs Code provides that articles the
importation of which is prohibited by law can not be released under bond" and set aside
its resolutions of February 3 and February 9, 1971. Private respondent led a motion
for reconsideration of respondent court's resolution of March 8, 1971, and said court, in
its resolution of March 24, 1971, reversed its resolution of March 8, 1971 and
reinstated the resolution of February 3, 1971, ordering the immediate release of the
foodstuffs.
Upon motion of private respondent dated April 6, 1971, respondent court issued
an order, dated April 12, 1971, requiring petitioner to appear on April 16, 1971 and
show cause why he should not be declared in contempt of Court for non-compliance
with the resolution of March 24, 1971. Petitioner led on April 16, 1971 his "Motion for
Reconsideration and Explanation", explaining why he should not be held in contempt
and at the same time praying for the reconsideration of the order of March 24, 1971,
which ordered the release of the goods upon the ground that goods imported without
release certi cates required by the Central Bank are "merchandise of prohibited
importation" and cannot therefore be released under any kind of bond.
In its resolution, dated April 19, 1971, respondent court found petitioner's
explanation for his failure to comply with the order of March 24, 1971 satisfactory, but
denied the motion for reconsideration upon the ground that it was led 23 days after
his receipt of the resolution, and ordering him to comply, within three days, with the
order of March 24, 1971.
On April 22, 1971 petitioner led an "Urgent omnibus Motion and Manifestation",
praying the respondent Court to reconsider and set aside its order of March 24 and
April 19, 1971 and reinstate its order of March 8, 1971; that the case be immediately
set for hearing on the merits; and to excuse him from complying with the order of April
19, 1971. Respondent court denied the omnibus motion in its order dated April 27,
1971.
Hence the present petition before this Court.
Herein petitioner contends that the importation of the foodstuffs in question is
prohibited and the articles thus imported may be subject to forfeiture under Section
2530 (f) and 102 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code; that the foodstuffs in question
being articles of prohibited importation cannot be released under bond; and that
respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
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jurisdiction, in ordering the release of the foodstuffs in question. The petitioner prays
that pending the determination of this case on its merits, a writ of preliminary injunction
be issued ex parte enjoining the implementation of respondent court's resolutions
dated March 24, 1971 and April 19, 1971; and that after due proceedings said
resolutions be declared null and void and ordered set aside.
This Court, by resolution dated May 5, 1971, issued a temporary restraining
order, and required respondents to le an answer. On May 6, 1971 a temporary
restraining order was issued restraining respondent Court of Tax Appeals, its agents,
representatives, etc. from enforcing the resolutions dated March 24, 1971 and April 19,
1971 issued in its C.T.A. Case No. 2206; more speci cally from directing petitioner
Commissioner of Customs to release under bond to respondent Eusebio Dichoco the
shipment of foodstuffs in question pending nal judgment of the case and from citing
or declaring said petitioner in contempt of court for failure to release said foodstuffs,
etc.
An answer was led, by counsel, for both respondent Court of Tax Appeals and
Eusebio Dichoco. In their answer, respondent allege special and a rmative defenses,
contending that the instant petition is fatally defective, and certiorari does not lie; that
there is no legal basis for the injunction; and that the importation was not a "prohibited
importation" and can be released under bond pursuant to Section 2301 of the Tariff and
Customs Code. Respondents pray for the dismissal of the petition and the dissolution
of the temporary restraining order.
Private respondent Eusebio Dichoco, in contending that the instant petition is
without basis in fact and in law, does not deny that "articles of prohibited importation
cannot be released under bond" as provided in section 2301 of the Tariff and Customs
Code. He, however, vigorously denies that the "foodstuffs in question are articles of
prohibited importation." He argues that the Tariff and Customs Code distinguishes
articles of "prohibited importation" from those that can be imported "only upon
conditions prescribed by law" or "importation effected contrary to law". He further
argues that Section 102 of the Tariff and Customs Code, which enumerates the articles
of "prohibited importations", refers to contraband or absolutely prohibited articles and
concludes in its sub-paragraph (k) with a general statement, "all other articles the
importation of which is prohibited by law". Respondent maintains that under the well
known rule of ejusdem generis, this general statement must be restricted only to those
articles which are absolutely prohibited or those considered contraband. Respondent
then insists that foodstuffs belong to that kind of importation that are, under Section
1207 of the Tariff and Customs Code, "subject to importation only upon conditions
prescribed by law", as distinguished from articles "of prohibited importation,"
mentioned in the same section; that said foodstuffs, furthermore, can be classi ed
under "importation effected contrary to law" as distinguished from "prohibited
importation" mentioned in section 2530 of the same Code. Respondent likewise argues
that section 2307 also distinguishes different kinds of importations when it provides
that there can be no redemption "where the importation is absolutely prohibited", but
allows redemption of other kinds of importation including forfeited foodstuffs.
