Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations: APRIL 2014

FM 3-94
THEATER ARMY, CORPS,

AND DIVISION
OPERATIONS
APRIL 2014
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*FM 3-94 (FM 3-92, FM 3-93)
Field Manual Headquarters

No. 3-94 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 21 April 2014
Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations
Contents
Page
PREFACE...............................................................................................................v
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................vii
PART ONE LANDPOWER TAILORED FOR THE JOINT FORCE

Chapter 1 ECHELONS ABOVE BRIGADE ........................................................................ 1-1
A Modular, Tailorable Army ................................................................................ 1-1
Combatant Command Through Tactical Headquarters ..................................... 1-4
Operational and Administrative Chains of Command ...................................... 1-14
Army Service Component Command ............................................................... 1-18
ARFOR ............................................................................................................. 1-19
Army Logistics and Medical Support ................................................................ 1-22
Overlapping Operational and Administrative Chains ....................................... 1-24
Operational Areas............................................................................................. 1-27
Chapter 2 THE THEATER ARMY ....................................................................................... 2-1
Army Service Component Command ................................................................. 2-1
Unified Action in the Geographic Combatant Command ................................... 2-3
The Theater Army and Campaigns .................................................................... 2-5
Defense Support of Civil Authorities................................................................. 2-15
Theater Army Headquarters ............................................................................. 2-15
Chapter 3 THEATER-LEVEL COMMANDS AND UNITS .................................................. 3-1
Assigned and Aligned Theater Forces ............................................................... 3-1
Other Theater-Level Army Forces ...................................................................... 3-8
PART TWO THE ARMY CORPS

Chapter 4 CORPS ROLES AND ORGANIZATION............................................................ 4-1
Roles of the Corps .............................................................................................. 4-1
Subordinate Forces ............................................................................................ 4-9
The Corps Headquarters .................................................................................. 4-12
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*This manual supersedes FM 3-92 (dated 26 November 2010) and FM 3-93 (dated 12 October 2011).
i
Contents
Chapter 5 CORPS OPERATIONS ...................................................................................... 5-1

Operations at the Corps Level ............................................................................ 5-1
Deployment of a Corps ....................................................................................... 5-2
Task-Organizing the Corps ................................................................................. 5-3
The Corps Area of Operations ............................................................................ 5-9
The Corps and Joint Forces .............................................................................. 5-11
Decisive Action.................................................................................................. 5-19
Operational Framework .................................................................................... 5-27
The Corps and Forcible Entry Operations ........................................................ 5-29
PART THREE THE ARMY DIVISION

Chapter 6 DIVISION ROLES AND ORGANIZATION ......................................................... 6-1
Roles of the Division ........................................................................................... 6-1
Subordinate Forces ............................................................................................. 6-3
The Division Headquarters ............................................................................... 6-13
Chapter 7 DIVISION OPERATIONS ................................................................................... 7-1
The Tactical Environment ................................................................................... 7-1
Deployment of a Division .................................................................................... 7-2
Task-Organizing the Division .............................................................................. 7-2
The Division Area of Operations ......................................................................... 7-6
Air Force Support ................................................................................................ 7-8
Marine Corps Units ........................................................................................... 7-10
Decisive Action.................................................................................................. 7-11
Operational Framework .................................................................................... 7-16
GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... Glossary-1
REFERENCES.................................................................................. References-1
INDEX ......................................................................................................... Index-1
Figures
Figure 1-1. The range of military operations .......................................................................... 1-4
Figure 1-2. Functional and integrating cells ........................................................................... 1-8
Figure 1-3. Planning horizons for integrating cells ............................................................... 1-10
Figure 1-4. Distribution of staff sections within a main command post................................ 1-12
Figure 1-5. Example of echelons above brigade command post......................................... 1-13
Figure 1-6. The operational chain of command and administrative control ......................... 1-15
Figure 1-7. Possible joint task force components ................................................................ 1-20
Figure 1-8. Overlapping chains of authority ......................................................................... 1-25
Figure 1-9. Joint task force organized by Service and functional components ................... 1-26
Figure 1-10. The area of responsibility and joint operations areas ...................................... 1-27
Figure 2-1. Service-specific responsibilities ........................................................................... 2-2
Figure 2-2. Theater army’s role in requesting regionally aligned forces ................................ 2-5
Figure 2-3. Joint phases and the theater army ...................................................................... 2-6
ii FM 3-94 21 April 2014

Contents
Figure 2-4. An overview of force tailoring ............................................................................. 2-11

Figure 2-5. Theater army as a multinational force land component in a theater of war ....... 2-14
Figure 2-6. Theater army main command post organization ............................................... 2-16
Figure 2-7. Theater army contingency command post organization .................................... 2-18
Figure 2-8. Theater army headquarters and headquarters battalion organization............... 2-20
Figure 3-1. Example of theater commands and brigades ...................................................... 3-1
Figure 3-2. Example of theater sustainment command ......................................................... 3-2
Figure 3-3. Modular medical support for the Army ................................................................. 3-6
Figure 3-4. CBRNE operational headquarters ..................................................................... 3-10
Figure 3-5. Example of mature theater ................................................................................. 3-14
Figure 4-1. Example of joint task force staff ........................................................................... 4-6
Figure 4-2. The corps as a tactical headquarters ................................................................... 4-8
Figure 4-3. An example of headquarters and units task-organized under the corps ........... 4-10
Figure 4-4. Modular brigades and groups ............................................................................ 4-11
Figure 4-5. The corps main command post.......................................................................... 4-13
Figure 4-6. Example of corps tactical command post .......................................................... 4-14
Figure 4-7. The headquarters and headquarters battalion of the corps ............................... 4-16
Figure 5-1. Possible configurations for the corps area of operations ................................... 5-10
Figure 5-2. Air and missile defense ...................................................................................... 5-17
Figure 5-3. Example of corps movement to contact ............................................................. 5-22
Figure 5-4. Example of corps attack ..................................................................................... 5-23
Figure 5-5. Example of corps defense ................................................................................. 5-25
Figure 6-1. Three types of brigade combat teams (current organization) .............................. 6-4
Figure 6-2. Example of a reorganized armored brigade combat team................................... 6-5
Figure 6-3. Field artillery brigade ............................................................................................ 6-6
Figure 6-4. Combat aviation brigade ...................................................................................... 6-7
Figure 6-5. Battlefield surveillance brigade ............................................................................ 6-8
Figure 6-6. Maneuver enhancement brigade ......................................................................... 6-9
Figure 6-7. Sustainment brigade .......................................................................................... 6-10
Figure 6-8. Main command post of a division....................................................................... 6-14
Figure 6-9. Division tactical command post.......................................................................... 6-16
Figure 6-10. Division headquarters and headquarters battalion .......................................... 6-19
Figure 7-1. An example of a task-organized division ............................................................. 7-6
Figure 7-2. Example of division using contiguous and noncontiguous areas of
operations ........................................................................................................... 7-7
Figure 7-3. Division contiguous and noncontiguous area of operations ................................ 7-9
Figure 7-4. Example of division movement to contact ......................................................... 7-12
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 iii

Contents
Tables
Table 1-1. The Army’s structure ............................................................................................. 1-2
Table 1-2. Combatant commands and their ASCCs.............................................................. 1-5
Table 1-3. Joint command relationships .............................................................................. 1-16
Table 5-1. Command and support relationships for the corps ............................................... 5-6
Table 7-1. Command and support relationships for the division ........................................... 7-4
iv FM 3-94 21 April 2014

Preface
FM 3-94 provides Army doctrine for the theater army, corps, and division. FM 3-94 explains the organization of
the theater army, corps, and division headquarters and their respective command posts. It establishes the roles
for each headquarters, including their respective contributions to joint operations. It discusses subordinate units
and each headquarters’ organization of its units, establishment of command and support relationships, and
conduct of operations.
The principal audience for FM 3-94 is theater army, corps, and division commanders and staffs. It also provides
relevant information regarding the organization and operations for commanders and staffs at field army,
subordinate theater-level commands and brigades, geographic combatant commands, and other Service
headquarters.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable United States,
international, and in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their
Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)
FM 3-94 implements STANAG 2014, Format for Orders and Designation of Timings, Locations and
Boundaries; STANAG 2019, NATO Joint Military Symbology; STANAG 2248, Glossary of Land Military
Terms and Definitions; STANAG 2281, Coalition Operations Handbook; and AAP-06, NATO Glossary of
Terms and Definitions.
FM 3-94 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the
glossary and the text. The term for which FM 3-94 is proponent is marked with an asterisk in the glossary. Its
definition is boldfaced in the text. For other terms and definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and
the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.
FM 3-94 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and
United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
The proponent of FM 3-94 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the
Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, United States Army Combined Arms Center. Send comments and
recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to
Commander, United States Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCD
(FM 3-94), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to
[email protected]; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 v

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Introduction
The Army gives the combatant commander depth and versatility because landpower
expands the friendly range of military options. The Army, uniquely, provides a
combination of armored, medium, light, and airborne forces. Along with a full suite of
enablers, this allows us to provide tailorable and scalable force packages for various
contingencies. By multiplying the range of U.S. capabilities that the adversary must
counter, the Army narrows options that might otherwise work against a lesser opponent
or a coalition partner supported only by U.S. air and maritime power.
ADP 1
The unique and crucial role of the Army is to provide landpower to the geographic combatant commanders.
Landpower, as ADP 1 notes, is “is the ubiquitous tool of the joint force—often decisive, sometimes
indirect, but indispensable.” FM 3-94 examines the employment of Army forces within a geographic
combatant command. It describes how the Army supports the combatant commander across the range of
military operations in that area of responsibility (AOR).
“The land domain is the most complex of the domains, because it addresses humanity—its cultures,
ethnicities, religions, and politics” (ADP 1). The operational variables—political, military, economic,
social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (known as PMESII-PT)—affect
operations within the land domain far more than in any other domain. The individual variables and their
effect on an operational environment also differ dramatically for each campaign. Conditions affected by
military operations, directly or indirectly, defy easy analysis. Thus, Army headquarters operating at
echelons above brigade constantly adapt their organization and planning to the conditions in that joint
operations area.
In addition to being the largest of the Armed Forces of the United States, the Army has a greater variety of
units than the other Services, each with a different organization and purpose. Therefore, the Army provides
the combatant commander with an interlocking array of higher headquarters trained and equipped to apply
landpower from the theater level, through the operational level, and down to the tactical employment of
various brigades, groups, and battalions. Together the theater army, corps, and division give the combatant
commander several options necessary for the employment of landpower in an interdependent joint force.
The combatant commander has ever-changing needs for landpower to prevent, shape, and win across the
AOR. Prevention requires flexible and credible United States (U.S.) military power to dissuade potential
adversaries from threatening vital American security interests. The theater army integrates landpower with
other deterrent capabilities. The corps represents an operationally significant Army force capable of
altering the land balance of forces in each geographic combatant command. The division is the tactical
hammer, translating operational-level plans into offensive, defensive, and stability tasks on the ground.
Partner nations under an external threat understand that introducing U.S. landpower alters the regional
military balance and bolsters their resolve to resist aggression.
All nations have land security elements, even if lacking credible air and naval forces. Army forces deploy
around the world to train with security forces of other nations. This diminishes regional tensions and is vital
to American security interests. Each geographic combatant commander develops programs to improve
regional stability and promote peace through security cooperation. Shaping with military assets to improve
security cannot prevent conflict, but it nudges global regions away from military confrontation and
increases the effects of diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power. Shaping the
strategic security environment improves the chance for peace around the world. This is a critical task
assigned to the theater army.
When war occurs, joint force commanders require Army units that can defeat the enemy and dominate land
portions of the joint operations area. Land combat remains chaotic, lethal, and intensely human.
Technology is important, but the outcome depends upon the skill and resolve of Soldiers, Marines, and
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 vii

Introduction
multinational ground forces. The ability to prevail in ground combat is often the decisive factor in breaking
the enemy’s will. History reflects that an enemy may cede the air and maritime domains to U.S. forces,
while placing his faith in close combat. Winning in this environment requires the theater army to set the
theater and assist Army forces into the fight. It requires the corps to integrate landpower throughout each
phase of a campaign. Divisions outmaneuver the enemy, destroy enemy ground forces, seize and exploit
operationally significant objectives, and match decisive action to ground conditions.
The theater army commander sets conditions for effective use of landpower. While commanding Army
forces supporting AOR-wide engagement, the theater army commander matches Army capabilities to joint
requirements, oversees the arrival of Army forces in the theater, and ensures that Soldiers across the AOR
receive the support they require for as long as they are in the AOR. The corps is the principal headquarters
for applying landpower as a component of a campaign. The corps commander translates campaign
objectives into broad missions for ground forces and sets the conditions for the tactical use of Army and
multinational ground forces to accomplish those missions. The corps commander coordinates land forces
with air maritime and special operations forces to dominate land portions of joint operations areas. The
division controls ground forces, synchronizing Army and joint combat power according to the conditions
on the ground.
Each echelon above brigade headquarters has considerable flexibility built into its structure. Each can fulfill
multiple roles depending upon the combatant commander’s requirements and appropriate joint
augmentation. This ranges from serving as the joint task force headquarters, as a joint and multinational
force land component, down through the tactical employment of brigades and battalions. The theater army
tailors each echelon, including itself, for its role in the campaign. Each headquarters varies its internal
organization to accomplish the mission. Each echelon adjusts the distribution of subordinate units between
headquarters—task organization—to the particular requirements of that phase or mission.
Operational and administrative responsibilities vary between echelons. Operational responsibilities include
command of forces, direction of operations in time and space, and control of assigned areas of operations.
The administrative responsibilities encompass the Service-specific requirements for equipping,
sustainment, training, unit readiness, discipline, and personnel matters. The Army also has specified
Service responsibilities to the joint force including certain logistics support and specialized support such as
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense. The theater army, as the Army Service component
command for that geographic combatant command, determines the most effective and efficient distribution
of Service responsibilities. Depending upon the joint structure, the corps or division assumes Army
component responsibilities within that joint force.
FM 3-94 has seven chapters organized under three parts.
Part One describes the Army hierarchy within a geographic combatant command and goes into detail about
the theater army, the senior echelon in each geographic combatant command. It includes three chapters.
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the higher echelons of the Army. It introduces the three senior echelons
of the Army within a geographic combatant command. It describes their roles and tasks in general terms. It
lays out the Army concept of sustainment and support provided by theater army. This chapter also
discusses operational and administrative chains of command and their differences. The chapter concludes
with a brief review of operational areas. Chapter 2 describes the roles and tasks of the theater army. It
discusses the staff organization of the theater army. It also discusses the main command post and
contingency command post of the theater army and their employment by the theater army commander.
Chapter 3 summarizes the theater-level commands and supporting organizations that allow the theater army
to fulfill its roles and enable the corps and division to accomplish theirs.
Part Two discusses the corps and includes two chapters. Chapter 4 explains the roles and tasks of the corps,
together with its operational and administrative responsibilities. The chapter summarizes the subordinate
units typically found in the corps echelon. The chapter then discusses the internal organization of the corps
and the various command posts available to the corps commander. Chapter 5 examines corps-level
operations. This includes how the corps arranges its combat power, organizes the area of operations, and
conducts decisive action.
Part Three addresses the division in two chapters. Chapter 6 explains the roles and tasks of the division
headquarters, together with its operational and administrative responsibilities. The chapter summarizes the
viii FM 3-94 21 April 2014

Introduction
subordinate units normally under the operational or tactical control of the division. The chapter then
discusses the internal organization of the division headquarters and the various command posts available to
the division commander. Chapter 7 examines division-level operations. This includes how the division
arranges its combat power, organizes the area of operations, and conducts decisive action.
More details on each echelon will be published in three supporting Army techniques publications (ATPs).
One will cover the theater army in detail. Another will provide details and vignettes on the corps and corps
operations. It will also describe how the corps headquarters transforms into a joint task force (JTF) for
contingencies. A third will address the division, with an extensive discussion on decisive action at the
tactical level.
This book is proponent for a single term, ARFOR. FM 3-94 modifies the definition of ARFOR. FM 3-94 is
not the proponent for any new Army terms. It does not rescind any defined terms.
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 ix

PART ONE
Landpower Tailored for the Joint Force

The Army provides landpower to an interdependent joint force. Landpower is tailored
for any combination of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil
authorities tasks. Brigades are the principal tactical units for conducting operations.
The exercise of mission command above the brigade level requires theater army,
corps, and division headquarters. They may be tailored as functional land
components with command of joint and multinational units. They will serve as
Service components as organized or required. When the combatant commander so
determines, they will become joint task force headquarters. The mix of echelons is
not a rigid hierarchy and does not require a standard array of forces. Each
headquarters provides a menu of capabilities to best match the combatant
commander’s requirements.
Chapter 1
Echelons Above Brigade
A MODULAR, TAILORABLE ARMY
1-1. In 2003, the Army undertook a fundamental shift from a division-based force toward a brigade-based
force. The highly integrated organization of the Army’s divisions in the late 1990s made it difficult to
deploy divisional units apart from their divisional base and keep the rest of the division ready for other
missions. The Army needed to reorganize around smaller, more versatile formations able to deploy more
promptly and sustain the fight indefinitely, while meeting global commitments outside the conflict region.
The ensuing transformation reorganized the Army into brigade combat teams (BCTs), multifunctional and
functional support brigades, and deployable, self-contained division and corps headquarters. The shift to a
brigade-based Army with modular corps and division headquarters allowed the Army to tailor forces
rapidly into expeditionary force packages that matched the combatant commander’s requirements.
1-2. The BCT-based Army facilitated rotation of complete units rather than individual replacement. The
BCTs become the centerpiece for Army maneuver. Today, the Army pools BCTs, multifunctional support
brigades, and functional brigades into expeditionary force packages. The force package consists of infantry,
Stryker, and armored BCTs; a variable mix of multifunctional and functional brigades; and division and
corps headquarters as required. The two Reserve Components of the Army (Army Reserve and Army
National Guard) making up about one-half of the total uniformed force, are integrated into the cycle of
force packages identified for contingencies or deployment to an active operation. The force package
combines Regular Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve units and Soldiers. (See ADP 1.)
1-3. The National Military Strategy and the Joint Strategic
force provider
Capabilities Plan determine the combatant commanders’
requirements for Army forces and operational requirements forecast A combatant commander or
Secretary of a Military
by the combatant commanders. The Army meets its strategic Department assigned to provide
responsibility to provide forces consistent with global requirements forces by the Secretary of
through the joint process known as global force management. The Defense via a deployment order.
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 1-1

Chapter 1
Army’s process for identifying and providing

forces is Army force generation (ARFORGEN). Service force provider
As part of joint global force management, A subcategory of force provider. An organization
FORSCOM executes functions, duties, and designated by the Military Department Secretaries
to provide trained and ready forces to combatant
responsibilities as a Service force provider on
commands as directed by the Secretary of Defense.
behalf of the Secretary of the Army. As part of Possesses authorities, as delegated by Secretary of
force generation, the Department of the Army, in Defense to Military Department Secretaries (which
conjunction with FORSCOM, establishes Secretaries may further delegate) to exercise
manning, training, and readiness cycles; assigns Training and Readiness Oversight, and provide
forces to headquarters; and manages global sourcing recommendations.
modernization. Guidance provided through the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, based on combatant commanders’ input, establishes requirements for ARFORGEN.
This in turn drives Regular Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve readiness cycles.
ARMY STRUCTURE
1-4. In addition to being the largest of the Armed Services, the Army has a greater variety of units than
the other Services, each with different organizations and purposes. Therefore, the Army provides the
combatant commander with an interlocking array of modular headquarters trained and equipped to apply
landpower from the theater level, through the operational level, down to the tactical employment of various
brigades, groups, and battalions. Together the theater army, corps, and division give the combatant
commander a menu of options necessary for the employment of landpower in an interdependent joint force.
Table 1-1 illustrates the variety of Army headquarters and units of brigade and larger size. The total
number of units and organizations will vary from the numbers shown.
Table 1-1. The Army’s structure
Element No. in Description Example
Army Organizations
Army command 3 ACOMs are four-star Service commands. All Army TRADOC, AMC,
(ACOM) commands are part of the generating force. FORSCOM
Direct reporting 10 A DRU is a two- or three-star command under the NETCOM, INSCOM,
unit (DRU) Department of the Army. DRUs fulfill unique Army USACE
requirements as part of the generating force.
Army Service 8 The ASCC for each geographic combatant command is USARCENT, SDDC
component a theater army (5). There are three ASCCs for the
command functional combatant commands.
(ASCC)
Field army 1 A field army commands two or more corps in Eighth U.S. Army
campaigns and major operations. EUSA is the ARFOR (EUSA) is the only
for U.S. Forces Korea, a subunified command of U.S. field army
Pacific Command.
Other Army 1 Other Army Service components may be a service USARCYBER
Service component of USCYBERCOM, a subunified command
components of USSTRATCOM.
Command 42 A command is a theater-level headquarters that AAMDC, MEDCOM
commands functional brigades and provides support to (DS)
deployed Army forces across the area of responsibility.
Corps 3 A corps headquarters is the Army’s primary operational- I Corps, III Corps,
headquarters level headquarters. Each corps has training and XVIII Corps
readiness responsibilities for Army divisions.
Division 18 A division is the primary tactical headquarters for 101st Abn Div
operations. Each division headquarters has training and (Regular Army); 40th
readiness authority BCTs. Div (Army National
Guard)
1-2 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

Table 1-1. The Army’s structure (continued)

Element No. in Description Example
Army Organizations
Brigade combat ~64 There are three types of BCTs: Armored (ABCT), 1st BCT 82d Abn Div
team (BCT) Infantry (IBCT), and Stryker (SBCT). (IBCT); 3d BCT 2d ID
(SBCT)
Multifunctional 98 A multifunctional support brigade provides support to 5 types of brigades:
support brigade BCTs. Organization varies. Normally, attached to a CAB; MEB; BFSB
division, but may be under a corps, or a joint or sustainment; fires
multinational headquarters. An ESC normally
commands sustainment brigades and provides support
on an area basis.
Functional 131 A functional support brigade is a brigade or group that ADA, engineer, MP,
support brigade provides a single function or capability. These signal, EOD, medical,
brigades can provide support for a theater, corps, or regional support
division, depending upon how each is tailored. The groups, theater
organization varies extensively. aviation
Special 28 A special functional support brigade is a small brigade AFSB, CSB, Space,
functional or group that augments echelon above brigade TASM-G
support brigade headquarters and manages Title 10 requirements.
Special 24 Special operations units and forces are brigades, Ranger, SF, and
operations unit groups, and regiments that support the conventional Special Operations
and force forces or operate under U.S. Special Operations Aviation
Command.
Ceremonial unit 1 The Old Guard provides national Army ceremonial 3rd Infantry Regiment
support and has operational commitments. It is part of
the operating force.
AAMDC U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Command MEDCOM (DS) medical command (deployment support)
Abn airborne MP military police
ADA air defense artillery NETCOM network command
AFSB Army field support brigade No. number
AMC Army Materiel Command SDDC Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
ARFOR senior Army component headquarters SF special forces
BFSB battlefield surveillance brigade TASM-G Theater Aviation Sustainment Maintenance
CAB combat aviation brigade Group
CSB contracting support brigade TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
Div division U.S. United States
EOD explosive ordnance disposal USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
ESC expeditionary sustainment brigade USARCENT U.S. Army, Central Command
FORSCOM U.S. Army Forces Command USARCYBER U.S. Army Cyber Command
ID infantry division USCYBERCOM U.S. Cyber Command
INSCOM U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command USSTRATCOM U.S. Strategic Command
MEB maneuver enhancement brigade
1-5. At the tactical level, subordinate units routinely operate in noncontiguous areas of operations. This
contrasts sharply with the contiguous and hierarchical arrangement of land forces in operations prevalent in
the large wars of the 20th century. Irregular warfare and hybrid threats have become commonplace.
Massive battles involving multiple divisions are infrequent, while the intensity and lethality of small-unit
engagements have increased. Army doctrine adapted, first embracing full spectrum operations and then
evolving its operational concept to unified land operations. Both have at their core the necessity of
simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks (or defense support of civil
authorities within the homeland).
1-6. The configuration of today’s higher echelon headquarters is determined less by their mobility than by
their ability to command forces across vast land areas, while integrating joint capabilities, interagency
support, and multinational forces. Commanders exercise mission command over widely dispersed
formations while maintaining a common operational picture with higher headquarters and subordinates
units.
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 1-3

Chapter 1
THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

1-7. Joint doctrine divides operations into three broad categories illustrated in figure 1-1. Army forces
provide versatile higher headquarters tailored for contingencies and capable of evolving so commanders
can exercise mission command for campaigns and major operations. The Army provides headquarters for
joint land operations and often provides JTF headquarters for contingency operations. The nature of
counterinsurgency campaigns, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, require Army headquarters to
function as joint and multinational integrators. As the nature of warfare continues to evolve, interactions
among U.S forces and myriad indigenous and external groups will complicate every aspect of operations.
While dealing with the complexities of multinational and interagency operations, the headquarters deploy,
evolve, and tailor its organizations as the campaign progresses. As recent natural disasters showed, Army
headquarters also enable commanders to exercise mission command for Regular Army, Army National
Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve elements that respond to disasters of all types, whether at home or abroad.
Figure 1-1. The range of military operations
COMBATANT COMMAND THROUGH TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS

1-8. Army transformation redesigned the division to be a self-contained headquarters instead of a fixed
echelon with permanently assigned units. The division can command any combination of brigades,
including up to five BCTs, for a particular mission. The corps headquarters received additional personnel
and organic support. By adding to their organic communications, fire coordination, and life support, the
division and corps headquarters became more flexible, no longer depending on subordinate units to reach
full capability. This increased the flexibility of higher headquarters and allowed division and corps
headquarters to adapt to diverse missions. Because the corps and division headquarters are self-contained,
they are able to deploy with any mix of forces allowing for strategic flexibility during protracted
campaigns. During the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, division headquarters often commanded BCTs
from posts across the Army, including Korea. The corps headquarters performed roles ranging from tactical
command of maneuvering divisions to operational command of multinational forces charged with
rebuilding a nation.
1-9. Army transformation restructured echelon-above-corps responsibilities to better support employment
of Army forces in that geographic combatant command. In order to make a modular Army work,
significant changes became necessary at echelons above corps. The Army Service component command
1-4 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

(ASCC) for each geographic combatant command became a dedicated theater army with a common design.
The theater army is the primary interface between the combatant commander and the Department of the
Army; it is responsible for administration and support of all Army forces assigned, attached, or under the
operational control (OPCON) of the geographic combatant command. The theater army commander plans
and requests tailored Army force packages. Tailoring the force requires the theater army to determine the
composition of the force (how many and what types of units); its optimum deployment sequence given
combatant commander priorities and available lift; and the initial command and support relationships. The
theater army assumes responsibility for supporting all deployed Army forces in that AOR and OPCON of
all Army forces within the AOR that are not OPCON to a JTF or subunified command. The theater army is
responsible for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of the Army force package
into the joint force. Although the theater army grew in size in order to control Army forces operating across
the AOR, the capability to use it as a field army commanding multiple army corps disappeared when the
Army deleted the operational command post module built into the design.
COMBATANT COMMANDS
1-10. There are three types of combatant commands. Functional combatant commands have global
responsibilities for U.S. military power, but do not have an AOR. Geographic combatant commands have a
regional responsibility defined by an AOR. A specified combatant command (there is none currently) is
established by the Secretary of Defense for a specific purpose and is normally composed of forces from a
single military department. Every combatant command has an ASCC. Table 1-2 lists the existing
combatant commands and their ASCCs.
Table 1-2. Combatant commands and their ASCCs
Combatant Command Army Service Component Command
U.S. Pacific Command (GCC) U.S. Army Pacific (theater army)
U.S. European Command (GCC) U.S. Army Europe (theater army)
U.S. Central Command (GCC) U.S. Army Central (theater army)
U.S. Africa Command (GCC) U.S. Army Africa (theater army)
U.S. Southern Command (GCC) U.S. Army South (theater army)
U.S. Northern Command (GCC) U.S. Army North (theater army)
U.S. Transportation Command (FCC) U.S. Army Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command – Army
U.S. Strategic Command (FCC)
Strategic Command
U.S. Special Operations Command (FCC) U.S. Army Special Operations Command
FCC functional combatant command U.S. United States
GCC geographic combatant command
THEATER ARMY
1-11. The theater army is the ASCC assigned to a geographic combatant command. It is organized,
manned, and equipped to perform three roles:
 Theater army for the geographic combatant command to which it is assigned.
 JTF headquarters (with augmentation) for a limited contingency operation in that AOR.
 Joint force land component (with augmentation) for a limited contingency operation in that
AOR.
1-12. The key tasks associated with its roles include:
 Serve as the primary interface between the Department of the Army, Army commands, and other
ASCCs.
 Develop Army plans to support the theater campaign plan within that AOR.
 Tailor Army forces for employment in the AOR.
 Control RSOI for Army forces in the AOR.
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 Exercise OPCON of deployed Army forces not subordinated to a joint force commander (JFC).
 Exercise administrative control (ADCON) of all Army forces operating within the AOR.
 Provide support as directed by the combatant commander to other Service forces, multinational
forces, and interagency partners.
 Exercise OPCON of all joint forces attached to it as either a joint force land component
command or JTF headquarters, as required by the combatant commander.
 Provide planning in support to the geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) strategic
planning, theater campaign plan, theater posture plan, theater security cooperation plans, theater
global force management planning, deliberate plans, and crisis action planning.
1-13. The combatant commander relies upon the theater army commander to integrate landpower into the
GCC’s plans for that AOR. The theater army coordinates with Department of the Army and the primary
Service force provider, FORSCOM, to integrate combatant commander requirements within the global
force management and ARFORGEN processes. The theater army coordinates through FORSCOM for
theater-specific training and preparation of regionally aligned forces by providing Army Training
Development Capability approved task names and task numbers to FORSCOM. As required, the theater
army may also coordinate directly with supporting combatant command ASCCs if the Secretary of Defense
directs the supporting combatant commander to provide forces. The gaining theater army commander
recommends to the combatant commander the composition, sequence of deployment, and operational chain
of command for Army forces deploying to the AOR. The theater army commander exercises OPCON as
specified by the combatant commander and ADCON as specified by the Secretary of the Army. (See
paragraph 1-51 for administrative control.)
1-14. The theater army performs a critical task in shaping the AOR for the geographic combatant
command. The theater army maintains a theater wide focus in support of security cooperation. ADP 1
succinctly explains:
Shaping the strategic security environment improves the chance for peace around the
world. It diminishes regional tensions and is therefore vital to American security
interests. Each geographic combatant commander develops programs to improve
regional stability and promote peace through security cooperation. American military
capabilities can reassure allies, while dissuading adversaries. Shaping by itself cannot
prevent conflict, but it nudges global regions away from military confrontation and
increases the effect of diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national
power… Soldiers are particularly important in this effort, since all nations have land
security elements, even if lacking credible air and naval forces. To the degree that other
nations see us as the best army in the world, they gravitate to us to help them achieve the
same high standards of military performance, or tie their security to the world’s most
capable army.
ADP 1
1-15. As required, the theater army provides Army support to other Services (ASOS), provides common-
user logistics, and carries out Department of Defense (DOD)-specified Service executive agent and
combatant command support agent (CCSA) responsibilities in the AOR. These ARFOR responsibilities are
discussed in more detail beginning with paragraph 1-64.
ARMY CORPS
1-16. The Army corps is the Army’s most versatile headquarters. The corps must be as adept at planning a
rapid noncombatant evacuation operation as supporting a multiyear major combat operation. The Army
corps is deployable and scalable to meet almost every requirement of the combatant commander for a
senior level headquarters. The corps now functions as the principal integrator of landpower into campaigns
and is the link between the operational and tactical levels of war. In the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq,
for example, U.S. Army corps has commanded all land forces in those countries. The corps is the preferred
Army headquarters for joint augmentation and employment as a JTF. As a joint or multinational land
component command, an Army corps headquarters commands multiple Army divisions, brigades, and other
formations, and multinational forces and organizations. The corps headquarters often functions as the
1-6 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

ARFOR (a senior headquarters) for deployed Army forces, exercising command over Army forces in a
joint operations area and prioritizing the extensive support provided by the theater army against the tactical
needs of joint and multinational forces. (See paragraph 1-57 for discussion of ARFOR.)
1-17. The corps headquarters is an essential element of the Army’s expeditionary capabilities. These
capabilities enable the Army to deploy combined arms forces into any AOR and operate effectively upon
arrival. Contingency operations require the corps and its subordinate forces to deploy quickly and set
conditions to seize the initiative and accomplish the mission. The corps is organized, manned, and equipped
to serve in four roles:
 Provide the ARFOR within a joint force for campaigns and major operations.
 Serve as the joint or multinational land component command headquarters (with augmentation)
in campaigns and major operations.
 Serve as a JTF headquarters (with augmentation) for crisis response and limited contingency
operations.
 Serve as a tactical headquarters commanding 2 to 5 Army divisions together with supporting
brigades and commands in campaigns and major operations.
1-18. The key tasks involved in these roles include:
 Command Marine Corps and multinational brigades and divisions.
 As a supported component, integrate supporting joint capabilities with landpower within a joint
operations area.
 As a supporting component, integrate Army capabilities with supported component operations.
 Exercise ADCON over Army forces in a joint operations area as specified by the ASCC.
 Integrate special operations forces (SOF) with conventional force operations.
 Provide ASOS as required by the JFC.
Each of these roles and tasks is discussed in detail in chapter 4.
ARMY DIVISION
1-19. The division headquarters operates as a tactical headquarters under OPCON of an Army corps or
Marine expeditionary force headquarters. It may become a joint force land component headquarters. In
limited contingency operations, it may become a JTF. As a tactical echelon of command, the division task-
organizes subordinate units and specifies the command or support relationships needed. The division
assesses the effort required for offensive, defensive, and stability tasks in its area of operations and
organizes its subordinate units accordingly. The division headquarters sets the conditions for employment
of its brigades, then controls and synchronizes their tactical actions. The division allocates resources,
designates the main effort as required, forecasts operational requirements, and establishes priorities of
support. Sustainment and other functional units (military police, engineer, air and missile defense, and
military intelligence) provide support in accordance with priorities established by the supported division
commander. The historical designations of the division headquarters, such as the 1st Cavalry Division, do
not necessarily reflect the capabilities of the subordinate forces task-organized under them.
1-20. The roles of the division include:
 Serve as a tactical headquarters in campaigns and major operations.
 Serve as the joint and multinational land component headquarters under a JTF in crisis response
and limited contingency operations.
 Serve as a JTF headquarters (with augmentation) for limited contingency operations.
 Serve as the ARFOR within a JTF in crisis response and limited contingency operations.
1-21. Key tasks for the division include:
 Command two to five BCTs together with supporting brigades in decisive action.
 Serve as the joint or multinational land component headquarters under a JTF (or multinational
JTF) in crisis response and limited contingency operations.
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Chapter 1
 Exercise tactical control (TACON) over Marine Corps and multinational forces.
 Exercise ADCON over attached Army forces.
Each of these roles and tasks is discussed in detail in chapter 6.
COMMON DESIGN, DIFFERENT MANNING

1-22. The theater army, corps, and division headquarters derive from a common design philosophy.
Although commanders have the authority to reorganize the headquarters to best suit the requirements of the
mission, the base design of echelon above brigade headquarters stems from a set of design criteria and
organizational principles.
1-23. The basis for the organizational design is warfighting functions. There are five functional cells in the
headquarters design—intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, protection, and sustainment. Elements
from coordinating and special staff sections (and in some cases, the personal staff) work within the
functional cells. Most of the functional cells contain representatives from different coordinating and special
staff sections; however, their activities fall within that warfighting function. The example protection cell in
figure 1-2 might include provost marshal; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN); safety;
and personnel recovery. Each of the five functional cells has as its chief the senior officer from a
coordinating staff section. Normally, the chief of the protection cell will be a special staff officer. The sixth
warfighting function, mission command, does not form a separate functional cell. The function of mission
command applies to the entire headquarters. The chief of staff directly supervises the coordinating and
special staff sections that do not work within a functional cell.
Figure 1-2. Functional and integrating cells

1-24. The movement and maneuver cell provides the nucleus for the three integrating cells—current
operations integrating, future operations, and plans. Integrating cells group personnel and equipment by
planning horizon. The current operations integrating, future operations, and plans cells assist the
commander in integrating the warfighting functions within the short-, mid-, and long-range planning
horizons respectively.
1-8 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

1-25. Each headquarters contains a commander; a command group; and coordinating, special, and personal
staff. Most coordinating and special staff sections divide into functional and integrating cells, normally on a
permanent basis. Designated staff sections, for example the G-6, normally report to the chief of staff
directly. The reporting channels for the personal staff vary within each command. Regardless of echelon,
the headquarters design provides for a main command post and a smaller, more mobile forward command
post. The latter is a contingency command post within the theater army structure and a tactical command
post at the corps and division levels. All three echelons have a headquarters and headquarters battalion
(HHB), although the structure for each echelon’s headquarters battalion differs. Rank and grade structures
also vary.
1-26. The higher headquarters design is based on the concept of matrix organizations. Staff cells, centers,
and working groups are organized into functional teams working together on a single line of effort or a
common purpose. This functional design facilitates the vertical integration of the staff elements in
permanent or ad hoc organizations. Multiple lines of effort meet in three permanently organized integrating
cells. The three integrating cells combine multiple functions and allow the commander considerable
flexibility to integrate the operation by planning horizon or by phases of the operation. A network and suite
of mission command systems enhance the ability to plan and coordinate operations across these staff
sections, cells, command posts, and echelons.
1-27. Vertical integration groups closely related tasks and functions. These groupings form the basis for
establishing five functional cells: intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, protection, and sustainment
functional cells. Although described as functional cells, in reality, the cells contain subject matter experts
from multiple staff sections. For example, the sustainment warfighting function involves logistics,
personnel, medical, and resource management tasks, and the sustainment warfighting function cell includes
personnel with the appropriate skills, training, and experience to perform those tasks. The sustainment
warfighting function cell usually has personnel from the G-1, G-4, and G-8 staff sections and medical staff
element. The functional cells provide a standardized method of vertically integrating closely related tasks.
1-28. Horizontal integration occurs in three integrating cells that synchronize across three planning
horizons (or by the phases of the operation). Like the functional cells, the integrating cells (current
operations integrating, future operations, and plans) are matrix organizations established around core
elements organized as components of the movement and maneuver functional cell. In addition to the core
elements, all the functional cells and special staff elements are represented in the integrating cells, either on
a permanent basis or as required by the situation. Each headquarters has a command group, personal staff
officers, coordinating staff officers, and special staff officers. (See ADRP 6-0 for a more detailed
discussion of their responsibilities). For each headquarters, the table of organization and equipment (known
as TOE) documents personnel by section and organizational design. The organizational design derives from
warfighting functions and reflects the organization of the staff for operations.
Functional Cells
1-29. The organizational design of each headquarters allocates personnel against six warfighting
functions—intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, protection, sustainment, and mission command.
The staff in the intelligence, fires, protection, and sustainment warfighting functions form functional cells
and reinforce the integrating cells with subject matter experts. The movement and maneuver function
becomes the basis for the integrating cells—current operations integrating, future operations, and plans—
under the overall supervision of the G-3. As dictated by the situation, the chief of staff forms temporary
teams such as working groups, boards, and centers.
1-30. The distribution of the mission command warfighting function is unique because mission command
is both the purpose of the headquarters and the warfighting function enabled by the entire staff. The
function includes elements that support the entire headquarters and enable it to operate, for example
network operations and knowledge management. It also includes highly specialized personnel, such as
intelligence analysts, space operations officers, cyber electromagnetic activities (CEMA) personnel, or civil
affairs specialists. It includes the command group, personal staff, information operations officer, and civil
affairs operations section. Typically, the battle roster distributes some special staff sections under a
functional cell while other sections merge into one of the three integrating cells. The chief of staff normally
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Chapter 1
supervises the G-6 and designated special staff sections. The arrangement of responsibility between the
chief of staff and the functional and integrating cells depends upon the mission variables. (See ADRP 6-0.)
Integrating Cells
1-31. Echelons above brigade have three integrating cells—current operations integrating, future
operations, and plans. Whereas functional cells focus on a particular function (such as fires), the integrating
cells are organized by planning horizons (see figure 1-3). The current operations integrating cell, future
operations cell, and plans cell coordinate and synchronize forces and capabilities within a specified
planning horizon. A planning horizon is a point in time commanders use to focus the organization’s
planning efforts to shape future events (ADRP 5-0). The three planning horizons are long, mid, and short.
In general, long-term planning is associated with the plans cell, mid-term planning with the future
operations cell, and short-term planning with the current operations integrating cell. Planning horizons are
situation dependent; they can range from hours and days to weeks and months. As a rule, the higher the
echelon, the more distant the planning horizon with which each integrating cell is concerned. The G-3
allocates integrating cell personnel between the main command post and smaller deployable command
posts. Normally, the tactical or contingency command posts have a core group of current operations staff
augmented by individuals from plans and future operations cells according to the situation.
Figure 1-3. Planning horizons for integrating cells
Flexible Staff Organization

1-32. The complexity of land operations—constant adjustment between the elements of decisive action,
multiple lines of effort and operations, and frequent changes to task organization—requires agility and
teamwork throughout the staff. The Army designed echelons above brigade to have the flexibility to meet
these challenges. The commander and chief of staff adjust expertise across the staff according to the
1-10 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

situation and do not adhere rigidly to the organizational document. The organization of each echelon’s staff
varies according to the mission, tailored force structure, multinational responsibilities, and other
circumstances.
1-33. The functional structure of the staff allows the commander and chief of staff considerable flexibility
to shift expertise among functional cells, integrating cells, centers, and temporary teams (such as boards
and working groups). It also allows the commander and chief of staff to adjust manning levels between the
various command posts employed by different echelons. For example, a corps headquarters on alert during
a crisis will expand its plans cell. Subsequently, the corps commander might deploy the corps tactical
command post with a deputy corps commander to the crisis area of operations. The chief of staff reinforces
the tactical command post with a small combined plans cell, a future operations cell, and additional
sustainment experts. When the main command post deploys, the staff reorganizes again, and the tactical
command post loses its planners. In another example, a division headquarters deployed in response to a
domestic disaster (a defense support of civil authority mission) will reorganize. Because of domestic legal
constraints, the chief of staff may redistribute the intelligence cell into the integrating cells to provide
“incident awareness and assessment” (see ADRP 3-28). Since there will be no requirement for fire support,
the chief of staff may shift personnel from the fires cell to liaison duties, airspace coordination, and rescue
coordination.
1-34. Figure 1-4 and figure 1-5 (pages 1-12 and 1-13 respectively) illustrate the design of echelons above
brigade headquarters. Echelons above brigade have large staffs to support the commander. Regardless of
whether the headquarters is a theater army, corps, or division, each has a command group, personal staff,
coordinating staff, and special staff, as shown in figure 1-4. In general, the personal staff works for the
commanding general. The coordinating staff and special staff work for the chief of staff. (ADRP 6-0
discusses personal, coordinating, and special staff sections in more detail.)
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Chapter 1
Figure 1-4. Distribution of staff sections within a main command post
1-12 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

ADCON
ADCON
Figure 1-5. Example of echelons above brigade command post

1-35. Organizational designs of the headquarters at theater army, corps, and division utilize a staff structure
based upon the warfighting functions. Figure 1-5 provides a sample echelons above brigade headquarters.
The personal staff works directly for the commander. Most of the coordinating and special staff separate
into cells derived from the warfighting functions. Five cells—intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires,
protection, and sustainment—receive the bulk of the sections. The movement and maneuver cell is the
largest and includes three integrating cells: current operations, future operations, and plans. The mission
command warfighting function does not have a distinct cell since the entire headquarters supports mission
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Chapter 1
command. However, coordinating staff elements that enable the tasks within the mission command
warfighting function such as the G-6 and G-9 often work directly for the chief of staff. Note that some of
the personal and special staff may remain at home station; this is situation dependent. The corps and
division receive large elements from the U.S. Air Force. Depending upon echelon and mission, different
headquarters will organize differently. A modified table of organization and equipment (known as MTOE)
delineates the specific organization, and the commander modifies the structure further based upon the role
and mission of that particular headquarters.
1-36. Other factors can alter the staff organization as well. If the headquarters is multinational in
composition, the commander may adjust it to fit the staff organization familiar to the international forces.
This is typically a derivative of the G-staff model, with G-1 through G-9 replacing the cells based on
warfighting functions. If the headquarters becomes a JTF, it reorganizes accordingly. Individual experience
and skill qualification play an important part. The most important determinant, however, remains the needs
of the commander. The commander communicates anticipated decisionmaking needs, and the staff adjusts
its organization and priorities accordingly.
1-37. Each echelon headquarters has a different table of organization and equipment, and each
organizational design is in the respective chapters on theater army, corps, and division. A modified table of
organization and equipment specifies the actual organization for each theater army, corps, and division
headquarters. The commander modifies the staff organization further based upon roles and missions
assigned.
OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHAINS OF COMMAND

1-38. Echelons above brigade exercise a mixture of OPCON and ADCON over subordinate forces. As
described in JP 1, the President and Secretary of Defense exercise authority and control of the armed forces
through two distinct branches of the chain of command. One branch runs from the President, through the
Secretary of Defense, to the combatant commanders for missions and forces assigned to combatant
commands. This is the operational chain of command. For purposes other than the operational direction of
combatant commands, the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense, to the
secretaries of the military departments, and, as prescribed by the secretaries, to the commanders of U.S.
forces. Each military department operates under the authority, direction, and control of the secretary of that
military department. This is the ADCON of forces. (See figure 1-6.)
1-39. At brigade and below, the distinction between the branches of command is small because in most
cases the operational and administrative chains are the same. The brigade commander is responsible for the
operations and administration of the brigade and all Army units attached to it. Above the brigade, the
responsibilities associated with the operational and administrative chains multiply. At the theater army
echelon, the support needed by deployed Army and joint forces requires not only the theater army
headquarters, but also large support commands. The theater army provides essential sustainment to the
corps through sustainment and medical commands. The theater echelon reduces the workload imposed on
the operational headquarters by shifting the sustainment, support to other Services, and multinational and
CCSA requirements from the corps and division. Without it, the support requirements could overwhelm the
ability of the corps and division to exercise effective operational command of their subordinate forces.
OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND

1-40. The assignment of forces to the combatant commands
comes from the Secretary of Defense in the Forces for Unified Global Force Management
Commands memorandum, and force assignments are Implementation Guidance
documented in the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance issued by the Secretary of
Guidance assignment tables. According to the Global Force Defense which codifies the
Management Implementation Guidance, unless otherwise processes used by Department of
Defense to execute Global Force
directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, all forces
Management. The text in this
operating in the geographic area assigned to a combatant document is updated in even fiscal
commander are assigned or attached to that combatant years and the Force Assignment
commander. A force assigned or attached to a combatant tables are updated every fiscal year.
commander may be transferred from that commander to another
1-14 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

combatant commander only when directed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by the President. The
Secretary of Defense specifies the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the
losing commander will relinquish). Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and JTFs
may direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands and delegate the
command relationship as appropriate. (See JP 1.)
Figure 1-6. The operational chain of command and administrative control

1-41. Inherent in command is the authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates
including authority to assign missions and accountability for their successful completion. Although
commanders may delegate authority to accomplish missions, they may not absolve themselves of the
responsibility for the accomplishment of these missions. Authority is never absolute; the establishing
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 1-15

Chapter 1
authority specifies its extent in accordance with DOD directives, and U.S. law. The specific command
relationship—combatant command (command authority) (COCOM), OPCON, TACON, and support—will
define the level of authority each commander has over assigned or attached forces. (See table 1-3 for a brief
summary of the joint command relationships.)
Table 1-3. Joint command relationships
Joint Description (Extracted from JP 1)
Relationship
Combatant COCOM is the command authority over assigned forces vested only in the
command commanders of CCMDs and cannot be delegated or transferred. COCOM provides
(command full authority for a combatant commander to perform those functions of command
authority) over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces,
(COCOM) assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all
aspects of military operations and joint training.
Operational OPCON is exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of a
control (OPCON) CCMD and may be delegated within the command. OPCON can be delegated from
a lesser authority than COCOM. It provides authority for organizing and employing
subordinate forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative
direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to
accomplish the mission. Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate
JFCs, Service commanders, and/or functional component commanders. OPCON
provides authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the commander
considers necessary to accomplish missions. It does not include authoritative
direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or
unit training.
Tactical control TACON is an authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military
(TACON) capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction
and control of movements and maneuvers within the operational area necessary to
accomplish missions or tasks assigned by the commander exercising OPCON or
TACON of the attached force. TACON does not provide the authority to give or
change the function of the subordinate commander, or modify the organization of the
subordinate unit.
Support Support is a command authority. A support relationship is established by a common
superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization
should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. The support command
relationship is used by SecDef to establish and prioritize support between and
among combatant commanders, and it is used by JFCs to establish support
relationships between and among subordinate commanders. The designation of
supporting relationships is important as it conveys priorities to commanders and
staffs that are planning or executing joint operations. The establishing authority (the
common JFC) ensures that both the supported and supporting commanders
understand the degree of authority that the supported commander is granted.
CCMD combatant command JFC joint force commander SecDef Secretary of Defense
1-42. The typical operational chain of command extends from the combatant commander to a JTF
commander, then to a functional component commander or a Service component commander. JTFs and
functional component commands, such as a joint force land component, comprise forces that are normally
subordinate to a Service component command but placed under the OPCON of the JTF, and subsequently
to a functional component commander. Conversely, the combatant commander may designate one of the
Service component commanders as the JTF commander or as a functional component commander. In some
cases, the combatant commander may not establish a JTF, retaining OPCON over subordinate functional
commands and Service components directly.
1-43. A JTF is the organization most often used by a combatant commander for contingencies. Combatant
commanders establish JTFs and designate the JFCs for these commands. Those commanders exercise
OPCON of all U.S. forces through functional component commands, Service components, subordinate
JTFs, or a combination of these. (See JP 3-33.)
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1-44. Support is a command authority in joint doctrine. When one organization should aid, protect,
complement, or sustain another force, a supported and supporting relationship is established by a superior
commander between subordinate commanders. Designating a support relationship does not provide
authority to organize and employ commands and forces, nor does it include authoritative direction for
administrative and logistics support.
1-45. JP 1 specifies four categories of support:
 General support.
 Mutual support.
 Direct support.
 Close support.
1-46. General support is that support that is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any
particular subdivision thereof. Mutual support is that support that units render each other against an enemy
because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent
capabilities. Direct support is a mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it
to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance. Close support is that action of the
supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported force as to require
detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the
supported force.
1-47. Joint support is somewhat vague but very flexible. Establishing authorities ensure both supported and
supporting commanders understand the authority of supported commanders. JFCs often establish supported
and supporting relationships among components. For example, the maritime component commander is
normally the supported commander for sea control operations; the air component commander is normally
the supported commander for counterair operations. For example, an Army corps headquarters designated
as the joint force land component may be the supporting force during some campaign phases and the
supported force in other phases. Often the JFC specifies only a supported and supporting relationship
between forces. In that case, the supporting force will be in general support.
Note. A joint support relationship is not used when an Army commander task-organizes
subordinate Army forces. When task-organized to support another Army force, Army forces use
one of four Army support relationships. (See ADRP 5-0.)
1-48. The JFC may establish a support relationship between functional and Service component
commanders. Conducting operations across a large operational area often involves both the land and air
component commanders. The JTF commander places the joint force land component in general support of
the air component until the latter achieves air superiority. Conversely, within the land area of operations,
the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) becomes the supported commander and the air
component commander provides close support.
1-49. When an Army corps headquarters becomes the joint force land component as part of a JTF, Army
units subordinated to it are normally attached, and OPCON is inherent. Marine Corps forces made available
to a joint force land component are normally under TACON, but the JFC may specify an OPCON
relationship. (See JP 3-31.) The JFLCC makes recommendations to the JFC on properly using attached,
OPCON, or TACON assets; planning and coordinating land operations; and accomplishing such
operational missions as assigned.
1-50. When the Secretary of Defense assigns Army forces to a combatant command, the transfer is either
permanent or the duration is unknown but very lengthy. The combatant commander exercises COCOM
over assigned forces. When the Secretary of Defense allocates Army units (from FORSCOM or a
supporting combatant command) to another combatant command, the transfer of units is relatively
temporary. Allocated forces normally return to their parent combatant command at the end of the
deployment. The combatant commander exercises OPCON of the allocated force. In either case, the
combatant commander normally exercises OPCON over Army forces through the ASCC until the
combatant commander establishes a JTF and functional components. At that time, the combatant
commander delegates OPCON to the JTF commander. When the JFC establishes any command
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 1-17