Respondent claims that section 2601 also makes the same distinction when it provides
that "seized property, other than contraband" shall be subject to sale. Respondent
points out that both the Central Bank and the Bureau of Customs, through their
authorized counsel, admitted that the foodstuffs are "not prohibited importation under
section 102 of the Tariff and Customs Code," which admission bars them from
asserting the contrary. 1 It is, therefore, asserted by respondent that the imported
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foodstuffs in question are not contraband, and are not, as stated by respondent court,
among the prohibited importations enumerated in Section 102 of the Tariff and
Customs Code, 2 and so said foodstuffs may be released under bond as provided in
Section 2301 of the same Code. Respondent likewise points out that both the Central
Bank and the Bureau of Customs have been releasing outright imported foodstuffs to
selected importers. Respondent also urges that the purpose of the release of the
importation in question is legitimate, for said foodstuffs are intended to be eaten, and
eating is always legitimate; and that the release under bond of the foodstuffs which are
fast deteriorating would be bene cial for all parties concerned. Petitioner argues,
nally, that Customs Administrative Order No. 19-70, dated October 20, 1970,
contravenes the Tariff and Customs Code. 3
and the foodstuffs imported by private respondent Dichoco are not among the items
listed in Circular No. 247 for which no release certi cates are needed. The reason for
this is to protect the country's international reserve, because every import of goods or
merchandise requires an immediate or future demand for foreign exchange (Pascual v.
Commissioner of Customs, 105 Phil. 1039, 1045).
The law also prohibits the release under bond of the imported foodstuffs in
question. This is provided in Section 2301 of the Tariff and Customs Code which
provides:
"Sec. 2301. Warrant for Detention of Property — Bond. — Upon making any
seizure, the Collector shall issue a warrant for the detention of the property; and if
the owner or importer desires to secure the release of the property for legitimate
use, the Collector may surrender it upon the ling of su cient bond, in an amount
to be xed by him, conditioned for the payment of the appraised value of the
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article and/or any ne, expenses and costs which may be adjudged in the case:
Provided, That articles the importation of which is prohibited by law shall not be
released under bond." (Emphasis supplied.)
Customs Administrative Order No. 19-70, dated October 20, 1970, also provides
that "all importations seized and forfeited for violation of Central Bank circulars shall
not be allowed to be released under bond, either surety or cash, nor allowed to be
redeemed . . ." This order cannot be said to contravene section 2301 or the Tariff and
Customs Code, as contended by private respondent. Anent this matter, this Court has
held that:
"Respondent importer's petition before the tax court was led to seek
judgment 'sustaining [the importer's] right to the discharge of its importation from
the carrying vessel and its release under bond to it and declaring Customs
Administrative Order No. 19-70 null and void' as an alleged unauthorized and
arbitrary modi cation or amendment of the provisions of section 2301 of the
tariff and customs code. As already shown above, the said administrative
reiteration of the express prohibition of the cited section against the release under
bond of prohibited articles seized and held for forfeiture by the customs
authorities. The tax court of course made no pronouncement of the alleged nullity
of the said administrative order, the validity of which cannot be gainsaid . . ."
(Geotina v. Court of Tax Appeals, L-33500, August 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 362, 384-
385).
It may be pertinent to note that Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. 1410 "An Act to
prohibit the so called 'No-dollar Imports' except under certain conditions" also provides
that "any violation of this law or any provision hereof shall subject the articles imported
to seizure and con scation without any right of redemption or release under bond,
existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding."