Chapter 1
relationship (including a joint support relationship), the theater army clearly specifies sustainment
responsibilities for all affected Army commanders.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL
1-51. Administrative control is direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in
respect to administration and support (JP 1). This administration and support includes organization of
Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and
unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the
operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. It is a Service authority, not a joint
authority. ADCON is exercised under the authority of and is delegated by the Secretary of the Army.
ADCON is synonymous with the Army’s Title 10 authorities and responsibilities. (See DODD 5100.01.)
1-52. ADCON does not necessarily follow to the operational chain of command at echelons above brigade.
Unless modified by the Secretary of the Army, administrative responsibilities normally flow from
Department of the Army through the ASCC to those Army forces assigned, attached, or OPCON to that
combatant command. As the ASCC, the theater army delegates ADCON as required to Army forces
attached by the combatant commander to a joint (or joint and multinational) task force. The ARFOR
commander and associated headquarters exercises ADCON of Army forces within that JTF as specified by
the theater army commander.
ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND

1-53. The Army Service component command is the command responsible for recommendations to the
joint force commander on the allocation and employment of Army forces within a combatant command
(JP 3-31). The ASCC is the senior Army command assigned to a combatant command. It consists of the
Army Service component commander and all those Army forces, such as individuals, units, detachments,
organizations, and installations under that command, including the support forces assigned to a combatant
command or further assigned to a subordinate unified command. If the combatant commander of a
geographic combatant command establishes a subordinate unified command, the Department of the Army
will form an Army component headquarters appropriate for that subordinate unified command.
1-54. The Secretary of the Army may redirect some or all Service responsibilities outside the normal
ASCC channels. In similar fashion, the ASCC may distribute some administrative responsibilities outside
the ARFOR. They primarily focus on the effectiveness of Army forces and the care of Soldiers.
1-55. Shared ADCON refers to the internal allocation of Title 10, United States Code (known as USC),
section 3013(b) responsibilities and functions. ASCCs usually share ADCON for at least some
administrative or support functions. This is especially true for Reserve Component forces. Certain
administrative functions, such as pay, stay with the Reserve Component headquarters even after unit
mobilization. Shared ADCON also applies to direct reporting units of the Army that typically perform
single or unique functions. The direct reporting unit, rather than the ASCC, typically manages individual
and unit training for these units. The Secretary of the Army directs shared ADCON. For example, the
theater army normally divides ADCON responsibilities for a military intelligence brigade stationed in that
AOR. INSCOM manages intelligence-specific equipment, activities, manning, and funding. The theater
army manages facilities, common item maintenance, and discipline.
1-56. Each theater army will have operational and administrative responsibilities. Through assignment or
attachment of Army forces to that geographic combatant command by the DOD, the theater army exercises
OPCON of all Army forces until the combatant commander attaches those forces to a subordinate joint
command. Regardless of whether Army forces are OPCON to the theater army or not, the theater army
commander retains responsibility for ADCON of all Army forces. Although the responsibility for ADCON
of Army forces within the AOR remains with the theater army commander, that responsibility involves the
entire Army.
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ARFOR
1-57. By definition, the ARFOR is the Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army
forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint
functional command, or multinational command. The ARFOR is the Army component of any joint
force. (See JP 1 and JP 3-0.) Army doctrine distinguishes, however, between the Army component of a
combatant command and that of a joint force formed by the combatant commander. The Army component
of the combatant command is an ASCC, and the Army component of the subordinate joint force is an
ARFOR.
ARFOR IN A SUBORDINATE JOINT FORCE

1-58. All JTFs that include Army forces have an ARFOR. The ARFOR consists of the Army commander,
the commander’s associated headquarters, and all Army forces attached to the JTF. The ARFOR provides
administrative and logistics support to all Army forces and retains OPCON over Army units not
subordinate to another component of the JTF. The senior Army officer assigned to the JTF, not in a joint
duty assignment, becomes the ARFOR commander. Since the preferred joint approach for a JTF
headquarters uses an existing Service headquarters, the JTF commander and headquarters would retain all
responsibilities associated with both command positions (ARFOR and JTF). This can overload the JTF
headquarters unless the commander delegates authority for Service-specific matters to another commander.
For example, when a corps becomes a JTF headquarters, the corps commander becomes the JTF
commander. The corps retains ARFOR responsibilities through the ASCC back to the Army, unless the
corps commander shifts Service responsibilities to another headquarters. The corps commander normally
designates a subordinate Army commander and staff as the deputy ARFOR commander for performing
those duties. (See JP 1 and JP 3-33.)
1-59. The typical JTF has a combination of Service and functional components. (See figure 1-7,
page 1-20.) While the JTF will always have an ARFOR if it commands Army units, the operational roles of
the ARFOR can vary. It is important to understand that the ARFOR exercises both OPCON and ADCON
over Army forces in the JTF. However, not all Army forces are necessarily OPCON to the ARFOR. The
ARFOR commander retains OPCON over Army forces attached to the joint force until the JFC places
selected Army units under the command of another component in the JTF. The JFC may designate the
senior Army commander and headquarters as the joint force land component command, in which case the
Army commander exercises OPCON or TACON over other Service forces, in addition to OPCON and
ADCON over Army forces. In this case, dual command responsibilities as ARFOR and joint force land
component are manageable, since the preponderance of forces are Army and missions assigned to other
land forces are similar in nature.
1-60. The combatant commander detaches Army forces from the theater army and attaches them to a JTF
(or another joint force, such as a subunified command). This removes them from the OPCON of the theater
army and places them under the OPCON of the gaining JFC (see note). When command transfers to the
gaining JTF, the ARFOR in the JTF exercises OPCON over Army forces attached to the JTF until the JFC
directs otherwise. The JTF commander organizes the joint force by specifying command relationships
(OPCON, TACON, or support) between attached forces. The ARFOR commander retains OPCON over
those Army forces not subordinate to another component commander such as a joint special operations
component. The ARFOR commander is responsible for all aspects of planning and executing operations as
tasked by the JFC.
Note. Attachment has different purposes in joint and Army doctrine. The combatant commander
attaches forces to a JTF in order to transfer OPCON. The Army attaches forces to transfer both
OPCON and ADCON. Therefore, when the combatant commander attaches an Army unit to a
JTF, it is automatically attached to the ARFOR unless the JFC specifies otherwise. The ARFOR
then exercises OPCON and ADCON over the Army unit.
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 1-19

Chapter 1
Figure 1-7. Possible joint task force components

1-61. In addition to controlling Army forces, the ARFOR coordinates ASOS. ASOS includes provision of
common-user logistics and executive agent support to the JTF as required the JTF establishing authority.
To make this coordination more manageable, the theater army normally retains command of logistics and
medical support units that are not part of the brigades. These units provide area support not only to the
Army forces but also to the joint force. The ARFOR headquarters manages support to other Services
including, but not limited to:
 Missile defense.
 Fire support.
 Base defense.
 Transportation.
 Fuel distribution.
 General engineering.
 Intratheater medical evacuation.
 Veterinary services.
 Logistics management.
 Communications.
 Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense.
 Consequence management capability.
 Explosive ordnance disposal.
1-62. As required by the theater army, the ARFOR commander exercises ADCON over all Army forces in
the JTF, including those subordinate to other components. Depending on the JTF organization, the ARFOR
commander may exercise OPCON of some or all Army forces assigned to the task force, and remain
responsible for ADCON of those forces. However, the exercise of OPCON is a delegation of joint
command authority and not a function of ADCON.
1-63. The theater army commander will specify the ADCON responsibilities of the ARFOR, with the
theater army normally retaining control of RSOI, logistics support of the deployed force, personnel support,
1-20 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

and medical support. Administrative responsibilities normally retained by the ARFOR include internal
administration and discipline, training within the joint operations area, and Service-specific reporting. The
theater army normally retains OPCON of Army sustainment and medical commands operating in the joint
operations area. The theater army commander establishes an Army support relationship between the
ARFOR and these units. (See chapter 2 for further details.)
ARFOR RESPONSIBILITIES
1-64. A division or corps headquarters serving as the ARFOR for a JTF includes the headquarters
controlling multiple subordinate tactical formations and the Army forces placed under a joint or
multinational headquarters. The Army commander is responsible to the JFC for these operational
requirements. However, the JFC is not responsible for Service-specific matters involving administration
and support of Army forces. The Army forces commander answers to the Secretary of the Army through
the ASCC for Service-specific matters, whether it is a theater army or functional command (for example,
SDDC of the USTRANSCOM). A theater army provides ADCON or Title 10 authorities and
responsibilities for all Army units within the JTF, including those not under OPCON of the headquarters. In
certain circumstances, such as geographic separation between the ADCON headquarters and the
intermediate tactical headquarters, the theater army commander can delegate authority to execute specified
administrative tasks to Army component commanders under OPCON of JFCs operating in joint operations
areas within an area of operations.
1-65. The ARFOR within a joint operations area normally exercises OPCON over all Army maneuver,
fires, and maneuver support forces (such as military police, air and missile defense, engineer, civil affairs,
and CBRN), except for Army forces providing sustainment (including medical support). The ARFOR in a
joint operations area identifies requirements, establishes priorities of support for Army forces, and
coordinates with the theater army for providing sustainment. The ASCC may itself function as an ARFOR
unless the combatant commander exercises command and control through subordinate JFCs. In this case,
each subordinate JFC potentially has subordinate Army forces, while the ASCC exercises ADCON of all
Army forces across the AOR. The ASCC provides ASOS, common-user logistics, assignment eligibility
and availability, and sustainment to interagency elements and Army, joint, and multinational forces in a
joint operations area.
1-66. This relationship relieves division or Army executive agent responsibilities. Under the
corps headquarters (as ARFOR within the joint authority of the Secretary of Defense and Title 10,
operations area) of responsibility for directly U.S. Code, the Army has been designated the
exercising ADCON and sustaining tasks for executive agent by the Secretary of Defense or
Army forces and providing ASOS, common- Deputy Secretary of Defense for foundational
user logistics, and Army executive agent activities that are not necessarily landpower equities,
responsibilities. The sustainment concept splits but functions necessary to the entire joint force.
the responsibilities between the ARFOR in the These functions include, but are not limited to—
joint operations area or the joint force command • DOD Detainee Operations Policy.
• Armed Services Blood Program Office.
(division or corps) and the theater army. The
• Chemical and Biological Defense Program.
theater army provides sustainment to all Army
• Chemical Demilitarization.
forces stationed in, transiting through, or
• DOD Combat Feeding Research and
operating within the area of operations. It also Engineering Program.
provides most ASOS, common-user logistics, • Defense Language Institute Foreign
and Army executive agent support to unified Language Center.
action partners within the area of operations. • DOD Level III Corrections.
The theater army executes these sustainment • Explosives Safety Management.
responsibilities through its assigned theater
sustainment command (TSC) with expeditionary sustainment commands (ESCs) and tailored sustainment
brigades provided from the Army pool of Service-retained rotational forces. The theater army provides
medical services to support the force through its assigned medical command (deployment support)
(MEDCOM [DS]) and forward deployed medical brigades. (See FM 4-02.)
1-67. For each of the combatant commands, the Secretary of Defense has assigned administrative and
logistics support for subordinate joint elements to one of the four military services. The Department of the
Army delegates its assigned CCSA responsibilities to the respective theater army (or in the case of Korea,
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 1-21

Chapter 1
to the Eighth Army) for that geographic combatant command. U.S. Army South conducts CCSA for
USSOUTHCOM and USSOCOM South. U.S. Army Europe conducts CCSA for USEUCOM, U.S. Special
Operations Command Europe, USAFRICOM, and U.S. Special Operations Command Africa. Eighth Army
conducts CCSA for U.S. Joint Forces Korea and U.S. Special Operations Command Korea. USASOC
conducts CCSA for Joint Special Operations Command. (See DODD 5100.03.)
ARMY LOGISTICS AND MEDICAL SUPPORT

1-68. The logistics concept of support, and its counterpart in the medical concept of support, affects the
command and support relationships among the theater army, the ARFOR (a division or corps
headquarters), and the logistics and medical units supporting Army and joint forces conducting operations
in a joint operations area. Under the logistics and medical support concepts, the logistics and medical units
above brigade level maintain a command relationship with their parent logistics and medical commands
and have a support relationship with the ARFOR in the joint operations area. The objectives of the logistics
and medical support concepts are to maximize the efficiency, effectiveness, and flexibility of logistics and
medical support provided to Army and joint forces operating in a joint operations area. Sustainment
provided by the ESC and medical brigade (support) relieves the ARFOR of most of the responsibilities for
sustainment, including ASOS, common-user logistics, and some executive agent functions. This allows the
ARFOR to focus on the operational maneuver, maneuver support, and fires tasks of land operations while
the logistics and medical commands provide tailored support to the Army and joint forces. The logistics
and medical units deployed within the joint operations area are normally in direct support of the ARFOR
and provide general support to joint and multinational forces on an area basis.
LOGISTICS CONCEPT OF SUPPORT

1-69. The purpose of sustaining operations is to generate and maintain combat power. Logistics operations
enable both shaping and decisive operations by extending operational reach and enabling commanders to
mass effects and maintain freedom of action. A structure that provides unity of command from a strategic
level to tactical level is critical to the success of sustaining operations. This applies equally to both logistics
and medical operations in support of Army and joint forces.
1-70. Sustainment of landpower requires an uninterrupted link between the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels. It requires close coordination and collaboration with other Services, allies, host nations, and
other governmental and nongovernmental organizations. The sustainment command headquarters serves as
the link necessary to extend operational reach, endurance, and freedom of action that are essential for
success of unified land operations. Sustainment planning and execution must establish command and
support relationships at the operational and tactical levels and across joint and Army forces.
1-71. The TSC is the senior Army logistics headquarters in the theater. It plans, coordinates, and resources
all Army or lead service logistics requirements, prioritizes requirements, and synchronizes distribution
throughout the theater. Integral to the TSC success is its ability to leverage and synchronize support from
joint and strategic partners (such as, the USTRANSCOM, the Defense Logistics Agency, the Air Mobility
Command, the General Services Administration, and the U.S. Army Materiel Command). The TSC is part
of an integrated network that links to both the joint and Army logistics networks for logistics focus and
command functions.
1-72. Sustainment commanders and staffs (logisticians, medical, and personnel services) develop theater
concept of support plans that ensure Army forces are sustained throughout all phases of an operation. These
plans are developed in close coordination with the theater army and the combatant commander to ensure
that all forces can be sustained in accordance with the joint commander’s priorities. Sustainment resides in
the TSC, ESC, MEDCOM (DS), sustainment brigades, and combat sustainment support battalion (CSSB)
headquarters. At echelons above brigade, functional sustainment units execute sustaining operations. These
units are specialized to perform unique sustainment capabilities primarily on a general support relationship.
At each echelon, information management systems capture sustainment requirements to produce a theater
sustainment common operational picture, allowing sustainment commanders to manage and prioritize
supply stocks, distribution assets, and medical assets. The sustainment command relationship is designed to
maximize sustainment efficiencies and provide effective medical, materiel, and distribution management
throughout the entire theater of operations.
1-22 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

1-73. Centralized logistics command means that staffs plan and coordinate theater logistics at the TSC and
ESC levels. The execution of logistics is decentralized, performed by the sustainment brigade and support
battalions within each brigade. The concept of centralized logistics command supports the theater army
commander by ensuring continuity of logistics support to land operations across the theater. Centralized
logistics requires continuous coordination, maintaining a common operation picture, and supported and
supporting commanders who focus on understanding each other’s capabilities and intents.
1-74. Centralized control of logistics maximizes three main responsibilities with which the TSC and ESC
are charged: theater opening, theater distribution, and theater sustainment. Materiel and distribution
management are critical to ensure that these responsibilities are executed efficiently and in accordance with
the commander’s intent and priorities. Within the logistics chain of command, the S-4, G-4, or J-4 staff and
support operations offices at each sustainment level ensure a seamless coordination effort to synchronize
materiel and distribution management.
1-75. The primary staff for logistics within an operational headquarters is the S-4, G-4, or J-4. The S-4,
G-4, or J-4 develops, coordinates, and monitors plans, policies, procedures, and programs for supply,
transportation, maintenance, field services, and facilities for the command’s subordinate units. This staff
determines logistics requirements for subordinate units, monitors the logistics posture of subordinate units,
and establishes support priorities in accordance with the commander’s priorities and intent. This staff
section provides supervision of all classes of supply operations as well as monitors and analyzes
subordinate unit equipment and supply readiness status. The S-4, G-4, or J-4 identifies systematic
sustainment problems, provides solutions to fix sustainment problems, and then makes recommendations
for provisions of adequate sustainment force structure to mitigate those problems. The S-4, G-4, or J-4 is
also responsible for planning and management of fixed facilities and coordination of construction, utilities,
and real estate for the command.
1-76. In conjunction with the theater army G-3, the G-4—who maintains oversight of Army unit
equipment readiness in the theater—develops plans for cross-leveling equipment to meet changing
operational requirements. Cross-leveling of materiel is communicated to the TSC and ESC so that U.S.
Army Materiel Command—responsible for the management and accountability of equipment replacement
stocks—can meet strategic and operational stockage objectives. During theater drawdown and retrograde of
equipment, the theater army G-4 (in coordination with the TSC and U.S. Army Materiel Command)
monitors equipment disposition and drawdown activities to ensure Army equipment is processed out of the
theater properly.
1-77. The support operations staff is a unique primary staff position found in logistics organizations.
Unlike the S-4, G-4, or J-4, the support operations staff focuses on the logistics mission of providing
support to customer units. The support operations staff is responsible for providing logistics support to
supported organizations in accordance with the logistics plan. It does detailed planning support for
deployment and the Army portion of the theater distribution system. This staff section manages supply,
maintenance, hazardous waste management, field services, transportation, and movement control activities
associated with support to the force. It integrates transportation and movement of units, supplies, and
materiel into, within, and out of theater. It provides this support through a distribution management center.
1-78. The TSC and ESC distribution management centers consist of seven subordinate branches:
distribution integration, supply, material readiness, munitions, mobility, logistics automation, and
operational contract support. Based on mission variables, medical supply and support to Army special
operations forces (ARSOF) may be included. These branches serve as the central logistics management cell
linking operational sustainment to strategic sustaining operations.
1-79. Normally the TSC is assigned to the theater army. Forces allocated to the TSC (ESC, sustainment
brigades, battalions, and companies) are normally attached. In almost all instances, companies and
battalions will be further attached to a sustainment brigade headquarters. The TSC organizes forces,
establishes command relationships and priorities of support, and allocates resources as necessary to support
mission requirements.
1-80. The subordinate units of the TSC that deploy into a joint operations area (an ESC with subordinate
sustainment brigades, for example) normally have a support relationship with the corps or division
headquarters serving as the ARFOR. As required by the JFC, the sustainment command will also support
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 1-23

Chapter 1
joint forces. The specific support relationship depends on several factors. If the mission of the ARFOR
requires extensive maneuver by brigades and divisions, then the sustainment command normally provides
direct support to the ARFOR based on ARFOR commander’s priorities. In campaigns dominated by
stability tasks where brigade-sized maneuvers are uncommon, the sustainment command normally is in
general support to the ARFOR and provides sustainment according to the JFC’s priorities and coordination
with the theater army and TSC. Subordinate units of the ARFOR normally receive support on an area basis.
If the JFC establishes a joint functional logistics command and designates the ESC as the logistics
headquarters, then the ESC provides general support to the ARFOR.
1-81. Under certain conditions, the corps or division may require TACON or OPCON of deployed
sustainment units. The JFC could also exercise OPCON of Army sustainment units directly. Regardless of
the command or support relationship to headquarters in the joint operations area, the TSC retains ADCON
of Army logistics units and maintains situational awareness through command reporting enabled by
automated logistics control systems and other mechanisms established by the theater army. (For detailed
information on the TSC and ESCs, refer to ATP 4-94.)
MEDICAL CONCEPT OF SUPPORT

1-82. The medical concept of support uses a single medical chain of command and the provision of
medical support on an area basis.
Centralized Medical Chain of Command

1-83. Like a single logistics structure, a centralized medical structure that provides unity of command from
strategic to tactical levels results from a need to fuse multiple capabilities together to achieve JFC
campaign objectives. A centralized medical chain of command enables medical commanders to meet the
requirements of dynamic operations. This allows medical commanders in the single chain of command to
identify and specify the need to re-route medical assets within the joint operations area and AOR. The
centralized medical chain of command enables the medical commander to effectively plan and execute
theater-wide (AOR) distribution of medical support between multiple joint operations areas.
1-84. The MEDCOM (DS) is the senior Army medical headquarters in an AOR. A MEDCOM (DS) is
normally assigned to the theater army and serves as the medical force provider within the AOR. The
MEDCOM (DS) executes its responsibility to provide health services through forward deployed medical
brigades. Medical brigades are normally in direct support of the ARFOR and provide general support on an
area basis to joint and multinational forces as well as governmental and nongovernmental organizations.
Under certain conditions, a medical brigade may be attached or placed under OPCON to an Army division
or corps headquarters (as ARFOR), but this limits the senior medical commander’s ability to rapidly task-
organize and reallocate resources across the AOR. Thus, all Army health service units maintain a command
relationship with a medical chain of command from the medical battalion (multifunctional) through the
medical brigade (support) to the MEDCOM (DS). (See FM 4-02.)
Provision of Medical Support on an Area Basis

1-85. Like logistics support, medical elements (medical brigades or medical battalions [multifunctional])
provide support on an area basis. Medical battalions (multifunctional) that provide Army health services to
the force are task-organized to a medical brigade and assigned an area of support. Medical brigades
(support) or medical battalions (multifunctional) provide support to designated Army, joint, and
multinational forces as well as governmental and nongovernmental organizations within that assigned area
of support.
OVERLAPPING OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHAINS

1-86. At echelons above brigade, the operational and administrative chains of command intertwine. The
operational chain of command extends downward from the combatant commander through the JFC to
Service and functional components within a subordinate joint command. ADCON of Army forces extends
downward from the theater army through the ARFOR and from there through task-organized Army units.
The ARFOR will have OPCON over many Army units, but not necessarily all. The ARFOR will exercise
1-24 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

ADCON over all Army units, but the theater army will retain ADCON for selected tasks or Army units. For
example, an Army corps headquarters may become a joint force land component within a JTF. (See
figure 1-8.) The corps commander exercises OPCON automatically over the attached Army divisions and
the maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB). The corps has TACON of a Marine expeditionary brigade. The
corps commander has placed an Army engineer battalion under the TACON of the Marine Corps
commander. The JFC has placed an air defense brigade in direct support of the joint force air component
commander (JFACC), who is also the area air defense commander (AADC). The JFC has organized a joint
special operations task force and attached an Army special forces unit and a Ranger unit to it. Therefore,
the joint special operations task force has OPCON of these Army forces. As the senior Army commander,
the corps commander exercises ADCON over the Army units distributed across the JTF. This ensures that
Service responsibilities are fulfilled while giving the JFC maximum flexibility for employing the joint
force. Unless modified by the Secretary of the Army or the theater army commander, Service
responsibilities continue through the ARFOR to the respective Army commanders.
Figure 1-8. Overlapping chains of authority

1-87. In some limited contingency operations, the JFC may elect to employ Marine Corps and Army forces
as Service components, instead of creating a functional joint force land component. In that case, the
ARFOR and Marine Corps forces would exercise OPCON over their respective Service forces as well as
ADCON. This arrangement may occur in a forcible entry operation due to the complexity of parachute, air,
and amphibious operations and limited time available for joint integration. As soon as the joint operations
area matures with the arrival of follow-on forces and headquarters, the JFC may establish a joint force land
component command.
1-88. Figure 1-9 on page 1-26 illustrates another case. If Army forces are the only conventional forces
attached to a JTF, the JFC may fight with the ARFOR serving as both the Service and operational-level
land component of that task force. Note that because the ARFOR does not control other Service forces, it is
not a joint force land component command. It functions as a co-equal component to the functional
components—JFACC, joint force maritime component commander, and joint force special operations
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 1-25

Chapter 1
component commander within the JTF. As the joint force land component, the ARFOR employs landpower
to accomplish the objectives of the campaign. Its focus is at the operational level. As the Service
component, the ARFOR has ADCON over the all the Army units attached to the JTF. It does not have
OPCON over all the Army units in this example. The air and missile defense brigade provides direct
support to the JFACC because the JFACC is also the AADC.
Figure 1-9. Joint task force organized by Service and functional components
1-89. Multinational operations may also complicate the chain of command. In general, multinational forces
will operate under the TACON of a U.S. headquarters. However, the National Command Authority of the
multinational force may impose constraints and restraints on the use of their forces. Army forces may
operate under the TACON or in direct support of a multinational headquarters but remain subject to U.S.
command. The ARFOR retains ADCON over all Army units under multinational command. The ARFOR
and its supporting sustainment command will often provide support to multinational forces within a
coalition. The combatant commander normally provides a formal agreement negotiated between the
supported multinational force and the U.S. joint force based on agreements concluded at the national level.
1-90. Although nations will often participate in multinational operations, they rarely relinquish national
command of their forces. As such, forces participating in a multinational operation will have at least two
distinct chains of command: a national chain of command and a multinational chain of command. As
Commander in Chief, the President retains and cannot relinquish national command over U.S. forces.
Command authority for a multinational force commander is normally negotiated between the participating
nations and can vary from nation to nation. U.S. Army forces can operate under the TACON of, or in direct
support to, a multinational headquarters but remain subject to U.S. command. The ARFOR retains
ADCON over all Army units under multinational command. The ARFOR and its associated sustainment
command often provide support to multinational forces. The combatant commander normally provides a
formal agreement negotiated between the multinational forces and the U.S. forces, based on agreements
concluded at the national level. (For more information, refer to JP 3-16.)
1-26 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

OPERATIONAL AREAS
1-91. This manual refers throughout to a hierarchy of operational areas. Within the AOR, the combatant
commander exercises COCOM over assigned forces. All U.S. forces within the AOR (assigned, attached,
OPCON, or in transit through the region) fall under the control of that geographic combatant command for
as long as they remain in the AOR. The theater army commander exercises OPCON and ADCON for all
Army forces within the AOR, except for Army forces in transit.
1-92. The combatant commander establishes subordinate joint commands, normally a JTF. The combatant
commander assigns the JTF a joint operations area that encompasses the three dimensional volume of sea,
land, and air within which the JTF will operate. Areas of operations are defined by the JFC for surface
(land and maritime) forces. The JFC may specify an area for SOF, designated as a joint special operations
area.
1-93. An area of operations assigned to the joint force land component does not typically encompass the
entire operational area of the JFC, but it should be large enough for the JFLCC to accomplish the mission
and protect the forces or capabilities provided. The JFLCC establishes an operational framework for the
area of operations that assigns responsibilities to subordinate land commanders and maximizes the
operational capabilities of all subordinate elements. Within the area of operations designated by the JFC,
the JFLCC (or ARFOR commander) is the supported commander. Within the designated area of operations,
the JFLCC (or ARFOR commander) integrates and synchronizes maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To
facilitate this integration and synchronization, such commanders have the authority to designate target
priority, effects, and timing of fires within their area of operations (see figure 1-10).
Figure 1-10. The area of responsibility and joint operations areas

1-94. Synchronization of efforts within land area of operations with joint operations in the joint operations
area is of particular importance. To facilitate synchronization, the JFC establishes priorities for all forces
within the joint operations area, including land forces. The JFACC is normally the supported commander
for the JFC’s overall air interdiction effort, while land and maritime component commanders are supported
commanders for interdiction in their area of operations.
1-95. In coordination with the JFLCC, those commanders designated by the JFC to execute AOR- and/or
joint operations area-wide functions have the latitude to plan and execute these JFC prioritized operations
within the land area of operations. Any commander accomplishing such a mission within a land area of
operations must coordinate the operation to avoid adverse effects and fratricide. If those operations can
adversely impact the land area of operations, the commander assigned to execute the joint operations area-
wide functions must re-adjust the plan, solve the problem with the JFLCC, or consult with the JFC for
resolution.
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Chapter 2
The Theater Army
ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND
2-1. The theater army enables the combatant commander to employ landpower anywhere in the AOR
across the range of military operations. It commands all Army forces in the region until the combatant
commander attaches selected Army forces to a JFC. When that happens, the theater army divides its
responsibilities between the Army component in the joint operations area (the ARFOR) and Army forces
operating in other parts of the AOR. Each theater army supports the Army strategic roles—prevent, shape,
and win—and facilitates the use of landpower in JTFs. The theater army is deeply involved in security
cooperation across the region. The theater army is organized, manned, and equipped to be the ASCC for
that geographic combatant command. It has limited capabilities to perform two other roles—JTF
headquarters for a limited contingency operation and joint force land component command for a limited
contingency operation.
2-2. The primary role of the theater army is that of the ASCC to that GCC. Title 10 establishes this in
law; it is reiterated in DODD 5100.01. The combatant commander exercises COCOM over all Army forces
assigned or attached to the command. Army forces under COCOM are attached to the theater army. Under
COCOM, the theater army exercises OPCON of Army forces until the combatant commander attaches
Army forces to a subordinate JFC, typically a JTF commander. For example, the Secretary of Defense
assigns (or attaches) an Army division headquarters and subordinate BCTs to USPACOM. Because the
DOD assigns them to the GCC, the division and its subordinate brigades attach automatically to the
USARPAC, the theater army. USARPAC exercises OPCON and ADCON over the division and brigades.
If the combatant commander creates a JTF and subordinates the division and BCTs to the JTF, then
OPCON of the division transfers from USARPAC to the JTF commander. However, ADCON and support
requirements remain the responsibility the theater army.
2-3. The theater army commander remains responsible to the Department of the Army for Service-
specific requirements. This falls under the ADCON chain of authority. This authority establishes a
hierarchy for Army support to deployed forces without modifying the operational chain of command that
runs from the combatant commander through subordinate JFCs. For example, theater army commanders
establish centers in the AOR to train individual replacements; complete collective training, theater
orientation, and theater acclimation; and manage force modernization of Army forces before their
employment by the JFC in the joint operations area.
2-4. DODD 5100.01 identifies the responsibilities of the military departments. The generating force and
operating forces of the Army divide responsibility for carrying out these functions. Figure 2-1 on page 2-2
illustrates the Service responsibilities inherent with ADCON.
2-5. The theater army and theater-level commands shift execution of much of the Service-specific
functions from the ARFOR, the senior Army echelon in a JTF, to the theater army. This shift allows the
corps or division commander to exercise flexible mission command over tactical units and permits the
ARFOR staffs to focus on their operational missions.
ARMY SUPPORT TO OTHER SERVICES

2-6. In all joint operations, sustainment is a Service responsibility except as specified by DOD CCSA
directives, combatant commanders’ lead Service designations, or inter-Service support agreements. Each
Service retains its responsibility for sustainment. Combatant commanders direct theater army commanders
to provide common-user logistics and ASOS, agencies, or multinational forces, as required. However,
shared sustainment responsibility or common-user logistics is more effective, especially for joint
operations. Title 10 authorizes combatant commanders to assign common-user logistics responsibilities that
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Chapter 2
overlap the military department’s prescribed functions. Additionally, directive authority for logistics is the
additional authority used by combatant commanders to eliminate duplicated or overlapped sustainment
responsibilities. The theater army coordinates with the combatant command staff to determine joint
sustainment requirements, identify responsibilities, and enable commanders to exercise mission command
for sustainment. Theater army commanders focus on operational-level theater support involving force
generation and sustainment during campaigns and joint operations. They match sustainment requirements
for a campaign to the Army forces’ capabilities. Combatant commanders may designate a Service
component as either the temporary common-user logistics lead or long-term, single integrated theater
logistics manager if required. (See ADRP 4-0 for more information.)
Figure 2-1. Service-specific responsibilities
PROTECTION
2-7. The Unified Command Plan directs force protection responsibility for all Title 10 DOD forces
stationed in, operating in, residing in, or transiting an AOR to the GCC. In support of the GCC, this
responsibility falls on the theater army commander for all Title 10 Army forces in the AOR. Since there is
no Army theater-level protection command, staff responsibility for planning and oversight falls entirely on
the theater army staff. If a JFLCC or joint security coordinator is required, the GCC normally assigns that
responsibility to the theater army commander. The tasks of the theater army include the exercise of
TACON over Title 10 Army forces stationed in, operating in, residing in, or transiting the AOR.
2-8. In addition to assets that provide protection, such as CBRN and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)
units, the theater army staff focuses on two enablers of protection: mission command and sustainment. The
theater requirements for air and missile defense, for example, often exceed the capabilities available. As the
force is tailored, the theater army staff coordinates with the GCC and is supported by the GCC’s aligned air
and missile defense command. The staff estimates the mission command and sustainment assets necessary
for both the campaign and an increased threat across the AOR. The staff also requests forces to meet the
combatant commander’s priorities. This planning necessarily involves coordination with multiple host-
nation militaries and the Department of State. Through careful planning, the theater army develops an air
and missile defense task force package consisting of sustainment assets, security forces, and headquarters
for deployment to partner nations outside the joint operations area. ADCON of these distributed task forces
becomes a challenge, and the theater army may require additional staff and earlier deployment of its air and
missile defense command in order to fulfill its ADCON requirements.
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The Theater Army
2-9. If the JFC elects to establish a joint security area (JSA) within the joint operations area, the ARFOR
normally determines its structure and its controlling headquarters. The options for the JSA depend on the
threat and the mission variables, particularly forces available. If the threat to the JSA is low to moderate,
the theater army commander may tailor the ARFOR with a MEB specifically for controlling the JSA. The
MEB may include additional military police (MP) and intelligence assets. If the threat to theater bases and
lines of communications is significant, the theater army may tailor the ARFOR with an additional BCT to
control that area of operations, and the supported commander in the JSA for protection. A third option, in
the case of very high threat levels, is to assign the mission to an Army division with BCTs and one or more
MEBs. (See ADRP 3-37.)
UNIFIED ACTION IN THE GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMAND

2-10. The Army provides each GCC with an assigned theater army headquarters with capabilities matched
to that AOR. The theater army and its theater-assigned Army forces support the combatant commander’s
theater engagement plans and security cooperation. The theater army and its theater-assigned Army forces
set the theater and the joint operations area for the employment of landpower in contingencies and
campaigns. The theater army’s contingency command post also provides the combatant commander with
command and control capabilities for immediate crisis response, assessment, and initial control of
operations. The theater army anticipates, plans, requests, receives, trains, sustains, and supports
redeployment of landpower within each geographic combatant command. In short, the theater army
provides and sustains the landpower in the AOR.
KEY TASKS AND LIMITATIONS

2-11. The theater army has operational and administrative tasks. Its operational focus is to plan for, tailor,
and control Army forces in that geographic combatant command. Its other purpose is to execute the Service
responsibilities specified in Title 10 and DODD 5100.01.
2-12. The tasks of the theater army include the following:
 Exercise ADCON over all Army forces in the AOR to include sustainment of all Army forces.
 Exercise OPCON over all Army forces not attached or under OPCON to a subordinate JFC
within that geographic combatant command.
 Provide Army support to theater security cooperation and theater engagement plans.
 Anticipate requirements and develop plans for the employment of Army forces in limited
contingency operations, crisis response, major operations, and campaigns.
 Set conditions in the theater for the employment of landpower; set the theater.
 Serve as the joint force land component command for military engagement, security cooperation,
and deterrence across the entire AOR when designated by the combatant commander.
 Coordinate with Department of the Army, Army commands, and supporting ASCCs for
additional Army forces and tailor them for the combatant commander.
 Control RSOI of Army forces deploying to the AOR.
 Provide ASOS and SOF including lead agent, common-user logistics, and CCSA requirements.
 Provide Army estimates and plans as well as advice to the GCC and to the Department of the
Army for the required exercises, engagements, and other activities in support of theater security
cooperation plans.
 Support other government agencies as directed by the combatant commander.
 Provide sustainment and other directed support to multinational forces as required by the
combatant commander.
 Provide a JFC and command post for limited contingency operations.
 Manage close and continual coordination with the Reserve Component in support of the ASCC
headquarters.
 Exercise TACON (for force protection) over all Regular Army forces stationed in, operating in,
residing in, or transiting the AOR. (This does not apply to Army National Guard forces under
state or territorial command.)
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Chapter 2
2-13. The limitations of the theater army headquarters include the following:
 The theater army is not designed, organized, or equipped to function as a combined forces land
component command or a field army in major combat operations. It does not exercise OPCON
over corps and larger formations.
 The main command post operates from a fixed location and is not mobile.
 The main command post can provide personnel for a multinational land component
headquarters, but this degrades the ability of the headquarters to provide and control theater-
level support across the area of operations.
 The contingency command post requires joint augmentation for employment as a JTF
headquarters. With augmentation, it can become a JTF for limited contingency operations.
Although the contingency command post is deployable, it has limited endurance without
reinforcement and additional security.
 Some of the theater-level capabilities required for campaigns and major operations must deploy
from the continental United States (CONUS).
 Augmentation for both a JTF and for theater-level capabilities is frequently provided by forces
mobilized from the United States Army Reserve and Army National Guard.
 Most theater-level capabilities required for campaigns and major operations are in the Reserve
Component and must be mobilized and deploy from the CONUS.
LANDPOWER FOR THE GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT COMMANDS

2-14. The strategic environment requires landpower to prevent, shape, and win. This requirement falls first
on the theater army. Army forces, in support of the combatant commander, work with partner nations to set
the conditions to prevent conflict as well as ensure the theater is prepared to execute contingency plans.
Strategically, the Army meets the demands for landpower from geographic combatant commands. Today,
most of this landpower comes through rotational units instead of forward stationed forces. Therefore, the
theater armies coordinate closely with the various Army commands and direct reporting units for
infrastructure, deployment and distribution operations, and in-theater support requirements. The CONUS
along with its territories and possessions constitute a unique and special AOR, with legally distinct
National Guard operations at the state level and multi-component federal military support when authorized
by the President. The Army National Guard provides the majority of military forces for state-level response
and for defense support of civil authorities (DSCA).
REGIONALLY ALIGNED FORCES CONCEPT

2-15. In support of the geographic combatant commands’ campaign plans, the Department of the Army, in
conjunction with FORSCOM, identifies regionally aligned forces to prevent, shape, and win in each AOR.
These forces maintain proficiency in the fundamentals of decisive action, but also possess particular
capabilities tailored for one or more of the missions specified for a geographic combatant command.
Regionally aligned forces provide the combatant commander with an Army headquarters tailored to that
mission, from tactical level to JTF-capable. These forces include Army units assigned to combatant
commands, units allocated to a combatant command, and units retained by the Service, aligned with a
combatant command, and prepared by the Army for regional missions. Regionally aligned forces
complement Army organizations and capabilities that are forward-stationed; complement those already
operating in an AOR; or support that combatant commander from outside the AOR. The latter extends to
those organizations providing reachback support and prepared-to-deploy forces into the AOR.
2-16. Combatant command requirements drive regional missions. These missions require the Army to
develop an understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries to where
Soldiers are most likely to be employed, as well as expertise in imparting military knowledge and skills to
others. This approach requires the Army to adapt forces from the lowest levels by emphasizing leader
development and leveraging technology to empower the force. Each theater army has a supporting theater
intelligence brigade, which enables regionally aligned forces and global response force units to connect to
the combatant command’s intelligence architecture for enhanced situational understanding. Figure 2-2
illustrates the theater army’s role in requesting regionally aligned forces.
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The Theater Army
Figure 2-2. Theater army’s role in requesting regionally aligned forces
THE THEATER ARMY AND CAMPAIGNS

2-17. A better understanding of the theater army’s responsibilities develops when examined in the context
of the joint phases. The theater army enables the Army to accomplish the strategic roles identified in
ADP 1: prevent, shape, and win. The joint phasing model uses six phases—shape, deter, seize the initiative,
dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority. At the conclusion of the sixth phase, the cycle resets to
phase zero—shape—within a new equilibrium across the AOR. The theater army plays a key part in the
conduct of campaigns and major operations, illustrated in figure 2-3 on page 2-6.
THEATER ARMY ACROSS PHASES

2-18. The actions of the theater army across phases are examined in more detail in paragraph 2-19 through
paragraph 2-27. Chapter 3 discusses theater army subordinate units that support deployed forces.
Steady State Activities and Phase Zero—Shape

2-19. The shape phase includes missions, tasks, and actions that deter adversaries and assure friends, as
well as establish conditions for possible contingencies. Security cooperation is the predominant activity.
Shape activities are continuous. The combatant commander uses them to improve security within partner
nations, enhance international legitimacy, and gain multinational cooperation. This cooperation includes
information exchange and intelligence sharing, obtaining access for U.S. forces in peacetime and crisis, and
mitigating conditions that could lead to a crisis. The theater army integrates landpower within theater
engagement plans and security cooperation activities. Integrating landpower requires the theater army to
train and prepare assigned forces for operations as well as to coordinate training and readiness requirements
with the Service force providers. Integrating landpower also includes extending the signal and network and
establishing the network that supports operations by the joint force land component. Notably, security
cooperation continues throughout the AOR even as the primary effort within the geographic combatant
command shifts during phase zero to the conduct of a campaign in a portion of the AOR. The ability to
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 2-5

Chapter 2
manage landpower within a campaign while continuing to support AOR-wide steady state activities to
include security cooperation underscores the requirement for a robust theater army.
Figure 2-3. Joint phases and the theater army
Phase One—Deter
2-20. The intent of this phase is to deter an adversary from undesirable actions because of friendly
capabilities and the will to use them. The deter phase is characterized by actions to protect friendly forces
and indicate the intent to execute subsequent phases of the planned operation. The theater army can
implement a number of flexible deterrent options during this phase. With the initial shift of the geographic
combatant command from shaping to deterrence, the theater army priority of effort moves to setting the
AOR and the joint operations area. Most of this initial effort focuses on refining contingency plans and
preparing initial estimates for the landpower needed for flexible deterrent options. As the dimensions of the
crisis take shape, the theater army examines a range of basing and deployment options. When the
combatant commander decides on specific deterrent options, then the theater army begins the process of
tailoring landpower for the deterrent options while refining plans for the full employment of landpower
should deterrence fail to resolve the crisis. As soon as feasible, Army forces attached to the theater deploy,
and the theater army receives, stages, and integrates additional Army forces into the JTF. During this phase,
the theater army develops additional basing requirements. As Army forces deploy into the joint operations
area, the theater army expands its footprint to sustain and protect Army, joint, and multinational forces, as
directed by the GCC. Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence continue across the
theater.
2-21. Concurrently with actions intended to confront and deter an adversary, the theater army commander
sets the theater to enable landpower to exert its full capabilities. This includes extending the existing signal
and network infrastructure to accept the land component and its supporting units. Enabling landpower may
include negotiation and contracting through the GCC with adjacent nations to establish tactical staging
bases and realignment of security cooperation efforts based on emerging threats. The theater army requests
not only forces that from the ARFOR involved in deterrence, but also the theater-level units necessary as
the flexible deterrent option expands and as those forces needed for supporting operations if deterrence
fails. An important consideration for the theater army is training for Army forces deployed as a flexible
deterrent option. The theater army works with host-nation officials to develop suitable training facilities
since the deter phase may be very lengthy if it is successful.
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The Theater Army
Phase Two—Seize the Initiative

2-22. JFCs seek to seize the initiative through decisive use of joint capabilities. In combat, this involves
both defensive and offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the enemy to react and setting
the conditions for decisive operations. When the JFC determines that joint combat power is sufficient to
seize the initiative, then the theater army’s priority shifts to sustaining and protecting deployed forces in the
joint operations area. However, the theater army continues to request and receive Army forces, and to
expand theater bases in and outside the joint operations area. During this phase the theater army expands
the number and capability of its subordinate commands to meet the demand for operations in the dominate
phase. Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence outside the joint operations area continue.
The theater army initiates transition planning for operations beyond the dominate phase.
2-23. During this phase, the theater army begins planning for phases beyond phase two. As early as
possible, the theater army develops plans and requests for forces for approval by the combatant
commander. Planning for the transition beyond the dominate phase requires intensive coordination with the
Department of the Army, supporting theater armies, the ARFOR, and theater-level commands such as the
TSC. The stabilize phase often requires different Army capabilities and headquarters from those required
for the dominate phase. The theater army also begins to develop redeployment plans in conjunction with
the geographic combatant command staff and USTRANSCOM for Army units that will no longer be
required.
Phase Three—Dominate
2-24. This phase focuses on breaking the enemy’s will to resist or, in noncombat situations, to control an
operational environment. Success in the dominate phase depends on overmatching enemy capabilities at the
critical time and place. Operations can range from large-scale combat to various stability operations
depending on the nature of the enemy. In a humanitarian crisis, this requires achieving a level of
effectiveness equal to the demands of host-nation and international agencies for U.S. military support.
Dominate phase activities may establish the conditions to achieve strategic objectives early or may set the
conditions for transition to the next phase of the operation. The theater army’s priority is sustaining Army
and joint forces throughout the dominate phase. During this phase, the number of forces controlled by the
theater army and its capacity reaches its maximum. The theater army staff coordinates with the ARFOR to
identify capabilities required for the stabilize phase. The theater army works with the geographic combatant
command to validate these requirements and transmit them to the Department of the Army and Army
commands. In many campaigns, landpower necessary for the stabilize phase will differ dramatically from
that used in the dominate phase. As the Department of the Army transforms requests for forces into force
requirements, the theater army plans to receive forces identified for stabilization and to enable civil
authority. The staff develops plans for redeployment of forces no longer required in coordination with the
geographic combatant command, JFC, and ARFOR. Military engagement, security cooperation, and
deterrence continue outside the joint operations area.
Phase Four—Stabilize
2-25. The stabilize phase is characterized by a shift in focus from sustained combat operations to stability
operations. These operations help reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential
government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. The composition of
Army forces continues to evolve. The theater army completes plans and requests forces needed for the
enable civil authority phase. Redeployment begins for forces not needed for this phase. The theater army
adjusts its theater posture in anticipation of new phase zero requirements. In particular, the security
cooperation requirements across the AOR change to meet new realities. Typically, the combatant
commander directs the theater army to plan for the establishment for long-term commitment of joint forces.
This often requires the transfer of theater army assets to a standing joint force, along with the creation of a
standing headquarters capable of controlling Army forces and supporting ARFOR requirements. Military
engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence continue outside the joint operations area.
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Chapter 2
Phase Five—Enable Civil Authority

2-26. This phase is characterized by joint force support to legitimate civil governance. The commander
provides this support by agreement with the appropriate civil authority. The purpose is to help the civil
authority regain its ability to govern and administer services and other needs of the population. The theater
army priority shifts to security cooperation under different conditions in the AOR. The theater army
manages Army support of forces remaining in the joint operations area, normally through a new ARFOR
identified and tailored for that purpose. Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence continue
outside the joint operations area.
2-27. At the conclusion of the enable civil authority phase, the cycle of phases is complete and the
combatant command resumes its phase zero posture. The environment of the theater of operations in the
new phase zero will be different, and the theater army adapts its activities accordingly.
THEATER ARMY ACTIONS

2-28. Paragraph 2-29 through paragraph 2-46 examine the theater army actions across the campaign in
more detail.
Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

2-29. In phase zero, GCCs shape their regions through many cooperative actions with partner nations. The
equipment, training, and financial assistance the United States provides to partner nations improve their
abilities to secure themselves. This assistance often improves access to key regions. Security cooperation
communicates U.S. intent and capabilities to potential adversaries in that region. If necessary, combat-
ready Army units deploy to threatened areas to conduct exercises, communicating unmistakable U.S. intent
to partners and adversaries. These are tangible effects of the Army’s role in security cooperation and
assistance. Other benefits are less tangible; these develop through face-to-face training involving U.S.
Soldiers and the soldiers of partner nations. Working together develops trust between military partners. The
impression U.S. Soldiers make upon multinational forces, local leaders, and other government agencies can
produce lasting benefits. (See ADP 1 and FM 3-22 for more information on shaping and security
cooperation.)
2-30. The theater campaign plan drives security cooperation in each AOR. The theater army has a critical
role in the theater campaign planning process. Theater army and supporting ASCCs participate in
operational planning teams, planning conferences, and the development and implementation of associated
documents. This participation includes conveying Service and DOD requirements to the combatant
command, conveying combatant command equities to their Service, assisting with concept design
(especially tasks and activities supporting theater-level tactical military objectives), determining resources
required to execute activities, and developing a synchronization plan for such activities.
2-31. The theater campaign plan differs from an operational campaign plan. The theater campaign
organizes and aligns operations, activities, events, and investments in time, space, and purpose to achieve a
strategic effect rather than an operational effect. While theater campaign plans have a large component
related to security cooperation, they also address posture, ongoing combat operations where applicable, and
the phase zero component of the combatant command’s contingency planning—or setting and shaping the
theater in which the theater army plays a significant role. The actions and objectives in each area will affect
the other areas; the commander balances actions and objectives carefully to ensure objectives in one area
reinforce those in another area without accidently undermining those of another.
2-32. The theater army, supported by the generating force, is crucial in resourcing and sustaining the
security cooperation activities. The theater campaign plan identifies steady-state force and resource
requirements. The theater army staff identifies and plans for likely deviations from desired requirements in
geographic combatant command contingency plans. The theater campaign can accomplish the following:
 Integrate shaping (phase zero) actions directly in support of particular contingency plans with
broad shaping and security cooperation activities.
 Enable DOD to synchronize global strategies with that geographic combatant command set of
contingency plans.
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The Theater Army
 Incorporate the combatant commander’s communication synchronization to convey clear

messages to partners, friends, and adversaries. Connect posture changes to DOD’s global and
regional strategies and provide a vehicle for continuously reassessing posture needs, refining
those needs, and updating DOD and regional posture plans accordingly.
 Identify and establish intermediate staging bases.
Set the Theater and Joint Operations Area

2-33. The term set the theater refers to a broad range of actions necessary to employ landpower before and
during a crisis. This includes base development, theater opening, RSOI, ASOS, DOD CCSA requirements,
and other sustainment-related support in the AOR. The theater army, in conjunction with its associated
TSC, prepares support and sustainment estimates that outline the responsibilities and requirements for
maintaining access and setting the theater where U.S. military presence is forward stationed or deployed.
The theater army executes many of these responsibilities through the TSC—some during phase zero, and
other actions in the deter phase. Setting the theater may also involve—
 Providing flexible Army headquarters to meet various joint command and control requirements.
 Providing force protection.
 Forward-stationing and rotational deployment of Army forces.
 Modernizing forward-stationed Army units.
2-34. The theater army and its supporting commands assess the adequacy of infrastructure in the AOR to
support anticipated military operations, determine requirements for additional infrastructure, and manage
infrastructure development programs assigned to Army forces for execution. The theater army develops
these plans and its assigned TSC in close collaboration with the combatant command’s J-4 and the Army
Corps of Engineers. Infrastructure development activities may include identifying requirements for forward
basing and air, land, and sea transit rights through the sovereign territories of partner or neutral nations
within the AOR. The Army identifies the requirements for basing and transit rights needed to support
landpower. However, the Department of State and the appropriate U.S. diplomatic mission must negotiate
bilateral or multilateral agreements.
2-35. As the combatant commander shifts priorities to a specific nation or region in the AOR, the theater
army focuses on setting the joint operations area. In conjunction with the geographic combatant command
staff and interagency partners, the theater army identifies bases in the joint operations area for logistics,
medical support, protection, and infrastructure development. The functions inherent in setting the joint
operations area include identifying responsibility for ASOS and agencies, land transportation, inland
petroleum pipeline operations, and common-user logistics. The associated functions of theater opening,
port and terminal operations, and RSOI of Army and joint forces are critical to the initiation of military
operations in the joint operations area.
2-36. The theater army also prepares to support joint command and control in the joint operations area.
Army contributions to joint command and control include establishing, maintaining, and defending the
communications and network architecture to support Army and joint forces operating within the joint
operations area, and maintain connectivity between land-based forces and the rest of the AOR. The Army is
designated as the DOD CCSA for theater communications and network architecture. Army forces execute
the responsibilities primarily through the signal command (theater) assigned to support the AOR.
2-37. Theater communications support is rapidly evolving. Cyberspace operations consist of DOD
information networks (formerly known as the Global Information Grid), and network operations, enterprise
management, network defense, and content management. Cyberspace operations provide network and
information system availability, information protection, and information delivery across strategic,
operational, and tactical boundaries. This includes a full range of defensive capabilities and when necessary
actions actively taken to defeat cyberspace threats.
2-38. At the joint level, cyberspace operations are operational missions accomplished by the commander,
USCYBERCOM (a subunified command of USSTRATCOM). This commander provides the command
and control as well as situational awareness required to operate and defend DOD information networks.
Army Cyber Command, as the ASCC USCYBERCOM, extends the command and control of the network
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 2-9

Chapter 2
through its OPCON relationship with each theater network operations and security center and through the
Army orders process to each of the signal commands (theater).
Tailor Army Forces

2-39. Force tailoring combines two complementary
force tailoring
requirements—selecting the right forces and deploying the The process of determining the right
forces in the optimum sequence. The first—selecting the right mix of forces and the sequence of
force—involves identifying, selecting, and sourcing required their deployment in support of a
Army capabilities and establishing their initial task organization joint force commander. (ADRP 3-0)
to accomplish the mission. The result is an Army force package
matched to the needs of the combatant commander. The force package can accomplish little until deployed.
The second requirement of force tailoring establishes order of deployment for the force package, given the
available lift and the combatant commander’s priorities. The U.S. Army Reserve, through augmentation
staff aligned to each theater, facilitates force tailoring. For example, U.S. Army Reserve augmentation to
the staff facilitates theater-level coordination with other government agencies and nongovernment agencies
for security cooperation. Tailoring the force is a complicated and intensively managed Army-wide process
and the theater army plays a critical role in it.
2-40. The majority of Army conventional operating forces
Service retained forces
is designated as “Service Retained” forces in the Global Those operating forces not assigned to a
Force Management Implementation Guidance assignment combatant command by the “Forces for
tables and is primarily based in the CONUS. FORSCOM, Unified Commands Memorandum.”
the largest of the Army commands, commands Active These forces remain under the
Component conventional forces (Regular Army, mobilized command of the Secretary of the Army,
Army National Guard, and mobilized Army Reserve); exercised through Army commands, until
executes training and readiness oversight of Army National allocated by the Secretary of Defense to
Guard forces under state command; and does the same for a combatant commander through the
joint global force management process.
nonmobilized Army Reserve units.
2-41. Based upon the landpower requirements developed by the theater armies and validated by the Joint
Staff, the Department of the Army and FORSCOM develop force packages based on cyclical readiness.
This is the ARFORGEN process. This includes forces for contingencies and forces needed to support
security cooperation activities. Wherever possible, the Department of the Army identifies regionally
aligned forces that concentrate on missions and capabilities required for a particular AOR. The regionally
aligned forces begin planning for their mission in conjunction with the theater army staff. The tailored force
package is task-organized by FORSCOM to facilitate strategic deployment and support the gaining JFC’s
operational requirements. FORSCOM is not the sole provider of Army forces; other supporting ASCCs
may contribute forces. The result is a set of trained and ready Army forces intended either for contingencies
or for planned deployments, such as a rotation of forward-based forces.
2-42. The theater army works closely with FORSCOM to match the composition of the force with the
forces identified in theater engagement plans, security cooperation plans, or contingency plans for a crisis.
FORSCOM modifies force packages as needed. The theater army commander identifies the major task
organization and pre-deployment training required for the mission. FORSCOM then modifies force
packages and training as needed. Whenever possible, FORSCOM (or the supporting ASCC) attaches forces
to its gaining higher headquarters during deployment (for example, BCTs to a different gaining division
headquarters). If geography or the sequence of deployment makes this impractical, the theater army
executes task organization changes when forces arrive in the AOR. The gaining theater army commander
modifies ADCON as required based upon the organization of the JTF and the support structure available in
the theater. Figure 2-4 illustrates force tailoring.
2-10 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

The Theater Army
Figure 2-4. An overview of force tailoring

2-43. The theater army also recommends the optimum deployment sequence for Army forces to the
geographic combatant command staff. The geographic combatant command staff may modify this
recommendation in coordination with FORSCOM and USTRANSCOM, based upon factors such as
available lift, location and readiness of deploying forces, and surface transportation requirements. Since the
initial deployment may not match the situation developing in the joint operations area, the theater army
refines the task organization based upon the ARFOR requirements. The theater army adjusts support
provided by theater assets to match the requirements of the forces on the ground.
2-44. In addition to forces allocated to the JFC from FORSCOM and supporting ASCCs, theater armies
provide Army forces from theater-assigned forces. Army sustainment units (logistics and medical)
normally have a support relationship with the deployed Army forces in the joint operations area. Other
Army theater forces such as military police, aviation, engineers, or civil affairs units may be attached or
OPCON to divisions or corps headquarters. Other units remain OPCON to the theater army and provide
direct or general support to the ARFOR. (See chapter 4 and chapter 6 for additional detail.)
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 2-11

Chapter 2
2-45. The organization established in force tailoring is not necessarily the same as the task organization for
combat. It is a macro-level organization established to control the forces through deployment and RSOI.
The gaining operational commander, typically the JFLCC, modifies this organization depending upon the
situation. Once deploying Army forces have completed RSOI, the OPCON passes to the JFC and gaining
functional component commander in the joint operations area. That commander further task-organizes the
force for land operations as needed. (See ADRP 6-0 for a discussion of task organization.)
Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration

2-46. Except for forcible entry operations, Army forces arrive in theater via the most efficient use of
available lift. Almost all personnel move by airlift, and 95 percent of their equipment and supplies move by
sea. The process of reassembling personnel, equipment, and supplies is RSOI. The theater army normally
assigns RSOI to the TSC and its attached ESC. Upon arrival in the AOR, attachment of the unit transfers
from the supporting commander (usually FORSCOM) to the theater army. The theater army passes
TACON of the unit to the ESC or other Army headquarters responsible for RSOI. Upon arrival of the
deploying unit’s chain of command, the theater army and gaining operational commander establish a
relationship of direct liaison authorized in order to facilitate communications and planning. The ESC
receives personnel and equipment at the joint theater base established in or near the joint operations area
(reception). When the unit is fully assembled, it moves as a unit to a designated assembly area within the
joint operations area (staging). At this point the ESC transfers OPCON to the gaining JFC or joint
functional command, and the theater army reassigns ADCON to the ARFOR in the joint operations area
(integration). (For a detailed discussion of RSOI, see JP 3-35 and FM 3-35.)
SUSTAIN ARMY AND JOINT FORCES

2-47. The Department of the Army is responsible for raising, training, equipping, disciplining, and
sustaining Army operating forces. These functions are Title 10 or ADCON functions. The administrative
chain of control passes from Department of the Army directly to the theater army for Army forces under
the COCOM of that geographic combatant command. Unless modified by Department of the Army, the
theater army provides ADCON of all Army forces assigned, attached, or OPCON to the geographic
combatant command, including those forces engaged in exercises and training. The theater army also is
responsible for the readiness and training of Army forces stationed in the AOR. It coordinates training and
readiness requirements for any forces identified for deployment to the AOR with their parent Army
commands or supporting ASCC.
2-48. Sustainment of Army forces under OPCON of a JTF remains a primary responsibility of the theater
army throughout all phases of a campaign. The theater army sustains the deployed forces by reinforcing the
organic sustainment capability of modular Army brigades and headquarters with theater army assets
dedicated to logistics, health service support, and personnel services. The deployed ESC and sustainment
brigades normally support on an area basis, utilizing a joint support area and bases distributed in the joint
operations area. Sustainment may be augmented through an intermediate staging base located outside the
joint operations area. (See ADRP 4-0 for a discussion of bases.)
2-49. The overarching consideration for all sustaining operations is to relieve the corps, division, and
brigade headquarters as much as possible of the requirements for managing sustainment across the joint
operations area. This grants the land commander greater flexibility to employ modular brigades using
mission orders across large areas. It also facilitates rapid changes in OPCON between Army units and joint
force headquarters.
Logistics and Personnel Support

2-50. The TSC manages logistics and personnel support across the entire AOR. One or more ESCs,
attached to the TSC, provide logistics and personnel support within the joint operations area. The ESC
provides logistics support by combining logistics and personnel support units into task-organized,
multifunctional sustainment brigades. The ESC and its attached sustainment brigades deploy to the joint
operations area, normally in direct support of the ARFOR. The sustainment brigades provide support on an
area basis to units of the ARFOR and other joint forces. Paragraph 2-51 through paragraph 2-54 discuss the
exceptions.
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The Theater Army
2-51. There are several options for command of logistics units, depending upon the geography and
distribution of forces within the JTF. The most flexible option retains command in the logistics
organization and provides logistics support on an area basis. The ESC is attached to the TSC and remains
under its OPCON. All sustainment brigades remain attached to the ESC. With the concurrence of the JFC,
the TSC places the ESC in an appropriate support relationship to the deployed ARFOR. The support
relationship will vary according to sustainment requirements within the joint operations area.
2-52. In high intensity combat, the ESC will provide direct support to the ARFOR, and its sustainment
brigades will provide direct support to the tactical units specified by the ARFOR. For example, large-scale,
high-tempo corps operations with rapidly changing tactical situations require decentralized logistics
support. The ESC, placed in direct support of a corps, normally places one task-organized sustainment
brigade in direct support of each committed Army division while one or more sustainment brigades
continue to provide general support to other forces in the operational areas outside the committed divisions’
area of operations. The corps commander plans for this option when the scheme of maneuver and division
task organization will produce very fluid maneuver and a rapidly changing situation. This will be the case
during attack, pursuit, and exploitation, or in a mobile defense. A variant of this option places a sustainment
brigade under OPCON of a division for detached operations. This may be the situation when an Army
division is conducting operations at a great distance from the rest of the corps, and its operations are
distinctly different from the remainder of the force. For example, an Army division may be defending
within a different area of the joint operations area while the remainder of the land component initiates
offensive operations.
2-53. In a protracted, stability intensive operations, the ESC will be in general support, with sustainment
provided on an area basis from established operating bases to joint, multinational, and Army units. The
ESC adjusts the size and composition of the individual sustainment brigades based on the density of Army
and joint forces drawing logistics support within the distribution radius of that sustainment brigade.
2-54. The JFC may centralize sustaining operations within the joint operations area. This arrangement may
support a multi-corps land force with a large contingent of Marine Corps and multinational forces. The JFC
establishes a joint logistics task force built around a sustainment command and subordinates Marine Corps
sustainment units and Army sustainment brigades to it. For the Army units at brigade and below, this
arrangement is largely transparent; they continue to receive support on an area basis. However, it permits
greater flexibility at the joint level to address competing priorities for logistics by Army, Marine Corps,
multinational forces, and SOF.
Health Service Support

2-55. The MEDCOM (DS) provides health service support for the deployed joint force on an area basis.
Army medical units form the backbone of a highly integrated joint medical support and evacuation system
that provides advanced medical care to all deployed joint forces, interagency personnel, and any
multinational forces specified by the combatant commander. The MEDCOM (DS) oversees AOR-wide
health service support and exercises OPCON of deployed medical units through its operational command
post. The operational command post commands one or more medical brigades, which in turn control
multifunctional medical battalions. The medical units subordinate to the medical brigade (support) can
include hospitalization, medical regulating and evacuation, dental services, laboratory services, veterinary
services, combat operational stress control, treatment, preventive medicine, and medical logistics. Medical
units will normally locate within joint and Army bases. The distribution and capability of medical units
depends upon the density of U.S. forces, available infrastructure, and evacuation capabilities. The
MEDCOM (DS) may place a task-organized medical unit in direct support of an Army division involved in
high-intensity, fluid combat operations or entry operations.
VERY LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS

2-56. Very large-scale combat operations may require the U.S. Army to conduct land operations with
multiple corps-sized formations, either as part of as part of a mature theater of war or under a joint or
multinational command. This could require a theater army headquarters to expand and transform into an
operational land headquarters (field army equivalent) exercising command over multiple Army corps and a
Marine expeditionary force. This is the original purpose of numbered armies and the role performed by
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 2-13

Chapter 2
Third U.S. Army in both Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom I. In this case, U.S. Army
corps would operate as tactical headquarters alongside Marine expeditionary forces. Such a campaign may
include large multinational forces and would operate under a joint or multinational land component. In
order to assume this role, the theater army requires extensive augmentation and time to assimilate not only
the personnel, but also the additional responsibilities. For example, before Operation Iraqi Freedom I, Third
U.S. Army (part of USARCENT) received approximately 70 Marine Corps staff officers to enable it to
control the Marine expeditionary force. Figure 2-5 illustrates a theater army in the role of a multinational
forces land component. If designated as a multinational forces land component, the Army headquarters will
follow joint doctrine contained in JP 3-31 and JP 3-16. Note that in such a campaign, theater-level
commands (such as the TSC and Army air and missile defense command [AAMDC]) may deploy into the
joint operations area to control several functional support brigades.
Figure 2-5. Theater army as a multinational force land component in a theater of war
2-57. The field army (when constituted) performs operational ARFOR tasks and is the Army component of
the joint force to which it is assigned. A field army, specifically tailored to the mission requirements, may
be assigned to a JFC with an enduring operational requirement. Typically, a subunified command is
established instead of a JTF when the military operation is anticipated to be enduring or protracted. In this
case, a field army would be appropriate as the Army component or ARFOR to the subunified command.
2-58. The theater army exercises ADCON over the field army and its subordinate Army forces, and it
provides the field army and its JFC with all Army Service functions. This includes Title 10, common-user
logistics, ASOS, and Army executive agent responsibilities, and sustainment and medical support for Army
and joint forces operating in the joint operations area or the theater of operations where the field army is
assigned. At the direction of the GCC, the theater army may delegate execution authority to the field army
for specified Army service functions.
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The Theater Army
2-59. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is an example of an enduring military operation for which the
United States established a subunified command (United States Forces, Korea) as the joint force
headquarters, instead of a JTF. Until the situation in the Republic of Korea is further resolved, the U.S.
Army will retain a unique structure on the Korean Peninsula. Eighth U.S. Army will serve as the forward
deployed field army headquarters and ARFOR to United States Forces, Korea or its successor joint and
combined forces headquarters. Eighth U.S. Army is configured and would be staffed to provide an
operational capability for Army forces engaged in multinational operations. Eighth U.S. Army remains
under the ADCON of USARPAC for most Army Service functions.
DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

2-60. Two geographic combatant commands, USNORTHCOM (also known as NORTHCOM) and
USPACOM (also known as PACOM) have responsibility for DSCA. The majority of DSCA falls to
USNORTHCOM with responsibility for the 48 continental United States, Alaska, and the U.S. possessions
in the Caribbean. USPACOM accomplishes DSCA missions in Hawaii, U.S. territories, and U.S.
possessions in the Pacific Ocean.
2-61. USARNORTH has unique responsibilities focused on homeland defense, homeland security, DSCA,
and theater security cooperation. Its responsibilities include the 48 continental United States, Alaska, and
the Caribbean territories of the United States. Within this vast area, USARNORTH prepares deliberate
contingency plans for homeland defense, DSCA, and theater security cooperation. It conducts operations in
close coordination with the Department of Homeland Security. USARNORTH maintains defense
coordinating officers and defense coordinating elements in each of the ten Federal Emergency Management
Agency regions.
2-62. Because the domestic operational environment is so unique, many tasks performed by
USARNORTH and USARPAC in support of domestic authorities are distinct. The two most important
differences distinctions are the legal limitations imposed on federal forces operating within the United
States and the different command structure for units of the National Guard. To highlight the most important
differences, Regular Army forces may not directly enforce the law, although they may provide equipment
and training for law enforcement agencies. National Guard forces remain under state command. National
Guard forces operate in parallel with federal military forces but under a distinct state chain of command.
There are exceptions. JP 3-28 and ADRP 3-28 provide extensive discussions about the unique requirements
of DSCA missions.
THEATER ARMY HEADQUARTERS

2-63. The theater army headquarters divides its staff focus among AOR-wide control, support of Army
forces, and ADCON of Army and joint forces within an active joint operations area. The staff will continue
to plan, prepare, and assess military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence outside the joint
operations area. Simultaneously, the staff will focus on support of Army, joint, and multinational forces
inside a joint operations area. Because each geographic combatant command is unique, each theater army
will have unique methods for organizing its headquarters to address these challenges.
MAIN COMMAND POST

2-64. The theater army main command post has limited operational responsibilities for Army forces
operating in a joint operations area; however, it provides support such as intelligence analysis and long-
range planning. The theater army main command post is the location for both routine day-to-day operations
as well as crisis action planning. The main command post is typically both a day-to-day headquarters as
well as an operational-level command post. For example, the regionally focused military intelligence
brigade collects against threats and adversaries in the AOR. It also provides all-source intelligence
concerning the threat and civil considerations to the theater army and other U.S. forces operating in the
AOR, as required. The TSC provides sustainment (less medical) for all Army forces forward-stationed,
transiting, or operating in the AOR, including those Army forces assigned or under OPCON to JTFs
operating in joint operations areas established in that AOR. In addition, the TSC provides ASOS, other
government agencies, common-user logistics, and other specific requirements established under specific
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 2-15

Chapter 2
operation plans (OPLANs) or contingency plans and Army CCSA agreements. (Figure 2-6 depicts the
organization of a main command post.)
Figure 2-6. Theater army main command post organization
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The Theater Army
2-65. The theater army oversees AOR-wide contingency planning and coordination, including developing
and maintaining operation and contingency plans, updating regionally focused intelligence estimates, and
updating Service-specific support plans to the geographic combatant command theater campaign plan. The
theater army collaborates with divisions, corps, or other designated Army headquarters assigned to execute
major exercises in the AOR or to execute specific operation or contingency plans. It also collaborates with
those headquarters aligned with the geographic combatant command for planning purposes. In particular,
the theater army contributes its considerable regional expertise (including cultural factors and regionally
focused intelligence and cyber threat estimates) to the collaborative planning process with division or corps
headquarters preparing to conduct operations in the AOR.
2-66. The main command post is primarily a planning and coordination element. It develops and maintains
OPLANs, contingency plans, and Service supporting plans for the combatant commander’s theater
campaign plan. The main command post may control Army forces involved in operations, training
exercises, and other security cooperation activities. It also coordinates collaborative planning with any
Army headquarters designated to deploy within the AOR. This collaborative planning facilitates the
transition of existing operation and contingency plans into the incoming headquarters’ own operation
orders for execution. The main command post provides planning support to the contingency command post
when it deploys command forces involved in limited contingencies or to participate in exercises and other
theater security cooperation activities.
2-67. The main command post also manages the support given Army, joint, and multinational forces
deployed to joint operations areas established in the AOR. This support includes theater opening, RSOI,
common-user logistics, and other Services associated with Army CCSA responsibilities. Most of these
responsibilities are sustainment related and performed through a subordinate TSC or deployed ESC.
2-68. The plans-to-operations transition across the integrating cells (current operations integrating cell,
future operations cell, and plans cell) in the main command post differs from a corps or division
headquarters. For example, in phase zero, the G-5 staff, with the support of an operational planning team
element, prepares the Army portions of the geographic combatant command’s theater engagement, security
cooperation, and contingency plans. The training section of the G-3 may plan exercises and readiness tests,
while the current operations integrating cell monitors exercises, deployment, and redeployments in
progress. In phase two, the plans cell supports campaign planning. The future operations cell prepares plans
and orders for flexible deterrent options, and the current operations integrating cell will monitor the AOR
and deployment of Army forces outside the AOR. The current operations integrating cell will control the
in-theater activities such as RSOI and air and missile defense activities as well as establish direct liaison
authorities between deploying Army headquarters. By phase three, the plans cell will be refining phase four
plans and preparing initial estimates for the transition to stabilization and post-campaign posture. The chief
of staff reorganizes the staff to obtain the necessary liaison and planners from the supporting commands,
while adjusting the priorities for the integrating and functional cells. The chief of staff also determines the
individual augmentation requirements for the staff and ensures that requests for additional specialists go to
the Department of the Army.
2-69. Throughout the campaign, the chief of staff and commander monitor the stress on the mission
command warfighting function created by current operations in the active joint operations area, and they
monitor the need to maintain an AOR-wide perspective. Although their priorities are the support of Army
forces committed in combat, they exercise mission command and shift the detail and method of support
onto their subordinate commands. The chief of staff and commander maintain a balance between the needs
of the JTF and the needs of the post-conflict theater.
CONTINGENCY COMMAND POST

2-70. The contingency command post enables the theater army to conduct small-scale operations. This may
include command of up to two BCTs or their equivalent for 30 days. Environments for these operations
vary from peaceful and permissive through uncertain to hostile. Employing the contingency command post
for an assigned mission involves a trade-off between the contingency command post’s immediate
responsive capability and its known limitations. These limitations address the scale, scope, complexity,
intensity, and duration of operations that it can effectively command without significant augmentation. The
contingency command post includes a command group, a personal staff section, and intelligence,
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 2-17

Chapter 2
movement and maneuver, fires, protection, and sustainment cells depicted in figure 2-7. The headquarters
support company of the HHB provides support to the contingency command post when deployed.
Figure 2-7. Theater army contingency command post organization

2-71. The contingency command post is organized with a command group, support and security elements
from the HHB, and a staff organized under the same five functional cells found in the main command post
organization. Unlike the main command post, the contingency command post is organized with only two of
the three integrating cells—a robust current operations integrating cell and a small future operations cell.
The contingency command post depends upon the main command post for long-range planning and special
staff functional support, if required. The contingency command post staff can access and employ joint
capabilities (such as fires, intelligence, and signal) and coordinate additional required capabilities through
the main command post. The contingency command post special staff normally includes personnel from the
main command post’s knowledge management and public affairs sections. Sometimes the special staff may
include representatives from other special staff elements based on the assessment of the operational
variables.
JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

2-72. The combatant commander may use the theater army contingency command post as the nucleus of a
small JTF headquarters. The contingency command post receives additional personnel based upon a joint
2-18 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

The Theater Army
manning document or individual augmentation requests for Army and other Service forces to accomplish
the mission. The contingency command post is a viable option for short notice and limited duration
operations because of its established internal staff working relationship. This capitalizes on the contingency
command post’s flexibility and rapid deployment. The contingency command post is deployable by C-130
(intratheater) aircraft. The contingency command post receives joint augmentation from the geographic
combatant command in accordance with a joint manning document for that specific mission.
2-73. The theater army provides the geographic combatant command with a deployable command post
element for contingencies that develop in the AOR. If a humanitarian crisis occurs simultaneously with a
campaign, the only headquarters available may the theater army’s contingency command post. The theater
army commander and chief of staff should maintain the integrity of the contingency command post during
the campaign for this eventuality. However, the contingency command post should redeploy as soon as
adequate Army headquarters are operational.
HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTALION

2-74. The theater army HHB provides administrative and sustainment support to the theater army
headquarters and contingency command post when the contingency command post deploys. The HHB
commander, staff, and three companies assist the theater army commander and staff in the areas of
administration, logistics, deployment, redeployment, life support, command post operations, and
coordination for area security. The HHB receives direction from the theater army chief of staff. The HHB
includes a command group, an S-1 section, an S-2 and S-3 section, an S-4 section, unit ministry teams, a
headquarters support company, an operations company, and the intelligence and sustainment company.
Figure 2-8 on page 2-20 shows the organization of the HHB.
2-75. The headquarters support company is composed of a company headquarters section, the HHB staff,
and the food service, medical treatment, and maintenance sections. This company—designed to deploy
with the contingency command post—provides sustainment support and commands the local security
section provided by an outside organization. Personnel assigned to the headquarters support company
include the commander and deputy commander sections, commander’s personal staff, chief of staff section,
special staff, HHB staff, contingency command post command group, contingency command post special
staff, and contingency command post support sections. The headquarters support company commander is
designated as the headquarters commandant for the deployed contingency command post. The headquarters
support company commander is responsible for administrative and sustainment support for the
headquarters as well as planning and commanding the access control, perimeter defense, and reaction
forces.
2-76. The operations company includes a company headquarters and the movement and maneuver, fires,
protection, G-6, G-9, and CEMA staff elements. The intelligence and sustainment company includes a
company headquarters section and the personnel assigned to the intelligence and sustainment functional
cells.
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 2-19

Chapter 2
Figure 2-8. Theater army headquarters and headquarters battalion organization
2-20 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

Chapter 3
Theater-Level Commands and Units
ASSIGNED AND ALIGNED THEATER FORCES
3-1. Each theater army has assigned theater-level forces for enabling capabilities (sustainment, signal,
medical, military intelligence, and civil affairs) based on specific requirements for the AOR. These
commands and brigades perform theater army tasks to support a joint operations area. The TSCs or ESCs
perform the majority of these tasks, normally through a support relationship to the ARFOR in the joint
operations area. The theater army tailors additional functional or multifunctional support brigades based on
mission variables. Divisions and corps then employ these supporting brigades as needed. The command
and support relationships for these organizations differ depending on the specific requirements of each
AOR.
3-2. Each theater army has assigned Army forces that enable it to support military engagement, security
cooperation, and deterrence for that geographic combatant command. These units allow the theater army to
support Army forces operating in the AOR and extend ASOS, interagency partners, and multinational
forces. The size and composition of assigned forces vary based on the continuing requirements for Army
support. Figure 3-1 illustrates a range of typically assigned forces. Not every theater army will have the
forces shown. Not every theater army will have these units assigned. In some cases, a brigade is assigned to
an Army command (or direct reporting unit), and aligned to the theater army. In other cases, the theater
army has a brigade in lieu of a full command. In each case, the aligned command or brigade is not part of
the force pool but is committed to the supported theater army and is integrated in all theater planning.
Figure 3-1. Example of theater commands and brigades
Note. Theater-level units in the Reserve Components are regionally aligned but not assigned to
theater armies. For example, most of the civil affairs brigades are in the Army Reserve. When
mobilized, these units are attached by a DOD order to their gaining geographic combatant
command. Upon attachment, the theater army exercises OPCON over them. This is the case with
all theater army units in the Reserve Components.
THEATER SUSTAINMENT COMMAND

3-3. Normally, one TSC is assigned to each theater army. Each theater army (less USAFRICOM) has an
assigned TSC. USAFRICOM receives theater sustainment support from USEUCOM. The theater army
provides support to Army forces and common-user logistics to other Services as directed by the combatant
commander and other authoritative instructions. The TSC is the Army’s senior logistics headquarters
within the AOR. When directed, the TSC provides lead service sustainment and executive agency support
for designated logistics and services to other government agencies, multinational forces, and
nongovernmental organizations. The TSC concentrates on strategic and operational sustainment
management. The command ensures the information flow from strategic deployment, distribution, and
sustainment partners is accurate, timely, and adequate to support the actions of the theater sustainment
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 3-1

Chapter 3
forces providing movement control for RSOI and all other sustaining operations. The TSC coordinates
strategic and operational distribution through its distribution management center. The TSC ensures that an
integrated and responsive theater-level distribution system is employed to anticipate and respond to theater
army requirements. The TSC will receive and deploy an ESC when it determines that a forward command
headquarters is required. The ESC will employ sustainment brigades to execute theater opening, theater
sustaining, and theater distribution operations. Generally, when two or more sustainment brigades deploy to
a joint operations area, the Army tailors the TSC with an ESC. Figure 3-2 depicts a TSC. (See ATP 4-94.)
Figure 3-2. Example of theater sustainment command
Expeditionary Sustainment Command

3-4. For each joint major operation or campaign requiring substantial commitment of Army forces, at
least one ESC is attached to the TSC. The ESC commands attached sustainment units in a land area of
operations defined by the JFC. The ESC extends the ability of the TSC to manage logistics and personnel
support by becoming the forward-deployed sustainment headquarters in the joint operations area.
Additional ESCs may be attached to the TSC if the combatant commander establishes a JSA or staging
base. Depending on the command structure within the theater, ESCs may support specific Army forces
within a joint operations area or support other ESCs and sustainment brigades with theater opening or
theater distribution capabilities. In most cases, the ESC will provide direct support to the ARFOR. In
certain circumstances, the ESC may be under OPCON of a corps, ARFOR, or JTF as required by an
appropriate order. It may serve as a basis for an expeditionary command for joint logistics when required
by the combatant commander or JFC. The ESC concentrates on synchronizing operational-level sustaining
operations to meet the day-to-day and projected operational requirements of the supported force. It
accomplishes this, in part, by establishing mid-range and short-range planning horizons derived from the
supported commanders OPLAN, commander’s intent, commander’s critical information requirements,
tempo, and distribution system capacity. The ESC supports the deployed force while the TSC maintains
AOR-wide focus. The expeditionary capability of ESCs becomes critical when multiple JTFs operate
within the AOR.
3-5. The theater army attaches sustainment brigades to the ESC. The ESC, when deployed, normally
assumes command of all Army sustainment units (less medical) that are not organic, assigned, or attached
to a brigade within that area of operations or joint operations area. Deployment of the ESC improves
3-2 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

logistics and personnel support by placing the ESC in proximity to the supported force. When given a
regional focus by the Army, the ESC can refine that portion of the TSC logistics preparation of the theater
for the JFC. The ESC normally establishes its command post near the ports of debarkation from which it
can effectively control both reception and sustaining operations. This location may be a secure base within
the joint operations area or in the JSA. The ESC is responsible for theater opening, including the execution
of port and terminal operations and RSOI.
3-6. The theater army commander normally specifies an Army support relationship between the ESC
(supporting commander) and the ARFOR (supported commander). This is normally direct support. When
conditions warrant, the ESC may pass to the OPCON or TACON of a corps, ARFOR, or JTF. When the
ESC provides direct support to the ARFOR, it subordinates units of the ARFOR on an area basis. For
example, a sustainment brigade supports all Army units within a division’s area of operations and provides
Army support to agencies and other Services, regardless of task organization. Operational and tactical
requirements vary as will command and support relationships between supporting and supported units. (See
Parts Three and Four.)
Sustainment Brigade
3-7. The theater army commander and TSC commander task-organize sustainment brigades for the
campaign. Each sustainment brigade is a multifunctional sustainment organization with a flexible, modular
headquarters organization capable of accomplishing multiple sustaining missions. Each sustainment
brigade is a key organization in linking sustainment support from the operational to tactical levels. It can
provide a full range of logistics and personnel services to supported units. The number of CSSBs attached
to the sustainment brigade varies with the task organization established by the ESC commander.
Subordinate units of the sustainment brigade may include CSSBs, functional logistics battalions, and
functional logistics companies, platoons, and detachments. Selected CSSBs may also be organized to
provide specific types of support to BCTs and to other support brigades lacking full internal sustainment
capability. The sustainment brigade usually has human resources and financial management units attached.
Under normal circumstances, the sustainment brigade will not have medical organizations attached.
3-8. The sustainment brigade is attached to either a TSC or ESC. The ESC normally provides direct
support to the deployed ARFOR. In turn, the sustainment brigade provides general support to all Army,
joint, and multinational forces located in or passing through an area determined by the ESC. Although the
area support may coincide with a tactical area of operations, for example a division area of operations, it
does not have to. The ESC commander adjusts area support based upon sustainment demands and the
capabilities of each sustainment brigade. In general, the sustainment brigade providing area support is
capable of providing support from the operational to tactical levels.
Medical Logistics Management Center

3-9. The medical logistics management center’s forward support team normally co-locates with the
distribution management center within the TSC (or ESC) and is subordinate to the MEDCOM (DS)
commander. The medical logistics management center’s forward support team is the supply chain manager
responsible for executing and influencing theater Class VIII policies and the commander’s intent. The
medical logistics management center is the single integrated medical logistics manager as directed by the
combatant commander. (FM 4-02.1 discusses medical logistics management center.)
Specialized Sustainment Units

3-10. The TSC normally receives augmentation from the Army Material Command and Army direct
reporting units. These specialized units include the Financial Management Center, Human Resource
Sustainment Center, and Army field support brigade. The Army field support brigade, for example,
coordinates material readiness, logistics civil augmentation program support, and acquisition logistics
within the theater. Depending upon the situation in theater, these units will deploy their subordinate teams
to the ESC and its sustainment brigades. The Army Contracting Command provides tactical contracting
teams to deployed units. Contracting may become a key enabler during the early phases of a campaign.
(See ADRP 4-0 for additional information.)
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 3-3

Chapter 3
THEATER-LEVEL SIGNAL SUPPORT

3-11. The joint force depends upon an integrated communications architecture that connects strategic,
operational, and tactical commanders across the globe. DOD information networks are the DOD’s globally
interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for
collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to joint forces and
support personnel. DOD information networks includes all owned and leased communications and
computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services, and other
associated services necessary to achieve information security. Operation and defense of DOD information
networks is largely a matter of overarching common processes, standards, and protocols integrated by
USSTRATCOM. (See JP 6-0.) The Army connects to DOD information networks through the NETCOM
and its subordinate signal commands and brigades.
Network Command
3-12. NETCOM is the Armywide provider for all network services. NETCOM enables commanders to
exercise mission command and freedom of access to the network in all phases of operations. It installs,
operates, and defends the Army’s Global Network Enterprise. NETCOM accomplishes this mission
through four signal commands (theater). Two of the signal commands (theater) are in the Regular Army
and assigned to NETCOM. The other two are in the Reserve Component and assigned to the U.S. Army
Reserve Command.
Signal Command (Theater)

3-13. Each signal command (theater) provides communications engineering and system control capabilities
for the theater-level network. The signal command and its subordinate units plan, engineer, install, operate,
maintain, and protect the Army’s portion of the theater network. The signal command theater normally
exercises OPCON and ADCON for the Army signal organizations within an AOR.
3-14. Within the CONUS, NETCOM commands the signal command (theater). The U.S.-based signal
command supports multiple Army commands, direct reporting units, and ASCCs, but it remains assigned to
NETCOM. Outside CONUS, one signal command (theater) provides network and information systems
support for all Army forces in that AOR. The signal command (theater) installs, operates, maintains, and
defends communication and information systems in support of the theater army headquarters, and as
required, to joint and multinational organizations throughout the theater. Although the signal command
(theater) is not deployable, they can deploy various capabilities to support specific mission requirements. A
signal command (theater) has one or more assigned theater network operations and security centers that
serve as the operational component of network operations. The theater network operations and security
centers are OPCON to Army Cyber Command for day-to-day defense of the Army’s portion of the DOD
information networks.
3-15. The signal command (theater) commands multiple signal organizations with different capabilities.
Subordinate signal organizations include nondeployable and deployable signal brigades. The theater
strategic signal brigade is not deployable; the theater tactical signal brigade is. These may be assigned,
attached, OPCON, or in direct support to the signal command (theater).
Theater Strategic Signal Brigade

3-16. The theater strategic signal brigade based in the United States includes network enterprise centers
(known as NECs). When stationed outside CONUS, a theater strategic signal brigade includes strategic
signal battalions, fixed satellite communications facilities, and many other strategic capabilities. The theater
strategic signal brigades plan, engineer, install, operate, maintain, and defend the Army portion of the
communication synchronization backbone in the form of terrestrial and satellite radio links and cable
systems. At Army camps, posts, and stations where the director of information management belongs to
NETCOM, network enterprise centers (CONUS) or strategic signal battalions (outside CONUS) are the
designated providers of baseline services to Army and other government agencies. The network enterprise
center or strategic signal battalion at each installation functions as part of the larger Army Global Network
Enterprise while remaining responsive to customer needs. Network enterprise centers and strategic signal
3-4 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

battalions support the generating force and operating forces engaged in operations through the transparent
delivery of LandWarNet capabilities. These capabilities include secure and nonsecure fixed-voice
communications, wireless voice, data and video connectivity services, and video conferencing services (not
including desktop video teleconferencing collaboration). Network enterprise centers and strategic signal
battalions provide telecommunications infrastructure support, collaboration and messaging services,
application and Web-hosting services, and desktop management support, to include service desk and
continuity of operation services. Although the theater strategic signal brigade and its subordinate units do
not deploy, they can, based on mission requirements, deploy personnel with specific technical skills to
support ongoing operations.
Theater Tactical Signal Brigade

3-17. The theater tactical signal brigade is deployable and normally includes expeditionary signal
battalions, combat camera assets, and tactical installation and networking companies. Theater tactical signal
brigades and expeditionary signal battalions are the Army signal formations optimized for deployment.
Theater tactical signal brigades provide detailed planning, engineering, installation, maintenance, and
defense of tactical networks. Theater tactical signal brigades augment the corps or division G-6 and
command one or more expeditionary signal battalions in large-scale operations. The expeditionary signal
battalion supports deployed Army forces that have no organic network systems and services. Expeditionary
signal battalions reinforce the network operations capabilities of an Army corps, division, BCT, and
multifunctional support brigade headquarters, and provide signal support to other Services components or
multinational headquarters as required. Expeditionary signal battalions provide line-of-sight and beyond-
line-of-sight communication links and network operations capabilities to extend information services to
supported headquarters. Normally, the theater army tailors expeditionary signal battalions to a theater
tactical signal brigade, although the theater army may detach an expeditionary signal battalion to support a
corps or division headquarters, depending upon the situation.
MEDICAL COMMAND (DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT)

3-18. The MEDCOM (DS) serves as the senior medical command within the theater. The MEDCOM (DS)
commands medical units that provide health care in support of deployed forces. The MEDCOM (DS) is a
regionally focused command and provides subordinate medical organizations to operate under the medical
brigade (support) or multifunctional medical battalion (medical battalion [multifunctional]). The
MEDCOM (DS) includes a main command post and an operational command post. Figure 3-3 on page 3-6
illustrates the theater medical structure.
Medical Brigade
3-19. The medical brigade (support) is a subordinate organization of the MEDCOM (DS). It is tailored
with multifunctional and specialized medical units. The focus of the medical brigade (support) is driven by
the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil
considerations (METT-TC). One or more medical brigades may support Army forces in a joint operations
area. One medical brigade (support) may provide direct support to a division commander, another may
provide Army health service support on an area basis to another division and corps headquarters, and a
third may provide area medical support to theater sustainment forces in the JSA. These organizations often
provide simultaneous support to interagency organizations and multinational operations occurring within
their areas of operations. The medical brigade provides all the control and planning capabilities necessary
to deliver responsive and effective medical support. The medical brigade (support) can provide an early-
entry module, an expansion module, and a campaign module. It can be tailored to the operation. As the
supported forces grow in size and complexity, the medical brigade (support) can deploy additional modules
that build upon one another to support unified land operations. When required, the commander of a medical
brigade (support) may exercise mission command for task-organized medical functional teams,
detachments, and companies.
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 3-5

Chapter 3
Figure 3-3. Modular medical support for the Army
Medical Battalion (Multifunctional)

3-20. The medical battalion (multifunctional) is designed as a multifunctional headquarters. It can also
command expeditionary forces in early-entry operations and facilitate the RSOI of theater medical forces.
Any higher-echelon medical companies, detachments, and teams in theater may be assigned, attached, or
placed under the OPCON of a medical battalion (multifunctional). The medical battalion (multifunctional)
is under the command of the medical brigade (support). One medical battalion (multifunctional) will
normally provide medical support on an area basis.
Area Medical Laboratory

3-21. The MEDCOM (DS) may attach an area medical laboratory to the medical brigade (support) or
medical battalion (multifunctional) if the supported units face a biological threat in the area of operations.
The health protection mission is supported by the area medical laboratory. This laboratory can provide field
confirmatory analysis of suspect chemical and biological warfare agents.
THEATER MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE

3-22. A theater military intelligence brigade normally supports each theater army. Every theater military
intelligence brigade is attached or under OPCON of the theater army. Although the military intelligence
brigade headquarters is theater-committed, it can provide subordinate battalions for operations outside its
3-6 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

AOR. When deployed to support the ARFOR in a joint operations area, military intelligence battalions are
normally attached to a military battlefield surveillance brigade (BFSB) or other brigade-level organization.
Note. USARNORTH is subject to domestic intelligence oversight restrictions. Because of these

restrictions applicable to the homeland, USARNORTH has different requirements for Army
military intelligence support.
3-23. The theater military intelligence brigade provides regionally focused collection and analysis in
support of theater army daily operations requirements and limited contingency operations. In particular, the
theater army headquarters relies heavily on the military intelligence brigade for threat characteristics,
intelligence estimates, threat and civil considerations, data files and databases, and all-source intelligence
products. These products support theater army planning requirements, including development of Army
plans supporting the theater campaign plan and maintenance of OPLANs and contingency plans. The
theater army headquarters’ intelligence cell depends on the theater military intelligence brigade for
intelligence operations and analytic support.
3-24. A theater army and its subordinate theater military intelligence brigade may provide intelligence
support to Army and joint forces in the joint operations area in one of two ways. First, they deploy military
intelligence assets forward and then attach or place those assets under OPCON or in direct support to the
ARFOR. Second, they provide intelligence support on a general support or direct support basis. In either
case, the supported Army forces operating headquarters tasks the military intelligence brigade assets by
identifying information requirements and priority intelligence requirements. The associated collection
requirements are assigned to the supporting military intelligence brigade or its operational elements.
3-25. The theater military intelligence brigade’s regional focus enhances its capabilities to develop and
exploit language skills and cultural insights specific to the AOR. The theater intelligence brigade’s regional
focus also provides the benefits of continuity and cultural context to its analytic intelligence products. The
theater military intelligence brigade can collect, analyze, and track the threat characteristics and doctrine of
partner nations, enemies, and adversaries over many years. These abilities allow the brigade to create and
maintain a valuable database of intelligence regarding regional military forces, persons of interest, and
evolving doctrine and capabilities of regional military forces.
CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMAND

3-26. Each theater army (except for USARNORTH) receives support from a Reserve Component civil
affairs command. The civil affairs command provides theater-level civil affairs planning, coordination,
policies, and programs in support of the geographic combatant command’s regional civil-military
operations strategy and stabilization, reconstruction, and development efforts. The civil affairs command
mobilizes and deploys with one or more civil affairs brigades and civil affairs planning teams. It also has
one or more civil-military operations centers (CMOCs). One civil affairs brigade normally supports the
land component command; a second brigade may support the ESC. A civil affairs brigade with its CMOC
can become the core of a joint civil-military operations task force under the OPCON of the JTF. Civil
affairs battalions from the civil affairs brigade are task-organized to Army divisions. Civil affairs planning
teams augment the geographic combatant command, theater army, joint land forces component command,
and division, corps, and brigades. Such augmentation provides liaison, coordination, education and
training, and area assessment functions. The theater army commander may employ a civil affairs brigade
CMOC in support of the G-9. Civil affairs elements are normally attached to the headquarters they support.
(See FM 3-57.)
3-27. A theater army normally has an aligned, regionally focused Regular Army civil affairs battalion. The
battalions provide regionally focused civil affairs support to the theater army commands as well as
conventional forces through the ARFORGEN process. The civil affairs battalion focuses on the supported
commander’s ready capability to plan, enable, shape, and manage civil affairs operations as well as
provides dedicated support to stability operations. The civil affairs battalion also enables, enhances, and
supports civil-military operations assigned to the theater army command by the theater security cooperation
plan. During stability operations, the battalion provides tactical-level civil affairs support to a division
command or an equivalent-level Army command or JTF.
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 3-7

Chapter 3
OTHER THEATER-LEVEL ARMY FORCES

3-28. For protracted major operations, the theater army may be reinforced by an array of Army capabilities
deployed from the United States and supporting theater armies. Other Army functional or multifunctional
headquarters and units may be made available to the theater army based on requirements of the AOR such
as forward stationing, base operations, security force assistance missions, theater security cooperation
activities, or ongoing military operations. These Army functional or multifunctional units may have either a
command or a support relationship with the theater army. In some cases, the Department of the Army tasks
certain functional or multifunctional battalions to support more than one theater army.
THEATER AVIATION
3-29. Each theater aviation brigade can conduct assault or general support aviation tasks in support of the
theater and its subordinate commands. Unlike combat aviation brigades, a theater aviation brigade lacks the
attack and reconnaissance battalions. The theater aviation brigade has a mix of lift helicopters and fixed-
wing aircraft. The brigade can conduct air assault, air movement, and sustaining operations. It will
normally not have attached unmanned aircraft systems. The theater aviation brigade reinforces combat
aviation brigades with additional assault, general support, heavy lift, and aeromedical evacuation. It flies
fixed-wing sorties in support of the ARFOR, theater army, and JFC.
3-30. A theater aviation sustainment maintenance group may be attached to a theater army to provide
depot-level maintenance support. The theater aviation sustainment maintenance group may be subsequently
attached to the TSC. (See TC 3-04.7.)
3-31. Army air traffic service units at the theater level consist of the theater airfield operations group with
its subordinate airfield operations battalions. These units are normally attached to the theater aviation
command; they establish and operate airfields as needed in the AOR. Advanced operations bases can
operate a fully instrumented airfield with airport surveillance radar approach, precision approach radar, and
controlling airspace necessary to support airfield operations. (See FM 3-04.120.)
ARMY AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND

3-32. When required by the geographic combatant command, one AAMDC will be attached to the theater
army, if not assigned. Air and missile defense units in the AOR are assigned or attached to the AAMDC.
3-33. The JFC establishes air and missile defense priorities, allocates forces, and apportions air power. The
JFC typically assigns overall responsibility for counterair and interdiction missions to the JFACC.
Normally, the JFACC also serves as both the AADC and the airspace control authority. The JFACC is
responsible for defensive counterair operations. The AADC coordinates with joint and multinational
partners to develop procedures for the theater air and missile defense plan. The AAMDC supports the
AADC for air and missile defensive operations throughout the area of operations.
3-34. The AAMDC commander has several responsibilities. These include command of all subordinate
Army air and missile defense units; army air and missile defense coordinator for the land component and
ARFOR; and deputy AADC if designated. The AAMDC commander has overall responsibility for
planning Army air and missile defense operations in support of the JFC. The AAMDC task-organizes and
assigns missions to subordinate brigades. The AAMDC has dedicated liaison teams able to deploy to a
major theater. It provides elements to the joint force air component, joint force land component, and joint
special operations task force to integrate air and missile defense operations.
3-35. The threat from hostile ballistic missiles, aircraft, cruise missiles, and unmanned aircraft systems
may originate from outside the joint operations area. Therefore, the JFACC may have AOR-wide
responsibility as the AADC. The AAMDC commander distributes air and missile defense assets to protect
not only the joint operations area, but also other high-value assets across the AOR. If the AAMDC is not
located in the joint operations area, the air defense artillery brigade commander may serve as the deputy
AADC. The air defense artillery brigade commander may serve as the deputy AADC. That brigade takes
responsibility for planning and for providing liaison to the JFLCC and AADC or JFACC. (JP 3-01,
FM 3-01, FM 3-01.7, and FM 3-01.94 explain the command and support relationships for theater air and
missile defense.)
3-8 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

THEATER ENGINEER COMMAND

3-36. The theater engineer command provides theater-wide engineer support as well as engineer support to
forces deployed within a joint operations area. The engineer command supervises geospatial support,
construction, real property maintenance activities, line of communications sustainment, engineer logistics
management, and base development. The command has primary responsibility for theater infrastructure
repair or development as required. The command supports Department of State or host-nation efforts to
restore essential services and aids in infrastructure development. Subordinate units of the command include
tailored engineer brigades.
3-37. The theater engineer command typically serves as the senior engineer headquarters for the theater
army as well as all assigned or attached engineer brigades and other engineer units. When directed, it may
also command engineers from other Services and multinational forces and provide oversight of contracted
construction engineers. The command provides peacetime training and support of military engagement for
their supported respective combatant commanders. The command also coordinates closely with the senior
contract construction agents in the joint operations area.
3-38. The theater engineer command can deploy modular staff elements and organizations to provide the
operational commander with technical engineering expertise and support. Each command can deploy its
main command post and two deployable command posts to provide flexibility and a rotational capability.
The Army Corps of Engineers augments the engineer command post as required and provides construction
contracting, real estate, and interagency coordination. DOD information networks enable deployed
elements to collaborate with subject matter experts in the Army Corps of Engineers, other Services
technical laboratories and research centers, and the civilian community.
3-39. In some cases, the theater army receives an engineer brigade in lieu of an engineer command. When
assigned or attached to the theater army, the engineer brigade is tailored to conduct combat engineer,
general engineering, or geospatial engineer operations. The engineer brigade can rapidly deploy in modular
elements to support the corps, division, JTF, or theater-level mission. The engineer brigade can provide a
wide range of technical engineering expertise and support including construction design and management,
coordinating support from the Army Corps of Engineers, and other Services’ technical laboratories and
research centers. The engineer brigade can control low-density, high-demand engineer assets to include
military working dogs, an engineer facility detachment, forward engineer support teams, and facilities
engineer teams, bridge units, and others. The brigade relies on DOD information networks to connect with
engineering expertise within the Army and across the DOD. These capabilities include technical assistance,
project planning and design, contract construction, real estate acquisition, infrastructure support, and
support to nation-building capacities. (See FM 3-34 and ATTP 3-34.23 for more information.)
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR UNITS

3-40. Army CBRN units offer a range of capabilities to theater (joint) force protection operations. Units
such as the standing joint force headquarters for elimination and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,
and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) operational headquarters support the combatant commander, JFC, and
functional components faced with a CBRN threat. The CBRN force organization within a theater depends
on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat. Based on the mission variables prevailing in the theater, the
theater army commander will request and tailor Army CBRN forces for the GCC. (See FM 3-11.)
Standing Joint Force Headquarters for Elimination

3-41. When ordered, a GCC may coordinate U.S. military efforts to identify, counter, secure, and eliminate
WMD threats. This mission requires special skills forces not normally organic to a geographic combatant
command staff.
3-42. The standing joint force headquarters for elimination (SJFHQ-E) provides the GCC with the
planning, intelligence, and operational capabilities required to eliminate a foreign nation’s WMD and
related programs. It provides a full-time, trained joint command and control element able to integrate into
deployed headquarters to help accomplish the WMD elimination mission. The SJFHQ-E is a permanent
headquarters trained and ready to act. It works closely with the GCC, completing crisis planning and testing
response procedures during major exercises.
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 3-9

Chapter 3
3-43. Leveraging the capabilities of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and USSTRATCOM’s Center
for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, the SJFHQ-E deploys to augment the geographic combatant
command headquarters and accomplish the WMD elimination mission. The SJFHQ-E provides robust
technical resources and expertise to the geographic combatant command and its subordinate commands.
The SJFHQ-E provides the command and control necessary to locate, characterize, secure, disable, and
dispose of hostile WMD so they no longer pose a threat. The SJFHQ-E includes specialized technical
intelligence oversight.
CBRNE Operational Headquarters

3-44. The CBRNE operational headquarters is DOD’s deployable headquarters for directing operational-
level elimination of WMD. The CBRNE operational headquarters is a multifunctional headquarters
consisting of CBRN, EOD, nuclear, intelligence, signal, and medical specialists. The headquarters can be
tailored and task-organized based on the mission and situation. The CBRNE operational headquarters’
operational command post can also serve as a JTF headquarters for elimination of WMD.
3-45. The CBRNE operational headquarters commands specialized, technical operations that achieve
campaign objectives for elimination of WMD. The CBRNE operational headquarters has capabilities to
support a GCC, Service component commander, or JTF commander directing and synchronizing each of
the four activities associated with elimination of WMD (isolation, exploitation, destruction, and monitoring
and redirection). The CBRNE operational headquarters also provides CBRNE threats and hazards-related
technical expertise to supported commanders and helps establish conditions for the long-term elimination
of WMD production sites and other related activities. It accomplishes its mission throughout the range of
military operations. The CBRNE operational headquarters is can support overseas campaigns and
homeland security operations (defense support of civil authorities) simultaneously.
3-46. The CBRNE operational headquarters is organized, trained, and equipped to serve as a subordinate
JTF under a JFC. It does not conduct major combat operations as, for example, an Army corps headquarters
does. Although the CBRNE operational headquarters’ subordinate units facilitate the JFC’s protection
requirements, the CBRNE operational headquarters lacks organic security elements. It depends on the
supported unit for operational area security requirements beyond individual protection. Figure 3-4 shows
the organization of the CBRNE operational headquarters. (See also ATP 3-11.36.)
Figure 3-4. CBRNE operational headquarters
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL GROUP

3-47. A theater army supporting major operations is allocated an EOD group. An EOD group commander
can exercise mission command for two to six EOD battalions. EOD battalions support Army forces at the
theater army, JTF, combined JTF, corps, and division levels. EOD groups and battalions position their
3-10 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

EOD companies at locations where they can support the maneuver commander. The EOD group
headquarters commands all Army EOD assets and operations in a theater and can serve as the basis for a
counter-improvised explosive device task force. The senior EOD commander normally functions as the
EOD special staff officer for the senior deployed Army headquarters. (See ATP 4-32, FM 3-34.210, and
FM 3-34.214.)
REGIONAL SUPPORT GROUPS

3-48. Regional support groups deploy to provide contingency and expeditionary base operations support.
These groups have responsibilities for managing facilities, providing administrative and logistics support of
Soldier services, and ensuring the security of personnel and facilities on a base camp.
MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT

3-49. The theater army normally receives one MP command when more than one MP brigade is required.
For MP tasks across the AOR, the MP command provides an organizational framework. The MP command
focuses on reinforcing and augmenting tactical-level MP efforts and developing the theater detention or
resettlement operations base requirements. The commander of the MP command also serves as the
commander of detainee operations. The theater-level MP force is tailored to a specific region based on
several factors:
 Nature of the operation, whether unilateral, joint, or multinational.
 Size of the security areas.
 Maturity of the theater of operations.
 Nature of the civilian population found within the support area—friendly or hostile.
 Ability of the host nation to provide MP-related support.
 The extent of civil police operations.
 U.S. and multinational detainee evacuation and detention policy.
 MP support required for main supply routes within the division, corps, and joint support areas.
 The number of designated critical facilities to secure.
 Resources or key personnel requiring dedicated MP security.
 Ability of host-nation forces to control the civilian population to preclude interference with
military operations.
(FM 3-39 discusses MP forces.)
Provost Marshal
3-50. The senior MP officer assigned or attached to the theater army becomes the provost marshal for the
AOR. The senior MP officer assigned or attached to the theater army becomes the provost marshal and is
responsible for assisting the commander in exercising control over MP forces in the AOR. The provost
marshal is responsible for coordinating MP assets and operations for the command. The commander
typically designates the provost marshal as a personal staff officer for law enforcement issues concerning
U.S. military forces and U.S. civilians. The provost marshal—
 Advises the commander and staff of MP capabilities.
 Prepares plans and policies.
 Coordinates MP and detainee operations.
 Assists, coordinates, and supervises supporting and supported units’ interactions.
 Reviews current MP operations.
 Coordinates with allied forces and host-nation military and civilian police.
 Synchronizes military working dog support.
3-51. The theater army provides personnel, administrative, morale, detention, resettlement, and
confinement services within the AOR. (JP 3-63 provides the Army doctrine on detention operations.) The
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 3-11