Private respondent also contends that there were some importations of non-
essential consumer goods that were released by the Bureau of Customs and the
Central Bank. This is true. In the record We nd, for example, that an importation of
fresh oranges, lemons and grapefruits by Savoy Philippines Hotel was issued Release
Certificate No. 20134, dated March 31, 1971 by the Central Bank of the Philippines; that
an importation of cheese by Savoy Philippines Hotel was also issued Release
Certi cate No. 19980 dated January 20, 1971; and that an importation of Danish
cheese by Hotel Intercontinental, Manila, was also issued Release Certi cate No.
39704, dated March 4, 1971. 6 These importations, however, cannot be said to have
been made "contrary to law" and were prohibited importations, because the
importations were authorized and were covered by "release certi cates," approved
pursuant to M. B. Resolution No. 383 dated March 4, 1970. 7 The authority granted may
be justi ed because it was given to hotels that cater to tourists visiting the country and
are, therefore, dollar earners. In order that the Central Bank might not be accused of
arbitrarily favoring certain importers, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Teehankee, has suggested:
"But it might perhaps be desirable that the Central Bank spell out such
exceptions and the cases where it will grant 'prior speci c approvals' as against
the standing prohibition for the guidance of all concerned, so that it may not be
charged with acting arbitrarily and without any de nite set of rules and guidelines
that assures equal treatment and equal application its circulars to all." (Geotina v.
Court of Tax Appeals, No. L-33500, August 31, 1970, 40 SCRA 362, 380-381.)
Another issue raised by private respondent is that the instant petition for
certiorari is procedurally defective upon the grounds that the disputed resolution of
March 24, 1971 was already nal and unappealable because of the failure of petitioner
to le a timely motion for reconsideration. Regarding this point, it may be said that if
private respondent meant that the order of March 24, 1971 had become unassailable
and the lapse of fteen days had given it conclusiveness, said contention can not be
sustained because the order complained of is interlocutory, and an interlocutory order
is such that it is always subject to correction and amendment before nal judgment is
rendered in the case.
Private respondent also argues that petitioner has not shown that respondent
court committed grave abuse of discretion or error of jurisdiction in issuing the order
complained of. Under Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, certiorari may issue
not only when the inferior court has acted with grave abuse of discretion, but also when
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it has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Although a court has jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties it has been held that if a court has no power to
give certain kinds of relief, and it acts otherwise, it is acting without jurisdiction (14 Am.
Jur. 2d., p. 786). It has been shown that the trial court could not, under the law and
decisions of this Court, order the release of the forfeited imported foodstuffs, under
bond, and in ordering its release it had acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
Private respondent furthermore contends that petitioner had an adequate
remedy, that is appeal. Su ce it to state that a petition for certiorari is the proper
procedure for obtaining a relief from, or review of, an interlocutory order. (14 Am. Jur.
2d., p. 789.)
Private respondent nally urges that the instant petition is defective in that the
copies of the orders subject thereof were not certi ed. This contention has no merit.
The Rules of Court should be liberally construed, for they are intended to secure a
method by which the issues may be properly laid before the court. When those issues
are already clear before the court, the de ciency in the observance of the rules should
not be given undue importance. What is important is that the case is decided upon the
merits and that it should not be allowed to go off on procedural points. (Co Tiamco v.
Diaz, 75 Phil. 672.)
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the questioned resolutions of respondent Court of
Tax Appeals, dated March 24, 1971 and April 19, 1971 in its CTA Case No. 2206
entitled "Eusebio Dichoco, petitioner, versus Commissioner of Customs, respondent"
are annulled and set aside, and the restraining order issued by this Court on May 5,
1971 is made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Concepcion, C . J ., Reyes, J.B.L., Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor
and Makasiar, JJ ., concur.
Makalintal, J ., did not take part.
Footnotes
1. Annex 11 of the Answer, p. 207, Record.
5. Section 1363 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code is now Section 2530 (f) of the Tariff and
Customs Code.
6. See Annexes 15, 16 and 17 to the Answer, pp. 212, 213 and 214, Record.