Chapter 3
MPs receive, process, and safeguard the detainees. The MP detention battalion and MP battalion provide
this support and are responsible for—
 Controlling detainees and dislocated civilians.
 Coordinating with other government agencies, host-nation personnel, military territorial
organizations, civilian police authorities, and nongovernmental organizations on matters
pertaining to control of detainees and dislocated civilians.
 Exercising OPCON of all detention and resettlement units.
 Handling detainees as set forth by U.S. law, the Geneva Conventions, other international laws,
and the United Nations, as applicable.
 Handling U.S. military prisoners, to include operating a theater-level military confinement
facility.
3-52. A military intelligence battalion (interrogation) may be attached or placed in direct support of the MP
command accomplishing an internment mission. The interrogation battalion is functionally not a part of the
theater military intelligence brigade.
Military Police Brigades

3-53. The MP brigade is one of the functional brigades of the Army. It can commandup to five mission-
tailored MP battalions; integrate capabilities from all three MP disciplines (police operations, detention
operations, and security and mobility support); and integrate police intelligence operations. It can also
command other non-MP units (focused on performing area support, detention, or resettlement tasks) and
synchronize MP support across multiple organizations that control an area of operations in support of
stability tasks. A functional MP brigade is not designed to control terrain; significant augmentation and task
organization would be required to assign the MP brigade an area of operations.
3-54. The corps or division requires one or more MP brigades when the number of MP units or the
functional nature of MP missions (such as the synchronization of technical MP capabilities across an area
of operations) requires brigade-level command. A corps normally receives a MP brigade headquarters to
command the MP units in its area of operations. Once deployed, MP brigades become the focal point for
apportioning and allocating mission-tailored MP forces across the area of operations.
Criminal Investigation Command

3-55. The Army Criminal Investigation Command helps theater army commanders maintain discipline and
order by preventing or investigating crimes. This command is a direct reporting unit whose special agents
in the field report through the Army Criminal Investigation Command’s chain of command (detachment to
battalion to group) to the commanding general of the Army Criminal Investigation Command. This general
reports directly to the Chief of Staff of the Army and Secretary of the Army. Normally an MP group
(criminal investigation division) supports a theater army. The group is placed in general support of the
theater but remains under the OPCON of the Army Criminal Investigation Command. Commanders of
criminal investigation command tactical units advise their supported commanders on criminal investigation
matters, as appropriate, although no formal operational command relationship exists. The MP group
(criminal investigation division) ensures the connectivity between all criminal investigation command units
within and external to the theater. (See FM 3-39.)
Military Police Command

3-56. An MP command is normally established and assigned directly to the theater army in a mature
theater with several MP brigades and a criminal investigation command group. Once established, the senior
MP commander serves as the theater army provost marshal and is normally designated as the chief of
detainee operations.
INFORMATION OPERATIONS SUPPORT

3-57. The Army provides information operations support to the theater army through elements dedicated to
helping theater organizations analyze and operate within an increasingly complex information environment.
3-12 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

These units augment theater forces with deployable mission-tailored support teams and CONUS-based
operational planning support, intelligence analysis, and technical assistance. They train to operate within
the joint information operations doctrinal construct and the Army’s inform and influence construct. These
support organizations include the 1st Information Operations Command (Land) from the Regular Army and
theater information operations groups from the Reserve Components. The 1st Information Operations
Command (Land) is a subordinate command of INSCOM and under ADCON of the Army Cyber
Command. These organizations provide the following support:
 Field support teams provide information operations subject matter expertise to supported
commands. The teams help those commands with the planning, execution, and assessment of
information operations.
 Vulnerability assessment teams help the supported commands identify information operations
and cyberspace vulnerabilities within their operational procedures, policies, practices, and
training. The teams also collaborate with the supported commands as they work to resolve the
identified vulnerabilities.
 Operations security support teams assist supported commands in assessing and developing unit
operations security programs.
 Reachback elements provide information operations and cyberspace operational planning
support, intelligence analysis, and technical assistance for deployed forces requesting support.
 Cyber opposing forces provide a noncooperative cyberspace threat during major exercises and
training center rotations to help fully challenge the ability of deploying units operate in a hostile
cyber threat environment.
3-58. Digital liaison detachments can provide liaison capability among Army forces, joint or multinational
forces land component, JTF, subordinate headquarters, and multinational headquarters to ensure
communication, mutual understanding, and unity of purpose and action.
BATTLEFIELD COORDINATION DETACHMENT

3-59. A battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) is a specialized, regionally focused Army element that
serves as the senior Army operational commander’s liaison with the air component or joint force air
component command. A BCD is co-located with the joint air operations center (JAOC), combined air
operations center, or the Air Force air operations center. The BCD is the Army’s interface for systems
connectivity to the JAOC and for personnel integration with their JAOC counterparts. Tasks include
facilitating the exchange of current intelligence and operational data, processing air support requests,
monitoring and interpreting the land battle situation, coordinating air and missile defense, coordinating
airlift, and integrating airspace requirements. (See ATTP 3-09.13.)
3-60. The BCD supports the ARFOR commander (see discussion of ARFOR in paragraph 1-57). When the
corps is either the joint force land component command or ARFOR, the BCD commander becomes the
corps commander’s liaison to the JAOC. The corps staff relays land component requirements and requests
for joint force air component command support through the BCD, and the BCD represents the corps
commander throughout the joint air tasking cycle in the JAOC.
MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT OPERATIONS

3-61. A tailored military information support task force supports the combatant commander, JTF
commander, theater special operations commander, and joint special operations task force commanders.
The military information support task force plans, develops, and (when directed) executes military
information support operations (MISO). The military information support task force functions as the central
coordination point for all MISO activities executed in the AOR. Military information support task forces
contribute to the planning and execution of discreet, precise, and scalable MISO to achieve the joint
commander’s overall objectives.
3-62. Military information support groups from the Army Reserve support conventional Army forces
within an AOR. The group controls military information support task forces that support Army corps,
divisions, and brigades. A military information support task force normally operates in support of a corps,
but may provide direct support to a division. The group’s capabilities are tactical in nature and lack the
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Chapter 3
level of analysis, production, and dissemination required at the operational and strategic levels. They
receive augmentation (language and cultural expertise, regional analysis, and mass communications
delivery capability). The regional and media operations battalion from the combatant command level
normally reinforces the task force with these capabilities. Depending upon its missions, the military
information support task force receives additional augmentation from the supported maneuver unit and the
Army Reserve strategic dissemination company. Selected MISO units train to support forcible entry
operations.
ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

3-63. The theater special operations command is the subordinate special operations command through
which the GCC normally exercises OPCON of all SOF within the AOR. (See FM 3-05.) The commander of
the theater special operations command serves as the primary advisor to the combatant commander for
applying regionally aligned, ARSOF. As directed by the geographic combatant command, the theater army
provides support to deployed SOF. The special operations commander coordinates with the theater army
for sustainment requirements. The ADCON of ARSOF and logistics support of SOF unique items will
normally remain in special operations channels.
THE EXPANDED THEATER

3-64. Protracted campaigns that include large-scale combat operations cause the theater army to expand to
support Army, joint, and multinational forces. This occurs as the combatant commander adapts the joint
command and control mechanism to the demands of the campaign. The theater army maintains its AOR-
wide focus while developing a mature support structure within the joint operations area. The mature theater
could include some or all of the commands shown in figure 3-5.
Figure 3-5. Example of mature theater
DEPENDENCIES
3-65. The theater army headquarters depends on theater-enabling units for staff functions or supporting
capabilities. While these enablers may vary considerably by size and type between geographic combatant
commands, paragraph 3-66 through paragraph 3-72 explain basic theater army dependencies.
3-66. The theater army depends on the theater signal command or brigade for connectivity to all
LandWarNet services, including the establishment and operation of the theater network architecture to
support theater army headquarters and all Army and joint forces operating within the AOR. The theater
3-14 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

army headquarters has no organic signal capability and depends on the theater signal command or brigade
for all network and signal capabilities. These capabilities include regional hub node, joint network node, or
command post node elements to support the contingency command post when it deploys to conduct
operations.
3-67. The theater army depends on the garrison command of the installation on which it is located for
installation access control and local security of the permanent headquarters (garrison or installation
security). Regional support groups provide contingency base operations functions at intermediate staging
bases or bases in the Army support area.
3-68. The theater army depends on the theater military intelligence brigade for access to top secret and
sensitive compartmented information communications and information systems used for analytical support.
The access enables the theater intelligence unit to provide regionally focused collection, analysis, and
production to support theater army planning (OPLAN or concept plan development) and operational
intelligence to support conduct of limited contingency operations. In addition, the theater intelligence unit
may provide regionally focused intelligence collection and analysis in support of JTFs, JFLCC
headquarters, ARFOR, and other Army forces operating in joint operations areas within the AOR.
3-69. The theater army depends on the Army Materiel Command for support through the aligned Army
field support brigade, contracting support brigade, and logistics civil augmentation program. The Army
field support brigade provides national level, materiel-focused sustainment support, as well as logistics civil
augmentation program planning and management. The contracting support brigade provides operational
contract support and planning assistance.
3-70. The theater army depends on the Army Corps of Engineers for engineering and construction
(including roads and buildings), real estate, and environmental management products and services.
Additionally, an engineer topographic company or geospatial planning cell provides geospatial information
and services to the theater army.
3-71. The MP protective services detachment provides protective service details for the theater army
commander, deputy commanders, and other designated high-risk personnel, as required. A force protection
team assists the theater army antiterrorism or force protection section in protection, physical security,
antiterrorism, and response force operations.
3-72. The theater army also depends on several unique teams to accomplish specialized functions. Defense
Logistics Agency personnel provide the theater army logistics reach to the national supply system. A civil
affairs planning team from a civil affairs brigade or command provides staff augmentation to the theater
army G-9 for operations. A modular CBRN team is assigned to the theater army to establish a full-time
CBRN planning expertise and assessment capability within the headquarters. Public affairs detachments or
teams augment the organic theater army staff and establish a media support or broadcast center, if required.
An Army band is assigned to the theater army to enhance unit cohesion and Soldier morale and provide
musical support. The theater army depends on the human resources sustainment center and financial
management center of the TSC for the execution of specified personnel and financial management
activities. Digital liaison detachments provide liaison between the theater army and multinational
headquarters or partners during operations and exercises.
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Chapter 3
JOINT THEATER ENABLERS

3-73. If the theater army assumes an operational headquarters role, the combatant commander provides it
with joint enablers. The Joint Enabling Capabilities Command of the USTRANSCOM provides mission-
tailored, joint capability packages to combatant commanders to facilitate rapid establishment of joint force
headquarters, fulfill global response force execution, and bridge joint operational requirements. This
command includes the joint planning support element, joint communications support element, and joint
public affairs support element. The joint planning support element provides rapidly deployable, tailored
joint planners, operators, logisticians, knowledge managers, and intelligence specialists. This first element
accelerates the formation and increases the effectiveness of newly formed joint force headquarters. The
joint communications support element provides rapidly deployable, en route, early-entry, and scalable
command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities
across the range of military operations. This element facilitates rapid establishment of joint force
headquarters and bridges joint relevant requirements. The joint public affairs support element provides a
ready, rapidly deployable joint public affairs capability to combatant commanders. This last element
facilitates rapid establishment of joint force headquarters, bridges joint public affairs requirements, and
manages public affairs training to meet theater information challenges.
3-16 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

PART TWO
The Army Corps

Part two discusses the Army corps headquarters and operations at the corps
echelon. The corps headquarters can serve as the ARFOR as a joint force land
component headquarters under a joint task force, as a joint task force headquarters
(with joint augmentation), and as a tactical-level land force headquarters as part of a
multinational land component. It is deployable and scalable. In combat it can
command Army, Marine Corps, and multinational divisions across the range of
military operations. The corps headquarters is the most versatile of the echelon
above brigade formations. It commands Army, joint, and multinational forces
engaged in crisis response, limited contingency operations, major operations, and
campaigns.
Part two includes two chapters. Chapter 4 describes the corps headquarters; its
capabilities, limitations, and organization; and the array of forces that it commands.
Chapter 5 describes the employment of the corps and its subordinate forces in
decisive action.
Chapter 4
Corps Roles and Organization
ROLES OF THE CORPS
4-1. The effective integration of landpower
across the range of military operations Roles of the Corps
requires an expeditionary, scalable, and • As the ARFOR in a campaign or major operation.
• Joint (or multinational) force land component in a
operationally flexible headquarters able to
campaign or major operation.
exercise command in a variety of roles. The
• Joint task force headquarters in a crisis response
combatant commander (command authority)
or contingency operation.
can use the corps as the ARFOR, joint force
• Tactical echelon in large-scale ground combat
land component command, JTF headquarters, operations incident to a campaign.
or as a tactical echelon.
ARMY COMPONENT (ARFOR) IN CAMPAIGNS AND MAJOR OPERATIONS

4-2. The corps headquarters is organized, trained, and equipped to serve as the ARFOR in campaigns and
major operations, with command of two or more Army divisions, together with supporting theater-level
organizations, across the range of military operations. As the ARFOR for the JFC, the corps serves as an
operational-level headquarters, conducting land operations as the Service component. The corps can control
up to five Army divisions in large-scale combat operations. The corps normally has one ESC and one
medical brigade (support) in direct support. Other theater-level assets are attached as required. The
headquarters of the corps allows it to adapt to operational- or tactical-level roles, depending upon the
combatant commander’s requirements.
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Chapter 4
4-3. In addition to operational requirements, the corps has extensive ADCON requirements as the
ARFOR. When it serves as the ARFOR, the corps is responsible through the theater army commander for
the Service specific support of all Army forces in the joint operations area, as well as for providing any
ASOS with forces deployed in the joint operations area. As it tailors the Army forces provided to the JTF,
the theater army accomplishes two things. First, the Army force package attached to the ARFOR receives
the sustainment necessary to conduct land operations effectively and indefinitely. Second, the theater army
relieves as much of the ARFOR requirements from the corps using theater-level units for support of the
combat units within the joint operations area. The right balance allows the corps commander to retain
responsibility for Service component actions while delegating as much as possible to the various theater-
level commands and units.
4-4. Command and support relationships between the corps headquarters (as ARFOR) and forces
provided from the theater army require the particular attention of the corps and theater army commander.
There are several options. The preferred option is placing the sustainment and medical headquarters
operating in the joint operations area in direct support of the corps, while the theater army attaches other
units to the corps. This option allows the corps commander to set priorities for Army sustainment and
support to other Services while delegating most Title 10 tasks and ASOS to these commands. Air units
require centralized control of fires through the AADC, and signal units must integrate into an AOR-wide
network. Therefore, these units may remain attached to the theater commands and provide direct or general
support. Attachment of units—such as the civil affairs, engineers, MP, and aviation—allows the corps
commander to allocate their capabilities among the divisions, multinational units, and corps troops.
4-5. The establishing directives for the JTF may allow the JFC to retain OPCON of the medical brigade
(deployment support) and sustainment command by designating them as separate functional components.
In this case, the corps receives general support from the functional logistics and medical functional
components. This has two advantages. When the corps controls sizeable multinational forces, its ability to
control operations may be stressed by multinational complications. These joint force support components
allow the corps to focus on its operational responsibilities while allowing the joint sustainment command to
focus on support of Army forces. The second advantage is that it allows the JFC to prioritize support
provided to other functional components even though the ARFOR may have the majority of deployed
personnel. The theater army augments the joint sustainment and medical command as required.
4-6. Air and missile defense units are assigned, attached, or OPCON to an AAMDC, normally operating
at theater level in direct support of the AADC. Air defense brigades may defend assets within the corps
area of operations. The AAMDC is responsible for balancing Army counterair and countermissile
capabilities between the ground forces and the theater-level requirements specified in the JFC approved
defended asset list and the area air defense plan.
JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT IN CAMPAIGNS AND MAJOR OPERATIONS

4-7. When designated as a joint force land component, the corps exercises TACON or OPCON over
Marine Corps forces, as required by the JFC, in addition to its attached Army forces. The corps functions as
an operational-level headquarters. The corps commander becomes the JFLCC when the Army provides the
preponderance of land forces. Land operations achieve the campaign objectives directly through land
operations or indirectly through support of other components of the joint force. Joint land operations
require synchronization and integration of all instruments of national power to achieve strategic and
operational objectives. Normally, joint land operations also involve multinational land forces (see
paragraph 4-14). Joint land operations specifically include control of assigned areas of operations. The
JFLCC employs land forces, supported by naval and air forces (as appropriate), to achieve military
objectives in vital areas of the operational area. (See JP 3-31.)
4-8. The corps is an ideal joint force land component for the JFC. The corps headquarters can command
joint land forces with modest augmentation from the Marine Corps. It has the necessary staff and
experience to control land operations across a joint operations area. When the mission dictates, the corps
headquarters identifies and fills needs for specialized skills not organic to the corps headquarters. This is
particularly true in protracted operations such as a counterinsurgency. The headquarters organizes
according to the JFC’s implementing directive. This document establishes the roles and responsibilities of
the joint force land component, assigns the mission, and designates forces. Normally, the staff consists of
4-2 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

corps staff, augmented with members of the other Service components. The distribution of other Service
personnel onto the corps staff allocates key staff billets so that all Services share equitably in staffing tasks.
Ideally, the deputy JFLCC or chief of staff comes from a different Service. Replicating this construct
throughout the staff leadership ensures all leaders understand the distinct capabilities of each Service to
optimize employment of the forces.
4-9. As the joint force land component, the corps headquarters normally commands two or three Army
divisions and exercises TACON over Marine Corps forces made available for tasking by the JFC. As the
senior Army echelon within the JTF, the corps is the ARFOR with the additional responsibility of ADCON
over all attached Army forces. As required by the JFC, the corps normally receives a special operations
liaison element and supports SOF throughout the land area of operations.
Note. The JFC may place the Marine Corps force under the OPCON of the corps but normally
specifies TACON if the Marine Corps force is a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF).
4-10. When designated as a joint force land component, the corps follows joint doctrine. (See JP 3-31.) As
a joint force land component headquarters, the corps has tasks that include, but are not limited to—
 Advise the JFC on the proper employment of forces and capabilities.
 Develop joint plans and orders in support of the JFC’s concept of operations and optimize the
operations of task-organized land forces.
 Execute and assess land control operations.
 Coordinate the planning and execution of joint land operations with the other components and
supporting agencies.
 Synchronize and integrate all elements of combat power in support of land operations.
 Designate the target priorities, effects, and timing for joint land operations.
 Establish a personnel recovery element to account for and report the status of isolated personnel
and to coordinate and control land component personnel recovery events.
 Provide mutual support to other components by conducting operations within the joint
operations area.
 Coordinate with other functional and Service components in support of achieving JFC’s
objectives.
 Provide an assistant or deputy to the AADC (normally provided by the AAMDC) for land-based
joint theater air and missile defense operations as determined by the JFC. The JFLCC provides
inputs to the JFC-approved joint area air defense plan and the airspace control plan.
 Support the JFC’s information operations by developing the information operations
requirements that support land control operations and synchronize land force information
operations assets when directed.
 Integrate the joint and Army networks within the DOD information networks throughout the
AOR. Performing this function may require joint and Service augmentation.
 Integrate special operations as required into overall land operations.
 Perform joint security functions.
 Supervise detainee operations.
 Establish standing operating procedures and other directives based on the JFC’s guidance.
 Assess and as necessary restore or reconstruct civilian infrastructure.
4-11. When organizing joint forces, simplicity and clarity are critical. By providing the joint force land
component a single commander for joint land operations, the JFC can enhance synchronization of
operations not only between U.S. ground components, but with multinational land forces as well. Forming
a joint force land component builds unity of effort, an integrated staff, a single voice for land forces and
land control operations, one single concept and focus of effort for land control operations, and a
synchronized and integrated land force planning and execution. The disadvantages of a single commander
are that joint force land component normally retains Service component responsibilities to the JFC
(requires split focus of the staff), it challenges integrating staffs, it requires more lead time to establish
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 4-3

Chapter 4
headquarters before execution, and it lacks the ability to resource the staffs. (See JP 3-31 for additional
doctrinal guidance on establishing the joint force land component.)
4-12. Within the joint force land component headquarters, the corps commander, deputy commander, chief
of staff, and key members of the staff should be fully integrated with representation from the forces and
capabilities made available to the JFLCC. Key members of the staff include the J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4, J-5, and
J-6. The corps commander as the JFLCC provides the core elements of the staff to assist in planning,
coordinating, and executing functional land component operations.
4-13. To facilitate joint security operations, the JFC
joint security area
may establish a joint security element with a designated
A specific surface area, designated by the
joint security coordinator to coordinate operations in a joint force commander to facilitate protection
JSA. If the JTF commander gives the JFLCC of joint bases and their connecting lines of
responsibility for a JSA, the corps commander may communications that support joint operations.
elect to split the corps headquarters responsibilities.
The deputy corps commander—with part of the corps staff, augmentation from theater echelon units, and
an Army MEB—receives TACON of the theater echelon units in the JSA for protection and movement.
The deputy corps commander becomes the joint security coordinator. (See JP 3-10.)
MULTINATIONAL LAND COMPONENT HEADQUARTERS

4-14. The associated requirement of the corps headquarters controlling U.S. land forces is as a
multinational land component headquarters. The corps continues to function as an operational-level
headquarters. This expands its role as a joint force land component. Only rarely will the land component be
purely American in composition. In most operations, the corps exercises TACON over multinational
brigades and divisions. If the corps commander exercises command over multinational forces in addition to
U.S. forces, then it becomes a multinational joint force land component, and the corps commander becomes
a multinational force land component commander. Command of multinational forces is complicated and
politically sensitive. The higher grades structured into the design of the corps headquarters facilitate this.
Commanders and staff operating as a joint headquarters must be aware that multinational brigades normally
lack the ability to communicate digitally, or if they do, their systems might prove incompatible. This
creates an additional layer of complexity to planning and execution. The corps also trains in multinational
exercises as part of theater engagement and security assistance managed by the theater army. (See JP 3-16
and FM 3-16.)
JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS FOR CRISIS RESPONSE AND LIMITED CONTINGENCY
OPERATIONS
4-15. The corps is the preferred Army echelon for use as a JTF headquarters. A corps headquarters acting
as a JTF headquarters requires a separate ARFOR because of the differing roles and responsibilities
inherent in each. JTFs focus on the operational level of war and use joint rather than Army doctrine. The
combatant commander may form a JTF on a geographic or functional basis, but the corps is normally a
geographic JTF, commanding all forces within a joint operations area. Normally, the commander of the
JTF exercises OPCON over all forces and other resources within the joint operations area. The JTF
includes functional and Service components. It may also have subordinate JTFs. Once constituted as a JTF,
the corps operates according to joint doctrine. (See also JP 3-33, JP 5-0, and supporting documents.)
Forming a Joint Task Force Staff

4-16. The corps headquarters needs individual augmentation to become a JTF. Identifying requirements for
individual augmentation is one of the earliest tasks the corps staff performs. These individuals can be Army
personnel identified and requested by the corps to fill slots in the joint manning document. For example, a
corps G-8 section does not have a joint doctrinal mission, nor is it structured to man and execute the
functions of a JTF comptroller section without significant augmentation. The corps staff identifies the
number, skill set, type, and availability of augmentees while the JTF is still forming. This enables the
headquarters to request military forces, Army civilians, representatives from other government agencies,
and contractors. Frequently, individual augmentees are functional experts to chair, provide guidance, or
4-4 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

serve on meetings (to include working groups and boards), centers, cells, and planning teams associated
with joint operations. As with other augmentation, individual augmentees may not remain throughout a
campaign.
joint manning documents
Documents that identify all manpower requirements essential to the command and control of a JTF
headquarters organization. Joint manning documents are created in the electronic Joint Manpower and
Personnel System (known as eJMAPS) in accordance with established business rules for the use of the
electronic Joint Manpower and Personnel System.
The organizational structure and size of a JTF headquarters, as reflected in the joint manning document,
should be based on mission requirements, a concept of operations, the combined JTF decisionmaking
process, both the supported combatant commander and combined JTF’s guidance, and other factors
external to the JTF headquarters control, such as an imposed maximum footprint ceiling or multinational
participation. A well-balanced JTF headquarters staff should be representative of its subordinate forces
and possess a thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations. Furthermore, the organization of
the staff should be established and modified as the needs of the headquarters evolve over time.
JP 3-33
4-17. The corps headquarters needs augmentation from other Service officers and special operations
personnel to transform it into a JTF headquarters. This augmentation includes officers inserted into the
integrating cells, primarily the plans cell and the current operations integrating cell. This augmentation does
not include the personnel needed to augment the corps headquarters battalion network capability.
Additional staff augmentation would be required for each functional cell, as well as the public affairs and
other personal staff sections.
4-18. When provided with the necessary joint augmentation, the JTF initiates campaign planning, deploys
its early-entry command post (EECP) and advance support elements, and establishes initial command and
control capabilities in the joint operations area. The JTF headquarters can initiate shaping operations and
coordinate with host-nation and multinational partners in the joint operations area. As the size of the force
in the joint operations area increases, the corps main command post deploys to the joint operations area,
and the combatant commander provides additional augmentation. Figure 4-1 on page 4-6 provides an
example of a JTF staff.
Organization
4-19. The JTF command group retains its basic Army organization with a commander, one or more
deputies, a senior enlisted advisor, and several aides and personal assistants. Personal and special staff
groups assist the command group with special matters over which the JTF commander wishes to exercise
personal control. This group may expand to fit the circumstances, for example, personal interpreters or
translators, a cultural advisor, and special liaison officers. The chief of staff supervises staff actions and
serves as the principal integrator of the joint staff. The chief of staff typically oversees organizational
integration, efficiency, and effectiveness by reporting through a deputy commander to the JTF commander.
The JTF’s mission and area of operations dictate its organization and relationship with other organizations.
The composition of existing and potential adversaries, the nature of the crisis (for example, floods,
earthquakes, and pandemics), and the time available to achieve the end state are factors when forming a
JTF.
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 4-5

Chapter 4
Figure 4-1. Example of joint task force staff
4-6 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

Joint Augmentation
4-20. Several joint organizations exist to augment the joint community in the execution of military
operations. The Joint Staff tasks these organizations to provide enabling capabilities to the corps as it
becomes a JTF. Many of these entities can support training exercises as resources allow. Some joint
enabling capabilities are self-supporting, while others require support from the supported headquarters.
(See JP 3-33.) These joint organizations include—
 The joint communications support element that provides rapidly deployable, en route, early-
entry, and scalable command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance capabilities across the range of military operations. This element facilitates rapid
establishment of joint force headquarters and bridges joint requirements for such capabilities.
 A national intelligence support team that provides a national-level, deployable, all-source
intelligence team to the JTF.
 The Defense Threat Reduction Agency that provides subject matter expert augmentees to
counter CBRNE.
 The Joint Information Operations Warfare Command that augments JTF planning, coordinating,
and executing efforts for the joint information operations community.
 The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency that coordinates and executes personnel recovery.
 The joint public affairs support element that provides a ready, rapidly deployable joint public
affairs capability to combatant commanders to facilitate rapid establishment of joint force
headquarters, bridge joint public affairs requirements, and manage public affairs training to meet
theater information challenges.
 Defense Logistics Agency contingency support teams that deploy or support the JTF.
 The deployable joint command and control system that provides the JTF with tools for planning,
executing, and assessing joint operations.
 The joint fires integration and interoperability team that provides rapidly deployable battlefield
assessment teams to augment large-scale training exercises and operational deployments to
gather data on planning, preparing, and executing joint fires.
 The joint systems integration center that provides operational and technical expertise and
technology to augment joint command and control capabilities as well as to solve joint
interoperability problems, focusing at the JTF level.
 The joint enabling capability command that augments the JTF with a mission-tailored, joint
capability package to facilitate the rapid establishment of a JTF headquarters.
 The joint planning support element that enables the JTF headquarters to rapidly form, plan,
operate, and integrate with interagency and nonmilitary instruments of national power for crisis
resolution.
Training
4-21. Each option for forming the JTF requires staff with specific military skill sets and training levels.
One important requisite skill set is the staff’s proficiency with joint command and control systems,
networks, and software applications. The corps headquarters is equipped with various Army mission
command systems so the staff can train on them. However, the respective echelon headquarters coordinates
with the geographic combatant command to gain access to joint command and control capabilities for
command post training. The division tactical command post, corps EECP, or theater army contingency
command post can and should deploy as part of a joint rapid deployment exercise. The headquarters can
also exercise in simulation as the core element of a JTF for limited interventions. It should also provide
augmentation as a staff plug to another Service headquarters tasked to form a JTF headquarters as part of
an exercise. Each opportunity to participate in joint exercises increases the experience of the corps staff and
builds knowledge that the corps staff can incorporate in unit standard operating procedures and contingency
plans.
4-22. An effective training program involves the corps in joint exercises with access to joint command and
control systems. The deployable joint command and control suite of equipment for each geographic
combatant command provides a rapidly deployable, scalable, modular command post suite.
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 4-7

Chapter 4
Reconfiguration of the deployable joint command and control system allows for rapid response and en
route communications capabilities if required. Deployable joint command and control provides a
standardized command post with full joint command and control capabilities. These capabilities include the
servers, workstations, and satellite uplinks to support the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication
System (known as JWICS), global mission network, nongovernment organizations, SECRET Internet
Protocol Router Networks (known as SIPRNETs), Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Networks (known as
NIPRNETs), the Global Command and Control System-Joint, and other collaborative information
environment and communications capabilities.
TACTICAL ECHELON IN LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS

4-23. Very large combat operations require the corps headquarters to function as a tactical land
headquarters under a multinational force land component or subordinate to a field army equivalent
established under an alliance. This is the original purpose of the Army corps and the role performed by
Army corps in both Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom I. Today, a corps could serve as a
tactical land headquarters if war recurred on the Korean peninsula, or if a future crisis led to a general war.
In this case, the corps would operate within a mature theater of war as a tactical headquarters under a joint
or multinational land command. Figure 4-2 illustrates an Army corps in this role.
Figure 4-2. The corps as a tactical headquarters
LIMITATIONS
4-24. Although the corps is a large and robust headquarters, its commander’s ability to exercise mission
command has limits. The corps may command up to five U.S. divisions and supporting units. However, if
4-8 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

the corps commands a multinational division (or its equivalent) outside a formal military alliance such as
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), then the span of control diminishes.
4-25. The ESC and medical brigades are not normally attached or OPCON to the corps. Therefore, the
corps staff pays particular attention to identifying and coordinating support provided by these commands.
When fully coordinated, the sustainment and medical commands provide effective and efficient support to
the corps. However, responsibilities for terrain management, area security, and priorities for movement
within areas of operations are inherently the corps commander’s responsibilities. These responsibilities
require continuous coordination among the corps headquarters and its supporting commands.
4-26. The corps main command post has limited mobility and no organic security. The tactical command
post is fully mobile, but has no organic security. Deployment of the corps main command post is lift-
intensive and requires careful integration into the deployment sequence. Once deployed, the corps
headquarters battalion normally receives an attached security company, such as a reinforced MP company.
SUBORDINATE FORCES
4-27. There is no standard configuration for the modular corps echelon. Almost every type of Army unit
may be task-organized under the corps headquarters. The primary function of the corps is to command
Army divisions in combat. In addition to the divisional units, the corps may command BCTs and several
different types of multifunctional and functional brigades. Other units provide direct or general support.
The corps attaches smaller, more specialized units as needed. Chapter 5 discusses task organization of the
corps.
4-28. When tailored for major operations, the corps becomes very large. Figure 4-3 on page 4-10 provides
an example of a corps tailored for major operations. In this example, the corps commands three Army
divisions and 28 brigades as well as and various detachments and smaller units. An ESC and a MEDCOM
(DS) provide sustainment with another five brigades. The corps receives direct support from signal and air
defense brigades commanded by the theater signal command and AAMDC respectively. The corps
commander uses the brigades under corps command to reinforce the divisions and to conduct shaping
operations for subordinate units. These brigades also support the corps as a whole. In a limited contingency
operation or crisis response, the corps commands a much smaller force.
4-29. The corps routinely commands multinational forces. The organization of these units varies as will
their support and sustainment capabilities. The corps commander should give particular attention to the
national capabilities and limitations of each multinational partner. Some limitations are tactical, while
others may be political. (Refer to FM 3-16.)
DIVISIONS
4-30. Divisions are the Army’s primary tactical warfighting headquarters. Divisions can control up to five
BCTs in major combat operations. They can control more BCTs in protracted stability operations. A
division force package may include any mix of armored, infantry, and Stryker BCTs. In addition to BCTs,
each division controls a tailored array of multifunctional support brigades and functional brigades. Since
divisions have no organic structure beyond the headquarters, all types of brigades may not be present in an
operation. In some operations, divisions may control multiple brigades of the same type. They may also
control functional groups, battalions, or separate companies; however, these are normally task-organized to
a brigade. The important point is that division organizations vary for each operation. The division is the
primary headquarters for the employment of brigades.
SUPPORTING COMMANDS
4-31. The theater army provides direct and general support to the corps. As the joint force land component
and ARFOR, the corps normally receives direct support from an ESC and a medical brigade (support).
Other theater commands and brigades provide general support in addition to any units attached to the corps.
For example, the AAMDC may place one of its assigned brigades in direct support to the corps. This
brigade then is responsible for providing air and missile defense for the corps commander’s priorities
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 4-9

Chapter 4
(defended asset list). The parent unit (the AAMDC) retains OPCON, while the regional or sector air
defense commander exercises TACON of this brigade for direction of fires.
Figure 4-3. An example of headquarters and units task-organized under the corps
4-10 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

SUPPORTING BRIGADES AND OTHER FORCES

4-32. The Army force package includes a mix of BCTs, multifunctional brigades, and functional support
brigades as well as specialized units. The corps normally task-organizes the divisions with a mix of BCTs
and multifunctional support brigades. Depending upon the situation, the corps may retain OPCON of one or
more BCTs for security operations or as a reserve. (See chapter 5.) Specialized units such as a civil affairs
brigade may be attached to the corps headquarters and their subordinate battalions task-organized with the
divisions. Figure 4-4 illustrates the various types of modular brigades.
Figure 4-4. Modular brigades and groups

4-33. Normally the multifunctional support brigades are attached or OPCON to a division headquarters.
However, any of the brigades may be attached to a corps or theater-level command, or they may be under
OPCON to a joint functional component commander (for example, the JFACC), to another Service
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 4-11

Chapter 4
headquarters (for example, a Marine expeditionary force), or to a multinational headquarters. When

operating under the control of the JFC, another Service, or a multinational force, the ARFOR commander
exercises ADCON over that multifunctional support brigade. (For additional detail on BCTs and
multifunctional support brigades, see chapter 6.)
THE CORPS HEADQUARTERS

4-34. The corps headquarters consists of four constituent parts: a main command post, a tactical command
post, a mobile command group, and a HHB. The composition of the corps headquarters allows the corps
commander and chief of staff great flexibility to structure the organization according to the demands of the
situation.
MAIN COMMAND POST

4-35. The main command post controls current operations, performs detailed analysis, and plans future
operations. The main command post includes the command group and most of the coordinating, special,
and personal staff. The staff organizes into five functionally focused cells (intelligence, movement and
maneuver, fires, protection, and sustainment) with broad responsibilities for coordinating these warfighting
functions across the corps. The movement and maneuver staff organizes further into the three integrating
cells—current operations integration cell, future operations cell, and plans cell. The integrating cells
include subject matter experts from across the entire staff. The movement and maneuver cell includes
several specialized elements such as airspace control. It also absorbs U.S. Air Force elements such as the
joint air component coordination element. (See discussion beginning in paragraph 5-41.) Because there is
no mission command functional cell, staff elements responsible for mission command tasks either receive
direction and priorities from the chief of staff or work within an integrating cell. Liaison elements from
higher, adjacent, and subordinate units locate at the main command post. If provided, the SOF coordinating
element locates here. See figure 4-5.
4-36. Although the corps main command post can operate from a field location, the preferred location for
the corps main command post is a permanent structure such as an unused warehouse or office complex,
augmented by field shelters as required. The ideal location for the main command post is often a forward
operating base located near the division main command posts and the supporting commands. Whenever
possible, the main command post should be within a short driving distance of a fixed-wing capable airstrip.
Once emplaced, the main command post normally remains in place for the duration of that phase of the
campaign.
4-37. The size and importance of the main command post create security challenges. Protection
emphasizes both active and passive measures, including a designated security force, air and missile
defense, access control, dispersion, and hardening of facilities.
TACTICAL COMMAND POST

4-38. The tactical command post is mobile and more easily deployed or displaced since most of its
transportation is organic. The tactical command post can control corps operations for a limited time and
form the nucleus of a forward-deployed early-entry command post (sometimes designated as an assault
command post). In a protracted campaign where operations are decentralized and divisions focus on lines
of effort rather than maneuver, the tactical command post normally co-locates with the main command post
and may reinforce the main command post staff. On the other hand, it may remain organized as a separate
command post to facilitate rapid displacement and function as an alternate command post. See figure 4-6
on page 4-14.
4-12 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

Figure 4-5. The corps main command post

4-39. When the tactical command post is an alternate command post, the corps deputy commander may
deploy with it to supervise the operation, exercising those command authorities specifically delegated by
the corps commander. The deputy G-3 usually acts as the tactical command post’s operations officer. The
deputy G-3 is responsible for establishing and coordinating the activities of the current operations
integrating cell and future operations cell, if manned. The G-5 may provide a dedicated planning element to
the tactical command post. Normally the cell and section chiefs for the tactical command post are deputies
of the coordinating staff officers or functional cell chiefs. Sometimes they are officers with required special
expertise peculiar to the operation or line of effort controlled by the tactical command post. Unless
employed for an extended period, the tactical command post does not manage planning or transitions from
plans to operations.
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 4-13

Chapter 4
Figure 4-6. Example of corps tactical command post

4-40. The primary role of the tactical command post is as the alternate command post of the corps. It
provides a place from which the commander can exercise mission command while the main command post
deploys or displaces. In a high-threat situation, the tactical command post may offset from the main
command post to provide redundancy in the event of an attack on the main command post. Commanders
can also employ it as—
 A task force headquarters.
 The controlling command post for a distinct operation within a phase.
 The controlling headquarters for a distinct portion of the corps area of operations.
 A forward-positioned headquarters during deployment.
 The controlling headquarters for a JSA.
4-41. First, commanders can employ the tactical command post as a task force headquarters that
temporarily controls a named operation. The tactical command post functions as a major subordinate
command, providing staff support and command post facilities to support the task force commander. The
corps deputy commander may conduct the operation. For example, the corps may conduct a large military
deception operation with several brigades, while the bulk of the corps displaces.
4-42. If the concept of operations envisions a significant shaping operation, such as a demonstration or
retrograde, then the corps commander may employ the tactical command post as the controlling
headquarters for that distinct operation. The main command post controls the majority of the corps while
the tactical command post controls forces in a named, distinct operation.
4-14 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

4-43. Commanders can also employ the tactical command post as the controlling command post for a
portion of the area of operations within which the predominant tasks or mix of forces differs sharply from
that of the remainder of the corps. For example, a multinational division may be conducting stability tasks
and security operations in its area of operations and the corps provides supporting brigades and other U.S.
capabilities. The tactical command post moves to that area of operations to facilitate employment of U.S.
brigades and supporting capabilities.
4-44. Commanders employ the tactical command post as a forward-positioned headquarters when the corps
is a tactical headquarters. In this role, the corps tactical command post locates in or near a committed
division’s area of operations. It may also position itself near a multinational division to provide more
extensive coordination and network capability than a liaison detachment.
4-45. Lastly, commanders can also employ the tactical command post as the controlling headquarters for a
JSA when the joint command and control requirements exceed the span of control of the MEB.
4-46. Displacing the tactical command post requires transportation assets, initially with intertheater airlift,
and subsequently with intratheater assets. The tactical command post should be strategically deployable by
a minimum number of C-17 aircraft. Once in theater, the tactical command post should need minimal RSOI
before becoming functional. By adjusting the vehicle and equipment mix, the tactical command post
reconfigures for movement by C-130 aircraft to forward locations.
EARLY-ENTRY COMMAND POST

4-47. The corps tactical command post can provide an EECP when the mission dictates. Ideally, manning
and equipment should allow the EECP to deploy aboard a single aircraft, although the composition adjusts
to the lift available. It should be 100 percent mobile and provide en route planning and rehearsal capability.
The function of the EECP is to act as the advance element of the corps headquarters. It includes network
specialists, drivers, and selected personnel from the current operations integrating cell, and normally the
deputy corps commander leads it. One or more aircraft from a subordinate aviation brigade may augment
the EECP if support facilities are available. Security for the EECP comes from co-location with a
subordinate unit’s command post already deployed into the joint operations area. If the environment is
benign, the EECP may deploy to a host-nation military facility.
4-48. The EECP serves as the eyes and ears of the corps commander during the initial deployment of the
corps. It normally does not exercise TACON over the entry operation. That is the responsibility of the
assault or entry echelon commander, normally the lead division commander. During most deployments, the
corps commander remains at home station with the main command post until the tactical command post
arrives and the EECP merges with the tactical command post. The corps commander delegates authority to
the deputy commander to adjust the corps plan as needed based upon on-the-spot coordination with
committed commanders. The EECP may also coordinate with military and other government organizations
based on the existing situation. If the theater army has deployed its contingency command post, the corps
EECP may move to that location to facilitate transition from the theater army to corps command of the
operation.
MOBILE COMMAND GROUP

4-49. The mobile command group consists of specially equipped vehicles that allow the corps commander
to move by ground within the land portions of the joint operations area and have network access to the
common operational picture, subordinate commanders, and the corps staff. In addition to the drivers and
gunners, the commander normally selects a handful of staff experts to handle en route communications and
coordination. A supporting aviation brigade has specially equipped helicopters that can substitute for the
vehicles when distance requires air movement.
PLANNING FOR COMMAND POST EMPLOYMENT

4-50. When circumstances require each of the corps command posts to operate in a separate area, the corps
staff and headquarters battalion staff develops plans for their security, sustainment, and communications.
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 4-15

Chapter 4
The commander, deputy commanders, chief of staff, G-3, and G-6 should consider factors related to
transportation, endurance, security, communications, and the exercise of mission command.
4-51. Movement of the various corps command posts is a function of transportation means and capacity.
The main command post requires considerable external transportation support to move. Once displaced, the
main command post requires time to set up facilities, establish network communications, and correct
connectivity problems.
HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTALION

4-52. The only troops organic to the corps are in the headquarters battalion. The HHB has four subordinate
companies as shown in figure 4-7. The battalion provides communications, transportation, and medical
support to the corps headquarters. The battalion’s personnel and equipment support the main command
post, tactical command post, and mobile command group. The battalion provides administrative (including
the Uniform Code of Military Justice) and life support to the additional resources assigned or attached to
the corps headquarters—such as a band, security assets, and joint or interagency augmentation—as
required. The subordinate elements of each company report to the company chain of command. The
company commander, in turn, reports to the headquarters battalion commander. The battalion command
group provides supervision and exercises administrative command functions over personnel assigned to the
corps headquarters. It consists of a commander, executive officer, command sergeants major, rear
detachment commander, rear detachment noncommissioned officer, and a vehicle driver. The battalion
commander also serves as the headquarters commandant for the corps headquarters.
Figure 4-7. The headquarters and headquarters battalion of the corps

4-53. The headquarters battalion staff consists of five staff sections. They provide administrative support,
human resources, logistics support, religious support, and life support to corps headquarters elements in
garrison and the field. When deployed, the battalion staff sections are responsible for unit-level
communications support, property accountability, transportation, and medical, food service, and
maintenance support for the main command post, tactical command post, and mobile command group.
4-16 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

4-54. The headquarters support company contains all members of the headquarters battalion staff. The
headquarters support company has two sections. One section supports Soldiers at the main command post
and one section supports the tactical command post. This company can split support between the tactical
command post and an EECP if required. The medical treatment section provides medical care for the corps
main command post personnel as well as emergency and advanced trauma management to main and
tactical command post personnel. It also provides sick call services, medical surveillance and preventive
medicine, and unit-level ground and en route patient care.
4-55. The operations company (A Company) provides company-level administrative and logistics support
to Soldiers in the movement and maneuver, protection, and fires warfighting function cells. The
headquarters battalion commander may direct the operations company headquarters to provide additional
support to the tactical command post.
4-56. The intelligence and sustainment company (B Company) provides company-level administrative and
logistics support to the Soldiers in the intelligence cell and the sustainment cell, as well as the tactical
command post elements of these cells. It also provides specialized communications support (such as
Operation Trojan Spirit) to the corps intelligence sections. When the tactical command post deploys, the
HHB commander may direct the headquarters support company to provide additional support to the tactical
command post.
4-57. The signal company (C Company) provides network and communications support to the corps
headquarters. It includes platoons that directly support the corps main and tactical command posts. The
signal company headquarters provides logistics support to the signal company. The company receives
maintenance support from the headquarters battalion. The company headquarters oversees installation and
operation of support for the main and tactical command posts including network, radio (line-of-sight and
satellite communications), wireless network extension, wire, and cable. Each support platoon provides
communications support using the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (known as WIN-T) to connect
user devices such as telephones and computers. The two platoons have nearly identical capabilities to
provide terrestrial and space-based communications support to each command post. Platoon capabilities
include secure tactical defense switched network voice, SECRET Internet Protocol Router Networks
(known as SIPRNETs), Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Networks (known as NIPRNETs), Joint
Worldwide Intelligence Communications System, and video teleconferencing. The tactical command post
has the wireless network extension teams for extended frequency modulation retransmission. The platoon
cable section provides support to the main and tactical command posts on a mission basis.
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 4-17

Chapter 5
Corps Operations
OPERATIONS AT THE CORPS LEVEL
5-1. The corps headquarters is the most versatile of the echelons above brigades. It may become a joint
and multinational headquarters responsible for conducting deterrence, crisis response, and limited
contingency operations. In campaigns and major operations, the corps commands multiple divisions and
attached brigades, serves as the land component, and serves as the operational-level headquarters for the
employment of landpower. The corps headquarters participates in multinational exercises designed to
improve OPLANs and theater security in each of the geographic combatant commands.
5-2. The corps commander synchronizes the employment of joint capabilities in conjunction with Army
decisive action. Corps operations shape an operational environment and set the conditions for tactical
actions by the division and lower echelons. In combat operations, the corps task-organizes and maneuvers
divisions to destroy enemy land forces, seize key terrain and critical infrastructure, and dominate the land
portion of the joint operations area. In protracted campaigns dominated by stability tasks or a foreign
humanitarian crisis, the corps commander integrates Army operations with those of host-nation forces,
other government agencies, and nongovernment agencies across multiple lines of effort.
5-3. Chapter 5 focuses on the corps as a joint force land component and ARFOR, or as a tactical
headquarters. The corps can and will become a JTF headquarters; however, its operations as a JTF are
governed by joint doctrine, specifically JP 3-33. When designated as a joint force land component, the
corps modifies its operations and organization per JP 3-31. When the corps also serves a multinational
force land component, it follows doctrine prescribed in JP 3-16 and FM 3-16.
5-4. The corps is normally the highest Army echelon deployed to a joint operations area. It commands
joint, Army, and multinational land forces in campaigns and major operations. The distinguishing aspects
of corps operations are their scope and scale. Normally, the corps exercises OPCON over two or more U.S.
Army divisions and a variety of supporting brigades, exercises TACON over various multinational units
and United States Marine Corps units, and is supported by various theater sustainment organizations. As a
land component headquarters, the corps becomes the bridge between the operational and tactical levels.
Mission command at this echelon requires operational art, tactical expertise, and complementary
employment of the warfighting functions, with special emphasis on sustainment. The corps commander and
staff need to understand joint capabilities and use them to the maximum extent feasible throughout the
campaign.
OPERATIONAL ART
5-5. Planning horizons are much longer at the corps level than for the division. Corps-sized operations
rarely take less than a week and may require several months to achieve a campaign objective. The corps
commander shapes throughout an operational environment to set the conditions for the tactical success of
subordinate divisions. In practice, this means that the corps is shaping and sustaining in preparation for the
next phase of operations, while the divisions are conducting tactical shaping and the decisive operation
within the current phase. Because the corps operates at the nexus of operational and tactical levels, the
ability of the corps commander to influence current operations is more limited than that of the subordinate
division commanders. The commander can shift joint capabilities and alter the boundaries between
divisions relatively quickly. Changing task organization, committing the corps reserve, and modifying lines
of operation and sustainment priorities take time and intensive staff coordination. The corps commander
anticipates requirements, requests joint capabilities, and repositions forces and resources for the next phase
of operations. The corps staff coordinates with higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters to ensure that
plans and tactical conditions for the next phase of operations are set.
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 5-1

Chapter 5
5-6. The scale of corps operations is much greater than that of division and brigade operations. The corps
commander and staff need to understand and master operational reach, and understand the related elements
of operational art—culmination, basing, lines of operation, and tempo. Operational reach is the distance
and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities (JP 3-0). As a land
component, the corps assumes responsibility for the land portion of the joint operations area. That area can
extend over thousands of square kilometers. The corps commander and staff think of distance in terms of
time and resources. They consider how long it takes to move by ground from one point to another in the
corps area of operations for a brigade or a division. They determine the assets needed to support movement
in the corps area of operations. They consider how long it takes for different types of aircraft to transit the
same distance.
5-7. Operational reach is relative; it requires careful analysis of the enemy’s capabilities compared with
friendly forces. This consideration becomes particularly important as the corps’ combat power becomes
widely dispersed, typical in offensive exploitation and stability-intensive area of operations. The
commander estimates the risks to friendly forces as the distance between subordinate forces increases. The
point at which the enemy (or the civil situation in the case of stability tasks) has the potential to overwhelm
committed units before other joint and Army forces can intervene marks the culminating point. By
employing all available joint capabilities such as intratheater airlift, and shifting boundaries, forces, and
priorities, the corps commander extends the operational reach of the corps. The corps commander needs to
implement each decision in time to alter the corps posture before the divisions reach their culminating
point. The corps can limit the effects of time and distance by carefully phasing the operation when its scope
and scale make culmination likely. This allows the joint or multinational land component to retain and
exploit the initiative.
ANALYSIS OF AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

5-8. As an operational-level headquarters, the corps commander visualizes, describes, and directs its
subordinate echelons, based on its understanding of an operational environment from their vantage point.
The corps shapes and sets conditions for success. This demands a comprehensive analysis of the
operational variables (sometimes called PMESII-PT). Corps staffs should thoroughly understand the
operational variables and describe those variables to the tactical echelons. The tactical echelons can then
translate those operational variables identified by the operational headquarters into the mission variables
(sometimes called METT-TC).
DEPLOYMENT OF A CORPS
5-9. The corps headquarters and the forces that make up the corps normally deploy from the CONUS as
part of joint force projection. USTRANSCOM manages joint force projection in accordance with priorities
developed by the geographic combatant command. Force projection is the military component of power
projection. It is a central element of the national military strategy. Speed is paramount; force projection is a
race between friendly forces and the enemy or situation. The side that achieves an operational capability
first can seize the initiative. The goal is a combat-ready force deployed to an operational area before the
enemy is ready or the situation deteriorates further.
5-10. Corps commanders visualize force projection as one seamless operation. Deployment speed sets the
initial tempo of military activity in the operational area. Commanders understand how speed, sequence, and
mix of deploying forces (tailoring) affect their employment options. They see how their employment
concept establishes deployment requirements. The theater army develops a recommended deployment
sequence for Army forces into the AOR. However, the corps has an active and collaborative role in the
tailoring process. During planning, the corps commander recommends to the theater army commander a
proposed mix of forces and their arrival sequence that best supports the future operations of the corps. If the
corps commander and theater army commander focus only on the land component, to the exclusion of
complementary joint capabilities, they may not achieve the correct force sequencing. Commanders exercise
active and continuous control during force projection.
5-11. Force projection encompasses five processes: mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment,
and redeployment. These processes occur in a continuous, overlapping, and repeating sequence throughout
an operation. Each process has its own criteria. Mobilization is the process of bringing the armed forces to
5-2 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

Corps Operations
a state of readiness in response to a contingency. Deployment is the relocation of forces and materiel to a
desired operational area in response to a contingency. It has four supporting components: pre-deployment
activities, fort to port, port to port, and RSOI. Employment is the conduct of operations to support a JFC.
Sustainment involves providing and maintaining personnel and materiel required to support a JFC.
Redeployment is the return of forces and materiel to the home or demobilization station. (See JP 3-35 and
FM 3-35.)
5-12. The theater army is responsible for coordinating RSOI of arriving Army forces. This responsibility
normally is delegated to the TSC. The ESC or other sustainment headquarters supporting the corps
reassembles deploying units and quickly moves them into staging areas. The corps assumes OPCON of
units as they complete integration of personnel equipment and unit logistics and the TSC releases the unit.
Even as the units complete RSOI, the corps ensures that unit commanders and key leaders are fully briefed
on the situation and their subsequent missions. Effective RSOI establishes a smooth flow of personnel,
equipment, and materiel from ports of debarkation through employment as reassembled, mission-capable
forces. A deploying unit is most vulnerable between its arrival and operational employment, so protection
is vital. If the corps is conducting operations while major subordinate units are still arriving, the corps
commander may employ the corps tactical command post as the corps’ interface with the ESC and arriving
forces at the port of debarkation.
5-13. The corps commander can influence—but not dictate tailoring of—the corps’ subordinate units. The
combatant commander, theater army, supporting combatant commands, USTRANSCOM, and FORSCOM
all make decisions concerning the composition and deployment sequence of the corps. The corps
commander, can, however, organize and prepare the corps command posts for efficient and effective
movement throughout the deployment. By selecting personnel with the right skill sets and providing the
right mix of equipment, the commander, chief of staff, and G-3 match corps capabilities with the
requirements at home station and in the joint operations area. Four areas require particular consideration:
 RSOI involves USTRANSCOM, the theater army, the TSC, the ESC, and gaining headquarters.
As early in the deployment sequence as feasible, the corps deploys a command post—EECP
then tactical command post, in sequence, or if lift is available, the entire tactical command
post—to oversee the initial arrival and deployment of the corps. Unless the deployment involves
forcible entry, the EECP should be one of the first deploying elements of the corps.
 Organization of the corps command posts should factor both the mission command requirements
and endurance. Commanders factor in the number of requirements each command post controls
and the duration corps command posts are required to control corps forces.
 Each deployment will differ. The corps commander should determine when personal presence in
the joint operations area would be required. For planning purposes, the corps commander can
influence deployment more effectively from the corps main command post at home station than
in an austere facility in the reception area. The earliest the corps commander should deploy is
when elements of two divisions and their command posts are operational. Before that, the corps
EECP or tactical command post with the deputy commander should suffice.
 The mission support element permanently based at the corps’ home station should serve as the
corps main command post during the period when the main command post begins to deploy until
the main command post completes RSOI. The chief of staff designates individuals who work
from the home station location and deploy late in the sequence. This facilitates control during
deployment and handover of any ongoing responsibilities such as support to other geographic
combatant commands.
TASK-ORGANIZING THE CORPS

5-14. The task organization of the corps is the foundation of mission command. It determines which
commander works for or supports which commander. It states who exercises mission command and who
operates under it. It also provides the limits of mission command in terms of further organizational changes
and the degree of control exercised by each commander. (See ADRP 5-0 for discussion of Army command
and support relationships.)
5-15. The theater army tailors the Army force package provided to the JFC according to the broad
requirements of the campaign; the corps task-organizes it according to operational requirements within the
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 5-3

Chapter 5
joint operations area. The corps staff collaborates with the theater army staff insofar as ensuring that the
tailored force package mirrors the initial corps task organization. The theater army commander
accomplishes several things through the tailoring. First, through tailoring, the theater army determines the
sequence of deployment for the Army force package, including the corps headquarters. This provides the
corps with a projection of what forces are available and when those forces should complete RSOI. The
tailored force package mirrors the initial task organization of the corps as closely as deployment
requirements allow. Second, tailoring determines the initial ADCON responsibilities for the corps as the
ARFOR. The Secretary of Defense attaches deploying Army forces to a gaining geographic combatant
command. The theater army receives attachment of these forces and retains control of them until they
complete deployment and RSOI. With the JFC’s concurrence, the theater army attaches Army forces to the
gaining ARFOR headquarters. Army attachment conveys operational and administrative responsibility for
the subordinate force, thus ADCON follows the subordination established by attachment.
Note. The theater army normally retains attachment of sustainment and medical units through
the TSC and MEDCOM (DS) respectively.
Third, the tailored force package determines initial sustainment responsibilities. The TSC and MEDCOM
(DS) arrange the deployment sequence and RSOI of the ESC and medical brigades to support the corps as
it deploys into the initial phase of operations.
5-16. When forces complete RSOI, attachment transfers to the gaining corps headquarters. As the ARFOR,
the corps exercises OPCON of all Army units not otherwise subordinated by the JFC to another component,
or controlled by the theater army through a theater command. The corps commander task-organizes the
corps for the upcoming phase of operations by specifying command or support relationships between
headquarters and subordinate units. (See table 5-1 on pages 5-6 and 5-7.) The corps commander organizes
the corps according to a hierarchy of considerations.
DIVISIONS
5-17. The first priority for organizing the corps is the combat power required by the divisions. The
divisions are the principal instrument with which the corps accomplishes its missions. Through the military
decisionmaking process, the corps commander determines the number and types of BCTs necessary for the
divisions to accomplish their respective missions. Unless there is an overriding operational requirement for
the corps to retain command of a BCT, the division headquarters should control all the BCTs. The BCTs
should retain their organic units. In some situations, the corps commander may detach one of the
subordinate battalions of a BCT, but the corps should only do so based upon an important operational
requirement, such as the corps reserve. The preponderance of BCTs goes to that division conducting the
decisive operation.
5-18. Based on the missions of the divisions and allocation of BCTs, the corps commander determines the
appropriate command and support relationships for brigades under the divisions. The corps may retain
some brigades under corps command. This is both science and art. The optimum exercise of mission
command at the corps is through the divisions. The corps’ focus is normally at the operational level, and its
planning horizons are different. In short, the corps commander provides the division commander with the
combat power needed to fight battles and conduct tactical operations envisioned for that phase of
operations, while the corps sets the conditions for the next phase through interdependent joint capabilities.
The divisions require a mix of warfighting functions in addition to those organic to the BCTs that it can
apply to the immediate operation. Ideally, the division controls a full set of multifunctional brigades (fires,
maneuver enhancement, battlefield surveillance, and combat aviation) and receives medical and logistics
support as required from the nearest theater sustainment brigades. However, the forces available are rarely
enough to satisfy all the operational requirements, so the corps may retain control of selected brigades in
order to influence current operations and manage scarcity.
BRIGADES UNDER CORPS CONTROL

5-19. The corps commander retains control of those brigades or smaller units with which it can directly
affect the outcome of division operations in time and space. This is a function of supporting range and
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Corps Operations
supporting distance. (ADRP 3-0 discusses supporting range and supporting distance.) These factors become
critical given the scope and scale of corps operations. For example, the corps may retain OPCON of a field
artillery brigade and its multiple launch rocket system or High Mobility Artillery Rocket System battalions
to shape the current battle across two or more division areas of operations. However, if the cannon
battalions of the field artillery brigade are out of supporting range of all but one division, it makes little
sense to retain them in general support. Therefore, the corps orders the field artillery brigade to reinforce
the division conducting the decisive operation with the cannon battalions and uses missiles and joint fires to
shape the corps operation. In another example, the Army force package may only include one tailored
BFSB. The corps retains the BFSB under its control. The corps then task-organizes the capabilities of the
BFSB, such as human intelligence and counterintelligence, into packages for attachment to the divisions.
5-20. Whether the corps retains control over selected brigades also depends upon tasks that the corps must
perform, and for which a division is unavailable, excessive, or unsuitable. For example, if the JFC orders
the corps to secure and control a JSA, the corps may retain OPCON of a MEB and reinforce the MEB for
that mission. The corps commander evaluates the overall capability of each brigade for the particular task.
If the threat, size of the JSA, and number of forces located inside it are too great for the MEB’s capabilities,
the corps commander normally assigns the mission to a division, if available. If the divisions are committed
elsewhere, the corps could organize a corps task force built around the corps tactical command post with
OPCON of a MEB, a MP brigade, and possibly supported by an air and missile defense battalion. The
corps normally commands theater-level brigades and commands—theater tactical signal brigade, civil
affairs, MISO, military intelligence brigades—other than the medical and sustainment brigades. The corps
transfers control of subordinate elements of the theater-level units to the divisions as required by
METT-TC. For example, a sustainment brigade operating within the division’s area of operations would be
under the TACON of that division for protection and movement, although it would remain attached to the
ESC and provide support on an area basis to many units.
5-21. The CBRN brigade is one of the U.S. Army’s functional brigades. It is a stand-alone headquarters,
and it commands between two and six CBRN battalions together with attached separate companies and
detachments. The headquarters is 100 percent mobile. The CBRN brigade normally supports the corps
when the latter is the joint land component and ARFOR, but the brigade may be OPCON to a multinational
forces land component headquarters or the JTF. (If a division is the ARFOR, the CBRN brigade supports
that division.) The CBRN brigade commander may also exercise mission command of WMD elimination
capabilities subordinate to a CBRNE operational headquarters. Its functions include exercising mission
command of CBRN operations, providing ADCON for attached CBRN battalions, providing intelligence
support for CBRN operations, and controlling battlefield obscuration. (See ATP 3-11.36.)
THE CORPS RESERVE

5-22. The corps constitutes, controls, and reconstitutes a corps reserve. The corps reserve serves as a hedge
against uncertainty and allows the corps commander to react to opportunity and difficulty. The reserve is a
fundamental component of the corps concept of operations. The size and composition of the reserve
depends upon METT-TC, as will the specific command relationship within the corps task organization. The
reserve should be large enough to affect changing tactical conditions that are beyond the capability of the
divisions, but not so large that it seriously impairs the combat power of the division to accomplish its
mission in the first place. If a division cannot accomplish its mission without the corps reserve, the concept
of operations is flawed. There is always a degree of risk associated with the corps reserve. It should be
powerful enough that it can exploit opportunity, or it can counter an enemy action without compromising
the entire corps operation.
5-23. The composition of the reserve depends upon both its inherent combat power and its mobility. The
reserve should have sufficient combat power to change the tactical outcome of a division’s operation
assuming a range of possible situations. It should be mobile enough that it is in supporting distance of corps
tactical operations. The corps commander considers capability and location when positioning or
designating the reserve. The corps commander has two options for control of the reserve. The corps can
control the reserve, or the corps can restrict the employment of a specified force under divisional command
until the corps commander orders its commitment.
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Chapter 5
5-24. The corps commander alone has the authority to commit the reserve. Once committed, the corps
commander issues orders to reconstitute the corps reserve from available units within the corps.
Table 5-1. Command and support relationships for the corps
Relationship Use Task Organization Movement and Administrative
Employment Control (ADCON)
Attached The attachment should The corps has the The corps can Unless modified by
last for the duration of authority to task- position the unit the DA or the
the campaign. A unit is organize as anywhere in the AO ASCC, ADCON
often attached when required, using any or delegate the unit transfers to the
the subordinate unit command or support to a subordinate gaining HQ. The
augments a higher relationship. commander through corps assumes
headquarters. task organization. ADCON of the unit,
including logistics,
medical, and
administration.
Operational OPCON is a temporary The corps can place The corps can ADCON remains
control change of organization the entire unit or position the unit with the parent unit
(OPCON) that allows the gaining parts under OPCON, anywhere in the AO headquarters.
commander maximum TACON, or in or delegate the unit Additional logistics
flexibility to employ the support of another to a subordinate and medical
subordinate unit. unit. The corps may commander through support provided
not attach the unit to task organization. on an area basis.
another unit.
Tactical TACON is a temporary The corps may not The corps may ADCON remains
control command relationship change the position the unit with the parent unit
(TACON) used among Army organization of the anywhere in the AO headquarters.
headquarters, other unit under TACON. or delegate a Additional logistics
Services, and However, the positioning authority and medical
multinational forces. gaining commander to a subordinate support provided
The JFC may specify may place the entire commander by task on an area basis.
TACON over specific unit under TACON organization.
capabilities (such as or in support of
ADA fires) while another unit.
leaving the Army task
organization
unchanged.
Direct support Direct support allows The corps The corps may Parent unit retains
(DS) the corps commander commander may put position the unit ADCON. Additional
to set priorities and the DS unit in any within its AO or logistics and
position the DS unit. It support relationship delegate positioning medical support
is similar to TACON to another unit. This authority to a provided on an
but allows a larger unit includes support subordinate area basis.
to support a smaller relationships commander through
formation. It allows the between subunits. a change in task
DS commander Note that the parent organization. The
maximum flexibility unit commander supporting
while conforming to the may adjust the task commander
corps’ priorities. organization of the recommends the
DS unit as needed. locations from which
the DS unit can best
support the mission.
ADA air defense artillery ASCC Army Service component command HQ headquarters
AO area of operations DA Department of the Army JFC joint force commander
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Corps Operations
Table 5-1. Command and support relationships for the corps (continued)
Relationship Use Task Organization Movement and Administrative
Employment Control (ADCON)
Reinforcing This relationship is The parent unit task- The corps HQ Parent unit retains
(R) between supporting organizes the coordinates with the ADCON. Additional
units with similar reinforcing unit. The maneuver HQ logistics and
capabilities such as supported unit owning the AO. The medical support
artillery units, but not (providing DS) may division or brigade provided on an
between different not specify further allocates terrain to area basis.
warfighting functions. support alignments. the reinforcing unit
The DS unit based on
commander sets recommendations
priorities for the from the DS unit.
reinforcing unit, and
recommends positions
for it to maneuver
commander.
General GS units provide The parent unit task- Movement and Parent unit retains
support (GS) support to the corps as organizes the GS positioning are ADCON. Additional
a whole. Units unit. controlled by the logistics and
providing GS normally maneuver medical support
provide the support on commander owning provided on an
an area basis. The that AO. area basis.
JFC specifies priorities
of support.
General GSR prioritizes The parent unit task- Movement and Parent unit retains
support additional capabilities organizes the GSR positioning are ADCON. Additional
reinforcing between supporting unit primarily to controlled by the logistics and
(GSR) units from the same provide support to maneuver medical support
headquarters. The the force as a whole. commander owning provided on an
headquarters assigns Supported units may that AO. The higher area basis.
one or more units to not specify further HQ of the supporting
support to the entire support unit coordinates for
force. If a unit in DS or relationships. movement and
R requests terrain with the HQ
reinforcement, the owning that AO.
GSR unit gives priority
to that support unit
ahead of other
requests unless
disapproved by the
higher HQ.
AO area of operations HQ headquarters
DA Department of the Army JFC joint force commander
OTHER SERVICE AND MULTINATIONAL UNITS

5-25. As a land component responsible for the use of landpower in a campaign, the corps often has control
of other Service forces and multinational forces. Unless the JFC specifies otherwise, the corps exercises
TACON over such forces made available. The corps absorbs these units within its task organization
effectively when it adheres to certain considerations.
5-26. As the joint force land component, the corps normally is delegated TACON of other Service forces.
The JFLCC and staff should understand the capabilities and limitations of other Service forces. A MAGTF
placed TACON to an Army corps normally includes Marine Corps tactical air assets. The MAGTF
commander retains OPCON of organic air assets. Consequently, commanders should address specifically
the issue of employment of Marine tactical aviation (that is, independent functional component air
operations) during planning. Therefore, the activities of the BCD and Marine liaison element to the JAOC
should be coordinated. The joint force land component also must be prepared to receive and coordinate
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Chapter 5
with Navy expeditionary forces (for example, riverine units and Navy construction engineers). The land
component commander also coordinates with USTRANSCOM and the naval commander concerning a
maritime pre-positioning force or the equipment of Army pre-positioned stocks. (See JP 3-31.)
5-27. Different land forces units have unique capabilities. TACON maintains the tactical integrity of the
other Service forces. The corps places the other Service forces under the TACON of a higher echelon with
the capability of controlling and employing that force to its full capabilities. In the case of Marine
expeditionary brigades and Marine expeditionary units (MEUs), with their organic aviation assets, the
controlling echelon is normally two echelons above the subordinate Marine expeditionary force. The corps
retains TACON of the entire Marine expeditionary brigade and an Army division may have TACON of a
MEU. The corps exchanges liaison with the subordinate other-Service units under its direct command. In
the case of a Marine expeditionary brigade, the corps incorporates Marine Corps staff into a joint force land
component headquarters.
5-28. Multinational forces have both unique abilities and unique requirements. The corps commander
should retain national integrity at the highest level feasible. This is not necessarily the same as the most
efficient distribution of multinational troops. The art of command and science of control for mission
command applies even more for multinational forces. Every multinational force has strengths and
weaknesses. In some cases, the multinational units integrate with U.S. forces at a small-unit level to
improve training and ensure the survival of the multinational unit. In other cases, the multinational unit
remains directly under the land component’s command because of political considerations. Multinational
forces also come with constraints unique to the particular arrangement of the coalition or alliance.
Commanders and staff remain aware that multinational forces may not have the ability to communicate
digitally, or if they do, their systems might not be compatible. This often creates an additional layer of
complexity to planning and execution. To maintain situational understanding of the multinational issues
and perspectives, the corps should have a liaison detachment from each national force embedded in the
combined land component headquarters. The corps also provides additional communications and liaison
support to each multinational force, either directly or by tasking a subordinate Army unit. In many cases,
this requires reinforcement by the theater army to the supporting communications units. For example, the
corps may receive and deploy tasking a digital liaison detachment a subordinate theater army unit. (See
FM 3-16.)
OPERATIONAL CONTROL AND SUPPORT

5-29. The corps specifies OPCON primarily when changing the subordination of one Army unit to another
in the task organization. The supporting theater sustainment and medical units adjust their support in
accordance with the priority of support and the position of each to the supported Army unit. In the case of
small, specialized units such as civil affairs and MISO, the corps attaches them to the gaining division or
brigade headquarters unless the subordination will be brief. This changes the ADCON relationship between
the supporting unit and gaining unit but simplifies administration and logistics when the subordination is
lengthy.
5-30. The corps specifies a support relationship between units in the corps when a superior and subordinate
relationship is inappropriate. This is the case when the echelon of the supporting and supported units is the
same or the supporting unit is a higher echelon formation. A support relationship also recognizes that the
type of support provided is specialized, and the supported commander only specifies priorities and
minimum movement and terrain control measures.
5-31. The corps current operations integrating cell maintains the complete corps task organization and
distributes it across the corps staff. Any change to the corps task organization is made through an operation
order or a fragmentary order sent by the current operations integrating cell.
5-32. Several theater-level commands normally support corps operations: the TSC (through the ESC); the
MEDCOM (DS) through the deployed medical brigade (support); the signal command (theater); the
military information operations group; and the AAMDC. The TSC remains attached to the theater army,
and the ESC normally provides direct support to the corps. The MEDCOM (DS) is attached to the theater
army, and its subordinate medical brigade(s) (support) deploy to the joint operations area in direct support
of the corps. The signal command (theater) extends the network by deploying tactical signal brigades to
5-8 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

Corps Operations
link headquarters across the AOR. The AAMDC normally provides direct support to the AADC and may
provide air defense units in direct support of the corps. As a supported command, the corps develops
priorities for sustainment, health service support, and air defense. To provide the support, the subordinate
units of the theater-level commands require terrain within the corps area of operations and protection from
ground threats. The theater army commander ensures that the TSC, ESC, and AAMDC collaborate with the
corps in developing all plans and orders. Each command should provide a liaison element to the corps
headquarters along with planners as requested by the corps. As the campaign expands in scale, other theater
commands provide additional support. (Refer to chapter 3.)
THE CORPS AREA OF OPERATIONS

5-33. The JFC assigns the corps its area of operations
Responsibilities within an assigned area
when the corps is a land component. Within the land area of operations
of operations, the corps commander is the supported • Terrain management.
commander and the other components provide support in • Information collection.
accordance with the joint concept of operations. The • Intelligence collection, integration,
corps commander collaborates with the JFC to determine and synchronization.
how much of the land portion of the joint operations area • Civil affairs operations.
that the land component can effectively control. The • Movement control (ground and air).
corps commander considers forces available, the area of • Clearance of fires.
influence, and joint capabilities when recommending the • Security.
land area of operations. Ideally, the land area of • Personnel recovery.
operations equals the area of influence of the land forces • Airspace control.
available, balanced against the capabilities of the total • Environmental considerations.
joint force. The corps commander estimates the corps’
area of influence—a geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations
by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander’s command or control (JP 3-0). The
actual area of operations may be somewhat smaller than the area of influence. This difference requires a
balance between forces available and the size of the area of operations. Too large an area with regard to the
available forces and the corps may not accomplish its mission. If the area of operations is too small, the
corps may fail to use subordinate forces to their full capacities.
5-34. The corps commander assigns subordinate areas of operations based upon METT-TC. The area of
operations is a fundamental control measure. It empowers subordinate initiative and provides a limit for
decentralized execution. The first priority for allocation of terrain is to the divisions. The division’s area of
operations should allow the division commander full use of the division’s BCTs and supporting brigades.
When assigned an area of operations, the subordinate division commander takes responsibility for
managing terrain, collecting information, conducting security operations, controlling airspace and ground
movement, clearing fires, and conducting operations in that area of operations. (See ADRP 3-0 for a
discussion of area of operations.) The corps also assigns areas of operations to Marine Corps combat units,
multinational divisions and brigades controlled by the corps, and MEBs attached to the corps.
5-35. If the corps has a multinational unit under its control, the corps commander carefully reviews the
area of operations assigned to that headquarters. The corps commander reviews tasks inherent with control
of the area of operations and discusses corps contingencies developed for that area with each multinational
commander. Areas of operations and boundaries between forces of different nations are always potential
weak points. This is not a discredit to the multinational force; it is recognition of the inherent friction in
multinational operations. The friction results from different doctrines, networks, languages, and force
structures. The corps commander stresses to adjacent multinational commanders and U.S. commanders the
importance of effective liaison between both and directs the corps staff to support liaison requirements.
5-36. The commanding general may divide the corps area of operations in one of three ways: contiguous
area of operations, where subordinate units share a common boundary; noncontiguous area of operations,
where they do not; or a combination of the two, containing some areas reserved for corps control. (See
figure 5-1 on page 5-10.) At the corps level, a combination is typical with the corps assigning the majority
of the area of operations to its divisions in contiguous areas, and retaining control of areas beyond the
influence of the divisions. Figure 5-1 shows this on the left side. An area assigned to corps control is that
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 5-9

Chapter 5
area between noncontiguous areas of operations or beyond contiguous areas of operations. This area
becomes the corps deep area (see the right side of figure 5-1). The higher headquarters is responsible for
controlling those areas of operations not assigned to its subordinate units. (See ADRP 3-0.) The type of
area of operations affects the corps’s requirement to resource the assigned mission. The unit controlling the
ground has responsibility for terrain.
Figure 5-1. Possible configurations for the corps area of operations

5-37. Within the areas not assigned to a division, the corps should develop sufficient situational awareness
to prevent the enemy from massing forces and capabilities that endanger elements of the corps. The corps
assesses the risk and reacts accordingly. The corps staff develops a contingency plan to cover the corps
areas with increased intelligence assets and sufficient forces to defeat a potential threat. The corps can
control areas of operations that have low risk in many ways. For example, areas with no indication of
enemy forces only receive periodic surveillance and reconnaissance. If the potential risk increases, the
corps could assign some or all the area to a subordinate unit with orders to develop the situation, collect
information, and disrupt any enemy forces detected in the area. At a minimum, the corps commander can
assign be-prepared tasks to subordinate units adjacent to the corps areas for dealing with potential threats.
5-38. The commanding general has several options available to gain and maintain control of the corps area
of operations not assigned to subordinate units. The commanding general coordinates with joint, host-
nation, and multinational forces to take responsibility for all or portions of the area. Designated units may
initially control corps areas by temporarily occupying portions of the area. For example, friendly forces
may continuously transit from contiguous to noncontiguous areas or from one noncontiguous area to
another. These forces can provide intelligence and coverage of the areas.
5-39. The corps may designate a support area adjacent to the divisions’ areas of operations. The support
area becomes that area in which the corps concentrates sustainment, available aviation, and support units
for other Services. The corps delineates the support area based on its geographical advantages for
sustaining the force and protecting these assets. Although the support area may be noncontiguous with the
other major subordinate units, this is rare. An area between the divisions and their support that is not under
division control always poses a weakness to the corps’ freedom of action. If necessary, the corps
commander positions sustainment units in bases located inside the divisional areas and assigns line-of-
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Corps Operations
communications security to the divisions. A similar situation may occur when the JFC establishes a JSA for
theater support. The corps commander should designate an area of operations that encompasses the ground
lines of communications between the corps and theater support area.
THE CORPS AND JOINT FORCES

5-40. The corps as a land component has the principal responsibility for arranging joint capabilities
together with landpower. Joint capabilities are the primary means available to the corps commander for
setting conditions and shaping the environment for division operations. The corps requests, plans for,
employs, and allocates joint capabilities to subordinate forces.
AIR FORCE
5-41. The United States Air Force (USAF) is a crucial partner to the Army in any major operation or
campaign. The USAF provides the corps headquarters with an air support operations group (ASOG). The
ASOG’s mission is to provide specially configured liaison packages to assist the corps commander with
integrating the full range of air power appropriate to the mission of the corps. Thus, both the mission and
makeup of the ASOG will change when the mission of the corps changes. The USAF provides the division
headquarters an air support operations squadron (known to the Air Force as ASOS). The air support
operations squadron provides the division with tactical air control parties (TACPs) and an air support
operations center (ASOC) that functions at the division level. The TACP supports the subordinate units of
the division and the ASOC supports the division headquarters.
5-42. Each corps has an assigned air liaison officer. When the corps becomes the operational-level land
component headquarters (joint force land component or multinational forces land component) or the JTF
headquarters, the USAF ASOG will form the nucleus of a joint air component coordination element
(known as the JACCE) to the JFLCC or JTF headquarters. The joint air component coordination element is
the direct representative of the commander, Air Force forces and JFACC. This element co-locates with the
joint force land component to coordinate and integrate air power into land operations at the operational
level of war. If the corps is the ARFOR (for RSOI), then the ASOG serves as the nucleus of the USAF
coordination element. When established, the commander of the USAF coordination element acts as the
commander, Air Force forces’ primary representative to the ARFOR. This element advises the ARFOR
commander and staff on the capabilities and limitations of airpower and assists the ARFOR commander
with the request for forces and RSOI of Air Force forces directly supporting Army forces.
5-43. When the corps serves as a tactical headquarters, the corps does not receive the joint air component
coordination element. Instead, the USAF commander directs the division air support operations squadrons
to provide an ASOC capability to the corps headquarters. The ASOC is a modular element and the USAF
adjusts the staffing and communications capability to the responsibility for the corps when it operates as a
tactical or intermediate headquarters. The ASOC is the principal USAF command and control node for
integrating air power into Army land operations. As a direct subordinate element of the JAOC, the ASOC is
responsible for the direction and control of air component operations directly supporting the Army land
operation. It processes and coordinates air missions requiring integration with other supporting ground
forces. The ASOC usually co-locates with the senior Army tactical echelon (normally a division, but it may
be a corps) and coordinates operations with the permanently aligned TACPs and the JAOC. The ASOC and
TACP normally integrate with the current operations fires cell and airspace element to form a joint air
ground integration center (JAGIC). The JAGIC integrates and coordinates fires and air operations over and
within the commander’s area of operations. As the air component portion of the JAGIC, the ASOC is
responsible for the direction and control of air operations in the corps’ assigned airspace within its area of
operations requiring integration with other supporting arms and ground forces. If the ASOC uses a fire
support coordination line (FSCL), the ASOC normally controls air component operations short of this
FSCL and below the coordinating altitude. (For further information on Army assigned airspace, see
FM 3-52.)
5-44. As previously discussed, the ASOC may also coordinate in other mission areas, to include air
interdiction, joint information activities, air defense, information collection, joint suppression of enemy air
defenses (known as J-SEAD), airlift, and joint personnel recovery. Air missions that fly within the corps
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 5-11

Chapter 5
airspace but do not directly support the ground component normally are coordinated through the ASOC to
de-conflict with ground force maneuver and fires as well as to receive target and threat updates.
Planning for Air Support

5-45. The supported ground commander is responsible for ensuring that the supporting air commander
understands the assistance required. (See JP 1.) When the corps becomes the joint force land component
command or a single Service headquarters controlling land operations (as an ARFOR), specific inputs to
the supporting air component affect air support to ground forces. This includes but is not limited to the air
apportionment recommendation, air operations directive, and air tasking order (ATO). The Army also
provides critical input to the area air defense plan and supporting tactical operational data. The air
operations directive has the most current and significant guidance for each air battle plan to drive the daily
joint air tasking cycle. It delineates targeting priorities for the use of joint air assets. The ATO is the key
document published and disseminated by the JFACC to delineate all air operations for 24-hour duration.
The airspace control plan and airspace control order are airspace control authority functions that affect both
ground and air operations. The land component commander (JFLCC or ARFOR commander) ensures that
both support Army airspace requirements. The senior air and missile defense commander (normally the
AAMDC commander) provides area air defense plan and tactical operational data input to the AADC.
5-46. The supported Army headquarters processes and either approves or denies preplanned and immediate
air support requests through the Army air-ground system to identify external air support requirements to the
air component. One type of air support request is a joint tactical air strike request (JTAR). JTARs go
through fire support planning and process through the fires cell. Each echelon approves and prioritizes
these requests before going to the BCD at the JAOC with the Army’s battle rhythm complementing the
joint air tasking cycle. Preplanned JTARs must go to the supporting air component in sufficient time to
meet the planning stages of the joint air tasking cycle and to appear on the ATO. Normally the BCD sets
the suspense for preplanned JTARs and ensures that the supported Army staff adjusts its planning
accordingly. Immediate JTARs occur after publication of the ATO. The supported ASOC normally answers
immediate requests (when given decentralized execution authority) with best available air assets that are
already on the ATO.
Air Mobility Operations

5-47. The Army is the largest user of airlift. The airlift system can respond to Service and joint
commander’s needs with rapid response globally and within the theater. The air mobility system can
provide a direct delivery preference from outside the AOR directly into operating locations within the AOR
to reduce cargo downtime. This mobility system provides air movement, air-refueling support to airlift
aircraft, aeromedical evacuation, and air-drop options for the Army and joint forces. The corps, as the joint
force land component or ARFOR, prioritizes transportation and movement requirements based on
operational necessities. Intratheater airlift provides a capability to respond to high priority combat and
logistics movement requirements. The corps validates and prioritizes intratheater airlift requests. One
request includes airborne operations processed through the G-3 to the J-3. Another is the Army’s air
mobility requests normally processed through the G-4 to the Deployment and Distribution Operations
Center to coordinate and prioritize theater airlift requests for the joint force.
5-48. The JAOC air mobility division monitors airlift operations and scheduling. The BCD airlift section
co-locates with the air mobility division and monitors joint airlift operations. The BCD airlift section is the
point of contact within the JAOC for coordinating and monitoring Army airlift requests, changes, and
cancellations. The USAF provides air mobility liaison officers to Army corps, division, TSCs, separate
regiments, selected brigade echelons, and other jointly validated headquarters to provide air mobility
liaison, special staff assistance, and controlled airdrops for the ground commander.
Direct Support Airlift

5-49. If the common-user airlift system proves inadequate for the needs of the joint force land component
(or ARFOR), then the JFC can task the JFACC to provide direct support airlift to JFLCC. In cases where
the JFC operates by Service component, the JFACC provides the ARFOR with direct support airlift. The
JFC apportions a certain amount of the total number of airlift sorties required to support theater movement
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requirements for priority mission critical or time sensitive airlift. The joint force land component (or
ARFOR) determines the timing and routing priorities of these missions and relays this information to the
JFACC combined air operations center for planning and execution. Aircraft accomplishing this mission are
under TACON of the JFACC. The missions normally operate via a support agreement with the supported
component, in this case the joint force land component.
Fire Support Coordination Line

5-50. The corps plan should make maximum use of the operational reach of U.S. air power. To maximize
the ability of the JFACC to strike and interdict enemy forces, the corps commander uses a carefully
selected FSCL. The FSCL is a permissive fire control measure for expeditious engagement of targets of
opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. An FSCL does not divide an area of operations. It delimits
the areas within which the land component is conducting ground operations and areas in the corps area of
operations where the JFACC can employ maximum combat power in support of the corps. Short of an
FSCL, the corps commander controls all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface engagement operations in the
area of operations. For maximum flexibility from the supporting air component, the corps establishes the
FSCL beyond the effective cannon range of the committed BCTs and then adjusts the FSCL as maneuver
dictates displacement of artillery and other corps supporting assets.
5-51. Use of an FSCL is not mandatory. Forces engaging targets beyond an FSCL must inform all affected
commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide, both in the air and on the
land. The FSCL applies to all fires of air, land, and sea-based weapons systems using munitions against
surface targets. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to complete this coordination does not preclude
the engagement of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do so increases the risk of casualties from
friendly fire. (See JP 3-09.)
Airspace Control
5-52. Army airspace users are ground forces operating in an inherently joint environment. Army
commanders are responsible for integrating Army airspace users, regardless of who controls the airspace,
within the larger joint airspace control framework. The Army depends on its joint partners for capabilities
that do not reside within the Army, and it operates more effectively with their support. The Army air-
ground system interfaces with the theater air-ground system to integrate air support with ground operations.
The Army air-ground system allows the coordinating and integrating air operations with the ground
commander’s concept of operations. It allows for initiating and processing air support requests, collection
requirements, airspace coordination, joint fires, air and missile defense, and liaison. Army commanders use
the Army air-ground system to coordinate and integrate airspace use and users over the ground
commanders’ assigned area of operations.
5-53. The corps headquarters oversees airspace control policy and standardization of tactics, techniques,
and procedures throughout the corps area of operations. It executes airspace responsibilities when it serves
as an intermediate tactical headquarters, an operational-level Army force, a joint force land component
command, or a JTF headquarters. Airspace element personnel in the main and tactical command posts
integrate airspace operations with the functional and integrating cells. The airspace element coordinates
with the TACP and with either the joint air component coordination element or ASOC co-located with the
headquarters. In most situations, the corps headquarters is the senior Army airspace element. As such, the
corps headquarters contributes to the BCD’s airspace section to ensure the joint airspace policies and
documents incorporate the Army airspace priorities and requirements.
5-54. The corps has airspace responsibilities to coordinate Army and supporting airspace user requirements
within its area of operations, including portions of the area of operations further assigned to subordinate
units. The corps may have additional airspace control responsibilities to provide joint airspace control for
airspace as directed by its higher headquarters or the airspace control authority and as defined in the
airspace control plan. This corps-assigned airspace is normally that airspace assigned by the airspace
control authority that is within the boundaries of the corps’ area of operations up to the coordinating
altitude. The assigned airspace may not be over the entire corps’ area of operations but could be a smaller
area within the corps’ area of operations. The airspace assigned depends on the corps’ ability to control it
effectively. (See FM 3-52 and JP 3-52.)
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5-55. The corps’ specific responsibilities for managing airspace depend on responsibilities delegated to it
by the airspace control authority and its role (operational or tactical headquarters) within the joint force. As
an operational headquarters (joint force land component command, multinational forces land component, or
ARFOR), the corps headquarters normally decentralizes airspace control to subordinate divisions within
their respective areas of operations (division-controlled airspace). It authorizes direct liaison between them
and other theater air-ground system airspace control nodes provided by other Services. The corps retains
responsibility for integrating airspace users. The corps integrates all airspace requirements for corps-
controlled BCTs and other brigades not assigned an area of operations. The corps airspace element may
retain responsibility for airspace control over any portions of the area of operations not assigned to
subordinate units (corps-controlled airspace). Responsibility depends upon the size of the corps controlled
portions of the area of operations, the capabilities of the corps airspace element, and the details of joint air
operations.
5-56. When the corps headquarters functions as a tactical headquarters under a joint or multinational land
component, the corps normally controls airspace over the corps area of operations directly. This is because
the corps area of operations is usually much smaller. In this situation, the corps headquarters would have an
ASOC or equivalent instead of the joint air component coordination element it would receive as an
operational headquarters. (For a more complete discussion of airspace control, see FM 3-52.)
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

5-57. Within the corps’ area of operations, conventional forces and SOF often operate near each other to
accomplish the JFC’s mission. Historically, commanders have employed SOF in the advance phases of
operations. During extended or large-scale operations involving both conventional forces and SOF, control
and de-confliction measures become vital to the integration and synchronization of conventional and
special operations missions. The corps commander considers both conventional forces and SOF capabilities
and limitations, particularly in tasks associated with mission command and sustainment warfighting
functions. The exchange of liaison elements between the staffs of appropriate conventional forces and SOF
further enhances integration of all forces concerned.
5-58. During mission planning, the corps staff and SOF planners include options regarding how to
integrate conventional forces and SOF ground elements. Successful integration and interoperability of
conventional forces and SOF depend on understanding each other’s missions, systems, capabilities, and
limitations. Exchange and use of liaison and control elements are critical when conventional forces and
SOF conduct operations in the same operational area against the same threat. Integration of SOF with
conventional forces is always a critical concern for SOF commanders, and areas of interest typically
include, but are not limited to—
 Target de-confliction.
 Communications systems.
 Political concerns.
 Civil populace.
 Possible linkup of ARSOF with conventional forces.
 Mission command.
 Information operations staff section.
 Electromagnetic spectrum management.
 Information collection.
 Airspace control.
 Fire support coordination, to include fire control measures.
 Coordination of logistics and area of operations support.
 Personnel recovery.
5-59. ARSOF provide capabilities that expand the options available to the corps commander; however,
ARSOF are not the ideal solution to all problems requiring a military response. The best means of
employing ARSOF is usually with conventional forces in which each force operates as a component of the
joint force. This expands options for dealing with hybrid threats, for example, because ARSOF conduct
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unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, and counterterrorism. The mutually beneficial actions of
SOF and conventional forces contribute to shaping and military engagement. The corps frequently supports
joint security cooperation activities as part of the campaign. Army conventional forces and SOF units train
partner units to increase multinational units’ proficiency. It is important to sustain a long-term relationship
between conventional forces and SOF because they benefit each other. ARSOF relies on operating with the
support of conventional forces. (See JP 3-05 and ADRP 3-05 for more information on special operations.)
5-60. Conventional force operations and special operations require coordination and liaison among all
components of the joint force and the joint force land component command to ensure that component
command and control, intelligence, movements and maneuver, fire support, and sustainment are fully
integrated and interoperable. The focal point for synchronization of SOF activities with conventional joint
land operations is the special operations command and control element (SOCCE) which co-locates with the
supported or supporting command element of the joint force land component. (See JP 3-31.)
5-61. The SOCCE is predominantly an ARSOF element but Navy and Marine Corps SOF may form
SOCCEs when these forces operate with the joint force land component. The SOCCE performs command
and control and liaison according to mission requirements and as directed by the establishing SOF
commander (the theater special operations command, joint force special operations component commander,
or commander, joint special operations task force). The SOCCE can receive operational intelligence and
target acquisition reports directly from deployed SOF elements and provide the reports directly to the
associated headquarters of the joint force land component. The SOCCE remains under OPCON of the
establishing SOF commander, but may be in direct support of the joint force land component. (See
JP 3-31.)
JOINT INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION COLLECTION

5-62. Planning, execution, and assessment of information collection activities require integration across all
echelons. The corps integrates corps capabilities with all other joint activities, systems, efforts, and
capabilities to provide the information the commander requires to make timely decisions. Subordinate
Army commanders submit their requests for information through echelon channels; if the corps as the land
component cannot satisfy the requests, the information requests pass to the JTF for research and response.
Corps and division commanders can submit a request for collection or request for joint support to the joint
intelligence operations center, which apportions its assets or resources from higher echelons against the
requests in order of priority, as defined by the JTF commander. Collection requirements that the JTF cannot
satisfy using assets controlled or apportioned by the JTF go into the national intelligence system for
collection.
5-63. An understanding of joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is required to
understand the relationship of Army intelligence operations and information collection to joint ISR. (See
ADRP 2-0.) In joint collection management operations, the synchronization manager, in coordination with
the operations directorate, forwards collection requirements to the Service component commander
exercising TACON over joint ISR assets. A mission tasking order goes to the unit selected as responsible
for the collection operation. The selected unit, sometimes called the mission manager, makes the final
choice of specific platforms, equipment, and personnel required for the collection operation, based on
operational considerations, such as maintenance, schedules, training, and experience.
5-64. Joint air planning products produced by the JAOC include the ATO, airspace control order, and
special instructions (known as SPINS). An ATO is used to task and disseminate across components,
subordinate units, and headquarters all projected aircraft sorties and aerial capabilities for the affected joint
operations area. The airspace control order is an order implementing the airspace control plan that provides
the details of the approved requests for airspace coordinating measures. It is published either as part of the
ATO or as a separate document. (JP 3-52 provides more details on airspace control orders.) Special
instructions are instructions issued to aviators that describe detailed procedures for loss of communication,
escape and evasion, and search and rescue operations. (See JP 3-30.)
5-65. At the JTF or joint force land component, aerial collection missions are developed via the joint
collection working group and the Joint Collection Management Board. The joint collection working group
is the ISR planning forum for the management of collection requirements and the coordination of collection
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operations much like the Army’s operations and intelligence work group. The joint collection working
group—
 Receives requirements from subordinate echelons.
 Validates these requirements against priority intelligence requirements.
 Prioritizes requirements against the commander’s stated ISR collection priorities.
 Prioritizes requirements against organic and attached ISR assets.
 Coordinates allocation of aerial ISR collection assets.
 Approves collection target decks for inclusion in the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target
acquisition annex in the daily ATO.
5-66. The Joint Collection Management Board reviews the aggregate daily collection requirements,
deconflicts them where necessary, and prioritizes said requirements. It assigns priorities for the allocation
of platforms against requirements and sensors. It articulates collection management guidance to the
components while ensuring coordination and deconfliction of requirements with the intelligence
community. The components act on the guidance and direction provided from the Joint Collection
Management Board. They ensure proper resourcing and allocation of targets to assets for which they are
assigned collection operations management authority. This process streamlines tasking and effectively and
efficiently uses limited collection assets.
SPACE SUPPORT
5-67. The Army relies on space-based capabilities and systems, such as navigation and timing, global
positioning, satellite communications, weather satellites, and information collection platforms. These
systems are essential tools used by the corps to plan, communicate, navigate, and maneuver forces,
maintain situational awareness, engage the enemy, provide missile warning, and protect and sustain forces.
Space-enabled capabilities are ubiquitous and every element of the joint force uses them. To meet corps
requirements, planning and coordination of space support requires national, Service, joint, and theater-
based capabilities. The corps staff has an Army space support element. This element coordinates with other
space control elements at the JAOC, the theater army, and national resources. The corps becomes the
principal integrator of space capabilities in support of the land component. The space support element
coordinates directly with the joint space coordinating authority—normally the JFACC—for support by
space-based systems to meet corps requirements.
5-68. The loss of space-based communications due to enemy activity remains a major concern for Army
forces conducting deployed operations. Whether enemy action against U.S. satellites causes an interruption
of the communications through persistent jamming or spoofing, the resulting blackout requires Army forces
to adapt and adjust until U.S. forces restore the capability. Short-term loss of satellite communications may
be mitigated through alternative communications methods and courier networks.
AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

5-69. The threat posed by enemy ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aircraft systems is
increasing. During Operation Iraqi Freedom I, for example, an Iraqi missile (probably a FROG 7) scored a
direct hit on the command post of the Second Brigade of the 3d Infantry division. Earlier in the campaign,
the Iraqis employed antiship cruise missiles against land targets. Defending friendly assets against future
threats becomes very important. Ballistic and cruise missiles can engage and destroy targets from well
beyond the corps area of operations and threaten theater-level bases. Protecting the force from these
weapons demands an integrated, AOR-wide air and missile defense umbrella. The AAMDC provides this
capability. The AAMDC is attached to the theater army and commands all Army air defense units within
the AOR. The command and support relationships among the subordinate units of the AAMDC, joint
forces, and the corps vary extensively according to the threat.
5-70. The AAMDC normally provides direct support to the AADC. Frequently the JFACC is also the
AADC. The AADC is the commander with the preponderance of air defense assets in a joint operations
area. The AADC integrates air and missile defense capabilities in the joint operations area. Specifically, the
AADC establishes central control of theater air and missile defense. This requires integration of joint
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control systems and Army mission command systems with sensor, strike, and shooter assets. Normally, the
AAMDC commander is the deputy AADC.
5-71. The AAMDC commands one or more air defense brigades. The composition of the air defense
brigade depends upon the threat, but normally includes Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (known as
THAAD), Patriot, Avenger, and counter rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM) units. The brigade
commander task-organizes batteries under air defense battalions. In general, Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense and Patriot units operate in direct support of the AADC. Task-organized air defense battalions
consisting of Avenger and C-RAM batteries provide direct support to the corps.
5-72. Figure 5-2 provides an example of air and missile defense for a major operation. In this example, the
AAMDC commands two air defense brigades. One brigade defends theater assets outside the joint
operations area. A second brigade provides direct support to the JFACC or AADC with two Patriot
battalions. The brigade commander places two task-organized battalions consisting of Avenger and
C-RAM batteries in direct support of the corps.
Figure 5-2. Air and missile defense

5-73. The corps distributes air defense capabilities provided by the AAMDC between the divisions and the
support area by establishing priorities for air and missile defense. Depending upon the tactical situation,
further decentralization of air defense batteries to individual brigades may occur. The AAMDC may detach
Avenger and C-RAM units to the corps, division, or a BCT. However, TACON of engagements remains
with the AADC and regional control centers to allow friendly air power maximum latitude to achieve air
superiority and support ground forces.
NUCLEAR OPERATIONS
5-74. The United States Army Nuclear and Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency (known as
USANCA) maintains nuclear employment augmentation teams (NEATs) to deploy and augment the
planning staff of at corps or echelons above corps for adaptive nuclear planning at the commander’s
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Chapter 5
request. The NEAT provides the resident expertise in nuclear planning and execution to offset a lack of
knowledge and doctrine at the geographic combatant command level to ensure an Army and joint interface
in theater nuclear operations.
5-75. The NEAT provides nuclear targeting experience and assistance in analyzing the impact of offensive
nuclear weapons on the friendly scheme of maneuver. The NEAT provides the supported commander with
independent analysis theater nuclear plans to ensure that these plans are synchronized with ground
operations. The NEAT is available at all times to assist Army planning staffs in nuclear operations, exercise
participation, and OPLAN development.
CYBER ELECTROMAGNETIC ACTIVITIES

5-76. Cyber electromagnetic activities are activities leveraged to seize, retain, and exploit an advantage
over adversaries and enemies in both cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, while simultaneously
denying and degrading adversary and enemy use of the same and protecting the mission command system
(ADRP 3-0). CEMA consist of cyberspace operations, electronic warfare, and spectrum management
operations. CEMA integrate and synchronize the functions and capabilities of cyberspace operations,
electronic warfare, and spectrum management operations to produce complementary and reinforcing
effects. While these activities differ in their employment and tactics, their functions and capabilities are
integrated and synchronized to maximize their effects. CEMA provide commanders with the ability to gain
and maintain an advantage in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum.
5-77. The CEMA element and working group within the corps, working with similar elements at division
and theater, becomes the primary integrating headquarters staff for CEMA. The corps receives
augmentation for the 1st Information Operations Command to increase its ability to coordinate and
integrate CEMA. The corps CEMA personnel may initiate or otherwise process requests for support
through the targeting process. Requests for cyberspace effects are submitted to the joint headquarters for
approval and resourcing. The CEMA element supports corps efforts to build, operate, and defend the
network; attack and exploit enemy and adversary systems; gain situational understanding; and protect
individuals and platforms. The CEMA elements at each echelon identify the enemy’s high-value networks
and identify means to disrupt enemy electronics and communications activities at critical times. These
attacks can disrupt enemy target acquisition, intelligence gathering, and command and control systems. The
object is either to destroy the enemy’s command and control system or create ambiguity and interrupt the
enemy’s ability to identify, decide, and transmit plans and orders. Military deception and jamming—
combined with operations security—cause lethal and nonlethal effects on the enemy while protecting
division and corps information systems from similar enemy activities.
5-78. CEMA require joint capabilities and planning and often employ strategic resources. Corps, division,
and theater headquarters may receive augmentation from Army and joint organizations. The role of the
corps determines whether it receives a cyber support element or an expeditionary cyber support element. If
a corps deploys as a JTF, then USCYBERCOM would provide it with the expeditionary cyber support
element. If the corps becomes the joint force land component command, then U.S. Army Cyber Command
would provide it with the cyber support element. The corps, working with theater CEMA and subordinate
division elements, normally develops requests for CEMA effects through the targeting or other applicable
processes. Operations in cyberspace or against a physical cyber asset occur under national or combatant
commander authority and are subject to applicable rules of engagement. Corps commanders may be
restricted from conducting offensive cyber operations but should prepare for lethal actions against known
enemy cyber assets within their area of operations. Requests for offensive cyber and electronic warfare
capabilities go to the joint headquarters for approval and resourcing. Because of the classification involved,
some or all requests for this support go through special information channels. (For more information on the
cyber support element and expeditionary cyber support element, see ATP 3-09.32, appendixes K and L.)
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

5-79. Soldiers and Marines have fought together for over 150 years. As a joint force land component, the
corps may have TACON or OPCON over a Marine Corps force. Normally, the largest Marine Corps force
that may be under the corps control is a Marine expeditionary brigade organized as a MAGTF. The Marine
expeditionary brigade normally includes a Marine Corps rifle regiment with attached artillery, armor, and
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Corps Operations
other combat support. Marine Corps combat forces are organized and equipped to fight as air-ground
combined arms task forces with their own fixed-wing and rotary-wing assets. The Marine expeditionary
brigade includes a Marine air squadron with both types of assets. A Marine Corps brigadier general
commands the MAGTF.
5-80. The Marine expeditionary brigade is a powerful force with different capabilities and limitations from
an Army BCT. It is well suited for independent operations under corps control in a large area of operations.
The Marine expeditionary brigade has tanks, more infantry, and more armored vehicles than an infantry
BCT, as well as its own close air and attack aviation. It has less tactical mobility than the Stryker BCT and
less shock and firepower than an armored BCT, but the Marine expeditionary brigade can mitigate both
with its air squadron. The Marine expeditionary brigade has its own sustainment unit but requires general
support from an Army sustainment brigade for operations lasting more than 30 days. For protracted
operations away from the Navy, the Marine expeditionary brigade requires health service support, and may
require missile defense depending on the threat. The Marine expeditionary brigade requires Army engineer
and CBRN support and typically receives additional specialized intelligence support.
5-81. A Marine Corps aviation combat element organized as part of the MAGTF includes Marine Corps air
command and control system capabilities tailored for the size of the aviation combat element. Smaller
regimental-based MAGTFs (with unmanned aircraft systems) may be integrated in a similar manner to
BCTs. Larger MAGTFs bring the full joint capability to control airspace over the MAGTF area of
operations. Large MAGTFs include a Marine Corps division and constitute a Marine expeditionary force.
The Marine expeditionary force deploys with the full range of Marine Corps rotary- and fixed-wing
aviation as well as a robust Marine Corps air command and control system. A joint doctrinal relationship
exists between the JFACC and JFLCC. In operations involving a MAGTF, the Marines establish direct
liaison within the air operations center to coordinate airspace and air operations directly with the JAOC.
JOINT CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR ASSETS

5-82. The 20th CBRNE headquarters can act as a joint force component for elimination of WMD, or it can
provide the basis for a CBRN task force under the OPCON of the JFLCC. Specialized capabilities from the
Defense Threats Reduction Agency may augment the corps. A WMD coordination element from the 20th
CBRNE may be attached to the corps of a subordinate division, depending upon the CBRN threat.
DECISIVE ACTION
5-83. The scope and scale of corps operations ensure that corps forces conduct simultaneous offensive,
defensive, and stability tasks. For purposes of this section, the discussion of offense, defense, and stability
considers that most corps forces are engaged in that related set of tasks. To understand decisive action in
corps operations, this publication reviews two distinct roles for the corps. The first, and more common
employment of the corps, is that of a land component command. As a land component, the corps functions
at the operational level, translating campaign objectives into tactical tasks for subordinate units. The overall
size of the land component varies, but it typically includes two or three divisions or their equivalent. In
most campaigns, the land component is the principal component used by the JFC to achieve the end state.
DECISIVE ACTION AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

5-84. Operational environments confronting the joint force land component are chaotic. Typically, the land
component confronts hybrid threats, wherein the enemy includes a variable mix of conventional military
units, SOF, well-armed and highly motivated paramilitary forces, loosely organized irregular forces, and
armed, organized criminal organizations, including terrorists. The corps may also confront anti-access and
area-denial threats, possessing sophisticated and asymmetric capabilities. The host nation, if friendly, may
be under internal and external threats and have limited control over portions of its citizens. Indigenous
government forces often lack adequate sustainment. Their ability to conduct combined arms operations is
limited by equipment and training.
5-85. In this type of environment, the land component decentralizes the tactical conduct of operations to its
subordinate divisions. Each division conducts offensive, defensive, and stability tasks as required to alter
conditions within an operational environment. (See Part Four of this publication.) BCTs supported by
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Chapter 5
divisional units conduct offensive, defensive, and stability missions. The land component develops the land
operation based upon lines of effort, assesses conditions, and resources the divisions. As the land
component, the corps headquarters manages operational complexity—the myriad tasks associated with
turning tactical success into operational-level progress towards the end state. The land component focuses
on enabling divisions to complete the current phase of operations while simultaneously establishing
conditions for tactical success in the next phase.
5-86. The land component commander adds or subtracts joint and Army capabilities from the divisions
through the task organization, adjusts their areas of operations, and oversees their sustainment. As the
ARFOR, the corps coordinates support from the theater army and supporting commands. In this type of
operational environment, the ESC and medical brigade (support) provide support to the divisions on an area
basis. The land component commander positions sustainment and medical resources, either within a
division area of operations or in a support area. When the land component establishes a support area, it
assigns it as an area of operations with responsibility to a subordinate unit such as a MEB. The land
component maintains a relatively small and mobile reserve, often consisting of ground forces positioned
centrally in the land component area of operations supported by joint and Army aviation. For example, the
land component may direct a division to provide the reserve consisting of one infantry battalion and assault
aviation assets sufficient to move it. The land component commander exercises OPCON of the reserve,
although ADCON remains the responsibility of the division commander and parent brigades.
5-87. The land component commander primarily establishes the conditions for successive phases with joint
capabilities, multinational forces, interagency coordination, and theater army support. Joint capabilities—
particularly fires, network, intelligence, CEMA, SOF, and air movement—shape conditions across the joint
operations area. The land component works closely with the JFACC to integrate air and land capabilities.
Air movement of forces and logistics extends the land component’s operational reach. The land component
coordinates intelligence requirements through both the JFC and JFACC depending upon the source. The
JFC provides CEMA support as requested and as made available through joint and strategic assets. The JFC
establishes guidance and direction for unified action, but the details of interagency support and
collaboration fall mainly on the land component (since these agencies operate in the land domain).
5-88. The land component and SOF exchange supporting and supported roles as the campaign progresses.
As early as possible, the SOF component and land component exchange liaison and planning elements. The
more closely the land component and SOF collaborate, the more effective land component and SOF
operations become. The SOF aviation and ground elements receive critical support from the land
component including sustainment, medical, and air and missile defense. The land component also provides
artillery and aviation in support of special operations and may provide a combat reserve. When required,
the land component may conduct operations to link up with and extract SOF units in the land component
area of operations. In return, the land component receives intelligence, unconventional warfare, foreign
internal defense, and counterterrorism support from SOF units.
5-89. Ideally, security cooperation requirements associated with rebuilding or re-equipping host-nation
forces become the responsibility of the JFC and theater army. Although the land component commander
remains responsible for tactical security cooperation requirements, the theater army should establish a
separate command under the JFC as soon as possible to control large-scale restructuring of host-nation
forces. Experience demonstrates that security cooperation that involves improvement or restructuring of the
entire armed forces of a host nation can overwhelm the land component with concurrent requirements
during decisive action.
5-90. The multinational command and control responsibilities of the land component are complex and time
consuming. Although the multinational forces may make up a minority of the combat power within the
combined land component, their employment requires the commander’s careful attention. Again, capable
liaison detachments become critical to effective command and control. The land component should receive
a liaison element from each national force under its command, and any division controlling a multinational
force receives a liaison detachment. Either the corps headquarters or the gaining U.S. division provides the
U.S. liaison detachment. At a minimum, the land component ensures that the U.S. liaison detachment has
reliable, network-capable communications able to convey and exchange the common operational picture.
As conditions in the land area of operations permit, the land component commander should visit
multinational forces frequently as well as consult with their liaison officers at the land component
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Corps Operations
headquarters. The commander ensures that the land component and U.S. divisions employ multinational
forces to the maximum of their operational capability consistent with any limitations placed on their
employment by their respective national command authorities. (Refer to JP 3-16 and FM 3-16.)
DECISIVE ACTION AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL

5-91. When the corps functions as a tactical headquarters, a potential operational environment and role of
the corps differs from that of a joint force land component. The corps serves as a tactical echelon,
commanding divisions as part of a much larger joint and multinational force. The Army corps can expect to
operate adjacent to a Marine expeditionary force, such as it did in Operation Iraqi Freedom I in 2003 under
the command of Third U.S. Army. In an alliance or AOR-wide war, the corps may operate with adjacent
multinational corps as part of an Army group or equivalent, which in turn falls under a ground component
command or equivalent. The corps functions at the tactical level despite controlling multiple divisions
while a land headquarters one or two echelons higher serves as the operational land component.
5-92. In this operational environment, the corps combines offensive and defensive tasks with simultaneous
stability tasks incident to its combat missions. The higher land headquarters establishes the corps task
organization and area of operations. Both change according to the tactical situation. In general, the corps
area of operations is smaller, the higher land headquarters uses boundaries, together with permissive and
restrictive control measures to de-conflict and regulate the corps operations with adjacent and following
units. The degree of control exerted by the corps over the divisions is greater because of the need to
synchronize operations with adjacent corps and Army-level formations.
Offensive Tasks
5-93. In major operations involving large-scale combat, the corps conducts all four primary offensive
tasks—movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. (See ADRP 3-90 for offensive tasks.) The
corps commander’s primary means of attack are the divisions under corps command. The corps monitors
the divisions’ operations and focuses on establishing conditions for tactical success during the next phase of
operations. The corps’ means of shaping and establishing conditions for offensive operations are primarily
joint capabilities provided through the JFC. The corps commander’s options for affecting current
operations include—
 Maintain a personal presence.
 Change the task organization of the corps.
 Modify the area of operations of subordinate units.
 Reinforce a committed division with corps assets.
 Change the priorities and distribution of support for joint and Army capabilities.
 Commit the corps reserve.
Movement to Contact
5-94. The corps may conduct a movement to contact with divisions abreast, with each division conducting
a movement to contact in its area of operations. As an alternative, the corps may lead with one division and
follow with another. Figure 5-3 on page 5-22 illustrates two divisions conducting a movement to contact
with one division leading. The lead division is the decisive operation and the trail division follows and
supports. In some situations, the trail division could have a follow-and-assume mission. The lead division
engages and destroys enemy security forces. The trail division eliminates bypassed enemy forces, secures
key terrain, screens the flanks of the corps, and conducts stability tasks. It also provides one infantry BCT
as the corps reserve. The trail division eliminates bypassed enemy forces, secures key terrain, and conducts
stability tasks. Depending upon the mission variables, the trail division may assume decisive operations.
The corps reserve is an infantry BCT positioned at an airfield in the corps area of operations. When the
reserve is committed, the corps provides aviation support and intratheater airlift. The corps normally uses
phase lines to control an operation as the divisions advance. If the lead division encounters a prepared
enemy defense, the corps transitions to a deliberate offensive operation. If the enemy is unprepared or
defending weakly, the corps conducts hasty offensive operations and exploits any favorable situations. (See
ADRP 3-90.)
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Chapter 5
Figure 5-3. Example of corps movement to contact
Attack
5-95. The corps employs multiple divisions in the attack. Normally, the corps attacks with two or more
divisions abreast and one or two divisions following, either in support (follow and support) or prepared to
continue the offense (follow and assume). The corps commander normally retains one BCT uncommitted
as the corps reserve.
5-96. If the situation permits, the corps fixes the main enemy defense using feints and limited attacks,
while conducting a turning movement with two divisions. Figure 5-4 illustrates a four-division corps attack
using two divisions to conduct a turning movement. The corps commander weights the turning movement
(decisive operation) using a second division with two BCTs to follow and support. The divisions in the
turning maneuver receive all available corps and joint assets. The corps commander retains one BCT in
reserve.
5-97. If the corps cannot envelop or turn the enemy’s defense, the corps then conducts a penetration.
Typically, the corps concentrates one division on a narrow area of operations and places a second, larger
division in position to follow and assume. The corps makes the penetration division the main effort and the
follow-on division the decisive operation as soon as the penetration allows exploitation. The other divisions
conduct shaping attacks, military deception, and economy of force operations.
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Corps Operations
Figure 5-4. Example of corps attack
Exploitation
5-98. Exploitation follows a successful deliberate offensive operation; therefore, the corps staff develops
branch plans to exploit any deliberate offensive operation. The corps exploits to dislocate defending forces
not defeated in the initial attacks and to seize terrain that allows for further exploitation and precludes
enemy re-organization and counterattack. As the enemy reacts to the rapidly changing situation, the corps
commander shapes through interdiction and attacks on enemy command and control. The objective of the
attack becomes the integrity of the enemy’s defense. As the enemy’s cohesion deteriorates and it attempts
to move forces, the corps employs available air support to destroy enemy forces and prevent the enemy
from re-establishing an effective defense. If the enemy forces remain in or near their original locations, the
corps encircles and destroys as much of the enemy forces as possible. If the enemy attempts to extract
enemy units, the corps transitions to pursuit.
5-99. The corps commander should anticipate the transition to exploitation and immediately shift assets to
that division enjoying success. Often success disorganizes the attacker; therefore, the corps commander
should have resources for reinforcing success and retaining the initiative. This does not necessarily mean
that the corps will control the exploitation. Initially, the corps reinforces the division that achieves its
objectives and detects opportunity. When and if the initial attack produces an operationally significant
change in the situation, the corps redirects assets to reinforce success. At that point, the commander
commits the corps reserve and reconstitutes the corps reserve from other assets. Sustainment assets not
already placed in direct support to the corps should now pass to direct support of the corps, with be-
prepared missions to provide direct support to exploiting divisions.
5-100. The challenge for the corps commander and staff is keeping the corps focused on the next
operation after the completion of the current phase. The corps commander should be thinking several
engagements ahead of the current situation. Critical decisions concerning logistics, follow-on operations,
and reconstitution of depleted units need to be made well in advance. In particular, the corps commander
calculates the operational reach of the corps and anticipates the likely culmination of the current offensive
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Chapter 5
operation. This allows the corps to impose, remove, or adjust control measures and retain the initiative for
as long as possible.
Pursuit
5-101. The pursuit is highly decentralized tactically with divisions conducting hasty operations based
upon the situation. Even with advanced mission command systems, the corps’ understanding of the
situation lags behind the situation reported in lower echelons. Before the corps releases divisions to pursue,
the corps commander should update the commander’s intent, stressing the priority between tactical tasks
and outlining acceptable risks. Corps orders should adjust control measures, particularly division area of
operations and the FSCL.
5-102. The most important changes the corps needs to make concern support of the divisions. Because the
pursuit is highly decentralized and the situation changes so rapidly, the corps commander may request
TACON over the ESC and its sustainment brigades. Once that change to the corps organization is granted,
the corps commander adjusts priorities of support and may elect to place sustainment units in direct support
of each division engaged in the pursuit. The ESC commander recommends the most effective use of
sustainment assets to support the corps across rapidly increasing distances. The corps requests intratheater
lift from the JFACC to support distribution of logistics to pursuing units. Simultaneously, the ESC and
corps plan the sustainment posture of the corps following the pursuit. The corps develops the plan for the
tactical positions and missions of the combat units of the corps. The ESC plans for additional bases and the
transportation assets that move to them.
5-103. A critical consideration during pursuit operations is the handling of enemy prisoners of war. The
ESC and MP brigades not only plan for supporting large numbers of enemy prisoners of war, they develop
plans to move them to detention facilities. Initially the divisions control enemy prisoners of war, but the
corps should accept enemy prisoners of war from the divisions as soon as possible. Large numbers of
enemy prisoners of war can slow down the pursuit and block available lines of communications more than
enemy resistance if the corps does not enforce movement discipline on corps routes and evacuate enemy
prisoners of war rapidly and efficiently. Corps aviation assets can shift supplies and personnel forward to
take control of enemy prisoners of war until ground transportation catches up with the offense.
Defensive Tasks
5-104. As a tactical land headquarters, the corps may conduct defensive operations. This often occurs
during the initial stages of a campaign when the joint force is deploying and before friendly combat power
becomes too great for the enemy to defeat. Since World War II, large enemy offensive operations offer an
opportunity to employ the full capacity of American air, sea, and land powers to destroy the enemy’s best
ground forces quickly. If joint operations can destroy the enemy’s offensive capability, the subsequent
campaign can eliminate residual enemy combat power much more easily.
5-105. The corps combines area and mobile defense based upon the commander’s intent and higher
headquarters concept of operations. The corps may also conduct retrograde operations. (See ADRP 3-90.)
When defending in an area of operations, the corps organizes the divisions and assigns their areas of
operations based upon defeating the enemy’s main effort. The corps commander organizes the corps
defense in depth, allowing the committed divisions maneuver room to conduct their own mobile defense.
The area selected by the corps for defense by the committed divisions becomes the main battle area of the
corps. Ideally, the committed divisions should have enough depth to conduct covering force operations
before the enemy contacts with the main force of each division. The corps commander accepts risk to mass
combat power in depth along the enemy’s main axis of attack. The corps reinforces the main effort division
with additional fires, engineer support, and attack aviation, and allocates it priority of air defense support.
5-106. The corps positions the ESC and other sustainment assets outside the main battle area and protects
them against enemy unconventional forces and missile attack. Due to the fluidity of the defensive battle,
the ESC normally is in direct support of the corps and positions itself in the JSA. Sustainment brigades
move to positions behind the committed divisions in the main battle area. The corps may request TACON
of sustainment brigades near the main battle area if the tactical situation becomes fluid and the corps needs
to make rapid changes to division boundaries.
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Corps Operations
5-107. The corps commander shapes the defensive battle through surveillance and reconnaissance, joint
fires, and CEMA before the enemy reaches the main battle area. The corps focuses on disrupting the
enemy’s attacking forces before they encounter the main battle area and break up the enemy’s combined
arms capability. Targeting should attack both the weapons and the command and control for that enemy
unit or system. The corps commander pays particular attention to disrupting the enemy’s command and
control, with intent of making the enemy more vulnerable to the corps counterattack.
5-108. The corps maintains the most powerful reserve possible, typically a division, with the intent of not
only defeating the enemy’s attack, but also regaining the initiative. The corps accepts risk to counterattack
at the time and place when the attack enemy culminates before the enemy has time to consolidate and
reorganize. If successful, the corps counterattack becomes the opening maneuver for a friendly
counteroffensive. Figure 5-5 illustrates a corps defense.
Figure 5-5. Example of corps defense
Stability Tasks
5-109. All corps operations conducted outside the boundaries of the United States involve stability tasks.
In most campaigns, the corps commits more effort over time to stability tasks than to offensive or defensive
tasks. The corps determines the lines of effort and priorities for stability tasks for the land areas of the joint
operations area and translates them into orders to the subordinate divisions and brigades.
5-110. The corps headquarters analyzes the situation to determine the essential stability tasks and the
priority associated with each task. The priorities and effort given to stability tasks vary within subordinate
units’ areas of operations. This analysis includes a planned transition to stability priorities when offensive
and defensive operations are executed. Stability tasks during offensive operations include restoration of
essential services and populace control in areas controlled by advancing forces. During defensive
operations, forces protect civilians from enemy attacks, maintain control, or evacuate civilians from areas
of operations controlled by friendly units. Initially, stability tasks may be incident to combat operations.
The divisions will not be task-organized to conduct stability-intensive operations but should include civil
affairs units. The corps retains control over forces such as MP and engineers so it can reinforce divisions or
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Chapter 5
conduct stability tasks directly. As requirements for combat diminish, the corps adjusts the task
organization of divisions for anticipated or known stability operations.
5-111. The corps staff plans for logistics and medical support to indigenous populations affected by
combat operations. As the joint force land component, the corps works directly with host-nation authorities
to identify minimum-essential support that U.S. forces must provide to meet international accords. The
corps staff collaborates with the joint staff and theater army to forecast requirements for each successive
phase of operations. As required, the theater army requests additional Army units to manage stability tasks
in the joint operations area.
5-112. The civil affairs brigade normally attached to the corps is a critical resource. Civil affairs personnel
assist in identifying stability requirements and identifying tasks in planning for stability operations and
their associated transitions. Using this information, commanders plan the time and method to task-organize
forces, re-allocate areas of operations and priorities of support, and request additional forces to perform the
previously identified stability tasks. These additional forces include MP, medical, sustainment, civil affairs,
MISO, general engineering, and EOD units. MP units provide population control and infrastructure
security. Medical units provide public health services. Sustainment units provide food and water, including
water purification and bulk water transport. Civil affairs, MISO, and other information-related capabilities
conduct information-related activities to engage the population. They publicize curfews, checkpoint
procedures, evacuation routes, food and water distribution points, emergency health care, and vector
control. General engineering units repair infrastructure or provide emergency shelter. EOD units clear
unexploded ordnance based on the scope, scale, and duration of the requirements.
Defense Support of Civil Authorities

5-113. The corps headquarters may deploy to support domestic civil authorities for military activities
known as DSCA. DSCA applies to domestic emergencies, designated law enforcement support, and other
activities upon request for assistance from civil authorities. It includes operations that address the
consequences of natural or man-made disasters, accidents, terrorist attacks, and incidents in the United
States and its territories. Army forces conduct DSCA operations when civil authorities request assistance
and the Secretary of Defense concurs. In DSCA, military forces always play a supporting role. State and
federal laws define how military forces can support civil authorities. Often, a state’s National Guard forces,
acting in their state capacities under Title 32 are enough to provide an adequate response to a situation.
However, when these forces are not enough, governors may request additional support from federal
authorities.
5-114. The unique domestic environment limits the corps headquarters’ role in DSCA. Two
circumstances might involve the corps with a DSCA mission. In the first circumstance, the corps
headquarters battalion may provide troops and support to civil authorities within the scope of immediate
response authority. This assistance involves unit-level deploying unarmed Regular Army Soldiers and
equipment to a disaster scene to save lives and mitigate suffering. Regular Army Soldiers providing
immediate response may not perform any law enforcement activities outside their installations. A corps
commander as the senior commander on an Army installation could order this type of response, but beyond
72 hours, it requires DOD approval. (See ADRP 3-28.)
5-115. The other circumstance might be a catastrophic incident that initiates cascading deterioration of
infrastructure and services. In that event, an Army corps could deploy to command ground forces as part of
a multi-division federal response. Although disasters occur every year in the United States, a disaster of this
magnitude rarely occurs. In an extreme emergency, the size of the federal military commitment may require
mission command system capabilities provided by a corps headquarters. However, the scope and scale of
such a catastrophe would exceed current U.S. Government planning and response capabilities. If alerted,
the corps headquarters exercises command over joint military units involved in DSCA over a multistate
area. On order, the corps passes to the OPCON of USNORTHCOM with USARNORTH functioning as the
ASCC. The corps does not become an ARFOR; USARNORTH retains that responsibility. For planning
purposes, the corps should deploy an augmented tactical command post to the disaster region while
continuing to operate the main command post from home station. The corps should organize and prepare to
deploy numerous liaison teams equipped with high-mobility vehicles, military and civil communications,
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Corps Operations
and 72 hours of sustainment resources. Unless expressly authorized by the Secretary of Defense, all
personnel deploy without weapons. (See ADRP 3-28 for additional information.)
OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
5-116. The corps commander uses the operational framework to relate time, space, and purpose within the
concept of operations. ADRP 3-0 articulates common operational frameworks for commanders to visualize
and conceptually organize operations: decisive, shaping, and sustaining or deep, close, and security. As an
operational headquarters, the corps typically frames operations using decisive, shaping, and sustaining.
When serving as a tactical headquarters, the corps typically frames operations in terms of close, deep, and
security.
DECISIVE, SHAPING, AND SUSTAINING FRAMEWORK

5-117. The corps normally uses the decisive, shaping, and sustaining framework when it is the joint force
land component unless the JFC dictates otherwise. The decisive land operation directly performs the most
essential task of the joint force land component for that phase of the campaign. The corps commander
conducts decisive operations by—
 Task-organizing the division for the decisive operation.
 Allocating resources by establishing priorities of support.
 Echeloning combat power.
 Assigning appropriate areas of operations.
 Employing other forces to shape conditions to guarantee success of the decisive operation.
Decisive Operations
5-118. Weighting the decisive operation requires the corps commander to accept risk to guarantee the
success of the decisive operation. Each division commander requests enough combat power to guarantee
that division’s success. The most common mistake made in developing the plan for the corps is minimizing
the combat power allotted to the decisive operation to maximize combat power in each division’s area of
operations. The decisive operation requires more than priority of fires or sustainment. It requires the
preponderance of the corps’ combat power, while the shaping operations receive the minimum combat
power necessary for their missions. If shaping and decisive operations require more combat power than the
corps can provide simultaneously, the corps commander phases the operations to allow combat power to
transfer from shaping to the decisive operation when the latter begins.
Shaping Operations
5-119. At the corps level, depth and timing distinguish shaping operations. Given the operational reach of
the joint force, shaping operations extend to the limits of the joint operations area, although the majority of
shaping occurs within the corps area of operations. Shaping operations set the necessary conditions for
success of the division conducting the decisive operation. Shaping operations set the conditions for the
decisive operation by preparing and isolating the battlefield, disrupting the enemy’s ability to synchronize
forces, deceiving the enemy, and delaying entry of enemy reinforcements to the main battle area. A shaping
operation can be one of several actions within the scope of decisive action. The corps commander uses joint
capabilities including joint intelligence, joint fires, CEMA and SOF with decisive action to shape
conditions.
5-120. When serving as an operational-level land headquarters, corps shaping operations focus on setting
favorable conditions for the decisive operation in next phase of the campaign. Tactical management of
battles and engagements pass to the divisions; the corps commander plans decisive, shaping, and sustaining
operations weeks ahead. The commander’s understanding of an operational environment becomes vital.
The commander visualizes changes occurring in each operational variable because of current operations.
Some variables are direct; many others are indirect and difficult to predict accurately. The corps staff, with
the joint staff, forecasts a likely operational environment for the next phase of operations, highlighting
those conditions that the corps can alter directly, such as enemy military capability, or key economic
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Chapter 5
infrastructure. The staff anticipates direct and indirect changes in an operational environment and explores
a range of shaping actions. The tools applied include analysis of the center of gravity, decisive points, lines
of operation and effort, and risk. The methods used by the staff to develop their analysis often include a
combination of operational design and the military decisionmaking process. (See ADRP 5-0.) The crucial
determinant is available combat power and the need to balance it between current operations and shaping
for the next operation. The corps commander and staff must maintain this operational-level perspective,
recognizing that at their level what comes next is more important than details of current tactical operations.
Sustaining Operations
5-121. Effective sustainment ensures freedom of action, extends operational reach, and prolongs
endurance. It provides support at the right place, at the right time, and in the right quantity. Because
operational reach underpins all corps maneuver, sustainment is intrinsic to the corps scheme of maneuver.
Operational-level maneuver demands anticipation, careful planning, and synchronization of sustainment
with corps operations. The key to sustaining operations depend on the supporting and supported
commanders understanding requirements, capabilities, priorities, and the operational environments. An
effective single logistics chain anticipates the requirements of the corps commander and minimizes the
logistics footprint, facilitating operational reach and increasing tempo. Sustainment at this level depends on
preparation well before the decisive operation occurs and becomes closely linked with shaping operations.
In other words, the corps not only shapes to set conditions for the decisive operation, it shapes to ensure the
success of sustaining operations. Sustaining operations focus on friendly forces rather than on the enemy or
environment. The corps commander considers the operational reach of the corps in terms of logistics
capacity, distribution, evacuation and treatment of casualties, and personnel services. The corps—
 Assesses the sustainment posture of the corps.
 Positions and protects sustainment and medical units.
 Establishes priorities of support.
 Establishes a corps or joint support area as required or directed.
 Secures and maintains lines of communications with Army and host-nation forces.
 Manages movement of corps forces and coordinates across the corps for movement of
sustainment units.
5-122. Normally, the ESC and its subordinate organizations provide direct support to the corps when it is
the joint force land component and ARFOR. The MEDCOM (DS) does so also. The JFC and TSC
commanders specify the relationship in their operation orders. Collaborative planning and continuous
coordination among the TSC, MEDCOM (DS), ESC, and the corps staff develops the situational
understanding necessary for synchronizing and integrating sustaining operations with the corps concept of
operations.
5-123. The corps staff coordinates movement of troops, equipment, and supplies across the corps area of
operations and establishes priorities for movement for specified elements within the areas of operations of
its subordinate formations. Movement control involves planning, routing, scheduling, controlling, and
coordinating personnel, units, equipment, and supplies moving over multiple lines of communications. The
transportation element within the main command post sustainment cell plans and monitors movement in the
corps area of operations. The movement and maneuver cell executes terrain management for the
commanding general.
5-124. The corps establishes a support area when required. The support area requires a controlling
headquarters; the minimum responsible echelon is a MEB. For major operations, considerably greater
capabilities may be required. This may include a multinational division, regional support groups, and
possibly the corps tactical command post reconfigured to control the support area.
5-125. When the corps is a tactical echelon, it plans for displacement of the support area based upon the
adjustment of tactical areas of operations. For example, a multinational force land component commander
adjusts the rear boundary of the corps in a very large combat operation. Displacing the support area
normally entails more time and effort than shifting a division. Many units operating in the support area are
not 100-percent mobile (including the corps main command post). The corps plans to displace the support
area based on movement, general engineering, security, and protection capabilities.
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Corps Operations
DEEP, CLOSE, AND SECURITY OPERATIONS

5-126. The corps typically uses the deep, close, and security operational framework when it is a tactical
land headquarters operating adjacent to other corps-sized formations. The multinational or joint force land
component commander develops a concept of operations and describes the conduct of operations in terms
of space (distance from the main battle area) and time (enemy forces more distant require more time to
enter the battle).
5-127. The corps deep operations begin beyond the division’s forward boundary and extend to the limit of
the corps assigned area of operations. Deep operations are normally those conducted against the enemy’s
forces, functions, or resources not engaged against the committed divisions. Commanders attack
simultaneously across great depth and breadth in a manner that appears as one continuous operation to
overwhelm and demoralize the enemy. Deep operations are not necessarily a function of geographic
distance, but rather a function of the intent of the operation. Deep operations nullify the firepower, disrupt
the command and control, and impair the synchronization of enemy forces. Commanders combine
maneuver, joint fires, MISO, and CEMA supported by intelligence to conduct deep operations.
5-128. The corps close operations usually include operations of the committed divisions. The divisions in
the main battle area develop their own nested deep, close, and security operations.
5-129. Security operations involve efforts to provide an early and accurate warning of enemy operations
and to provide time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy. These operations protect the
force from surprise and develop the situation to allow the commander to use the force effectively. Security
operations include necessary actions to retain freedom of action and ensure uninterrupted support or
sustainment of all other operations. The security area is that area that begins at the forward area of the
battlefield and extends as far to the front and flanks as security forces are deployed. Forces in the security
area furnish information on the enemy; delay, deceive, and disrupt the enemy; and conduct counter-
reconnaissance. A commander may conduct security operations to the front, flanks, or rear of the friendly
force. (See ADRP 3-90.) Corps security operations emphasize protection of support areas and the JSA, if
the latter is a corps responsibility. The corps employs combined arms to defeat conventional and
unconventional threats detected in the support areas.
5-130. When fighting as a tactical land headquarters, the entire corps area of operations moves, not just
the divisions’ subordinate forces and areas of operations. For example, as the corps advances, the Army
may shift the rear boundary of the corps forward. This means that the corps needs to reposition sustaining
assets and corps units in advance of the change in boundaries.
MAIN AND SUPPORTING EFFORTS

5-131. The corps designates a main and one or more supporting efforts in either operational framework.
This confers temporary priority of all available resources to that unit designated as the main effort. At the
corps level, this normally is one of the divisions. However, it could be a unit or temporary group of forces
performing a particular task. For example, the corps may plan and execute a military deception operation.
The headquarters managing the deception may become the main effort. All other units provide support as
directed by the corps headquarters or in accordance with priorities of support.
THE CORPS AND FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS

5-132. At the operational and strategic levels of war, the Armed Forces of the United States must be
capable of deploying and fighting to gain access to geographic areas controlled by hostile forces. Forcible
entry is the seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. Forcible entry
operations constitute a unique subset of decisive action. Forcible entry operations range in scope from an
operation designed as an initial phase of a campaign or major operation to a coup de main in which the
decisive results are accomplished in one swift stroke. Forcible entry operations combine large-scale
offensive, defensive, and stability tasks during the simultaneous deployment and employment of Army
forces. Forcible entry operations are inherently joint operations; they comprise the most dangerous and
most closely synchronized combat operations conducted by the Armed Forces.
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Chapter 5
5-133. The U.S. military maintains three primary forcible entry capabilities or options: amphibious
assault, airborne assault, and air assault. Local air and maritime superiority are essential for the duration of
the entry operation. The JFC seeks comprehensive control of a potential operational environment,
permitting as many such options as possible to frustrate enemy plans. JFCs may select one entry capability
or a combination of capabilities based upon METT-TC. The JFC may task JFLCCs to perform the detailed
planning for a forcible entry operation. (See JP 3-31.)
5-134. Army forces may conduct parachute assault, air assault, or amphibious operations as part of a joint
forcible entry operation. The forcible entry itself may use any combination of the means of entry to seize
and hold a lodgment. The forcible entry force normally consists of one or multiple assault echelons if the
JFC combines different means of forcible entry. The assault echelon seizes key terrain necessary to accept
additional friendly forces, usually an existing airfield or port, or critical choke points to deny enemy access
to the airhead or beachhead, such as bridges or mountain passes. A reinforcing echelon follows the assault
echelon immediately, deploying sufficient combat forces and sustainment to expand the lodgment and
defend it against immediate enemy counterattack. The expanded lodgment should be large enough to
accommodate the entry of follow-on forces by air and sealift. If the JFC intends to initiate major operations
from the lodgment, follow-on forces deploy into the lodgment, complete RSOI, and conduct operations as
required by their component headquarters.
5-135. If the Army provides the preponderance of forcible entry forces, the corps may be designated as
the JTF headquarters. The division providing the assault echelon becomes the assault force headquarters
and the ARFOR. If the forcible entry involves a simultaneous amphibious assault by Marine Corps forces,
Navy forces control the amphibious portion of the operation, the ARFOR conducts the parachute assault,
and the JTF synchronizes both operations. The Service components may transition into a joint force land
component after the airhead and beachhead join into a single lodgment. At this point, the combatant
commander adjusts command and control of the operation based upon the objectives of the campaign.
5-136. Following seizure of the lodgment, the corps may remain the JTF if the land operation remains a
division-sized effort, with a MEU under the TACON of the Army division. (See chapter 7.) However, if the
campaign requires the deployment of significant follow-on forces, either a full Marine expeditionary force
or a second Army division, the combatant commander may replace the corps as the JTF headquarters. At
the point when a second division begins to arrive, the combatant commander and GCC may assume control
and the corps transitions to a tactical headquarters and the ARFOR. Alternatively, the corps may serve as
the joint force land component with command of a Marine Corps division, while the Marine expeditionary
force headquarters can become the JTF. During the transition, the corps tactical command post, with
augmentation, may exercise TACON or OPCON over Marine Corps and Army forces until the main
command post becomes operational.
5-137. When the corps is not the JTF, it provides command and control expertise and augmentation to the
fleet and Marine Corps headquarters when controlling an amphibious assault combined with Army
parachute and air assault. The corps provides additional staff and communications as required to the Army
division providing the parachute forces. The corps also organizes and runs the deployment of the Army
division’s assault echelon and reinforcing echelons. (For more information on joint forcible entry
operations, see JP 3-18.)
5-30 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

PART THREE
The Army Division

Part three discusses the Army division headquarters and operations at the division
echelon. The Army division’s primary role is command of Army brigades in combat
operations across the range of military operations. Its other roles include serving as a
joint force land component (and Army component) under a joint task force and as a
joint task force headquarters (with joint augmentation) in a limited contingency
operation.
Chapter 6
Division Roles and Organization
ROLES OF THE DIVISION
6-1. This chapter discusses the division’s roles and organization. The division commands multiple Army
brigades and is the Army’s primary tactical headquarters for decisive action. When required it may serve as
a JTF or joint force land component headquarters in a limited contingency operation. As required, the
division may be the Army component (ARFOR) and the joint force land component within a JTF. When
the division headquarters serves as a JTF headquarters or a joint force land component headquarters, it
requires joint augmentation.
6-2. The division is the Army’s primary tactical
warfighting headquarters. Its primary role is as a Roles of the Division
• Tactical headquarters commanding brigade
tactical headquarters commanding brigades in
combat teams.
decisive action. The division combines offensive, • Joint force land component command or
defensive, and either stability or DSCA tasks in an multinational force land component for a
area of operations assigned by its higher small contingency operation.
headquarters, normally a corps. It task-organizes • Joint task force for a limited contingency
its subordinate forces according to the mission operation.
variables of METT-TC to accomplish its mission. • ARFOR for a small contingency operation.
Depending upon the METT-TC, the division
commands between two and five BCTs and a mix of multifunctional support brigades.
6-3. The division headquarters may serve as a joint force land component headquarters with joint staff
augmentation (primarily Marine Corps) in a limited contingency operation. When required to serve as an
ARFOR in a limited contingency operation, it normally requires support from an ESC. With extensive joint
augmentation, it may serve as a JTF for a limited contingency operation. When serving as the ARFOR,
joint force land component, or JTF, the division is primarily concerned with the conduct of operational
tasks. The theater army provides most of the ADCON and Army support to forces deployed in the joint
operations area. Joint manning documents specify other Service augmentation according to the role
determined by the combatant commander, either as a JTF or as a joint force land component headquarters.
When serving as a JTF headquarters, the division headquarters organizes and operates in accordance with
joint doctrine. (JP 3-33 provides doctrine for the JTF, and JP 3-31 provides it for the joint force land
component command.)
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 6-1

Chapter 6
COMMAND BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS

6-4. The striking power of the U.S. Army is concentrated in its BCTs. The division headquarters is
organized, trained, and equipped to command between two and five BCTs in combat as well as support the
BCTs with any mix of multifunctional support brigades. Because the BCTs and the division headquarters
are modular, any division headquarters may command any mix of armored, infantry, and Stryker BCTs.
JOINT FORCE LAND COMPONENT COMMAND

6-5. In a limited contingency operation, the JFC may organize the JTF with the division as the joint force
land component. The joint force land component of such a JTF may have TACON of Marine Corps and
multinational forces. The Marine Corps unit may be a MEU, but is often smaller. When a MEU is under the
control of an Army division, the division employs it as a BCT, although with different capabilities from the
Army BCT. (See the discussion of Marine Corps forces in chapter 7.) The division headquarters receives
staff augmentation from the Marine Corps and other Services, as well as individual Army augmentation
and communications support from the theater army. Although the mix of other brigades varies according to
the mission, the division should have OPCON of a brigade special troops battalion (BTSB) to meet the
demand for intelligence and integration of collection assets.
6-6. When it is the joint force land component, the Army division becomes the ARFOR. As the ARFOR,
the division retains OPCON of all Army forces not subordinated to another component of the JTF. To
function effectively as both the joint force land component and the ARFOR, the division headquarters
requires the support of an ESC and its sustainment brigades. The ESC normally operates in direct support
to the division (ARFOR). This enables the division to oversee logistics and administrative support to all
Army forces, while also providing logistics support to other Services and multinational units. Without it,
the ARFOR responsibilities for sustainment would degrade the operational focus of the division. If the
tactical situation permits, the division headquarters and ESC co-locate to integrate land operations and
sustainment closely.
Note. If the scale of the operation requires only one sustainment brigade, the TSC commander
may elect to deploy the brigade without an ESC.
MULTINATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
6-7. Either as a tactical headquarters or as a joint force land component, the division commands
multinational forces. Normally, these forces are under the TACON of the division. Depending on the size
of the multinational force, the division commander reorganizes the staff and command group. (See
JP 3-16.) In Afghanistan, for example, American divisions frequently operated with a NATO general
officer in their command group when the division commanded a brigade equivalent from that nation. The
division commander may deploy the tactical command post to the command post of a large multinational
formation to ensure that the multinational force has full connectivity with the division main command post.
Normally, the division receives a digital liaison detachment to support this requirement.
6-8. The higher headquarters—corps, Marine expeditionary force, or combined JTF—assesses the
additional load placed on the mission command system of the division headquarters as multinational forces
come under the division’s control. The division headquarters requires communications and personnel
augmentation to fill liaison requirements. As the intensity of combat increases, the higher headquarters
should assess the span of control of any division commanding multiple multinational brigade equivalents.
Often as the division adds additional combat multipliers (fires, engineers, and sustainment), its agility
decreases.
THE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS AS A JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

6-9. The division headquarters is not the preferred Army unit for a JTF headquarters; that is the corps.
However, in a limited contingency operation involving limited combat, peace operations, or humanitarian
operations, the division headquarters may become the base for a JTF headquarters. The division may fall in
on a small theater army command post already deployed and use some of its personnel to accelerate JTF
6-2 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

staff integration. When it becomes a JTF headquarters, the division headquarters requires extensive
augmentation, joint and Army. The combatant commander provides joint network capabilities and each
Service provides command and control detachments. The USAF provides the JTF with a joint air
component coordination element. (See discussion in paragraph 5-42.) Normally, Navy forces have a
supporting relationship to the JTF if present. When the division headquarters becomes a JTF headquarters,
it requires an ARFOR. The expeditious solution is to designate the division tactical command post as the
ARFOR headquarters. The tactical command post, with an assistant division commander, co-locates with
the largest brigade’s command post and exercises OPCON over land forces. The division commander and
the main command post form the JTF headquarters. The TSC tailors a sustainment task force to support the
deployed Army force. Because of the limited size of the force, the TSC may place the deployed
sustainment unit under TACON to the ARFOR.
LIMITATIONS
6-10. In large-scale operations, the division normally commands three or four BCTs, together with one of
each type of multifunctional support brigade. (The discussion beginning in paragraph 6-17 covers
multifunctional support brigades.) The division can command more than five maneuver brigade equivalents
in a protracted land operation with limited combat and relatively static areas of operations. The division
headquarters can become a joint force land component headquarters with command of a MEU, but it still
requires Marine Corps augmentation. The division headquarters may become a JTF headquarters for a
limited contingency operation, but requires extensive augmentation.
6-11. The division has a tactical command post and a main command post. The division’s tactical
command post is 100-percent mobile using organic transportation. The division main command post is not
100-percent mobile; it requires additional transportation to displace. It is also not fully transportable by
C-130 aircraft and requires numerous C-17 sorties to deploy by air. Normally the main command post
deploys by a combination of air and sealift; it also requires RSOI to reach full capacity. Neither command
post has an organic security force. The division tasks a subordinate unit to secure the main and tactical
command posts as required.
6-12. The Army has only one division headquarters trained and equipped to command airborne operations.
When the airborne division conducts a large parachute assault, it requires extensive sustainment and
intelligence support from the higher headquarters. Other divisions may command an airborne task force
once it arrives on the drop zone. Only one Army division trains for multi-brigade air assault operations,
although all divisions can conduct a one-brigade air assault operation with OPCON of sufficient aviation.
SUBORDINATE FORCES
6-13. The division’s composition determines its capabilities. To achieve its full capabilities and be capable
of conducting decisive action on a large scale, the division commands between two and five BCTs. The
division also commands at least one of each of the multifunctional support brigades including combat
aviation, fires, maneuver enhancement, and battlefield surveillance. One sustainment brigade supports the
BCTs and modular brigades, normally on an area basis. One or more medical brigades provide health
service support to the division on an area basis. The corps normally controls several functional brigades,
including engineer, civil affairs, and network. The corps reinforces the division with assets from these
brigades and specialized units.
BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS

6-14. BCTs maneuver against, close with, and destroy the enemy. BCTs seize and retain key terrain,
exerting constant pressure, and breaking the enemy’s will to fight. They are the principal ground maneuver
unit of the division. Three BCT designs make up the ground maneuver power of the division: armored,
infantry, and Stryker. These BCTs have organic combined arms capabilities, including battalion-sized
maneuver, field artillery, reconnaissance, and sustainment units. Each BCT has organic medical support.
Division maneuver combines joint capabilities with the organic capabilities of the BCT to provide mutual
support across large areas of operations and enable BCTs to conduct operations within contiguous or
noncontiguous areas of operations. Figure 6-1 on page 6-4 shows the three types of BCTs.
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 6-3

Chapter 6
Figure 6-1. Three types of brigade combat teams (current organization)

6-15. The division task-organizes and assigns an area of operations to each BCT. The commander’s intent
and concept of operations allow a BCT to perform assigned tasks with minimum control from the division
by use of mission orders. The BCT conducts decisive action. That does not mean that the BCT is ideal for
all decisive tasks. The division normally allows the BCT commander to create task forces for specific
missions. The BCT may require task organization changes, even for combat operations, because it does not
have all the combat multipliers that are often required. For example, it does not have organic air and missile
defense or engineer bridging assets.
6-16. The organization of BCTs will likely change during the lifespan of this publication. The Army plans
to add a third maneuver battalion to the armored and infantry BCTs. The reconnaissance, surveillance, and
target acquisition battalion then becomes a cavalry squadron with three reconnaissance troops. A separate
headquarters and headquarters company then replaces the brigade special troops battalion. A new engineer
battalion headquarters then commands the signal company, two engineer companies, and the military
intelligence company. The engineer battalion organic to the armored BCT and infantry BCT will include
assault bridging (the Stryker BCT already has this capability). The field artillery battalion receives a third
firing battery, and the brigade support battalion will receive additional assets. The Stryker BCT
organization will also change. Figure 6-2 illustrates an armored BCT with the expanded organization. Refer
to FM 3-90.6 for detail on the organization of BCTs.
6-4 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

Figure 6-2. Example of a reorganized armored brigade combat team
MULTIFUNCTIONAL SUPPORT BRIGADES

6-17. The modular force features five types of multifunctional support brigades that complement and
reinforce the BCTs. These multifunctional support brigades are combat aviation, battlefield surveillance,
maneuver enhancement, fires, and sustainment. These multifunctional support brigades are combined arms
units that accomplish a broad mission such as protection, in the case of the MEB. Each multifunctional
support brigade includes a headquarters, brigade troops, and specialized battalions. A mix of other
specialized battalions is attached or OPCON to the brigade to match capabilities to requirements. During
operations, the division commander task-organizes between the multifunctional support brigades and
BCTs. Unlike the BCT, tailoring and task organization leads to considerable variation among
multifunctional support brigades of the same type.
6-18. The multifunctional support brigades may occupy terrain within other BCT areas of operations and
can conduct operations in support of BCT operations or in any area the division retains under its control.
The BTSB collects information, the field artillery brigade accomplishes fires missions, and the combat
aviation brigade conducts attacks and other operations in these division retained areas. (Paragraph 6-19
through paragraph 6-33 discusses the various types of brigades.)
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 6-5

Chapter 6
Field Artillery Brigade

6-19. The field artillery brigade conducts operations to provide shaping and decisive fires for the division.
Figure 6-3 illustrates a field artillery brigade. The field artillery brigade is capable of employing Army and
joint fires as well as supporting SOF operations, electronic warfare, and airspace control elements. Field
artillery brigades have the ability to reconnoiter, detect, and attack targets and confirm the effectiveness of
their fires. They have the necessary capabilities to facilitate the efficient application of fires. The field
artillery brigade provides the division with the following capabilities:
 Force field artillery headquarters for the division.
 Fires and counterfire for the division.
 Close reinforcing fires in support of BCTs.
 Fires, counterfire, unmanned aircraft system, and radar coverage for the combat aviation,
battlefield surveillance, maneuver enhancement, and sustainment brigades.
 A headquarters able to control Army and joint fires.
Figure 6-3. Field artillery brigade
Combat Aviation Brigade

6-20. The combat aviation brigade is the primary integrator of aviation assets within the division. The
brigade must prepare to fight as a whole, support BCTs using pure or task-organized units, and accomplish
multiple independent missions requiring pure or task-organized units. Each aviation brigade is tailored for
specific missions; however, each accepts other organizations and accomplishes missions not necessarily
defined in the table of organization and equipment (known as TOE) mission statement. Aviation brigade
missions include reconnaissance, security, movement to contact, attack (interdiction, and close combat
attack), air assault, air movement, aerial medical evacuation and casualty evacuation operations, personnel
recovery operations, downed aircraft recovery, forward arming and refueling point operations, aviation
maintenance, and air traffic services.
6-6 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

6-21. Combat aviation brigades come in three types: heavy, medium, and expeditionary. Each combat
aviation brigade normally includes two attack reconnaissance battalions (or one battalion and one
squadron), an assault helicopter battalion, a general support aviation battalion, an aviation support battalion,
and typically an unmanned aircraft system company. Each brigade contains a headquarters and
headquarters company providing personnel, equipment, and security and defense for the brigade command
post. One combat aviation brigade normally supports the operations of each division with task-organized
aviation capabilities. The bulk of Army aviation’s combat power resides in the combat aviation brigade
organized to support the division, the BCTs, and other brigades. Based on priorities and missions, the
combat aviation brigade collaborates directly with supported brigades for operational details of the support
required.
6-22. The combat aviation brigade (expeditionary) primarily supports homeland security. These operations
include counterdrug missions, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, civil disturbance, counterterrorism,
and domestic support (for which the National Guard is uniquely suited to conduct). Elements of the brigade
can be task-organized for deployment abroad.
6-23. The combat aviation brigade can accomplish a screen mission for the division. With artillery, ground
maneuver forces, and other support, it can accomplish a guard mission. The combat aviation brigade
normally supports a BCT in a covering force mission. Figure 6-4 illustrates the combat aviation brigade.
Figure 6-4. Combat aviation brigade
Battlefield Surveillance Brigade

6-24. The BFSB collects information that answers the division commander’s critical information
requirements, specifically priority intelligence requirements, and other information requirements based on
the priorities established by the division. The collected information focuses on the enemy, terrain and
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 6-7

Chapter 6
weather, and civil consideration aspects of METT-TC. In turn, these feed the development and update of
the division’s common operational picture. Normally, the priority of the BFSB collection efforts is the
division’s area of operations outside the BCT’s area of operations. It receives tasking from the division.
The division commander describes the operation, identifies the commander’s critical information
requirements, and prioritizes other information requirements.
6-25. BFSB assets can provide direct or general support to the BCTs. The specific relationship depends on
the capacity of the BFSB to effectively control and maintain these systems or formations and the ability of
each BCT to receive, analyze, and disseminate the information received. The BFSB provides the
intelligence gathered to commands at each echelon based on information requirements, regardless of the
responsibility for an area of operations.
6-26. Normally the BFSB commander retains OPCON over all the BFSB assets involved in collecting
information on enemy, terrain, and civil considerations in response to taskings from the division. The BCTs
retain control of their collection assets but prioritize their collection efforts as required by the division plan.
BFSBs may provide intelligence support to BCTs as designated by the division, corps, or JTF commander
to include multifunctional teams, human intelligence collection teams, low-level voice intercept teams,
counterintelligence teams, and long-range surveillance teams. (See figure 6-5.)
Figure 6-5. Battlefield surveillance brigade

6-27. The BFSB is a high-demand, low-density asset. The division frequently manages scarcity since there
are not enough BFSBs to provide one to each committed division. In the absence of a BFSB, the division
G-2 manages intelligence capabilities across the division. The division commander requests additional
assets from the corps as needed.
Maneuver Enhancement Brigade

6-28. The MEB receives and controls forces that provide protection, mobility, and countermobility. The
MEB is responsible for security within its assigned area of operations, which typically encompasses the
support area and main supply routes. Typical missions include area security, line of communications
security and maintenance, mobility and countermobility, vertical and horizontal construction, CBRN
6-8 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

defense, and limited offensive and defensive tasks. The organization of each MEB varies based upon the
missions for which it is tailored. A typical force mix includes engineer, CBRN, MP, and EOD assets. In
some circumstances, such as when the division is the initial entry force, the MEB may receive direct
support from air and missile defense units, including short-range air defense and C-RAM systems. The
brigade is also task-organized with a tactical combat force when assigned an area security mission.
6-29. The presence of a MEB within the area of operations does not supplant unit self-defense
responsibilities. Units remain responsible for self-protection against Level I threats. The MEB provides
forces to respond to Level II threats and, when task-organized with the tactical combat force, they can
respond to Level III threats. The MEB has some area of operations-wide responsibilities for CBRN
response and air and missile defense, when it controls these types of units. Figure 6-6 illustrates a MEB.
Figure 6-6. Maneuver enhancement brigade
Sustainment Brigade
6-30. Sustainment brigades are subordinate to the TSC (or by extension the ESC). The sustainment brigade
is a flexible, multifunctional sustainment organization, tailored and task-organized according to METT-TC.
It plans, prepares, executes, and assesses sustaining operations within an area of operations. It conducts
sustaining operations and distribution management.
6-31. Sustainment brigades normally provide logistics support to the brigades of the division on an area
basis. This support includes, but is not limited to, the provision of supplies, field services, as well as field
and sustainment maintenance. One or more sustainment brigades may provide support for the combat
operations of the entire division. Subordinate elements of the brigade support reconstitution for BCTs
rotating out of combat operations.
6-32. The sustainment brigade coordinates the movement of sustainment convoys when moving through
the area of operations of other brigades. A movement control battalion may be co-located with the
sustainment brigade. The movement control team from the movement control battalion coordinates with the
G-4 division transportation element to plan and control convoy movement throughout the division area of
operations.
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Chapter 6
6-33. The sustainment brigade coordinates with the owning division commander for terrain within the
division’s area of operations. Normally the sustainment brigade operates from a support area. The division
assigns responsibility for this area of operations to a MEB. When there is a serious and persistent threat to
sustaining operations, or in the absence of a MEB, the division commander may assign an area of
operations to a BCT within which the division concentrates its sustaining operations. Within the support
area, the sustainment brigade answers to the MEB or BCT for protection, security, and related matters. The
sustainment brigade establishes ground and aerial lines of communications to link the brigade support areas
to the sustainment brigade area and back to the theater base. It is important to note that command and
support relationships may change during different phases of the operation. The division should plan for
security of ground and aerial lines of communications that link the sustainment brigade area with the
theater base. Figure 6-7 illustrates a sustainment brigade.
Figure 6-7. Sustainment brigade
SEPARATE UNITS AND OTHER FORCES

6-34. Other units and forces contribute to the division role. These consist of a civil affairs battalion, a
tactical military information support company, an EOD battalion or company, CBRN units, SOF, a military
history detachment, and a mobile public affairs detachment.
Civil Affairs Battalion

6-35. Normally, a civil affairs battalion is attached to each division if sufficient civil affairs units are
available. This support can come from either the Regular Army or the Reserve Component civil affairs
battalions with the conventional force support mission. The composition of both civil affairs battalions is
similar in the areas of a civil affairs planning team, CMOC, civil liaison team, and the civil information
management cell. Unlike the more robust functional specialty structure or the Reserve Component civil
affairs battalion, the special function team within the Regular Army battalion provides limited capability
for intermediate-level assessment of threats to the civil component of an operational environment at the
6-10 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

provincial to local levels. The organization also allows civil affairs battalion to assess mission planning
requirements, and to develop, coordinate, and synchronize resources for stability tasks. Missions that
require more in-depth functional specialty support than the allocated civil affairs battalion can be
accomplished through reachback to the civil affairs regiment. Reserve Component functional specialty cells
contain subject matter experts in the areas of rule of law, economic stability, infrastructure, governance,
public health and welfare, and public education and information.
6-36. The civil affairs battalion’s CMOC is capable of managing, coordinating, and synchronizing civil
affairs operations and civil-military operations within a division’s area of operations. The CMOC provides
a place where stakeholders can coordinate their activities as unified action partners. This center serves as
the primary coordination interface for U.S. forces and indigenous populations and institutions,
humanitarian organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations,
multinational forces, host-nation government agencies, and other civilian agencies of the U.S. Government.
The division G-9 provides direction and oversight to the CMOC through the CMOC officer in charge
(usually the civil affairs battalion commander). The CMOC is tailored to the specific tasks associated with
the mission based on a METT-TC analysis. Protection is a key concern when considering where to locate
the CMOC. Placing the CMOC within the division’s consolidated command post can enhance security for
the CMOC, but this may also interfere with its ability to interact with nongovernmental organizations and
other stakeholders. The division G-9 should carefully consider the location and security of the CMOC. The
CMOC should be accessible to government and nongovernment agencies. It should be secure from
irregular threats, but the presence of sizeable U.S. security may create an unfavorable impression with host-
nation authorities.
6-37. As part of the civil affairs battalion, the civil affairs planning team is skilled in the military
decisionmaking process and the operations planning process. The civil affairs planning team can assist the
G-9 and division staff with planning and integrating civil affairs operations, stability tasks, and civil-
military operations into the supported commander’s overall plan. The G-9 synchronizes all civil affairs
operations throughout the division area of operations. (For more on the civil affairs battalion and support to
the division, see FM 3-57.)
Tactical Military Information Support Company

6-38. The division normally receives a tactical military information support company to support the
maneuver commanders. It enables the maneuver commander to influence, either directly or indirectly,
foreign populations to achieve behavior changes consistent with the maneuver commander’s stated
objectives. The tactical military information support company develops messages and actions in a series to
address operational requirements of the maneuver unit. Series development consists of developing both
product concepts and actions for a psychological effect. MISO units develop messages and talking points
for Soldiers and leaders conducting senior leader engagement. The company command section augments
the maneuver unit staff to provide MISO, senior leader engagement, and military deception planning
assistance. The tactical military information support company commander works with the supported unit
staff to integrate attached MISO forces. The company requires sustainment support from the HHB as its
organization does not include sustainment assets.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units

6-39. An EOD battalion may support the division. An EOD company attached to the battalion may support
either a BCT or the MEB.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Battalion

6-40. The EOD battalion is a functional headquarters for EOD operations. The EOD battalion is
responsible for staff planning and staff control of all counter-improvised explosive device (known as IED)
assets within a division area of operations. The EOD battalion is capable of conducting and supervising
EOD operations for two to seven EOD companies. The EOD battalion reports directly to the EOD group.
The EOD battalion may be attached or OPCON to a theater army, corps, division, JTF, or combined JTF
for a specific operation. (See ATP 4-32.)
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 6-11

Chapter 6
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Company

6-41. The EOD company commands between one and five EOD platoons and provides company-level
planning and support based on the level of employment. The EOD company normally provides direct
support or general support to a BCT or MEB. The EOD company may also be placed under the OPCON or
TACON of Army special forces units. (See ATP 4-32.)
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Units

6-42. The Army chemical corps maintains two CBRN echelons: battalion and brigade. These two
headquarters provide intermediate CBRN capabilities for divisions or at echelons above division. These
organizations provide the supported command with the capacity to mass the effects and capabilities of
CBRN units at decisive locations or times on the battlefield. The CBRN battalion is a stand-alone
headquarters that commands up to six CBRN companies or equivalent CBRN elements. The battalion is
typically employed in support of a division or at echelons above division. Its command and support
relationship may include attached, OPCON, or direct support, depending on the factors of METT-TC. It
may also be task-organized to a CBRN brigade, an MEB, or as an independent CBRN battalion to a
CBRNE operational headquarters.
6-43. Army CBRN units that make up a CBRN battalion or brigade offer a range of capabilities to division
operations. They can accomplish missions as units, teams, or individuals. Diverse landpower requirements
often require a mix of different units—decontamination, CBRN reconnaissance, and bio-detection. CBRN
units provide the capability to accomplish or support WMD counterforce missions (interdiction, offensive
operations, and elimination) and CBRN consequence management, while maintaining capabilities to
conduct CBRN passive defense operations that are required for the Army to prevent, shape, and win. The
CBRN force organization within a division depends greatly on the threat. Based on the mission variables
prevailing in the AOR, the commander tailors available CBRN forces for the specific situation. The senior
chemical unit commander, staff, and functional units assigned normally conduct CBRN operations to
provide support across the joint force in addition to Army units. (See FM 3-11.)
Special Operations Forces (Other than Civil Affairs and MISO)

6-44. The division may have SOF under its control or operating in its area of operations. When this is the
case, the division may receive a special forces liaison element to synchronize SOF activities with division
operations. This element should locate at the appropriate command post.
Military History Detachment

6-45. A military history detachment may support the division headquarters battalion in preserving
historical documentation and artifacts. Individuals in this detachment may attend key briefings and
meetings and interview key personnel to gather firsthand observations, facts, and impressions. The
personnel within the detachment keep a daily journal of their personal observations and key events. They
also assist the division information management element in packaging and forwarding collected
information to appropriate agencies. The information collected by this detachment assists the division
complete after action reviews and document the division’s lessons learned.
Mobile Public Affairs Detachment

6-46. A mobile public affairs detachment provides support to units in support of Army, combined, joint, or
multinational operations. A mobile public affairs detachment is assigned, attached, or OPCON to echelons
at division and above. It may support the ASCC, TSC, or corps public affairs staff sections. It also may
augment a press camp headquarters in operating a media operations center or deploy independently in
support of other Services and operations. A mobile public affairs detachment has personnel and equipment
to—
 Assist and advise commanders on public affairs programs and missions.
 Plan, prepare, and execute information strategies.
6-12 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

 Facilitate, assess, and monitor media activity.

 Acquire and process public affairs digital video, audio, and imagery.
THE DIVISION HEADQUARTERS

6-47. The division headquarters is organized and equipped for sustained combat operations. By design, it
resembles the corps headquarters, but it has different manning (chiefly standards of grade) and equipment.
The headquarters consists of a main command post, tactical command post (which may be reorganized into
an EECP), mobile command group, and HHB. Plans and operations across these staff sections, cells,
command posts, and echelons are facilitated by a network and suite of mission command systems to
enhance collaboration and synchronization.
MAIN COMMAND POST

6-48. The main command post is the primary command post of the division. It controls division operations.
The division main command post is responsible for the sustained conduct of current operations, future
planning, analysis for current and future operations, sustainment coordination, and other staff functions.
The division staff at the main command post operates under the general supervision of the division chief of
staff. The main command post can accomplish its mission command warfighting functions without the
tactical command post. It is a complete command post capable of autonomous operation. Staff
responsibilities include:
 Controlling all division operations.
 Serving as the primary location for plans, analysis, and sustainment coordination.
 Monitoring and assessing operations for impact on future operations.
 Planning operations.
 Producing operation and contingency plans.
 Integrating intelligence operations into both current and future operations.
 Producing all-source intelligence products.
 Producing terrain products.
 Conducting information management and knowledge management.
 Coordinating and managing force structure to include request for forces and equipment.
 Synchronizing the division’s targeting process.
 Controlling division-assigned airspace with the assigned ASOC. (See paragraph 6-52.)
 Coordinating offensive, defensive, and stability (or DSCA in the homeland) operations.
 Providing DSCA as part of a JTF-state (for National Guard Divisions), a USPACOM JTF, or a
USNORTHCOM JTF. (See ADRP 3-28.)
 Preparing and maintaining division running estimates, plans, and orders to support future
operations.
 Planning and synchronizing division sustaining operations.
 Preparing all reports required by higher headquarters.
6-49. Division assigned airspace is normally that airspace assigned by the airspace control authority within
the boundaries of the division’s area of operations up to the coordinating altitude. The airspace assigned
may not be over the entire area of operations, but could be from the rear boundary to the FSCL between the
lateral boundaries. The airspace control authority may not assign the division the airspace over the entire
division area of operations, depending on the size of the area. The terrain or just the volume of air over the
entire area of operations, if it is very large, can exceed the ASOCs ability to control.
6-50. Figure 6-8 on page 6-14 illustrates the organization of the main command post. The main command
post consists of a command group, functional cells, and integrating cells. There are five functional cells—
intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, protection, and sustainment. The movement and maneuver
functional cell forms three integrating cells—current operations integrating cell, future operations cell, and
plans cell—to which other staff cells attach subject matter experts. The cells are scalable to accommodate
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 6-13

Chapter 6
joint staff augmentation when required, such as when the division becomes a joint force land component or
JTF headquarters.
Figure 6-8. Main command post of a division

6-51. The integrating cells operate across the warfighting functions. The three integrating cells consist of
individuals and elements from within the functional cells and focus on integrating plans and operations
across division structure. The three integrating cells are the current operations integrating cell, the future
operations cell, and the plans cell. The integrating cells divide responsibilities for planning and execution
based on the complexity of the plan, the planning horizons for planning and execution, or another criterion
selected by the commander. As an alternative, a commander could assign a specific plan to an individual
staff member or group of staff members to develop from origin to execution. Managing the handoff of a
plan from G-5 plans to G-3 future operations to G-3 current operations is the responsibility of the G-3.
6-14 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

6-52. The USAF provides an air support operations squadron as well as the ASOC to the division to
control close air support and other air support in the division’s airspace area of operations. The ASOC and
TACP personnel work within the division fires cell and airspace element. Together with the Army
personnel, they form a JAGIC. This center integrates and coordinates fires and air operations over and
within the division commander’s area of operations. A JAGIC is located within the current operations
integrating cell and works directly for the current operations chief. Chapter 7 discusses tactical
considerations concerning USAF support. The JAGIC—
 Executes the ATO as directed by the joint or multinational force air component commander.
 Provides procedural control of close air support aircraft operating in the area of operations.
 Establishes, maintains, and operates the air communications architecture.
 Provides decentralized execution of immediate air support and obtains clearance of fires from
the appropriate fires echelon.
 Integrates, coordinates, directs, and controls other air component missions.
 Coordinates air missions that fly within the division-assigned airspace but do not directly
support the ground component and other supporting arms activities (such as Army Tactical
Missile System missions) to de-conflict with ground force maneuver and fires, in addition to
receiving target and threat updates.
 Assists with dynamic targeting and friendly force location information.
 Advises the division commander on close air support employment, target nominations for those
air interdiction and suppression of enemy air defenses (known as SEAD) missions that support
the ground force, airborne surveillance, and airlift that directly supports the division.
 Integrates division fires with other complementary and reinforcing functions for achieving air-
ground integration.
6-53. Some staff elements work directly for the chief of staff, such as the G-6, while other elements
become part of the integrating and functional cells. This includes most of the special staff. The commander
determines which elements of the personal staff, if any, will work in an integrating or functional cell.
TACTICAL COMMAND POST

6-54. The division employs the tactical command post to control specific operations. The tactical command
post maintains continuous communication with subordinates, higher headquarters, the other command
posts, and supporting joint assets. It is also capable of controlling division operations for a limited time
when the main command post is displacing or otherwise not available. However, the tactical command, if
separated from the main command post, requires augmentation from a main command post to control
operations for extended operations. The tactical command post contains a robust network capability with
many of the same mission command systems as the main command post. The tactical command post can
maintain situational awareness and connectivity with higher headquarters and subordinate units when the
main command post is displacing or not available. (See figure 6-9 on page 6-16.)
6-55. One of the two assistant division commanders controls operations from the tactical command post.
The G-3 staff section is responsible for the operation of the tactical command post. The division
commander may command the division from the deployed mobile command group, the tactical command
post, or the main command post, as dictated by the mission variables of METT-TC.
6-56. The tactical command post extends the division headquarters’ capabilities to specific actions within a
larger operation. The division commander may use the tactical command post to control any operation
involving two brigades but not the rest of the division. For example, the tactical command post may control
a passage of lines between BCTs or the relief in place of a BCT by a MEB. The tactical command post may
control a BCT and supporting forces in a covering force mission while the main command post controls
defensive preparations in the main battle area. The tactical command post also controls forces committed to
a specified operation, such as brigade-sized air assaults, river crossings, deliberate breaching operations, or
a passage of lines involving multiple subordinate units or a large-scale stability operation. The tactical
command post may form the headquarters of a task force with subordinate units task-organized under its
control, such as establishing security. However, it could also control particularly complex sustaining
operations such as RSOI or reconstitution involving multiple subordinate brigades.
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 6-15

Chapter 6
Figure 6-9. Division tactical command post

6-57. When the division employs the tactical command post to control the execution of the division’s
overall operations, such as when the main command post is deploying into or displacing within the area of
operations, then the tactical command post maintains the common operational picture for the division
according to the command information management plan. In this case, the tactical command post performs
duties that may include the following:
 Control units and activities conducting the decisive operation or shaping operations.
 Maintain the current operations estimate.
 Maintain and disseminate the common operational picture throughout the division.
 Populate the common operational picture to meet the commander’s requirements.
 Monitor division-level sustaining operations.
 Prepare a forward location for issuing orders and conducting rehearsals.
 Prepare a forward short-term planning facility when the main command post displaces.
 Provide the majority of the personnel and equipment to form an assault or EECP.
 Provide personnel with specific skills sets to support the mobile command group.
6-58. The tactical command post is completely mobile and can displace all its personnel and equipment
with organic transportation. Factors that influence the movement of the tactical command post include the
flow of operations, the threat of enemy action, and the desires of the commander. Elimination of the
dependency on line-of-sight communications systems, with their inherent range limitations, allows the
tactical command post to remain stationary longer and maintain control over units conducting operations
over extended distances. However, the tactical command post should remain close enough to subordinate
brigades for the staff to be cognizant of an operational environment in which the brigades are operating.
Some potential roles for the tactical command post include the following:
6-16 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

 The tactical command post can act as the headquarters of a multi-brigade task force organized
from divisional units for a mission. During the conduct of widespread offensive actions, the
commander may designate the tactical command post to control the operations of forces
eliminating bypassed enemy forces within small cities along a line of operations while the main
command post controls the decisive operation.
 The tactical command post may control decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations. The
division commander may distribute control of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations
between command posts in complex operations. Whichever command post is controlling the
decisive operation also controls the shaping operations that are setting conditions. This ensures
the controlling headquarters has visibility over both and can effectively synchronize the entire
operation.
 In protracted operations, the commander may combine the tactical command post and the main
command post into a single co-located command post. This single command post increases the
capacity to control particularly complex tasks that may be performed in the area of operations.
 The tactical command post can employ forces and deploy forces simultaneously with the main
command post. The main command post can control the deployment of forces into the area of
operations while the tactical command post is in the area of operations controlling initial
operations.
EARLY-ENTRY COMMAND POST

6-59. The EECP is an ad hoc organization comprised of equipment and personnel from the staff of the
tactical command post and the main command post. The tactical command post provides the base for the
EECP. The division adds or subtracts personnel based on mission requirements. The EECP includes a mix
of current operations personnel, planners, and logisticians able to coordinate the reception of the division
and plan its initial operations.
6-60. When the division headquarters alerts for deployment, the tactical command post moves to a high-
readiness posture, configuring equipment and personnel into a command post package to fit constrained lift
with the other equipment and personnel prepared to follow. A division deployment might consist of a
consolidated main command post (main and tactical command posts) at home station that provides control
of pre-deployment preparation, mission rehearsals, collaborative planning, training with higher
headquarters, and initial phases of unit deployment. The EECP deploys early in the deployment sequence.
While the EECP is deploying, the division main command post monitors deployment of subordinate units
and coordinates with the gaining headquarters. Once the EECP is fully functional within the joint
operations area, the commander determines the best time to deploy the remainder of the main command
post. The commander determines the initial locations, sequence, and timing of deployment and
displacement for all command posts. The commander deploys along with elements of the command group
forward once a fully functional command post becomes operational in the division area of operations.
MOBILE COMMAND GROUP

6-61. The purpose of a mobile command group is to allow the commander to exercise personal leadership
at a critical time and place during the conduct of operations. It allows the commander to displace from a
command post while maintaining continuous access to the common operational picture. Mobile command
groups allow commanders to—
 Provide personal leadership, intent, and guidance at the critical place.
 Make a personal assessment of the situation.
 Maintain situational understanding while moving around the area of operations by allowing them
to have continuous access to updated information.
 Travel with key staff officers necessary to provide information relevant to the current operation.
6-62. The mobile command group allows the division commander to move to the point of decision. The
division commander moves to a location to best assess the risks and make adjustment decisions by seeing,
hearing, and understanding what is occurring. What division commanders learn and see helps them
mentally visualize adjustments needed in current and future operations while moving about the area of
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 6-17

Chapter 6
operations and interact with their subordinate commanders and different staffs. Thus the mobile command
group allows the division commander to command from anywhere in the area of operations and not become
tied to the tactical command post or main command post.
6-63. The mobile command group has both a ground and an aerial component. The mobile command
group’s ground component consists of specially configured vehicles, each with multifunctional mission
command systems that provide the commander with networked communications while moving. The air
component of the mobile command group consists of helicopters (each equipped with a mission command
system) assigned to a combat aviation brigade and provided when required. Data links for connectivity to
many ground and airborne platforms provide the commander with the flexibility to operate in all
environments without additional equipment.
6-64. The mobile command group requires a security force. The division tasks a subordinate unit to
provide a security force to the entire HHB that secures the mobile command group and division command
posts.
6-65. The division commander selects the individuals who staff the mobile command group. These
personnel are normally functional representatives of those staff sections control combat operations (such as
maneuver, fires, and intelligence) in addition to the air liaison officer, and when needed, a joint terminal
attack controller. The mission and staff available, however, dictate its makeup.
THE HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS BATTALION

6-66. The division HHB provides all administrative support, life support, communications, and
transportation for the division’s two command posts and the mobile command group. The HHB has a
complete battalion staff. The HHB consist of four companies with distinct missions: the headquarters
support company, the operations company, the intelligence and sustainment company, and a signal
(network support) company. The division headquarters also requires a security company that is not
currently resourced. The division band (if present) is attached to the HHB. (See figure 6-10.)
6-67. The organization of the division HHB is quite similar to that of the corps headquarters battalion. The
headquarters support company includes life support and maintenance sections for the division main and
tactical command posts. These can be task-organized to support the configuration of the division
headquarters. The operations company provides administrative support to the movement and maneuver,
fires, and protection sections of the staff. The intelligence and sustainment company provides
administrative support to the intelligence and sustainment sections. The signal company task-organizes to
support the main and tactical command posts, in whatever configuration the division commander directs. It
connects the division headquarters into the Army global network enterprise, and through it, into the DOD
information networks. The signal company ties into the network through a supporting expeditionary signal
battalion from the theater tactical signal brigade.
6-18 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

Figure 6-10. Division headquarters and headquarters battalion
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 6-19

Chapter 7
Division Operations
THE TACTICAL ENVIRONMENT
7-1. The Army division headquarters deploys and commands multiple brigades across the range of
military operations. It operates in any geographic region. The division synchronizes brigade maneuver with
joint and Army capabilities to conduct battles and engagements. Its higher headquarters normally is an
Army corps, which assigns the division its tactical tasks and allocates joint support. The Army corps
assigns the division its tactical tasks and provides capabilities and resources to the division to achieve
specified objectives. The corps commander distributes air support made available by the JFACC. The corps
commander’s distribution decision affects the priority of use for close air support and the sorties available
to subordinate divisions. The division may operate under the commander of a Marine expeditionary force
or a multinational corps headquarters, supported by the theater army.
7-2. The division operates in tactical environments spanning the range of military operations. In its most
likely missions, the division conducts simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations under the
command of a joint force land component as part of joint force. Likely conditions in the area of operations
could include the following:
 Hybrid threats and irregular warfare.
 Host-nation authorities under duress due to conflict and civil instability.
 Dense population areas within which threat forces may attempt to operate.
 Damaged, deteriorating, and inadequate infrastructure.
7-3. In less likely but more dangerous environments, the division conducts battles and engagements
against large, well-trained, and heavily armed conventional forces operating with unconventional forces.
Often the division is supported by CBRN and cyber electromagnetic capabilities. Division units conduct
stability tasks incident to combat operations with host-nation authorities.
7-4. In either case, the division commander translates the higher headquarters’ broad operational
objectives into tactical tasks assigned to subordinate BCTs and supporting brigades. Exercising mission
command at this echelon requires synchronization of joint and Army capabilities with brigade maneuver.
The division commander focuses on the current operation and potential branches to the current operation
while visualizing the concept of operations for next tactical phase (sequels). The division commander
allocates and re-allocates capabilities under the division’s control between brigades constantly. Planning
horizons for the division are shorter than for the corps, cycling, as they must, within the longer campaign
horizons of the corps. The division commander conveys requirements for joint shaping through the corps
commander while limiting most division shaping efforts to those things affecting the immediate operation.
7-5. The division commander employs BCTs in combined arms operations, integrated with aviation, fires,
and intelligence. Maneuvering the BCTs into position to destroy enemy forces through close combat is the
principal means by which the division accomplishes offensive and defensive missions. Joint capabilities
coordinated through the corps are enablers for the division, allowing the division commander to economize
or weight subordinate brigades. Where the corps commander develops operations based upon operational
reach, the division commander calculates mutual support, supporting range, and supporting distance. The
division commander also carefully monitors the endurance of subordinate brigades in terms of days and
hours until their organic sustainment units require replenishment. The tempo of operations becomes as
important as the distance between the division’s brigades and the supporting sustainment elements; these
factors determine the relative endurance of the division.
7-6. The division commander assesses stability tasks in terms of how they affect local conditions, which
might be quite different from another division’s area. Whereas the joint force land component engages with
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 7-1

Chapter 7
the U.S. country team, national authorities, and regional host-nation authorities, the division commander
most often works with provincial and local officials. The division commander frequently engages with
other agencies on the ground. The division commander and the brigade commanders often meet and build
relationships with other U.S. government agencies.
DEPLOYMENT OF A DIVISION
7-7. As soon as possible in the deployment sequence, the division deploys an EECP followed by the
remainder of the tactical command post. The earlier that the division can deploy a functioning command
post, the earlier the division commander can move to the area of operations. This is important because
some of the brigades joining the division may have never before worked with that commander. The
division commander deploys as soon as the division has a functioning command post. The division
commander and staff collaborate with the deploying brigades even before the brigades complete RSOI.
7-8. The commander also evaluates the situation and determines from where the main command post will
deploy and what the tactical command post and mobile command group will need to do based on actual
conditions in the area of operations.
TASK-ORGANIZING THE DIVISION

7-9. Exercising mission command at the division level depends on commanders completely
understanding of the chain of command, support responsibilities, and geographic responsibilities. The
division order specifies command and support relationships within the division’s task organization. The
commander assigns subordinate areas of operations together with the minimum necessary control measures
for that phase of operations. The order then clearly states the mission, commander’s intent, and concept of
operations. Regardless of the nature of the mission, the G-3 transmits any changes to every subordinate unit
in the division and receives a formal acknowledgement from each unit. The current operations integrating
cell tracks each transmission and receipt.
7-10. Division commanders designate command and support relationships to ensure subordinate and
supporting commanders understand their roles in the operation and support the division commander’s
intent. Table 7-1 on pages 7-4 and 7-5 highlights command and support relationships used by the division.
Command and support relationships carry with them varying responsibilities to the subordinate unit by the
parent and the gaining units. (See ADRP 5-0.) Commanders consider four related guidelines organizing the
division for decisive action:
 The BCTs are organized, trained, and equipped to fight as a combined arms force. The division
commander normally reinforces the BCT with capabilities from the multifunctional support
brigades and adjusts the tasks assigned to the BCT accordingly. The division may temporarily
detach one of the BCT’s organic battalions. For example, the division may place a Stryker
battalion under the OPCON of a MEB as a tactical combat force.
 Multifunctional support brigades are more effective when they operate as they organized and
trained. The division commander maintains the tailored organization of multifunctional support
brigades until tactical circumstances require temporary reallocation of subunits.
 The division operates more effectively when the commander adjusts tasks to subordinate units
rather than constantly adjusting the division’s task organization.
 The commander assesses the span of command for each brigade and does not exceed it.
7-11. When the mission assigned to a particular BCT or the combat aviation brigade requires more combat
power than what is organic to that unit, then the division commander may decrease the size the subordinate
brigade area of operations. Resizing the area of operations conforms the size of the division area of
operations more closely to its area of influence. Conversely, the commander adds combat power to the
BCT or combat aviation brigade by placing a battalion with support from another BCT, a multifunctional
support brigade, or a functional brigade temporarily under its command. Considerations concerning other
warfighting functions, especially for sustainment, may preclude multiple reorganizations of attached BCT
and combat aviation brigade internal structures.
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Division Operations
7-12. Division commanders should avoid imposing an excessive span of control on subordinate
commanders. Span of control refers to the number of subordinate units under a single commander.
Allocating subordinates more units typically gives subordinates greater flexibility and increases the number
of tactical options available. However, subordinate commanders should not be given more units than they
can effectively command. The addition of multinational units to a subordinate U.S. brigade’s task
organization can reduce its span of control, even though the number of units appears manageable.
Additional units can slow the operations process in that brigade, particularly as the tactical situation
becomes more fluid.
7-13. An effective division task organization—
 Facilitates the division commander’s intent and concept of operations.
 Retains flexibility within the concept of operations.
 Weights the division’s decisive operation.
 Adapts to conditions imposed by the mission variables of METT-TC.
 Maintains or creates effective combined arms teams.
 Provides mutual support among brigades.
 Ensures flexibility to meet unforeseen events and support future operations.
 Allocates resources with minimum restrictions on their employment.
 Ensures unity of command and synchronization of effort through proper use of command and
support relationships.
 Offsets limitations and maximizes the potential of all available forces.
 Exploits enemy vulnerabilities.
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 7-3

Chapter 7
Table 7-1. Command and support relationships for the division

Relationship Use Task organization Movement and Administrative
employment control
(ADCON)
Attached Attached applies to a The division task- The division can ADCON transfers
long-term transfer. The organizes as position the unit to the gaining
command relationship required, using any anywhere in the AO HQ. The division
should last for the command or support or delegate to a assumes
duration of the campaign. relationship. subordinate ADCON of the
Normally used when the commander through unit, including
subordinate unit task organization. logistics,
augments an attached medical, and
brigade. BCTs and administration.
multifunctional support
brigades (less
sustainment) normally
are attached.
Operational OPCON applies to a The division can The division can ADCON remains
control temporary transfer that place the entire unit position the unit with the parent
(OPCON) allows the gaining or parts under anywhere in its AO, unit. Additional
commander maximum OPCON, TACON, or or delegate to a logistics and
flexibility to employ the in support of another subordinate through medical support
subordinate unit. unit. The division task organization. provided on an
Battalions transferred may not attach the area basis.
from corps-controlled unit to another unit.
units are normally
OPCON.
Tactical TACON is a temporary The division may not The division may ADCON remains
control command relationship change the position the unit with the parent
(TACON) used among the division, organization of the anywhere in the AO unit
other Service, and unit under TACON. or delegate headquarters.
multinational forces. However, the positioning authority Additional
gaining commander to a subordinate logistics and
may place the entire commander by task medical support
unit under TACON organization. provided on an
or in support of area basis.
another unit.
Direct support DS allows the division The division can The division serves Parent unit
(DS) commander to set assign the DS unit as the terrain retains ADCON.
priorities and position the any support manager for DS The ESC and
DS unit. DS allows a relationship. This units operating medical brigade
larger unit to support a includes support within its AO. DS (support)
smaller formation. The relationships units positioned supports DS
division may receive DS between subunits. within the division units.
from ADA, engineer, and Note that the parent AO is under the
signal units. unit commander TACON of the
may adjust the task division for
organization of the protection and
DS unit as needed. movement.
ADA air defense artillery ESC expeditionary sustainment command
AO area of operations HQ headquarters
BCT brigade combat team
7-4 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

Division Operations
Table 7-1. Command and support relationships for the division (continued)
Relationship Use Task organization Movement and Administrative
employment control
(ADCON)
Reinforcing R is used when two or The force field Based on Parent unit
(R) more units are artillery commander coordination with the retains ADCON.
supporting one of the (normally a field DS unit, the BCT or Additional
division’s units. The artillery brigade) MEB owning the AO logistics and
reinforcing unit answers task-organizes the allocates terrain to medical support
requests for additional reinforcing unit. The the reinforcing unit. provided on an
capability from a DS unit. supported unit area basis.
R is normally used by (providing DS) may
field artillery when one not specify further
field artillery battalion is support alignments.
in DS to the field artillery
battalion of a BCT, and a
third field artillery
battalion reinforces the
DS battalion.
General GSR prioritizes additional The parent unit task- Movement and Parent unit
support capabilities among three organizes the GSR positioning are retains ADCON.
reinforcing supporting units. The first unit primarily to controlled by the Additional
(GSR) priority of a GSR unit is provide support to maneuver logistics and
normally to the land the force as a whole. commander owning medical support
component or corps. If a Supported units do that AO. The higher provided on an
DS or its reinforcing unit not specify further HQ of the supporting area basis.
requests help, the GSR support unit coordinates for
unit gives priority to that relationships. movement and
support unit ahead of terrain with the HQ
other requests, unless owning that AO.
disapproved by the
higher HQ.
General GS units provide support The parent unit task- Movement and Parent unit
support (GS) to the land component as organizes the GS positioning are retains ADCON.
a whole, normally on an unit. controlled by the Additional
area basis. The JFC maneuver logistics and
specifies priorities of commander owning medical support
support. The division that AO. provided on an
receives GS from the area basis.
sustainment, medical,
and signal brigades.
AO area of operations JFC joint force commander
BCT brigade combat team MEB maneuver enhancement brigade
HQ headquarters
7-14. Figure 7-1 on page 7-6 illustrates some of the command and support relationships used within the
division. The division in the example originally deployed with three infantry BCTs, a field artillery brigade,
a MEB, and a combat aviation brigade. The corps task-organized the division as shown. The corps detached
one infantry BCT to another division and placed a Stryker brigade OPCON to the division. The corps
placed a MEU under TACON of the division and attached a civil affairs battalion to the division. The corps
placed a BTSB under OPCON to the division. The field artillery brigade commander, as the force field
artillery commander, supports the 2d Infantry BCT with two battalions—one direct support and one
reinforcing. The division commander organizes forces received from the corps as shown. The division
commander opts to attach an additional chemical company to the MEB while placing a corps MP battalion
under OPCON and an air defense artillery battalion (-) in direct support. The division commander places
one of the air defense artillery batteries in direct support of the MEU. The sustainment, medical, and signal
brigades are in general support and provide support on an area basis.
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 7-5

Chapter 7
Figure 7-1. An example of a task-organized division
THE DIVISION AREA OF OPERATIONS

7-15. The higher commander (corps or land component) defines the division’s area of operations. The
division area of operations should be large enough for the commander to accomplish the mission and
protect forces. The division commander employs assigned, attached, OPCON, and TACON units and
positions supporting units within the division’s assigned area of operations. Within the division area of
operations, subordinate commanders synchronize their operations with the division’s plan.
7-16. The division assigns areas of operations to the BCTs, multinational forces, and Marine Corps units.
The MEB, if available, also receives an area of operations. The other types of multifunctional support
brigades do not normally control an area of operations. The brigade controlling the area of operations is
responsible for terrain management, information collection, civil affairs operations, air and ground
movement control, clearance of fires, security, personnel recovery, and environmental considerations.
Minimum-essential stability tasks are inherent to any commander assigned an area of operations.
7-17. The division, utilizing its ASOC, receives airspace control responsibilities for its area of operations
from the airspace control authority. Division-controlled airspace typically extends from the rear boundary
to the FSCL and between the lateral boundaries, up to the coordinating altitude.
7-18. The division typically assigns the MEB an area of operations that includes the support area. Other
brigades such as the sustainment brigade, BTSB, field artillery brigade, and the combat aviation brigade
may occupy terrain in the MEB’s area of operations. The division may also position the main command
post or tactical command post in the MEB’s area. The division commander assesses the threat to the
division’s units and determines the distribution of protection capabilities in accordance with established
priorities. The priority accounts for differences in vulnerability and mobility of different units to hostile
means of detection and attack. At the division level, protection includes passive measures such as
7-6 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

Division Operations
dispersion and concealment. The division tasks the MEB to improve survivability of critical assets located
in its area of operations that often includes sustainment, aviation, and the division main command post.
7-19. Division commanders use a mix of permissive and restrictive control measures to ensure subordinate
commanders have the maximum flexibility to accomplish the mission. The concepts of area of interest and
area of influence are applicable when assigning area of operations to brigades. (See ADRP 3-0.) The area
of operations should coincide generally with the area of influence, and the higher headquarters (the joint
force and corps commanders) should provide intelligence concerning the area of interest. The division
assigns contiguous areas of operations, noncontiguous areas of operations, or a combination of adjacent and
distinct areas of operations, as shown in figure 7-2. When assigning a noncontiguous area of operations, the
division retains control of any areas in the division area of operations not assigned to a BCT or other units.
Figure 7-2. Example of division using contiguous and noncontiguous areas of operations
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 7-7

Chapter 7
CONTIGUOUS AREAS OF OPERATION

7-20. In most operations, the division employs contiguous areas of operations. This allows the division
commander to control the majority of the area of operations by using subordinate BCTs while avoiding
gaps and seams in responsibility. The division assumes responsibility for the area of its area of operations
beyond the brigade area of operations. Contiguous areas of operations may provide additional security for
maneuver units as well as headquarters and the support area. Reasons that might favor using contiguous
areas of operations include—
 A manageable size of the division area of operations in relation to the number of BCTs.
 Concentrated enemy forces.
 Limits to the gaps between BCTs.
NONCONTIGUOUS AREAS OF OPERATION

7-21. In special circumstances, the division may assign a BCT or another maneuver force such as a MEU a
noncontiguous area of operations. The reasons for using a noncontiguous area vary but begin with
geographical separation of important terrain from the remainder of the division areas of operations. The
commander’s decision deploys part of the force into a noncontiguous area of operations, regardless of
command echelon, derived from analysis of the mission variables of METT-TC. In particular, the division
commander evaluates the threat and ability of the enemy to mass combat power sufficient to threaten
friendly forces in noncontiguous areas of operations. Second, the commander evaluates the enemy’s ability
to sever ground lines of communications between the noncontiguous areas of operations and the bulk of the
division.
CONTIGUOUS AND NONCONTIGUOUS AREAS OF OPERATIONS COMBINED

7-22. Figure 7-3 illustrates a combination of contiguous and noncontiguous areas of operations. A division
with three BCTs, a MEB, and a MEU conducts operations in this example of area of operations. Note that
the Marine Corps area of operations is within the division’s area of operations but not contiguous with the
other brigades. In this case, the division assumes responsibility for that area between the different
subordinate areas of operations. The division coordinates with the JFACC to establish a kill box (a fire
control measure) within the division-controlled area. This allows the JFACC to attack targets freely within
that part of the area of operations even though it lies within the division’s boundaries. In some tactical
situations, the JFACC may become the supported commander within the kill box, and the division may
become the supporting commander within that area. The division may provide artillery for suppression of
enemy air defenses and attack aviation to screen along the kill box boundaries.
7-23. The ESC and sustainment brigade normally provide logistics and administrative support to the units
of the division on an area basis. The area of sustainment support does not necessarily equal the division’s
area of operations since the sustainment brigade supports corps, division, other Service, and some
multinational units. The location and logistics demands of these units determine which units draw support
from a particular CSSB, not the supported units command relationship. In the conduct of offensive and
defensive operations, a sustainment brigade normally provides direct support to each committed division
and area support to corps units on an area basis. The division commander exercises TACON over
sustainment units located in the division’s area of operations for protection and movement through the area
of operations. The division staff coordinates continuously with the sustainment brigade staff supporting
them. The BCT or MEB assigned an area of operations including a sustainment brigade or base locates its
command post in proximity to the sustainment unit’s command post to improve tactical planning and
execution of protection and movement.
AIR FORCE SUPPORT

7-24. Tactical success at the division echelon emphasizes joint interdependence. USAF liaisons at each
echelon of command integrate air support operations with the division’s concept of operations, scheme of
maneuver, and fires. The division depends on joint fires and capabilities provided by fixed-wing aircraft to
include close air support, surveillance and reconnaissance, air interdiction, electronic warfare, and airlift
missions.
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Figure 7-3. Division contiguous and noncontiguous area of operations
AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS CENTER AT THE DIVISION

7-25. The air support operations squadron deploys to support each Army division with an ASOC and
enough TACPs to support the division headquarters down to the maneuver battalions within the attached
BCTs. When deployed, the ASOC and TACPs within the division are under the command of a single
officer; they remain equipped and manned to perform distinct functions in support of BCTs.
7-26. The division commander considers three factors about the ASOC. First, the ASOC is a control center
and derives synergy and efficiency from Air Force personnel working with division field artillery personnel
in the JAGIC. The division commander should not split up the ASOC and JAGIC to co-locate it with
multiple command posts, other than when the main command post is relocating. Second, the ASOC needs
to be located in a relatively secure location. Due to the firepower the ASOC can potentially bring, its loss
due to enemy action could have serious consequences for the ground forces. Third, the need for a relatively
secure location has to be balanced by the ASOC’s primary limitation—communications. To control
airpower, it needs to be able to communicate with the aircraft, which in most cases remains restricted by
ultrahigh frequency (known as UHF) or very high frequency (known as VHF) line-of-sight
communications. The ASOC should maintain communications in all airspace short the FSCL. Depending
upon terrain, radio relays, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (known as JSTARS), and
airborne forward air controllers, the ASOC can extend these distances for a limited time.
7-27. Normally, the ASOC co-locates with the main command post within the current operations
integrating cell as part of the JAGIC. However, the ASOC or JAGIC may displace to the tactical command
post when the division shifts control of operations to the tactical command post or if the main command
post is out of radio range of aircraft operating further forward. The ASOC commander recommends the
best location for positioning the ASOC to the division commander based on the mission variables.
REQUESTS FOR AIR SUPPORT

7-28. The Army processes preplanned and immediate air support requests—JTARs—through the Army
air-ground system. JTARs are how the Army approves or denies requests for external air support and
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identifies air support requirements to the air component. The fires cell plans and processes JTARs, which
then flow to higher headquarters for approval and prioritization. Once approved and prioritized, JTARs go
to the air component. The JAGIC advises and assists the fires cell with completing valid JTARs.
7-29. The use of joint air assets requires the Army to submit its air support requests in time to meet the
daily battle rhythm of the joint air tasking cycle. The division submits its preplanned JTARs through the
corps (or other higher headquarters) to the supporting air component in sufficient time to meet the planning
stages of the joint air tasking cycle. The joint air tasking cycle is time driven and designed to enable the
JFACC to publish the ATO in time to enable tasked aircraft units to complete tactical mission planning and
prepare for their missions. The BCD normally identifies the suspense to the corps and division
headquarters, which in turn drives that portion of Army planning. When the system works as designed and
the requests arrive on time at the JAOC, the supported ground forces commander knows whether or not
there are dedicated air sorties available to support the ground force.
7-30. It is important for the division staff to send preplanned JTARs to the JAOC on time. Depending on
the situation, the division fires cell can take initiative to submit preplanned JTARs for those subordinate
units unable to meet the suspense. The division can submit JTARs for on-call air missions and area targets
to get dedicated sorties on the ATO to support its BCTs. JTARs need to include sufficient information to
task aircraft on the ATO but may require additional information before the flying unit can complete tactical
mission planning. The preferred method for processing JTARs is the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical
Data System. Units should use the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System to process their JTARs
in a prioritized air support list. The BCD has an Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System that nets
with Air Force command and control systems at the JAOC. Digital submission enables the Army BCD to
parse JTARs into the database for the air component to plan and resource.
7-31. Immediate JTARs are sent after publication of the ATO. The ASOC resources immediate JTARS
(when given decentralized execution authorities) with suitable air assets that are already available on the
ATO. Those JTARs that arrive too late to allow the BCD sufficient time to include them in the planning
stages (target development, weaponeering, and allocation) of the joint air tasking cycle are treated as
immediate JTARs. The ASOC and JTARs can use the joint air request net or Air Force air request net to
send urgent requests as immediate JTARs. However, when time is available, JTARs should go through the
Army air-ground system using the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System.
WEATHER SUPPORT
7-32. Weather services provided by attached Air Force forces provide environmental information,
including both space environment and atmospheric weather, to commanders for their objectives and plans
at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Weather services gather, analyze, and provide
meteorological data for mission planning and execution. Environmental information is integral to the
decision process and timing for employing forces and planning and conducting air, ground, and space
launch operations. Weather services also influence the selection of targets, routes, weapons systems, and
delivery tactics.
MARINE CORPS UNITS

7-33. The division may control a MEU. The normal command relationship is TACON. The MEU consists
of a reinforced Marine Corps rifle battalion and a composite air squadron with attached logistics support. A
Marine Corps colonel commands the MEU. Although the MEU differs from an Army BCT in capability,
the division employs it as a combined arms maneuver formation equivalent to the BCTs. The MEU has less
artillery than a BCT, but the Marine Corps air squadron deploys fighter-bombers assault helicopters and
attack helicopters. The MEU normally includes light armored units. The MEU’s command and control
capabilities equal those of a BCT; its airspace control is superior. The MEU normally deploys with 30–45
days of supplies. However, medical support away from the fleet is limited. The MEU’s engineer and CBRN
assets are normally limited. It has no missile defense capability once it maneuvers beyond the fleet’s air
and missile defense capability.
7-34. The MEU can conduct independent operations in a large area of operations. For offensive and
defensive operations, the division reinforces the MEU with additional engineers and artillery, typically a
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battalion of each. The MEU, if available, may be the unit of choice for an economy of force operation
within a large area of operations. The MEU may also follow and support an armored or Stryker BCT. For
stability intensive operations, the MEU normally requires support from Army civil affairs and MISO.
DECISIVE ACTION
7-35. The division conducts simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks throughout any
campaign. The weight of effort allotted to each task varies by phase and within phases. The division’s
primary means of conducting decisive action are its BCTs operating in assigned area of operations,
supported by various brigades. Subordinate brigades perform all three tasks, although one task normally
requires the preponderance of their combat power. When deployed as part of a major operation or
campaign, the division may command Marine Corps and multinational ground forces. When required, the
division supports domestic authorities (using DSCA) in response to domestic disasters and during special
events requiring large-scale military support.
OFFENSIVE TASKS
7-36. The division conducts offensive tasks to defeat, destroy, or neutralize an enemy. The preferred
method of conducting offensive tasks is to find and disrupt the enemy at distance from friendly troop
positions to set the conditions necessary for the division’s decisive maneuver.
7-37. The division commander must leverage every available technological advantage to gain intelligence
and to employ lethal fires, offensive cyberspace operations, and electronic attack as a precursor to a
decisive operation. The division’s BCTs can then precisely maneuver for the final, decisive blow.
7-38. Division commanders array their BCTs and supporting brigades so their subordinate commanders
can employ their weapons systems with precision while degrading the enemy’s ability to employ their
weapons. This allows division commanders, assisted by their staffs, to assess the operation as it unfolds,
conserve combat power, and minimize risk.
7-39. Division commanders seek to achieve decisive results by massing overwhelming combat power at
the point of attack while avoiding the enemy’s main strength. They employ their subordinate BCTs to
disrupt the cohesiveness of enemy defenses and force the enemy off plan. Ideally, division commanders
force the enemy to give up the advantage of fighting from prepared defensive positions by attacking the
enemy’s flanks or selecting a location or time of attack when the enemy is most vulnerable. Division
commanders use the four primary offensive tasks.
Movement to Contact
7-40. Although the corps and division commanders may have an accurate idea of the overall situation and
enemy disposition before they attack, their degree of situational understanding decreases as the situation
becomes fluid and as large enemy and friendly forces maneuver. Division-sized movements to contact also
may become necessary when the division fights against dispersed hybrid threats. The division’s
reconnaissance and surveillance systems are less effective when the enemy conceals himself in difficult
terrain and urban areas. Under these conditions, the division largely depends on human intelligence
resources, including ground reconnaissance, to find the enemy. See figure 7-4 on page 7-12.
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Figure 7-4. Example of division movement to contact

7-41. The characteristics of a movement to contact are centralized planning, decentralized control, rapid
movement along multiple axes, and rapid transition of BCTs from the march to the attack. The division
focuses its efforts on two priorities: finding the enemy and rapidly developing the situation. On contact, the
commander has five options: attack, defend, bypass, delay, or withdraw. Opportunities for hasty attack and
exploitation may be numerous. For example, in Operation Iraqi Freedom I, the 3d Division conducted a
movement to contact extending from Kuwait to Baghdad.
7-42. The division conducting a movement to contact organizes its BCTs, the combat aviation brigade, and
supporting brigades into a forward security element and a main body. The combat aviation brigade
normally screens ahead and to the flanks of the lead BCT. The lead BCT acts either as an offensive
covering force or as an advance guard. The division commander reinforces it with engineer assets to
conduct breach and mobility support. The advance guard BCT engages any enemy force with which it
makes contact using maneuver and fires. If possible, the advance guard eliminates the opposing forces and
continues to advance. If not, the advance guard BCT maneuvers to either side of the initial contact in order
to fix the enemy force and develop the situation.
7-43. The main body includes the remainder of the division. The division’s BCTs and units of the combat
aviation brigade within the main body prepare to respond to enemy contact when the lead BCT locates
significant enemy forces. When moving, the BCTs located in the main body normally provide flank
security (screen or guard mission). In a very fluid environment, the trail BCT may provide a rear security
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unit and maintain contact with the remainder of the corps. If the situation allows, the commander can assign
a follow and support mission or a follow and assume mission to a BCT from the main body. Both groups
conduct security and reconnaissance operations throughout the movement to contact.
7-44. The division commander designates a portion of the main body as a reserve. The size of the reserve
depends on the mission variables and the amount of uncertainty concerning the enemy. The more uncertain
the enemy situation, the larger the reserve becomes. In a division movement to contact, one BCT remains
uncommitted as the division’s reserve. (See ADRP 3-90.)
Attack
7-45. An attack differs from a movement to contact. In an attack, the division has useable intelligence on
the disposition and strength of the enemy, which allows the commander to achieve greater synchronization.
This enables the commander to mass combat power more effectively in an attack than in a movement to
contact.
7-46. Division attacks are either hasty or deliberate, depending on the time available for planning and
preparation. Commanders execute hasty attacks when the situation calls for immediate action with
available forces and minimal preparation. They conduct deliberate attacks when they have more time to
plan and prepare. Success depends on skillfully massing the effects of combat power. (ADRP 3-90 provides
more detail on offensive tasks.)
7-47. The division task-organizes its BCTs and supporting brigades based upon the commander’s intent
and concept of operations. Normally one BCT constitutes the division’s decisive operation. The
commander weights the decisive operation by adding combat power to that BCT, giving it priority of
support, and allocating the majority of joint support to that BCT. Depending upon the depth of the attack,
the commander may use another BCT in a follow and support or follow and assume mission behind the
initial main effort BCT. Each BCT receives enough combat power to accomplish its mission.
7-48. The division designates and maintains a reserve. The size and composition of the division reserve
depends upon the mission variables. Typically, the division commander withholds at least one maneuver
battalion, although the reserve units remain under the direct command of their parent brigades. The
commander may move the reserve or direct aviation attack and lift assets to be prepared to reinforce at
critical points.
Exploitation
7-49. Exploitation follows a successful attack and disorganizes the enemy in depth. Commanders of
exploiting forces receive the greatest possible latitude to accomplish their missions. Exploitations may be
local or major. Local exploitations take advantage of tactical opportunities. Division and higher
headquarters normally conduct major exploitations using their most mobile BCTs to transform tactical
success into a pursuit.
7-50. The BCTs and combat aviation brigade conducting the division’s attack are also the forces that
initially exploit that attack’s success. The division then follows with commitment of the division reserve
BCT. Division commanders request additional resources from the JFLCC, including close air support, air
reconnaissance, and priority for sustainment support.
7-51. The division commander preparing to exploit should specify the acceptable degree of damage or risk
to each BCT in the course of the current operation. The commander estimates the depth and time before the
committed BCTs require relief. At that point, before the attacking BCT is exhausted, the commander
commits the following or reserve BCT to continue to exploit.
7-52. BCTs designated to follow and assume conduct a forward passage of lines and replace the initial
exploiting BCTs when they approach their culminating point. When possible, BCTs assigned these tasks
should possess mobility equal to that of the exploiting BCTs or receive additional engineers and
transportation assets to provide the necessary mobility. Once organized, they are committed forces and
should have a priority of support from the division’s multifunctional support brigades in accordance with
the mission variables.
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Chapter 7
Pursuit
7-53. A pursuit catches or cuts off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it.
Pursuits may commence at any point when enemy forces are beginning to disintegrate or disengage. If
enemy resistance has broken down entirely and enemy forces are fleeing, a force can transition to a pursuit
from any type of offensive or defensive operation. Pursuits require speed and decentralized control.
7-54. The division commander uses BCTs to perform two pursuit options. Each option involves a direct-
pressure force. The first is a frontal pursuit that employs only a direct-pressure force. The second is a
combination that uses a BCT as direct-pressure force and an encircling force comprising one or more very
mobile BCTs. The combination pursuit is generally more effective. Either the direct-pressure force or the
encircling force can conduct the decisive operation in a combination pursuit.
7-55. For pursuits, the division commanders organize their brigades into security, direct-pressure,
encircling, follow and support, and reserve forces. Each of these forces is normally at least of brigade size.
The commander can employ available airborne and air assault brigades as part of the encircling force
because of their ability to conduct vertical envelopments. The division maintains a small combined arms
reserve to exploit tactical opportunities or respond to enemy counterattacks.
Forcible Entry
7-56. Forcible entry operations are special forms of attack employed by the JFC. The division conducts
forcible entry operations using air assault, parachute assault, or a combination of both methods. Forcible
entry differs from vertical entry in that it is an operational maneuver to seize and retain a lodgment. It is
always a major joint operation and demands extremely careful planning and synchronized execution. The
requirement for air or sea movement across a major geographic feature to get to the lodgment with ground
forces makes it potentially one of the most hazardous missions assigned to a division. The mission to seize
and retain the lodgment normally goes to either an airborne or an air assault division, based upon the
primary means of assault.
7-57. Based upon the joint operation plan, the division organizes an assault echelon, typically a BCT
tailored to the lift available, and an immediate reinforcing echelon consisting of the remaining BCTs of the
division. The reinforcing echelon, configured for combat upon arrival, deploys by air landing in the
lodgment secured by the initial assault. Elements of the supporting brigades not attached to the BCTs arrive
with follow-on forces that conduct RSOI before joining the division.
7-58. The division deploys a small EECP as part of the assault echelon. The EECP accompanies the lead
BCT by helicopter or aircraft. The tactical command post, tailored for available lift, follows in the
reinforcing echelon. The main command post arrives with follow-on forces. (JP 3-18, FM 90-26, and
ATTP 3-18.12 provide additional details on forcible entry operations.)
DEFENSIVE TASKS
7-59. The division conducts defensive tasks—mobile defense, area defense, and retrograde. A mobile
defense defeats the attacking forces by permitting the enemy to advance into a position that exposes him to
counterattack. Area defenses orient on retaining terrain; they draw the enemy in an interlocking series of
positions and destroy the enemy largely by fires. A retrograde moves the friendly force away from the
enemy to gain time, preserve forces, place the enemy in unfavorable positions, or avoid combat under
undesirable conditions. Defending commanders combine the three types of defensive tasks to fit the
situation.
7-60. All three types of defense use mobile and static elements. In mobile defenses, static positions help
control the depth and breadth of the enemy penetration and retain ground from which to launch
counterattacks. In area defenses, commanders closely integrate patrols, security forces and sensors, and
reserve forces to cover gaps among defensive positions. They reinforce positions as necessary and
counterattack as directed. In retrograde operations, some units conduct area or mobile defenses or security
operations to protect other units that execute carefully controlled maneuver or movement rearward. They
use static elements to fix, disrupt, turn, or block the attackers. They use mobile elements to counterattack
and destroy the enemy.
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Division Operations
7-61. The scheme of maneuver chosen by the division commander varies according to METT-TC.
However, certain fundamentals guide the employment of forces. Regardless of the defensive task, the
division commander maneuvers forces and adjusts supporting capabilities to pit the greatest friendly
combat power against the enemy’s main effort. The commander accepts risk and economizes in less
threatened areas of operations to mass sufficient combat power and to defeat the enemy’s main effort.
7-62. Tactical depth is critical. The longer the time and the greater the distance that the enemy attacking
force exposes itself, then the greater the damage that joint fires can inflict before the enemy joins in close
combat. Defensive depth allows the division to disrupt enemy combined arms capabilities. Depth equals
time; it permits the division commander to develop the situation and understand the enemy’s intent. The
division commander conducts security operations (screen, guard, and cover) to add depth to the defense and
develop the situation. The division shifts forces and fires to mass combat power according to the enemy’s
actual versus anticipated attack.
7-63. The enemy begins with the initiative. The division defends to slow and stop the enemy’s attack, at
which point the operational initiative is uncertain. As the attacking force culminates, it requires time and
resources to consolidate and reorganize due to casualties and disorganization. A counterattack delivered at
this time multiplies the effects of surprise and shock. A smaller counterattacking force can defeat a much
larger and disorganized attacking force. The effect of the counterattack is often more emotional than it is
physical; fear, fatigue, and uncertainty may break the enemy’s coherence more completely than attrition.
Through the counterattack, the division seizes the initiative and exploits any tactical advantage it creates to
defeat not only the enemy’s main effort, but also the entire enemy scheme of maneuver.
STABILITY TASKS
7-64. The division plans and conducts stability tasks simultaneously with offensive and defensive tasks.
Stability operations is an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities
conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or
reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency
infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (JP 3-0). Stability operations support a host-nation or
interim government or an occupation when no government exists. These operations are designed to
establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries;
establish political, legal, social (educational, health, and welfare), and economic institutions; and facilitate
the transition to legitimate local governance. Stability operations involve both coercive and constructive
military actions. (See ADRP 3-07.)
7-65. The tactical priority of stability tasks determines the missions allotted to subordinate units. The effort
required to perform these tasks vary within the area of operations given to the BCTs and MEB (if
available). The priorities of stability tasks are:
 Provide civil security.
 Establish civil control.
 Restore essential services.
 Support to governance.
 Support to economic and infrastructure development.
7-66. The first priority in stability is civil security. There is a tactical security threshold for performing any
of the other stability tasks. That threshold varies tremendously in different operational environments. As a
minimum, the division and its brigades protect noncombatants from large-scale hostile attacks. The division
and its BCTs conduct offensive and defensive tasks against armed threats until a specified area is safe
enough for the friendly force and interagency partners to address the next stability priority. If available,
host-nation security forces should assume this task with division support. If large-scale combat operations
are ongoing or anticipated, the division assists the local authorities with evacuation of noncombatants as
authorized by the JFLCC.
7-67. Civil control is the regulation of noncombatant activity within an area of operations. When operating
within a friendly host nation with a functioning civilian government, the division supports civil authority to
ensure that noncombatants and Soldiers can coexist. At the opposite extreme, the division regulates a
hostile population through military authority until a competent civil administration relieves them. In the
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Chapter 7
aftermath of a battle, damage to civilian infrastructure may be so great that the BCTs assume temporary
responsibility for civil control. The division should attach civil affairs and additional MP units as required
to allow the BCTs to provide minimal civil control in that area of operations.
7-68. With security and control established, the division assesses the state of local infrastructure to support
the local population. The division either supports local authorities or provides directly the minimum-
essential supplies and services to prevent further loss of life and mitigate extreme suffering. This includes
food, water, temporary shelter, minimum sanitation, and critical medical support. In extreme cases,
essential services may include the temporary evacuation of noncombatants to an area where the higher
headquarters and local authorities can provide the essential services requirements.
7-69. Support to governance and development of the local infrastructure and economy are subsequent tasks
assigned to the division based upon the overall campaign plan. Initiation of these tasks requires a secure
environment, at least secure enough to permit other government agencies to operate alongside Army forces.
Army forces undertake these tasks when ordered by higher headquarters, and not, as is the case with the
previous three tasks, in response to the situation extant. The corps normally provides additional forces and
sustainment during the latter phases of the campaign to address these requirements. Both tasks require
divisional support of interagency and host-nation actions.
7-70. In stability intensive missions, the division should adjust the BCT areas of operations to conform to
administrative boundaries such as provinces and districts as closely as tactical conditions permit.
DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES TASKS

7-71. When ordered by the Secretary of Defense, a Regular Army division deploys and supports domestic
authorities through missions collectively labeled as DSCA. Most DSCA missions require only small
numbers of Regular Army and Army Reserve Soldiers, and the division only deploys during a major
catastrophe. When ordered to deploy, OPCON of the division passes to the gaining theater army, either
USARPAC or USARNORTH. During a disaster, the division controls federal military forces in support of
the appropriate civil authorities. The Army division works in parallel with National Guard forces under
state command. The division may also deploy and support a national special security event when
authorized by the President. Note that National Guard divisions may conduct DSCA under state command.
(See DODD 3025.18 and ADRP 3-28 for additional details.)
7-72. If the division is the senior headquarters on an Army installation, the division may initiate DSCA
under immediate response authority. Immediate response authority allows the division commander to
deploy Army units in response to a disaster in the region, but only under specific circumstances. Such
circumstances include a request for assistance from a civil authority, imminently serious conditions, and
time constraints that do not permit approval from higher authority. In all cases, the division should consult
the servicing staff judge advocate. There are critical restrictions on what federal military forces can do on
U.S. soil. Division units assist civil authorities to save lives, reduce suffering, and prevent great property
damage. Soldiers are not in charge; the civil authorities are. The division commander adheres to three
restrictions. First, Soldiers may not undertake any law enforcement tasks. Second, Soldiers providing
DSCA under immediate response authority will not carry weapons. Third, unless authorized by the
Secretary of Defense, the authority for immediate response ends after 72 hours. (See DODD 3025.18 and
ADRP 3-28 for additional details.)
OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK
7-73. The division commander chooses the appropriate operational framework for the mission. The
framework links purpose to time and space. For most operations, the division allots as much or more effort
to stability tasks as to offensive and defensive tasks. The BCTs conduct offensive or defensive operations
in their area of operations as required by circumstances in that area, the synchronization between BCTs is
less important. In this tactical environment, the division describes the concept of operations through
decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations.
7-74. In large-scale combat operations that require synchronized offensive and defensive tasks between the
BCTs, or when the higher headquarters uses it, the division frames its concept of operations through deep,
close, and security areas. This associates the purpose of division combat operations to time and space. It
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Division Operations
aligns responsibilities for division shaping operations in areas beyond the brigade area of operations (deep).
It specifies the areas within which the division commander employs BCTs in decisive action (close). This
framework links area security to sustainment in an area of operations protected by BCTs in adjacent close
areas (security). It also links time and distance with purpose. While the enemy’s main force is too distant
for close combat, the division employs joint and Army fires in the deep area to set the conditions for the
BCTs. When an attacking enemy enters the close area or the BCTs maneuver into range of defending
forces, the enemy is subjected to concentrated close combat supported by all available fires. Throughout,
logistics and medical units remain in the security area, distant enough from major enemy forces to allow for
uninterrupted sustainment, secured by the MEB or a BCT.
7-75. In either framework, the commander temporarily adjusts priorities for the situation by designating a
particular unit as the main effort at that time and place. By definition, other units in the corps become
supporting efforts. The division designates a main effort and weights it to conduct the decisive operation.
The commander avoids parceling out the division’s combat power to each BCT equally. The main effort
receives the priority of support from the multifunctional support brigades and any functional brigades
provided by the corps. The division task organization specifies command and support relationships to
provide immediate combat power and sustainment to the main effort. Examples of actions to weight the
main effort include the following:
 Temporarily attach one or two maneuver battalions to the BCT.
 Place attack aviation in direct support or under TACON to the main effort BCT.
 Narrow the area of operations to concentrate the combat power of decisive operations.
 Reinforce the main effort BCT with reinforcing and general support fires from the field artillery
brigade.
 Allocate the majority of close air support and assign priority for joint fires to the decisive
operation.
 Move one or more MP battalions in or near the supported BCT to process detainees and control
movement of dislocated civilians.
 Position support areas forward to increase distribution of key logistics.
 Coordinate with the ESC to reinforce the BCT’s brigade support battalion with direct support
from a CSSB.
 Assign the main effort BCT priority of network resources, such as bandwidth and preemption
level of information.
 Provide aviation assets in direct support to a BCT for lift support for troop movement and
resupply of critical items.
 Attach one or more MISO units to the main effort BCT.
SHAPING OPERATIONS
7-76. The division conducts shaping operations to set and maintain tactical conditions for the success of
the decisive operation. In combat, this generally involves centrally planned and decentralized completion of
tasks assigned to BCTs and multifunctional support brigades in support of the BCT conducting the decisive
operation. This includes stability tasks. In protracted joint stability operations, shaping operations often
involve offensive and defensive tasks to establish a relatively secure environment for nonlethal activities.
Shaping operations, by their nature, require economical distribution of division capabilities. Therefore, the
division prioritizes them according to the length of time needed for them to be effective, and according the
force required to achieve the minimum desired condition before the decisive operation. Because most joint
support requires adequate lead time to provide support, the division and corps collaborate on the
distribution of joint support.
7-77. Reconnaissance and surveillance precede every division operation and continue throughout the
operation. The division commander establishes the commander’s critical information requirements and the
division staff plans reconnaissance and surveillance operations to answer these requirements.
Reconnaissance and surveillance operations require movement and maneuver to develop a clearer
situational understanding. This requires tactical art. The commander balances the need to develop the
situation while avoiding a needlessly large engagement that detracts from the decisive operation. The
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 7-17

Chapter 7
commander also emphasizes the need for subordinate unit reconnaissance and surveillance actions. As the
division’s operation continues and the situation becomes fluid, the level of situational understanding
decreases. Without adequate reconnaissance and surveillance, the risks of missed opportunities and tactical
surprise increase. Intelligence synchronization increases common, shared situational understanding.
7-78. Fires, lethal and nonlethal, remain the most timely and flexible asset available to the division for
shaping in combat. The division integrates shaping fires with fires supporting the decisive operation
through the targeting process. When available, the division employs an attached field artillery brigade as
the force field artillery headquarters to manage all field artillery systems and synchronize fire support with
maneuver.
7-79. BCTs use movement and maneuver. The BCTs and the attached combat aviation brigade shape
through maneuver. The BCTs and combat aviation brigade conduct security operations (screen, guard, and
cover). They also perform offensive and defensive tasks intended to set the conditions for the decisive
operation. Note that the division is tasked to conduct security operations as part of the corps scheme of
maneuver.
7-80. CEMA occur before, during, and after every operation. The degree of input that the division has to
overall CEMA varies enormously depending on METT-TC. Some CEMA require planning and approval at
levels far above the corps and JFCs.
7-81. BCTs use information-related capabilities to shape within their area of operations. In concert with
corps-planned information operations, the division develops its supporting plans for activities within its
area of operations. The division submits requests for support from MISO to the corps. Division-developed
MISO activities normally require approval above the division level before implementation. There may also
be a considerable lag time between the time that activities commence and any appreciable effect on
operations.
SUSTAINING OPERATIONS
7-82. The commander may establish a support area within the division’s area of operations. The support
area is an effective and efficient means of concentrating and protecting logistics, personnel, and medical
support. In particular, the support area allows the division to exercise TACON over sustaining units for
protection and movement without interfering with the sustainment unit’s ability to provide flexible and
responsive area support. When the division designates a support area, it normally gives the mission of
controlling it to an attached MEB.
7-83. The corps collaborates with the ESC to establish logistics and administrative priorities. The corps
staff develops plans for the positioning and repositioning of sustainment units. Major elements of the ESC
and MEDCOM (DS) position within the support area (or the joint support area). However, units of the ESC
and MEDCOM (DS) often deploy forward into the support area. For example, a sustainment brigade may
move forward to the support area. Although the sustainment brigade is in general support, it responds to the
division commander owning that area of operations for positioning, security, and movement within that
area of operations or support area. The division staff, MEB or BCT staff, medical staff, and sustainment
headquarters coordinates the employment of sustainment assets operating within the support area.
Sustainment is the key to freedom of action. Properly integrated, the area support provided by the ESC and
MEDCOM (DS) units allows the divisional brigades to maneuver, concentrate their capabilities, and adjust
their task organization quickly. If poorly coordinated, sustainment becomes a major contributor to loss of
momentum and inadequate operational reach. The division staff gives particular attention to integrating the
sustainment brigade’s requirements into the concept of operations. This includes careful selection and
security for forward operating bases in the division’s area of operations.
7-84. Friction, chance, and uncertainty often disrupt even the most carefully planned concept of
sustainment. The division commander emphasizes exercise of mission command vice detailed control of
sustainment. The sustainment brigade and ESC commanders adjust their operations to conform to the
division’s requirements, given the commander’s intent, an up-to-date common operational picture, and
effective liaison between the supported division and the supporting sustainment brigade.
7-18 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

Division Operations
SUPPORT AREA
7-85. Divisions may establish a support area and assign responsibility for it to a MEB. The support area
provides terrain to units supporting the division or the corps (such as medical, sustainment, engineer,
aviation, and air defense), allowing the division commander to control and protect the area using the MEB.
The support area also provides the division a place to position and protect its main command post in a
location outside of the BCT areas of operation. The MEB commander organizes the support area into one
or more bases, and assigns security responsibilities to units located within the bases. The MEB commander
positions available air defense forces, MP forces, and the tactical combat force. The MEB controls
movement in and through the division support area and provides security elements for convoys that require
them.
7-86. The division clearly defines responsibilities for the security of units within the support area. The
MEB’s area of operations normally is the support area. The MEB commander designates the commanders
of tenant units within the support area (less medical corps officers) as base and base cluster commanders.
Those base and base cluster commanders are responsible for the local security of their respective bases and
base clusters. The division may receive a regional support group to assist in control of multiple bases and
base clusters within the support area. The MEB commander establishes protection priorities and defensive
readiness conditions for tenant units and units transiting through the support area. The MEB staff
coordinates with the division main command post to synchronize security operations in the support area
with the sustainment and movement priorities established by the division.
7-87. The location and size of the support area varies according to METT-TC. It should be contiguous with
the BCT areas of operations and have adequate lines of communications to each BCT. Convoys from the
support area to the brigades and back should not require excessive driving time.
7-88. Divisions operating in Iraq and Afghanistan were accustomed to receiving support from large, fixed
bases located centrally within the division’s area of operations. In major combat operations, the situation
may greatly differ. When the division maneuvers, the support area and all the bases located in it move. The
division should develop plans for displacing the units within the support area in conjunction with the
scheme of maneuver. The plan should include the displacement sequence, movement tables, and security
responsibilities.
7-89. Displacing the support area and the units operating within always proves challenging; the presence of
multiple units that provide general support complicates division-sized maneuver. The division staff, the
MEB staff, the ESC, and medical brigade should carefully plan the movement plan for the support area. In
offensive operations, the division locates the support area as far forward as possible consistent with security
and protection considerations. The key planning consideration is operational reach. As the distance between
the support area and each brigade support battalion increases, the risk of culmination increases. In
defensive operations, the support area is as far behind the BCTs as feasible. The distance between the
support area and the brigade support battalions of the BCTs should permit the BCTs to maneuver and
defend in depth without forcing units in the support area to displace. The combat aviation brigade is a
major sustainment multiplier. The division commander and staff should develop plans to employ assault
and heavy lift aircraft for resupply of committed BCTs and the field artillery brigade.
7-90. In stability intensive environments, the reduced tempo of operations allows the corps, division, ESC,
and MEDCOM (DS) to focus on efficient sustainment across very large areas of operations. The support
area usually is centrally located between all the brigades, and the arrangement of bases facilitates
throughput from the support area to the brigades and battalions with minimum transshipment. The primary
consideration is protection.
ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR

7-91. In large-scale combat operations, Army units may capture enemy combatants in large numbers.
While not a major subfunction of the sustainment warfighting function, detainee operations require
logistics, personnel services, and health service support. MP units relieve maneuver forces of captured and
detained individuals and assume responsibility for coordinating shelter, protection, accountability, and
sustainment for them. However, MP units will need extensive support if the number of captured individuals
is large. This requires a wide range of support, including logistics (particularly transportation), personnel
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 7-19

Chapter 7
services, and medical treatment for detainees. The presence of dislocated civilians can compound the
problems of handling numerous detainees. Unless the division and corps carefully plan for the likelihood of
enemy prisoners of war, dealing with detainees and dislocated civilians will overtax existing sustainment
networks. Planning considerations should include:
 The possibility of capturing significant numbers of enemy personnel.
 Essential stability tasks in support of noncombatants.
 Availability of MP units for detainee operations.
 The capability of the BCTs and MEB to manage detainees and noncombatants.
 The capability of logistics units to provide support.
 The capacity of medical units to treat captured and wounded enemy personnel.
 The capability of the corps and its subordinate units to provide support.
 The combat aviation brigade’s ability to shift assets to support detainee operations.
7-20 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Terms for
which FM 3-94 is the proponent are marked with an asterisk (*).
SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AADC area air defense commander
AAMDC Army air and missile defense command
AAP Allied administrative publication
ADCON administrative control
ADP Army doctrine publication
ADRP Army doctrine reference publication
AOR area of responsibility
AR Army regulation
ARFORGEN Army force generation
ARSOF Army special operations forces
ASCC Army Service component command
ASOC air support operations center
ASOG air support operations group
ASOS Army support to other Services
ATO air tasking order
ATP Army techniques publication
ATTP Army tactics, techniques, and procedures
BCD battlefield coordination detachment
BCT brigade combat team
BFSB battlefield surveillance brigade
BTSB brigade special troops battalion
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosives
CCSA combatant command support agent
CEMA cyber electromagnetic activities
CMOC civil-military operations center
COCOM combatant command (command authority)
CONUS continental United States
C-RAM counter rocket, artillery, and mortar
CSSB combat sustainment support battalion
DA Department of the Army
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive
DSCA defense support of civil authorities
EECP early-entry command post
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 Glossary-1

Glossary
EOD explosive ordnance disposal

ESC expeditionary sustainment command
FM field manual
FORSCOM United States Army Forces Command
FSCL fire support coordination line
G-1 assistant chief of staff, personnel
G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3 assistant chief of staff, operations
G-4 assistant chief of staff, logistics
G-5 assistant chief of staff, plans
G-6 assistant chief of staff, signal
G-8 assistant chief of staff, financial management
G-9 assistant chief of staff, civil affairs operations
GCC geographic combatant commander
HHB headquarters and headquarters battalion
INSCOM United States Army Intelligence and Security Command
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
J-1 manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff
J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff
J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff
J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff
J-6 communications system directorate of a joint staff
JAGIC joint air ground integration center
JAOC joint air operations center
JFACC joint force air component commander
JFC joint force commander
JFLCC joint force land component commander
JP joint publication
JSA joint security area
JTAR joint tactical air strike request
JTF joint task force
MAGTF Marine air-ground task force
MEB maneuver enhancement brigade
MEDCOM (DS) medical command (deployment support)
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, and civil considerations
MEU Marine expeditionary unit
MISO military information support operations
MP military police
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEAT nuclear employment augmentation team
Glossary-2 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

Glossary
NETCOM Network Enterprise Technology Command

OPCON operational control
OPLAN operation plan
RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
S-1 personnel staff officer
S-2 intelligence staff officer
S-3 operations staff officer
S-4 logistics staff officer
SDDC Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
SJFHQ-E standing joint force headquarters for elimination
SOCCE special operations command and control element
SOF special operations forces
STANAG standardization agreement
TACON tactical control
TACP tactical air control party
TSC theater sustainment command
U.S. United States
USAF United States Air Force
USAFRICOM United States Africa Command
USARCENT United States Army, Central Command
USARNORTH United States Army North
USARPAC United States Army, Pacific Command
USASOC United States Army Special Operations Command
USCYBERCOM United States Cyber Command
USEUCOM United States European Command
USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command
USPACOM United States Pacific Command
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command
USSOUTHCOM United States Southern Command
USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command
USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command
WMD weapons of mass destruction
SECTION II – TERMS
administrative control
Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration
and support. (JP 1)
area of influence
A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver
or fire support systems normally under the commander’s command or control. (JP 3-0)
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 Glossary-3

Glossary
*ARFOR
The Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or attached to a
combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational
command.
Army Service component command
Command responsible for recommendations to the joint force commander on the allocation and
employment of Army forces within a combatant command. (JP 3-31)
cyber electromagnetic activities
Activities leveraged to seize, retain, and exploit an advantage over adversaries and enemies in both
cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, while simultaneously denying and degrading adversary
and enemy use of the same and protecting the mission command system. (ADRP 3-0)
operational reach
The distance and duration across which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities.
(JP 3-0)
planning horizon
A point in time commanders use to focus the organization’s planning efforts to shape future events.
(ADRP 5-0)
stability operations
An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside
the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a
safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure
reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0)
Glossary-4 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

References
All URLs were accessed on 6 March 2014.
REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.
ADRP 1-02. Terms and Military Symbols. 24 September 2013.
JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 08 November 2010.
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.
JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS

Most joint publications are available online: <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm>.
DODD 3025.18. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). 29 December 2010.
DODD 5100.01. Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.
21 December 2010.
DODD 5100.03. Support of the Headquarters of Combatant and Subordinate Unified Commands.
09 February 2011.
JP 1. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. 25 March 2013.
JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 11 August 2011.
JP 3-01. Countering Air and Missile Threats. 23 March 2012.
JP 3-05. Special Operations. 18 April 2011.
JP 3-09. Joint Fire Support. 30 June 2010.
JP 3-10. Joint Security Operations in Theater. 03 February 2010.
JP 3-16. Multinational Operations. 16 July 2013.
JP 3-18. Joint Forcible Entry Operations. 27 November 2012.
JP 3-28. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 31 July 2013.
JP 3-30. Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 10 February 2014.
JP 3-31. Command and Control for Joint Land Operations. 24 February 2014.
JP 3-33. Joint Task Force Headquarters. 30 July 2012.
JP 3-35. Deployment and Redeployment Operations. 31 January 2013.
JP 3-52. Joint Airspace Control. 20 May 2010.
JP 3-63. Detainee Operations. 30 May 2008.
JP 5-0. Joint Operation Planning. 11 August 2011.
JP 6-0. Joint Communications System. 10 June 2010.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications are available online: <http://www.apd.army.mil/>.
ADP 1. The Army. 17 September 2012.
ADRP 2-0. Intelligence. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 16 May 2012.
ADRP 3-05. Special Operations. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-07. Stability. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-28. Defense Support of Civil Authorities. 14 June 2013.
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 References-1

References
ADRP 3-37. Protection. 31 August 2012.

ADRP 3-90. Offense and Defense. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 4-0. Sustainment. 31 July 2012.
ADRP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.
ADRP 6-0. Mission Command. 17 May 2012.
AR 10-87. Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units.
04 September 2007.
ATP 3-09.32. JFIRE: Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Joint Application of
Firepower. 30 November 2012.
ATP 3-11.36. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Aspects of Command and Control. 01 November 2013.
ATP 4-32. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Operations. 30 September 2013.
ATP 4-94. Theater Sustainment Command. 28 June 2013.
ATTP 3-09.13. The Battlefield Coordination Detachment. 21 July 2010.
ATTP 3-18.12. Air Assault Operations. 01 March 2011.
ATTP 3-34.23. Engineer Operations–Echelons Above Brigade Combat Team. 08 July 2010.
FM 3-01. U.S. Army Air and Missile Defense Operations. 25 November 2009.
FM 3-01.7. Air Defense Artillery Brigade Operations. 11 February 2010.
FM 3-01.94. Army Air and Missile Defense Command Operations. 08 April 2005.
FM 3-04.120. Air Traffic Services Operations. 16 February 2007.
FM 3-05. Army Special Operations. 09 January 2014.
FM 3-11. Multi-Service Doctrine for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations.
01 July 2011
FM 3-16. The Army in Multinational Operations. 20 May 2010.
FM 3-22. Army Support to Security Cooperation. 22 January 2013.
FM 3-34. Engineer Operations. 04 August 2011.
FM 3-34.210. Explosive Hazards Operations. 27 March 2007.
FM 3-34.214. Explosives and Demolitions. 11 July 2007.
FM 3-35. Army Deployment and Redeployment. 21 April 2010.
FM 3-39. Military Police Operations. 26 August 2013.
FM 3-52. Airspace Control. 08 February 2013.
FM 3-57. Civil Affairs Operations. 31 October 2011.
FM 3-90.6. Brigade Combat Team. 14 September 2010.
FM 4-02. Army Health System. 26 August 2013.
FM 4-02.1. Army Medical Logistics. 08 December 2009.
FM 27-10. The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.
FM 90-26. Airborne Operations. 18 December 1990.
TC 3-04.7. Army Aviation Maintenance. 02 February 2010.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS
Most NATO publications are available online:
<https://nsa.nato.int/protected/nsdd/_CommonList.html>.
AAP-06. NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions. 03 April 2013.
Global Force Management Implementation Guidance. FY 2010 – 2011, approved by Secretary of
Defense Memorandum OSD 77941-09, January 7, 2010.
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2013.
References-2 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

References
National Military Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 2011.
STANAG 2014. Format for Orders and Designation of Timings, Locations and Boundaries.
STANAG 2019. NATO Joint Military Symbology.
STANAG 2248. Glossary of Land Military Terms and Definitions.
STANAG 2281. Coalition Operations Handbook.
Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces.
Title 32, United States Code. National Guard.
PRESCRIBED FORMS
None.
REFERENCED FORMS
Most Army forms are available online: <www.apd.army.mil>.
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 References-3

Index
Entries are by paragraph number.
A area of influence, definition of, Army Corps of Engineers, theater

5-33 army headquarters, 3-70
AAMDC, 3-32–3-35
command, 5-71 area of interest, 5-33 Army forces, attachment of, 1-60
commander, 3-33 area of operations, assignment of, combatant command of, 2-2
support from, 5-70 5-34, 7-16 sustainment of, 2-47–2-55
command post, 4-43 theater level, 3-28–3-73
ADCON, 1-51–1-52
ASCC, 1-55 contiguous, 5-36 Army Materiel Command, theater
chains of command, 1-86 controlling, 5-38–5-39 army headquarters, 3-69
echelons above brigade, 1-38 coordination, 5-54 Army Service component
requirements, 4-3 corps, 5-33–5-39 command. See ASCC
responsibilities, 1-63 division, 6-49, 7-15–7-23
FSCL and, 5-50 Army special operations forces,
theater army, 2-58 3-63, 5-59
joint force land component
administrative control. See and, 1-93–1-95 Army support to other Services,
ADCON military police and, 3-54 1-61, 2-6
air and missile defense, 3-32– noncontiguous, 5-36 ASCC, 1-53–1-56
3-35 resizing, 7-11 ADCON, 1-55
corps, 5-69–5-73 responsibilities of, 5-33 combatant command and, 1-10
threats, 5-69 sustainment, 6-33 components of, 1-53
units, 4-6 synchronization within, 1-94 definition, 1-53
air defense, capabilities, 5-73 types, 5-36 theater army and, 2-1–2-9
air defense brigade, corps, 5-71 area of responsibility, 1-91 theater army as, 1-11
landpower for, 1-13 versus ARFOR, 1-57, 1-65
Air Force. See USAF protection, 2-7, 3-50 attack, corps, 5-95–5-97
air mobility operations, corps, security cooperation in, 2-30 division, 7-45–7-48
5-47–5-48 shaping of, 1-14 types, 7-46
air support, 5-41, 6-52 ARFOR, 1-57–1-67 augmentation, CEMA, 5-78
planning for, 5-45–5-46 ADCON, 1-63 corps, 4-16–4-18
requests, 5-46, 7-28–7-31 campaign, 4-2–4-6 division, 6-3
air support operations, division, commander, 1-62 joint, 4-8, 4-20
6-52, 7-24 coordination with, 1-61 nuclear operations, 5-74
air support operations center, definition, 1-57 TSC, 3-10
7-25–7-27 division, 6-6
aviation, assets, 6-20
factors, 7-26 ESC and, 3-6
combat brigades, 6-20–6-23,
location of, 7-27 ESC support, 2-52
7-79
force tailoring, 2-9
airlift, 5-47 theater brigades, 3-29–3-31
joint operations area, 1-65
direct support, 5-49 JTF and, 1-58–1-63 aviation combat element, Marine
RSOI, 2-46 major operations, 4-2–4-6 Corps, 5-81
tactical command post and, OPCON, 1-65
4-46 B
operational-level headquarters,
airspace, division, 6-49 4-2 battlefield coordination
responsibilities, 1-64–1-67 detachment, 3-59–3-60
airspace control, 5-56 airlift and, 5-48
corps and, 5-52–5-56 support and, 1-68
division, 7-17 support to, 3-60 battlefield surveillance brigade.
tasks, 2-57 See BFSB
airspace control authority, 6-49 theater army, 1-66 BCT, 1-2
airspace control policy, corps, TSC and, 1-80 BFSB and support provided,
5-53 versus ASCC, 1-57 6-25
airspace responsibilities, corps, Army, modular, 1-1–1-7 combat operations, 7-74
5-54 Army, structure of, 1-4–1-6 combined arms operations, 7-5
alternate command post, corps, decisive action, 7-10, 7-35
army air and missile defense division, 4-30, 5-17–5-18,
4-39–4-45 command. See AAMDC 6-14–6-16, 6-4, 7-42–7-43
area medical laboratory, 3-21
exploitation, 7-50–7-52
21 April 2014 FM 3-94 Index-1

Index
BCT (continued) civil affairs battalion, capabilities, commanders, adjustments by,

forcible entry, 7-57 6-36 7-75
pursuit, 7-54 division, 6-35–6-37 ARFOR, 1-62
reinforcement of, 6-17 civil affairs brigade, corps, 5-112 authority of, 1-41
reorganization of, 6-16 considerations, 5-58
shaping operations, 7-79 civil affairs command, support priorities, 7-75
support to, 6-25 from, 3-26–3-27 responsibilities, 5-18, 5-52,
task organization of, 7-47 civil control, division, 7-67 5-86, 7-9
types, 6-14 civil security, division, 7-66 shaping conditions, 5-93
versus Marine expeditionary theater army, 1-63
close operations, corps, 5-128
brigade, 5-80 communications, 3-13
combat aviation brigade, division,
BFSB, corps, 5-19 integrated, 3-11
6-20–6-23
division, 6-24–6-27 space-based, 5-68
types, 6-21
branch plan, exploitation, 5-98 support, 4-57
combat operations, campaigns theater, 2-37
brigade combat team. See BCT and, 3-64
concept of support, logistics, 1-68
brigades, supporting, 4-32–4-33 division, 7-74
medical, 1-82–1-85
under corps control, 5-19–5-21 large, 2-56–2-59
theater, 1-72
support to, 6-31
C sustained, 2-25, 6-47 conduct of operations,
campaign, ARFOR in, 4-2–4-6 tactical land operations, 4-23 decentralize, 5-85
corps and, 5-25, 5-104 combat power, corps, 5-17 contiguous area of operations,
division, 7-35 decisive operations and, 5-118 corps, 5-36
joint force land component, division, 7-11, 7-47 division, 7-20
4-7–4-13 massing, 7-39 contingency command post, HHB,
protracted, 3-64 sustaining operations and, 2-74
theater army and, 2-17–2-59 1-69 JTF headquarters, 2-72–2-73
campaign plans, support to, 2-15 combatant command support organization of, 2-70–2-71
capabilities, analysis of, 5-7 agent, 1-67 theater army, 2-70–2-71
Army, 5-86 combatant commander, ASOS, control measures, 7-19
joint, 5-86 2-6 corps, 1-16–1-18
CBRN, brigade, 5-21 chain of command, 1-42 ADCON requirements, 4-3
capabilities, 6-43 COCOM, 1-91–1-92, 2-2 air support planning, 5-45
division, 6-42–6-43 JTF headquarters, 2-72 area of operations, 5-33–5-39
joint, 5-82 landpower, 2-1 brigades under, 5-19–5-21
units, 3-40–3-46 requirements, 1-3 capabilities of, 1-16
CBRNE operational headquarters, theater army and, 3-73 close operations, 5-128
3-44–3-46 combatant commands, ARFOR, configuration, 4-27
1-57 deep operations, 5-127
CEMA, coordination with, 5-77
ASCC, 1-53 defensive tasks, 5-104–5-108
corps, 5-76–5-78
assignment, 1-40 deployment of, 5-9–5-13
definition of, 5-76
forces assigned, 1-50 DSCA, 5-113–5-115
shaping operations, 7-80
headquarters, 1-8–1-37 effects on task organization,
chain of command, administrative, requirements, 2-16 5-20
1-38–1-52, 1-86–1-90 support to, 1-67 force tailoring, 4-28
authority, 1-38 types, 1-10 forcible entry operations,
centralized medical, 1-83–1-84 5-132–5-137
echelons above brigade, 1-86 command, authority of, 1-41
joint force land component
multinational operations, 1-89– supporting, 4-31
and, 4-7–4-13
1-90 theater level, 3-1–3-73
joint forces and, 5-40–5-82
operational, 1-38–1-52, 1-86– command and support JTF headquarters, 4-15–4-22,
1-90 relationships, 1-68, 4-4 5-135
overlapping, 1-87 corps, 5-18 land component tasks, 4-10
typical, 1-42 division, 7-10 main effort, 5-131
chemical, biological, radiological, command post. See also specific offensive tasks, 5-93–5-103
and nuclear. See CBRN command post operational framework, 5-116–
chemical, biological, radiological, planning for, 4-50–4-51 5-131
nuclear, and high-yield command relationships, affects organization of, 4-1–4-57,
explosives. See CBRNE on, 1-68 5-17, 5-105
joint, 1-41 reserve, 5-108
Index-2 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

Index
corps (continued) deep operations, corps, 5-127 support to, 5-102, 7-23, 7-88
responsibilities, 5-40, 5-55 deep, close, and security task organization of, 7-9–7-14,
roles of, 1-17, 4-1–4-26, 5-91 operational framework, corps, 7-47
RSOI and, 5-16 5-126–5-130 tasks, 1-21
security operations, 5-130 transformation of, 1-8
stability tasks, 5-109–5-112 defense, shaping, 5-107 USAF and, 7-24–7-32
subordinate forces, 4-27–4-33 defense support of civil division commander,
subordination, 5-29 authorities. See DSCA considerations, 7-25
support to, 5-122 defensive tasks, corps, 5-104– control measures, 7-19
supporting effort, 5-131 5-108 decisive operations, 5-118
tactical echelon, 5-125 division, 7-59–7-63, 7-74 mobile command group, 6-62
tactical headquarters, 5-91 relationships, 7-10
dependencies, theater army,
task organization of, 5-14–5-39 requirements from, 6-24
3-65–3-72
tasks of, 1-18 responsibilities, 7-4–7-6, 7-37–
deployment, corps, 5-9–5-13
corps commander, considerations, 7-39
division, 7-7–7-8
5-13, 5-100 tactical command post and,
division headquarters, 7-1
determinations by, 5-18–5-22 6-55
EECP and, 4-48
EECP, 4-48 division headquarters, ARFOR
force tailoring, 2-43
joint capabilities, 5-2 and, 1-64
tactical command post and,
joint force land component, deployment, 7-1
4-38
4-12 joint force land component, 6-3
tempo, 5-10
mobile command group, 4-49 JTF headquarters, 6-9
theater engineer command,
responsibilities, 5-5, 5-10 organization of, 6-47–6-67
3-37
support to, 5-33
depth, 7-62 division operations, 7-1–7-91
corps headquarters, 4-34–4-57 CBRN and, 6-43
corps, 5-119
airspace control policy, 5-53 main command post, 6-48
division defense, 7-60–7-62
ARFOR and, 1-64
as joint force land component, design, manning and, 1-22–1-37 dominate, joint phase, 2-24
1-49 philosophy of, 1-22 DSCA, circumstances of, 5-114–
augmentation, 4-16–4-18 warfighting functions and, 1-23 5-115
operational level, 5-42, 5-120 detainee operations, 3-51, 7-91 corps, 5-113–5-115
parts of, 4-34 division, 7-71–7-72
deter, joint phase, 2-20–2-21
tactical level, 5-43, 5-126 responsibilities for, 2-60
versatility of, 5-1 deterrence, theater army, 2-29– theater army, 2-60–2-62
2-32
corps operations, 5-1–5-137 E
support to, 5-32 distribution management center,
1-78 early-entry command post. See
corps reserve, 5-22–5-24 EECP
division, area of operations, 7-15–
corps staff, coordination by, 5-123 7-23 echelons above brigade, 1-1–1-95
criminal investigation command, Army, 1-19–1-21 chain of command, 1-38, 1-52,
3-55 BCTs in, 6-4, 6-14–6-16 1-86
crisis response, JTF command and support control, 1-38
headquarters, 4-16–4-18 relationships, 7-10 headquarters, 1-34, 5-1
corps and, 4-30 integrating cells, 1-31
cyber electromagnetic activities.
corps organization, 5-17–5-18 EECP, corps, 4-47–4-48
See CEMA
deployment, 7-7–7-8 division, 6-59–6-60
cyberspace operations, 2-37–2-38 joint force land component, organization, 6-59
6-5–6-6
D enable civil authority, joint phase,
limitations, 6-10–6-12
decisive action, corps, 5-83–5-115 2-26–2-27
multifunctional support
division, 7-35–7-72 brigade, 6-17–6-33 enemy prisoners of war, division,
operational level, 5-84–5-90 multinational headquarters, 7-91
organization for, 7-10 6-7–6-8 pursuit and, 5-103
tactical headquarters, 6-1 offensive tasks, 7-36–7-58 ESC, 3-8, 5-122
tactical level, 5-91–5-115 organization of, 1-1, 6-1–6-67, corps, 7-83
decisive operations, corps, 5-118 7-42, 7-55, 7-57 distribution management
division, 7-47, 7-76 other forces, 6-34–46 center, 1-78
decisive, shaping, and sustaining reserve, 7-44 limitations, 4-25
framework, corps, 5-117–5-125 roles of, 1-20, 6-1–6-12 positioning of, 5-106
division, 7-74–7-81 subordinate forces, 6-13–6-46 relationships of, 3-6

Index
ESC (continued) geographic combatant command, J

support from, 2-50, 2-52, 7-23 1-10, 2-60, 2-73 JFC, 1-64
theater army, 3-4–3-6 ASCC, 1-11 chain of command, 1-86
expeditionary sustainment augmentation to, 3-43 corps, 5-33
command. See ESC civil affairs, 3-26 support relationship and, 1-48
deployment of, 2-43
exploitation, corps, 5-98–5-100 landpower, 2-14 joint air assets, division and, 7-29
division, 7-49–7-52 support to, 1-9 joint air planning, products of,
risks, 7-51 unified action in, 2-10–2-16 5-64
explosive ordnance disposal, geographic combatant joint capabilities, arrangement of,
division, 6-39–6-41 commander. See GCC 5-40
explosive ordnance disposal global force management, 1-3, CEMA and, 5-78
group, 3-47 1-40, 2-40 JFC, 2-22
with decisive action, 5-2
F governance, support to, 7-69
joint CBRN, corps, 5-82
field army, control of, 2-58 H
tasks of, 2-57 joint collection working group,
headquarters, design of, 1-23 5-65
field artillery brigade, division, division as, 1-8
6-19 joint force commander. See JFC
echelons above brigade, 1-34
fire support coordination line. See multinational, 1-36 joint force land component,
FSCL staff, 1-35 ARFOR and, 4-31, 6-6
structure of, 1-25 as corps headquarters, 1-49
fires, shaping with, 7-78 conditions, 5-87
table of organization and
force packages, 1-2 corps and, 4-7–4-13, 5-26,
equipment, 1-37
corps, 4-32 5-117
development of, 2-41–2-42 headquarters and headquarters division, 6-5–6-6
tailoring requirements, 5-15 battalion. See HHB division headquarters, 6-3
force projection, corps, 5-10 headquarters support company, integration of, 4-12
processes of, 5-11 2-75 operational environment, 5-84
health service support, 2-55 requirements, 5-49
force tailoring, Army forces, 2-39–
role, 5-88
2-45 HHB, corps, 4-52–4-57 SOF and, 5-61
corps, 4-28, 5-13 division, 6-66–6-67
deployment, 2-43 organization of, 6-67 joint force land component
force packages, 5-15 support from, 6-66 command, 6-5–6-6
MISO, 3-61 theater army, 2-74–2-76 joint forces, corps and, 5-40–5-82
requirements, 2-39 higher headquarters, corps, organizing, 4-11
forces, assignment of, 1-40 5-105, 6-8 sustainment of, 2-47–2-55
Service retained, 2-40 organization of, 1-26–1-27 joint information collection, corps,
sustainment to, 1-72 5-62–5-66
I
forcible entry, 5-132 joint intelligence, corps, 5-62–5-66
capabilities, 5-133 information collection, BFSB, 6-24
integration, 5-62 joint intelligence, surveillance, and
corps, 5-132–5-137 reconnaissance, 5-63
division, 7-56–7-58 joint, 5-62–5-66
requirements, 5-66 joint operations area, 1-94–1-95
forward passage of lines, ARFOR, 1-65
exploitation, 7-52 information operations support,
3-57–3-58 joint security area, 2-9
framework, decisive, shaping, and OPCON, 1-65
sustaining, 5-117–5-125, 7-74– infrastructure, assessment of, set the theater and, 2-33–2-38
7-81 2-34, 7-68 threats to, 3-35
f, deep, close, and security, deterioration of, 5-115
development of, 7-69 joint phasing model, theater army
5-126–5-130 and, 2-18–2-27
FSCL, corps, 5-50–5-51 initiative, enemy, 7-63
joint security area, 4-13
functional cells, 1-23, 1-27, 1-29– integrating cells, 1-28, 1-31 establishment of, 2-9
1-30 main command post, 6-51
movement and maneuver cell joint security operations, 4-13
G and, 1-24 joint task force. See JTF
garrison command, theater army transition across, 2-68 joint theater enablers, 3-72
headquarters, 3-67 integration, horizontal, 1-28
vertical, 1-27

Index
JTF, ARFOR and, 1-58–1-63, deployment of, 7-9 military history detachment,
1-64 division, 6-11, 6-48–6-53 division, 6-45
attachment to, 1-60 location, 4-36 military information support
directives of, 4-5 organization, 6-50 operations, 3-61–3-62
functional components, 1-59 responsibilities, 2-64–2-67
Service components, 1-59 staff, 6-48 military operations, range of, 1-7
use of, 1-43 support to, 4-51 military police, brigade, 3-53–3-54
JTF headquarters, augmentation, tactical command post and, command, 3-56
4-20 6-54 support, 3-49–3-56
contingency command post, theater army, 2-64–2-69 mission command warfighting
2-72 versus contingency command function, 1-30
corps and, 4-15–4-22, 5-135 post, 2-71
mobile command group,
division headquarters, 6-9 main effort, corps, 5-131 components of, 6-63
limitations, 4-24–4-26 priorities for, 7-75 corps, 4-49
organization, 4-19 major operation, ARFOR in, 4-2– division, 6-61–6-65
theater army, 2-72–2-73 4-6 purpose, 6-61
training, 4-21–4-22 campaigns and, 4-7–4-13 mobile public affairs detachment,
JTF staff, forming, 4-16–4-18 corps, 5-93 division, 6-46
joint, 3-4
L movement, sustainment brigade,
tailored, 4-28
6-32
land forces, capabilities, 5-27 maneuver enhancement brigade.
corps, 4-7 movement and maneuver cell,
See MEB
integrating cells and, 1-24
land operations, complexity of, manning, design and, 1-22–1-37
1-32 movement to contact,
conduct of, 2-56 Marine Corps, corps and, 5-79– characteristics, 7-41
joint force land component, 4-7 5-81 corps, 5-94
division and, 7-33–7-34 division, 7-40–7-44
landpower, combatant
Marine Corps aviation combat versus attack, 7-45
commander, 2-1
employment of, 2-33, 5-25 element, corps, 5-81 multifunctional support brigades,
geographic combatant Marine expeditionary brigade, 4-33
command, 2-14 corps, 5-79–5-80 division, 6-17–6-33
integration of, 1-13, 4-1 Marine expeditionary unit, types, 6-17
sustainment of, 1-70 division, 7-33 – 7-34 multinational forces, abilities, 5-28
theater army, 2-10 combat operations and, 2-56
materiel, cross-leveling, 1-76
limited contingency operations, corps, 4-29, 5-25–5-28
MEB, division and, 6-28–6-29, responsibilities, 5-90
6-3
7-18
chain of command, 1-87 multinational headquarters,
support area, 7-85–7-86
division, 1-20 division, 6-7–6-8
JTF headquarters, 4-15–4-18 MEDCOM (DS), 1-84, 3-18–3-21
multinational land component
logistics, ASOS, 2-6 medical, chain of command, 1-83– headquarters, corps and, 4-14
execution of, 1-73 1-84
concept of support, 1-82–1-85 multinational operations, chain of
responsibilities, 1-74 command, 1-89–1-90
staff, 1-75 medical battalion (multifunctional),
3-20 multinational unit, area of
logistics command, centralized, operations for, 5-35
1-73–1-74 medical brigade, limitations, 4-25
logistics operations, 1-69 medical brigade (support), 3-19 N
logistics support, division, 6-31 medical command (deployment network command, 3-12
medical support and, 1-68– support). See MEDCOM (DS) noncontiguous area of operations,
1-95 medical logistics management division, 7-21–7-23
personnel support and, 2-50– center, 3-9 nuclear operations, corps, 5-74–
2-54 5-75
stability and, 5-111 medical support, logistics support
and, 1-68–1-95 O
logistics units, command of, 2-51 provision of, 1-85
stability and, 5-111 objectives, operational, 7-4
M
military engagement, support to, offensive tasks, corps, 5-93–5-103
main command post, ASOC and, division, 7-36–7-58
7-27 3-2
corps, 4-26, 4-35–4-37 theater army, 2-29–2-32

Index
OPCON, ARFOR and, 1-59, 1-65 corps, 5-5 theater army, 2-29–2-32
ASCC, 1-56 defined, 1-31 theater campaign plan and,
BFSB, 6-26 division, 7-4 2-30
combatant commander, 1-60 plans, support, 1-72 security operations, corps, 5-129
corps headquarters, 1-49
joint operations area, 1-65 protection, enablers of, 2-8 seize the initiative, joint phase,
JTF and, 2-48 main command post, 4-37 2-22–2-23
support and, 5-29–5-32 responsibility for, 2-7–2-9 Service retained forces, 2-40
operational areas, 1-91–1-95 protective services detachment, Services, responsibilities, 2-3-2-4
theater army headquarters,
operational art, corps, 5-5–5-7 3-71 set the theater, actions, 2-33
operational campaign plan, versus joint operations area and,
provost marshal, 3-50–3-52 2-33–2-38
theater campaign plan, 2-31
pursuit, consideration, 5-103 shape, defense, 5-107
operational control. See OPCON corps, 5-101–5-103 joint phase, 2-19
operational environment, 2-62 division, 7-53–7-55
analysis of, 5-8 options, 7-54 shaping, AOR, 1-14
characteristics, 5-84 GCC, 2-29
joint force land component, R shaping operations, 4-42
5-84 reception, staging, onward corps, 5-119–5-120
operational framework, corps, movement, and integration. See division, 7-76–7-81
5-116–5-131 RSOI signal command (theater), 3-13–
division, 7-73–7-91 regional support group, 3-48 3-15
operational reach, 5-7 regionally aligned forces, 2-15– signal support, theater level,
definition of, 5-6 2-16 3-11–3-17
extension of, 5-121 relationship, command, 7-33 situational awareness,
FSCL, 5-50 command and support, 1-68, development of, 5-37
shaping, 5-119 4-4, 5-18, 7-10 situational understanding, 7-40,
operational requirements, joint command, 1-41 7-77
meeting, 1-76 support, 1-44, 1-47–1-48, 3-6,
SOF, 3-63
operations, corps level, 5-1–5-13 5-30
coordination, 5-60
organization, 4-19 requirements, forecast of, 1-3 corps, 5-57–5-61
division, 1-1, 5-17–5-18 reserve, composition of, 5-23 division, 6-44
force tailoring and, 2-45 corps, 5-22–5-24, 5-108 role, 5-88
joint forces, 4-11 division, 7-44, 7-48 space support, corps, 5-67–5-68
theater army, 1-11 responsibilities, ARFOR, 1-64– span of control, 7-12
other Service forces, corps, 5-25– 1-67
special operations forces. See
5-28 ASCC, 1-53
ARSOF and SOF
limitations of, 5-27 commander, 3-34
corps, 5-54–5-55 stability operations, definition of,
P ESC, 1-74 7-64
personnel, allocation of, 1-29 military departments, 2-4 ESC support, 2-53
augmentation to, 4-17 redirected, 1-54 stability requirements,
movement of, 2-46 Services, 2-4 determining, 5-112
provision of, 3-51 staff, 6-48 stability tasks, assessment of, 7-6
personnel support, logistics theater army, 1-56 corps, 5-109–5-112
support and, 2-50–2-54 TSC, 1-74 determination of, 5-110
phases, joint, 2-18–2-27 RSOI, attachment and, 5-16 division, 7-64–7-70
shaping for, 5-87 corps, 5-16 priorities of, 7-65
theater army and, 2-46, 5-12 stabilize, joint phase, 2-25
planning, air support, 5-45–5-46
civil affairs and, 6-37 S staff, division, 7-89
command post employment, scheme of maneuver, 7-61 flexible organization of, 1-32–
4-50–4-51 1-37
exploitation, 5-100 security, MEB, 6-28 headquarters, 1-35
joint air, 5-64 mobile command group, 6-64 JTF, 4-16–4-18
main command post, 2-64, support area, 7-86 logistics, 1-75, 1-77
2-66 security cooperation, organization, 1-32–1-37
SOF and, 5-58 requirements, 5-89 responsibilities, 6-48
planning horizon, 1-24 sustaining, 2-32 tactical command post, 6-55

Index
standing joint force headquarters roles of, 6-58 security cooperation and, 2-30
for elimination, 3-41–3-43 tactical echelon, combat theater engineer command, 3-36–
structure, Army, 1-4–1-6 operations and, 4-23 3-39
support, categories of, 1-45–1-46 tactical environment, division, support from, 3-36
command authority and, 1-44 7-1–7-6 theater forces, 3-1–3-27
displacing, 5-125 tactical headquarters, corps, 5-91, theater military intelligence
joint, 1-47 5-131 brigade, 3-22–3-25
OPCON and, 5-29–5-32 theater army headquarters,
staff, 1-77 tactical military information
support company, division, 6-38 3-68
support area, corps, 5-124 theater signal command, theater
displacement of, 7-89 task organization, 2-45
division, 7-13, 7-47 army headquarters, 3-66
division, 7-85–7-90
location, 7-87 task-organizing, corps, 4-32, theater strategic signal brigade,
5-14–5-32 3-16
support relationship, affects on,
1-68 division, 6-15, 7-9–7-14 theater sustainment command.
corps, 5-30 sustainment brigades, 3-7 See TSC
TSC, 1-79 technology, leveraging, 7-37 theater tactical signal brigade,
supporting effort, corps, 5-131 tempo, stability and, 7-90 3-17
sustain, Army forces, 2-47–2-55 terrain, sustainment brigade, 6-33 Title 10, 1-55, 2-7
joint forces, 2-47–2-55 functions, 2-47
theater, expanded, 3-64
sustaining operations, centralized, training, JTF headquarters, 4-21–
theater army, 2-1–2-76 4-22
2-54 actions, 2-28–2-46
corps, 5-121–5-125 support to, 4-20
ARFOR, 1-66 sustainment and, 2-47
division, 7-81–7-84 ASCC and, 2-1–2-9
purpose, 1-69 ASCC roles, 1-11 transformation, Army, 1-8–1-9
sustainment, disruptions to, 7-84 ASCC tasks, 1-12 transition, anticipation of, 5-99
sustainment assets, positioning of, campaign and, 2-17–2-59 BCT, 7-41
5-106 commander, 1-63 plans-to-operations, 2-68
DSCA, 2-60–2-62 TSC, 6-30
sustainment brigade, attachment joint phasing model, 2-18–2-27
of, 3-8 assigned, 3-3
limitations, 2-13 augmentation from, 3-10
division, 6-30–6-33 plans-to-operations transition,
movement coordination, 6-32 distribution management
2-68 center, 1-78
support from, 6-31, 7-23 reinforcements for, 3-28
theater army, 3-7–3-8 responsibility of, 5-12
requirements of, 1-15, 2-14, role, 1-71
sustainment units, OPCON of, 2-48 support, 2-50
1-80 responsibilities, 1-56, 2-34 support relationship, 1-79
specialized, 3-10 role of, 2-2 sustainment brigade and, 6-30
TACON of, 1-80 support from, 2-36, 3-2 theater army, 3-3–3-10
synchronization, area or tasks, 2-11–2-12
operations, 1-94 theater army commander, 1-13, U
joint capabilities, 5-2 1-63, 2-21, 3-6 units, theater level, 3-1–3-73
operational framework and, protection from, 2-7 unity of command, 1-83
7-74 responsibilities, 2-3
USAF, corps and, 5-41–5-56
T theater army headquarters, 2-63– division, 7-24–7-32
2-76 support from, 5-41, 6-52, 7-24–
table of organization and capabilities of, 2-10
equipment, headquarters, 1-37 7-32
dependencies on, 3-65–3-72
tactical command post, alternate flexibility of, 2-56 W
command post, 4-39–4-45 theater aviation, 3-29–3-31 warfighting functions, design and,
capabilities, 6-56 1-23
corps, 4-38–4-46 theater campaign, 2-32
theater campaign plan, weather assets, 7-32
displacing, 4-46
division, 6-11, 6-54–6-58 operational campaign plan
duties, 6-57 versus, 2-31

FM 3-94
21 April 2014
By order of the Secretary of the Army:
RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
GERALD B. O’KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1408701
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the
initial distribution number (IDN) 116054 requirements for FM 3-94.
PIN: 104123-000

Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations: APRIL 2014

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FM 3-94

THEATER ARMY, CORPS,

Field Manual Headquarters

Theater Army, Corps, and Division Operations

PART ONE LANDPOWER TAILORED FOR THE JOINT FORCE

PART TWO THE ARMY CORPS

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Chapter 5 CORPS OPERATIONS ...................................................................................... 5-1

PART THREE THE ARMY DIVISION

ii FM 3-94 21 April 2014

Figure 2-4. An overview of force tailoring ............................................................................. 2-11

21 April 2014 FM 3-94 iii

iv FM 3-94 21 April 2014

21 April 2014 FM 3-94 v

21 April 2014 FM 3-94 vii

viii FM 3-94 21 April 2014

21 April 2014 FM 3-94 ix

Landpower Tailored for the Joint Force

21 April 2014 FM 3-94 1-1

Army’s process for identifying and providing

1-2 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

Table 1-1. The Army’s structure (continued)

21 April 2014 FM 3-94 1-3

THE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Figure 1-1. The range of military operations

COMBATANT COMMAND THROUGH TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS

1-4 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

21 April 2014 FM 3-94 1-5

1-6 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

21 April 2014 FM 3-94 1-7

COMMON DESIGN, DIFFERENT MANNING

Figure 1-2. Functional and integrating cells

1-8 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

21 April 2014 FM 3-94 1-9

Figure 1-3. Planning horizons for integrating cells

Flexible Staff Organization

1-10 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

21 April 2014 FM 3-94 1-11

Figure 1-4. Distribution of staff sections within a main command post

1-12 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

Figure 1-5. Example of echelons above brigade command post

21 April 2014 FM 3-94 1-13

OPERATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHAINS OF COMMAND

OPERATIONAL CHAIN OF COMMAND

1-14 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

Figure 1-6. The operational chain of command and administrative control

21 April 2014 FM 3-94 1-15

1-16 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

21 April 2014 FM 3-94 1-17

ARMY SERVICE COMPONENT COMMAND

1-18 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

ARFOR IN A SUBORDINATE JOINT FORCE

21 April 2014 FM 3-94 1-19

Figure 1-7. Possible joint task force components

1-20 FM 3-94 21 April 2014

21 April 2014 FM 3-94 1-21

ARMY LOGISTICS AND MEDICAL SUPPORT

LOGISTICS CONCEPT OF SUPPORT

1-22 FM 3-94 21 April 2014